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ETHNICITY, CONFESSION AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AT THE EUROPEAN UNION EASTERN BORDER
ETHNICITY, CONFESSION AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AT THE EUROPEAN UNION EASTERN BORDER

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Ioan HORGA
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(Coordinators)

Suppliment of Eurolimes

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INTRODUCTORY STUDIES
ETHNICITY, RELIGION AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN THE EUROPEAN BORDER SPACE

Mircea BRIE*

Abstract. Ethnicity and religious confession are concepts around which discussion and controversy arise, generating emotions and feelings of extreme intensity. Each of us belongs to such communities. By default, there is a strong pressure on us to be subjective. Intercultural dialogue can be successfully provided where a community that is aware of the others comes to communicate, to cooperate, and to build the structure of a multicultural society. Studies have shown that ethnic and religious diversity is poor when missing openness to other communities. On the other hand, this diversity, as it is the case throughout Central and South-Eastern Europe, reveals the less desirable realities. Today we are talking about discrimination, marginalization, low-status minorities, peripheral societies, inequitable distribution of resources; therefore, we can conclude that the majority-minority relations management highlights the demographic aspect (quantity) and the sociological aspect, i.e. the distribution of authority and power.

Keywords: ethnicity, religion, intercultural dialogue, European border space.

Ethnicity and religious confession are concepts around which discussion and controversy arise, generating emotions and feelings of extreme intensity. Each of us belongs to such communities. By default, there is a strong pressure on us to be subjective. Intercultural dialogue can be successfully provided where a community that is aware of the others comes to communicate, to cooperate, and to build the structure of a multicultural society. Studies have shown that ethnic and religious diversity is poor when missing openness to other communities. On the other hand, this diversity, as it is the case throughout Central and South-Eastern Europe, reveals the less desirable realities. Today we are talking about discrimination, marginalization, low-status minorities, peripheral societies, inequitable distribution of resources; therefore, we can conclude that the majority-minority relations management highlights the demographic aspect (quantity) and the sociological aspect, i.e. the distribution of authority and power.

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realities. Today we are talking about discrimination, marginalization, low-status minorities, peripheral societies, inequitable distribution of resources; therefore, we can conclude that the majority-minority relations management highlights the demographic aspect (quantity) and the sociological aspect, i.e. the distribution of authority and power.

The current context of crisis, which is not only a financial and economic crisis, but also a political, social, mental, and even ideological crisis, shows a throw at the forefront of discussions, on the one hand, of the need to strengthen the dialogue and on the other hand, the trends to return to certain forms of nationalism and cultural cleavage. Without advocating for one or other of these trends we see that Europe is at a crossroads. The old forms of social-political and economic life are redefined. Even relations between people and between communities resettle on new organization and relational forms. In a Europe without borders, more and more types of borders appear; on another occasion we called them “symbolic and ideological frontiers” (Brie and Horga, 2009: 15-31, Brie, 2010: 79-92; Horga and Brie, 2010 [2]: 63-86). We refer to them as symbolic and ideological frontiers as they, most often, are not tangible. From Europeanism to nationalism, from ethno-religious identity to cultural identity, and to social cleavages, the wide range of approaches of these borders could continue in the context of implementation of an effective European Neighbourhood Policy. The physical border of the European Union’s external limit can "open" in time, but new types of frontiers can occur between people and communities. Immigrants, for instance, live in the European Union maintaining their own identity, thus creating a world that "refuses integration" by the specificity that it develops; we are able to identify a cleavage between this kind of community and the majority, a cleavage that can take the form of symbolic cultural borders that sometimes turns into an "external" border.

In the current context, many European societies develop a strong sense of "self-protection", which takes not only a form of economic nature, but also one of preservation of their identity and culture. Moments of crisis or excitement can easily lead to the emergence of nationalist sentiments that dilute the "Europeanist" perception of the border. Such a dilution occurs in parallel with the strengthening of identity-community cohesion, of the spirit of ethno-cultural belonging to nation. It is a time when many European nations reaffirmed, "they regain identity" by returning to the national, that despite the "unity" and solidarity affirmed at the level of European institutions through officials of Member States. National borders, created in different periods and historical and political contexts have contributed to national economic integration and cultural periphery. In the current context, with the EU accession of the Central and Eastern Europe states, there was a reverse phenomenon: the disintegration of the national market and the administrative decentralization have led to integration of peripheries in the national systems,
including the cultural one. Powerful currents are currently channeled in the direction of cross-border cooperation, eroding the idea of the national bloc, compact and relatively isolated (Muller and Schultz, 2002: 205). In terms of cultural relations it is obvious that we are dealing nowadays with a streamlining of trades, without being able to talk about a loss of national, regional or local specificity. The cultural specificity brings into question the cultural border. It separates the areas of own cultural identity, building what we call the European cultural space of the cultures.

The cultural diversity records the plurality of ideas, images, values and expressions. All this is possible through a great variety of expression and through the presence of a large number of parallel national, ethnic, regional, local, etc. cultures. Moreover, in this context, some authors talk about the "revenge identity" and the "feeling of return to historical, national and cultural identity" especially in an area such as the Central and Eastern Europe, and a historical time in which the specificity and the national identity are bound to redefine themselves through opening to new geo-political, historical, cultural configurations (David and Florea, 2007: 645-646).

In the approach, surely an important element of reference is given: sub- or multinational, local or diaspora, not least by the European and international context (Bennett, 2001: 29-32). Beyond any approach, the image of European culture has been given by associating concepts of people-culture-history and territory that give a certain local specificity. Under this report, we identify, beyond a European culture, a cultural space with national, regional and local specificities. Therefore we identify at least two European cultural identity constructions: a culture of cultures, namely a cultural space with a strong identity at individual, local, regional, and national levels, or a cultural archipelago, namely a common cultural space interrupted by discontinuities. Whatever the perspective, the existence of a European cultural area is not denied, even if it is either the diversity or the "continuity interrupted" (Horga and Brie, 2010 [1]: 157).

But we increasingly find that Europe is at a turning point, in terms of more than ideology. The association of state-nation-territory-border involves some nuances. In the current geopolitical context, we could say that the era of nation states, as known to date, is redefined, reshaping it in a different sense. “Borders” between communities have been increasingly occurring within states. Unintegrated immigrants (unwanted by the majority!) are increasingly numerous. Discrimination and marginalization are forcing them to isolate and to respond sometimes as parallel "existential forms" to the state in which they live.

Our approach could be too simplistic if we remain only to debate about classic immigrants or national minorities. Introducing the concept of extraterritoriality in the approach of ethnicity and intercultural dialogue seems
mandatory for a proper understanding of European realities in this field. A subject that has been intensively debated at European level is the Roma, the Gypsies. Comments relating to the expulsion of Roma from France and their forced repatriation to Romania and Bulgaria have filled the pages of the European newspapers. Events in mid September 2011 in Bulgaria relating to the "revolt" brought against the Roma in many cities of the country south of the Danube have exposed a cruel reality that needs to be on the agenda of all institutions of Europe. Extremist groups in Bulgaria gathered important masses of people who were not limited to racial chanting, but they also became violent and destroyed Roma properties. Shocking was the extremist calling for chasing the Roma from Bulgaria. France repatriates them in Bulgaria and Bulgarians banishes them from the country. Where? Roma are members of a great people living in many European countries, but a people without its own a territory and without its own state. Tackling the Roma in Europe is therefore a problem of Europe and not of a certain state, not even of the South Central-Eastern Europe, as it is the very wrong impression of the West. Estra-territoriality, both as a concept and as a starting point in managing the problems of an ethnic minority (but not national!), becomes therefore a reality that invokes new clarifications and rethinking of European policies.

Another example, which falls somewhat in the same category of discussions on "non-traditional minority" is in Central and Eastern Europe; there are issues related to granting dual citizenship to members of ethnic groups. The most present in the mass-media were the granting of dual citizenship for the Romanian ethnics in Moldova and granting the dual citizenship for the Hungarian ethnics from countries around Hungary (during public debates, a strong emphasis has been put on the pros and cons in the disputes from Slovakia and Romania, where Hungarian communities are more numerous). The topic has gained special importance by the fact that this dual citizenship, even if individually granted, peaked so high that is sent the message that dual citizenship was granted in mass to a group, to a community. Hence the hope or the fear for the possible creation of "Little Hungaries" in southern Slovakia and in central Romania.

Cultural diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism are specific elements of the European space. European integration is complex and it does not require, nor is it conditioned by the idea of cultural unity, or by the existence of a common culture to include all Europeans. Specificity and diversity belong to the realm of intercultural dialogue, prerogatives of the European peoples. Each of the European societies must find its own integrated solutions, depending on the specific traditions and its institutions. European societies and cultures do not repel each other in the European construction equation. It is time that everyone learns from the experience and the expertise of others. Central and Eastern European countries issued by the communist authoritarian regimes have
experimented in the post-1990 a transition to a democratic model. This democratic model assumes, however, the acceptance of diversity, including those claims that had acknowledged the minorities. In some cases, the opportunities for cultural expression and political responses to these claims were not really the desired ones and thus, unfortunately, military settlements were sought.

Over a long period of time, the minorities in Western Europe have gradually won self-recognition and equity in distribution of national resources (sudden changes were recorded in the central-eastern continent that manifested with a much higher intensity, both through the minority claims and the resistance of the majority). Not the same situation can be found in minority rights from the old European colonies. Their proposals raised issues related to the question of social status, financial resources and, finally, the relations between European cultures and those from the world where these populations originate (La culture au cœur, 1998: 69).

The problem of immigrants, their access and integration, is another sensitive and important issue from the perspective of inter-ethnic or inter-religious relations. Diversity is not only ethno-religious, it is also cultural and mental. The attitudes of Europeans towards immigrants have not remained constant over time. If in the ‘70s the European countries were favourable to immigration, and in some cases such as West Germany and Switzerland, immigration was encouraged, as it addressed employment, then things have changed. In the late ‘80s, because of the overwhelming number of immigrants and their "non-European" character, the old continent proved to be less welcoming. Yet Europe has tried to cultivate a climate of openness and generosity.” It is fundamental to create a welcoming society and to recognize that immigration is a two-way process involving both immigrants being adapted to the society, and the society that assimilates them. Europe is by nature a pluralist society, rich in cultural and social traditions that will further diversify”(Tandonnet, 2007: 50). Is it just a utopia this European optimism that Maxime Tandonnet identified? The presence of Islam in Europe is a certainty, but its Europeanization remains a contentious issue. As the French academician Gilles Kepel noted "neither the bloodshed of the Muslims in North Africa, fighting in French uniforms during both world wars, nor the toil of the immigrant workers, living in deplorable conditions, who rebuilt France (and Europe) for nothing after 1945, did not transform their children in ... European citizens in the true sense of the word" (Leiken, 2005: 1). If Europeans are able to assimilate Muslim immigrants, or if there will be a conflict of values remains an open issue. Stanley Hoffman observed that more and more Westerners are afraid of "being invaded not by armies and tanks, but by the immigrants who speak other languages and worship other gods from other cultures and will take
their jobs, will occupy their land, will live far from the prosperity system and will threaten their way of life" (Stanley, 1991: 30, Huntington, 1998: 292).

Alternating negotiation and conflict, communication and doubt, the Muslims are building step by step an individual and collective identity "that is likely to be both pure and hybrid, local and transnational" (Saint-Blanc, 2008: 42). The multiplication of identity vectors contributes to a fluidity of symbolic borders and to an individuality of communities from diaspora. A cleavage is identified around the Islamic community, by comparison to the wider community. This cleavage sometimes takes the form of internal and external borders, all at the same time. Such a reality is amplified by the creation of community models in which identity features are transferred from the sphere of ethnic or national (Turkey, Maghreb, Arabs) to the religion, i.e. Muslim, Islamic (Saint-Blanc, 2008: 44). In this model of behavior we can observe the numerous behavioral reactions of Islamic communities that achieve a solidarity going slightly beyond ethnic or national differences. Such a reality is determined by the discriminatory attitude of the majority. Many stereotypes not only lead to a generalized stereotyped image, but also to a solidarity around Islamic values even of those who are not into religious practices, maybe even atheists. The phenomenon can be reversed: leaving from Islamic solidarity can lead to ethnic solidarity. This is the case of the Pakistani Muslim community in the UK (approximately 750,000 people) who have regrouped ethnically (ethnic border) on the basis of religious support (Pędziwiart, 2002: 159).

Here we are, the difficulties of integration are obvious. Between different ethnic groups or cultures there are often communication barriers that not infrequently lead to cleavages, engaging discriminatory reactions and conflictual situations. On the other hand, these cleavages are only expressions of the elitist political current, being difficult to spot in everyday life. Under this report, the ethnic boundaries are from one point of view mutual spaces of understanding and inclusion, and from another point of view spaces of divergence and exclusion (Tătar, 2003: 159).

The political events of 1989 particularly marked by the fall of communism outlined the possibility of building the new Europe soon. The border imposed by the Iron Curtain fell and therefore, the gap between Eastern and Western Europe began to fill. Under the strong influence of globalization, which has made the world a small global village, the European Union came into being, a body which in the future will include all European countries.

The new Europe brings together a multitude of ethnicities, beliefs, traditions, cultures and religions. The European integration process has profound implications not only of political, economic and social natures, but also of religious nature. A political structure "cannot live without religious consensus" (Moșoiu, 2006: 312). But what kind of religious consensus is required today? And what kind of religious identity will be there in the New Europe? These questions
must be seen in the context of postmodernism and secularization. The Europeans have been showing a decreasing interest in the Church and in religion, in general. René Rémond talks about an abandonment of Christianity in Europe. In England and the Scandinavian countries, the proportion of believers who regularly attend services is 1-2% (Rémond, 2003: 10).

On the other hand, one can observe an ideological and religious division between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. The West accommodates the Catholic and Protestant populations, while the East accommodates mainly the Orthodox. Moreover, if Europe was once considered a Christian continent, today we cannot say the same. On the European continent live alongside Christians, millions of Muslims, only in Britain, Germany and France there are more than twelve million Muslims (Rémond, 2003: 217). To this a substantial segment Jewish population and eastern religions are added.

In this context, the construction of the new Europe requires a consistent and coherent intercultural dialogue. Moreover, the issue of the importance of Christianity in the formation of the "European identity" has been highlighted, being even put in relation with the pressing institutional crisis, and with the much debated European Constitution rejected by the French and Dutch referendums (Kalinowski, 2008: 297-298). The continuation of the process of European construction itself requires significant progress towards achieving intercultural dialogue, involving also the realization of a bridge between religions and religious movements at European level.

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Saint-Blancat, Chantal (2008), *L’islam diasporique entre frontières externes et internes*, în Antonela Capelle-Pogăcean, Patrick Michel, Enzo Pace (coord.), *Religion(s) et identité(s) en Europe. L’épreuve du pluriel*, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, p. 41-58
Abstract. Our initiative first aims at introducing the topics on ethnicity, religion and intercultural dialogue in the Curricula of European Studies in 12 European Union Member States (Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Italy, Romania, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, France and Denmark). Although the number of courses approaching topics relating to culture, social realities and historical experiences is low (only 4.5% out of the total number of inventoried courses), there is a great variety of such courses. Second, our initiative is an attempt to settle the trends in the evolution of the curricula in the field.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Religion, Intercultural education, Curricula of European Studies, Old Europe, New Europe.

In a world where cultural and religious interdependencies get deeper due to economic, political and cultural globalization on the one hand, and isolationist outbursts meant to separate cultures, religions and communities on the other hand, one seems to question humanity trends for harmony of interdependences as an expression of diversity where multiculturalism is contested by both rational political voices and irrational anarchic actions. We consider that the fight for religious and ethnic diversity and intercultural dialogue is both justified and morally necessary. On the one hand, intercultural education contributes to establishing a set of values due to which students pass from the level of understanding and affirmation of their own culture to the level “where spatial and cultural borders are becoming ever more permeable” (Checkel, J.T & Katzenstein P.J, 2010: 2). On the other hand, intercultural

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education contributes to affirming diversity in a joint cultural space of democratic values, which could turn into a real European citizenship policy (Howard M. M, 2009).

From this point of view, this event is not only a scientific initiative, but also a civic enterprise meant to seize, explain, and draw people’s attention. Our endeavour referring to topics focusing on ethnicity, religion and intercultural dialogue in the Curricula of European Studies is meant to respond to these three objectives.

1. Fields with courses contributing to intercultural education

Our endeavour is based on data collected in 2008 – 2010 under the Erasmus Thematic Network project referring to the curricula on European Studies in 12 European countries: Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Italy, Romania, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, France and Denmark. Out of the nine operational fields in which we have divided the courses selected, in five we can find a greater number of courses relaying information referring to the topic of our paper to the students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Political and Administrative Studies</th>
<th>EU Historical Studies</th>
<th>EU Interdisciplinary Studies</th>
<th>EU Intercultural Dialogue Studies</th>
<th>EU Communication and Information Studies</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>46</td>
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The EU Intercultural Dialogue Studies is the richest field for these types of courses both as absolute value and as average out of the total number of courses we have identified in our database (130 courses out of a total of 331, i.e. 0.3 courses). It comprises a large diversity of courses that belong to this field, especially at the BA and MA levels. We have identified three major subfields where we can insert the following courses: Islam and Europe, Europeanization and cultural diversity and European dialogue with other geo-cultural spaces.

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1 Parts of this survey belong to the chapter entitled “Current Problems in the Development of the European and/or EU Studies Curriculum”, in print. It will be published in the volume entitled Teaching European Studies Curricula and Teaching Methods, edited by Stephania Baroncelli, Ioan Horga, Sophie Vanhoonakar, Roberto Farneti, Springer Editions

2 EU Political and Administrative Studies, EU Legal Studies, EU Historical Studies, EU Economic Studies, EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, EU Intercultural Dialogue Studies, EU Communication and Information Studies, EU and Comparative Regionalism Studies, EU Interdisciplinary Studies -

3 www.iser.rdsor.ro
At the BA level, within the Islam and Europe group, we have noticed that this issue is becoming more active in the quest for a clear European identity, addressed to other cultures as a consequence of the “traditional ethnic immigration of the non-European” (Favell, A. 2010: 167). Religion, culture and language are the three variables that affect the curricula. Within the EU universities, specific courses are investigating Pluralism and Religious Minorities in the European Union, Religious Plurality and Religious Conflict in Modern Europe (Spain), Identities in Contemporary Europe (UK), Sociology of Religions in Europe (France), Islam in Europe (Lithuania). As we can notice, these courses belong to the paradigm of the “religious border in decomposition” (Antes, P., 2008) phenomenon. Even if the issue of Islam is not necessarily specified within the name of the courses, the religious and cultural differentiations often arise, thus contributing to the “identification with Europe’s internal diversity” (Kaelble, H. 2010: 201) and integration is becoming “more flexible and fragmented” (Moravcisk, A, 1998: 5).

The subfield of Europeanization and cultural diversity holds a core place within the European universities. There is a large number of courses that are gathered within this category. Therefore, there is a series of common courses investigating social and cultural aspects of European integration, European cultural heritage, Religion and cultural bases of European civilization, European identity, Cultural identities in Europe, etc. The concept of cultural diversity used here is in accordance with two types of European multicultural approach: a western traditional one and an eastern dynamic one (Horga, I & Brie, M, 2010).

From this perspective, it is very important to mention that in each country, within the category of Europeanization and cultural diversity there are courses aiming to integrate local, national, and regional culture to the European identity (Checkel, J.T & Katzenstein P.J, 2010: 9). For example, there are courses on Slovenian culture in European context, Slovak Cultural Heritage in European Context or Poland in Europe. The integrative cultural and intercultural approaches became part of rediscovering and strengthening the European dimension of the national “symbols and rituals of power” (Donnan, H & Wilson Th. M., 1999: 63-86). A curriculum with European touch has to reflect the voices, hopes, and dreams of the students from diverse ethnic and social-class group contributing to shaping the European identity (Fligstein, N. 2010: 136).

The other group dealing with intercultural dialogue - European dialogue with other geo-cultural spaces – becomes a subject of most recent teaching and investigation efforts as a consequence of cultural influences of globalization and the EU new borders (Anderson, M., 2004: 178-192; Howard M. M, 2009: 169-193). One of the objectives of intercultural education is to help students learn how they could cross their cultural borders and establish intercultural dialogue and action. The study of the Other and the Outside has increased in importance

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4 Most studies on the matter were published in issue 5/2008 of Eurolimes journal.
within the academic curricula. We have identified courses that specifically questioned these matters: *Dominant Religions of Europe & Middle East; Euro-American Relations* (Slovakia); *Extra-European Worlds; International and European Culture; Extra-European Influences, Extra-European Civilizations* (France); *Intercultural Euro-Asian Relations* (Portugal), etc.

On the MA level, the *EU Intercultural Dialogue Studies* are subject to the same interest where the curriculum has developed on more strictly basis focusing more on specific matters. There is no obvious direct interest for the Islam, with some exceptions addressed to Mediterranean space and Muslim influences (for instance, in France there are course *Turkey and European political Debate* or *Euro-Maghreb culture*). This can be explained by the increasing need for understanding intercultural approaches where religious aspects are addressed in a comparative and integrative manner among Christianity, Judaism and Islam (Santagostino, A., 2008; Brie M. & Brie, I, 2008). A more comprehensive approach is dedicated to the *Europeanization and cultural diversity*. There is much more interest on the MA level for teaching and research of intercultural dialogue. The most covered issues are gathered within courses such as: *European cultures and identities; European culture and civilization; Identity, Heritage and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. There might be a distinction on two different approaches of intercultural dialogue in Europe: first, there is a comprehensive approach that tries to have a general European view (Horga, I. & all, 2009) and second, there is an approach with different national or particular cultural character (such as language, literature, theatre or cinema). With reference to *European dialogue with other geo-cultural spaces* (Contogeorgis, G, 2010) on the MA level the same interest is maintained for curricula development, especially in the context of a deeper multidisciplinary approach.

The PhD level that covers intercultural issues in Europe is subject to interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary pursuits that make it difficult to set as a distinctive field because of its multiple specialized perspectives: sociology, anthropology, philosophy, languages and religious studies. From this perspective, the curriculum reflects the cultural learning styles of the students within the university community.

The *EU Historical Studies* come in second in the field of EU studies made up of courses particularly referring to ethnicity and confession. Yet the weigh of these courses is approximately 1/10. These topics mainly belong to general courses on *European Cultural History and European Religions History*, but also to specific courses showing contemporary religious patterns (Kocsis, K., 2008) in Central and Eastern European Countries, such as: *Ethnic minorities' political representation in Central and Eastern Europe; Political modernity’s in South-East Europe; The Jewish Intellectuality in Central and Eastern Europe* in universities like: University of Bucharest, Alexandru Ioan Cuza of Iasi, Western University of Timisoara; *Rights and values of European History* at Universidad de Salamanca.
An important aspect of this topic makes us underline the fact that within the newcomers to the EU there is a great interest for *European Identity*, which folds perfectly on their interest of identifying themselves with the public sphere and European Union’s political identity (Medrano, J. D., 2010: 81-110). Belonging to the same logic of cultural, ethnic and religious realities of newcomers (Maron, F., 2007: 116-121), there is also an interest of academics belonging to “old Europe” in courses such as: *Central and Eastern Europe since 1945*, University of St Andrews, *Civil society and the state in Central and Eastern Europe, An economic and social history of Eastern Europe 1918–89*, University of Glasgow, *Europe East and West, 1943-1991*, Durham University, *Where is East Europe*, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen; *The Decay of the Eastern Block – The end of Communist Systems in Central and Eastern Europe (1985-1991)*, Justus -Liebig-Universität Gießen.

From a quantitative point of view, the *EU Political and Administrative Studies* are the second within the field of EU studies. They can be considered as belonging to the topic of the paper. However, their weigh is barely 1/10 courses.

These courses help the students develop their social participation skills and their decision-making abilities as the very strong association between political factors and citizenship liberalisation (Howard M. M, 2009: 53). These topics are approached in general courses on *Elites and Power - Political Elites in Europe?* (Technische Universität Darmstadt), *Where does Europe end? - Ukraine as a Border Region of the EU; Forms of Families and Gender Arrangements in European Comparison* (Technische Universität Dresden); *National Competition and/or European Social Model?* (Technische Universität Carolo-Wilhelmina zu Braunschweig).

They are also present in special courses, such as: *Pluralism, freedom of belief and integration in Europe* (University of Almeria); *Consideration of public policy in the process of European economic integration* (University of Carlos III de Madrid).

The *EU Interdisciplinary Studies* is a highly complex field, where courses contributing to intercultural education provide not only an interdisciplinary perspective, but also a multidisciplinary one. If the BA curriculum of *European Ethnology*, another sub-domain of EU Interdisciplinary Studies lists only a few courses, they are varied in countries where they are offered. In Germany we have found several courses of European Ethnology: *Times, Spaces, Cultures - Introduction to European Ethnology, Current Questions of European Ethnology* (Katholische Universität Ingolstadt-Eichstätt), *Introduction to European Ethnology* (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg), and in Romania - *European Ethnology* (Universitatea din Bucuresti). There are no such courses in the other countries that we have studied. However, we have found that all universities hold courses about *European multilingualism*. This proves, on the one hand, the interest of each EU Member State to develop such important area, and on the other hand, the
development of students’ skills and competences to master foreign languages (Ugalde, E.G 2007: 124-133).

Regarding *Other studies on Europe* sub-domain, most courses are in the field of *Euroregional Studies or Studies of European Regions*. This is the result of the fact that we included here the perspectives that go from the territory to the de-territorialisation (Albert, M., 2002: 58-62), such as: *Geography of Europe tour* (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia) in Spain, *Territorial Studies- Europe* (Univerzita Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici) in Slovakia, *Geography of European Union* (Universitatea Babes-Bolyai din Cluj-Napoca) in Romania, or *Regional Geography: Europe* (Otto-Friedrichs-Universität Bamberg), *Urban Europe* (Technische Universität Chemnitz) in Germany. Within this sub-domain there are also several religion courses with various forms: *Communication and Ecumenism in a Christian Europe* (Universitatea „Ovidius” din Constanța), *Religious relations of contemporary Europe* (Universytet w Białymstoku) in Poland, *Deaconry in European and Ecumenical Context* (Fachhochschule der Diakonie Bielefeld), *Churches and Denominations in Europe* (Technische Universität Darmstadt). All these courses are relatively balanced in all the countries that we have reviewed. Taking into consideration that this sub-domain is very wide and that the EU Interdisciplinary Studies include the largest range of courses, we will point out some of them that we have found most interesting, which we have considered necessary to integrate as European Studies as they refer to Europe through their very interdisciplinary nature: *States, European Union and Marine* (Universidad de Cadiz, in Spain), *Food quality in the European Union* (Uniwersytet Rzeszowski in Poland), *Design of Eurocodes* (Vilniaus Gedimino Technikos Universitetas in Lithuania), *Famous European Fairy Tales* (Justus Liebig-Universität Gießen in Germany), *Opening to Europe* (Université Lille 1).

Regarding the courses about multilingualism, we can mention the following types of courses: *Structures des langues européennes: phonologie lexicque syntaxe* (MA) and *Intercompréhension: les 7 langues de l’ouest européen* (MA) at Université de Reims-Champagne-Ardenne, *Areal Linguistics-Language Structures in Europe* at Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, etc.

The distinct approach of *EU Communication and Information Studies* as a *New EU studies* field has come to our attention due to its increasing importance and presence within the EU Studies curricula. Due to these courses, the students should develop cross-cultural communication skills, examining media of ethnic groups, clarifying ethnic and cultural attitudes and values. There are several factors that induced the emergence and development of these approaches (Banus, E, 2007: 134-140). First, the communication structures and technologies must be adapted to the EU’s need for legitimacy. Second, communication and information are instruments to strengthen the European dialogue in the sense of enhancing both intercultural dialogue and European identity (Hoffman, M, 2008). To this end, the *EU Communication and Information*
Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Education in the Curricula of European Studies

Studies field represents one of the most challenging new visions within the EU studies. Our investigation has collected some data that emphasize this new approach. For a better understanding, we have split this new field in two secondary subfields: European Media Systems and Other forms of EU Communication and Information Studies.

At the BA level, the European Media Systems represents a group of courses that are trying to relate the EU messages with the European and national media forms of communication (Horga, I, 2007). There is no integrative approach for the study of the media at this level, only with few multidisciplinary (but notable) exceptions. In Germany, for example, there are specific courses on subjects such as: Democratic media discourse in Europe; Focusing European integration by media analysis; European Media Systems; Journalism and European public Spheres; EU integration as reflected in the Press. These courses are listed in different teaching programmes, addressing EU Studies, Communication and Journalism at the same time. Therefore, it seems plausible to associate these courses within an interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary framework of other study programmes. Other examples can be found in Spain (course Advertising in the EU; Communication policies in the EU), France (European communication); Poland (Contemporary media systems in Europe; European information) or Romania (Mass-Media and the challenges of EU).

We have also noticed courses addressed to intra-communitarian communication, communicating cultures in Europe (Tavares Ribeiro, M.M., 2010), language policy in Europe or European identity sources. Within the perspective of this subfield, there are no clear standards to set the specific courses directly responding to the strengthening of this new field of EU studies.

The MA level comes with more specialized courses within the same multi, inter and trans-disciplinary approach.

The EU Communication and Information Studies curriculum is adapted and responds to the most challenging current needs of the EU. Within the different programmes that might benefit from these courses we can single out public communication and journalism, in their quest to adapt the courses to the needs and particularities of the European communication environment.

The analysis of the curricula in European Studies has shown that there is a variety of studies of cultures, social realities, historical experiences, and existential factors of ethnic and cultural group evolution. Certainly, at a closer look, we can see that the number of courses related to ethnicity, religion and intercultural dialogue is very small in the totality of the curricula of EU Studies, that is only 448 courses to 9929 courses inventoried (4.5%).
2. *Where to the intercultural education in the Curricula of European Studies?*

A detailed analysis shows that there is an unbalance between the countries from the Old Europe and the New Europe. For instance, over 7.5% of the courses are in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Portugal and UK. Between 5-7.5% of courses are in France. Paradoxically, the lowest number of courses, between 0-5% of the courses are in Italy, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, and Slovakia. Even though we cannot make a definite approximation, we still have to mention that there is an interesting coincidence between a certain excess of “intolerance” in certain countries (Moravkova, K., 2009) and the low number or absence of courses supporting students understand that persons from all ethnic groups have common characteristics and needs on the one hand and acquire the ability to interpret events and conflict situation from diverse ethnic and cultural perspectives on the other hand.

We can also see that there are more courses at the Bachelor level than at the others levels. In New Europe, there are a few courses relating to *Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue* on Bachelor level. The biggest number is at on Master level. We assume that such a situation is mainly due to the idea that the topic is considered to be an area of expertise. In Old Europe, there are more courses related to *Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue* on Bachelor level and less on Master level. The civic side is more pronounced. There are a few courses at the Doctoral level in all countries, except for Germany and Spain.

The impact of European Commission through Jean Monnet Action is low in supporting courses in the field. Only 49 courses out of the total number of 1215 (4%) are supported by the “Jean Monnet” Action in countries on which our analysis has focused. Initiatives like the Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2008) who have stimulated the introduction of the courses and other projects (Horga, I. & all, 2009) related to *Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue* in the university curricula must be encouraged. For example, only in the period 2008-2010, 19 courses were introduced through Jean Monnet Action Projects (over 1/3 out of the total number of courses financed by this program in the countries assessed).

In conclusion, considering the ever more multicultural reality of European societies and the ceaselessly altering integrating area, the study of *Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Education* are highly important, in order to teach the students how they could preserve cultural diversity in the European Union and to reinforce its cohesion and promote the respect for joint values. They allow Europe engage in partnership with neighbouring countries. The idea of intercultural dialogue in the curriculum on European Studies opens an
enriching topic leading to the respectful division of ideas and values and encouraging the communication of these ideas and values.

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MINORITY AND MAJORITY IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN AREA
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND MINORITIES REPRESENTATIONS IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN AREA

Victoria BEVZIUC*

Abstract. The political integration of ethnic minorities is one of the most challenging tasks facing the countries of post-communist Europe. The roads to political representation in the mainstream political process are numerous and diverse. The results of the analysis support the paper's argument that electoral arrangements are important but not key to achieving meaningful political representation. Electoral arrangements thus seem to matter, but mostly do so in situations where other factors of political mobilization seem to make representation uncertain. The effect of electoral arrangements on the success of ethnic parties is clearly mitigated by the size and dynamics of the minority they represent. However, there seems to be some link between the presence of ethnic parties in the political system and the level of political participation of the ethnic minority. Both Lijphart and Norris point out the importance of proportional representation for that aim, as this electoral system allows the representation of all social groups. Or, in the other words: “Majority rule is dangerous in divided societies, because minorities that are continually denied access to political power will feel excluded and discriminated against by the regime”. Undoubtedly, electoral rules have an important effect on

Keywords: electoral system, proportional representation, political parties, etc.

Introduction

Institutional engineering is the art of providing for rules and institutions in order to pursue political goals – such as creating a functioning multi ethnic democracy (Sartori, 1968; Reilly, 2001; Grofman & Stockwell 2003, etc.). Electoral systems translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by

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parties and candidates. The aim of most electoral systems is to be representative: to give a voice to minorities and to register dissent. Therefore, to treat people in a diverse society as equals requires more than a system based on ‘majority rules’. We expect that the discussed electoral system might bring advantages to all ethnic groups in some aspects, while not favouring any of them. All members are elected on equal grounds, and the number of votes decides on the election, whereas the seat guarantee works as a backup to assure at least one seat for each constituent people. They would also gain it according to their vote share.

Ethnic minorities are all numeric minorities in a country with an own ethnic identity. The term “ethnicity” refers here to the self-definition or social definition of social groups that are considered to have common roots in history. Often, ethnic groups are distinguished by common characteristics such as religious believes, language, cultural habits or race, even if such characteristics are often socially constructed. Thus, I consider all numeric minorities that consider themselves to have their own ethnic identity, regardless of whether they are officially recognized, as ethnic minority, or not. Ethnic groups are identified based on data included in national censuses and alternative reports from human rights organizations and academia.

The way ethnic minorities are included in the democratic process heavily affects interethnic relations. Electoral rules have a major impact on the inclusion of minorities in political life (Bochsler, 2010: 153). Even though electoral systems might seem at first quite similar across all the 20 democracies of Central and Eastern Europe—namely with a steady trend towards more-proportional representation (PR)—they importantly differ with regards to the rules that allow or hinder the representation of parties of ethnic minorities. Undoubtedly, electoral rules have an important effect on ethnic minority representation (Reilly, 2001: 53; Horowitz, 1985: 85; Toplak, 2001:62). Theory treats “power sharing” institutions as a means to accommodate all social groups in the political system (Lijphart, 1994b). Proportional representation systems for the elections to parliaments are considered to be such an inclusive “power sharing” institution, while plurality elections (“the winner takes all”) are exclusive (Duverger, 1951; Taagepera, Shugart, 1989).

But this “classical” electoral system theory not be applied so straightforward to ethnic minority representation like some authors claim. In fact, most ethnic groups in Central-Eastern Europe are geographically concentrated. And this characteristic has an important impact on the functioning of electoral systems (cf. Friedman, 2005: 381f.). Rarely noticed literature on electoral systems and party systems shows that the electoral system effect is almost reverse for minority groups that live on a concentrated territory (cf. Riker, 1982; Barkan, 1995). In other words: in contrast with the common theory, geographically concentrated ethnic minorities in many cases should prefer plurality electoral systems: In their regional “strongholds” they are able
to get even more than proportional seat share. On the other hand, minorities dispersed throughout the country prefer proportional representation (cf. OSCE, 2001). Furthermore, many Central and Eastern European states introduced different models of special electoral rules for ethnic minority parties (cf. Cesid, 2002; Jovanović, 2004). Yet, they may have unwanted consequences, promoting ethnic segregation instead of giving incentives to mixed ethnic political parties.

1. The history of the ethnic representation in the Republic of Moldova

In this paper, I investigate which electoral rules in Central-East Europe (particularly in the Republic of Moldova) are able to integrate which ethnic minorities into the national legislative bodies. I test if electoral systems are suited for ethnic minorities according to three aspects: Ethnic minorities are all numeric minorities in a country with an own ethnic identity. The term ‘ethnicity’ refers here to the self-definition or social definition of social groups that are considered to have common roots in history. Often, ethnic groups are distinguished by common characteristics such as religious believes, language, cultural habits or race, even if such characteristics are often socially constructed. Thus, I consider all numeric minorities that consider themselves to have their own ethnic identity, regardless of whether they are officially recognized, as ethnic minority, or not.

The traditional approach of democratization includes the requirements for limiting or reducing to the minimum the ideological and institutional noncompliance of the old regime, autonomy from old powers, mobilization of civil society, and creation of a stable system of political parties. The new details about the consolidation concept imply a consideration of the cultural realities and traditional culture from the particular country. In this case, it is recommended to reform the administrative-territorial structures, develop the party system, different social-political movements, and the corporatism. The democratic transformations imply also the reformation of the political system within the society, including the establishment of a multiparty system.

The political parties have the mission to concentrate and represent citizens’ interests. The political parties have to crystallize the aspirations of individuals with the same tendencies and shape the positions from which population will have to choose during the elections. Nevertheless, although nobody denies the need for a multiparty system in transition countries, where the democratic principles only start to emerge, the political parties are not very popular. In 1993 more than twenty political parties and movements were registered in the Republic of Moldova. Until 1990 the Communist Party of Moldavia (CPM) was the dominant political force in the republic. It had
controlled the administrative, economic, and cultural affairs of the Moldavian SSR from its establishment until 1990. During that period, CPM officials monopolized virtually all politically significant government positions. However, once democratic elections were decided upon, the party's power disintegrated swiftly. The CPM was formally banned in August 1991, following the abortive August coup d'état against Soviet president Gorbachev, but former communists continue to participate actively in politics through their membership in a variety of successor organizations.

In the wake of the 1990 elections, the Moldovan Popular Front, founded in 1989 and consisting of an association of independent cultural and political groups, moved into a commanding position in the country's political life. It emerged as an advocate of increased autonomy from the Soviet Union and of the rights of the Moldavian SSR's ethnic Romanian population. Popular Front delegates were able to dominate proceedings in the Supreme Soviet and to select a government made up of individuals who supported its agenda. The Popular Front was well organized nationally, with its strongest support in the capital and in areas of the country most heavily populated by ethnic Romanians. Once the organization was in power, however, internal disputes led to a sharp fall in popular support, and it fragmented into several competing factions by early 1993.

In February 1993, the Popular Front was reformed as the Christian Democratic Popular Front (CDPF). Several other parties, primarily composed of ethnic Romanians, were organized after 1990. The largest and most influential of these ethnically based parties is the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova, which is a coalition of former communists and moderate to status-quo supporters of Moldovan statehood and closer economic ties with Russia. The party's support comes mainly from the rural populace, economic conservatives, and ethnic minorities opposed to reunification with Romania. The Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova won a majority of the votes in the 1994 parliamentary election.

A much smaller but still influential political group is the Social Democratic Party of Moldova. Most of the Social Democrats' leaders originally participated in the Popular Front but later formed their own organization in response to what they perceived as the increasingly nationalistic position of that party (Botan, 2002). The Social Democrats are multiethnic, and their constituency consists mainly of educated professional and managerial groups. Their support is strongest in the republic's capital.

Another independent formation committed to promoting a less nationalistic agenda for the republic, the Democratic Party for the Rebirth and Prosperity of Moldova (PDRPM), was formed in late 1990. The PDRPM draws its support primarily from among ethnic Romanian intellectuals and is active primarily in the capital. At the other extreme of the political spectrum is the
National Christian Party (NCP). The NCP is more expressly nationalistic than the Popular Front and its other competitors—Congress of the Intelligentsia (which is a component of the Congress of Peasants and Intellectuals, a bloc in the 1994 elections), the Democratic Party, and the Democratic Labour Party—and it campaigned openly for reunification with Romania during the 1994 election. Other parties active in the 1994 campaign for the Parliament were the Reform Party, the Yedinstvo/Socialist Bloc, the Republican Party, the Democratic Labour Party, the Green Alliance, the Women's Association of Moldova, and the Victims of Totalitarian Repression.

In late 1993, former Prime Minister Valeriu Muravschi, along with several other leading members of Parliament unhappy with the direction of policy under the existing government, formed yet another party, the Socialist Workers' Party, in order to counter what they saw as the excessively conservative influence of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova.

Non-Romanian ethnic communities have also formed political organizations representing their interests. In the early transition period, the most influential of these was the Yedinstvo-Unitatea Intermovement. Yedinstvo, whose members include not only Russians but also Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and other Russian-speaking residents of the republic, is politically conservative in its support of the pre-1990 status quo. Based primarily in Transdnestria, it is strongly pro-Russian. In Parliament, its positions are represented by the Conciliere legislative club. Yedinstvo emerged in 1988 from the mobilization of Russian-speaking workers responding to efforts to alter the republic's language laws and demote the status of the Russian language. During the transition period, Yedinstvo was the most effective and influential minority nationalist organization. Its representatives walked out of the first session of the democratically elected Moldavian Supreme Soviet in 1990. In local elections, its adherents won control over local and raion governments throughout Transdniestria (Anghel, 2002: 12).

Gagauz Halkî (Gagauz People) is a second pivotal minority political group, formed to represent Moldova's population of approximately 153,000 Gagauz. Like the Russian-speaking community in Transdniestria, with whom they had been close political allies, Gagauz nationalists gained control over local government in the five southern raioane, where their numbers continue to be concentrated. Like the Transdniestrians, the Gagauz declared themselves sovereign in 1990. The results of Public Opinion Barometer from Moldova show that the political parties are the least popular among social organizations of the country. Over the years the surveys showed that less than 30 per cent of respondents trusted political parties (The minimum (11 per cent) was registered in 2001 and the maximum (28 per cent) was registered in 2004-2005. This result is lower than the result registered for trade unions (14-36 per cent)
nongovernmental organizations (20-36 per cent) and much lower than the one for mass media (47-62 per cent).

2. The influence of the electoral system on ethnic representation

The level of trust for political parties is the lowest if compared to other institutions and organizations from the country. The sceptical attitude towards political parties is dictated by the Soviet legacy and the times of denial of social and political life. This explains why the political parties find it difficult to affirm themselves in society. People believe that political parties represent the influential groups of power controlled by the elites, whose purpose is to manipulate the public opinion. There are no considerable differences between political parties and there is little interest in citizens on behalf of them. Some people believe that political platforms of different parties are quite similar and see no need for the existence of more parties. The Public Opinion Barometer from April 2002 also outlined this aspect of citizens' attitude towards political parties. The political parties are not deeply rooted in society, are unstable and sometimes provisional, and this explains largely the citizens' attitude towards political parties.

In societies in transition, the rule of law is not established and political life is managed poorly, allowing the parties to commit abuses of authority and achieve their profit-driven trivial goals. In the conditions of a poor society, citizens are tempted to blame political parties for the poverty. The political parties are unevenly weak compared to the level of literacy of the population, a fact with a direct negative impact on the political sphere from the country. According to the Ethno barometer studies, the political parties are often listed among the organizations or institutions influencing interethnic relations (Rosca, 2006: 69). For political parties contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations, the representatives of different ethnic groups listed the Communist Party from Moldova: 6 per cent of Moldovans and Bulgarians, 15 per cent of Ukrainians and 17 per cent of Russians. One per cent of the Gagauz also listed the mayor's offices. The respondents also mentioned other parties: Christian Democratic Party (2 per cent of Moldovans), “Our Moldova” Bloc (2 per cent of Ukrainians and 8 per cent of Russians), and Social Democratic Party (2 per cent of Ukrainians and 5 per cent of Russians). For organizations the respondents mentioned United Nations (1 per cent of Moldovans), schools (1 per cent of Gagauz), Parliament (1 per cent of Gagauz), Ministry of Culture (3 per cent of Bulgarians), and the House of Nationalities (2 per cent of Bulgarians). The Christian Democratic Party was listed exclusively among the organizations contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova: 5 per cent of Moldovans, 1 per cent of Gagauz, 16 per cent of Ukrainians, 20 per cent of Russians and 8 per cent of Bulgarians. The Communist Party was
listed by 2 per cent of Moldovans, and Agrarian Party by 2 per cent. The respondents also mentioned the customs (3 per cent of Bulgarians) and Parliament (2 per cent of Bulgarians).

2.1. The roots of the ethno political conflict

Since the period of national revival, the ethno political situation in Moldova has been an example of polarization of interethnic and intercultural contradictions. The national idea or the idea of defending the national interests can become the methodology for political consolidation. The ethnic groups cannot emerge as independent subjects in the political sphere because their actions do not bear a formal character of a group. Their interests are represented by the ethnic elites that get involved in the political struggle for power, in other words they become subjects of political struggle (Rosca, 2006: 70). Presently, one can see the contradiction between the government on one side, and the ideological orientation of the political elites, on the other side. Any ideology is a project of the future society. The complexity of the ideas that represent the interests of the ethnos are systematized by the politicians in a set of norms, values, directions which allow for an influence on the ethnos or on each individual, and allow winning the political space. Thus, ideology justifies the government’s actions and represents a means for political struggle.

The interests of the group are subordinated to the common idea, which directs the group in a certain direction for the achievement of the goal. The political leader presenting the interests of his or her group interprets them, turns them into an ideology, and subordinates them to his or her interests. The politicization of the ethnic factor occurs, which signifies a real transformation of the ethnic factor into a tool of political struggle. The political conflicts then become ethnic conflicts. Rothschild J. believes that politicizing the ethnic element means:

1. To give individuals the possibility of understanding the role of politics in the preservation of ethno cultural values and vice versa;
2. To stimulate their attention towards this connection;
3. To mobilize people in forming ethnic groups with a collective self-consciousness;
4. To direct them in the sphere of political activities, based on this understanding and collective self-consciousness (Rothschild, 1981: 9);

In the case of ethnopolitical conflicts, we can outline some common aspects characterized by set goals and ideology. In many cases, the conflicts start with an approach and discussion on the national language issue, and these particular conflicts changed from closed into opened conflicts. This sphere had a large mobilizing force because it resorted to all people of this ethnic group. Then the claims were generally entering the political sphere and were extending over
the state. Consequently, one got the territorial claims, which implies conflicts regarding the resources of the relevant ethnic group. At this stage, one frequently invoked the historic past, certain events and traditions from the past. Moreover, both parties start using vast historical and archeological materials, which then come to justify the claims put forth by both parties.

The congruence of the national claims with the struggle of political elites for power represents a reality of the transition period. The trends that follow in this situation can be different: in some cases, the importance of the ethnic factor grows and is then used in the political struggle. One must also consider these consequences generated by the worsening of the living standards of the population, massive migrations that could generate a tension in the interethnic relations. Preoccupied with the national identity, the ethnic groups will continue to be an object of manipulation of the formal and informal elites during the political struggle for the division of power positions. Although there is an interdiction for the creation of political parties on ethnic principles, the politological analysis openly proves that there is a trend in the distribution of the electorate by national criteria.

In the case of politicization of national issues, one focuses the attention on the "main" identity and on the need to choose from mutually exclusive identities. In this case, politicization represents an essential stimulus for the "nationalism", which represents a politicized national idea. When the goal is a successful democratization, the researchers focus on the multiple identities, which represent the changing reality and which are built on the social basis of individual’s identities. The human capacity for complementary and multiple identity, besides guaranteeing the right for equal and full citizenship, represents a key factor that makes democracy in multinational states possible (Linz, Stepan, 2004: 51). The emergence of political and civic identities is considered one of the opportunities of democratic consolidation.

2.2. The civic identity and its concept

We can distinguish several approaches of the concept of civic identity. One of them however can be considered the basic approach, which considers the political citizenship as the central point from which all other dimensions derive. For Barber, the civic identity represents the genuine affiliation to political community, which, despite the distinctive identity references, unites everybody through common preoccupations affecting everyone (Page, 1997: 22-32). Most authors outline that the concept of citizenship is getting wider within a general social change: transition from modern to post-modern societies. David Miller conceives citizenship as practiced in several ways: Right of association, civil right to a relative freedom, the social right to a minimal
standard of living ensured by the welfare state and a postmodern warrant of access the communication technologies (Miller, 1999).

Bryan Turner defines citizenship as a set of practices in a civil society (Turner, 1993). We agree with the larger concept according to which, the civic identity embraces the feeling of the individual to be included in the social contract, the conscience of being a member of a certain social group, one of the many groups from the political community. Derek Heather explains that the community and political affiliations are not mutually exclusive at the individual level (Heather, 1999). He argues that such a situation could lead to the emergence of a multiple identity: A person can be simultaneously a member of a state (through citizenship) and a member of civil society. The civic conscience is supposed to be assured by the daily process of negotiation between different groups. It is more of a process than a final destination. We can assert that the political identity backed up by the right to participate and exercise political power, and the civic identity, as a feeling of belonging to a state and society, are mutually stimulating. The determinist correlation and the feeling of devotion towards a state, the common interest of all members of the society, can have multiple sources with a different impact in varied contexts.

Thus, the empirical analysis suggests that the civic identity can be based on the state or local identity, implying rights and duties, economic interest, perceptions about common goals and a common future. Based on this understanding of the term of civic identity, the creation of a common civic identity of the representatives of different national entities from Moldova is defined through the relevance of determination of national identity, and establishing the clear lines between „us“ and „them“, adherence to democratic values, and nurturing the hope for the future. A common pattern for all citizens of Moldova can be also the aspiration towards democratization of the society, orientation towards European integration, which is currently supported by a significant part of the population (Rosca, 2006: 72). Largely, the emergence of civic identity is determined by the orientation towards the modernization of the society, a phenomenon conditioned by the inclusion in the contemporary global processes (Kymlicka, 1995).

The issue of correlation between democracy and interethnic problems has been on the agenda since the French Revolution, experiencing a new impulse with the „third wave of democratization“, which in 1970s overwhelmed the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Analysing the definitions of the term democracy in the present political science, we notice that one of the most used definition includes, in addition to the traditional approach, the public competition and political participation, thus implying that democracy includes civil and political rights, freedom of expression, press, freedom of assembly, existence of organizations necessary for free competition-based elections. The relationship between the terms democracy and
democratization is similar to the relationship between a state and a process. Through democracy, one understands the process of transition towards a democratic form of government. In the spotlight of researchers studying the issue of democratization, are the issues of the dynamics of transition period processes, of the “democratic transition” including the period of political development between two regimes.

2.3. The correlation between democratization and interethnic processes

Another deduction relates to the issue of correlation between democratization and interethnic processes and to the condition that the chances of democratic consolidation in a multinational and multicultural society grow due to policies applied by the state. The adopting of the laws on language, citizenship, Moldovan Constitution and other laws guaranteed a full and equal citizenship and a common “shelter” for all citizens regarding individual rights. The analysis of ethnic and national identity in the Soviet period allows us to draw the conclusion that the “soviet identity”, which also claimed to be a state identity, was rather ideological, closed, politicized and ethnocentric. The phenomenon of double conscience spread and persisted at the beginning of the Perestroika, the attitudes towards state institutions and the state being as low. At the same time, the level of trust in nongovernmental institutions, such as the Church, is high. Concerning mass conscience, the situation cannot be changed rapidly, that is why national ideas persisted in the post totalitarian period and were largely predetermined by the Soviet legacy. At the beginning of Perestroika, the national idea was regarded by many people from the country as a supreme ideological value and this idea mattered as much as the idea of socialism in the Soviet period. Pointing at these aspects, the researchers also mention the closed character of mass conscience during social cataclysms and, therefore, the phenomenon of national idea appeared in closed version, more precisely, in the ethno cultural form. Like in Soviet times, the mass conscience was not oriented towards openness, general and universal values; it was leading to deadlock, being also one of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the closed form of the conscience has changed. According to the Delphi study results, the representatives of different ethnic groups took different ideological stands.

The Moldovans advocate democratization and perceive independence as national revival. The survey participants belonging to national minorities perceive independence as an opportunity for the consolidation of a new nation and existence of multi ethnic mixture. We identified several attitudes of the representatives of different ethnic groups regarding Moldova as a state. In addition, the ethnic groups provide different appreciations regarding the
political events from the country related to domestic as well as external policy. Some issues are viewed only from the perspective adopted by the survey participants. Nevertheless, as proved by the survey, some controversial issues on the country’s political agenda have a high potential of conflict that could place different ethnic groups in controversial or even conflicting positions. The different opinions regarding the Transdniestrian conflict and the possible solutions put the representatives of different ethnic groups in conflicting positions. The topics with the highest conflict potential identified by the participants in the first part of the survey were the state configuration: unitary state, federal state; strategic orientation of Moldova’s foreign policy: EU or CIS; topics related to the national identity, threat of losing the Moldovan statehood. This set of issues with a high potential for conflict generally identified by the participants is perfectly overlapping in the first part of the survey with the set of issues identified by the participants as having a potential of causing interethnic conflicts.

During democratization, one of the main problems the societies are facing with is the stabilization of the formal institutions. Thus, during the transition period, Moldova adopted several laws and took certain measures in regulating interethnic relations. In addition to the structures that more or less dependent on the state (Department for Interethnic Relations, Institute for Interethnic Relations within the Moldovan Academy of Sciences), the groups or persons influencing (mostly in a negative way) the interethnic relations in Moldova are represented almost exclusively by politicians or political parties. Democratic transformations also imply the reformation of political system from the respective societies, including the establishment of multiparty system. Nevertheless, although nobody denies the need for multiparty system in transition countries, where the democratic principles only start to emerge, the political parties are not very popular.

3. Differences in ethnic diversity and formation party rules

The results of Public Opinion Barometer from Moldova indicate show that political parties have the lowest popularity among social organizations from country (Rosca, 2006: 73). Although there is an interdiction for the creation of political parties on ethnic principles, the politological analysis openly proves that there is a trend in the distribution of the electorate by national criteria. When the goal is a successful democratization, the researchers focus on the multiple identities, which represent the changing reality and which are built on the social basis of individual’s identities. The human capacity for complementary and multiple identity, besides guaranteeing the right for equal and full citizenship, represents a key factor that makes democracy in multinational states possible, and the emergence of political and civic identities
is considered one of the opportunities of democratic consolidation. Based on this, the creation of a common civic identity of the representatives of different national entities from Moldova is defined through the relevance of determination of national identity and establishing the clear lines between „us“ and „them“, adherence to democratic values and nurturing the hope for the future. As a common pattern for the citizens of Moldova it could serve the aspiration towards democratization, modernization and social progress.

Variety in diversity leads to the expectation that the content and type of demographic interaction with party registration rules will differ between countries depending on the size, cohesion, geographical concentration, and attributes specific to the group. Attributes of the individual group interact with the specific types of party registration rules in ways that make them more or less of a barrier to electoral participation by the group and the resulting group potential for conflict behaviour. For example, a ban on ethnic parties affects only linguistically and/or culturally distinct groups such as indigenous peoples and national minorities, but not de facto racial groups. Consequently, where other avenues for the political representation of the group are prevented, one might expect a ban on ethnic parties to augment the conflict potential of linguistically and culturally distinct groups but not of racial groups.

Size of the group is another characteristic that is important to the impact that formation rules will have. Racial groups, for instance, tend to be larger than the average national ethnic minorities and may, therefore, demand greater input in a country’s governance than small national minorities, whose primary objective more likely involves greater autonomy over their own affairs. When restrictive formation barriers successfully keep the larger groups from representation one might expect any subsequent political conflict to be bitterer and have as its objective a more radical change to national politics than the change a small national minority might seek. Which type of group, small or large, formation rules are likely to present the greatest barriers to is not, however, entirely clear. For example, larger more internally diverse groups are less likely to overcome the collective action problem required to mobilize successfully (Madrid Raúl, 2005: 689-707). Any additional barriers presented by formation rules will likely further prevent successful collective action by such large groups. At the same time small groups may experience difficulties in mobilizing enough of their members for political action. In the case of small groups formation rules may therefore prevent the successful conclusion of an already difficult task. How small is too small for electoral mobilization is not evident. For example, in the relatively homogeneous Poland the small German minority does run a separate party in national elections, and the same is true for Greeks in Albania, but a party representing the sizeable community of Ukrainians in Moldova has never gained legislative representation.
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Pre-election signature requirements are among the specific rules that interact with the size of the group to alter its potential for mobilization and representation and consequent potential for conflict behaviour. Theoretically, pre-election signature requirements place a proportionally heavier burden on smaller groups and groups in the early stages of mobilization than on large and established ones. Indeed, where electoral institutions are very permissive, the registration requirements effectively substitute for the effects of more restrictive electoral institutions. Alternatively, because pre-election signature requirements work as an incentive for internal party consolidation, if the requirements are not sufficiently high, ethnic groups that might otherwise consolidate to run a unified political party fragment in their electoral competition to the detriment of ethnic group representation (Bieber, 2004: pp. 231-248).

Conclusion

This purpose of this paper has been to highlight some of the complex historical, theoretical and structural aspects hindering the capacity of parliaments to reflect the cultural diversity of the Moldavian community. At present, ethnic minorities remains disproportionately under-represented in legislatures in the Republic of Moldova. The debate surrounding the appropriate level of presence of ethnic minorities in legislative revolves around questions of democracy, equality and recognition. It gives rise to the threshold question of which groups deserve representation, and how are these groups to be defined? There are no simple answers and matters are complicated further by the fact that many people have multiple group identifications and that groups can come into being and then fade away. Essentially it is a question of the balance that needs to be struck between the representation of minorities, and the maintenance and development of an overarching sense of national identity and purpose. If the ultimate goal is democracy building and consolidation, the quality of democratic governance of political elites must be central. A successful democratization strategy requires less majoritarian and more consensual policies in each of these fields. This can be guaranteed by modernizing the society, changing the mentality of population as well as political leaders and determining the democratic values as unique and irreversible.

The existence of numerous ethnic minorities, e.g. Ukrainians, Russians and Gagauz, raises additional questions of principle, which would increase in importance if the predominantly non-Moldova ethnic population in the Transdniestrian region were to be incorporated in Moldovan elections. The reduction in the electoral threshold to would allow large minorities, e.g. Russians and Ukrainians, to be represented in Parliament – if a substantial portion of the ethnic group wished to be represented by an ethnic party. The
Gagauz minority does not appear to be large enough to clear a four per cent threshold but because it is spatially concentrated, it can enjoy power in local government in its special region. In Romania 19 of the 346 seats in Parliament are allocated to minorities, equivalent to 5 or 6 seats in a 101-seat Moldovan Parliament. To follow the Romanian practice would, however, create difficulties in determining which ethnic minorities should receive scheduled seats - and five seats would under-represent the larger minorities. Moreover, it would institutional divisions in a political system where the integration of diverse ethnic groups is a sine qua non for the maintenance of the state. Lowering the threshold to one per cent would allow smaller minorities to get at least one voice in Parliament, if there was a significant degree of cohesive voting along ethnic lines. Making such provisions would also avoid the normatively and empirically contentious issues of deciding whether or not Moldovan citizens ought to be represented on ethnic grounds or in terms of other cleavages of income, urban/residence, etc. That decision should not be taken by legislation but by the electorate.

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ADMINISTRATIVE TOOLS IN THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES

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Abstract. The increased interest of international organizations and institutions toward minorities has led to the accumulation of a sufficient amount to respond to the desideratum of "equal rights". The two components of the international system of protection of national minorities - hard law and soft law - advertise active intervention of states. The institution with the mandate of organizing and executing the law is the public administration. The range of administrative tools used by public authorities on the question of minorities is varied. They are classified conventionally, in compulsory and voluntary instruments.

The application of administrative tools in the protection and promotion of minority rights requires broad categories of resources: authority, financial capacity, official structure, information. Cultural conventions and regulations at the international and national level can provide to certain tools greater legal character than to others.

In order to ensure the respect of the compulsory legal documents and of those politically binding, the efforts of the public authorities should be channeled at least in two directions: formulating and implementing appropriate policies and ensuring a sense of identity security of pluralistic demands. The identification as an ethnic minority related only by the verb "to be" and not to the verb "to do", impose that administrative tools must be selected according to criteria fairness, efficiency and of existing social support. Policies on minorities will be even more effective, if they will be based on comprehensive statistical data or some other data on the situation of ethnic groups, and approach the quality identity. The analysis of administrative tools by emphasizing the social impact that it produces, can serve as a foundation support for administrative decisions.

Keywords: binding tools, voluntary tools, mixed tools, administrative capacity, citizen competence.

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The increased interest of international institutions and organizations subject to ethnic minorities has led to the accumulation of sufficient legal weight to meet the demands expressed by the minorities. Taking into account the specific content of documents, soft law and hard law, as well as their large number, it is probably “... for the administration to fail,” as alerts the depressant Jessop (Pierre, 2006). There are at least two reasons to suspect a failure of the implementation of provisions existing in the field. The first expression of the failure could be the lack of an engagement process between those entitled to administrative functions and the ethnic group, the second failure - the inopportune choice of the administrative tools.

The key problem we want to put into question is to assess the administrative institutions and the tools used by them, and the description of some options or models that could have more to offer in solving the problems of minorities. Structurally, the speech highlights three issues: 1) an overview of the international protection of minorities, 2) a theoretical excursion on administrative tools, 3) considerations on the impact of applying administrative tools.

The first aspect is necessary for methodological reasons. Whether the provisions of international documents are directly applicable in domestic law, or they are developed into own domestic legal instruments, the mission to execute them is for the public administration.

The creation of an international system of the national minorities protection is determined by at least two factors: the consideration of minority rights as human rights, and also the fact that the field is not reserved exclusively for the state sovereignty. In a synthetic formula, the international system of the national minorities rights include:

- the Law System as developed in the UN
- the Law System developed within the OSCE
- the Law System developed within the Council of Europe (Andreescu, 2004: 142-146).

Some conclusions are imposed on the international system of national minority rights. Except the Framework Convention for National Minorities Protection of the Council of Europe and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, all other documents are of the soft law. Although, there were expressed some views that insist on not to distinguish between mandatory and legal binding requirements, the violation of political agreements being as unacceptable as any violation of the international law (Bloed, 1993: 51-52), such documents as soft law offer the public administrations a greater public discretion.

An unresolved issue remains the definition of: „national minority” or „ethnic minority”. There is no a generally accepted definition on the international level that could be imposed on any state or that could be invoked with the international standard authority. There is no document where any
definition of concepts is found. The logic of this abstention is given by the large number of reservations expressed about the criteria according to which a group can be considered a minority and the extent to which the identity of persons may be only the result of self-identification.

To mitigate a confused discussion on ethnic minorities, we invoke the paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen Document which states: „Belonging to a minority is a matter of individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from such a choice”.

In this respect, there is a consideration expressed H.-R. Patapievici, about which the author himself says that it doesn’t go too far and should not be exaggerated: “to be Romanian, to be anybody else is, therefore, assuming a given rather than the giving itself” (Patapievici, 2004: 32).

The claim substantiation is found in an admirable passage from Virgil Nemoianu. “I'm only half-Romanian for, while both grandparents are pure and integral Romanian, both grandmothers are of other ethnic descent: one Serb, the other Italian-blooded German. The consequence is that my son, who speaks Romanian imperfectly (in which he does not know to read or write) and whom only a vague, amusing and condescending sympathy links to the Romanian, but by no means an awareness of belonging, however, is - strictly ethnic considered more Romanian than I am, his mother being Romanian without any interference” (Patapievici, 2004: 32).

Another problem is the use of terms. For example, the term “minority”-politically correct in its primary meaning, from the beginning emphasizes a relation of force between the most numerous and the less numerous, overshadowing the historical status and the diversity of minorities in question, which are: ethnic minorities and national minorities. The distinction between “national minorities” and “ethnic minorities” we consider of less importance. The conferment of powers of the administrative structures and the development of a policy issued by the public administration will have as the background the rights of minorities as such, and not their origins.

Moldova is a state with a multiethnic and multilingual population. The national composition of the Moldovan population, recorded by the census in 2004, the Moldovans, which is the majority, constitutes 75.8% of the total population, marking an increase of 5.9% compared to 1989. Besides Moldovans there live: Ukrainians, representing 8.4%, Russians accounting for 5.9%, Gagauz - 4.4%, Romanian - 2.2%, Bulgarians -1.9% and other nationalities accounting 1.0% of the total population. For 0.4% of residents the nationality was not recorded.²

²http://www.statistica.md/newsview.
Multiethnic and polylinguistic specificity of Moldova is elucidated on the Ethnic Map of Moldova "Structure and ethnic consciousness of the population in Moldova". The map was made in a joint project by the Austrian Academy of Sciences in collaboration with the National Museum of Ethnography and Natural History of Moldova and the Association of Geography and Ethnology of Moldova „Moldova AW”. According to Prof. Theda Kahl, a researcher at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, this is the first detailed map of the current ethnic structure of Moldova’s population at the community level, published in the 2004 census. The map also includes adjacent regions of Romania and Ukraine, presenting the ethnic situation in Eastern Romania, Odessa and Chernivtsi regions, Vinnitsa, Kirovograd and Nikolaev in Ukraine.

The legal framework that refers to the rights of national minorities in Moldova includes more than 30 documents, 10 of which are of international importance. According to experts, this is considered to be a relatively complex and satisfactory one. The law of the Republic of Moldova regarding persons belonging to national minorities recognizes by persons belonging to national minorities „persons residing in Moldova, who are its citizens, have ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious features different from the majority of population - Moldovan - and consider themselves of a different ethnic origin.

The institutions empowered to enforce provisions of legislation are:
- the Bureau of Interethnic Relations
- the Ethnic Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova
- the Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights and National Minorities
- the Center for Human Rights in Moldova.

The perception of minorities theme involves, certainly, discussions regarding technical issues of implementing the existing legislation on the protection and promotion of ethnic minorities rights. The means or the real devices that the administrative institutions have at their disposal to ensure the application of laws and law enforcement in specific are varied. Researchers have tried for many times to identify the administrative tools and to classify them into significant categories. The resulting schemes do not have much in common. Some of them have either a high level of abstraction, or insist too much on certain tools.

A sufficiently abstract scheme to encompass many existing possibilities and a specific enough yet, to match the way by which those involved in the administrative process implement their options, is developed by Howlett and Ramesh. The scheme is developed from the analysis of the extent to which the state is involved in providing goods and services involving the use of each tool. Using this analysis as a criterion, the result is a classification which arranges various public policy tools on an axis of the voluntary nature and an axis of the binding nature.
The binding tools, also called routing tools, require or direct the actions of individuals or societies. The administrative body, practicing the authority, can train people to carry out certain activities, may force the societies it controls to perform any function desired, or can directly provide requested goods and services through bureaucratic structures. These are tools with a high coercive feature. The binding tools are: regulations, public enterprises, direct delivery (Howlett, Ramesh, 2004: 95).

The voluntary tools involve the administrative interference in a very small degree or they don’t involve it at all. The desired objective is achieved on a voluntary basis. The administrative bodies often deliberately decide that they will not involve a matter of public interest (“non-decision”) because they believe that it can be better solved by voluntary organizations, family and market. These are NGOs which are acting voluntarily, meaning that their members are not required by the administration to perform any task. If they take any action that serves the public administration, this happens for reasons of self-interest, ethics or their own satisfaction. The voluntary instruments are family and community, voluntary organizations and market. (Howlett, Ramesh, 2004: 98)

Mixed tools combine the features of voluntary and mandatory tools. These allow administrative bodies different levels of involvement in the decisions elaborated by those whose involvement ranges from a simple dissemination of information to fines for improper activities. Between these two extremes there is the subsidizing of appropriate activities and the establishment of a price mechanism in those sectors where the price doesn’t exist, normally. These tools present, to some extent, the advantages of binding tools, as well as of those voluntary. (Howlett, Ramesh, 2004: 121)

To select a tool it is necessary to take into consideration two interrelated variables: the administrative capacity and the civic-administrative competence of the local community, the latter being determined largely, by the existence of social and human capital.

The administrative capacity represents the ability of public institutions to identify clear objectives, to set concrete priorities and to implement them efficiently (Cornea, 2008: 122). The citizen and administrative competence is expressed by citizens’ capacity to influence administrative decisions by compliance with law and with administrative decisions (Sandu, 2005: 169). Market-based tools (the supply of goods and services by the economic agents) are appropriate for a high level of administrative capacity of the community and the certification of medium and high standard of living of the population. For a limited administrative capacity and a low standard of living there will be used such voluntary tools as family or community, the incentives, propaganda and persuasion.

In order to ensure the respect of the compulsory legal documents required and also of those politically binding the efforts of public
administration should be channeled into at least two directions: formulating and implementing appropriate policies and ensuring a sense of identity security of pluralistic demands. The identification as an ethnic minority related only by the verb “to be” and not to the verb “to do”, impose that administrative tools must be selected according to criteria of fairness, efficiency and of existing social support.

Policies on minorities will be even more effective, if they will be based on comprehensive statistical data or some other data on the situation of ethnic groups, and approach the quality identity. Previous emphasis that focused on providing and guaranteeing certain rights by law under the current conditions should be changed and put on the rising potential of authorities and on the capacity of the supposed beneficiaries to realize these rights.

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Abstract: The waning of the birth rate and of fertility, the increase in life expectancy and the ageing of the population trigger important imbalances on the labor market, in the public sector and even in the financial-banking system. The population segment able to work decreases in favor of that representing the older population, thus causing an increase in the dependence rate of the elderly. The low birth rate and the low fertility render the work force reserve insufficient regarding the economic growth perspectives. The social insurance and health care budgets undergo heavy pressure as a consequence of the ever increasing needs of the pensioners. In its turn, the financial-banking system suffers from a reduction in the saving rate, the elderly being forced to reduce their consumption, let alone to save money, due to their low income from pensions.

Even if they do not represent the main causes of the current economic-financial crisis, without doubt, demographic changes have contributed to its start, and their unfavorable evolution on a long term basis can accentuate such crises or it can start new ones. In such circumstances, it is mandatory to transform population ageing from a problem into an opportunity.

Keywords: economic and financial crisis, causes, demographic changes, labor market, budget, the financial-banking system

Introduction

The economic crisis can be defined as an accentuated deterioration of the current economic situation, as well as of the future one. With its diverse aspects, with its stages, with its longer or shorter periods, it represents an economic malfunction the causes of which have been identified within different areas by economists; therefore the suggested anti-crisis measures have also been

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diverse. Such economic crises have been frequent throughout the 19th century until WWI but they have had a climax in the Great Depression of 1929-1933, and have continued with the two energy crises from 1973 and 1979, with the local crises from Mexico, South America, Japan during the 1990s, and in 2008 the current international crisis broke out. Of course there were longer periods of sustained economic growth, especially during the post-war period until the beginning of the 70s in industrialized countries, which have triggered doubts among economists regarding the viability of the economic cycle idea. (Krugman, 2009: 19)

In these circumstances, the economists’ concern for the identification of the causes generating economic crises seems natural, in view of the delineation of an ensemble of measures that would prevent the crises or manage to overcome them.

Keynes’ theory, included in the well-known paper *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936) is a construction meant to replace the old classic English approach and justify the active economic policies and the necessity of the state’s intervention in a differentiated manner according to the stages of the economic cycle, by using the key factors it controls: the budgetary, monetary and fiscal policy. The model he suggested is based on a few fundamental concepts: the tendency towards consumption, the marginal productivity of the capital, the interest rate and the full occupancy.

Keynes transfers the so-called causes of the crises from the interest rate area to that of the capital's marginal productivity: “We were accustomed to explain the crisis by stressing the increasing tendency of the interest rate under the influence of the growing demand for money, both for commercial purposes and for speculative ones. In certain moments, this factor can certainly have an aggravating role, and occasionally an initiating one. But my suggestion is that the most likely explanation for the crisis, and probably the prevailing one, is not the increase of the interest rate, but a sudden collapse of the capital’s marginal productivity.” (Keynes, 1936, 2009: 385) (Our translation).

In his introduction to the Romanian edition of this book from 2009, Paul Krugman considered that John M. Keynes got rid of the idea which was “enticing, but certainly false that the business cycle was like a morality game, that the economic depression was like a necessary purgative following the excess of a prosperity period.” (Keynes, 2009: 47) (Our translation).

Starting with the 70s we witness the intensification of the economic globalization process, a fact that puts a limit on the states’ capacity for efficient intervention (the collapse of the myth regarding the ‘providence state’) and reactivates the ideology of the ‘minimal state’ and of the ‘limited government’, embraced since 1989 by the Eastern European states too, following the communism’s state-controlled experience, which has brought forth a type of ‘anarcho-capitalism’. (Gray, 1998: 240) Otherwise, there are economists who, when
talking about the effects of globalization on the economic level, underline the fact that it leads to “Richesse du monde, pauvreté des nations”. (Cohen, 1997).

On the background of an often exaggerated optimism, we witness a considerable economic growth not only in the developed countries, but also in the less developed ones, which will determine the increase of the oil price thrice in 1973 and twice in 1979, which for an economy based on oil, could not but trigger a major crisis with long-term effects. Paul Krugman believes that the same happened in 1990 when the excessive trust in the profit potential of informational technology and “the growing safety feeling regarding the economy, the belief that the harsh recessions era was over” pushed the price of the stock shares “to bewildering prices”. (Krugman, 2009: 167) (Our translation)

Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize laureate for economy in 2008, has identified among the main causes of the current crisis the reduction of the trust in the banking system coupled with the lack of cash, the emergence in the economy of the ‘speculative bubble’ be it of a real estate, financial, stock exchange or another nature, which eventually collapsed influencing the decline of investments, of the consumption, of the general demand, the increase of unemployment, the disturbance of the banking activities and the activity of the ‘shadow banks’. He also warned in the above-mentioned book about the return of the ‘decline economy’. (Krugman, 2009: 79, 173-175).

Taking into account the recent economic and demographic evolutions and the forms of the current crisis, I suggest that beside the above-mentioned causes, one can also bring forward for discussion demographic determinants.

1. Demographic changes and their economic implications

Until the middle of the 20th century, demography and the economic sciences, just like the population and the economy, were approached by specialists as separate, independent research or activity areas, having separate subjects, methods and specific rules; they were less studied from the point of view of the relationships, or the interconnections among them. Only in the last 6-7 decades have the demographers underlined the role of the economy in demographic evolutions, and have the economists stressed the importance of the demographic elements for the economic development; thus one can envision more and more clearly an interconnection between the two areas.

In this respect, Vladimir Trebici suggested that “the interdependences between the demographic variables (‘the demographic transition’) and the socio-economic variables (‘the economic growth’, ‘the development’) were finally admitted. Even if not all the detailed aspects of the demographic process have been identified, the specialists’ studies regarding the demographic transition have truly become a theory of the population’s evolution seen from
the point of view of its connection with the economic development.” (Trebici, 1991: 302) (Our translation)

In time, the unitary approach of economy, society, the environment and technology has become the pattern of a new type of development, the sustainable development. At the present day, numerous economists and politicians consider that the traditional model of economic growth is in crisis (Peter F. Druker, *Societatea post-capitalistă*, 1999; Lester C. Thurow, *The Future of Capitalism, How Today’s Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow’s World*, 1996; G. Soros, *Criza capitalismului global*, 1999; Lester Brown, *Planul B*, 2006, etc). As a consequence, one feels the need for “new reconsiderations on the level of economic theory/practice, the drawing up of new strategies for the two processes. (Popescu, Bondrea, Constantinescu, 2005: 125).

The labor market is, like any other market a place where the demand meets the supply, in this case, the labor power. The demand for man power, materialized in job offers, is determined not only by the evolution of the economy and its potential, but also by the number, structure and demographic characteristics of the population. In its turn, the supply of labor force, materialized in the quantity of work that can be carried out by the active population, is related to this population’s consumption needs but also by the ability to cope with the job’s demands. Also in the case of the supply and demand of labor power, an important element is represented by the productivity; because the productivity and the work carried out are substitutable: when the overall population remains constant or increases, the decline in employed population can be compensated by an increase in productivity. At the same time, when the productivity decreases, the quantity of work must increase so as the consumption be constant.

The changes that took place on the demographic level can be found with a certain delay both in the supply as well as in the demand of labor power. The decline of the birthrate and of the death rate, a common occurrence in many developed countries, causes population ageing and implicitly, a reduction of the segment of the employed population, respectively a shortage of labor power. This must be compensated by extra investments and by an increase in productivity which can be accomplished by means of devising, implementing and putting into practice technical progress, which in itself demands a better qualified, dynamic, flexible and creative work force in the area of research, development and innovation. On the other hand, if demographic growth is not accompanied by an equivalent economic growth, will determine considerable pressure on the unemployment rate, welfare work, education and health care systems. Likewise, the structuring on work domains of the employed population represents an indicator of a country’s level of economic development: a high level of development is matched by a very little percentage of employed population in the primary sector (agriculture and forestry), and
respectively by a very high percentage of the population employed in the secondary sector (the processing industry) and in the tertiary industries (public services). All this is taken into account knowing that non-agricultural activities are generating production techniques which allow for a better capitalization of material and labor resources and they provide services for the unfolding of production at a higher level of efficiency and for pursuing population’s needs, as well as for the society's safety on the whole.

The quantitative correlations between economy and population, though not easily dismissed, especially if we take into account the structure of the population according to various criteria, are nevertheless surpassed by qualitative correlations, i.e. between the human capital and the efficiency economic indicators. “The human capital represents one of the development engines, both on a social, community level and on an individual one” concluded Bogdan Voicu in a study on the human capital in Romania. (Voicu, 2004: 155)

(Our translation)

The physical and psychological state of health of the population is to be found in the quantity and the quality of the work, in the quality of family and professional life, even in the civic attitude and the political action. In its turn, the state of health varies according to the level of individual, family or national income and according to the educational and health care policies. “The presence of a highly educated human resource having a good state of health determines high labor productivity, a better organization of the economic activity, a better production and superior income which, in their turn, bring new investments in education, the health care system, thus influencing the production of a better educated and healthier human resource.” (Mihail, Sandu, 2010: 73) (Our translation)

In the theory of economic growth, R. Solow (1956) underlines the importance of the demographic factor as a source of growth regarding the employed population, stating that a more efficient action is the replacement of the active population than the simple replacement of generations, the latter being a necessary but not sufficient condition for the replacement of the employed population. “To make children is not the same thing as making them active”, he used to say; in other words, a child is a potential labor force, not a certain one. He/she needs to be at least 16 years old till he/she might become active, meanwhile he/she is only a consumer, and sometimes a very demanding one. (Our translation)

The level and the quality of education, not only of the initial one, but also of the permanent one, have a considerable impact on labor productivity, especially considering the ageing of the population and the decrease of the employed population. They also influence the level of personal income, of the adjustment and flexibility capacity on the labor market, the level of creativity and innovation. Yet education, the access to a high quality of education is
conditioned by a certain level of income, of social values, of educational, economic and social policies.

In other words, it is a cycle that repeats itself with every generation and which has special characteristics on shorter intervals (election cycles, local, regional, international changes) on the political, ideological, economic, technological, even environmental levels. A study carried out in European countries between 2001-2003 has underlined very strong correlations between formal education indicators, those representing the state of health and those of economic power, drawing the conclusion that “the richer societies are better educated and have healthier citizens, the better educated societies are richer and have a better state of health.” (Voicu, 2004: 152) (Our translation)

One of the most important demographic changes with the greatest impact upon the present and future economic evolution and which may cause even economic crises seems to be the ageing of the population. In its turn, the current crisis has determined a leap backwards regarding fiscal consolidation issues, a fact that has imposed serious fiscal-budgetary restrictions, even restrictions regarding the pensions systems. The economic contractions, the budgetary deficits, the financial instability have pointed out the need for the adjustment of the retirement practices, of the pensions’ calculus manner; the need for improving the efficiency and the safety of the pensions systems to prevent equating old age and poverty.

Starting with the last century, one can notice a major change in structuring the world population according to their age – it is a population growing old due to the increase of life expectancy and of the number of the elderly as well as due to a decrease of the number of the young. Currently, the world population age structure looks like this: 0-14 years old: 27%, 15-64 years old: 65%, 65 years old and over: 8%. (CIA – The World Factbook, 2008)

This phenomenon has affected the entire planet, but it has various intensities in different geographical areas. First it took place in the North, but it is threatening to extend with an increased velocity in the South in the next decades. (Pison, 2009) We can provide an example in the situation of Asia which has the greatest part of the world population; the chart below shows the fact that this area is ageing too, the number of those over 65 years old and over this age is increasing, at the same time with the decrease of the number of those between 0 and 14 years old.

The same situation is valid for other continents: for North America where the size of the two segments tends to become equal; for South America where the situation is better at the present moment, but the same trend is present; and especially Europe. Only in Africa this process is not yet present due to a high birth rate and also due to the low life expectancy at birth.

The ageing process, which takes the shape of a demographic imbalance when it comes to the age structure, is likely to cause serious economic and social
malfunctions on the labor market, in the pensions system, in the health care system, in the education system, in the social care system, in the system of budgetary income and expenses, even in the banking system, thus being a genuine carrier of crisis generating elements. This is the reason why the European Commission has drawn up a document called “The Green Book of Pensions”, meant to launch a debate on a European level in order to ensure safe, viable and suitable pensions, which would be able to sustain the efforts to reform and improve the present systems on a national level.

**Figure 1.** The age structure of the population in Asia (1950-2020)

![Asia Age Structure](http://ecoglobe.ch/population/e/p2k07407.htm)

In a study published in 1996, Lindh and Malmberg have underlined a strong positive correlation between ratio of the population between 50-64 years old compared to the overall population and the increase of the GDP/inhabitant in the next period, respectively, a negative correlation between the ratio of the population over 65 years old compared to the overall population and the economic growth. This was the result of classifying ages according to the economic behavior criterion. Thus, young people (0-14 years old) depend on the grown-ups for the consumption and the health care and education related expenses; the young adults (15-29 years old) represent the source of rejuvenation of the labor force but they still need investments in the human capital being in various schooling stages and needing money for age appropriate goods and services; the working adults (30-49 years old) represent a part of the active man power but they spend their income for acquiring long-term utility goods, thus being less available for saving money; the middle age people (50-64 years old) are working the and earn a high income based on their experience and furthermore, they can save money due to the fact that they already have the products that ensure the comfort of a household; the elderly (over 65 years old)
rely on the active people due to the transfer of income, but also rely on their family because of the big and expensive needs, especially those regarding the health care services and because of their low income from pensions. (Lindh, Malmberg, 1999).

In this respect, the labor force is influenced on the one hand by the decrease of the number of active population, and on the other hand, by the diminution of work productivity, which may cause a smaller increase of the population's living standard. The compensation of the work force deficit in developed countries by bringing cheap man power from China, Africa and India will be stopped only when these countries will have themselves a work force deficit. In this situation, there are only two valid solutions for maintaining economic growth at least at the same level: the increase of the retirement age, respectively the increase in productivity.

On the one hand, the increase of the retirement age is possible due to the increase in life expectancy and life quality; on the other hand, this is necessary for unblocking the pensions system and for the removal of the inner tensions between generations by reducing the burden on the active generations for supporting the pensions system. As a consequence, one needs to install some mechanisms for the occupancy of the elderly. But this depends on a series of factors: the capitalization of the old work force by the employers (the relationship between productivity, age and salaries); cultural aspects like: the attitude towards work, family values, the future, the attitude towards risk; the reduction of the devaluation rate of the human capital. (Algan, Cahuc, 2007)

But this fact equally depends on the economy's capacity to offer jobs that are suitable for this age group. The statement according to which the massive retirement has a positive influence on the unemployment rate by freeing jobs for the young, is not valid in all the countries. If this fact seems to be valid in Spain (where the unemployment rate is higher than its European average), in Germany, Italy or France this does not take place. Although the large number of pensioners has freed numerous jobs, the unemployment rate did not drop due to the qualification and high goals of the young work force on the one hand and on the other hand due to the employers' needs and expectations. The first have new and better qualifications which entitles them to have higher demands regarding the income, the working conditions, the professional relationships; while the employers look for experience, discipline and acceptable salary demands. In these circumstances, the younger part of the old age group will be preferred, at least for certain jobs. In developed countries they are often requested to help as consultants or mentors.

The increase in the occupation rate of the population over 60 years old (ensuring an active ageing), the discouragement of early retirement and the encouragement of part time work, the reform of the pensions systems, the age-targeted policies, all of these lead to an increase of life quality and of the
solidarity among generations, to the correct management of the economic and human problems, all adapted to the differences between regions and cities. (Cartea verde a populaŃiei: 24)

Paradoxically, although the increase of life expectancy should almost automatically lead to the increase of the retirement age, one can rather see an earlier exit from the labor market under the form of early retirement, or illness-induced retirement, etc. For instance, in 2005 in Italy, Poland, Belgium and Luxemburg, the median age for retirement for men was about 7-8 years under the official age and over 5 years lesser in Austria. (Statistică socială europeană: 212, Source: Eurostat, Anchetă forŃei de muncă şi indicatori structurali pentru ocupare)

As for the health care and education services, the population ageing demands changes regarding the adjustment of the structure of these services according to the changes occurring at the demand level: developing geriatrics and gerontology services, house-call services, e-medicine, e-learning schools and continuous education.

Yet demographic ageing can also be considered an opportunity, not only a problem. The extension of the active life will determine the transfer of a considerable part of the senior citizens into the rank of the active population and the taking over of the tasks generally associated with grandparents by great-grandparents.

On the other hand, the productivity is not necessarily dependent on the age. Considering the new forms of learning (life learning, long-distance learning), the elderly are no longer situated outside the education and continuous learning system. In this situation, taking into account their work experience, they can obtain productivity levels that can surpass even those of the young people. The same thing can be valid with respect to innovation.

The ever increasing and diverse needs of the elderly, materialized in the growing demand for social and medical services, for specific products, represents an opportunity considering the setting up of jobs in these specific areas which are accessible even when lacking a superior qualification, but which demand a humane attitude.

In what the financial banking system is concerned, the changes that population ageing might trigger regard the change in attitude of the senior citizens towards the consumption and savings, with an influence on the interest and exchange rates. Considering the increase in life expectancy, 'the young pensioners’ need to save money to be able to have the necessary resources to go through the old age, thus contradicting the theory of the life cycle according to which people save money only during their economically active period.

---

1 The actual median age for retirement is estimated from the data provided by the work force inquiry regarding the occupational status. In each member state it is calculated taking into account the age when the ratio of those who are economically active (i.e. the activity rate) is of 50% from all those who are economically active at the age of 50.
Those with large pensions are saving by reducing the everyday expenses, as well as those with small pensions by using different saving forms, especially using their home – if they own it by renting a part of it or reducing the maintenance costs. One can notice even a reversal of the inter-generational solidarity flow: the grandparents support their children and grandchildren. Of course one cannot generalize this tendency, because it is possible that this characteristic of saving money of the present pensioner generations may not be constant throughout all the elder generations, taking into account the type of education that they had, the social-economic context of their upbringing and the system of values and life style which is specific to each generation.

Another opportunity brought by the population ageing is connected to the reduction of the growth rhythm of the population, which connected to a lower consumption of the elderly contributes to the lowering of the environmental hazards.

The ageing process is further accompanied by a positive social effect, i.e. the decrease in the crime rate; but it is equally true that the suicide rate among the elderly is increasing.

From a political point of view, the elderly represent an ever more attractive category being a disciplined, interested and increasing body of electors. The older voters are usually associated with conservative parties, but the studies carried out on the baby-boomers have underlined very diverse political options among them, therefore stressing an uncertain voting behavior. (Palard, Vezina; 2007: 35)

As a consequence, the ageing of the population is not only a handicap, but also an opportunity. For Europe which has already known, researched and begun to capitalize on this new resource, the opportunity can become a pioneering enterprise by adopting some economic policies about the implications of the population ageing.

On the overall, there are two approaches to ageing and old age: a pessimistic one and an optimistic - triumphant one. The pessimists warn about some dangers connected to the pensions system failure, to the public finances imbalance, to the collapse of the economic growth on the background of the drop in productivity, competitiveness, creativity and technological innovations. They also warn about the rise of health care expenses, the slackening of the intergenerational relationships, even about the installation of a type of gerontocracy. In their opinion, the old person is a burden both for his/her family and acquaintances and also for the society.

On the other hand, the optimists insist on the experience that the elderly have and which can be successfully used, on their autonomy, freedom, self-promotion and development, on their contribution to the economic development (their capacity for consumption and investments, of saving money, of making donations, giving inheritances and transferring goods and
In between these two types of discourse, it is necessary to look for a nuanced position that cannot ignore the appearance of the Homo senectus, “the new emblematic figure of contemporary history” and the fact that it represents an achievement of civilization and an “economic, social and political force that cannot be ignored”. (Palard, Vezina; 2007: 49-51) (Our translation)

2. The case of Romania

In Romania, the current financial crisis manifested itself less than in other countries due to the fact that the Romanian financial-banking system does not have the proportions it has in other countries where one can notice a ‘hypertrophy of the financial sector’. In exchange, there was and continues to be an acute economic crisis. If a financial crisis can be softened by an infusion of capital from the reserves of the national banks, in the case of the economic crisis things are more complicated, the efficient measures pertaining to the area of economic reorganizations, innovations, investments, etc.

In their paper Criza economică din România anului 2009. Cauze, efecte, soluţii, the authors identify next to the impact of the external crisis, two important causes for the economic-financial crisis in Romania: the deficit of the trade balance and the budgetary deficit, both having an important demographic component.

Among other causes, external migration – especially that of the young and qualified workforce – also contributes to the deficit of the trade balance, a fact which has contributed to the difficulties in reestablishing the proper structure for the Romanian economy after the collapse of the industry in the immediate period following 1990. For Romania, external migration represents 10% of the total population and almost 25% of the active population, having as a main disadvantage the appearance of the workforce deficit, especially in some economic sectors. Even if external migration was often considered to be an element of profitable export, on the long haul, the damages inflicted to the Romanian economy are bigger.

It seems that the population aged 25-29 years old is the most dynamic when it comes to temporarily migrating abroad. (“The migration of the Romanians abroad: premises for public policies (I)”, in Populatia si dezvoltarea României - prognoze si posibile solutii, nr.3/2007: 3).

The prevalence of young people among the immigrants amplifies the phenomenon of population ageing by the negative influence this phenomenon has on the birth rate, and it makes difficult the correlation of production, consumption, the imports and exports with the potential of the work force which remains in the Romanian economy; knowing that the better qualified immigrants have greater chances of success on the labor market of the Western countries.
Table 2.
The percentage of the people aged 26-40 years old from the totality of immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The year</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ratio of young people (26-40 years old) from the totality of immigrants</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Regarding the budgetary deficit, there was a strong influence of both the decrease of income and a lowering of the degree of collecting wages. On the other hand, the burden of increased expenses, especially those with the pensions and the health care system as a result of population ageing, of the increase in life expectancy, of early retirements have lead to a ratio of 1.5 pensioners to 1 wage earner. Even if a better life is a great achievement, one wonders if those who live longer have the capacity to enjoy this longevity.

After 1990 Romania in its turn has faced a process of population ageing determined by the evolution of demographic indicators: a low birth rate, a low fertility rate, the increase of life expectancy at birth, a decrease of the death rate according to the table below:

Table 3. Demographic indicators in Romania (1990-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/ year</th>
<th>Birth rate</th>
<th>Death rate</th>
<th>Fertility circumstantial index</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>69.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>69.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>69.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>69.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>68.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>69.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>69.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>70.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>71.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>71.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>71.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>71.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A low death and fertility rate have lead not only to the phenomenon of population ageing, but have also changed the structure of the dependency relationship. Thus, in Romania, the population aged 0-14 years old has dropped from 33.4% in 1930 to 26% in 1980 and 15.6% in 2007, while the population over 60 years old has increased from 7.4% in 1930 to 13.3% in 1980 and 14.7% in 2007. (Trebici, p.112) In these circumstances, the rate of the demographic dependency of the elderly has risen (from 15.6% to 20.5% between 1990 and 2000), the rate of the demographic dependency of the young people has decreased in the same period from 35.9% to 25.3%, and the ratio old people-young people has increased dramatically from 43.5% in 1990 to 97.3% in 2007 (Anuarul statistic al României – 2008, Serii timp, 1990-2007). At the same time, the employment rate in Romania is inferior to the European average (58.8% compared to 65.4% in 2007).

**Figure 2. The employment rate in Romania (1997-2007)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/year</th>
<th>Birth rate</th>
<th>Death rate</th>
<th>Fertility circumstantial index</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>71.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>72.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>72.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>72.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>72.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Vladimir Trebici underlines the characteristics which are specific to the demographic transition in Romania:

1. The fact that Romania belongs to the Western Europe cultural model makes the birth and death rate level in the pre-transformational period
have other values than the ones registered in the currently developing countries: between 1930-1939 to a gross birth rate of 31.4 living newly-born children to 1000 inhabitants and a gross death rate of 19.5 deaths to 1000 inhabitants, the yearly growth rate was about 1.2% considering that the national annual revenue per inhabitant was 100 UDS.

2. The demographic transition took place through an accelerated decrease of the death rate between 1918-1956, followed by an accentuated decrease of the birth rate between 1957-1966.

3. Both phenomena occurred as a follow-up of the intermingling of economic, political, cultural and educational factors (Trebei, 1979, p.34)

In what the demographic projections for the next 50 years are concerned, they are not quite optimistic since the population of Romania continues the descending trend towards a total of 15-18 millions towards the 2050s.

Nevertheless, the population statistics seem to place us in a somewhat normal state. The population of Romania was in July 2007 of 22,276,056 inhabitants, having the following age structure: 0-14 years old: 15.6% (1,787,334 men/ 1,696,270 women); 15-64 years old: 69.6% (7,721,160 men/ 7,793,063 women); 65 years old and over: 14.7% (1,344,673 men/ 1,933,556 women). The average life expectancy is for the whole population of 71.91 years, with differences between men (68.41 years) and women (75.62). In the last two years, the usage of the life expectancy at birth indicator is contested by demographers because the greater number of years that a generation can enjoy does not necessarily mean a healthy life. Due to this reason, the World Health Organization has recommended another indicator called the *average healthy life span* in order to capture the level of socio-economic development of a country. For Romania, in 2002, this indicator was of 61 years for men and 65.2 years for women.

By comparing these data to the European Union average we can see that:

a) There is a slightly lower share of the 0-14 years old age segment (15.7% in EU).

b) There is a larger share of the 15-64 years old age segment (67.2% in EU).

c) There is a lower share of the 65 years old and over age segment (17.1%).

d) There is a numeric supremacy of women in the 15-64 years old age segment.

The b) and c) headings seem to indicate a favorable situation, which can be called ‘a window of opportunity’ due to the fact that the work resources represented by the population which is able to work are important in order to sustain a strong economy. Yet this thing took place during 2000-2008 when Romania had an economic growth of 4-8%.
But such a demographic situation is not stable for a long period because the generations replace one another and the segment of population between 0-14 years old is rather small and even more seriously, it continues to decrease. In a few years this situation will be far from favorable. In the same manner, the share of population of 65 years old and over seems to represent an advantage considering a lower rate of dependency. In fact, on the one hand the lower share of this age segment is due to a lower life expectancy in Romania as compared to that of the European Union (72 years compared to 78.5 years), a sign of underdevelopment, civilization and life quality gap; but paradoxically, on the other hand the dependency rate of the elderly is one among the highest in the EU, as a follow-up of the massive retirements and of the very numerous illness-triggered retirements.

**Figure 4. The evolution of the number of pensioners and wage-earners (1990-2007)**

Source: ASR, 2008 serii, cap. 6, p.149, 337
Early retirement, adopted by Romania as a solution to the unemployment problem, has led to an outburst of the number of pensioners in the public system. As a consequence, the number of contributors for each pensioner has decreased from 3.43 in 1990 to only 0.79 in 2003.

In these circumstances, the pensions expenses, as well as their share in the total of budgetary expenses and in the GDP have risen while the budgetary revenue represents a maximum of 33% of the GDP, a fact that situates us on the last position in the EU.

This is a situation which is able to amplify the budgetary deficit, a ‘balloon’ (to use Krugman’s word) which broke in the context of the current crisis, bringing Romania on the brink of insolvency and making it resort to massive loans.

**Figure 5.** The evolution of pension expenses

![The evolution of pension expenses](image)

*Source:* ASR, 2008 serii, cap. 21, pg. 993

One can notice that the share of social expenses represents a third of the total of budgetary expenses, having a great share in the GDP; which means that on the one hand there are other budgetary sectors and objectives that will lack financing, and on the other hand, these expenses put a great pressure on the budget, generating considerable deficits, which in their turn represent sources of malfunctions in the country’s socio-economic life in general.
Table 4. The social expenses from the state’s consolidated budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The year</th>
<th>The share of social security expenses in the total expenses of the general consolidated budget (%)</th>
<th>The share of social security expenses in the GDP (%)</th>
<th>The surplus/deficit of the general consolidated budget (% in the GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>-2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The share of pensions expenses from the total of budgetary expenses (36.8%) place Romania within the European Union on the second position after Greece, which spends 40.5% from its revenue for pensions.

Table 5. The share of pensions in the budgetary revenue within the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pensions/Revenue (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Consiliul Fiscal

The inversion of the age pyramid in Romania and not only, renders the current pensions system inefficient, therefore needing a restructuring that
would make it more flexible and would interconnect the pension level, the life expectation and the economic growth, allowing at the same time to approach the target of 75% work force occupancy established by the EU Agenda 2020. The pensions system sustainability and the budgetary deficit reduction, coupled with the macroeconomic balance represent a primary objective for the Romanian politics on a short, medium and long term level. This might not prevent all future economic crises, but at least will not contribute to or amplify these phenomena.

**Conclusions:**

1. In tackling the causes of economic crises one really needs to use the demographic factors analysis, taking into account that there is a strong connection between economic development and the human capital resources.

2. One needs to transform population ageing from a problem into an opportunity by using a coherent strategy of stimulating the younger echelon of the old population into becoming economically active, or preventing the devaluation of the human capital.

3. A profound reform of the pensions system is necessary by introducing some mechanisms of pensions' adjustment to the average life expectancy and to the average rate of economic growth.

4. Considering the increase in longevity and the population ageing, one needs to encourage individual money saving coupled with the establishment of crisis reserve funds, so as the social insecurity situations be prevented.

5. Socio-economic reforms should target the long-term sustainability of the pensions systems, even by encouraging private pensions.

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UKRAINIAN MINORITY IN ROMANIA:
PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY PRESERVING

Yuriy YURIYCHUK*

Abstract. In this article the author analyzed the position of Ukrainian minority in
Romania. It’s dedicated to the problems of Ukrainians in Romania. The author pointed out
that during XX century there were two waves of immigration to Romania from Ukraine.
Nowadays the most part of Ukrainians concentrates in Maramures, Suceava, Karash-Severin,
Tulcea, Satu Mare, Arad and Botosani. They have some difficulties in realizing their right for
free ethnic-cultural development. For instance, they haven’t a possibility to study in native
language, to listen service in Ukrainian, etc. These problems have to be solved according to
European standards.

