

Civilian peacekeeping: a barely tapped resource

Schweitzer, Christine (Ed.)

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Sammelwerk / collection

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Schweitzer, C. (Ed.). (2010). *Civilian peacekeeping: a barely tapped resource* (IFGK-Arbeitspapier, 23). Belm: Sozio-Publ. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-332229>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de>

Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Commercial-NoDerivatives). For more information see:

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0>

**Institut für
Friedensarbeit
und Gewaltfreie
Konfliktaustragung**



INSTITUTE FOR PEACE WORK AND NONVIOLENT CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

In cooperation with: NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE



Civilian Peacekeeping

A Barely Tapped Ressource

Rolf Carrière
Rachel Julian
Christine Schweitzer
Tim Wallis

Ed. by Christine Schweitzer

ISBN 978-3-935431-79-8



Sozio-Publishing

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme
Ein Titelsatz für diese Publikation ist bei der
Deutschen Bibliothek erhältlich.

Verlagslektorat: Ludger Müller
Umschlaggestaltung: Sozio-Publishing
Konzeption und Gesamtgestaltung: IFGK und Sozio-Publishing

Edition Sozio-Publishing 509
1. Auflage 2010
ISBN 978-3-935431-79-8
ISSN 1439-4006

IFGK-Arbeitspapier Nr. 23
IFGK, Hauptstraße 35, 55491 Wahlenau
Internet: www.ifgk.de

© Sozio-Publishing, Belm-Vehrte
Die vorliegende Publikation ist urheberrechtlich geschützt.
Alle Rechte sind vorbehalten.

Verantwortlich für den Inhalt sind die AutorInnen.

Sozio-Publishing, Farnbrink 32 a, 49191 Belm-Vehrte
Internet: www.sozio-publishing.de

Druck: Sozio-Publishing

Contents

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Introduction: Civilian Peacekeeping – A Barely Tapped Resource By Christine Schweitzer | 7 |
| The Manifestations of Civilian Peacekeeping | 9 |
| How Civilian Peacekeeping “Works” | 13 |
| Research on Civilian Peacekeeping | 14 |
| The Articles in This Publication | 15 |
| | |
| The World Needs ‘Another Peacekeeping’ By Rolf C. Carriere | 17 |
| Introduction | 17 |
| Much War, Little Peace | 17 |
| Civilian Casualties Up | 18 |
| Peacekeeping: A Missing Link | 19 |
| Limits to Armed Peacekeeping | 19 |
| The Case for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping | 20 |
| How Can Unarmed Be Effective? | 21 |
| Economies of Peace | 21 |
| A New Peace Role for Global Civil Society | 22 |
| Not Last, But Early Resort | 22 |
| Conclusion | 23 |
| | |
| Best Practices for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping By Tim Wallis | 25 |
| Theoretical Background | 25 |
| Primacy of Local Actors | 26 |
| Typology of Civilian Peacekeeping Options | 26 |
| 1. Unarmed Military | 27 |
| 2. Police | 27 |
| 3. Unarmed Civilians With an Official Mandate | 27 |
| 4. Unarmed Civilians From Civil Society | 28 |
| 5. Unarmed Civilians With Special Skills and Training | 28 |
| Why Are the Military Used For Peacekeeping? | 28 |
| What Unarmed Civilians Can Do | 29 |

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| What Unarmed Civilians Cannot Do | 31 |
| How Civilian Peacekeeping is Done | 31 |
| Underlying Principles That Determine Degree of Success | 32 |
| 1. Nonpartisanship, independence, and being international | 32 |
| 2. Nonviolence | 33 |
| 3. Visibility, transparency, quiet diplomacy, and cultural sensitivity | 33 |
| Lessons Learned and Ways Forward | 34 |
| | |
| Peacekeeping with Nonviolence: Protection Strategies for Sustainable Peace | |
| By Rachel Julian | 35 |
| Short and long term goals | 35 |
| What is peacekeeping? | 36 |
| Nonviolence | 38 |
| Strategies | 38 |
| Conclusion | 42 |
| | |
| Humanitarian Protection as an Additional Function of Humanitarian, Development and Peace Projects—Or Rather a Task Requiring Experts? | |
| By Christine Schweitzer | 43 |
| Introduction | 43 |
| Case Study 1: Protection in the former Yugoslavia | 45 |
| Governmental Missions | 46 |
| Protection and Peacekeeping by Civil Society Actors | 47 |
| Case Study 2: Civilian Peacekeeping ‘Pure’: Nonviolent Peaceforce in the Philippines (Mindanao) | 49 |
| Conclusion | 50 |
| | |
| The Responsibility to Protect: Towards an Expanded Role for Global Civil Society | |
| By Christine Schweitzer | 53 |
| Introduction | 53 |
| The Role of Civil Society as Defined So Far Under R2P | 54 |
| A More Encompassing Role of Civil Society under R2P | 55 |
| Civil Society in the Three Responsibilities | 56 |
| Responsibility to Prevent | 56 |
| Responsibility to React | 57 |
| Responsibility to Rebuild | 58 |

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Civil Society in the Three Pillars | 59 |
| Pillar 1: The Role of Local Civil Society in Protection | 59 |
| Pillar 2: The Role of International Civil Society in Protection | 60 |
| Pillar 3: A Role for Civil Society if Earlier Prevention has Failed? | 61 |
| Conclusions | 62 |
| Zusammenfassung | 65 |
| Bibliography | 67 |
| The Authors | 75 |
| Rolf Carrière | 75 |
| Rachel Julian | 75 |
| Christine Schweitzer | 75 |
| Tim Wallis | 75 |
| Tables | |
| Table 1) Roots and Types of Civilian Peacekeeping | 11 |
| Table 2) Objectives of Civilian Peacekeeping | 13 |
| Table 3) Development of armed conflicts | 18 |
| Table 4) The Conflict Triangle | 25 |
| Table 5) Three Aspects of Handling Conflict | 26 |
| Table 6) Humanitarian Protection | 36 |
| Table 7) Comparison Civilian PK - humanitarian protection | 51 |
| Table 8) Conflict stages and R2P | 55 |

Introduction: Civilian Peacekeeping – A Barely Tapped Resource By Christine Schweitzer

In August 2007, the coordinator of the local peace process organization in Mindanao (Philippines) reported: “Thanks to Nonviolent Peaceforce, we did not evacuate our village earlier this month. We are 1,000 people living here. We have never evacuated yet, through the Spanish, Japanese and American colonizers, and now the Philippines’ own internal armed forces.”

During a recent tense situation, with two armed groups threatening each other from opposite sides of the village, only 200 meters separated the potential combatants. Villagers were frightened and prepared to leave. NP members came into the village and communicated with both armed groups to defuse the situation. Part of the reason for the flare-up, it turned out, was a misunderstanding, with one armed group interpreting a threat from the other when none was intended.¹

During 2007 and early 2008, Peace Brigades International accompanied the Solidarity Committee for Political Prisoners (CSPP) on visits to Casanare in eastern central Colombia. Due to the presence of the oil industry, it is a highly militarised region, where the campesinos have suffered at the hands of all parties to the conflict. The CSPP requested PBI’s accompaniment to enable them to conduct investigations into extrajudicial executions. This process took them into remote areas where it would have been too dangerous to go without PBI’s presence, as well as to the headquarters of the army brigade alleged to have committed most of the killings. In this way, with PBI’s accompaniment, CSPP continued their work against impunity, through direct investigations and by giving the local population the tools with which they could gain access to justice.²

Two reports from the Truce/Peace Monitoring Mission in Bougainville:

While on the topic of security, it is probably worth commenting on the concept of being unarmed. This is an interesting concept for military personnel, but one that is apparently becoming more common in peace operations. There is no doubt in my mind that being unarmed in Bougainville is the correct posture. Relying on the Bougainville people to ensure the safety of peace monitors reinforces the message that peace for Bougainville is the responsibility of the people of Bougainville. They are only too aware that should the safety of the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) be placed at risk, there is a very real danger that the peace process will falter. This was emphasised on a number of occasions when Bougainvillians assisted patrols in difficult circumstances. The PMG provides the environment for the peace process, and many fear the consequences should they depart. (Major Luke Foster, Australian Defence Force, 1999)

The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed caused some angst in the Australian Defence Force at the time, but it was the right one. At least two occasions I encountered may have gone differently if we had been armed. Perhaps more fundamentally, the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) experience reaffirmed for me that the role of peacekeepers is to not only stand between the warring sides to prevent more suffering but also to encourage the coming together of divided people. (Andrew Rice, Australian Department of Defence, 1999)³

In spite of the encouraging statistics that the number of wars has actually been decreasing for some time now, there is no doubt that war remains one of the greatest causes of human suffering.⁴ It is so much more tragic as it is a totally human-made cause and therefore should be more easily be avoided than natural disasters.

There are certainly a number of reasons why something that should be so easy proves so difficult. It must not be denied that superficially and under a short-term perspective war has often been a successful instrument of handling conflict—otherwise it would have died out long ago. Defence against the evil neighbour rather than admitted aggressive intentions has also been a very strong

¹ Nonviolent Peaceforce (2008)

² Peace Brigades International (2008)

³ These two quotes are taken from the papers of a Seminar at the Australian National University (*Seminar: Monitoring Peace in Bougainville*, 1999). The mission it refers to is the Truce/Peace Monitoring Group (TMG/PMG) at the end of the 1990s (see footnote 15 below), an unarmed peacekeeping mission staffed by a mixture of soldiers and civilians.

⁴ See Human Security Centre 2008, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung 2008. Akuf. Currently 28 wars, 14 other armed conflicts.

legitimization for armament and war for thousands of years. Institutions that have been built around war, especially in the past 200 years – the organized military based on mass recruitment of citizens, the arms industry and growing dependency on resources from faraway places – are also important factors which must not be neglected, even if not subscribing to the beliefs of leftist antimilitarists who see economic interests as the exclusive causes for militarism and war.

There are many ideas regarding how war could be overcome. Some build their hope on common security and disarmament agreements; others see the world moving towards a system in which the UN eventually plays the role individual governments play today; still others believe that only civil society and social movements, acting transnationally and in solidarity, will be able to do away with the differences of today. Many argue that abolishing war requires the development of functional equivalents for defence and protection that are currently fulfilled by the military – equivalents not for waging war for oil or strategic interests, but alternative ways to defend oneself against an aggressor, to peacefully settle ethnic and other intrastate conflicts, and to control potential perpetrators of violence so that they “at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves.” (Galtung 1996:103)

This last function is the meaning of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is one component in the total picture of functions and strategies that are needed when seeking to transform conflict and eventually overcome war.⁵ In many cases, peacekeeping has proven essential in

- monitoring ceasefire agreements and building the trust necessary to overcome conflict in the post-war stage;
- controlling buffer zones, disarmament, and demobilization;
- protection of the civilian population in general or of especially vulnerable groups (such as minorities and internally displaced people - IDPs) in all phases of a conflict;
- preventing violence in such critical moments as elections, referenda, or the implementation of other agreements.

The term “peacekeeping” seems to have its origins with the United Nations. It was the “UN Emergency Force” (UNEF 1) that was established in response to the invasion of Egypt by British and French forces during the Suez Canal crisis which first was termed a “peacekeeping” mission, and at the same time defined what today can be considered classical military peacekeeping.⁶

While such peacekeeping missions⁷ are still being carried out, new types of peacekeeping have been developed since 1988. These newer types are often multidimensional, inasmuch as they include

⁵ Since the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali published in 1992 the *Agenda for Peace*, the triad of peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping has become well known. However, it was not Boutros-Ghali who invented these terms but Johan Galtung (1976) 20 years earlier who called them “approaches to peace”. Since then these terms have been refined by other authors such as the social anthropologist Stephen Ryan who speaks of “peace strategies” (Ryan 1995:102). Together, these three strategies formulate a general theory of achieving or maintaining peace. As Miall *et al* have written:

With reference to the conflict triangle, it can be suggested that peace-making aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peace-keeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, and peace-building tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:22).

For both Galtung and Ryan these three strategies are seen as complementary, to be pursued at the same time. Peacekeeping without peace-making and peace-building would be very difficult because the violence might overwhelm the process, and any group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative would find it easy to provoke armed clashes. If peace-building is ineffective, the decision-makers might lose the support of their communities, and if peace-making is ineffective, the perceived disagreement that caused the conflict will remain unresolved, and the probability that violence would restart would be high. (Ryan 1995:117 pp).

⁶ However, the reality preceded the naming, as it is often the case. There were already at least two missions of the League of Nations after World War I which would fall under the same category, among them the „Saar International Force“ 1934-1935. It was sent to the Saar region to oversee the plebiscite that resulted in the return of the region to Germany after 15 years of rule of the Saar region by a Governing Commission that had been appointed by the League of Nations after WW I. (See Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:130.)

⁷ These missions were governed by five principles:

reconstruction, state-building, civil society support and other peacebuilding tasks. The peacekeepers are heavily armed, often sent under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, powerful countries participate in the missions, and the peacekeepers usually operate in an environment very different from those of classical peacekeeping missions—an environment of intrastate conflict where one or both sides are hostile to the peacekeepers.⁸

The by now almost traditional picture of the lightly-armed Blue Helmet standing on some street surrounded by curious children has today (due to these developments and to wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are falsely presented to the international public as ‘humanitarian’) been replaced by the picture of a NATO soldier in combat dress sitting in an armoured vehicle, driving around in fear of a suicide attack by terrorists.

But at the same time as what I would call the “militarisation of peacekeeping” happened, the concept of alternative peacekeeping undertaken by unarmed civilians also has gained ground.

The Manifestations of Civilian Peacekeeping

I would like to define civilian peacekeeping as **the prevention of direct violence through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators by unarmed civilians who are deployed on the ground.**

In the literature one can find different terms besides “civilian peacekeeping” (which was already used by Charles Walker in 1981) that describe more or less the same concept:

- Peace Army (Shanti Sena in Hindi), a concept originating with Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the 1930s (see Weber 1996, Easwaran 2002);⁹
- Nonviolent intervention across borders (Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000);
- Third-party nonviolent intervention (this term is often used in the US-American nonviolence movement – it is unclear who coined it);
- Peace force (used early by the British MP Henry Usborne in a suggestion to send an unarmed force to patrol the demilitarised zone between Egypt and Israel in 1956);
- Interpositionary peace force (Weber 1993);
- World Police Force (term used probably first by the British MP Richard Acland in 1958);¹⁰
- White Berets (a term developed in advocacy work, relating to the proposal of unarmed UN forces);¹¹

1. Consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission;
2. Non-use of force except in self-defence;
3. Voluntary contribution of troop contingents from smaller, neutral countries or middle powers;
4. Impartiality;
5. Day-to-day control of the operation by the Secretary-General.

See Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:xi. These five principles were laid down by then Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson.

⁸ See Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:xiii pp. In 2009, there were 18 UN peacekeeping missions with more than 120,000 staff (90,000 soldiers and police) at an annual cost of more than US \$8 billion (Bennett 2009). In addition, there are the NATO and EU-led peacekeeping missions in Europe (KFOR in Kosovo, EUFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the controversial NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan.

⁹ The focus of civilian peacekeeping lies of course on external actors. But it must not be overlooked that it is often the local communities and citizens themselves who are the first agents of their own protection (see Barrs 2009). And there are also countries where groups form who consider themselves local peacekeepers (e.g. Bantay Ceasefire in the Philippines, see Bantay Ceasefire 2003). The most famous of this sort are of course the mentioned Shanti Sena in India who consist of people living and working in their own communities (see Weber 1996).

¹⁰ See Weber 2000 and Schweitzer et al 2001 (appendix to chapter 2).

¹¹ See Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000a:6.

- Peace teams, a term becoming fashionable in the 1980s and 1990s, with a number of organisations referring to themselves and the type of work they were doing as “peace teams” (e.g. Christian Peacemaker Teams, Balkan Peace Team, etc).

Activities that could be summarized under the heading of civilian peacekeeping have a history that goes back at least to the 1930s, with certainly earlier cases yet to be discovered in the history books (see Weber 2000, Schweitzer et al 2001) and with Gandhi’s concept of a Shanti Sena as model. Civilian Peacekeeping as it is presents itself today has different sources or roots as the different terminologies listed above illustrate:

1. The first was Gandhi’s concept of a Peace Army (Shanti Sena) which also became known between the World Wars in Europe and was realized as a sort of community defence force by Gandhi’s successor Vinoba Bhave in 1957.
2. This idea was taken up several times by Europeans (mostly in Britain) who tried (usually unsuccessfully) to build up ‘peace armies’ to interposition themselves in certain conflicts.¹²
3. Related to the first have been various proposals by individuals and organisations, and directed mostly at the United Nations (since the 1990s also at the European Union), to establish a standing unarmed peacekeeping force.¹³
4. A third source has been the different volunteer services that have developed since World War I seeking to contribute to reconciliation (particularly among youth) through voluntary work (Service Civil International, the various services of Christian Churches, etc.)¹⁴
5. The fourth source of inspiration has of course been military peacekeeping. This is particularly true for unarmed governmental missions.

Out of these four sources, different types of activities have been developed today that are at the core of civilian peacekeeping:

1. Different peace team organisations, with quite different approaches, methods and philosophies. At one end of the spectrum is Peace Brigades International. PBI was founded in 1981 and has specialised in nonpartisan protective accompaniment of human rights activists and been very successful in this work in many countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Indonesia). At the other end are groups – often of fundamentalist Christian orientation – engaging in solidarity work with people they perceive as oppressed, particularly in countries in which the United States (home to most of these groups) is involved in the conflicts.¹⁵
2. The 1990s saw the first larger civilian missions with protection mandates deployed by governments or international organisations: The European Community (later European Union) Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in the former

¹² The first was probably the proposal by an British Anglican minister, Maude Roydon, to organise a nonviolent ‘army’ to intervene in the war between Japan and China. In 1931, Japan had occupied Manchuria, and the fighting threatened to start again in 1932. Roydon was inspired by Gandhi whom she had met personally. Together with two supporters, she published the proposal in the London Daily Express, and later presented it to the League of Nations which did not consider her idea. Because of lack of both recruits (they only found about 1,000 volunteers, well short of the numbers they hoped for) and funds, the peace army proposal failed. The initiators continued to work for a few years on their idea, sending a team of volunteers to Palestine for a couple of years. The initiative eventually died with the onset of World War II (see Weber 2000).

¹³ See Schweitzer et.al 2001, appendix to chapter 2, for a list of such proposals.


¹⁴ See Schweitzer et al 2001, Clark 2009:89-90

¹⁵ I am omitting short-term actions like peace walks, caravans and the like, as they took place during the second Iraq war and in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 (see Schweitzer 2009b) because of their structural incapacity for sustainable impact on the violence in a conflict.

Yugoslavia¹⁶ and the Truce / Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville¹⁷ are examples, as are today's EU observers in Georgia.

3. In the last ten years relief, development (and human rights) organisations have increasingly begun to realize that humanitarian protection is a task they must take into account in their programming and work in the field (see the references given below in the section on "research").
4. The fourth has yet to come to completion: Larger-scale unarmed civilian peacekeeping by nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). The NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce has (as did many earlier organisations) set itself the goal to grow to numbers that would enable it to deploy enough civilian peacekeepers to permit comparison to governmental peacekeeping missions, but in spite of quick progress over the last years and growing recognition by a number of governments who fund its activities, it has yet to reach this aim.

Table 1) Roots and Types of Civilian Peacekeeping



Civilian Peacekeeping is being used for different purposes and situations. Probably the most important that can be distinguished currently are:

- Monitoring of ceasefire agreements (examples are the mentioned KVM and TMG as well as many other monitoring missions (see Mahony 2006);

¹⁶ See 33pp in this Working Paper.

¹⁷ Bougainville is an island that belonged to Papua New Guinea. Since 1988, Bougainville went through a serious civil war between the "Bougainville Revolutionary Army" fighting for independence of the island from Papua New Guinea (PNG), and the PNG defence forces, supported by Australia. The war was brought to an end by two agreements in 1997 and 1998, and as part of the agreements, an unarmed Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was established. Under the leadership of the New Zealand military, in 1997 approximately 370 soldiers and civilians from New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu were sent to Bougainville to monitor the cease-fire and the implementation of the agreement. All members of the TMG had to be unarmed and wear civilian clothes, because an armed peacekeeping force would have been refused by the parties in conflict. The operation was set up according to military standards and rules, using a military infrastructure and approach. Most of the staff today are based in a tent camp in one central location. From there they go out to patrols in the villages to explain the cease-fire agreement and through their presence prevent new violence. See Böge 1999, *Seminar: Monitoring Peace in Bougainville* (1999) and the NP Feasibility Study, chapter 2 (Schweitzer et al 2001).

- Prevention of violence during particularly volatile situations, e.g. when elections or referenda are upcoming (e.g. the EMPSA mission in South Africa before and during the first free elections in 1994 (see Schweitzer et al 2001);
- Protection of vulnerable groups and communities (e.g. protection of IDPs or ethnic minorities; an example is the work of NP in the Philippines (see the contributions in this Working Paper).
- Human and civil rights monitoring can also be seen as part of civilian peacekeeping since it usually has an element of direct protection of victims (see Mahony 2006);
- Protection of activists in the sense of opening space for them so that they can do their work without fear of being kidnapped or murdered (Peace Brigades International being the classic example);
- Protection of activist communities such as those in Colombia that declared themselves peace zones (again PBI is the best example);
- Protection of activists and communities in the sense of not only opening space for them but actively participating as internationals in their (nonviolent) actions (see below);
- In theory, there is also the goal to prevent a war by interpositioning of internationals between warring parties – the basic idea of the various early peace army proposals as well as of more recent peace walks (see Schweitzer et al 2001, Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000b). These, however, have so far never been successful and remain a vision, one that many (including the author) doubt can ever put into practice given the realities of modern war.


The articles in this Working Paper describe in greater detail what types of activities are undertaken within the framework of Civilian Peacekeeping. Therefore, it should only be remarked here in the introduction that civilian peacekeeping is based on the presence of people, be it people calling themselves civilian peacekeepers, accompaniers, or humanitarian workers. But it is much more than presence, monitoring, accompaniment and interpositioning, the activities of civilian peacekeepers most often listed. Civilian Peacekeeping is usually multi-dimensional – it is at least as much about bringing parties in conflict together and building capacity of local communities—and that goes for most governmental missions as well as for peace teams and the work of Nonviolent Peaceforce.¹⁸

One more issue needs to be addressed: Peacekeeping is usually considered to be necessarily and absolutely impartial in regard to the conflict issues and the objectives pursued by the parties to the conflict. It seeks to help implement an agreement made by the conflict sides, or to protect and uphold matters of international law (e.g. protection of civilians). But as mentioned above, there are also groups that focus on protection, but who consciously seek to support one side in a conflict in its struggle. They usually argue that in extremely asymmetrical power situations there can be no nonpartisanship. Perhaps the best examples are the various international groups and projects currently active in Palestine, such as the International Solidarity Movement. They are in Palestine to support the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation, and often do not hesitate to initiate actions of their own rather than only opening space for local groups to design and carry out their own activities.

Between these two extremes are projects and organisations (like PBI or the Balkan Peace Team in the 1990s) that consider themselves nonpartisan and who argue that they do not support the struggle of those they accompany but are there to uphold human rights and thereby “open space” for these local activists to pursue their struggle. I would place this position in the middle between truly nonpartisan action and solidarity action.

¹⁸ See Slim & Bonwick, Mahony 2006, Schirch 2006, Schweitzer 2009a, and also Julian’s article in this paper.

Table 2) Objectives of Civilian Peacekeeping



How Civilian Peacekeeping “Works”

Accustomed as they are to the predominant frame of thinking that violence is the only source of protection, many people find it hard to understand what an unarmed peacekeeper can achieve in a violent environment. It is true that unarmed civilians do not have means for direct enforcement – they cannot shoot and kill attacking perpetrators what military peacekeepers nowadays usually are mandated and equipped for. Unarmed peacekeepers do, however, have their own sources of power:¹⁹

- Internationals are – at least to a certain degree which may vary from place to place – somewhat protected from violence because they are respected per se or because the countries or organisations they come from enjoy such respect. This is particularly true in countries of the Global South where past and present power disparities protect those coming from the Global North or representing the international community (UN). The fact that they themselves are protected can be transmitted to individuals, groups and communities they are accompanying because a potential perpetrator risks hurting or killing these internationals if he attacks.
- In addition, the potential perpetrator risks having these internationals report the misdeed to the international world, which may lead to direct or indirect repercussions for them. These may include pressure by supporters of the perpetrators who find themselves vulnerable to international discredit or sanctions. “The world is watching” has often proved a powerful deterrent.

¹⁹ See the paper by Rachel Julian in this publication, Mahony & Eguren 1997, Schirch 2006, Schweitzer 2009a.

- Internationals and locals may be protected because of the standing they have within the local community (e.g. village elders), and again transmit this standing to the community as a whole.
- All of these sources of protection are relative, of course. Perpetrators may be aware of these factors but disregard them, or there may be countries and areas where internationals are hated for, rather than protected by, their status as outsiders – our Western countries unfortunately tending to be such places.

Nevertheless, when taking a step back and looking at the efficiency of nonviolence as such, it must be recognized that the means of nonviolence are very powerful.²⁰ Without the use of any organised violence, “people power” movements have overthrown numerous dictatorships (e.g. Philippines, former Yugoslavia), have liberated countries from colonial rule (India, Zambia) and have made very powerful countries withdraw their armies from foreign places they invaded (Vietnam War).²¹ Even under the Nazi regime—hardly known for its lenience regarding civil society protest—civil society in Germany as well as the countries occupied by the German forces in World War II was often able to protect Jews or other threatened groups. Famous examples include the teachers in Norway refusing to submit to the implementation of a fascist school curriculum and the ‘women of the Rosenstreet’ – women married to Jews who when their husbands were arrested in 1942, protested in front of the prison in Berlin at the Rosenstreet until their husbands were released.²²

Research on Civilian Peacekeeping

Compared to other fields in peace and conflict research, civilian peacekeeping has so far received very little attention.

Studies and other publications on “peace teams,” “cross-boundary intervention” or civilian peacekeeping mostly consist of case studies and overviews of different projects, missions and organisations. Aside of a few articles in magazines and the book edited by Hare and Blumberg (1977), the first scientific studies on this topic only came out in the middle of the 1990s. Coy (1993 and 1997) on the work of PBI, Buettner (1995) on peace brigades in general, Schirch (1995) on civilian peacekeeping, Weber (1996) on Shanti Sena, and Mahony & Eguren (1997) on the theory of nonviolent deterrence based on the PBI experience are the first ones of which I am aware. In the last ten years, the main publications on the issues appear to have been Moser-Puangsuan & Weber (eds., 2000), the NP Feasibility Study (Schweitzer *et al.* 2001), Müller (2004) on the Balkan Peace Team, Slim & Eguren 2004 and Slim & Bonwick (2005) on humanitarian protection, Schirch (2006) with an update of her 1995 study on civilian peacekeeping, and Mahony (2006) on “proactive presence”, a comparative study based on an overview of governmental missions. Also Clark (ed., 2009) contains a section on “nonviolent citizens’ intervention across borders.”

Very much related to the issue (though not using the terminology of “civilian peacekeeping”) is the discussion of strategies and methods of humanitarian protection that developed in the last ten years, usually referring to humanitarian protection as a task “to mainstream” by humanitarian organisations. Among them are the report on a framework-setting Workshop on Protection for Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations held by the International Committee of the Red

²⁰ For literature on people power, see the bibliography on people power by Carter, Clark and Randle (2006).

²¹ See the articles in Moser-Puangsuan & Weber 2000. Also the UN Secretary General remarks about the power of local citizens in his recent report on R2P when he says that „*even in the worst genocide, there are ordinary people who refuse to be complicit in the collective evil.*“ (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:14).

²² See Semelin 1995.

Cross (1999), the handbook on human rights protection by the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2002, the already-mentioned Slim & Eguren 2004, and Slim & Bonwick 2005 on humanitarian protection in general, O'Callaghan & Pantuliano 2007 on "Incorporating civilian protection into humanitarian response," and the International Committee of the Red Cross (2008) on "enhancing protection." Also the papers that have been published after the 2009 conference of the University of Oxford's Refugee Studies Centre on humanitarian protection (<http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/>) are worth mentioning here.

The Articles in This Publication

The articles have been written independently of each other and for different audiences. These audiences had in common that they were mainstream policymakers and scientists, not people from the peace and nonviolence movements. Also in this paper here one will notice that while all authors basically pursue the same idea, there are nuances in their definitions and emphases, as well as in their ideas regarding how civilian peacekeeping could be advanced to become a full-fledged alternative to military peacekeeping. All the authors have for some time (or, in the case of Rolf Carrière) still are involved with the NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce, and therefore chose the majority of their examples from the experiences of the work of NP.

In mid-2009, **Rolf Carrière** addressed an audience of politicians, leading military personnel and local civil society leaders in the Philippines in a series of two events that presented the notion of civilian protection in peacekeeping as an element for the upcoming new peace process agreements between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

In his paper "The World Needs 'Another Peacekeeping,'" he begins by describing the global context of wars in which the ideas of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding arose. Then, after listing some of the limitations of armed peacekeeping, he summarizes what unarmed civilian peacekeeping is, how it operates, and why unarmed peacekeeping and direct human protection, actually works. Thereafter he refers to some recent writings on the economics of war and the disproportionate benefits of stopping war and to build peace. In his conclusions, Carrière argues that unarmed civilian peacekeeping should now be scaled up worldwide, not least for the helpful, practical and benign contribution it can make to the ongoing global discourse about Human Security, about Immediate Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, and the new Humanitarian Protection agenda.

Tim Wallis presented his paper "Best Practices for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping" at the same conference in the Philippines. He distinguishes five types of civilian peacekeepers: unarmed military, international police, unarmed civilians with an official mandate (for example UN observers), unarmed civilians from civil society (for example from humanitarian NGOs) and unarmed civilians with special skills and mandate for peacekeeping (Nonviolent Peaceforce). He illustrates with some examples what unarmed civilians can do in regard to violence prevention. In the last section of his paper he discusses underlying principles that determine the degree of success of civilian peacekeeping: 1. nonpartisanship, independence and being international, 2. nonviolence and 3. visibility, transparency, quiet diplomacy, and cultural sensitivity. He concludes by saying that mere presence is not enough to deter violence, nor are governmental missions in some cases, and that there is a role for trained and mandated civilian peacekeepers being deployed by NGOs.

Rachel Julian's paper "Peacekeeping with Nonviolence: Protection Strategies for Sustainable Peace" was originally drafted for a conference the Refugees Study Centre in Oxford held in September 2009.

Like Carrière, she begins by placing peacekeeping into the framework of the triad of peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and discusses advantages unarmed peacekeeping has over UN Blue Helmets. Referring mostly to Schirch (2006) and Eguren (2009), Julian goes on to describe different approaches and methodologies of civilian peacekeeping.

She concludes that peacekeeping in general is an important function when seeking to move from war to peace, that it should take a greater role, and that its activities can benefit those who live in fear of direct violence.

The first of **Christine Schweitzer's** two papers, "Humanitarian Protection as an Additional Function of Humanitarian, Development and Peace Projects—or Rather a Task Requiring Experts?" was drafted for the same conference in Oxford. It deals with one aspect of the discussion on civilian peacekeeping, namely whether mainstreaming of protection as a task of all humanitarian agencies is all the answer the protection needs require, or if in situations of extensive tension it is preferable or more effective to have organisations concentrating solely on civilian peacekeeping.

Based on two case studies, the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the work of Nonviolent Peaceforce in the Philippines since 2007, she compares the advantages of both approaches and comes to the conclusion, that there are situations in which the presence of specialized unarmed peacekeepers may be advantageous.

Christine Schweitzer's second paper, "The Responsibility to Protect: Towards an Expanded Role for Global Civil Society" looks at the doctrine of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) and points out that in the discussion so far the role of local and international civil society in contributing to the different phases (prevent, react and rebuild) and the three pillars (the state in question dealing with the problem itself, international assistance and intervention against the will of the state in question) has not been adequately recognized. She agrees with those authors who point out that R2P is much more than a pretext for legitimizing so-called "humanitarian intervention", and argues that civil society in particular has an important role to play in preventing that a "R2P-situation" (pillar 3) arises at all. Civilian peacekeeping is one possible strategy of civil society in this context.

The World Needs 'Another Peacekeeping'

By Rolf C. Carriere

Introduction

People around the world are beginning to see the limits of meeting violence with only armed, military means, either to restore and keep the peace, to protect civilians, or to resolve conflicts. Therefore, interest has been growing to try out a variety of new peacekeeping methods. Attention has recently turned toward larger-scale, unarmed peacekeeping efforts initiated by civil society organizations, undertaken independently or in association with pertinent UN and regional agencies. This concept and practice of unarmed civilian peacekeeping is probably the least understood and least recognized among the different roles, strategies and capacities civil society organizations may bring to peace processes. But it reflects that profound global shift that is taking place: from national to human security, and from the defence of states to the protection of civilians.

Hereunder I will first briefly describe the global context of wars in which the ideas of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding arose. Then, after listing some of the limitations of armed peacekeeping, I will summarize what unarmed civilian peacekeeping is, how it operates, and why unarmed peacekeeping and direct human protection, actually works. Thereafter I will refer to some recent writings on the economics of war and the disproportionate benefits of stopping war and to build peace. And I will conclude by arguing that unarmed civilian peacekeeping should now be scaled up worldwide, not least for the helpful, practical and benign contribution it can make to the ongoing global discourse about Human Security, about Immediate Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, and the new Humanitarian Protection agenda.

Much War, Little Peace

But before that, let me share with you a sobering reflection on war and peace, to put our challenge in a historic perspective. We all know that violence and war have been with us throughout history—and even *before* that! But exactly how much it had been the norm I had not realized until I came across the following astounding statistics. It is estimated that “*between 1500 BCE and 1860 CE there were in the known world an average of thirteen years of war to every year of peace.*” In that whole period of well over 3000 years “*more than 8000 peace treaties were concluded—each one of them meant to remain in force for ever. On average they only lasted two years!*” (Stevens 1989:5-6).

One obvious conclusion from this is that peace treaties don't guarantee peace—because they often don't resolve conflicts. At best, peace treaties provide a brief interlude *without* violent action, to give the conflict parties a chance to get down to the tough task of peacebuilding, to address the deeper causes of the war, to get the peace right.

But the fact is that, since Roman times, that window of opportunity, that chance for peace, was almost never seriously seized. *Si vis pacem, para bellum!* was, and has remained, the prevailing adage: *if you want peace, prepare (for) war!*

Even in the second part of the 20th century, after the United Nations in 1945 had solemnly declared to be “*...determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...*” more than 200 wars were fought (Yanacopulos & Hanlon 2006:18). And of the contemporary peace treaties concluded or ceasefires agreed, almost half collapse before a decade is over, with the conflict parties relapsing back into violence and war²³.


²³ Post-conflict situations are fragile; in the past around 40 percent of them have reverted to violence within a decade.

Civilian Casualties Up

Of even greater concern is the rising cost of armed violence to civilians. In the course of the 20th century, some 110 million people are estimated to have been killed in wars²⁴, but the percentage of civilians killed increased from 10 percent at the beginning of the century to perhaps as high as 90 percent at the end²⁵. That would conservatively translate into 1370 civilians killed each day of the century we just left behind! These statistics, of course, don't tell us the scale of senseless, needless human suffering; they cannot begin to measure the human cost of life-long disability, trauma, guilt, sorrow and anger.

Greater civilian casualties are in part due to the changed nature of wars. The so-called 'new wars' are increasingly intra-state, of relatively low-intensity, lasting ten times longer than international conflicts, and less noticed by the world at large, especially by dominant powers and media. But of course not less noticed by the victims themselves!

Table 3) Development of armed conflicts



Source: Human Security Centre (2005)

This lesson of history has profound implications for the way we organize peace. Unless from now on we truly embrace and act on the new motto: *Si vis pacem, para pacem! If you desire peace, prepare (for) peace!*, our future would certainly look bleak!

Let me hasten to add that there is some good news from the global peace front. According to the Human Security Report 2005, over the past twenty years, since the end of the Cold War, the number of wars and war fatalities has come down²⁶. This historic reduction is variously attributed to more active diplomacy, better mediation, more military peacekeeping and the spread of democracy.

In total these reversions account for around half of all the world's civil wars. See Collier 2009:75.

²⁴ Weiss & Daws 2007:11; Smith 2003:38-39. This conservative figure excludes the war-related deaths of the first decade of the 21st century. Despite death's finality, there are great variations in statistics, in part due to differences in definition.

²⁵ See *Human Security Report 2008/9*. In some cases, the Report says, the ratio of indirect to direct deaths is higher than 10:1. Indirect deaths—the hidden cost of war—is one of its two main themes.

²⁶ The *Human Security Report 2005* and *Human Security Brief 2007* report declining world trends of global violence from the early 1990s to 2003 and beyond. More specifically, it reports major worldwide declines in the number of armed conflicts, genocides, human rights abuses, military coups and international crises, as well as in the number of battle-related deaths per armed conflict. See also Smith 2008:58. War-related fatalities *as a percentage of the population* in earlier

Even so, far too many civilians still get killed and the potential for future violent conflict remains high due to growing ethnic tension²⁷, competition for scarce resources, the nefarious trade in—and ubiquitous presence of—small arms²⁸, growing population pressure and widening income disparities—all exacerbated by the effects of climate change. The world of the 21st century is likely to be much *more* dangerous, not *less* than the one just past.

Peacekeeping: A Missing Link

How does peacekeeping fit in here? We already concluded that the world has been far more successful at *peacemaking* (that is: all the diplomatic negotiations and mediation work that results in signing peace treaties) than we have been about *peacebuilding* (that is, solving conflicts, addressing their deep causes). But peacemaking is only the very beginning. And what we have been critically short of is deliberate *peacekeeping* efforts (that is: stopping the war and deterring violence during fragile ceasefires, stabilizing the environment, and beginning peace processes during these brief war-free periods). Effective, appropriate peacekeeping, ranging from ceasefire monitoring and verification to more robust engagement, but also always with a much sharper focus on the special protection needs of civilians—is one critically missing link between peacemaking and peacebuilding.

The term ‘peacekeeping’ usually conjures up images of UN-sponsored, armed Blue Helmets deployed in areas of violent conflict in poor countries. Armed, military peacekeeping is currently indeed the dominant paradigm, the UN’s own invention not mentioned or foreseen in the UN Charter, a “*great experiment in conflict control*” ... using “*soldiers without enemies*” (de Cuéllar 1989). So, altogether, peacekeeping is a new concept and practice. But while UN peacekeeping has suddenly become much more important, and the world expects more of it, it has also become much more controversial, for several reasons.

Limits to Armed Peacekeeping

First, its very size. Over 115,000 armed peacekeepers are serving today in 17 different conflicts²⁹. With Darfur and possibly Somalia added, numbers will rise to well over 120,000. This poses a daunting logistical and management challenge. Consider that the UN’s ‘Pentagon equivalent’ consists of a mere 2 crowded floors in the NY Secretariat building!

Consensus is growing that Blue Helmets often are simply not the appropriate instrument to deploy in the ‘new wars’, especially if their mandate includes civilian protection in the more complex missions.³⁰ They take a long time to field, often only after mass atrocities have already been

centuries were always higher than those during the 21st century—despite the high absolute numbers. But now even the absolute numbers seem to be going down.

²⁷ As Johan Galtung points out, there are about 2000 distinct ethnic groups living within some 200 sovereign states: what if the principle of self-determination was more widely adopted?

²⁸ According to the UN, since 1990 the small arms trade has fueled close to fifty wars around the world, especially (though not only) in Africa (see Naim 2006:15)

²⁹ As stated on the UN/DPKO website, “Although the military remain the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now include administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-miners and electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers and experts in communications and public information”. But direct human protection that is largely community-based (or even focused on individuals) is much less part of the UN peacekeeping practice.

³⁰ See e.g. several articles from the Global Policy Institute (<http://www.globalpolicy.org>); also PBS video *Can the U.N. Keep the Peace* (<http://video.pbs.org/video/1146753456/feature/62>).

committed. Carrying guns does not always make it easy to establish informal relations with local communities, to win hearts and minds. Concerns have also been expressed that their high cost (well over US\$8 billion per year) has not yielded commensurate returns. And if you add to that the well-publicized cases of sexual abuse and exploitation by these forces then it is clear why the UN is in soul-searching mode over its peacekeeping operations.

The Case for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping

Therefore, I will now describe, and make the case for, *another* type of peacekeeping, one in which civil society organizations deploy *unarmed* civilian peacekeepers to deter violence and human rights violations in situations of violent conflict. Unarmed civilian peacekeeping has two principal, complementary components: monitoring agreements (which includes ceasefires, peace treaties, human rights and international humanitarian law) and protecting civilians (through proactive and conscious presence, close to where threatened, vulnerable people live. Unarmed peacekeeping uses methods that have proven to be effective. For example, providing protective accompaniment of individuals or groups under threat. Or creating neutral safe spaces for local people to engage in sustainable conflict resolution and peace-building. Or monitoring local ceasefires and verifying human rights violations, always in close coordination with the authorities and local peace monitors on the ground. Or rumor control to prevent conflict escalation. Or strengthening local early warning systems to spot imminent violence outbreaks and arrange for quick preventive responses. Or even sometimes inter-positioning between conflict parties.

There is an important niche for this work, which can be undertaken during almost any stage of the conflict cycle, but is most effective early on when mediation and peacemaking are in progress, or later, when a ceasefire or peace treaty has been concluded, or before, during and after critical elections (see Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study, Schweitzer et al 2001).

Please note that it is not only people in military uniform who are working to keep the peace. Many civilians and organizations, all over the world, are convinced that they, too, can contribute to practical peacekeeping. What distinguishes their work from 'normal' armed peacekeeping is that they are *always* unarmed, operating as an impartial, non-partisan 'international third-party presence', *always* working on the invitation of, and in close cooperation with, local civil society organizations, and *always* with the consent of all conflict parties. This approach was pioneered and refined, over the past three decades, by many civil society peace organizations, but almost always on a very small scale³¹. It should be noted that *intergovernmental* organizations (like the OSCE, EU and the UN) have also fielded unarmed missions with civilians³², but they differ in mandate and

³¹ In addition to the well-known Peace Brigades International (which had significant presence in Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Indonesia), there were: Christian Peacemaker Teams (Palestine, Iraq, USA, Canada); Witness for Peace (Nicaragua); International Brigadistas (Nicaragua); Fellowship of Reconciliation (Colombia); Sipaz (Mexico); Balkan Peace Teams; Bantay Ceasefire (Mindanao); Shanti Sena (Gujarat); Gulf Peace Team; Cry for Justice (Haiti); EMPISA (Ecumenical Monitoring Project South Africa); GIPP (Grassroots Initiative to Protect Palestinians); EAPPI (Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine/Israel); Women's International Peace Service (Palestine). Nonviolent Peaceforce, established in 2002, is the only global civil society organization that aims to take their lessons and best practices to scale.

³² To avoid confusion, it should be clarified that when the UN/DPKO speaks of *civilian* UN peacekeepers, they refer almost always to a category of technical assistance workers who deal with issues such as transitional justice, interim administration, police training, logistics, communications, etc.—*not* the kind of *direct* human protection provided by unarmed civilian peacekeepers, including the Nonviolent Peaceforce. Meanwhile, UNHCR and UNHCHR, but also UNICEF and UNWRA, each within their own protection mandates, do employ staff to provide civilian protection services (for refugees, human rights defenders, children and Palestinian civilians, respectively), but except for UNHCR, most of their field work consists of advisory services, monitoring compliance with international instruments and

method from initiatives by global civil society organizations working hand in hand with local civil society organizations.

How Can Unarmed Be Effective?

The question could be asked: Why would such unarmed teams be able to deter violence and human rights violations? Experts point out that in situations of violent conflict, all parties have multiple sensitivities, vulnerabilities and points of leverage, and international ‘presence’ tacitly activates those sensitivities (see Mahony 2006:13pp). A conflict party naturally wants to look better than its opponents. Moreover, all conflict parties have several good reasons to pay attention to third parties, especially outsiders: first, because their personal or political reputation is at stake; second, because they want to avoid blame or retribution; and finally, because of individual moral concerns. Civilian peacekeepers want to work together with all parties to stop and prevent human rights abuses and violations of agreements, in dialogue with all concerned. Therefore, the leverage unarmed peacekeepers have is mostly through personal persuasion, and this operates particularly in the space between the grassroots and the higher national levels.

It is easy to dismiss unarmed peacekeeping as some kind of woolly-headed idealism or naïve pacifism, or a romantic notion, or even as something only suited for the weak and the timid. Seldom do we examine our deepest beliefs about power: namely that it grows out of the barrel of a gun, that there is only one kind of power—‘threat power’. As Theodore Roszak put it, *“people try nonviolence for a week, and when ‘it does not work’, they go back to violence which hasn’t worked for centuries”* (1994).

But unarmed peacekeeping is a form of ‘soft power’, benign and humble but hard-nosed, working in solidarity with threatened civilians. It aims to influence all conflict parties to comply with human rights and international humanitarian law standards. It is based on intelligent human relationships which impartial peacekeepers build and maintain with all the conflict parties. Therefore, unarmed peacekeeping is a subtle but effective force, requiring courageous hard work by well-networked professionals operating in a low-key, disciplined fashion in often challenging field conditions. There is nothing glamorous about this work, but that does not make it any less valuable. Moreover, it is done at a much lower cost than the armed military variety of peacekeeping operations.

Economies of Peace

The huge costs of war and violent conflict, both in human and economic terms, might finally bring us collectively to our senses. Paul Collier has estimated the economic consequences of war in *developing* countries, and also the benefits of well-considered responses. He calculates that the total national and regional cost of a single war, on average, is more than US\$ 64 billion. Further global impacts include international terrorism, production of hard drugs, and the spread of HIV/AIDS—which are not easily quantifiable. He concludes³³ that a US\$ 5 billion investment in international

advocacy—not direct protection services at scale for threatened individuals and communities or especially vulnerable target groups in situations of violent conflict. Outside the UN system it is the ICRC, a unique organization basing itself on the Geneva Conventions, that has provided large-scale protection services in crises situations for many decades. Clearly, there is a need for ad hoc on-the-ground <http://video.pbs.org/video/1146753456/feature/62d> coordination of efforts, although, given the massive unmet need for protection, a quantum increase in the number of full-time protection field workers remains an urgent requirement and opportunity.

³³ It should be noted that their reference to peacekeeping is of the armed, military variety.

peacekeeping and well-targeted, conflict-sensitive aid would yield a return of US\$ 397 billion in selected post-conflict countries—a huge pay-off for preventing conflicts from going violent! (see Collier & Hoeffler 2004).

That is precisely why the Copenhagen Consensus included it as one of ten ‘best buys’ for development if the world wanted to spend another US\$50 billion (see Collier, Chauvet & Hegre 2008). And an international panel of experts³⁴, estimating the financial value of peace, has recently calculated an overall positive annual economic impact of a cessation of violence worldwide of US\$7.2 trillion, with US\$4.8 trillion of new business created each year (and a loss of US\$2.4 trillion in violence-dependent economic activity, namely by “*industries that create or manage violence*”). In short, peace is far more profitable for all than war for some!

Kofi Annan summed it all up well when he said: “*The cost of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding pales into insignificance compared with the cost and consequences of violent conflict and war*” (Annan 2002).

A New Peace Role for Global Civil Society

And this is what the former UN Secretary-General said about the role of civil society in conflict prevention : “*I look to civil society to act as our partners in helping to defuse potential conflicts. As experience tells us, you will be most effective by coordinating with bilateral and intergovernmental actors—and with one another. As civil society organizations, you have a vital role to play. You are uniquely placed: to facilitate local conflict resolution; to champion human rights; to mobilize public support for peace settlements; and to build trust to encourage healing and reconciliation*” (Annan 2005).