Keywords: national minority, religious freedom, assimilation, public organizations.

The contemporary development of the European Union demonstrates the growing interest toward the national minorities, to the problem of preserving their national, cultural, educational and other rights. The processes of globalization and regionalization are the parallel ones. On the one hand, we’re the witnesses of the European Unions’ enlargement. We see the wish of different states and nations to join the larger international union with all its pluses and minuses. On the other hand, the processes of regionalization, in which national minorities often play the key role are really are really powerful (for instance, precedent Kosovo). The understanding of danger of such processes of regionalization pushed European leaders to more active work in

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the sphere of national minorities’ rights preserving. In 1995 the Framework Convention on National Minorities Protection was adopted\(^1\). This document became one of the most important in regulation national minorities’ issues.

One of the most actual problem in this context is interaction of the state and its diasporas. Obviously, this interaction is not the same in different cases. Ukraine activated its work in that direction after proclaiming its independence. The most active collaboration was between Ukraine and the USA and Canada Diasporas. They paid big attention to Ukraine and its problems in the first years of independence. Nowadays the interaction between Ukraine and its neighboring states is developed both by politicians and scientists.

Ukrainian researchers V. Troschyn’s’ky and A. Shevchenko prepared a general work on Ukrainian diasporas in the world. They’ve done the analysis of the position of Ukrainians in Romania. (Трощинський, Шевченко, 1999).

Yuriy Fed’kovych Chernivtsi National University is really active in this question. Its scientists pay a lot of attention to the different aspects of national minorities’ life, both in Ukraine and abroad.

Position of Ukrainian minority in Romania, its problems and prospects are analyzed by historians and political scientist of the Department of History, Political Science and International Relations of the University. Professor Y. Makar worked a lot on this theme. He published a number of scientific works dedicated to the situation with Ukrainian national minority in Romania. In his works the author pointed out the necessity of bigger support from Ukrainian state to Ukrainian diaspora in neighboring Romania (Makar 2009) V. Makar works on Ukrainian national identity issues. Common with V. Motsok and S. Popyk he published a research dedicated to this problem (Моцок, Макар, Попик, 2005).

Several conferences dedicated to the relations in triangle Ukraine-Romania-Moldova were initiated and held by the Bukovinian Center of Political Science (Chief Prof. A. Kruglashov) common with F. Ebert Foundation and other state and public institutions. Scientists and researchers have got a possibility to discuss different scientific issues during these conferences. The most actual issues of Ukrainian-Romanian collaboration in the sphere of national minorities’ rights protection were discussed there.

Such scholars as L. Aza, S. Popyk, O. Shvachka (Аза, Попик, Швачка, 1999) research the problems of the Romanian Ukrainians. They tried to draw the perspectives of national and cultural development of Ukrainian minority in Romania.

So, the problem of Ukrainian minority being in Romania is rather actual issue in contemporary Ukrainian science.

The author used the methods of historical analysis, historical-chronological method and method of comparative analysis in this article.

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Historically ethnic Ukrainians live not only in Ukraine but also abroad, particularly on the territory of Romania. Around 20 millions of Ukrainians live abroad by different data (Макар, 2006: 7). Several waves of migration were during the history.

Firstly Ukrainians appeared in Romania in the late XIX century, after Romania has become a modern independent state. The second wave of migration took place between the two world wars (1918-1939). During interwar period many people left the residence. They were trying to found themselves in foreign countries. Sometimes they emigrated far away from their state. Sometimes they immigrated to neighboring country, like Romania. About one million Ukrainians, mainly rural population, settled at that time in Romania. Nowadays Ukrainian community in Romania continues to be mainly rural, as it was in the first part of the XX century.

For decades, Ukrainians in Romania were virtually left to fend for themselves. They hadn’t any guidance in any sphere of live, i.e. cultural, educational, legislative etc. They had not any spiritual or material aid from outside, even from Ukraine, unlike other ethnic communities in Romania (Germans, Slovaks, Bulgarians and others). The last almost always have both financial and political support from their native countries.

It is well-known that USSR kept little interest to the life of their people overseas. So, Ukraine, as a part of the Soviet Union, could not provide other politics toward its former compatriots. But after proclaiming independence Ukraine didn’t (on our opinion) pay proper attention to the problem of ethnic Ukrainians living outside of Ukraine until recently. This lack of support from the historic homeland facilitated contacts between different groups of Ukrainians of Romania. It allowed the previous Romanian government to completely ignore an insecure minority.

The worst times for the Ukrainian community in Romania were the times of Ceausescu. During his rule all minorities were suspected in disloyalty and even espionage. The ideal of Ceausescu was to “dissolve” all the people regardless to their national identity in “Romanian boiler”. Ukrainian schools were closed. That influenced a lot on the level of national identity of Ukrainians. According to the official data, a lot of Ukrainians lost their national identity and turned in Romanian during those times.

Nowadays there are many citizens of Ukrainian origin in Romania, who call and consider themselves as Romanians. But even in such difficult conditions rather huge Ukrainian minority was kept in Romania.

After 1989 the restoration of the Ukrainian schools or even individual items of educational programs have started.

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2 USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
3 Гудзик К. Українці в Румунії, on April 12, 2011, http://www.day.kiev.ua/169982/
When we’re talking about Ukrainians in Romania, it should be noted that they can be both autochthons and immigrants. But it’s rather difficult to talk about them as immigrants, because the main part of Ukrainians lives on the territory of Romania during centuries.

Generally Ukrainians in Romania can be divided into three groups:

1. The autochthons in northern regions of Romania – South Bukovyna and partly Botoshan’ county, Maramorschyna.

2. The descendants of Zaporizhzhya cossacks, who after the destroying of Zaporizhzhya Sich settled in North Dobrudzha, created Zadunajs’ka Sich which is in contemporary Tul’cha county.

3. Population of Eastern Banat, which is in the western part of Romania where the first Ukrainians from Zakarpattya appeared in second part of XVII century, from Galicia and other Ukrainian lands in the process of labor migration at the beginning of XX century (Моцик, Макар, Попик, 2006: 47).

As far as it was told above, after the First and Second World wars a number of Ukrainians came into Romania. That immigration had political character. Some of them left in European states, some immigrated to the American continent.

According to the official census of 2002 in Romania lived 61 098 people of Ukrainian population (around 4.4 thousand less than in 1992). 56 116 persons of these people declared their native language Ukrainian (almost 94% of all Ukrainian). However, some Ukrainians recognized their native language Romanian - 4540 persons (7.43%), and other languages, including Hungarian, German and others. As a separate ethnic minorities, the Romanian statistics highlights Rusyns - 257 persons in 2002, Lipovans - 35 791 person and Hutsuls (Юрійчук, Нечаєва-Юрійчук, 2010: 18).

According to the opinion of many respected researchers the Romanian official data are not objective. It has some tendencies. The first, to the prejudice of members of ethnic minorities, and the second, to the artificial dissipation by dividing the big national community into the small sub-ethnic groups (the allocation of the total number of Ukrainian and Ruthenians, Hutsuls). This contributes to the actual lack of Romania of separate legislation that has to restrict state policy in ensuring the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. Recently there was the consideration to the Romanian Parliament concerning the bill on the status of national minorities. However, by preliminary analysis of independent experts, this bill is mainly focused on solving the problems of ethnic Hungarians, which have a lot of contradictions with Romanian authorities in contemporary political situation.

There are also alternative non-official calculations. In particular, according to the information proposed by Union of Ukrainians of Romania at the beginning of the XXI century from 200 to 350 thousand Ukrainians lived in
this country. On our opinion, the true figure lies somewhere between the two above (official and unofficial data).

Romania census 2002 showed that the majority of Ukrainian population lives in some regions - Maramures, Suceava, Karash-Severin, Tulcea, Satu Mare, Arad and Botosani (Аза, Попик, Швачка, 1999: 13). These are the historic regions of South Bukovyna: Maramoresh, where Ukrainian population live historically, and regions of Eastern- North Banat, Dobrogea, in which Ukrainian settlements have appeared in the XVIII – XIX centuries.

The vast majority of Ukrainians in Romania lives in rural areas. That promotes conservation of their native language in this environment. For example, in Suceava region 99.8% of Ukrainians speak Ukrainian as native language. Similar situation is in Botoshani and Karash-Severin regions (respectively 99.22% and 92.51%). However, in other parts of Romania, occupied by Ukrainian residents, the situation is not so optimistic. We can see the tendency of assimilation of national minorities including Ukrainians. Obviously, the opportunities for education in mother tongue for Ukrainians in Romania are much smaller than the possibilities of Romanians in Ukraine.

The census 2002 in Romania showed that among people declared their national identity as Ukrainians, the biggest part named Ukrainian as a mother tongue. From 61098 Ukrainians 56116 declared Ukrainian as the native language (it’s around 93.96% from all Ukrainians). Romanian is the native language for 4540 persons (7.43%), Hungarian – 149 persons (0.24%), German – 24 persons (0.04%), Russian-Lipovan – 226 persons (0.37%), Serbian – 10 persons (0.02%), Turkish – 8 persons (0.01), Tatar – 8 (or 0.01%). These data demonstrates that percentage of Ukrainians declared Ukrainian as the native language grew between census 1992 and census 2002 (Макар, 2009: 65-66).

For better understanding the processes in Ukrainian environment it is necessary to pay attention to the level of Ukrainian education. According to Romanian official information, more than ten years ago, in 1997-1998 academic years 443 pupils studied in schools with Ukrainian language of learning. All these schools are situated in Maramuresh County. 219 pupils have studied in 1-4 classes, 84 pupils – in 5-8 classes, and 140 pupils – in 9-12 classes. 234 children were in kinder gardens (Макар, 2009: 67).

At the end of 1990-s Ukrainian language was studied in Taras Shevchenko lyceum, 13 schools, 46 departments and 253 classes (Трощинський, Шевченко, 1999: 195). But in reality just several subjects were studied in Ukrainian language. For instance, in Taras Shevchenko lyceum (restored in 1997 in Siger-Marmsitjej) only 40% of all disciplines were studied in Ukrainian (Макар, 2009: 68).

According to official data, in 1997-1998 the Ukrainian language as a subject in Romanian schools were studied by only 7708 students. 5429 of these students were residents Maramuresh County. In other counties of Romania with Ukrainian residents this number is much lower (particularly in the region of
Tulcea were Ukrainian language is currently studied by 37 peoples). In the Suceava region of Romania (close to the Chernivtsi region of Ukraine), just 38 schools give their pupils the possibility to learn Ukrainian language. This number is twice smaller in all other regions of Romania in common.

There are several factors which are not favorable for development of Ukrainian language education in Romania. Nowadays Romanian authorities are trying to fulfill their obligations before the European Union on national minority right defense, at least formally. But in reality they are not concerned in restoring Ukrainian schools in the districts where Ukrainians live compactly. The system of pedagogical personal preparing is not working properly. There are not enough textbooks for Ukrainian schools.

Responsibility on such situation with education in Ukrainian language in Romania is laid not only on Romanian authorities, but also on Ukrainian state. Ukraine has to support and collaborate widely with its diasporas. But Ukraine is not active enough in this direction. Some meetings on high level were provided, some protocols were signed. But they can be considered as “good wills”, but not “active work” by the author.

The serious problems in the situation with preserving rights of ethnic Ukrainians in Romania were also reported by international experts. They worked during the period from October 31 till November 3, 2006. They checked the conditions of Ukrainian minority in Romania, its position and perspectives. Monitoring was conducted in five towns (villages) of Suceava and Botoshani regions with compact Ukrainian population:

- **Dermeneshty commune** with village Meritseya / Marike - total population is 1753 people. Ukrainian recorded only 27 people (1,5%). Representatives of SUR⁴ believe that 90% of the population of this village has an Ukrainian origin;

- **Commune Arbor** (3 villages), with village Klit - total population is 1390 people, of which 136 people are Ukrainians (10%);

- **Commune Mushenitsa** (6 villages), with village Vashkivtsy / Veshkeuts - the total population of 669 people, of which 193 are Ukrainians (29%);

- **Commune Belkeuts** (3 villages), with Nehostyna village - the total population are 1486 people, with 1095 Ukrainians (73,7%), in a fact Ukrainians is actually about 90% of rural population;

- **Commune Mihaylen** (5 villages), with village Rohozheshty / Rohozhesht - total population are 719 people, of which 515 persons are Ukrainians (72%). In fact there are only 651 persons Ukrainians.

This situation corresponds to the Ukrainian representation in local government: among the 63 advisers (MPs) of the local councils of Ukrainian

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⁴ SUR – Sojuz Ukrajintsiv Rumuniji (The Union of Ukrainians of Romania)
villages, Ukrainians are 26 people (41.2%). Primars of these villages are three Romanians, one Russian - Lipovan and one Ukrainian.

According to the results of international monitoring of 2006, financial aid from Romanian state and local budgets for the preservation and promotion of Ukrainian identity amounted to 167,050 lei. These funds were used for holding cultural and sports activities, repair and construction of religious buildings and more. However, money for the revival of Ukrainian schools is not provided.

The analysis of the basis of preliminary results of monitoring of the level of religious freedom of the Ukrainian minority in Romania noted that the most part of the Ukrainian community today is Orthodox. They expressed the desire to worship proceedings both in Ukrainian and Romanian languages. Such situation was not always.

Before 1948 Ukrainians were mostly Greek Catholics. Orthodox Ukrainian vicariate in Romanian Orthodox church was created after prohibition of Greek Catholic. It was situated in Siget-Marmatijej. In 1952 Orthodox Ukrainian vicariate was transformed in Protopopiat under Romanian Orthodox Bishop in Baja Mare. In 1990 Orthodox Ukrainian vicariate was restored. Nowadays it’s under jurisdiction of Romanian Orthodox Church and unites around 50 thousand believers. Till now Ukrainian language believers have troubles with listening to the mess in native language, because Romanian church is not in favor of providing service in Ukrainian (Моцик, Макар, Попик, 2005: 54-55).

In 1996 General Vicariate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with the center in Suceava was restored. The Greek-Catholic believers have troubles with returning to them churches, taking out from them in 1948 (primarily in Maramuresh and Southern Bukovyna).

The important feature of national minority life is media and publication in native language. Ukrainian minority in Romania has some possibilities for realizing their constitutional rights in this direction. Access to media is basically provided by four periodicals of Union of Ukrainians of Romania: 3 – in Ukrainian language and 1 bilingual (Ukrainian-Romanian): “Free word”, “Ukrainian Herald”, “Our Voice” and “Kur'yerul ukrayinyan”. Circulation - 2-3 thousand copies per month distributed exclusively through branches of SUR.

On public TV of Romania (TVRI, TVR2) there are two weekly one-hour TV program in Romanian for 18 national minorities. Part of the programs provided for the Ukrainian population is bilingual. Special program in Ukrainian language is absent. There is a program in the Ukrainian language at Radio Iasi (in summer - 30 minutes, in winter period - 20 minutes) per week (Юрійчук, Нечаєва-Юрійчук, 2010: 21).

In local government the Ukrainian language is used only orally. Local Councils meeting and the paperwork are exclusively in Romanian language. Ukrainian names usually transliterated in the Latin graphics.
The schools with Ukrainian language teaching are absent. There are only Romanian language schools in all villages with Ukrainian community.

According to the results of the monitoring the cultural life of the Ukrainian national minority in mentioned above five communes we can indicate that the minimum amount of literature in Ukrainian (200-600 copies) and artistic groups exist in two of them.

In the context of the analysis results of the first phase of monitoring by the substantial comments from representatives of the OSCE significant imbalance should be noted in the provision of minority rights in Romania. In particular, they clearly pointed out the lack of real opportunities for Ukrainians in Romania for education in native language, for preservation and development of their ethnic culture at the same legal level as well as the indigenous nation. At the same time, experts from the OSCE stated that the Romanian minority, which lives compactly in Chernivtsi region through appropriate legal policy of Ukraine, has managed to maintain a strong ethno-cultural identity and keep the Romanian language as their mother in contrast to Ukrainian minority in Romania.

Ethnic Romanians in Ukraine have opportunity to study in schools, which are taught entirely in Romanian language. According to observations of foreign experts, unlike Ukrainians in Romania, they have possibility to provide all cultural and religious services in native language. For comparison the situation the author can give some statistic information. Ukraine has 77 schools teaching in Romanian language (15 397 pupils), 16 of them - mixed in Chernivtsi region, 18 - in Odessa (on Moldovan language teaching) and 11 - in Transcarpathia. A number of universities, particularly Chernivtsi National University, Uzhgorod State University and Izmail Pedagogical Institute prepare teaching staff for schools with Romanian language of study.

Romanian minority has a number of local, regional and national magazines and newspapers (Zorile Bukovinei (the newspaper of Chernivtsi Regional Council), Concordia (supplement to parliament newspaper “Voice of Ukraine”), “Arkashul”, “Play Romynes”, “Septentriion literar”, “Newspaper of Hertza”. In Chernivtsi Romanian national house "Alexandru cel Bun" is also active. Romanian language television broadcast is over 450 hours per year (Нечаєва-Юрийчук, Юрійчук, 2011: 90). Romanian language radio broadcast is about 356 hours per year. (Program are preparing by Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Odessa regional broadcasters)

Romanian language uses in 106 Orthodox parishes and 50 Protestant communities. Ethnic Romanians are represented in local governments proportionally to their number. During last elections ethnic Romanians make up 96% Gertza District Council members, over 60% - Glyboka and more than 40% - Storozhynetz District Councils.

An important factor for proper functioning of any national community is the possibility to publish of the literature in their native language. Unlike the
Hungarians or Germans, Ukrainians in Romania have not their own publishing house. Ability to print in Ukrainian literature provides only state publishing house for national minorities “Kryterion” with the Ukrainian section. Council of National Minorities in Romania provides the Ukrainian periodical publication “Ukrainian Journal” (every two weeks) and “Our Voice” (once a month).

The debate which has lasted for more than a year has not increased airtime. It didn’t improve the quality of Ukrainian language programs on radio and television broadcasts.

An important factor in solving rights of the minority is the activity of public organizations. There are some public organizations in Romania which represent Ukrainian community. The biggest one is the Ukrainians Union of Romania (SUR). It has rather interesting history. The first serious attempt to internal self-government was done by the Union of Ukrainians of Romania (SUR), formed in 1946. It was organized with the support of much of Ukrainian. The main goal of SUR is the protection of the rights of Ukrainians as an ethnic minority. This organization is supported by most of those counties in the country where there is the highest level of Ukrainian identity, particularly in Suceava.

Ukrainians in the parliament of Romania have only one seat. SUR has representation in the Parliament of Romania (1 place), as well as in the Council of National Minorities (advisory body to the Government of Romania).

In 1996 the split of Union of Ukrainians of Romania took place. There was created an alternative organization - Ukrainian Democratic Union of Romania (DSUR). This structure has no representation in Parliament and is not subsidized by the government. There is also AHN - Association of Hutsul people – in Romania.

Significant split of the Ukrainian community in Romania was fixed during the census in 2002. Among Ukrainian organizations there are Hutsuly and Ruthenians (Rusins), which are represented by Rusins Cultural Union and the General Union of Romanian Ethnic Societies of Hutsuls.

Another split in Ukrainians Union of Romania took place in 2010. Some Ukrainians in Maramures County created the new organization - the Regional Centre for Ukrainian Hutsuls of Romania (RCUHR) headed by V.Popovic. The leaders of SUR believe that the establishing of this new organization may lead to separation from SUR almost 20 thousand ethnic Ukrainian and has an aim to divide the Ukrainian community in Romania.

Since 2009, a new organization - the National Forum of Ukrainians of Romania (NFUR) - started its activities in Suceava region.

A number of Ukrainian-Romanian official agreements signed by the presidents of two countries have to improve the situation with the rights of Ukrainian minority. We can say that they are not realized yet. A problem of material and technical software of a single Ukrainian language institution in Romania - Ukrainian Lyceum in Sighet-Marmatsiey still exist. Romania is not yet
realized its promise to open the Faculty of Bucharest, Suceava and Kluzh university departments of the Ukrainian language, as well as a number of inter-ministerial agreements.

Thus, the situation with Ukrainians in Romania is quite complex and in some aspects is not correspond to European standards. It is also quite different from the situation with Romanian community in Ukraine. On our opinion, the future of ethnic identity of local Ukrainian population is in risk in the neighboring Romania.

In this case, the main goal of current leaders of numerous European Ukrainian communities – the opposition to the assimilation processes, is very actual issue for Ukrainians in Romania. As Chairman of the European Congress of Ukrainians Yaroslava Hartyani pointed, it is the time to explain to the European politicians and leaders of Ukrainian communities the difference between the processes of “assimilation” and “integration”. The problem of the fate of Ukrainian Diaspora has a long history, but the activation of the processes of European integration encourages some political leaders to the substitution of concepts.

The entering of Romania to the European Union and development of Ukrainian-Romanian cooperation in different spheres opens the possibilities for realization of European standards for national minorities in Romania. The activity of civil society, NGO’s, local authorities, scientists and experts of both countries is very important in this situation.

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IDENTITY PERCEPTIONS AND BUILDINGS OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ROMANIAN MAJORITY IDENTIFICATIONS

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Abstract. The objective of this study is to analyze the discursive identity buildings from the perspective of the members of the Hungarian political elite who has to give a reasoned endorsement to the people that it stands for, as a way to prove not only a territorial belonging, but also the irreconcilable differences of this ethnic group in relationship to the majority represented by the Romanians. From this perspective, we analyze the feeling of the national affiliation, the claim of the regional autonomy and the setting of the “historical memory” in the public sphere, with recurrent use in the rhetoric of the Hungarian political elite, as possible elements generating conflict for a minority group whose level of perception of its own difference in opposition to the identity of the majority is very high.

Keywords: rhetoric, political elite, ethnic group, national affiliation, territorial autonomy, “historical memory”, “social memory”.

Introduction

In social sciences, a minority is considered to be a “self-identified group of people” (Triandafyllidou, Anagnostou, 2005: 49), culturally, politically, ethnically distinct from the dominant group that coexists with, “who have in common a historic language and culture particular to a geographical place, but which does not benefit of its own state” (Triandafyllidou, Anagnostou, 2005: 49). Accordingly, the subordinancy is the main defining characteristic of a

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minority group. For this reason, sociologists may use the expressions of “subordinate group” and “dominant group” in parallel with “minority” and “majority”. Nevertheless, using these concepts does not involve for us having made a classification according to the criterion of superiority or inferiority of a group against another one, but this classification may only underline a domination of a group over another one. Otherwise, the finding of cultural diversity led anthropologists to show that “there is neither superiority in culture, but only a relative diversity, nor classification criteria that can order the different cultures hierarchically” (Alain Beitone, 2000: 200). From this point of view, we talk about “cultural relativism”. The concept of cultural superiority is the result of a fundamental bias that is the “ethnocentrism”. This term was invented by William Graham Sumner in his book Folkways (1907) to “describe and criticize U.S. imperialism”. The ethnocentrism, “collective attitude that consists in evaluating others in terms of their own culture” (Bădescu, Cucu-Oancea, 2005: 169), is viewing one’s own culture as superior \(^1\) to all other cultures. The most eloquent example of this theory that develops the model of the human being within his own culture is represented by the Nazi doctrine which claims the idea of the superiority of the Aryan race over another one, in this case the Jews or the Gypsies, considered by Hitler “racially inferiors”. The Nazi politics is one of many examples of racism led to an extreme point. Yet, the process of recognition \(^2\) of cultural diversity does not share the humanity in races, superior and inferior, as racism which, while denying the acceptance of cultures, rejects the different others out of civilization, in nature, considering them “barbarians”, “wild”, “underdeveloped” or “uncivilized”. However, some discrimination attitudes, prejudices, stereotypes and stigmatizing the different other can define the multicultural societies. Moreover, we consider that an ethnic group or a group with a particular identity at the national level, called

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\(^1\) According to William Graham Sumner’s definition (1959 [1907]: 13), “the ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it”.

\(^2\) It seems that the “notion of humanity, which includes, without distinction of race or civilization, all forms of the human species, was developed very late and had a limited expansion; but for large fractions of human history and within tens of thousands of years this notion seems to be totally absent” (Bădescu, Cucu-Oancea, 2005: 169). Indeed, the recognition of cultural diversity does not date for a long time. It is the twentieth century that recognizes the differences and cultural diversity. The cultural cohabitation has become one of the most important stakes for the XXI century, since humankind has entered the era of multicultural civilization. One of the most important objectives of our century is to create a bridge between the different cultures.
“national minorities”}, is perceived towards the members of another group, a dominant one, and for this reason that can give rise to such attitudes. This exists in “processes of categorizing social groups and acts as rational knowledge in order to separate and reject specific social groups” (Govaris, Kaldi, 2010).

In this context, the explanation of an ethnic identity as a production process of different items showing the difference comparing with the majority does not ignore the difficulty of the concept of identity itself inherently problematic: covering a rich signification, mostly ambiguous and contradictory, which balance between continuity and rupture, stability and change, differences and similarities, perceptible and indiscernible, objectivity and subjectivity, etc.. According to Mucchielli (1986), the feeling of having his “own culture” refers to a conception of identity designed in an interactive network of influences, confrontation, conflict, tension, positioning, therefore in a constant development since the identity is not given once for all; contrarily, it is rather a dynamic reality, in permanent construction and transformation. The identity “refers in the same time to what remains, what distinguishes and what brings together. It concerns individuals, as groups. It is conceivable only as combination of heterogeneous elements. It is experienced and manifested in the selected figures depending on the context. It changes in response to changing social relations and affiliations” (Chevallier, Morel, 1985: 3).

Moreover, the identity is built in relation with the Other, because the group, as individuals, need to confront the Other. It is a contesting perspective, because the identity involves the confrontation with the Other, tending to exclude the difference. The multiplicity of the different participations and the variability of the references lead to permanent changes. For this reason, the identity is not considered a static concept. Contrarily, it is rather a dynamic, fluid and adaptive product, constructed, deconstructed, reconstructed to each interaction or contact. Referring to the idea expressed previously, January Stets and Peter Burke (2000: 234) suggest that it is a “dynamic process that changes during the whole life, being marked by ruptures and crises”.

Starting from these theoretical elements and by reference to the Romania’s territory, a multicultural country if we consider the “18 minority groups represented in Parliament, and 23 categories of identity recorded by the census, thus occupying the third place among countries with a significant

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3 According to Irina Culic (2005: 14) that are “minorities for which there exist national states rooted on the ethnic groups of which they are part of”.

4 In the Romania’s Constitution it is stipulated that “Romania is the common and indivisible country of all its citizens irrespective of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social status” (Article 4, paragraph 2). http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_1&par1=1 accessed in 2011, on June the 27th.
number of minority, after the Russian Federation with 45 national minorities and Ukraine with 23” (Salat, 2008: 9), we focus on the Hungarian minority, the most important ethnic community in Romania, territorially concentrated in Harghita, Covasna and Mureș (HCM).

According to the common sense, the minorities are generally considered discriminated within the nation-state and the recognition of the multiculturalism is a very long process requiring primarily a series of policies in favour of this subordinate group, to go along the changing mentalities in a multicultural state. However, in Romania, whether some specialists recognize that recently “several processes were realized in the benefit of the minorities, especially the Hungarian one” (Horvath, 2005: 3), they remain reluctant to pronounce themselves on the multiculturalism in the host country because “the multiculturalism, as it is understood in Romania, becomes a politics of limitation of the minority nationalism” (Horvath, 2005: 9); some others consider that “in Romania, the Hungarian community, like other national minorities (...), benefits from the most favourable legislation across the Europe (only Croatia equals our country) with guaranteed representation in Parliament. There is a large number of rights that guarantees a real cultural autonomy for the Hungarian community: bilingual inscriptions, bilingual official documents, education in Hungarian at all levels, full autonomy of the Hungarian religious and absolutely no fencing to assert their own identities” (Duca, 2011). Actually, in Romania, after more than twenty years of the collapse of the communist government, the status of national minorities has not been yet adopted. Currently, the Commission of Human Rights of the Deputies’ Chamber is working on. On the other hand, it is true that the few rights the national minorities received, especially after 1996, compared with the period before, do not affect its identity; on the contrary, they strengthen it. However, we need to accept that there still remain many things to improve on the national minorities’ status. On the other hand, as a multicultural country, which recognizes and works to maintain differences, Romania cannot escape from conflicts, as the “Hungarian revisionist discourse, the claiming of territorial autonomy on ethnic criteria, intended to obtain the region inhabited by the Szeklers, the memory of the Great Hungary” (Duca, 2011).

In this context, the purpose of our analysis is to radiography the references of the Hungarian minority identity with regard to the Romanian

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\(^5\) According to the given data from the National Institute of Statistics on the 2002 census (http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol4/cuvol4.pdf, accessed in 2011, on June the 13\(^{th}\)), the main ethnic group in Romania is the Romanians’, as Romanian language speakers. They represent 89.5% of the population. An important ethnic community (6.6% of the population) is that of the Hungarians, with more than 1.4 million and the Gypsies (2% of the population), the Germans (0.3%) and the Ukrainians (0.3%). The other ethnicities are underrepresented (0.2%).
national identity passing by the rhetoric of the elite of this minority group. As the identity involves being conscious of its specificity and refers to the difference, considering the identity strategies of the Hungarians entails to analyze how the ethnic group in question defines itself in relation to the Romanians, as majority group, within the Romanian nation-state, by a complex game of identification and differentiation. To achieve this objective, we intend to identify the discursive buildings of this ethnic identity belonging to the Romanian territory, and make out the different items of identification between a minor and major national group. Taking into account the cultural dimension of the representations that are emerging in the national context implies the inclusion in our study of certain indicators such as the feeling of national affiliation, the claim of regional autonomy and the setting of “historical memory”, as possible elements generating conflict, if used in public sphere, for a minority group whose level of perception of his own difference in opposition to the identity of the majority is very high.

The description of the strategies put into action by the Hungarian political elite in order to provide an identity (re)definition of the ethnic group that it represents makes possible to address its stakes, especially since this elite is currently well represented in the Parliament, taking active part in it. We are committed therefore to determine the role of this elite producing the identity discourses seeking to impose its own definition of the values attached to a representative ethnic identity in relation to a supra-ethnic identity, a national one.

What discursive modalities use the Hungarian political elite to build the identity of the ethnic group that it is representing, positioning itself against the dominant group and at the same time within this majority group? What does oppose Hungarians to the Romanians, the “Others”, seen as difference? These are the main questions of our study!

Our underlying assumption is that the discursive identity buildings of the Hungarian political elite take shape based on historically and socially constituted...
“habitus,” and that it leads to a conflicting relationship among actors that represent the minority in opposition to the majority within the Romanian nation-state.

Using the concept of “habitus,” our issue has the roots in the Bourdieu’s theory (1980: 87, 88). Sociologist Bourdieu that forges the concept of “habitus” refers to a set of dispositions which generate individual or collective practices and perceptions, whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production, “the complex process by which we are both acting and taking action.”9 These dispositions only exist in, through and because of the actors’ practices and their interaction with each other and their environment. From this point of view, the representations of Self are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to “fulfil a social function of legitimating social differences,” and thus contribute to the process of social reproduction. Taking into account this theory, our endeavour is to identify how the practices and perceptions are related to the historical and social conditions in which the “habitus” that generated them was constituted. We try to understand if this “habitus” is responsible for the identity buildings of the Hungarian political elite who is charged to denote the items of identification for the ethnic group that she leads.

Our study is organized into three sections according to the three indicators we choose to question: the first chapter deals with the feeling of the national affiliation for the Hungarians living in Romania who are facing with the dilemma of their status: citizen of a state and, in the same time, members of their ethnic group. The second one addresses the issue of regional autonomy as recognition of the cultural differences between the majority and the minority. The third one cross-examines the setting of “historical memory” in the public sphere and its stakes.

1. The feeling of the national affiliation

This chapter deals with the analysis of the collective identities’ multiplicity, as the case of an ethnic identity. It addresses the issue of the nationalism and the relationship to the feeling of the national identity in the public discourse. An important element of the analysis is the triptych: the ethnic rhetoric identity perceptions and buildings in relationship to the national identity and other identities than the identity circumscribed to the national geographic area respectively. Are there conflicts or on the contrary complementarities among these identities? What is the most frequent identification item for an ethnic group within a multicultural state? Could the Hungarians living in Romania identify themselves in the first place with another

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identity then an ethnic one? How could we explain the identification with a Hungarian identity in public rhetoric in opposition to the other identities, especially a Romanian national identity? Could the Romanian identity go beyond the ethnic identity?

Referring to a group identity, it is generally considered that its members “are identifying themselves with a similar set of values, norms, rules and this identity of the members among them makes up the unity of the group”\(^\text{10}\). The personal recognition of these items makes a person identify himself or herself with a particular group. Historian Robert Frank (1994: 133-134) declares that: “The cultural group identity is made of common characteristics that make its members to feel themselves “alike”[]. Although distinct, they feel identical because they oppose to “others”. For instance, it is recognized that the national identity is in the first place the awareness of belonging to the national space, in opposition to those that do not belong to it, the consciousness of similarity and the recognition of the resemblance of the members, the feeling of belonging to a culture, translated into a set of common elements acquired by each individual. In addition to this, the national identity is the “legal link common to all citizens”. The belonging to the same political community, the Nation, is due to the citizenship. According to Dominique Schnapper (1994: 44), “which is a necessary condition for the existence of a nation is that its citizens share the idea that there is a political domain independently constituted from its own interests, and they must respect the rules of its function”. Moreover, “the process of national consciousness, [is] based on (...) the feeling of a common destiny and “places of memory” [«lieux de mémoire »], of a common language and culture” (Geremek, 2010: 140). The “national consciousness” therefore refers to a common memory, a territorial, linguistic or religious unity.

In Romania, sharing a common past find the foundations in the ethnogenesis as a result of the fusion of the Daces and the Romans, and the assimilation of the different migration substrates, that the archaeological, ethnographic and anthropological evidence, as well as the documentary mentions, support the authenticity. The indigenous component represented by des Thraques et des Daces (as fundamental substrate of the ethnogenesis) conquered by the Romans reconstructs the origins of the Romanian identity by the references to both the native and “the founder ancestor”, a hero come from another world who delivers goods and cultural values that make him “hero that share culture” (Mesnil, 2007: 31). The founder myth of the “Great Ancestors” (the example of Trajan, the Roman emperor who civilized the Daces) justifies a Romanian identity which renewed its genesis in the past. Yet, our historical

\(^{10}\) http://www.communautarisme.net/capve/Identite-culturelle-article-paru-dans-le-bulletin-CAPVE-n-14_a120.html

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memory in relation to the Hungarians is fed only to divisions and animosities because of the submission to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This legacy that emerges from the past does not link the Romanians and the Hungarians, but oppose them.

Another element of national unity is, apart from history, the unity of the language or religion, “key factors around which is built the identity feeling” (Mesnil, 2007: 26). Indeed, the “identity construction” pass through the Romanian linguistic unification: the introduction of the Latin in the seventeenth century instead of the Slavonic language (in fact, having had a considerable influence in the Orthodox religion for the peoples of Indo-European languages like the Romanian principalities, Moldavia and Walachia, until the late fifteenth century when the Greek Church of Constantinople take its relay), but finally adopted in the nineteenth century, “following the movements of awareness of the Romanian people’s cultural and political identity (determination to be linked to the Roman Latinity)” (Piru, 1962: 29) is the guarantee of an assumed national unity. However, the appropriation of the Hungarian language used in the region HGM which goes sometimes to a rejection of the Romanian language, mostly in private sphere, is an important reference for the ethnic identity, which serves at the same time to define the difference. For instance, Tanczos Barna, executive vice-president of UDMR, said that the use of the native language “is not a favour, a positive discrimination, (...) but every citizen’s right” and its no-use could lead to „the assimilation and the disappearance of the community”.

The command of the Hungarian language becomes an important stake for the ethnic group in question, whose representative members, involved in the production of the identity representations, are entitled to support its use in the public space. Consequently, the language became an important item of identification of this group. Similarly for the confession, where the differences in opposition to the dominant group are irreconcilables. All the items analyzed previously, the historical roots, the language or confession, are source of disparity among the ethnic communities and a national group.

11 According to Al. Piru (1962, p. 6), Slavonic was the official language even in the early Feudal period “that runs from the tenth century, when we have the first attestations of feudal masters on the Romanian territory, until the fourteenth century, when the feudal states of Walachia and Moldova were formed.” In the late fourteenth century, the Slavonic language “is not only the language of the Church, but also of the Voivods’ Chancery and the boyars domain” (Al Piru, 1962, p.7). The Slavonic, used as language of religious literature in the fifteenth century (Filotei, Nicodim, Grigore Țâmbac) will be abandoned in the late sixteenth century in the favour of the use of the Romanian language having a Latin origin (the Coresi prints are the first attestations of the use of this language).
Thus, the recognition of a national identity at the expense of an ethnic identity within a multicultural nation-state as Romania opens up some problems, especially if the assimilation of the ethnic minorities into the dominant culture is impossible because of the very high perception of its own difference. Irina Culic (2005: 13) talks about a “dilemma that a national minority person confronts [being] the result of a double and complex belonging. One is a formal, legal belonging to the state whose citizen this person is, and the other a cultural, emotional belonging to the nation he/she comes from, and which is constituted itself into another state”. Whereas a country can impose to its citizens some obligations due to the legal belonging to the state (as political entity defined in national term) which provides rights and facilities to all the people living here, it cannot oblige to feel something for it. Moreover, the prevailing cultural background, native or acquired during the socialisation, gives to the members of a minority group the possibility to feel and express the national appertaining or the ethnic feeling. From this point of view, the Hungarian minority, although within the Romanian state, seems to be more attached to the Hungarian nation than to the Romanian one, since recently some members of its political elite have applied for obtaining the Hungarian citizenship. Subsequently, we could say that the Romanian national feeling is not only less important than the feeling resulting from the emotional belonging, but also rejected. Our assertion is strengthened by some Hungarian political elite statements, as Tamas Sandor’s for whom the “Hungarian citizenship solved (…) only the “formalities” because the Szeklers were and are part of the Hungarian nation”\footnote{Ibidem 13.}. The patriotic sentiment attached to the emotional belonging is then stronger than the national feeling imposed by a birth certificate. The sense of the Romanian national belonging is erased before the Hungarian ethnic belonging. The references of this ethnic minority, formed in-group, remain within its own group, as holder of identity. As a result, the Romanian identifications cannot go beyond the Hungarian ethnic identity which is more powerful than any other reference.

\footnote{According to the journal “Curentul”, on the celebration of the Day of the Hungarians from Everywhere, (…) the Presidents of the departmental councils of Harghita [Borboly Csaba], Covasna [Tamas Sandor] and Mureş [Lokodi Edita Emoke] received the Hungarian citizenship, after the allegiance to the Republic of Hungary”, http://www.curentul.ro/2011/index.php/2011031655954/Actualitate/Avram-Iancu-spanzurat-de-extremistii-unguri-de-Ziua-Maghiarilor-de-Pretutindeni.html, accessed in 2011, on June the 27th.\footnote{Ibidem 13.}}
2. The regional autonomy - political project of the Hungarian minority overruling the nation-state territorial principle

This section interrogates the cultural perspective which gives birth to debates on the autonomy of the Szekler Land [Ținutul Secuiesc], a geographically delimited territory in the heart of Romania which is mostly occupied by the Hungarian ethnic group. The representation of this delimitation creates the image of a micro-state within the Romanian political nation which the borders are delimited for almost a century. The idea of the territorial autonomy, which is claimed by the minority in question, raises the problem of the relationship between geography and culture. Could the Szekler Land be separated from Romania as a consequence of a cultural delimitation criterion? Could the cultural borders impose a geographical delimitation within a “national, sovereign and independent, unitary and indivisible state”\(^{15}\)?

Having formulated this topic, we point out the fact that our analysis imposes a characterization of the national identity as a spatial notion which includes multicultural differences. From this perspective, the borders are considered as an important instrument in the construction of the identity, “continuing to influence and assist in people’s construction of the self” (Triandafyllidou, Anagnostou, 2005: 48). They are the appearance of an identity expressed in terms of territorial delimitation. Moreover, the borders are an imposer not only of an identity, but a support of difference too. This can be used as a manner of identification with the others sharing the same cultural references, and as means to differentiation against the different other. Accordingly, the borders can be used by the similar people to their own advantage, in order to acquire a more visible functionality in defining themselves and establishing their identity in front of the Other.

With this idea as basis of their reflection around their specificity, the Hungarian members of the political elite consider the cultural borders represented by the region Harghita-Covasna-Mureș, although drawn within the borders of a nation-state, inclusive for the Hungarian minority and exclusive for other identities. Moreover, this incites them to demand the territorial autonomy of the Szekler Land as a space imposing external borders clearly settled from a territorial point of view.

Apparently, the “rejection of the Trianon Treaty, deeply embedded in the consciousness of the Hungarian nation that has produced a veritable

trauma”, calls for a territorial reorganization based on cultural similarities. In addition to this, although in the Romanian state, the Hungarian political elite does not consider natural the idea of nation. Being against this political project, they ask for a territorial autonomy. The most important reason of this request is the displaying of an ethnic identity which dominates a territory delimited by cultural borders. The most important support of this geographical delimitation is the attachment to the Hungarian language, intensively used in the domestic household and public sphere.

The physical structures of the territory the Hungarians’ ethnic minority occupies in Romania build a model of a territorial identity based on instrumental manipulation of a language for its own interest and at the expense of the national identity which language use has a secondary place. The role of the state that is supposed to build a national identity developed through the nationalism process seams to be obliterated in the favour of a territory that imposes its rules in order to preserve his cultural identity. From the beginning, Kelemen Hunor, the President of the Union approved the need to “rewrite” the current development regions, “because the current structure [of the territory] is useless for a coherent development of the communities”. Additionally, in order to support the “principles and interests of the [Hungarian ethnic] local communities”, the President of the UDMR, does not approve the new proposal for a reorganization of the country in territories that could separate Harghita, Mures and Covasna or the Partium Region (departments of Bihor and Satu Mare). “We don’t make a puzzle play. We are talking about principles and interests of local communities”, he said. For this reason, the majority proposal of the territorial reorganisation was interpreted as an anti-Hungarian manifestation. Moreover, according to Kelemen Hunor, the reform concerning the national minorities needs to consider the “institutional frame for the cultural autonomy”, because the current territorial division made in the

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19 *Ibidem* 19.
20 which was proposed this year during the month of June.
21 *Ibidem* 19.
late ‘90s, was “based on statistical, artificial criteria”, which “did not take into account certain historical characteristics”\(^{23}\). In this context, the historical characteristics refer to the cultural identity of the minority group living here. In the opinion of the Hungarian political elite, this is the most important factor that could influence a territorial delimitation overruling the nation-state territorial principle.

3. The setting of the “historical memory” in the Romanian public sphere

This chapter points out the relevance of the setting of the history in the space of the “memory” for the Hungarian minority which historical references do not correspond to the historical memory of the majority group. Which are the events accepted / rejected in the process of identity buildings? How does the historical memory work in relationship with the social memory? Is the meaning of history demystified in order to respond to the identity appropriations of a group?

According to Bogumil Jewsiewicki, “the memory makes present what is absent because it happened in another time, in the past. If we want to analyze the past in its own time, we rather use the history. While the history works as a kind of affirmation, the memory works quite in hollow. The memory is more a comparison with the past of a particular genre, because the memory is made of comings and goings between different times (mostly when it is a testimony), it values the view of actors” (Bogumil Jewsiewicki, 2004). If we agree with Bogumil Jewsiewicki, we can assert that taking into account the actors’ memory, the history can get other dimensions, being used as an identity positioning in front of the Other.

The idea expressed previously obliged us to choose through some major historical events being sources of fixation of the historical memory in the public sphere, and analyze them from the point of view of the social memory. In consequence, we proceed to an analysis of the celebration of the Romanians’ National Day on December the 1\(^{st}\), the commemoration of the Treaty of Trianon. In relationship to these items, we need to study the meaning of some acts of the minority group radical members towards the Romanian historical personalities around which a national identity was created. What is the significance of these historical events for the minority and majority group that structure the Romanian public space when building identity discourse? Can be the preservation of a particular type of memory for the minority group an essential element generating conflict in relationship to the setting of the historical memory by the majority group?

\(^{23}\) *Ibidem* 18.
The creation of the modern Romanian state (basically made in two steps if we don’t count the matter with Bucovina) date of the twentieth century, when Walachia and Moldavia, ancient medieval principalities, were been joined together in 1859; then, in 1918, Transylvania was attached to them. However, the recognition of the Union of Transylvania with Romania is done passing only by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, on June the 4th, signed between the Allied Powers, having won in the World War I, and Hungary as a defeated state. This is the national event recorded by the history, and celebrated in Romania on December the 1st. Yet, in Romanian public space some extremist actors of the Hungarian minority group are trying to change this historical memory, with a social one. Various protests against the identity of the majority, such as those organized by “the Hungarian extremists, with Csibi Barna, at Miercurea Ciuc, when celebrating the 91st anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon” 24, begun subversive elements of division, separating the minority group of the majority. In addition to this, the extremists have held a “moment of silence to commemorate the great “injustice” that was committed in the history of this country, the division of the Great Hungary” 25. According to the Romanian mass-media, this action was supported by Csaba Sogor, member of the European Parliament elected on the UDMR lists, who has posted on his Facebook page a message where he said he didn’t like the Treaty of Trianon. Moreover, Csaba Sogor has urged his friends to put their picture next to the Hungarian flag on social networking site 26. We are thus inside an ideological training meant to rewrite the Romanian history.

The Hungarian extremists’ behaviour and Csaba Sogor’s is not a single attempt to deny the Romanian historical memory. Nostalgia for the glorious past of the Austro-Hungarian Empire determines the Hungarian Presidency, currently at the head of the European Union, “to make its promotion in Brussels by displaying some symbols of its past glory, on a carpet in the centre of which it was drawn a map from 1848 of the Habsburg Empire” 27. The Hungarian authorities’ explanation regarding the two maps, the first one drawn in the bottom right representing the ‘Hungary and its neighbours in the Middle Ages, and the second one, larger and placed in the centre of the picture of the Habsburg Empire, containing the date “1848” in the middle”, was that “it only represents a map of the Habsburg Empire and, more generally, a map of the Central and Eastern Europe” 28. According to Ziare.com, in response to the

26 Ibidem 24.
28 Ibidem 27.
promotion of Hungary in Brussels, Bogdan Diaconu, Vice-President of the Conservator Party said that “the map of the Empire displayed by the Hungary country on the EU Council building is an insult to the nations that have regained the rights and freedom by the Treaty of Trianon, and a violation of the fundamental principles of the Union”.

On the other hand, in the winter of 2010, when the Romanian authorities have rented the main hall of the National Theatre of Hungary in order to celebrate Romania’s National Day on December the 1st, the Hungarian authorities have reacted accordingly, refusing any Romanian cultural manifestation. Furthermore, Robert Alfold, the director of the theatre, was accused of having “working with the anti-Hungarian forces” through his consent to the request of the Romania’s Embassy. Thus, this was interpreted as “treason” towards the Hungarian state.

If the Romanian minority group living in the Hungary does not have the right to celebrate the Romanian National Day in their host country, in Romania the situation is different: the National Day of the Hungarians on Mars the 15th became a “local National Day”. The Hungarian minority grant it a great significance, being a “source of remembrance of the meaning of the Revolution of 1848, and a source of celebration of the liberties obtained by the Hungarian community from Romania after 1989”. Referring to this Day, Kelemen Hunor, the President of the Union has announced that: “March the 15th has been freely commemorated in Romania for 20 years. For us, it was normal to display the flag of the Hungarian nation, and the Romanian community got used to commemorating the Revolution of 1848 and to use unreservedly the national symbols. The Day of March the 15th is very important to us because it reminds us not only the Forty-eighters Revolution, but also our freedom acquired since 1989. The Hungarians living anywhere in Romania can walk with their head up in order to commemorate the 15th of March. It is something natural!”.

Furthermore, this Day became a solid foundation of the Hungarians from anywhere’s unity. This could be also an occasion to reaffirm the basis of the Hungarian minority identity which draws on historical and cultural roots: “Our love of freedom, the Hungarians’, cannot be destroyed by anyone, neither then, in 1848, nor today. Our hope and freedom has always united the Hungarians. The Hungarians can count only on themselves; our fight cannot be taken by others, but only by us. As a young person of 1848, we must look forward for the national identity, to have clear goals, and we need all Hungarians in this work, we need to keep our historical and cultural traditions, because without them

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29 Ibidem 27.
we have no future. We need young people and children to ensure the Hungarian future in Transylvania," said Kelemen Hunor. Analyzing this statement, we understand that this minority group defines itself by the references to a Hungarian identity, no way to a Romanian's. Having found its roots in the collective memory of the Hungarians, this minority is placing itself outside the Romanians' history, particularly in this memory that structures the life of the nation and gives its political contours. The social imperatives of the collective memory of the Hungarian minority ask for other references, even if invented, that could respond to their present needs of identification.

Sometimes, affirming and setting the identity signifies also rejecting the different Other and its identifications. Accordingly, the celebration of this Day at a local level could give birth to anti-Romanian actions. This kind of acts could be the demystifying of the Romanian national symbols. Hence, to perform historical elements about the 1848 year in the shape of a theatre play, Csibi Barna, a Hungarian extremist working in the public administration in Miercurea Ciuc, used this so-called “cultural action” to organize an anti-Romanian event directed against Avram Iancu, one of the Romanian people's personalities around which it was constituted “the “patriotic” historiographical discourse” (Cioroianu, 2001: 20), a prominent personality of the “Transylvanian Romanian intellectuals who was fighting for social and national emancipation” and the Romanian national fight in the Revolution of 1848.

The theatre play staged by Barna, a person calling himself as leader of “Culture and Tradition Association of the Szekler Guard [AsociaŃia de Cultură şi TradiŃii Garda Secuiască]”, the day before the 15th of March – the Day of the Hungarians from Everywhere - was a “public trial in the course of which Avram Iancu, a symbol of Romanism, was sentenced to death by hanging. The show (...) culminated with a hanging of a doll in straw, dressed in traditional Romanian port. Analysing his performance, the Romanian mass-media characterized Csibi Barna as “universal soldier” inspiring the Magyars Nazi”. Accordingly, his performing act was sanctioned by the representative voices of the majority as extremist. Apparently, for the Hungarian extremist this is a way of expressing his disagreement with the unification of the Transylvania with the Romanian people. Moreover, it seems that Csibi Barna wanted through his actions to bring to the public attention the “crimes of the local people led by Avram Iancu, Petru Dobra, Axente Sever and others”, committed against the

32 Ibidem 31.
33 Ibidem 14.
34 Ibidem 14.
36 Ibidem 14.
Hungarians with an “animal cruelty” 37. Currently, it is accepted by historians that atrocities were committed in both directions.

In relation to this kind of events concerning the Romanian personality, mystified in order to create a national identity, the official Hungarian political elite’s reaction is shown as being against this kind of “values” promoted in-group, “likened to the Arab countries’ style”. The member of the European Parliament Laszlo Tokes said that “this action has nothing in common with the celebration of Hungarian traditions; our holidays are not directed against anyone” 38. Under this statement, we can read once again the attachment to the Hungarian people. Csibi Barna’s provocative actions on the 14th of March were disavowed by Laszlo Tokes, Kelemen Hunor and others, being labelled as disrespectful. “It’s unfortunate what happened, unfortunate and disrespectful. We have asked every time for respect for our national day, for our traditions, for our holidays for our values. And this respect must be mutual” 39, said Kelemen Hunor. The mayor Robert Raduly added that he approved another kind of manifestation, and he concluded that Csibi Barna had to pay for his actions. Approved or not, sanctioned or not, the Csibi Barna’s performing exists and it reactualizes the conflict between the majority and the minority.

**Conclusion**

This study sets out to investigate the extent to which the feeling of the national affiliation, the claim of the regional autonomy and the setting of the “historical memory” in the public sphere could become items of identification for the Hungarian minority. Our main question was focused around the relationship between a national identity and an ethnic one.

The inscription of the collective memory in the social memory of the Hungarian minority group is the product of a praxis which is due to build an identity to be shared by all members of the ethnic group in question. Their social memory produced outside the historical references of the majority obliterated in the process of the ethnic identity construction has the role of forming a minority group identity reference. Halbwachs (1950) was right to assert that the social processes strongly influence not only people’s personal memories, but also the community’s shared memories of the past. Indeed, the historical support of the social memory, even if appropriated, invented or counterfeit, is undeniable for the members of a group that are

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37 Ibidem 14.
39 Ibidem 14.
sharing the same references. Their social memory finds support in a “habitus” incorporated by all members. This “habitus” is called to account for the past into the present. Nevertheless, between the subjectivity of the memory and the objectivity of the history, the Hungarian minority chooses to place its memory in the narrative, creating its own identity. Built by this minority group, its social memory, that is the past conveyed in the present, has a teleological function because the truth of the past events lies in the present. Except that this present is shaped in order to meet an identity positioning. For this reason, March the 15th, the Day of the Hungarians from Everywhere, began a more important resource to set the references of the Hungarians minority than December the 1st, the Romania’s National Day. The narrative that accompanies the historical event connects the minority to the identity of the Hungarians living in Hungary rather than to the identity of the Romanians whose country provides to the minority group in question an area to register its cultural repertoire. Moreover, constituted as symbolic space, this cultural area set an ethnic identity, greatly claimed in the rhetoric. This identity is built in relationship to the Hungarians’ identity, and not to the Romanians’. Therefore, it is normal for the Hungarian minority from Romania not to be attached to the Romanian national feeling. The contradictions between an assumed identity and an identity imposed by the dominant group, but rejected by the dominated one, make double identity to be reabsorbed into the dominated group’s cultural specificity. Because of this, the identity parameters built in-group do not give access to any identification with the out-group. This is allowed only when a minority group is assimilated by a dominant one. In the case of the Hungarian minority from Romania, the identity is designed from the beginning as specificity. But the minority group’s cultural specificity is built relational, against the majority group. Therefore, the identity is built as difference as well. The cultural specificity, exalted in the rhetoric at the expense of the difference, is a good reason to claim the geographical delimitation within the Romanian national space, defined in the Constitution as “unitary and indivisible state”. From the point of view of those elites supposed to have generated the idea of regional autonomy, this could enshrine the identity of this minority group. Moreover, in order to mark the very strong sense of belonging of this cultural area, the rejection of the difference is materialized in all kinds of performances, such as Barna’s theatre play. Although sanctioned in the public sphere by the political elite of the minority, these performances are designed to place the minority’s roots in identity terms. This kind of acting put into practice in interaction with the difference aims at denying any element which is built outside the identity boundaries of the group in question.

Our conclusion is that the ways the minority behave, act, interrelate, build narrative and develop possibilities are the result of a “habitus” set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production. This “habitus”
becomes the matrix of in-group behaviour which involves denying over-group determinism. The sense of minority’s place, inscribed in their members’ minds through the “cultural products” including systems of education, language, judgements, values, methods of classification and everyday life’s activities, leads to an unconscious acceptance of its specificity. This specificity becomes conscious when opposite to the difference and claimed in the public space. Certainly, it leads to a conflicting relationship among actors that represent the minority in opposition to the majority within the Romanian nation-state. In this context, we talk about a social construction of the reality which may respond to the necessity of a group to set his identity regarding “otherness”.

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MARITAL STRATEGIES AND IDENTITY CHANGES OF ROMANIANS IN HUNGARY (HAJDU-BIHAR)

Gheorghe ȘIŞEȘTEAN*

Abstract. The analysis of marriages within a community can provide important information on the meaning of demographic processes that are part of the community. Thus, high levels of marriage indicate the existence of young population of childbearing age, able to ensure biological reproduction of the group; a low level of marriage registration shows the regressive model of the community, which can eventually cause the demographic disappearance of the group by depletion of biological regeneration. Our surveys show the findings of a sociological research conducted on Romanian communities from the county of Hajdu-Bihar (Hungary).

Keywords: parish registers, marriages, religion, magyarization, identity

1. Orthodox parish marriages in Apatu

In the summer of 2000, together with a group of students in sociology at the University of Oradea we conducted a sociological research on Romanian communities in the county of Hajdu-Bihar (Hungary). Some of our findings are listed below. The surveys below are based on parish registers that we found in some regions of the Romanian-Hungarian border area.

The analysis of marriages within a community can provide important information on the meaning of demographic processes that are part of the community. Thus, high levels of marriage indicate, undoubtedly, the existence of a young population of childbearing age, capable to ensure the biological reproduction of the group, while a low level of marriage registration shows the regressive model of the community, which can eventually cause the demographic disappearance of the group by depletion of biological

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regeneration. Undoubtedly, a low level of marriage will be associated with a low birth rate, at least in the traditional type communities such as the ones within the rural areas.

Starting from these premises, we proposed the analysis of marriage in the Romanian community in the village of Apateu, through the only statistical means we had at hand: parish registers of marriages. Unfortunately, because of unfortunate historical circumstances, the old parish registers disappeared so the Orthodox Parish in Apateu does have only registers that cover the period 1930-20001, for marriages, births and deaths. However, they are of the utmost importance because they capture demographic phenomena occurring in a period of high mobility of population, during changes of regimes, and also in a period of high territorial mobility determined by the entrance of peasant communities in the historical trend of modernity, in the post-war period. Our analysis will capture a specific fact for the Romanian communities within the eastern Hungary (Hajdu-Bihar County), namely that the demographic regression is strongly associated with a strong ethnic identity dislocation, in fact the Romanian communities in this area undergoing extinction.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of marriages</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of marriages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Orthodox parish from Apateu. Parish registers (1930-2000)
The statistical analysis of marriages in the Orthodox parish of the village of Apateu allows for shaping the next evolution of marriage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of marriages</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of marriages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analyzing the statistical series in terms of number of marriages, we were able to distinguish between various periods in the dynamics of marriage:

1. 1930-1939, corresponding to a specific model of traditional village characterized by a relatively high number of marriages and homogeneity
of their annual distribution. During this interval there is an average of 6.7 marriages per year, deviations from the average value having a relatively small value.

2. 1940-1945, corresponding to WW II. The consequences of the war are reflected in the marital regime, so that the year of 1940 still recorded a total of four marriages; between 4 September 1943 and 1945 no marriage is recorded. The average annual number of marriages in this period is 2.

3. 1946-1960 may reveal a new marital period, which has similarities to that of the interwar period, i.e. an average relatively close to the interwar average, 5.53 marriages a year. Marital trends are not homogeneously distributed, recording large annual deviations from the average.

4. The decrease in the volume of marriages, registered for the period 1946-1960, continues of an accelerated manner during in the period from 1961 to 1974. The annual average is only 1.71 marriages, falling under the average recorded during the war. In 1970 and 1972 no marriage is recorded.

5. The 1974-2000 interval marks a true collapse of marriage. In the 26 years there were only four marriages, fact that corresponds to an annual average nearing zero, i.e. 0.1 marriages per year. It is obvious that such a marital regime will decisively and irreversibly affect the birth phenomenon, which, as I will show later, falls into the same regression demographic trend. Basically, in a short while, the disappearance of older generation will lead to the disappearance of the Romanian community from Apateu.

2. Birth dates and ways of marital selection

The analysis of surnames can be a sociological method extremely interesting in trying to capture at least two aspects:

a) Political influence on onomastics. It is well known that the Hungarian administration practiced extensively the Magyarization (Hungarization) of names during the dualism. It is however noted that the Apponyi Law of 1907 does not do anything else but to express in a systematic and coherent way, even at the legislative level, an old but constant tendency in the Hungarian policies, namely the Magyarization of names of populations of other ethnicities. However, the analysis of onomastics of the early years of dualism show through parish registers that population still retain complete Romanian names, even if they are often written with specific Hungarian phonetic rules. Besides, the Romanian first name is maintained. The situation will change in the first part of the inter-war period when the Magyarization of last names is not enough.
On the other hand, in times of liberalization of political life in Hungary, Romanian name will resurface, and then again in times of political repression of minorities, as it was the period 1940-1944, the Romanian names are replaced by their Magyarized version.

b) similarities of names at regional level are an indicator of cultural homogeneity, thus they can configure cultural areas, characterized also by marital exchanges, through which, on the male line, there is an inter-community dynamics of names, so various names circulate from one village to another, through their integration in marital exchange games.

We will proceed below to an inventory of last names, and first surnames within the places called Săcal and Apateu. Our analysis will refer specifically to Apateu where we held an exhaustive inventory of parish registers, which unfortunately were not preserved outside the period 1930-2000. On the other hand, wherever possible, based on parish registers from Apateu, we mentioned the last name specific to other villages in the area, with Catholic or Greek Orthodox population, who maintained marital exchanges with Apateul. It is the case of the villages housing Romanian communities Komádi, Magyarhomorog, Vecherd, Jaca, Bedeu, Mezőpeterd, Biharkeresztes and others, which we will mention at the right time.

First though, we reproduce a short list of names of Săcal, contained in the parish register of weddings. It should be noted that fortunately the wedding registers in this town escaped destruction in 1944, when before the arrival of Romanian and Soviet troops the archive was devastated and the registers scattered on the field. These records begin in 1853, so they are much older than the ones in Apateu. The writing of the old records was done with Cyrillic letters. The priests will use both Latin and Cyrillic characters to record data. In fact, until about 1866 it is not uncommon to find this interesting mixture between Cyrillic and Latin in records, often even in the same word. After 1867 the Latin alphabet prevails, but the priest sometimes forgets to stick just to Latin and writes a name or several letters in Cyrillic script. Another interesting remark can be made in relation to the combination of Romanian and Hungarian spellings; the priest often used Hungarian rules in Romanian script when writing names: ş-s, ț-cz, ș-zs, s-sz etc. Sometimes the same name appears with both elements from Romanian and Hungarian spelling, such as Țegehea Floarea is written Czeghea Floarea or a Silaghi Floarea is written Szilaghi. It should be noted however, that the 1867 does not have a process of names Magyarization, the sometimes use of the Hungarian spelling is not a sign of that Magyarization but of a period when the scripts varied, especially with sounds and letters like: ţ, ş, ă, ci, j etc. On the other hand, all the first names are Romanian, without any tendency for their Magyarization that we we later on find. But here, for example, a small list of names as we extracted them from the
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year, month and the day of marriage</th>
<th>Groom and bride names</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>Place of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1867 30. 08 Gurbadan Ioan, widower, with widow Gurbadan Ana</td>
<td>31 29 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Săcal Săcal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 09 Iovan Giorgie, not married, with girl Balkus Sofia</td>
<td>23 19 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Darvaş Magyar-homorog</td>
<td>Săcal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 10 Veres Ioan, not married, with girl Haida Floarea</td>
<td>24 19 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apateu Săcal</td>
<td>Săcal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(?) 10 Iuhasz Ioan, not married, with girl Szilaghi Floarea</td>
<td>24 19 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jaca Magyar-homorog</td>
<td>Jaca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. 10 Gerdan Flore, with girl Czeghea Floarea</td>
<td>21 19 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Săcal Săcal</td>
<td>Săcal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868 11. 01 Monok Mihailu, widower, with widow Petka Anna</td>
<td>43 40 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Săcal</td>
<td>Săcal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 01 Mezei Ioan, widower, with widow Miru Floarea</td>
<td>24 22 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Veched Săcal</td>
<td>Veched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 01 Varga Crăciun, not married, with girl Hodiman Maria</td>
<td>23 27 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ş</td>
<td>Szent-Miklos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. 01 Gurbadan Dimitrie, not married, with girl Opre Sofia</td>
<td>23 17 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Săcal Darvaş</td>
<td>Săcal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 02 Zsuro Ioan, not married, with widow Olá Jusanna (?)</td>
<td>25 28 Orthodox Reformed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Săcal Harsany</td>
<td>Săcal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 02 Făr Ioan, not married, with Dobai Ana</td>
<td>29 18 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Săcal Săcal</td>
<td>Săcal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 02 Tamucza (n.n.TomuŃa) Nicolae, not married, with girl Pintea Maria</td>
<td>25 19 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apateu Magyar-Homorog</td>
<td>Apateu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 04 Gerdan Ioan, not married, with girl Csikortas (n. n. Cicortaş)</td>
<td>28 25 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Săcal Săcal</td>
<td>Săcal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. 04 Drimbé Ioan, widower, with Sonea Floarea, widow</td>
<td>33 30 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apateu Săcal</td>
<td>Apateu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 05 Vajna Irimie, not married, with girl Szilágy Maria</td>
<td>23 17 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>? Tarian</td>
<td>Mezőkeresztes (Bihar-keresztes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. 06 Nikita Ioan, not married, with girl Szakadatan (n.n. Scădătan) Ana</td>
<td>24 16 Orthodox Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Săcal Săcal</td>
<td>Săcal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2Orthodox parish from Săcal. Marriage register (Esketési anyakőnyv II-ik kötete 1853-1908)
All entries made by the priest in this register are in Romanian. Based on the last names, they can be grouped into three classes:

a) Romanian names;
b) names whose origin is difficult to determine;
c) names common to both Romanians and Hungarians.

In terms of onomastic classes we can group them as follows:

a) Romanian names: Gurbădan, Iovan, Țeghea, Miru, Tomuța, Jura (Juro), Cicortăș, Drimbe (Drimba, Drâmba), Sonea, Nichita, Săcădătan, Opre, Bălcuş, Pintea
b) names whose origin is difficult to determine: Făr, Vajna, Petka, Gerdan, Monok;
c) names common to both Romanians and Hungarians: Veres, Iuhasz (Iuhász), Silaghi (Szilágyi), Mezei, Varga, Ola (Olá).

As it can be seen from this small onomastic sample, in Săcal at the beginnings of the dualist system Romanian names are the most numerous. In terms of first names, they are all Romanian, fact that could not be encountered in some later periods when all the first names are Magyarized (Floare becoming Virág, Gheorghe-György, Petru-Péter, Teodor-Tivadár, Ioan-Iános, Ana-Anna, Iuliana-Iuliána, Maria-Mária, Ileana-Ilona, Irimie-Imre, Alexandru-Sándor, and the list could go on).

With regard to Apateu, in the analysis of last names we used marriage statistics from the period 1930-2000, so a period longer than in the case of Săcal. It is interesting to highlight a link between names and historical periods. In 1930-1934 all last names are written in Hungarian spelling and first names are Magyarized. Between 1935 and July 1940 it was a period of liberalization that makes the most first names be Romanian and written in Romanian spelling. With regard to names, after the long period of Magyarization, the priest Gregory Muresan will use a hybrid system, some names are written in Romanian spelling, for others he will further use the Hungarian spelling. It is interesting that the events of the summer of 1940, i.e. the yealding of the northwest Transylvania to Hungary will have direct consequences on the Orthodox parish of Apateu; entries in the register will suddenly go from Romanian to Hungarian spelling and to the Magyarized variant of the names. In 1945, with the entry of Hungary into a new historical phase, i.e. the entry of Romanian and Soviet armies in Hungary, it was an immediate return to the Romanian first and last names; this phenomenon will go on throughout the interwar period, until 1974. We chose 1974 as the reference year because until then we can construct statistical series relatively continuous; beyond that, the next marriage will take place only in 1982 (in fact, between 1975 to 2000, the Orthodox parish will record only 4 marriage-see table of Apateu register marriages). On the other hand, very few cases of Orthodox people from
Apateu who marry after 1974 will have their names Magyarized, just like today, when, in fact, the Orthodox families are currently registered in the records of the Apateu Orthodox Church. Let us take a look at the names registered in the parish of Apateu and their frequency in the period 1930-2000:

Name of the Orthodox in Apateu (by last name of groom and bride from parish records)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family name</th>
<th>Number of listings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blaga (both as the Romanian Blaga, and the Hungarian Blága)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leu (both as the Romanian Leu, in the deaths records, one Ecaterina Leu, from Apateu, deceased in 1951, and the Hungarian Leó, in the marriages records)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berche (also with the Hungarian variant, Berkes)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kovari, the Romanian register will maintain the Hungarian k, but it also lists the Romanian form Chivari, and often the totally Hungarian form of Kővári. In fact, this name is a translation of the Romanian name Chioreanu, well spread in the north-western Romania</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazăr, also with Hungarian spelling, Lazár</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drimba, found in the villages from Bihor-Romania, as Drimba, and Drimba. Obviously, the Romanian ĩ was transformed into i, according to the Hungarian phonetism</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciora, found as the Romanian Ciora</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalugyer, obviously the Romanian Călugăr. The name is listed under the Romanian form Călugăr in the parish records</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groza, the same form all throughout the register</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budai, the same form all throughout the register</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marușca, also with the Hungarian form of Maroska</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kősi, also in other forms, either Chiș, or Chișin, or Mis</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papp, also as Pap, and Pop</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lajtai, also as Ládczko</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gui, also as Guin or as the Hungarian form of Guj</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iuhás, also as the Hungarian Iuhász</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegle, Teglea, also as the Hungarian Czeglé</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torga, also as the Hungarian Torzsa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonea, also as the Hungarian Szonya</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But, Buta, also as the Hungarian Bút</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitye, rarely found with this form. Usually it is the Hungarian form, Gitye or the transformation from the Magyarized name, Ghița</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botó, also listed with this form, but most often as its Magyarized form of Botó</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidő</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szaporan (evidently, the Magyarized form of the Romanian Săpuran, listed in the deaths registers -Ioan Săpuran, from Magyarhomorod, dead in 1955)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megő</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trippon, mostly in its Magyarized form -Trippon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pintye, mostly in its Magyarized form -Pintye</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Family name** | **Number of listings**
---|---
Veres | 3
Ardelean, mostly in its Magyarized form -Argyelan | 5
Şima | 1
Preşup, also as the Hungarian -Preksep | 1
Hudojan, evidently Romanian | 1
Ciorba, evidently a linguistic change, Magyarized after the Romanian Ciorba | 1
Bui, Buin, also the Hungarian Buj | 3
Şăcădat, also the Hungarian Szakadati | 3
Moldovan | 1
Pantea, also the Hungarian Pantya | 4
Lancan, also the Hungarian -Lankan | 2
Teberan | 2
Geoara | 1
Rafi, Rafin | 2
Teft, but also a linguistic hybrid -Czent and a hungarian form -Czencz | 5
Silaghi | 3
Irimi | 2
Brumaru | 1
Goron | 3
Hanj | 1
Oparhanu | 1
Irimie | 1
Bonariu | 1
Ragaci, Ragain | 3
Bonati | 1
Guiaş | 1
Schupkeger (two brothers, it seems, of Lutheran religion, who marry Orthodox women) | 2
Dobai | 1
Covaci, also an interesting semi-Magyarised form-Covács | 2
Magălu | 1

Analogous to the method used for Săcal, we grouped the last names in onomastic classes, building the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Romanian names</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Romanian and Hungarian joint names</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Names with uncertain origin</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blaga</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chivari, Kövári</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Huli</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Budai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Geo Geoara</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berche</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Chiş, Chişiu Kiss</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Irimi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazăr</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Papp, Pap, Pop</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Rugaci</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drimba</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Iuhas, Iuhász</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Bonati</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciora</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mezei</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Guiaş</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Călugăr</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Veres</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Teberan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groza</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Moldovan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lătcău</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Szilágy, Silaghi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One can see that the vast majority is formed of Romanian names, even though in many cases they are Magyarized and using the Hungarian spelling, the Romanian name is still visible.

3. Zonal network of marital exchanges with Apateu

Marriages with partners from Sâcal. Marriage duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Masculin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most inter-marriages of young people in Apateu are recorded to be with people from Sâcal, a fact explained by the approximately 4 km that separates the two towns and the existence of large Romanian Orthodox communities in both villages.
Marriages with partners from Komádi

Total marriages with people from Komádi, between 1930-2000: three marriages (three men marry girls from Apateu) from 1930 to 1939, when in this town there were some Orthodox population left.

At Komádi, a town situated about 11 km from Apateu, there was an Orthodox community, but also a Greek Catholic community. The 1900 census recorded a total population of 7520 people, of which 48 are declared Romanian (criteria of the mother tongue). The same census recorded 28 Greek Catholics and an impressive number of Orthodox: 546 people. In our knowledge, there was no church of their faith in Komádi. Currently there is no declared Romanian, however the parish registers of Apateu show for people from Komádi married to people from Apateu family names of evident Romanian descent. These are some of these names:

1. A Dürge Gyula, ie Durgheu, (born May 25, 1907); this name is popular in the area, as we see in other villages with Romanian population; he married at 10.01.1931 with a woman from Apateu. They are both of Orthodox religion.

2. Pintye Maria, mother of Dürge Pintye Gyula. Also of Orthodox religion. The name of Pintye-Pinte-Pintea is of obvious Romanian origins, widespread in the villages in the area, can be met both in Săcal and Apateu.

3. A Ianos Guj, meaning Gui Ion, born at 22.04.1902, Komádi resident, married in Apateu at 31.08.1931, both partners are of Orthodox religion. The names of Guj, Gui, Guin are found also in Apateu.

4. His mother is called Hodosán Anna and she is of Orthodox religion. Despite the Hungarian spelling, it is clearly a name of Romanian origin-Hodoșan.

5. Szilágyi Ianos of Komádi, born 20.03.1907, of Orthodox religion, married at 12.11.1932 to an Orthodox girl from Apateu. Szilagyi's mother is called Pintye Szófia.

Marriages with partners from Magyarhomorog

Total marriages with people from Mogyarhomorog: 8 marriages, of which 5 in the period 1930-1939 and 3 in the period 1946-1960.

Magyarhomorog City is at about 9 kilometers from Apateu. The census of 1900 mentions here a relatively large Romanian community. The number of declared Romanians (by the criterion of the mother tongue) is 174, thus more than in Komadi. They are also records of 383 Orthodox, a difference of 209 between the number of Romanian people and the number of Orthodox records indicating that there is a heavy loss process and assimilation of ethnic Romanian Orthodox among Hungarians. The whole locality comprises 1756
people. Unfortunately we do not know where the records for Romanian Orthodox are in Magyarhomorog, not even if they were still kept. Absolutely limited information about the existence of this population can still be gathered from the analysis of parish registers that capture marriages between people from Apatel with partners from Magyarhomorog. This information can sometimes revive Romanian names that were Magyarized. Here is the list of people in Magyarhomorog, married in the period of 1930-2000, to people from Apatel:

1. Kacsora Mária, born on 01. 03. 1913, of Orthodox religion, married at 24.10.1931 a man from Apatel, also of Orthodox religion. Her mother is called Farkas Iuliána.
2. Papp Iános, born 28.05.1898, married at 28.12.1931 a girl from Apatel. The boy’s mother is called Erdeli Mária. The two partners are of Orthodox religion.
3. Butt Sándor, born 15.05.1905, of the Orthodox religion, married at 19.05.1934 with a local girl from Apatel. The names of Butt, Bat, are among the most common name for the Romanians in Apatel. Also, the boy’s mother has a clear Romanian name: Tipanucz Zsofia, ie Tipănuț Sofia.
4. Elizabeth Kovacs, of Magyarhomorog, the Roman Catholic religion, married a Romanian Orthodox from Apatel, Pintye Ion, at 02.10.1937. The mother’s maiden name, Szófia Zsuzsa (ie Sofia Juja) seems to indicate a Romanian origin, and it could be a mixed marriage between a Hungarian and a Roman Catholic Romanian who inherited the Orthodox religion from her father.
5. Teberan Mihai, Orthodox from Magyarhomorog, married at 19.02.1938. The boy’s mother is called Catalina Erdei.
6. Ioan Magău, Magyarhomorog Orthodox, married at 07.02.1952 an Orthodox girl from Apatel. The boy’s mother has a very popular name with the Romanians in the area: Floarea Drimba.
7. Moise Magău, 28 years old, an Orthodox from Magyarhomorog, married at 26.06.1953, another Orthodox from Apatel. Her mother has a Romanian name: Maria Gligor.
8. Here is a very interesting case: Emeric Dan, 27 years old, Roman Catholic from Magyaromorog married at 21.10.1956 an Orthodox girl from Apatel. The boy’s mother is called Carolina Țegelea, a very common name in Apatel, and Dan is evidently a Romanian name. In this case we can find ourselves in front of a phenomenon: some Romanians left the Orthodoxism or Greek Catholicism, and converted to Roman Catholics. In fact, some oral information that we collected in the area, from the Roman Catholic priest in Komádi, Zoltán Dénes, refers to some possible Roman Catholics Romanians who lived in this
town. Information at the time of research could not be verified, but the Săcal archives list conversions from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism or Calvinism. This seems to confirm the existence of these religions conversions. Obviously, we cannot overlook here the mixed marriages, when a child can keep the name (from the father), but can acquire the maternal religion.

The marriages between Orthodox people in Apateu and people from other localities within the area

From Bedeu there is only one person, Vancsa Iános, of the Greek Catholic religion, married in 1930 an Orthodox woman from Apateu. The name of Vancsa (Vancea), which is often found at the Greek Catholics in Bedeu (where there is only one church, namely Greek Catholic and a very strong Romanian community, with Romanians as the majority in 1900) is of evident Romanian origins.

From Jaca (where there was a great Romanian Orthodox community, today practically extinct; no one here knows Romanian anymore, but there is still an Orthodox Church), from the following people, we found the following people married with inhabitants from Apateu:
- Kurucz György, Orthodox religion, married at 23.03.1931 to an Orthodox girl from Apateu. His mother, Klára Pintye has a Romanian family name, common in Orthodox communities in the area.
- In 1934, his sister, Kurucz Roza, will marry an Orthodox from Apateu.
- At 26. 06. 1937, another Orthodox, Iuliu Gál, will marry an Apateu Orthodox girl.
- At 18. 02. 1939 Emeric Goron, an Orthodox from Jaca will marry a girl from Apateu. The Goron name and the married name of his mother, Maria Murgui (written Murguj) indicate an origin undoubtedly Romanian
- Iosif Ghitea, 29 years old, son of Elena Pintea, an Orthodox from Jaca will marry Maria Tripon, an Apateu Orthodox.

The place called Vecherd was practically Romanian in 1900, marking a total population of 467 inhabitants, of which 449 were Romanian and as many Orthodox. Currently, in Vecherd nobody speaks or knows Romanian. The parish registers record the following marriages between people from Apateu with people from Vecherd:
- On 16. 11. 1951, Iosif Cordoș, 20 years old, an Orthodox from Vecherd, married Irina Marușca, an Orthodox from Apateu. The groom’s mother is called Ecaterina Fărcaș.
- On 12. 11. 1960, Ion Durgheu, 26 years old, an Orthodox from Vecherd marries Maria Blaga, 19, of Orthodox religion from Apateu.
In the town Biharkeresztes the census in 1900 recorded a small Romanian community. After the Magyarization, the records show 30 Romanian and in terms of religion, 9 185 Greek Catholics and Orthodox. The Romanian Community of Biharkeresztes never had its own church. The locality is about 15 kilometers from Apatau, close to the current border crossing between Hungary and Romania, Artánd-Bors. The parish register records the following people from Biharkeresztes who married partners from Apatau:

- Iuhasz Iozsef, Orthodox, 23 years old, married at 22.03.1934 with a local girl from Apatau.
- Vasiliu Magyari, Biharkeresztes, Orthodox, married at 26.02.1938 Rozalia Tripon from Apatau. The groom’s mother is called Floarea Panya (Pane), a name with evident Romanian origins.
- Maria Urs, 29 years old, an Orthodox from Cresteș (Biharkeresztes) married at 07. 02. 1952 with an Orthodox from Apatau. The bride’s is called Florica Chivari, family name Chivari, as we have seen, it is very popular among the Orthodox in the area.

The 1900 census shows that in Berettyóújfalu there was an important community of 227 Orthodox believers, and also a small group of 52 Greek Catholics. But the two communities are in an advanced process of ethnic Hungarian assimilation, only one person declaring himself as having Romanian language. But the Orthodox have maintained Berettyóújfalu matrimonial ties with the Orthodox in Apatau. The number of marriages is small.

- Mágyary Ianos, Berettyóújfalu, Orthodox, married at 22.09.1934 Orthodox girl from Apatau.
- Ianos-Berke, Berettyóújfalu, Orthodox, married in 1982 with an Orthodox Apatau (name Berke, Berchem, often found within the area)

In the place called Berekbőszőrmény, located on the road between Apatau and Biharkeresztes, the census from 1900 recorded 41 Romanians, 3 Greek Orthodox and 98 Catholics. This town too had links with Apatau in terms of marriages.

- In February 1939, Ioan Iuhasz, Berekbőszőrmény, Orthodox, married Iuliana Berke, Apatau, Orthodox. The boy’s mother is called Floarea Argeylan. Obviously, it is the Romanian case from Berekbőszőrmény.
- A girl, Maria Chivari, 25 years old, from Berekbőszőrmény, Orthodox, married an Orthodox from Apatau at 07. 02. 1952. Her mother is called Ana Fazecaș.
- Magdalena Csőrsz (read Ciorș), 18 years old, from Berekbőszőrmény Orthodox, married at 24.10.1959, Iohn Pantea, an Orthodox from Apatau. Her mother is called Elena Gurbădan, an obvious Romanian name.

Mezőpetered City had in 1900 a large Romanian community, with Romans holding here an absolute majority. Of the 799 residents, 444 were of Romanian language. In the village there were 24 Catholics and 428 Greek
Orthodox. The city currently has an Orthodox church. And the people here also had marriage links with those from Apateu.

- At 03.02.1940 Georgiu Veres, Mezőpeterd, Orthodox, married Mărie Berke, Apateu, Orthodox.

- Atym Ion, meaning Ion Achim, 26 years old, Mezőpeterd, Orthodox, married Ecaterina Ţenţ, an Orthodox from Zsadány, at 13.11.1954. The marriage is registered in Apateu. The name Achim is, without doubt, Romanian, and the awning, and Ţenţ is also spread among the Romanians in the area.

- Gheorge Papp, 25 years old, from Mezőpeterd, married at 12.11.1955 Ion Iuhas, an Orthodox from Apateu. The groom's mother is called Carolina Achim, which proves that the name Achim, also found in previous marriage, is well spread among the Romanians in the area.

Zsadány, a village situated about 20 kilometers from Apateu, had in 1900 a Romanian community of 197 people from a total of 2433 people. From the religious point of view, 263 Greek Orthodox and 1 Catholic are registered. 2 Orthodox from this village are registered in the parish registers of Apateu. We already presented a case of marriage between a man from this village with a woman from Mezőpeterd. Another case is that of a girl from Zsadány, Kóvári Iuliána, of Orthodox religion, who in 1934 married an Orthodox from Apateu. Her mother has a Romanian name widespread in the rural area-Butt (But) Virág (Floare).

A special case is the period from August 1940 to October 1944, when after the Vienna Award the western part of Bihor came into the composition of Hungary, including a series of villages between Oradea and Salonta, neighbouring Apateu. In the new conditions, the extra marital selection area will expand, including villages from Romania, with which the villagers from Apateu traditionally had closed links, as currently stated by Apateu villagers. This resumption of contacts between Romanian villages situated on both sides of the border resulted in few inter-marriages. Thus, the Kacsora Ianos from Roit (from the present Romania) will marry at 01.03.1931 with Kalugyer Ilona of Apateu. Both spouses are of Orthodox religion. The boy’s mother is called Lázár Katalin. Beyond the Magyarization of names, including the Orthodox Romanians from Roit, resumed after the Vienna Award, it is to be noted that both the name of Kocsora (Ciora, possibly from the Romanian Cioara, name in fact widespread in the area), and that of Lazár, are found on both sides of the Romanian-Hungarian border, indicating that this area represented a Romanian Orthodox cultural homogeneity, even at the level of onomastics. Another marriage from this period (16. 05. 1943) is that of Trippon György, 31 years old, an Orthodox from Apateu with Ianosdan Katalin of Martihaz (Bihor, Romania).

After 1944, the relations between the Romanians on either side of the border will continue for some time, also at the marital level. On 22.02.1947, the parish of Apateu will record the marriage of Alexander Drimba, 28 years old, from
Cheresig (Bihor, Romania) and Maria Papp, 20 years old, from Apateu. The groom’s parents are called Florian Drimba and Iuliana Tripon, which again shows the similarity of last names in the villages situated on both sides of the Romanian-Hungarian border (as we have shown, the names of Drimba and Tripon are very widespread among the Orthodox Romanians in Hajdu-Bihar, Hungary).

After WW II an extension of marital selection area can be noted, including further Romanian Orthodox communities. It is the case of the Micherechi village, where there has been a large Romanian Orthodox community. We have no current demographic data on the actual current demographic volume; the census of 1900, which we took as the baseline for all surveyed areas, indicates a total population of 1670 people, of which 1516 are Romanian. Confessionally, the village has two Greek Catholic and 1520 Orthodox.

In the marital ties with Apateu, the parish register here reported for 25.02.1951 the marriage of Teodor Rocsin, 26 years old, from Micherechi, with Elena Oşorhanu, 16 years old, an Orthodox from Apateu. The groom’s mother is called Maria Marc. Another marriage is recorded at 17.08.1959. It is between Teodor Rujea, 30 years old, an Orthodox from Micherechi and Ileana Berchem, 24 years old, an Orthodox from Apateu. The groom’s mother is called Floarea Nistor.

In a later phase, that of dissolution of the Romanian community, beginning around 1974, the marriages recorded by the Orthodox parish are increasingly rare, after 1974 and until 2001, i.e. only four marriages. Their registration in the parish register, however, is incomplete (see the table listing marriages). Nevertheless, these notes show that the selection area extends beyond the community or geographical area, including remote villages and people of Reformed or Roman Catholic religions. Moreover, this phenomenon of national and inter-confessional expansion of the marital selection area starts around 1965. Belonging to Orthodoxy and to Romanian ethnicity are no longer structuring factors of marital behavior.

In conclusion, we could say that the analysis allows the capture of two types of marital selection areas:

a) A geographic type area, limited to the surrounding villages, mostly Orthodox and Romanian. In terms of statistical manifestation, this historical period of marital behavior corresponds to a high marriage percentage.

b) After 1965, there is the tendency of developing a large selection of areas across Hungary. In this new aspect of religious behavior the marital and ethnic criteria lose their importance, as we saw from records of marriages with Hungarian Reformed or Catholics. Statistically, this stage corresponds to a very low marriage, at least in religious marriages concluded by Orthodox parish, with a very low incidence.
4. Vienna Award and the waiver of Orthodoxy

Because the Apatelu-Săcal was part of Hungary after 1918, one might believe that the period after the Vienna Award had no politico-social or religious consequences of the Romanian communities here, the Magyarization and expulsion of the Romanian population being carried out to the east, within that part of Transylvania that was awarded to Hungary. However, during 1940-1944, the Magyarization pressures were intensified on the Romanians in the area of Apatelu, some showing many similarities to those carried out against the Romanians in the yielded Transylvania. First it was the attempt to forcibly introduce the Hungarian language in the Romanian Orthodox churches in Hungary. In fact, suddenly, the parish registers from Săcal or Apatelu are written in Hungarian, and the names of people are Magyarized overnight. The parish stamp is also printed in Hungarian. On the other hand, in the case of Apatelu, for instance, there are attempts to bring a Hungarian Orthodox priest, who obviously has to hold the liturgy in Hungarian. From interviews with older people in Apatelu, they remember, although they were then very young, that the inhabitants of Apatelu chased the Hungarian Orthodox priest imposed by the authorities. Also in the period 1940-1944, we see, it seems, an intense campaign to convince the Romanian Orthodox, almost completely Magyarized, to convert to either the Hungarian religion, Roman Catholic or Reformed. This action took place primarily in villages where there were small Romanian communities, obviously, without a priest or an Orthodox church. Passage phenomena, less numerous, were recorded in villages like Apatelu or Săcal, where there were both priests and Orthodox churches. Such crossings were recorded by the Romanian Orthodox priest in Săcal; they are listed in parish records that were kept here. Unfortunately, Apatelu keeps only a part of the records, many have been lost over time, and the remaining ones show no mention of such conversions.

In the parish archives from Săcal we found a parish register that is absolutely surprising, that the conversion of people from the Orthodox religion to other religions, primarily to Reformed religion but to a lesser extent to Roman Catholics. This register may explain, at least in part, the disappearance of Romanians from several villages from Hajdu-Bihar; the 1900 census mentions the existence of Romanians, and of Orthodox believers but then they gradually disappear. Based on data from these records, it appears that the disappearance of the Romanian ethnic identity occurred in several stages

a) Romanian linguistic identity loss, many mentioning as the reason for conversion the fact that the person does not know Romanian. So, it seems that in localities where the Romanian community was

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3 A gőr-kel. vallásba bértétek anyakönyve, I, kötete,
numerically small and located within a Hungarian majority, the bilingualism, so common within the Romanians in multiethnic community was gradually replaced by the Hungarian monolingualism. The documents do not allow us to discern, but it can be assumed that the transition from bilingualism to monolingualism was accompanied by the loss of Romanian ethnic identity consciousness - as it happened in the last decades in the village of Apatua.

b) Giving up the Orthodox religion, by converting to the Reformed or Roman Catholics, as a next step to losing the old Romanian linguistic identity. In some cases such a waiver occurred by mixed marriage (conversion from the Orthodox religion to the religion of the to partner). In this late phase of linguistic and ethnic identity displacement, the identity remains only with the name, but this criterion is often enough irrelevant. We think for instance at the common name of the Romanians and Hungarians, such as Iuhasz, Papp, Magyari, Varga, names that cannot provide conclusive information about former ethnicity. On the other hand, the mixed marriages where woman is Romanian Orthodox and takes her husband’s name deletes, by means of the new name and by crossing over to a new religion, any information about the former ethnicity. However, even in these cases the transition will be able to maintain the male lineage, with the ancient Romanian names, although in that village there is neither Romanians, nor Orthodox left.

The conversions from the Orthodox to Reformed or Roman Catholic that the parish register from Sâcal records refer to the period between 1942-1944, that is exactly the time when the Romanian communities were either in Hungary, or they were ceded to Hungary after the Vienna Award; the Magyarization put great pressure on the Romanian people. As we have seen, these pressures have also pushed the Magyarization of Romanian names. With all this Magyarization, under the crust of the Hungarian language the old Romanian name is many times visible.

Below we present a list of people who converted from Orthodox to Reformed, with the reason for the conversion in the cases where we found this information. Usually, the reason is that the person does not know Romanian. On the other hand, judging by the conversion age, it seems that in most cases it is about marriage, although this is explicit only in few cases.

1. A Etelka Papp, from Sâcal, born in 1921, in the Orthodox religion, converts to the Reformed religion in 15.01.1942, “reason for conversion is that she does not know Romanian and does not understand the divine services.” It seems that this woman belongs to a mixed family, the mother is
Hungarian and the father is Romanian (Burzuk-Bursuc Iános), being baptized in the religion of the father, then abandoning the religion.

2. Herring Iános, born November 23, 1922, in Sácal, with parents on Herring Imre, Orthodox and Irimias Maria, Orthodox; she converts to Roman Catholics in February 15, 1941, as “she does not understand the divine services in Romanian”

3. Magyari György, born in Komádi, parents Magyari György and Papp Maria, both Orthodox; she converts to Roman Catholics in 15. 02. 1942 by the same reason of the same “she does not understand the divine services in Romanian”. It should be noted that in Komádi there was not an Orthodox church, although the Orthodox community had over 500 people in early twentieth century, although only 48 declared Romanian as their mother tongue.

4. Also from Komádi comes Kirila (obviously Cyril) Marie, of Orthodox religion, born here on 28. 07. 1923, passing to the Reformed religion on 16. 02. 1942.

5. Probably a brother or husband, Kirila Sandor, 29 years old, from Komádi Orthodox, passing to the Reformed religion on the same day.

6. Oladi Tivadar, born in Komádi in 08. 05. 1915, of Orthodox religion, move to the Reformed at 03. 03. 1942.

7. Kiss Ioszef, Orthodox, born in 27. 09. 1907 in Biharugra, move to the Reformed religion at 05. 03. 1942.

8. Száva Antal (Sava), Orthodox, Sándor Száva father, mother Czige (Țighe) Erzscébet, born October 19, 1911 at Geszt, to Reformed at 05. 03. 1942.

9. Hodosán (obviously Hodoșan, Romanian name) Tivadar, Orthodox, Tivadar Hodosán father, mother Rozália Szalai, born Biharugra, 06. 10. 1913, passing to the Reformed on 05. 03. 1942.

10. Nasza (probably a Romanian name, Nosa) Gyorgy, Orthodox, born in the Jackal 09. 01. 1924, passes to Roman Catholics on 11. 07. 1942.


12. Iuliánna Bordas, Orthodox, born 01. 07. 1919, A pateu, go to the reformed on 14 January 1943.


14. Abrudan (obviously novelistic Abrudan) Iozsef, Orthodox, born in 1912 in Komádi passes to the Reformed in January 14, 1943. The reason for conversion “he does not know Romanian and this is why he leaves the church. The family is of the Reformed faith.” (nn probably new family, resulting from marriage).

15. Pantya (Pantea) Mozes, Orthodox, father Pantya Iános, mother Zsuró Anna, born Komádi 16. 03. 1923 passes to the Reformed in January 25, 1943. The reason is marriage, his wife being Reformed.
16. Taga Győrgy, Orthodox, father Taga Győrgy, mother Káss (probably Caș) Maria, of Greek Catholic religion, born 05. 10. 1923 in Săcal, passes to Roman Catholics.

17. Radovics Ianos, Orthodox, 25 years old, born in Biharugra, Ianos Radovics father, mother Mária Papp, and passed came to the Reformed "because the bride does not know Romanian and she is reformed." Moves to the Reformed in February 15, 1943.

18. Hotya (the name of Hotea being spread among the Romanians in northwest of Transylvania) Sándor, Orthodox religion, born Săcal, 20. 03. 1912, of parents Hotya Ianos and Zsuró Maria, passes to Roman Catholics at 24. 07. 1943 because he does not know Romanian.

19. Mirú Mary, Orthodox, 31 years old, from Săcal, parents Mirú Iános and Dobai Virág, converts to Roman Catholics at 24. 07. 1943, because he does not know Romanian.

20. Onáka (Onaca) Iózsef, Orthodox from Săcal, born 19. 09. 1914 of Onáka Demeter and Bordas Maria, pass in 24. 07. 1943 to Roman Catholicism because he doesn’t know Romanian.

21. Onáka Józsefine, Orthodox, 21 years old, born of parents Onáka Iószef and Burzuc Rozalia, converts to Roman Catholicism at 24. 07. 1943, because they do not know Romanian.

22. Mirú Mária, Orthodox born in 11. 06. 1922 in Săcal, to Mirú Győrgy şi Lazurán (Lăzuran) Mária, goes to Roman Catholics in 30. 10. 1943.

23. Iózsef Szilágyi, 36 years old, Orthodox, born in Biharkeresztes, from Drimba Maria and Szilágyi Iózsef, converts to Roman Catholics on 30. 10. 1943.

24. Varga Gyuláme, 32 years old, born Orthodox in Komádi but living in Săcal turns to Roman Catholicism on 30. 10. 1943.

25. Iliszi Katalin, Orthodox, Komádi, 35 years old. Father Iliszi Iános. Moves to Roman Catholicism.

26. Szoke Károlyne, 26 years old, Orthodox from to the Reformed on 01. 11. 1943

27. Pintye Péter, Orthodox from Zsadány, born on 9 May 1923, father Pintye Iános, Orthodox, mother Mária Varga, Orthodox, moves to the Reformed.

28. Gerdán Ianos, Orthodox 20 years old, born in Săcal, Gerdán Győrgy Orthodox father, mother Futur Katalin (apparently Roman Catholic), goes to Roman Catholics, 25. 11. 1943.

29. Szilágyi Gyuláne (maiden name Far Iuliánna), 18 years, Orthodox, father Far Tivadar, mother Drimba Piroška, passes through marriage to Roman Catholics.

30. Trippon Virág, Orthodox born in Săcal, 23 years old, father and mother Tripon Iános and Erdei Ilona. The girl passes to the Reformed on 22. 01.
1944. The reason recorded by the priest is that "she does not understand the language of the Orthodox religious service."

31. Iuliana Varga, Orthodox, 18 years old, Varja Lajos father and mother Daicin Virág, born Komádi, move to reform at 23. 04. 1944

32. Gyulane Gaál, Fekete girl named Mary, Orthodox and 42 years with being born Biharkeresztes. My father called Imre Fekete and his mother Iuliana Borza. Through marriage, she passes to the Greek Catholics on 13. 04. 1944.

33. Tripop Sándor, Orthodox, 18 years old, from Magyarhomorog, parents are Tripop László and Bordas Piroska; he passes in 13. 04. 1944 to the Reformed.

34. Radovics Ilona, born Orthodox, in Biharugra, on 16. 05. 1920, she passes to the Reformed on 13. 04. 1944

35. Gyula Gombos, Orthodox, 37 years old, parents Gombos Károly and Papp Iuliana, born in Komádi, passes to the Reformed.

36. A very interesting case of transition from Orthodox to Reformed and then back to Orthodoxy: Hodosán Veronka 24 years old, from Sacal, converted to the Reformed in 1940 and then returned to Orthodoxy in March 1942. This case is an exception, the general movement is from the Orthodox to Reformed or Roman Catholic and we found no cases of a person of Reformed or Roman Catholic religions to pass to Orthodoxy (even though there were very few people of Reformed or Roman Catholic religion married to Orthodox, they never changed their religion by marriage).

As it can be noted, the register includes not only people from Sacal but also Orthodox from the surrounding villages, who had no Orthodox church and who turned to the religious service of the priest from Sacal (Biharkeresztes, Biharugra, Magyarhomorog, Komádi, Zadány). In all these villages the Romanian population is nearly extinct. It is however possible that some people still keep their Romanian identity and perhaps, the language, but we failed to detect them. In 2000, when we started our investigation in Hungary, we found no Romanian in Biharkeresztes, a locality situated on the border near the Romanian village of Bors. Continuing to travel in the area, to my surprise, in 2003, I found a person in Biharkeresztes, a restaurant and boarding house owner, who told me in a very good Romanian language that he was a Romanian local and he kept his Romanian language intact because he was a customs' officer at the crossing point with Romania and his job required good command of Romanian. In fact, after opening the borders with Hungary, many stores and restaurants rose on the road from Biharkeresztes listing prices in both languages, Hungarian and Romanian, and some of the staff speak very good Romanian. By initiating conversations with these people, I was able to find out that they were of Romanian origins and they had some knowledge of Romanian
from their parents, and then maintaining close contact with the Romanians who
cross the border helped perfecting their command of Romanian.