Creating a large, multinational professional reserve force of unarmed civilian peacekeepers would indeed have significant advantages for the international community, UN agencies and donors. It could offer a quick, non-bureaucratic response to local requests for help. It would offer round-the-clock dedicated protective presence, not distracted by other duties. It would not be subject to UN security phases. It would not entail a compromise of sovereignty. And if timely deployed, such a force could potentially even be effective in preventing crimes of mass atrocities.

Not Last, But Early Resort

Deployment of unarmed civilian peacekeeping may well follow most of the criteria the UN applies when mandating its Blue Helmets under UN Charter Chapter VI: gravity and urgency (preventing large-scale, imminent loss of life); right intention (to halt or avert human suffering); acceptability (with consent of conflict parties); proportional means (scale and scope are minimum necessary); reasonable prospects (action likely to be more successful than inaction). But it would differ with regard to the use of force (even in self defense or as measure of last resort) because it would always be unarmed; moreover, it would always also be on the invitation of requesting civil society partners; and finally, it could mobilize much earlier in the conflict cycle, to enable much more preventive action, long before large-scale loss of life could become a reality.

The world has too often failed to protect civilians threatened by genocide and ethnic cleansing. While unarmed civilian peacekeeping obviously cannot stop many of these atrocities, it is one

³⁴ This information comes from the Global Peace Index 2009, Institute for Economics and Peace, (see www.visionofhumanity.org). It includes the estimates derived from models made by the Economists for Peace & Security (Levy Institute, New York).

highly appropriate first response to prevent, contain and manage violent conflict, and to prevent escalation, and to enable the conduct of further preventive local, national or even international diplomacy. It therefore has the potential to contribute to the prevention of these kinds of atrocities further down the road. Civilian peacekeepers can work in partnership with local communities to contribute to the protection of all civilians—mainly children, women and the elderly, refugees and internally displaced persons, demobilized child soldiers, human rights workers, humanitarian aid workers, journalists, and others caught somewhere in the conflict cycle.

That way unarmed civilian peacekeeping could also become an antidote against the general sense of powerlessness, resignation and cynicism in the face of violent conflict, including ethnic cleansing and genocide.

The UN always maintains that its use of military force is a measure of *'last resort'*. Likewise, the Security Council often authorizes *'all necessary means'* to maintain peace and prevent violent conflict. To them we say: unarmed civilian peacekeepers are a low-cost, subtle force for peace, and make them an important addition to the peace-builder's toolbox. It is our hope that the international community will avail itself of this new tool, through predictable long-term funding, once its value is more widely appreciated. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee has already broadened its definition of ODA to include activities such as unarmed civilian peacekeeping³⁵.

Conclusion

Let me conclude. Many millions of civilians all over the world find themselves caught in conflict cycles and trapped in war, facing unprecedented hardship and injustice. The humanitarian reflex and response is to provide material relief. Such relief is necessary, but it alone is not sufficient. Direct human protection is equally essential! But how?

We have seen that armed peacekeeping is possible, sometimes necessary, but also often not effective enough—especially in the so-called new wars. We are all witnessing the limits of meeting violence with only armed, military means. Meanwhile the world of civilians needs much *more*, not *less* human protection.

Fortunately, civilian protection has, at last, moved up on the world agenda. In this decade it has become an important topic in the global discourse on human security and protection³⁶.

In this presentation we have argued that international 'presence' itself confers protection, especially when done consciously and proactively, in combination with national and local organizations and people. *Unarmed* peacekeeping is now a newly available force for peace. The world can ill afford to ignore its great potential.

³⁵ The 2005 decision by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to expand the definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to include, among other things, "enhancing civil society's role in the security system" and "civilian activities for peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution" makes unarmed civilian peacekeeping activities in principle eligible for donor funding.

³⁶In addition to Geneva Conventions and ICRC reports, several significant reports may be mentioned here: *Agenda for Peace* (Annan 2002 and 2005), Report of the Commission of Global Governance (1992), Brahimi Report (2000); *The Responsibility to Protect*—Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001); Commission on Human Security (2003); *A more secure world: Our Shared Responsibility*—Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004); *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*—Report of the UN Secretary General (2005); Slim & Bonwick 2005; Mahony 2006, Gowan and Johnstone (2007); *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*—Report of the Secretary-General, UN, New York (2009); Paffenholz (2009), *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, UN (2009); Refugees International (2009)

No doubt, unarmed civilian peacekeeping faces many difficult challenges and dilemmas. No one says it's going to be easy. But the benefits of even partial success are fully worth the effort, both in human, economic and societal terms.


Best Practices for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping

By Tim Wallis

Theoretical Background

After more than 50 years of peace theory and peace research, it is generally accepted that for any conflict there are three fundamental aspects; the *attitudes*, or enemy images, hatreds and animosities that fuel conflict; the *behaviours*, or the actions that people take to inflict damage on their enemies, mainly in the form of violence; and the *causes*, or conditions, which led to the conflict in the first place. Without understanding and dealing with all three of these aspects, it's very hard to handle a conflict effectively.

Table 4) The Conflict Triangle
ABCs of Conflict (Galtung)



See Galtung 1996


Corresponding to the three fundamental aspects of conflict, we have three strategies or three aspects of handling conflict: peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

The *peacemaking* aspect of handling conflict refers to the A point on the triangle: the attitudes. Peacemaking is about getting people together to sign an agreement, or getting them to decide to stop fighting each other. Peacemaking involves mediators, it involves dialogue, it involves reconciliation, and it involves trying to get people to change their attitudes so they can actually sit down and talk, because without talking they can't resolve their conflicts.

Peacekeeping deals with the B point on the triangle. It deals with behaviour, with violence. Peacekeeping is about creating an environment where people are not killing each other on the streets and therefore there is a chance for people to sit down and talk or start to address some of the root causes of the conflict. Without peacekeeping it is very difficult for those other peace strategies to work, but peacekeeping by itself does not resolve a conflict. Peacekeeping does *not* bring people together. It does *not* address the causes of the conflict. All it does is try to reduce the violence, and create the conditions so that those other things can happen.

The C part of the triangle, the *peacebuilding*, is about addressing those root causes, or conditions that led to the conflict in the first place. And of course without addressing those, you can't have any sustainable kind of peace, because unfortunately conflicts recur in cycles. If the parties get to the point of stopping the fighting and sitting down and making a peace agreement, but the root causes of the conflict are not addressed, the chances of that conflict just starting up again in any form or time or place are very high.

Table 5) Three Aspects of Handling Conflict
Three Aspects of Handling Conflict



Primacy of Local Actors

The people in the conflict, including the conflict actors but also all the people caught up in the conflict who may not have allegiance to one side or the other, are ultimately the only ones who can resolve that conflict. Nobody from outside can impose a solution and expect it to last, because people need to buy into a solution, they need to understand it, and they need to know that it's in their best interests. That is why the peacemaking process is so critical and why that is basically about the parties sitting down and talking and resolving their own differences - working out their own solutions.

At the same time there are roles for outsiders to play in most conflict situations. Sometimes people simply can't or won't talk to each other, so having a mediator can be crucial to get the process started. This is an outside person who can bring the people together, somebody neutral who can help people think through the issues and begin to listen to the other side of the story. A mediator from outside the conflict may be able to gain the trust and respect and confidence of the parties sufficiently to get them to sit down, calm down, and start thinking about solutions.

Similarly, the peacebuilding work of addressing root causes can also benefit from outsiders. These outsiders can contribute through capacity building, supplying of resources, or offering other kinds of support. Building a lasting and sustainable peace is still something that must come from within the communities that have suffered the conflict, but often they do not have the resources available to do that and so, once again, outside support can be beneficial.

When it comes to peacekeeping, it is assumed that this is largely a role for outsiders, like the UN. However here too there needs to be a recognition that ultimately it is the people in that situation who must keep their own peace. When violence is severe and people are killing each other or have good reason to assume that killing will go on, outside intervention can be very helpful. So there is a role for outsiders to play here, but it needs to be understood that this role is within an overall context where the local people must be in charge of the process that will lead to a sustainable peace.

Typology of Civilian Peacekeeping Options

Most people when they think of peacekeeping think of the UN Blue Helmets, in other words of *military* peacekeeping. With over 100,000 Blue Helmets deployed in 18 countries around the world, it is not surprising that this is the dominant model of what peacekeeping has come to mean. However, even within these military peacekeeping operations there are more and more roles being played by civilians. The EU, for instance, as one of the newer actors in this field, places more

reliance on (armed) police officers than on military troops for its peacekeeping operations. Almost one quarter of all staff deployed on UN peacekeeping missions are in fact now civilians, including not just drivers and translators but human rights officers, democratization officers, election officers, (civilian) protection officers and so on.

1. Unarmed Military

There are also unarmed military operations. In fact, the very first 'peacekeeping' type of operation conducted by the UN (before the term 'peacekeeping' was coined), which was in Palestine in 1948, was unarmed. UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) consisted of unarmed military observers, essentially a military operation but without weapons.

All UN military observer missions since then have been unarmed (or only lightly armed), although the personnel are serving military officers. Other non-UN observer and monitoring missions have followed a similar format, such as the SLMM (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) in Sri Lanka and the IMT (International Monitoring Team) in the Philippines, using unarmed military officers from several countries to monitor a cease-fire. There have also been examples, for instance in Bougainville in the Pacific, where the parties agreed to have an outside military force come in to maintain the peace, but they didn't want weapons and so those peacekeeping troops, in this case from New Zealand, were entirely unarmed.

2. Police

Recently, there are more and more police missions doing peacekeeping work. These police are sometimes armed, and they are sometimes considered military (or uniformed) operations, but also sometimes considered civilian operations. There are a large number of police maintaining law and order in Bosnia, for instance, who arrived initially under the UN flag, and now operate under the EU flag. In many cases these are roles which up until recently would have been played by military, but which are now being played by police.

3. Unarmed Civilians With an Official Mandate

There are many examples of unarmed civilians also doing peacekeeping work. When I talk about unarmed civilians in this context, I am referring to non-uniformed personnel, ie. not police or military.

In this first category I am referring to unarmed civilians working on behalf of official organizations, including the UN. Increasingly civilians are playing roles as human rights monitors, election monitors, and protection officers. Sometimes this happens as part of UN peacekeeping missions that are a combination of civilian and military. But there have also been a number of peacekeeping missions that have been purely civilian.

The largest organization in the world that is running purely civilian peacekeeping operations is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They do not refer to their operations as peacekeeping, however they involve border monitoring, ceasefire monitoring, 'civilian crisis management', maintenance of law and order, protection of civilians and of human rights and so on. Over the past 20 years, the OSCE has been sending very effective, purely civilian, peacekeeping missions to Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Baltic states, and the Caucasus. For instance on the border between Chechnya and Georgia, for many years the OSCE had a monitoring post, with civilians sitting in watchtowers, monitoring the border and reporting activities going on there, such as any movement of soldiers.

This category of unarmed civilian missions with official mandates also includes UN agencies with a specific protection mandate, such as UNHCR (UN High Commission for Refugees) and UNHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), as well as UNICEF, which has a protection mandate on behalf of children. Increasingly other UN agencies, including World Food Programme, are playing a protection and peacekeeping role in places where they may have exclusive access to vulnerable populations.

The ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross) also serves a very critical function in conflict situations. They have a very specific mandate going back to the Geneva Conventions, which gives them a special role to play in protection of civilians, monitoring of ceasefires, investigation of abuses of human rights in prisons, in detention camps and so on.

4. Unarmed Civilians From Civil Society

There have also been many situations where unarmed civilians without an official mandate, or sometimes without any official role or function at all, have been able to play an important part in reducing violence and protecting civilians. This category includes a whole range of humanitarian NGO's that are often on the front line in conflict situations, working with IDPs, with refugees, or with resettled communities. Oftentimes these NGO workers are the first ones there, the first ones to make sure that things are being done properly, that people are safe, that the parties are not attacking each other, and that space is made for humanitarian corridors to let food aid in and things like that.

There are also journalists who have sometimes played a critical role as outside observers, monitoring the situation and enabling the parties to know that they're being watched. There are also election monitors who help reduce violence and tensions around elections, which in a post-conflict situation can be a highly de-stabilising moment. And there are organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who may send in delegations to monitor or to investigate abuses or allegations of human rights violations and may play a role in protecting civilians and reducing violence in those circumstances.

And there are solidarity movements playing this role in many countries. For instance in Palestine, there are a large number of groups who send people from different countries to come and help the Palestinians harvest their olive crops, or who will go with them to their farms, or go with them through checkpoints.

5. Unarmed Civilians With Special Skills and Training

The final category I want to talk about, of people playing this role, are unarmed civilians from civil society, but with specific skills and experiences, and with specific training, who operate according to certain principles, and who follow certain international standards. These are unarmed civilians who are specifically trained and prepared to play a peacekeeping role and I will highlight some specific examples of this below.

Why Are the Military Used For Peacekeeping?

Before looking at what civilians can and cannot do as peacekeepers, the question arises as to why up to now peacekeeping has been predominantly done by the military. Obviously there are many benefits to using military in certain situations. For one thing, they are very good at the logistics side

of things. They can fly people into a conflict area, they've got all the right equipment, they have excellent communications systems, and they know how to live under harsh conditions.

Almost every country in the world has a standing army that is predominantly (and ideally!) idle much of the time. So these are useful and available people to be deployed in an emergency, and it's easy to send them almost anywhere at a moment's notice. Furthermore, the cost of actually deploying those forces tends to remain hidden because the costs of maintaining a standing army are already built into national budgets and the additional cost of deploying them somewhere on a peacekeeping mission is marginal compared to the huge expense of having them, and all their equipment, in the first place.

Over the last 50 years of peacekeeping, when it has been successful, it has not been the tanks or the machine guns that have kept the peace. In fact these have been rarely used. It's been the blue helmets themselves that kept the peace, or rather, what they represent. Soldiers on UN peacekeeping missions represent the UN; they represent the international community; they represent world public opinion. That's what gives them the authority, or the power, to actually keep the parties from fighting each other, to keep the environment safe for civilians, and to create the conditions for peacemaking and peacebuilding activities. It is not the weapons, or the fact that they are soldiers, that makes them effective.

And when we draw this out a bit further, it becomes rather obvious that actually there are many things needed for peacekeeping that military troops *cannot* do, or that unarmed civilians can do far better.

What Unarmed Civilians Can Do

Unarmed civilians can first of all gain the trust of the parties to the conflict, and can usually do this more effectively than military personnel, although admittedly not in all contexts. Unarmed civilians who have the training, experience, and people skills to establish those relationships of trust are the most effective at doing so, and this is the first critical step in any peacekeeping work, because without those trust relationships with each of the parties, other aspects of peacekeeping work are not possible.

Gaining access to physical locations is the next important thing in peacekeeping. Military forces can do this when they have a specific mandate to do so, but as long as the parties trust the unarmed civilians and other factors are also present (which I'll discuss below), the parties will provide access to places which people would otherwise assume you need military force to gain access to. And access based on trust is far more reliable than access based on the use or threat of force.

As an example of this I will tell a story from Bosnia. In the early 1990s, Col. Bob Stewart was the commander of UNPROFOR forces (UN peacekeepers) in Bosnia. He was leading a column of UNPROFOR tanks, trying to get into a village. They were stopped at a Bosnian Serb checkpoint and refused access. Now this man is in charge of military forces and he has a huge column of tanks behind him. He had all the military force he could possibly want. And yet he was being stopped by a few soldiers at a checkpoint who were telling him he couldn't go through. Now, he had a very short time to make a decision whether to fight his way through, which could have involved not just casualties among the soldiers at the checkpoint, but also could have had repercussions in the area. There could have been reprisals against civilians. It could have led to a restarting of the war. All those factors are at play if you start fighting, so he couldn't really risk fighting his way through this checkpoint. So what he did was call the BBC! He told them to come to the checkpoint and

start filming and interviewing the soldiers at the checkpoint. And within minutes the soldiers had capitulated and said 'OK, you can go through'.

That demonstrates the power, not just of the BBC, but of unarmed civilians in general, in this case journalists. Sometimes even the most powerful army on earth is impotent in a situation like that. It takes unarmed civilians to create a different dynamic to the one of brute force that people are used to in wartime. In fact there are so many other tools and methods out there, that are able to influence, put pressure, convince, and ultimately to deter people from doing certain things.

Another example is from Nicaragua, during the 1980's, just after the Contra war started. There were Contra attacks on villages along the border with Honduras. A group of Americans went down there in 1983 to see for themselves because the American government was funding the Contras, so they went down to see what their government was doing. And when they got to this border village there were no attacks. So they said we want to see the attacks and the results of what the Contras are doing, and the villagers told them, well as long as you're here they're not going to attack us. So the group from the US said, 'oh, if that's really the case, then we'll stay here and we'll get more people, and we'll stop them attacking you!' And so over the next seven years, an organization called Witness for Peace sent over 7,000 American citizens down to Nicaragua, to just be in these villages on the border. And the Contras, because they *were* being funded by the US government, could not risk killing an American citizen, and so stopped attacking those villages. So this was a very effective way of actually deterring violence, simply by their presence there.

A similar dynamic has been going on in Palestine for many years. People discovered that whenever someone foreign was at a checkpoint, the Israeli soldiers would behave differently towards the Palestinians trying to get across. When no one is there, they can refuse Palestinians access to their farmland, they can refuse them to go home, or even refuse them to take people to hospital. But as soon as someone is watching, they behave differently. It's been proven time and time again.

So unarmed civilians can gain the trust of the parties, they can gain access, they can monitor the situation, they can encourage the parties to stick to the agreements that they've made. And that's where ceasefire monitoring and similar activities come in, where people say we are not going to move our troops, we are not going to attack this area, and we are not going to deploy weapons to this area. If people are watching, this encourages people to stick to their agreements. But they can also literally reduce the violations and abuses of human rights, as I have just described in Palestine and Nicaragua.

Even the most bloodthirsty, ruthless dictator doesn't want to be seen doing things that they shouldn't, and doesn't want to get caught doing those things.

Peace Brigades International (PBI) was working in Guatemala in the early 1980's, trying to stop disappearances and assassinations of human rights groups and people promoting peace and democracy in Guatemala. These groups were struggling against the military dictatorship at the time -- the generals that were in power, all their underlings, and the death squads that were operating underground. One of these groups was called GAM, a mutual protection and support group, and they had three of their leaders assassinated in quick succession in 1983. Then Peace Brigades started accompanying their leaders, 24 hours a day, with people from North America and Europe. And from that moment on, no-one was killed in GAM. In fact one of the leaders of GAM at that time is now in the Guatemalan Congress and has publicly stated that she owes her life to PBI. So that's a very inspiring example of how civilians can provide this kind of protection, and reduce human rights abuses and attacks.

But the really fascinating part of this story is that two researchers from PBI went back to Guatemala 10 years later, and interviewed those very generals that they were trying to protect these people from. They learnt a great deal about the thinking behind the strategies of the military

dictatorship, why they behaved in certain ways, and the kind of effect that they felt from this international presence of unarmed civilians.

So we've learnt a lot from those experiences. We've learnt that unarmed civilians can not only encourage parties to stick to agreements or stop attacks and abuses, but also they can play a major role in building confidence and stabilizing the situation, because they encourage civilians and civil society organizations to be more proactive, to be more daring, to actually work on the peacemaking and peacebuilding activities that otherwise they're afraid to do. So it works from both directions. It's both about trying to reduce the violence and attacks from taking place, and also about trying to encourage, support, and build confidence in people to take more responsibility for their own situation, because the role of violence in these kinds of situations is often to inhibit, prevent, and scare people away from taking action and playing a stronger role in their own situation.

What Unarmed Civilians Cannot Do

Unarmed civilians cannot stop spoilers and determined actors from one party or the other, who want to carry on fighting. In situations like Bosnia or Chechnya, where there are snipers shooting people, even targeting internationals, where there are cities under siege, or shelling of civilian targets, in those kinds of situations, there's absolutely nothing that an unarmed civilian can do, directly, to stop those kinds of actors and those kinds of behaviours. Now, that's not to say that military peacekeepers can stop those things either.

Neither military nor unarmed civilians can 'guarantee' to protect civilians. There are many examples where UN or other military forces have been unable to protect civilian populations, the most notorious cases being Rwanda, where the UN stood by as nearly 1 million people were killed and Srebrenica, where UN peacekeeping forces were unable to stop the massacre of 6,000 civilians, despite them being protected by a so-called UN 'safe haven'. So whether it is military or civilian peacekeepers that are deployed, there are certain conditions that need to be in place, and there are certain situations where neither are likely to be effective.

Unarmed civilian peacekeeping is much more preventative in terms of trying to work with parties and convince them not to do things in the first place, but once they are already doing those things, it is very difficult for unarmed civilians to stop them. Militaries can, in theory, 'force' the parties to stop fighting. But then we're moving quite a ways away from the peacekeeping role defined above, and more into the war fighting role, which unfortunately has become very confused because of recent 'peacekeeping' actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fighting wars and trying to win them is a very different thing from trying to create peace, and obviously civilians are not very good at fighting and winning wars.

How Civilian Peacekeeping is Done

Building relationships of building trust and confidence is the foundation of civilian peacekeeping. Without that, we cannot be effective. That also goes for military peacekeeping, but obviously the military do that in a different way. Sometimes military commanders have a certain respect for other military commanders of the same rank, and will listen to them. Sometimes civilians have a more difficult time in gaining that credibility. But in most circumstances a civilian poses less threat and has less of agenda to get in the way of building the trust and so it is far easier for civilians to build effective relationships.

The second most important element of peacekeeping is a careful analysis of the situation, knowing what is happening. Without the analysis, it is possible (and it has happened) that civilians can make the situation worse rather than better. They can inadvertently end up giving support to one side instead of the other. They can make serious mistakes that actually lead to people being killed. Careful analysis is absolutely critical for this work, because it means knowing who is threatening whom and why. Sometimes, in the Philippines for instance, the apparent breakdown of a ceasefire, or an apparent ceasefire violation, may actually be taking place because of a local feud between different clans in that area. Unless you understand the dynamics that are involved in that situation, you can misinterpret what is going on and help to escalate the situation rather than de-escalate it.

The purpose of analyzing the situation, building relationships, and then using all these relationships of different kinds with different people, is to try to influence other people. And this is where the crux of the effectiveness of civilian peacekeeping comes in. Because people, as I said, do not want to be seen doing the wrong thing. If they can get away with it, without being caught, or without other repercussions, then they might well do it. But if there are consequences (and it doesn't take a completely rational interpretation of behaviour to realize that), people do weigh up the costs and benefits of undertaking particular actions. If a guerilla movement or a government army, or the politicians behind those people, determine that getting rid of certain people quietly and discreetly is a lot more cost effective, and a lot easier than trying to deal with them legally through the courts, that is very different than if there are consequences to that kind of activity and people know that there are consequences. And those consequences can be purely about their own stature in their own community, or in their own organization, it can be about their relationship with other people in that organization, it can be about their standing in the community and in the group at large that is supporting them.

No organization exists in a vacuum, and these people need to take these things into calculation all the time, and there are ways of influencing that. So the way civilian peacekeeping works is by understanding those webs and chains of influence, and understanding and working with people, and having good relationships with people somewhere along that web so that those people can help to influence other people. And through the influence, you try to get people to do the right thing and to stop doing the wrong thing. It is very simply and it is surprisingly effective. But there are principles and other factors that determine how effective it is, so we need to look at those as well.

Underlying Principles That Determine Degree of Success

1. Nonpartisanship, independence, and being international

One absolute fundamental of this work is neutrality or more strictly, 'nonpartisanship'. The Red Cross is neutral in the sense that they don't take sides in a conflict, they don't play any role in that conflict, and as a result, in theory they don't do anything to encourage or undermine either party. That is a very restricted mandate which does not suit most other organizations, so there is also the term "impartiality." Most humanitarian agencies say that they are impartial, rather than neutral. By this they mean that they deliver aid or other services according to need, and not according to any political agenda, regardless of who may be in the 'right' or in the 'wrong'.

Nonpartisanship is a more nuanced term, used by civilian peacekeeping organizations to describe the way that we have to work in these environments. We absolutely have to have the trust and confidence of the different parties. And the minute any party thinks that an unarmed civilian is collecting intelligence for the other side, or is spending more time with, or has political sympathies for the other side, then that's the end. They cannot continue doing the work because

the trust has been lost. This is the big difference between groups who are working more in solidarity with one side, such as those supporting the Palestinians, and those who are working according to certain basic principles of peacekeeping, that include this strict approach of nonpartisanship. The nonpartisanship is not only for their own safety and security, but it is critical for the relationships that have to be built with all kinds of actors, who are then critical for actually having an influence on armed actors, and therefore being able to protect people and to stop violence and abuse from taking place.

The same principle applies to independence and being international. Effective civilian peacekeeping is all about being an outside party that does not have an agenda, and can thereby gain the respect, trust and confidence of the different parties involved, and can thus go in and work with different people. That can be very difficult for people who see abuses taking place, and have natural sympathies for the underdogs or for the victims. However, this kind of work cannot succeed unless people maintain this absolute nonpartisanship.

2. Nonviolence

Unarmed civilians, by definition, are not going to be going around shooting people. Even the military recognizes that one of the limitations of military peacekeeping is that by sending soldiers onto the streets to monitor and stop the fighting, they are also reinforcing the concept that military force is the way to deal with problems. By putting soldiers into these situations, and thereby reinforcing the limiting notion that soldiers and military force are what keep the peace, the military can also be actually perpetuating the conflict, because as soon as the soldiers leave, they are replaced with the soldiers that just stopped fighting, or perhaps were even attacking the very civilians they are now 'protecting'. Trying to model a different way of handling conflict, of working together, sitting down and talking, not using weapons or force of any kind, is about trying to present the only viable future out of violent conflict. Nonviolence, in this sense, is a critical component of unarmed civilian peacekeeping.

3. Visibility, transparency, quiet diplomacy, and cultural sensitivity

There are other principles that we have learnt from the last 25 years of civilian peacekeeping: about the degree of visibility of our work; about being open and honest with all the parties regarding what we're doing; about being very careful in the handling of information. Information itself in any conflict situation is very sensitive and delicate to manage. If one side thinks that you are collecting information for the other side, that can be a serious security issue. We are not able to work like Amnesty or Human Rights Watch, or other big campaigning organizations. If we want to work on the ground, we have to work in a quiet diplomatic way with people to try to address problems. We have to work, step by step, up the chain of command, not blaming people, not putting ourselves in a situation where we are seen as vilifying one side or the other.

Also essential for success in doing unarmed civilian peacekeeping is a sensitivity to the situation that you are going into, and an understanding of the political connotations involved, and of cultural sensitivities. That is why ultimately this needs professional people with expertise in doing this kind of work. Journalists and solidarity workers and civilians just coming in off the street can do a certain amount, but they cannot do the kind of detailed peacekeeping that is being described here.

Lessons Learned and Ways Forward

We have learned over the past 25 years of civilian peacekeeping, that mere presence by itself is not enough. It can protect and save individual lives, but it cannot stop violence from erupting somewhere else and it will not change the underlying conditions that result in people being killed or put in danger. We cannot de-escalate tense situations without professionalism, discipline, specialized roles, training, and preparation. In addition, having a specialized NGO like the Nonviolent Peaceforce adds effectiveness by providing the ability to make decisions quickly, to go into situations and to change mandate when necessary. The ICRC or UN agencies with a protection mandate, such as UNHCR, who are in many of these situations in much larger numbers and have a role to play in reducing the violence and protecting civilians, have other roles to play as well. They are there to provide aid and to help refugees.

These specialized UN agencies do not have the expertise or the flexibility to go in and address needs that do not fit easily into their mandate. They can be very cumbersome at making decisions and taking actions because of the bureaucracy. And ultimately their ability to build relationships and use them to influence behaviour is limited by their attachment to political entities who do have vested interests of their own and can interfere with the political situation in ways that undermine the effectiveness of peacekeeping.

Another limitation of official bodies trying to do this work is illustrated by the example of Georgia. After recent fighting between Russia and Georgia, the EU is providing a peacekeeping presence on the border of two breakaway areas that were the source of the conflict. But because these breakaway areas are not recognized by the EU, it is politically impossible for the EU peacekeepers to go into those areas. They are restricted to the Georgian side of the border, and there is no one patrolling the other side. So the EU had to ask NGOs like Nonviolent Peaceforce to go to the other side of the border to provide protection and monitoring of what is happening on that side of the border, because the EU cannot go there. That is an example of where a specialized NGO can do work that a big official institution like the EU cannot.

But the most important area where a specialized NGO like NP provides added value is in building credibility and relationships at the grassroots level. Big organizations like the EU, OSCE, or UN have more difficulty living and working directly with the communities at the grassroots level, building up the kind of trust and confidence of those communities that enable so much of the other peacekeeping work to take place.

Unarmed civilian peacekeeping has enormous potential. For a number of years, it has been tried on a small scale with startling success, but it is still largely unknown. In the future, civilian peacekeeping can play a much more important role in reducing violence and creating the conditions for effective peacemaking and peacebuilding. This is a tool of great potential. We are at the early stages of discovering what it can do, and it requires much more investment from governments and from the UN to try this, to allow it, to learn from it, to experiment, and to move forward.

Peacekeeping with Nonviolence: Protection Strategies for Sustainable Peace By Rachel Julian

When we talk about ‘protecting civilians’ we mean many things from ‘Responsibility to protect’, to ensuring livelihoods and security. In this paper I focus on protecting civilians from direct violence and suggest there are benefits of this role being carried out with nonviolent strategies.

Although normally associated with the military, peacekeeping is a function that can be performed by civilians using nonviolent strategies and methods. Maintaining a primarily military focus on peacekeeping (UN Security Council 2009 and Ramsbothom & Woodhouse 2005) inhibits local ownership of both protection and peace, and makes collaboration and cooperation with peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies more difficult than it could be if nonviolence was used in both short term protection and long term strategies.

Using nonviolence would facilitate a faster and more effective path towards a long term sustainable peace.

Short and long term goals

When we aim to protect civilians from direct violence there are both short term and long term goals that affect any given community. In the short term we need to save lives and prevent harm, but in the long term we need to enable a sustainable peace to be built in the vulnerable communities.

Galtung (1976³⁷) described three ‘approaches to peace’, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Miall, Ramsbothom & Woodhouse (1999:22)³⁸ see the three approaches linked by,

“peacemaking aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peacekeeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, and peacebuilding tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict”.

In the document produced for ‘Responsibility to protect’³⁹ the authors recognise the range of tools, related to the role played by military intervention,

“If military intervention is to be contemplated, the need for a post-intervention strategy is also of paramount importance. Military intervention is one instrument in a broader spectrum of tools designed to prevent conflicts and humanitarian emergencies from arising, intensifying, spreading, persisting or recurring. The objective of such a strategy must be to help ensure that the conditions that prompted the military intervention do not repeat themselves or simply resurface. ... the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action ... an integrated peace building effort is needed to address the various factors which have caused or are threatening a conflict.”

In strategic and tactical terms, by aligning approaches and methods throughout the process of meeting short term *and* long term goals, there is a shared understanding of the values and aims, participants can have ownership of their peace, and it increases the likelihood of reaching the intended outcomes.

³⁷ Cited in Schweitzer 2009a:112


³⁸ A.a.O.

³⁹ ICISS 2001:39, cited in Rigby 2006.

As well as Galtung's approaches, the short and long term goals involved in taking a vulnerable community from fear to safety, in this case a transition from violence to sustainable peace, are identified in the ALNAP publication Slim and Bonwick (2005:43) as:

- Responsive Action
- Remedial Action
- Environment building

Table 6) Humanitarian Protection



Achieving a sustainable peace requires peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding (and will include aspects of Responsive Action, Remedial action and Environment building), but it is not a linear progression through them. At any one time elements of them all are likely to be taking pace in a situation, implemented by various agencies. To be a coherent and collaborative effort, to make effective progress towards peace, wherever possible all organisations and agencies should have common approaches and understand their roles.

Good practice in protection involves the collaboration of many agencies. If nonviolence is a thread that weaves amongst them, and starts to demonstrate the benefits of involving communities in building sustainable peace from the stage of Responsive Action or Peacekeeping, then nonviolent approaches will become more understood and integrated.

What is peacekeeping?

Peacekeeping is defined by the International Peace Academy⁴⁰ as, the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace,

and Schirch (2006:56) additionally notes that peacekeeping, usually refers to attempts to reduce the amount of direct physical violence and not the underlying structural violence of discriminatory policies and institutions...

Peacekeeping commonly brings up an image of soldiers keeping parties to the conflict apart and with protection roles, but modern peacekeeping involves many different functions. Randle (2006:6)

⁴⁰ Cited in Schirch 2006:15

suggests that the only peacekeeping task not able to be carried out by nonviolent peacekeepers is 'enforcement', that is where,

the peacekeepers are authorized to use their weapons not just in self defence but in other circumstances, notably defending civilians under attack or engaging armed groups that are breaking the ceasefire, and sometimes more broadly to protect public security.

And he suggests that,

Here the question is whether they [the unarmed peacekeepers] could provide by their presence and authority a reasonable measure of protection to the civilian population, and whether sanctions and internal civil resistance could prove sufficiently powerful coercive instruments when enforcement was required. (Randle 2006:6)

At present the dominant method of peacekeeping is using military forces, but peacemaking and peacebuilding are implemented using nonviolent strategies such as participation or ownership, and therefore there is an existing tension between stages of peacekeeping and peacemaking or peacebuilding. If we chose a nonviolent approach at the peacekeeping stage, it will enable a more coherent strategy throughout short and long term goals and actions.

Military peacekeeping has changed over time from traditional to third generation peace support operations (Ramsbothom & Woodhouse 2005) and now includes many civilian functions, and additional activities. It is still seen as necessary to have a military component and often run as a military mission with civil-military cooperation necessary with non-military agencies, but there are nonviolent alternatives to the military component, which could reduce the tensions in the cooperation and collaboration tasks.

Ramsbothom & Woodhouse (2005) have put forward the proposal that civilians should play roles in an international 'cosmopolitan peacekeeping' force such as mediation, and conflict resolution experts (as well as relief and environmental crisis experts), but make no mention of the roles that civilians can play in directly protecting civilians. Randle (2006) suggests one way of increasing nonviolent peacekeeping is a continual expansion of the roles and numbers of civilians in peacekeeping missions from the small number that exist today. He shows how nonviolent peacekeeping has already made a difference and describes the many roles that civilians can play, which are explored below.

Unarmed protection is a nonviolent response to direct violence and it is used in nonviolent peacekeeping to protect individuals and communities, for example returning refugees or informal groups. It can create the space for them to build and own protection stages, conflict resolution mechanisms and a peace community, which will build a sustainable peace.

To achieve a long term sustainable peace requires the collaboration of many agencies, projects and stakeholders. This was identified in the CDA project "Reflecting on Peace Practice" and I suggest that by using nonviolent peacekeeping strategies, it is possible to increase collaboration, reduce the necessity for civil-military cooperation functions, and start the process of building civil society and an accountable governance from early on in an intervention.

We must also consider that long term peace can only be secured by the involvement of local people and our strategies should be in line with that theory, and also consider that peace cannot be imposed through violence so ensuring an intervention models nonviolence will create a stronger opportunity for peace.

Nonviolence

Nonviolence is about transforming or changing the situation, it is about engaging people – effective protection strategies that involve local people, and it is participatory – finding out what people need and want, and involve communities in discussions on *how* they want to be protected.

Nonviolence is about change – not just diminishing the violence, but also addressing the structural and cultural violence.

As Schweitzer says in the *Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility* (2001):

Nonviolence is always searching for a future for all sides to the conflict, while other approaches might be content to have pacified and silenced one side, or in the extreme case even aim at their extinction.

Some communities specifically choose nonviolent methods of protection because they fear that protection with weapons will draw more fire to them, instead of protecting them from violence.

For example the peace communities in Colombia like San Jose de Apartadó, a community who declared themselves a peace community in 1997 rejecting any participation in the war and not to have any weapons in the community, and not to give information or support any of the parties in the conflict. They keep a high national and international profile, aided by international accompaniment from unarmed protectors, and have had success in nonviolently resisting the war, but since they were formed there have been 160 deaths amongst members of the community, and they continue to need a high level of international support and visibility to maintain their nonviolent resistance. They are an example of the use of nonviolence through short term protection aims and long term peacebuilding through resistance to the war.

If we choose nonviolent peacekeeping, then the links, the trust and relationships necessary for peace begin to be built from the first intervention.

Nonviolence can be a tactic used in a specific situation, but is also about challenging violence at direct, structural and cultural levels in a society, and is therefore not always welcomed by those with an interest in maintaining violence and armed conflict (spoilers).

Strategies

Peacekeeping is being carried out with nonviolent methods and there are various strategies that organisations have developed and employ in places such as Colombia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Philippines and Indonesia.

Nonviolent peacekeeping can equally be carried out by civilians in their own country. Schirch (2006) mentions women in Africa interpositioning themselves between warring tribes or of white Americans accompanying African Americans to deter violence as segregation was opposed, and even when there is an external intervention it will typically include the goal of enabling local people to provide their own protection mechanisms, or even include local people on the peacekeeping teams, as Nonviolent Peaceforce does in Mindanao, Philippines.

Nonviolent peacekeeping primarily uses dissuasion, or deterrence, rather than force, to stop violence. Nonviolence analyst Gene Sharp defines dissuasion as,

the result of acts or processes which induce an opponent not to carry out a contemplated hostile action. Rational argument, moral appeal, increased cooperation, improved human understanding, distraction, adoption of non-offensive policy and deterrence may all be used to achieve dissuasion. (Sharp 1985, cited in Mahony & Eguren 1997:85)

Schweitzer (2009a:119) notes that deterrence is not the only factor in how nonviolent peacekeeping works. She comments that,

Relationship-building to the local community and trust that is built up to the different actors in conflict is at least as important as having 'international clout'.

And goes on to list the following as important components to success;

- The identity of the peacekeepers (for example gender or country of origin),
- The role they assume in the conflict and whom they represent,
- Local law and tradition (for example special places or respect in some circumstances), and
- A basic interest of all sides in avoiding further violence.

As well as deterring violence and threats, nonviolent peacekeeping seeks to create space for people to work effectively on their own safety and peace initiatives. For example, by providing constant accompaniment to human rights defenders in Guatemala, Peace Brigades International enabled them to travel safely to meet people needing help and support and therefore help build the structures for long term peace at the same time as providing protection from direct violence.

Schirch (2006:44) identifies some sources of power that civilian peacekeepers can use:

Moral authority – she says,

civilian peacekeepers can have the power to protect civilians threatened by violence, if they can effectively remind the armed groups of the basic moral values of the international community and its rights and norms.

Legal authority – the international law system can be supported by civilian peacekeepers collecting data that can be used in legal processes.

Media attention – Schirch explains this power as,

civilian peacekeepers gain credibility and an ability to be effective deterrents to violence by advertising their presence and role in newspapers, radio, and television. Schirch (2006:45)

Schirch (2006) also describes the following forms of peacekeeping, which apply in different situations depending on the nature of the conflict and the violence, and interests of local people:

Buffer Zones – An area, often described in a Peace Agreement, and patrolled by peacekeepers to keep opposing parties separate. The monitoring and patrolling aspect could be undertaken by nonviolent peacekeepers

Interposition Peacekeeping – Where peacekeepers physically stand between opposing parties, maybe enabling communication, or using their 'moral authority' to prevent direct violence and provide space for nonviolent solutions to be found.

Peace Zones – An area where no fighting takes place and no weapons are carried. These can be declared by the inhabitants and do not require peacekeepers, although as the peace community in Colombia found, international protective presence is necessary if armed parties to the conflict do not respect the peace zone.

Accompaniment and Presence – Protects individuals, organisations or small groups from attack, which reduces direct violence and increases confidence of those accompanied. It can be used to deter known threats or random acts of violence.

These forms of peacekeeping are dissociative, but peacekeeping also involves other tasks such as,

- Observing and Monitoring** – There are many aspects of a conflict which can be monitored and recorded, such as the conditions of a peace agreement, the impact on civilians and number of human rights abuses, or conduct of people during elections. It is a role that has been done by unarmed civilians for many years and remains important when engaging the international community.
- Facilitating Communication** – Within peacekeeping facilitating communication can involve preventing or stopping rumours that could lead to an escalation in violence, or opening communication channels between opposing groups, or providing a safe, neutral, space for parties to the conflict to meet.

Some aspects of nonviolent peacekeeping are to ensure that the primary responsibility for protecting civilians remains with the state, and that the state is reminded of this. Eguren (2009:104) notes that the role of non-governmental actors is to be a permanent reminder to the state that it is the state who has the responsibility to protect civilians. Governments still have the responsibility to protect civilians, and one role of unarmed protection is to put enough political pressure on them to change or generate the political will to protect the civilians.

In order to ensure that civilians receive the protection to which they are entitled, peacekeepers would need to ensure they monitor and collect information, have strong links to the authorities, and accompany community leaders who request the protection.

Once nonviolent peacekeeping has been identified as a possible strategy there are many decisions about approach and methods of implementation. Analysis of the situation, identifying points of leverage, and how the international community are being involved will help inform the choice of tasks and activities. There is overlap between the strategies and tasks because peacekeeping relies on a number of inter-related approaches that then carried out iteratively over time aim to reduce violence, but it is not a linear process that can be easily separated and progression mapped out.

Eguren (2009:104) suggests that once a specific strategy has been adopted, then the essential tasks must be chosen, which he suggests could be;

a) To maintain a presence in the area.

For example the Nonviolent Peaceforce teams in Sri Lanka regularly monitor several IDP camps, visiting others as field work takes them to other parts of the district. They respond to emergency calls for protective presence when residents feel insecure about some developing incident, or the local Human Rights Commission (HRC), depend on the same Sri Lanka Team's presence and accompaniment for their field investigations from time to time, including in contested border areas where land disputes can quickly turn violent.

b) Build and maintain a network of contacts.

For example when hundreds of families living in Sri Lankan border areas between Muslim and Tamil communities that were becoming increasingly violent towards one another fled their homes and sought safety in churches or other community centers, a Nonviolent Peaceforce team was able to visit several of these make-shift camps and convey to other agencies the immediate needs for relief the families shared.

The work of Nonviolent Peaceforce in setting up strong community networks in part prevented the same violence spreading northwards and the Valaichchenai Traders Association, made up of Tamil and Muslim businesses, requested Nonviolent Peaceforce to host a meeting where 30 traders came together to discuss how to prevent violence from spreading in their area.

c) Ensure regular communication with authorities and officials.

For example in Sri Lanka there are continuous reports of adults affected by threats, arrests, killings, abductions, forced recruitment, disappearances, and sexual/gender-based violence. Nonviolent Peaceforce provides support to help people to report their cases to agencies, for example the Human Rights Commission, or to access legal advice.

d) Publish analysis and information.

Peacekeeping organisations do this to different extents. For some it is expected that the peacekeepers will return home with their information and experience and share it widely, whilst others tightly control what comments are made, but all peacekeepers rely to some extent on informing others about the situation in which they work.

Other commonly used activities, which overlap with strategies in some areas, are:

e) Accompaniment.

For example Peace Brigades International have 25 years of experience in accompanying community leaders to protect them from attack. Or Accompaniment of individuals could be for many different reasons for example a local NGO partner doing community awareness programs in a vulnerable area who sought Nonviolent Peaceforce support to travel with them to and from the area so they felt safe carrying out their program or a community leader in fear of armed group activity in area where he was meeting.

f) Monitoring.

For example the tasks of presence and monitoring are already carried out by nonviolent peacekeepers. The Nonviolent Peaceforce project in Sri Lanka use presence and monitoring to reduce the threat and spread of direct violence in vulnerable communities.

g) Linking people to authorities or agencies.

For example in Sri Lanka, relationships were strengthened with government agencies mandated to help protect children, such as the Probation Department and the National Child Protection Commission. While Nonviolent Peaceforce facilitated initial meetings with government servants, the confidence of parents increased and they were able to subsequently advocate on their own behalf. Such activities help empower local communities to be more active agents for the protection of their children.

h) Training and dialogue at community level.

For example working with a number of active Peace Committees in Sri Lanka, Nonviolent Peaceforce supports community-based efforts aimed at bringing different communities together across issues and boundaries, for example meeting Peace Committees to discuss any early warning signs of communal tensions erupting.

Nonviolent peacekeeping does not happen in vacuum, and relies on the connection of a peacekeeper to other people at anytime, so the tools of unarmed peacekeeping are cameras, tape recorders, satellite phones, and notebooks. The need to document and communicate is essential in successful nonviolent protection (Martin 2009) and ensures that the links to other people are clear.

In addition the necessity of having trust in communities needs to be emphasised. Trust by the community is first established by being invited in as non-violent peacekeepers by local community leaders, and then by living and working with people on a day-to-day business, and following up the work they commit to doing. By being able to demonstrate that there is a real benefit that the peacekeepers provides, gradually trust will develop.

Conclusion

Whilst peacekeeping continues to be an essential component in the creation of a durable peace, the new strategies and proven impact of the existing projects of nonviolent peacekeeping show that it is a viable and useful method that can be used in an intervention.

Peacekeeping continues to be a subject debated and developed, and Michael Randle suggests that a continuous increase in the number of nonviolent peacekeepers will help demonstrate and enable nonviolent peacekeeping to be used by larger agencies.

If we continue with the assumption that the military are the only ones with power to stop violence, then we miss a huge opportunity to empower and engage those who require protection.

Although the military peacekeepers in an intervention do good and can improve a situation, there may be better ways of doing it using nonviolent strategies. The two are not direct alternatives, but when nonviolent peacekeeping can be used, it can reduce some of the negative aspects of military peacekeeping and contribute to improve collaboration.

The existing projects have demonstrated that in taking on the unarmed protection and peacekeeping role, civilians can:

1. Protect people from immediate harm (for example prevention through rumour control, presence and accompaniment to reduce likelihood of attack, and coordination to ensure international pressure),
2. Contribute to medium term goals where there is an absence of direct violence (for example training local people in unarmed protection methods, building peace committees) and,
3. Support long term efforts for a safe and secure community (model nonviolent alternatives, support the creation of structures to handle human rights abuses).

The benefits of this are that short, medium and long term goals can be integrated as required in a community without the need to falsely separate the actions, or leave civil society initiatives unsupported (as they could be in a military intervention because military methods rarely don't allow for ownership of a protection strategy to be shared with civil society).

If peacekeeping had nonviolent protection strategies recognized as proven and used in the formation of peacekeeping missions, it could influence how we implement and coordinate long term peace strategies.

Synergy between short and long term goals is important in finding sustainable peace. If we want them to be integrated (making long term goals easier to achieve), want local ownership and embedded protection strategies, then we need to allow nonviolence to guide our actions from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

We need more peacekeepers, but let us open the possibility that nonviolent peacekeepers can take a greater role and their activities can benefit those who live in fear of direct violence.

Humanitarian Protection as an Additional Function of Humanitarian, Development and Peace Projects—Or Rather a Task Requiring Experts? **By Christine Schweitzer**

Introduction

The importance of protection of civilians—a phrase used here to mean assuring the safety of civilians from acute harm (O’Callaghan & Pantuliano 2007:3)⁴¹—has been amply recognized in the international field. I focus in this contribution on harm resulting from armed conflict or protracted violent social conflict—in other words, protection against threats of direct violence committed by a human perpetrator.

In mainstream politics, increased threats to security in crisis regions are often solely seen vis-à-vis the decision to send in armed forces. The debate on human security and on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) illustrates this observation. Said debate is in fact dominated by the issue, despite the UN General Assembly’s clear message that R2P is *not* only about military intervention.⁴² In this paper I would like to leave out the question of military peacekeeping or ‘humanitarian intervention’ and concentrate solely on civilian, unarmed strategies and methods of protection.