Going back to the problem of giving up their Orthodox or Greek Catholic allegiance, unfortunately, the transition to Reformed or to Roman Catholics is recorded only for a period of three years. Based on the above, we can imagine the extent of the shift from Greek Orthodoxy or Catholicism to new religions, as a consequence of the loss of Romanian linguistic identity and mixed marriages. We believe that this phenomenon is the main mechanism that explains the disappearance of entire Romanian Orthodox communities in the area. It is clear that the loss of linguistic identity or the mixed marriage are among the ultimate causes of the disappearance of the Romanian communities, in a whole causal chain. Giving up Orthodoxy and converting to Catholicism or the Reformed takes place against the background of extinction of the linguistic and ethnic identity links with the religion of the Romanians. It is important, however, to explain the concrete sociological determinisms that made possible the loss of Romanian linguistic and ethnic identity. The lack of Romanian schools and Orthodox priests for a very long period after WW I, the Magyarization pressures of the period 1940-1944 as well as the involvement of territorial mobility area after WW II were factors that augmented the loss of ethnic identity, rendering the reconstruction of Romanian identity impossible.

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_A Gor-Kel. bertétek vallásba anyakőnyve, I kötete, Apateu, 1940

_A gőr-kel. vallásba bertétek anyakőnyve, I, kötete, Apateu, 1940

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4 Unfortunately, although in many places with ethnic Romanian Greek-Catholics the parish registers are very old, and starting with the 18th century there cannot be found. For example, in Bedeu, the Greek Catholic priest who is Hungarian and speaks no Romanian (although the village has a large number of Romanian-speaking population and the Greek-Catholic church is the only one in the village with a once-majour Romanian population) allowed us to consult the parish registers from 1945 onwards, saying that they are the only ones existing in the parish. In these books the Romanian name are completely Magyarized, it is rare when we detected an ancient Romanian name. Perhaps the old registers are also found in the archives of the Diocese of Niregyhaza and surely these records, dating from a time when the liturgy was performed in Romanian, has entries with the old Romanian names.
ETHNICAL ANALYSIS WITHIN
BIHOR-HAJDÚ BIHAR EUROREGION

Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA

Abstract. Bihor – Hajdu Bihar Euroregion is a form of cross-border cooperation that includes the counties of Bihor and Hajdu Bihor, at the midst of which there are the two county capitals, Oradea and Debrecen, communities that have a diverse ethничal structure, sharing a history older than 800 years. Nowadays we can talk about an intense cross-border cooperation at the Romanian-Hungarian border of various forms and shapes.

Keywords: Euroregions, Demography, Ethnicity, Cross-border Cooperation, NUTS system

The cities of Debrecen and Oradea, two cities on each side of the Romanian-Hungarian border, sharing a history of more than 800 years, found elements that made the two communities develop a series of cross-border cooperation elements on both sides of the border.

The two municipalities become in 2002 part of Bihor-Hajdu Bihar Euroregion, a newly created structure within a diversified area in terms of ethnic-confessions, culture and not least of cross-border cooperation, a structure that aims at being an engine for cooperation at the level of the Euroregional structure that houses 2 NUTS elements: the counties of Bihor and Hajdu Bihar, as well as the two cities.

The two cities analysed from the point of view of the Debrecen-Oradea are at the centre, considering that they reach several levels such as:
- there is a local level in both municipalities; these are the most important cities in the area from the point of view of the political,

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administrative, and economic points of view; here we can find the highest concentration of people; they are both border cities and regional points
- the county level; here we remind the counties of Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar, where Oradea and Debrecen are the most important cities
- from the point of view of the regional level, the two development regions to which the two centres belong, North-Western Development Region and Eszak-Alfold Development Region, are representative
- the Euroregional level is represented by the Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion (according to NUTS, there is no such level in Romania)
- the national level is represented by the two neighbouring countries: Romania and Hungary.

The idea of Euroregion occurs at the same time with the evolving process of local autonomy and regionalisation. The aim is to set direct connections between regions and communities on both sides of state borders by virtue of local authorities’ competences as they are defined in national and European law. The conditions for optimal development of a Euroregion are minimal economic balance, cultural similarities despite ethnic diversity, geographical proximity and common historical heritage. Cooperation develops mainly in these fields.

Originally, the Euroregion refers to cooperation between authorities at the border while the Council of Europe shows that cross-border regions have a certain homogeneity and functional interdependence, otherwise cooperation would not be needed.

Association of European Border Regions states that “within the limits of the geographical aim of cooperation, cross-border structures are cooperation
arrangements for cooperation between local or regional governmental structures lying along the border in agreement with the promotion of common interest to increase the standard of living of border populations.

Euroregions can be identified as territorial structures established with the aim to strengthen interregional and cross-border cooperation to reach a coherent area for economic, scientific, social and cultural development (A. Ilieş, 2004, p 24).

Cross-border cooperation Euroregion is a voluntary association respecting national and international law, territorial and administrative structures of the countries at different levels with the aim to eliminate territorial isolation and to settle the framework for cultural connection or to rebuild typical groups, and to set up economic development nuclei to achieve a balance between the centre and the periphery at an advanced stage of functional territorial systems (Ilieş A., 2006).

Cross-border cooperation regions aim at reducing border conflicts in convergence and good neighbourhood areas, eliminating isolation and reaching confidence between neighbouring states.

Elements of Euroregions: cross-border structure, cooperation between governmental structures, interregional cooperation, economic development, scientific development, social development, cultural development, cross-border cooperation, pursuing common interests, territorial-administrative structure, association of communities, compact area, development of functional territorial systems, promoting common interests, promoting joint projects, respect for national and international law, developing common projects and partnerships in different directions that are a priority for Euroregions, Euroregional actors, Supporting good neighbourhood, eliminating isolation.

Sucha shows the main elements of Euroregions as follows (K. Czimre, 2006, p 84):

- Core forms of cross-border cooperation
- Instruments to diminish differences between border regions
- Strong confidence and cooperation with the citizens
- Studies in the field of good neighbourhood and integration
- Preventing negative heritage
- Important elements for the Central European countries’ integration to the European Union

There are two types of factors generating cooperation. They are as follows (K. Czimre, 2006, p 87):

- Unifying factors: geographical position, climate, common history, common culture, economic development, trade, linguistic competences, common strategies
- Inhibiting factors: differences envisaging the administrative system and responsibilities, tax system, territorial planning and regional
development, legal and executive methods, environmental protection and territorial planning, linguistic elements.

In order to have an efficient cooperation and communication on the regional and Euroregional levels, we have to consider a wide range of aspects (Thomas Lunden, 2004, pp 25-125): space, time, technology, rules, policies, power exercise, economy, communication: language, symbols, culture, identity, human resources, social aspect.

The Bihor-Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion was established at the end of 2002 upon the initiative of the Bihor County Council (Romania) and the Hajdu-Bihar Local Government (Hungary). They seized the important role of cross-border cooperation in fields of common interest for European integration.


Tasks of the Euroregion Council:
1. Discusses and approves the strategic priorities of the Euroregion for the following year;
2. Decides on changes to the association’s legal status;
3. Approves the budget of the Euroregion that is equally supported by the members, as well as the changes to the budget;
4. Approves the report on activities funded by the Euroregion;
5. Debates and approves the changes to the internal Regulations of the Euroregion;
6. Decides on admission new members or withdrawal of existing members;
7. Elects the Board members;
8. Approves the Board report;
9. Appoints the members of the Working Commissions;
9. Appoints the Secretariats;

From the point of view of communication between the two counties, we will mention the crossing points between them:

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pos</th>
<th>Crossing point</th>
<th>Traffic type</th>
<th>Means of transport</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Valea lui Mihai/Nyírábrány</td>
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<td>Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Valea lui Mihai/Nyírábrány</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Episcopia Bihor/Berettyoufalú</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bors/Artánd</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Salonta/Mehkerek</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Salonta/Mehkerek</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Oradea</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Debrecen</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Airport</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Map 3. Ethnic groups in Bihor-Hajdu Bihar

Source: Tabel 2, Tabel 3, Tabel 4

Table 2. Ethnic structure in the Bihor – Hajdu Bihar Euroregion in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ev</th>
<th>Region NTUS 3</th>
<th>Összesen</th>
<th>Román</th>
<th>Magyar</th>
<th>Cigány</th>
<th>Német</th>
<th>Szlovák</th>
<th>Ukrán</th>
<th>Egyéb</th>
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<td>30089</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>7370</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>1304</td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67.38</td>
<td>25.96</td>
<td>5.01</td>
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<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.21</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Hajdu Bihar</td>
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<td>669</td>
<td>540721</td>
<td>10836</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>242</td>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>98.77</td>
<td>1.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>Bihor-Hajdu Bihar Euroregion</td>
<td>1153266</td>
<td>405137</td>
<td>696570</td>
<td>40925</td>
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<td>7418</td>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35.13</td>
<td>60.39</td>
<td>3.54</td>
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<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.13</td>
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Table 3. The main towns in the Bihor County according to the 2002 statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Romani</th>
<th>Maghiari</th>
<th>Germani</th>
<th>Evrei</th>
<th>Țigani</th>
<th>Ucrainieni</th>
<th>Szerb</th>
<th>Szlovák</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>224</td>
<td>30089</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7379</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oradea</td>
<td>206614</td>
<td>145284</td>
<td>56985</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2449</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>474</td>
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<td>7267</td>
<td>10335</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aleșd</td>
<td>7387</td>
<td>4503</td>
<td>1566</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>360</td>
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<td>Beiuș</td>
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<td>9849</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>169</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Marghita</td>
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<td>485</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nucet</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ștei</td>
<td>8637</td>
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<td>319</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vale lui Mihai</td>
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<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vașcău</td>
<td>2854</td>
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<td>Săcuieni</td>
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<td>1747</td>
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</table>


Table 4. Towns in the Hajdu Bihar County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debrecen</td>
<td>211 034</td>
<td>Hajdúszoboszló</td>
<td>23 425</td>
<td>Téglás</td>
<td>6 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balmazújváros</td>
<td>17 974</td>
<td>Létavértes</td>
<td>7 045</td>
<td>Hajdúdorog</td>
<td>9 463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berettyőújfalu</td>
<td>16 116</td>
<td>Nádudvar</td>
<td>9 074</td>
<td>Hajdúhadház</td>
<td>12 709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biharkezersztes</td>
<td>4 230</td>
<td>Nyíradony</td>
<td>7 701</td>
<td>Hajdúnánás</td>
<td>18 055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derecske</td>
<td>9 136</td>
<td>Sárpály</td>
<td>8 373</td>
<td>Tiszacszege</td>
<td>4 975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajdúböszörmény</td>
<td>31 993</td>
<td>Püspökladány</td>
<td>15 946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/04/tartalom.html

Table 5. Comune în Hajdu Bihar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Álmosd</td>
<td>1 694</td>
<td>Gőrbeháza</td>
<td>2 641</td>
<td>Nyírábrány</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artánd</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>Hajdúbagos</td>
<td>1 972</td>
<td>Nyírcsád</td>
<td>3 982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagamér</td>
<td>2 418</td>
<td>Hajdúsámson</td>
<td>10 677</td>
<td>Nyírmartonfalva</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakonszeg</td>
<td>1 240</td>
<td>Hajdúszovát</td>
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<td>Pocsaj</td>
<td>2 733</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bărănd</td>
<td>2 692</td>
<td>Hencida</td>
<td>1 318</td>
<td>Sáp</td>
<td>1 051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedő / Bedeu</td>
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<td>Hortobágy</td>
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<td>Sáránd</td>
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<td>Hosszúpályi</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kismarja</td>
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<td>Szerep</td>
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<td>Kokad</td>
<td>701</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boeskaikert</td>
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<td>Kómádi</td>
<td>6 015</td>
<td>Tétilen</td>
<td>1 463</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Ethnical Analysis within Bihor-Hajdú Bihar Euroregion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Csökmő</td>
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<td>Körösszakál / Sácal</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>Told</td>
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<td>Monostorpályi</td>
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<td>Nagyhegyes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gáborján</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>Nagyrábé</td>
<td>2 367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/04/tartalom.html

At the level of Bihor County there is another structure, namely Oradea Metropolitan Area, a structure gathering around Oradea the communities that now have a more harmonious perspective for development; see below the demographic composition of Oradea Metropolitan Area.

Debrecen and Oradea are two cities with a common history of almost 800 years old, so we think that in the near future, it is likely to begin a much closer cooperation, it can set the example of good practice, as being the most modern and developed in terms of cross-border relations.

The ethnic-demographic analysis at the level of the two neighbouring counties, plus the analysis of the territorial administrative units, show us an ethnic-demographic diversity at the Romanian-Hungarian border, in a region that shares the same history for more than 800 years, period with moments of cross-border cooperation.

Nowadays, and more accurately after 1989, the cooperation at the Romanian-Hungarian border at the level of Debrecen and Oradea communities and of Bihor-Hajdú Bihar Euroregion has been more dynamic than ever. We can note an increased cooperation, in a diversity of ethnicities, and cultures, and religions; moreover, the perspectives of a cross-border cooperation and more recently territorial through the newest European cooperation instrument, i.e. Groupings for Territorial Cooperation - EGTC, have led us to debating on a new form of cooperation at the level of the two communities of Debrecen and Oradea, mainly through a possible Eurometropolis Debrecen – Oradea.
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www.zmo.ro
ETHNIC AND SOCIO-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN MOLDOVA

Anna GORBAN*

Abstract. Intercultural and interethnic tensions have influenced the formation of Moldova’s statehood, and have largely determined the political consciousness and behavior of the population over the past 20 years. Different socio-cultural issues such as national identity, the historical, linguistic and religious questions etc. have been subject to various participatory events and numerous civic and protest actions. This proved the existence and maintenance of a strong center-periphery cleavage (in terms of S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan) in the post-communist context in the Moldovan state. Moldovan society remains divided in the promoters of nationalist message and the advocates for multicultural vision of state development, and communication between them is quite formal and inefficient. One of the main criteria of the division of population in these opposed categories is the national self-identification, which confirms the key role of national factors in determining the intercultural dialogue in the country. The ambivalence in social and cultural orientations of Moldovan citizens determined the ambiguity in the civilizational status of Moldova. This causes the presence of fragmented and conflictual political culture in Moldova, which affects national consolidation and modernization of the state in general. The purpose of this paper lies in highlighting and analyzing the features of consciousness and socio-political behavior of representatives of various ethnic groups in Moldova, and the main national and ethno-cultural problems and issues characteristic for Moldovan society during the last 20 years.

Keywords: democratization, ethnic minorities, national identity, ethnic consciousness, ethnic conflict, ethno-cultural stereotypes.

The actual processes of globalization intensify the interaction and contraposition of different socio-cultural models. The catalytic role in these processes belongs to the national factor, which continues to influence to some

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extent on the socio-cultural self-identification process of individuals, social groups and large human communities. It is caused by the special significance ethnic identity has for the individuals and for the society. Thus, Professor of Social Anthropology, University of Sussex (UK) A. Epstein argues that ethnic identification “… is the ultimate identity, which embraces the smaller roles, statuses and identities” (Avksentiev, 1996: 44).

Ethnicity is not a matter of free choice. In most cases, people "choose" their ethnic identity once in a lifetime in the socialization process, which with rare exceptions is not conscious. If linguistic and religious elements of socio-cultural code are relatively flexible and may be subject to personal choice, then ethnic identity is static and remains virtually unchanging. People change their religion, learn foreign languages, acquire new values and beliefs, identify with the new symbols, adapt to a new way of living, but at the same time cannot change their roots, ethnicity being constant in this regard. If ethnogenesis is mixed (parents with different ethnicity) the situation is complicated, there is a socio-cultural conflict, in which the individual is exposed simultaneously or sequentially to the influence coming from different ethnicities (Balan, 2008: 77).

Beginning in the 1960s, Western civilization discovers a new social phenomenon - the ethnic revival or ethnic paradox of our time. The essence of this phenomenon is the significant increase in the role of ethnicity in social processes, renewed interest in ethnic culture, language, customs, traditions, way of life against the backdrop of the growing internationalization of economic, social and political life and globalization of human activity (Avksentiev, 1996: 47).

In the 1960-1970-s ethnic revival spreads into Europe, gradually involving more and more nations in the process. In the former Soviet Union, ethnic revival is evident from the mid-1980s, playing an important role in the subsequent disintegration of the state. In the last third of a century ethnic revival turned into a worldwide phenomenon, defining the contours of the historical process at the turn of the century. The ethnic revival is not an ethnic conflict by itself, but it has a strong conflict-potential. The line separating ethnic patriotism from nationalism is very blurred and mobile. A slight change of emphasis can often lead to crossing the invisible line, and developing of intellectual and spiritual environment favorable for the conflict (Avksentiev, 1996: 47).

National contradictions are also characteristic for Moldova, a multiethnic and multicultural state, which after becoming independent has stepped on a very complex and controversial way of finding its own identity, its place in the contemporary world (Moșncaga, 2001: 148). On the territory of Moldovan state have merged elements of various socio-cultural models, including the Western model (European), Eastern Christian (Orthodox) and Turkic (Gagauz) with strong influence from Hebrew, Armenian, and other cultures. All this has been a fertile ground for the emergence and development of various conflicts of ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc. nature. A complicating
factor in this regard is the geopolitical one, which is manifested both globally (Republic of Moldova as part of post-Soviet space, which American political scientist Z. Brzeziński called "grand chessboard" where the interests of big powers such as USA, EU and Russia are played), and locally, Moldova being situated in a region called by Western researcher "space of tension" between Russia, Romania and Ukraine (Jaz'kova, 2008: 289).

Throughout the process of democratic transition ethnic and social cleavages continuously troubled and divided Moldovan society. Unstable economic and political situation in the country to some extent is caused by the unbalanced ethnic and political situation - consequences of armed conflict between left and right banks of the Dniester, the lack of integration of the Gagauz autonomy in the united socio-political and cultural space of the republic, various contradictions on the national, linguistic, historical issues. This and more is not conducive to the maintenance of stability within the state and the final determination of the civilizational status of the country (in particular, the process of European integration).

Decisive role of ethno-cultural issues has been specific for difficult transition process in the Moldovan society, the very creation of independent and sovereign Moldovan state being preceded by national revival activism at the end of 1980s - early 1990s. At the end of 1980s Moldovan society was subject to excessive politicization manifested in the phenomena of political frustration and large extent of participatory forms of protest. Engaging people in the political sphere was stimulated by disintegration processes in the USSR, the deepening ethnical problems and promoted democratic ideas, the population being divided into two opposing camps - reformers and conservatives. Protest activism centered on ethno-cultural issues reached its peak within the 1990-1991 period, due to the democratic forces supported by overwhelming number of militants.

The liberalization process initiated by Gorbachev's "restructuring", created favorable climate which prompted the appearance and institutionalization of political and ideological pluralism. Political pluralism in Moldovan society, in particular, was determined by the national revival with the upraise of various social formations in 1988-1989 (Popular Front of Moldova, International Movement "Unity-Edinstvo", Popular Movement "Gagauz Halki" and Bulgarian Social-Cultural Association "Vozrojenie"). Gradually, however, they began to make political demands, which were derived from national and language problems. One of the defining features of the considered period reside in different attitudes and specific orientations of political parties and social movements towards the national question, to the process of national revival of titular and other ethnic groups inhabiting the country.

It should be mentioned also that after declaring of independence of Moldova, local intellectuals were mainly pro-Romanian, rural population was mainly pro-Moldovan and Russian-speaking minorities, who constituted in the
early 90s about 35% of all population and were concentrated in the main cities, have expressed constant pro-Russian attitudes. Indeed, the value systems shared by Moldovans over a millennium and more were deeply Christian, being substituted in the 40s-90s of the last century with the communist ones. Finally, the consequences were dramatic - faith in God was lost, and communism was impossible to be built. This resulted, on the one hand, in frustration and lack of values for the absolute majority of the population, and on the other hand, created a true "paradise" for the "upstarts". In such cases, usually luck of guidelines is compensated by calls to return to the "authentic" national, traditional values, ancestor’s faith, etc. This situation stimulated the rise of nationalism in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, when the disintegration of USSR has occurred. Later, the transition has imposed "borrowing" of some attractive social models, which asserted its viability and performance in other, Western countries (Guvernare şi democraţi, 2008: 12-13).

Development of nationalist and Russophile tendencies in Moldova in the late 1980's fits into such phenomenon as the emergence of new nationalisms in the former Soviet Union or the "new irredentism". The post-Soviet space, according to Ernest Gellner, refers to "the fourth belt" of "irredentisation" process that is, the emergence of new nations and nationalisms. Any emerging nationalism must be directed against any external enemy (a "negative integrator") used for the integration, of the new nation. Virtually in all post-Soviet countries, the object of such "integration against" was Russia as the former imperial center. In addition, the growth of such rhetoric is triggered using Russia as a "negative integrator" in many "third zone" countries by E. Gellner (Eastern Europe and the Baltic).

Fusion of the ideas of liberalism, anti-communism and nationalism, which occurred at the beginning of the democratic reform of the Republic of Moldova’s political system initiated processes of social disintegration, splitting the society on the political and ethnic grounds. Use of nationalist rhetoric by the supporters of liberal ideas, often with offensive attacks on the non-titular ethnic groups living in the country, has turned a considerable part of Russian-speaking population into the social stronghold of the conservative forces which resist change in the new socio-political conditions. Therefore the political culture of the Moldovan society since the beginning of transition has become a split culture (Braga, 2010: 100).

Later, in the 1990 - 1994 period political forces continued to formulate those values under which they intended to win confidence of the public. During this period the right political forces called for democratization, "national renaissance", orientation for union with Romania. Thus, in view of local researchers I. Rusandu and R. Cărbune Moldovan political spectrum during the 90 has two aspects, namely ethno-national and socio-economic:

- early 90's - concern for ethno-national and national-state problems;
- starting with the mid '90s - differences and confrontations between political parties mainly based on socio-economic problems (Rusandu, Cărbune, 2008: 53).

However, despite the relative attenuation of national factor in identity of political parties in the country, the population of the republic still makes a distinction between political parties, taking into account the ethnic factor, i.e. distinguishes parties oriented toward Romania and Russia oriented parties (Rusandu, Cărbune, 2008: 54). Urgency of ethnical-cultural issues is related also with the ambiguity of Moldova's geopolitical status, which explains to some extent the division of political parties and organizations by national criteria.

From time to time issue of interethnic relations in the Republic of Moldova has a new impetus, becomes a "bargaining chip" in the political game of different political parties and socio-political movements. With great power confrontation on the ethnic and cultural basis manifested during the protests in the first half of 2002, when Christian Democratic People's Party had demanded rescinding of the authority's decision on the introduction of compulsory schools courses of Russian language and history of Moldova, starting with the second grade (Bolotov, 2002: 52). The abovementioned events were also notable for the fact that these unpopular measures related to the linguistic and historical issues adopted by ruling Communist Party have provoked demands of Government’s resignation. Along with other examples of civil dissent in the history of Moldova's independence, this fact clearly demonstrates that the imprudent handling of matters of ethnic and socio-cultural order could seriously undermine the legitimacy of national political parties.

In general, the dynamics of many contemporary conflicts confirms the role of catalyst of national factor for the emergence and escalation of intergroup contradictions, and the fairly high receptivity of the masses to ethnic problem certifies the actuality of this parameter for the social self-identification process. In particular, such a situation is characteristic for multinational societies usually in the process of transition, with the population which is characterized by a split consciousness by unresolved national self-determination issue. The Republic of Moldova is typical in this respect, the conflict of identity representations in the Moldovan society is manifested not only by national problem (dividing of the titular ethnic group in "Moldavians" and "Romanians"), but also language problems ("Moldovan" or "Romanian") and historical ("History of Romanians" or "History of Moldova"). Such a state of continuous division of society based on many parameters is created due to objective (problematic and ambiguous historical past) and the subjective (ideological and politicized approach to socio-cultural issues, manipulation and speculation on national linguistic and historical issues, in order to achieve personal and group interests of the various forces inside and outside the country) factors. Artificial kindling of socio-cultural contradictions preserves and deepens the existing in Moldova strong social
"center-periphery" cleavage (in terms of S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan), namely between representatives of ethnic minorities and the titular nation. Therefore, Moldavian researchers R. Gorincioi and V. Varzari deemed deliberate politicization of ethnic relations, the language ethnonyms, history and identity is part of the political threats and vulnerabilities for national security (Gorincioi, Varzari, 2007: 48).

According to renowned Moldavian analyst I. Boțan, "Moldova is practically the only country in Europe where identity crisis (Moldovan - Romanian) is a determining factor in attitudes polarization of political forces. It is used constantly in election campaigns, starting with the 1994 elections. In this respect, serious discussions between the parties on social-economic and political issues are often deliberately replaced with ethno-linguistic, historical, etc. discussions. This kind of discussion has the maximum propaganda impact, appealing directly to the emotions of citizens and the natural need of identity" (Guvernare și democrație, 2008: 38).

Maintaining largely artificial division of the Moldovan society by national criteria perfectly fits the logic of fragmented and conflicting political culture, both in terms of differences between the its carriers and in terms of ways of expression and its functioning. In the political culture, and beyond, there is a social isolation, lack of trust between different social groups and classes, between elites and masses, reflecting different states of conflict and political instability generating social tension in society (Fruntaşu, Rusnac, 1999: 76).

In this context there is a series of questions: 1. What is the nature of ethnic consciousness and other socio-cultural identity in Moldova? 2. What is the mechanism that determines the individual's self-identification with an ethnic or national group and its subsequent political socialization in the chosen community? 3. What are the characteristics of socio-political consciousness and behavior of representatives of various ethnic groups in Moldova?

1. Ethnic consciousness and other socio-cultural identity in Moldova

Self-consciousness and national consciousness are manifested in their full extent especially during the turning point stages in the historical development of nations. From this perspective, in the modern Republic of Moldova development conditions national factor is manifested by an explosion of ethnic consciousness - both titular ethnic group, and other ethnic groups living in the same space. Ethnic origin remains one of the basic forms of manifestation of individuality, because in principle there are no people without national affiliation or ethnic group without its concrete bearers. Thus, ethnic traits of human individuality are indissoluble components of its concrete socio-human existence (Balan, 2008: 101).

Moldovan political analyst N. Vizitei describing the social consciousness
in Moldova, qualifies its ethno-cultural component as one of "ideological blocks" specific to local population (others being soviet-socialist ideas, the principles of liberal doctrine and orthodox religious values) (Vizitei, 1998: 226). Thus, social orientations and principles related to the idea of strengthening and development of specific ethno-cultural consciousness are immanent to Moldovan citizens.

The high importance of the ethnic component in the social consciousness of the Moldovan population is due, in particular, the fact that in situations of social uncertainty, which is characterized by unpredictability, difficulty to control, individual searches support group required to meet the basic needs in stability. Along with such characteristics of ethnic group as the stability in time and status, stability of composition, important function of ethnicity in modern society is that it serves as a kind of "information filter" which allows people to identify themselves with a particular social group, and to be oriented towards its norms and values (Kaunenko, 2008: 40).

A high level of national identity in Moldova can be demonstrated on the basis of statistical data on the importance of various socio-cultural identities for Moldovan students (Table 1).

Empirical data were obtained during quantitative sociological research held in spring 2010 by a team of researchers from the State University of Moldova within international bilateral project "Youth in civilizational dilemma: based on Republic of Moldova and southern Russia" (survey based on the sample of 1226 students of the major universities and colleges of the northern, central and southern regions of the country).

Statistical data in Table 1 demonstrate a high level of civil, ethnic and religious identities of the Moldovan youth. As part of the distribution of responses, depending on the nationality of the students we should note the high level of recognition of importance of civic identity by all ethnic groups; for 70-80% of them the statement "I am a citizen of the Republic of Moldova" is true. The exceptions are Ukrainian respondents, among them the rate is half the figure. These correlations are broadly confirmed by the national surveys data, according to which 85% (index 0,74) of Moldavians/Romanians, 72% (index 0,48) of Russians and 78% (index 0,61) of Ukrainians are proud of the status of citizen of the Republic of Moldova. At the same time the answers of ethnic minorities' representatives are more reserved in this regard. In particular, among representatives of the titular ethnic group the option "I am very proud" prevailed, while among Russians and Ukrainians - "I am quite proud" (Barometrul de Opinie Publică, 2011: 125).

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1 Unfortunately, survey data refers only to the Russians and Ukrainians.
Table 1. The significance of the main socio-cultural identities for young students of the Republic of Moldova in general and depending on ethnicity (% of total number of respondents for each type of identity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significance level</th>
<th>I am a citizen of the Republic of Moldova</th>
<th>I am a representative of my nationality</th>
<th>I am a representative of my religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is very important to me</td>
<td>It is important to me</td>
<td>It is of little importance to me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion / nationality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a citizen of the Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>33,8</td>
<td>46,2</td>
<td>15,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>36,8</td>
<td>46,7</td>
<td>13,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians²</td>
<td>31,4</td>
<td>52,3</td>
<td>12,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>21,7</td>
<td>48,3</td>
<td>21,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>14,3</td>
<td>39,3</td>
<td>39,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gagauz</td>
<td>23,2</td>
<td>55,4</td>
<td>16,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>40,6</td>
<td>34,4</td>
<td>18,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a representative of my nationality</td>
<td>45,3</td>
<td>37,3</td>
<td>12,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>45,5</td>
<td>37,4</td>
<td>13,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>65,1</td>
<td>25,6</td>
<td>5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>28,3</td>
<td>50,0</td>
<td>16,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>25,0</td>
<td>42,9</td>
<td>19,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gagauz</td>
<td>44,6</td>
<td>42,9</td>
<td>10,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>62,5</td>
<td>21,9</td>
<td>9,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a representative of my religion</td>
<td>47,0</td>
<td>29,2</td>
<td>14,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>51,7</td>
<td>28,9</td>
<td>12,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>41,9</td>
<td>24,4</td>
<td>22,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>16,7</td>
<td>36,7</td>
<td>28,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>26,8</td>
<td>28,6</td>
<td>23,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gagauz</td>
<td>50,0</td>
<td>25,0</td>
<td>10,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>31,3</td>
<td>9,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² The index is calculated by the formula: I = (+) - (-) / (+) + (0) + (-), where (+) - "It is very important to me" and "It is important to me", (-) - "It is of little importance to me" and "It's not important to me at all"; (0) - "No answer". The numerical value of the index ranges from +1 to -1, respectively, from positive to negative value of variable.

³ Moldovan or Romanian ethnicities were chosen by the respondents themselves. In this case it is necessary to understand the fact that students who identified themselves as "Moldavians" or "Romanian" are part of the same majority ethnic group (the titular nation). Separation of the respondents into "Moldavians" and "Romanians" in the survey is necessary to identify the specific of socio-cultural identity of each of these categories. As well know, the dichotomy between "Moldovan" and "Romanian" identity emerged due to the ideological perception of national and cultural issues, conflict of approaches to political and historical processes in the country and appears not only in the "disrupted" identity of the titular ethnic group but also in the name of the state language (Moldovan/Romanian), and national history study courses ("History of Romanians"/"Integrated History" or "History of Moldova").
To be mentioned high level of national consciousness, which is observed in representatives of all analyzed ethnic groups: the vast majority of respondents for each of these categories underscores the importance of belonging to a particular nationality.

This figure is highest among those who identify themselves as Romanians and the Bulgarians and Gagauz: about 90% of these groups emphasize the importance of the attitude "I am a representative of my ethnic group", of which almost two-thirds believe that "it is very important" for them (among the Gagauz, this percentage is less than 44,6%). Among the other ethnic groups (Moldovans, Ukrainians and Russian) the importance of national identity is represented at the level of 70-80%, and, unlike the students of Moldovan nationality, Russians and Ukrainians are more reserved in this respect: only a quarter of them share the view of the special, high importance of this type of socio-cultural identity (the representatives of the majoritarian nation – 45,5%).

Analyzing the level of development and priority of the religious factor in the self-determination of the respondents, it should be noted the high importance of this type of identity for young people of Moldavian nationality (80,6%), Gagauz (75%), Bulgarians (68,8%) and students with self-identification as Romanians (66,3%). Ukrainians and Russians in particular are less inclined to associate themselves with any religion: slightly more than half of respondents from each of these ethnic groups recognize the importance of this identity component.

Thus, the above data confirmed high level of importance of ethncial identity for students of different ethnicity. In this connection, noteworthy is the fact that the minimum value of the index of the importance of national identity is recorded in students of East Slavic ethnic origin (Russian and in particular Ukrainian). Amorphousness of identity views of Slavic respondents is obviously connected with their less compact residence compared with the Bulgarians and Gagauz and greater territorial dispersion, which in turn determines high level of integration in the socio-cultural space of the country. National minority living in the south of Moldova, have a territorial-administrative (Gagauz) or cultural (Bulgaria) autonomy, allowing them to avoid large-scale assimilation with the majority nation and maintain a high level of national consciousness.

A specific feature of ethnic consciousness Moldovan youth is its structure. According to some researchers in the field (Kaunenko, 2006) for titular and Russian ethnic groups is characteristic the mono-ethnic identity, while for Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz – bi-ethnic, including identification with own ethnic group and not with the Russian one while Russian language is the mother tongue for these ethnic minorities in Moldova (Timuş, 2008: 126). In this context, noteworthy is the fact that national minorities in Moldova have experienced two contradictory processes - updating of national identity, intraethnic consolidation - on the one hand, and cohesion
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in a multinational ethno-political aggregate "Russian language speakers" - on
the other (Shornikov, 2002: 163).

Another aspect of ethnic consciousness is different stereotypes and
normative notions of students related to the ethnic component of social life
(Table 2).

Table 2. Distribution of respondents based on the question "Compare the
following statements and mark on the scale the statement which is closer to
your opinion" (% of the respondents who answered the question)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Interethnic marriages are natural and acceptable</th>
<th>It is better to marry with representatives of the same nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2 29,9</td>
<td>-1 12,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. National minorities should have equal rights with the titular ethnic group and have additional guarantees of their rights</th>
<th>Representatives of the titular ethnic group holding should have unconditional priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2 23,7</td>
<td>-1 15,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. There are single laws of living, common for all humanity, which provides similarity of all communities in the world.</th>
<th>Human world is characterized by a diversity of cultural models, each of which is unique and different from others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2 12,4</td>
<td>-1 11,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. My ethnicity is not so important to me; all people are equal and similar.</th>
<th>My ethnicity plays an important role in my life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2 18,5</td>
<td>-1 12,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on the data of the same sociological survey

In analyzing the data presented in Table 2, an interesting picture emerges: first, the quite high significance of ethnicity among the students has been confirmed (position 4). Secondly, against the explicit recognition of cultural pluralism of the world (position 3), only less than 40% of the respondents believe that national minorities should enjoy equal rights with majority nation and provided with additional guarantees of their rights (position 2). It is noteworthy that almost a third of the students chose to give a neutral response (a score of "0") on this "tricky" question and another third favored the "absolute priority of representatives of state-nation". Third, the number of young people who think that mono-ethnic marriages are more appropriate is quite large (36,7%), while the number of supporters of the opposing point of
view is only 6% bigger (position 1).

Thus, we can draw conclusions about the relative progressiveness of the views of the Moldovan students in certain aspects of national issues. At the same time, ethnic and cultural stereotypes of young people signal a certain patriarchal and conservative attitudes (attraction in more than a third of respondents to the unmixed marriages), and also identify risk of maintaining and deployment of nationalist tendencies (recognition of importance of ethnicity and sharing the ideas about the primacy of the rights of titular nation in the third of the students).

The conflict potential of ethnic and cultural stereotypes of young people may be explained, partly by that, perhaps, against the background of continued relatively high level of ethnic tolerance in Moldova, so-called protective nationalism is growing fueled by the fear of representatives of the titular ethnic group of exclusion from familiar to them life space (Petuhov, 2004: 35).

2. Ethnic consciousness and political consolidation

In this context the problem of the interaction between ethnic consciousness and identity on the one hand and political sphere, on the other arises. Correlation between national and political factors is fairly complex and is determined by their interdependence. Social-economic problems and political issues intertwine in ethnic canvas, forming a whole, a complete and complex picture of contemporary society. Difficulties and socio-economic, political and spiritual crises in the society largely condition transformation of ethnic consciousness of people (Balan, 2008: 107).

An important aspect of the interaction between ethnic and political factors is related to the problem of correlation between such phenomena as ethnic identity and national identity. According to Romanian researcher Maria Cobianu-Băcanu (Cobianu-Băcanu, 1999: 313-314) ethnic identity is the consciousness of belonging to an ethnic group, which shows both in the inter-relations and in internal world of those who belong to the group. In relation to ethnic identity, national identity, according to the researcher, means consciousness of belonging to a nation and both adoption and evidence of common features shared with its members, expressed in culture, language, religion, customs and traditions. Centered on nation, nation-state and national sentiment, national identity is strongly linked to a territory and has political connotation. Researcher concludes that as an attribute of the individual, national identity is an option, meaning that the individual has the right to opt for a national identity that does not result automatically from ethnic identity (Balan, 2008: 78).

Thus, the connection between ethnic and political factor is mediated by national problem and shows, in fact, as the question of correlation between particular and general, which requires integration of ethno-cultural features in a
single socio-cultural system. This is achieved through the mechanism of political socialization of the individual, especially by its pluralistic model specific to European countries, where the presence of various subcultures, which initially socialize individual according to values, roles and norms specific for the given subculture (party, ethnic group etc.), and does not prevent achievement of national consensus, because of existence of a set of common values (Balan, 2009: 69).

Such a model corresponds to the specificity of the Republic of Moldova, multiethnic and multicultural state, where the optimal strategies for the development of unique national consciousness, could favorably influence the quality of political life, as well as psychosocial and interethnic climate (Balan, 2008: 107). Integration of ethnic particularities in a single national space is important for establishing the civic political culture in Moldova, which involves arranging the interests and actions of all social actors in a set of general societal values and goals.

However currently in Moldova exists an ambivalence of national interest due to opposition of pro-European and pro-Russian vectors in local socio-political life. Society remains divided by national criteria, and the population is far from model of consolidated and united nation.

3. Political subcultures of ethnic minorities in Moldova

According to political scientists P. Fruntaşu and G. Rusnac in the Moldovan political culture can be distinguished certain categories of subcultures, which include also the ethno-linguistic one (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, etc. political subcultures).

Peculiarities of political subcultures of minorities in Moldova can be identified through Republican polls data analysis, which allows revealing of socio-political consciousness of representatives of country’s various ethnic groups (in this context our analysis is limited to the titular nation, Russians and Ukrainians due to lack of empirical data on other ethnic groups). To achieve our purpose we will call the data of Public Opinion Barometer from May 2011, conducted by the Institute for Public Policy of Moldova (Table 3).

First of all we should mention that the local population does not show a significant concern in the issue of interethnic relations in Moldova, it always occupies the last place among problems which the citizens of our country are concerned (after the last survey in May 2011 with interethnic relations are concerned only 3% of respondents, the highest indicator is among Ukrainians - 7%).

Responses to survey questions showed that ethnic Russians and Ukrainians show a higher level of dissatisfaction of virtually all aspects of social and political situation in the country (Russians are significantly more dissatisfied than other ethnic groups with their job and Ukrainians - the available financial resources and politics). Also, Russians and especially Ukrainians gave more
negative evaluation to changes in their lives over the last year and expressed a stronger skepticism for improving their lives in the near future.

Regarding the political parameters slightly higher interest in politics among ethnic minorities was found. According to the survey, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians show less confidence in virtually all socio-political institutions (governmental and non-governmental) in the country compared with the Moldavians/Romanians.

Exceptions in this respect are parties, the credibility of which is equal for all ethnic study. The survey showed that there are more Russians and Ukrainians than Moldavians/Romanians, who believe that Moldova is not governed by the will of the people and that elections in Moldova are not free and fair (this applies only to Russians). Also among Russians and Ukrainians were more frequently certified orientations towards electoral absenteeism and predisposition to protest activities.

After analyzing Barometer of Public Opinion data we can conclude that socio-political consciousness of the East Slavic ethnic minorities (Russians and Ukrainians) is quite specific and indicates a certain level of marginalization of ethnic representatives in the Moldovan political space. Generally, we can talk about low credibility and legitimacy of social institutions in vision of main ethnic groups. Thus, it can be said that Russians and Ukrainians have proved to be more receptive to political instability and systemic socio-economic crisis in Republic of Moldova, mainly declarative character of pro-European slogans, the escalation of nationalist tendencies and increasing antagonism in society, which exacerbates existing socio-cultural contradictions.

If socio-political consciousness of ethnic minorities in Moldova is characterized by higher levels of criticism and discontent with the basic parameters of social and political life, then how these characteristics are manifested in political behavior of these groups? In this regard, we note that in the past two years, after coming to power of right-wing political parties in July 2009, Moldova has seen increased political participation of ethnic minorities. Thus, in mid-2010, 20 public associations of national minorities of Moldova took the initiative to hold a referendum on declaring the Russian second state language, which they proposed to hold at the same time with a constitutional referendum on returning to the nation-wide procedure of president election. Certain initiatives on the improving the status of Russian language were developed by the Gagauz autonomy, its leadership sent to the Acting President Mihai Ghimpu on February 4, 2010 the proposals to amend the Constitution of Moldova, providing the Russian language with official status and give Gagauz-Eri the right for self-determination in case Republic of Moldova looses its independence. These initiatives were not supported by the Moldovan government, but despite this they are still relevant for certain part of society. Currently, in Bălți, the second largest city of the right-bank Moldova, which has a high percentage of Russian speakers, an initiative group "The referendum for the Russian language" has been created.
**Table 3.** Moldovan population attitude towards various aspects of local social life overall and depending on ethnicity (the indexes\(^4\) of the total number of respondents in each category).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population category</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Overall population</th>
<th>Moldavians / Romanians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall assessment of the country's direction of development (&quot;right/wrong&quot;)</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The degree of satisfaction with economic situation in the country</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of the political life of the country</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The degree of satisfaction with own life</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of changes in own life over the last year (&quot;better / worse&quot;)</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forecast of change in own life through the year (&quot;better / worse&quot;)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation of the availability of free access to information for people such as respondent</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of freedom of expression on the country's leadership</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of personal freedom for street protest against the decision taken by the government</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of interest for politics</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation of opportunities for people like the respondent to influence the decision making process at local level</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation of opportunities for people like the respondent to influence the decision making process at national level</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The potential to vote in case of organization of parliamentary elections in the near future</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation of governance in Moldova in terms of its conformity to the will of the people</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of fairness and freedom of elections in Moldova</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Public Opinion Barometer from May 2011 (Barometrul de opinie publică, 2011)*

\(^4\) The index is calculated by the formula: \(I = (+) - (-) / (+) + (0) + (-)\), where (+) - the response options corresponding to the positive evaluation of the variable, (-) - the response options corresponding to a negative assessment of the variable; (0) - the response options corresponding to a neutral evaluation of a variable, as well as the option "no answer". The numerical value of the index ranges from +1 to -1, respectively, from positive to negative value of the variable.
Political participation of Russian-speaking youth is part of the increased activity of the League of Russian youth of the Republic of Moldova, positioning itself as a social organization ethno-cultural anti-fascist organization. It organizes numerous events and pro-Russian and anti-Western activities (for example, the pickets demanding the dismantling of the memorial stone "In memory of victims of Soviet occupation and communist totalitarian regime", celebration of Russian holidays in Moldova, and rallies against NATO and the "Eastern Partnership", etc.).

Thus, we can conclude the following theses:

1. Ethnic and national component of the political culture of Moldova has played an important role in the formation of the Moldovan statehood itself, as well as in the dynamics and nature of the Moldovan public life throughout the 20-year period of democratic transition.

2. The contradictions of ethnic and cultural character appear in the existing in Moldova cleavage "center (majority Romanian-speaking ethnic group)" - "peripherals (ethnic minorities, Russian language acts as their consolidation factor)". There is also observed the existence of identity conflict within the titular ethnic group (Moldovan versus Romanian identity in its national, linguistic and historical aspects). These conflicts cause the lack of a consolidated political nation and national unity in the country.

3. National problematic in Moldova has always been highly politicized. Ethno-cultural issues are often the subject of political speculation and propaganda by various parties and organizations. The split along ethnic lines existing in the Moldovan society nourishes and maintains the polarization of political forces and preferences (as a rule, representatives of the majoritary nation with the Romanian identity supported right-wing parties which use the nationalist and pro-Western rhetoric while ethnic minorities - the left flank parties, which speculate on the pro-Russian sentiments, important for a significant part of the population).

4. Ethno-cultural component of the social consciousness of the Moldovan population is characterized by a high level of national consciousness, well formed civil and religious identity among all ethnic groups (except for Russians and Ukrainians, their social and cultural identities are less pronounced). Ethno-cultural stereotypes of Moldovan citizens are fairly progressive and broadly consistent with the pluralistic national model, but retain a certain potential for conflict and risk of deployment of nationalism.

5. Political culture of Moldova's population is still characterized by a high degree of conflict and fragmentation. It contains subcultures of different ethnic groups with certain particularities of political consciousness and behavior of their representatives. In general, the political culture of national minorities is characterized by a more critical and cautious attitude towards various aspects of social and political life, as well as a certain activity, including the protesting one,
directed towards promotion of their own ethnic interests at the political level. These processes are largely determined by the specifics of national and foreign policy pursued by the ruling in Moldova liberal-democratic forces.

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Abstract. Citizenship represents the permanent legal and political relationship that exists between the state and the individual. Citizenship is often defined in terms of legislation and accompanying political debates, far from the realities experienced by citizens.

Due to the lack of uniformity between laws of different countries regarding the criteria for granting citizenship, an individual can be found in a position to have more than one citizenship or in a position where his/her right to citizenship is denied. We are facing a citizenship conflict that bears the concept of multi-nationality or even of statelessness.

Keywords: citizenship, society, Romania, Hungary, perception
body, the citizen’s loyalty toward the state that protects him and grants him civic rights, access to public life and civic participation (O’Byrne, 2003: 5-10).

In this context, the citizen is a legal person, free to act in accordance with the law and entitled to claim protection of the law.

The second dimension involves the possession by the citizens of a status of political agent, participating actively in the activity of political institutions of the political society. Not least, the notion of “citizen” makes reference to membership of a political community that provides a distinct source of identity (Heater, 2004 188-191).

How T. H. Marshall\(^1\) sees citizenship is fully conventional. First, he states that citizenship comes as a status attached to those community members possessing full rights, equals in terms of rights and liberties resulting from it. Marshall adds that different societies will assign different rights and different responsibilities to the citizen status, as there is no universal principle that may determine those rights and responsibilities which are particularly required by the citizenship, in general. It is the very fact that Marshall goes beyond the conventional idea, i.e. the membership of a community is predominantly a political matter, that it contributes greatly to the study of citizenship. He identifies three distinct parts or elements of citizenship: civil rights, political rights and social rights (Beşteliu, 1997: 147).

The most important aspect of Marshall’s theory on citizenship might be that he addresses directly and explicitly the issue of the relationship between citizenship and social class. Marshall notes that the development of modern citizenship institutions has coincided with the rise of capitalism. He regards this as an anomaly because, while capitalism creates class inequality between individuals, citizenship is a status that allows its possessors to enjoy same rights and responsibilities. Therefore, Marshall concludes that “it is natural to expect that the impact of citizenship on the social class would take the form of a conflict between opposite principles”. The description of this relationship is particularly convincing as Marshall succeeds in explaining the apparently opposite effects without falling in contradiction (Barbalet, 1998: 22).

Mobility of individuals and development of societies lead to the concept of “multiple citizenship”, allowing people to be citizens of more than one country simultaneously (Tilly, 1996: 14-17). Each state is competent to establish, by national law, conditions for granting citizenship. The effects of citizenship as compared to other countries from the international community may be limited by norms of international law.

Citizenship becomes even more complicated because, in time, a number of features will arise, such it is the case of “dual citizenship” - the legal situation in which a person possesses at the same time citizenships of two different states

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\(^1\) Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1893-1981), English sociologist, known for his essay collection on citizenship and social classes
(http://www.euroavocatura.ro: 2011). This brings us to the main concept of this paper, with a note that we will address this concept at a much more pragmatic level.

The basic principle of nationalism is the fact that each nation must create a nation-state, which, as its name says, must encompass the entire nation. In theory, this principle might work, but it is difficult to implement. The so-called nation-states created after World War I and the fall of the great European empires, especially the Austro-Hungarian Empire, failed to meet this principle. The interdependence of the various ethnic communities living within the empire prevented them from reaching their objective, namely to create a nation-state for each community. The emergence of minorities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe created room for revisionist policies and proliferation of ethnic nationalism, which is based on cultural mobilization. This is the particular distinction between the one who belongs to the community, and the one who does not correspond to common features of language, religion and culture.

After losing much of its territory, the new Hungarian state made a priority from protecting “Hungarians from everywhere”. Currently, when the period of aggressive nationalism has faded away, the protection of Hungarians in other countries relates to providing facilities for maintaining living contact with the Hungarian state, but especially to prevent assimilation. In 2010, the Hungarian government adopted the law granting dual citizenship to Hungarians in other countries, who could prove their Hungarian ancestry and who spoke the Hungarian language. This was an addition to the law on benefits granted to ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries of Hungary, adopted in 2001. Initially it included some important benefits for ethnic Hungarians, such as employment opportunities, social services and public health insurance.

The attempt to protect the ethnic Hungarians was seen as a counterbalance to the troubled history that the Hungarian community has had. At the same time, it was perceived as an attempt to preserve the cultural identity intact. This discussion may seem outdated already, in the context of EU enlargement to the east and at a time when it is believed that the nationalist discourse has been put behind.

Is dual citizenship a right, or a privilege granted to Hungarians in other countries? The protection issue of Hungarians from everywhere raises both nationalist reactions, and political responses. This paper addresses the politicization of these nationalist reactions within both Hungarian domestic politics, and domestic politics in countries that have a significant Hungarian minority. In addition, the integration of this situation in the unifying context of the European Union must also be addressed.
Hungarian Status Law, the precursor of dual citizenship

The efforts to protect the Hungarian community from everywhere are explained by the specific of the Hungarian community. The extent of this community living outside Hungary’s borders is “unusually high, even for Europe”; about a quarter of the ethnic Hungarians total live in Hungary’s neighboring states (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 159). Most ethnic Hungarians live in Romania (about 1.7 million), in Slovakia, (about 600,000), in Ukraine (about 135,000) and in Serbia (about 350 thousand) (http://news.bbc.co.uk:2011). Thus, given the size of ethnic Hungarian community, its protection is regarded as a priority for the Hungarian authorities in Budapest. The irredentism that had manifested in public discourse, even up toward the ‘90s, was considered a possible solution to prevent assimilation of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries. But the prospect of accession to the European Union has mitigated these claims, and the desire for action in favor of minorities turned into a political initiative, called the Hungarian Status Law (Stewart, 2009: 14). It was adopted in 2001, despite heated political debates and international protests (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 155).

The result of this law was the introduction of a specific certificate for ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia. The Hungarian Status Law defines a number of cultural, economic and political objectives. At the cultural level, the law aims to preserve the national identity of Hungarians beyond the borders, while at the economic level, the law plans to improve their living standards. These objectives are framed in the ambiguous idea of “unification of the Hungarian nation” (Stewart, 2009: 15). The problem with the initiative lies in the reaffirmation of ethnic nationalism, based entirely on sharing a language and a religion common to all Hungarians. In a time when Hungary’s neighboring states were focused on measures to protect minorities in the context of EU accession, the Hungarian state has reignited a debate of almost an irredentist nature. Furthermore, although it was a law that practically affected citizens of neighboring countries, the status law was a unilateral movement from Hungary to create “a cross-border form of citizenship” (Malloy, 2008: 75). Although not offering direct citizenship, the benefits and privileges enjoyed by holders of this card were initially offered to create a sense of belonging to the Hungarian nation.

Following protests of neighboring states, the law was amended in June 2003. The benefits related to social security, public health services and access to employment were canceled. The amendment to the law stipulates that any benefits will be the result of bilateral agreements between the home country and Hungary. However, they maintained some privileges of Hungarian communities granted in the state of residence, namely providing funding for
organizations working to promote the Hungarian language and culture, and tradition of Hungarian identity (Krupper, 2010: 159).

In conclusion, at a symbolic level, the premises of Hungarian citizenship had already existed for ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring states. The Hungarian status law can thus be considered a precursor of dual citizenship law because it establishes the symbolism of Hungarian citizenship and it institutionalizes it through an official document. However, there was a felt need to strengthen the links between the community from across the borders and the community from the “mother land”. These links refer to granting the Hungarian citizenship. The initiative started in 2004, but not even this one was accomplished without protests and objections from both the international space, and the domestic political environment in Hungary.

**Adoption and implementation of the law granting dual citizenship**

From 1 January 2011, ethnic Hungarians living in other countries can apply for Hungarian citizenship by a simplified procedure, described in the law adopted on 26 May 2010. The law liberalizes the application procedure for Hungarian citizenship as it eliminates the criterion for granting permanent residence in Hungary as a prerequisite to granting citizenship (Szymanowska, 2011). But the right to Hungarian citizenship law is not coupled with the possibility to vote in internal elections in Hungary.

At a first glance, this law seems to be just another move to stimulate the Hungarian community within neighboring Hungarian surroundings. However, the support and preservation of ethnic Hungarians’ identity in other countries has been on the political agenda of the Fidesz Party that has recently won elections in the neighboring country. This move was supported by the rightwing Hungarian electorate, thereby decreasing support for the Jobbik Nationalist Party from 17% during the previous election to 7% (Szymanowska, 2011). The Fidesz Party’s strategy was therefore to incorporate in their agenda an initiative to boost Hungarian identity and this happened in accordance with a political scenario designed to ensure popular support for electoral victory. In fact, this was the first legislative draft voted by the new Hungarian parliament by an overwhelming majority (http://www.evz.ro). The law entered in force on 20 August, the National Day of Hungary. Thus, the new Hungarian government played the ethnic nationalism card, calling symbolism, history, and emotion in order to keep the Hungarian nation alive, a nation wronged throughout history and in order to contribute to shaping the myth of Hungarian pan-nationalism.

International reactions caused problems for the Hungarian government. Romania, Serbia and Croatia reacted calmly to Hungary’s decision. In the case of Romania, this is understandable because Romania has a similar law for
Moldovan citizens. It is important to add that the lack of reaction from Romania, however, was predictable, according to an analysis published in The Guardian or the Wall Street Journal. “Since Bucharest, too, handed over discreetly thousands of passports to ethnic Romanians in the Republic of Moldova, which to be clear is not an EU member, Romania will not make much fuss of the dual citizenship law in Hungary” (Traynor, 2011), writes The Guardian. Moreover, the Hungarian Deputy Prime-Minister stated that the Hungarian law is shaped almost entirely following the Romanian law: “Following the Romanian model, we will grant citizenship on a fast-track pace” (http://www.adevarul.ro, 2010).

The Hungarian government has thus fended any criticism coming from the European Union by claiming similarity to the Romanian law. Although the Hungarian citizenship for the Hungarian ethnic minority within Romania and Slovakia remains symbolic, as both countries are members of the European Union (Slovakia is also a member of the Schengen area), the communities from Serbia and Ukraine might get Hungarian citizenship because of the possibility of moving freely throughout Europe. Neither Serbia, nor Ukraine had objections to enforcing the law (Szymanowska, 2011).

According to some estimates, during the first three weeks of January about 8,000 applications were recorded in Romania.

Articles from the Romanian press

The article titled “Dual citizenship for the Hungarians from Romania, a priority for Hungary” (http://www.ziare.com/europa/ungaria/lege-controversata-in-ungaria-privind-dubla-cetatenie-1016296, 2011) published by the Cotidianul website on 15.04.2010, written by Razvan Ciobotariu, breaks down the structure of the new power in Budapest who wants to simplify the procedure for granting citizenship and for changing the diplomatic personnel within neighboring countries, and to establish a department of Hungarians from everywhere. By these measures the Hungarian Government wishes to accelerate the process of granting Hungarian citizenship by putting into operation an effective mechanism.

This mechanism has caused anxiety not only in the Romanian media but also in the world politics. The Romanian media presents with a significant dose of negativism the lack of reaction from the Romanian diplomacy. The lack of reaction was harshly criticized by the press in Romania, especially in direct comparison with the vehement reaction that the political sphere had in Slovakia.

The law on granting dual nationality to ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries will be one of the first laws passed by the new Hungarian parliament. This measure addresses approximately 3.5 million people, most of whom living in Romania and Slovakia. The vehement reaction that came from
Slovakia was not surprising, especially since these ethnic Hungarians will be granted Hungarian citizenship based only on filling in a simple individual application. Let us remind the reader that the ethnic Hungarian population is slightly over less 10% of the entire population in Slovakia.

In addition to criticizing the Romanian Government caused by the lack of response and to presenting the vehement Slovakian reaction, the Romanian media analyzes the political and legal approaches in Hungary that led to the adoption of this law.

The article published on the news website Ziare, on 18.05.2010, titled “Controversial law in Hungary, on dual citizenship” (Idem) presents the step-by-step political approach that was initiated and run by the Hungarian Governing party, Fidesz, which owns a majority of two thirds. In addition to this overwhelming majority of the Hungarian parliament there is the pressure put on both voters and Government by the far-right party Jobbik, which treats the subject of dual citizenship with special interest.

The media in Romania presents in several articles published in the period May to July 2010 some of the relief measures that have been adopted by the Hungarian authorities for states housing important communities of Hungarians. The Hungarian politicians invoke the Romanian model of granting citizenship for the ethnic Romanians in Moldova.

Regardless of the measures adopted by the Hungarian political circles, Slovakia has maintained the role of firm opponent to the project.

Serbia and Ukraine that house important communities of Hungarians have not made any comments on the decision, although Ukraine does not allow for dual citizenship.

Bucharest has not made any comments regarding the approach of Budapest, perhaps because the Romanian law allows for dual citizenship. Besides, Romania carries a similar policy of citizenship in the case of Romanian ethnics from the Republic of Moldova.

On 08.03.2011 Aura Costache signs the article “Tens of thousands of Romanians want Hungarian citizenship” (http://www.glasulmaramuresului.ro, 2011) that is published by the news website Adevarul, telling the story of the 35 million of Transylvanians who intend to apply for Hungarian citizenship, subsequent to a batch of 12,000 people who have already applied for it.

After we have analyzed a large number of articles from the Romanian press, we can conclude that the media have considered the matter from all possible angles, with a focus on the reaction of neighboring states and on the reaction of the Hungarian community in Romania. It is important to mention the criticism of the Romanian Government brought by a large number of articles, precisely because of its lack of reaction.
The article published on 20.05.2010 on the HVG website, titled “Dual citizenship: Jobbik bid on Fidesz” (http://hvg.hu/itthon, 2011) presents perfectly the tense atmosphere of the Hungarian politics around this law.

The ruling party, Fidesz, has presented the draft law for granting citizenship to ethnic Hungarians from everywhere. The bill specifically describes the rights and obligations of the new Hungarian citizens and the ways in which Hungarians from everywhere may apply for the citizenship. To apply for Hungarian citizenship, the individual must speak Hungarian, must have Hungarian ancestry and (s)he must have the birth certificate names registered with Hungarian spelling.

Tensions have been caused not only by the socialist opposition in Hungary, who opposed to no avail to this bill, but also by the far-right party Jobbik, who criticized the restricted rights of the new citizens. More specifically, they wanted to introduce the voting right in the bill.

In addition to presenting and analyzing the domestic political debates, the Hungarian media has analyzed and presented the political backlash within the countries where there is a Hungarian minority. The critical tone of the Hungarian press was mainly addressed to Slovakia and to the Slovak political circles, in response to the vehement and even extremist reactions against Hungary.

In general, we can say that a big part of the Hungarian press supported the “Hungarian cause” and limited itself to political analysis inside Hungary.

At the same time we need to remind the reader about the criticism made especially by the leftist media representatives from Hungary, which in many media appearances have criticized the bill. These criticisms have focused on the costs of this project and on the anxiety caused by a possible migration to Hungary of the new citizens.

The results listed within the present study were obtained from analyzing articles published in the Romanian and Hungarian press from Hungary in the period April to June 2010 and January to May 2011. We will present in this paper only some of the significant articles published in the Romanian and Hungarian press, together with their conclusions.

The citizenship is the permanent legal and political connection that exists between the state and the citizen. In our society we discuss at length the issue of dual citizenship. To these public debates not only the juridical or the political circles take part, but also the large masses of the population represented by the mass media.
Dual citizenship: right or privilege?

Dual citizenship has been interpreted as a step towards a post-national opening of multiple identities and their free movement. Why was the Hungarians’ motivation for such a law built on nationalist bases, though? To prove this point it suffices to study the incipit of the amendment for dual citizenship that regulates Hungarian citizenship. It invokes the Hungarian constitution which stipulates that: “The Republic of Hungary has a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside the borders and will promote and strengthen their relations with Hungary”. Maintaining relations with Hungary and preserving the Hungarian identity are the reasons for this amendment (http://www.allampolgarsag.gov.hu). The need to protect the Hungarian identity is achieved though by even the members of the very Hungarian ethnic community, given the known homogeneity of the Hungarian minorities living in countries neighboring Hungary.

Although the current tendency is to disengage citizenship from ethnicity by promoting a civic nationalism based on civic values and on political community, the Hungarian law carries out the opposed operation. The dual citizenship law seeks to combine dual citizenship with ethnicity. Reaffirming the ethnic component in granting citizenship is demonstrated by a statement of the Deputy Prime Minister who claims that the Hungarian nation is subject to assimilation, and the assimilation process can be stopped only by granting citizenship. The same official stated that “the Hungarian nation is a nation with public rights ever since St. Stephen”, thus reiterating the myth of the Hungarian nation that transcends the centuries. The problem with this type of statements is that it arouses nationalist sentiments, sentiments that took 90 years to temper. Hungarians who became minorities in the newly created states from Central Europe after World War I had a choice between either the new state citizenship, or relocating to Hungary and, consequently, acquiring the Hungarian citizenship (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 161-163). Of course, the frontiers of those times were borders separating nations and they were closed. Today, the borders are open, and the discussion shifted to converting them to links and not divisions. For this reason, the Hungarian law for dual citizenship is not viable in the unifying context of the European Union and in the post-national developments. Besides, the European Union promotes diversity and multilingualism in favor of homogenization and assimilation of minority ethnic communities.

According to the opponents of this law, Hungary must accept that the Hungarians abroad are citizens of other states, and protecting the Hungarian minority must be done within the efforts to strengthen individual and collective rights from the states of residence (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 161-163). It is thus a new dilemma that is arising: the new Hungarian citizens might consider
themselves members of a diaspora, or members of a minority community that has already been enjoying full rights in the state of residence. The success of the initiative affirms the need of the Hungarian minorities, both from the EU Member States, and from Serbia, Croatia and Ukraine, to institutionalize this cultural identity and not necessarily the benefits of obtaining Hungarian citizenship. In addition to this, a fact that demonstrates the Hungarian-Slovak dispute is the discourse on cultural identity and on ethnic nationalism, seen strictly in terms of belonging to a homogeneous community based on culture, language, religion, history. Therefore, granting dual citizenship to Hungarians from “everywhere” could be considered a right in terms of reaffirming the cultural identity of ethnic Hungarians. Although the contemporary society has proven that the cultural identity does not need a clear label reading “citizen” to be used before the name of ethnicity, the specificity of Hungarian ethnic nationalism requires the assertion of this right.

Granting the right to vote by changing the Hungarian Constitution can turn this right into a privilege, but it would generate a series of internal and external problems. The internal problems would be justified by the fact that those citizens who do not reside in Hungary, and thus they are not directly affected by the outcome of the vote, can influence the outcome of the Hungarian parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the external feedback can generate a new conflict with neighboring countries, especially with Slovakia that proved quite inflexible in dealing with this situation.

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Citizenship represents the permanent legal and political relationship that exists between the state and the individual. Citizenship is often defined in terms of legislation and accompanying political debates, far from the realities experienced by citizens.

The citizen quality must be redefined in the post-socialist context, where it escapes from all definitions given by political elites, mainly because of their inability to guarantee the social rights expected by the citizens.

Due to the lack of uniformity between laws of different countries regarding the criteria for granting citizenship, an individual can be found in a position to have more than one citizenship or in a position where his/her right to citizenship is denied. We are facing a citizenship conflict that bears the concept of multi-nationality or even of statelessness.

Multi-nationality or better said dual citizenship or rather dual statelessness result from obtaining a new citizenship without losing the one of the state of origin.

In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the issue of dual citizenship was raised politically, becoming a useful electoral strategy of the party led by the
Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban. Similarly, the Slovak response was political, to problem of cultural identity. Although nationalism was stained with political reactions and intervention, it can be thus proved how viable are the debates on national identity within an increasing talk of post-national state evolution inside the European Union.

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THE SOCIO-POLITICAL DILEMAS OF INTEGRATION OF GAGAUZ IN REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Natalia PUTINÁ∗

Abstract. The Gagauz people are a Turkish-speaking group adhering to the Christian Orthodox faith. Today, the majority of them live in the autonomous region of the Republic of Moldova called Gagauz Yeri (Gagauz Territorial Autonomous Unit). Also, smaller groups live in enamearing districts in The Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the pockets in the Caucasus. This research wills traits the main peculiarities and the lacks of sociopolitical integration\disintegration of The Gagauz in Moldovan society. Certainly, the integration of ethnic groups in a nation-building state represents a complex and dynamical process of accommodation. In particular, it will be analyzed the degree of participation and interest of The Gagauz in the socio-political processes in Republic of Moldova and in autonomous unit; the degree of identification of Gagauz people with Moldavian state and their elements. To assure a positive result it’s important to improve the implication of the both parts: one side, the main goal of ethnic politics of state needs to be the protection of identity of that segment of population and an equilibrate naturalization by accommodation in the state community; other side, the ethnic groups mast to wish a live in a democratic integral state. Especially, the autonomous status of the Gagauz in Moldova doesn’t stipulate the separation or isolation, but represents a guarantee for accommodation of the Gagauz by keeping their ethnic specific.

Keywords: ethnic/national politics, Gagauz Yeri, minorities integration etc.

Introduction

The problems of national integration and nation-building began to occupy writers on the new states even before their independence. A key element for
plural societies is the need to mitigate the unfortunate effects of majority rule in ethnically divided societies (Horowitz, 1985). This role is realized by politics of minorities’ integration. To be effective, social integration requires a bottom-line consensus on what individuals involved see as a desirable and necessary outcome. The terms and the expected effects of integration need to be negotiated among and across broad segments of both the majority and minority communities. However, majority and minority groups seem to pursue different goals and thus favor different, partially excluding means to achieve societal integration. While the members of the majority regard integration as a tool with which to increase social cohesion and improve institutional performance, the members of minority usually seek to augment group integrity and stability by securing the status of their group (Agarin, Brosig, 2009: 15).

Taking into consideration the whole situation in the Moldovan society, we will refer to the situation of interethnic relation during the last twenty years, to identify the producing variances of national/ethnic policies, to reflect the results, but also the blockages and lacks of legal and institutional framework in Republic of Moldova, to analyze the causes of manifestation intolerance phenomena and the factors of Minority’s disintegration. It is necessary to approach these components of the model through the identity that could facilitate the understanding of the social environment. Examining the phenomena of the Gagauz ethnic identification and integration, the dominance of the political factor is obvious.

1. The general framework of Minorities status in Republic of Moldova

To achieve stability and prosper as a democratic state, Republic of Moldova requires a new model of the state and its relations with ethnic groups. Moldova especially requires a political model that specifies the responsibilities, as well as rights, that citizens have toward and in the state. There are many models for organizing democracies, some of which encourage more conflict between interest groups than others. Kaufman (1996) argues that Moldova’s conflicts during the early post-Soviet period occurred because of a convergence of three factors: hostile masses, belligerent leaders, and interethnic security dilemmas. In post-Soviet Moldova the population was ethnically and regionally diverse, increasing the complexity of accomplishing such fundamental tasks as selecting state and official languages, crafting citizenship laws, and developing political authority to local districts (Cash, 2004: 1). The wide variety of local situations and the rather different position of the ethnic minority in each societies generates a series of peculiarities with a great relevance that refers on general: what are the local factors determining mutual understanding and institutional adjustment of the ethnic groups; the local factors determining mutual mistrust.
and institutional conflicts of the ethnic groups; the types of institutional arrangements seem to facilitate the interethnic integration/disintegration in the local context; the measures for resolving manifest or latent interethnic tensions and conflicts?

After the collapse of USRR most of republic within post-Soviet area was larger multiethnic. The cote of minorities in Moldova in 1989 was about 36%. The ethnic migration in the earlier 1990 increase a bit titular nation ponders. At the time of the 2004 census, Moldova’s total population was 3,383,332. The largest ethnic group in the republic is the Romanians/Moldavians accounting for 76.1 % of the population. Other major ethnic groups are the Ukrainians (8.4 %), Russians (5.8 %), Gagauz (4.4 %), Bulgarians (1.9 %), and Jews (2 %) etc. When Republic of Moldova became independent, enshrining the titular language as the official language was closely bound up with the idea of establishing and maintaining full independence. By this time, however, Russian and Russophone minorities had become identified with opposition to democracy and independence. Finding themselves treated as second-class (and probably disloyal) citizens, they turned to Moscow for help. This only served to confirm the suspicion and mistrust of the newly independent states. Issues of language and national identity fuelled the series of conflicts which led to the breakup of the USSR (Waters, 2001: 5). While the Chisinau authorities spent as much of their political energy on defending this conceptual duality as their opponents from both sides on attacking it, political and economic reforms were on the backburner (Meurs, 2004).

1.2. The peculiarities of national/ethnic politics of Republic of Moldova

Against the background of the empirical evidence and the efforts to conceptualize issues of interethnic integration, it is more and more often interpreted as mutual adjustment of various ethnic groups in the major sectors of social life:

- Interethnic integration undoubtedly supposes the recognition of the need for equal economic opportunities for representatives of all ethnic groups in a given society. The basic elements of these equal opportunities are the access to jobs, in particular to good quality jobs, together with the equal opportunity for private economic activity.
- Another key dimension of the so understood interethnic integration is the equality of rights and opportunities for political participation. In practical terms, this means equality in legal regulations and in practicing active and passive election rights and equal opportunities for representatives of ethnic groups to be placed in institutions. In facts, Moldova’s current political system and legislative framework discourages the formation or recognition of distinct ethnic parties.
Political structure, procedures, and interests are not correlative with ethnic identity.

- The third component concerns the equality of involvement in the cultural life of the society under scrutiny. Undoubtedly, the key condition for realization of this equality is the command of the common language or languages, together with the development of shared cultural institutions. In fact, this element of integration is also unrealized. We will describe the languages situation in further compartments of this article.

- Last but not least, interethnic integration presupposes the development of a widespread value-normative identification with the given society, crosscutting the boundaries of ethnic groups. This is possible when they develop shared traditions and an understanding of shared challenges and a shared future (Genov, 2007: 9-10). In this context, it’s important to remark the undefined national interest and the large difficulties in transformation of different ethnic interests into general. Fully analyzed, typological diversity of interests allows us to identify evolutionary trends and involution of interethnic relations, to design active social behaviors and actions, and reactive ethnic background. Polyvalent state interests, conceived as a whole enables the determination and assessment of the integrative and disintegrative ethnic policy. The transformation of private interests of ethnic groups in national and economic interests, national, social, national-cultural is the way of successful integration of minorities (Saca).

Taking into account the overall political context Botan (2002) can identify five main factors that had or may have a decisive impact on interethnic relations problems concerning Moldova. These are:

1) Political speculations on the history of Moldova and the indigenous ethnic identification,

2) The Moldovan authorities' policies on ensuring the rights of national minorities and the attitude of the main political forces in the country to these policies,

3) International legal framework on national minority rights;

4) The policies of neighboring countries to their respective ethnic communities;

5) Integration policies in Europe (Botan, 2002). The last of the three factors mentioned are external and internal factors influencing crucial impact on ensuring the rights of national minorities 'integration into the Moldovan society. Analyzing all this factors we can indentify some different cleavages of Moldovan society. It means the identity cleavage of ethnic majority; extern policies cleavage of political parties system and electorate; territorial cleavage (the existence of separatist territory in the eastern part of Moldova); the ethnic cleavage in interethnic relations; the ethnocentric cleavage of ethnic group within Moldova.
The activities of Moldovan state on minorities’ integration could be oriented in three key directions:

1. **Communicative-linguistic integration** – it would be realized by creating of an uncial informational area and the Moldovan/Romanian linguistic environment with condition of keeping the cultural diversity and mutual tolerance.

2. **Political and legal integration**, that should be made by formation of a population state fair, by respect to law and the committed to support and defend it. Unfortunately, the political element is the most difficult to realize. The equilibrium between ethnic and civic (political) identification is an imperative in this way.

3. **Socio-political integration** – it means achieve an ability to compete and a social viable mobility by each member of society regardless of ethnicity or language (Morozan, 2005).

In general lines, the policy promoted by Moldova’s government in interethnic relations area aim at preserving the cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the national minorities, and not their assimilation. At the same time, the Moldovan authorities asked for the support of the OSCE high commissioner on national minorities to work out a national program for the national minorities to study the state languages from childhood, at kindergarten or primary school. Also is welcomed the implementation of the project backed by the OSCE high commissioner on national minorities on the studying of the state language by the civil servants and local public administrations’ representatives from Moldova. In near future it will be presented a conceptual document on a strategy for ethnic minority’s integration into society, drafted by OSCE experts to Moldova.

### 1.3. The status of national minorities in Republic of Moldova – legal aspect

The current legislation is imperfect and stimulates unreal expectations, violates the balance between the rights and obligations both of the majority and of the minorities, prescribes to the language of a minority representatives the status of interethnic language of communication to the detriment of the official state language and encourages leaders, representatives of some national minorities to use their cultural identity to gain benefits for their own, as is the case of Gagauz minority (Coreți, Pascaru, Stevens, 2002). The basic legislation regarding national minorities has not changed in the last years, so it is safe to switch back to the 1994 Constitution at this stage. **Article 10 II of the Constitution** recognizes the right of all citizens to preserve, develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity and **Article 13**, although reaffirming Moldovan as the state language, acknowledges and protects the
right to preserve, develop and use the Russian language and other languages spoken within the Republic of Moldova. The language tests, which had been originally envisaged for 1994, had been postponed in the meantime and will probably, now never, be introduced. Russian was not officially granted the status of a second state language, as most Russian speakers wished; nevertheless, it does have de facto such status (Neukirch, 1999: 53). The division of the Moldovan society according to the ethnic criteria is just a visible part of the iceberg. This is a way to hide the incompetence of the governing body that is challenged to solve the problems confronting the society, negatively impacting the majority as well as minority populations. Among the key issues that persist is the attempt to manipulate and politicizes the linguistic context within the society. *The Law on the Functioning of Languages* (1989), considered in relation to international legal standards, was tolerable to those unfamiliar with the language of the majority, and encouraged the representatives of the national minorities to learn the official language during a transition period up to 3-7 years (Corețchi, Pascaru, Stevens, 2002).

*The Law on the right of persons belonging to national minorities* (2001) was adopted only after ten years of Moldova’s independence and represents nothing but a copy of languages law from 1989 (Anghel, 2002: 11). Delayed nature of this law and respectively of *Law on national concept of Republic of Moldova* (2005) reveals an action and decision-making paradox of Moldovan Government. In these circumstances, a strategy on integration of national minorities in Republic of Moldova is just in preliminary stage of draft.

Another bone of contention in language and minority politics is usually the education sector. Article 35 II of the Moldovan Constitution envisages that the state will enforce the right of each person to choose his or her language in which teaching will be conducted. This provision, which is reinforced in the language and in the education laws, is followed in practice as far as possible under the current socio-economic crises. In practice, Moldovan and Russian dominate in schools and higher education institutions. Schools with education in Ukrainian (77), Gagauz (49), Bulgarian (32), Ivrit (2) and German (1) also exist, but none teaches the whole curriculum in one of these languages (Neurkirch, 1999: 54). Thus, it may seem that some lessons have been learned regarding the language legislation and its application in practice, but others probably have to be taken. *First of all*, it is now for the Russian-speaking community in Moldova to accept that learning the state language of the state of which they are citizens is a necessary step for integration. This does not mean that they should be assimilated. But symmetric bilingualism has to replace the asymmetric bilingualism which has prevailed in Moldova until today if the idea of a multi-ethnic Republican Moldovan identity is to have a chance in reality. *Secondly*, the Moldovan government has to undertake further efforts to offer real possibilities for Russian speakers to learn Moldovan and for other nationalities.
also to learn the native language. Thirdly, Moldovans should refrain from any aggressive propaganda against the use of Russian in public or in parliament, as has happened recently, in order not to alienate Russian speakers again (or not to do so further). Fourthly, young Moldovans should continue to learn and to speak Russian in order to ensure that Moldova remains a bilingual society. Trends are already visible that more and more Moldovans are not learning a full command of Russian. If Moldovans start to abandon Russian, and Russians, Ukrainians and others continue to refuse to learn and speak Moldovan, the chances for the development of a republican Moldovan identity are bleak (Neurkirch, 1999).

2. The role and place of Gagauz in ethnic structure of Moldovan society

The 153,000 Gagauz who lived in Moldova in 1989 have no kin state. Outside Moldova, Gagauz settlements can be found only in the neighboring Odessa region of Ukraine (36,000), Romania and Bulgaria (four cities and 67 villages where Gagauz predominated). Gagauz origins in southern Moldova can be traced to migration from northeastern Bulgaria in 1750-1791 and 1808-1812 (Chinn, Roper, 1998: 88). The Gagauz have been heavily russified in the past. Many use Russian even for daily encounters, whereas hardly any Gagauz speaks Moldovan. Thus, like Russians and Ukrainians, they felt threatened by the language law and the politics of “Romanization” and “derussification” which were pursued by the new Prime Minister, Mircea Druc. The Gagauz Halki (Gagauz People) movement, which had been founded in 1989 and which had sided with the Popular Front of Moldova at the beginning, consequently changed sides after the adoption of the language law. The Gagauz leadership under Stepan Topal, a nationalist-turned communist, then sought closer relationships with pro-soviet forces (Neukirch, 1999: 49). The autonomy of Gagauz Yeri came about in the context of violent clashes between the central government of Moldova and the separatist Transnistria during the first half of the nineties.

In Moldova, the Autonomous Gagauz Republic is still another special case of the ethnicisation of politics after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. In order to avoid additional interethnic tensions after the bloody conflict in Transnistria, the government in Chisinau agreed to include the political autonomy of the Gagauz people (Turkish speaking Christians) in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. But the situation in the Gagauz Autonomous Republic still very much depends on developments in and outside of the country (Genov, 2007: 8). Stabilization or changes in the ethnic stratification in the Autonomous Republic of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) in the
framework of the Republic of Moldova might be initiated or supported by various domestic and international factors.

2.1. Geopolitical repercussions in the process of Gagauz integration

The geopolitical background of southern and eastern part of state is characterized by such complex influences from ethnical groups Patron-states and other political regional interests. At the same time, external homelands are another variable deeply involved in Moldavian politics. Russians and Ukrainians ask their mother countries to interfere in Moldavian politics to promote their interests or protect privileges from Soviet times, and other minorities engage in similar behavior. Gagauzes, for instance, established an autonomous status with strong support from Turkey, which is speculating on linguistic and racial kinship. Bulgarians, in turn, can thank the direct involvement of the authorities in Sofia for their success in obtaining a special status for the Taraclia district in the south, where they are in the majority, as well as a national university (Cașu:246). However, economically and culturally, the population of this Autonomous Republic is more closely connected to Transnistria and to Russia than to Moldova, which is dominated by the Moldovan (Romanian) ethnic group. Since the Republic of Moldova has experienced a catastrophic economic decline during the transformation period and the prospect of economic recovery has been substantially delayed, the ensuing problems can be easily used and abused for the purposes of constructive or destructive ethnic policies. The unresolved issue of Transnistria and the yet unclear geo-strategic situation of the country also offer a variety of options for further changes (Genov, Potentials., 2007: 35). The Gagauz elites need to understand that while a pro-Russian and pro-Transnistrian position is bound to alienate Moldova’s political establishment and civil society, especially in the present context in which European integration has been mainstreamed as the priority not only of Moldovan foreign policy, but also of internal reforms (Avram 2010).

2.2. The impact of russification and sovietization factor

During Soviet rule, russification proceeded more successfully among the Gagauz than among the titular nation. Education within the Gagauz region was almost entirely in Russian. As a result of Soviet educational policy, the most educated portion of the Gagauz population became the most russified (Chinn, Roper, 1998: 90). The education that targeted the representatives of the minorities in Moldova is neither an alternative education, nor one complementary to the State. Instead, it’s an education that reflects nostalgia on the part of the population for the old regime and its incapacity to adapt itself to
democratic changes and European values (Pascaru, 2000). Soviet education as a value system was limited in that as it included only a marginal exponent of the national cultures of the Soviet nations. The parents and grandparents educated by the Soviet ideology now are modelling the younger generation, compounding the issues of a system that failed to encourage learning other languages and cultures. As a result, the education for minorities is hampered by the incapacity to revitalise the national component of the education and by the impossibility, due to objective and subjective factors, to integrate into universality (Corețchi, Pascaru, Stevens, 2002).

2.3. The emergencies of linguistic situation in Gagauzian Autonomy

In spite of russification of Soviet times, 97% in 2005 maintained Gagauz as their native languages, 89% claimed to speak Russian, while only 3% claimed competence in Moldovan/Romanian (Etnobarometru, 2005). Unfortunately, Russian remains the primary language of administration, commerce, and education after fifteen years of autonomy. This fact questions the proposed objectives in the founding acts of Gagauz Autonomy. While the Gagauz movement for autonomy has resulted in increased attention to the native language in schools and media, it is not yet resulted in a shift from Russian as the primary language of instruction. Indeed, for a long period of time, Gagauz only functioned as an oral – or “kitchen”- language (Menz, 2003). Although based on cultural and linguistic criteria, Gagauzes preserved the Russian language in its administrative and education systems, as in the Soviet era. Thus, the case of Gagauz most directly reflects the fact that ethnic issues have been instrumentalized by local elites in their struggle for power and prestige. The international community, however, especially the Council of Europe, has criticized this approach to solving ethnic problems by offering territorial autonomy as a dangerous precedent for other secessionist movements (Cașu: 244). Rendering reference to lows establishing autonomy the stipulate trilingual solution does not work. This fact becomes an impediment to ascertainment relationships, communication between autonomy population and central government because the polities of central authorities is focused on the state language as a means of communication. In current circumstances the Gagauzes face long-term difficulties in establish and operation trilingual or bilingual system where the state language would be registered. Such discordance of the situation in which central government has Romanian as a working language and regional government – the Russian generates less desired effect.

A survey carried out by a Moldovan research team among representatives of regional political, cultural and business elites responded that only about one-third of the respondents had full command Gagauz, whereas all
claimed to be fluent speakers of Russian (Teosa et al. 2008: 199). The official homepage of the Gagauz region is supposedly trilingual, but a closer look is more sobering, since besides the menu of the website, there is no further information in the local idiom. Notably, only the Russian version is up-to-date, whilst even the Moldovan one has been filled with some content (Avram 2010). Gagauz language newspapers and broadcast media remain limited and often originate with the small group of Gagauz intellectuals in Chisinau rather in Gagauzia. The first and most significant newspaper in Gagauz, "Ana Sozu" (Mather Language), began in 1986 and was published in Chisinau (Chinn, Roper 1998: 91). All local laws are published in Russian only. The election campaign was also conducted mainly in Russian.

Modest attempts have been made to improve the linguistic situation in Gagauzia by joint initiative of central government and Governor Mihail Formuzal with external partners’ large support. In September 2005 was started Language Training Program for Minorities within Republic of Moldova, financed by High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE (Haga). The program was conducted in about 10 urban and rural localities of Gagauzia and was attended by Governor and other civil servants of autonomy’s authorities (Isac, 2010). In autumn 2009, for the first time two meeting were held by the Executive Committee in Gagauz and Romanian. As well, in October 2009 the Governor took the oath member of new Moldovan Government for the first time in Romanian (Cubreacov, Comrat…, 2009). Regrettfuly, such gestures remain largely symbolic. The current Governor declared supporting the necessity in state language knowledge by Gagauz population for ensuring their competitiveness in society. Gagauz authorities assumed their obligation to ensure the equality of all three official languages stipulated in autonomy’s legislation (Cubreacov, Interview with M. Formuzal, 2009). By the other side, during the campaign for national election Anna Harlamenco, President of the People’s Assembly, strongly demanded to grant Russian the status of state language. Lack of cooperation and inconsistent statements of Gagauz political elites makes more difficult to apply the tasks of national politics.
2.3. The Gagauz between ethnic and civic identity

Guboglo a leading exponent of Gagauz intelligentsia mention that in all ex-Soviet area the Gagauz hardest exceeded the collapse of Soviet Union. Thus, about 67.5% of respondents categorized that event as very grave and particularly grave. At the same time 30% considered like homeland - URSS and 16.1% - Republic of Moldova (Guboglo, 2009: 11). Answering at option I consider myself primarily Gagauz or citizen of Republic of Moldova? The result was respectively 81% and 46% (Etinobarometrul, 2005). A very important component of Gagauz self-awareness is historical orientation. Answering at the question what means to be Gagauz? A lot of respondents of older generation mention – Christian civilization membership, the need to preserve the ethnic authenticity, respect for the history of his people, the memory of the Soviet past, the spirit of people unity in an enormous state. The overall landscape of ethnic perception by the Gagauz young generation is different. The explosion of ethnicity remained in last plan; at the moment dominate state political pessimism that influences more the provisions of ethnic conscience. The young Gagauzes couldn’t identify clearly the peculiarities of their “gagauzization”. This situation can be explained by his widespread use of Russian language and deeply pro-Russian orientation. Such orientation has more practical than ideological or civilization reasons (as eventually emigration destination for work or study interest) (Anikin, 2009: 24-25). As the data shows, none of possible markers – religion, language or history – has the potential of serving as fundament for Gagauz identity (Avram, 2010). A strong ethnic identity is assured by amassing compact nature of Gagauz during all their habitation in the southern Moldova. The Gagauz habitation in Moldovan state lasts more than two centuries and theirs concentration in the southern part didn’t decrease. In spite of this the Gagauz ethnic is profoundly reduced by russification and sovietization. We find that the Gagauzes like Moldovans faces identity cleavage. Without national consciousness, the development of a Gagauz-based nation-building process seems quite improbable, if not impossible, to achieve. The weakness of Gagauz identity is compensated through recourse to the USSR as an “imagined community” with Russian as a key component. The political elites also make no attempts to accelerate the process of deconstructing Soviet identity (Avram, 2010).

Appealing to social distance scale between social groups developed by Bogardus in 1925, we can measures the inter-ethnic perceptions and stereotypes manifested in actionable and verbal behavior (Anghel, 2004: 70). The comparative study “Potentials for interethnic integration and disintegration”, was realized in a few Turkish-speaking minority states. In Republic of Moldova it was made based on interviews with representatives of economical, cultural and political Gagauz elites. The results of this research allow us to make some findings: The
Gagauz people live in a society every day becoming more distanced from Russian influence. Despite of this fact the Gagauz elites have a strong preference to cooperation with Russians (14 of 32 respondents). This strong affinity with Russians is in a contradiction with low level of affinity with their ethnic group. Just 1/5 of respondents expressed their willingness to cooperate “intra-group” (Genov, 2007). This fact may have some explanations – a low intra-group orientation or a strong preference for universalistic (cosmopolite) normative-value guidelines. Ethnocentrism represents the essence of ethnicity postulating as a kind of ideal being, which embodies all the qualities of good and beautiful and place foreign population outside the family word, whose appearance and manners embodies their ugliness and evil (Roth, 1998: 77).

Kolsto says that linguistic russification did not mean a lack of identity but showed instead that the identity was in process of changing. Despite the concessions received from the majority, the Gagauz identity remains confused because the majority of them continue to speak Russian instead of their native language.

2.4. The influence of political and ideological factors in Gagauz integration/disintegration

This factor is closely related to sovietization, russification and linguistic factors. High developed Sovietic identity continuing influence to date heavily the Gagauz mentality and perceptions. The Gagauz leaders utilizes often the ideological rhetoric especially in national and regional electoral campaigns that influence the increasing of ethnicity phenomena and distance the Gagauz electorate from the national political process. Analyzing the electoral presence of Gagauz population in national election we remark decreasing effect of interest in Moldovan political live. Another condition that assures the ideological impact is the large utilizing of Russian and local mass-media sources rather than Moldavian. Information mainly from external sources that often intentionally distort political, social events in the country has negative effect in perception of Moldovan state realities and stops the Gagauz integration.

The content analyze of principal official Gagauz newspaper allows us to identify the objectives and consequences of published articles. The criterions for comparison concerns are: 1) formal characteristics of articles dealing with attitudes of the ethnic majority towards the ethnic groups - this topic can be found on the front pages of the larger publications, indicating the importance attached to the ethnic issues. An exception in this respect is the newspaper Vesti Gagauzii, which publishes documents (7% of the local sample of information units), thus continuing the Soviet tradition. In the soviet times, the newspapers used to inform the population about important official decisions. In a small autonomous political unit in a post-Soviet country, this still makes
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sense under the conditions of ongoing series of political and institutional changes (Golovin, 2007: 25); 2) the emotional orientation of public - post-Soviet Gagauzia (Moldova) is also characterized by multilateral polemics, but the disputes are characterized by the domination of representatives of the local authorities (53%). Thus, the formal characteristics of the published materials show structural similarities to the functions of the press in describing ethnic policy among both the EU members and the post-Soviet countries. (Golovin, 2007: 27). In many respects, it expresses the position of the regional authorities, who hope to inspire optimism among the public of the region. Vesti Gagauzii, in Moldova, is also emotional in a positive way, reflecting the success of the Gagauz people in their autonomisation. According to the newspaper Vesti Gagauzii, the political aspect of this ethnic conflict is most prominent. This can easily be explained by the history of conflict in the establishment of the Gagauzian autonomy; 3) The analysis of the ideological and manipulator content of the press publications revealed the strong influence of Soviet political discourse on newspapers in Gagauzia. This discourse often obscures the issues with the help of integrative slogans (Golovin, 2007: 33).

Among the reasons of anxiety of Gagauz people, the following are put forward: the ethnic group is poorly represented in the political decision-making process; it is difficult for Gagauz people to get a public service position and to find a well paid job; public opinion is against the ethnic group. The interviewees identify discriminatory practices in relation to the Gagauz in the economic, as well as in cultural and linguistic spheres. Religious beliefs are not a subject of anxiety (Tsucan, Teosa, Molodilo, 2007: 76). Referring to relationship between central and autonomous authorities we remark a hardly stabilizing effect. Elites both at the central and the sub-state level appear to bear the responsibility for this modest result (Avram, 2010).

3. Conclusion

Although, the regulations of relevant legislation are categorized as quasi-tolerant, the overall institutionalization, development of right, and integration of national minorities in the socio-political system of Moldova remain in arrears. Therefore, conclude that the main reasons are for stagnating integration of ethnic minorities in Moldova. The evaluation of the Gagauz question autonomy model raises more questions than it answers. On the normative level, the persistence of Soviet elements makes it difficult to employ the theory of multiculturalism to justify the existence of Gagauzian territorial autonomy (Avram, 2010). Notwithstanding the objective factors conditioning the situation on the ground, it should be borne in mind that for Gagauz elites, the most important achievement of the power-sharing agreement is the possibility of not having to learn Romanian (Troebest, 2001: 77). The fact that at least a few steps
have been taken in the direction of promoting the Gagauz language and culture shows that territorial autonomy may serve to offer the societal framework for such measures to take place. The official declaration of 2010 as the “year of the Gagauz language” serves as an example in this respect (Avram, 2010).

The imperative step of Moldovan government that will be made is to ensure the real conditions for developing cultural diversity in this area and to achieve the successful integration of ethno-national minorities. The basic tool for plenary asserting of a citizen in society is knowledge of the state language. At the same time, Government have to be aware that any change can generate resistance, especially when there are factors and forces ready to obstruct such changes. Thus, integration policy must be linked supported by opinion leaders in those communities. It’s important the “stripping” of minorities and harnessing the benefits offered by a genuine integration politics.

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Abstract. In the Soviet period the Romanian ethnic minority in Ukraine was submitted to a Russification process, in order to achieve the so-called Soviet People, speaking of the Russian language. Now there is a process of Ukrainization in order to achieve a Ukrainian nation, including the ethnic minorities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Romania and the Republic of Moldova (RM) have the duty to establish agreements and cooperation with Ukraine, to create common governmental Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan commissions on the fields of education, culture and so on, to solve all problems regarding the preservation of the ethnic identity of the Romanian minority. In this regard there are a few topical problems: to open schools with the Romanian language of teaching in the Romanian villages with no such schools; to create an University with Romanian as the language of teaching in CernăuŃi (Chernivtsi) or in Hertă; the problem of the recognition of diplomas obtained by the Ukrainian citizens in Romania and RM (the graduates have to pay a lot and must take certain exams); a branch of the Romanian Cultural Institute in CernăuŃi is a matter of urgency; to enhance the cooperation within the Upper Prut Euro region and Lower Danube Euro region, between the RM, Ukraine and Romania; to open all the possibilities for the Romanian minority to travel in Romania, as it can travel in Moldova, without visas (in this regard, the authorities from Bucharest and from Kiev must achieve the same agreements as the Polish Government achieved with the Ukrainian Government); the example of the Swedish minority from Finland would be useful to follow: as it is known, the Swedish language has the status of state language in Finland. Perhaps, it would be useful to introduce the Romanian language as the official language in the Romanian villages from the CernăuŃi and Odessa regions. The perspectives of the Romanian minority survival depend on the implementing these proposals.

Keywords: ethnic community, ethnic group, ethnic minority, assimilation, ethnic and cultural identity, inter-ethnic dialogue, cultural survival, ethnicity, rights, autonomy, cross-border cooperation.

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The ethnic Romanian community in Ukraine is the third ethnic group as a number, after the Ukrainian and the Russian communities. According to the last census of 2001, the number of ethnic Romanians was about 410,000 people. Unofficially, the number of our nationals can be estimated at 500,000, taking into account that the number of the Romanians who identify themselves as Moldovans decreased by 27%, compared to the previous average forecast. They declare themselves as belonging to other ethnic groups from various reasons (linguistic assimilation – “desire to naturalize”, by tuition of children in the dominant ethnic group language and the tendency to change their social status, reducing the natural increase) (Popescu, Ungureanu, 2010: 42, 61). The main regions of compact living of Romanians in Ukraine are: Odessa: 123,751 Moldovans and 724 Romanians; Chernivtsi: 114,555 Romanians and 67,225 Moldovans and Zakarpattya: 32,152 Romanians (Popescu, Ungureanu, 2010: 48). This article is like a warning on the difficult situation in which is the native Moldovan-Romanian population of the Moldovan/Romanian historical territories, currently within the state borders of Ukraine.

The greatest challenge the Romanian community faces in Ukraine is related to that of assimilation - its Ukrainization – to wit giving up the Romanian (Moldovan – in northern and southern Bessarabia, and in areas beyond the Dniester and the Bug) identity by the community members. This process became quickly a trend, as today more and more Romanian parents enroll their children in classes with Ukrainian language of instruction, having as reason the wish their children to study at a university in the region where they live. Higher education in Ukraine, as well as in the educational institutions of Chernivtsi (Cernăuți), Odessa and Uzhgorod is performed in Ukrainian language. At the only faculty where students can study in Romanian language – that of Philology, Romanian department – half of the courses are taught in Ukrainian, the education authorities justifying this fact as an advantage for students, because this way the graduates have increased employment opportunities, based on their personal choice option or need in schools with Ukrainian language of instruction. Those who want to be enrolled as students to the Faculty of Philology, Romanian department, of the Chernivtsi State University, have to get through Ukrainian Language/History of Ukraine Exams. On the other hand, Ukrainian citizens who obtain degrees in Romania or in the Republic of Moldova can get an equivalence/nostrification of their diploma Study Degree with great difficulty: they have to pay exorbitant fees and pass additional exams in Ukrainian language, as well as for the Ukrainian language.

We are aware of the importance and necessity of inter-ethnic dialogue within the Ukrainian state, where our nationals’ community should be involved in. But above all, it is necessary to establish a Romanian-Romanian dialogue between the Romanians of the two Romanian states – Romania and the Republic of Moldova on the one hand and – with the Romanian community in
Romanian Ethnic Minority in Ukraine: Current Issues and Prospects of Survival

Ukraine on the other hand. Romania and the Republic of Moldova do not support the Romanian minority from the neighboring state they way that Hungary supports the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattya (151,500 people) (Popescu, Ungureanu, 2010: 39). A Pedagogical Institute with Hungarian language of instruction activates in the locality of Berego; it prepares teachers for schools with Hungarian language of instruction from Zakarpattya region, where the Hungarian minority lives, and it is supported by the Hungarian state. So, we need first to consolidate the Romania-Romanian dialogue in order to preserve the Romanian ethnicity in the Moldovan and Romanian historic territories of Ukraine. An interethnic dialogue is possible between the cultures and ethnic groups consolidated in the result of an intra-ethnic dialogue. When an ethnic group is about to lose its cultural identity - foremost the mother tongue – it is necessary to focus on finding solutions to ensure the conditions for the cultural survival of the ethnic minorities are kept. If during the period of ten years the Romanians who identify themselves as Moldovans have decreased by 27% in Ukraine (according to the census of 2001 compared with 1989 census data), it means that the Moldovan-Romanian minority in Ukraine is in a difficult situation. These 27% have not emigrated to the Republic of Moldova, Romania or other countries. An explanation of this decrease would be that people who form these 27% have disowned their parents' ethnic identity in order to firm up in the Ukrainian society. If for gaining a foothold (get a higher status) in Ukraine, you have to give up your own ethnic and cultural identity (as do the Moldovan-Romanian parents from the village of Coteleu (Koteleva), district of Novoselytsia, who speak Ukrainian with their preschool children – in order to make it easier when they go to school – where the language of instruction is Ukrainian), then the situation is not one of the best for the Moldovan-Romanian minority, which is on its historical territory, where it has been formed as a ethnicity, a territory which is currently within the state borders of Ukraine.