Several overlapping discourses can be distinguished:

1. Discussion on the concepts of Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect.⁴³
2. Discussion of strategies and methods of humanitarian protection, usually referring to humanitarian protection as a task ‘to mainstream’ by humanitarian organisations.⁴⁴ Protection here is understood consisting of three layers: The first is ‘responsive action,’ which ‘is defined as any activity undertaken in the context of an emerging or established pattern of abuses, aimed at preventing its recurrence, putting a stop to it and/or alleviating its immediate effects.’ Methods are pressuring authorities or convincing them, providing direct services to persons exposed to abuse, alleviating immediate suffering, legal assistance (see the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee publication on ‘Growing the Sheltering Tree’ 2002:16pp). The other two forms of humanitarian protection are remedial action, which ‘refers to action taken with a view to restoring dignified living conditions subsequent to a pattern of abuse’ (2002:16)

⁴¹ Slim & Bonwick (2005:52pp) define protection as reduction of vulnerability, using the risk-based model: Risk = Threat + Vulnerability x Time.

⁴² The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) put forward by a report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. It was then adopted by the 2005 United Nations World Summit of Heads of States and Governments and confirmed a year later by the UN Security Council. The World Summit affirmed that ‘each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from four types of crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (see Evans 2008). According to this concept, if a State fails to meet its responsibility, the international community has the responsibility to intervene, by force if necessary. The Responsibility to Protect furthermore recognizes three elements or phases: a responsibility to prevent, a responsibility to react, and a responsibility to rebuild, and describes three pillars. Pillar 1 is the responsibility of each State to protect its population from the R2P crimes and their incitement. Pillar 2 consists of international assistance and capacity building to help States to meet these obligations. Pillar 3 is the timely and decisive response, including intervention in the sense of acting against the will of the State in question.

⁴³ On R2P, two publications summarizing the debate held so far are Evans 2008 and Von Arnould 2009. See also United Nations Secretary-General 2009. The discussion of Human Security that to some extent preceded that on R2P was started by a UNDP report from 1994 (United Nations Development Programme 1994). While some of its protagonists prefer to widen the concept to cover all sorts of threats, others (e.g. the Human Security Centre) focus on threats caused by armed conflict. See the webpage of the Centre <www.humansecuritycentre.org> and *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (2004).

⁴⁴ See for example, International Committee of the Red Cross 1999, United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2002, Slim & Eguren 2004, Slim & Bonwick 2005, O’Callaghan & Pantuliano 2007, International Committee of the Red Cross 2008.

and environment-building action which ‘involves contributing to creating a social, cultural, institutional, and legal environment conducive to respect for the rights of the individual, in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law’ (2002:19).

3. The role and work of UNHCR, ICRC (see for example International Committee of the Red Cross 2008).
4. Civilian Peacekeeping, a term used here to mean the prevention of direct violence through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators by unarmed civilians who are deployed on the ground. The literature here consists mostly of case studies and overviews from different projects, missions and organisations.⁴⁵ Sometimes, in particular in the USA, the term ‘nonviolent intervention’ is used to describe the same field. The NGO world is heavily dominated by projects referring to themselves as *peace teams*. As to unarmed governmental missions, these are often civilian ceasefire, human rights or election monitoring missions.
5. Particular topics related to the field are humanitarian negotiation, the safety of humanitarian personnel, and the discussion on Do No Harm.⁴⁶
6. Besides these discourses focusing on the role of external parties in protection, there is also growing evidence about the role of local civil society in protection.⁴⁷

Starting from the basic strategy of ‘proactive’ or ‘conscious’ presence as a model of how to protect civilians⁴⁸, the main methods used in protection are

- Protective accompaniment aiming at deterring an attack, a method developed and linked mostly to the NGO Peace Brigades International, though a number of other peace team projects also use accompaniment as a major tactic⁴⁹;
- Monitoring of the situation of vulnerable groups and/or of human rights in general;
- Visibility through local or regional offices and/or patrolling;
- Sustained multi-level diplomacy⁵⁰;
- Active encouragement and empowerment of civil society;
- Bridging and convening mechanisms bringing parties together; and
- Public advocacy.

Sometimes also the tactic of interpositioning, ‘peacekeepers placing themselves physically between groups engaged in violent conflict,’ (Schirch 1995:24) is added here.⁵¹

⁴⁵ See Schirch 1995, Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber (eds) 2000, Schweitzer *et al* 2001, Mahony 2006, Schirch 2006:8, Clark (ed) 2009. An exception are Mahony & Eguren 1997 who developed a theory of unarmed deterrence to explain the strategy and impact of protective accompaniment.

⁴⁶ Humanitarian negotiation: See Mancini-Roth & Picot 2004, McHugh & Bessler 2006.

Safety of humanitarian personnel: See Stoddard *et al* 2006.

Do no harm: See Anderson 1999.

⁴⁷ See O’Callaghan & Pantuliano (2007:4pp) who distinguish 1. Avoidance through flight, 2. Engaging with armed groups and negotiating or purchasing safety, or 3. Active resistance, and the comparative study of the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding Geneva (Paffenholz 2009a and 2009b).

⁴⁸ Mahony 2006:v, Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2002:42pp.

⁴⁹ The *physical presence of foreign volunteers with the dual purpose of protecting civilian activists or organizations from violent, politically motivated attacks and encouraging them to proceed with their democratic activities.* (Mahony & Eguren 1997:2)

⁵⁰ This and the following see Stoddard *et al* 2006. They refer to the work of humanitarian agencies but their list is equally valid for civilian peacekeeping missions.

⁵¹ See articles in Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber (eds) 2000 and Schweitzer *et al* 2001 for a critical discussion of interpositioning.

The first of two major mechanisms at work in unarmed protection is deterrence of a perpetrator, a strategy researched and defined on the example of the work of Peace Brigades International by Mahony & Eguren (1997).

International accompaniment can succeed in deterring attacks because the decision makers behind these attacks seldom want a bad international image. They don't want the world to know about what they are doing. They don't want diplomats making them uncomfortable mentioning human rights problems in their meetings. They don't want to read in the international press that they are being called monsters or criminals. (Mahony 2004:7)

The second is acceptance, entailing

the ... agency becoming a familiar and trusted entity by the host community and the beneficiary population, cultivating a network of contacts and intermediaries to maintain open lines of communication and reception from the key (often belligerent) parties. (Stoddard et al 2006:1)

This paper aims in particular to discuss whether protection is most effectively and efficiently provided as an additional function of the work of aid and development organisations on the ground ('mainstreaming' of protection), or if in situations of extensive tension it is preferable or more effective to have organisations concentrating solely on civilian peacekeeping. To simplify language, the term 'humanitarian protection' shall be used to describe protection as a function fulfilled by humanitarian organisations, and 'civilian peacekeeping' to describe projects or missions deploying personnel with the provision of protection as a major objective.

The paper is based mainly on my recent not yet published dissertation on interventions by non-state actors into the conflicts in former Yugoslavia (Schweitzer 2009b), on the findings of the comparative Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study (Schweitzer *et al* 2001) and on my direct experience between 2001 and 2008 as Programme Director of the INGO Nonviolent Peaceforce that has or has had projects in Sri Lanka, Guatemala and the Philippines. As case studies, I will present the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the civilian peacekeeping work in Mindanao, Philippines.

Case Study 1: Protection in the former Yugoslavia

There has been a broad plethora of missions, organisations and projects involved in humanitarian protection and peacekeeping in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo) in the 1990s. There has been little that was not tried over the years, by international organisations and individual governments, by nongovernmental organisations, churches, an uncounted number of small citizens' groups in Western Europe and North America, by civil society groups from the former Yugoslavia itself, and others. As to protection, there have been many state and non-state actors combining the function of protection with other strategies as well as (governmental) civilian missions with peacekeeping as a main focus.⁵²

⁵² I am referring here solely to direct protection what in the literature on humanitarian protection is often called „responsive action“, see footnote above.

Governmental Missions

Aside from the different military peacekeeping missions,⁵³ there have been several larger-scale governmental civilian peacekeeping missions, as well as UN agencies with a clear protection mandate.⁵⁴

The first was the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM, later EUMM, from 1991-2007).⁵⁵ In July 1991, the ECMM was sent to Slovenia and Croatia with a typical peacekeeping mandate of monitoring ceasefires but also including protection elements like monitoring the release and return of prisoners in cooperation with ICRC (Maloney 1997:28pp).

With the deployment of UNPROFOR in 1992, the mandate of ECMM changed. It concentrated then on those thematic and geographic areas which did not fall under the UNPROFOR mandate, gathering information on ceasefire violations, military movements, the local civil situation and the status of implementation of the Vance Peace Plan of 1991 (the plan that had led to the deployment of UNPROFOR I). They also accompanied international negotiator teams, brokered local ceasefires, helped with the exchange of prisoners of war, escorted (without arms) humanitarian aid, reported on human rights violations, etc.⁵⁶

In Croatia, the ECMM ran into many problems. It faced logistical dilemmas and suffered from poor communication and confusion over objectives and priorities. The Serbs saw the monitors as spies for Croatia, while in Croatia they were considered highly ineffective and usually referred to by the nickname 'ice cream men' because of their white uniforms (see Maloney 1997, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:88pp, Lucarelli 2000:26pp). Nevertheless, they may have achieved more on the ground than they were credited with at the time, preventing small incidents from leading to major confrontations (see Gow 1997:106, Libal 1997:49, Giersch 1998:98).

The second has been the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of the OSCE. Under the threat of NATO intervention in Kosovo in the autumn of 1998, the Yugoslav government under Milosevic agreed at the end of October 1998 to the deployment of a civilian peacekeeping force.⁵⁷ An unarmed OSCE mission was acceptable to both sides, although the Kosovo-Albanian leadership would have preferred an armed peacekeeping force. Deployment began in November 1998, but not having the personnel (or equipment) ready, the Mission only reached around 75 percent of the agreed number of 2,000 staff before it was withdrawn on March 20, 1999 after the collapse of the Rambouillet negotiations.

Its mandate was to establish a permanent presence throughout Kosovo, monitor the ceasefire agreed between OSCE and FR Yugoslavia in October 1998 and to report ceasefire violations, conduct border monitoring, and facilitate the return of refugees along with ICRC and UNHCR. It was also anticipated that it would supervise elections in Kosovo. The Verifiers established permanent

⁵³ UNPROFOR I – III 1992-95, UNPREDEP in Macedonia (before UNPROFOR III, until 1999), IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina from end of 1995 until 2004, then becoming EUFOR, KFOR in Kosovo from 1999 onward being the main ones.

⁵⁴ Though their civilian character however was limited since they operated in heavily militarised scenarios. The Kosovo Verification Mission was even protected by a NATO Extraction Force (see above).

⁵⁵ They were mainly recruited from civil servants (diplomats) and the military (professional soldiers). Besides the (then 12) EC countries also Canada, Sweden and some Eastern European countries participated. The head of the mission automatically came from the country which had the EC (EU) presidency, and changed every six months (as did most of the monitors, few of whom had contracts for longer than six months.) The EUMM in the Western Balkans came to an end formally on 31 December 2007, during its final years only maintaining a presence in Montenegro and Albania. For ECMM / EUMM in general, see Giersch 1998:96pp and 129pp. (In forthcoming Schweitzer 2010, a fuller list of references is given.)

⁵⁶ They also became involved in small-scale humanitarian aid, for example delivering letters across border-lines, locating missing people etc.

⁵⁷ For an overview on the KVM, see Loquai 1999, Wenig 1999, Schweitzer *et al.* 2001 and Dufour 2007. In Schweitzer 2009b), a fuller list of references is given.

outposts in crisis areas, visited places where fighting was reported, monitored several court trials, conducted weapons verification inspections, accompanied Serbian police and Serbian investigators to places controlled by the UCK, and sought to intervene actively if they came across violence.

The evaluation of KVM is rather contested. On the one hand, it undoubtedly managed to reduce violence by talking to both sides and convincing them to contain localised outbreaks of violence.⁵⁸ In addition, their mere presence played a role in restraining violence. Specifically, at the beginning of the mission, the ceasefire was respected. Both the Serbs and the more moderate commanders of the UCK were willing to stop fighting, which gave a chance for stabilisation of the situation. Refugees and displaced persons returned in greater numbers as the fighting calmed down. Even in January-February 1999 when the situation became tense again, the arrival of KVM personnel on the scene usually had a de-escalating effect.⁵⁹

On the other hand, the Verifiers could not fully contain the violence. There were attacks on police and civilians all the time in varying degrees, and increasingly also on the Verifiers themselves.⁶⁰ The agreement to deploy KVM was also flawed because it was an agreement between the USA and FR Yugoslavia, with the UCK not being a party to it, and not feeling bound by it (see Calic 1998). As Judah (2002:198) and Loquai (2000:62) point out, the ceasefire was also used by the UCK to move back into its strongholds as soon as the Yugoslavs withdrew, probably in preparation for a new offensive in spring 1999.

My evaluation would be that given the circumstances under which KVM was deployed—with one party of the conflict explicitly hoping to bring about the military intervention already threatened against the other party—the KVM was surprisingly successful in the field.

There were several other governmental missions and organisations with peacekeeping roles and functions, among them:

1. International police (IPTF/ CIVPOL and EUPM) were deployed by the UN or the EU at one point or the other in almost all countries of former Yugoslavia. They have usually had a mandate that focused on training of local police (which would fall under peace-building), but many of them also had a monitoring element to their mandate, including dealing with incidents of political violence and how ethnic minorities were treated by the local police forces. The IPTF in Kosovo from 1999 onward has been one of the first international police missions with an executive mandate, meaning that they have the right to arrest people themselves rather than only accompanying local forces.⁶¹
2. Being the UN's lead agency to deal with the humanitarian crises in former Yugoslavia, UNHCR also had a clearly protection-related mandate, e.g. through its presence at vulnerable places. There were also cases when UNHCR helped threatened groups to leave the area or the country, although this was mostly the initiative of the staff on the ground and not part of their mandate. To avoid the accusation of helping with ethnic cleansing, UNHCR was not supposed to help people escape.⁶²

Protection and Peacekeeping by Civil Society Actors

Unlike the situation in some other countries, peacekeeping by civil society actors was relatively rare. Preventing and stopping violence by deploying personnel on the ground and addressing the

⁵⁸ 'The first weeks of deployment had shown that in those areas where verifiers were present, the number of incidents decreased.' (Wenig 1999:83p, translation CS)

⁵⁹ See Loquai 2000:61pp, Wenig 1999/2000:89.

⁶⁰ See the Kosovo Updates of KVM from 27.1.99, 22.2.99, 23.2.99, 26.2.99.

⁶¹ For the International Police missions, see Holm & Eide (eds) 2000. (In Schweitzer 2009b, a fuller list of references is given.)

⁶² See Woodward 1995:243, 319 and 325.

potential perpetrators has mostly been just one function among several of the different projects and organisations in question.

There is only one example of an organisation that had a longer-term peacekeeping mandate:⁶³ The volunteer project Balkan Peace Team (BPT) that was working with small teams of 2-5 people each in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1994 and 2001. BPT's overall goal was a wide one: to 'promote a peaceful development by maintaining a permanent presence of international volunteers in some crisis areas' (Schweitzer and Clark 2002:29). Protection and support of dialogue were its two foci. In Serbia and Kosovo, the priority was the support of dialogue between civil society activists, whilst in Croatia, protection was more important and revolved mainly about two issues.

The first was the issue of illegal house evictions, which was a focus of concern for a number of local human rights groups. In the first years after independence, the Croatian state (or local authorities) tried to evict tenants from flats that had belonged to the Yugoslav Peoples' Army. Victims were usually ethnic Serbs. Accompanying local human rights activists to evictions was one of the first protection-related activities BPT undertook in 1994 (see Mueller 2006:48). When called to an eviction, BPT volunteers usually did not only come by themselves but also called upon other international agencies and media to be present as well. In several cases, the police aborted their attempts to evict the tenant when they found that internationals were present in the flat.

The second was monitoring the situation in the former Krajina (UN Protected Areas West and South) after the reoccupation by Croatia in 1995, and again the accompaniment of local activists to the area. In Western Slavonia, BPT together with volunteers from other international projects entered the area within a few days of the reconquest, seeking to establish a continuous presence of observers. One volunteer spent two nights in the house of a local politician who was considered to be threatened (see Mueller 2006:63).⁶⁴

While the theoretical reflection of the importance of humanitarian protection may have still been mostly lacking in the earlier 1990s, in practice many organisations found themselves challenged with issues of direct protection in certain situations:

Just to give one example: In the early years after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, peace-building projects working there found themselves sometimes challenged by the possibility of interethnic violence especially in the context of refugee and IDP return. While they usually tended to call to IFOR/SFOR in for such cases—for example to escort people visiting graveyards—there were also situations where the presence of the civilian peace or development workers directly provided some protection. For example, one peace worker from the German Civil Peace Service in Banja Luka looked after an elderly widow who had returned to her pre-war apartment but was afraid of being attacked and evicted again (see Pax Christi 2003).

Besides these activities of direct protection, thousands of NGOs have been involved in supporting IDPs and refugees or other war victims and fulfilling functions of humanitarian protection. One example which is a bit out of the ordinary is what civil society organisations in several European countries started to do, namely helping refugees to leave the war area and come to third European countries against the will of the government of these countries that were not willing to accept more refugees as agreed in form of 'contingents' each EU country was to accept. In Germany between 1993/94 and the end of 1995, the initiative 'Survive the War' brought more than 8,000 people out of Bosnia and Croatia.⁶⁵

⁶³ There were several short-term peace caravans and similar activist-type projects with an element of interpositioning into the war in Bosnia and the conflict in Kosovo but they had little if any positive impact. See Schweitzer 2009b.

⁶⁴ Both in Mueller (2006) and Schweitzer & Clark (2002), a number of further examples of accompaniment of local activist in this context can be found.

⁶⁵ It used a gap in the German immigration laws. People from non-EU countries could get a three-month visa if they

Case Study 2: Civilian Peacekeeping 'Pure': Nonviolent Peaceforce in the Philippines (Mindanao)

In the first case study on the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, there has been no example of a longer-term, stable NGO focusing on civilian peacekeeping. Therefore I would like to introduce this second example which is perhaps particularly attractive because it involves the cooperation of local and international civilian peacekeepers.⁶⁶

The ceasefire agreed between the government of the Philippines and the insurgent Muslim Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao in 2005 was monitored by an official mechanism that had four elements: The Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), Local Monitoring Teams, an International Monitoring Team staffed mostly by Malaysia, and an Ad hoc Joint Action Group. The CCCH set up Monitoring Posts in the conflict areas that were manned by government and MILF soldiers as well as with representatives of local civil society initiatives. The extraordinary feature of this set-up was the close involvement of several hundred local civil society peacekeepers who mostly work in a voluntary capacity.⁶⁷

These local peace groups invited Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) to send an international team to provide support and protective presence to local groups working to enhance civil society initiatives and prevent violence. NP is a young international NGO based in Brussels, founded with the goal to develop unarmed peacekeeping, in the sense of having direct impact for the human security of populations caught in an armed conflict through the presence of large numbers of international trained professionals using purely nonviolent means.⁶⁸

Beneficiaries of the project were be vulnerable communities, individuals and civil society groups whose lives and work are threatened by the continuing violence or threat of violence, in particular women and children.

Nonviolent Peaceforce sent its first team of six persons to Mindanao in May 2007. In the first two years of its work, NP has been able together with local groups to work successfully on several smaller and larger incidents in Central Mindanao as well as the Sulu Archipel including Basilan), helping to prevent such incidents leading to a full-scale military confrontation. The tasks of NP teams include:

- To reduce the incidence of violence in the vicinity of NP field sites (which are based in conflict-prone areas) through quickly responding when violent clashes threaten or break out, keeping lines of communication open with all parties, helping to negotiate ceasefires that would allow civilians to leave the area, and accompanying local monitors and negotiators.
- To support human rights reporting mechanisms in remote conflict areas and to assist/connect local and international advocacy groups
- To localise grassroots conflicts so that they are resolved through dialogue at the lowest level and do not escalate into larger crises
- To help set up a system of early warning and early response by local civil society.
- Training and other support to local civil society groups

were invited personally by a resident who guaranteed the costs of their stay.. Through the network of its supporters and through public appeals, Survive the War found hundreds of individuals, families and local groups, both ethnic Germans and people with a migration background from the area to personally invite refugees. See Schweitzer 2009b.

⁶⁶ There are many other examples of such NGOs to be found in the literature, e.g. Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, Carea and different initiatives in Palestine. See Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000, Schweitzer *et al* 2001, Schirch 2006.

⁶⁷ See Bantay Ceasefire 2003. The ceasefire broke down when the peace talks collapsed in 2008 which meant the suspension of the ceasefire mechanisms and led Malaysia to leave the IMT, and also Currently (September 2009) there are indicators that the peace process will be revived and new ceasefire monitoring mechanisms created.

⁶⁸ See <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org>

- Protective accompaniment of local groups (e.g. when a Philippine-wide peace caravan was undertaken in 2008)
- Linking civil society and governmental actors from all sides and different levels of society
- Engage the leaders of different parties involved in the peace process and other stakeholders, and maintain impartial and open lines of communications with armed parties to the conflict

The overall internal monitoring of the project (a first external evaluation will only take place later in 2009) shows that the presence of the International Civilian Peacekeepers (as the NP field personnel are called) is quite effective in spite of the situation that worsened in 2008 with the suspension of the ceasefire mechanism and the resumption of fights which only recently in August 2009 have been ended once more. NP is contributing impressively in this critical situation to deter and document cases of human rights violations, creating spaces for dialogue at various levels. The continuous presence of NP International Civilian Peacekeepers on the ground also helps to relay real-time information to all the key stakeholders in the peace process.

After two years of presence, most stakeholders in Mindanao have come to know NP and to understand and appreciate its role. This, however, has not been easy to achieve. In the process of setting up the work, a number of obstacles had to be overcome, often due to the problem local NGOs had in understanding what an NGO that was not going to distribute relief or engage in physical construction, etc. was about. Unlike the human rights defenders in many Latin American countries who by now are well familiar with the role of NGOs providing humanitarian accompaniment and know how to make use of this service, international NGOs in Mindanao were traditionally considered to be either relief/development organisations or missionaries.⁶⁹

Similarly, though NP has experienced a real breakthrough in this regard in the last year when the peace process came under a real threat, it has also not been easy to convince funders that such work is worth funding.

Another issue is how protection works in this case, which is also different from the experience of PBI and others in Latin America who more or less solely rely on their international clout for their security.⁷⁰ In NP's analysis, there is a double mechanism of protection at work here as regards the work of international civilian peacekeepers: They are providing the 'eye and ear of the world,' and being outsiders are able to talk to all sides of the conflict without being seen as partisan. Their own security is based on the trust the local communities and the civil society partners of NP give the international peacekeepers. The result is a relationship of mutual support and protection, with its outcome being an increase of the impact the joint peacekeeping efforts have.

Conclusion

The question asked at the beginning of this paper was whether protection is most effectively and efficiently provided as an additional function of the work of aid and development organisations on the ground ('mainstreaming' of protection), or if in situations of extensive tension it is better or more effective to have organisations concentrating solely on civilian peacekeeping. Based on the examples from Southeast Europe and the Philippines, it is possible to list both strengths and weaknesses for each approach.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Personal experience of the author in Guatemala and the Philippines while supporting NP's work in these countries.

⁷⁰ See Mahony & Eguren 1997.

⁷¹ See also Slim & Bonwick 2005:46pp, Mahony 2006:51, O'Callaghan & Pantuliano 2007:17, International Committee of the Red Cross 2008.

Table 7) Comparison Civilian PK - humanitarian protection

| | Strengths, advantages | Weaknesses, disadvantages |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Humanitarian Protection | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust and acceptance already formed through humanitarian work • Economic and political weight because of the humanitarian commitment • Capacity: Infrastructure already in place • Long-standing contacts in the area • Funding may be easier because there is much more money available for relief and development as there is for protection and peacekeeping • Can be applied in situations where threats are only occasional | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capability of staff (lack of training and special conflict-transformation related knowledge) • Capacity: personnel and financial resources may be insufficient for what is considered an additional task • Possible conflict with conflict parties over issues of protection which may lead to loss of acceptance or in worst case having to leave the country • May disguise the need ,to do more‘ from the side of the international community • May not fit well into mandate • Politicization of humanitarian action in eyes of stakeholders • Intra-organizational problems: internal hurdles and resistance surrounding words like ,advocacy‘ • Risk to personnel may increase |
| Civilian Peacekeeping | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capability (special training) • Capacity: Personnel and financial resources are dedicated to the purpose • Failure or problems with conflict parties would not necessarily affect service provision by humanitarian agencies • Mandate can be written to exactly fit the situation • May be mandated by UN or regional governmental organisation <p>IN COMPARISON WITH JOB SHARE HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES -MILITARY PK:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May be more acceptable than deployment of international military forces • Cheaper | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust and acceptance need to be gained which may be difficult process • Capacity (personnel and financial resources need extra recruitment and fundraising) • There are few special budget lines for civilian peacekeeping or protection work with international donors though the situation is much improving recently • Shorter-term stays in the field (this goes especially for governmental missions that often have a 6 month terms instead of 2-3 years as NGOs often have). • No economic or political weight gained through material aid • Local partners often find it difficult to understand that a NGO refuses to engage in relief or development work |

| | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It also may have fewer undesired side-effects like having a population already traumatized by many years of war and fearing everyone who is armed being faced with new heavily armed soldiers. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some NGOs are carrying an ideological burden of religious fundamentalism or principled nonviolence which deflects from the question of impact (see the short-term interpositioning projects in Bosnia) • Deployment of a peacekeeping mission expresses concern about situation which may in some circumstances increase the vulnerability |
| Both approaches share | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk to lose perception of non-partisanship (see EUMM) • Need to talk to all sides which may lead to legitimization of certain actors • Risk to personnel • Dependency on acceptance by actors in conflict, from high level to local level |

This overview is certainly incomplete and more arguments can be added. However, one thing becomes quite clear: There is justification for both approaches, but also situations in which the concentration of a solely peacekeeping role is advantageous, as the examples of the governmental missions in the former Yugoslavia and of the different civil society monitoring organisations in Mindanao, Philippines show.

Civilian peacekeeping is an efficient instrument, especially in situations when a ceasefire ended the open warfare in a country but violence is still occurring. It cannot enforce peace, of course – but then again: how good and convincing is the record of military peacekeeping in doing so?

Civil peacekeeping is being used under at least two different scenarios: On invitation by civil society groups who use nonviolent means of dealing with conflict, or as an outcome of official negotiations when one or both sides reject military force for whatever reason.

The costs of civilian peacekeeping are probably much lower than that of military peacekeeping because it requires less infrastructure and less hardware. If carried out professionally, it also may have fewer undesired side-effects, like having a population already traumatized by many years of war being faced with new heavily-armed soldiers.

The Responsibility to Protect: Towards an Expanded Role for Global Civil Society

By Christine Schweitzer

Introduction

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a doctrine adopted by the 2005 United Nations World Summit of Heads of States and Governments and confirmed a year later by the UN Security Council. The World Summit affirmed that ‘each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from four types of crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’ According to this concept, if a State fails to meet its responsibility, the international community has the responsibility to intervene, by force if necessary. The Responsibility to Protect furthermore recognizes three elements or phases: a responsibility to prevent, a responsibility to react, and a responsibility to rebuild. The document further describes three pillars.⁷² Pillar 1 is the responsibility of each State to protect its population from the R2P crimes and their incitement. Pillar 2 consists of international assistance and capacity building to help States to meet these obligations. Pillar 3 is the timely and decisive response, including intervention in the sense of acting against the will of the State in question.⁷³

The concept of R2P was coined in 2001 by the International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent commission appointed by the Canadian government in response to a speech to the UN General Assembly by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999. Referring to Kosovo, the Secretary-General spoke of a core challenge ‘to the Security Council and to the United Nation as a whole in the next century: to forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights—wherever they may take place—should not be allowed to stand.’⁷⁴

R2P entered the UN reform process through the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that referred to the concept in its 2004 report, and was then taken up at the World Summit of 2005.⁷⁵ In early 2009, the Secretary-General has reported on the implementation of R2P to the General Assembly, and it is expected that there will be further discussion about the concept this year.⁷⁶

The definition of the three pillars (which cannot be found in the original ICISS report) and in particular the emphases of the first two result in large part from the concerns raised by a number of States against the concept. Russia, the USA, and China especially wished to uphold the principle of absolute sovereignty. In spite of the 2005 UN summit decision, some countries in the global South

⁷² The three pillars must not be misunderstood as stages in conflict escalation. Rather, as the UN Secretary-General (2009) points out, there is no set sequence of moving from one to another.

⁷³ Pillar 3 is often falsely identified with military intervention alone but includes as well other forms of non-military intervention, in particular sanctions, criminal prosecution of war crimes and preventing incitement to violence (e.g. jamming of radio frequencies). Here the focus may have shifted since the original ICISS report of 2001. That report focuses ((while calling it a last resort) a lot on military ‘humanitarian’ intervention, trying to define its legitimacy by applying the rules of ‘Just war’.

⁷⁴ United Nations Secretary-General 1999, quoted after von Arnould 2009:17.

⁷⁵ R2P is not a legal norm though sometimes it has been called an ‘emerging legal norm’ in spite of its recognition in official UN documents. Only the founding document of the African Union proclaims in Article 4 that ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ (quoted after von Arnould 2009:24).

⁷⁶ See von Arnould 2009 for a discussion of the different elements of the concept and how their emphasis changed between the ICISS report and the report of the Secretary-General in 2009.

continue to suspect R2P as a new legitimization for military aggression by the global North against their countries and just another way to bring about regime change.⁷⁷

In his January 2009 report, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon invited the UN General Assembly to 'address ways to define and develop the partnerships between States and the international community under Pillar 2' (2009:30), and in particular invited 'further creative thinking' about the option of creating a standing or standby rapid response civilian and police capacity for such emergencies: 'There have been a host of proposals by Governments and civil society alike for creating a standing or standby rapid-response civilian and police capacity for such emergencies. I would encourage further creative thinking about such an option and will ensure its careful review by the relevant United Nations officials.' (2009:18)

This article will take a closer look at the role of national and international civil society in R2P, arguing that civil society has a much more ample role to play providing protection against mass atrocities than has hitherto been recognized, and that a civil society approach may also help to defuse the concern that R2P is merely a euphemism for military intervention intended to camouflage Northern hegemonial interests.

The Role of Civil Society as Defined So Far Under R2P

In the documents on R2P, generally only a few paragraphs or pages are devoted to the role of civil society. In the original ICISS study, civil society is discussed primarily in the context of monitoring of and advocating for human rights norms and early warning, as well as provision of humanitarian aid in times of war (2001:14, 20, 61, 71pp). In his 2009 report, the Secretary-General mentions the cooperation of civil society in the efforts under Pillar 2 (p.9), noting that states can seek technical cooperation (p.13). Under Pillar 3 he only recognizes an advocacy role for international civil society, observing that its reactions often shape the international response to a crisis, as in the case of Darfur (p.26).

In his recently published book, ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans defines four distinct roles for civil society (2008:198pp):

- as think tanks, research institutions or policy forums;
- as campaign and advocacy organisations;
- as on-the-ground operational organisations promoting peace through mediation, capacity and building, and the like; and
- as humanitarian relief organisations.

He states that all these roles are relevant in various ways to R2P tasks and are present in all three stages of prevention, reaction and rebuilding. They are in his eyes not a substitute for governments but complementary to them, filling gaps that official organisations and institutions cannot or will not fill.

In 2008, some international NGOs created the *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*, which seeks through research and advocacy to 'advance and consolidate the World Summit consensus on R2P, protect its integrity, clarify the cases of use or non-use of military force, build capacity

⁷⁷ See von Arnould 2009, Evans 2008. This became also very clear when France in 2008 suggested that the situation in Myanmar caused by the cyclone Nargis should be consider a R2P case. It led to angry debates in the UN (ECOSOC in particular) and many states felt that this ,was a confirmation of their assessment that R2P is another way of bringing about regime change under the cover of humanitarian action' (KOFF 2009:5-6).

on R2P within international organisations and governments, and have in place mechanisms and strategies necessary to generate an effective political response.⁷⁸

What is strikingly missing from the discussion is a more direct role for civil society in protection other than early warning, advocacy and what generally would be considered to fall under peacebuilding (like dialogue, capacity building, etc). Neither have these publications yet suggested that local and global civil society has the capacity for direct protection rather than pleading and influencing others to organise that protection. This capacity for direct protection can be summarised under the term of unarmed civilian peacekeeping, and the focus of this article will be to explore different aspects of this capacity in particular. The motivation here is not to belittle the importance of other roles, especially the role of advocacy in this field, but to put the spotlight on one approach to protection that has so far received very little attention.

A More Encompassing Role of Civil Society under R2P

The four crimes that R2P deals with (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing) are crimes that are closely linked to armed conflict in general. Cold-blooded genocide without the framework of a war is hard to envisage. Even the German Nazis only started to implement their plans of mass annihilation of Jews once World War II was well under way. The same is usually true for ethnic cleansing. War crimes in many cases are committed in the course of an armed conflict without having been planned or condoned from the outset. In some other cases, ethnic cleansing or genocide (or war crimes, e.g. rape) are part of a deliberate strategy chosen by an aggressor.⁷⁹ That means that there is a strong overlap of, and connection between, seeking to prevent the crimes of R2P, and the prevention of armed conflict in general. All work on prevention of armed conflict could potentially be work on a R2P case, but it is often only in hindsight or once a conflict has escalated so much that there are concrete indicators warning of R2P crimes that the work is generally considered to be undertaken in the name of R2P. This problem contributes a great deal to the conceptual vagueness of R2P. In spite of the narrow definition of the four crimes as R2P cases, and in spite of the three phases (prevent, react, rebuild), R2P lacks focus until the moment concrete incidents of the four crimes are either threatened or actually happening.

Table 8) Conflict stages and R2P

| Conflict phase | Latent | Escalating | Open conflict with R2P situations | Ceasefire | Return to normal |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Responsibilities | Prevent (structural and systemic prevention) | Prevent (operational prevention) | React | Prevent and Rebuild | Rebuild |
| Pillars | 1, (2) | 1, 2 | 3, (1), 2 | 1, 2 | 1, (2) |
| Peace strategies | (preventive strategies comparable to peacemaking and peacebuilding) | Peacemaking peacekeeping (peacebuilding) | Peacemaking (peacekeeping, relief as almost only strategy of peacebuilding) | Peacekeeping peacebuilding (peacemaking, e.g. negotiating a peace treaty) | Peacebuilding, (and ongoing peacekeeping) |

⁷⁸ The four organisations are the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Institute International and Refugees International. It is housed at the The Graduate Center of The City University of New York, and financed by a number of countries and foundations. See <http://globalr2p.org/about.html> [15.5.2009]

⁷⁹ There is a danger of war crimes in all armed conflicts- in fact it might be hard to find a single war where not one or the other side (usually both) became guilty of committing war crimes.

In the following sections, this article will look at the role of civil society using the two parameters that have been developed for R2P: the three phases of responsibility (prevent, react, rebuild) and the three pillars. They stand in a rather complex relationship to each other and to the ideal-typical conflict curve:⁸⁰

Civil Society in the Three Responsibilities

Responsibility to Prevent

What has been said above about the difficulty to differentiate between prevention and peacebuilding in general on the one hand, and in relation to R2P in particular, is most true for what has been called ‘deep’ (Lund 2004) ‘structural’ (Carnegie Commission 1997) or ‘structural’ and ‘systemic’ prevention (Rubin 2002). ‘Systemic’ prevention refers to the ‘promotion of policies that counteract ways that global institutions promote or facilitate violence’ (Rubin 2002:131), for example in the field of global economics, and is not country-specific. ‘Deep’ or ‘structural’ prevention deals with a situation in a specific country or region before the spiral of escalation is put in motion, and the danger develops of mass atrocities being committed. Structural prevention may mean to deal with economic injustices and to ensure human rights and political participation of all levels of society and all minorities. International wars, the number of which has been greatly reduced in the last decades, can be prevented by traditional mechanisms like power balances, conventions on disarmament and cooperation, democratisation of all countries in question, or joint membership in international organisations.

If a conflict has clearly begun to escalate, then what is needed is what the Carnegie Foundation and Rubin call ‘operational’ prevention – specific actions taken to confront an imminent crisis. Here there needs to be no doubt that a certain situation may be of relevance for R2P, because there is usually clear evidence that indicates the potential for such crimes.⁸¹ Instruments applicable by civil society actors in such contexts include second-track mediation, dialogue support, and advocacy for decisive action by the country in question and/or by the international community.

In addition to such instruments, all of which would fall under peacemaking and peacebuilding, there is also a role for preventive peacekeeping. Its basic idea is to deter and prevent violence by the means of the presence of a peacekeeping force. As to military peacekeeping, the first preventive mission was UNPROFOR (later UNPREDEP) in Macedonia in 1992-1999. Its work, based on the classical ‘blue helmet’ mandate without enforcement power or heavy armament, has been generally evaluated as an important contribution to maintaining peace in that country.⁸²

The idea of preventive peacekeeping has so far rarely been practiced, but few would not agree that in many circumstances it may be a good instrument to use. The question that needs to be asked is: Does it have to be the military? A few points to consider:

- Even if wishing for peace, many countries have serious concerns about allowing international military forces onto their territory—even if under UN auspices.
- There is the danger of militarising a situation further by pulling more military into it.

⁸⁰ What is not meant when speaking of a more encompassing role of civil society are the forms of integration of military and civilian personnel and action as in the different CIMIC-concepts, the US Human Terrain Teams or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. The question to be pursued here are rather options for an autochthonous, independent civilian role that has the potential to be an alternative to military options.

⁸¹ See the indicators for developments in racial discrimination that may lead to violent conflict and genocide formulated by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2005.

⁸² See Lund 2000.

- If one or the other of the conflict parties does not accept the presence of such peacekeepers, they may become the first targets, and thereby contribute to the escalation of the conflict instead of the contrary.

For these reasons, unarmed civilian peacekeeping conducted either by state missions or civil society actors would be an option avoiding these risks at least to a certain degree:

- It is often easier to find acceptance for an international civilian mission (see the examples below for post-conflict peacekeeping missions in Kosovo-Serbia 1998, Bougainville 1997, Georgia 2008).⁸³
- On the cultural and symbolic level, civilians express civilian values by their very presence. In addition, the fact of being unarmed may send to the parties in conflict a message of trust that they themselves are interested in peace.
- At a superficial level, the danger of peacekeepers becoming targets is the same whether they are armed or unarmed. But while armed peacekeepers, especially those with heavy weaponry, are often sent under a Chapter VII mandate and rely on potential armed force for their own protection, the mere fact that unarmed peacekeepers need to activate other sources of protection, including acceptance and protection by local communities, may increase their protection from being targeted.

Responsibility to React

During the ‘hot’ phases of a conflict, civil society is not by any means excluded from work for peace, though its possibilities are more limited. A recent comparative study conducted by the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) in Geneva entitled ‘Civil Society and Peacebuilding’ found that ‘during phases of war, the space for civil society to act is reduced drastically. The main goal during this phase is to lessen violence. Civil society can monitor human rights violations, advocate and facilitate a dialogue for the protection of civilians, and ultimately protect people from suffering due to the war. As such, the functions of protection, monitoring, advocacy and facilitation are of particular relevance within this phase.’ (Paffenholz 2009a:8)⁸⁴

What exactly can be done during an armed conflict depends entirely on the context. Where there is high-level intense and widespread violent conflict, protecting civilians by helping them to get to safe places, ensuring that victims receive adequate humanitarian aid, and using all possible channels for bringing the parties back to the negotiating table may be all that can be done. As was evident in the final months of the conflict in Sri Lanka, even *that* often proves difficult enough.

Where violence is more sporadic or geographically limited, unarmed civilian peacekeeping may be an option as well. The presence of peacekeepers, for example, could help communities that do seek to avoid being drawn into the troubles of war to be respected as peace zones from all sides. Peacekeepers can help to bring displaced people to safe places or can through protective accompaniment lessen one of the side effects of war—namely the rising lawlessness and attacks on human rights activists, journalists and other parts of civil society. These activities can help to prevent war crimes or ethnic cleansing to a certain point. Examples include the international presence of protective companions in peace communities in Colombia or the combined efforts of local and international peace monitors today in Mindanao, Philippines.⁸⁵

⁸³ See Schweitzer *et al* 2001, Mahony 2006.

⁸⁴ Other important roles for civil society are service delivery (humanitarian aid) and, if there is a window of opportunity for peace negotiations, to facilitate the onset of such negotiations or to influence their contents.

⁸⁵ See Bantay Ceasefire 2003, Schirch 2006.

Responsibility to Rebuild

After a violent conflict is ended, whether by ceasefire or military victory, the tasks of peacebuilding remain (see above footnote 13) and ensuring that there is a secure environment in which peacebuilding can take place. The same level of generality mentioned in respect of prevention can be observed for rebuilding. Whether or not R2P crimes happened during a conflict has no bearing on the tasks of post-war rebuilding. To perpetrators these tasks may appear particularly threatening; and transitional justice and dealing with trauma may be of prime importance. But as far as we can see, there is nothing *sui generis* in rebuilding for R2P.

The 'traditional' division of labor here has international military forces taking care of security while civilians from both governmental and nongovernmental institutions and agencies take care of the peacebuilding.⁸⁶ But there have been cases in which unarmed peacekeeping was chosen in place of military peacekeeping in this phase of conflict. Such civilian missions are often deployed in cases where the target countries would not accept foreign military on their territory and the international community was not willing or able to enforce such a mission. UN Monitoring Missions, many missions by the OSCE (including the Kosovo Verification Mission of 1998-99), by the EU (the EU Monitoring Missions in the former Yugoslavia and since 2008 in Georgia), and the Truce/Peace Monitoring Mission set up in Bougainville after 1997 belong in this category.⁸⁷

Beside these governmental unarmed peacekeeping missions, there has been and still is comparable work by civil society actors. One example is the Philippines: For over 30 years, more than 120,000 lives have been lost in the struggle for independence waged by Muslim groups against the Christian majority in Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippines. The main guerrilla group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), signed a peace treaty with the Philippine government in 1996. MNLF leaders joined the government structures in Mindanao, mainly in what was then the newly-created Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). But another group calling itself the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) split from MNLF and continued the fight. It took many years and several ceasefire agreements before fighting more or less stopped, and violent incidents still occur in central Mindanao. Negotiations for a comprehensive peace agreement have been undertaken (though at this writing, in early 2009, the talks are stalled).

The ceasefire was being monitored through an official mechanism, including both the government and the MILF, with four elements: The Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), Local Monitoring Teams comprised of civil society actors, an International Monitoring Team staffed mostly by Malaysia, and an Ad-hoc Joint Action Group. The CCCH set up monitoring posts in the conflict areas that were staffed by government and MILF soldiers as well as with representatives of local civil society initiatives. The extraordinary feature of this set-up is the close involvement of several hundred local civil society peacekeepers mostly working in a voluntary capacity. These local peace groups invited the international NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) to send an international team to provide support and protective presence to local groups working to enhance civil society initiatives and prevent violence. NP started to work in Mindanao in May 2007.

⁸⁶ This traditional jobshare has become more diffuse in the recent years by the military forces (e.g. Afghanistan) assuming more and more civilian reconstruction task. See Burghardt & Pietz 2006, Brzoska & Ehrhart 2008.

⁸⁷ See Böge 1999, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, and the report of a seminar 'Monitoring Peace in Bougainville' that was held at the Australian National University on the 8th of September 1999. The talks of different participants of the monitoring mission can be found in the report that is available on Internet (<http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia>, [25.4.2001]).

Together with local groups, its quick responses to several smaller and larger incidents in Central Mindanao, as well as the Sulu Archipelago including Basilan, have helped to prevent incidents leading to a full-scale military confrontation.⁸⁸

So far, there are few other examples for civil peacekeeping that go beyond the protection of individual activists through protective accompaniment as Peace Brigades International and others offer.⁸⁹ The reason is not that such peacekeeping is conceptually impossible, but rather that so far nongovernmental actors have for the most part lacked the resources to engage in this personnel-intensive (and therefore, compared to other peacebuilding work, expensive) endeavour. This type of work is financed primarily through budget lines of international agencies, ministries or the EU that are not intended for peacekeeping but for development cooperation. In recent years, many of these funders have developed an understanding of and support for projects of unarmed civilian protection, but the very outline of their budgets are often critical about the funding of a larger number of international staff. This maxim is well-justified in development cooperation, but it violates the very purpose of civilian peacekeeping initiatives for which staff (rather than material aid or projects carried out with local partners) is the very centre of its work.

Civil Society in the Three Pillars

Pillar 1: The Role of Local Civil Society in Protection

Pillar 1 describes the responsibilities of each State to protect its population from the R2P crimes and their incitement. When asking about the role of civil society, we need to look at local peace-builders, human rights defenders, peace advocates, citizens' groups generally working for democracy and political and civil rights and freedom, and of course humanitarian groups contributing to peaceful developments by trying to alleviate poverty and suffering.

As quoted above from the Geneva study (Paffenholz 2009a), the roles of monitoring, advocacy and dialogue facilitation can be assumed by civil society actors not only before and after but also during armed conflict. A famous example is the women of Wajir. The Wajir-District is located in the arid areas of Northeastern Kenya. At the end of the 19th century, the district was absorbed into the British colony of East Africa, despite the fact that its inhabitants were almost exclusively Somalis. After Kenya's independence in 1963, there were two armed conflicts in the area. First Kenya and Somalia fought over control of Wajir, then there was an unsuccessful uprising of the Wajiris against Nairobi to achieve secession from Kenya. After that war, Wajir was governed between 1967 and 1992 by emergency rule and the region was further impoverished, leading to violent resource conflict among the three leading family clans of the area. These clans also recruited mercenaries from Somalia and Ethiopia. In 1992, after a prolonged period of drought, open war erupted among the three clans. International NGOs left the region in 1993 after the death of a UN worker. In this situation and in absence of any state authority that could have dealt with the conflict, a group of Somali women founded the Wajir Women for Peace (later called the Wajir Peace Group). The women joining had to pledge to work for peace under all circumstances, even if their clans attacked each other.

⁸⁸ See the website of Nonviolent Peaceforce: <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org>

⁸⁹ Other examples are the election monitoring during the first elections in South Africa 1994, the accompaniment of refugees and displaced in some Latin American countries (e.g. Guatemala), the shorter-term monitoring in Haiti through the *Cry Justice* coalition of civil society groups and the work of different solidarity and observation groups in Palestine. For more examples and assessments of the mentioned work, see Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000, Schweitzer *et al* 2001 and Schirch 2006.

Their first activities were meetings with the elders of a clan. The women particularly sought to involve the elders from small clans that were able to play a mediating role. After intensive work and overcoming many obstacles, the women managed to convince the elders to found a joint committee to discuss the problems. After some meetings, there was a larger peace conference in September 1993 in which both a ceasefire and the end of the widely-practiced theft of animals were agreed upon, as well as a Code of Conduct. The results of the conference were the key factor in bringing the situation to a positive end, and the Wajir Peace Group became the most important actor for peace in the region. In the following years, they have undertaken a large number of activities involving the Kenyan government, clans, parliamentarians, civil servants, religious leaders, and others. One of the founders of the group, Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, received the 2007 Right Livelihood Award, often referred to as the Alternative Nobel Prize for Peace.⁹⁰

While this example would fall under the category of peacemaking, there are also numerous activities of unarmed civilian peacekeeping by local actors. What has not been recognized in documents on R2P so far is that local civil society has already been playing a direct role in preventing large-scale violence. Examples include monitoring of ceasefire agreements (e.g. Bantay Ceasefire and the Society of Bangsamoro Civil Society in Mindanao, Philippines), elections (e.g. the Sri Lankan organisation PAFFREL and its partners in other countries in the region), or by protecting vulnerable groups like internally displaced persons and refugees by maintaining a presence at refugee camps and houses (e.g. the work of a number of German grassroots groups in the 1990s when fascist groups attacked the homes of refugees).