In February 2011, I have conducted an opinion survey of the Romanian ethnicity in the Chernivtsi region. The questionnaire “on polling the opinion of people who are part of the Moldovan-Romanian community on the Moldovan historic territory - Chernivtsi region (currently part of Ukraine)” contained the following questions:

1. Do you consider that the rights of the Moldovan-Romanian minority from Chernivtsi region (the Moldovan historic territory) regarding the preservation and use of the mother tongue in the society, as well as of the traditions and customs are observed? If „NO”, what needs to be changed in order to improve the situation?

2. Do you support the idea of the requirement to assign the Romanian language the official/state language status in Chernivtsi region, where, on its historic territory, the Moldovan-Romanian community lives?
3. What actions should the Government of the Republic of Moldova take in order to support the Moldovan-Romanian community from the Moldovan historic territory - Chernivtsi region?

4. Would you support the idea of creating a territorial-administrative autonomy, which would comprise the localities populated by the Moldovan-Romanian community from the regions of Storozhynets, Adancata, Hertsa and Novoselytsia, centered in the town of Hertsa, where to create a university having the Romanian language as a language of instruction?

5. Would you support the idea of exchanging territories between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, following which the localities from the Republic of Moldova inhabited by the Ukrainians (especially those over the Dniester) would return to Ukraine, and the localities inhabited by the Moldovan-Romanian community from the region of Chernivtsi would re-enter within the Republic of Moldova?

There were interviewed 25 persons from the districts of Storozhynets, Adancata, Hertsa and Novoselytsia. At the first question 15 persons answered „no”. A respondent underlined: „Romanians are not respected in general – neither the language, nor the customs, no door is opened in front of you without knowing the Ukrainian language”; „I consider the state should assign the Romanian language the same level as of the Ukrainian language”. Other respondent answered that „the customs and traditions are respected, but the language no”. The answers at the question what needs to be changed in order to improve the situation were the following: „Democratization of the country”, „We should change first”, „The law on the state language and the languages of the minorities should be observed. According to this law, the language of the minorities should be used by state bodies in that region where the minority lives compact – thing that does not happen here”. Another 7 persons answered „yes”, some of them mentioned that „the Moldovan-Romanian minority does nothing for its rights to be observed, it does not fight for these rights to be exercised in the day by day life”; „The Constitution of Ukraine provides the rights for the national minorities, but we have not learnt how to respect ourselves as a nation, have not learnt how to demand our rights”. Two respondents answered: „Partly”. One of them mentioned, as an answer to the question what needs to be changed in order to improve the situation: „to maintain the schools where the language of instruction is Romanian, to perform extracurricular activities in the mother tongue - Romanian, to draw up the documents in the Romanian language, to have available in Romanian language methodic literature, scripts for festivities and others (currently these are missing)”.

At the second question, 19 persons answered „yes”, 5 persons answered „no”, two gave no explanation, and another person, who lives in Novoselytsia, where the process of Ukrainization is more advanced, explained
that „Few people know literary Romanian language. People would laugh to scorn of the documents drawn up by the officials in Romanian”. One respondent answered „I do not know”.

At the third question, among others, I was given, these answers: „By belles, popularizing the science in Romanian language, both Romanian and world writers, study books, books for children”. „It should take interest in what happens here, keep contiguity with us”. „Pay more attention to us, not to neglect us, to show interest toward our minority’s concerns”. „To defend our interests, to be able freely to contact with Moldova, to be able to visit our relatives in Moldova without any passports requirement”. „To provide support by publishing historical documents”. „The relation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova shall be similar to that of Germany and Austria (to recognize a language – Romanian – and an ethnic community – Romanian)”. „To assist in creating and organizing of cultural societies of the Moldovan-Romanian community; to explain the rights, to inform the masses – people do not know they have rights”. „Collegial relations, exchange of experience”. I got one answer: „Nothing”, „It does not matter for me”. One respondent answered „I do not know”. A respondent answered: „I cannot answer this question; I am not interested in these issues”. A respondent did not answer at all.

At the fourth question 21 respondents answered „yes”, one of whom added: “If the [administrative territorial] reorganization of the country is to take place”, and another answered: “Yes, although in this case I will have to learn literary version of Romanian language, which I do not know”. One respondent said: “University – yes, an autonomous administrative-territorial formation – I do not know”. One said “no”. Another respondent said: “It is impossible. Hertsa cannot replace Chernivtsi, which is our soul”. One said: “I do not feel it is real”.

At the fifth question 10 respondents answered „yes” (one respondent explained: yes, because we cannot study at universities [in Ukraine] in Romanian language), 5 respondents said „no”. 2 respondents said „yes” conditioned: „Yes, if it is possible”, 2 respondents said „Yes, but I don’t think it is possible”. One said that „Ukraine is not going to give up”. Two were skeptical about such a possibility, without giving an „yes” or „no” answer: „But is it really possible?”, „Let’s wait for the referendum and we’ll give an answer”. One respondent said: „I don’t know. I have never been to Moldova”. One respondent said: „I don’t think it is real”, adding however „50/50”. One respondent said: „At present, more no than yes”.

From these answers we can conclude that our nationals are looking forward to get the assistance they need from Romania and from the Republic of Moldova. First of all, a dialogue on how to improve the situation of our nationals has to be performed between the authorities of Romania and the Republic of Moldova on the one hand and the authorities of Ukraine on the
other hand. Although, the Romanian-Ukrainian agreement, signed in 1997 by
the presidents Emil Constantinescu and Leonid Kuchma, provided the
foundation of a multicultural university, with faculties with the Romanian
language of instruction, this provision has not been implemented. During a
discussion held in Kiev on 25 May 2011 with the participation of the Vice
President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the Deputy of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Ion Popescu, a native of Patrautsii de Jos,
Stotojinets district, Chernivtsi region, being asked “Why the project of
foundation of a multicultural university in Chernivtsi is not performed?”, he
cited the lack of financial resources from the Ukrainian state. “If Romania and
the Republic of Moldova involved with financial support, an institution of
higher education with Romanian language of instruction could be created in
Ukraine”, said Ion Popescu. Also, diploma equivalence issues shall be addressed
at the intergovernmental level, such as: cancellation of fees (which are currently
very high), ceasing to oblige the graduates of higher education institutions from
Romania and the Republic of Moldova pass any exams in various universities
from Ukraine, for equivalence of diplomas. Bologna Process, which includes
both Romania and Moldova, and Ukraine, provides mutual recognition of
diplomas obtained in the states party to the process.

Romanian states should get involved to ensure the economic and
cultural development of the Romanian community. The Euro-regions the
Upper Prut and the Lower Danube was conceived as a framework for joint
working and collaboration of the communities from Romania, Republic of
Moldova and Ukraine (Chernivtsi and Odessa regions), which for centuries had
lived together without borders between them. Unfortunately, cross-border
cooperation remains to be one at a low level because of difficulties in
elaboration of projects. Once Romania joined the European Union, there was
created the Joint Operational Programme Romania-Ukraine-Republic of
Moldova 2007-2013. It receives funding from Europe in this period through
the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. “The program aims
to create a bridge between the three partner states in order to support
communities in border areas to find common solutions to similar problems
they face”\textsuperscript{1}. Through this program, local authorities and other organizations in
the border areas are encouraged to collaborate in developing local economy, in
solving certain environmental problems and to strengthen emergency
preparedness. The program aims, also to promote a better interaction between
the communities in the border areas. The European Commission provides
funding of EUR 126.72 million for the Joint Operational Programme Romania-
Ukraine-Republic of Moldova 2007-2013 for the corresponding period. The

\textsuperscript{1} http://ro-ua-md.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=190&Itemid
=226, 9.06.2011.
three partner states should participate by co-financing, amounting to EUR 11, 404, 628. A total program budget for 2007-2013 is of EUR 138 122 69. However, very few have managed to access the funds - at two offices of the program, in Suceava and Iasi - from 2010, when the actual financing had started. The authorities should give more support to potential beneficiaries by informing and advising them on developing of projects.

The assistance offered by the authorities of Romania and the Republic of Moldova should focus on culture and education. The lack of classes having Romanian as a language of instruction in some villages with mixed population, lack of classical literature in libraries, of teaching literature in schools (even if in Ukraine cannot be used textbooks not approved by the Ministry of Education of Ukraine) - denotes the absence of real relations between the Romanians from Romania and the Republic of Moldova and those from Ukraine.

The Romanian-Ukrainian agreement, signed in 1997 by the presidents Emil Constantinescu and Leonid Kuchma aroused discontentment, and some intellectuals of the Romanian community in Ukraine had qualified it as an act of treason against the Romanians in their historical territories, currently under state borders of Ukraine. It is not clear why the Romanian side did not include in the agreement some clauses to help the Romanian community. It is known that the Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920 in the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles by the victorious Allies of World War I (16 allied countries, including Romania) and Hungary, as the successor state of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, defeated State, provided, for example, the possibility of creating a territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. I think the Romanians from Chernivtsi region could request the official status for the Romanian language in Chernivtsi region. In Finland, thanks to the Aland Islands, populated by Swedes and which belong to Finland at present, the Swedish is the second official language throughout Finland. If the proposal of assigning the official status for the Romanian language in Chernivtsi region might seem exaggerated to Ukrainian community from this region, there could be considered the possibility of establishing a territorial-administrative unit which could include the district of Herts and the Romanian localities from the districts of Storozhynets, Adancata, Hertsa and Novoselytsia, where the Romanian language would have the official status. In the Republic of Moldova there are two such examples: Gagauz autonomous territorial unit and Taraclia, which includes villages populated by the Bulgarian community.

During the Austrian domination Bukovina intellectuals and their leaders actively advocated for an autonomous status of Bukovina within the empire (Ungureanu, 2003: 136, 142, 178, 234). In the „Promemoriul la Petiția Țării Bukovina din anul 1848” (Promemoria on the Petition of Land of Bukovina of 1848) among the 9 clauses (which provided the separation of Bukovina from Galicia, arguing from the historical pint of view the right of Bukovina to
become an autonomous province), there was also mentioned that “the Romanian language had to enter the national schools, government and the provincial diet” (Ungureanu, 2003: 135). The document mentioned that “there must be assured the free circulation between Bukovina and Danubian Principalities” (Ungureanu, 2003: 135). Today the claims of 1848 turn to be current: the Romanian language is not used in the administration of the region and the regional council. However, after decades of Soviet occupation regime, we found out within the Moldovan-Romanian community a state of indifference to the problems of their ethnicity or a state of fear. On the other hand, we have noticed a division of the Romanian cultural societies from Chernivtsi. In addition, there is another division, into two ethnic groups - Moldovans (population of Novoselytsia district, Chernivtsi region and southern Bessarabia, Odessa region) and Romanians (population of districts Hertsa, Storozhynets and Adancata). This fact does not contribute to the solving of the problems of the minority, because only by joining efforts notable results can be obtained. Unfortunately, by reason that, the Romanian population of Chernivtsi and Odessa regions is poorly informed about the rights it has (including the constitutional rights), it is subjected to fear when it comes to demand rights and it is divided within itself, makes its survival prospects as an ethnic group (as ethnic minority) in Ukraine to be less optimistic.

The absence in the curriculum of the subject "History of Romanians" leads to a situation when the Romanian national consciousness (including Moldovan - in the districts where our nationals identify themselves as Moldovans - especially in Novoselytsia, Reni, Sarata, Tatarbunar etc.) becomes more obsolete. Therefore, at present we can observe the phenomenon when parents give their children to schools/classes with Ukrainian language of instruction. Even more frequent are cases when parents from Romanian villages call for the formation of classes with Ukrainian language of instruction in schools where from the beginning of Soviet occupation and so far the Romanian language was the language of instruction, such schools become Ukrainized\(^2\). They explain this option by their desire for their children after graduating schools to be easier to study at higher education institutions in Ukraine - the educational process is conducted in Ukrainian, but also “to prevent the ashamed situations when Ukrainian would make fun of their (Romanians) poor level of speaking Ukrainian language”, said the director of the school with Romanian language of instruction from the village of Ropcea, Storozhynets district, Chernivtsi region, where from 1 September 2011 a new class with Ukrainian language of instruction will be created, at the request of a group of parents of Romanian ethnicity. Although the

\(^2\) Lavric Aurelian, „În Nordul Bucovinei procesul de ukrainizare a școlilor românești ia amploare”, http://www.arena.md/?go=news&e=3220&t=În_Nordul_Bucovinei_procesul_de_ukrainizare_a_%c4%83colilor_româneşti_ia_ampa...22.06.2011.
Constitution of Ukraine stipulates the right of ethnic minorities to study in their mother tongue, including at university level, because of ignorance of the law, the Romanian minority are ready to obey to the process of Ukrainization, rather than to request, as taxpayers in the state budget of Ukraine, to create for them a university with Romanian language of instruction.

What is required? What should be done for the preservation, survival and development of local Romanian community, from its historical territory, now within the borders of Ukraine? After examining the situation of our compatriots from Ukraine, I have identified several urgent measures to be taken, which I would display by items:

1. It is necessary to create common governmental Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan commissions on the fields of education, culture and so on, to solve all problems of the Romanian ethnic minority;

2. To create institutions of higher education in Romanian language (an university or an pedagogical institute with Romanian as the language of teaching) in CernăuŃi or in HerŃa; or to establish faculties with Romanian language of instruction at the University of Chernivtsi, in other words – the transformation of this university from a mono-cultural into a multicultural one, pursuant to the provisions of the Romanian-Ukrainian Agreement of 1997. The example of the Hungarian minority from Romania, which has the possibility to study at colleges and universities in their native language - Hungarian (there are over 90 departments in Hungarian at the University of Cluj), and the Bulgarian and Gagauz minorities from the Republic of Moldova, each one having a university with Gagauz language of instruction in Comrat and Bulgarian language in Taraclia, are models that have to be promoted. As part of measures to improve the situation of the Romanian community in Ukraine can be considered similar measures aiming the Ukrainian community in Romania and the Republic of Moldova.

3. The relation Ukraine – Republic of Moldova needs symmetry with regard to opening of schools where teaching is performed in the mother tongue (or transforming the existing ones, where teaching is performed in a language other than the mother tongue, in schools where teaching is performed in mother tongue of the ethnicity residing in the village). At present, in the Republic of Moldova in most of the villages populated by Ukrainians the language of instruction in schools is Russian, the same as in Ukraine there are Romanian or Moldovan villages where the language of instruction in schools is Russian or Ukrainian. So there is a need to open schools with the Romanian language of teaching in the Romanian villages with no such schools.

4. If such an approach is accepted, the authorities of the Ukrainian state and of the Moldovan state, possibly of the Romanian state would take interest
of these reborn schools to equip them with textbooks and the libraries with bells and other literature. The Ministries of Education from Romania and RM have to provide teaching materials, if the Ukrainian authorities cannot do this for their citizens – tax payers; to provide books by classic writers, dictionaries, literature for children for the Romanian schools (Romania could support “Alexandu cel Bun” Publishing house from Chernivtsi to publish the texts of the classic writers).

5. The exchange of experience between the teachers that perform the tuition in Romanian language in Ukraine with their colleagues from Romania and from the Republic of Moldova would constitute another important step in helping our compatriots across the political borders of the two Romanian states.

6. Another measure to be taken is signing of new interstate agreements on the recognition or equivalence/nostrification of diplomas obtained in Romania and the Republic of Moldova by citizens of Ukraine, without their owners having to pay fees (which are very high) and pass other exams in Ukrainian or for Ukrainian language.

7. Opening, in localities inhabited by Romanian, of bookshops with Romanian literature, as, for example, the Hungarian minority in Romania also has such bookshops.

8. Opening of radio and television stations to broadcast in the language of the Romanian minority in areas where the Romanian minority from Ukraine lives.

9. To create the opportunities to make subscriptions to the cultural Romanian and Moldovan newspapers.

10. To organize the festivals of movies produced in Romania and RM.

11. Opening of a theater in Romanian language in Chernivtsi or Hertsa, often tours of the theaters from Romania and the Republic of Moldova (to show theatre performances) in the localities inhabited by Romanians on the Moldovan/Romanian historic territory, currently within Ukraine.

12. Opening a branch of the Romanian Cultural Institute in Chernivtsi or Hertsa is a matter of urgency.

13. Reaching of an agreement on local border traffic between Romania and Ukraine, for the Romanians from Ukraine to obtain the right to cross the Romanian-Ukrainian border without a visa (possibly without passports, by means of the identity cards) as they can travel in Moldova (in this regard, the authorities from Bucharest and from Kiev must achieve the same agreement as the Polish Government achieved with the Ukrainian Government).

14. Restitution of the Romanian House building, built for this purpose since the interwar period, to the Romanian community. Currently the building lodges the Army/”officers” and other institutions.
15. To enhance the cooperation within the Upper Prut Euro region and Lower Danube Euro region, between the RM, Ukraine and Romania.

16. The example of the Swedish minority from Finland would be useful to follow: as it is known, the Swedish language has the status of state language in Finland. Perhaps, it would be useful to introduce the Romanian language as the official language in the Romanian villages from the Chernivtsy, Odesa and Transcarpathian regions.

In conclusion, we can say that Romania and the Republic of Moldova should morally and materially support the Moldovan-Romanian minority on its historical territories, now within Ukraine.

So, for the survival of the Moldovan-Romanian minority on its historical territories, currently under state borders of Ukraine, it is necessary to put together the efforts of the authorities and civil societies of the two Romanian states, Romania and the Republic of Moldova, and also the minority Moldovan-Romanian in Ukraine shall take actions, shall aim to keep its ethnic identity and require observance of its rights stipulated both in the Constitution and in other laws.

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Abstract. The slovak population from the upper part of Bistra valley played an important role in the economic, social and political life of the area. Present here from the late XVIII\textsuperscript{th} century, the slovak community faced all the changes caused by historical, political, economical evolutions and still remains, in the present, an active and important part of daily life with significant influence upon all other social and economic components.

1. Location of the study area

The Bistra basin is situated in the north-western part of Romania, being framed by the following mathematical coordinates: 22°36’ - 22°64’ East longitude and 47°12’ și 47°37’ North latitude, the river being the most important tributary of Barcau river.

The territory drained by the Bistra river overlaps the three morpho-structural types of units, namely: the mountainous unit (Plopis Mountains), hilly unit (Dernei Hills) and depression relief, including a corridor of the valley (Barcau river valley), which finds its explanation in the tectonics and structure formation in the region and the extensive erosion agents.
Fig. 1. The location of the study area within Romania and Bihor county

The creation of the most important river in the region (Bistra), imposed both by the size of the basin, and by his age. Has its source in Mount Plopiș, with a relatively large catchment area (180 km²).

2. Historical landmarks of the colonisation

The colonisation of slovak population was made under two control factors: some hungarian noble families, such as Csáki family, who rule the Sinteu domain, or Bárányi and Banfy families; under the control of Austrian-Hungarian authority, in different parts of Transylvania.

The colonisation process was made by the Imperial authorities in several steps the most important moment being the following:
- First families arrived from three different regions: Orava, Kysica and Gemer in 1785 and they founded Budoi village (Ștefăno, 2004: 20). But according to other sources the foundation of Budoi village could be related to year 1828 (Suciu, I, 1966: 110). The most probable year of
foundation it is considered to be 1785 as the moment of the arrival of the Slovak colonists because the first documentary mention, 1828, did not mean the year of appearance of the village.

- New Slovak colonists arrived in 1790 from Gemer and Zemplin area and they founded villages Borumlaca and Varzari (Štefanco, 2004: 20).
- In 1817 Count Bánffy colonize with Slovak settlers from Šariš, Gemer and Zemplin, Tarna valley and Sinteu. (Štefanco, 2004: 20).

3. Historical Evolution of the Slovak Community

This process has some different stages and all the stages went under different historical, political, economical and social circumstances but all these processes have in common the following circumstances: during times they kept a strong relation with their home land (in 1829 the Slovak community from Budoi built his own church) (Štefanco, 2004: 31); in the interwar period many Slovak teachers came from Slovakia and were involved in the life of these communities; after 1945 many Slovak families went back to Chechoslovakia; the isolation of these communities is the primary cause of preservation of authonomy and ethnic identity (Štefanco, 2004: 21-23).

Fig. 2 Slovak families from Budoi in the 30's

(Source of pictures: Ondjei Andreiko, Despre slovacii din România, Editura Ivan Krasko, 2001: 8)
4. The economic activities – key factors in the preservation of the identity of Slovak population.

The forest exploitation, the glass producing activity and the mining activity were the first industrial activities in which the Slovak community was largely involved (Štefanco, 2004: 20-23). The mining activity started at the beginning of XIXth century, the first geological surveys being made in 1818.

The first mine was called Budoi Tunel because the coal was transported through an underground tunnel to Derna Tatarus village, where a Hungarian company called Magyar Asphalt had built an asphalt and bitumen processing factory.

Fig. 3. Miners from Budoi in the 80s

(Source of picture, www.Adevarul.ro)

From 1948 the mines belonged to Romania state and they were operational up to 2004. The first way of disposal were in 1997 and the process continued up to 2004 when the mines were completely closed (the mines functioned relatively long period comparatively with other mining areas in Romania).

4.1 The happy days.

This period is so-called the „happy days period“ because it was, by far, the most significant from financial point of view. The period started with the opening of quarry exploitation, in 1980, in Budoi 1 site, and was continued with the opening of the second quarry, in 1991, the estimated reserves in 1990 were over 1 million tones of coal. In 1985 the total production of the mines covered 6% of Romania's lignite production (source of data: Ministry of Economy).

4.2 The glass factory from Padurea Neagra

The first factory appeared in the first period of the XVIIth century at Huta Sinteu but few years later was built the factory which soon will become
the icon of the glass makers in the north-western part of Romania, the glass factory from Padurea Neagra (Pinta, 1991: 153). During the period of functioning the factory was renewed several times, unfortunately, in the 90's was completely abandoned. The skill and the attachment to the traditions of the Slovak workers turn them into unique values of this craft.

Fig. 4. The “Happy Days” of the glass factory from Padurea Neagra in 1915

(courtesy of Mr. Constantin Demeter private collection)

5. The present

Unfortunately the present is not so bright as the past was for the Slovak communities. The economic decline of the area and demographic negative balance forced the Slovak community to face a new situation, unknown in the past. The mines, which represented the economic background for the communities, were closed in several steps: Varzari mine in 1999, Cuzap mine in 1994-1995, Budoi mine in 1997 (underground exploitations), and the quarries were closed in 2003-2004.

Although the mining activity is closed, the communities show strong attachment to the values of the past although, slowly by slowly, all the signs of the past are removed. The communities try to face the situation in different ways the most representative ways being the following: the refuse to accept the difficult present situation and the permanent will to find solutions. The most
accepted way of facing the situation is the emigration of the male former workers from the glass factory or miners mainly in Senica area (southern Slovakia) in the glass factories.

Fig. 5. The symbols of the past still present in the collective memory of the community

(Source of pictures, Nistor S.)

Being a very open community, the Slovaks allowed the presence among them of a variety of different ethnic groups (romanians, Hungarians, gypsies, jews) this feature having as a result the existence of an multi-ethnic demographic structure of the upper Bistra valley. This feature allowed the Slovaks to learn the language of the other ethnic groups (for example Hungarian language) which is significantly useful in present because allowed the Slovak workers a very easy integration in the glass factories from Ajka (Hungary).

6. Conclusions

Under present circumstances the future of the Slovak community is definitely not a bright one. Although the present sighs are not very bright the future, under a clever management of the present circumstances could turn into a better one. In brief, the favorable conditions could be summarized as follows:

- Natural resources (accessible mountains, mineral and thermal water resources, relatively untouched landscape) sandy bitumen and coal reserves for industrial exploitations could represent the base for a future economic background, the first good signs being already present (the re-opening of the former coal quarries by local and foreign investors);

- Taking into account the potential, the development of local tourism could be a good alternative. This alternative is based on two main factors: the closeness of three important cities (Oradea, Alesd and Marghita) which could
supply weekend tourists; the vicinity of Hungary (about 60 km from Debrecen, Hungary’s second largest city) and the Hungarian language;

- Relatively good road infrastructure is another major factor and the importance of this factor will definitely increase after the opening of the Transylvania Highway in the nearby vicinity of the area.

**Fig. 6. Padurea Neagra holiday village**

![Padurea Neagra holiday village](image_url)

(Source of picture Nistor S.)

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THE PHENOMENON OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE
THE INTEGRATION PROCESS OF IMMIGRANTS IN SCOTLAND, UK AND IN WASHINGTON STATE, USA. IMMIGRANTS FROM COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Judit MOLNÁR*

Abstract. Migration is a key element of modern society, bringing benefits and conflicts both to the receiving places and to the places of origin and raising issues of security, social measurements and multiculturalism in our globalised world. This paper aims to analyse the processes of integration into a new society for immigrants, providing examples of the experiences of groups moving from countries of the former Soviet Union to the USA (Washington State) or to the UK (Scotland). We compare immigrant groups’ experiences in different countries through different times and argue that different elements have an effect on the integration and acculturation process, e.g. how the receiving society’s characteristics and attitudes, or how the characteristics of the immigrants, can modify the newcomers’ adaptation processes of the new culture, country and customs. These circumstances can have significant impacts on the individuals’ lives, by relieving or exacerbating the difficulties of the period of integration. Our methodology comprises questionnaire surveys (91+81) of immigrants and local citizens, and qualitative interviews (17+4) of émigrés and local authorities in both countries: in Scotland and Washington State.

Keywords: international migration, adaptation of the new society, émigrés, host society

1. Introduction

Despite the international migration has not involved huge proportion of the world’s population, it has got very significant impact on the countries of

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departures and destinations. “By 2007, the figure [international migrants] approached 200 million or approximately 3 percent of the world’s population of 6.5 billion people.” (Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. 2009). However, 3% does not suggest big volume worldwide, but because the immigration happens to be concentrated in certain places and certain times, requiring fast reaction for both, the destination and departure sides, its consequences have effects on the economies and societies of both places for a long period. In many cases the host countries are surprised by very significant immigration waves challenging their capabilities to handle these situations.

The number of the publications about international migration is almost uncountable, it is impossible to look at and study them all. It is still significant its literature if we only focus on one aspect of the relating issues within the whole immigration studies. We were interested in papers related to immigrants’ integration, acculturation. Many of them investigate selected ethnic groups’ situation in their new home places, like Woltman and Newbold or Skop wrote about the Cuban Americans émigrés (Woltman K, and Newbolt, K. B. 2009, Skop, E. H. 2001). E.g. Haines studied the Vietnamese (Haines, D. W. 2002); Martin, Martinez, Oppenheimer, Alba explored immigration issues of Mexicans (Martin, P. 2002; Martinez, 1994; Oppenheimer, R. 1985, Alba, R. 2006); Hardwick, Kishinevsky, Kopnina wrote about immigrants from countries of the former Soviet Union (Hardwick, S. W. 1993, Kishinevsky, V. 2004, Kopnina, H. 2005); Robila’s work investigates émigrés from East Europe in the USA (Robila, M. 2010), etc. Other papers focus on the theoretical issues of immigration and immigrants’ adaptation. Portes and Böröcz underline three basic dimensions of assimilation: 1) condition of exit; 2) the class origin of immigrants and 3) the contexts of reception (Portes, A. – Böröcz, J. 1989). The segmented adaptation theory is based on three factors: 1) the nature of migration to the host country (forced or voluntary); 2) the resources that immigrants bring; and 3) the host country’s reception (Portes, A. – Zhou, M. 1993, Skop, E. H. 2001). Woltman and Newbold consider the segmented assimilation theory (“discrimination and unequal opportunities affect processes of adaptation”) “in the context of how the adaptation of Cuban émigrés differs along lines of race” (Woltman, K. – Newbold, K. B. 2009). Skop argues the same issue in case of the adaptation of Mariel Exiles (Skop, E. H. 2001). Zelinsky and Lee pointed out the impact of the new technologies on immigrants’ sociospatial behaviour, how inventions reformed the late 20th century’s communication provided new aspects for people to keep in touch, creating or keeping their social networks (Zelinsky, W. and Lee, B. A. 1998). Berry introduced four-four acculturation strategies of ethno-cultural groups and larger society: Strategies of ethno-cultural groups are: integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization, while the acculturation strategies of larger
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society are: multiculturalism, melting pot, segregation and exclusion (Berry, J. W. in: ed. by Azzi, A.E, Chryssochoou, X, Klandermans, B, Simon, B. 2011.).

This paper focuses on the process of the immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union in Washington State, USA and in Scotland, UK. In this research we employed both statistical and empirical methods. We asked altogether 172 people: 91 immigrants and 81 local citizens in the two host countries. As the consequences of the lack of statistical data about these immigrants’ figures we only could utilize non probability sample. We also used in-depth interviewing among immigrants and locals. Additionally we contacted with different associations dealing with immigrants and immigration issues in both countries, we conducted altogether 21 interviews.

2. Adaptation to the new place and society

Our approach includes two ways process: studying the characteristics and resources of the immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union in Washington State and Scotland; and investigating the local residents’ attitudes of the host societies toward the immigration. As these characteristics are changing, the adaptation process alters as well determining the acculturation of an immigrant or immigrants groups.

2.1. Characteristics and resources of immigrants

The way and the reason how and why migrants leave their countries of origin has effect on the process of adaptation. Many scholars emphasized that the process of integration or assimilation is different if someone experienced forced or voluntary immigration as one dimension of the segmented assimilation (Portes, A. and Zhou, M. 1993, Portes, A. and Böröcz, J. 1989, Skop, E. H. 2001). If people had to flee because of war or political, religious or ethnic persecution, could receive refugee status in their new countries, which would provide very different situation for them: they would receive significant help in their place of destination (of course it may vary according to the receiving country’s immigration policy). Portes and Böröcz also pointed out that if an immigrant loses his/her possibility to return to his or her homeland it effects his/her attitude toward his/her new country resulting special process of his or her adaptation to the new society (Portes, A. and Böröcz, J. 1989).

Hardwick (1993) says about the Russian speaking immigrants in the West Coast, USA, that “Russians have not been typical of other Euramerican immigrant groups in North America…Russian residential enclaves have been relatively slow to disperse through time” (Hardwick, S. W. 1993, p.4). Hardwick argued that there are many reasons behind this phenomenon, like members of some religious groups tend to stay separated from the main stream of the
society, but the host country negative reception also made obstacles for these immigrants’ integration (Hardwick, S. W. 1993). Our research results show that after 1990 the characteristics of immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union have been changed in this area of the USA. There are still refuges but their number has significantly dropped. More and more people arrive with work visa permit or other visas finally finding their way to stay.

The immigrants’ story from the countries of the former Soviet Union is a bit different in Scotland. As Kopnina says “in the nineteenth century, most Russian migrants left for America, Canada, Germany and France. …[In Britain] However, members of the Russian political opposition, although not numerous, were quite influential.” (Kopnina, H. 2005, p. 24). She refers to four waves of immigration from the Soviet Union to Great Britain: the first one related to the Russian Revolution in 1917, the second one occurred after the Second World War, the third wave concerns the period between 1950 and the end of 1980s. All of these émigrés left their homeland because of political, cultural, religious or ethnic persecutions (Kopnina, H. 2005). After this period more and more people arrive from these countries because of economic reason during the fourth wave up to recent days (Kopnina, H. 2005). Many arrived from the Baltic states after the join to the European Union as our result represents (table 1).

Table 1 Characteristics of respondents: making decision about leaving their country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why did they leave their home countries?</th>
<th>Washington State %</th>
<th>Scotland %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unfavourable economic circumstances in the CoO (Country of Origin)</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious discrimination</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic discrimination</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better economic situation in the USA /UK</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better future for their children</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reason</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the outcome of our questionnaire survey there are still numerous émigrés who left their homeland because of religious and ethnic persecution in Washington State, however, their proportion is less than 30% within our Washington State sample while their percentage is very low among our respondents in Scotland (2.7% and 5.4%). Most of the immigrants decided to leave their countries of origin because of economic reason or hoping better future for their children, but in Scotland their proportion is much higher (62.2%) than in Washington State (37%) (table1). 70.4% of these émigrés arrived at the USA between 1991 and 2004, while 61.1% of our immigrant respondents went to the UK after 2004. In both receiving countries had benefit
accommodate large proportion of highly educated people among these immigrants (in Washington State: 53.7%; in Scotland: 86.5%), but it is extremely significant in Scotland which refers to the brain drain phenomenon.

It was not easy to investigate their success of their new life. When we carried in-depth interviewing they mainly reported that they would be very happy, very satisfied with everything. When we asked them how they would measure their happiness in their home countries when they lived there, then their satisfaction with the circumstances and things when they just arrived at the destination country and finally how happy they are now, after living for few years in their new home place, they provided more classified answers. While among immigrants who live in Washington State we can see an improving progress since they left their countries of origin, among émigrés in Scotland from these countries had not had so bad experience in their homeland, but their feelings toward their new life had got better by the time (table 2).

### Table 2 Characteristics of respondents: attitude: happiness and national identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Washington State</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How happy they were/are (scale 1-5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to live in their countries of origin</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>when they entered</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>now</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>4.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their national identity (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian American</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian with Jewish roots</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud of their nationalities (scale 1-5)</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reason of this result is palpable if we look at the next table. We can see that among those who fled their home places because of some kind of discrimination, the happiness index is the lowest. They probably still have memories about how much they suffered and stated it in our questionnaire (table 3). And because their number was more significant in Washington State than in Scotland it had impact on the happiness index of the whole studied group in Washington state. This is why they even felt happier being in the USA when they just arrived despite all the hassle and difficulties what an immigrant has to tolerate. However, among those who had to flee because of ethnic discrimination we cannot see the similar progress of their happiness then among who suffered religious persecution. Among the former group the improvement level was two times bigger than in the latter one. However, among those who experienced ethnic persecution in their homeland their
happiness level was lower than those who had to bear religious discrimination in their countries of origin. But the former group had higher level of happiness by today. It is possible that those who belong to a special religious denomination perceive some kind of separation. Hardwick also argued that the strong religious belief had a role in the Russian speaking immigrants’ integration in the West Coast in case of some religious groups and could make this process slower than it usually is among white European: “Religious affiliations thus emerged as both a help and a hindrance to larger assimilation experience for these and other groups of refugees and immigrants” (Hardwick, S. W. in: ed. Jones, R. C. 2008, p. 36). If we continue the analysis of the immigrants’ adaptation using people’s happiness as its indicator, it is also interesting that the improvement of their happiness since they left their homeland is also relatively low among those who left their countries of origin because of economic reason. However, they provided the happiest group in recent time with those who hope a better future in for their children in their new countries (table 3). Further investigation shows relating to this issue that the happiest at home were among those who left their countries of origin because of family reason. Many émigrés arrived when they were elderly to join to their children. It is more difficult for them to adopt a new society, they usually do not speak the language, and they left their friends and other relatives behind. Only among this particular group we could see that they were less happy when they arrived than in their homeland and however, there is an improvement in their feelings by recent time, but it is very little betterment (table 3).

**Table 3** Happiness level of living in their home countries and in the host places according to the reason of leaving their countries of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics, scale 1-5 (1= the worse, 5=the best)</th>
<th>1. happiness level of living in their home country</th>
<th>2. satisfaction when they arrived at the USA/UK</th>
<th>3. how they like living in the USA/UK now</th>
<th>difference between 2-1</th>
<th>difference between 3-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>better future for their children</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bad economic situation in their home countries</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all economic related reason</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>better economic situation in the new places</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic discrimination in their home</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics, scale 1-5 (1= the worse, 5=the best)</th>
<th>1. happiness level of living in their home country</th>
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<th>difference between 2-1</th>
<th>difference between 3-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>religious discrimination in their home countries</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family reason</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of our respondents explained well this situation: “We were not afraid to try a new life...As far as our homesickness is concerned, the beginning of our life here was the hardest...One should not emigrate without a very serious reason, because the lack of a serious reason will overtake you later and destroy your life” (Kotelnikov, D. 2001:50). Here we have to mention that because of our methods we cannot represent a real picture of the success of the acculturation. Not only because our sample is relatively small but because we could not interview those immigrants who returned to their home countries after a while. The frame of this study did not provide resources for broader investigation neither in its element of sample or its territorial expansion. This could be a further aim of our study. Most of our respondents considered themselves as Russian, however, in Scotland almost 20% of our immigrants said that they do not have national identity at all (table 2). Mainly they arrived from the Baltic states. This raises the question whether there is any connection between the attitudes towards their national identity and any issues of ethnicity in the post-Soviet states, such as one that was described by one of our Russian interviewees who left Estonia with his family: “In Estonia we were Russians, in Russia we were Estonians” (Kotelnikov, V. 2001:12). For those Russians who lived outside the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union the situation became more difficult, as we can see in the case of the Baltic states (Smith, D. – Burch, S. 2007). Meantime it is interesting that for the question how proud they are for their nationalities, we received more positive answer from our émigrés living in Scotland then from those who live in Washington State (table2) In both destination countries our immigrants (around 65% or more of them in both studied areas) tend to live in those neighbourhoods where other people with same nationalities live (table 4). Despite more than 60% of our respondents’ closest friends’ nationalities are the same as their nationalities, only around 10% stated that they would not have any international friends and in both destination countries more than 25% of our émigrés possesses that their closest friends come from the local citizens (table 4). Our result shows that there are significant differences between the factors of immigrants’ acquaintances and friends, relatives in the destination places who
are playing important role in the immigration and in the choice that what it would be their place of destination. While among our respondents in Washington State almost 80% of them had friends, relatives in their new country before they moved there, in case of the émigrés who settled down in Scotland this figure was only 46% (table 4). Maybe the distance and the fact that it is harder to enter the USA than UK from these countries, especially it is easy to move for the Baltic states members within the European Union, could have effect on this. When it becomes more difficult to move somewhere, émigrés rather would prefer chain migration to ensure their resettle process, as Portes and Rumbaut pointed out as well (Portes, A and Rumbaut, R. G. 2006).

**Table 4 Resources of immigrants respondents: social network**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Washington State %</th>
<th>Scotland %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Know people (relatives/friends) in the area before they came here</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in the area where other people from their countries of origin live</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They have friends among them</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their friends’ nationalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only people with the same nationalities than they are</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closest friends among local Americans, Scottish, British people</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their closest friends’ nationalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same nationalities than they are</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We cannot see big differences between the characteristics and attitude of our émigrés according to their relocated groups in the USA and UK. Their happiness level are very similar too, however, when we were curious about whether they want to return to their homeland, more our émigrés in Scotland stated that they would like to do that or they are thinking about it (table 5). We also could find some differences in their happiness according to the reason of their moving as we presented in this subchapter. But in general there were no significant dissimilarities between the characteristics of our immigrants in Washington State and Scotland.
The Integration Process of Immigrants in Scotland, UK and in Washington State, USA. Immigrants...

Table 5 Characteristics of respondents: thinking about returning to their countries of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would they like to return their CoO?</th>
<th>Washington State %</th>
<th>Scotland %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2. Characteristics and reception of the places of destinations

This subchapter investigates the attitude of the local societies toward the immigrants. Is there any significant differences between the mind-set and outlook of the two study areas’ local citizens toward this issue? How their attitude alter the process of adaptation of immigrants? How open these societies are toward immigration? The characteristics and reception of the host societies play significant role in the process of adaptation of émigrés. As Berry argued: “acculturation is a two-way interaction, resulting in actions and reactions to the contact situation.” (Berry, J. W. in: Azzi, A.E, Chryssohoou, X, Klandermans, B, Simon, B. 2011, p.282). We tried to explore the locals’ social networks regarding their relations and connections with international people. The table 6 shows that our Americans in Washington State had more international friends than local people living in Scotland. The figure is even more extreme if we do not count British or English people as international (table 6). If we look at their closest friends’ nationalities, we can see that more Americans have international friends than Scottish people (table 6). These figures suggest that the Americans are more open toward immigrations. During our surveying our local American respondents emphasized that they are immigrants themselves. In contrast for a Scottish person an English man or woman is a foreigner.

Table 6 Characteristics of the place of destinations: social network of the local Americans/Scottish people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Washington State %</th>
<th>Scotland %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They have friends in their neighbourhood</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their friends are only Americans/Scottish people - Sc+Br+En</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>36.7/63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closest friend’s nationality is American/Scottish people - Sc+Br+En</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>86.7/96.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The immigrants received more help in the USA than émigrés in Scotland according to our data (table 7). The reason of this is that there were more refugees in Washington state in our sample than in Scotland and there is
an officially organised service for them which provide help them to settle down in the US.

**Table 7** Reception of the place of destination: supporting émigrés

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Washington State %</th>
<th>Scotland %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received help when they moved to the USA / UK</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received help to settle down, financial support</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial support from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friends, company</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reception of the host society always plays significant role in the development of adaptation of émigrés. Not only the resources and the characteristics of the newcomers can modify this process but the host society reception as well as many argued (Portes A. and Böröcz J 1998, Skop, E. H. 2001, Woltman, K. Newbolt, K. B. 2009 and others). One element of this treatment is the level of discrimination against foreigners, the lack or the existence of xenophobia, the level of tolerance toward these immigrants. In our sample we could not really discover strong discrimination against our immigrants group (table 8). They only experienced a little impatience from locals because of their lack of English (table 8).

**Table 8** Reception of the place of destination: discrimination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale 1: never – 5: always</th>
<th>Washington State</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>discrimination because of their nationalities</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uncomfortable feeling because they are foreign</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feeling that they are not welcome because of their nationalities</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disadvantages because of their English</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally we asked our local Scottish citizens what benefits and difficulties are there in Scotland in receiving immigrants (table 9). They rather see cultural diversity as a good thing, however, they worry about their loosing position in the labour market because of the immigration. Regarding the qualification and demographical issues they welcome immigrants. Some of them mentioned the increasing house cost and tapering social benefits as one of the causing elements by immigration (table 9).
Table 9. Reception of the place of destination: attitude toward immigration in Scotland 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What benefits/difficulties are there in Scotland in receiving immigrants</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural diversity</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regarding employment</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regarding qualification</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing population</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing housing costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having problem to provide additional support</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some immigrants only use benefits but cannot give anything back to the country</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing crime level</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Altogether 86.7% of our Scottish respondents mentioned at least one benefit in receiving immigrants and 90% of them stated at least one disadvantageous factor (table 10). 23.3% of them see two things as good about it and 16.7% of them brought up two reasons why it is not beneficial and furthermore 10% of them had three things to say as difficulties about having émigrés in Scotland (table 10) So the picture is complex, but not hopeless. The advantages and disadvantages are almost balanced among the Scottish locals.

Table 10 Reception of the place of destination: attitude toward immigration in Scotland 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What benefits/difficulties are there in Scotland in receiving immigrants</th>
<th>Altogether %</th>
<th>Mentioning 1 thing (%)</th>
<th>Mentioning 2 things (%)</th>
<th>Mentioning 3 things (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration has benefits</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration has disadvantages</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of our interviewees explained the role of very supportive attitude’s importance of their integration process: “We have lots of help. Lots of people, American people around offering help like once a week, twice a week you could come they could help with the language, it was amazing. And one person who we used to live with in an apartment building, her name is Miss C, at the time when we met she was an international counsellor at the Seattle Pacific University. She offered us help, right away when we came after a week, she helped us with language, and she helped Michael, my husband, and he started a
couple of courses at the Seattle Pacific University. This lady was amazing to us.” (Lena, November 2009). We called this element micro environmental factor, which can have significant effects on the individuals’ lives, by relieving the difficulties of the period of integration.

3. Conclusion

We have to emphasize that the international migration and the process of the adaptation, acculturation of immigrants are very complex phenomenons. It is not possible to forecast exactly how many people are going to leave their homeland and when it could occur, where they would move, etc. Our model represents this complicated system (Figure 1). The process of acculturation is similarly complex, relying on many factors and elements as we can see in Figure 2. However, in this paper we do not aim to introduce these models in more detailed as it is the purpose of our future article. We only provided them as to demonstrate the complexities of these phenomenons. Both models represent open systems. In case of the migration the model shows the two main poles of the system, the place of departure and destination. The characteristics of them and their players and the interactions, relations between these elements will create an always changing situation for the migration. The adaptation model describes the two-way process, the characteristics of these factors and elements which determine and modify the success of the émigres’ accultaration.

Figure 1 Model of immigration
In this paper we provided some examples for this integration process in case of the immigrants from the countries of the former Soviet Union in two departure places: in Washington State, USA and Scotland, UK. Our result shows that immigrants in Washington State experienced more significant change in their happiness if we compare its levels at their home countries with their new home. They think less to moving back, they are very satisfied with their life and their children possibilities in the US. However, the immigrants from the same countries in Scotland are also quite happy, more than 50% of them thinking about to return their home countries. It is also palpable that the Scottish people less open toward immigrants than Americans in Washington State. Despite their similar appearances than the local citizens have, they feel being strangers in their new home, which for the first generation is not unusual. The question is that how the local society will accept their children if their parents could manage their stay in the UK and then how this second generation will be able to acculturate. It is positive that the Scottish people think about multiculturalism as a good thing, however, they are also concerned about their perception in the shrinking labour market and the imbalanced social system because of the immigrants. There always be a conflict between the new arrivals and locals if the number of émigrés reached a certain amount at a time and at a place. In some cases it is just simple impossible to prepare for receiving these immigrants in every level of the society, but well organised measurements can reduce tens significantly. It is a matter of not only macro political and economic regulations but also micro political actions, civil society programs and supportive attitude of individuals and communities. Many immigrants remain
in their new country because of e.g. they cannot return to their homeland for different reasons (they lost their citizens, war, extremely unfavourable economic circumstances, corrupt political system, etc.), or their children who grew up in the new country, do not want to leave, their parents’ country is strange to them, etc. It is beneficial for everyone if they can resettle well and find a good way of their new life. If they can see their children being happy and having good opportunity they will be more satisfied themselves and their children can integrate very well into their new society. If the destination countries’ societies, politics, measurements cause obstacle to their acculturation progress there would be a risk that they might fail to integrate and will remain being excluded. If this would happen in the target countries of the migration this could cause serious problems in their economies and societies. Europe has very different experience regarding to the migration then the USA, in both places there are success and failures in their experiences regarding to the integration of immigrants. Supporting the first generation helps to integrate the second generation well. Providing support to the host communities to accept émigrés helps the acculturation process. All these things with good political and economic measurements could establish a successful multiculturalism.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Abstract. This essay explores the strong and weak aspects of Moldovan Communities formation abroad. As the Moldovan Diaspora is not yet established, the process is at the beginning, the formula Moldovan Communities Abroad is accepted. Authors referred to the role of Moldovan Communities in maintaining and promoting cultural, national values in the host countries: Italy, Spain, Portugal. Also, the relations between Moldovan Communities Abroad and authorities from Republic of Moldova to strengthening the dialog are analyzed. The Scientific Diaspora is treated as a type of Diaspora which contributes to cultural and education relations with the homeland. We consider that representatives of the Moldovan diplomatic corps should increase their relationship with Diaspora associations abroad in order to offer their total support to Moldovan citizens, working migrants.

Keywords: migration, Moldovan Communities Abroad, scientific Diaspora, cultural associations, ethnicity, remittances.

Throughout human history, people singly, more often in groups, have moved across international borders. Migration is considered one of the defining global issues of the early twenty-first century, as more and more people are on the move today than at any other point in human history. There are now about 192 million people living outside their place of birth, which is about three per cent of
the world's population. This means that roughly one of every thirty-five persons in the world is a migrant. With globalization the numbers continue to grow.

The migration in Republic of Moldova represents a widespread and highly important process due to the fact that a significant share of persons able to work is involved there into, and related money transfers make up 1/3 of GDP. There is no adequate and complete information regarding the exact number of migrants working abroad. One of the reasons is the lack of an effective and log-life recordkeeping of migration processes. In addition, the lack of overall national control on eastern borders of the country, resulting from the unsolved Transdniestrian Conflict also has adverse impact on the labor migrants’ record-keeping process.

Diasporas are the consequence of transnational migration. A Diaspora is a transnational community that defined itself as a singular ethnic group based upon its shared identity. Diasporas result from historical emigration from an original homeland. Ethnic Diaspora communities are now recognized by scholars as "inevitable" and "endemic" features of the international system. Diasporas are thus perceived as transnational political entities, operating on "behalf of their entire people", and capable of acting independently from any individual state (be it their homeland or host states).

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The interest in Diasporas, defined here as migrants and their descendants who have maintained strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin, is not hard to understand. The definition of Diaspora includes temporary and permanent migrants and is adapted from Gabriel Sheffer’s classic work on modern Diasporas. In the contemporary context, with the acceleration in international mobility, the term Diaspora has been used more broadly to encompass expatriate populations who are living outside of their home countries or contemporary Diaspora linked with issues of transnationalism and globalization (Hugo, 2005). Diaspora population may consist of people living permanently in the country of origin or country of

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1 www.iom.int (accessed on 25.05.2011)
Diaspora as an Element of Cultural-Ethnic Cohesion

destination, and migrants who work abroad temporary, people who hold double citizenship, ethnic Diaspora.

The phenomenon of Diaspora poses challenges but also offers potential benefits to communities in both the homeland and the Diaspora. Diaspora communities face the dual challenge of integration into host communities and maintaining strong personal and cultural ties with their families and homeland. Countries of origin face the dual challenge of how to address issues such as brain drain and separated families, but also realize the full potential of financial remittances, business ties and other benefits of expatriate communities. Diasporas and home countries alike are realizing that both can benefit in important ways from strong partnerships addressing areas of mutual concern, ranging from identity in the Diaspora to development of the homeland.

In our research we will use the term of “Moldovan Communities Abroad” referring to Moldovan Diaspora since we consider that the process of the Diaspora formation is at the beginning phase. The term of ethnic communities is a phenomenon that characterizes the crystallization and strengthening of the Diaspora. Its main characteristic is, first of all, the fact that ethnic communities abroad are concerned with the self establishment, and are not preoccupied to enhance the interaction with the country of destination.

Many migrants originally regard themselves as persons who have left their homeland temporarily, intending eventually to return, and are so regarded by officials and the public in their host countries. As many as a third do eventually return to their homelands. Yet, the great majority, having rebuilt their lives in their host country, choose, when this is possible, to remain, as do their locally born and locally educated children. They form communities, hoping to retain their inherited culture and to reproduce, as much as possible, and the familiar environment of their former homeland. In residential enclaves in urban areas, they establish institutions to serve their distinctive religious, cultural, social, informational, entertainment, and economic needs and to relate to the society and to official-dom in their host country. These communities in host countries constitute the Diaspora from their country of origin.

While the Moldovan community abroad is relatively new, and many of the Moldovan migrants are only temporarily living abroad, these migrants increasingly come together to form Diaspora organizations. These organizations take a variety of forms, but generally aim to facilitate cultural, economic, social, educational links with Moldova. Some of these organizations collect donations from their members and send them back to Moldova for specific purposes, such as: the refurbishment of a school, winter clothes for a boarding school, or the building of a church. In addition to such nascent interests in development, these Diaspora organizations may also participate in the political, social and cultural affairs of Moldova and their own community. For example, the Association of the Moldovan Community in Ireland and
Moldova Vision established in 2006 by a group of Irish volunteers wants to help support rural communities in Moldova to develop social services. Moldova Vision now organizes events for the Moldovan community in Ireland, including Martisor Festival, Annual Christmas Party, Celebration of Independence Day (August), International Children's Day (June). Since September 2009, they have supported the Moldovan Embassy in London to provide a consular service in Dublin once a month for Moldovan nationals living in Ireland. One of the achievements of the Association and Moldova Vision from 2006-2010 are: grant of 100,000 euro to Casa Sperantei build a high spec, fully wheelchair accessible community centre in Cosnita village (Dubasari raion), grant of 5,000 euro to Hippocrates Centre, Chisinau to support their work with children with physical disabilities, etc.

The main role in order to organize and mobilize the Diaspora in the collective interests are material, cultural and organizational resources of the Diaspora and its opportunities in the country of residence, motivation and ability to maintain unity.

Diaspora is influenced by and interacts with both the country of origin, as well as that of destination and countries of origin with communities in destination countries (students associations, communities of migrant workers (seasonal, legal, illegal and others). It seeks to develop and maintain relationships with political, social, cultural institutions with destination and of origins countries.

A Moldavian community represents a homogeneous social phenomenon, which includes:

a) "Historical Diaspora" – Moldovan ethnic communities traditional living abroad, and keeping historical-spiritual legacy, also representatives of various ethnic groups (Hebrew, Germans etc...), who lived long ago in Moldova.

b) "Post-Soviet Diaspora," Moldovan communities abroad formed as a result of collapse of the Soviet Union. In the former Soviet republics, originating from Moldova, citizens of the new independent states found themselves: in Ukraine - 258 thousands, Russia - more than 200,000 persons, Kazakhstan - 19 500 persons. Belorussia - 5000 pers., Lithuania - approximately 6000 persons, Kyrgyzstan - 1 500 pers., Latvia - 1 500 pers., Estonia - 1 2000 pers.

c) Moldovan communities abroad, which are formed in the context of labor migration and do not intend to live abroad. This process occurs actively mainly in Italy, Greece, Spain (Mosneaga, Rusu, 2008: 91-103).

The process of forming Moldovan communities abroad is determined by a number of factors, both positive and negative.

The strong aspects of the process of forming Moldovan communities abroad are the following: firstly, the demographic and geographic concentration

3 Basarabian Community in Ireland www.moldova.ie/ (accessed on 15.05.2011)
of the Republic of Moldova citizens abroad. Moldovan labor migrants are mostly present in Russia (60%), Italy (20%), Portugal (5%), Spain, Turkey, Greece, France, Romania, and Ukraine. The tendency of migrants to concentrate in big cities – megalopolises is remarkable - ¾ of all Moldovan labor migrants are concentrated in 10 big cities (Moscow, Rome, Sankt-Petersburg, Istanbul, Odessa etc).

Secondly, the socio-cultural Moldovan communities abroad are characterized by their high skills and by having learned languages of immigration countries.

Thirdly, learning and emotional relationship with Moldova. This relation is stable and real, materialized in contacts with the family, money transfers and phone calls. The type of the relation is determined by the legal/illegal status, the seasonal nature of migration.

Fourthly, individual and collective initiatives manifested through assistance in solving social and legal problems of citizens (registration in the country of residence, web site support and cultural initiatives). Often these measures are facilitated by the authorities of the country of residence and choices in the municipal structures for the legal foreign migrants, (Moldovan advisers do exist in Italy, Portugal, Spain).

Fifthly, the church; Moldovan churches are built and opened under the Russian Metropolitan abroad (Russia, Italy, etc.). The church is not only an institution of spirituality, but also a mean of communication between migrants. Together with the Embassy, the church organizes Sunday schools and provides material help in finding a job sometimes.

In the sixth place, migrants remittances from Moldovan workers living abroad. The annual share of such remittances is permanently increasing. The amount of money transfers of citizens temporarily employed abroad (gastarbeiters) to Moldova via banks accounted for US$116 million in April, in 2011 reaching US$393.35 million within 4 months. According to the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) data, the remittances went up US$64.84 million (+19.7%) in comparison to the similar period of 2010. The main share of money was transferred via international money transfer systems - US$336.02 million. In 2010, the money transfers reached US$1.24 billion, which is 5.2% more against 2009. The historical maximum was registered in 2008, when Moldovan citizens remitted US$1.66 billion. According to the World Bank (WB) data, the transfers of Moldovan gastarbeiters reach 30% of the country gross domestic product (GDP)\textsuperscript{4}.

Origin countries’ interest stems unquestionably from the remittances that Diasporas send back to their homelands. Remittances are huge and, relative to other types of financial flows to developing economies, remarkably stable – a

\textsuperscript{4} Gastarbeiter remittances to Moldova reached over us$393 million http://www.azi.nmd/en/story/18840 (accessed on 06.06.2011)
particular feature in a time of global economic slowdown. Diasporas are also considered to be a major source of direct investments in key industries and are often seen as “first movers” who pave the way for other, more detached investors. They bring valuable skills, experience and networks, while acting as an influential lobby that can advance the homeland’s political and economic interests in the destination country. Their contributions have many faces and appeal to policymakers in both origin and destination countries.

Also, we have identified the weak aspects of the process of forming Moldovan Communities Abroad.

Firstly, it is connected with the character of instability of the migrants working illegally. Illegal status prevents the formation of Moldavian communities abroad. It is linked to lack of legal and social protection of migrants, to various risks and threats that can arise.

Secondly, poor organizational trend explained by the hard work of migrants. The situation differs based on the legal or illegal migrant’s status. There is a mutual distance between old Diaspora and new migrants. Nevertheless, the events organized by the embassy (primarily spring holiday - Martisor) represent cultural points of unification, linking them.

Thirdly, we have the perception of Moldovan identity amongst different migrants. This is subject to transformation processes in the period of post Soviet era, especially in Moldova. In the mass consciousness of Moldovan citizens the soviet and post soviet identity cohabits, as well as the political and ethnical identity, the Moldavian and Romanian one. This makes difficult the self-identification process of Moldovan Diaspora.

Fourthly, representatives of the Moldovan diplomacy do not facilitate strengthening of these communities. For most migrants, embassies and consulates are the first and most important bridges to the homeland, (for those who are in capital cities where Moldovan diplomatic structures are set up). They are not transparent and open to migrants, working just with some associations of our migrants.

Fifthly, it is the poor communication with and from Moldova. Practice demonstrates that Moldovan communities abroad have insufficient information on the situation in the country. The informal channels of communication are the main sources of information about Moldova: medications with relatives by telephone, with international routes, bus drivers, train conductors, migrants who have returned.

Please note that migrants use Internet possibilities insignificantly in obtaining information about Moldova. This is explained by lack of computer use, their inaccessibility.

As we remarked above, IOM/CIMI research points out that one of the main weaknesses in the relationship between Moldova and its Diaspora is the inability of the government of Chisinau to communicate effectively with
Moldovans abroad. Many overseas nationals have no access to Moldova's diplomatic missions or proper information about developments in Moldova.

The Moldovan government should find ways to strengthen its presence abroad through a broader network of embassies and consulates. Furthermore, Moldovan authorities should build up formal and informal communication networks and improve the use of mass media to further develop links with Moldovan nationals abroad. To inform its policy development, Moldova should establish a database of associations of Moldovan abroad.

There are some specialized structures involved in the Diaspora problems: the Interethnic Relations Bureau, Coordinating Council to support the Moldovan citizens living abroad and Coordinating Council of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova live abroad.

Thanks to the work of promoters of the Moldovan non-governmental organizations, in most countries in the world have already become known national Moldovan holidays - Republic Day and Our Language, Mărţişor. On the non-governmental basis are organized the Day of Moldovan culture (Russian Federation, Belarus), festivals of Moldovan language (Ukraine), are created language and cultural centers (Moscow - Russian Federation, Berlin - Germany Odessa - Ukraine), Sunday schools function (Latvia, Lithuania), working folk collectives (Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine), published newspapers (Ukraine), television and radio broadcasts in the Moldovan language (Lithuania, Ukraine) (Morozan, Margarint, 2004: 35).

The organization of the Diaspora Congress represents a way of communication between migrants and homeland; it's a possibility to strengthen the links between Diaspora and government. Till present were organized 4 Congresses: usually in October, in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. The IV Moldovan Diaspora Congress organized in Chisinau 14 October, 2010, adopts a resolution identifying measures such as the creation of a specialized state agency on Diaspora and a Diaspora council with a consultative role for Moldovan government; the involvement of Diaspora leaders in Moldovan official delegations; supporting the creation of Moldovan Cultural Centers in cities with large number of Moldovan migrants and promoting policies which would better involve the Moldovan Diaspora in the social, economic and political affairs of their home country. The Congress, organized by the Bureau of Inter-Ethnic Relations in partnership with IOM, brought together 110 Moldovans living in 31 countries, government ministers, Moldovan President Mihai Ghimpu and Prime Minister Vlad Filat.

Discussions also included the protection of migrants' rights; utilizing educational, cultural and scientific activities abroad to promote national culture and traditions; the importance of Moldovan Diaspora in promoting the country towards European integration and ways to consolidate the Moldovan Diaspora.
The adopted resolution will be discussed with Moldovan authorities at a later stage and will be included in the National Diaspora Action Plan.\(^5\)

Previously, the Diaspora managing and protecting Moldovan citizens abroad was identified as one of the key priorities in the Moldova National Action Plan on protecting Moldovan citizens residing abroad 2008 and the Program of Actions for supporting persons born in the Republic of Moldova residing abroad 2006-2009.

We will examine the cultural-ethnic role of some of the Moldovan communities abroad in such countries as: Italy, Spain, Portugal. Adaptation and integration of migrants is a very complex and controversial issue. In Rome, Italy 5 Moldovan ethno-cultural associations are registered ("Cittadini Moldavi in Italia", Istituto Italia-Moldavia, Assomoldave, etc.) (Монияга, Морару, Руснак, 2009: 93).

One of the Moldovan Community in Italy published a monthly magazine about and for migrants from Moldova - „Gazeta Basarabiei". The Association of Independent Press from the Republic of Moldova, in partnership with Comunison RC Association from Great Britain, published the first number of „Pro Diaspora” magazine – a periodical writing about and for migrants originating from the Republic of Moldova – (10,000 copies) 80 percent of circulation is distributed abroad, 20 percent - in Moldova.

The „Pro Diaspora” magazine aims at serving as a communication bridge between inhabitants of Republic of Moldova and fellow countrymen from abroad, connecting Moldovan diaspora from Europe and not only, and informing Moldovan migrants about the opportunities to invest the money earned abroad in Republic of Moldova’s economy. „Pro Diaspora” shall report about problems, success or failure, aspirations and experiences of Moldovan citizens from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Great Britain, Austria, Germany and other states, furnishing thematic information about Moldovan communities abroad, professional abilities and their rights in host-countries etc.

Official authorities being in diplomatic visit to European countries have on their agenda also meetings with the representatives of Moldovan Communities. For example, the Prime Minister Vlad Filat had a meeting with the Moldovan Diaspora in France on 12 April 2011. The ambassador to France, Oleg Serebrian, expressed satisfaction with the high number of participants in the meeting, noting that the France-based Moldovan community has displayed strong political activism. Also, he noted that France is the second host-country for Moldovan students (after Romania), with over 1,000 youths studying there. In his turn, Prime Minister Vlad Filat said that the political involvement of the France-based Moldovan community was proved during the 2010 snap

\(^5\) www.diaspora.md (accessed on 06.06.2011)
parliamentary polls, when a large number of Moldovan nationals exercised their right to vote.

Moldovan Communities from Italy organizes the national holidays of Moldova, literature evenings dedicated to Gr. Vieru and others cultural manifestations. At June, 8, acting President of Moldova, Parliament Speaker, Marian Lupu met with representatives of the Moldovan community in Italy. The sides discussed issues of providing support for Moldovan citizens working in Italy, pensions, recognition of diplomas, etc. Were informed the representatives of the Moldovan community the size of the ratification of bilateral agreements between our countries. Moldovan community in Italy has asked the Moldovan head of state support in solving several problems such as corruption. Also discussed was the need for national economic recovery, creating well-paying jobs that providing Moldovan citizens to return home and work.6

In order to consolidate the formation process of the Moldovan diaspora in Italy, the Pro-Diaspora Center Foundation Moldova was created with the following objectives: to create a network of associations between Moldova and Italy; to organize and support activities to preserve the national and cultural identity of the Moldovan Diaspora in Italy; to support the process of structuring the Moldovan Diaspora by supporting and establishing public associations; to attract potential representatives of the Moldovan Diaspora in developing collaborative relationship with institutions of the Republic of Moldova and Italy; to protect the national-cultural rights and interests of Moldovans in Italy in compliance with international human rights standards and laws of the country of residence.

In Spain the process of Moldovan community formation, their institutionalization in the form of ethno-cultural associations has not received a flurry of manifestation yet, like in Italy (Мошняга, Цуркан, Слободенюк, 2009: 159). Therefore, by virtue of linguistic features the Moldovans most often adhere to the Romanian or Russian-speaking communities. Examples include joint activities of the Moldovan-Romanian Association "TRAJANO" (translated name of the emperor Trajan), which promotes the Romanian culture: celebration of Martisor, Dragobete, Independence Day and other national and traditional holidays.

At the same time, the Moldovan ethno-cultural society of Portugal (especially, the Moldovan cultural center «Sentro de cultura moldavo») is attempting to establish branches of its association in Spain. These attempts are unsuccessful; one reason for this is the tendency of creating independent Moldovan Communities in Spain. However, it should be emphasized that what is observed, is the main trend of association, self-organization, not vertically

6 Lupu s-a întâlnit cu reprezentanții moldovenilor în Italia. http://www.diaspora.md/?pag=news&opa=view&id=304&t=fp=noutati_diaspora&start=&dl= (accessed on 06.06.2011)
and horizontally, with equality and parity rights for all associations, regardless of size, duration of existence, with social status of their members, etc.

The main Moldovan communities are located in large cities such as Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia.

It should be noted that in Italy and Portugal the Moldovan Diaspora consolidated the efforts to protect the interests of their representatives already on the national level. It is worth mentioning the effort of ARBs 'Bessarabia' association continually fighting for the rights of Moldovan citizens in Spain. The Association struggled enormously to establish democracy in Moldova and supported the voting process as much as possible.

The Embassy of the Republic of Moldova in Spain has an important role in promoting dialogue between Diaspora and diplomatic representatives. Meetings were organized with Moldovan citizens and official Embassy representatives, providing assistance in disseminating general information, including consular consultations with legal character. Various aspects of socio-human nature were also addressed, especially in the context of commemorating the 70th anniversary of the first wave of mass deportations of Moldova.

A special theme that was addressed covered the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the independence of Moldova. In this context an initiative group was set up, which would help to organize cultural and artistic events, under the patronage of the Embassy, titled "My heart is Moldova" (having as protagonists artists from the Republic of Moldova), which are expected on August 26th, 2011, in Bilbao, Spain.

The Moldovan community in Portugal passes the process of self-organization and possible creation of Diaspora. It should be mentioned that the Moldovan community in Portugal is one of the most numerous, after the Brazilian and Ukrainian community, and statistical data recorded over 24,000 citizens of the Republic of Moldova (Slobodeniuc, 2007: 165). The key players that could contribute to the creation of Diaspora are the citizens of Moldova who have decided to live and work in Portugal for a longer time.

Integration and adaptation of the citizens of Moldova is dynamic and complex. The complexity extends to economic, social, cultural and ecological relationships with intra-and inter-specific Moldovan community in Portugal. The most important non-governmental organizations founded by citizens of the Republic of Moldova which contribute more or less to cultural and social integration are: Centro Cultural Moldavo (CCM), Centro "Mihai Eminescu", Centro "Miorița" and Centro "Nash Style". The number of citizens who support the initiatives and projects aimed at community development is growing. However, it highlights a lack of organizational and administrative resources, directed to the development of the Moldovan community deserved

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7 http://www.spania.mfa.md/embassy-comes-you-ro/ (accessed on 20.05.2011)
to receive the status of Diaspora in Portugal. Actions of self-organization in Portugal require mobile civic leaders employed full time. It opens an opportunity for real support from the Republic of Moldova to theirs citizens in Portugal, through the implementation of civic projects and international assistance programs. Literary Circle of the Moldovan Diaspora in Portugal "Dor de Plai" organized at April, 30, 2011 a soiree devoted to literary and musical events of April 7, 2009, and the Easter Holiday and the holiday of the national flag.

As we can see, the members of Moldovan Communities from Spain, Portugal and Italy and decreasingly succeeding generations tend to lead transnational existences, economically and occupationally in their host country, but socially and culturally still in the old country. At home and in their neighborhood they communicate in their native language. They follow political events in the old country, they listen to radio broadcasts and read publications from their homeland or news and entertainment broadcast and published locally in their maternal language. They remit funds to help family members they have left behind; they contribute with funds to political movements that they favor in their homeland and support candidates for public office. In many cases as dual citizens, they are permitted to vote in elections in their former homeland, as well as in their adopted country. They call upon their homeland for cultural reinforcement, usually in the form of teachers and religious leaders, to help maintain their ancestral culture; governments and associations in the homeland eagerly provide them. They keep in touch with relatives and friends who have formed similar Diaspora communities in other countries and in other cities in their host country, and provide help when this is needed.

The post-Soviet space, in CIS countries there Moldovan Diaspora is characterized by long-time existence, the presence of citizenship, language skills, legal status, with high social status, the integration in the culture, customs and traditions of the country of residence. They do not want to come back and will not return to Moldova. This applies to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. A similar pattern is in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. The main problem of this Diaspora is associated with the persistence and resurgence of language and culture of their ancestors. They seek to restore and establish ties with their historic homeland.

We consider that the scientific Diaspora also, played an important role in the cultural-ethnic cohesion of Moldovan Communities abroad. The recent literature define the term scientific Diaspora as "a community antagonized by scientists abroad contributing to the development of their home country or region, mainly in science, technology, education and other related fields (Barre, Hernandez, Meyer, Vink, 2003).

The exchange of information between the scientific community in the Diaspora and the state of origin in both directions is the simplest form of
interaction (Casiadi, Porceșcă, Varzari, 2010: 29). In the context of transmission in the country of origin information and skills acquired abroad scientific Diaspora representatives may use the following methods: organization of annual seminars in cooperation with scientific institutions from the state of origin; providing consulting services to government authorities in the country of origin; involvement in training of young researchers; transfer of technology know-how; business network development among members of the Diaspora etc..

Taking into account these circumstances and acknowledging the need to involve scientific Diaspora of Moldova in the development of the country, Academy of Sciences in 2008 launched the initiative "Developing cooperation in Moldova's scientific Diaspora". The initiative is aimed primarily to create a platform for interaction between scientific Diaspora and the scientific community in Moldova by setting up staged Scientific Diaspora Network of the Republic of Moldova. Relevant in this respect is the project "Connecting scientific Diaspora from the Republic of Moldova for scientific and economic development of the country of origin", developed jointly with the Federal Polytechnic School in Lausanne.

A practical initiative in this regard is the recent national project launched under International Organization for Migration in Moldova (IOM), which meant to use migration as a development factor. In the same context, outlining a framework for effective policy to promote practical initiatives on January 31, 2010, acad. Gh. Duca – president of Academy of Sciences, prof. E. Constantinescu - the President of Academic Scientific Forum, President of Romania (1996-2000), and acad. E. Doga, composer, people's artist, member of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova drafted and signed the Declaration from Chisinau. The main goal is to sensitize and mobilize of our notorious figures in the cultural and scientific diaspora and to accelerate the accession of Moldova to European Union.

Moldovan communities abroad represent a real bridge for the establishment of bilateral ties, ways of cooperation between Republic of Moldova and states of immigration. In this regard, it should be noted that only in 2008 were opened the Italian Embassy in Moldova, consulates in Bologne (Italy), Istanbul (Turkey), Odessa (Ukraine), a Embassy in Spain in 2010, were there are more Moldovan migrants concentrated.

Migrants are often not aware of any official Moldovan organization that represents their interests in the place of migration. Some migrants referring to Diaspora organizations/MCA in their host countries, usually referred to unofficial groups of people involved in solving migrants’ problems, particularly concerning legalization and accommodation. For most migrants interviewed,

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the contribution of official organizations abroad to strengthening and mobilizing communities of other Moldovan nationals is rather small/insignificant.

Moldovan diplomatic representations abroad are not currently being effectively used by Moldovans. Moldovans appeal to them, as a rule, when they have problems with documents that can only be solved through these institutions. Migrants often accuse diplomatic services of lacking transparency in their operations, being corrupt and having unprofessional attitudes towards their fellow citizens (no fixed fees for services, no receipts provided, selling labor contracts or other fake documents, extorting money).

Expanding the network of diplomatic and consular services of the Republic of Moldova will consolidate Moldovan communities abroad, the establishment of closer ties with their homeland, migrants and the Diaspora. The structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova became more efficiently and targeted to the problem of informing Moldovan citizens living abroad. In this context, on the official sites of embassies is a compartment entitled Diaspora. Here is placed current useful information for migrants about the latest events from Moldova, governmental programs, from social, cultural area; opportunities for returning and providing opportunities for reintegration in Moldova.

Among the Diaspora, Moldovan Communities Abroad we observed a trend – the desire of self-organization, establishing contacts between the Moldovan citizens, immigrants from Moldova living abroad at both local level (where they live and work), and at regional, national and international levels of ethnic and cultural cooperation. This is typical for many countries, especially Italy and Portugal.

The International Organization for Migration launched at the end of 2010 a Call for Proposals for Diaspora Associations and initiative groups under the Diaspora Small Grants Mechanism. The initiative aims to support the communication between Diaspora associations and migrants in their host countries, to develop existing or create new ways of communication between Moldova and migrants abroad, to create service platforms for migrants in host countries and to strengthen the institutional capacities of Diaspora associations and initiative groups.

Currently, there are a number of state agencies dealing with the issue of external migration and management of migration problems in the Republic of Moldova. These agencies have different authorities, or deal in parallel with the same issues of data collection and problem management with no coordination between them”. As a result, there is a low efficiency in solving migration-related problems.

In conclusion, we outline the fact that Moldovan nationals abroad increasingly come together to form homeland associations. These organizations
take a variety of forms, but generally aim to facilitate cultural, economic, social, educational and political links with Moldova.

Governmental authorities should engage Diaspora communities as equal partners; comprehensive dialogue should be initiated between embassies and Diaspora associations. These consultations should lead to concrete collaboration in educational and cultural programming; with Moldovan authorities providing migrant associations with the tools needed to implement such programs.

In order to maintain and strengthen the link between migrants and their homeland, the Moldovan government should offer Moldovan children abroad Moldovan language classes, and support educational activities through the formation of youth movements.

The Moldovan government should also put an emphasis on cultural promotion through cultural emissaries and the celebration of national festivals and cultural events in destination countries, including art exhibitions, musical events, film festivals, literary events, Moldovan cuisine, etc. The establishment of Cultural Houses/Centers.

Policies should be developed to increase: the developmental impact of remittances, use of bank accounts and use of formal channels for money transfers. Temporary and permanent return migration schemes should be developed. Diaspora should be engaged for the purpose of joint development projects and the promotion of trade and investment as was stipulated in regulation on financial support meant for activities dealing with preserving national-cultural identity of persons originating from the Republic of Moldova residing abroad (Moldovan Diaspora) approved via decision No 1521 dated 29.12.2007.

The Moldovan government is keen to strengthen migrant associations in all the main destination countries, thereby enhancing very weak communication links between the Chisinau government and the Diaspora and mobilizing resources for Moldova’s development. Currently the positive impact of migrant organizations that are constructively engaged in development initiatives depends mainly on the transfer of remittances. One way to enhance the involvement of the Diaspora in development processes in Moldova is for governmental and international organizations to provide matching funds for such financial transfers that are put to effective developmental use. One of such program launched by government is named "The attraction of remittances in the economy." (PARE 1+1) having the goal to mobilizing Diaspora resources for economic development. By rule 1 +1, the government comes to say the following: for every leu of remittances invested, the government will give a leu. In other words our migrant workers, or their first degree relatives, may receive a grant of up to 200,000 lei. Thus, it is a small investment of 400,000 lei, additional support with advice, training and information. It is an attempt to
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redirect remittances from consumption to investment, to develop rural areas and create new businesses.

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Abstract. This paper studies the linkage between migration and (in)security in the context of two major conflicts that have marked the recent history of the Iraqi Kurds: the Gulf War and the Iraq War. One of its observations is that current migratory patterns from the Middle East towards Western Europe and the emergence of Middle Eastern ‘diasporas’ within the EU are important sources of perceived insecurity for the citizens of the recipient countries. This is related to a number of reasons including: historical experiences, recent events, cultural and religious cleavages, economic disparities, normative differences etc. Most of these factors are actually overemphasized and even exploited by the political elites or the mass-media. The European societies had become throughout centuries homogenous societies. The foreign element was usually rejected and blamed for anything went wrong within the society. A residual xenophobia is still manifesting in the behaviour of many Westerners whether or not they acknowledged it. Meanwhile, the positive aspects of migration are frequently forgotten.

Keywords: ethnicity, identity, minority, Islam, secularization, Kurds, imagined communities

Introduction

This paper approaches the interaction between migration and societal security in the context of two major conflicts that have marked the recent history of the Iraqi Kurds: the Gulf War and the Iraq War. The case-study used in this
This paper regards the migrations of ethnic groups from the Middle East to the EU countries and the establishment of ‘diasporas’ that signifies that these people define themselves as communities, fighting for their right to existence, forging or (re)claiming a sense of identity which is strongly related to their former motherland. The focus will be on the Kurdish diasporas in the EU countries.

**Background**

Some historians may have argued that the age of migration has passed (Musset, 2002a, 2002b), but the world in which has become more and more globalized, so that one can easily notice that the phenomenon of migration is still a daily reality. Whether or not people decide to leave their homeland countries for political, economic or religious reasons, the borders of the states are increasingly fading. The global trade, colonialism and post-colonialism or the development of new types of global communication (most of them allowing communication in real time) have in time contributed to migration. Currently, rural populations are seeking a better life in urban areas, so that there is a rural-urban/urban-rural migratory flow which, most often is seen inside the borders of the same state (Détang-Dessendre et al., 2001: 35-62). Migratory flows are also noticeable within cities from central areas to suburbs. Than, there are the so called internally displaced people due to violence, conflicts, environmental catastrophes or epidemic diseases (Internal Displacement, 2011: 8). In fact, the trends and patterns in global migration date as back as 1945 and have continuously accelerated up to the present. A report of the United Nations Population Fund highlights that one of every three migrants now lives in Europe, Western European countries receiving more migrants than they send to other countries (United Nations Population Fund, 2006). The International Organization for Migration estimates the number of migrants in 2010 around 214 million (WMR, 2010: 115). Most of them (around 42 million) are hosted by the USA, followed by the Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Canada, France, United Kingdom, Spain, India and Ukraine (WMR, 2010: 115).

One must further notice that the Western European countries have not been exposed to significant migration flows since the Early Middle Ages, which explains the reduced genetic diversity across the European populations. The Western European welfare states achieved a remarkable social and ethnic homogeneity in the 20th century. This pattern gradually changed after the end of the Second World War. Another key moment was the fall of the Iron Curtain and its demographic repercussions. Large numbers of people from Central and Eastern Europe migrated towards the West attracted by the prospects of a better life. The same happened with migrants from Northern Africa and the Middle East. The Western societies had to accommodate to these new
demographic patterns and trends and at the same time maintain their internal unity and solidarity (Mau, 2007).

**Migration and societal security**

In 1998, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde introduced a new framework for analyzing security studies (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: VII-VIII). They believed that the traditionalist agenda of international relations that emphasized the role of the military element was not offering anymore a coherent explanation for what was happening in the post-Cold War security agenda. These theorists of the Copenhagen School of security studies proposed a widening of security agenda, encompassing the societal sector alongside the military, economic, environmental or political sectors, as important elements for the national security. This paper argues whether the phenomenon of migration produces security or insecurity in the societal sector of security studies.

In conceptualizing societal security, one must first understand its antinomy: societal insecurity. When a community perceives a development or potential threat to its existence as a community than there is societal insecurity (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 119). It is a matter of identity, namely of *imagined communities* (Anderson, 1991)\(^1\) seldom associated with the nation-states. Such communities have the capacity of self-sustaining their identity and they differ from place to place and from time to time. If in nowadays’ Europe one can still argue that nationality is one of the most consistent factors in defining identity, in other places religion or race could play the same role. In order to identify oneself with a group a person has to select at least one characteristic (political, religious, language, culture etc.), which, after all, is a matter of personal choice. A group identity is being *constructed* in this way (Cottam, Uhler, Mastors, Preston, 2004: 63-96)\(^2\). Moreover, the group identity is forged but referring it to other groups (otherness). Essentially, this means defining *Us* as not necessarily but possibly opposed to *Them*.

According to Robin Cohen, there are four forms of migration after the Second World War (Cohen, 1996: 238-242):

1. The mass displacements that have appeared as a consequence of nationalist pressures (the Muslims from India were replaced with Hindus from

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\(^2\) In psychology, the importance of the group identity is connected to the perception, called *entiativity*, which refers to “the extent to which a collection of people is perceived as a coherent entity”. The members of a family are perceived as high in entiativity, while in an office the colleagues are low in entiativity (see Martha Cottam, Beth-Diez Uhler, Elena Mastors, Thomas Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, p. 64; especially chapter 4 ”The Political Psychology of Groups”, pp. 63-96).
Pakistan; the expulsion of Palestinians from Israel). The two World Conflagrations have also caused interstate wars, civil wars, famine, economic crisis and political instability, which eventually led to mass migration.

2. The unskilled labor migration has continued, sometimes illegally and to new destinations, like rich oil countries. Of course, one may say that after the Second World War there was a high demand for migrant labors due to the process of reconstruction.

3. For the skilled migrant workers (such as international civil servants, independent entrepreneurs, scientists, doctors and dentists, business executives, skilled engineers, and architects) it was easy to cross the frontiers and secure a better advantage in their employment.

4. The last category, the asylum-seekers tried to be recognized as political refugees in countries like USA, using some German and French constitutional provisions. But they were rapidly perceived as newcomers, provoking hostile, xenophobic and sometimes violent reactions. As a consequence, the authorities tried to impose restrictive measures in order to limit the access in the destination countries.

After the Cold War there was a great concern for the illegal migration, which has developed organized human smuggling and crime (Guiraudon, Joppke, 2001: 2).

However, one can talk about the “old” migration, in 1950s and 1960s, when there was a great demand for migrant workers and the “new” migration world (Guiraudon, Joppke, 2001: 1-2), the world in which we live – a world where there is a redundancy of migratory workers, so that the state is forced to adopt control policies. Thus, the migration policies nowadays favor the highly qualified, educated, well-off immigrants whereas the unskilled ones can only use the family reunion reasons (Appleyard, 2001: 14).

When one talks about migration or the dispersal of people, one must definitely use the term “diaspora” (Vertovec, 1996: 99-101);3 because diasporas appear as a consequence of migration. Michel Bruneau offers a clear definition of the term: “A community diaspora first comes into being and then lives on owing to whatsoever in a given place forges a bond between those who want to group together and maintain, from afar, relations with other groups which, although settled elsewhere, invoke a common identity” (Bruneau, 2010: 35). Whatever the form of bond (family, community, religious, political, economic, a trauma or a catastrophe), these imagined communities do not consider anymore distance as an obstacle that separates them from the country of the origin. In

3 If the term was used related to the dispersal of the Jewish population, more recently it can refer to any transnational community, regardless to its type: immigrants, ethnic minorities, guest workers, expatriates, and refugees. Because of the connections with their homeland, one can question the loyalty of displaced people, so that often they are considered a threat to the state’s security.
order to enhance a person’s sense of belonging to a group, there are the ethnic markers (Volkan, 1998: 81-83). They can be abstract concepts, as for example chosen glories or traumas, or specific objects.

**The Iraqi case and the Kurdish migrants**

We have chosen to write about Iraq from the perspective of two conflicts that made the Iraqi migration politics change: the Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War in 2003. Both of them brought many changes regarding migration and societal security. We shall write about the Kurdish migrants as they are a more special case.

Iraq is not a homogenous country ethnically or religiously speaking. Thus, ethnically speaking there are the Arabs and the Kurds. Religiously speaking Iraqis are sunni Muslims, who live mostly in the North and shi’a Muslims, located in the Southern Iraq. The ethnic and religious factors were the cause of many conflicts in Iraq. Sometimes these factors were used by whoever was in power in order to maintain control.

The Kurds are an ethnic minority living in the mountains where the borders of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey meet. They are probably the largest stateless minority in the world and they never had a state of their own. Moreover, until the war in Iraq in 2003 they never had a political representation. However, the war brought Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, as president of Iraq.

The situation of the Kurds in Iraq is significantly different compared to the Kurds living in Iran or Turkey – countries in which they represent only considerable minorities. Only Iraq recognized the Kurdish reality, offering them autonomy in 1974 (Vanly, 1993: 162; Human Rights Watch, 1993), except the cities of Kaniqin and Kirkuk (surrounded by oil fields).

After a short interlude to power in 1963, the Baath Party took over completely the Iraqi political arena in 1968. Its regime proved to be remarkable resilient and stable. The Baath nationalism and welfare policies had reflected the long term values and political aspirations of the Iraqi people. It was a personal regime, embodying the objectives, ambitions and vanity of a single man, Saddam Hussein. He was a genius in capturing all political power in his country, but he found no way to transmit his power to a possible successor (Humphreys, 1999: 121). While he was overthrown, his political system collapsed into chaos or into a new order.

In 1976, the Iraqi government was beginning to evacuate an area with a width of about 10 to 20 km along the border with Iran (Bruinessen, 1986: 16). Entire villages were demolished, their inhabitants being forced into moving into other settlements near cities. Thus, a series of internal displaced people appeared. It is a fact that the Kurds living alongside the Iran-Iraq border have been used by the Iranian and Iraqi authorities to advance their national interests.

The Iran-Iraq war created a power vacuum that proved to provide an opportunity for the Kurdish movement. The fights between KDP and PUK for
the leadership of the movement have been so intense that literally broke in two
the Iraqi Kurdistan from 1979 to 1980: the North and the West (the Badinan
region) under the KDP leadership, while the South and the East (the Sooran
region) under the PUK leadership. At the beginning of the war the clashes
between the two sides were limited by the scarcity of military capabilities. Later,
the two organizations have been able to build entire armies of peshmerga
(Bulloch, Morris, 1992: 8). The areas controlled by the Kurdish guerrillas have
literally become ‘liberated areas’ (Karadaghi, 1993: 220). The Kurds had to face
also mercenaries recruited by government among the Kurds (the so-called jash).

During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi Kurds had sometimes fought
alongside the Iranian troops against the Iraqi ones. An important consequence
of this war from their point of view was the so-called ‘Anfal operation’. The
Iraqi government used two instruments in the Anfal campaign: (1) the 1987
census and (2) the establishment of the so-called ‘restricted areas’
(Gengercide.org, 1988).

The first Kurdish mass deportations in the area situated along the Iran-
Iraq border between 1975 and 1977 had represented the first attempts of the
Baath government to ‘cleanse’ the Kurdish rural areas. These near border areas
have become ‘restricted areas’.

The ‘campaign’ itself lasted for six months but the Kurdish deportation
took two years. The central figure in this campaign, the decision-maker, was Ali
Hassan al-Majid (later nicknamed ‘The Chemical Ali’) (Zina, 25 June 2007),
Saddam Hussein’s cousin and Secretary-General of the Northern Bureau of the
Baath Arab Socialist Party. He received ‘special powers’ from 29 March 1987 to
23 April 1989, in fact equivalent to those held by the Iraqi President. The
Chemical Ali took his role very seriously, stating during the meetings of the
Baath Party that any animal or human being living in the ‘restricted area’
should be exterminated. A decree dated 23 June 1987 signed by Chemical Ali
ordered the bombing of the Kurdish areas with any type of artillery, including
chemical weapons, with the purpose to kill as many Kurds as possible (Human
Rights Watch, 1994). Even though the inhabitants of the area might have
surrendered to the Iraqi troops, they should have been condemned to death,
based on that infamous document. The Kurdish rebels estimated that during
that year 182,000 persons had disappeared and over 4,000 villages had been
utterly destroyed.

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4 This is the name of the PKK guerrilla warriors, in translation “those who confront death”.
5 These deportations took place against the fact that for 20 years the government
   attempted to implement, in the areas considered strategic, a policy of Arabization
   consisting in bringing Arab farmers in the area.
6 The report Human Rights Watch (1993) notes that the number varies between 50,000 and
   100,000; many victims were civilian, not only peshmerga and the majority were killed after
The 17 October 1987 census proved to be essential for defining which particular groups were to be exterminated. The destruction of the villages in the spring of 1987 had created a buffer-zone between the areas controlled by the government and those controlled by the Kurdish guerrillas. This allowed the Baath Party to give an ultimatum to the inhabitants of the ‘restricted areas’: either they “return to the national ranks” (Gengercide.org, 1988), specifically by abandoning their households and accept the repartition into a complex, or they would lose the Iraqi citizenship, being considered deserters. By a decree of August 1987 the deserters would have met the death penalty.

Also for defining the groups, the Chemical Ali asked the files of the families living in the areas controlled by the government. As a consequence, a number of persons had been resettled to the rural areas to share the faith of their peshmerga relatives.

Yet, the most important case in the Anfal campaign was the bombing of the town Halabja, where it was estimated that 5,000 out of its 80,000 inhabitants died during the first stage of Anfal (23 February 1988 – 19 March 1988) (Lancaster, 2008: 29).

Until the Gulf War in 1991, one can generally say that “the Iraqi international migration regime was one of immigration” (Sirkeci, 2005: 198).

Soon after the beginning of the Gulf War (1991), the Kurds questioned the willingness of the US and their allies to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia and defeat the Iraqis. Therefore, they adopted a neutral position. The condemned the invasion of Kuwait, but did not approved the response of the Allied forces to it. The Kurds realized that if they decided to strike Saddam’s regime too early, before this would have turned sufficiently weak, there was the possibility for Baghdad to use once again its chemical weapons, as it did just early before (Bulloch, Morris, 1992: 8).

During the Desert Storm, US President George Bush was giving a speech pledging the Kurds to rebel and overthrow Saddam Hussein. His message was broadcasted on all TV and radio stations around the world (Romano, 2006: 203-204), including Voice of Free Iraq (backed by CIA) which broadcasted from Jedda (Saudi Arabia).

Having in memory the speech of George Bush and hoping that America would support their cause, especially after Saddam’s defeat (February 1991), the Kurds from the North and the Shiites from the South rebelled and soon after managed to capture a number of towns from both areas. Their common hatred towards Saddam Hussein’s regime and their belief in the total victory of the Allied forced, ensured that the mobilisation was relatively quick, but barely organised in the North. Meanwhile, the US administration worried about the unexpected and difficult to control consequences of a rebellion in Iraq. What

several days in captivity, or in villages marked for destruction. Some were killed during their flight from the attacks of the Iraqi army in the ‘restricted area’.
the Kurds and the Shiites did not account was the unwillingness of Turkey and Iran to admit a Kurdish state near their borders, or that of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (the Allies of the US) to accept an Iraq led by Shiites that could have followed Iran's example (Bulloch, Morris, 1992: 12-14).

As soon as Saddam Hussein realised that the external help promised for the rebels would not come, he struck swiftly and unmerciful, mobilising his best troops – the Republican Guards (which had not participated to the defence against the operation Desert Storm). First of all, they crushed the Southern Shi’a. Then, the brutal repression was unleashed against the North, forcing two million refugees to flee toward the borders of Turkey and Iran. Turkey decided not to repeat the ‘mistake’ of 1988 when it was criticized by the West for the way it handled the Kurdish refugees. Therefore, Turkey closed the border with Iraq just before the moment when the Kurdish refugees intended to cross it (Frelick, 1993: 235).

The Kurdish refugees still remembered the infamous Anfal campaign of 1988. In fact, the Kurdish and Shi’a rebels profited from an actually inexistent political opportunity: the help promised by Bush was not a promise, while Saddam still held the significant elements of his repressive apparatus.

The protests of the international public community urged the US, the UK, and France to consider all the options, together with their NATO Allies, the Turkish. Turkey, pressured by the refugee wave, came with the idea of a temporary ‘safe heaven’ (Halliday, 2005: 148), protected by the Allies, in the Northern Iraq. It was for the first time in Kurdish history that such an area was to be created and protected by international forces in order to protect the Kurds (Olson, 1992: 485).

The consciousness of belonging to a diaspora is evident to the Kurdish refugees especially when measuring the political activism from within the Kurdish communities. The Kurdish organizations of refugees and displaced persons are often influenced by political and social divisions and loyalties from Kurdistan. Sometimes, there had been an indirect support for the Kurdish cause or the Kurds’ fight among their organizations (Wahlbeck, 1998).

William Safran well illustrated some of the characteristics of the Kurdish diaspora (Safran, 1991: 83-89, quoted also in Wahlbeck, 1998):
1. forced dislocation of Kurds;
2. collective memory of their homeland;
3. alienation and discrimination experienced in Europe;
4. desire to return to Kurdistan;
5. collective engagement toward restoring the homeland;
6. transnational social networks.

The concept of ‘diaspora’ is usually associated with that of transnationalism. Martin van Bruinessen thinks that the term ‘transnational’ designates different types of social relations and interactions transcending the
national borders (Bruinessen, 2000). The author affirms that the notion could be used to describe the network of complex contacts and activities linking the Kurdish communities of Germany, Great Britain, or France, but not for those linking the Kurdish communities of Turkey, Iran, or Iraq – for them, the author prefers the concept ‘cross-state’ or ‘cross-border’. Van Bruinessen (2000) also notes that there are many situations of diaspora with transnational character, in Kurds’ case:

1. Kurds displaced in Kurdistan, but not in the state from which they are citizens (e.g. the Kurds refugees into Syria during the 1920s, in the aftermath of Sheikh’s Said rebellion);

2. Kurds that had migrated to Kurdistan from other parts of the state of whose citizens they are (e.g. Kurds migrating from Eastern Turkey to Western Turkey);

3. the most significant diasporas refer to the Kurds alienated from Kurdistan or from the state of whose citizens they are (e.g. during the 1960s there was a migration of labor force from Turkey to Lebanon, Germany, other Western European states, Libya, USSR, Australia – many of those who departed were Kurds).

The case of the Kurds from Europe is particularly interesting since it highlights three characteristics regarding the political mobilisation of diaspora and the long distance intervention: (1) it illustrates the complexity of diaspora formation and the fluid borders between the economic immigrants and the political refugees (not all Kurds migrants are political refugees); (2) the Kurds are perceived both as destroyers of peace, but also as peace-makers (due to their heterogeneity, there are numerous Kurdish networks within diaspora, such as the PKK or KOMKAR in the case of the Kurds from Turkey; PUK or KDP in the case of Iraqi Kurds); (3) some Kurdish associations had changed, during the last 20 years, the political purposes and the way in which they intend to fulfill their aims, infirming one of the assumptions found in the topical literature: the groups situated in diaspora cannot make compromises since, on the one hand, the conflict implies a low cost for them, and on the other hand the conflict has turned to be a part of their identity in exile (Vertovec, 2005).

At the beginning, Kurdish diaspora’s ethnic consciousness was almost nonexistent. In time, especially due to students and political refugees, the Kurds

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7 The Kurdish political refugees from the diaspora originate from several waves: (1) following the Agreement of Alger between Saddam Hussein and the Sheikh of Iran, by which the last one withdrew his support for the Iraqi Kurds, approximately 50 guerrilla warriors fled to Iran and later asked for asylum in European countries – granted to the most educated; (2) following the coup d’état in Turkey (1980) and the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988); (3) the Kurds fleeing from the Iran Islamic revolution; (4) Iraqi Kurds after the Anfal campaign; (5) after the Gulf War, those that felt that the ‘safe heaven’ was not entirely safe; (6) after the destruction of
from diaspora have begun to play an important role for Kurdistan. Some papers and books published in Kurdish have appeared meanwhile. The Nowroz – the Kurdish New Year was adopted, being celebrating in 21 March, while for the first time, the satellite MED-TV broadcasted, for a certain time, in Kurdish.

Some Kurdish institutes and organizations have also emerged within diaspora: first of all, the Kurdish Institute of Paris (founded in 1983), followed by similar institutes in Brussels, Berlin, Moscow, and Washington, D.C. A Kurdish library was founded in Stockholm. There are also two Kurdish human rights organizations: International Association for Human Rights in Kurdistan (Bonn), Kurdish Human Rights Project (London).

Consequently, one must certainly agree that the Kurdish diaspora has not remained indifferent to what happens in Kurdistan. Quite the contrary, this diaspora has had and still has an important role especially in preserving the Kurdish culture.

Nowadays, the Kurdish diaspora is one of the biggest diasporas without a state in the world. The Kurdish diaspora in Europe alone (without Turkey) numbers approximately 850,000 Kurds, out of which 85% originate from Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006).

The war in Iraq has once more created a climate of chaos. The memory of Halabja is still alive, so one can say that the presence of conflict is not necessary, as even the perception the possibility of impending conflict may trigger out-migration flows, in the form of refugee and asylum seeker flows, and other ways (including “clandestine migration”).

As a consequence of the war in 2003, Iraq now occupies the third place in the world for internally displaced people (UNHCR, 2011; WMR, 2010: 264). Forced to leave their communities in 2006 and 2007 due to sectarian violence, more than 1.5 million Iraqis fled their neighborhood. Now they live in camps where they have no access to basic needs such as clean water, sanitation or electricity (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 4).

A detailed analysis of the wars in Iraq may lead to the conclusion that, in fact, there was one long war that started in 1980, the war in 2003 being only a phase, perhaps not even the final one. The politics of changing the composition of the population through ethnic cleansing and mass-Arabization employed by Saddam Hussein are still echoing. Whenever the opportunity (vacuum power caused by wars or conflicts), the violence between Kurds, Sunni and Shi’a will never stop. And as mentalities change in a very long time, probably it will take generations to forget.

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thousand villages of Turkey with the purpose of destroying any help for the PKK, during the 1990s. See Bruinessen, 2000.


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LABOUR MIGRATION REFLECTED IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE LAW

Adrian-Claudiu POPOVICIU *

Abstract. Politicians, specialists or the civil society have realized the major impact of migration upon different main social processes – culture, religion and education – only in the past decades, although it has been a constant element throughout our entire human development.

The movement from one place to another represents one of the most important rights of a population, which was consented by the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, in article 13: (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Despite the existence of the legal ground recognized by all member states of the United Nations, the world’s populations do not fully enjoy the exercise of this freedom.

Labour migration is one of the main forms of the contemporary migration and which enjoys of a better regulation than the other types of migrations, especially when we talk about the European space, in which the regulations elaborated by the Council of Europe are primary.

Keywords: labour, migration, Council of Europe, European Social Charter, migrant worker.

1. Globalization and Migration

Although a favourite topic nowadays, migration1 as a phenomenon has existed since the beginning of humankind, especially because today it has

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greatly boosted by globalization. This last concept defines an ensemble of processes of extension, depth and acceleration of human activity over regions and continents (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton, 2004: 39). In order to better understand the globalization process, we need a conceptual delimitation of the notion of migration, geographic mobility and population. The total movement of a population is composed of the natural movement and the migratory movement. The population of a country or of a region modifies its number not only as according to birth or death rates, but also according to the migration of the population either through immigration or emigration. Because the migratory fluxes can affect categories of people in point of age and gender, the migration modifies not only the number of population, but also its structure according to gender, age, culture, religion etc.

The inhabitants’ movements can be done outside the locality, or between countries, regions or continents; they can be short, they can last longer, or they can last forever, which needs a detailed classification of the different types of migration. The migration of population is the main form of the geographic mobility (spatial), consisting in the definitive change of the fixed residence, between two administrative – territorial units. It is also called residential migration, as the person involved in such movement changes their residential statute. Regarding the official borders of a country, the migration can be:

• the internal migration, which consists in the total of movements, together with the definitive (permanent) change of residence, inside a country, between the territorial – administrative units.
• The international or external migration consists of the ensemble of movements, together with the definitive (permanent) change of residence, between two countries.

Regarding the destination place (arrival), respectively the departure one (origin), the terms immigration and emigration are being used:

• Immigration is migration considered from the point of view of the destination locality (of international migration). The individuals included in this migration flow are called immigrants.
• Emigration is that type of migration seen from the point of view of the departure locality (of international migration). The individuals included in this migratory flow are called emigrants.

1 human migration = the permanent change of residence by an individual or group; it excludes such movements as nomadism, migrant labour, commuting, and tourism, all of which are transitory in nature. (Encyclopædia Britannica)
2 The term “globalization” appeared in the late ’60s and was released by the renowned communication theorist, Professor Marshall McLuhan at the University of Toronto and the American researcher on issues of communism, Zbigniew Brzezinski, from the Columbia University. The term “globalization” first entered the dictionary in 1961.
Considering that the geographic space upon which we focus the analysis is Europe, we will present the four main migration periods that took place after the end of World War II:

a) The migration of labour force and the reconstruction of Europe: period 1945-1970

After World War II, the national ethnics and other people who moved, forced or not by the evolution of war, began to come back in the countries of origin, generating mass migratory flows in all Europe. Simultaneously with this ample movement, every country that participated in war began its own reconstruction process, thus determining higher labour demands. The massive requests of workers in all the fields and especially from the countries on the road of development, contributed to the development and successive economic increases in Europe during 1945 – 1975.

Between the two main military and economic blocs began, after WWII, a competition in all the social, political and economic domains. Therefore, Western Europe developed a series of public policies that lead not only to a high level of employment, but also to the improvement and modernization of social security systems. After 1951 we already have in view the building of the first Community construction, which announces one of the main freedoms that define even today the European Union and that it was regulated for the first time in The European Economic Community (EEC). Under the circumstances of changing the paradigm of work and the European worker, Europe gets to know important movements of workers from countries that with stagnating economies and high rates of unemployment, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, to states generating job vacancies: France, Belgium, Holland, Great Britain or Federal Germany.

In the `60s an important increase of migration had been registered inside the Community, due, in most part, to the important number of Italian workers who were moving towards the other five Member States. But, even after the

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3 The four main migration periods had been analyzed by Jean-Pierre Garson and Anais Loizillon in the work “Changes and Challenges-Europe and Migration from 1950 to Present”, presented at The Economic and Social Aspects of Migrations conference, organized by The European Commission and the OECD, Brussels, 21-22 January 2003, source: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/3/15516948.pdf
4 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), signing 18 April 1951, in force 23 July 1952, expired 23 July 2002
5 Title III The Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital, Chapter 1 — Workers, Article 48 (1) The free movement of workers shall be ensured within the Community not later than at the date of the expiry of the transitional period. (2) This shall involve the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States, as regards employment, remuneration and other working conditions.
realization, in 1968, of the legal and institutional frame for assuring this freedom, the migratory flows from the third countries had remained quantitatively superior to the intra – labour migration force (Garson, Loizillon 2003: 3).

During 1945 – 1975, the Member States’ economies dependence of the foreign workers diminished the volume of illegal migration. According to OECD statistics, from the early ‘60s until the early ‘70s, more of 30 million foreign workers entered the European Economic Community. Until the early ‘80s, the number of foreign residents in Western Europe tripled as compared to the ‘50s, getting to 15 millions (Garson, Loizillon 2003: 3).


The second period of migration was determined by the world’s economic changes. Therefore, in the early ‘70s, Germany strengthened its currency position through the possibility that this had to freely fluctuate, in the USA began over again the imposition of surcharges on imports – fact with consequences upon the CEE.

Another determinant of the modification of migration is given by the change of the international monetary system, caused, primarily, by the oil crisis in 1973, when the oil’s price suddenly increased four times. This crisis was the consequence of the Yom Kippur War, 1973, between Israel and the Arab states, started by a surprise attack of Egypt and Syria over Israel. The oil crisis lead to panic on the world’s great markets, when the phenomenon of stagflation manifested first – a mix of inflation, increase of unemployment, decline of economic increase. In 1975, the UK asks for help to IMF (FMI), registering a 25% inflation. The second crisis of oil takes place in 1979, as a consequence of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The Iran stopped the oil exports at the end of 1978, OPEC doubled the price of oil, and at the end of 1979 URSS invades Afghanistan.

As a consequence of these events, the migration of labour force had substantially modified. The increase of unemployment and the escalation of social tensions determined the governments to eliminate the active policies of recruitment from abroad. The costs of recruitment from abroad increased for the employees; the categories of foreign workers who could have been employed had been limited, and annual rates were settled for the foreign labour force. Also, the governments applied policies for encouraging the migrant workers to return to their states of origin, even if according to the United Nations estimations, only 10% of the migrant workers returned in their states of origin in the next two years after the 1973 oil crisis. (Tudorache, 2008: 81)

c) The diversification of host states and the origin ones and the increase of the number of asylum seekers, refugees and ethnic minorities

Traditional emigration countries in Europe such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Portugal, are gradually being transformed into immigration countries. Migrants do no longer come from the former colonies, but from Central and Eastern European countries. This is partly due to political changes
in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR, political asylum applications are intensifying. Also, regional conflicts, such as those in former Yugoslavia and northern Iraq, have caused considerable flows of asylum seekers and refugees from the affected areas\(^6\). (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 4)

According to the OCDE statistics, this period is also characterized by the predominance of family reunification migration flows and the return of interest in migration and labor, particularly for the skilled and highly qualified workers, towards the end of the ’90s. After the collapse of the communist bloc and the opening of borders, the east-west migration flow increased, in particular the movement of ethnic minorities in the countries of origin, especially Germany, but also Greece and Finland\(^7\). (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 4)

d) The “preferential” labour migration: skilled workers and temporary migration.

In the first decade of the present century there is a change in labor migration flows. On the one hand, it shows an increase in permanent migration due to intense development of information and communication society. On the other hand, temporary labor migration increases as a result of highly skilled labor demand in areas such as health and education. Once the construction and agricultural sectors are developed, the demand for unskilled foreign labor considerably increases (see the case of Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal). The same situation occurs in the household services. Another phenomenon that emerges only at this stage of labor migration refers to foreign students, who are given the opportunity to help reduce labor shortages in the host countries. Although the offer of employment for foreign students is very important in the U.S. (through the Summer Work & Travel Programme), several EU countries (Great Britain\(^8\), Germany\(^9\), France and Spain) develop similar programmes. Many OCDE members bring important changes in what concerns the

\(^{6}\) The increase of asylum applications was high in the early 1990s and reached a new pitch in 1997, largely due to the civil war in former Yugoslavia. In 1983, Western Europe recorded around 70,000 asylum seekers, and by 1992 this figure raised tenfold. Then, the applications decreased to 1996 (at 245,000) and recorded a small increase in 1997 (260,000 requests). In 2001, the Member States have made more than 388,000 asylum applications from a total of 612,000 requests in all OECD countries.

\(^{7}\) In 1989 and 1990, Germany received more than 620,000 people of German ethnic origin originating in Poland, Romania and the former Soviet Union, but Greece and Finland also witnessed the return of ethnic minorities originating from the former Soviet Union and in the case of Finland, the Baltic States. In addition, the flow of gypsy people, mostly from Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, increased, with destination Austria, Germany, France and Italy.

\(^{8}\) UK Work Experience

\(^{9}\) See http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/en_29928/Dienststellen/besondere-Dst/ZAV/Arbeitsmarktzulassung/arbeitsnehmer/amz-studierende-ferienbeschaeftigung.html
possibilities of changing the statute and access to the labour force market after
the closure of the training stage. After the ’90s, the women share among the
migrants increases. This tendency is noticed especially in France, Greece,
Sweden, Great Britain and Italy. The “feminization” tendency it is noted in all
the components of the migratory flows, not only in the family reunification
cases. (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 5)

If in the ‘80s, countries like Spain or Portugal begin to become
countries exporting labour force to immigration countries, the Eastern and
Central Europe countries, are not only migration countries, the same
phenomenon is manifested among the EU newcomers (10+2). Therefore, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland or Romania become destinations
for migrants from Eastern Europe Countries, like Ukraine, Moldavia, CSI.

2. The Council of Europe and the regulating of labor migration

2.1 Establishment and objectives

It was at the end of the WW II that the United States of America
organised Europe through the Marshall Plan and OCDE\(^{10}\) starting from the
necessity of creating the collaboration spirit between states, which until not
long time ago were on rival positions. The Council of Europe appears as a
different structure, by its nature, compared to its predecessors, being the result
of a spontaneous manifestation of the numerous European movements
appeared after 1848. On the 5\(^{th}\) of May 1949, the Statutes establishing the
Council of Europe were signed. The official communiqué issued was
specifying: “…The essential characteristic of the statute … is creating a
Committee of Ministers and of a Consultative Gathering of which assembly
constitutes the Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers will have as
responsibilities the development of cooperation between governments, and the
Consultative Gathering, expressing the aspirations of the peoples of Europe,
will provide the governments the opportunity to stay in permanent contact with
the European public opinion.”\(^{11}\) Throughout the first four decades, the
organization thus created remained a Western European institution but after
the fall of the Iron Curtain the Council of Europe established the first
European institution receiving Central and Eastern European countries, as they

\(^{10}\) The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international
organization of those developed nations which accept the principles of
representative democracy and free market economy. The organization was
constituted in 1948, under the name Organization for European Economic Co-operation
(OEEC), and from 1961 it was reformed taking the name of Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

\(^{11}\) The Statute of the Council of Europe entries into force at 3 August 1949
were choosing a democratic regime. Under these circumstances, “The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.”

Any European state can become a member of the Council of Europe provided that it accepts the rule of law. It must also guarantee that the principle whereby any person within its jurisdiction can enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Council of Europe aims particularly: protecting the human rights, of pluralist democracy and supremacy of law; promote awareness and encourage the development of European identity and unity, of identity and cultural diversity; seeking solutions to problems facing European societies; development of democratic stability and security in Europe, including the security of citizens, by supporting political, legislative and constitutional reforms.

The main objectives of the Council of Europe are reflected primarily in the preamble of the statute: „Convinced that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilization; Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy; Believing that, for the maintenance and further realization of these ideals and in the interests of economic and social progress, there is a need of a closer unity between all like-minded countries of Europe; Considering that, to respond to this need and to the expressed aspirations of their peoples in this regard, it is necessary forthwith to create an organization which will bring European States into closer association, …”. According to the principal assumptions referred to above, art. 1 of Chapter I of the Statutes defines the aim of the Council of Europe. The first paragraph regulations, only referring explicitly to the scope of organization, are required to be correlated to the regulations in the preamble of the Statutes and with the international instruments developed by the Council of Europe. Out of them, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is highly important in defending human rights and fundamental liberties. (Ecobescu, Nitelea, 2006: 54)

According to Article 10 of the Statute, the Council of Europe bodies are: the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. The two bodies being assisted by the Secretariat of the Council of Europe. According to the decision of the Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly in July 1974, it would be called the Parliamentary Assembly, thus reflecting its structure and nature.

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12 The Statute of the Council of Europe, art.1 lit. a
13 Article 10: The organs of the Council of Europe are: - the Committee of Ministers; - the Consultative Assembly. Both these organs shall be served by the Secretariat of the Council of Europe.
2.2 The migrant worker in the Council of Europe regulation

Before presenting the main regulations developed by the Council of Europe regarding the migrant labor, some considerations regarding the terminology are necessary. Given that in recent years, doctrines, practitioners and researchers on European law have increasingly used the concept of European social law instead of other concepts with a limited scope in point of regulated social relations. We refer to concepts such as: the right of the migrant worker, European labor right, European security law, the European Union labor law.

Regarding the concept of European social law, the opinions are divided. If, for some theorists, by the European social law it is understood the ensemble of rules adopted by the European institutions referring to work relations and social security (Ținca, 2005:3), for others, the concept gathers the social regulations adopted by the Council of Europe and the European Union (Popescu, 2008: 260). Another opinion considers that the European social law represents the legal rules adopted by OIM, CE, CECO, CEEA and EU which govern the individual and collective legal relations, social security and the institutionalized legal of protection and social integration of workers from Europe (Nistor, 2004: 21).

We believe that the most relevant definition of the concept of European social law requires some preliminary clarifications. Thus, if the Council of Europe, which is an intergovernmental regional organization, the legal instruments are the European conventions and agreements, the European Union, which only from December 1, 2009 has a legal personality by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, regulates on the labour and social security field through derived sources of Community law, mainly through regulations and directives. The two types of rules mentioned above have a different legal regime in relation to their enforcement in the national law. If the rules prescribed by the Council of Europe are transposed into the national law by the will of states, by the classic procedure of ratifying international instruments, the rules developed by the supranational institutions of the European Union are directly translated into national policy, based on two Community principles (Diaconu, 2008: 81-89): direct applicability of the Community provision and primacy of Community law. Another indication that we believe it needs to be made concerns the applicability of EU rules in space and those of the Council of Europe. While the European Union rules are compulsory for its 27 member

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14 The Treaty of Lisbon, known in draft form as the "Reform Treaty" is designed to replace the EU Constitutional Treaty. The official complete name is "Consolidated Version of the Treaty regarding the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Union ". The treaty's text was finalized after an informal summit in Lisbon on 19 October 2007 and on 13 December 2007 the treaty was signed by the representatives of the 27 EU member states and entered into force on 1 December 2009 (The EU Official Journal 2008/C 115/01)
Labour Migration Reflected in the Council of Europe Law

states, the legal rules elaborated by the Council of Europe can be applied in the space of the 47 member states of this international organization.

Therefore we believe that the European social law can be defined by the legal rules governing the individual and collective labor legal reports, as well as social security adopted by the European Union and the Council of Europe and which are harmonized with the rules adopted by the International Labour Organization. We believe that the joint analysis of these two categories of European regulations from the point of view of the European social law do not interfere the delimitation that was made in the internal law, where the analysis on labor law rules is done separately from the social security rules.

The fundamental document of the Council of Europe is The European Convention on Human Rights, which regulates only the politic and civil rights, even if the convention proclaims and obliges the states that ratified it to respect a series of rights which refer to work in its ensemble (Popescu, 2008: 268-269). It was only later that the need for regulation in areas of economic and social rights was felt. Under these conditions, the most important documents produced and then taken by the Council of Europe member countries are: European Social Charter which was completed by three protocols: Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter, Protocol amending the European Social Charter and Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints. As I mentioned in first part of the paper, the sixth to eighth decades of the twentieth century were very dynamic in terms of labor migration in Europe. For these reasons, to which the objectives as set out by the statutes are added, the Council of Europe regulated the entire spectrum of labor relations, even before the European Communities. Together with the European Social Charter and the three protocols, the Council of Europe adopted the European Code of Social Security, which was revised in 1990, and the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers.

Of course, the most important document in the labour and social security field developed by the Council of Europe remains the European Social Charter. This is a synthesis of international labour law, considering that the document brings together the general principles mentioned mant regulations

\[15\] Opening of the treaty 18/10/1961; entry into force 26/2/1965
\[16\] Opening of the treaty 5/5/1988; entry into force 4/9/1992
\[17\] Opening of the treaty 21/10/1991
\[18\] Opening of the treaty 9/11/1995; entry into force 1/7/1998
\[19\] Opening of the treaty 16/4/1964; entry into force 17/3/1968
\[20\] European Code of Social Security (Revised), Total number of signatures not followed by ratifications: 13 states / Total number of ratifications/accessions: 1 states; at 3/8/2011; Source: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=139&CM=8&DF=03/08/2011&CL=ENG
\[21\] Opening of the treaty 24/11/1977; entry into force 1/5/1983
separately developed by the International Labour Organization (Voiculescu, 2009: 84-85). Regarding the migrant workers, the European Social Charter settles their statute through articles 18 and 19, which must be correlated with other relevant dispositions, more precisely the article 12 (4), relating to equality of treatment between nationals of the contracting parts in respect of social security rights through bilateral or multilateral agreements (or otherwise) and article 13 (4), which obliges the signatories states “to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social and medical assistance, the Parties undertake: to apply the provisions referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this article on an equal footing with their nationals to nationals of other Parties lawfully within their territories, in accordance with their obligations under the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, signed at Paris on 11 December 1953.” (Cholewinski, 2004: 11)

Article 18 of the Charter stipulates the obligation to facilitate the citizens of other signatory states to work on their territory, as set out by the obligation to simplify the formalities for hiring migrant workers: “With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to engage in a gainful occupation in the territory of any other Party, the Parties undertake: (1) to apply existing regulations in a spirit of liberality; (2) to simplify existing formalities and to reduce or abolish chancery dues and other charges payable by foreign workers or their employers; (3) to liberalise, individually or collectively, regulations governing the employment of foreign workers; and recognise: (4) the right of their nationals to leave the country to engage in a gainful occupation in the territories of the other Parties.”

Article 19, by the 12 contained paragraphs, states that once a migrant worker is admitted to settle on the territory of a State, then equal rights should be acknowledged to them, on taxes, access to justice, expulsion, transfer of earnings. Also, the migrant workers may, within the law of the State of employment, to join the family, “(6) to facilitate as far as possible the reunion of the family of a foreign worker permitted to establish him in the territory.”

If through the European Social Charter a first legal document was created guaranteeing social and economic rights, by signing and then ratifying the European Code of Social Security, which was revised in 1990, the Council of Europe finalized a long process regarding the establishment of some social security rules, began by adopting of the European Interim Agreement on Social Security Schemes Relating to Old Age, Invalidity and Survivors and European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance.

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22 Total number of signatures not followed by ratifications: 6 states / Total number of ratifications/accessions: 7 states; at 3/8/2011; Source: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=048&CM=8&DF=03/08/2011&CL=ENG

23 Opening of the treaty 11/12/1953; entry into force 1/7/1954

24 Opening of the treaty 11/12/1953; entry into force 1/7/1954
The European Code of Social Security establishes minimum protection values which the signatory states must assure in nine fields of social security\(^{25}\), and for each of them the Code states diverse conditions for iar pentru fiecare dintre acestea Codul precizează various conditions of giving the benefits. If Minimum standards of social security\(^{26}\) established minimum rules of social security mainly focused on low developed countries, The European Code of Social Security was elaborated in the spirit of creating a higher standard of social security, targeting, also, the harmonization of social security systems of member states of the CoE. Given the demographic and geopolitical changes in the late 80s, and the renewal of concepts on social security, it was decided to review the Code. Thus, the review aimed to improve standards and introducing more flexibility in its functioning (Voiculescu, 2009: 107).

As noted above, CoE regulations have not been developed only for migrant workers, unlike the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers\(^{27}\), which aims only at this category of workers. Even the preamble of this document states the main objective: „Considering that the legal status of migrant workers who are nationals of Council of Europe member States should be regulated so as to ensure that as far as possible they are treated no less favourably than workers who are nationals of the receiving State in all aspects of living and working conditions; Being resolved to facilitate the social advancement of migrant workers and members of their families; Affirming that the rights and privileges which they grant to each other’s nationals are conceded by virtue of the close association uniting the member States of the Council of Europe by means of its Statute.” From the perspectives of this Convention, the worker “shall mean a national of a Contracting Party who has been authorised by another Contracting Party to reside in its territory in order to take up paid employment.”\(^{28}\), with few notable exceptions: “a) frontier workers; b) artists, other entertainers and sportsmen engaged for a short period and members of a liberal profession; c) seamen; d) persons undergoing training; e) seasonal workers; seasonal migrant workers are those who, being nationals of a Contracting Party, are employed on the territory of another Contracting Party in an activity dependent on the rhythm of the seasons, on the basis of a contract for a specified period or for specified employment; f) workers, who are nationals of a

\(^{25}\) Medical care; Sickness benefit; Unemployment benefit; Old age benefit; Employment injury; benefit; Family benefit; Maternity benefit; Invalidity benefit; Survivors’ benefit


\(^{27}\) Total number of signatures not followed by ratifications: 4 states / Total number of ratifications/accessions: 11 states; at 3/8/2011; Source: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=093&CM=8&DF=03/08/2011&CL=ENG

\(^{28}\) Art. 1 (1)
Contracting Party, carrying out specific work in the territory of another Contracting Party on behalf of an undertaking having its registered office outside the territory of that Contracting Party.”

The Convention provides for equal treatment of migrant workers with the national ones, thus eliminating any discrimination linked to nationality or residence. The rule established by the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers applying the law on the territory where workers operate (Țiclea, 2009: 99).

For a better compliance with the provisions of this Convention, a control procedure was settled in charge of an Advisory Committee composed of representatives of Member States, “a Consultative Committee shall be set up within a year of the entry into force of this Convention”\textsuperscript{30} which must report to the Committee of Ministers regarding the appliance of this Convention “The Consultative Committee shall draw up periodically, for the attention of the Committee of Ministers, a report containing information regarding the laws and regulations in force in the territory of the Contracting Parties in respect of matters provided for in this Convention”\textsuperscript{31}.

Conclusions

The labour migration phenomenon, although manifested in ancient times, today, thanks to new information technologies, the new type of corporate management as well as other intrinsic factors of globalization, it tends to become not only a result of the present time, but a necessity. Even if the migrant worker is a permanent element on the continental areas, the way in which the Council has managed to develop a broad set of regulations on the rights of European workers can be copied even at international level, either through the ILO, the UN, or other intergovernmental organizations with continental or global vocation. It is true that the studies made through CoE or the EU confirmed the gap, sometimes large, between the regulatory requirements regarding the rights of migrant workers and their concrete ensurance. Although the CoE convention signatory states undertook, by partial or total ratification, to ensure equal treatment between the migrant worker and the national one, there are numerous cases in which legal bodies notice flagrant violations of the Conventions. Although these irregularities appear in the application of rules regarding the European worker, the great importance of the dynamics of a process determined mainly by the CoE, which can be completed in the future by creating a free space of the European worker.

\textsuperscript{29} Art. 1 (2)
\textsuperscript{30} Art. 33 (1)
\textsuperscript{31} Art. 33 (7)
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Abstract. The extent of migration is increasing in the European Union as well as in the world in general. This can be both an advantage and a disadvantage for the target countries. Many migrants are legal and their presence could help in promoting economic development, with the migration of skilled people playing an important part in increasing employment and economic growth.

However, there are many immigrants who are illegal and these people constitute a major problem, politically and socially, for the receiving country. These illegal immigrants can increase the number of unemployed and homeless people, and can be a significant burden for the host country.

Because of this, countries need to resolve migration issues by implementing a well-designed integration policy. This policy would be the best solution for this problem. The most significant legislation has been the Schengen Agreement, which removed the internal borders and at the same time confirmed the external borders. Also, the Schengen Agreement introduced the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in order to achieve integration, which is founded on the balance of rights and obligations of migrants. The policy should include a provision in reference to employment and the requirement of learning the language of the host country.

The primary method of this paper is the documentation of acts and policies regarding integration in the European Union.

Keywords: Schengen Agreement, immigrants, European Union, migration.
integrated into the EU (EC) population, with improvements in employment as well as their standard of living.

1. Migration

Mobility is a position change between units of a defined system; this can be social, geographical or regional. The regional change is between units of a regional system, and can happen with a residential interchange or without it. If residential interchange occurs, we speak of migration. This is caused by the reduction or increase of the consequences for economic and social areas. If residential interchange does not happen, we can speak of circulating mobility, e.g. between home and workplace or school (Mackensen et al. 1975 In: Ekéné, I. Z. 1995).

Migration can be typed into three groups by distance (local, close and far), and into two main groups by reason (forced and self-sufficient migration). The first important researcher, who worked with migration and established laws of migration, was Ravenstein. According to him, we can acquire general information about migration, such as the fact that most migrants will migrate a short distance; that migration happens periodically; that those who migrate long distances will settle in large industrial cities; that people from a rural population are more likely to migrate than those from an urban population; and that the most important reason for migration is economic (Ravenstein, 1885/89. In: Ekéné, I. Z. 1995).

1.1. Push-pull factor

The most important factor in the explanation of the causes of immigration is the “push-pull” factor. Economic conditions are certainly a determining factor. Whenever we ask individuals about their reasons for moving, there is a marked uniformity in the answers. According to them, they leave their homes in order to find better job opportunities, to earn a higher salary, to raise their standard of living, and to guarantee better living conditions for their children (Isbister, 1996). People emigrate from developing countries because of poverty, unemployment, disease, and a high mortality rate, hoping to improve their lives in the target country (Portes – Rumbaut, 1990). Thus, push factors include issues of demography (population growth), low standard of living, and lack of economic opportunities. These factors also affect the inflow of labor migration.

1.1.1. Economic migration

This kind of migration is based on fund and labour demand, and the direction is mainly West-to-East, which means that labour migrants have moved East and then transported agricultural products to the West. In the
1990s, significant economical investment was directed toward the eastern part of Europe (with the involvement of multinational business and entrepreneurs), and the movement of agricultural and industrial products to Western Europe was prohibited by the European Union. Of particular importance are the substantial numbers of people who had begun to move from Poland and Hungary as labour migrants by the 1970s (Glatz, 2004).

1.1.2. Political migration

From 1849 to 1990, the direction of political migration was only East-to-West, but the political reasons for this movement ended with the collapse of the Soviet Regime (Glatz, 2004).

1.1.3. Cultural migration

Until 1945 cultural goods could move from West to maintain the flow of intellectuals and cultural products into Eastern Europe. However, this is a unique kind of migration of those students who have studied at Western universities and have then returned to their homelands after graduation. Even so, more and more biologists, informatics specialists, and similar intellectuals have migrated mainly to Germany where they can increase their salaries, so the process of the “brain drain” has accelerated in Western Europe (Glatz, 2004).

1.2. Categories of migration in European Union law and policy

According to European law and policy, we can place immigrants in five categories. We can speak of tourists or visitors when people migrate from one country to another within the EU, but these travelers do not work, and do not engage in economic activities as self-employed persons or otherwise. They travel mainly during holidays or for various other recreational reasons (Bigo – Guild, 2005).

Labour migrants have a right to travel within the European Union to search for employment. The third group is family members, who have rights with respect to the maintenance of family life, and the EU supports them in this endeavor. The fourth category consists of asylum seekers, “who have a particularly tenuous position on EU law and policy. In considering the economic consequences of being an asylum seeker, a number of initial clarifications need to be made” (Bigo – Guild, 2005). And finally, the illegal immigrants are moving within the European Union without any permission and legal documents. A foreign-born person is able to become unauthorized in three ways: 1) entering the country without monitoring, or using false documents or overrunning conditions of admission of border crossing; 2)
residing legally in the country with non-immigrant status (e.g. as a tourist, businessperson or student) and breaking a condition of entrance (e.g. after due date of visa he/she does not leave U.S.); 3) or if, as a foreign-born LPR (Legal Permanent Resident) he/she breaks a condition of entrance (e.g. committing a crime) (Bean et al, 1998. In: Loucky et al, 2006).

1.3. Short history of immigration in the European Union

After the Second World War, the European migration had several phases. The first phase began after 1945, when DPA (Displaced Persons), who had left their homes during the war, returned, and defeated countries admitted escaped and persecuted minorities from neighboring countries. The second period was from the 1950s to the 1980s, when the main direction of migration was from South-to-North. In this period, many people emigrated from colonies (South) into the UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The migration of guest workers was also common, with many laborers coming from North Africa and the Mediterranean areas into Western Europe. The third period of European migration was after the 1980s, when the direction changed and the main trend was from East-to-West. The most important sending countries were post-Soviet countries and the Balkans, and many of these migrants were refugees (Cseresznyés, 1996).

In the early 1990s, the annual migration from CEE countries to Western countries was 850,000 people. During the Communist period, most emigration had been based on ethnic origin, and these were mainly Germans and Jews. The largest in-flow is to Germany, with 601,800 persons in 2003. Spain is in second place, and the third is the UK. Of the other countries, only Italy (2002) and France (2001) had an in-flow of over 100,000. Switzerland’s in-flow fell below 100,000 in 2003. The Czech Republic’s in-flow reached 60,000 migrants in 2003 (Salt, 2005).

In Western Europe in 2003, Germany lost half a million emigrants; the UK was in second place with 170,000 people. Russia was the main sending country with about 105,000 people, followed by the Ukraine (88,000) in 2001 (Salt, 2005).

In consequence, the net gain was of about 953,000 in Western Europe in 2003, and 102,000 in CEE countries. Italy had the largest net gain (380,000), and the next was the UK (250,000). Of these two countries, only Germany had a significant net gain (Salt, 2005).

2. Integration

“Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the Member States” (EU Common Basic
Principles, 2004). Thus, integration means that both women and men could adapt in a new host country with their own family, who should have the right to keep their habits, language, and culture. In addition, the target country should ensure social, cultural, political, and economic participation for all immigrants. These are some areas of action which are very important for the integration of immigrants:

- employment
- knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions
- education
- access to institutions public and private goods and services
- frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens
- safeguard of the practice of different cultures and religions
- the participation of immigrants in the democratic process, especially at the local level (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004).

2.1. Employment

This is the main element of integration, and employment can facilitate the immigrants’ integration into the host society. For this reason, the host country must support the recognition of qualifications acquired in another country, and must attempt to provide opportunities that ensure the acquisition of skills in demand in the workplace. Immigrants should receive the right incentives and opportunities for seeking and receiving employment.

The European Employment Strategy is a very important indication of the employment on the integration process. Its aim is that at workplaces fighting against discrimination should be supported with cooperation of social partners and employers based on ethnic origin (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004).

2.2. “Knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions”

Several Member States have begun to emphasize the importance of basic linguistic, historical and civic knowledge in the integration process. These kinds of programs will allow immigrants to find a workplace, housing, education, and health care, and will aid in their adaptation to the host society. Nevertheless, with this integration policy, immigrants are allowed to keep their own language and culture so that the integration is not a full assimilation but, rather, a peaceful coexistence (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004).
2.3. Education

Education can give many opportunities to immigrants in a new society, because it prepares immigrants and other residents for greater participation in all areas of life and for better communication with others. Therefore, education has positive effects for the individual as well as for the society as a whole (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004).

2.4. “Access to institutions public and private goods and services”

Immigrants should be allowed to take part fully within the new society and they must be treated equally and be defended from discrimination. The European Union policy forbids discrimination based on ethnic and racial origin in education, social security, employment, housing, healthcare and access to goods and services. This aspect of the integration process means that policies, housing, institutions and services are open to immigrants. The host country and society must ensure these conditions in order to integrate immigrants more quickly, easily and seamlessly. Not least, the possibility of the attainment of Member State citizenship could be an important incentive for integration (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004).

2.5. “Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens”

These interactions create a connection between immigrants and Member State citizens. Member States have created shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants, and living conditions in urban areas. The integration process takes place primarily at the local level (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004).

2.6. “Safeguard of the practice of different cultures and religions”

Every immigrant group has its own culture and religion, and it should be allowed to maintain these, so that the new society could be enriched and made more colorful with the customs and cultural practices of newcomers. This kind of freedom is guaranteed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and all Member States have an obligation to maintain these rights. In addition, European Union law prohibits discrimination against immigrants in employment (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004).
2.7. “The participation of immigrants in the democratic process, especially at the local level”

Member States must ensure participation in the democratic process for immigrants, and encourage their involvement in voting, elections and joining political parties (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004).

2.8. “Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public-policy formation and implementation.”

In order to avoid decreasing standards of quality in education and social services, consideration should also be given to the impact of immigrants at the level of local and regional administrations. At the European level, they need to ensure the focus on integration which is a mainstream consideration in policy execution. However, the integration of immigrants is influenced by several non-governmental entities (e.g. businesses, political parties, trade unions, employer organizations, sport clubs, the media, cultural, social and religious organizations). Communication and cooperation between these entities is very important because they are able to contribute to effective integration policies (EU Common Basic Principles, 2004).

2.9. “Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective”

3. Indicators per field of integration

In the integration process, we can differentiate four categories, which are very important to investigate (Entzinger – Biezveld, 2003).

3.1. Socio-Economic integration

- Employment
- Income level
- Social security
- Level of education
- Housing and segregation

This is the most significant indicator for successful integration, and containing participation of immigrants in the labour market (employment). The
next point is about incoming levels, which is closely related to employment (migrants with higher educational attainment are able to find jobs with higher salaries). About social security, we should see that migrants do not have the same priority as non-migrants, but they should be protected in order to become well-integrated into the host society (with child benefits or pension schemes). Levels of education are based on a similar education system in the EU, and it is instrumental in finding a better position in the labour market, as well as attaining better living conditions. Skilled people are able to integrate more successfully. Migrants have the right to choose accommodations as tenants or as owners. In some Member States, an elaborate system of social housing is typical, but in others, people have more potential to buy homes. Migrants often move to only one area of a country or a city, which results in segregation. These migrants have greater difficulties in their attempts to integrate (Entzinger – Biezeveld, 2003).

3.2. Cultural integration

− Attitude towards basic rules and norms of the host country
− Frequency of contacts with host country and country of origin
− Choice of spouse
− Language skills
− Delinquency

This indicator refers to contact between residents and immigrants, who possess different culture, and since the dominant culture is not uniform, peaceful coexistence is complicated process. The first point is an indicator for acculturation. It is very difficult to measure because we cannot always easily identify the basic rules and the norms of the host society. Immigrants are free to marry natives of the host country, but the rate of this activity is higher in the second generation. With this procedure, an immigrant marrying a resident is able to get resident status. Language skills are a very important indicator for integration because migrants are able to better communicate with members of the host society and they will act in accordance with attitudes toward immigrants in the new society. Immigrants have the right to learn the language of the host country, but their language skills depend on their length of residency. The last point in this indicator category is delinquency, which is an indication of weak integration in the cultural as well as in the socio-economic sphere. This rate can be higher when discriminatory practices make access and participation difficult or impossible (Entzinger – Biezeveld, 2003).
3.3. Legal and political integration

- Numbers of migrants naturalized annually or who obtain a secure residence status
- Numbers of migrants with dual citizenship
- Participation in politics
- Participation in civil society

The European Union values equal rights for all citizens of Member States, whether they were born as citizens or foreigners. However, full citizenship rights can only be granted to those immigrants who have been naturalized. The European Commission has defined certain core rights and obligations toward migrants. Naturalization can be an expression of loyalty of migrants toward their new country. In regard to dual citizenship, some Member States are more open, but in others it is not allowed. However it does not mean that a migrant is less integrated in the new society. Political participation means participation in elections, but, in some Member States, those immigrants without resident status do not have the right to run for political office or vote. Participation in civil society can be understood as indirectly and inadvertently encouraging segregation, but can also create a multi-ethnic society based on shared cultural identity or national origin (Entzinger – Biezeveld, 2003).

3.4. Attitudes of recipient countries

- Reported cases of discrimination
- Perceptions of migrants by the host society
- Incidence and effects of diversity policies
- Role of media

Integration is not a one-sided process, because migrants and the recipient society both play a very important role and bear mutual responsibilities. Political rights and certain entitlements will further contribute to integration, and the fight against discrimination and racism is essential in the attainment of integration. To monitor incidents of discrimination, the European Center on Racism and Xenophobia only keeps records in Vienna. The group known as Eurobarometer compares attitudes of various groups in the population. Its aim is to acquire knowledge of migrants’ social conditions, and there are questions concerning the blaming of migrants, repatriation, restrictive immigration and the need for assimilation. One problem is that the respondents give politically and socially desirable answers and not their real opinion. The media play a specific part in the integration process, which can be seen in the way immigrants are presented (Entzinger – Biezeveld, 2003).
4. **Schengen Agreement**

The Schengen Agreement is the result of a convention of five of the ten member states of the European Economic Community (the Governments of the State of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic), and the agreement was signed in 1985. Five years later, it was expanded by the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. These treaties constitute the borderless Schengen Area of Europe, which allow travelers to travel in and out of the area without internal border controls (Communication department of the European Commission).

4.1. **Schengen Area**

Twenty-five European countries are contained in the Schengen Area. It allows travel within the EU without internal border controls. In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty absorbed the Schengen rules into the European Union law. However, there are three non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) which are included officially, and there are three European micro-states (Vatican city, Monaco, and San Marino). Ireland and the United Kingdom do not belong to the Schengen Area, nor do with Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus. Over four hundred million people live in this area, which is more than four million square kilometers (Communication department of the European Commission).

**Figure 1. The Schengen Area**

![Image of the Schengen Area](http://celestinechua.com/blog/images/posts/schengen_area.jpg)

*Source*: http://celestinechua.com/blog/images/posts/schengen_area.jpg
5. The Hague Programme

The Hague Program was adopted by the European Council; it works out ten priorities for the European Union with a view to strengthening freedom, justice and security. Its purpose is to guarantee fundamental rights, the access to justice and to minimum procedural protection. It also regulates migration flows and controls the European external borders, in order to fight organized cross-border crime, and to inhibit the threat of terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2004).

5.1. Strengthening fundamental rights and citizenship

Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and settle down anywhere within the EU and to attain naturalization in order to become a citizen of another Member State. It will devote special attention to children’s rights and to the prevention of violence against women. This will work against discrimination and ensure the protection of personal rights (Council of the European Union, 2004).

5.2. Anti-terrorist measures

The need for the inhibition of terrorism is very important and the Commission must support Member States in this fight by focusing on financing, risk analysis, prevention, consequence management and the protection of vulnerable infrastructures (Council of the European Union, 2004).

5.3. Defining a balanced approach to migration

The Commission has plans to create a balanced approach to illegal and legal immigration. It includes the prevention of illegal immigration and efforts to prevent the smuggling of immigrants. Also, cooperation with third countries can come into play in the management of migration flows. The measures of the Commission contains the “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” framework program. It expands the creation of an Integration Fund, an External Borders Fund, and a European Refugee and Return Fund (Council Of The European Union, 2004).

5.4. Developing integrated management of the Union’s external borders

The removal of internal borders has given people the opportunity to migrate from one Member state to another. Nevertheless, the external borders must also be strengthened. An effective visa policy should be also created.
Identity and travel documents will be more secure with biometric identifiers (Council of the European Union, 2004).

5.5. Setting up a common asylum procedure

The Commission aims to produce an effective asylum procedure. Operational cooperation will be continued by the European Refugee Fund. “In the short-term, it will be submitting a proposal for a directive concerning long-term resident status for refugees and in the medium-term, once the way in which existing legislation is being applied has been assessed, it will propose a common procedure and status for refugees” (Council of the European Union, 2004).

5.6. Maximizing the positive impact of immigration

Immigrant communities must be integrated if they are not to become excluded from society. Member States are encouraged by the Commission to develop their integration policies in favor of mutual understanding and communication between cultures and religions. It proposes to create a European framework for integration and to help to create a structural exchange of experiential knowledge and information about integration (Council of the European Union, 2004).

5.7. Striking the right balance between privacy and security while sharing information

Law-enforcement authorities have to be able to share their information in order to combat terrorism and analyze cross-border crime effectively. The European Union has to support communication between all interested members in order to find solutions for the preserving of fundamental rights and the availability of information, as well as protection of data and privacy. The European Police Office (Europol) plays a key part in this action (Council of the European Union, 2004).

5.8. Developing a strategic concept on tackling organized crime

The cooperation of Member States, such as customs and police authorities, should be improved in the combat against organized crime. The Commission accepted a communication on prosecuting organized crime in 2005 (Council of the European Union, 2004).
5.9. A genuine European area of justice

The European Union must work to achieve mutual confidence between Member States to ensure and safeguard the right of legal defense. By drawing up new legislative proposals, the Union will be able to protect family property, succession and wills (Council of the European Union, 2004).

5.10. Sharing responsibility and solidarity

“No political objective can be met without adequate funding. The Hague Program was adopted at a time when the Commission was preparing its proposals for the financial perspective of 2007-13; this made it possible to ensure that the objectives of the Hague Program were in line with the financial means available for them over the same period. In April 2005, the Commission presented three framework programs examining which type of political and financial instruments most effectively enable the objectives of freedom, security and justice to be met” (Council of the European Union, 2004).

6. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum

(PACT: “The Pact is a political document, by which the Member States of the European Union have a commitment to each other, their citizens and the rest of the world. It contains a set of political objectives and strategic guidelines for the development of European immigration and asylum policies” (Hortefeux, 2008).

The European Council accepted the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in October, 2008. It is a statement of the political commitment of the EU and its Member States (citizens and non-member countries) to an efficient common policy for immigration issues.

The reason for the Pact is the problem of migration. It is a durable phenomenon which will remain as long as there are differing levels of development between Europe and Southern and Eastern countries. The need for regulated and organized legal immigration is important in those countries which have both economic development and an aging population. However in some cases, the migration is badly managed and illegal immigration causes serious conflicts.

The European Union is convinced that an effective and balanced policy can deal with all aspects of immigration (e.g. control of illegal migration and management of legal migration).

The Pact must be executed by the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commissions, and by the Member States individually (Hortefeux, 2008).
6.1. To organize legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception capabilities determined by each Member State, and to encourage integration

Legal immigration must be the main question in cooperation between the host country and the country of origin. The responsibility of Member States is to effect labor migration policies. The attractiveness of the EU must be strengthened in order to attract highly skilled workers. Circular and temporary migration must be advanced by avoiding the brain drain from immigrants’ countries of origin. Notwithstanding this, family immigration must be better organized with respect to the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the integration possibilities of families. The determining factors in integration are learning the language of the host country and gaining access to employment (Hortefeux, 2008).

6.2. To control illegal immigration by ensuring the return of illegal immigrants to their country of origin or a country of transit

Cooperation between countries of origin and transit will be confirmed in order to fight against international criminal networks and human smuggling. Illegal foreign persons must leave countries by themselves by their own free will. Deportation will be approved by all Member States, but assistance in voluntary repatriation will be suggested. Cooperation of Member States can help more effectively in the repatriation of illegal immigrants (Hortefeux, 2008).

6.3. To make border controls more effective

Each Member State is responsible for checking its own external, land, air, and sea borders for its territory in the EU. The issue of visas consisting of biometric identification will be expanded across all Member States beginning in January 2012. A Visa Information System will be connected electronically which will help to control illegal immigration (Hortefeux, 2008).

6.4. To construct a Europe of asylum

In the territory of the European Union, every persecuted person has the right to assistance and protection. The Pact supports a common European asylum system in order to avoid disparities. By 2012, a uniform asylum procedure will be introduced (Hortefeux, 2008).
6.5. To create a comprehensive partnership with countries of origin and transit to encourage synergy between migration and development

“Migration must become an important component part of the external relations of Member States and the European Union” (Hortefeux, 2008). Member States must make agreements with countries of origin and transit. Circular and labor migration will be encouraged, because migrant workers can help in the development of their countries. For enabling migrants to take part in the development of their countries of origin, this pact will support actions for combined development. “Development policy will be more effectively coordinated with migration policy to benefit the development of countries and regions of migration origin” (Hortefeux, 2008).

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Schengen Agreement – unofficial translation (http://www.spjelkavik.priv.no/henning/ifi/schengen/intro.html)
Abstract. This article attempts to investigate the phenomenon of migration in Europe against the backdrop of the Global revolution for social change, democracy and the effect of the social media, the cyber revolution and youth uprisings in changing world politics; with particular reference to Africa. The churning wheels of social change, communication and political thinking invites intercultural dialogue on the social conscience revolution and its future in addressing the changing landscape of constructive intervention and management.

Keywords: global revolution, social change, democracy, social media, cyber revolution, youth uprisings, changing world politics.

1. Introduction

A Global revolution is ensuing a new world order as aptly coined by Zbigniew Brzezinski ‘the global political awakening’. As Brzezinski wrote:

For the first time in human history almost all of humanity is politically activated, politically conscious and politically interactive... The resulting global political activism is generating a surge in the quest for personal dignity, cultural respect and economic opportunity in a world painfully scarred by memories of centuries-long alien colonial or imperial domination... The worldwide yearning for human dignity is the central challenge inherent in the phenomenon of

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global political awakening... That awakening is socially massive and politically radicalizing.

We are living in a global village where the boundaries that divide us are that which we seek to define, understand and through centuries we have killed for. These boundaries whether political, religious, cultural or ethnic have been the preserve and delusion of mankind.

2. The African Perspective

In Africa there are approximately 410 tribes with 1500 to 2000 languages which were divided by colonial powers on the basis of geopolitical invasion and imperial domination.

The migration of colonial powers from the west to Africa was a process of invasion, occupation, colonization and annexation of African territory by European powers during the new imperialism period, between 1881 and World War 1 in 1914. This marked the beginning of an era of division, dissemination of the African culture and bondage of its people. Thus began the European migration into Africa.

Figure 1 Map of official and spoken languages of african countries

Colonial Africa

“The eight European nations that invaded Africa and established colonies there left indelible marks on the language, cultures, and governments of each African country. In many cases, the European language and governmental systems supplanted the indigenous African language and traditional governmental systems or at least curtailed or limited their influence... Until about 1870, colonial invasion did not have much in the way of intensity as the continent had not presented much economic or political value to Europe.

After 1875, competition for raw materials by the European powers sparked bitter rivalry for conquest and expansion into the African interior. The Berlin Conference of 1885 laid down the rules for partitioning of Africa between the European powers... The African people, often exploited by this expansionism offered valiant resistance which continued into the mid-Twentieth Century when African Nations, one by one, won freedom and independence.”

Figure 2 Map of Colonial Africa

2 Key facts: Africa to Europe migration <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228236.stm>
The global revolution which is now permeating the boundaries of political dictatorship, colonial domination, cultural constraints, religious dogma and ideologies is...simply a revolution of consciousness.

This momentous awakening in the history of mankind is viral in its social, political, religious and cultural dimensions...simply a revolution of humanity.

3. Global Revolution for Social Change and Democracy

As social beings man has always sought to explore and conquer for better opportunities and greener pastures. In time immemorial Mans’ migration has mirrored migration in nature and the resultant 21st century activism is as a result of hundreds of years of colonial domination, political oppression, tyrant dictatorships, fraudulent governments and its corporations, religious dogma and fanatical ideologies.

There is a hunger to regain human dignity; respect for basic human rights, hunger for self-determination of people who have had enough and are willing to do whatever it takes to be released from the previous bonds of economic disparity caused by corrupt governments and transfer of leadership within consanguineous relations.

Democracy is our birth right and people are beginning to demonstrate their dissatisfaction throughout the world in response to their basic human rights compounded by the present economic crisis. The dilemma of migration against the backdrop of the Global revolution for social change and democracy is a reality.

The problem does not belong to any one nation or group of people but the entire world as its reverberating effect transcends the barriers of all national identities and boundaries. The tsunami of the revolution is still to arrive on all coasts unless all those in power who have the ability to foresee this reality take responsibility.

Europe is faced with a rising tide of migrants, especially from African countries fleeing persecution from the onslaught of civil war sparked and fuelled by student anger and uprisings.

‘Tens of thousands of Africans - men, women and children fleeing their homeland - attempt to make the perilous trip from their home countries to Europe every year, seeking refuge, asylum and economic opportunity. Some travel thousands of miles overland, being handed from smuggler to smuggler, ending up at one of many ports in northern Africa, to be packed into makeshift boats and make treacherous sea crossings to European soil, to places like Spain's Canary Islands and tiny Malta where they hope to either sneak in unnoticed, or, if intercepted, be allowed to stay. Many do not survive the journey. Authorities in southern
European nations are still struggling however, to patrol for, care for, to process and repatriate this continuing flow of immigrants.\textsuperscript{3}

However their fate is not guaranteed and many do not survive the journey or reach their destination.

\textbf{Figure 3} Map of Routes to Europe

According to the map the main departure points are:

- West coast of Africa: Northern Mauritania, Western Sahara and southern Morocco from where most head for the Canary Islands.
- There is migration from Northern Morocco to cross into Ceuta and Melilla or cross the straits to Spain.
- From Tunisia and Libya people board boats, heading for Italy's island of Lampedusa, Sicily and Malta.\textsuperscript{4}

"Those who make it to Malta face an uncertain future. They are held in closed detention centres for up to 18 months while their claims are processed."

\textsuperscript{3} African Immigration to Europe http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/01/african_immigration_to_europe.html

\textsuperscript{4} Key facts: Africa to Europe Migration http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228236.stm
If they are granted refugee status or humanitarian protection, they are released to live in open centres...Malta is struggling to cope and some see the arrival of immigrants as an "invasion"...Most of them are there by mistake. They wanted to get to Italy but were blown off course or were rescued at sea. They do not want to be in Malta and Malta does not particularly want them...Malta has been appealing for help: more ships, helicopters and equipment to increase border patrols. It also wants "burden-sharing": that is, EU countries less exposed by geography taking in a share of the migrants."

The Council of Europe has had numerous meetings on these burning issues; the European Committee on Migration (CDMG) and the UNHCR representation to the European Institutions in Strasbourg attended a “Round table on Durable Solutions: Local Integration and Resettlement of Refugees”

Oliver Beer, the UNHCR's representative underlined “the purpose of the round table was to hold a fruitful exchange of views and ideas as to how we can best effect the integration of refugees, many of whom remain in the margins of society, are the victims of discrimination and are often used as scapegoats for all the problems affecting Europe”.

On the issue of unaccompanied children, the aim was to draw attention to the situation and pinpoint action that can be taken at the European level to improve their protection. Other issues of grave concern are the protection of women and the elderly, their welfare and integration into society.

The European Union adopted its first Action Plan in June 2010, to assess the scale of unaccompanied migrant minors, combat human trafficking and set out measures on reception, return and reintegration.

In an article on Migration and the changing face of Europe two paths to migration is discussed; reference is made of the world’s poorest and most conflict–ridden continent Africa and the trafficking of impoverished immigrants that has mushroomed into a million dollar business. According to BBC news quoting statistics from the UN it is noted that Smugglers' prices by sea from Africa to Canary Islands could cost 1,000 to 1,500 euros, from North Morocco to Spain; 1,000 euros and from Libya to Italy 1,500 to 2000 euros. Smugglers’ prices by land from the Sub-Sahara to Morocco range from 1,000 to 2,000 euros, through Mali; 1,000 euros and across the Sahara 1,700 to 3,400 euros. Travel by air, land and sea from South Asia to Africa and then to Europe would cost 9,000 to 16,000 euros. There are no guarantees of reaching their destination and this often feeds the crime of human trafficking.

5 Alix Kroeger, Malta Struggles with Migrants http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ europe/6283736.stm
6 Council of Europe Migration http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/migration/default_en.asp
The other path of migration according to the article was as a result of the addition of eight ex-communist East European countries to the EU in 2004, which threw rich and poor nations together into one borderless entity. Further, that this move sparked a wave of legal migration westward, as the well-educated (but underpaid) managers and unskilled labourers sought higher wages and a brighter economic future.

Figure 4 Graph of Migration Destination Spain

“As the closest European country to the African continent, Spain is on the frontline for illegal migration. From there, migrants often make their way to other European countries… Spain's enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in northern Morocco are initial targets for many migrants. Once detained they can be expelled, repatriated or sent to mainland Spain, where many are reported to be released, pending expulsion... For years, people have risked crossing the sea to get to mainland Spain, but in 2006 there was a closer focus on its islands - thousands headed for the Canary Islands in former African fishing boats, prompting an increase in joint "Frontex" patrol operations by Spain, the EU
and African nations. But tightening security at one departure point simply seems to shift it elsewhere."

A report on migration in 2005 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) says African migration to developed countries is marginal in relation to overall flows. However, these figures would be notably different due to the recent influx of immigrants in recent times.

The report stated that about two-thirds of Africans in Europe are from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and an increasing number are travelling from Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly heading for the former colonial powers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK.

It was also reported that most Sub-Saharan migrants are from West Africa - Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, in particular.

It would be pertinent to mention that the colonising countries of Europe who have influenced the different parts of Africa in enforcing their language would in turn attract immigrants of that language to their countries; for example, France would attract immigrants from the French speaking colonies and United Kingdom would attract English speaking immigrants. This has already paved the process of integration.

Figure 5 Graph of Immigrants in Europe by Region of Origin

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7 Key Facts Africa to Europe Migration, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6228236.stm>
This study reported by the BBC indicates figures of what percentage of remittances migrants send home to family they have left behind.

“Billions of dollars each year is sent back to Africa from the diaspora around the world - in some cases making up a sizeable chunk of the home country's GDP.”

Figure 6 Map of Remittances in the Year 2005

Figure 7 GDP Europe Vs Sub-Saharan Africa

8 Key facts: Africa to Europe Migration <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/622836.stm>
Table 1 GDP Europe VS Sub Saharan Africa

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<tr>
<th>EUROZONE</th>
<th>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</th>
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<td>Life expectancy:</td>
<td>Life expectancy:</td>
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<td>80 years</td>
<td>47 years</td>
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<td>Population growth:</td>
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<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
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<td>School enrolment,</td>
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<td>primary: 98.9%</td>
<td>primary: 65.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV prevalence (</td>
<td>HIV prevalence (</td>
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<td>aged 15-49): 0.3%</td>
<td>aged 15-49): 5.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internet users</td>
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<td>(per 1,000 people): 439.4</td>
<td>(per 1,000 people): 29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time to start a</td>
<td>Time to start a</td>
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<td>business: 26.9</td>
<td>business: 61.5</td>
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<td>Source: World Bank 2005</td>
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4. Social Media and the Cyber Revolution

Migration although an age old phenomena is greatly influenced by the social media; advertisements of better job opportunities and working conditions in foreign lands; attractions for a better life and the benefit to be able to improve quality of life at home by sending remittances are driving forces. The role of social media, through Facebook, twitter, blogs and the power of major networking forums has taken over national media and become the global communication which is fast tracking information and mobility, thus making the world very accessible.

Brzezinski on the technological Revolution and its impact on the world supports this view as follows;

“The nearly universal access to radio, television and increasingly the Internet is creating a community of shared perceptions and envy that can be galvanized and channeled by demagogic political or religious passions. These energies transcend sovereign borders and pose a challenge both to existing states as well as to the existing global hierarchy, on top of which America still perches...”

Andrew Gavin Marshall in an article concludes on this point that;

“the Technological Revolution has led to a diametrically opposed, antagonistic, and conflicting geopolitical reality: never before has humanity been so awakened to issues of power, exploitation, imperialism and domination; and simultaneously, never before have elites been so transnational and global in orientation, and with the ability to impose such a truly global system of scientific despotism and political oppression. These are the two major geopolitical realities of the world today. Reflect on that. Never in all of human history has mankind been so capable of achieving a true global political psycho-

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social awakening; nor has humanity ever been in such danger of being subjected to a truly global scientific totalitarianism, potentially more oppressive than any system known before, and without a doubt more technologically capable of imposing a permanent despotism upon humanity. So we are filled with hope, but driven by urgency. In all of human history, never has the potential nor the repercussions of human actions and ideas ever been so monumental.\(^{10}\)

The seeds of the cyber revolution have been sown and as the social, political and technological environment develops, new options are explored, opportunities seized and the cyber nation is networking globally every second…influencing thought, introducing new ideas and sharing information.

5. Youth Uprisings

The youth of Egypt were ignited into an uprising following the words on Facebook “Egypt deserves a better future. On 25 January we will change our country. Nobody will stop us if we are united. Young people must speak now.”\(^{11}\). These were the words that fuelled the latent anger and dissatisfaction with a regime festering in fraud, corruption and tyranny. Dissatisfaction with unemployment, lack of job opportunities, inflation and the stirring of youth connected to the world by internet facing injustices that can no longer be hidden.

“On the same Facebook page on which the invitation to protest appeared were links to where and when demonstrations would take place and the numbers of coordinators, lawyers and doctors. By 21 January membership of the page had grown to more than 100,000, with many volunteering to lead demonstrations in their home towns.”\(^{12}\)

"Everything was online and everybody was participating in organising the protests," said activist Abdallah Helmi.

Two days before the protests youth movements, including the 6 April and HASHD, offered online training courses for those organising demonstrations on how to avoid clashes with the security forces.

"Be ready with masks for the tear gas. Do not insult, talk or provoke any soldiers or policemen. This is not personal. They have orders to stop you,


\(^{11}\) Mohamed Abdel-Baky Cyber revolution, Al-Ahram Weekly Online <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1034/sc30.htm>

\(^{12}\) Mohamed Abdel-Baky Cyber revolution, Al-Ahram Weekly Online <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1034/sc30.htm>
but we are all Egyptians and one day the security forces will know that we are right," said one online guide sent to hundreds of thousands of protesters.  

"While the ensuing demonstrations quickly developed a dynamic of their own the role of youth movements in kick-starting the process was essential. The 6 April youth movement, created in 2008 to support striking textile workers in the industrial town of Mahala Al-Kobra, took the lead, focussing on technical assistance, coordination and creating an online communication channel between protesters through social networks like Twitter, Facebook and UStream."  

The student uprisings were viral and spontaneous and quickly infecting youth who initiated similar uprisings in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and other parts of the Middle East and Northern Africa. Syria’s cyber revolution effectively monitored and reported on the events within the country as the uprisings grew in numbers and shaped yet another revolution amongst the youth. Through the internet they had the power to influence, ignite and inform the youth as well as report to world news the events of this revolution even though foreign media coverage and information was censored within the country. The uprisings, demonstrations and civil war in these countries are still continuing.

This has been the cause of the wave of migrants risking their lives to cross perilous seas, pregnant women, children, the elderly and men seeking better opportunities for their families.

Most countries experiencing civil uprisings have attempted to curb news reporting and internet access in order to control, brainwash and dispel the flames of revolution. However, the power of the technological revolution has overcome and with it has ensued the new age; “the awakening.”

“The youth of the Third World are particularly restless and resentful. The demographic revolution they embody is thus a political time-bomb, as well. With the exception of Europe, Japan and America, the rapidly expanding demographic bulge in the 25-year-old-and-under age bracket is creating a huge mass of impatient young people. Their minds have been stirred by sounds and images that emanate from afar and which intensify their disaffection with what is at hand. Their potential revolutionary spearhead is likely to emerge from among the scores of millions of students concentrated in the often intellectually dubious “tertiary level” educational institutions of developing countries.

Depending on the definition of the tertiary educational level, there are currently worldwide between 80 and 130 million “college” students. Typically originating from the socially insecure lower middle class and inflamed by a sense of social outrage, these millions of students are revolutionaries-in-waiting,

13 Mohamed Abdel-Baky Cyber revolution, Al-Ahram Weekly Online <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1034/sc30.htm>
14 Mohamed Abdel-Baky Cyber revolution, Al-Ahram Weekly Online <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1034/sc30.htm>
already semi-mobilized in large congregations, connected by the Internet and pre-positioned for a replay on a larger scale of what transpired years earlier in Mexico City or in Tiananmen Square. Their physical energy and emotional frustration is just waiting to be triggered by a cause, or a faith, or hatred…Brzezinski favours an increased and expanded ‘internationalization’, i.e.; an increased supranational cooperation that should be actively promoted by the United States. He explains that “Democracy per se is not an enduring solution,” as it could be overtaken by “radically resentful populism.”\(^{15}\)

6. Case for Migration and Pressures for Restriction

One cannot discount the value that migration can have to a host country. The case for labour migration as proposed by Christina Boswell for the Global Commission on International Migration is as follows;

“Unlike the self-proclaimed countries of immigration of the New World – the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – Europe has found it difficult to come to terms with the fact of immigration. Many sections of European societies have been profoundly reluctant to welcome and incorporate immigrants, especially those coming from non-OECD countries who are perceived to have significantly different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Anti-immigrant sentiment has manifested itself in public support for restrictive immigration and asylum policies, negative reporting on immigrants and asylum-seekers in the popular press, discrimination against resident ethnic minority groups, and racist or anti-immigrant harassment and violence…This hostility appears counter-intuitive, given the extent to which European countries have benefited from immigration in the past decades.

The large-scale, mainly low-skilled immigration of the 1950s and 1960s was a crucial component of post-war economic reconstruction in Western Europe. Today, labour migration fills critical gaps in the IT sector, engineering, construction, agriculture and food processing, health care, teaching, catering and tourism, and domestic services.”\(^{16}\)

Christina proposes that the economic case for labour migration is likely to become more urgent in the coming decades, for at least three reasons.

\(^{15}\) Andrew Gavin Marshall: The Global Political Awakening and the New World Order
The Technological Revolution and the Future of Freedom, Part 1

First, European governments are increasingly recognising the importance of skills in generating productivity and growth. Human capital has become the most crucial determinant of productivity and growth in an increasingly knowledge-based economy. Highly skilled workers are vital for ensuring innovation and improving productivity, and therefore for creating new jobs. A study on the impact of the Green Card programme for IT workers, for example, estimated that each high skilled migrant created on average 2.5 new jobs in Germany (Wimmer AG, 2001). This has made many governments keen to loosen up rules on labour migration, intra-company transfers and movement of service providers, to attract the best skills. Indeed, there are serious concerns in many states about whether Europe is attractive enough to qualified workers in comparison to North America: the latter appears to be a more powerful magnet for high skilled workers, including European scientists and researchers.

Second, despite substantial structural unemployment in many European countries, European workers are often selective in their choice of occupations and locations, and are also more highly qualified than they were a decade ago. So although the portion of low- and semiskilled jobs is declining (because of new production techniques and outsourcing), there are substantial gaps in a number of these occupations – especially in the agro-food industry, catering and domestic services. There are also acute shortages in a number of skilled public sector jobs, because of inadequate remuneration or low status. This has created significant gaps in occupations such as medical care and teaching – gaps which are increasingly filled by labour migrants.

Thirdly, ageing populations imply an increased dependency rate in European countries, i.e. a higher ratio of economically inactive to active population. This will place a strain on welfare systems, as health and pensions become more expensive. Ageing populations will also generate shifts in consumption patterns, in particular increasing demand for healthcare and leisure activities, in turn creating additional demand for labour in these sectors.

Thus despite continued unemployment, problems of demand-supply mismatch and the need to attract high-skilled workers are likely to create serious labour shortages. Because labour migration is so politically sensitive, it is rarely the first choice of governments for filling these gaps. The first line of response is likely to be measures to influence patterns of domestic labour supply – through education and training, attracting more people into work, lengthening the working age, or encouraging higher birth rates.

The EU has also been aiming to increase mobility between member states, including the new CEE members (once restrictions on free movement have been lifted).

However, these measures are unlikely to perfectly meet demand. Indeed, there have already been moves to liberalise labour migration policies for particular skills, occupational or sectorial categories in almost all European
countries. As shortages become more acute, we can expect governments will increasingly have recourse to labour migration as a fast and efficient tool for filling gaps.  

Christina also posits that pressures for restriction is often discerned from a range of anxieties in popular media and party political debates as well as opinion polls…”that Europeans are anxious about the ‘ghettoization’ of ethnic minorities in deprived inner cities, and the corresponding problems of inter-ethnic tensions and violence; the apparently poor educational and labour market performance of immigrants and ethnic minorities; criminality and even terrorist activism on the part of ethnic groups; and, more generally, the perceived fragmentation of social solidarity and collective identities, as a result of increased cultural diversity…These fears are exacerbated by the growing challenge of migration control. The evolution of this problem over the past three decades is familiar.

The effective halt to labour migration in the early 1970s encouraged many people to try to enter Europe through asylum systems or family reunion. The ensuing attempts to restrict access through these ‘humanitarian’ routes gave rise to new patterns of irregular migration and human trafficking. Irregular migration flows have also emerged as a response to demand for illegal labour in many sectors, including construction, textiles and sewing, catering, and domestic work.

These forms of irregular movement have fed alarmist tendencies; the notion that Europe is being flooded with migrants from poorer regions, and that states are no longer able to control access to their territories and resources.  

7. Conclusion

We cannot prevent the events to come nor can we attempt to control it. Neither can we hide our heads in the sand and pretend that we are secure as long as the problem is not on our shores and not a catastrophe yet. We need to find innovative, consultative and pragmatic approaches to the challenges that we are faced with.

Christina Boswell in her article Migration in Europe proposes those policies which appear to offer the most interesting lessons for other regions and countries as:


• Involving source and transit countries in planning and implementing migration policies
• “Package” approaches to cooperation, which incorporate the concerns of source countries
• Better cooperation between different ministries/departments involved in migration policy
• Encouraging arrangements for multilateral burden-sharing in cases of refugee crises
• Liberalisation of free movement to enhance efficiency and integration in regional trade blocks
• Common legislative guidelines to ensure good practice in less experienced host countries
• More emphasis on language learning and naturalisation to promote integration

The European Commission and the UNICEF met in Rome to examine the situation of unaccompanied migrant minors aged 15 years and more and discussed the implementation of Life projects; the aim of which is to develop the capacities of minors allowing them to acquire and strengthen the skills necessary to become independent, responsible and active in society. Although this is for a limited duration, Life projects are a lasting solution for both the host states and the minors themselves to meet the challenges arising out of the migration of unaccompanied minors. At this meeting of member states it was proposed that a training manual be prepared and put into effect soon. This programme must also deal with the reality that these minors would be faced with after the training programme, i.e.; finding productive work, integration into a foreign society and how this will be implemented. Especially minors who have been victims of human trafficking and have no one and nowhere to go. They cannot just be sent back to the country they came from without the source country and host country agreeing on a structured integration.

A conference on Human Rights and Migration was held in Lisbon on 31 May to 1 June 2010, focusing on the interception of migrants at sea, how they are detained and treated in receiving countries, the dangers they can face such as trafficking and racism, as well as what happens when they are expelled or forced to return. This conference was organised by the Portuguese Parliament, the Council of Europe and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

At the 58th Meeting of the European Committee on Migration (CDMG), the progress of on-going activities within the framework of the years

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– program (2009-2012) was reviewed and approved. This was to enable as well as finalise Draft recommendations on the question of validating migrant’s skills and experiences and make proposals for a manual thereof. Also the prevention of vulnerability risks for elderly migrants and the improvement of their welfare were to be addressed.

Brzezinski notes in Part 1 of his three part series:

“Suddenly, global elites are faced with the reality of seeking to dominate populations that are increasingly becoming self-aware and are developing a global consciousness. Thus, a population being subjected to domination in Africa has the ability to become aware of a population being subjected to the same forms of domination in the Middle East, South America or Asia; and they can recognize that they are all being dominated by the same global power structures. That is a key point: not only is the awakening global in its reach, but in its nature; it creates within the individual, an awareness of the global condition. So it is a ‘global awakening’ both in the external environment, and in the internal psychology.”20

Collective conflict management of international security and violations of human rights is certainly a way forward in resolving disputes in changing world politics. There is potential for multilateral military action in the post-cold war era…potential for collective responsibility and respect for the future of the world and global consciousness.

I would like to elaborate on this further, as I believe that contemporary world foreign policy making deserves to be explored in greater depth and not for the purposes of this research.

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MANAGING INTERETHNIC RELATIONS
AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
INTERETHNIC RELATIONS STABILITY ON THE UKRAINE-ROMANIA BORDER: A CASE OF CHERNIVTSI REGION

Anatoliy KRUGLASOV*

Abstract. Situation with interethnic relations on the border of Romania and Ukraine is subjected to changes, especially after Romania accession to the EU. The most characteristic features of it could be analyzed on the example of Ukrainian part of Bukovina. This article considers first of all two aspects of Bukovynian regional phenomenon of ethnic tolerance: historical and contemporaneous ones. First part of the article proposes a brief historic retrospect, evaluating main stages of this multiethnic regional society phenomenon formation and evolution. And the second part regards current challenges of culture of tolerant relations amidst deferent ethnic groups, which leave together in this region. The data collected and points expressed in the article reflect surveys done with the author himself and summarizes mainly but not exclusively results of scholarship representing researchers of Yury Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University. The author does not pretend to cover all the issues related with making ethnic situation and ethnopolitics in the regions better. But these aspects of securing ethnonational stability into the given region could be taken into account by all parties concerned with the improvement of this very important sphere of social and political life alongside with the current border of the EU.

Keywords: Bukovyna, ethnic relations, culture of tolerance, borderland.

Ethnic relations widely depend on variety of changeable factors. Among them leading role play historical past, with the positive or negative experience of interethnic relations. When the latter are predominantly defined by samples

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of the mutual cooperation, inherited from the previous periods respectful stances and attitudes towards ‘others’, they contribute towards a formation of the tolerance culture, which might be treated as a great asset in nowadays Europe, including the regions and countries of the EU.

Regarding this kind of the historic heritage, Bukovyna is well reputed as a peculiar region, distinctive not only because its multiethnicity, but a widespread here culture of ethnic and religious tolerance. As of the context of East European history, level of ethnic tolerance among local communities and their members seemed to be pretty high. If to choose, what period of the regional history had been formative one as far as regional tolerance in Bukovyna is concerned, than the Austrian period is to be chosen as the starting point for emergence of the regional model of ethnic relations. This article is composed of two principal parts. The first one delivers historical outline of Bukovyna phenomenon of polyethnic community, regards its main stages of evolution, from Austrian period towards the today’s reality of Ukrainian part of former region of Bukovyna. The second part is dealt with the ethnopolitics of Ukraine vis-a-vis of Romania policy towards Ukraine at whole and Chernivtsi region in particular, keeping an eye on problems which were or are still unresolved in bilateral relations of both countries. The author relies on variety of sources concerning chosen topics and systematically represents his own researcher, reflected in his articles on Bukovyna as a multiethnic society, which were published earlier.

1. Bukovyna as a lucky case of polyethnicity

 Territory of the current Chernivtsi Region and, before that, all of Bukovyna was not monoethnic ever. Tracing back the history, this region was inhabited by representatives of different ethnic groups. However, it’s important to stress, evidence of their developmental and ethnocultural legacy, even though meaningful, may hardly be related to the modern situation in their ethnic relations. Under Austrian emperors’ rule, the Bukovyan multicultural society as polyethnic mosaic started to be formatted. Processes of economic and ethnocultural evolution of region, which possessed a peripheral place into imperial state’s administrative and economic structure, were influenced by relatively favorable external conditions. Austrian Empire could ensure more efficiently, as being compared to Ottoman Empire, the previous hegemonic master of the whole region of South-East Europe for ages it’s more peaceful existence. Borderland position of Bukovyna predisposed Vienna to pay a special if not a strategic attention to the regional stability. That’s why Vienna pursued a consolidation policy which was to guarantee Habsburg sovereignty over acquired territories (Petrea Lindenbauer, 2003: 239).
That required well-controlled system of subordination in relationship between ethnic communities of the region and the provincial as well as the central government. Hereby the key importance belonged to relations between the Ukrainian and Romanian communities as the biggest ones. Alongside with them German, Jewish and Polish communities has been playing stabilizing and sometimes integrating role in social and political life of Bukovyna. This policy coordinated with the demographical situation in the region. Statistics for the Bukovyna population show nearly 800,000 people living there in the mid-19th century, including: 38% Ukrainians, 33% Romanians, 13% Jews, 8% Germans, 4.5% Poles and a number of other smaller minorities (Ewa Rzetelska-Feleszko, 2006: 5). Regional specificity of Bukovyna in sense of the local ethnonational climate evolved from the mid-19th century. Since then this region had been granted with the status of the Dukedom of Bukovyna attributed with administrative autonomy. That change enabled it to deal independently with a wide range of political and cultural issues. While Ukrainians to a slight extend outnumbered the Romanian population here, in turn leaders of the latter community represented mostly hereditary dynasties of medieval Moldova. They were lucky to preserve some privileges and enjoyed, in comparison with the Ukrainians, greater opportunities in their cultural and social development (Luceac I., 2000: 26 – 34).

Gradual consolidation of the young Romanian state, following up Romania’s full independence in 1878, gradually strengthened influence of this ethnic group in the region. The very existence of the Romanian state, and moreover governed by the elites, inspired by the ideals of Romania Mare, constituted a certain threat of the Romanian irredentism emergence in Bukovyna. This urged the official Vienna to implement check and balance policy regarding key actors of the regional Romanian community. Contrary to the Romanians of Bukovyna, the Ukrainian community did not have the corresponding and neighboring kin state. Because of intensifying tensions with the Russian Empire, in the framework of Vienna and St. Petersburg competition over the Balkans, the ‘Ukrainian vector’ in the Austrian domestic and foreign policy would have been gradually gaining prominence. These reasons were changing Vienna’s treatment of the Ukrainian population in the Empire, its leaders and institutions. Hence, the Austrian government was compelled to conduct the policy of balancing interests of particular national communities and rely on inter-ethnic conflict prevention management. Under circumstances regional decision-makers masterfully counterpoised their interests, and supported or persecuted some social and political movements, and later political parties, which in turns were aspiring at representation and lobbying interests of major ethnic groups. This kind of policy brought about some fruitful results, contributing into preservation of ethnically fragmented state integrity. Both the Romanian and Ukrainian social and political milieus in Bukovyna did not engender nationalist or separatist movements up to
the breakdown of the Danube Empire. Leaders of these ethnic groups succeeded with building up the formal and informal communication with Vienna, shoving their sincere loyalty towards the Emperor, and only after that cherishing their distinctive national and political ideals, and subsequently ethnic identities.

Noteworthy is the outstanding role played by the German, Jewish and Polish communities into regional polity. The German community representatives were in charge of the imperial political, administrative and cultural policies execution, and they ensured bureaucratic support for the existing regime. Nonetheless, their modest number and limited resources for local sociopolitical clout did not allow the central power to rely on this community only and satisfy demands of the local Germans as the top priority (Осадчук С., 2002: 2 -17). The Jewish in fact possessed peculiar status in the communication of the different ethnic cultures of Bukovyna. They numerically prevailed upon other ethnic group in the cities and towns of Bukovyna (Corbeaj-Hoisie A., 2003:29 – 42). In the region local Jews targeted at performing the role of the values of high-level European urban subculture proponents. And they were most active in spreading, consuming and supporting the German-Austrian culture and traditions of that time indeed1. Well-educated local Jews were agents of the imperial culture; they were ready, in their most part, to abandon voluntarily, for example, their own traditional language – Yiddish. At the same time, their efforts were noticed from Vienna. Their zeal was rewarded with the support by the authorities not witnessed in neighboring Russia and other European empires (Ingraо Ch., 1996: 10).

To a very extend, successful formation of interethnic relations, based on the values of tolerance, might be explained by slowed down urbanization process in the region (Добржанський О., 1999: 76 – 77). As a result of that ‘belated modernization’, processes of ethnic consciousness transformation into modern national identity in Bukovyna underwent with less dynamics than in the neighboring regions. It helped avoiding of sharp social antagonism and ethnic confrontation. The regional system of economic labor distribution and relevant social roles emerged in Bukovyna led to the complex system of relations and interdependencies among the citizens of its towns and villages. Within this interdependencies network, the polarizing effect of ethnic differentiation has been partially mitigated by religious cohesion, while social and class conflicts were dampened, to some extent, by ethnocultural solidarity and concomitant appreciation of common identity.

This system of intricately intertwined, socially important and economically determined connections ensured a rather stable, albeit somewhat

1 Lichtblau A. & John M. Jewries in Galicia and Bukowina, in Lemberg and Czernowitz. Two divergent examples Jewish Communities in the far east of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. – http://www.sbg.ac.at/ges/people/lichtblau/cape.html [Last accessed 10.03.2009]
shaky, balance among major social and ethnic groups of population in the urban environment of the Bukovynian region. Thus, the region inhabitants collectively created Bukovynian ethnocultural traditions as predominantly tolerant ones. Deficiency of numerical representation for some regional communities was compensated by their high social activity which rested on quality education (surely, by the then standards) and prestigious social ties. For example, local Poles were far from being numerous, yet they exerted considerable influence in the administrative and educational spheres of the Bukovynian society (Strutinski W., Jaceniuk F., 1999: 118 – 129). Relatively low social mobility, as well as somewhat outdated placement of social and economic roles at the regional labor market reduced competitive tension with regard to primary resources among members of various ethnic groups. Its prevented formation and subsequent social and political articulation of their conflicting interests. In these circumstances, desperate somehow tough completion among the local elites for regional resources via political mobilization of their fellow citizens and impending confrontation among members of different nations and ethnic groups was hardly possible (Ostafi-Ost G., 1995: 45 – 58).

The most characteristic is the fact that local dwellers were not only bearers of ethnic and later national identities, but also widely regarded themselves as Bukovynians, proudly emphasizing this regional identity of theirs. Such informal consensus on the common regional identity by members of different ethnic and religious groups crowned foundations of the regional ethnic and religious equilibrium. One should not underestimate Vienna’s well-thought policies towards Bukovyna. They actively contributed to ensuring the local ethnopolitical climate in which threats to regional and national security were circumvented as usually (Попик С., 1999: 32 – 36). Local ethnic tolerance was supported by the central and regional authority’s right because it was an efficient tool matching both domestic and foreign interests of the Empire. Simultaneously, this position was in compliance with the prevailing mindset and needs of regional populations, members of Bukovyna’s major ethnic and religious communities.

However regional phenomenon of ethnic tolerance was not granted forever to Bukovynians. WWI started undermining the foundations of Bukovynian regional identity. War cruelties and crimes initiated the ‘beginning of the end’ to this remarkable regional identity and solidarity. Reprisals and dangers of the wartime forced exodus of generations of local public figures. These people were proponents and bearers of the ‘Bukovynism’ culture, which was a rather viable regional synthesis of imperial patriotism and local ethnosocial conformism (Добржанський А.В., 1997: 74 – 83). Later on Austrian era left behind rich legacy of legends and myths about regional prosperity and conformity. Images of the lost Golden epoch would have been reviving in contemplations of the local intelligentsia and bolstered by nostalgia
of ordinary citizens (Буркут И., 2004: 194). In reality, the end of Great War burned dreams and hopes for fair and peaceful resolution of the issue of the Bukovynians’ national self-determination, envisaging partition of the region into the Ukrainian and Romanian territories. Idea of dividing the territory of Bukovyna in 1918 by the ethnodemographic criterion, i.e. into the Romanian and Ukrainian parts, was supported by a many of local ethnic communities leaders, including some of Romanian stock. Would such a plan be implemented, instances of ethnic confrontation, typical of later periods of the regional history might be prevented, for sure.

2. Bukovynian multiethnicity versus Romania Mare ethnic policy

Romanian period of Bukovyna’s history requires much more activity of researchers, and this deficit of academic scrutiny is not overcome in the modern Ukrainian academic literature, despite some attempts made. This statement concerns of scholarly acquaintance with the ethnic policies of royal Romania in the interwar period. Local academic tradition divides the time of the region’s inclusion in Great Romania into two main periods – the ‘First’ and ‘Second Romania’. The first period lasted from late 1918 until mid 1940, while the second period – from June 1940 until August 1944.

Romania’s annexation of the territory of Bukovyna did meet expectations of dominant majority of Romanians, leaving in Bukovina. Ukrainians and representatives of other national groups did not fell themselves equally happy because of that radical sharp change of region political, social and economical shift. Royal Romania failed to fulfill its international commitments with regard to voluntary plebiscite of the Bukovynian population, as well as ensuring favorable conditions for the national and cultural development of ethnic minorities leaving on newly acquired territories. Moreover, consolidation of the Romanian rule upon Bukovyna led to gradual deterioration of the administrative and territorial status of the region, which lost its autonomy in 1923. Together with a process of administrative centralization and cultural unification of Greater Romania, extended towards new lands went losses with regard to domestic politics and sociocultural atmosphere, reflected in the status of its citizens of different ethnic origin (Буркут И., 2004: 235 – 236). New (as for the region) Romanian authorities launched the policy of Romanization of this multiethnic region, in a resolute and oftentimes uncompromising manner.

Romanian authorities tried to justify annexation of proving the historical and ethnic “Romanianness” of the Bukovynian region. Accomplishment of this goal met with the presence of the numerous and well-organized Ukrainian communities in the region, which demographically dominated in the northern and eastern parts of Bukovyna. Bucharest official stance on Bukovynian Ukrainians was ideologically formulated by Prof. Ion
Nistor, who declared that autochthonous Ukrainians of Bukovyna were in fact Romanians who had “forgotten” their true ethnic roots. That’s why Romania should take all necessary steps to help them be freed of that national amnesia and restore their lost consciousness (Livezeanu I, 1995: 65).

And this policy started to work in a number of ways, primarily with the help of elaborated information, educational and cultural policies based on all-comprehensive Romanization. Material stimuli have been used for bearers of the agrarian and patriarchal culture. For instance, in the time of the agrarian reform Romanians were given priority in receiving land lots. Census results of the interwar period proved that direct police coercion and systematic use of other degrading instruments resulted in disowning their national identity by some segments of the non-Romanian population. Obviously, this remark equally applied to those Ukrainians who were receptive to persistent explanations of their true national affiliation by the new rulers. Other measures of direct and latent discrimination were also put into force, including limitations for enrolment in gymnasia and higher educational institutions for non-Romanians, denial of access to public service etc. 2. Undoubtedly, such ethnic policies negatively affected minority ethnic groups, especially after ascent of the extreme right in the late 1930s. Being worried about the problem of internal stability and territorial integrity of the state, which borders reached well beyond ethnically homogeneous ethnic territories of the Romanian people, Romanian political elites conducted the model of the ethnic policies bringing about an opposite effect. The general remark about Greater Romania’s ethnic policy is applicable to the case of multicultural Bukovyna at a full stand. Insecure international stage as well as internal tendencies for authoritarianism and, later, totalitarianism within the Romanian political system made conditions of national minorities getting worse and worse. They were often exploited, discriminated and falling victim to the growing ethnic and political intolerance, which was spreading in Romania in the 1930s.

Many of Bukovynians, comparing new State’s order with the previous one were nostalgic about the Austrian times. Thus, ethnic Germans of Bukovyna underwent through considerable losses of their status, which were somewhat eased after rapprochement between Bucharest and the leadership of Nazi Reich based on geopolitical priorities. The Jewish community position could not be compared with the Austrian period, either. Jews were not only ethnically, but also economically discriminated. Romania of that time was the country which widely tolerated, if not politically cultivated, wide-spread anti-Semitism (Штейн І., 1997). Conditions of the Polish community equally exacerbated in comparison with the Austrian period. Because these and other reasons, official Bucharest’s permanent efforts at pursuing ethnic policies which

would guarantee internal stability and external security of the country, went a failure. It resulted not only of chauvinist intentions and arrogant attitude towards minorities of the political elite, as well as aggressive Romanization. In fact, Romania was not exclusive with regards to its ethnopolitics, pandemic of xenophobia and ethnic intolerance clouded political atmosphere practically all over Central and Eastern Europe.

Romania’s second occupation of Northern Bukovyna is attributed with much more brutality of intolerant ethnic policy. The local population remembered that period as a regime of military and police terror, policies of ugly oppression and ethnocide, in particular with regard to the Jewish population (Alexandru F., 2010: 207 – 217). Jews, Ukrainians, Poles and other national minorities suffered from such policies (Манаачинский А., 2000). Local Romanians were no exception either, as far as they suffered also from the regime brutality. That position has been even worsened by the fact, that they were treated by other national groups as accomplices in these misdeeds at least, and therefore carried the burden of responsibility for such myopic policies (Жуковский А., 1994: 188 – 190).

By the late 1930s liberal freedoms remained surviving in the previous decade had been trampled. Political, institutional and socio-cultural foundations of traditionally cherished polyethnicity and cultivated by the society and authorities ethnic tolerance, inherited from the previous spell of Bukovynian history were seriously deformed. Locals and in the first place regional intellectuals had been trying to resist these negative processes in order to preserve the traditional Bukovynian multiculturalism. Now it was not so much reminiscence of the bygone empire, as affiliation with the genuine and high European culture. Nevertheless, social and intellectual defiance from could not overweigh the impact of other destructive factors. Being deprived of intellectual and moral impulses sent by the regional elite, Bukovyna’s ordinary citizens’ culture was even less capable of resisting negative influences which depraved traditional ethnic tolerance. Finally, chauvinism of Great Romania provoked and strengthened reactive nationalism of other national communities, thus drawing the vicious circle of mutual antipathy, suspicions and persistent prejudices. Mutual offences and ethnonational conflicts resulted in gradual and inevitable loss of the culture of ‘Bukovynism’ and subsequently synthetic identity of Bukovynians, which fall victim to historical circumstances of the ‘Great politics’ of two World Wars. Social and political environment of that time was hostile towards national and cultural peculiarities, ignoring protection of minority rights. Bukovyna did not constitute any untouchable island in stormy ocean of dramatic chances.

3. Soviet Internationalism: another ‘ideal’ modeling of the inter-ethnic relations

The Soviet period of the history of ethnic relations started with partition of Bukovina into two parts. A new region and constituent part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in the north-western part of historical Bukovyna, plus northern part of Bessarabia and the former Herta cinut of Romania, which were arbitrarily included into a new territorial unit. This led to profound changes in the all aspects of the population life in newly-formed Chernivtsi Region. Besides change in the political and territorial status of the region, social and cultural dimensions of newly formed Chernivtsi Region of UkSSR were changed too. Another crucial factor as for the new region must be taken into consideration is active migratory processes which transformed ethnonational features of the local population and earlier proportions of major ethnic communities of the region (Холодницький В., 2001: 42 – 50). First of all, early 1940s witnessed exodus of the traditionally important ethnic group of the Bukovynian population – the Germans. Secondly, the number of Polish residents decreased considerably. Thirdly, the ratio of ethnic Romanians also diminished (less dramatically), primarily due to their emigration to Romania, and sometimes even farther away. Fourthly, the Ukrainian segment of the local population similarly underwent tangible transformations. In the aftermath of WWII and guerilla fighting of the Ukrainian nationalist groups, the local Ukrainian population was decimated, and local intellectuals were those who suffered most severely. Reprisals practiced by the Soviet regime were not directed against any particular ethnic group, and affected almost all ethnic communities of the region. The quantity and structure of the Jewish population underwent most considerable changes. Exterminated or forced to emigrate, local Jews of Chernivtsi and the region were replaced by Soviet Jews who resettled from Bessarabia and other far distant regions of the USSR after the WWII. Thus, ethnic and cultural character of the region was suffered serious and perhaps irrevocable qualitative and quantitative losses. The ethnic structure of the region was significantly socially simplified and culturally impoverished.

As the outcome of USSR migratory policy ethnic Russians replaced, to some extent, the German community, at least numerically in the new region. At the same time, some local residents, primarily Ukrainians, Romanians and Moldovans, were recruited voluntarily or forcefully for the sake of industrial and agricultural grant plans of Kremlin. From that time till now migratory processes play an important role in shaping the ethnonational situation in the region, defining its cultural and social transformations (Курс України, 2002: 16 – 17). Simultaneously, Soviet regime exterminated or imprisoned bearers and creators of national consciousness or bribed and neutralized some of them (Марусик Т., 2002: 134, 141, 144). Ethnocultural associations were dismantled;
local national and cultural life was constrained to official state institutes of Soviet education and culture.

This situation resulted in ignoring specific ethnonational aspirations and interests of regional citizens. Because of institutional devastation, systemic reprisals and consequent vehement “preventive” measures against “relapses” of bourgeois nationalism, conscious and open activities of national communities at that time were next to impossible. The Soviet experience of the region was also marked by processes of forceful if not aggressive industrialization. These processes made a pronounced impact on socio-cultural life of the regional center – Chernivtsi. First and foremost, they ensured formation of the local working class whose representatives were regarded as a social and political support to the regime, the only and true representative of proletarian and later on soviet internationalism. At the same time, this process of harshly developing working class was an effective instrument of Russification of the local population. No other language but the Russian – not Ukrainian – as language of the majority of the population in the region and the UkRSSR was increasingly used as the main means of official and everyday communication, supported by all means with authorities. But even so, the ethnopolitical situation in the region differed significantly from flagrant discrimination and national humiliation of the Romanian period.

The new political realities of 1950s-1980s minimized dangers of ethnic tension accumulated in the previous periods and the first afterwar years. In such environment, with legal social and cultural channels of aggregation and expression of ethnonational interests absent, the importance of ethnic factors both at the regional level and in citizens’ social and personal life, gradually diminished on the surface. These tendencies were supported with everyday official propaganda, which permeated and thoroughly affected all spheres of people’s lives in USSR.

Despite all this policy all-union ‘melting pot’, designed to engineer the Unique and Single Soviet nation proved to be a failure, in a final run. Specifically, as far as Chernivtsi region is concerned Soviet authorities does not invent and imply any kind of regional ethnic policy model, adapting towards local circumstances all-Union ideology and subsequent practice.

4. Regional Ethnic Mosaic rediscovered and simplified

At the beginning of the Perestroika period long-time silenced problems of ethnic relations in Chernivtsi Region reappeared on the public scene. Open debates on pros and cons of the Soviet history, as well as about crimes of the regime against citizens and larger social and ethnic groups, led erosion of the enrooted in consciousness Soviet myths about the wise national policy.

Late period of Perestroika is marked with revival of national
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Communities and fellow institutes of the civil society. These transformations inclined to patterns which were remained unforgotten by the older generation, whose representatives were experienced of partaking in these organizations (Буковина, 1996: 298 – 299). Perceptions of the ‘ideal period’ in national and cultural life of Bukovyna differed significantly among different ethnic communities. Leaders of the Romanian community were unhesitant about virtues of the interwar period, which in fact ensured the dominant status to this ethnic group (Герман К., 1991). However, the majority of other national groups, namely Ukrainians, Poles and Jews, were more eager to agree on the region’s inclusion in the Austrian Empire as the ‘golden era’ of Bukovyna, when the region provided numerous examples of high culture of ethnic tolerance. This time the myth of Austrian and European Bukovyna, which until recently has been cherished only in the émigré circles far abroad started receiving enthusiastic support of the local intellectuals and to a lesser extend of ordinary citizens.

Ethnonational rival has been characterized by tolerant behavior dominating upon radical and extremist modes. Antipathy towards Soviet national policy united regional leaders and neutralized dangerous spread of xenophobia and intolerance, propagated by some radicals of different ethnic origin. Severe political and socioeconomic crisis which began in 1990, increasing street protests bred apprehensions about the future. Local manifestations of radical Ukrainian nationalism resonated with and went together with the first public symptoms of Romanian irredentism. Their representatives justly condemned the infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and at the same time questioned the afterwar peace arrangements, including territorial integrity of the UkSSR and USSR making claims on the ‘historical justice’ of returning Northern Bukovyna to Romania. Contradicting not only with the historical circumstances, which are always debatable, but also the standards of international law, those demands ignored the evident ethnodemographic composition of the Chernivtsi oblast region, where Romanians comprised about 10% of the region population, according to the 1989 census (Національні склад…, 2003: 4).

After the USSR breakdown in 1991, the young independent Ukrainian state faced with hardships with regard to official Kyiv’s domestic and foreign policy as well as with the lack of experience and knowledge in the sphere of ethnonational policy and administrative management. This was exacerbating the ethnopolitical issues inherited from the previous periods of regional history. Since the time of Ukraine becoming independent the ethnic situation in the region continued to change. Substantial difficulties in the regional ethnic

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relations system functioning have begun in the early 1990s. Looking at collapse of the USSR as the great chance for Romanian foreign policy and considering Ukraine as a much weaker new state, Bucharest started making the official claims to the territory of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. The regional ‘Cold War’ period between official Bucharest and Kyiv poisoned not only bilateral relations of both neighbouring countries but also inevitably victimized relations of the Romanian and Ukrainian communities in Chernivtsi Region. One the eve of Independence some leaders of local Romanian Societies supported from Bucharest orchestrated campaign of boycotting of the National referendum on Independent, accompanying with other open manifestation of separatism (Bugajski J., 2000: 178). These and other events took place in the region some years more, seeding a alienation and confrontation in relations of ethnic groups of Chernivtsi region.

Fortunately, the influence of the factor has been diminishing upon entering an interstate Treaty of 1997 which considerably decreased the contradictions between Bucharest and Kyiv, however not eliminated them completely until now. Another factor, contributing to the destabilization of the regional ethnic politics was further dynamics of emigration processes which resulted in disappearance of the Jewish population of the territory which, according to the 2001 census, amounted to just over 1,000 persons in the almost one million population of the territory. Simultaneously the region became a source of active labour migration which permitted emigration of the Ukrainian as well as Romanian and Moldovan population abroad. Vacated room of the traditional population is replacing with the afflux of the so-called new minorities formed by persons who left former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia for economic and political reasons. They challenge the ethnocultural character of the territory and these problems have not been resolved yet.

Finally, the EU enlargement makes opened for the border region of Chernivtsi oblast facing with both challenges and advantages of the new neighbourhood. Whine enlargement of 2004 – 2007 included Romania but left the citizens of Moldova and Ukraine outside borders of the EU; it has influenced the ethnic situation in the border region directly and indirectly. Positive aspect is that the regions is getting closer to standards and politics of the EU, covering delicate issues of interethnic relations. But the policy of granting to the citizens of Ukraine of the Romanian origin or whose ancestors lived in the territory of Romania prior to 1940 with the Romanian citizenship (and, automatically, of the EU) whatever way it is justified by official Bucharest represents not only an attempt to overcome the new economic cleavages and political divisions generated by the gradual and selective process of European Union’s enlargement in the regions of CEE (Iordachi, 2002: 139). It results also
in new wave of distrust of Kyiv in Romania, and contradictory effect the relations of the main ethnic groups of the region.

More important challenges originated from the slow pace of transformation processes in Ukraine, its lagging behind its western neighbours in the conducting policy of reforms required. Still, ethnonational relations in Chernivtsi Region remain mostly balanced and non-conflicted ones. In the same time, obvious is that the region of bygone Bukovyna has undergone radical changes of its ethnonational relations and experienced several models of ethnopolitical implementation, which resulted in challenging heritage, collective memory and individual practices sometimes not in compliance with norms and attitudes of true tolerance. The region has been changed from the historically polycultural one, distinctive because effective system of tolerant ethnic relations amidst ethnic groups without any kind of comprehensive domination into a region with one dominant ethnonational group, represented by the Ukrainian population and other significantly smaller national groups. On the other side of the new, more polarized system of ethnic relations, the Romanian population is present. This population undergoes the painful processes of identity change of the local Ukrainian citizens of the Moldovan ethnicity to the Romanian identity (Круглянов, 2008: 30 – 31). It means that the territory of Chernivtsi oblast (Ukrainian part of the former Bukovyna) with no doubt evolves towards loses of its earlier polycultural and multiethnic character gravitating, reshaping into a region with rather a bipolar model of ethnic relations. That results in braking down the logic of continuity, substituted with new risks and opportunities not inherent previously.

5. Romania and Ukraine discords about minorities

Final part of the article makes an attempt to propose wider political framework of the topic considered. The Ukraine and Romania’s relations are significantly influenced by the issue of ethnic minorities. During the initial period of Kyiv and Bucharest’s relations the two postcommunist countries had different if not contradictory approaches to their resolution. Due to the new country’s being deep in an economic and political crisis, Kyiv could neither support appropriately the Ukrainians in Romania nor monitor efficiently their development in the post-Communist Romania. At the same time, then-time Romania political elite cherished the hopes to resolve issues of Romanians abroad by fight for reconsideration of those borders first of all in order to return “historical Romanian lands”. It is obvious that such a situation determined mutual distrust at least.

Problems in this field of the bilateral relations began from the parties’ discussion about the quantity of the relevant minorities in the both countries already. According to the 2001 population census 151 thousand Romanians
reside in the Ukraine, however the Romanian party believes that their number is twice as high. Romanians densely reside in Chernivtsi, Odesa, and Transcarpathia Regions. In its turn, 61 thousand Ukrainians reside in Romania according to the 2002 census, 250-300 thousand according to some other data. Ukrainians mostly reside in the northern part of the country, namely in Maramureș, Suceava, Timiș counties which are immediately adjacent to the Ukrainian border.5

Such territorial contingency required the relevant simplified visa regime between the both countries. Thus, the Agreement on Cancellation of Visa Regime between the Government of Romania and the Government of the USSR signed in the city of Bucharest on 11 March 1991 was the first step in this direction. On 19 December 2003 the Agreement on the Terms of the Citizens Mutual Travel was signed between the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine and the Government of Romania which provisions stipulated a simplified procedure of visa issue for the citizens of the both countries. This agreement entered into force on 16 July 2004. According to this agreement, the Ukrainian citizens could receive visas in the Embassy of Romania in Kyiv as well as in the Consulates General of Romania in Chernivtsi and Odesa. According to the terms of the Romanian legislation, the whole procedure of visa issue took 3-5 (transit, short-term) to 30 days (long-term). Depending on the visit to Romania purpose, the visa application should have been confirmed by various sets of documents which list could be found in the diplomatic missions of Romania. Certain categories of citizens also had to prove the possibility of their upkeep in Romania in the amount of 100 euros per day at the Ukrainian-Romanian border immediately (Чорныi, 2004).

The relevant visa regime for the Romanian citizens was also established by this agreement. According to it, Romanian citizens could receive visas at the Embassy of Ukraine in Bucharest or at the Consulate General in Suceava. In January 2007 upon Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU the Romanian and Ukrainian presidents stated that Bucharest would introduce free visas for the Ukrainians and Kyiv would abandon the visa regime for the Romanians as well as for all the EU members. The Ukraine and Romania hold active dialogue concerning further liberalisation of the visa regime which is heavily dependent on the success of negotiations between Kyiv and Brussels concerning gradual transition to visa-free regime for the Ukrainian citizens. This negotiation is framed with wider process of completing the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine which finalization has not got defined terms as yet.

Besides ensuring the possibility of free contacts with relatives and representatives of own nation abroad, the both states attempted to regulate and

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resolve other issues of their minority policy, namely of the ethnic policy. Among the priorities determined which are absolutely understandable in their importance there is securing the rights of the Romanian minority in the Ukraine and of the Ukrainian minority in Romania (Петров, 2006: 94-95). During the whole period of the bilateral interaction the countries were able to reach significant progress in resolution of the issue. In particular, during 1991-2007 such regulatory acts were entered into as the Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Culture, Science, and Education between the governments of the Ukraine and Romania, the Agreement on Simplified Procedure of Crossing the Common State Border by the Citizens Residing in Near-Border Areas and Counties between the governments of the Ukraine and Romania, Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Science and Technologies between the governments of the Ukraine and Romania, Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation Relations between the Ukraine and Romania (Договір про відносини…, 1997), Consular Convention between the Ukraine and Romania etc.

Establishment of two Euroregions should be added to these interstate co-operation resources, namely Lower Danube and Upper Prut (Патраш, 2002:324). Following the joint decision, an intergovernmental commission was established, the activity objective of which commission are harmonisation and monitoring of securing the rights of Ukrainians in Romania and of Romanians in the Ukraine.