Perhaps the best-known examples of local civil society organisations involved in direct protection work are the Pakistani and Indian ‘peace armies’ developed by Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mohandas Gandhi. The peace armies, or ‘shanti sena,’ were units formed by citizens of local communities who committed to service for their community and protection against violence. The members of shanti sena primarily worked where they lived, becoming so-called peace soldiers only when there was an emergency. They worked to de-escalate communal riots, helped to re-integrate members of criminal gangs into society, and did humanitarian work during refugee crises (like the 1971 Bangladesh war) or natural disasters. Their effectiveness is mainly derived from their membership in the local communities. They seek to change the minds of those ready to apply violence, and to strengthen the communities to resist that violence, using methods of dialogue, counteracting rumours, and physical interpositioning as needed.⁹¹

Pillar 2: The Role of International Civil Society in Protection

Under Pillar 2, we are looking at international civil society – the quickly growing network of transnationally active NGOs working in these same fields as listed above under Pillar 1. In the process of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) the range and depths of this work has been analysed and presented in a large conference in 2005 to the United Nations.⁹² Once more it needs to be stressed that most of the instruments used here are not particular to R2P situations – prevention, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peacemaking are general strategies of a much wider range than only dealing with the extreme cases of R2P – in a certain sense these four R2P crimes are the tip of the iceberg of the wider issues of violent conflict. The particular work of unarmed civilian peacekeeping has been described in the sections above under the three different responsibilities.

⁹⁰ See Mathews 2001, USAID in <http://eastafrika.usaid.gov/en/Article.1117.aspx> [20.11.2008]).

⁹¹ See *Abdul Ghaffar Khan* 1995, Weber 1996, Schweitzer *et al* 2001, and the references given there.

⁹² See <http://www.gppac.net>.

Pillar 3: A Role for Civil Society if Earlier Prevention has Failed?

If all that which was described above under Pillar 1 and 2 fails, including ,peacekeeping by consent,‘ (national and/or international civilian peacekeepers working on invitation, or at least tolerance, of the government and other armed actors), are there also options that local and/or international civil society has when there is an acute R2P case, but the State in question is not able and willing to handle it?

Civil society does lack direct enforcement capacity. It cannot just send an army that through superior fire power can efficiently pacify violent perpetrators.⁹³ The status of internationals is different. If a government decides that it doesn’t want the internationals on its soil, internationals have little choice but to leave, as was recently demonstrated in Darfur. The number of instruments of local civil society under such circumstances is very limited, though as has been found in the Geneva study quoted above, even in cases of open war and conflict there is still a protection role to play for local civil society.

My intention is not to speculate about possible ways that internationals may enter a country against the will of the powerholders. There may be, in exceptional circumstances, such possibilities.⁹⁴ But these are not R2P situations, and it could be argued that the more violence escalates, the less likely it becomes that such entry has a chance of success.

The question for civil society under the third pillar is another one, and is salient for civil society as for the international community in general: If the State in question is not able or willing to prevent a R2P situation, how can the State be convinced to allow others to come in and take over the function that the State itself has proven unable to play? The mentioned advocacy role of international civil society comes into play here, and the option of unarmed civilian peacekeeping may, as has been argued above, be more palatable to such a State than the deployment of a military force.

Having addressed the limitations of international civil society under Pillar 3, there is one additional consideration: International civil society may play a role in protection *between* Pillar 2 and Pillar 3, a role that goes further than that of governmental (civilian or military) missions, because it is not dependent on a formal international agreement that sometimes is difficult to achieve. Civil society actors do have a different legal basis. For them to work in a country, it is enough to be tolerated by the government of the State in question. While unarmed peacekeepers will usually seek formal permission or even invitation to work in a country, in numerous cases they had to satisfy themselves with the grudging permission of being allowed into the country legally. This means that they may still be able to work in a country in a situation where governmental missions would not be invited or their invitation revoked. This is an advantage that the international community concerned with preventing mass atrocities could make use of by consciously supporting the unarmed peacekeeping work of INGOs in countries where official outside missions themselves are not allowed to go.

There are also some secondary advantages NGOs may have over state-run missions. When they have been in an area for a longer period, they often have better-founded relationships and knowledge of the situation on the ground. While staff in international (governmental) missions is often rotated every six months, the average stay of civilian workers is two years or even longer. This

⁹³ I leave aside here the question if that kind of military intervention is not more a chimera than a real option. In the discussion on such kind of enforcement missions, it is more often argued with examples of those cases where such enforcement did NOT happen (like in Rwanda) like in cases where it was tried (Cambodia, Kosovo). The reason may be that these real-life examples leave many questions open, both in regard to their legitimacy as to their outcomes.

⁹⁴ For example there is the work of the different solidarity groups working in Palestine which enter Palestine with bare tolerance by the Israeli government and who to a certain though limited extent is successful in providing protection to civilians, e.g. accompanying school children threatened by extremist settlers. See Schirch 2006.

allows them to build much better relations at the grassroots level—the very level at which violence often originates.

Conclusions

1. In his implementation report on R2P, the UN Secretary-General has once more raised the call to create a standing or standby force ready to intervene in conflicts. Possible suggestions:
 - that in the draft mandate of such a standby force, the functions of unarmed peacekeeping are included;
 - that civilians sent to monitoring missions by the United Nations, one of its regional organisations, or other international organisations like the European Union are trained in methods of unarmed peacekeeping in addition to the other tasks they are meant to perform;
 - that unarmed civilian peacekeeping is included in the checklists and budget lines of such agencies as DPKO and OCHA.
2. Investment in institutional capacities for conflict prevention is essential. This is a demand raised in many places nowadays.⁹⁵ For every dollar spent on peacebuilding around the world, nearly two thousand dollars are spent on defence and the military.⁹⁶ ‘...[D]espite increasing rhetorical enthusiasm, the international community has repeatedly failed to invest in early action. As a result, peaceful measures, such as preventive diplomacy, have been under-used by the Security Council, leaving situations that could have been de-escalated to fester until the only option is to impose coercive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter’ (International Peace Institute 2009:7). In order to be able to implement measures of operational prevention, there is a need for the establishment of an early warning capability on national, regional and international bases, e.g. at the European Union and at the United Nations.
3. One particular instrument of prevention of armed violence is unarmed civilian peacekeeping. It is an instrument to which much less attention has been paid so far than to other instruments of conflict prevention. It is suggested here that the European Union, the UN and the other international organisations consider making use of the offer of NGOs to perform protection tasks in countries and contexts where for whatever reason international governmental peacekeeping missions cannot be sent. This could happen designating them as official ‘implementing partners’ or by simply funding through extra budgets devoted to R2P (including a new trustfund at the disposal of the UN S-G), thereby stopping the current problem of unarmed peacekeeping competing for funding with humanitarian and development cooperation projects.
4. The European Union, the United Nations and regional organisations should find a place in their structure that focuses on unarmed civilian peacekeeping as an instrument of its own. This could be an office, an expert panel, or a subcommission to investigate the reasons for the curious underemployment of unarmed global peacekeepers—professionals who, by their very presence, will deter abuses and protect threatened local populations, including peaceworkers and humanitarian and human rights workers. The principal role of the body would be to begin to capture the world’s imagination about the significant contribution the use of such peace forces could make. The initial emphasis would be on advocacy, training and communication to do the much-needed consciousness-raising among several priority audiences and, ultimately,

⁹⁵ See GPPAC 2009, International Peace Institute 2009.

⁹⁶ Figures from the OECD, taken from *Smart Power - Saving Money, Saving Lives: Why Conflict Prevention Policy Needs to be Joined Up*. Forthcoming Publication of the International Task Force on Preventive Diplomacy, quoted from GPPAC 2009

the general population.

5. The question could and should be asked whether the legitimisation of NGOs, especially of those involved in protection work, could be strengthened by recognition through the United Nations. Of course we are not necessarily suggesting here that the UN Security Council should in the next years mandate NGOs to intervene the same way it currently mandates a UN peacekeeping mission, or sanctions other international organisations or 'coalitions of the willing' to 'use all means necessary' to alleviate a presumed R2P situation. The mere fact that there are ten thousands if not more NGOs worldwide alone probably forbids such an act of mandating civil society the same way as States or other international organisations (NATO) are mandated today. But there is nothing that would forbid or preclude the Security Council referring to the work of unarmed peacekeeping by NGOs in its decisions on a particular crisis, the same way as it sometimes refers to humanitarian aid being allowed or continued, thereby strengthening the legitimization of these NGOs (see criterion # 10 of Lewer and Ramsbotham). And of course nothing excludes UN organisations choosing NGOs (local or international) as their implementing partners.
6. A capacity for unarmed civilian peacekeeping at large scale must be created. Measures needed for that include:
 - Training of a large number of people with the skills to be deployed when needed;
 - Maintaining up-to-date rosters of such individuals with their special assets;
 - Training in civilian unarmed peacekeeping for civil servants and soldiers who are deployed in governmental unarmed missions;
 - A global initiative convincing UN Member States to create labour laws that free people to leave their civilian jobs for such deployments the same way as in most countries military reservists can be called in for service without losing their jobs;
 - Financial resources for such missions set aside and quickly accessible (without long application deadlines). This could be prepared by a pre-screening of civil society organisations that then are considered trustworthy of deployment and funding of additional programmes.

We do not know how many Rwandas have already been prevented. The number of violent conflicts clearly declined in recent years, a fact attributed to international efforts.⁹⁷ Successful conflict transformation in early stages can be easily demonstrated, but it is always helpful to speculate on the possibility of mass atrocities having thus been prevented. One thing is sure: National and international civil society has always been a crucial factor where there was true conflict transformation. And protection work is one important area to which civil society has already made contributions extending far beyond advocacy to urge States to meet their responsibility to protect. Civil society does have its own responsibility to protect, and it is ready to assume much greater responsibility.

Unarmed civilian peacekeeping need not be the second choice, considered only in light of failures of political will and funding to send military peacekeepers. I have attempted in this paper to make clear that in many situations, especially in the context of prevention and after wars, unarmed civilian peacekeeping can be the first option precisely because it IS less threatening to those in power, and therefore has a chance to be accepted when the only choice would otherwise be to call upon the Security Council to send a mission under Chapter VII.

⁹⁷ See Human Security Centre 2005 and 2006.

Zusammenfassung

Das Arbeitspapier, das das IFGK zusammen mit *Nonviolent Peaceforce* herausgibt, enthält fünf Beiträge zum Thema „Ziviles Peacekeeping“. Ziviles Peacekeeping (deutsch: „Friedenssicherung“) hat bislang in der Friedensforschung eine vergleichsweise geringe Rolle gespielt. Aus diesem Grund hat das IFGK bislang unveröffentlichte oder nur auf Internetseiten zu findende Artikel zu dieser Publikation zusammengestellt.

Die Beiträge wurden – mit Ausnahme der Einleitung – unabhängig voneinander und für verschiedene Zielgruppen geschrieben. Zumeist wandten sie sich an Politik und Wissenschaft, erst in zweiter Linie an Menschen in den Friedensbewegungen. Trotz gewisser Unterschiede in den inhaltlichen Gewichtungen plädieren alle AutorInnen für einen weltweiten Ausbau des zivilen Peacekeepings und seine Förderung durch die Vereinten Nationen sowie die Staatenwelt im allgemeinen. Alle AutorInnen sind mit Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) zeitweilig verbunden gewesen oder sind es noch, so erklärt sich, dass NP bei den gewählten Beispielen eine große Rolle spielt.

In der Einleitung definiert **Christine Schweitzer** Ziviles Peacekeeping als die Verhinderung direkter Gewalt durch Beeinflussung oder Kontrolle des Verhaltens potentieller Gewaltausübender durch unbewaffnete ZivilistInnen, die vor Ort eine Präsenz aufgebaut haben. Die Autorin sieht sie als Menschheitsaufgabe zur Überwindung von Krieg. Vier historische Quellen haben die Entwicklung des Peacekeepings gespeist: die Idee von Gandhi zu einer Friedensarmee (Shanti Sena), europäische und nordamerikanische Versuchen, Kriege gewaltfrei zu stoppen, indem sich internationale AktivistInnen zwischen die Fronten stellten, verschiedene vor allem an die Vereinten Nationen gerichtete Vorschläge zum Aufbau von Einheiten zur unbewaffneten Friedenssicherung und das Vorbild des militärischen Peacekeepings. Vier Hauptformen zivilen Peacekeepings können unterschieden werden:

1. Friedensteams in verschiedenen, Graden an Unparteilichkeit und Aufgabenstellungen;
2. Zivile staatliche Missionen wie z. B. die EU Beobachtungsmissionen im ehemaligen Jugoslawien oder seit 2008 in Georgien;
3. Schutz als eine Aufgabe, die von humanitären, Entwicklungs- und Menschenrechtsorganisationen als Teil ihrer Arbeit wahrgenommen wird;
4. Noch zu leisten ist: Der Ausbau von zivilem Peacekeeping durch NROs in einem Ausmaß, das ihre Arbeit mit der Reichweite staatlicher Missionen vergleichbar macht.

Rolf Carrières Beitrag „Die Welt braucht ein anderes Peacekeeping“ beginnt mit einer Beschreibung des globalen Kontextes, in dem die Ideen der drei Friedensstrategien Peacemaking, Peacekeeping und Peacebuilding entstanden. Nach einer Auflistung einiger Begrenzungen militärischer Friedenssicherung beschreibt er die Funktionsweise des unbewaffneten zivilen Peacekeepings und die Gründe für ihre Wirksamkeit. Danach bezieht er sich auf einige jüngere Schriften zur Ökonomie des Krieges und beschreibt die immensen Vorteile, die ein Ende des Krieges und die Herstellung von Frieden mit sich bringen.

Tim Wallis stellte seinen Aufsatz „Best Practices des unbewaffneten zivilen Peacekeeping“ wie auch Rolf Carrière im Sommer 2009 bei einer Konferenz auf den Philippinen vor. Er unterscheidet fünf Typen ziviler Akteure der Friedenssicherung: unbewaffnetes Militär, internationale Polizei, unbewaffnete ZivilistInnen mit einem offiziellen Mandat (z.B. UN BeobachterInnen), unbewaffnete ZivilistInnen aus der Zivilgesellschaft (z.B. von humanitären NROs) und unbewaffnete ZivilistInnen mit speziellen Fähigkeiten und einem speziellen Mandat für Peacekeeping. Er illustriert anhand einiger Beispiele, was zivile Peacekeeper für die Verhinderung von Gewalt leisten können. Im letzten Abschnitt seines Beitrags diskutiert er Grundprinzipien, die für die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit zivilen Peacekeepings bestimmend sind: 1. Unparteilichkeit, Unabhängigkeit und internationaler Charakter, 2. Gewaltfreiheit und 3. Sichtbarkeit, Transparenz, stille Diplomatie und kulturelle

Sensibilität. Er endet damit, dass Präsenz alleine nicht genug sei, um von Gewalt-Handlungen abzuschrecken, und dass auch Regierungsmissionen allein in manchen Fällen nicht ausreichen, weshalb ausgebildete und mandatierte zivile Peacekeeper, die von NROs entsendet werden, eine wichtige Funktion haben können.

Rachel Julians Beitrag „Peacekeeping mit Gewaltfreiheit: Strategien des Schutzes für nachhaltigen Frieden“ beginnt wie der von Carrière mit der Einordnung von unbewaffnetem Peacekeeping in die Triade der drei Friedensstrategien. Unter Bezugnahme auf Schirch (2006) und Eguren (2009) beschreibt Julian anschließend verschiedene Ansätze und Methoden zivilen Peacekeepings.

Der erste Aufsatz von **Christine Schweitzer** befasst sich mit der Frage: „Humanitärer Schutz als eine zusätzliche Funktion von humanitären, Entwicklungs- und Friedensprojekten – oder eher eine Aufgabe, die Experten fordert?“ Auf der Basis von zwei Fallstudien (dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien in den 90er Jahren und der Arbeit von NP in den Philippinen seit 2007) erfolgt ein Vergleich über die Vorteile und Schwächen beider Optionen. Die Autorin endet mit dem Fazit, dass es Situationen gibt, in denen die Präsenz spezialisierter Peacekeeper von Vorteil sein kann.

Christine Schweitzers zweites Papier, „Die Schutzverantwortung: Auf dem Weg zu einer erweiterten Rolle für die globale Zivilgesellschaft“ beschäftigt sich mit der Doktrin der „Responsibility to Protect“ (R2P). Der Artikel zeigt auf, dass einheimische und internationale Zivilgesellschaften eine viel größere Rolle in den verschiedenen Phasen (Verhinderung, Reaktion und Wiederaufbau) und den drei Säulen von R2P (Verantwortung des betroffenen Staates, internationale Hilfe und Intervention) spielen können, als bislang anerkannt wird. Die Autorin stimmt denjenigen zu, die argumentieren, dass R2P mehr ist als ein Vorwand zur Legitimation sogenannter „humanitärer“ militärischer Interventionen. Die Zivilgesellschaft trage insbesondere dazu bei, zu verhindern, dass eine „R2P-Situation“ (Säule 3) überhaupt entsteht.

Bibliography

A Human Security Doctrine for Europe (2004). The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. Barcelona

Abdul Ghaffar Khan. A Centennial Tribute (1995) Issued under the auspices of Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications

Anderson, Mary B. (1999) *Do No Harm. How Aid Can Support Peace—or War*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Annan, Kofi (2002). *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, Report of the Secretary General. New York: UN.

Annan, Kofi (2005a). *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*. New York: UN.

Annan, Kofi (2005b). *Speech to the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict*. New York: GPPAC

Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (2008) *Aktuelle Kriege und bewaffnete Konflikte (2007)*. [Online] at http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/kriege_aktuell.htm#Trends [16.11.2009]

Ban, Ki-Moon (2009) *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*. New York: UN.

Bantay Ceasefire (2003) *2003 Reports of the Grassroots-led Missions Monitoring the ceasefire between the Philippine Government (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)*

Barrs, Casey A. (2009) *Preparedness Support: Helping Brace Beneficiaries, Local Staff and Partners for Violence*. Under the Auspices of the Cuny Center. October. [Online] at <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/> [18.11.2009]

Bennett, Nicki (2009) *International Peacekeeping Missions and Civilian Protection Mandates – Oxfam's Experiences in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and Somalia*. [Online] at <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/> [18.11.2009]

Böge, Volker (1999) *Friedenskonsolidierung in Nachkriegszeiten. Der Fall Bougainville*. Arbeitspapier Nr. 3/1999 der Forschungsstelle Kriege, Rüstung und Entwicklung der Universität Hamburg, Hamburg

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992) *An Agenda For Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992*. New York: United Nations

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1995) 2nd edn. 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations.' In: *Agenda for Peace*. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. New York: United Nations

Brzoska, Michael and Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (2008) *Zivil-militärische Kooperation in Konfliktnachsorge und Wiederaufbau. Empfehlungen zur praktischen Umsetzung*. SEF Policy Paper 30. Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden

Büttner, Christian W. (1995) *Friedensbrigaden: Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung mit gewaltfreien Methoden*. Münster: Lit Verlag

- Burghardt, Diana and Pietz, Tobias (2006) *Handreichung Themenbereiche und Konfliktfelder zivil-militärischer Beziehungen*. BICC / Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung / Gustav Heinemann Initiative, 2006. [Online] at <:http://www.konfliktbearbeitung.net> [17.9.2008]
- Calic, Marie-Janine (1998) 'Kosovo: Krieg oder Konfliktloesung' *Suedosteuropa Mitteilungen* 2, 112-120
- Carnegie Commission (1997) *Preventing Deadly Conflict*. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report. New York
- Carter, April, Clark, Howard and Randle, Michael (2006) *People Power and Protest Since 1945: A Bibliography of Nonviolent Action*. London:Housmans. [Online] at <http://www.civilresistance.info/bibliography/> [5.4.2009]
- Clark, Howard (2009) 'Editorial Introduction to Section II: Nonviolent Ciitzens' Intervention Across Borders'. In *People Power. Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity*. Ed. by Clark, Howard. London/ New York: Pluto Press: 89-92
- Clark, Howard (ed.) (2009) *People Power. Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity*. London/ New York: Pluto Press
- Collier, Paul (2009) *Wars, Guns and Votes—Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2004) *The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War: A Discussion of the Available Policy Instruments*. The Copenhagen Consensus. [Online] at <http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com> [21.10.2009]
- Collier, Paul, Chauvet, Lisa and Hegre, Haarvard (2008) *The Security Challenge in Conflict-Prone Countries*. [Online] at <http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com> [21.10.2009]
- Commission on Human Security (2003) *Human Security Now*. New York
- Commission on Global Governance (1995) *Our Global Neighborhood*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Coy, Patric G. (1993) 'Protective Accompaniment: How Peace Brigades International Secures Political Space and Human Rights Nonviolently.' *Nonviolence: Social and Psychological Issues*. Ed. by V.K. Kool, Lanham, MD: University Press of America ^{*(FK)}
- Coy, Patrick G. (1997) *Protecting Human Rights: The Dynamics of International Nonviolent Accompaniment by Peace Brigades International in Sri Lanka*. UMI Dissertation Services
- de Cuéllar, J. Pérez (1989) *The United Nations Peacekeeping Forces*. Nobel Lecture. [Online] at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1988/un-lecture.html [21.10.2009]
- Desai, Narayan (2000) 'Foreword'. In: *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders. A Recurrent Vision*. Ed. by Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Weber, Thomas. Honolulu: Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace: v-viii
- Dufour, Pierre (2007) *On a marché sur la paix*. Paris: Thélès
- Easwaran, Eknath (2002) (1999 2nd ed., reprint) *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam. Badsha Khan, A Man to Match His Mountains*. Tomalis: Nilgiri Press
- Eguren, Luis Enrique (2009) 'Developing Strategies for Accompaniment'. In: *People Power. Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity*. Ed. by Howard Clark. London/ New York: Pluto Press:98-107
- Evans, Gareth (2008) *The Responsibility to Protect. Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press

- Galtung, Johan (1976) 'Three Approaches to Peace. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding'. In: *Peace, War and Defence - Essays in Peace Research Vol I*. By Galtung, Johan. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen: 282-304
- Galtung, Johan (1996) *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage Publications
- Galtung, Johan (2004) *Transcend and Transform : An Introduction to Conflict Work*. London: Pluto Press
- Giersch, Carsten (1998) *Konfliktregulierung in Jugoslawien 1991-1995. Die Rolle von OSZE, EU, UNO und NATO*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
- Gow, James (1997) *Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*. London: Hurst
- Gowan, Richard and Johnstone, Ian (2007) *Coping with Crisis—New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the “War on Terror”*. New York: International Peace Academy
- Hare, A. Paul and Blumberg, Herbert H. (eds.) (1977) *Liberation Without Violence: A Third-Party Approach*. Totowa: Rowmand and Littlefield
- Holm, Tor Tanke and Eide, Espen Barth (eds) (2000) *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*. London: Frank Cass
- Human Security Centre (2005) *Human Security Report 2005*. Ed. Mack, Andrew und Nielsen, Zoe. Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. [Online] at <www.humansecuritycentre.org> [20.10.2005]
- Human Security Centre (2006) *Human Security Brief 2006*. Ed. Mack, Andrew und Nielsen, Zoe. Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. [Online] at <www.humansecuritycentre.org> [10.10.2007]
- Human Security Centre (2008) *Human Security Brief 2007*. Ed. Mack, Andrew und Nielsen, Zoe. Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. [Online] at <<http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/access.html>> [12.12.2008]
- Human Security Centre (2009) *Human Security Report 2008/2009*. Ed. Mack, Andrew und Nielsen, Zoe. Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. [Online] at <www.humansecuritycentre.org> [10.10.2009]
- ICISS (2001) *The Responsibility to Protect*. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (2001). [Online] at <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report-en.asp>> [27.8.2004]
- Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2002) *Growing the Sheltering Tree – Protecting Rights Through Humanitarian Action*. PDF/Web version. [Online] at <http://www.icva.ch/doc00000717.html> [25.8.2009]. Geneva: UNICEF
- International Committee of the Red Cross (1999) *Workshop on Protection for Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations: Doing Something About It and Doing It Well*. Report of the workshop held at the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 18-20 January 1999
- International Committee of the Red Cross (2008) *Enhancing Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence*. [Online] at <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_publications_protection?OpenDocument> (25.8.2009)