In spite of functioning of such a vast regulatory basis which corresponds to the current requirements of the international and European law as well as to implementation of interstate programmes, representatives of the Romanian community in Chernivtsi and Odesa Regions still assert systematic violations of their rights, laying a number of claims at the same time. For instance, at the beginning of the 2000s it was a persistent demand to open a multicultural university in Chernivtsi with the Romanian and a number of other languages taught following the example of the University at Cluj-Napoca. Upon consideration of the issue, the Ukrainian party postponed its resolution indefinitely while the Romanian suggestions mostly considered its dominant Romanian component of receiving higher education in Romanian more than its multicultural nature. This would create serious employment problems for the specialists having Romanian as the language of special higher education, in the Ukrainian experts’ opinion. The issue of establishing Romanian theatre societies, creation of book collections in Romanian at the expense of the

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6 Договір між Урядом України та Урядом Румунії про співробітництво в сфері науки та технологій // www.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=642_014 (last accessed on 7.09.2006)

7 Консульська конвенція між Україною і Румунією // www.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=642_007 (last accessed on 7.09.2006)
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Ukrainian state is also being discussed. Besides, the request to return to the Romanian community the building of the former Romanians’ Palace of Culture in Chernivtsi should be mentioned as well (Буркут, 2005: 249).

While the necessity of meeting and satisfying legitimate ethnic minorities claims is very important in order to gain more stable and democratic development of any democratic country which is not ethnically homogeneous, this process has faced with some obstacles and invoke certain reservations on the practise. Quite often, those requests were of the take-it-or-leave-it nature, which caused certain tension in the relations of the local ethnic communities. The policy of the neighbouring country was one of the reasons for tension of the ethnonational situation in the region. According to the governmental Basic Programme of Romania’s Development in 1996-2000, the priority tasks of Bucharest’s foreign policy were guarantee of the national security by the country’s integration to the security or joint defence institutions and development of peaceful relations with the neighbouring countries. At the same time, significant attention was paid to strengthening relations with Romanians leaving abroad and to their support in order to preserve their ethnic, cultural, language, and religious identity, to reaching the national ideal by ensuring conditions for reunification of all the Romanians from the historical territories within the United Europe. However, persistent propaganda of great-power, revisionist ideas via the mass media not only in Romania itself but also beyond its borders, first of all in the Ukraine and Moldova, was one of the most often methods of integrating Romanians into the single cultural space (Буркут, 2005: 249). That as well as the policy of illegal passportisation of ethnic Romanians, especially in the Ukraine, which provocative nature as well as dangerous consequences were on numerous occasions indicated by the Ukrainian party, however to no avail, complicated resolution of the existing problems, hampered search for the ways of harmonisation of the ethnonational policy of the both countries, did not enable to free them from quite a “traditional” for them but forced position of hostages of the geopolitical and regional environment. Certain hope for betterment in the aspect of two countries relations arose from a fact that responding to EU criticism about its overexpansive external citizenship policies, Romania has recently narrowed down the circle of those eligible for Romanian external citizenship.

It is imperative to mention that upon ratification of the basic political Treaty with the Ukraine by the Romanian parliament in October 1997 efforts of the political circles which insistently favoured reconsideration of borders and restoration of Greater Romania, including as the most favourable method of re-

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integration of the Romanian nation in the single national state, decreased significantly. This influenced very positively the atmosphere in which the issues of the minority policy were discussed in a more business-like and politically balanced manner later.

Considering Romania’s influence on the ethnonational situation in near-border regions the role of radical national organisations should be paid attention to. The most influential ones among them are For Bessarabia and Bukovina international association, Bukovina society, League of Romanians from Everywhere, Union of Bukovina Romanians, League of Forcibly Dissolved Counties etc. There are also a number of small parties and organisations which activity is less known to the public at large but they don’t have significant influence. In fact, certain politicians and political organisations did not reject the above efforts later on, stating great dissatisfaction with the very fact of recognising the present borders by the president and government of Romania.

However, the attempts to exert pressure on the Ukraine were transferred by them to biased position as to the Ukrainian party’s performance of certain provisions (first of all, of article 13 concerning provision of rights of national minorities) of the interstate document, demands to monitor closely concerning the above issues (Programa de bază.., 1996). The fact and practice of such mutual monitoring by Bucharest and Kyiv may be only greeted. At the same time, however, consolidated proposals of researchers of the both countries to make this monitoring scientific and all-purpose in its methodological and instrumental bases, to begin such actions in the territory of Upper Prut Euroregion as a pilot project were aired at the international research conference in June 2001, Ethnic Relations in the Territory of Upper Prut Euroregion (Ethnic relations.., 2001: 397 – 398). They were made known to all official power institutions of the parties concerned but remained unanswered since then. And this causes a rightful question concerning objectivity of the monitoring tools as well as the possibility of arbitrariness of certain interpretations of is certain parameters remained opened.

These manifestations occur in the foreign policy also. The proof of the fact is that the official statement by the Romanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs dd. 27.01.2006 concerning provision of interests and rights of Romanian communities in the Ukraine, preservation of their ethnic, cultural, language, and religious identity is quite harsh. Referring to the position of the Consultative Committee on National Minorities of the Council of Europe concerning the Ukraine’s report about fulfilment of the Framework Convention, the foreign-affairs body noted problems in the field of education in Romanian. It was also stressed that Romania would follow how the Ukraine abides by the standards in the field of protection of national minorities, including with the assistance of international institutions which can influence the Ukraine on the issues of improvement of the national-minorities policy. Taking into consideration the fact that Romania has not exceeded the limits of dialogue with the Ukraine, the
issue of using a confronting position in relations with the Ukraine was not posed. Upon establishment of the independent state of the Ukraine, activity of the major cultural organisations of Romania obtained more obvious traits of Bukovina-directed trend. At the same time, nationalistic socio-political organisations become especially vivid before or during signing of important interstate treaties (Петров, 2006: 94-95).

One of the principal points of the associations’ programme documents is propaganda of the idea of Greater Romania restoration, namely assertion of the following provisions:

1. Romanian lands have never belonged to the Ukraine ex gratia; as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact Romania forcibly evacuated the administrative bodies and army from its historical territories in 1940;

2. The Snake Island was annexed in 1948; upon dissolution of the USSR the above territories were groundlessly left within the Ukrainian state;

3. Acceleration of the process of Romania’s integration to the Euro-Atlantic institutions by losing part of own territory is intolerable etc. (Петров, 2006: 562).

The analysis of the document and literature sources available proves that not only radical national parties (Greater Romania People’s Party, Party of Romanians’ National Unity etc.) but also centre-right parties (National Liberal Party, Democratic Party, Conservative Party) and right parties willingly turn to the issue of sovereignty over North Bukovina, South Bessarabia, and Hertsa territory, violation of the rights of the Romanian national minority in the Ukraine etc. It is quite obvious that radical national socio-political associations negatively influence the political stability in the region acting in such a manner. Moreover, as the report of president Traian Băsescu on 31 March 2008 demonstrates, such pressure has bears its fruit and the higher authorities of the Romanian state sometimes responds to it, at least partially satisfying the expectations of the pressure organisers. Pitiful is, that kind of revisionist statements have been made and in the latest time. Following up with course, expressed by president Basescu declaration that “the minimal policy of Romania is for the unification of the Romanian nation to take place within the EU”, the phrase minimal policy allows to imply the existence of a maximal policy that goes way beyond unification with Moldova. Its reality is apparent in the decision to grant Romanian citizenship to all residents of the territories belonging to the pre-1940 Greater Romania and their descendants up to the third generation –

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including the denizens of Bukovina and southern Bessarabia\textsuperscript{11}. Of course, they kept away of mutual trust Ukrainian-Romanian relations, proving the preservation of certain threat towards territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and thus contributing negatively towards the climate of interethnic relations in the border regions of two neighbouring countries.

Summarizing the condition of ethnonational relations in the near-border areas of the Ukraine and Romania at present, it is possible to make conclusions about certain evolution of this situation and of the respective policy of the neighboring countries. At the beginning of the new period in the Romanian history in the first half of the 1990s its ruling circles laid territory claims against the Ukraine. However, with assertion of the country’s European and Euro-Atlantic course of the country its ruling elite began reconsideration of the foreign-policy priorities, in particular concerning the position on the Romanian minority in the territory of the Ukraine. Bucharest approved the decision to strengthen relations with the Romanians abroad and to support them in order to preserve their ethnic, cultural, language, and religious identity. Fulfilment of such a government programme made the Romanian influence on the ethnonational situation in the near-border regions of the Ukraine gradually, first of all in Chernivtsi, then in Odesa and Transcarpathia Regions. Among the methods of such influence it is possible to mention circulation of certain information in the regional and central mass media of Romania and the Ukraine (Петров, 2006: 206 – 211). Active efforts of Romanian socio-political associations, constant visits of near-border Chernivtsi and Odesa Regions by the Romanian politicians etc. should also be mentioned.

The Ukrainian party took up an absolutely reactive station, expressing its surprise concerning the fact that the Romanian party laid a number of claims to the ethnonational condition of the Romanians in the Ukraine. In the opinion of the official Kyiv, it had created better conditions for preservation and development of the national distinctiveness and culture than the conditions of Ukrainians in Romania. For a long time the discussion on this issue had accusatory and even hostile key notes and was underproductive, in my opinion. At the same time, in those really sensitive spheres in the territories of the both countries there are still problems of overcoming the heritage of the previous periods, establishing mutual understanding and bringing the minority policy, in particular ethnonational policy, not only to the formal and legal but also to the actual level in general by which the united Europe is characterised. It looks like mutual readiness for constructive co-operation in the humanitarian field asserts itself in the Ukraine as well as in Romania more and more; in this field assistance of the EU, and of the European Commission in particular, including

within the New Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, provides new resource potential, creates framework of co-operation. This enables the both parties to reach mutual understanding and weighty consequences of co-operation across common and, we hope, more friendly and open borders.

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THE CULTURE OF SECURITY: PERCEPTIONS AND PREFERENCE FORMATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Dorin I. DOLGHI

Abstract: The present paper brings into discussion the role and importance of identity and cultural variables in the construction of a European security culture. The main points are related to a conceptual and theoretical framework that can provide the methodology for investigating security perceptions and to understand the limits of preference formation. For exemplification, we use certain data from Eurobarometer that suggest an increasing common perception that all the fears and expectations are commonly shared by the Europeans and in this terms we can talk about a security culture.

Key words: security, identity, culture, European Union, perceptions, preferences

Since the beginning of humankind the security-insecurity relationship has influenced the development and behaviour both of individuals and groups and consequently, has deep implications in the present structure of the contemporary world. Within social interactions each entity, regardless of the form and content of assuming its identity in relation with others, starts with several basic interrogations that are not necessary formulated directly. Who/what am I? Who/what are the others? How we differ? What we have in common? Inevitably, a major question arises: is the other one a threat? These interrogations determine the social, political, economic and cultural relations of human interactions. In the moments or contexts where the answers were not convergent it leads to conflicts and the strongest one imposes its will over the weaker or less prepared ones (Dolghi, 2010: 75). This view can be easily extrapolated at international level, where the range, diversity and complexity of actors as well as the levels of interaction can determine a better understanding of security dynamics within the international and regional systems.

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Within this paper we propose to evaluate to what extent the theoretical perspectives of international relations, security and European studies can be adapted in order to explain the perception of security within the European Union and implicitly contributes to preference formation, taking into consideration the variables of culture and identity. Our approach of security is related with the following definition: *security represents the perception of an actor that there are no direct or indirect vulnerabilities, risks or threats that can affect its existence, status, interests, preferences or image*. The keyword is perception. A wrong or incomplete perception of security can be translated into insecurity. Therefore, each entity is in a permanent search for accurate information and data about the surrounding environment and the potential threats and challenges for its own security. Perception of security leads to the development of particular defense mechanisms that are designated to respond to the sources of insecurity identified. Also, in case of major international actors such as nations, organizations or corporations we can clearly identify security policies and strategies.

Within contemporary societies the security policies and strategies suffered essential transformations generated not only by the mutations in the international system but also by major mutations in the way that people perceive the issues related to security (Hlihor, 2009: 2). Within any analytical framework, a good understanding of security must start from the observation, research and analysis of its triple condition: objective reality; a reality constructed through discourse and as a policy and strategy (Hlihor, 2009: 2).

The early literature in security studies employed a narrow definition of politics and the field tended to ignore the nonmilitary of international tensions and to focus solely on military balances (Walt, 1991: 215). Within the new approaches of security studies in the past two decades there is a clear transcendence from “narrow” to “wide” approaches or from military to non-military perspectives. This ongoing debate emphasizes the increasing importance of non-military security aspects for the regional and international system (Kirchner, Sperling, 2007: 2). Also, another major turn in security studies underlines the importance of constructivist explanations, especially if we consider identity as a variable for preference formation and as a spectrum of perceiving security and insecurity within and among groups. Before analyzing these aspects it is necessary to reevaluate the conceptual framework we use, having in mind the interdisciplinary nature of security studies.

**Conceptual and theoretical background**

When culture, identity and security are taken together into consideration for the understanding of social groups’ behaviour there is a direct observation that culture and identity is influencing the perception of security. Still, there are different interpretations about what a group means, how it may be defined and analysed.

Generally, a social group might be understood as a two or more people who interact with one another, share the same values and recognize themselves as a distinct social unit. Large groups that share the same culture, traditions, beliefs, customs and specific norms of interaction can be recognised as the most stable and enduring of social units and might become important variables within the understanding of regional and/or international social interaction. The self-awareness and the sense of
belonging are the key elements that define the group. This perception allows the members of the group to recognize each other and to differentiate from other groups. In this perspective, the group might represent the most secure environment for its members because of the well-known, stable and predictable behavior within the group and of the group. Therefore, from a sociological and anthropological perspective, social groups with strong cultural identities can be identified as one of the most driving forces of present security dynamics around the world. Indeed, the condition of a nation and the nation-state created around the national identity is the ultimate/highest level where culture, identity and security can be associated in a context where international politics and security are influenced by the group’s identity, preferences and expectations. What is structured and institutionalized beyond the state (international organizations and alliances) is only a contextual and functional construction where the associated states share the less common denominator of their expressed, mutually recognized, negotiated and shared preferences.

Social groups may be understood as the basic levels where security perceptions are formulated (either is family or community) due to the interaction with other groups. The historical experiences consolidate the group’s identity and therefore there is an accumulation of practice and experience about the perception and distinction between security/insecurity. This may lead to a certain degree of predictability of their behavior. In this way, recent approaches of security made use of the knowledge of anthropology in order to enhance the better understanding of other groups (especially ethnic and religious groups). In this perspective, behaviorist and constructivist approaches implicit agree that if it is a true human essence, that one must be discovered and not postulated (Kolodziej, 2007: 281). That is the main reason for the security studies to consolidate the anthropological approach.

The variables for group self-awareness and identity can be distinguished as race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, language, traditions, customs, territory, symbols, etc. The association of these elements and the historical experience of the group allow the members of the group to associate, define themselves and in relation with other groups by using the identity differentiation.

The preference formation within a group is bringing into attention two perspectives. A realist assumption will emphasize the need of survival, the assurance of welfare, the promotion of group’s interests and inevitably the assurance of a secure environment (through specific security policy and correspondent military capabilities). The constructivist explanations suggest that the preferences of a group are determined by the ability of the group to respond and adapt its interests according to the dynamics within the surrounding environment and perception’s effect on the security culture of the group will dictated the action of the group. We believe that an association between these theoretical approaches cannot be translated into a new theory, but for sure can help in the design of analytical models for particular case studies, such as EU.

With no doubt, we can say that any group has, more or less aware, a certain degree of security culture having in mind the above arguments. It is the issue of how and to what extent this culture of security is influencing the behaviour of the group in the way of setting security policies and addressing proper resources and capabilities in order to fulfil the perceived degree of security of the group. Applying anthropological and sociological methodologies on these perceptions, the group’s expectations,
preferences and behaviour can become are measurable, quantifiable and predictable, and represents a source that allow the researcher to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the group. And why not, the conclusions may be a resource for an outsider (other group) to manipulate the target group. For example, there is no secrecy that the US intelligence services made appeal to cultural anthropologists from universities in order to use their expertise in the fight against terrorism and the conduct of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and led to a debate over the ethics about to what extent the expertise on universal issues – such as cultures and identities – might be used for actor oriented interests. Therefore, identities can be manipulated both to engage different groups into conflict but also to engage different groups into cooperation. This perspective has a special relevance when a dominant group (actor) is trying to control other groups according to a self-interest strategy. It becomes more interesting when we take into consideration similar groups that are aware about their position, interests and capabilities and they found a convergence in their perception on mutual cooperation as a way to fulfil their interest and to acquire security. Within this approach we can better understand the beginning of the European integration as a security project. But from this proposition to the statement that EU represents also a security culture we should bring some other clarifications.

According to Peter Burgess, security culture might be understood as a way that a certain idea of security orders and structures what we understand to be the dangers to our lives, the threats to our values and the most apparent defenses against these. In addition, security culture participates in shaping what is valuable for us. It regulates our moral, economic and political priorities. It sets the limits and possibilities for what declaring, for what is important and not important, valuable and not valuable, worth protecting or not protecting (Burgess, 2010: 3).

Much earlier, in the context of Cold War, Jack Snyder proposes the collocation of “strategic culture” that can be defined as the sum of total ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitations and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy (Snyder, 1997: 8; Biscop, 2007: 13). More than that, Snyder suggests that “sub-culture” is a very useful notion and defines it as a subsection of the broader strategic community with reasonably distinct beliefs and attitudes on strategic issues, with a distinct and historically traceable analytical tradition, with characteristic institutional associations, and with more or less distinct patterns of socialization to the norms of the subculture. At the same time, members of subcultures are also members of the broader strategic culture (Snyder, 1977: 10).

The security culture can be seen also as communication framework within the group that allows the sharing and development of particular attitudes, motivations and behavior needed for personal or group self-defense reactions toward internal or external aggressions, threats, risks and vulnerabilities. From an institutional approach the security culture promotes the issue of security among the political leadership and its relationship with security structures within the political structure, according to the rule of law, specific decision-making procedures and legitimacy constrains.

From the above definitions we can deduce that there is a direct relationship between the interdependencies and sharing patterns of the values of a group (either is homogeneous or heterogeneous, formal or informal, but perceived as such a group
from others from outside the group). The EU’s security identity and its role in the international security environment can be framed as an analytical tool, having in mind both the overall process of European integrations, the formal construction of Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the perceptions of different actors within the EU.

Within the European integration theories, there are two relevant models that can offer a set of very useful variables in order to define and analyze the EU as an emerging “security culture” or a “strategic culture” in the terms of the above definitions.

Firstly, we have in mind the propositions of neo-functionalism that agrees the political differentiation among the members and explains that the integration process starts by the integration of those economic sectors that are very important for the military capabilities (coal and steel) but the specific industries can be isolated within the “low politics”. Preferences and loyalties can easily adapt to supranational integration and the recognition of the new centers of power and also the pressures of the spill-over effects on other economic sectors will gradually strengthen the integration. Security and defense politics are too important for the nation states and therefore are subject to “high politics”. The political integration of these sensitive sectors are seen by the neo-functionalists as the ultimate steps toward a complete supranational integration and the assurance of a long-standing peace in Europe (Dolghi, 2003: 30). This perspective is the synthesis of the Ernst Haas initial approach on the first decade of the European construction. After the first challenges of the integration (produced by internal or external factors) it was clear that especially in times of crisis the dynamics of the integration process can be affected. In this perspective, other theorists are talking about the spill-around or spill-back effects (Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 1990: 443).

Therefore, only positive experience will deepen the integration to such extent that a common security policy would be functional and comparative with similar policies of other global powers. The “integration gradualism” variable is affected when fundamental issues that belongs to the basic levels of EU (states) do not consider that their fundamental interests are well defended and promoted at the EU level and the governments choose to manage themselves the issues in question, especially if is about nation’s security or welfare.

Secondly, the transactionalist perspective makes a distinction between a European society and a European community, some delimitation was made by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft (community) denotes a situation when people are held together by common sentiments and common loyalties. Relationships with non-members of the group are considerably less significant than the sense of kinship that develops within the group. Gesellschaft (society) is a condition binding people less through trust and more through a mixture of self-interest, division a labor and contract (Rosamond, 2001: 43-44) (such a social contract or formal agreements). From this perspective, Karl Deutsch was interested on the transactions between the Gesellschaft to the Gemeinschaft. As a result, the transactionalist approach of the European integration states that a sense of community among states would be a function of the level of communication between states and the route to European community is conditioned by the mutual transactions (Rosamond, 2001: 44). If the mutual transactions within a society will increase the confidence, basic identity values will be shared and in time, those who
were related within social, political or economic contracts will accept each other as members of the same community. The main variable consists in *responsiveness* defined as “the probability of getting an adequate response within an acceptable limit of time” (Rosamond, 2001: 44). According to this perspective the European security culture is defined by the perception of the Europeans, either as a regulated society, and either as a shared common sense of belonging within the community, depending on the context and the issue that implies security related reactions.

Other theoretical models of integration, as well as theories of IR can provide more arguments that the EU cannot be understood within a single theoretical framework. Still, all the theoretical contributions can offer, through a selective analytical research design, different tools in order to have a comprehensive image upon the dynamics of the perception of security as well as the patterns of behavior and responses to European common security challenges.

**The European Union security culture**

The issue of identity of European Union is an unsolved case due to the lack of acceptance of a complete common set of cultural variables perceived and used by all different actors within the community, having in mind the conservative nature of identity. But the sharing process of common values among the Europeans represents a positive example of the transcendence from intergovernmental relations toward the benefits of supranational integration. The identity similarities of the Europeans as well as differentiations that occur during the integration process raise questions on the continuity, change and adaptation of the identities. Therefore, when we associate European identity with security, we assume that a European security culture is changing as the objective conditions change.

Until 1945 the historical experiences of Europe that implied security issues underline the negative impact of war and violence on the Old Continent and the engagements of the Europeans in regional wars, one against another. Each European state has its own security culture and the recognition of other similar security cultures led to the creation of alliances. The extensive literature on this issue emphasizes the security interdependences among the Europeans, based on the preferences and interests derived from cultural identities.

European integration process is a security project. This statement is probably the most comprehensive definition of the integration, if we have in mind the conditions that led to the emergence of EEC/EU and the present situation. The main goal – to ensure peace in Europe – was achieved and in these terms we can talk about a success of the integration. Even in terms of intergovernmentalism we can distinguish that the member states are engaged in a mutual interdependency in such manner that if any member state will act against other member states, will actually act against its own interests. Still, the issue of common identity remains unresolved.

Any political construction should find its own democratic legitimacy as the main resource for its functioning. Within the European Union the basic challenge is to find those elements that can allow the Europeans to express a sense of belonging and to identify within a common set of values. If we refer to European identity we must apply the notion of collective identity which assumes that people tend to defines themselves on the
basis of a set of ideas to which they can relate positively and which they share with others. These ideas help to define the community they belong to. The formation of such a community will not only lead to a definition of the Self, but also of the Other, and thus to inclusion and exclusion of people (Schot, 2004: 2).

Often, a European identity is considered in opposition with national identity, the first one trying to surpass the last one. We believe that there is no need for an extensive explanation in this matter because since the beginning the issue has a wrong formulation. Still, many scholars mention the approach used by Benedict Anderson on nationalism as an imagined community (Anderson, 1991). What is often described as the ‘search’ for Europe’s identity is not so much a search as a construction or an ‘imagination’ of Europe (Diez, 2004: 320). Within an “imagined community,” members have a shared conception of an embodied political space, a horizontal political communion where people have a sense of belonging despite never knowing each other personally (McNamara, 2011: 2). The European Union has been and is being constructed not only through economic and political dynamics but culturally, through social dynamics that are creating an “imagined political community” of Europe and Europeans (McNamara, 2011: 5).

This perspective can open the path for investigating the European security culture as an imagined one, and constructed through the political speech. The main arguments that indicate this approach are related to the formal engagements of the European leaders in different official documents. The developments within the treaties as well as in the policies of the EU are to a great extent related to the previous successes of integration. The security dimensions of EU were developed as an opportunity within the new international context after the collapse of bi-polar world. Europe had the chance to redefine itself as a global actor not only economically, but also from political and security viewpoints, having in mind the geopolitical settings at the end of the 20th Century.

Beyond the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU had the chance to contribute to the securization of the continent through the engagements with Central and Eastern European stated in the perspective of integration. This strategy was well politically designed but it cannot isolate the crucial role of NATO’s same view and the trans-Atlantic interests in Europe.

In this perspective, the European security culture is strongly tightened to the US strategic culture and the relationship between EU and NATO is underlying the importance of both organizations on security approaches in Europe. EU is seen as a “soft power” and NATO as a “hard power”. The “soft power” of EU is mainly related on the EU’s capacity to express common views on the security challenges around the world and to engage a large part of its members in the support of the “international community” toward the enforcement of the specific measures of conflict management.

The main components that support the idea of a European security culture lays on the provisions set in the Title V of the Maastricht Treaty (1992): safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The mechanisms agreed were common positions and joint actions presented in general terms, without referring about clear instruments, mechanisms, resources or capabilities needed to enforce such a policy. The practice of the application of CFSP demonstrated the lack of the EU member states to assume measures in order to develop the Union as a “hard power”. This led to an effective failure of the initial presented and expected project. Still, humanitarian missions or police missions across the world are saving the image of Europe as a security actor. But if we consider the potential of EU and the achievements in the present, it is clear that beyond the political disagreements there are also the procedural implications that take too long within the EU decision making process.

Beyond this politically constructed culture of security, the imagination of Europe rest also on the role of the public opinion and the perceptions among the citizens. The main instrument of measurement is the Eurobarometer (the Standard one, issued twice a year, as well as special ones, issued occasionally, according to the importance and relevance of certain subjects).

In the process of development of a CFSP/CSDP, the public opinion represents a strategic variable of primary importance. The perception of security, of threats and risks can offer an image about the fears and expectations of the citizens. According to a Eurobarometer survey in 2000, the three things Europeans fear the most are non-military risks, specifically organized crime (77 %), an accident at a nuclear plant (75 %), and terrorism (74 %). At the other end of the scale, the three risks cited least often (but nonetheless by more than four respondents out of ten) are a nuclear conflict in Europe (44 %), a conventional war in Europe (45 %), and a world war (45 %) (Manigart, 2001: 4-5).

According to the same survey, more than four Europeans in ten (43 %) are of the opinion that decisions concerning European defense policy should be taken by the European Union. Only 17 % thought it should be NATO and 24 % the national governments (Manigart, 2001: 11). This fact underlines the expectations of the Europeans toward the integration’s results. Preferences and expectations are addressed to the community level which overpasses the national level. Also, the security identity is highlight in relationship regarding the perception of NATO (17%) which led us to the conclusion that the European security is not necessarily perceived within a trans-Atlantic framework.

With regard of the 1999 Helsinki European Council decision on the establishment of a rapid reaction force of 50-60,000 men by 2003, capable of being deployed within 60 days and for a period of at least a year, able to cover the whole spectrum of the so-called “Petersberg missions” (humanitarian and evacuation missions, peacekeeping, and restoring peace) over seven Europeans out of 10 (73 %) believe that the establishment of a rapid reaction force of 60,000 men is a very good (23 %) or rather good (50 %) thing (Manigart, 2001: 14). Therefore, the perception on a distinct European army is positive, a fact that suggest also the common perception of the security within the EU. Some opinions were in favor of a permanent European Army that would replace the national armies (19%) while 37% agreed a permanent European Army in addition to national armies. Over seven Europeans out of 10 (71 %) are of the opinion that a European army should be used to defend the EU’s territory, including their own country (Manigart, 2001: 18).
Another special Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2006 approaches the role of the EU in justice, freedom and security policy area. Respondents believe first and foremost that there should be more decision-making at EU level regarding the fight against organized crime and trafficking, as well as against terrorism (both 86%). This indicates that interviewees are concerned about their security and hence believe that EU-wide action could provide them with a higher level of security (European Commission, 2007: 3).

A great majority wants more decision-making at European level regarding the promotion and protection of fundamental rights (73%), the control of external borders (72%), as well as asylum and migration policy (65%). In security terms, the fight against organized crime and terrorism should be EU priorities. Respondents cited as the two top priorities for the Union those areas in which they also wished to see an increase in supranational decision-making. The areas in question are the fight against organized crime (56%) and terrorism (55%) (European Commission, 2007: 14).

A significant majority of EU25 citizens consider that in all the areas covered by the survey (the fight against organized crime and trafficking, the fight against terrorism, the fight against drugs abuse, the exchange of police and judicial information between Member States, the promotion and protection of fundamental rights, the control of external borders, as well as asylum and migration policy) more decision-making should take place at EU level. This indicates that EU citizens perceive the EU’s presence in the fields of justice and home affairs as legitimate and they thus want to see the EU’s role evolving in this area.

This survey was applied also in 2008 in all 27 member states and concludes that EU citizens are most supportive of more EU influence in areas of justice and home affairs where they may expect a higher level of security from EU action than from national action (European Commission, 2008: 32).

These data suggest the gradually, a common perception among Europeans is already formed and seems that the state is no longer perceived as the main or single provider of security for the citizens. An European security community is obvious because all the fears and expectations are commonly shared by the Europeans.

Conclusion

Our conclusion rests on the arguments that the theoretical approaches of European security should be reevaluated according to interdisciplinary perspectives that must criticize the optimism of the models of integration and accept that the security implications can also have a negative impact on the perceptions and sharing of security. Still, further investigations can better define the variables needed in order to clarify the European identity and culture. Such efforts will definitely underline the security oriented expectations as well as the weaknesses and strengths of the present status of EU. It is obvious that the Europe’s security culture not only builds upon a set of standard values, but generates values and modifies them. An important role is played by the political elites in the establishment of the EU security agenda, but the possibility of failure of their engagements and the lack of clear results can led to a rejection of EU’s role as a security actor. Also, Europe’s cultural diversity may point out certain limits in the consolidation of the security culture.
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Abstract. Western and Eastern European national identities developed and differed due to the disparate historical contexts (both recent and distant) that they were exposed to. Often, it is seen that Western civic nations are more ethnic than is usually recognized, and Eastern nations are more civic and less ethnic than their Western counterpart. Conceptually, some scholars have even attacked the logic of the civic/ethnic distinction. Most say that states and nations contain both ethnic and civic components in their national history. Smith (1991), for example, writes that “every nation building has civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and in different forms… Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized. France and Germany, and all of Western and Eastern Europe, have faced the international discourse on nationalism-including both ethnic and civil claims of popular political participation”.

Keywords: national identities, civic and ethnic elements, Europe

Despite the rigid civic-West/ethnic-East characterization of nationhood and nationalisms in Western Europe/North America and Central/Eastern Europe, a lot needs to be empirically evaluated in order to justify the civic-ethnic dichotomy on determining national identity.

The distinction between civic and ethnic nations is one of the most widely employed conceptual building blocks in the study of ethnic relations and nationalism. A closely related distinction is that between Western and Eastern nations, according to which Western Europe and the United States developed primarily as civic nations and Germany and Eastern Europe primarily as ethnic nations. Unfortunately, few analyses challenge these dichotomies theoretically or empirically. Survey data from 15 countries reveals that the standard view

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greatly exaggerates the current differences in national identity between the West and East. Western civic nations are more ethnic than is usually recognized, and Eastern ethnic nations are more civic. Furthermore, on some measurements, countries in Central and Eastern Europe are more civic and less ethnic than Western countries.

**The civic/ethnic and west/east conceptual dichotomies**

For much of the 20th century, scholars of nations and nationalism have commonly argued that (a) there are many different traits that can provide the foundation for national unity and identity, and (b) nations differ in the mix of the traits that form the basis of their unity and identity. A simple classificatory scheme has arisen that distinguishes nations as civic, political, or territorial on one hand, versus ethnic or cultural on the other. Parallel with this conceptual distinction is a geographic one in which civic components of nationhood are dominant in Western Europe and the United States, whereas ethnic components are dominant in Central and Eastern Europe.

In his 1907 work “Cosmopolitanism and the National State”, German historian Friedrich Meincke (1970) became one of the first scholars to assert a fundamental difference between political and cultural nations. However, it was Czech scholar Hans Kohn who developed and popularized the dichotomous framework in his 1944 book “The Idea of Nationalism” and in his later works (Kohn, 1944, 1946, 1949). Kohn argued that in the West, particularly England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States, nationalism was primarily political. They were based on the political ideas of revolutionaries who fought for the ‘sovereignty of the people’. There, ideas of the nation and nationalism arose within preexisting state structures that encompassed populations with a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity, or developed simultaneously with those structures. Inspired by Enlightenment ideas of liberty and equality, Western nationalism struggled against dynastic rule and equated citizenship with membership in the nation. The membership of the community was thus defined primarily in political terms; civic virtues were more important for the new republic than ethnicity, common culture, or even common language. Members of the nation were unified by their equal political status and their will as individuals to be part of the nation. Thus in the Western model, the state temporally precedes (or coincides with) the development of the nation. According to Hutchinson, civic nationalists tend to create a “polis” of educated citizens united not by a common historical descent but by current common laws and interests. To mobilize a political constituency, they may adopt specific ethno-historical identities within a given territorial homeland and may become ethnicized or re-traditionalized. But their objectives are, however, essentially modernist: they are concerned with a functional entity, the state. However, in
the more socially and politically drawn areas of Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, nationalism arose in polities (Roudometof, 2002: 16) that are very poorly coincided with cultural or ethnic boundaries (e.g., Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires). In these regions, Kohn (1944) argues, nationalism struggled “to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands”. The ethno-cultural nationalism was a movement interested in the uniqueness of the nation, its ethno linguistic specificity and its historical roots. Thus, in the Eastern model the nation precedes, and seeks to create, the state. Nations in the East consolidated around the common heritage of the people rather than on the notion of citizenship.

Many contemporary scholars employ the analytical distinction between civic/political and ethnic/cultural nations originated by Meincke and Kohn, although they differ in their precise characterization of these concepts. Alter (1994) contrasts cultural nations, based on common heritage, language, distinct area of settlement, religion, customs, and history, with political nations, composed of politically aware citizens equal before the law. In Smith’s (1991) Western or civic model, national unity arises from a historic territory, laws and institutions, the legal-political equality of members that expresses itself in a set of rights and duties, and a common civic culture and ideology. Smith’s non-western ethnic nation is based on descent or presumed descent, and thus is seen by its members as a “fictive super-family.” In addition, vernacular culture, especially language and customs, is a key element of the ethnic nation.

Ignatieff (1993) characterizes the civic nation as a “community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values”. In contrast to this notion, which originated in Great Britain, France, and the United States, Ignatieff explains that for the German Romantics of the 19th century, national unity sprung not from “the cold contrivance of shared rights but [from] the people’s preexisting ethnic characteristics: their language, religion, customs, and traditions”.

In addition, he asserts that ethnic nationalism tells people to “only trust those of your own blood”.

Regardless of the differences in definition, the assertion that Western Europe and the United States developed primarily as civic nations and Eastern Europe as ethnic states is common. But it is not just a historical argument; many scholars see the continuation of historical patterns in current national identities in the West and East. Particularly with the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the conceptualization has become a standard point of departure for many studies of ethnic relations and nationalism in the post-communist “New Europe.” According to Brubaker (1996), the 20 or so new post-communist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were “conceived and justified, in the nationalist movements preceding their independent statehood as well as after statehood was achieved, as the state
of and for a particular ethno-national group”. Brubaker thinks that civic notions of nationhood have little chance of prevailing in the new states of Eurasia, given the “pervasively institutionalized understandings of nationality as fundamentally ethno-cultured rather than political, as sharply distinct from citizenship, and as grounding claims to the ownership of polities”.

Another expert on Eastern Europe, George Schopflin (1996), also stresses “the strongly ethnic character of nationhood and state legitimation” in the region. Following Kohn, Schopflin argues that the West citizenship arose before or concomitant with nationalism, whereas in Eastern Europe, elites mobilized nations around ethnicity in an attempt to carve states from the empires that subjugated them. But in addition to this relatively distant historical source of current ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe, Schopflin underscores the role that communist rule played. Schopflin links communism and ethnic nationalism in the region in several ways. First, because communism was associated with foreign oppression, opposition to communist rule became a national project. “In these circumstances,” Schopflin (1996) writes, “it was very difficult for any civic dimension of nationhood to emerge”. Second, communism destroyed civil society in the region, turning communities there into “civic deserts” characterized by mistrust and atomization. Consequently, ethno-national identities were the only ones in the public sphere that could become salient.

Finally, communism pushed out other competing ideas and values, making it “much easier for an undiluted nationalism referring solely to ethnicity to survive more or less intact” (Schopflin, 1995). As a result, many national disputes from the pre-communist era were swept under the carpet, only to reemerge with the end of communism. A final argument for the alleged predominance of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe concerns the newness of the states and regimes that are constructing from scratch democratic political and legal institutions. Echoing Gellner (1992), Snyder (1993) contends that ethnic nationalism fills an institutional vacuum. Thus “ethnic nationalism is the default option: It predominates when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people’s basic needs, and when satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available”. In the context of wholesale institutional transformation in Eastern Europe, with its attendant economic malaise, widespread corruption, and high crime rates, one would expect ethnically based conceptions of nationhood to be very strong in the region.

**Critique of the civic/ethnic and west/east dichotomies**

Conceptually, some scholars have attacked the logic of the civic/ethnic distinction. Yack challenges the notion that a civic identity must be freely and rationally chosen, whereas an ethnic identity is inherited and emotionally based. Civic identities can be inherited too, Yack (1999) argues. Furthermore, both
Nielsen and Kymlicka note that it is a mistake to equate ethnic with cultural nationalism, because they differ according to their openness to outsiders.

On the empirical side, most states and nations contain both ethnic and civic components. Smith (1991), for example, writes that “every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized”. Calhoun (1997) writes that although France and Germany are commonly seen as civic and ethnic nations, respectively, “France and Germany, and all of Western and Eastern Europe, have been shaped by the international discourse of nationalism—including both ethnic claims and civil projects of popular political participation”. Kuzio argues that nationalism in the West and East has never been as divergent as scholars have argued. Indeed, the transformations that the East (Central-Eastern Europe and the three Baltic states) has undergone and its integration into NATO and the EU affirm that the convergence of Western and Eastern nationalism is based on a far narrower gulf than has been traditionally articulated by scholars. The ability of the East to fulfill the requirements of the Membership Action Plan for NATO membership and the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership over two decades would also affirm that nationalism in the East was never fundamentally different to that found in the West. Thus nationalism in the West and East is not radically different. Western nationalism emerged as a civic variant after two centuries of gestation, conflict and evolution. Eastern nationalism evolved into a civic variant during the course of the twentieth century, first under communism and secondly during the post-communist transition to a democratic-market economy. The democratization of Eastern European post-communist states took place relatively quickly in the decade following the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire. North American and Western European nation-states matured into civic states only in the second half of the twentieth century. The West and East therefore evolved into civic states during the same century separated by only a few decades.

The major difference between the West and East was that the arrival of a consolidated democracy in the West came after a journey that had begun in the late eighteenth century whereas the East transformed into civic states during a "big bang" following the collapse of communism. The East undertook its transition to a civic state at a faster pace than the West because of external pressure from the OSCE, globalization and the desire of the East to "return to Europe" through membership of the Council of Europe, NATO and the EU. The main problem with the civic/ethnic dichotomy is that it collapses too much in the ethnic category. As Kymlicka, Nielsen, and Nieguth correctly point out, ethnic and cultural components of identity should be distinguished. Superior to the current dichotomy is a scheme with three variants of what can
be called the content of national identity—factors that people in a nation believe are, or should be, (Parekh, 2000: 263) the most important in uniting and distinguishing them from others and that become the basis for defining membership in the nation. The main variants for the content of national identity are civic, cultural, and ethnic. The existing literature on civic nations produces five main components of the civic identity, according to which national unity and membership in the nation derive from attachment to a common territory, citizenship, belief in the same political principles or ideology, respect for political institutions and enjoyment of equal political rights, and will to be a part of the nation. Cultural identity is based on nonpolitical cultural traits. The key components here are language, religion, and traditions. Finally, for ethnic national identity, shared ancestry and race are the dominant criteria by which membership in the nation is defined. Beside refining the civic/ethnic framework, evaluating the civic-West/ethnic-East argument requires measuring and distinguishing types of nationhood.

Two main options exist: examining the policies of states or the attitudes of members of the nation. Scholars often interpret a state’s policies as supportive of the construction of ethnic versus civic nations, and to some extent belief in the civic-West/ethnic-East pattern is based on analysis of these policies.

Primarily, a problem is seen when scholars conflate civic nationhood with cultural assimilation policies. For example, Brubaker (1992) argues that a policy of cultural assimilation “presupposes a political conception of membership” in the nation. In a similar vein, Kymlicka (1999) describes how ethnic conflicts often result from the attempt by civic nationalists to forcibly incorporate and assimilate ethnic minorities into the dominant culture. The weakness of such claims is that no theoretical or logical link is made between civic nationalism and cultural assimilation of minorities. These scholars simply label France and other Western nations “civic”, recognize that they engaged in assimilation, and therefore conclude that civic nationhood demands or lead to assimilation. But a truly civic conception of the nation entails no need for cultural unity. People in a purely civic nation are united by such traits as common citizenship, respect for law and state institutions, belief in a set of political principles, and so forth. Similarity in language, religion, and other cultural markers is not necessary for the development of such traits. Theoretically, the idea of civic nationhood leads to one of two policies in the cultural sphere. The first option is a laissez-faire approach in which the state is as culturally neutral as possible and promotes individual, not collective rights. A second option is a policy of multiculturalism. Here the state recognizes collective rights and promotes the maintenance or development of minority cultures in an attempt to buy ethnic minority attachment to the state and its institutions and territory. Such an attempt is predicated on the (civic) assumption that will and consent are central aspects of national identity. In
contrast, nation building under a cultural concept of nationhood requires that the state pursue cultural assimilation of minorities, because cultural unity is the foundation for a strong nation-state in this formulation. Here the state will actively promote the majority ethnic group’s history and culture in education and language policies as the core around which to build a national culture. Finally, an ethnic conception of the nation also logically leads to the promotion of the dominant ethnic group’s culture, because the state is conceived here as the state of and for a particular group, and a group’s common ethnic identity is expressed through its culture. But assimilation is not encouraged because even if other ethnic groups acquire the majority group’s culture, they can never be part of the latter group, and the ethnic nation would not be strengthened or expanded in any meaningful way by such assimilation.

For instance, in the realm of immigration, a civic nation should be relatively open to foreigners of any background. The civic nation has a large capacity to absorb new members because it makes few demands on the nonpolitical beliefs and characteristics of its population. For those immigrants who live in the country long enough, or their offspring, it is relatively easy to meet the criteria for national membership. A purely cultural nation should also admit immigrants, but only conditionally. Adopting a new culture is not easy and is sometimes resisted. Therefore immigration should proceed only as long as immigrants and their offspring are willing and able to assimilate into the dominant culture. Furthermore, a cultural nation will have a bias in accepting immigrants from culturally similar countries, precisely because this will facilitate their assimilation into the national culture. Finally, ethnic nationhood calls for a highly restrictive immigration policy. Immigrants cannot be true members of the nation because they lack the “proper” ancestry. Therefore any ethnic nation that permits large numbers of immigrants decreases the numerical dominance of the majority ethnic group and risks fueling discord and disharmony. The exception here is immigrants who are of the same ethnic stock as the dominant group in the ethnic nation. The state should permit easy entry to such immigrants.

Assessing the Civic-West/ Ethnic-East Stereotype

Current conceptions of the civic-West/ethnic-East stereotype lead to the prediction that civic national identities should be strongest in the West and weakest in Eastern Europe, with Central Europe; the two halves of Germany falling somewhere in between. Similarly, ethnic and cultural national identities should be strongest in Eastern Europe and weakest in the West, with Central Europe again in the middle. Germany should, on the whole, be less ethnically/culturally nationalistic and more civic than Eastern Europe not only because its Western part did not experience communism, which is alleged to increase ethnic nationalism but also due to the greater political institutional
strength and economic prosperity of Germany (its Eastern part included) than Eastern Europe. In addition, Western and Eastern European National identities should not just differ, but differ greatly given the disparate historical contexts (both recent and distant) that are alleged to influence national development. Finally, arguments on the influence of communism on national identity led to the prediction that Western Germany should be substantially more civic and less ethnic/cultural than Eastern Germany.

When respondents from several European countries were asked to rank the following traits for national membership,
- to have been born in (respondent’s country)
- to have citizenship in (respondent’s country)
- to have lived in (respondent’s country) for most of one’s life
- to be able to speak (the dominant language in respondent’s country)
- to be a (believer in the dominant religion/denomination of respondent’s country)
- to respect political institutions and laws of (respondent’s country)
- to feel (British, Spanish, Hungarian etc)

of the seven items, those on religion and language evaluate support for cultural national identity, whereas the rest tap into support for civic identity. Interestingly, the respondents’ supporting a cultural or ethnic notion of national identity, considered citizenship to be an “essential component of national identity”. To counteract the high levels of corruption and political disorder, the East Europeans felt that the presence of law and political institutions were important for the stability and effectiveness of national membership.

Another factor Territory was seen to be basis for national unity in both the civic and the ethnic state. In his description of civic nation building in the Third World, Smith (1991) explains that ‘living together’ and being ‘rooted’ in a particular terrain and soil become the criteria for citizenship and the bases of political community’. Presumably those who have lived a long time in a state are more rooted in the territory and thus are more “authentic” members than new residents. Similarly, someone born in a territory may be seen as more attached to it than an immigrant. Using territory as a criterion of national membership is inclusive in that anybody who is born or lives a long time in a country meets this criterion-regardless of ethnicity, religion, class, race, and so forth. It is exclusive, however, in that some (those who are newly resident) or all immigrants are not considered fully part of the national community. The dominant ethnic groups in the Eastern European states were generally more supportive of a territorial notion of national identity than in the Western states, although both regions were supportive in an absolute sense. In fact, only one country, Canada, has majority of respondents who do not stress the importance of one of the two types of territoriality. In addition, both regions of Europe place slightly more importance on length of residence than on birth, the latter
of course being the harder standard to meet as it is more exclusive. Another important factor determining nationhood is language. It is a country’s dominant language that shapes its’ nationality and it is a factor that is constitutive of one’s national identity, be it civic or ethnic. Because language has historically played such an important role in German identity, this is particularly good evidence of the depth of culturally grounded national identities in the West.

There are strong ongoing debates and instances about the role of culture as a basis for national identity in the West. Smith’s (1986) argument that nations have ancient “ethnic cores” around which nations are constructed clearly demands a great role for the cultural components of national identity. A nation founded on the culture, symbols, myths, and memories of a dominant ethnic group is likely to retain its

Cultural based identity for a very long time. Smith writes that the earliest cases of the Western model (England, France, Spain, Holland, Sweden, Russia) were “ethnic states” that were gradually transformed into nations through economic unification, territorial centralization, provision of equal legal rights, and growth of mass public education. It is interesting that Kohn’s argument begins with assumptions similar to Smith’s. Recall that in Kohn’s Western model, the state encompassed a relatively culturally homogeneous population, which the state then forged into a nation. The strong match between ethnography and political boundaries in Kohn’s Western model is akin to Smith’s ethnic core of modern nations. But Kohn did not follow his initial assumption to its logical conclusion—that relative cultural homogeneity in a state would be a strong force binding the people together into a nation. By the logic of (Sugar, 1995: 369) both Kohn’s and Smith’s approaches, since the Western nation’s inception, culture has been prominent in uniting and distinguishing a large proportion of the population of a state. Gellner (1983) and other “modernists” disagreed with Smith’s contention about the ethnic origins of nations. Gellner instead explained the rise of nations through a functional argument whereby states intentionally forged national unity to meet the demands of industrial development. The state, primarily through public education, pursued cultural homogenization of its population to create a mobile workforce able to communicate with strangers. Another modernist, Benedict Anderson, focuses not on industrialization but the rise of print capitalism in forging national consciousness. In Anderson’s (1983) view, mass communication stimulated the diffusion of a common culture based on a vernacular language. In each theory, culture plays a key role in uniting a large proportion of a state’s population, just as in Smith’s version. The difference is primarily one of timing. If Smith’s argument meant that cultural and civic elements should coexist from the start of Western states’ national development, Gellner’s and Anderson’s arguments implied that the cultural elements should be weak at the start of national development and then gain strength as
industrialization and mass communications developed over the 19th and 20th centuries.

A second explanation for the current strength of the cultural components of national identity in the West enters on the inability of civic components of national identity to provide sufficient unity in a state. To the extent that a civic identity is rationalistic and voluntary, it is unlikely to cultivate an attachment to the nation with the great emotional resonance that ethnic and cultural elements provide. But the main reason that civic components of nationhood fall short in their ability to evoke emotional attachment to the nation is because most civic components of nationhood are external to the individual, whereas ethnic and cultural components are internal. Territory, political institutions and rights, and citizenship exist outside the individual, whereas ancestry, race, religion, language, and traditions are a direct part of a person’s physical and psychological makeup. As a result, the intensity of attachment to communities founded predominantly on the latter will likely exceed those founded predominantly on the former. The dismal record of civic-territorial nation building in many postcolonial multiethnic states in the Third World is a testament to the weakness of civic nationalism unsupported by elements of ethnic or cultural nationhood at the statewide level. Using functionalist logic similar to Gellner’s, a case can be made that Western states for most of the past two centuries have promoted a homogeneous linguistic and cultural identity precisely due to the ability of culture to provide cohesion for populations in an environment in which civic elements of nationhood alone were not up to the task.

Finally, all social identities, including national ones, require that the social unit be differentiated from other units. Purely or predominantly civic-based national identities are unable to provide a sufficiently high degree of differentiation in the modern world. The very universalistic nature of civic nationalism that many applaud is a reason for its inability to provide the sole or even overwhelming basis for identification in the West. Not only is it relatively easy for states to make citizenship an important criterion for national membership, but it is exceedingly common. Similarly, all states have territory, and making attachment to that territory a criterion for national membership is also easy and ubiquitous. There is more room for national variation in political rights and institutions, and belief in political principles. However, the spread of democratic government and ideology in the past two centuries has greatly reduced this variation. In this context, culture, which varies substantially from place to place, grows in importance for its ability to distinguish one Western nation from another and from non-Western nations.

However, there is a lot of support for civic components of national identity among majority ethnic groups in Eastern Europe. Those observers who expect nationalism in Eastern Europe to be mostly of the ethnic variety neglect
to take into consideration the enormous influence and prestige of the civic model of the nation. Whereas Western nations have long been based on culture, the rhetoric emanating from these countries stressing the centrality of territory, citizenship, and political institutions to nationhood has been strong. This civic conception of the nation diffused to the non-West, in large part due to wealth and power of the West. Western ideas at the end of the 18th century about the state being the representative and embodiment of the nation had become commonplace, precisely because of the military and economic success of what is presented as the civic-nation-state model. In this context, ethno-national groups look to statehood, or at least a degree of political autonomy within an existing state, as a means of defending and promoting their culture, identity, and interests. Thus as soon as Hungarians, Czechs, Latvians, and so forth became majority and titular groups in independent states, free of Soviet domination, attachment to and membership in the nation quickly became measured against a person’s relation to the state-its territory, institutions, laws, and the like.

A second, and related, reason for the strength of civic-based national identities in Eastern Europe was the historical experience of many of these countries with statehood. Of the many Eastern European titular groups, five have enjoyed independent statehood prior to indirect or direct Soviet domination: Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, and Latvians. The other two groups, Slovenians and Slovaks, attained nominal sovereignty in territorial-administrative units of the Yugoslavian and Czechoslovakian federations, respectively. Consequently, contemporary national identity did not develop solely in the context of struggle against political borders in Eastern Europe, the dimension stressed by Kohn and others. It also developed around political borders that overlapped to a large degree with ethnic and cultural borders. Furthermore, Eastern European ethnic groups’ national mythologies celebrate their earlier periods of statehood as golden ages. With the collapse of communism, the independent state and its institutions and territory are looked to as vehicles of national renaissance. Another aspect of Kohn’s original argument provides an insight into the strength of civic national identity in Eastern Europe. Kohn wrote that nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe developed in reaction to the French invasions during the Napoleonic Wars and the Universalist ideology of Western liberalism. To counter this, Central and Eastern Europe looked to their own unique historical and cultural heritage as the basis of national identity.

This same argument can be adapted to post-Communist Eastern Europe to explain the strength of civic components of national identity there. Modern national identities in this region developed in opposition to Soviet domination and its universalist communist ideology. As Soviet and communist rule weakened and finally collapsed, people in the region again rallied around
their heritage, but now they interpreted this heritage as fundamentally democratic-in contrast to that of their imperial overlord. In constructing national identity and asserting national autonomy, most titular ethnic groups in the region consequently underscored democratic principles flouted during the communist period—the rule of law, political equality, and minority rights. Therefore, whereas the reactive nature of Eastern European nationalism in the 19th century may have led to a stress on ethnic and cultural components of national identity; in the late 20th century it led to a stress on civic components.

Concluding Perspective

The traditional civic-West/ethnic-East argument is a gross simplification of concepts of nationhood in the West, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe. Although some survey measures support the argument, an equal number do not. Furthermore, even when the argument is true, it is only weakly true, as the differences in national identity between the regions are small and there is a substantial degree of diversity within each region. Overall, the data suggests that the imperial and communist rule have not pushed Eastern European nationhood in a strongly cultural direction while greatly weakening civic-ness. And whereas most of the West has a long tradition of democracy and relatively strong and stable political institutions, cultural conceptions of nationhood are alive and well, and support for multiculturalism is relatively weak. Data also revealed an interesting tension between policies adopted by many of the states in the sample and the identities of their inhabitants. For example, although Canada has adopted an official policy of multiculturalism; Anglophones, they are more supportive of minority assimilation than are majority groups throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Likewise, although Germany until 1999 had a citizenship law more ethnically discriminatory than that of any Western democracy, ethnic Germans themselves place greater importance on developing minority cultures and less importance on language and traditions as criteria of national membership than do most other Western majority groups. This suggests that one must be careful not to overestimate the ability of states to shape mass national identities.

On the patterns of national identity, it is seen that support for ethnic/cultural versus civic notions of national identity may systematically differ for masses and elites, with elite views more consistent with the civic-West/ethnic-East pattern. Further study of a wide range of political elites in each state will tell if there is a mass-elite gap in identification on this score. A lot is left to speculation as because the limitations of the survey data did not permit a rigorous assessment of the differences in support for the strictly ethnic content of national identity in the cases under study, or analysis of the role of political principles in generating civic identities. Additional multi-country surveys should
be conducted to ascertain whether ancestry, race, and political ideology play a different role in national identity in the West, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe. Still, much work remains to be done in explaining the differences in national identity found amongst individual countries in the region. Factors such as the settlement patterns of a nation’s main ethnic groups, the cultural distance between these groups, the existence and size of diaspora groups outside the country, and levels of immigration all may affect the strength of ethnic/cultural/civic conceptions of national identity.

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Abstract. In the context of European integration of the countries of Eastern Europe problem of ethnic relations remains the key issue. At the present stage of its development Ukraine is actively trying to bring its legislation in conformity with major European norms in the field of interethnic relations. However, there are several problems nowadays in Ukraine that could potentially affect this branch of relations. Ethnic stereotypes play an important role in the formation of inter-ethnic tolerance. In order to study the impact of ethnic stereotypes on the sphere of interethnic tolerance the author cites the results of monitoring of periodicals of the Chernivtsi region of Ukraine. In spite of the fact that there is some information that involves inter-ethnic intolerance, the author concludes that in general the press materials of the Chernivtsi region are dominated by neutral character or there are those which have no significant influence on the formation of ethnic stereotypes and which over some time might serve as a basis of conflict on the interethnic grounds.

Keywords: interethnic relations, ethnic stereotype, monitoring, interethnic tolerance, Ukraine.

Dynamic development of modern world has become a prerequisite of focusing on the ethnic relations’ issues and the prognosis of the main tendencies of their development. NATO military operation in Serbia in 1999, the aggravation in the Middle East, international community’s partial recognition of the Kosovo Republic as an independent state, Russian-Georgian military conflict in 2008 all led to a change of the current situation in the world, resulting in the destruction of a peculiar myth about existing “security zones”, which had nothing

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to be afraid of (Малюська, 2010: 381). All this once again foregrounds the problem of security, especially in the field of international relations.

Interethnic relations are considered to be among the most difficult problems in international relations. The issue of forecasting and preventing the emergence of ethnically motivated conflicts and territorial disputes certainly remains valid for any multi-ethnic state. After all, only according to official UNO data there are about 1 billion people in the world who belong to national minorities, which is 15 – 20 % of the population of the planet. Ukraine isn’t an exception in this context with the territory bordering on 2 international organizations - the EU and the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States).

It is commonly known that one of the peculiarities of the population of Ukraine is its multinationality. According to the Ukrainian population census, over 130 nationalities and ethnic groups lived on the territory of Ukraine in 2001, whose share in total population of Ukraine was 22% (11 million people). According to the same information, 85% of these 11 million citizens of Ukraine have identified themselves as representatives of bordering on Ukraine countries, in particular members of the CIS: Russian Federation (8.3 million citizens of Ukraine), Belarus (276 thousand) and Moldova (259 thousand) and also representatives of countries which are members of the EU: Hungary (157 thousand), Romania (151 thousand), Poland (144 thousand) and the Slovak Republic (6 thousand). Thus, about 9.3 million people belonging to national minorities coming from bordering on Ukraine countries lived in Ukraine in 2001, representing 19% of the population of our country.

Today, Eastern European countries undergo some pressure from European institutions concerning the minority rights’ protection. There exists an assertion that the requirement to adopt Western standards or models of multiculturalism and minority rights has been raised in reference to the countries of postcommunist Europe. Rating and ranking of the countries-candidates depends on how well these countries follow the relevant standards (Johnson, 2004: 118-119).

World-wide experience indicates that the opportune and optimal improvement of national minorities’ protection may be the key to strengthening democracy, tolerance, and positive social organization development.

Of course, Ukraine, having claimed about its European integration strivings, joined the supporting initiatives and legislation on regulation of inter-ethnic relations. As the examples of such actions may serve the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the adoption of certain legislative acts regulating issues of ethnic relations: The Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, Law on National Minorities in Ukraine and the Concept of the Language Policy. It should be noted that among many researchers there is a debate around the issue who should be considered representatives of national minorities, because in European legislation there
remains no clear interpretation of this concept, which causes some confusion, even after the ratification of European documents. In this regard, existence of such a law in Ukraine is very important. Apart from that, regional support programs of national cultural societies should be adopted.

It must be admitted that for the past 20 years, lawmakers have done little to ensure minority rights, although the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine submitted dozens of bills, but none of them was adopted. The declared aim of the changes was to reform and update the existing legal framework to protect the rights of minorities, for harmonization of legislation of Ukraine to European norms of international law on minority rights. The need for reforming interethnic legislation in the status of minority rights and ensuring these rights is a long period of time overdue, but a comprehensive approach to the problem of minority rights is absent. Bills lobby for the interests of particular minorities, offer the Crimean Tatars the status of native people etc., and this violates the well-known principle of equal meeting of the interests of all national minorities. However, during these years the legal status of national minorities in Ukraine has been formed, including ratifications of the mentioned above international treaties governing the protection of minority rights.

The main task of Ukrainian ethnic policy is to ensure ethnic harmony and prevent conflicts involving an ethnic factor. For this purpose, at the state level regulation of ethnic relations and processes is carried out, which is based on legal principles laid down in ethnic legislation (Майборода, 1995: 78). The internal legal framework of national ethnic policy is based on the following international legal documents: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Language Minorities, The Hague Recommendations on National Minorities in Education, the Recommendations regarding the Language Rights of National Minorities, adopted in Oslo; the Declaration on Principles of Tolerance, the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. Most of these documents Ukraine also ratified and they became a part of Ukrainian legislation, on the basis of which the state ethnic policy was formed and which also regulates mechanisms and principles of its implementation. Declared Ukrainian policy towards European integration directs the state to reach the Copenhagen criteria for the EU membership, including also the political ones, which provide stability of institutions, democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights, respect and protection of national minorities. These are the goals which can be fulfilled only in democratic model of ethnic policy.

The main documents which guarantee the realization of national minorities’ rights also include: a system of national legislation acts, international legal documents in this field, signed and ratified by Ukraine; acts of state authorities representing executive power, targeted sectoral programs of spiritual
revival of national minorities; government organs of general and special competence, responsible for implementing state ethnonational policy; public organizations on national minorities (Трощинський, 2001: 379).

Important role in these processes played a Law of Ukraine “On national minorities”. It guaranteed the protection of national minorities, namely their rights at the first stage of building the state. The appearance of this legal act was also determined by the need for further development of international cooperation in promoting and protecting the interests of minorities by concluding multilateral treaties in this field (Зварич, 2009: 47). The preamble of the Law specified that the Verkhovna Rada adopts the Law in order to guarantee the national minorities the right of free development, following the international obligations as to respect of national minorities. Despite the fact that current wording of the Law of Ukraine “On national minorities” now is mainly criticized, in the early years of forming a model of ethnic policy of Ukraine, it was very progressive for the post-totalitarian country. The document defended representatives of minorities from any form of discrimination based on nationality, which took place in the USSR.

Existing problems in interethnic policy and hindering of their solution don’t give any grounds to assert unequivocally that political and legal basis of ethnic policy, formed during the years of independence, has created a solid foundation for the harmonious combination of interests of all ethnic communities of the Ukrainian society and has ensured equal opportunities for ethnic development and active participation in the state processes. Problems of Rusyns, Crimean Tatars indicate inadequate legal framework of ethnic policy. First of all, the policy fails to respond adequately to the challenges that some minorities and ethnic groups make with the support of other countries. The priority objectives of Ukraine as a lawful, democratic country in ethno-politics are support of the atmosphere of tolerance, elimination of the factors of ethnic tension and conflicts. The situation in which the main mechanism of inter-ethnic tensions’ and conflicts’ deprivation eventually becomes the Criminal Code of Ukraine is abnormal.

Rational position on implementation of national ethnic policy should acknowledge the improvement of existing mechanisms. This structure of mechanisms becomes effective only if there is a coordinated interaction of its elements. For such mechanisms as local authorities and public administration is important to clearly delineate their powers in decision-making and responsibility for implementing these decisions. It is desirable to achieve analogous regulatory powers of the organs of management of ethno-national sphere on the international and local levels, thus in the decision-making, budgeting etc. According to Ukrainian researcher O. Maiboroda, Ukraine should introduce some monitoring mechanisms judging from ethno-political sphere and control of realization of the national ethnic policy. Mechanisms of
this kind can be both public and communal (Майборода, 2008: 24). Therefore, the need for specialized governmental organs that would carry out a systematic and coherent national ethnic policy is relevant both on the national level and for the state administration and local authorities.

Despite the adoption of several legislative acts on regulation of international relations, in our opinion, today there are two main problems affecting the ethnic policy of Ukraine:

- Providing legislative regulations as to the rights of national minorities’ representatives to be elected into the legislative and local authorities;
- The right to freely use a mother tongue (mother tongue of minorities).

Speaking of the impossibility of securing legislative laws concerning the representation of minorities in state legislatures, in the first place, this problem is connected with the peculiarities of Ukrainian election legislation. The current format of the electoral system is focused upon the party vote, rather than personal, in other words, voting in parliamentary or local governmental elections people choose among Ukrainian general (regional) party list. Typically the party lists are formulated in such a way that the first 10, 20, 50 candidates who have an opportunity to get into elective bodies (it depends on the rating of each party), are chosen without any regard to the ethnic factor (it should be mentioned that sometimes regional office isn’t taken into account either). Areas of compact residence of national minorities are sometimes not interested in supporting the parties that do not support their interests, which results in ignoring the elections, and as a result (at least theoretically) non-recognition of government elected without their participation. This, in turn, can cause internal conflicts, which can theoretically give rise to separatist movements.

Naturally, such situation is undesirable and dangerous for any country. Taking into consideration this danger, representatives of the most influential parties in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine working with regions of compact residence of national minorities resort to such solutions of the problem: they appoint a candidate from their own list, who undertakes the obligation to represent the region. Moreover, advisers and assistants among minority are appointed; they can pass to the lists of elections to the local governmental bodies. Of course, such measures are insufficient to fully satisfy the interests of ethnic communities, because the mechanisms of the advisers’ appointment remain outside the general discussion that almost minimizes the effectiveness of their activities for the community. Therefore the most effective solution is to enable people to choose not a party, but specific people on the basis of majority. It should be mentioned that in local elections in October 2010, this possibility has been provided (though legislative introduction of such a standard pursued other goals).

Speaking about the problem of a free use of mother tongue, it is worth mentioning that this problem has several aspects. First of all, a household level
– that is native speakers’ opportunity and desire to communicate with each other using their native language. Usually no problems occur there. When monitoring the press of the Chernivtsi region concerning formation of ethnic stereotypes (monitoring was being conducted from September 2010 to April 2011) there weren’t any articles, which would refer to the impossibility of free choice of language in everyday communication. Some publications in Romanian were talking exclusively about Romanian being not prestigious among Romanian youth community, which is connected primarily with the timidity to communicate in their native language. But such problem is solely internal, it is within the community and the country cannot solve it. However, there is a number of positive articles (not only in publications in Romanian, but also in Ukrainian) concerning the celebration of a holiday “Our Romanian (language)” organized by the national and cultural community named after M. Eminescu in September 2010. Apart from describing it, there information has been provided about the Chernivtsi region students from schools where everything is taught in Romanian who took part in competitions of the knowledge of Romanian in Bucharest and took first places. The second aspect of the problem is a political one. At this level, this problem can be supported by both the representatives of national minorities and also by neighboring countries which act on behalf of their communities in Ukraine.

Among the language problems which are often discussed is the inability to study using native tongue at school, although the government tries to provide such an opportunity. In the Chernivtsi region there exist several schools teaching in Romanian, in the Zakarpatskyi region – some schools with Hungarian as a language of instruction, in eastern Ukraine there is a large number of schools with Russian as a language of teaching. However, representatives of national minorities react immediately if there are any restrictions related to the closure of schools of such kind. But on the other hand, there are a lot of schools closing with Ukrainian as a language of teaching. Just as an example there is the fact that this year in Ukraine there are more primers (ABCs) printed in Russian than in Ukrainian (a few thousands more) (Генпрокуратура підтвердила факт..., 2011). In other words, problems exist, but they are systematic and aren’t always based on ethnic issues, so taking into consideration everything said above, the problem of inter-ethnic tolerance acquires a significant importance as a prerequisite for ensuring stability in the region.

Ethno-social and ethno-cultural situation in the Chernivtsi region is undergoing some changes. In the interethnic region complex and potentially tense ethno-contact situation has been historically formed, characterized by a conglomerate of ethnic and cultural communities, on the basis of which multicultural environment of the region with growing differences between "us" and "them" is being formed. The situation is complicated by considerable social
differentiation and marginalization of large groups from the community of the majority.

Even though in the Chernivtsi region there exist no evident ethnic and religious conflicts, relations between ethnic groups are characterized by the relative instability in the ethno-social and socio-psychological terms. Socio-psychological background of ethnic relations is characterized by tendency to ethnic phobias’ growth. It should be noted that an alarmed worldview is inherent not only to adults, but also to the majority of youth. Many teenagers and young people show persistent pessimism, irrationalism, distrust of others, especially if their behavior, speech, appearance and so on somehow differ from common perceptions. A rather friendly attitude to specific representatives of ethnic groups in the mass mood can change to the negative if they are perceived as a cohesive, potentially dangerous unit.

The speed at which the process of overestimation of historical knowledge and events of the past of our country and nation in the difficult conditions of economic reforming, political instability and ideological chaos is being carried out, makes a profound impact on public consciousness, significantly complicating the process of socialization, encouraging the search of the most persistent social patterns, symbols, standards, samples for self-identification.

Problems of investigation of causes and mechanisms of emergence and formation of ethnic stereotypes have been recently paid much attention to, due to both the aggravation of interethnic relations and the growth of national consciousness. Functioning in a particular environment, ethnic stereotypes unite the human community in a socio-cultural system. However, in the moments of crisis, consolidating "our own", stereotypes to the same extent can differentiate the "alien". Under such conditions the people grow concentration on the problems of their own ethnic group due to impairment of the rights and freedom of other ethnicities.

Highlighting the positive and constructive role of maintaining of ethnic stereotypes in the preservation of traditional features and characteristics of national culture, we cannot but mention the negative effect of those stereotypes that are upheld by scornful attitude towards other ethnic groups and usually lead to nationalism in the worst of its forms.

Modern mass media makes a multi-aspect impact on the growing manifestations and general level of tolerance in society and, simultaneously, acts as a powerful factor influencing the mass consciousness and is a source of all sorts of stereotypes, particularly ethnic. In the terms of presence of the objective conditions (illegal migration, terrorism etc.) for the emergence of intolerance as to the representatives of "other" ethno-cultural and ethno-confessional groups in the environment, the mass media plays a crucial role in disseminating and increasing xenophobia (while the potential of the mass media
could be successfully used in the reverse process aimed at overcoming negative ethnic and cultural stereotypes and upbringing of tolerance).

The problems of interethnic relations, particularly those associated with acute conflict situations, criminal incidents, splashes of mass emotion, engaging both the journalists concerned about the resonance of their publications, as well as the owners and editors who are interested primarily in the increase in circulation of their publications’ editions. Therefore, description of ethnically colored processes and events in mass media, targeted at a mass audience, often becomes tendentious. To improve reliability and availability of relevant information, journalists tend to rely on the opinion of the reader, representing the majority of ethno-cultural population of the region, and as a result deliberately or involuntarily mimic the stereotypes of mass consciousness.

Recent mass media, owing to the increased capacity of the virtual impact on the consciousness and sub-consciousness of mass audience, are ready to offer value-significant and behavioral models to the society. These models can consolidate the society, rather effectively remove social tension and psychological stress, but they also can undermine the positive consolidation and psychological stability of society via creating and promoting in the stereotypical images to the masses, splitting the emotions of spectators, listeners, readers to the level of ordinary ones.

As a factor of formation of cultural and political identity the mass media in modern conditions can affect not only public opinion but also the content of interethnic relations, creating social settings and behavioral models of communication, language, communication, strategy, interaction (cooperation, competition, alienation) etc. This means that mass media can be a direct participant in the interethnic conflicts. Moreover, journalists can aggravate ethnic tension and bring it to the level of resistance by incompetent, unethical image of ethnic differences in lifestyle and manner of behavior, by creating negative ethnic individual and group images. Purely destructive forms of mass media in ethnic relations can include false propaganda of ethnic myths, stereotypes formation, one-sided and tendentious image conflicts on ethnic, racial or religious grounds, the use of words and expressions with incriminating, sarcastic and derogatory overtones.

Monitoring of a press, organized by our department, was dedicated to all the problems mentioned above. But we would like to focus on it in detail.

Selection of information units (articles, notices, chronicles) which are a subject to the analysis was carried out on the basis their containing such elements:

- ethnonyms (Ukrainians, Russians, Romanians, Moldavians etc.);
- toponyms, that were used in interethnic context (“Fascism is Prospering in Moldova”).
Peculiarities of Ethnonational Policy of Ukraine (Illustrated by the Example of the Chernivtsi Region)

- meta-ethnic (the Slavs, Russian world etc.) or sub-ethnic (Guzuls, Gagauzes etc.) markers;
- pointing out the race (Asians, Negroes);
- pointing out the confession in the ethnic context (Orthodox, representatives of Russian patriarchate etc.);
- idiomatic expressions, that have ethnic loading (hard-working people, fascist aggressors etc.);
- contemptuous and offensive expressions that are used to indicate ethnic, ethno-cultural and ethno-confessional and racial groups (“niggers”, “hohly”, “churky” etc.).

During the logical analysis of the totality of selected materials positive materials on interethnic relations in the Chernivtsi region (it should be noted that these materials are quite common) as well as neutral materials which have no potential for the creation or destruction of ethnic stereotypes were put aside. During the secondary processing of information the brightest and most typical publications that demonstrate the most common reasons for the formation of ethnic stereotypes were selected.

As a result of the analysis conducted on the basis of printed and electronic mass media, there were distinguished groups of mass media according to their impact on the mass consciousness of citizens:

- Regional mass media in Ukrainian (Час, Молодий Буковинець, Доба, Свобода слова, Буковина, Версії, Погляд, Ва-Банк, Буковинське віче);
- Regional mass media in Romanian (Libertatea Cuvântului, Zorile Bucovinei, Gazeta de Gerța, Meleag natal, Cuvântul adevărului, Timp nou);

While systematizing the chosen material we used the following criteria inherent to the researches of such kind:

1) appeals to violence (genocide, murders, repressions, deportations) or the menaces of violence as to any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives;
2) appeals to ethnic cleansings on the certain territories, calls to the filtration of migration flows on the basis of ethnic indication;
3) appeals to discriminations (breaking the people’s rights and liberty, limitation of civil rights, deprivation of social status and professional positions) of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives, altogether with demanding the perks and privileges according to the ethnic indication;
4) assertions as to the historical and contemporary crimes of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives;
5) assertions as to the existence of some conspiracy, dangerous intentions of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives;
6) propaganda of historical and contemporary cases of violence and discriminations concerning any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives;
7) conscious forgery of information, which questions the historic and contemporary facts of violence and discrimination concerning any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives;
8) pointing out the connection of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives with any criminal structures, separatist organizations, illegitimate and illegal political actors;
9) accusation of negative impact of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives on the economic, social and political processes;
10) assertion as to the existence of persistent negative “features of the national character” or “ethnical peculiarities of mentality” concerning any ethnic group;
11) mentioning the name of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives in a disdainful context;
12) assertion as to the physical, intellectual, spiritual and moral inferiority of any ethnic group, its fragments or separate representatives in a disdainful context.

For the lack of time, I cannot analyze all of the items from the mentioned posts (I'll try to describe them in detail while preparing this report for publishing). But it should be noted that the monitoring of the mentioned mass media during the period of eight months gave us no examples of publications that contained open calls to violence, ethnic cleansings, discrimination on ethnic grounds. In the examined materials there were no publications, which would promote historical or contemporary examples of violence against a particular ethnic group or its representatives. It is also worth noting that there were no allegations/statements of physical, intellectual, spiritual or moral inferiority of any ethnic group in the examined materials. Thus, we can state that the analyzed empirical material contains no intentions relating to items 1 - 3, 6 and 12 of our classification.

The problem of calls for discrimination against an ethnic group is not raised in the mass media of the region in the period under investigation is undoubtedly a good tendency. But if you analyze this feature in the mass media materials, it should be noticed that it presupposes not only appeals to discrimination, but also demanding of benefits and privileges based on ethnic
origin. Taken into consideration this point, to publications that fall into the range of interests of the 3rd post, with certain restrictions, we may include publications as to the evaluating by individual representatives of Romanian community of the condition of the Romanian language in the Chernivtsi region.

Orientation on the formation of stereotype of "restricting the rights of national minorities" can be determined as a common feature for these publications, but at the same time the authors of these articles don’t use enough arguments, and sometimes disclaim them, which in its turn leads to the lack of interest in these problems from public. However, following fears and phobias which exist in the mass consciousness, journalists involuntary or deliberately make a situation ethno-confessional factors. Common in Ukrainian local and regional mass media publications are devoted in particular to the adoption of the bill "On the languages in Ukraine", the result of which will be introduction of Russian as a second official language and its formal use in preschool, professional-technical and higher education, in courts, social and economic activities, in the field of science etc. As a result, in the minds of readers of popular mass media editions phobic attitudes towards the members of other ethnic groups are fixed.

Conducted monitoring noted a significant share of ethno-conflict publications in periodicals, which are considered popular by a common region reader. As showed by the research, ethno-conflict publications with the greatest frequency occur in the criminal chronicles' sections, as well as in analytical articles that are concerned with the issues of balanced ethnic relations in the Chernivtsi region. Production of xenophobia (ethnophobia) often occurs through selective designation by journalists of ethnicity of criminal plots' heroes (pointing out the ethnicity of mainly "non-Ukrainian" criminals, such as Moldovans, Romanians and Gypsies) which, in our opinion, objectively contributes to the formation in mass consciousness of representatives of ethnic majority of the negative ethnic and cultural stereotypes of others. These materials in most cases fall under the indication of "historical and current crimes of a particular ethnic group, its fragments or individual representatives."

Attention should be drawn to the fact that some publications, in the absence of open verbalized calls for discrimination on ethnic grounds, contained certain elements of conspiracy and pressure, which primarily concerned the right of self-determination. This problem is vividly presented in a number of publications which highlight the relationship of Romania and the Romanian community in Chernivtsi region to the question of independence of Moldova and discussions around the issue of state language in Moldova. In similar mass media monitorings one of the most common is the problem of specifying the relationship of ethnic groups, its fragments or individual members with criminal organizations, separatist organizations, illegal
and illegitimate political actors. It should be noted that during the monitoring it was revealed that similar themes in the studied media practically weren’t touched upon, especially in the context of identifying ethnic groups with representatives of criminal structures. The absence of publications of such kind can be regarded as a very positive trend. Spreading of the fact that over the last year in the Chernivtsi region no crime on ethnic grounds has been committed by almost all mass media is the confirmation of this trend which ruins the stereotypes of identification of the representatives of an ethnic group with the crime.

According to the analysis of collected materials, replicating of stereotypical settings is often a result not of the position of an editorship or other mass media, but on the contrary, of ethnological incompetence and incorrectness of professional journalists who often mention ethnic groups, their fragments or individual representatives in the contemptuous context.

Conducted monitoring has also manifested examples of positive perception of interethnic relations. The most positive materials include articles, which form the tolerant acceptance of a particular ethnic group aimed at overcoming the negative ethnic stereotypes or containing examples of constructive intercultural interaction and cooperation. It is worth noting that such publications are typical for almost all investigated media, but among all of them Romanian publications of the region are in the lead by the number of positive material, especially in the field of intercultural interaction.

Need of formation of a real and effective mechanism of preventing interethnic conflicts, based on monitoring, scientific analysis and forecast of ethno-social and ethno-political processes, structures, tools and procedures that can ensure a positive dialogue from various ethnic communities among themselves and with authorities in modern terms comes to the foreground.

Solving this problem is impossible without a comprehensive study of the impact of mass media on the formation of tolerance in multiethnic environment. The urgency of such studies is determined by the need to optimize the impact of media on social processes in general, and on the ethnic ones in particular. Meantime this impact cannot be characterized as optimal as it is often negative. Some notes of stereotypical prejudices are “heard” from time to time even in the top socio-political periodicals. Journalists and editors often just do not pay any attention to the fact that these or other statements, estimates, manner of presenting the material have a shade of ethnic intolerance, and do not contemplate how this may affect the state of interethnic relations. Exotism of the cultural and behavioral peculiarities of the ethnic communities is commonplace for the mass media representatives. Understanding of the fact that all this facilitates the emergence of negative ethnic stereotypes is lacking.

As a conclusion I would like to note that despite all the difficulties in the ethnic policy of Ukraine, nowadays we can speak about a potential to
interethnic tolerance existing in Ukrainian society, which in appropriate conditions could be a good foundation for stability in the region.

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ETHNICITY AND MULTICULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN SHAPING THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SPACE

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Abstract. This paper aims to describe the phenomenon of the feeling of belonging to ethnic groups and how this influences the behavioral patterns and attitudes, manifested in the social groups. Also draw attention to the needs related to the adoption and implementation in the social space of general values designed to make compatible interaction between different ethnic groups. The material also brings a series of processing data that are developed as a result of social research, designed to motivate state of affairs related to the interaction between ethnic groups and to show how is conduct the intercultural communication. In the last part we try to develop a set of suggestions about possible strategies for implementation of social values necessary for intercultural communication and social spaces multinational construction. We also mentioned a number of advantages that Romanian society has social areas from construction and multicultural membership of the European social space.

Keywords: collective behavior, public institutions, ethnicity, European values, social compatibility

Multiculturalism is a social phenomenon of tradition, manifested with different intensity, depending on the frequency of specific interactions between different nations, ethnicities, religions. Multiculturalism is manifested existence since the dawn of human civilization and has been driven by the needs of exchange of knowledge, exchange of products and markets and not least the need for alliances to ensure social security.

Multiculturalism today knows a new dimension in terms of functionality that the phenomenon of interaction between civilizations is expressed in the

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construction of large social structures. Continuing trend of human communities was increasing in size and geographical demographic. This provides stability, strength, and access to resources. Socio-economic and political mechanisms of complex 21st century, great civilizations have imposed the need to reorganize and effort building mega social spaces. Trends in construction of a European unit has existed since the time my old, but the success of this approach was always placed on the coordinates of unstable social and political construction. One reason for the lack of perennial principle in connection with the European space reasons is the lack of internal social structures. Roman Empire, the Habsburgic, Napoleonian Empire or German expansionism, are just some examples of failed attempts to build united European space. These failures are due to non-constructive arguments of force and intentions related to social perspectives of communities which have been extended unification plan. Because of these shortcomings, often imposed by aggression, such political-military actions with a strong social impact were assessed and adverse events with known abusive. They assumed norms and rules imposed from outside, that daily burden of a large number of social communities. In this context, multiculturalism often represents a potential threat, and ethnocentric and nationalist practice - a form of resistance and a means to caution against any tendency to expand the social space. (Krivis, Lucks 2009)

The new model brings some significant differences in social reorganization, because motivation is based on an inner construction of the new social space. This rationale is supported by transnational media attention and assistance to improve and strengthen the social problems of a better lifestyle. We see so very social construction technique based on internal motivation requires compatibility need social spaces. Multiculturalism becomes an undeniable value and binding towards building a global social space.

1. Multiculturalism and the public institutions

The field of the public relations has recently become a subject of great interest that is more and more often met in the discourse of the social studies in Romania. Books and items have been written, meetings have been organized, lectures have been voiced, being all directed towards the theme of the public relations.

From experience, the fields of first priority of the social studies are not at random. On the contrary, we can stand that the interest for a certain theme is in correlation with the needs of the society in witch they show themselves. So, if it were fulfilled an inventory of the approached subjects, in the last years by means of the social studies, it is quite probable that in Romania, on the first places, there would be the studies liked to the problem of poverty, the problem of corruption or of the difficulties existing in the social integration of different
categories of population. Meanwhile the social studies in USA approached more intensively the problems liked to the family dissolution or those in the field of immigration. What we want to stand here is that the scientific interest for a certain theme could be at a certain moment an indicatory for the kind of problems the respective society is confronted with. (Cutlip, Brown 1999)

The natural questions arising from this context are referring to the more or less functional aspects that should be correlated with the interest for the field of the public relations. Is this interest really justified by the problems with which the Romanian society is confronted, or it is rather a fashionable subject coming out of an international perspective?

One of the most important difficulties we are confronted with in treating such a subject is that the term of “public relations” is often met under the form of some ambiguous acceptances and exaggeratedly generalizing. In that case we sometimes very closely come up to the extreme situation of confounding the public relations with any process of communication. In the work that was coordinated by S. Cutlip, A. Center and G. Brown, they show that the idea of public relations designates the managerial function that identifies, establishes and maintains mutual advantageous relations between an organization and different categories of public, relations on which the success or the failure of the respective organization depend. Analyzing this definition some conclusion can be clearly attached. They are meant to suggest and sustain the place and essence of this concept:

1. We firstly think that there must be specified the idea of the link between the institutional field and the specific activities of the environment of the public relations. Thus we can make a clear-cut distinction between these activities and the other types of communication. Modern institutions are characterized by a complex net of links with other institutions and the performance of the institutions is dependent of the functionality of these relations. This is the cause of the development of the public relations.

2. As long as the departments of the public relations represent professional media specialized in the building up of a proper relational climate between an organization and different categories of public, one can stand that the real relationship manifests itself one more levels. Thus, we can speak about an inner level of the public relations (the relations between the persons who do the different jobs in an organization are attentively had in view), but also by an external level of public relations (thinking of the relations that are held by the organization towards the beneficiaries of the services and goods that are offered. From another point of view, thinking of the importance held by the organizational activity, we can speak about institutionalized public relations (specialized in the links that must be maintained with
other institutions) and non institutionalized public relations (specialized in the relations of the organization with physical persons, having the quality of being either the beneficiaries or the employed ones).

3. We also consider as being important some short considerations about the fields in which the activities of public relations find themselves again. We can easily notice that, in fact, the services of the public relations can be adjusted to any field of any social institution. This phenomenon is very important from the point of view of the consequences it has upon the social level. As long as the citizens’ relations with the public institutions represent a daily phenomenon, we have the right to conclude that the way of going on of these relations will greatly influence the social behavior, the degree of involvement in the public problems and the civic spirit proved by the member of the collectivity.

The hypothesis we formulate and put into analysis is the fact that there exists certain specificity of development of the relations between the members of a human community and the social institutions on which they directly depend. In their turn, these social institutions, being organisms with formal structures, are obliged, at a certain length, to build up strategies of relationship and implicitly of communication with the social categories which they serve. The good organizing of these activities depends on a corresponding vision that is specific for the public relations. This organizing has to impose specific solutions in order to optimize the institution’s relations with the beneficiaries of the services offered.

On the part of the beneficiaries of the public services, if there are well introduced and if they correspond to the interests of those who ask for the services of the social institution, we will see a positive attitude towards the organization in case. This fact will draw to the creation of a favorable imagine that the institution should have on the public consciousness. On the contrary, if the modalities of relationing and the offer services don’t correspond to the standards imposed by the beneficiaries with their interests, the impression of that social institution, no matter the problem, will mark a descendent evolution. And the climax could be the discreditation and loss of authority (Samovar, Porter, Mc Daniel 2008).

From the perspective of the relations between the social institutions and the members of the society, in the period after 1989, there have been detached some specific situations in Romania and they, as we will later present, came to influence and determine a certain type of social behavior promoted at the level of large social segments. In other words, we will see that the persistence of a dominant type of manifestation in public relations will significantly influence a set of behavior attitudes and models of the social order (Giddens, 2000).
A first idea in this respect is linked to the passing on from a central social system to a system based on free strategies of organizing, at least from the point of view of declared perspective of desirability of the new models to organize the institutions. Yet social and institutional liberalism did not offer a comfortable dimension at the moment of breaking off from the centralized regime. So it is necessary for an institutional system to work an ensemble of internal relations (the organization of the institutions). The matter that stood against the institutional liberalism, beyond the practical unknowing of what such a system is supposed to be, was exactly the characteristics of this internal and external relations that we rather going on in accordance with the old centralized system. In this respect we want to point out the transformational phenomenon of the specific character of the social relationships. It is a necessary and normal matter in the context of the transformation of the Romanian society by adopting the occidental methods. The all ensemble of the communist society, by centralizing all social systems, succeeded to exclude the beneficiary out of the economical equation and not only. In other words production and the quality of the services did not depend on the beneficiaries’ evaluations regarding quality. This fact was caused by the lack of competition on one side, and by central authority on the other side. This authority was in fact only possible threatening for the functioning of the social institutions, so that central authority was the real beneficiary that had to be satisfied by all means. We think unimportant to insist here upon the nature of the central authority of the communist society, organized in an oligarchic and unitary way and having as a last and universal argument the Communist Party. Thus we have here an evidence of refusing the responsibility, a defalcation of authority, from the real beneficiary represented by the population towards the political and politicized structures of the state. The motifs of this model of social relationing used to be firstly linked to the need of social control, being exchange at that time any situation that could have been used as an instrument for that goal.

After 1989 the Romanian society was confronted with the powerful phenomenon of perpetuation of the patterns of social relationing, patterns that include economical, political, administrative and even educational dimensions. Thus we find ourselves in the situation in which the declination of responsibilities that should have become history became independent with an even greater force inside the vital bodies of the society. Happening like that, we can see once more how the rightful beneficiaries of the social products and services are avoided by history, being forgotten in a disconcentrating lake of authority. It is seen how Romania, in fifteen years, has experimented with success a democratic pattern build and perpetuated by elimination of the population from almost all decisional context, thus being built up a social system that wants to be democratic but in reality it continues to elude the essence of liberal democracy that is the phenomenon of social control. Still, the
mechanism of eluding the social control is different from the one of the communist period; the social control is not minimized by oppression, as in the former form of government, but by omission and poverty. The phenomenon of omission is in fact a poor offering of instruments for social control, which was created and promoted by the political systems of post Decembrist Romania. A suggestive example in this respect is represented by the vote-on-list system, by which is defalcated the senators’ and deputies’ responsibility for their electors. This responsibility is directed towards the political parties and institutions that promoted them on the voting list, in a period in which the Romanian population was supposed to have understood and learned the mechanism of liberal democracy. The pauperization of the population was a powerful argument which succeeds to generate a weak social reaction and a diminution of the interest for a strengthening of a civic consciousness. In free societies there finally appear different modalities for the creation of the instruments for the social control, but only under the circumstances of a suitable civic education meant to stimulate the social participation. But if the population develops some rather atomizing models, where each individual looks only after his/her interest, ignoring the collective one, it is quite improbable to appear coherent instruments of social control, especially in a medium in which the political power deliberately discourages that control.

On the other side, on the background of population’s pauperization, society is dealing with the structures of the communist pattern. The historical evolution of American population and of that of the European Occident permits us to consider that the liberal democracy goes hand in hand with the society of consumption, in other words it is seen that the level of the social control increases directly with the power of consumption of the population for offered goods and services, which in their turn get diversified and increase their quality, generating a positive process in social evolution. Unfortunately the Romanian population is still far enough to consider themselves as a consuming force and the fact diminishes its authority, both directly and indirectly. In the direct relations the goods and services offered on the market are either of a poor quality or incomplete, usually to permit their selling at prices, or to be profitable when the phenomenon of consumption is reduced. From an indirect perspective the duties and taxes to the local and central authorities being reduced, we have to face the reality of a reduced budget which implies small salaries in the budgetary fields and on organizational substructure insufficiently developed. This brings with it a poor quality of services or even their inexistence. From another point of view we draw attention to a phenomenon of getting sometimes deliberately, more difficulty in the ways of access to different services that are usually compulsory for a citizen. This phenomenon is motivated by the practice of the preferential services that generate tips, the respective practice being very often meet among the office workers. Although
for a certain point of view we could consider that such phenomena have the role of protecting and conserving a certain category by a mechanism of auto protection against a prolonged state of crisis, all this things diminish the social authority because they become extremely noxious factors for the formatting process of a social ensemble.

2. Public relations and the citizen’s belief in social institutions after 1989

The field of the public relations in the communist society was practically useless and thus existing as a dimension of a superficial formula. That was mostly due to the specific of the depending relations of the different social institutions. In the situation of a competitive economy the depending relations of an organization become manifest at the level of its relations with the sources materials or with the necessary services for the private activity and, what is very important, of its relations with the potential beneficiaries. With no constraints generated by a competitive medium, the social institutions remained with no motivation in the direction pf having proper relations with the beneficiaries. Thus, without direct responsibilities for their beneficiaries, the institutions of the totalitarian form of government in Romania, promoted a not evolved, not elaborated and an incoherent relation towards the citizens, who, with no competitive field, had no other alternative. In the economical, commercial and even administrative surroundings of the communist period the relations of dependence manifested themselves at other levels; avoiding, as we have seen, the aspects of public’s satisfaction, which was in rather ideological goal than a real necessity in the activity of an institution.

The strategies of the public relations develop and make evolutions in accordance to the necessities imposed by a social and economical context at a certain moment. The centralized economy of the communist period imposed efforts of relationing with the party structures and with the contractors of raw materials, materials and services. Even in the case of the services, the political arguments had an important role. As a result, the specific activities of the public relations were directed towards the social factors that could influence the activities of the institution by means of their authority. In most of the cases the relations where individualized and they were based on links with key characters who used to facilitate the interest of the institutions in exchange of some services of social and personal nature, thus strengthening their own positions. Due to the personal character of the professional relations and due to the restricted spheres of reference points of responsibility, the departments of public relations had no object of activity (Regnault 2009).

The poor quality of relationing between the social institutions and population implied certain results at the level of some behavioristic and
Atitudinale models of population. On one side, the trust in public institutions decreases, the collective mentality being feed continuously on the negative aspects of the activities of these institutions. On the other side the model of the institutional relations got very quickly to be adopted by population and it was also considered from the point of this efficiency. It was like that, that at an individual level, there was developed the idea that the standard of living depends on one’s net of “acquaintances” that should facilitate and promote the personal interests in different fields. Thus the defalcation of the social responsibilities and the lack of any direction of social control became accepted and naturalized relations in the Romanian society.

The process of passing to a competitive economy has not brought great changes in the field of the public relations, fact that was generated both by the low competitive context and by the small power of buying. From another point of view the system of personalized relations was maintained at all levels, which determined the economical, administrative and political surroundings (having no external authority like that of the former party) became more and more hermetically for those who had come from outside the system. On the other side, due to a very poor market of working force, the society had to face a phenomenon of hermetization of the guilds, crafts-man-ships and fields of activity passed on from one generation to another. All these brought their contribution to the perpetuance of a lack of trust of the population towards the social institutions and to the maintaining of a bad relationship with those.

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Abstract. The present paper analyzes the concept of security, emphasizing the difference between political security and societal security, referring to the different types of threats to security, depending on the traits that social groups will define as essential to their identity.

Our paper aims also to draw attention upon the significant facts of culture and civilization in a region situated at the confluence of Central and South-Eastern Europe, it aims to reflect the understanding of the plural character of the historic development, and it also aims to pin-point the intercultural character of the Banat region as an example of inter-regional tolerance. The chosen case study - the region of Banat - proves balance between various religions, traditions, customs and between various lifestyles. The intellectual work and the improvement in the degree of civilization conveyed by Romanians, Serbs, Hungarians, Jews, Bulgarians and Slovaks in Banat have become a common inheritance. Another important feature of the culture of this region would be that it was promoted by the entire community, and one can notice the interactive feature of the inter-cultural phenomenon as an outstanding approach of a peaceful living together.

Our research can be considered a synthesis regarding the relationship between the coexistence of different ethnicities and cultures and the economic and social performance and, respectively, the setting up of an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual assistance, in fact a manifestation of inter-territorial solidarity aiming towards a better life and in which the diffusion of historical experiences becomes factor of development and economic growth.

Keywords: Ethnicity, culture, values, inter-cultural communication, tolerance, solidarity
1. The European Union – space of liberty, security and justice

The European Union is a union of states and not of individuals. The European Union is a construction which is unprecedented in time and space, which began in the 50s of the twentieth century, which has not ceased to develop given the adopted treaties. Since its origins two background processes have marked it - one of deepening (increasing the EU competence) and another of extension, in order to increase the number of members. The founding member, and those that have joined later, have agreed to partly replace the traditional intergovernmental cooperation, within which each state is sovereign in decision-making, given the organization of supranational institutions with their own legal rules. The EU is therefore a political structure based on national-state interests.

According to the Treaty of Amsterdam the European Union should be maintained and developed as an Area of freedom, security and justice. The setting-up of an area of freedom, security and justice has been decided on in order to allow truly free movement of persons within the European Union and in order to undertake effective actions to fight organized crime and fraud. By the Treaty of Maastricht the fields of justice and internal affairs were included in Title VI of the EU Treaty (third pillar). The decisions were taken under intergovernmental procedures.

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force at 1 December 2009, the three pillars’ system was annulled, and the judicial and police force cooperation in criminal matters was also set up at communitarian level. Even if it was set up at communitarian level, the role of the Member States does not disappear. For these sectors the states’ intervention is possible more than usual in communitarian sectors. Special exemption clauses remain in force for the UK, Ireland and Denmark. The Lisbon Treaty improves the EU’s ability to act in various areas of priority for the today’s Union and for its citizens, such as freedom, security and justice (the fight against terrorism and crime). The Lisbon Treaty promotes the Europe of rights, values, freedom, solidarity and security, as well as the fundamental values of the Union, it introduces the Charter of fundamental rights in the European primary law, it provides new mechanisms of solidarity and ensures a better protection of the European citizens in a space of freedom and security. This last objective is achieved through closer cooperation between police forces and customs authorities both directly and through Europol.

Our geographical position places us at the European Union's eastern border. The enlargement which took place in 2004 and 2007 raised the EU27 border issue and also the meaning, essence, durability and the sustainability of the European project. It is necessary, first, the analysis of the European border concept considering the new reasons due to the maintenance of Europe’s borders, the mechanism to ensure the EU security, decisional transparency at
the level of the EU's supranational institutions regarding geographical and political borders and the specific relationships between the member countries on these issues, which despite the quality of members of the same organization, are the classic diplomatic relations. Subsequent to the enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the EU has new states as neighbors, some of them lacking history as independent states and also lacking appropriate diplomatic experience and facing outstanding sensitivity especially in the neighborhood of major powers. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) provides a framework for relations with neighboring states – old and new, in the east or south – to which the EU has not granted any prospects regarding integration, but still wants to have closer ties with. The European Parliament supports the ENP. The legal backing of this policy is Title V of the EU Treaty, on foreign policy and common security policy (FPCS) articles 133.3 (trade) and 300 (international agreements) in the EU Treaty.

For bilateral relations with East European countries the EU has Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. The pursued objectives are: increasing the degree of stability, security and prosperity of the EU and of neighboring countries in the East and South, especially offering the Eastern neighboring states a closer relationship with the EU. ENP should prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighboring states. The policy is based on commitments to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and for the economic principles on the free trade market and sustainable development and poverty reduction as well. Based on the ENP, the EU aims to counteract or prevent threats to “direct security” such as large-scale illegal immigration, stopping imports of energy, environmental degradation, terrorism and organized crime dissemination.

2. Reflections on the concept of security. the significance of the global balkans concept

The concept Security is a complex concept. Paradoxically, while everyone talks about security, a very small number is made up of those who wonder what security really is. The concept of security is now the center of numerous political and media debates. Security is in Europe and elsewhere “pervasive” in the everyday concerns of individuals; security influences almost all aspects of life.

Defining security can take two ways – firstly, in a very general and condensed way, and secondly giving it a broader content and undoubtedly more complex one. This second meaning has been adopted to the extent that the conceptualization of security has allowed exploring the debates triggered by the EU's security policy.
The security concept is currently used, but little analyzed, because it brings forth a number of analytical difficulties. The term “security” is a dual term because it means not only being free (to have escaped, to have been released) from a threat, but also suggests that there has to be a means, an instrument, to avoid or limit danger. Some say that “strengthening security measures reduces the freedom and rights. But it was always argued that strengthening security measures is not done for the sake of security, but exactly to protect and promote freedom”. But does security itself stand for freedom?

Security teaches us, makes us look to identify a danger (a threat), such as terrorism, bird flu, energy dependence, and to define – at the same time – the necessary means to face the arisen danger.

We should emphasize that there is still no consensual definition of security. Some define it as opposed to insecurity – negatively when it opposes insecurity, and positively when it is considered a means of maintaining integrity of the national territories and of the accepted institutions. Others define security in relation to threats on individuals and institutions. Other tentative definitions present it as a lack (absence) of threats to fundamental values. Such a view is considered as an objective point of view. Other statements view it subjectively, considering it the absence of fear (it does not raise fear) that these values can be threatened, so there is no insecurity. In other situations the concept of security is challenged – “essentially contested concept”, and to the extent that it is subject to contestation there are known several meanings:

National security implies the existence of the state and its ability to exercise power in a given territory. Collective security, on the other hand, is based on intergovernmental cooperation and interdependence in international relations. And human security, this concerns satisfying the basic needs of individuals and the primacy given to the state and its defense to achieve “societal security” which refers to identity, culture and the survival of society in changing conditions and in the case of actual or probable threats. Following the above it is clear that security has many meanings. Therefore, security represents a relative value, tributary to the national culture, to traditions, concepts and political options as well as theoretical options adopted by different authors.

The realistic understanding of security is state-centered. The state - which refers to security, which is actually reduced to the issue of protection and defense. This way security is conceived as a response to existing threats to which the state must answer and is obliged to respond to. Realistic understanding is related to geopolitical and geostrategic understanding, basically studying the links between space and power relations (including military) allowing the state to ensure control upon its territory, both inside and outside, on international level. According to this concept security is seen as deriving from the power of the state as well as an indicator of strategic success of states in their economic and military competition.
The idealistic understanding of security is individual-centered. This was developed after World War II and gives primacy, as previously mentioned, to individual rights and freedoms emphasizing the conflictual human nature in a natural way, hence the need for security arises. The followers of this approach, which is also called “Peace Studies”, are convinced of the possibility of progress towards international cooperation between states within international institutions.

But the question to be asked is, which is the dimension of political and societal security? The security concept is familiar to social and political sciences, because it refers to groups, societies or individuals.

A security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are linked together so that their national security problems cannot be treated differently. Security complexes generate regionalization within the international system. The security theory says that the existence of security complexes represents a natural characteristic of the international system. Security always has been considered in political terms. Political security has been linked to the state and defined primarily in terms of sovereignty, being associated with the military security.

The literature in the field refers to the political security by the phrases “community of security” (the states are to be found in similar conditions), “security system” (those principles, rules and norms that make nations behave moderately, starting from the belief that the other nations will follow suitably), referring mainly to issues of political security in the EU’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe on the grounds that “Europe is currently the field which faces different visions regarding the political space” (each considering also a security paradigm) and “the EU enlargement is an expansion of the security space for both the EU and the Central and Eastern European states”.

On the other hand, societal security (the security of the society) is often considered related to threats to the societal security, i.e. related to the society’s identity, and may include: the destruction of the entire population as such, the destruction of the community’s specific lifestyle, banning the possibility of cultural expression, the use of own language and / or religion, the occupation of a territory filled with historical significance for the respective group, and also permissiveness towards minority rights and practices, for example, may be perceived as a threat factor to the uniformity - and therefore - to the identity of the majority society.

Given that we are dealing with societies that have no state or at least do not correspond to existing states, societal security concerns the society's ability to maintain its essential character in changing conditions and under actual and potential threats. Specifically, we refer to persistence, under conditions allowing the evolution of traditional models of language, culture, association, as well as identity and religious and national customs. For the securitization process in this field reference can be made to “collective identity”, the “we” - that is
exactly what society considers to be vital in order to exist as such. If something threatens the central symbol of this “we”, if there still is this “we”, it is expected to launch a call to their defense.

Clarification is required here, stressing that the notion of society with which the “Copenhagen School” is operating is similar to that commonly used in sociology and social theory, and it does not represent the society of a state or the national society. In this case, society simply represents “large identity groups, which stand for themselves”. The authors of “Copenhagen School” use the term “societal” for communities which people identify with (being treated especially in Europe, the emphasis falls on national identity as a form of political and social identity on large scale, but - the authors write - it may take the forms of tribes, clans, nations and entities similar to nations, called minorities, the civilizations, religions or races). Simultaneously, the authors also specify clearly that “nation” and “religion” remain the most comprehensive and robust types of social identity in the contemporary world.

Societal security has as main element the one of identity (state security having sovereignty as a criterion, societal security being concerned with identity issues). The survival of the state is fundamentally bound with its sovereignty while the survival of the society is related to identity.

To conclude, political security refers mainly to the state's role in international relations and the possible threat to state security. States can be differentiated - in terms of their internal stability and cohesion - in powerful states and weak states and internationally they are differentiated by the types of relationships which are established between them. Societal security theory shows that the state cannot always constitute the central objective of security. Some argue that the state can sometimes threaten the security for different groups in society so it is necessary to analyze the security from the identity perspective. This means that any coherent social entity - not just the state - may perceive threats to the elements which they consider crucial to their own identity. Depending on the traits that social groups will define as essential to their identity, there can be highlighted different types of threats to security. But the basic problem remains the conceptualization of identity.

Also, this part of the European Union is considering the “new neighborhood”, considered “close foreign countries” by Russia. These two perspectives generate divergent opinions regarding the behavior towards the populations and ethnic groups in the area. And, especially, the Eastern part of the EU - in macro-spatial terms – is part of the global Western Balkans concept, which represents major importance in the context of NATO enlargement and globalization.
3. Case study – the uniqueness on the intercultural environment in the Banat area

In the era of globalization, sustained by a widely spread technology, there are constantly set up multiple relations between continents, countries, regions, groups and individuals. For these relations to be set up a common denominator is – or must be – found, usually of economic nature. These procedures, unparalleled in history, sometimes challenge strong reactions from particular cultures which, by rights or not, feel threatened, tending to consider these procedures as inconsistent with their essence and existence. In this very sensitive context it is quite easy to resort to “multicultural tolerance”. Although the tolerance among cultures is a mere necessity, it will not offer a definite solution to issues that might occur. To reach a satisfactory outcome, we need a thoroughgoing study of cultures and their values.

The UNESCO Commission for 21st century education, led by Jacques Delors, promulgated four pillars for the future education:
- to learn to know
- to learn to learn
- to learn to be
- to learn to live together.

This way, the challenges of intercultural education are strongly backed up by “learning to live together”. The important task of intercultural education and intercultural learning is not restricted to the formal system of education but it unfolds upon individuals, allowing them to change their present beliefs, values and judgment, assigning them “towards others”.

The work of the European institutions is based on the values which play an important role in the building of a peaceful Europe, in overcoming the gap between East and West, in promoting the participation of minority groups, in supporting the forming of an intercultural society. Everyone should be able to fully and equally participate to the building of Europe. Therefore, it is important not only for the European politics, but also for an objective reality at both national and local level that people should learn to live together. One should only think about the relations between the intercultural learning and human rights, minority’s rights, solidarity, equality of chances, participation and democracy. These are the values of intercultural learning, as well as the avowed values of the European institutions, as the base for European cooperation and integration.

Geographically placed at the cross-roads of commercial paths which bind Central Europe to the Mediterranean South, placed between two worlds often differently organized, the Banat area is a frontier area, and it was exactly this quality which significantly contributed to the making of the multiple
language environment, alongside the shared presence of different religions — orthodox, catholic, protestant, Lutheran, Mosaic and Moslem. There are also to be found forms of private and public administration inherited from the Roman and Byzantine Empires, from the Hungarian Royalty, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg and Austrian-Hungarian monarchies, as well as from the former Kingdom of Romania. The region of Banat was always conferred a distinct identity, with a reflective meaning of economic, social and political privilege, and having this frontier culture as background, the economy of the region advanced towards higher standards compared to the other regions of the country.

The uniqueness of the intercultural environment in Banat can be defined on hand several aspects:

1. compared to the Western Europe, where the intercultural phenomenon has arisen as a reaction to the cultural patterns of emigrants, often accepted with withheld hostility because of their destabilizing potential and considered as being a factor which might contaminate the identity of the community’s perception, in the region of Banat the intercultural phenomenon was based on a very original nonjudgmental behavior which allowed each ethnicity to integrate into the history of the community, without any aggressive reaction from the local inhabitants, represented either by the majority or minority. The constant bearing of the same daily issues made them jointly look for practical solutions to the community’s issues, a fact which led to a natural social cohesion, with no institutional interference. The ethnic diversity was perceived as a source to increase the choice of solutions to the communitarian issues, basically identical; the intercultural phenomenon has always been interactive in this respect.

2. the school-system has included teaching in the mother-tongue of all minorities, ensuring them a financial support which was equal to what the Romanian population ought to have.

3. the Romanian state supported cultural institutions with performances in the mother tongue of the minorities, Timisoara being the only European city with state theatres in the Romanian language, the German language and the Hungarian language.

The use of two, three, even four languages in the Banat region is a very seldom feature to be found in other regions in Europe. The multi-linguistic feature of a significant percentage of the population can be traced back to the 19th or even the 18th century, being very visible during the whole period, in spite of the pressures exerted by the national languages, which had hoped to extend their area of use in the minority languages’ disadvantage. The need of communication, the economic interests, the understanding and acceptance of the other’s needs and values led to the learning of the other languages in use,
besides the mother tongue. So, the speaking of many languages has been alleged as a wealth belonging to every inhabitant; it was perceived as a way to bring people closer together. The use of many languages – supported by schools, cultural associations, political organizations, minority groups and the church – has properly been understood by the communities in Banat, because the efforts were collective, urging the rise of the values of civilization and cultural inheritance accepted by everybody, as a team of equals. The speaking of several languages – strongly related to the historical course of modernization – was considered as being a result of the fact that the Romanian majority was sharing the same territory with several minorities – German, Serbian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Jewish, Slovak and Romany. And there has to be put an emphasis on the fact that this did not happen as a result of an outer intervention, but as a natural consequence of the fact that the local population has taken upon itself the multiple identity.

The Banat area reflects a variety of encounters and proves the chance of survival for diverse languages and different cultures. Though today we can refer to this experience as inter-cultural relations, it has never brought forth misunderstandings, but it proved ability to encourage and motivate the building of a community of people to whom the common interest regarding order and progress were more important than ethnic affiliations. It was therefore possible to show concern towards innovation, at least more efficiently than other neighboring regions did. Practically, the life of every individual was enriched, gaining importance by avoiding conceptual ideologies. To what concerns the ethnic traditional values, these were shared and preserved as an outcome of the manifold identities’ input. The intellectual work and the improvement in the degree of civilization conveyed by Romanians, Serbs, Hungarians, Jews, Bulgarians and Slovaks in Banat have become a common inheritance. Generally, the culture of bordering areas of a country has a pluralistic character, so the Banat region of today cannot be considered focusing on the cultural outcomes highlighted only by the Romanian language. Multiple literary and historical studies written in the Romanian language entered a channel of communication and exchange of ideas with the Transylvanian School, reflecting esthetical and political values promoted by scholars in the most important cities of Europe. In addition, using the Hungarian and German languages, many Romanian scholars in the Banat region promoted themselves more than one language to make themselves easier heard and better understood in the cultural and political circles of the former Hapsburg Empire. There were as well many scholars of German, Hungarian or Serb ethnic origin, whose contribution – in spite of being written in their mother tongue – can neither be denied nor declined. The same degree of importance can be associated to the outcomes of various other domains like art, architecture and music, the identity of which can definitely not be defined or referred to from an ethnic-cultural point of view.
The authors themselves could often not be able to undergo a particular identity, many of them descending from mixed marriages, but they easily made themselves at home speaking diverse languages and entering various cultures, in many communities.

Communication among ethnic minorities in Banat has always been outstanding, and it is based on its pluralistic character, as every community where ethnic minorities are to be found uses more than one language to communicate. The Germans, for example, speak – besides their mother tongue – Romanian and Hungarian; the Serbs and Bulgarians speak two languages, the Romanian language being always the first second choice in their families; the Jews are known to speak many languages. In Nadlac, besides the Slovak language, most of the inhabitants speak Romanian and Hungarian as well. There were many links between the ethnic minorities, most of them being triggered by the cooperation among the linguistic communities in various domains, like culture, science and technology, and common issues with regard to defending their rights. To respect the religious belief of the other has always been characteristic for these communities. The use of three to four languages in the region of Banat is seldom to be found in other areas of Europe, this feature having defined the population in this area for centuries.

The language can be considered an important factor, being hierarchically prior as an identification criterion. Most of the inhabitants speak more than one language. To speak Romanian, Hungarian, German and Serb, or at least two or three of these languages, has always been considered a matter of pride and certainly a particular feature of the regional or local identity. Even though there were times when the population had to learn and accommodate to another language because of less favorable historical circumstances and not because of practical means, the inter-cultural phenomenon was retrospectively appreciated, as a form of development and cosmopolitism. Of course, the younger generations show more interest towards modern languages – German, English and French – but it is important that families consider the learning of a modern language as an important and valuable asset. There are also situations where the common spoken language is not a solid enough feature to describe ethnic affiliation. The catholic Bulgarians in Banat stress the importance of their being catholic to portray the difference from the orthodox majority of Bulgarians in Bulgaria. With regard to the Jews in Banat, most of them speak Hungarian and their religious tradition is the only one to undoubtedly indicate their belonging to the Jewish community.

Once the ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural diversity was accepted, many of the local population would adopt the distinctive features of this region, they tend to exchange and borrow religious traditions, cuisine or the house building techniques; there were also exchanges between languages, as the ethnic Romanian dialect in Banat included various terminology of Hungarian, German
or Serb origin. The most interesting finding was that many people adopted such expressions from the various languages that were being spoken in the region; many of them would prefer mixed marriages; and that many would think of professional relationships with the Hungarians, the Germans or the Serbs as a start of a future friendship. Most of the Romanians in Banat continue their admirable bond with the ethnic minorities, defending their relationship if needed, and showing this way their awareness of the common origin of their regional civilization.

Compared to other areas of the country, the region of Banat is a real proof of steadiness, proving balance between various religions, traditions, customs and between various lifestyles. A very important feature of the culture of this region would be that it was promoted by the entire community, and one can notice the interactive feature of the inter-cultural phenomenon as an outstanding approach of a peaceful living together. This sort of intercultural society based itself mainly on the variety of languages that were being spoken and as well as on the degree of broadmindedness with regard to the variety of beliefs. This is easily to be seen in the every-day life of the community, as most of the people take part in each other’s celebration – either social or religious ones. There have also been registered mixed marriages – between people of different ethnic belonging – and these might be considered as a living proof of an intercultural society and in the same time it led to the speaking of several languages. In this regard, the Banat region may offer effective solutions which might help avoid possible misunderstandings or conflicts started by the lack of knowledge and by perceiving the others as being different. To be different and to be accepted like this may lead to the development of creativity, and – from this point of view – the Banat region may be considered a role model.

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Abstract. The subject in this study is part of a broader theme in sociology, that is dealing with ethnic relations. Data analysis provided by the concrete research carried out in the Bihor-Hajdú-Bihar euroregion, aimed at measuring the social distance using Bogardus scale, through which we intend to identify the degree of acceptance / social tolerance manifested by the majority ethnic group in relation to minority groups. We submitted for validation the hypothesis that, given the long-term coexistence between the Romanian and Hungarian in the region, attitudes of acceptance and tolerance of minority groups will prevail in both areas. Also, permissive attitudes will be significantly influenced by a high level of education of individuals, by the frequency of social contacts between members of the group and by the area of residence, meaning that in the urban environment – characterized by more pronounced modern attitudes – the degree of tolerance towards minority groups will be higher.

Keywords: intolerance, tolerance, ethnicity, in-group, out-group

1. Introduction
The research shown in this study fits into a broader theme, that on social tolerance, in general and ethnic tolerance, in particular.

Tolerance is an important factor in forming connections between different social groups, facilitating daily interaction among their members. In
today's society the concept of tolerance includes a much broader spectrum of behavior and attitude patterns towards distinct groups, beside the religious or political ones. Individuals are forced to adapt to a new reality characterized by ethnic and cultural diversity and by a diversity of life styles. To meet the requirements asked by the new society, scientific approaches have changed the way the tolerance concept is understood; it is highly connected with notions such as liberalism and social identity (Horton, 1993). Today, tolerance is explained also by its correlation with justice, human rights and democracy (Kymlicka & Opalski, 2001).

The concept of tolerance is understand by most scientists of modern society as representing the individual willingness of the persons to motivate themselves to take part in public life even if, personally, they disagree with the views of the others who are distinct from them in various ways. Tolerance is seen as an orientation towards social and political life, assuming a specific negotiation of opinions and attitudes based on certain norms and values (Mutz, 2001).

A special category of relationships between individuals in society, often interrogated by the scientific literature, is the tolerance between different ethnic groups.

In the analysis of the individuals relation with their ethnic groups, which appear to them as assigned groups, of particular relevance is the concept of social identity defined as "the individual conscience that is part of a particular social group, along with a certain axiological and emotional significance, related to the fact that the individual is a group member" (Hogg şi Abrams, 1990: 7, apud Chelcea, 1998: 11). It’s relevant to retain that the production and assertion of identity is achieved through identity process (through which the social actor is being distinct, tends to become autonomous, and asserts its individuality) and identification process (which means the reverse process by which the actor tends to integrate itself into a larger ensemble - social group, community, class, nation) - (Chelcea, 1998: 11).

The interactionism interprets the social reality as a negotiated order that builds continuously social identities that transcend the immediate situation and individual biography. The manifestation of social identity is behavioral limited by abilities and disabilities, structurally limited by the number and quality of social agents and dialectically limited by the social context that predetermines the socio-cultural expectations set of the historical reference period. These identity limitations are conceptualized as sources of identity and are socially constructed through symbolic interaction. Thus, territorial boundaries, ethnicity, gender or occupation are both limitations and sources of social identity (Weigert, 1986: 170).

In an attempt to identify the social factors with "limited" role in identities assertion we will refer to the theories of identity, which are subsumed to the symbolic interactionism perspective. (the one called inter-group social
identity developed by Henri Tajfel (1981) and the auto-categorization theory, developed by John C. Turner (1987). In summary, it is to be remembered that in the construction of social identity overlap "the self" (as a reflection of society and to be regarded as a multifaceted and organized construct), on the one hand and social structure, on the other hand. People are living in relatively small networks of social relations which are specialized in roles that ensure the participation in these networks. Interaction and social relations patterns bring on stage one of the symbolic interactionism argument: the probability of entering in a specific social network is influenced by broader social structures of which this social network is being part of. Thus, social structures give the networks the role of "borders" for potential new participants. Cognitive approach shows that identities are constructed and are determined by structural social contexts. Both approaches have understood that identities are related to the social roles or to behavioral manifestations through meanings. The principles of the interpretative paradigm were systematized by E. Morin (Mucchielli, 1986: 5-12) in his theory of complexity, for humanities in particular, emphasizing that: there is no objective reality given; human reality is a reality of meaning (of meanings) and is constructed by social actors; there isn’t a “single reality" but multiple realities constructed by different actors which coexist at the same time, neither of which is "more real" than others (they do not exclude and deny themselves mutually by coexistence); a reality of sense does not have a cause or several causes, but several sets of causal references among which the reality itself has it’s own contribution (the denying of the positivist principle of linear causality).

In building intolerant attitudes would be appropriate to be taken in the analysis also the process of stereotypes construction (as a set of shared beliefs regarding the personal characteristics, personality and behavioral traits specific for a group of people) and which are used by individuals as an identity strategy (Liiceanu in Badescu and others, 2005: 74). The author moves in line with the constructivist perspective - the thesis regarding the polar stereotyping based on membership – according to which in the social interaction environment the individual meets competing identity offers, launched in accordance with the structure of social processes that characterize a society at a certain time. The person chooses a single combination of identity sources, which builds its multiple identity in a certain moment. To rationalize the choice, the individual claims, in correlation with multiple acts of affiliation, a set of polar stereotyping processes which are positive for the affiliation groups (in-groups) and negative for the out-groups. (Liiceanu in Badescu and others, 2005). Similarly can be explained also the construction of the manifested intolerance attitude, in our case towards neighbourhood.
2. The Social Frameworks of the Neighbourhood’s Acceptance in the Context of Interethnic Relations. Sociological Survey in Euroregion Bihor- Hajdu-Bihor

2.1. Introduction

In this phase of analyzing the resulted data from the ENRI survey, we will highlight the respondents self-placing in relation with relevant neighbourhood groups. Our investigation outlines the Bihor (RO) - Hajdu Bihar (HU) inhabitants tolerance towards the ethnic groups that are most commonly encountered in the region and in relation to three other significant social groups. The double perspective, given by the hetero-identification of Romanians and of Hungarians, both inhabitants of the Bihor - Hajdu Bihar geographical area, provides a detailed overview of the Romanian-Hungarian ethnic relationship and shows how the two communities relate to the neighborhood context.

The purpose of the study presented is to identify the social frameworks that help building the tolerance attitudes of the population in Bihor (RO), Hajdu-Bihar (HU) euroregion in relation to the social groups which interact in this social space.

2.2. Objectives

• indentifying the intolerance attitudes of the subjects in relation to the out-groups that interact in the analyzed social space, by measuring the frequency of their members acceptance as neighbours;
• surprising the ethnic intolerance degree manifested between romanians and hungarians;
• highlighting the significant social factors which determine the construction of the ethnic intolerance attitudes.

2.3. Research methodology

The used method was the sociological survey based on questionnaire applied to the population of the cross-border area Bihor (RO)-Hajdu-Bihar (HU). To achieve our objectives we have processed and analyzed one question from the questionnaire which aimed to obtain answers about the subjects acceptance of the interconnected out-groups members neighbourhood being present in the social space: "If your neighbour would be a member of one of the following groups, what would be your opinion about that?"

We used the question to measure attitudes of tolerance towards members of other groups based on the idea of E.S. Bogardus – measuring the social distance by means of "social distance scale" or "Bogardus's scale", as
known in the scientific literature. Social distance is defined as "the degree of understanding and affection that people feel for each other" (cited Chelcea, 2001: 325). It is measured by subjects' answers to seven questions ordered from highly positive attitude (7), to the one intensely negative (1), requiring the agreement with the following statements: to be in kinship by marriage, to be in the club as an intimate friend, on my street as neighbour, as employed in my profession, as a citizen in my country, only visitor in my country, I would exclude him/her from my country (cited Chelcea, 2001: 325-331). We considered that the agreement regarding the out-groups members neighbourhood is a sufficiently relevant indicator for social tolerance attitude, standing in the middle of the scale, if we exclude its extremes. We calculated the response frequency, considering them a degree of tolerance towards various groups indicated as answers for the question.

2.4. Sample description

The sample used in the research consists of a number of 1824 respondents, structured in two sub-samples, the one from Hungary consisting of 1,000 respondents (484 respondents from Hajdu-Bihar and 516 respondents from Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg) and 824 respondents from Romania (528 respondents from Bihor, 296 respondents from Satu-Mare).

From the sample, in terms of the subjects' residence, 1,156 are urban subjects (63.4%) and 666 are from rural areas (36.5%) and by gender, there are 1,064 female (58.3%) and 760 male (41.7%). By educational level, the sample comprises 1,528 people with high education (83.8%) and 296 without high education (16.2%). Depending on ethnicity, 507 respondents are Romanian (27.8%), 1,225 Hungarians (67.2%), 40 stating themselves as being Romanian and Hungarian (2.2%) and 18 respondents of other ethnicities (1.0%).

2.5. Research premises

Based on theoretical data presented in the context of identity theory, according to which the personal and social identity is constructed in the process of personality formation under the influence of the social frameworks, we postulate that the studied subjects will mostly manifest tolerant attitudes towards the out-groups to which they have a long relationship history and which are situated in their proximity.

We advanced the hypothesis that in expressing attitudes in relation to neighbourhood, Romanians and Hungarians will occur, commonly, attitudes of high tolerance. The foundation of the statement is based on the long experience of cohabitation between the two ethnic groups. Despite some inconsistencies and even acute social conflicts in some historical moments, the Romanians and
Hungarians ethnic groups predominantly developed collaborative relationships, surpassing common difficulties arising from the experience of communism and other vicissitudes of the history.

The study aims to test several hypotheses that concern the influence of some socially subsumed factors in which individuals included in the sample have built their intolerant attitudes as identity strategies:

The residence of the subjects will significantly guide the attitudes of intolerance in relation to the neighbourhood, meaning that the rural area will generate more intolerant attitudes, given the higher role invested in the neighbourhood, as being an important factor in helping, networking in most areas of life, based on similar values and behavior.

We postulate that women, through a stronger affirmation of the emotional dimension, will be more tolerant than men; Higher levels of education will generate more tolerant attitudes than lower ones as fosters the acquisition of specific values of democracy and multiculturalism; respondents from ethnically mixed families (Romanian-Hungarian) will mostly state tolerant attitudes, the acceptance of marriage with a member of an out-group assuming a higher degree of tolerance than accepting him/her as neighbour (also in the social distance scale); a higher income of the subjects, as a high social status indicator, will lead to more tolerant attitudes.

2.6. Research results

2.6.1. Subjects’ tolerance degree towards the out-groups to which they relate in the same social space

It should be noted that the analyzed responses were expressed by the entire sample from Hungary and Romania.

The clusterial analyze of the intolerance manifestation in relation to the mentioned groups, outlines three classes as follows:

• drug addicts and homosexuals;
• gypsies, arabs, chinese and people with disabilities;
• the rest of the ethnic groups.

This overview shows that there is a positive correlation between the level of knowledge, of interaction with others and the tolerance level, meaning that individuals tend to show a high tolerance towards proximate and known out-groups, with which they have frequent social interactions. Basically, reporting to the other, determines in the social context the social distance and establishes inclusion and exclusion relations between individuals and groups.

The mentioned social groups which are little known by the respondents and with which they do not have interactive social relations are less tolerated because in defining these out-groups normative stereotypes for the in-group occur and intergroup behaviours acquire competitive and discriminatory
properties in various degrees depending on the size of social distance between groups. Thus, marginal social groups, which usually do not assert their identities in everyday social interactions, such as drug addicts, homosexuals or ethnic groups, few as number in the ethnic configuration of the region are normally perceived as being at the greatest social distance.

Regardless of the ethnic group, subjects expressed the highest degree of intolerance (73.6% of respondents) towards drug addicts, with whom they would not interact in their spatial proximity, for the reasons mentioned above but also because they, perhaps, appreciate the drug addicts’ presence near their residence as a possible factor of contamination of the social environment through exhibited behavioral examples. They can be seen also as a potential threat by exhibiting potential deviant or criminal behavior, aiming at the neighborhood’s resources to purchase drugs, to which they usually become addicted. Public intolerance against drug can be interpreted as a success of policies adopted by institutions in order to prevent drug use in two social spaces (Bihar-Hajduj-Bihar region). The message against drug consumption enforces individuals’ beliefs based on traditional values, generating negative stereotypes in relation with the real or virtual drug addicts’ group.

The next group in line that is being intolerated are the homosexuals, which registers though a higher acceptance degree than drug addicts, 57.2% from the subjects affirming that they would be disturbed by their neighbourhood. The deviant sexual behaviour according to the socially accepted norms prescribed by the religious communities and in general by traditional culture, generate negative hetero-stereotypes for in-groups. The openness to diversity and multiculturalism creates many attitudes of acceptance and tolerance, including in the neighborhood proximate social space, the out-groups from this category not being considered dangerous, even if they share different values on one dimension of social networking (42.8% are not disturb by the neighborhood with homosexuals).

Among ethnic groups included in the analysis, the gypsies register most intolerant attitudes of the subjects (38.3%) and Hungarians the fewest intolerant attitudes (4.8%). Perhaps in building gypsies’ rejection an important role is attributed to the universal hetero-stereotypes about this ethnic group, causing, in many situations, intergroup conflicts (Levine and Campbell, 1972, p.183 cited Chelcea (ed.), 1998: 270).

There is an interesting situation in terms of intolerance attitudes towards arabs and chinese (22, 2% and 19.7%), which are placed after the gypsies according to manifested intolerance; these attitudes could be explained in the same register - universal hetero-stereotypes and low awareness and networking. On the other hand, arabs are suspect, especially after the events of September 11, of attacks and revenge and the chinese - of the invasion of other groups’ social space for their survival. Along with these elements there can be
added also the differences in religious beliefs compared with the subjects from the sample which are mostly Hungarians and Romanians.

### 2.6.2. Tolerance aspects between romanians and hungarians

Next we will try to deepen the attitudes expressed only between the two ethnic groups in the sample, namely that of the Romanians and Hungarians, which actually is our main object of interest.

As shown in the data presented in table no. 1, the total population sample (of Romania and Hungary) expressed much more intolerant attitudes towards Romanians (11.7%) than to Hungarians (4.8%). Therefore we will attempt to detail the analysis to capture possible explanations.

### 2.6.3. Expressed attitudes towards the ethnic group of Romanians

**Table 1.** Tolerance towards romanian manifested by the subjects from Romania and Hungary (total sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerate romanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>1576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tolerate romanian</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>-12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not tolerate romanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tolerate romanian</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>-12.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The neighbourhood relationship with Romanians is perceived significantly different from the Romanians and Hungarians ($\chi^2=149.0$, $\text{sig}=0.00$). From 224 subjects who have responded that they would be disturbed to have romanian neighbours (expresses the intolerance towards Romanians) 20.3% are part of the sample from Hungary, compared with 1.5% of respondents living in Romania. The conclusion that could be directly inferred from the mentioned data would suggest that the population of Hungary are more intolerant with romanians than the population from

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1 ($\chi^2=149.0$, $\text{sig}=0.00$) represents the values resulted from the Significance Test
Romania (which is made up of romanians and hungarians, obviously in different weights).

If we consider only the sample from Romania, the data reveals that the two ethnic groups do not show significantly different attitudes in accepting a romanian in their neighbourhood ($\chi^2=3.43$ sig=0.064). However, the data suggest little difference in the detriment of the romanians, meaning that the hungarians from the romanian sample show more intolerant attitudes against the romanians (2.5%) compared with the romanians (0.8%).

We analyzed the significance of the relationship between hungarians and romanians` intolerant attitude from the entire sample towards the ethnic group of romanians. The significance test ($\chi^2=84.9$ sig=0.000) indicates a significant relationship between the two variables, meaning that hungarians have more intolerant attitudes towards romanians (17.0%), compared with the romanians from the total sample (0.8%).

2.6.4. Expressed attitudes towards the ethnic group of hungarians

Analyzing the relationship between tolerance towards hungarian manifested by the respondents from Romania and Hungary, we find that the relationship is not statistically significant ($\chi^2=0.8$ sig=0.363). However, the data shows a sensitive difference between respondents from the two sub-samples in the sense that respondents from Hungary show more pronounced attitude of intolerance towards hungarians (5.3%), compared to respondents from Romania (4.4%), which would raise additional explanation.

If you submit to analysis only the sample from Romania, we find that the relationship between the tolerant attitudes expressed by romanians and hungarians towards the hungarian group is statistically significant ($\chi^2=8.3$ sig=0.004), the hungarians from Romania being more intolerant with the hungarian group (5.9%), compared with the romanians - only 1.3% of cases declare that they would be disturbed by the proximity of the hungarians (see table 2).

Unfortunately we can not verify the attitude of the romanians from Hungary towards hungarians, because the number of romanians from Hungary in the sample is totally insignificant (only 2 subjects in the sample are romanians).

The conclusion generated by the analyzed data suggests that the hungarian ethnic group, both from Romania and Hungary, is characterized by more intolerant attitude, including towards its in-group members.
Table 2. Tolerance towards Hungarians manifested by the respondents from Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample Romania</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The intolerant in-groups are being created only based on ethnic criterion?

Table 3. The relation between the tolerance towards Romanians and towards Hungarians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerate Romanian</td>
<td>Do not tolerate Romanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>1522</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tolerate Romanian</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>-16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tolerate Romanian</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals</td>
<td>-16.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The relationship between the attitudes of tolerance / intolerance expressed mutually by romanians and hungarians is highly significant ($\chi^2 = 558.3, \text{ sig}=0.000$), meaning that the most intolerant subjects (66.7%) say they do not tolerate both romanians and hungarians. This relationship suggests that negative stereotypes associated with intolerant attitudes are built not only in relation to ethnicity because identity is multidimensional. Romanians and hungarians from the analyzed region interact not only in the context of ethnic in-goups, but also in the professional and political context, entertainment, sports, economics, etc. Perhaps in this context can be explained also the intolerant attitudes manifested by the hungarians from the hungarian sample towards hungarians.

2.6.5. The role of social frameworks in identity construction

Next we proposed to distinguish the social frameworks which might influence the construction of intolerant attitudes against members of ethnic groups.

The study starts from testing some sub-hypothesis targeting the influence of some factors subsumed to the social environment in which individuals included in the sample have built their intolerant attitudes as identity strategies. In this context, it was tested the relationship of tolerance with the following variables involved in the hypothesis we made (area of residence, gender, income, education level, occupation, age and ethnicity of the partner).

2.6.6. The influence of the residence in building the intolerance between romanians and hungarians

Table 4. Tolerance towards romanians manifested by subjects according to their residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tolerate romanian</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerate romanian</td>
<td>Values</td>
<td>1029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate romanian</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not tolerate romanian</td>
<td>Values</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate romanian</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First is to note that, by applying significance tests, few relationships were found to be insignificant (variables: gender, income, age). Data showed that these variables do not significantly differentiate the attitudes of tolerance towards ethnic groups, which means that they are not "social limits" in shaping tolerance based on ethnic criterion.

Attitudes towards romanians proximity is significantly different based on the residence of the subject ($\chi^2=11.96$ sig=0.001), 15.5% of the subjects that would not like to have romanian neighbours come from the rural space, compared to 10% coming from the urban area.

**Table 5.** Tolerance towards hungarians manifested by subjects according to their residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tolerate hungarian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>1099</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>1678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate hungarian</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do not tolerate hungarian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate hungarian</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% eşantion</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intolerance towards hungarians also differ significantly depending on the residence of the respondents ($\chi^2=10.01$ sig=0.001). Of the ones intolerant registered, most are from rural areas (7.9%) than urban (3.3%).

The two situations give us clues to support that intolerant groups, which we have identified in our previous analysis, are mainly recruited from the rural areas. We advance for now the explanatory hypothesis of this difference by invoking the characteristics of the current rural, consisting in the predominance of awareness relations, in establishing competing in-groups and out-groups, which mutually convey self-stereotypes and polar hetero-stereotypes, which they reproduce in order to rationalize their attitudes of mutual intolerance. In the social rural area also, competing offers are displayed among which the ethnic ones have an important perhaps even a central role, around which there can be configured other dimensions of identity, as kinship, profession, religion, politics, etc. The speech of political leaders from romanian and hungarian transition imbued by ethnocentric attitudes, with visible marks of nationalism.
revival and assertion of ethnic separation tendency, as a way of networking, could be perceived better in rural areas considered to be more traditional. Correlating the data with those provided by the distribution analysis of ethnic intolerance attitudes between Romanians and Hungarians, we could say that the Hungarian ethnic groups from the rural areas express attitudes with the highest degree of intolerance, establishing in-groups that tend to build positive self-stereotypes along with negative hetero-stereotypes against out-groups with which they interrelate in the same social and geographical space.

Among ethnic and racial patterns of interaction, the literature states assimilation, as a change in lifestyle and of distinctive characteristics of a group to comply with the dominant group model; ethnic pluralism, the model in which all racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinctive identities and enjoy relatively equal social position; segregation involves the physical and social separation of different racial and ethnic groups, in a context in which the dominant group uses its power to maintain the control over minority groups, giving them limited power and freedom; population transfer - population displacement belonging to one of the rival parties; annihilation – the extreme model of relationships between different racial and ethnic groups, where the dominant group annihilates the minority group and the genocide, which represents the extermination of a group of people by another. (Goodman, 1992: 203-206).

2.6.7. The role of the variable "level of education" in the construction of ethnic tolerance attitudes between Romanians and Hungarians in Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar euroregion

The analysis of the mentioned relationship started from the hypothesis according to which a high level of education will encourage in building a tolerant attitude.

The significance test indicates a significant difference of the tolerance towards Romanians according to the high level of education ($\chi^2=13.35$ sig=0.00). From the total of intolerant subjects, most of them are recruited from among those that do not have a high education level (13.2%), compared with those that have a high education level (5.6%), which is equivalent to the assertion that the high educational level favors building more tolerant attitudes.

Although the relationship between tolerance towards Hungarians and level of education ($\chi^2=3.25$ sig=0.071) is not significant, the trend is maintained, meaning that people with high level of education express lower intolerance attitudes (2.8%) towards Hungarians, compared with those who do not have a high level of education (5.3%).
**Table 6.** Tolerance towards Romanians according to the educational level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Without high education</td>
<td>With high education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerate Romanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>1304</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate Romanian</td>
<td>82.7%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reziduri ajustate</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not tolerate Romanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate Romanian</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.** Tolerance towards Hungarians according to the educational level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I do not a high education level</td>
<td>I have a high education level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>1403</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% eşantion</td>
<td>94.7%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted residuals</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tolerate Hungarian</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% sample</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Residual</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.6.8. Interethnic tolerance attitudes shown by ethnically mixed family members (families consisting of Romanian and Hungarian partners)

In building the hypothesis regarding the presence of high tolerance attitudes at married respondents towards partners from other ethnic groups, we started from the hypothesis that accepting the other as a partner of the couple assumed its location as being situated at a lower social distance than the neighborhood relationship (assumption involved also in Bogardus's scale).

To test the hypothesis we analyzed the structure of the sample based on the rules of family couples’ construction. We found that most married respondents have chosen their partner based on ethnic endogamy principle; only 5.6% of romanian respondents are married to hungarians and 2.9% of hungarian respondents are married with romanian partners.

The relations between the attitudes of tolerance towards romanians and hungarians and the membership of a joint romanian-hungarian family are insignificant. Therefore belonging to a ethnically mixed family do not constitute a significant factor to increase ethnic tolerance as we assumed by the initial hypothesis, primarily because of the small number of mixed families in the sample. However, of the four tested relations (tolerance towards romanians and romanian-hungarian or hungarian-romanian joint families on one hand and tolerance towards hungarians and being member of a romanian-hungarian or hungarian-romanian joint family), we identified a single situation of intolerance expression - 2 subjects, representing 1.3% of romanian-hungarian mixed families from the sample (the subject is hungarian and the partner is romanian) said they would be disturbed by the neighborhood with the romanians. In all other cases, subjects from mixed families showed attitudes of tolerance towards the romanians and hungarians.

3. Conclusions

- The study aimed to identify the degree of tolerance manifested by the population living in the Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar cross-border euroregion in relation to the out-groups located in the same social space and aimed to capture the significant social factors that influence the construction of intolerant attitudes. We measured the degree of tolerance by quantifying responses to a single question from the questionnaire, the one that interrogates the attitudes of subjects in relation to the neighborhood of other groups;
- The population of the Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar euroregion mainly manifests high tolerance attitudes in relation to the out-groups living in the same social space;
Respondents tend to show an increased tolerance towards proximate well-known out-groups, with which they have frequent social interactions;

- Regardless of the ethnic group, subjects express the highest degree of intolerance (73.6% of respondents) towards drug addicts, with whom they would not like to interact in their spatial proximity, followed by homosexuals (57.2%);

- In relation to the ethnic groups, the most intolerant attitudes are expressed towards gypsies (38.3%), and towards hungarians are manifested the fewest intolerant attitudes (4.8%);

- From the analysis of the relation between romanians and hungarians results that the hungarian group is more intolerant than the romanian one, at the level of the entire sample and at the level of the sub-samples from Romania and Hungary. Moreover, hungarians express the most intolerant attitudes also towards the hungarians;

- The relationship between the attitudes of tolerance/intolerance expressed by romanians and hungarians is highly significant in the sense that most intolerant subjects (66.7%) state that they do not tolerate both romanians and hungarians. This relationship suggests that negative stereotypes associated with intolerant attitudes are built not only in relation to ethnicity -Identity is multidimensional (economic, political, cultural, etc.). Romanians and hungarians from the analyzed space interact not only in the context of ethnic in-groups, but also in the professional, political, entertainment, sports, economic ones etc. Perhaps in this context can also be explained the intolerant attitudes declared by hungarians from the sample in Hungary towards hungarians.

- The most common intolerant attitudes towards both the romanians and hungarians are located in rural areas and they are manifested mainly by people with no high education level.

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SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING AND SATISFACTION WITH PLACES OF RESIDENCE IN THE COUNTIES AT THE CROSS-BORDER BETWEEN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA

Sergiu BĂLŢĂTESCU*

Abstract. Using data from a survey with 1824 subjects from four counties at the Romanian-Hungarian border, this paper focuses on levels of personal subjective well-being and the relationship that this has with satisfaction with neighbourhood, locality, region, country and EU. We found that Hungarians in Hungary are the most satisfied with their lives, and also with their places of residence. Romanian majority and Hungarian minority in Romania display similar levels of personal well-being, and are equally satisfied with their neighbourhoods and localities. However, the Hungarian minority is less satisfied with Romania, but also with EU. Satisfaction with neighbourhood, locality and region predicts the best personal well-being of the citizens from both countries.

Keywords: happiness, satisfaction with residence, national satisfaction, cross-border region

1. Introduction

In the present paper I will explore the variations in subjective well-being in the counties at the cross-border between Hungary and Romania. The field research was conducted within the ENRI (European, National and Regional Identity) project. I will start with a theoretical discussion on the signification, measures and determinants of subjective well-being. Then I will explore comparatively the levels and the determinants of subjective well-being in these

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1 European, National and Regional Identity – Theory and Practice, Research grant HURO 0801/180, 2009-2011.
regions, in relationship with satisfactions with variations places: personal house, neighborhood, locality, region, country and European Union.

2. Subjective well-being: theoretical approaches

Defined as the overall evaluation of life (Andrews, Robinson, 1991), subjective well-being is the operationalization of the concept of happiness. It has a multidimensional concept, which comprises a cognitive dimension and an affective one (Andrews, Robinson, 1991; Diener, 1994). The cognitive dimension is measured by “life satisfaction”, or “satisfaction with life as a whole” and is defined as a general evaluation of the way the personal life match the personal aspirations, in domains such as work, family, relations, leisure, etc. (Cummins, 1996). Life satisfaction is measured either by simple scales (answer to the question “taking all your life into consideration, how satisfied are you with life as a whole?” (Andrews, Withey, 1976), or by scales with multiple items.

3. Subjective well-being in Hungary and Romania

Both neighbouring societies share common characteristics concerning the levels and correlates of subjective well-being, which are the product of similar experiences as post-communist countries. Most important, the average happiness level of their citizens are among the lowest in European Union, which is not surprising, giving their communist legacy, the fall of the economy in the early nineties, and that they a type of society plagued by lack of trust and optimism (Bălțătescu, 2002; Orsolya, 2002). Another remarkable aspect is that not only global satisfaction, but also satisfaction with different domains is usually lower than in the rest of EU. It is the case not only for income, but also for more intimate domains such as satisfaction with family or friends is not so straightforward. Delhey (2004: 28) explains that economic hardship matters in their case, making their citizen’s life more stressful, and lowering their level of satisfaction with, for instance, social and family relations.

As displayed in World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven, 2003), people report generally higher values in Hungary than in Romania. For the 4 point life satisfaction scale, used in the Eurobarometer surveys from 1998 in Romanian and since 2001 for Hungary, the average for Hungary is 2.5, which correspond to an average of 5 on a scale from 0 to 10, and the average for Romania is 2.23, which corresponds to an average of 4.4 on a 0-10 scale. Giving these results, we can anticipate that we would find higher levels of interpersonal subjective well-being in the investigated Hungarian region than in the Romanian counterpart.
4. National satisfaction and happiness

While being experienced mostly at individual level, happiness is not a strictly personal phenomenon, and has strong causal links with the physical, economic and social environments of our lives. It’s because - Morrison, Tay and Diener (2011) discuss with reference to countries – living in a specific territory affect many personal circumstances such as job opportunities, health care, crime victimization.

There is not a single factor that matters here: living in certain territories is associated with a sense of social identity, with a potential of enhancing or lowering the personal well-being. National pride and identification is a predictor of subjective well-being in countries like Romania (Bălătescu, 2009), Poland (Hamer, in press), as well as in Europe (Bălătescu, 2010) and Asia (Jagodzinski, 2010).

But living in a certain nation is only a part of the experience that the individual has with “places” or “territories”. Closer areas such as neighborhoods, localities, regions may also have influence on personal well-being.

5. Satisfaction with housing, neighborhood, locality, region, nation and Europe

Among the places we live, our house is an important part of our individual quality of life. Determinants of housing satisfaction are not individual, but linked with factors such as the network of relationships that members of the household develop over time, or the characteristics of neighborhood and localities where the house is situated (Vera-Toscano, Ateca-Amestoy, 2008).

Neighborhood is the closest instance of a community. Satisfaction with neighborhood is also a very important component of community satisfaction. An array of characteristics determines individual satisfaction with it, among them being the quality of neighborhood itself (e.g. security, pollution, and utilities), frequency of interaction with neighbors, and also sociological qualities such as social capital of the individuals or families involved, and collective efficacy (Allen, Bentler, Gutek, 1985; Hur, Morrow-Jones, 2008; Oidjarv, 2010; Sirgy, Cornwell, 2002).

Satisfaction with localities and regions are less discussed in the literature. Here, however, the ethnic differences seem to matter more than for the satisfactions with housing and neighborhood. Finally, satisfaction with EU is important for the citizens of this supra-national entity, and should be linked with personal satisfaction, although there are scarce evidences in the literature.
6. Objectives and research questions

In this study I will explore the links between satisfaction with all the above-mentioned instances and personal satisfaction. I will start with the supposition that satisfactions with neighborhood, locality, nation and EU are correlated with the personal satisfaction of the interviewed persons. We chose to explore these relationships in the Romanian counties of Bihor and Satu-Mare, and in the neighboring Hungarian counties of Hajdu-Bihar and Szabolcs-Szatmar, multiethnic neighboring regions in which the three most important ethnic groups (Romanians and Hungarians in Romania, and Hungarians in Hungary) are supposed to have different levels of satisfaction, depending on the socio-economic development of their countries and counties, their minority status, local and national attachments.

Thus, my research questions would be the following: Is membership in these three groups associated with different levels of subjective well-being? Is it associated with different levels of satisfaction with neighborhood, locality, region, country and EU? And finally, which of these satisfactions are associated with the evaluation of personal wellbeing?

7. Method

In the survey conducted within the ENRI project, 1824 subject were interviewed at their homes on both sides of Romanian-Hungarian border. The sample was stratified and is well represented. We were interested in variations of the studied variables by the three most important ethnic groups Hungarians in Hungary (n=979), Hungarians in Romania (n=246), and Romanians in Romania (n=506). The questionnaire includes different measures of attachment and satisfaction with locality, region, country and European Union, as well as various measures of subjective well-being.

Subjective well-being was measured by the Personal Wellbeing Index, a scale composed on 8 items, asking the respondents to rate their satisfaction with: Standard of living, Health, Achievements in life, Personal relationships, Personal safety, Community connectedness, Future security, Spirituality or religion (Cummins et al., 2004). The summative scale shows a very good reliability (Cronbach alpha over 0.8). The sum of the eight items has been linearly transformed on a 0-100 scale.

Additionally, 7 items measured the satisfaction of the respondents with their home, neighbors, neighborhood, locality, region, the country of your residence, and the European Union. The items have been introduced in a Principal Component Analysis. Results were rotated using Varimax method with Kaiser Normalization. For the Hungarian in Hungary subsample we computed a single factor solution. For the rest of the samples, a 2 factors
solution emerged, the second factor explaining satisfaction with country (Romania) and satisfaction with European Union. As a result we computed an index of “regional well-being” from the following four items: your home, your neighbourhood, the locality where you live, the region where you live. The index shows a very good reliability for all the samples, with Cronbach alpha’s varying between 0.797 and 0.816. The scale PWI was constructed as a sum of unweight items, and linearly transformed to a range from 0 to 100.

8. Results

8.1. Personal Wellbeing Index

Overall, there are serious differences between the three groups in what concerns the average levels of Personal Wellbeing Index. This is in perfect concordance with most country averages in subjective well-being, measured by international surveys.

Table 2. Average levels of personal well-being for the three samples, standard errors and sign of significant differences between the means (using Bonferoni test).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity by country</th>
<th>Sign of significant differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian in Hungary</td>
<td>Hungarian in Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Error of Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Wellbeing Index</td>
<td>67,30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2. Satisfaction with places

We can see that the samples have significant differences in what regards their evaluations of satisfaction with places. The ethnic majority in Hungary reports higher satisfaction with all domains than the Hungarians in Romania, and also from the ethnic majority in Romania (with the exception of satisfaction with European Union). Members of Hungarian minority in Romania are less satisfied than the majority population with nation, but also with European Union.
The fact that Hungarians from Hungary are the most satisfied with the majority of the above mentioned domains proves there is a correlation between social well-being and personal well-being. People in richer countries/regions (Hungary, in our case) are the most satisfied with their neighborhood, locality, region, nation and even with European Union.

We compared average levels of items that compose by sub-samples. Results are shown in the following table:

**Table 3.** Average levels of satisfaction with places for the three samples, standard errors and sign of significant differences between the means (using Bonferroni test).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity by country</th>
<th>Sign of significant differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarian in Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local &amp; regional satisfaction</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National satisfaction</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with European Union</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another line of interpretation of these results is the difference within minority and majority. In the Romanian counties investigated, the minority population reports equal satisfaction with the local & regional places, while they report lower satisfaction with nation while even with EU. The lesser attachment with the nation would explain the lower satisfaction with nation. However their lower satisfaction with EU is somehow hard to explain, giving the fact that Hungarian minority in Romania sees European Union as a guaranty for their cultural autonomy.

8.3. Unique contribution of local, regional, national and EU satisfactions to personal well-being

I regressed Personal Well-being Index against the three satisfactions variables (i.e. local & regional, national and EU), in order to compare the unique contribution of these satisfactions with the global subjective well-being indicator. The next table shows the results of this analysis for all the items. The
Subjective Well-Being and Satisfaction with Places of Residence in the Counties at the Cross-Border…

The overall fit is very good: variations of PWI items explain around 50-60% of the variation of the dependent variable.

Table 4. Regression of satisfaction with places against life satisfaction for the three subsamples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hungarian in Hungary</th>
<th>Hungarian in Romania</th>
<th>Romanian in Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local &amp; regional satisfaction</td>
<td>( \beta ) = 0.525 0.00</td>
<td>( \beta ) = 0.505 0.00</td>
<td>( \beta ) = 0.436 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National satisfaction</td>
<td>( \beta ) = -0.067 0.82</td>
<td>( \beta ) = 0.058 0.38</td>
<td>( \beta ) = 0.015 0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with EU</td>
<td>( \beta ) = 0.173 0.00</td>
<td>( \beta ) = 0.046 0.50</td>
<td>( \beta ) = 0.133 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. ( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>0.508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A first conclusion is that all sub-samples are very similar in what concerns the structure of the predictors. Local and regional satisfaction has the largest contribution to the prediction of life as a whole, with beta = 0.44-0.52. The other domain that also predict the dependent variable is satisfaction with European Union, with \( \beta \) = 0.13-0.17 (except for Hungarians in Romania). Contrary to the findings in the cited literature, national satisfaction has no contribution to life as whole.

9. Conclusions

In four counties at the Romanian-Hungarian border, the ENRI survey measured personal well-being and satisfaction with local & regional instances, country and EU. We found that, in concordance with other results, Hungarians from Hungary are the most satisfied with their lives, and also with neighbourhoods, localities, country and EU. Romanian majority and Hungarian minority in Romania display similar levels of personal well-being, and they report they are equally satisfied with their neighbourhoods and localities. However, the Hungarian minority is less satisfied with the country in which they live, which is explainable by the lower attachment to the national state. They are also less satisfied with EU, which is somehow surprising. Finally, I found that there is an association between personal well-being, local & regional satisfaction, and satisfaction with EU. Against the previous results, national satisfaction does not seem to be correlated with subjective well-being. These results confirm that places of residence have an impact in people’s happiness, which may be explained by variations in living conditions that these different places provide, but also by people’s attachments to them.
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Abstract. The evolutions in the final years of the twentieth century in the Soviet Union and in all the Communist area led to significant changes in the Eastern Europe area, changes that continue until today. Some countries of the former Soviet bloc have been able to define a clear orientation to the west, to “Europe”, while others are still searching for a direction, and have passed through different orientations depending on their own temporal interests or strong external influences. Our subject research is focused on the case of Transnistria, the conflict and its core elements, the main actors involved, the characterization of the conflict and its peculiarities compared with other “frozen conflicts” and the attempts to create an identity.

The methodology used for this research is the following: after a brief geographical, socio-political and economic area description, with references to some historical facts that we consider important for understanding the problem in its complexity and in its totality, we will make a synthesis of the points of interest which will then be analyzed. We consider relevant to make a description and an analysis of the developments in Moldova, generally, and of the conflict, particularly, but not to isolate excessively the problem of Transdniestria.

From the documentary sources that we used we mention: official documents (treaties, declarations, speeches, etc), reports of international

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organizations or bodies, books, articles, press, information issued in media channels, web sites of various institutions, organizations, missions, etc.

1. Introduction

The developments which took place with the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), have had effects on the borders in Eastern Europe. The emergence of New Independent States has changed the geopolitical context in the region. The national borders appear as places of speeches on security and identity, when new entities are appearing there.

The changes taking place in the Eastern European area are the product of the conflicts between the interests of the global and/or the regional powers (Enciu, 2001: 167).

The current Transdniestria is the successor of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic, created in 1924 by Stalin in the Soviet Ukraine, after the loss of Bessarabia at the end of the First World War. The capital was established at Balta, and then moved to Tiraspol. After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Bessarabia was incorporated into the Soviet Union, then proclaiming the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic with the capital in Chisinau, and in its composition entering also the western part of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic, the eastern part entering in the composition of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Transdniestria declared its independence on September 2, 1990, established its capital at Tiraspol, but is not recognized internationally. Transdniestria’s population is about 555,000 inhabitants of which Moldavians account for 40%, Ukrainians 28%, Russians 24% and 8% others. The area is about 3567 square kilometers and its territory is divided into six different administrative regions.

After the conflict of 1992, the separatists organized as a state: Transdniestria has a president, a parliament, a bank, currency, customs, border police, declares persona non grata, etc.

The relations between Moldova and Transdniestria and the resolutions of conflicts has been mainly influenced by internal factors and external factors such as geopolitical interests and the policies of other actors on the international scene: Russia, European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ukraine, Romania etc.

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1 We chose data from the 1989 referendum, because they are recognized (official) data, other data are taken by leaders from Tiraspol and are not recognized because they come from not recognized authorities. Another reason is that this data is from just one year before the conflict. The same data are used by the European Court of Human Rights.
Transdniestria's economy has the following main features: dependency on imported raw materials from Russia, high energy dependence; it is a declining economy, with a high rate of emigration due to economic difficulties.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union – a global super-power - Russia has been trying to retain the legacy of the USSR and the status of the Soviet Union, but with the loss of territory and influence Russia is going through a delicate moment in its history and is obliged to reduce its status to that of a regional power.

However, by late 90, as Romania had made progress toward EU membership, the Romania-Ukraine-Moldova border had come into the center of EU attention. The persistence of conflicts in the Moldavian separatist region of Transdniestria turned the territory into an area of illegal activities, along with the potential to export political instability and immigration from the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the EU states, factors that forced the EU to participate more actively in the region.

2. The Origin of the Conflict

The origin of the conflict is to be found in the emergence of the language laws that established the Romanian language as the official language -, thereby enhancing the Romanian-Moldavian identity and denouncing the forced distinction made in the Soviet period through the use of the Russian language and the Cyrillic alphabet. This was the perfect excuse to shake, since 1990, the ghosts of the reunification.

Regarding the causes of the separatism in Transdniestria, the historian Enciu N. (2001: 167) presents three essential elements:

a) the expansion of the Kremlin policy, which tried to maintain the ex-Soviet countries in its sphere of influence.

b) the echoes of the national pro-Romanian revival movement of the majority of the population in Moldova in 1989-1991.

c) the political reaction in the opposite direction of the Russian population from Transdniestria.

Since 1991, Moldova has been trying to find his identity, distancing itself from its Soviet half-century, but without a real decision to adopt its Romanian history and heritage.

It should be mentioned that the Transdniestrian separatist intentions have their roots in the Soviet Union, but the problem must be solved inside the new state of Moldova. In Transdniestria there also live people who accept the sovereignty of Moldova, but the regime struggles to assert a full independence. The Transdniestrian regime, which is a totalitarian and oppressive regime, could be changed only by the action of external factors.

It is very clear that this is a Russia-Moldova dispute, caused by Russia's desire to play an important role in the political, social, and economic life of the
former Soviet space, trying to defend its interests in the region and to maintain control in the area.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and later with Moldova's independence, the political elites from the left bank (Transdniestria) feared that the new independent country (Moldova) will unite with Romania. The fear that this might happen led to the separation of Transdniestria from Moldova. Most of the leaders of Transdniestria are old members of the Communist Party of Moldova or of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and are opposed to any rapprochement to Romania.

The Pro-Russian elites have fought in the war of 1992, supported by the Russian 14th Army, led by the Russian General Lebed. In 1992 President Yeltin engaged in negotiating a peace agreement between the two parties, the agreement that ended the fight, but supporting the maintenance of the region outside the control of the Moldavian authorities. Since then there is an uncertain peace, while negotiations for a political agreement have had no tangible results.

After signing the Agreement of June, 21, 1992, the Russians decided to install in the area 6,000 peacekeeping troops, but far from being independent, they have helped to strengthen the separatist regime, including the loss of authority in the area by the legitimate government of Chisinau.

In 1994 an agreement was signed between Moldova and Russia related to the exit of Russian troops from Transdniestria, but the Russian Duma has not ratified it. During the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999, Russia promised again to withdraw troops from Transdniestria, but has not done so to this day.

3. The Peculiarities of the Conflict

There are different opinions on the type of conflict and its similarities with other frozen conflicts.

Some authors characterize the conflict as an ethnic civil war, ethnic conflict (Kaufman, 1997: 171; Urjewicz, 1993: 9-25; Chinn, 1997: 43-51). The general conclusion is that the conflict in Transdniestria is based on political and ideological reasons.

The conflict was very different from the war in the Balkans and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in the manner that it was not based on ethnic identity, but was motivated by economic and political issues: a mixture of economic interests, a Soviet nostalgia and a Russian influence. There are no ethnic tensions between the main groups living in Moldova and those living in Transdniestria (Boonstra, 2007: 1).

The conflict in Transdniestria cannot be described as an ethnic conflict. Its motivations are political, as are its elements and everyday actions (Weissman, 1992: 17). The confrontation on the Dniester is essentially a political struggle (Waters,
In fact, this secessionist movement is made up of old communists and Russian militaries, driven by the idea to restore communism in a renewed Soviet Union, starting from Transdniestria (Simon, 1994: 39).

A report by the OSCE Mission in Chisinau emphasizes the idea that this conflict cannot be described as an ethnic conflict, because it is purely political and ideological.²

Although the role of the conflict from Transdniestr ia was to constitute a weapon to influence the policy of the Republic of Moldova, it turned into an instrument of Russia to manage the geostrategic balance in the region, to influence the foreign policy of Ukraine, Georgia, Romania and to stop the eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO.

Over time, the conflict has come to represent a problem of organized crime and to enter on the agenda of the political actors in the area. Changes and developments that have taken place require a vision and approach under different aspects:

a) geopolitical: NATO and EU enlargement have changed the geopolitical map of Europe, Transdniestria gets closer to the borders of the Member States, resulting in greater interest in its bodies and institutions. Wider international actors with greater weight and power on the scale of international relations can only be beneficial to find a peaceful, fair, sustainable and effective solution for the conflict. It is important to emphasize the difference between the Transdniestrian conflict and other conflicts in the Balkans or the former Soviet territories. In Transdniestria there is not an entity, a subject that wants free self-determination (Abkhazia, different ethno-cultural entity, Nagorno-Karabakh, mono-ethnic minority group).

b) Regional: changes towards a homogeneous political space, composed by states that have adopted common values, and moves with different speeds in a common direction - towards the EU and NATO. All these changes become particularly important if we are looking at the developments in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in recent years.

c) national level: given that none of the regional actors (Moldova, Ukraine, Romania) have the necessary tools for tackling the crisis, requires the cooperation and involvement of all actors for finding a negotiated solution, and then to promote and support this solution at the national level.

d) Local: illegitimate authorities have made efforts to consolidate their power and control in Transdniestria and to acquire the characteristic attributes of a state. So the breakaway region has president, parliament, judiciary power, security and police organs, currency, flag, anthem, etc.

The position of the Transdniestrian authorities remains to achieve some objectives that are considered favorable for Transdniestria:

1. Maintaining the tension in the conflict of Transdniestria using tactics of intimidation and inciting, Tiraspol succeeding to tension relations with Chisinau, using the thesis of “the impossible compromise” as justification for its separation from Moldova. In defending their position the Transdniestrian authorities took the following steps: maintenance of peak demand in the negotiations, supporting the need for a referendum to determine the future of the two entities, developing direct relations with other CIS auto proclaimed independent republics (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh) including military cooperation, promoting the maintenance of the Russian peacekeeping troops and rejecting the introduction of the Western peacekeeping forces etc.

2. Making every effort for Russia to strengthen its political-military presence in Transdniestria; Desiring to strengthen its interests in the region, the Russian Federation takes every opportunity to support the demands and the actions of the separatist regime from Tiraspol, using diplomatic tricks to project the image of an independent mediator and guarantor of conflict resolution.

3. Maintaining the ambiguous position of Ukraine on the issue of Transdniestria.

4. Preserving and consolidating the power of the separatist regime of Tiraspol.

5. Reinforcing the existence of an important human presence in military leadership and in the separatist administration from Tiraspol, coordinated by Moscow.

The conflict in Transdniestria, changes often from the political to the economic dimension, because the authorities from Tiraspol want to demonstrate and to convince Chisinau that they have sufficient instruments to influence the economic situation and the security of the Republic of Moldova and to guide the negotiations towards the “necessary direction”.

The stability in Moldova, in the South and the North Caucasus is important for the enlarged EU, because it is close on its borders. There are considerable differences in the status of the three entities. First, the conflict in Transdniestria is almost dead while in Abkhazia and Ossetia the situation is very hot, and fighting continuous in Chechnya. Second, Russia's interests also vary - Moscow has its heart in the events in Chechnya and is keeping its finger on the pulse in Abkhazia, but Moldova appears to be not a priority, even within the CIS policy of the Kremlin.

The EU is very concerned about the problem of Transdniestria and has a general interest in Abkhazia (part of the South Caucasus). The European vision about Chechnya has not changed substantially, even in light of the war.
on terror although the statements on this issue have become milder; Europe continues to exploit the Chechen issue as a lever to influence Russian policy.

The prospects for an intervention in the case of Moldova are favorable, while Abkhazia is unlikely to fall under the auspices of the European Union or of a European-Russian joint force. Regarding Chechnya, there is no chance that Moscow would allow some kind of international involvement in this region.

Moreover, it will depend on Russia's help and the ability of the parties to overcome the rivalries of the Cold War and to come back to the post cold war mentality.

The Transdniestrian case is different from that of Kosovo because the state (Moldova) respects laws and international rules and that which does not respect is the separatist region (Transdniestria), whose leaders are not allowed to enter the territory of the European Union or the United States. In Transdniestria there isn’t a dominant minority different from the state (from the ethnic point of view) and the international community has not sanctioned the state’s behavior, but there has been a confrontation between the separatist region - supported by another state - and the internationally recognized state. In conclusion, no Kosovo solution exists and there is no basis to support such a solution in the case of Transdniestria.

4. The Intention to Build an “Identity”

In Transdniestria there was no conflict before 1989, which makes this conflict different from that of other post-Soviet conflicts. It is not possible to build an identity based on conflict alone, especially in the case of the "Transdniestrian people" which did not exist before the conflict (Sofransky, 2002: 293-296). There is a strong intention and activity of the leaders of Transdniestria to create a Transdniestrian identity, and that identity could be a significant barrier in the way to solving the conflict, a brake on the reintegration of Transdniestria with Moldova.

The leaders of Transdniestria have argued that Transdniestria has the right to be independent. Creating or converting an ethnically heterogeneous space into an identity of its own was a priority for the authorities from Tiraspol. The intention is to create even a new "nation".

The political propaganda insists to create a type of loyalty to the "republic", especially for the new generations, developing campaigns in schools for the young people to consider themselves citizens of Transdniestria and to believe they have nothing in common with Moldova, to ensure that in future they will preclude reunification with Moldova and that Transdniestria will insist on the idea of independence. Most students consider that the separation into two countries is artificial and that there is no difference between the population of Moldova and Transdniestria especially because for a long time they have
lived together in the same country and because the Transdniestrian people has no historical roots as a different people (Cojocaru, 2006: 6).

In the ideological sphere, Transdniestria has consolidated its separatist positions and has developed obligations for the political factors. The doctrine of the authorities from Tiraspol is based on two essential elements. The first of them is the strengthening of the region/province statehood in order to oppose, what they call, "the aggressively nationalistic politics of Chisinau". The second element is Russian economic, political and cultural support.

In Transdniestria the term Russian-speaking (Russian speaking) is used to refer to Russian, Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz people living in Transdniestria, to show that the Russian-speaking population can be considered as a majority. The term is challenged by Romanian speakers in Transdni estria because they speak Russian also, but they are not Russians, and in the same situation are the Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz (Chinn and Roper, 1995: 306-307).

According to the Tiraspol regime’s data (which are not considered official data), in recent years the number of Russian citizens who are established in the region has grown significantly. In 1999 in Transdniestria were approximately 50-55 000 Russian citizens, in 2000 the number grew to 80 000, in 2004 to over 125 000. If the rate of growth remains in the next few years then it is possible that people with Russian citizenship to become a majority.

Transdniestria has developed an educational system based on a startling combination of Soviet relics and innovations such as “History of Transdniestria” or “Literature of Transdniestria”. All school programs are loaded by ideology centered on Transdniestrian patriotism talking about the “President of Transdniestria”, Smirnov, in a similar manner to the personality cult during Stalin. It promotes values that have nothing in common with European values and human rights, but are very similar to those of the Soviet regime (Roper, 2005: 1-14).

The official discourse tends to rewrite history; many historical events are presented differently from what happened in reality and in a strong pro-Russian and anti-Moldavian manner. It tries to create a common identity for the population of Transdniestria, developing Transdniestrian patriotism based solely on opposition and condemnation of identity or similarity with Moldova and based on a Moldavian and Transdniestrian difference, an approximation between Transdniestria and Russia or Soviet – Transdniestrian nearby.

From religious point of view, the predominant practice is orthodoxy with 91%, then Catholic with 4%, and others.

3 According to the website http://www.geopolitic.ro/actualitati.htm accessed 10.01.2009, deserves emphasize that most of those who established in Transdniestria are former military officers of the Soviet army.
The national identity is defined in terms such as: our land, our language and in opposite terms such as: aggressors-victims, invaders-victims. But there is a difference between what is identity for the leaders and what it means for the people, the leaders are trying to create an identity different, opposite, contrary to Moldova, while the population believes that there are no differences, they lived in the same state, have the same history and that the distinction is artificially created.

The ideological and political orientation of Transdniestria is much deeper and more complicated than those of its neighbors (Ukraine and Moldova). In contradistinction to Moldova, the rhetoric of the political regime from Transdniestria is linked to search of an ideology that could unite the people living in Transdniestria around authoritarian power. The leaders from Tiraspol consider appropriate an idea that is a mixture of concepts that express traditions of Soviet totalitarianism with some kind of community of race and on this basis to be restored the Soviet Union. So it attempts to propagate an idea of “the glory of a mythical Slavic union”.

The International Commission of Jurists, in a report on Moldova and Transdniestria, shows that the region of Transdniestria remains firmly placed in the Soviet period, which could be equivalent to trying to live in the past, and the failure to adapt to new realities.

5. The Geostrategic Importance of the Area

The Dniester River is a strategic line that separates two large geopolitical spaces, the Slavic world of the rest of Europe. For the Ottoman Empire, the Dniester had marked the northeastern border for nearly 400 years.

The same fortification line created by the Turks was used by both the Russian Empire and the Soviets. The separation of Ukraine and the loss of Odessa, and then the orientation of Moldova to Europe makes Russia want to maintain Transdniestria in the Russian influence area due to its strategic importance.

Russia provides support for Transdniestria, both economic and political. The Russian Duma decision to declare the Transdniestria region as a geostrategic interest zone to Russia was received with great satisfaction in Tiraspol. This decision clarifies the meaning for maintaining Russian troops in Transdniestria and their role. The Transdniestrarian leaders have publicly stated that they have a historical mission to resist Western expansion and they have promised to continue to defend Russia's geopolitical interests in the heart of the Balkans (Marakuta, 2005).

The conflict of Transdniestria with Moldova is the fundamental problem of Moldova, affecting the territorial integrity and at the same time a

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potential risk for the security in South-Eastern Europe. Russia uses the economic issues for political purposes. Gazprom sells gas to Transdniestria at a price below market price and this price is negotiated with Transdniestrian leaders, without consulting the Moldavian authorities.

Russia's interest is to maintain its sphere of influence in the former Soviet bloc countries. In its area of interest, Transdniestria is only a small part of the problems and we have to add other areas that are in similar situations such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Chechnya.

The increasing trend of Russian nationalism in Russia has been translated into greater involvement in the conflicts that take place on the outskirts of the old Soviet Union. In Russia, many political forces believe that Russia must assume the role of regional gendarme, and this is reflected, for example, in the proposal for the creation of Russian blue helmets. The Russian military doctrine from 1993 sets forth a genuine right of interference in internal affairs of CIS member countries (Taibo, 1995: 32).

A solution to Transdniestria can be identified with a broad international participation. Legitimacy in international relations is not absolute, it can be negotiated if there is interplay of interests, and in this case there is an interweaving of the interests of Russia, European Union, Ukraine and, of course, Moldova.

The problem of Transdniestria remains without solution because of the lack of involvement of the great powers and great bodies, organizations, international institutions which are the main and most powerful actors on the international scene and because of the lack of real dialogue between them. The conflict can be interpreted as a conflict between Russia and the West (EU, NATO, USA), as a continuation in another form of the cold war.

The main problems are the presence of Russian troops in the region and the lack of attitude, decision and action from the EU and the West in general. The Western position is due to the interest of the West to maintain good relations with Russia, mainly for energy reasons.

Russia's main objective was to maintain the Moldavian political under the tutelage of the old center of decision (post) Soviet, using the Transdniestrian region as a wick which can be aflame at any time. Tiraspol, the “capital” of Transdniestria has become the key of the region and of the Russian domination system. The separatist leaders have established with the Russian military support, an army with modern military equipment, equipped with tanks, rocket installations, engineering troops, including aviation capability (Marcu, 2007: 85).

Regionally, Russia manages to keep two very important points in terms of geopolitical and strategic: Kaliningrad, in the Baltic zone, and Transdniestria, in the Black Sea region. Russia is concerned about the concentration, in the south-western part of the old soviet area, of states with possible future NATO
bases, and tries to keep Moldova in the area of Russian influence, with Transdniestria help. The Russian presence in Transdniestria brings the opportunity to exert pressure on Ukraine's southern flank also.

The geostrategic value of Transdniestria results also from the fact that Transdniestria became the first area where peacekeeping forces were deployed after the meeting of the CIS on July 6, 1992, and so “the provocation of Moscow was taking place with a silent conspiracy of the Western States” (Gabanyi, 1993: 98-107).

Why is Transdniestria so important to Russia and its proximity to the Black Sea? First, for the resources it offers, because it is a transit zone, and for the geostrategic position between Europe and Asia. Second, for what it could be, there is the risk of becoming a hotbed of terrorism, drug traffic and human traffic, which will affect Western Europe too. This is affecting EU and NATO members in addition to the neighboring countries.

Any discussion about Transdniestria leads to Russia; a country that does not welcomes changes in the area and feels that she loses control of the Black Sea area and Eastern Europe, areas which were in its zone of influence. The changes in Georgia and Ukraine, leading to much debate in Moscow about the possibility of Russia being isolated behind the "orange zone", and mean that Russia tries to maintain close links with the areas that are still oriented toward it.

We also have to mention the fact that the political elites and the citizens of Moldova have agreed that the priority for the country is European integration, while in Transdniestria there is a clear orientation towards Russia. The European Union is keen to create a space of security and democracy at its borders. On this line has been established a Border Assistance Mission EUBAM\(^5\). Another tool could be joint projects and regional cooperation involving Ukraine, Moldova, Transdniestria and Romania.

The conflict is purely geopolitical. There is a difference between a political and geopolitical conflict. In a geopolitical conflict comes into play a space, not just a political regime. The controversy of Chisinau - Tiraspol is a kind of cold war in miniature. Transdniestria has no importance compared to Kaliningrad or Gibraltar for example, because of geographical location or area, but it has strategic importance in a military crisis. So, Transdniestria has geopolitical importance (Serebrian, 2001: 32-38).

Russia’s position, effective military presence in Transdniestria shows the importance of the region and the response of Russia in the conflict with Georgia in 2008 is relevant for understanding the importance Russia places on those areas where it has interests. For Moldova, Transdniestria is a geopolitical factor determinant for its stability, development and strengthening.

\(^5\) For more details see the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine web page http://www.eubam.org/.
All parties are interested in finding solutions and resolving the conflict as soon as it is possible. Lately, Russia has interests in economic and humanitarian projects, in addition to their geostrategic interests. The EU is interested in creating spaces for their border security and democracy. Lately appears a new idea. An instrument for such concepts could be the euro cross-border projects or euro regions. The benefits of the regional cooperation would be real in the sense that it is possible to create a euro region with the participation of Ukraine, Transdniestria, Moldova and Romania.

The main problems of security or insecurity of Moldova are related to Transdniestria. Both, for the state and for its citizens, the main threats and risks are directly related to the conflict or its results: the inability to control its territory, the problems with drug traffic and arms traffic, illicit economic activities, weakening the authority of the state etc. (Chifu, 2005: 24-32).

Why did the United States begin to show interest in the area? The U.S. has interests in the Black Sea area to gain access to the oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea and the North Caucasus. The U.S. is interested in establishing an area of long-term stability in the context in which things are not clear about Iran for example. It is possible for a large part of American interests to be focused on southern Caucasus and to form a Europe-Middle East axis via the Black Sea and its neighborhoods.

The conflict in this region can be seen as a problem that hinders the development of Moldova, as well as a challenge that could lead to some opportunities. The external influences in Moldova are much larger than the capacity of Chisinau to solve problems. For the EU for example, Moldova is a singular event – it is an unresolved conflict at the EU border, there is the Russian military presence in the territory of Moldova and Transdniestria’s economy is controlled at a rate of 80 percent by Russia.

6. Conclusions

Transdniestria has a big geopolitical and strategic importance for Russia and this is an obstacle to progress towards a final solution to the conflict of Transdniestria.

Russian foreign policy, especially in close vicinity and particularly in Moldova can be described as interventionist.

The ultimate goal must be to ensure the stability in the entire region. The economic development, changes and investments depend on stability. Furthermore, economic development is an important generator of democracy.

The economic, political, national, military and social problems, as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent developments, are combined and constitute an obstacle in finding a solution to Transdniestria.
Transdniestrian separatism is supported by Moscow, through a lot of pressure instruments, military or not: political-diplomatic, informational, psychological and economic.

The conflict in Transdniestria is not an ethnic problem but it is in essence a political issue, and the possibilities of settlement can be found through greater involvement of international politics.

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Abstract. The most of the modern states, including the Republic of Moldova, are poly-ethnic; according to their political forces it is necessary to solve the problem of formation and realization of the internal policy reflecting interests and prospects each, from an ethnic group occupying them. The political parties play a special role in this process, their variety on the one hand displays ethnic diversity existing in a society, and on the nother they can influence interethnic relations through the competent policy. During existence of Republic of Moldova as an independent state a fairly rich experience of party’s ethno policy including both positive and negative examples of influence of the parties on interethnic relations has been collected. Experience of the developed European states has shown that overcoming of ethnic discrimination in activity of parties became an important factor for harmonization of interethnic relations in a society and the precondition of its progress in the future. Level of representation of interests of various ethnic groups in the Moldavian society by political parties and the outlined tendencies of development of parties’ ethno policy allow us to draw a conclusion on prospects of our state in this direction.

Keywords: Nation, ethnicity, national policy, the interethnic conflict.

Today the most countries are multinational, poly-ethnic and therefore harmonization of interethnic relations becomes very important being always a topical problem. The ethnic structure of population of any country with minority groups, relations between titular ethnic group and ethnic minorities throughout history - recent or distant one - have been always considered as a difficult and delicate issue. Difficult, because the legal status of ethnic
minorities even now are in full development and permanent change; the delicate nature of the problem always provoked violent passions, resentment, suspicion, animosity and, beyond these factors of emotional nature, has been complicated by interference of political calculations (Carbune, 2001). The efforts of inter-ethnic relations theorists are aimed at developing strategies and tactics of coexistence of titular ethnic group with minorities in order to ensure progress of the society and avoid conflicts between its component parts. Achieving these goals depends on the key actors of the political process. Actors are those institutions, organizations or subjects, which are involved in the process of regulating inter-ethnic relations. It remains for us to identify the main actors in this process.

The state is a key player in the process of balancing ethnic relations within a society. Through its institutions, it coerces other actors, developing, promoting and exercising the control in all areas of social life, using political, economic, legal and informational resources. In what concerns with Moldova, we can certainly speak also about the existence of legal as well as institutional framework designed for protection of ethnic minorities. For a newly independent state this is crucial since minorities constitute approximately 25% of the population.

Legal framework, which refers to the rights of national minorities in Republic of Moldova, includes more than 30 documents, 10 of which are of international importance. Engaging itself to respect the rights and freedoms of citizens disregarding their ethnicity, Moldova adhered to several international UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, documents, it signed on 10/22/1996 the Framework Convention for National Minorities Protection; on 19/07/2001 the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted the Law on the Rights of Persons, belonging to ethnic minorities and to legal status of their organizations. Creating the legal framework for managing interethnic relations involves the creation of institutions that would implement and take the control on exercising these legal rules. Such institutions became the Office of Interethnic Relations of Moldova, Inter-Ethnic Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova, The Committee of Parliament for Human Rights and National Minorities, Human Rights Centre of Moldova. However, a number of difficulties still remain in this regard which require to be addressed primarily by increasing efforts of authorities and representatives of national minorities.

Another actor, which inherently affects interethnic relations, is the civil society, which through its ethnic organizations contributes to the development of minorities and their rights. The democratization of society, freedom of speech, political pluralism has led to the awakening of national consciousness not only in the titular ethnic group, but also in ethnic minorities. The first non-governmental ethnic organizations appear during the 1980s-1990s. Today in
Moldova already exists 85 ethno-cultural organizations accredited to the Inter-Ethnic Relations Office, among them: 8 Ukrainian Public Associations, 9 Russian Public Associations, 4 Gagauz Public Associations, 5 Bulgarian Public Associations, 4 Hebrew Public Associations, 10 Roma Ethno-cultural Associations, the Belarus Community from Moldova, 2 German Public Associations, 5 Polish Public Associations, Public Associations of National Less Numerous Minorities (2 Tatars, 4 Armenian, 3 Azeri, Georgian, representatives of Central Asia, Ossetian, the Uzbek, Chuvash, 3 Lithuanian, of Estonian, 2 Greek, Korean, Italian, the natives of African Asian countries) and other public organizations of minorities (Interethnic Cultural and Protection of Human Rights Society "Conciliation-Soglasie", Charity Centre for Refugees, the International Association of Ethnics, Association for the Harmonious Development of Children JUNIOR and others) (Lista organizațiilor etnoculturale pe lîngă Biroul RelaŃii Interetnice, 2010). Some of these organizations, associations, ethno-cultural minorities have registered missions in Moldova. The existence of wide network of ethnic organizations is largely due to loyalty and tolerance towards ethnic minorities existing in the Moldovan society. Those organizations are important because of their contribution to the socialization and development of national culture of ethnic minorities, as well as to the harmonization and balancing of ethnic relations.

A third actor designed to influence relations among ethnic groups are political parties, whose participation in politics and promotion of certain policies contribute to harmonization or de-harmonization of interethnic relations. The actions undertaken by the parties play an important role in building relationships within a poly ethnic society at different stages of its existence. Moldova, which proclaimed its sovereignty on June 23, 1990 and state independence on August 27, 1991, for the first time in its history, faced issues related with ethnic coexistence. In these conditions, its political forces had to implement internal policies which would reflect the interests of all ethnic groups living in that territory.

Before the nineteenth century the ethnic composition of population in Bessarabia has changed slowly and insignificantly. During the twentieth century there have been some changes in the ethnic composition of Bessarabian population: if at the beginning of the century Moldavians constituted 78.2% of the entire population, then by the end of the century we may notice a decrease to 52.1%; the percentage of other nations increased (Ukrainians by 4.6%, Russians - 4.4%, Jews - 10.6%, Germans - 1.5%, Bulgarians and Gagauz - 4.3%). This change is explained by intense colonization policy pursued by the Russian Empire which annexed Bessarabia. After the unification of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918 the ethnic structure of Bessarabia has been the following in 1930: Romanians accounted for 56.2%, while the Ruthenians - 23.3%, Jews - 5.7%, Bulgarians - 5.7%, Turkish - Tatars - 3.5%. After the annexation of territory between the Prut and Dniester to the USSR in 1940, demographic
composition of population changes essentially due to deportation, removal, mass evictions and the Russification of national minorities. The census conducted in Moldova in 1989 revealed the following ethnic structure: Moldavians - 64.5%, Ukrainians - 13.8%, Russians - 13%, Gagauz - 3.5%, Bulgarians - 2%, Hebrew - 1.5%, Belarusians - 0.5%, Germans - 0.2%, Roma - 0.3%, Poles - 0.1%, other nationalities - 0.6% (Morozan, 2005: p.10). The national structure of population of Moldova, registered by the census in 2004, showed that the Moldovan majority population constitutes 75.8% of the total population, marking an increase over 1989. Besides Moldovans, there also live Ukrainians who represent 8.4%, Russians with a share of 5.9%, Gagauz - 4.4%, Romanian - 2.2%, Bulgaria - 1.9% and other nationalities - 1.0% of the total population. Population structure by nationalities reflects the changes occurring in our society over the past 15 years due to intense emigration which influenced the decrease in the proportion of people of Ukrainian and Russian origin (Rezultatele Recensămîntului PopulaŃiei 2004, 2006: 16).

The collapse of the USSR revealed especially, a whole complex of problems which have sought for their solution for a long time. The second half of the twentieth century is characterized by increasing of ethnic and national consciousness. Not accidentally, the national factor have been one of the main reasons the Soviet Empire collapsed (Carbune, 2010). After the collapse of USSR and the obtaining state independence and sovereignty by the former soviet republics, the situation changed dramatically: the main ethnic groups once governed and marginalized became ruling along with promotion and development of national culture, spirit and language.

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Empire the new states appear, some of which for the first time in the twentieth century get their independence, such us the case of Republic of Moldova. Countries of the former socialist bloc, most of them established as nations, faced two problems: that of national identity and of ethnic identity (Andrieş, 2001: 9). In the first case it deals with increasing national feelings, once attenuated by the former communist regime, as a result of obtaining state independence. In the second case it has to do with the rise of ethnic identity among minority groups within the state. Like the other states, Moldova has faced these problems, but specific for our country had been the acuity of issue of national identity of the Moldovan population. We had to find the answer to question so simple for our neighbors, but so complicated for us: who we are, where do we come from, and what do we all who live on this territory share together (Carbune, 2010).

Searching for answers to these questions practically coincided with the emergence of new political formations in our country, which first of all began to look for their electorate basis. In 1988 "the Democratic movement in support of Perestroika" and literary-musical club "A. Mateevici" were created, which members founded the Popular Front of Moldova at the congress in May
1989. As a social base of the Popular Front there served the big part of the Moldovan people, who took hard the loss of functions of mother tongue and who had fears about the process of denationalization caused by Russian-Soviet assimilation. Reflecting the views and opinions of its supporters, the Popular Front declares aims related to national revival of the Moldovan nation; its starting point became the language problem (giving the Moldovan language an official status, the reintroduction of Latin script, confirming its identity with the Romanian language, etc.). The struggle for language, which started back up to independence proclamation, has become a symbol of the beginning national rebirth for a good part of population. This struggle, unfortunately, contained not only a huge mobilizing potential, but also a disintegrating one. In the late 1980s – early1990s changes in language policy have aroused a wave of complaints from people who didn’t speak the new state language. The language issue, in other places and times a linguistic one, became a political issue in Moldova (Tulbure, 2001: 249). Later, it led on the one hand to national cohesion and consolidation of society (in what concerns the titular ethnic group), and de-harmonization of interethnic relations, generation of armed conflict on the left bank of the Dniester river and the Gagauz ethnic conflict, on the other hand.

In response to processes of national consolidation, in July 1989 the "Unitate-Edinstvo" international movement appears, reflecting the opinions of people, who saw in the claims of Moldovan national rebirth an attempt to change the soviet national linguistic status, to narrow the space of Russian language, so it stood up for equal rights for all languages and nations. In the south of the country, with mostly gagauz localities, a social-political movement "Gagauz Halc" is formed, focusing on the revival of Gagauz ethnicity. These two parties, whose electoral base represented ethnic minorities, were supported by population from the left side of the Dniester River.

Ethno-political reality created in most countries in post-soviet space, especially in Moldova, has divided imminently the population into two categories: titular and not-titular ethnic groups (Bulova, 2001: 24). The movements for independence in former soviet republics have fixed as their main task the establishment of national states where the political nationality would coincide as much as possible with cultural nationality, so that all the citizens of these states will belong to the titular ethnic group, the state being called to serve only the interests of this group. However, in almost all of the new independent states (with few exceptions), national minorities made up important segments of the population, and their simple presence "hindered" substantially the achievement of establishment of national states (Carbune, 2001). Therefore, in order to achieve the major goal there should be liquidated the existing obstacles. In this regard the older injuries, supported by not Russian nationalities during the Soviet Power, began to be exploited, even till
the power itself has been artificially associated with the Russians and national minorities, or, as they have been also named - the "foreigners ". The Russophones guilt was not only that they did not speak the language of the titular nationality, but even the fact of their presence in the ex-soviet states. In order to stimulate their migration process and exclusion of them from important social positions there were adopted laws giving the status of state language to the titular ethnic group language. The slogan "Cemodan - Vokzal - Russia" ("Suitcase - Station - Russia") was addressed not only to Russians, but also to all Russian language speakers. This slogan, along with the circumstances of its appearance, has contributed to a significant percentage of the non-titular population who left the countries. Although, the most effective it appeared to be in Central Asia and Caucasus, and in the European part of USSR this slogan had an effect below expectations, causing resistance of various degrees in the part of the population who increasingly began to be called "national minorities", because of implementation of new language legislation, narrowing the space of the Russian language in public education system, excluding Russian speakers from state structures (Carbune, 2001).

Thus, change of roles (transformation of the former minority in the dominant nation) has led to a new conflict. Given the lack of experience, the new majority appeared to be unprepared for the task of strengthening the society, using in order to promote its interests the coercive means successfully applied by the past regime. National movement leaders did not take into account feelings, attitudes and ideals of minorities, which, in turn, gave up to support the aspiration of titular ethnic group to achieve state independence (Carbune, 2001).

In various republics the events developed following in fact, one and the same scenario, although with some specific caused by the particular local colour. This specific consisted, in Moldova, primarily in the fact that resistance of minorities to the tendency to constitute an "ethnic democracy", as of a democracy whose defining principles are addressed only to the titular majority, leaving "outside" ethnic minorities, led finally, to the establishment of two autonomous entities - Transnistria and Gagauzia, with later full separation of the first and recognition of the special status of autonomy within the Moldovan state, for the latter (Carbune, 2001).

Another feature was emerged by existence of Romanian factor: the common ethnic roots of Moldovans and Romanians and the manifested tendencies by some political forces from Moldova in favor of using the independence as a step towards unification with Romania in a single unitary state (Carbune, 2001). The new program of the Popular Front of Moldova declared as a strategic goal the unification of Moldova with Romania, recognition the Romanian identity of Moldovans, etc., but these ideas have played partially a negative role, leading to alienation of masses of people and narrowing its electoral
The party tried to build national state with a mono-national society, without taking into account the specifics of the newly formed multi-ethnic state, which caused conflicts in interethnic relations, in some cases even hatred based on ethnic belongings, and as a consequence has transformed this movement, in the fullest sense of the word popular, in marginal right side force.

In 1994 the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova (PDAM) comes to the power, its electoral platform was based on ideas of the existence of Moldovan identity and creation of an independent Moldovan state. Mass support of this party has shown willingness of ethnic minorities in Moldova to consensus in terms of consolidation of society based on the principles of civic nation. The PDAM attempts to implement in practice the concept of Moldovan identity encountered some difficulties. Romanian identity paradigm has been supported by local intelligence, which constituted the result of ethno-national socialization, and did not allow the complete change of mentality of people (Moşneaga, 2001: 153-154). After all a more or less consensus formula there have been found: Romanian language -Moldavians - The Republic of Moldova. This step can be evaluated as a real progress in building interethnic relations, because it reconciles both sides of the society, titular nation, which obtains its own identity indicating the common roots with Romanians; and ethnic minorities giving them a common identity regardless of ethnicity, given that the term "Moldovan" carries not only ethnic connotations but also the state ones therefore belonging to the nation was determined by the citizenship. Thus the common goals for these groups of population emerge: strengthening Moldovan state, progress and prosperity of consolidated society and Republic of Moldova becoming a common house for all its citizens. Other political forces, who ruled the country, promoted permanently the idea of an independent state with a poly-ethnic society, although even till today there are more forces that put under the question the existence of Moldovan state, troubling the interethnic relations.

During the formation of party system in Moldova the three basic orientations, reflecting the ethnic relations in terms of political parties: Moldovan, Romanian and Soviet, could be seen. Analysts consider that these visions of social and political formations, practically determined their activity and function further on.

Adherents of the first orientation (Moldovan) stood up for strengthening the republic's independence, for territorial integrity, for further development of democracy and implementation of new democratic ideas, creation the rule of law state and a social-oriented market economy. This vision was characteristic for the Social Democratic Party of Moldova, Republican Party of Moldova, the Party of Social Progress, the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova, the Democratic Labour Party of Moldova, Moldova Women's Association, National Youth League of Moldova, Renaissance of Economy
Party of Moldova etc. (Carbune, 2001). These political forces have played an important role in the harmonization of interethnic relations, because in their electoral platforms they focused on developing a prosperous Moldovan state and the entire society; and issues concerning with ethnic differences were left outside the proposed goals.

The second orientation (Romanian) of some political parties on the abovementioned issues projected the possible unification of Moldova and Romania. In turn, this trend was also divided in two: the partisans of immediate unification (Christian Democratic Popular Front, Democratic Christian League of Women of Moldova, Christian Democratic Youth Organization, the National Christian Party of Moldova and other socio-political and public national-cultural and religious organizations, which in the early '90s formed Christian Democratic Alliance) and the supporters of the moderate wing who pleaded for gradual unification with Romania made up of the following political parties: Christian Democratic Party from Moldova, the Ecologist Party "Green Alliance", the National-Liberal Party of Moldova, Reform Party, the Congress of Moldovan Intellectuals, etc. (Carbune, 2001). The role of these parties in our society can be measured by their contribution to national identity, and in what concerns with interethnic relations, they always have contributed to their disharmonization, because of policies pursued by them, being at the governance; the existence of ethnic minorities have been ignored, and they were not given special rights.

The third orientation (Soviet) of political parties in the state-national and ethno-national aspect is supported mostly by elderly people who may still believe and aspire to restoring the USSR (Movement for equal rights "UnitjEdinstvo", communist parties and United Council of Labour Collectives from Transnistria, Popular Movement "Gagauz Halki", etc.). (Carbune, 2001). Their supporters consider themselves soviet rather than Russians, Ukrainians, Moldovans, etc. They gradually come to understand that the past can not be returned, for this reason these parties don’t enjoy a high popularity and don’t play any role in building relations between ethnic groups.

Currently in the division of political parties, the ethno-national aspect has less importance, the priority being given to the socio-economic one (Carbune, 2001). Although it was maintained the principle of placing the parties on political scale depending on their identity orientations, which constituted one of the main criteria for the positioning of political forces in Moldova during the first decade of independence. Thus, the political right side is represented by parties that advocate for “Romanian” ideas, protecting the interests of titular ethnic group, and the left side - those who work under the anti-Romanian slogans representing the interests of ethnic minorities; in the centre being placed parties with intermediate positions. Currently these two forces share political influence in the country. At the last parliamentary
elections the right side parties have won 44 parliamentary seats (Democratic Liberal Party with 32 seats, Liberal Party-12 seats), the Left parties - 42 seats (Communist Party of Moldova), the centre having fewer seats - 15 (Democratic Party of Moldova). This picture of political representation in some way satisfies the interests of ethnic groups of Moldovan society, because traditionally the political left parties are voted by ethnic minorities, while the right is supported by the titular nation.

In terms of representativeness, the situation can be considered satisfactory, but the practical realization of ethnic policies pursued by the ruling political forces makes some ethnic groups believe that they are disadvantaged compared to the others. Here opinions are divided: there are opinions that Moldovans have the advantage because of the number, (the majority) and that their language has official status (Bogdan, 2007:6). Because of this in the early 90s Moldovans replaced representatives of other ethnic groups in administration and state apparatus. This seems to be natural, as soon as the very democracy means rule of majority. Another set of opinions claims that Moldovans are disadvantaged compared to other ethnic groups, even though they represent the majority (Bogdan, 2007: 6). This is possible due to the advantages Russian-speaking ethnic groups, especially Russians and Ukrainians had compared to Moldovans in early 90's. These minorities living mainly in urban area as opposed to Moldovans were rather rural population, were more educated and had representatives in key economic and political positions. While the political situation has turned in favour of representatives of Moldovan ethnicity due to the introduction of Romanian as state language, economically, the Russian and Ukrainian minorities dominated the country. Moreover if the language of politics and administration became Romanian, the language of economy was Russian. There are also some opinions that consider Gagauz, Bulgarians or Roma as disadvantaged minorities (Bogdan, 2007: 7). This is because Gagauz and Bulgarian minorities have been living in poorer rural areas in southern Moldova. As for the Roma that ethnic group hardly adheres to social norms and values of the majority, and not much had been done for their integration so far.

The relations of minority groups with majority population are reflected by relations between Romanian/Moldovan and Russian, and the larger is the minority, the more chances it has to defend its rights, to fight for its political advancement status, more opportunities to be heard by the international community, yet we see that in this case relations between minority and majority groups become more tensed. Tensions within the majority–minority relationship are motivated not only by cultural, political, economic factors, but also by the psychological ones. The psychological tensions are caused by conflict between the dominant system of values that is required in the social environment and the one that tries to resist pressure of assimilation. Minority ethnic groups believe in
uncertainty of their security (Anghel, 2004: 70). They feel threatened by the quantity dominant value system of the majority representing a real danger for these ethnicities. The behavior of ethnic majority is interpreted by the ethnic groups as the one of dominant community. Verbal and action pressures of the minority annoy the national majority, who realize that cultural and political status of titular majority is neglected. The inter-group distances within Moldovan society are motivated by positive or negative stereotyped attitudes and prejudices of the majority and minority representatives which may be supported by some political forces, with especially during electoral campaigns. The hostile competition to redefine and preserve the ethnic values reduces the chances of integration of population. Dichotomy of "we" - "they", characteristic for relationship between majority and minority raises the mutual hostility and represses the improvement of interethnic relations. Groups that are included in "we" category share the same feelings of belonging to common identity and exclude other groups assigned to the category of "they" (Anghel, 2004: 72). The encouragement of this mentality by political parties can provoke a ranking of cultural-ethnic values in society.

Initial inter-ethnic conflicts in Moldova still exist, they just moved into another phase. Relations between ethnic minorities and indigenous population over the years have been based on tolerance and loyalty. Therefore ethnic differences that arise can be considered as a result of activity of various political forces; ethnocentric orientation in Moldova is speculated and politicized. Political representation of minority makes it possible to lessen the tension of ethnic relations only by political dialogue, through authorized representatives of ethnic minorities. Launching a dialogue between political parties as institutions representing among others ethnic interests makes possible to find those institutional and constitutional remedies to pave the way for coexistence of ethnic groups in a multiethnic state in the spirit of mutual understanding.

For ruling parties there are two methods for solving national problems: the policy of assimilation and coexistence policy. The followers of the first way, assimilation, argue that democracy and non-conflict development are impossible without the establishment of the national homogeneity through assimilation of minorities (Macovei, Svetlicinîi, 2001:19). The possibility of realization and effectiveness of this policy have been demonstrated by international practice, for example the experience of the U.S. But in the Republic of Moldova the interethnic relations have some peculiarities largely due to policy of Communist Party promoted over half of a century. If in the U.S. ethno-cultural variety was the result of individual and family migration of people, who speak different languages, profess different religions and belong to different cultures and races, the ethno-cultural variety of the former USSR, largely resulted from the expansion of people on large territories that were inhabited by other people who were at different stages of economic development, spoke different
languages and belonged to different cultures. This is only one peculiarity of the situation. But there is another aspect: in the former USSR it was propagated a policy of denationalization, organized and carried out by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and on the other hand, granted a status of superiority to Russian "minorities" (people of Russian origin). As a result of such policy, other minorities, trying to preserve their national character, were "secluded", as a response to propagated policy. "Seclusion" had been more profound, the more insistent had been the effects of propagated policy. As a result, during the transition to a democratic society, ethnic minorities in Moldova could not or did not want to get rid of the shell in which they have been preserved for several decades, demonstrating reluctance to integrate into the new society (Macovei, Svetlicinii, 2001: 20).

In Moldova there are heated debates also on issues of "state language", "second mother tongue", "communication language" related to the status of Russian language. These debates have always been placed in the context of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities (Bogdan, 2007: 7). International standards developed in the second half of the twentieth century show a special concern for the linguistic rights of national minorities in order to eliminate discriminatory policies pursued against them. At the same time these rules encourage the assimilation policies of the states and the studying the state languages by persons belonging to national minorities as an element of integration. As long as the policy of integration is not transformed into a policy of linguistic terrorism and grammatical hegemony and is made with respect for human rights, benefits and advantages of knowing official language by the persons belonging to national minorities are undeniable. Studying official language is the premise of social unity and social cohesion and integration factor (Bogdan, 2007: 7). The compulsory knowledge of official language is not discriminatory because it does not necessarily require people to communicate with each other all the time in that language. The official language is the language of public authorities, the language in which the state exercises its authority.