International Peace Institute (2009) *Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity*. IPI Blue Papers No 7

Judah, Tim (2002) 2nd edn. Kosovo. *War and Revenge*. New Haven/London: Yale Nota Bene

KOFF (2009) *Responsibility to Protect: The State of Discussion within the United Nations*. KOFF-Newsletter No 77:5-7

Lewer, Nick and Ramsbotham, Oliver (1993) ‚*Something Must Be Done.*’ *Towards an ethical framework for humanitarian intervention in international social conflict*. Peace Research Report No 33, University of Bradford [Online] at <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/> [1.3.1994]

Libal, Michael (1997) *Limits of Persuasion. Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992*. Westport/London: Praeger

Loquai, Heinz (2000) *Der Kosovo-Konflikt - Wege in einen vermeidbaren Krieg. Die Zeit von Ende November 1997 bis März 1999*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft

Lucarelli, Sonia (2000) *Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International

Lund, Michael S. (2000) ‚Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992-1999: From Containment to Nation Building.’ In Jentleson, Bruce W. (ed.) *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized. Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield: 173-208

Lund, Michael S. (2004) ‚Operationalising the Lessons from Recent Experience in Field-level Conflict Prevention Strategies.’ In: Andreas Wimmer et al. *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Towards a New Realism*. Lanham et al: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004:120-140

Mahony, Liam (2004) *Side by Side. Protecting and Encouraging Threatened Activists With Unarmed International Accompaniment*. Ed: The Center for Victims of Torture, Minneapolis

Mahony, Liam (2006) *Proactive Presence. Field Strategies For Civilian Protection*. Geneva: Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. [Online] at <<http://www.hdcentre.org/publications/>> [10.9.2008]

Mahony, Liam and Eguren, Luis Enrique (1997) *Unarmed Bodyguards. International Accompaniment for the Protection of Human Rights*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press

Maloney, Sean M.(1997) ‚Operation Bolster: Canada and the European Community Monitor Mission in Former Yugoslavia, 1991-92.’ *International Peacekeeping* (ed Frank Cass, London), Vol 4, No 1, Spring, 26-50

Mancini-Roth, Deborah, Picot, André (2004) *Humanitarian Negotiation: A Handbook for Securing Access, Assistance and Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict*. Geneva: Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. [Online] at <<http://www.hdcentre.org/publications/>> [25.8.2009]

Martin, Brian (2009) ‚Making Accompaniment Effective’. In: *People Power. Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity*. Ed. by Howard Clark. London/ New York: Pluto Press:93-97

Mathews, Dylan (2001) *War prevention works. 50 stories of people resolving conflict*. Oxford: Oxford Research Group, 2001

Mc Hugh, Gerard and Bessler, Manuel (2006) *Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups. A Manual for Practitioners*. New York: United Nations

Miall, Hugh; Ramsbotham, Oliver und Woodhouse, Tom (1999) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution. The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press

- Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Weber, Thomas (2000a) 'The Recurrent Vision and the Peace Brigade Movement'. In: *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders. A Recurrent Vision*. Ed. by Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Weber, Thomas. Honolulu: Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace: 3-14
- Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Weber, Thomas (2000b) 'Nonviolent Humanitarian Intervention: A Framework for the Future'. In *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders. A Recurrent Vision*. Ed. by Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Weber, Thomas. Honolulu: Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace:319-337
- Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Weber, Thomas (eds) (2000) *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders. A Recurrent Vision*. Honolulu: Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace
- Müller, Barbara (2004) *The Balkan Peace Team 1994-2001. Nonviolent Intervention in Crisis Areas with the Deployment of Volunteer Teams*. Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag
- Naím, Moises (2005). *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy*. New York: Random House
- Nonviolent Peaceforce (2008) *Nonviolent Peaceforce Storybook. Field Deployments. Capacity Building. Public Awareness. Advocacy. Civilian Peacekeeping*. Brussels / Minneapolis: Nonviolent Peaceforce
- O'Callaghan, Sorcha and Pantuliano, Sara (2007) *Protective Action. Incorporating Civilian Protection Into Humanitarian Response*. HPG Report 26, London: Humanitarian Policy Group. [Online] at <<http://www.odi.org/hpg>> [26.8.2009]
- OECD/DAC (2005) Conflict Prevention and Peace Building: What Counts as ODA? OECD, DAC High Level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies. Paris: OECD/DAC
- Paffenholz, Thania (2009a) *Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project: Civil Society and Peacebuilding*. CCDP Working Paper. The Graduate Institute / The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding Geneva
- Paffenholz, Thania (2009b) *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*. Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publishers (forthcoming)
- Panyarachun, Anand (2004) *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. (UN) [Online] at <<http://www.un.org/secureworld/>> [21.10.2009]
- Peace Brigades International (2008) *Annual Review 2007-2008*. [Online] at <http://www.peacebrigades.org/publications/annual-reviews/> [16.11.2009]
- Ramsbotham, Oliver and Woodhouse, Tom (1999) *Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO
- Ramsbottom, Oliver and Woodhouse, Tom (2005) 'Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalization of Security.' *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, Vol.12, No.2, Summer 2005 :139 – 156
- Refugee Studies Centre (eds) (2009) *Protecting People in Conflict and Crisis*. Conference papers and key note addresses. Oxford. [Online] at <<http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/>> [18.11.2009]
- Reychler, Luc and Paffenholz, Thania (eds.) (2001) *Peace-building. A Field Guide*. London/Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Rigby, Andrew (2006) *Is there a role for the military in peacebuilding?* CCTS Review October 2006

- Roszak, T. (1994) *Thinking Green! Essays on Environmentalism, Feminism, and Nonviolence*. Berkeley: Parallax Press
- Rubin, Barnett R. (2002) *Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action*. Washington: Brookings Institution
- Ryan, Stephen (1995) 2nd edn. *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd
- Schirch, Lisa (1995) *Keeping the Peace. Exploring Civilian Alternatives in Conflict Prevention*. Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute
- Schirch, Lisa (2006) *Civilian Peacekeeping. Preventing Violence and Making Space for Democracy*. Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute
- Schweitzer, Christine (2008) 'Civilian Peacekeeping: How Civilian International Interventions at Grassroots Level Contribute to Human Security and Stability,' in: *From Early Warning to Early Action? The debate on the enhancement of the EU's Crisis Response capability continues*. Ed. by European Commission External Relations Directorate-General : 155-161
- Schweitzer, Christine (2009a) 'Civilian Peacekeeping: providing protection without sticks and carrots'. In: *People Power: Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity*. Ed. By Clark, Howard. London/ New York:112-121
- Schweitzer, Christine (2009b) *Strategies of Intervention in Protracted Violent Conflicts by Civil Society Actors. The Example of Interventions in the Violent Conflicts in the Area of Former Yugoslavia, 1990 – 2002*. [Online] at <http://www.ifgk.de> (forthcoming)
- Schweitzer, Christine and Clark, Howard (2002) *Balkan Peace Team - International e.V. A Final Internal Assessment of Its Functioning and Activities*. Balkan Peace Team/Bund für Soziale Verteidigung (eds), Minden: Bund für Soziale Verteidigung, Hintergrund- und Diskussionspapier No. 11
- Schweitzer, Christine, Howard, Donna, Junge, Mareike, Levine, Corey, Stieren, Carl and Wallis, Tim (2001) *Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study*. Minneapolis. [Online] at <<http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/en/feasibilitystudy>> [2.3.2009]
- Semelin, Jacques (1995) *Ohne Waffen gegen Hitler. Eine Studie zum zivilen Widerstand in Europa*. Frankfurt a. main:dipa Verlag
- Seminar: Monitoring Peace in Bougainville* (1999) Seminar Papers. 8. September 1999. The Australian National University. State Society and Governance in Melanesia. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies. [Online] at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/melanesia/conference_papers/1999/bougpapers.htm [16.11.2009]
- Sharp, Gene (1985) *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defence*. London:Taylor & Francis
- Slim, Hugo and Bonwick, Andrew (2005) *Protection. An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies*. London:ODI 2005. [Online] at <<http://www.alnap.org/alnappubs.html>> [11.9.2008]
- Slim, Hugo and Eguren, Luis Enrique (2004) *Humanitarian Protection. A Guidance Booklet*. Pilot Version, ALNAP, [online] at <<http://www.alnap.org/alnappubs.html>> [30.11.2005]
- Smith, Dan (2003) *The Atlas of War and Peace*. London: EarthScan.
- Smith, Dan (2008) *The Penguin State of the World Atlas* (8th ed.). New York: Penguin.

- Stevens, Anthony (1989) *The Roots of War—A Jungian Perspective*. New York: Paragon House Publishers
- Stoddard, Abby; Harmer, Adele and Haver, Katherine (2006) *Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations*. Humanitarian Policy Group Report No 23. [Online] at <<http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg>> [21.4.2008]
- The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin: Berghof. [Online] at <<http://www.berghof-handbook.net/>> [2.3.2009]
- Troebst, Stefan (1999) 'Chronologie einer gescheiterten Prävention: Vom Konflikt zum Krieg im Kosovo, 1989-1999.' *Osteuropa* 49 (1999), H. 8 (August):777-795
- United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2005) *Decision on Follow up procedure to the declaration on prevention of genocide. Indicators of systematic and massive patterns of Racial Discrimination*. [Online] at <<http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/unindicators.htm>> [13.6.2009]
- United Nations Development Programme (1994) *Human Development Report 1994*. New dimensions of human security. online] at <<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/chapters/>> [15.7.2008]
- United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2002) *Growing the Sheltering Tree. Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action. Programmes & Practices from the Field*
- United Nations Peacekeeping . (n.d.). [Online] at <<http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>> [[21.10.2009]
- United Nations Secretary-General (2009) *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, UN Doc. A/63/677, January 2009
- United Nations Secretary-General (1999) *Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly*, 20.9.1999. SG/SM/7136 GA/9596
- United Nations Secretary-General, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, UN Doc. A/63/677, January 2009
- United Nations Security Council (2009) *Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict*. (S/2009/277) UN
- Volker Böge (1999) *Friedenskonsolidierung in Nachkriegszeiten. Der Fall Bougainville*. Arbeitspapier Nr. 3/1999 der Forschungsstelle Kriege, Rüstung und Entwicklung der Universität Hamburg, Hamburg
- Von Arnould, Andreas (2009) 'Souveränität und responsibility to protect.' *Die Friedens-Warte* Bd 84, Heft 1: 11-52
- Walker, Charles (1981) *A World Peace Guard. An Unarmed Agency For Peacekeeping*. Hyderabad: Academy for Gandhian Studies
- Weber, Thomas (1993) From Maude Royden's Peace Army to the Gulf Peace Team. An Assessment of Unarmed Interpositionary Peace Forces. In: *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 30/1: 45 -64
- Weber, Thomas (1996) *Gandhi's Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping*. New York: Syracuse University Press

Weber, Thomas (2000) ,A History of Nonviolent Interposition and Accompaniment.‘ In: *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders. A Recurrent Vision*. Ed. by Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Weber, Thomas. Honolulu: Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace: 45-72

Weir, Erin A. (2009) *Greater Expectations: UN Peacekeeping & Civilian Protection*. Refugees International. [Online] at < <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/greater-expectations> > [21.10.2009]

Weiss, Thomas and Daws, Sam (2008) *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*. London: Oxford University Press

Wenig, Marcus (1999/2000) ‘Wo die Kosovo-Mission an ihre Grenzen stieß.’ In *Perspektiven und Defizite der OSZE*. Ed. by Lutz, Dieter S. And Tudyka, Kurt P. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft:81-90

Yanacopulos, Helen and Hanlon, Joseph (eds.) (2005) *Civil War, Civil Peace*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

The Authors

Rolf Carrière

Rolf Carrière, Switzerland, is a Dutch national who, after studying development economics and philosophy at Groningen University, worked for over 30 years with the UN, mostly with UNICEF and World Bank in Indonesia and India, and as UNICEF Country Representative in Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Indonesia. Since his retirement in 2005 he serves as Nonviolent Peaceforce's Senior Adviser *pro bono*. He can be contacted at r_carriere@hotmail.com.

Rachel Julian

Rachel Julian, Britain, has worked internationally in peace and nonviolence for 15 years, most recently for Nonviolent Peaceforce, an international NGO specialising in unarmed protection. Her consultancy work has included evaluation of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) services in sudden onset disaster and analysis of the provision of GIS to humanitarian actors.

She is currently researching how to support 'demonstrating impact' in conflict transformation evaluation, and is a doctoral candidate studying 'the extent to which 'project management' could be applied to support nonviolent intervention projects' at Leeds Metropolitan University. She has given presentations on Unarmed Protection at 'Communities, Conflict and Change' conference, INTRAC International Conference, Conflict Research Society Conference, and Leeds Metropolitan University. She can be contacted at rachel@navigatelife.co.uk.

Christine Schweitzer

Christine Schweitzer, Germany, is researcher at the Institute for Peace Work and Nonviolent Conflict Resolution (www.ifgk.de) and doing different pieces of consultancy work. Between 2001 and May 2008 she was Programme Director of Nonviolent Peaceforce, supervising NP's projects in Sri Lanka, Philippines und Guatemala. Formerly the Research Director of NP, Christine co-ordinated the Feasibility Study for Large-Scale Nonviolent Intervention.

Christine has an Masters in Social Anthropology from the University of Cologne and a PhD awarded by the University of Coventry for her thesis on civil society interventions in the former Yugoslavia between 1990 and 2002. She can be contacted at CSchweitzerIFGK@aol.com.

Tim Wallis

Tim Wallis is the new Executive Director of Nonviolent Peaceforce. Prior to that, Tim served as Programme Director of NP as Christine's successor (2008-2009).

Tim has a PhD in Peace Studies from Bradford University and over 20 years experience of peace-related work. He has been Training Director at International Alert (2006-2008), Director of Peaceworkers UK (2000-2006), Director of the National Peace Council (1997-

2000), Editor of *Peace News* magazine (1995-1997), International Secretary of Peace Brigades International (1991-1994), Coordinator of the Commonweal Peace Library (1986-1990) and Campaigns Organiser of the Molesworth Ploughshares Campaign (1984-1986). In 1995 he led an exploratory peace team to Chechnya and was involved in setting up the Balkan Peace Team and a number of other peace team projects, including the Nonviolent Peaceforce. He served as co-chair of NP's International Governing Council from 2002-2007. He can be contacted at TWallis@nonviolentpeaceforce.org

Institut für Friedensarbeit und Gewaltfreie Konfliktbearbeitung (IFGK)

Publikationen:

Arbeitspapiere (AP) - ISSN 1439-4006:

- Albert Fuchs 1995: Wie wird militärische Gewalt zur „friedensschaffenden Maßnahme?“ Kognitionspsychologische Aspekte der Beurteilung von Militäreinsätzen, Wahlenau, AP 2, Oktober 1995, 21 S., 2,50 €
- Barbara Müller 1996: Zur Theorie und Praxis von sozialer Verteidigung, Wahlenau, AP 3, Februar 1996, 18 S., 2,50 €
- Barbara Müller und Christian W. Büttner 1996: Optimierungschancen von Peacekeeping, Peacemaking und Peacebuilding durch gewaltfreie Interventionen?, Wahlenau, AP 4, Oktober 1996, 2. Auflage, 64 S., 5,00 €
- Liam Mahony und Luis Enrique Eguren 1997: Internationale Begleitung zum Schutz von Menschenrechten: Szenarien, Ziele und Strategien, Wahlenau, AP 5, Juni 1997, 58 S., 5,00 €
- Barbara Müller und Christian W. Büttner 1998: Optimizing Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding through nonviolent intervention? A methodological and systematic operationalisation, AP6, Januar 1998, 67 S., 5,00 €
- Albert Fuchs 1998: Wo bleibt die Moral von der Geschichte? Parteilichkeit und politisch-moralische Situationsbeurteilung als Determinanten der Entscheidung zum Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Ex-Jugoslawien, Wahlenau, AP 8, März 1998, 16 S., 2,50 €
- Achim Schmitz 1998: Gewaltfreie Interventionen im ehemaligen Jugoslawien durch Organisationen der europäischen Friedensbewegung, Wahlenau, AP 9, Dezember 1998, 26 S., 3,50 €
- Albert Fuchs 1999: Bundeswehr: Nicht unter „Generalverdacht“, aber unter kritischem Blick, Wahlenau, AP 10, 1999, 19 S., 2,50 €
- Christine Schweitzer 1999: Krieg und Vertreibung im Kosovo – Ist die NATO Feuerwehr oder Brandstifter?, Wahlenau, AP 11, Juni 1999, 27 S., 3,50 €
- Howard Clark 1999: Kosovo: Vorbereitungen für die Zeit nach dem Krieg, Wahlenau, AP 12, Juni 1999, 28 S., 3,50 €
- Albert Fuchs/Claudia Schuchart 2005: Gewaltwahrnehmung und Gewaltbegriff. Wie (un-) bestimmt ist der Alltagssprachgebrauch von „Gewalt“?, Belm-Vehrte, AP 13, Juli 2000, 2. überarbeitete Neuauflage 2005, 24 S., 3,50 €, ISBN 978-935431-75-0
- Achim Schmitz 2000: Kampagnen der Friedensbewegung der neunziger Jahre. Eine Analyse von Fallbeispielen, Wahlenau, AP 14, September 2000, 74 S., 5,00 €
- Albert Fuchs unter Mitarbeit von Kristin Pöch 2000: Rechtsextreme Orientierung, Gewaltakzeptanz und Gewalttätigkeit, AP15, Dezember 2000, 32 S., 3,50 €
- Martin Arnold 2007: Gütekraft (Satjagrah): Thema für die Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Belm-Vehrte, AP 16, April 2001, 2. Auflage 2007, 20 S., 2,50 €, ISBN 978-3-935431-71-2
- Barbara Müller 2005: Möglichkeiten der Förderung von Friedensallianzen in Konfliktregionen durch externe Basisorganisationen. Bericht über ein Aktionsforschungsprojekt in Kroatien, Belm-Vehrte, AP 17, Januar 2002, 2. überarbeitete Neuauflage 2005, 48 S., 4,00 €, ISBN 978-3-935431-72-9
- Martin Arnold 2007: Basistext - Was untersucht die Gütekraftforschung? Aus der Arbeitsgruppe Gütekraft, Belm-Vehrte, AP 18, März 2003, 2. Auflage 2007, 24 S., 3,50 €, ISBN 978-3-935431-73-6
- Albert Fuchs 2007: Kultur und Krieg, Belm-Vehrte
AP 19, Juni 2003, 2. Auflage 2007, 34 S., 3,50 €, ISBN 978-3-935431-74-3
- Barbara Müller und Christine Schweitzer 2006 (Hrsg.): Zur Aktualität von Sozialer Verteidigung, Belm-Vehrte, AP 20, Januar 2006, 1. Auflage 2006, 148 S., 9,90 €, ISBN 978-3-935431-76-7
- Jan Heider 2007: Ein sozialphilosophisches Weiterdenken des Gütekraftverständnisses von Hildegard Goss-Mayr, Belm-Vehrte, AP 21, Mai 2006, 2. Auflage 2007, 34 S., 5,00 €, ISBN 978-3-935431-77-4
- Barbara Müller 2007: Gewaltfreie Interventionen Planen und Anpassen (GIPA), Belm-Vehrte, AP 22, Januar 2007, 1. Auflage 2007, 44 Seiten, 5,00 €, ISBN 978-3-935431-78-1
- Christine Schweitzer (Hrsg.) 2010: Civilian Peacekeeping, Belm-Vehrte, AP 23, Januar 2010, 1. Auflage 2010, 78 Seiten, 7,50 €, ISBN 978-3-935431-79-8

Studien zur Gewaltfreiheit:

Barbara Müller 1995: Passiver Widerstand im Ruhrkampf. Eine Fallstudie zur gewaltlosen zwischenstaatlichen Konfliktaustragung und ihren Erfolgsbedingungen, Münster, Band 1, 530 S., 19,50 €

Christian W. Büttner 1995: Friedensbrigaden: Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung mit gewaltfreien Methoden, Münster, Band 2, 147 S., 10,-€

Uwe Painke 2001: Ein Stadtteil macht mobil. Gemeinwesen gegen Gewaltkriminalität. Neighborhood Safety in den USA, Münster, Band 3, 504 Seiten, 19,00 €, ISBN 978-3-8258-5600-7

Burkhard Bläsi 2001: Konflikttransformation durch Gütekraft. Interpersonale Veränderungsprozesse, Münster, Band 4, 202 S., 10,- €

Weitere Publikationen in (Mit-)Herausgeberschaft

Christoph Besemer: Konflikte verstehen und lösen lernen. Ein Erklärungs- und Handlungsmodell zur Entwurzelung von Gewalt von Pat Patfoort. Mitherausgeber: Werkstatt für gewaltfreie Aktion, Baden. Heidelberg; Wahlenau. Juni 1999. (142 Seiten; 8 € + Porto)

Howard Clark: Ziviler Widerstand im Kosovo. Mitherausgeber: Verlag Weber & Zucht, Kassel: Verlag Weber & Zucht, 2003 (302 Seiten; 20 € + Porto)

Barbara Müller: Balkan Peace Team 1994-2001. Mit Freiwilligenteams im gewaltfreien Einsatz in Krisenregionen. Mitherausgeber: Arbeit und Leben. Braunschweig 2004. (240 Seiten; 10 € + Porto).

Konfliktbearbeitung und Friedensförderung Zugänge - Begriffe - Instrumente – Konzepte. Barbara Müller, 2005. ISBN 978-3-935431-30-9 CD-ROM, Sozio-Publishing (CD-Rom, 6 € + Porto)

Ausgewählte weitere Buch-Publikationen der MitarbeiterInnen

Arnold, Martin und Knittel, Gudrun (Hrsg.) (1999) Gütekraft erforschen: Kraft der Gewaltfreiheit, Satyagraha, Strength to love. Minden Versöhnungsbund e.V.

Blum, Heike und Knittel, Gudrun (1994) Training zum gewaltfreien Eingreifen gegen Rassismus und rechtsextreme Gewalt. Köln: Kölner Trainingskollektiv für gewaltfreie Aktion und kreative Konfliktlösung

Herwegh, Rolf und Knittel Gudrun (1995) Zuhause, eine europaweite Unterrichtskampagne zu Einwanderung, Flucht und Asyl. Hrsg Institut für empirische Psychologie und Sozialforschung e.V. Köln :Eigenverlag

Müller, Barbara (2004) The Balkan Peace Team 1994-2001. Nonviolent Intervention in Crisis Areas with the Deployment of Volunteer Teams. Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag

Schweitzer, Christine, Aust, Björn und Schlotter, Peter (Hrsg.) (2004) Demokratien im Krieg. AFK-Friedensschriften Band 31, Baden-Baden:Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft

Sommer, Gert and Fuchs, Albert (Hrsg.) (2004) Krieg und Frieden. Handbuch der Konflikt- und Friedenspsychologie. Weinheim/Basel/Berlin: Beltz Verlag

Schweitzer, Christine (2009) Erfolgreich gewaltfrei. Professionelle Praxis in ziviler Friedensförderung. Hrsg. IFA, Berlin: IFA. [Online] bei <http://www.ifa.de/pub/dokumentationen/zivik-zivile-konfliktbearbeitung/>

Schweitzer, Christine (2009) Rekrutierung und Qualifizierung von Personal im Zivilen Friedensdienst. Mit einem Exkurs von Steffen Emrich: Von der Wirtschaft lernen?! Die richtigen Mitarbeiter finden und an sich binden. Bonn: Akademie für Konflikttransformation. [Online] bei http://www.forumzfd-akademie.de/files/va_media/nid2882.media_filename.pdf

Schweitzer, Christine (2009) Strategies of Intervention in Protracted Violent Conflicts by Civil Society Actors. The Example of Interventions in the Violent Conflicts in the Area of Former Yugoslavia, 1990 – 2002 (Dissertation) Herunterzuladen bei: http://www.ifgk.de/oben/publikationen_all.htm.

unverbindl. Preisempfehlung 7,50 €