The above listed peculiarities complicate the achievement of effective assimilation policies in Moldova. But in a democratic society this process may take place more rapidly, being supported by an appropriate policy of coexistence. The adherents of policy of existence demonstrate, citing the experience of Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands that democracy and multiethnic state phenomena can be compatible. Analysing the case of Moldova we can see the attempts of carrying out policy of coexistence that despite its attractive and "democratic" character creates enough problems to ethnic minorities, giving them the inferior position compared with the titular population (Macovei, Svetlicinii, 2001: 23).

In the case of Republic of Moldova an attempt to implement the both methods would have a wholesome effect. In order obtain a positive result the
collaboration of the both parties is necessary, accompanied by a desire to live in a democratic society. And state policy towards ethnic minorities is only effective if along with the protection of their national, linguistic, religious identity the political naturalization of minorities is promoted, so they can fit more effectively in the national community. Political parties can become a catalyst for integration of national minorities in the local environment, effectively combining the interests of titular ethnic group with those of ethnic minorities, putting emphasis on democratic developing of the country, aimed at prosperity and welfare.

In conclusion, we find the fact that the main problem of national minorities remains a priority for the Moldovan parties. Political parties do not only express the interests of certain ethnic groups, but also form and coherently consolidate these interests. They are practically the only institutions designed to ensure civic consensus, the development and implementation of national policies in practice depending especially on them. Harmonization of interethnic relations is the goal of national policy, a strategic necessity for peaceful coexistence of titular ethnic group with minority ethnicities, the main task of governance, failure of realizing which may constitute a threat for stability and an obstacle to European integration of the country. Multicultural character of our society should contribute to enhancing local cultural values, but in no case interethnic conflicts. Development and implementation into practice of a balanced ethnic-national policy, based on mutual respect, where the national features are preserved and developed should be kept always on the agenda of local political party activity.

The success of democratic transition in Moldova depends on the affirmation of civic values and identity, representing the dynamics of adaptation to new social and political conditions, the capacity to form a favourable psychological climate for people, the awareness of value and common norms system which would guide their behaviour (Anghel, 2004: 73). This process requires consolidation and solidarity of these general civic interests of people, putting them above those of the group, without any imputation of the latter ones; it must be led by political forces, since they are the institutional mobilizing force. Reality shows that Moldova's national policy has evolved from mono-ethnic concept of nation-state society (early 90s of XX century) to the concept of nation state with poly-ethnic society (mid-90s of XX century), that today we have multinational state with a poly-ethnic society (Moșneaga, 2001: 152). National identity got a civic dimension, which means the awareness of individuals as citizens of the state, being the base of common goals. The formula "all citizens of Moldova are Moldovans" is a successful one, and its prospects of construction depends directly on the success of the reform in the economic, political, social domain, because the desire to be a citizen of this state means the willingness to be a part of this nation.
During the existence of the Republic of Moldova as an independent state we have managed to accumulate a lot of experience in development and implementation of ethnic policies. The political parties’ activity contributes to the harmonization of interethnic relations when they reflect the whole variety of interests in society, and are based on constitutional mechanisms of achieving these interests. If the party’s ideological component is replaced with an emphasis on ethno-national differences, its activity leads to unfrozen of inter-ethnic relations within a poly-ethnic society. Nowadays we need a strong idea that will be able to integrate the national society. Such ideas can become European integration, which in turn can provide a national identity, widely - European, that do not support exclusion, xenophobia and repression untitled groups, it will contribute to harmonization of interethnic relations, reconcile different parts of the society interests. Experience shows that European countries balanced relations between ethnic groups in a multiethnic state are the condition of prosperity and social progress. Functioning democracy, human rights, a decent life, economic and political stability are as the civic consensus, which can only be achieved firstly through political consensus between existed political forces.

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NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Nataliya NECHAYEVA-YURIYCHUK

Abstract. This article is dedicated to the main issues of national minorities being in Ukraine. The author analyzes the Ukrainian law in the sphere of protecting of national minorities rights, the level of implementation of international agreements in this direction by Ukraine. The problems and perspectives of national communities of Bukovyna region and Crimea peninsula are observed in the article. The author points out that the position of such national communities as Romanian, Moldovan and Russian in named regions is very good. They are protected by Ukrainian state and have wide possibilities for realization their national-cultural, educational etc. rights. At the same time, Crimean Tatars need more attention from Ukrainian state, especially in educational sphere.

Keywords: national minority, Framework Convention, national policy, national minorities’ language, educational policy.

1. The Scientific Base of Research.

1.1. The state of scientific research development issues.

The current position of Ukrainian science development is characterized by a number of studies dedicated to the implementation of Council of Europe standards in national minorities’ protection in Ukraine.

It’s necessary to make some fundamental observations about the state of scientific development of the problems. When the Council of Europe was
founded and European Convention on Human Rights was drafted, its authors decided not to include economic, social and cultural rights. That was done because the most part of experts considered that the state should play a much more active and offensive role in those spheres, than it was required for the realization of civil and political rights.

Such differentiation stimulated the developing in the Council of Europe frames few special conventions and agreements, directed to the protection of the wide spectrum of national minorities’ rights. From the early beginning it was obvious that the rights proclaimed by the European Social Charter or by Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, will not receive legal status in the sense that individuals will not be able to defend them in court on international level.


The aim of scientific research is to analyze the comprehensive study of international aspects of national minorities’ protection, the peculiarities of national minorities’ status in Ukraine and, consequently, public policy’s analysis on ensuring national minorities’ rights and freedoms. The historical aspects and current trends of development of international legal protection of minority rights; the implementation level of international legal principles and norms in the national legal system of Ukraine; and the position of national minorities and the prospects of their development in Ukraine are analyzed in the research.

The methodological basis of the study is the modern theory of knowledge of social phenomena, and the basic provisions of international law doctrine; General theoretical principles and approaches to determining the constitutional-legal status of national minorities are used in the research.

Ethno-political science provides research of such aspects of social and political life. Ethno-politics and related to it sciences are intensively developed by scientists of the Russian Federation, like A.Abashidze (Абашидзе, 1996), R.Valeev (Валеев, 1996), S.Glotov (Глотов С., 1998), A.Tiunov (Тиунов А., 1991) etc.

Noticeable impact on research of European standards implementation in Ukraine was done by Ukrainian researchers B.Babin (Бабин Б., 2002), C.Verlanov (Верланов С., 2005), D.Kytsenko (Киценко Д., 1996).
Such researchers as G.Paly (Палій Г., 2005), A.Kolody¹, I.Losiv² and others have done the analysis of the problems of national self-determination.

Peculiarities of Russian national identity in the Crimea, its main problems are fully disclosed in the works of Russian authors O.Volkohonova and A.Polunova (Волкогонова, Полунов, 2008: 144-163).

After Ukraine joined the Council of Europe and ratified the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, its legal system has undergone significant changes in the direction of democratization, rule of law, and human rights protecting. After independence one of the biggest achievements of Ukrainian state was the preserving of international peace and harmony, the avoidance of potential threats to international conflicts. Public ethno-political management can be evaluated as successful. It’s obvious that without the proper attitude of society, which is formed by citizens themselves, this result would be difficult to achieve (Котигоренко, 2002: 64-111).

The purpose of international legal regulation of national minorities’ protection is, particularly, protection of cultural diversity as the common heritage of human civilization and preventing inter-ethnic conflicts, resolving them peacefully. Practice shows that the implementation of minority rights can be guaranteed by effective interaction of international and national law, rules which are designed to ensure their protection.

Problems of national minorities have not only domestic but also interstate meaning for Ukraine. Considerable attention in international relations, particularly with neighboring countries is paid to this issue not only by politicians, but also by many domestic scholars. V.Evtukh, L.Aza, V.Troschynsky, I.Prybitkova and many other social scientists are examining the ethnic-conflict problems. Russian scientists L.Drobyzheva, A.Aklayev, V.Koroteyeva, G.Soldatov, J.Bromley explore the institutional solutions, the behavior of ethnic and ethnic-regional subjects of their country.

The necessity of research is escalated by insufficient degree of scientific development of the theme. Theory of nations, ethnic relations and nationalism is now an interdisciplinary field of knowledge, which is covering philosophical, sociological, political, legal, psychological and other studies. A number of issues in studying of these problems are not illuminated. Thus, relatively little attention is being paid to the problems of national minorities integration into the Ukrainian society, to the formation of national identities of ethnic groups living in Ukraine, particularly in Crimea and in Bukovina.

¹ Колодій А. Радянська ідентичність та її носії в незалежній Україні, on May 26, 2009, http://www.politics.lviv.ua/nations/soviet3.html
1.2. Analysis of the source base.

Study and analysis of the Ukraine’s constitutional obligations on national minorities’ protection, their status in Ukraine, peculiarities of their integration into Ukrainian society is impossible without a broad source base.


“The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, and European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages have recently become an important component of the current national legislation in the field of interethnic relations. Collection of legal acts is containing the above-mentioned documents and the relevant provisions of other laws of Ukraine (Збірник нормативно-правових актів держкомнацміграції, 2003). It also includes the texts of decrees, orders of the President of Ukraine, legal acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The problem of the language situation in Crimea was analyzed by the researcher A.Emirova (Емірова, 1998: 121-126; Емірова, 1994: 60-63). To the studying of the experience of language policies in the world and Ukrainian prospects in it L.Lazarenko has devoted his research (Лазаренко, 2002: 3-22).

V. Mushkeresh in his article “Language Tolerance in the Crimea as a cultural phenomenon of the multiethnic Ukrainian society” tried to make a theoretical analysis of the content of the notion of tolerance, to outline guidelines for the development of language tolerance in Crimea as part of inter-ethnic relations.

In this article the author made an independent attempt to analyze the experience of Ukraine in implementation of the declared principles of the Framework Convention. The author has also analyzed the status of national minorities in Bukovyna and the Crimea, the main problems of their integration into the Ukrainian cultural, social and political life. Analysis of the source base and used literature shows that this area is actual theme for scientific research.

On our opinion, the issue on status and prospects of national minorities in Crimea and in Bukovyna is not fully developed. This problem remains relevant and requires thorough research.

2. Legal Aspects of National Minorities Position in Ukraine

2.1. Legislative base of national minorities’ rights in Ukraine

The formation of Ukraine as the independent state required a transformation of governance in all spheres of Ukrainian society, including ethno-political. As a result, ethno-political system of state administration was formed. The basis of state national policy, including its legal basis, is represented by the Parliament of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and Ukraine’s President and his Administration. These state institutions approved a number of important legal documents in ethnic policy-making (Котигоренко, 2002: 64-111).

On November 1, 1991 the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the “Declaration of Rights of Nationalities”. In the preamble to it was stated that “on the territory of Ukraine live more than 100 nationalities”.

In article 1 of the “Declaration of Rights of Nationalities” “Ukrainian State guarantees to all peoples, national groups, citizens living on its territory equal political, economic, social and cultural rights”. And “discrimination based on nationality is prohibited and punishable by law”. This “Declaration...” proclaims the equality of citizens of Ukraine before the law regardless of national and ethnic origin. In the following articles of the “Declaration of the Rights of National Minorities” Ukraine guarantees to the representatives of all national minorities and ethnic groups living on its territory the right to freely use their language in all spheres of life, including education, manufacturing, media. In addition, the “Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine” guarantees to all national communities living in Ukraine, the ability to freely practice their own religion, to use national symbols, to follow their own national traditions, the right to create their own national-cultural societies, and the right “to free contacts with their historic homeland”.

In June, 1992 the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk signed the Law “On national minorities in Ukraine”. It was previously adopted by the Parliament of Ukraine. This law consists of 19 articles. It is intended to regulate ethnic relations in the contemporary Ukraine. The law establishes the equality of citizens before the law of Ukraine, “regardless of national origin”. This Law places before them the same requirements – “citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities must respect the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect language, culture, traditions, customs, and religious identity of the Ukrainian people and all minorities”. The


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law guarantees to all national minorities the right of national-cultural autonomy, i.e. the right to freely use, study the language through cultural associations and public institutions, preserving and developing national traditions, to profess their own religion etc.

National, non-government and cultural associations are entitled to have a free and full development of their right in establishing and maintaining relationships with their national associations outside Ukraine, including obtaining financial assistance from them.

Thus, from 1991, Ukraine adopted a number of legislative acts, which consolidated the basic provisions of state policy on national minorities in Ukraine. National minorities received state guarantees of their rights and freedoms.

2.2. The implementation of international standards for protecting minority rights by Ukraine

According to UN and UNESCO documents, the nation state is the state in which title nation covers 67% of the population. According to the National Census in Ukraine (2001), the overwhelming majority of citizens are Ukrainian (37,541.7 thousand, or 77.8% of the total population). The remaining 22.2% of the population belongs to ethnic minorities. Therefore, satisfaction of ethnic and cultural needs of citizens of Ukraine, who consider themselves as the members of national minorities, is the important part of state policy (Збірник нормативно-правових актів держкомнацміграції, 2003: 286).


Ukraine has signed many international multilateral treaties concerning the protection of national minorities. It consistently implements the European and world standards of ethnic policy in the life (Полешко, 1999: 23). Thus, Ukraine has gradually introduced to life not only the provisions of the FC, but also the Hague Recommendations regarding the rights of national minorities to education, the Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities, Lund Recommendations on Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life etc.7

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7 Гаазькі рекомендації щодо прав національних меншин і пояснювальна записка, on February 1, 2010, gaazki_recommendations1996[1].pdf; Осовські рекомендації щодо мовних прав національних меншин і пояснювальна записка, on February 1, 2010, oslovski_recommendations1998[1].pdf; Лундські рекомендації про ефективну участь
It should be noted that substantive provisions of the FC on ensuring political, social, cultural and linguistic rights of national minorities are reflected in national legislation of Ukraine (the Constitution of Ukraine, the Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, different Ukrainian laws). It is necessary to note that Ukraine adopted so-called “zero option”: its citizens are all citizens of the former USSR, which at the time of independence of Ukraine (August 24, 1991) were living on its territory and all persons regardless of race, color, ethnicity, socio-demographic and other characteristics, which at the time of entry into force of the Law of Ukraine “On Citizenship of Ukraine” (November 13, 1991) permanently residing in Ukraine and were not citizens of other states. Thus, all non-Ukrainian nationality citizens of Ukraine have the right to make decision on their own about their citizenship.

In order to prevent the spread of xenophobia, racist and anti-Semitic information through computer systems in April, 2005 Ukraine has signed the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cyber crime. The President of Ukraine introduced a separate unit for detecting and stopping activities aimed for inciting racial or national hatred in the structure of the Security Service.

From April, 16 to April, 20, 2007 experts of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) made a regular cycle of monitoring of Ukraine in the context of the draft of third report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. In Article 35 of the conclusions on Ukraine, the Advisory Committee noted that in general a spirit of tolerance and interethnic dialogue is spread in Ukraine. However, the debate on language issues have caused tension in Ukraine and led to statements and actions (including government officials) that contradict the principles laid down in Article 6 of the Framework Convention. In particular, it refers to the debate over the Ukrainian and Russian languages, as well as to legislative initiatives in this area (including the Crimea)\(^8\).

FC provides broad rights and freedoms of national minorities, including the religious. According to experts, Ukraine kept peaceful interfaith relations (Доповідь Міжнародної організації релігійної свободи за 2004 рік, 2004: 67).

The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees the “free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine” (Article 10), the right for education in their native language or study their native language (Article 53); forbids privileges or restrictions on linguistic grounds (Article 24). Article 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Article 6 of the Law of Ukraine “On national minorities in Ukraine” guarantee citizens belonging to national minorities the right to educate in their native language or to study their

native language in state and communal educational institutions and through national cultural societies. The language issue in Ukraine is also governed by Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine “On ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages” (Гіждіван, 1999: 27-29).

The right of writing sign, inscriptions and other information in minority languages is guaranteed by Articles 35 and 38 of the Law “On languages in Ukraine”. The right on education of national minorities is declared by Article 12 of FC (paragraphs 1, 2, 3). It is fully implemented in Ukraine. Ukrainian state provides and funds training of teachers for schools with the education in minority languages. These specialists are studying in 15 state universities of the country. In addition, training teachers for ethnic minorities’ schools in Ukraine is also provided by private higher education institutions - the International Solomon University, other private universities.

The letter-instruction of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (October 7, 1996) established the procedure of creating classes and groups for studying in minority language by the request of parents. It determined that the group should consist of groups of students from at least 8-10 persons in urban areas and 5 persons in rural areas. The right for education in national minorities’ languages is impossible without the support of the educational process by relevant textbooks and manuals. During recent years about 200 titles of official publications, textbooks and manuals were published to meet the cultural and educational needs of pupils from national minorities. It was done on the basis of the annual State Program on issuing literature in minority languages. In particular, for pupils of 1-2 classes 26 titles of textbooks and manuals in Polish, Romanian, German, Hungarian languages were published. Common with the Romanian and Hungarian sides there were also published books on the history of Hungarian and Romanian peoples (Українська книга, 2005: 47).

After the declaration of sovereignty and independence of Ukraine the returning of the persons deported in the 1940s (the Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, ethnic Germans, Romanians) and their peaceful integration in Ukrainian society can be considered as an example of Ukraine's compliance with human rights, regardless of ethnicity and nationality. The legal basis for the returning was the Bishkek multilateral agreement (1992). The famous fact is that the decision to deport these people was taken by Soviet power. Ukraine has done an act of goodwill by turning back its former compatriots. Ukraine made a series of laws aimed to protect the rights of formerly deported peoples. Ukraine has provided to persons who have returned, citizenship, housing, assistance in solving socio-economic problems.

Minorities in Ukraine have the opportunity to create a variety of social, cultural, educational organization. At the national level there are the following non-governmental organizations as the Association of National Societies and
communities of Crimea (15 organizations), Confederation of national-cultural societies of western Ukraine (about 10 organizations) etc. Ukraine ratified the FC without any reservations. At the same time Ukraine is trying to improve its ethno-national policy, to develop new projects to ensure a high level of tolerance and mutual respect in Ukrainian society.

3. Peculiarities of the Position and Prospects of Ethnic and Cultural Communities of Bukovyna and the Crimea Development.

3.1. Ensuring the rights of ethnic communities in Bukovyna: Problems and Perspectives.

According to the census 2001, Chernivtsi region is inhabited by 80 nationalities, the largest of which are Ukrainian (75%), Romanians (12.5%), Moldovans (7.3%), Russians (4, 1%). Poles, Jews, Belarusians, and Germans are about 1% of the population.

Statistics of 2006 confirmed that the number of Romanians and Moldovans in Chernivtsi region remained unchanged (12.5% of the population consider themselves Romanians, 7.3% - Moldovans). The area, densely populated by the Romanian and Moldovan population (which together makes up 19.8%) is Hertsaiv, Glyboka, Storozhinetes and Novoselytsya districts. There are 11 Romanian national-cultural societies in Chernivtsi region, in particular the Regional Association of Romanian culture named after M.Eminescu, which has 10 thousand members. It is the founder of media organ - the newspaper “Play rominesk” and the bilingual edition of “Bell Bukovyna”.

In the information space Romanian and Moldovan communities have 12 periodicals, including “Concordia” and “Zorile Bukovinei” financed from the state budget. There are also some districts newspapers, like “Gazeta de Hertz”, “Native Land”, “New Day”, “Word of truth” (bilingual). 426 hours of annual television broadcast and 230 hours of radio broadcast are preparing by Romanian edition of Chernivtsi Regional State TV and Radio Company (which has national ownership) (Нечаєва-Юрійчук, Юрійчук, 2011: 90).

One of the most important needs of each national community is the possibility to study their native language. In Bukovyna the representatives of the Romanian-Moldovan communities have no problems with education in their native language. From 450 schools operating in 2005/2006 school year, 81 were Romanian and 10 - mixed (with the Romanian and Ukrainian language of

education). In percentage terms this represents about 20% of the total number of schools and covers the common interest of Romanian and Moldovan population in Chernivtsi region. In total over 20 thousand pupils are studying Romanian language, learn it, and also Romanian and Moldovan literature, history, culture.

On May 26, 2008 Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine Vakarchuk signed a decree № 461 “On approval of the program of improvement Ukrainian language learning in secondary schools with minority languages of study in 2008-2011”\(^{10}\). By this degree, from September 1, 2008 in secondary schools with minority languages of study the number of hours of the Ukrainian literature and language was increased. This program provided a number of measures designed to help graduates from schools with minority languages of education to join any higher education institution in Ukraine, to search themselves in future professional activity in Ukraine.

However, this order has caused a huge response from the staff of secondary schools, national public and cultural societies, especially Romanian. And the consensus in their assessments of this order was not observed. The teachers of schools with Romanian language of study adequately assess the situation and realize how difficult for their graduate exams, how problematic for them is studying and realization in professional life without knowledge of Ukrainian (state) language. G.Popescu, school director in the village Bukivka (Hertsar district) said: “This is very good. Now our pupils will better understand the Ukrainian language, because it is so necessary. When I said to parents, children and teachers that the number of hours in learning Ukrainian language would increase, it sounded positively for everybody”\(^{11}\).

But some representatives of Romanian societies of Bukovyna believe that the draft document was prepared by government “without the involvement of linguistic minorities”. Moreover, on their opinion, this order of the Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine was directed “against national and cultural rights of national minorities and contradicts the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages”\(^{12}\). Member of the Chernivtsi Regional Council B. Terytsanu during the press-club discussion (held on December 23, 2008), announced the open letter to the president of Ukraine, Prime Minister, Speaker of Ukraine, the Parliament of Ukraine Commissioner for Human Rights N. Karpachova on the draft Concept of State language policy, which, according to his opinion, violated their constitutional rights. The letter was signed by leaders

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of the Romanian community of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Council of Russian Compatriots, All-Ukrainian Council of the Democratic Union of Hungarians of Ukraine.\(^{13}\)

According to the opinion of the mentioned above representatives of national cultural societies, this order shows an almost violent Ukrainization. Position of Romanian teachers and public-political figures shows the versatility of this problem. While for parents and teachers learning Ukrainian language by national communities’ representatives is logical, necessary and very positive phenomenon, for representatives of national-cultural societies this degree contains a political dimension. They use it for their own PR as “defenders of their native language and culture”.

Representatives of Ukrainian authorities believe that this order “is intended to help pupils from schools with minority languages education”. As the Deputy Head of Education and Science of Chernivtsi Regional State Administration, Head of the pre-school, secondary school education and the Chernivtsi Regional Administration B.Poturnak said, “this order only aims to help pupils with school in minority languages education. For now, wherever you go, everywhere you need official language”\(^{14}\).

The language issue was and remains relevant in Ukraine till now. On our opinion, the main problem is its politicization. On the one hand, the part of the Romanian population of the region supports the idea of a deep study of the Ukrainian language. They understand that for Romanian and Moldovan young people it becomes increasingly difficult to find them in Ukrainian social, political and economic life without knowledge of the state language. It's not a secret that for many students from Hertsa, Glyboka districts of Chernivtsi region it is difficult to study in Ukrainian language the specialty because of lack of language practice (both written and oral). This, in turn, affects on the quality of knowledge acquired by them. It also affects on their future professional level.

As for higher education, from 2002/2003 academic year in Y.Fed'kovych Chernivtsi National University at mathematic, physics, chemical, biological, geographical and other departments mini-groups in Romanian language are opening (in the recruitment of 10 or more students of Moldovan and Romanian origin). There is also Romanian language and literature department in Chernivtsi University, which in 2006-2007 academic years enrolled 102 students.

The Pedagogical College of Y.Fed'kovych Chernivtsi National University is enrolling around 100 students, which are going to be teachers in Romanian and Moldovan schools.

\(^{13}\) Чернівецькі румунії не хочуть вчити історію та математику українською мовою, on April 24, 2009, http://zik.com.ua/ua/print/2008/12/23/163351

Each year graduates from Y.Fed’koych Chernivtsi National University go on their studying in higher education institutions of Romania and Moldova.

If we analyze and summarize all financial support provided by the Ukrainian authorities to national-cultural development of the Romanian and Moldovan ethnic community, it becomes obvious that Ukraine has allocated funds to support the Romanians in Chernivtsi region much more than neighboring states. Including Romanian language and mixed language schools of the region, the sum is over 51 800 thousand USD.

At the same time there is a disharmony in the social life of the Romanian and Moldovan minority in Bukovyna. According to 2001 census 52% of Romanians did not know Ukrainian. In most localities Hertsa, Glyboka and Storozhets’ districts bilingual signs are established. All Romanian secondary schools, village councils have bilingual signs. That's why the part of the population (10%) is detached from social and political life. They are limited in professional and career development in Ukraine. Taking into account the fact that any person who wants to be realized in any country, should study the official (or state language) of the country, the question arises, where do the representatives of Romanian and Moldovan community who refuse to study the state language in Ukraine see their future and the future of their children. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a similar situation in neighboring Romania, which is very concerned about the Romanian community and ensuring their rights in Ukraine.

Thus national and cultural rights of the Romanian and Moldovan communities of Bukovyna are provided at the appropriate level. On our opinion, these communities have positive prospects for the preservation of their national and cultural identity in Ukraine.

3.2. Crimea: the specific features of ethnic situation

Crimea is the most controversial and ethnically diverse region of Ukraine. Crimea is the most multiethnic region of Ukraine. It is home for over 125 ethnic groups. About 58% of the population is Russians. The last in general in Ukraine are representatives of national minorities. Ukrainians in Crimea are only 24.3%, Tatars - 12%, Armenians - 0.4%, Azerbaijanis, Moldovans, Jews – 0.2%, Greeks - 0.1% (Кринична, 2005: 52-53).

Specific feature of ethno-political relations in Crimea is the belonging of population to different religious faiths. By data of 2002, in Crimea 972 religious organizations, including 847 religious communities, 48 denominations and several different religious confessions, were functioned. The number of religious organizations has increased in 20 times and religious diversity – in 4 times
compared with 1989. Dominant position in the Crimea is taken by Orthodoxy and Islam, which unite under 43 and 30% of all religious organizations.

Returning and resettlement of Crimean Tatars in Crimea, their integration into Ukrainian society is a unique precedent in the world. According to the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Crimea the number of repatriated citizens reached 265.5 thousand by 2004. Tatars are 243.4 thousand of them.

The situation is complicated by the fact that Ukrainian state left alone-on-one with this problem: neither Russia nor Uzbekistan is concerned about the fate of their immigrants, although previously in Bishkek it was agreed on joint participation in the resettlement of immigrants.

Crimean Tatar problem for Ukraine is a certain political and socio-economic triad – the repatriation, the adaptation (social improvement) and the integration of Crimean Tatars into Ukrainian socio-cultural and political space. The Parliament of Ukraine has adopted the necessary legal framework to solve this problem (including Regulation and Laws of the Supreme Council of 25 December 1990, May 13, 1992, June 30, 1992, 6 April 1995, etc.).

An important aspect of this problem is the ensuring of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of Crimean Tatars, guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine. But from 606 schools, which operate in the Crimea, only 16 schools and 133 classes are with the Crimean Tatar language of learning. They enrolled 5,872 pupils. However, the problem of teachers is not fully solved in these schools.

The opening of Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University with more than three thousand students of different nationalities (although preference is given to the Crimean Tatars), the Crimean Tatar Republican Library and the reconstruction of the Crimean Tatar Music and Drama Theatre became the important events in the social life of the Crimea. The research center of the Crimean Tatar language and literature was established on the basis of the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University.

There are exhibitions on history and culture of national minorities in Ukraine in Crimean Republican museum, Simferopol Art Museum, in many city, district, and regional museums, located in peninsula. Recently, the new museum institutions were opened. Among them an important place occupies the Crimean Republican Museum of Art. Dozens of monuments of history and culture of Crimean Tatars are under the protection of the state.

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There are the national TV and radio stations in state TV Company “Crimea”. Crimean Tatar version has three hours of radio air time per week. The state also supports the print edition of the Crimean Tatars. In late 1991 the Council of Ministers of Crimea moved to Simferopol the edition of the newspaper “Yanъy Dun” (“New World”). The first issue of this newspaper came out in January, 1992. The publishing of other magazines and newspapers (including the children's magazine “Yыldыzchyк”) in Crimean Tatars’ language was started that year (Нечаєва-Юрійчук, Юрійчук, 2011: 82).

In November, 1990 state budget laboratory for preparation of textbooks and manuals on Crimean Tatar language and literature was established. In 1993, according to the decision of Council of Ministers of Crimea, an educational publishing house “Krymuchpedhyz” was created. It was opened for preparing textbooks and teaching literature for schools and specialized secondary educational institutions of the Crimea.

The cultural events of national cultural societies and communities in Crimea, including the Crimean Tatars are supported on a regular basis from the national budget since 2001.

Crimean Tatars are Muslims by their faith. As it was noted above, Muslim communities are rather active in the Crimea. Ukrainian state has returned the ownership of around 40 religious buildings and about the 20 - in free use. Since independence, Ukraine built 50 religious buildings in the Crimea17. Thus, the Crimean Tatars have sufficient conditions for exercising the rights of citizens to freedom of conscience and faith.

Crimean Tatars actively participate in social and political life not only in Crimea but also all over Ukraine. For example, during the election campaign of 2002 the Crimean Tatars have gained indisputable political success. In 2002 they received Deputy Chairman of the Parliament of Crimea, Deputy Chairman of the Commission on international relations and problems of deported citizens, and Secretary of the Commission on Agricultural and Land Affairs, Environment and Natural Resources. During the election campaign of 2002 the Crimean Tatars significantly changed the ethnic composition of the deputies of the councils on all levels.

The Russian community of Crimea has the best opportunity for implementation of their ethnic and cultural needs. In total 177,863 159,359 schoolchildren are educated in Russian (which is 89.6%). Among college students this percentage is even higher - 96 (4% remaining in the Ukrainian language study, and nobody in Crimean Tatar language). In higher education

institutions of III-IV accreditation levels 89.5% of students are studying in Russian (and nobody in Crimean Tatar).

The information space of autonomy is clearly dominated by Russian and pro-Russian ideology. Total (once) circulation Russian-language printed materials issued in the Crimea is more than 1.5 million copies. TV and radio in the Crimea are in the Russian language mostly (Нечасева-Юрійчук, Юрійчук, 2011: 86-87).

According to the Committee on Monitoring of Press Freedom, Crimean journalistic corps consists of 90% of Russian journalists working in Russian-language press. The analysis of the situation in Crimea suggests that there is a competition in autonomy between Russian-speaking population (so-called Slavic community) and the Crimean Tatars for the symbolic-values space and historical rootedness on the peninsula. The most significant examples of such confrontation are controversy surrounding the figure of Parthenius Kyzyltashskoho and the situation around the construction of the Cathedral memorial mosque (Juma Jami) in Simferopol.

A variety of civic organizations play the important role in the socio-political activity of Russian Community of Crimea. They began to appear on the peninsula in the turn of 1980-1990’s. From the beginning the main objective of such structures was the protection of national cultural, historical and linguistic identity of the Russian population of Crimea. In 1989 branch of the All-Union Society “Memorial” where worked prominent politicians in the future, including future Crimea president Yuri Meshkov was officially registered in the Crimea.

Today in the Crimea there is a lot of NGOs that have pro-Russian position and express the interests of the Russian community (for instance, the Popular Front “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia”, “Russian Community of Crimea” etc).

Analysis of Russian organizations in Crimea showed that the policy of unity with the historical homeland - Russia, the preservation of historical memory, a sense of belonging to Russian culture is the most important part of their activity.

Thus, the position of the Russian community in Crimea is stable. It has the opportunities to secure national rights and freedoms. It has the full support of the Crimean government, much of which also belong to this ethnic group. Representatives of the Russian community in Crimea are the ethnic majority of population of the peninsula.

Conclusions

Summarizing, we can conclude that the basic documents managing the status of national minorities in Ukraine are the “Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine” and the Law “On national minorities in Ukraine”. These are legal instruments of European standards of ethnic policy towards ensuring the rights and freedoms of national minorities. As a member of the Council of Europe, OSCE, UN and other international organizations, Ukraine has adopted a number
of international legal instruments designed to harmonize ethnic relations in the state, protect them from firing up ethnic conflicts.

The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was one of the basic international documents adopted by Ukraine. Ukrainian government is trying to fully implement the assumed international obligations with respect to the rights of national minorities in all spheres of life. Ukraine finances (as much as possible) the activities of national cultural societies, including publishing newspapers and airtime on radio and television, education in minority languages.

At the same time Ukraine is trying to improve its ethno-national policy, paying attention to new projects of ensuring of high level tolerance and mutual respect in Ukrainian society. It should also be noted that the representatives of ethnic communities living in Ukraine, have the opportunity to realize their national and cultural rights fully. They have the possibility to learn in their native language, to provide cultural, educational, social activities within the framework of national cultural societies and public organizations.

In Bukovyna the largest ethnic groups are Moldovan and Romanian. Their main national-cultural needs are provided with a number of educational, cultural and civic institutions which are active in the Chernivtsi region.

As for Crimea, the situation is different. The Russians, who make up the largest ethno-national group of the peninsula, have the best opportunities to ensure their national and cultural rights, while the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups need more attention and support from the government in this direction.

So, today's Ukraine is actively shaping its ethnic policy based on international legal instruments towards wider provision of minority rights.

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OLD AND NEW IDENTITIES IN THE UPPER ADRIATIC: 
IS A CROSS-BORDER KIND OF CITIZENSHIP
EMERGING IN CROSS-BORDER REGIONS?

Elisabetta NADALUTTI*

Abstract. The 1990s have witnessed a strong debate around the emergence of a new kind of citizenship in Europe. This paper analyses the ways in which identity and citizenship are being reshaped in cross-border areas following the implementation of EU CBC programmes and civil society mobilization, with reference to the Upper Adriatic area. First, it offers a brief theoretical background on citizenship. Second, it investigates how different cross-border grassroots stakeholders relate to each other in the process of implementing CBC projects, and through their interaction construct new meanings, interests, and values and revisit their identities. It concludes by arguing that the constant interaction between societal and political cross-border actors at the local/elite level is leading to greater mutual understanding, long-term transnational initiatives and an increasing emphasis on shared interests and values.

Keywords: cross-border cooperation, cross-border region, citizenship, EU, Interreg, transnationalism, multi-culturalism, post-nationalism.

1. Introduction

The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a sustained debate around the meaning of citizenship (Soysal, 1994; Shaw, 1998; Bertossi, 2003b; Painter, 2008). After the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War, scholars started to dissociate nationality from citizenship, leading to ‘the new development of paradigms of membership, beyond the uniqueness of national identity as a resource of equality’ (Bertossi, 2003: 5). Different

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Theoretical approaches to citizenship stressing pluralism, multiculturalism, ethnic and cultural hybridity, multiple and fragmented identities, spatial complexity and transnationalism have consequently emerged (Painter, 2008; Kymlicka, 1995; Meehan, 1993; 1995; Soysal, 1994). These new approaches seek to articulate how citizenship, and its main elements - identity, rights, and participation - are developing and transforming within the EU.

The Commission (EU White Paper, 2001: 11, 18) is trying to find innovative ways to redefine relationships, overcoming social and cultural barriers, foster economic growth. Citizenship practices and identities nowadays transcend the narrow boundaries of the nation-state, and different channels through which grass-root citizens can civically, socially and politically participate within the EU arena are emerging (Perkmann, 2003). In this context, cross border regions (CBRs) which are particularly problematic in relation to citizenship because of the coexistence of different cultures, ethnicities, political, administrative and social systems, have been identified by the EU as ideal laboratories for testing the development of a new understanding of citizenship and cohesion (Popescu, 2008). Indeed, as highlighted by Anderson, O'Dowd, and Wilson (2003), very often citizenship issues arise specifically from these 'hybrid' areas. Moreover, cross-border cooperation (CBC) activities have been identified by the EU as the channel which may help to embed systems of social protection, boost economic development, cultural promotion, environmental sustainability and social policy (Ferrera and Maino: 2010). Popescu states that when a CBR is formed a 'new' separate territorial, social and economic space develops. It goes beyond the exclusive sovereignty of any single national government, and it exercises authority beyond state borders (Popescu, 2008: 422).

Focusing on the Upper Adriatic region, an area which includes countries at different stages of EU membership (ie., Slovenia, Croatia and Italy) inhabited by both ‘historic’ and ‘new’ ethnic minorities (Faro, 2005) and which was marked in the past by acrimonious ethno-political divisions, the paper argues that it has become a laboratory where a new form of citizenship, able to challenge ‘long-held assumptions about the tight political link between citizenship and the nation state’ (Painter, 2008: 7), is at play. Furthermore, it investigates the reasons behind this recent change.

Specifically, the paper addresses the following questions: what model of citizenship has the EU been promoting through CBC? How have local actors reacted to and mobilised around CBC programmes? Are these actors developing new transnational forms of membership and participation which blur national boundaries and ‘transgress the national order of citizenship’ (Soysal, 1998)?

Drawing on two key theorists whose ideas will be contextualised in relation to CBC, Kimlicka’s multiculturalism (2001, 2002, 2007) and Soysal’s elaboration of post-national citizenship (Soysal, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2001), the
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The paper will then consider the kind of citizenship that has emerged in this area and it will argue that it is close to Soysal's conceptualisation. The paper concludes with an analysis of the reasons why new understandings of citizenship have developed in the area under consideration.

2. Theoretical frameworks

Kymlicka’s original multicultural approach to citizenship and categorization of ‘minority groups’ defined as ‘national communities that share a state with one or more larger nations’ (Kymlicka and Norman, 2001: 19), offers an important contextual framework for this discussion. He focuses mainly on two types of ethno-cultural groups and examines the ways Western democracies have been dealing with ethnocultural diversity in recent decades. One approach concerns the treatment of *substate/minority nationalism* (Kymlicka, 2002: 3). The second trend concerns the treatment of *indigenous people* who should be granted the land claims, cultural protection and self-government rights needed to sustain themselves as distinct societies. Therefore, Kymlicka suggests that there has been a transition from a process of assimilation or indeed exclusion, to a more ‘multicultural’ approach which accommodates diversity within a unitary system.

Kymlicka argues that the consolidation of democracy may have a positive influence because it limits the ability of elites to crush dissenting movements and it increases the number of levels at which minorities can claim their rights (Kymlicka, 2002). He concludes that nowadays, in western liberal-democratic states, different ethnic groups, although sharing a territory, and guaranteed personal freedom, democratic rights, as well as economic security and prosperity, ‘stand with their back to each other’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 14; 2007c). He stresses that what curbs the construction of a truly multicultural society is the fact that ‘minority groups are often seen as a kind of “fifth column”, likely to be working for a neighbouring enemy’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 19; Kymlicka, 2007c). So the securitization of ethnic relations erodes both democratic space to voice minority demands, and the likelihood that those demands will be accepted. Since the dominant group feels victimized by its minorities acting in collaboration with foreign enemies, minorities are seen as allies and collaborators of external entities which have historically damaged or oppressed the majority group. Minorities are therefore labelled as disloyal to the state, and as such should be disempowered (Kymlicka, 2002: 21).

Furthermore, although Kymlicka speaks of different institutional levels at which minority groups can claim their rights, he pictures mainly a top-down approach, where rights are guaranteed either by the state or international organizations. By analysing how minority groups shape a different...
understanding of citizenship across nation-state borders through building relationships with other minority groups as well as with the majority, this paper contributes towards the understanding of a new political/social discourse of governance at the local and regional level. By doing so, it investigates whether majority and minority groups in these areas are indeed ‘parallel societies’ where ‘the state has become more just, inclusive and accommodating, but inter-group relations remain divided and strained’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 11).

In conceptualizing citizenship as post-national and multi-layered, Soysal’s approach is both complementary to and different from Kymlicka’s. Both Soysal (1994) and Kymlicka stress that there is a growing consciousness that the demand for equality is a ‘right’ for all human beings; that the universal right of ‘one’s own culture’ has increasingly been legitimised at the international level, and particularistic individual characteristics such as culture, language, and standard ethnic traits have become variants of the universal core of ‘humanness or selfhood’ (Soysal, 2008: 310). Furthermore, both claim that universalistic rules and conceptions regarding the rights of the individual have emerged in the post-war era and have been formalized and legitimated by a multitude of international codes and laws (Soysal, 1994; Kymlicka, 2007).

However, Soysal introduces the ‘transnational principle’ which clarifies why and how minority groups can ‘connect their claims to broader, institutionalized agendas’ (Soysal, 1997: 515-16) and also explains how minority groups can simultaneously relate to members belonging to the same group, and develop a net of linkages with other groups. As a result, Soysal takes issue with Kymlicka’s perspective when he suggests that citizens in the dominant group are not aware of, and are uninterested in, the internal life of minority groups, and vice versa (Kymlicka, 2002). Since people interact with each other, whatever their lineage, she argues that a new concept of membership is emerging within the EU (Soysal, 1994: 166).

The post-national model suggested by Soysal implies a multiplicity of memberships where ‘universal personhood’ replaces ‘nationhood’ and ‘universal human rights’ replace ‘national rights’ (Soysal, 1994: 142). Furthermore, although Soysal, in agreement with Kymlicka, points out that the nation-state remains the main agent of public functions, without questioning its sovereignty, she argues that the nature and parameters of these functions are increasingly determined at the global level (Soysal, 1994: 144-145). In this respect, the EU has played an important role in shaping a transnational understanding of citizenship, especially through European Community laws and treaties. ‘European citizenship’ is then an emblematic embodiment of postnational membership because citizenship and its legal and normative aspects are based in the wider community and implemented within its member states. Consequently, if we apply Soysal’s framework to CBRs and CBC activities, is there evidence that a different ‘multi-cultural’ understanding of
citizenship has been emerging in CBRs which is transnational in its scope? If this is the case, what role have minority groups played in this process? Has the behaviour of individuals changed in response to CBC activities?

3. The Case Study in Context

This paper is concerned with the border territory between Italy and Slovenia, an area characterized by a complex ethnic composition. The inhabitants include Slovenophones resident in the region of Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (FVG) (estimated numbers in 1994 varied between 80,000 and 100,000); an Italophone minority in Slovenia (3,064 people inhabitant, according to the 1991 census, now separated from the 19,636 Italians living in Croatia); and a number of ‘new’ ‘ethnic groups’ which have recently emerged as minorities. The ‘Friulan people’ is the majority group in the FVG, defined as an ‘ethnic minority’ in 2007 in the proposed new statute of the Region (http://www.lucianoviolante.it/index.php?Itemid=16andid=1405andoption=com_contentandtask=view). There are also Italo-Istrians-Dalmatians who are the descendents of those Italians who left the Slovene littoral during and after WWII. Those organised around the ‘National Association Venetia-Giulia-Dalmatia’ (Associazione Nazionale Venezia Giulia-Dalmazia - ANVGD) have recently started to claim that they constitute a minority comparable to the Slovenian one in Italy. This is the case also for the inhabitants of Resia (a village in FVG) who do not consider themselves as Slovenes (but Slavs), although their commune applied in 2007 in order to be included in those municipalities where the Law on the Protection of the Slovene Linguistic Community (Italian national law 482/2001) is to be implemented. The same applies to the people who live in villages located in the Natison Valley and Canal Valley.

Many scholars have shown an interest in studying this area due to its strategic geographical position, its important role on the European scene and its pluralistic ethnic composition (Bratina, 1997; Faro, 2003; Bufon, 2002). They have stressed that the Commission through CBC is having an impact upon transfrontier cooperation and socio-economic integration, and aims to ‘fuzz’ the Italo-Slovene border through the construction of economic linkages, and the engagement of the ‘border people’ in cross-border activities (Faro, 2003: 121; Bufon, 1998, 2002).

While some scholars suggest that an integrated borderland is very difficult to achieve in this area due to a lack of co-ordination in cross-border activities (Anderson and Bort, 2001), opposition by minority groups and lack of intergroup trust (Faro, 2003), other scholars, have focused on the role played by those ethnic groups who live in the area (Bufon, 2002; Warwick, 1998), without linking this analysis to the role of political institutions or to CBC programmes.
In a nutshell, the above two groups of scholars address different issues in relation to cross-border territory. Starting from the common ground that borders play an important social, cultural, economic, political, and geographical role in constructing new and different identities, the first group of scholars (particularly Faro, 2003), focuses primarily on institutional actors and transformation, while the second group focuses instead on the socio-cultural dimension of cross-border relations. On the other, scholars such as Bufon remarks that it is important to understand and analyse the role played by ethnic and national identities and minority groups in the border territory between Italy and the ex-Yugoslavia (Bufon and Minghi, 2000). However, what they have all in common is that they share the belief that the Upper Adriatic is a laboratory where a ‘new’ model of citizenship can potentially emerge. In this paper I also focus on the mobilization and role of minority groups, but I seek to analyze how minority groups have influenced institutional change and transformation. The novelty of what has been happening in this area can be assessed and understood by linking these two dimensions.

4. The Upper Adriatic Area Since 2007: Towards New Citizenship Practices?

This section draws on 43 in-depth interviews with Slovenian and Italian officials, representing local (in the case of Slovenia, which is still lacking a regional level) and regional authorities (in the case of the FVG region); NGOs and cultural associations, and business organizations. There are many non-profit voluntary associations engaged on the ground to facilitate cooperation and dialogue across the border. I focus here on six main voluntary associations which represent the Italian minority in Slovenia (Unione degli Italiani, founded in 1944 in Čamparovica, in Croatia), the Slovenian minority in Italy (Slovenska kulturno-gospodarska zveza –SKGZ, founded in 1958 in Triest; Svet slovenskih organizacij –SSO, founded in 1976 in Triest; Euroservis-Europrogettazione e Collaborazione transfrontaliera, founded in 2004 in Triest; Slovensko deželno gospodarsko združenje –SDGZ which represents the Slovenian entrepreneurs in Italy; Slovene Research Institute–SLORI, founded in 1974 in Triest), and the associations founded by Italian-Istro-Dalmatians in FVG (Lega Nazionale Gorizia and Comitato Provinciale di Gorizia dell’Associazione Nazionale Venezia Giulia e Dalmazia-ANVGD, founded in 1891).

The fieldwork demonstrates that minority groups (still mainly at the elite level) mobilize through these associations, developing a network of ‘friendship’ and ‘influence’ across the border. The implementation of European CBC programmes, especially the activities promoted under Interreg 2007-13, has led to the establishment of a remarkable net of linkages between associations representing Slovenes, the Slovenian minority in Italy, Italians
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(mainly those living in FVG and Veneto regions) and the Italian minority in Slovenia. Cooperation is now taken for granted, so much so that all my interviewees remarked that ‘border people’ are ‘geographically’, therefore ‘naturally’, inclined to cooperate with each other, because they share the same territory and have to deal with common problems. In particular, CBC programmes are viewed by both minorities as vital tools which stretch social and political ties within and beyond national boundaries, as well as between ethno-national minority groups and across minority and majority groups.

The analysis of EU Commission documentation, shows that although Interreg programmes did not specifically target borderland minority communities with their development priorities (Faro, 2005), there are objectives which have an implicit ‘minority’ focus, such as cross-border cultural and vocational cooperation, or economic development between similar linguistic communities (Rigo, 2006: 93).

The evidence collected during four years of fieldwork between 2007-2013 shows that CBC has been beneficial to both minorities, particularly for the Italian minority in Slovenia. The latter is considerably smaller in size and less organised than the Slovenian minority in Italy. All the interviewees from both minority groups argued that the Slovenian minority played a key role in helping the Italian minority in Slovenia to be able to effectively make use of the tools offered by the EU and therefore to become a dynamic actor in CBC. As an Italian minority representative in Slovenia noted:

> Everything we (the people who work in the Europa office, an NGO Italian association in Slovenia which directly deals with CBC) have learnt is thanks to the Slovenians in Italy. I have built not only an economic relationship with them, but especially a personal friendship. I refer here mainly to the Society of the Euroservis, and its President […] who helped us enormously. He provided us with all his ‘know how’ in CBC activities (interview with an Italian minority representative, Unione Italiana, 3.08.07).

Although the above extract stresses especially the ‘utilitarian’ appreciation of the other minority for practical reasons (i.e. the Slovenian minority group ‘has been helpful’ to the Italian minority), recognising here only the important economic help provided by the Slovenian minority to the Italian one will lead to a restrictive interpretation of what is happening on the ground. The findings show that intercultural contacts are at play here as well, and a more open multicultural realities emerging. The same interviewee expressed the view of the many interviewees who highlighted the fact that minority groups are bound together by cultural linkages and that it is important to move in this direction as well:
There is the need to educate to a multi-cultural, multi-lingual society, to live together, to be integrated into society. These are the values promoted by the EU. Here there are different cultures: the Slovenian, the Italian, the Croatian, the Hungarian ones. All these cultures contributed to develop, to create this territory which is richer, and more beautiful because of them. [...] Therefore, we (the minority groups) want all together to spread a positive vision of ‘our’ presence here (interview with a representative of the Italian minority association in Slovenia, Unione Italiana, 16.04.08).

Both Slovenians and Italian minority representatives stress the importance of this process:

We (the Italian minority in Koper and the Slovenian minority in FVG) worked in order that minority groups become and are subjects of these programmes, a target group, who should have a special role within EU transfrontalier programmes. The EU has given us the tools, but it is very important that we become skilled actors able to make use of them (interview with an Italian minority representative in Slovenia, member of staff of the ‘Europa Office’ in Koper, 16.04.08).

Moreover, EU projects are perceived as helping to overcome stereotypical prejudices rooted at the local level. The outcome is greater social integration and increased motivation to continue to work together. Speaking about the Project ‘MI.MA: Majorities know Minorities’ which belongs to

\(^1\) The project MI. MA. was carried out in 2006 and 2007 by SLORI in Italy and the Unione Italiana in Slovenia and Croatia. The project partners are the Coastal Self-Governing Community of the Italian Nationality and the Italian Centre for Promotion, Culture, Education and Development ‘Carlo Combi’ in Slovenia and the SKGZ, the SSO and the Association of the Friends of the Newspaper Isonzo in Italy. The project was developed in the frame of the Community Initiative Programme Interreg IIIA Italy-Slovenia 2000-2006 and was already carried out for the first time in the period 2004/2005. It arose from a very close cooperation between the Italian community in Slovenia and the Slovene community in Italy. The aim of the project was to raise awareness particularly among young people about the presence of the autochthonous minorities living in the border areas between Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. Through educational and informative activities the project has promoted the knowledge of the Slovenes in Italy and of the Italians in Slovenia and Croatia (http://www.slori.org/index.php?pag=progettiandanno=1andcid=12andlang=en&PHPSESSID=1zfdklqctqandPHPSESSID=1zfdklqctq).
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Interreg III 2000-06 an Italian minority representative of the Unione Italiana noted that:

[...] since in our cross border territory Slovenes are scornfully labelled as 'selavi' (slave) or 'communists', and Italians as fascists and slaughterers of Slovenes and Croats, both the Italian and Slovenian minority sought a project which could help to make us be known by the majorities. This project has been very successful [...]. One of the remarkable messages we have been able to deliver is that the two minorities can plan projects which are very useful for the wider society, not just for us (interview with the author, 3.08.07).

Interestingly, the analysis of official documentation shows that the Italian and Slovenian minorities mutually support one another in relation to their nation state, the Slovenian and Italian state respectively. The official website of the Slovenian minority in Italy, represented by the SKGZ states:

The Italian Union (which represents the Italian minority in both Slovenia and Croatia [...]) has again shown its support towards our minority [...]. The Italian Union has approved a document with which it aims to put pressure upon Italian authorities in Rome to effectively implement the Italian national law 2001 [...]. The SKGZ thanks and appreciates indeed the work of the Italian minority which is particularly attentive to our needs (http://www.skgz.org/tisk/ita/54, 4.07.07; translated by the author).

This evidence suggests that a different mode of ‘membership’ of ‘minority group’, which is not exclusive, but inclusive because anchored in the universalistic rights of personhood and solidarity is developing between the two communities (Soysal, 1994). A ‘collective’ way of referring to two different minorities is emerging. It is very interesting to note that the Italian minority (in this case) is the channel through which the Slovenian minority is trying to influence the Italian state. The multiculturalism which emerges is quite different from that suggested by Kymlicka, who focuses on ethnocultural and religious diversity. Instead, we are witnessing a multiculturalism which is better summarised in the expression suggested by Bufon ‘unity in diversity’ (1998).

The fieldwork presents findings which initially appeared closer to Kymlicka’s model. Two parallel societies, two ‘solitudes’ as he called them, although living in peace and sharing the same territory, used to stand with their backs to each other. After the implementation of CBC activities however this picture has been revolutionised. Transnational linkages are developing and there is an increasing tendency to mobilize, in the ways suggested by Soysal. Accordingly, in line with Soysal’s model, EU top-down programmes, together with a dynamic
grass-root participation in CBC activities, are leading to a mobilization which goes beyond the confines of national communities (Soysal, 1998: 315).

The ‘national citizenship model’, which ‘is normatively predicated upon integrity of national communities and boundaries’ (Soysal, 1998: 307) seems therefore to be transcended in the Upper Adriatic. Furthermore, the kind of language used by these actors is highly significant. The Italian and Slovenian minorities mobilize around common issues, appealing to a universalistic language of ‘culture’, ‘minority’ and ‘multi-culturalism’ to claim participation and recognition. Remarkably, as one interviewee put it ‘…we think that the only way of overcoming the scars of history is through constant dialogue, not through contraposition’ (interview with a Slovenian minority representative, SKGZ, 17.07.08). The EU Commission has clearly played a role in shaping this view and in ‘initially forcing’ different border communities to cooperate (Rigo, 2006). It has not only favoured this reciprocal ‘cultural’ knowledge and dialogue, but it has also promoted a new awareness within minority groups according to which they are not only objects of the programmes, but important dynamic subjects.

5 Ties Linking Majority and Minority Groups

In an effort to fully grasp the new social, economic and political scenario which emerges in the Upper Adriatic I will address in this section the issue of whether, as suggested by Kymlicka (2002), majority and minority ethnic groups, although respecting each other, and being guaranteed in their rights, remain divided. Conversely, I will explore whether a change is occurring in their relationships which points towards new ways of conceptualising citizenship, as indicated by Soysal (1998).

As documented by Faro and Bufon in their own research and indicated by my interviewees, both the Slovenian and Italian minority groups have had difficult relationships with the Italian and Slovenian majority group. While the Italian and Slovene minorities’ protections within Italy and the former Yugoslavia were legally described in the 1975 Osimo Treaty (which fixed the border between the two states), the legal protection of the estimated 80-100,000 Slovenophones in Italy continues to evolve to this day. Rights to Slovene-language education, public address, and toponomastic signage vary between the three provinces in which the Italian Slovenophones live—Udine (Videm), Gorizia (Gorica), and Trieste (Trst). Though the region of FVG has been officially autonomous since 1967 due to its multicultural nature, much of the interpretation and implementation of the various minority protections has been left at the discretion of the municipal level; indeed, the Italian parliament only formally recognised the Slovenophones (and those of the province of Udine among them, having been resident in Italy since 1866) as a ‘national’ minority in 2001. In comparison, the roughly 3,000 Italophones of the Slovene littoral—who live within four officially bilingual
respectively (Faro, 2005; Bufon, 2000, 2001). Recently, however, this relationship has significantly improved due to three different developments. Firstly, at the EU level, as already discussed, CBC programmes pushed in this direction. Secondly, at the national level, Italy approved the national law 38/2001, which recognises the Slovenian minority as a ‘national’ minority. According to Rigo, Italy had to endorse this law protecting the Slovenophone minority due to Slovenia’s accession to the EU. Indeed it would have been embarrassing for Italy to continue to justify such a gap in its legislation at the EU level. Thirdly, at the local level, civic mobilization, through economic minority Associations (Euroservis, SDGZ in particular) has proved vital in developing economic and social linkages between the minority and majority group.

A Slovenian association in Italy, the already mentioned Euroservis, co-operates with several public and private bodies, both in Italy and in Slovenia and, according to one of its representatives, has contributed to connecting different economic and social actors across the border. This interviewee evaluated the outcome very positively:

Italy, and the FVG region in Interreg Italy-Slovenia, were and are more than happy to include the Slovenian community living in Italy, and the Republic of Slovenia as well to include the Italian minority living in Slovenia. This process allowed the two minorities to know each other better, but also to link the minorities to their motherland majorities […] Eventually a stronger integration and cohesion between the Slovenian minority with the Italian majority, and the Italian minority with the Slovenian majority can emerge (interview with a Slovenian minority representative of Euroservis, 10.01.08).

Empirical research thus shows that a ‘quadrangular’ partnership can evolve from this perspective. Let us think of four ethnic groups, A-B-C-D, where A and B are majority national groups, while C and D are historical ethnic minority groups which live respectively in X and Y territories.
This can be represented as follows:

Through EC Interreg programmes, as we discussed above, cross border cooperation linked first historical ethnic groups (C to D) living in X and Y territory, second the majority and minority groups who share the same territory (A to C and B to D), third the minority group of X territory with the majority group of Y territory (C to B and D to A), and finally the two majority groups who live in X and Y territory (A and B).

I put forward the argument that the Europeanization process, through CBC activities, in this respect is overcoming Kymlicka's model which suggests that the majority (dominant) group (eg, A) recognizes the specific rights and the autonomy of a minority group living in the same territory (C) but also objects to this same group establishing relations with the majority group of the neighbouring country (B). A possible outcome of this approach is that the ethnic minority group C is easily labelled and perceived by the majority A as the ‘outsider’ and the ‘other’ (Kymlicka, 2001).

Notably, my research clearly shows that this scenario is being completely transformed due to a different perception of the ‘minority group’ and its dynamism in participating socially, economically and politically at the local level, which is viewed as an enrichment rather than a threat, as well as to the influence exercised by EU programmes and policies.

Turning to the above graphics, my fieldwork has discovered that A, B, C, D are not autonomous from each other, but are embedded in a network of ties with each other. Minority and majority groups find themselves interlinked on the basis of a shared wider territory, the EU in general, and the border region in particular and ‘are better equipped to maintain social norms and social cohesion’ (Fennema and Tillie, 2000: 33). I argue that Soysal’s multi-layered model is hence at play in the Upper Adriatic cross border region, where horizontal and vertical links have developed. These minorities are now fully aware that networks, cooperation and joint representation, are key tools for an effective participation and an active mobilization both at the national and supranational level.

The analysis has shown so far that thanks to a synergic combination between bottom up mobilization and top down recognition there is an increased development of intergroup linkages across the border. In fact, although it is generally recognised that the relationship with the majority group
is still difficult (for both Italians in Slovenia and Slovenians in Italy), alongside the development of socio-economic ties - especially between the Italian majority and the Slovenian minority in Italy - there are recent political signs of openness as well. As it was reported to me the year 2007 marked an important date in this respect:

What is very important is the fact that the two minorities were officially recognised by the Italian state in 2007. This happened during the official visit of Minister D’Alema in Nova Gorica where he met the Slovenian President, Mr Rupel and the President of the Italian Union, Mr Tremul. The official meeting gave us (the minorities) official recognition, and for the first time the two minorities were officially together (interview with a Slovenian representative of SKGZ, 29.01.10).

The findings show that the Slovenian minority, in particular, started to perceive an improvement in its relations with the FVG region thanks to the centre-left presence at the region’s helm, led by Riccardo Illy (Governor of the FVG Region, from 2003 to 2008) which favoured an institutional cooperation with the minority. Referring to the political climate created by Mr Illy, one interviewee remarked:

Illy has been a great governor in relation to the Slovenian minority in Italy […] He increased economic funds for the minority; he was the one who launched and approved the regional law in favour of the minority and was actively engaged in implementing the national law 2001 (interview with a Slovenian Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 07.07.08).

Consequently, the relationships between minority and majority groups are influenced by the regional-national political set up, which can either speed up or slow down the integration process and dampen or mobilise inter-ethnic tension (see also Faro; 2003; 2005). However, although the Italian minority in Slovenia shares the view that Mr Illy really boosted and improved the political and economic relationship between the two minorities and the majorities as well, its representatives do not have such a pessimistic view due to the change in the political set up. As one of them stated, although Mr Illy had been a key figure in backing minority groups in EU projects (i.e. I poeti delle due minoranze), ‘I believe that Mr Tondo like Mr Illy will go on developing the dialogue between the two minorities and the minorities with their majorities’ (interview with a member of the Unione Italiana, 16.04.08).
In this respect, it is interesting that some minority groups which are themselves politically right leaning, appear to have played a positive role in influencing right-wing political institutions in favour of CBC. One of my interviewees, President of the *Lega Nazionale Gorizia* (FVG) and the Gorizia provincial committee of the *Associazione Nazionale Venezia Giulia e Dalmazia* (ANVGD), claimed that:

> It is socially and politically relevant that in Gorizia (Italy) there is a ‘right-wing’ council. This helps explain why the relationship with Nova Gorica (city in Slovenia) is very difficult […]. Our association has a strong relationship with the right-leaning electorate and interact with them through press releases, meetings, political demonstrations. Therefore, the fact that we give a positive message about cross-border cooperation and cross-border projects influences the way people think. They trust us, they share our views (interview with the author, 2.02.10).

I suggest here a different picture from the pessimistic one provided by Faro at the beginning of the 2000s when he argued that the Upper Adriatic was dominated by political right-wing movements which impeded the enhancement of an effective and stable CBC across the borders. We can see that even ‘right-wing’ minority groups can influence borderland voters and political institutions and therefore can strengthen multicultural integration.

Why has this change of attitude and political climate occurred in the Upper Adriatic? I contend that there are two key reasons. One can again be drawn from Kymlicka’s model. He argues that a working multicultural system has not succeeded in Western democratic countries and even less in Eastern countries due to their inability to create a ‘robust or constructive intercultural exchange’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 11). Members of the dominant groups have not yet fully accepted minority groups, which are perceived as a threat to the unity and security of the state. I remark that in the Upper Adriatic, EU community Initiatives helped to overcome these fears. They represented the starting point of a web of relations between all groups. Interestingly thanks to CBC, minorities were perceived as an enrichment for border society, because of their knowledge of the border territory and their ability to create and reinforce bonds with the border country.

This leads to the second reason, which concerns the role played by minority groups themselves, as they are able to ‘challenge the roles and meanings of boundaries’ (Paasi, 1999: 15) with their activities and this facilitates coordination and cooperation in the name of the common good. In fact, minority groups:
know all these border realities and we understand how to link these territories and their people. We are really trying to overcome political barriers also because tensions between our states influence our way of living (interview with a Slovenian minority representative, SKGZ, 20.01.10).

These conditions therefore allow the emergence of multiculturalism, because, as Kymlicka himself suggests, where there are ‘increasing numbers (of minority group members), increasing rights-consciousness, and multiple points of access for safe political mobilization, I believe that the trend towards greater accommodation of ethnic diversity is likely to arise’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 9).

6. Conclusion

This paper has addressed the question of whether and why a new form of citizenship has emerged in the Upper Adriatic area. In answering this question, the theoretical framework provided by Kymlicka’s multi-cultural model and Soysal’s post-national understanding of citizenship, as well as the research on this area carried out by Bufon and Faro provided the starting point. The latter scholars asserted that European integration pushed for the implementation of cooperative policies with regard to neighbouring states, involving sub-national actors (Bufon, 2000; 2002; Faro, 2003, 2005), in order to overcome national borders for a more integrated Europe (top-down approach). However, Faro stressed that, although in the last decade the relationship between Italy and Slovenia had improved at a political-economic level and contacts had substantially increased, thanks to CBC, there was still a lack of inter-ethnic linkages and a limited participation of minority groups in transfrontalier activities, or bottom-up mobilization (Faro, 2005).

Significantly, Faro concluded that:

the Italo-Slovene borderland had not progressed beyond a state of interdependence […], due to the persistence of historic, intercultural mistrust in the borderland, local political opposition to, and subversion of, specific initiatives in regional economic integration which had been motivated by xenophobia and economic nationalism, and the more general failure of EU-led and coordinated national efforts to create sustainable institutional and person-to-person networks in the region (Faro 2003).

Bufon, by contrast, stressed the important role minority groups (especially the Slovenian one) might play in order to promote greater integration. However, he did not investigate the nature of the ties that could
join different minorities together, or the impact of a joint mobilization by minority groups upon the national and local-regional level.

This paper has therefore revisited the issue of citizenship in the Upper Adriatic area. It has taken into account both the changes brought about by the application of EU CBC programmes and the important role played by ethnic minority groups (in particular through their associations), who, in actively participating in cross-border activities, become subjects rather than merely objects of these programmes.

My results show that especially since 2007, thanks to Interreg 2007-13, an innovative understanding of citizenship has emerged in the cross-border territory between Italy and Slovenia as a consequence of a ‘top down’ impetus and, most importantly, ‘bottom up’ responses. Top down, Interreg 2007-13 has been one of the main, if not ‘the’ major instrument, through which people were initially forced to interact transcending national borders. Bottom up, Slovenians and Italians cross-border minority groups through their associations and representatives, and the practice of ‘learning by doing’, have been successful in developing not only economic but also social and cultural ties. Old animosities are in the process of being overcome because these communities, having been ‘directed’ towards a cooperative approach, ended up knowing each other better and grasping the advantages of cooperation.

Most importantly, the establishment of social trust between cross-border society members (Fennema and Tillie, 2001) has permitted them to both construct and pursue common interests. The positive mutual outcome achieved through cooperation thus represents an incentive to continue the cooperation after the funded programmes come to an end. Ethnic groups continue to communicate with one other through ‘informal’ contacts and develop interlocking permanent channels of communication.

The fieldwork shows notably that Kymlicka’s model, in suggesting that in ‘multi-nation’ states minorities are acting in order to sustain themselves as distinct and self-governing societies (Kymlicka, 2002), does not adequately reflect the situation on the ground. On the contrary, the role played by minorities who, in becoming active subjects within the programmes, are constructing a different consciousness of the self and the ‘other’, can be better understood through Soysal’s model. A more inclusive attitude towards those who do not belong to the same ethnic group reflects the choice of individuals and groups in the way they define themselves and relate to political institutions. The Upper Adriatic area is becoming thus more hybrid (i.e. an area no longer divided by a social, cultural, economic border), plural and blurred thanks to EU cross-border programmes and an active and dynamic sub-national mobilization which builds and spreads trust at the local-regional level. In other words, a more cohesive community has been engendered. Ethnic identities are not a limit to cooperation, but are an enrichment to a multi-cultural society. In the
construction of a hybrid territory, it is therefore impossible to categorize, or label minorities in the same way as in the past. The interpretation of what is happening on the ground suggests thus a move away from Kymlicka’s particularisms, and a redefinition of ethnicity itself, no longer viewed uncritically as linked to the historical legacy of migration or annexation, but anchored to a process of redefinition and reconstruction of the self.

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Abstract. Should we pay special attention to the relations between countries that have historical interethnic issues? In our century it turns out that managing interethnic relations between countries in the EU is an important bottleneck that can have a powerful impact upon the integrity of the EU. Uncertainty regarding what it is to become of the contemporary European Union, yet apparent certainty about the need for reconstructing geopolitics within the EU has rekindled interest in the field of international relations and interethnic cooperation. Such renewed interest of this core concept has translated into the need for a greater historical sensitivity to forms of geopolitical social organization that can arise European political structures. It is my opinion that we are going to witness a shift in the way ethnicity is viewed, a shift towards the concept of “interest”. It is now something of a bien pensant cliché to remark that the EU-led policy of public diplomacy and soft power did a lot to persuade countries into the system. This study is supported by a complex statistic data base that comes to support or even put forward new interpretation to this problem.

Keywords: ethnic, demographic, migration, clash, policy.

Ab initio, it is the purpose of this article to point out that geopolitical relation between countries that have historical interethnic issues may not do much in defining or shaping the European continent in the twenty-first century. Although the concept of ethnicity, as it was introduced in anthropology from

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around the year 1960, has kept a lot of headline in many articles, it is our belief that the ethnic framework is changing. Understanding it by raising questions and by putting to examination the conceptualization of ethnicity and its allusive quality could account for interesting European issues, which sometimes may be considered only marginally. Max Weber supported the allusive quality of ethnicity ‘The whole conception of ethnic groups is so complex and so vague that it might be good to abandon it altogether.’(Weber, 1968: 385)

The European continent faces a challenge in dealing not with historical interethnic issues, but with new interethnic relations that might arise in the near future. In order to continue to guarantee security, development and stability the European Union must face a twofold challenge: internally and externally. Internally, the European Union will have to construct an approach towards new ethnic issues, the increase in the Muslim minority, which statistics show it will become a large percent of the population in the near future. Externally, the European Union will have to construct a proper approach to the neighboring Muslim countries, basically, really test the limits of its soft power in determining flows of immigration and flow of capital and exchanges with these countries. These new variables have rekindled new phenomena that will have to be dealt with such as the move towards right wing political parties, the need to recalibrate domestic and foreign policy.

Gradually, it becomes more and more visible that the old ethnic issues pertaining to the European continent is no longer salient. On the other hand the old ethnic issues, even if their existence will still be acknowledged from time to time, their importance will be shifted gradually from the national domain, to the domestic realm of the European Union. No longer an ethnic issue will concern and involve relation of a type nation-nation, but mainly the entire European Union. On the other hand, in large measure, the ethnic issue of Muslim origin affects not only the domestic realm, perceived as everything within the borders of the European Union, but also the foreign policy towards the foreign realm. A sensitive nerve in the past, national anxiety towards old ethnic disputes seems to have been replaced with an exacerbating widespread fear of Muslim ethnicity and Europe’s periphery. Sure, not long ago the perspective of changing minds on questions of old ethnic issues between nations on the European continent was no small task, but merely shifting the focus from one set of ethnic issues to another is not the answer. In such a case entrenchment of such an ethnic issue will not result merely in a change in domestic policy but also in a change in foreign policy, effectively blocking both inner growth and the increase in soft power outside the European Union. Being a twofold issue, it brings double advantages or disadvantages. Samuel

The fact that we are perhaps witnessing a deconstruction and reconstruction of history, reinterpreted under the pressure of new circumstances and even interests, make me ponder about something said by Mark Twain
History does not repeat itself, but sometimes rhymes. If indeed we are in a clash of civilizations context, as Samuel P. Huntington put forward in the *Clash of civilization and the Remaking of the World Order*, we may be privileged enough to capture the moment in which Islam provides the impetus for a new Europe, as it was the case a millennium ago. He considers that ab incunabulis, people from different groups, civilizations are bent on converging at some point or another.

As the European Union celebrates its handling of ab intra traditional ethnic issues, it is faced with yet another paradox that sets out. Although it attached more weight to old traditional ethnic issues, focusing on solidarity, economical cooperation between fellow European countries and the defense of common interests it did little to create reference policy towards the new ethnic groups made out of Muslim citizens. However, supporting a new view on this issue as an objective has been increasingly been factored into Europe's policymaking. Among other impulses, origin and kinship in the conduct of ethnic groups are used quite often. These concepts are bound even more prominently to ethno nationalist movements. Yet, we are still left with one question: will Europe's system become a natural and vital component for all ethnic groups within its borders as many from the old continent hope? Such ethnic movements have been tied by W. Connor (1993, p. 373) to references regarding ideology at the operational level such as “fatherland” (Connor, 1993: 373-398). Research has proved that Muslim immigration and those that were born on the European continent have far more in common with *umma* (*universal Muslim community*) and the *dar al-Islam* (abode the peace, or Islam territory). Further, we shall highlight the relevance of term *umma*, to put it simply aligning it to a definition.

THE TERM ‘UMMA’ is derived from the word ‘amm’ (the root) which means ‘to aim at’ or ‘to intend to’. Hence, ordinarily, it means the people who ‘intend to’ follow a leader or a religion. Moreover, it is used in the sense of the desire ‘to belong to’ one place or generation, and various kinds of birds. The Quran, however, has employed the term in a variety of meanings. These are: Nation. The following translations of the verses of the Quran can be inferred as referring to *umma* as nation. “Our Lord, and make us submissive unto Thee and of our seed a nation submissive unto Thee.” *(Quran, II: 128)*

Equally consequential in the reappearance of this ethnic issue was the extraordinary fascination of the Orient for the West. Roosens, 1968 was indeed convinced that once the political establishment stopped working on policies to better construct around the ethnic element so as to make the system fit the ethnic reality, *ethnic-cultural differences can re-appear* (Roosens, 1989). Roosens controversial statement seriously pressures the European continent to invest a lot of energy for its readiness for a new framework of ethnic cooperation.
Above all, it comes to correct any perspective that at one point or another, policy makers could shed the activist approach in pushing towards substantive policies in accordance with ethnic realities. Roosens, assessing the impact of arbitrary external circumstances and thorny conditions such as reliance on ideological determination, lingering political strategies and embedded structural conditions concluded that ethnic identities goes beyond the groups involvement. Communities that have sought to preserve important pillars such as structural conditions or which have nurtured ideological determination know a greater ethnic gap. Ultimately, all of these points of divergence trace their roots in external circumstances. This ethnic issue has no simple solution. Yet, it seems that the dominant European policy towards this new ethnic issue is to call for patience, in the best case, perhaps leaving the impression of postponement to a still-distant future this important issue. The question of the Muslim ethnicity vis-à-vis the European mainland goes beyond homeland security, challenging European strategic ability. Foremost, this issue, which can become a vision, could hamstring relations on the ethnic level, for inner relations, and at the foreign policy level for outer level, on a variety of questions. Europe must avoid seeing this issue as a marginal one and not engage in a potentially unsettling unilateral policy towards this ethnic population. The presence of this ethnic issue speaks on the evolving nature of European policy and demographics. The course Europe chooses as it enters into this new stage will affect its homeland security commitment, soft power capability, economical growth planning, all of them pivotal for its existence.

A pragmatic view on ethnicity will produce a mixed theoretical definition. We should not be reluctant to define ethnicity as a real fusion of strong cultural practices, a strong legacy of perspectives, fierce distinctions, all of them achieving - particularly as it relates to the outside - to reflect more or less an enclose arena, setting a group of individuals outside of the mainstream, sometimes reluctant to allow someone else ethnically distinct to be part of the community. Seldom, does these groups converge in political harmony other groups. Ethnicity has emerged, at least for the moment and for the majority that sought to define it as shared cultural heritage. Ethnic groups have been branded, sometimes willingly, through the use of emphatic ancestry, a strong commitment towards conventional forms of dress. Focus as we are on the defining of the concept of ethnicity we should not omit the investment of a significant energy in preserving a group language and above all the unsurprising proliferation of a common religion, which especially applies to our discussion. These factors define ethnicity and underline the rising force of an apparently socially and economically vulnerable and sometimes discriminated upon ethnic group, self-confident enough to try to even further advance on the global stage. Demographics, by itself can shape the continent by sheer force of inertia and the new ethnic reality can shape the continent by holding on to its traditional
position. Increasingly, researchers have sought to support an initiative to promote ethnicity as not being inherited. Awareness has been steadily growing that ethnic differences are learnt, and ethnic differences are built around the idea of learning it, thus such a practice would help to differentiate the ethnic group for those outside, sometimes perceived as the adversaries. Yet, we are skeptical that such a view from the part of any ethnic group, once established, would benefit anyone or bring any new connection into the system. The European Union through continuing to promote democracy and its core values should support a changing in this view also in regard to this new ethnic background, further trying to treat as equals each citizen and applying neutrality in its overall system. At a minimum, the European Union is compelled to review yet another time the concept of ethnicity and create an offer, not response, to those involved. By doing this the European Union would demonstrate once again to the rest of the world the nature of its internal politics meant to serve as the primary means for its soft power.

Thus, European analysts should focus their attention on defining a policy towards this new ethnic reality. I believe that it is precisely this context that has not been conceptualized enough on the European agenda, thus creating a power incentive for others to manipulate kinship and cultural symbols. This possible misbehavior can enforce a powerful pressure upon economic growth, critical to both social ethnic stability and for a future robust foreign policy. Europe’s rising status and influence on the world political arena, through its dominant soft power component can only be preserved through a balancing strategy. On the other hand, this would require Europe to diverge energy and money from its already scarce resources, in a time of economical upheaval, to its own disadvantage. To avoid the treatment of ethnic groups as interests groups, as it was defined by Glazer & Moynihan, 1963; Yancey et al., 1976, Europe should enhance its own international standing by creating a more nuanced and strategic policy, rather than one dominated by clear-cut decisions. Ethnicity has the ability to exert considerable pressure and in order for the European continent not to succumb to this pressure it should also view that ethnicity in the long run can become a political resource. Europeans and Muslim ethnicity should come to an abiding interest in adherence to the same values. Commonality on the possible misuse of ethnicity as a political resource exists. This has been a concern for Cohen (1969 who has provided us and any power-wielder with information regarding urban ethnicity in Nigeria (Cohen, 1969). In the long run, in other countries that have known current European tendencies in the broader sense of ethnic issues have also known the appearance of rallying cries for public resentment. Therein lies one of the most puzzling dilemma. In order to participate successfully in the globalized economy and benefit from its mechanism, Europe has to invest energy, but perhaps without devoting enough energy to managing the ethnic challenge. On the other hand Europe has to cope with this ethnic reality,
investing energy, but it may forgo or limit competitiveness and integrated world policy. Its economic base requires harmony and workforce. Increased interaction and involvement of each European citizen may help in shifting the configuration of ethnic power and interest through each European citizen's self-regulating process of both life and behavior. Demographics create both challenges and opportunities. A future European model should take into account the essential demographic model and its dynamic, in order to continue to pursue power and wealth. Ethnic groups should be helped in discovering a common interest in joining the greater European cause, so as its interest won't seem illicit which in turn would lead to domestic discontent and stumbling foreign policy. Such a policy would be consistent with Europe's economic and security aspirations, thus any possible or explicit social discontent should be systematically dismantled.

In the following part of the article a link between two variables shall be researched. In the present study the European Values Study Longitudinal Data File has been used. This data set has the following features: Number of Units: 166,502, Number of Variables: 865, Analysis System: SPSS. On one hand we have a detailed outline of the percentage of Muslim individuals in several European countries. The hypothesis was that there is a link between the percentage of Muslim individuals present in a country and the way in which immigration is perceived by the population. It is our opinion that the majority of countries in which Muslim immigrants’ cohesion is not properly managed by the government the sentiment towards immigrants and ethnic difference is less friendly. In the following chart the opinion of those who have answered regarding their outlook on immigrants has been statistically researched, according to their citizenship. It is visible that the highest positive views on immigrants are present in the countries marked with green, as opposed to those that are marked with the color red.

Bona fide, significant differences are among the Nordic and central European states and the rest of Europe, in terms of both openness towards immigrants and in terms of percentage of population made out of Muslim individuals. The Nordic and Central Europe have in common a smaller Muslim community (Omer Taspinar, “Europe’s Muslim Street,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2003; Simon Kuper, “Political Muscle,” Financial Times (FT), September 27, 2003; Roula Khalaf, “Urgent Challenge of Muslim Integration in Europe,” FT, July 14, 2005; U.S. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future, available at [http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_home.htm], Sebastian Rotella, “Europe’s Boys of Jihad,” Los Angeles Times, April 2, 2005). It is also interesting to have a look over the basic principles that lie at the foundation of the European immigration policy. This was set in November 2004. Europe specialists and EU leaders adopted in 2004 a set of 11 common basic principles for immigrant integration policy. The picture that emerges out of these common, yet basic principles are a combination of nationalistic pride, material self-interest, free-market mechanisms and democracy. These common practices rely on a two-way integration process.
### Table 1

#### Descriptives

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<th>REGR factor score 1 for analysis 3</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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Through this set of principles the European Union wished to support a mutual accommodation process. The nexus between all immigrants and residents of member states focuses on respect for the basic values of the EU. The list of 11 EU common basic principles on integration may be found in a European Commission press release, “Integration of Third Country Nationals,” September 1, 2005, available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/press_room/index_en.htm]; also see “Handbook on Integrating Immigrants Unveiled by Commission,” *European Report,* November 13, 2004. In figure 2 we have kept the countries situated at the two poles, in order to better see the percentage of Muslim population.

### Table 2

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>Turkish, Tatar</td>
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<td>No recent data is stored.</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.1&lt;</td>
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<td>12%</td>
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<td>5.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Turkey and Yugoslav</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
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<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>In 2001 3%, but it increase 10 times in the last 10 years</td>
<td>Contact with Muslim identity is increased because they represent an important percentage of the urban population. Recent statistics show variable of 8%-125 for cities such as London, Birmingham, Bradford, Leicester.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot/ Turkey</td>
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Europe’s over all ethnic atmosphere has been further poisoned by the ignoring of this growing ethnic group; a critical appraisal of this apparent indifference to the growing number of new ethnic issues and the publicly announced support for military actions against countries with Muslim majority, not long thereafter followed by actual shocking military action may lead to troublesome future developments. The method employed by the majority of European countries of focusing in their national surveys on citizenship not on ethnic background suggests a deliberate effort to further deviate from old ethnic issues, while also ignoring a fact, the growing ethnic issue of Muslim
population, in need of another type of reaction and method. The fact that this method worked with most old ethnic issues testifies to the degree of involvement to the cause of equality and strength of European core values, but leaves untouched another reality, the new ethnic reality, which has undergone a significant transformation over the last couple of decades. In the next image it is obvious the gap between the central and northern Europe and west Europe in terms of Muslim population.

Some make the case that the suspension of old ethnic issues and the reversal of old ethnic stereotypes in Europe have been instrumental in bringing politically significant changes that allow the creation of an European
citizenship, with which everyone can identify. It is also important to note that indeed this cumulative result of this approach to the ethnic issue and enhance over-all cooperation and interlinking economies, heading towards multi-level cohesion triggered the emergence of a political system that imitates former systems, nor contemporary ones. It is clear that although it only now starts to perceive the need for an approach towards the new ethnic reality, it is not asserting pervasive social control, nor does it engage in a mass programatic design of its society. Politically significant remains the European democratic system of values which leaves room for future critically assertive political consciousness to this issue. In any case, Europe continues to remain relatively open towards this issue, especially as long as it can afford it. Ultimately, Europe’s political strength is derivative of and dependent on the system’s powerful, yet possibly transient, in lack of proper political, economic and social measures, soft power. We are used that European soft power is used to yield passive consent from the part of Europe’s ethnically different population, more positive focus from outside countries, yet the growing dependence on foreign workforce, often of Muslim origin, inflow derived from an aging population needs to be properly managed so as to defer social restlessness.

Eventually, if not the proper quantity and quality of policy changes are not being made towards this new ethnic issue, it could become a fertile soil for unrest. Immigrants, although increasingly identify with the socio-cultural lifestyle of the West, still preserves ethnic identity. We should expect that in the future Muslim population may bring a stronger contribution to the public and political life, through an increase consciousness. Till now, the European policy towards this new ethnic reality can be characterized as sometimes erratic, most of the times contradictory, even with conflicting policies which did little to improving circumstances, while consolidating a stumbling approach to the ethnic realm. In brief, Europe should manage both its inner and outer difficulties out of pure choice, not out of necessity. To strengthen the union it should not ignore striking facts and should attempt a symbiosis of inner policy and foreign policy towards the Muslim communities. The absence of a truly ambitious program to shape a symbiotic policy towards this new ethnic issue may lead to stifling innovative and growth enticing policies. Given the potentially threatening prospect of an aging population and the fact that Europe’s closes neighbors have an ethnically Muslim population a policy not taking into account this potentially unstable and volatile situation would be self-defeating. Quid nunc? (What now?)
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


*The data base used is available for research purpose at the following link: http://info1.gesis.org/dbksearch18/SDESC2.asp?no=4804&search=&search2=&DB=E&tab=3.
Abstract. In the context of the 2004, 2007 EU enlargement and the increased Roma mobility that followed, the EU should be the natural choice to lead policy developments to tackle the anti-Roma sentiment and discrimination. It is argued in this paper that this debate reflects a much larger political discussion about EU responsibility and identity. The failure of the EU’s reform process over the past ten years highlights a crisis of identity for the EU. The security dimension of Roma migration issue is one case which has the potential to force researchers to think afresh and confirm the social responsibilities of the EU. This is important because until the EU clarifies its position as a 'social' regional actor it will never be in a position to play an active role in the relation with other regional organizations or states.

Keywords: The Roma population, discrimination, social exclusion, social inclusion, human rights.

“I have a dream, that in one day this nation will rise up and live according to the true meaning of his beliefs, this truth is self-evident for us: all people are equal ... I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by their character. I have a dream today.” (Martin Luther King, 28 August 1963) Starting from this motto, we see that almost 50 years later, the situation has little

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improved, the differences are still cause for stigma - women walk, in some countries, behind men, the Roma are lower class citizens, without a state of their own, embassies or consulates to protect their rights.

The fall of communist regimes in 1989 and the rise in attacks on Roma during the subsequent economic liberalization and restructuring process prompted many Roma to seek asylum in western European states. Opportunities for movement of Roma across Europe were further enhanced with the 2004/2007 enlargements of the EU which provided free movement for Roma, as EU citizens. However, high profile cases (e.g. Italy 2008, Northern Ireland 2009 and France 2010) provide evidence of increased tensions within host communities and heightened levels of general intolerance towards migrant populations (Cashman, Butler, 2010: 7). Since the enlargement, however, the Roma are more clearly than ever a subject of internal EU policy. Although there is still concern about the Roma as migrants, they are now primarily viewed as Europe’s largest transnational minority faced with the problem of socio-economic exclusion – a problem that, according to the emerging consensus, the EU should help to address.

The Roma minority in the European Union-a problem or a threat

We choose to analyze the Roma problem do to is complexity, stakeholders, social and political stakes that surround it but also because the subject is apparently an exotic one, unique, in fact, extremely useful for understanding, acceptance and the process of social integration. The freedom and beauty of nomadic life are tales, myth, the brutal reality means poverty, deprivation, stereotypes, social exclusion, rejection, the state initiatives are stopping at the institutions gates and money is spent on posters, workshops and speeches about social integration and positive discrimination (Marinescu, 2010). The actual means of intervention, in the light of the recent events from Italy (2007) and France (2010), are the brutal force, the excavator, or rattles statements with political taste.

With a population in Europe estimated at eight to 12 million, the Roma population can be found everywhere from Finland to Greece and from Ireland to Russia, but they have no "homeland"(Tanner, 2005). The greatest number live in Central Eastern Europe: Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary. According to official sources, in these 4 countries the numbers are:

- Romania (2001 census)-409,723, other sources claim up to 1,8-2,3 million (Minority Right Group, The Life Quality Research Institute)
- Slovakia- (2001)-89,920 persons counted as Roma, around 1.7% of the population. Other sources claim up to 10% of Slovakian (520,000 people) may be Roma. They are the second largest ethnic minority in Slovakia after Hungarians.
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- Hungary—(2001) -190.046 (1.9%), (according to the Open Society Institute) between 500.000 and 600.000 (6%).
- Bulgaria - (2001) - other sources claim up to 370.908 (4.7%) (Cahn, Guild, 2010: 78).

Even thou the numbers are higher in these countries, the Roma population is facing problems almost in all the EU countries, if they are not social problems, they are economic, security, illegal migration, discrimination on labour market, education or access to public services. Because of the higher number in these 4 countries the problems are more visible than in others that are far more developed (like Germany, England or Slovenia).

Roma in Europe, like any other ethnic group, they are no monolith. They include rich and poor, success stories and failures, the talented, scroungers, and those unsuited for life in a modern society. In certain areas, they have become well integrated, living among and working with the local population, speaking the local language, and achieving higher levels of education. More often, however, they live apart from the native population, and are under-employed and poorly educated (The Economist, 2010: 46). Indeed, although they sometimes received gracious welcomes, Roma have historically been marginalized in every European country where they have settled. To make matters even more complex, a number of European states – including EU Member States such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland – have become both countries of migrant origin and countries of emigration for Roma. Roma from the Czech Republic, for example, continue to migrate particularly to the United Kingdom, while Roma from Romania and Slovakia – also EU Member States – migrate to, among other places, for example-the Czech Republic (Cahn, Guild, 2010: 17).

The Roma that have exercised their right to free movement under European law by migrating to other parts of Europe are faced with difficulties in accessing national health systems, public housing and the labor market. There is a culture of open hostility and discrimination toward the Roma and they are often singled out. Being politically disorganized and lacking political representation, they do not have a strong lobby. The European Union Minorities and Discrimination survey reported that 47% of Roma maintained that they had been a victim of ethnically-based discrimination in the past 12 months and 32% said they were victims of crime, making it clear that the Roma needs assistance and support (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009: 9-12). Few measures for integration have been forthcoming, and often the solution is instead to send them back to their country of origin, like it happened in the France and Italian case. This is not a solution, but being a vulnerable trans-national minority, less visible in cases of human rights violation, without the help of embassies or national states, they are an easy target in the problem of illegal immigration.
From case to case, the Roma minority is being used as political stake, scapegoat in security problems (especially societal security) or a mean of attracting millions of Euros from the UE for developing social integration. In this conditions they have limited access to education, healthcare, public services, housing, labour market, that’s why their life expectancy is lower (10 years less according to the European Union Minorities and Discrimination survey), they have lower levels of educational attainment and unemployment rates about thrice the average. In this situation they are pursuing informal economic activities for survival, including begging and petty crime.

However, it is also important to note that many Roma are also completely integrated into society, benefitting from the process of democratisation that has occurred in many member states as a part of European integration, as well as enjoying the benefits of the welfare system and social protection afforded by citizenship that has occurred alongside their incorporation into the Union (Cahn, Guild, 2010: 19).

When we refer to Roma minority we need to talk about the economic cost of their social exclusion. The long tradition of discrimination, indignity and stigma associated with the Roma population is translated in economic losses, millions of Euros annually in productivity and in fiscal contributions to the governments.

The challenges posed by the economic and fiscal cost of Roma exclusion are particularly acute in light of the declining and quickly aging populations (World Bank, 2007:3). For example, only in Romania, between 2000 and 2025, the national population is expected to decline by as much as 10%, meanwhile experiencing a substantial increase in the proportion of elderly people (65+ years). The Roma population represents already a sizeable share of the working age population in many European countries and this share will continue to increase given the relatively younger age profile of the Roma community. As such, substantially increasing the participation and productivity of Roma is an economic necessity for everyone (de Laat, 2010: 2). Full economic participation will not be achieved if the current status quo is maintained. Apart from barriers such as labour market discrimination, the problems are the lack of education—only 1 of 6 working age Roma from an EU member state has the necessary education skill level.

The potential gains of social inclusion far exceed the necessary investment costs of the process of education and training. According to a recent research by the World Bank, for instance, full Roma integration on the labour market could bring economic benefits estimated to be around € 0.5 billion annually for some countries (de Laat, 2010: 4), especially the ones with important number of Roma population, such as Romania, Bulgaria or the Czech Republic.
In this situation it is very interesting to see what the European Union is doing to solve the situation, taking into consideration the discrimination problem and the social integration solution through educational, economic and social programmes.

What is being done?

The Roma problem needs a complex action plan, that’s why it has both a national and a European dimension, involving the national stakeholders, NGO’s and the European Union institutions, like the Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council, the EU Council, the Committee of the Regions and the European Social an Economic Committee. For over a decade, the EU institutions have been regularly calling on Member States and candidate countries to improve the social and economic integration of Roma.

From 2000 till now a lot of national integration strategies, international integration and mobility programs, action plans have been proposed in order to solve the Roma migration issue followed by social integration. Till now little has been achieved, but there are some programs and actions taken by the EU that deserve to be mentioned here. The initial steps have been done.

The EU program of Roma integration is covering 4 four crucial areas: access to education, employment, healthcare and housing.

A Pan-European initiative is the Decade for Roma Inclusion 2005-2015, a program started in 2004 by eight Central Eastern European countries with the World Bank and Open Society Institute, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, European Commission, so on. The program represents an effort to combat discrimination and to close the gap in welfare and living conditions between the Roma and the non-Roma, in order to break the discrimination and exclusion circle.

Four fields of intervention, namely: education, employment, health, and housing and three cross-cutting fields of intervention: combating poverty and discrimination, and the gender issue represent are stipulated. The instruments used by the Decade are inspired by the European “working style” in the programming documents: the Terms of Reference and the National Plans of Actions (Decade for Roma Inclusion, 2007: 34). Romania was the first country to secure the Decade presidency between 2005 and 2006.

If we are talking about National Action Plans, it worth mention the Spain case, the ACCEDER Program, managed by the Fundación Secretariado Gitano, which has been very successful in providing training and in securing work contracts for participants. In 2007 the National Agency for Roma (Romania) decided to copy the ACCEDER Program and adjust it to the needs of the Romanian Roma population. Following the ACCEDER pattern, in 2008, the Agency won a social inclusion project for Roma minority, called “Together
on the labour market (Impreuna pe piata muncii)”. Through this project, 250 Roma people were qualified and inserted on the Romanian labour market.

At national level we have the National Anti-Poverty and Social Inclusion Plan, elaborated and developed under the coordination of the Governmental Anti-Poverty and promotion of Social Inclusion Commission and endorsed by G.D. 829/2002. It is a complex document conceived at its time to anticipate the Lisbon Agenda and a “program of social construction for a European society”. Its entire Chapter XIV is dedicated to reduction of poverty and of social inclusion of Roma (Ionescu, Cace, 206: 61).

The EU’s Europe 2020 strategy for a new growth path – smart, sustainable and inclusive growth – leaves no room for the persistent economic and social marginalization of what constitutes Europe's largest minority. The Europe 2020 strategy sets a headline target of 75% of the population aged 20-64 to be employed (on average, the employment rate in the EU amounts to 68.8%) (COM 2011: 11).

The European Network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds (EU Roma), provides the opportunity for joining forces at all levels (EU, national, regional) and with all stakeholders, including the Roma, to address one of the most serious social challenges in Europe: putting an end to the exclusion of Roma. EU funding alone can certainly not solve the situation of Roma, but the Commission recalls that up to € 26.5 billion of EU funding is currently programmed to support Member States' efforts in the field of social inclusion, including to support efforts to help the Roma (COM 2011: 13).

Is a commitment by European governments to improve the socio-economic status and increase social integration of the Roma, this includes bringing together Roma civil society, governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and European institutions.

To-date, migration (especially Roma migration) is considered as a strategic matter for Europe, meaning that it can have an impact on economy, stability and security. Even so, migration cannot be fully controlled and zero migration within the Roma population is neither feasible nor desirable in the European Union member states.

In spite of some progress achieved both in the Member States and at European Union level over the past years, little has changed in the day-to-day situation of most of the Roma. According to the Commission's Roma Task Force findings, strong and proportionate measures are still not yet in place to tackle the social and economic problems of a large part of the EU’s Roma population. For over a decade, the European Union institutions have been regularly calling on Member States and candidate countries to improve the
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Social and economic integration of Roma. Now is the time to change good intentions into more concrete actions.

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THE BELGIAN DILEMMA OF PARTITION. A PATTERN STUDY FOR THE EAST

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Abstract. The practice of post-modernity revived in the concept of devolution as the best referential to local governance as compared to the permanent structure of federalism. As a result of almost continuous state reform in the last 40 years, Belgium has both systems, but also no full-fledged government. Divided in a complicated array of linguistic-based communities and regions boasting large competencies from education to fiscal and voting rights, the kingdom faces not only the fluctuating political choices of its citizens (as shown by the modern tool of manipulation, namely the polls), but also the specter of dissolution - due to the political deadlock of defining a common functional governing agenda, and to a sort of reciprocal ethno-linguistic cleansing.

Keywords: Partition, Flemish Flanders, French Wallonia, Ethno-linguistic cleansing, Devolution, State reform, Governmentlessness, Laissez-faire politics, EU Capital

The Kingdom of Belgium is the 9th EU member state in terms of population (10.8 million estimation for the year 2010 – 2.1% of the EU population) (Eurostat, 2010), the 22th in size (area of 30.528 square km – 2% of the EU territory) and the 7th in wealth (GDP/capita – 43.794 USD) (CIA, 2010). The European statistics show higher living standards, life expectancy among the highest in the EU, good governance practices and functional decentralization. Despite all these arguments, the dissolution of Belgium is one

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of the most popularized scenarios in recent years with hard-to-predict consequences on the EU and the state organization patterns from within.

Is Belgium a failed state? The constitutional, economic and International Relations theories could offer both pro and con arguments.

History continues to be a hard reference for the European Union of 27 sovereign states. The theory of the nation state, founding people, basic language and defining borders does not apply to the case of Belgium.

Located between the current Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Duchy of Luxembourg in the geopolitical space of the Low Countries, the Kingdom of Belgium represents a diplomatic compromise between the European great powers of the first half of the XIXth Century. The absence of a unified and centralized state meant the existence of several medieval formations of variable frontiers and power with the most notable cases of the Duchy of Brabant, the County of Flanders and the Archbishopric of Liège. The collapse of the ambitious Duchy of Burgundy (the most significant medieval power ever to attend the unification of the formations located between France and the Holy Roman Empire) after the final defeat and death in combat of Charles the Bold in the battle of Nancy (1477) emphasized the uncertainty and insecurity of these hard-fought territories located at the crossroads of the commercial highways of Western Europe. Both Brabant (with Brussels as capital) and Flanders (with Bruges as capital and Ghent afterwards) were highly developed from the economic point of view. The prominence of such urban centres of intense merchant, banking, cloth fabrication or rare metals refining activities (Anvers for instance) was a constant cause and stake for France and the Imperial House of Habsburg for making war and peace between them at the end of the Middle Age and during the Modern History. The 80 Years’ War marked the political and religious breakdown in relations between the North and the South of the Low Countries. The first bourgeois revolution saw the creation of the protestant Netherlands while the loyal Catholics of the future to be Belgium “betrayed” the cause and stayed within the Habsburg Empire. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) consecrated the demise of the Duchy of Brabant whose territories were annexed to the Habsburg Empire. A century and a half later on, the French and Napoleonic rule over the Low Countries (1794-1815) was followed by the creation by the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, a short lived state dissolved by the Revolution of 1830 – celebrated by the Belgian patriots as the founding event of their country (Fridl, 2005).

Taking into account the fact that Flanders had belonged for centuries to the French monarchy, there was a strong feeling among the French political elites for this county to be annexed. But in the end, despite the diplomatic endeavors of

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1 The Wallon Revolution of August-October 1830 was highly influenced by the success of the French Revolution of July which marked the fall of the King Charles X.
the French former foreign minister Talleyrand, the concert of European great powers decided to create Belgium -a buffer state- in order to contain the resurgence of French hegemonic ambitions. (Thomas, 1983)

Promoter of the Industrial Revolution facilitated by a vanguard political regime of liberal democracy, Belgium founded its security policy on the principle of perpetual neutrality (Palo, 2000: 227-304) imposed by the quintet of European great powers in the Treaty of 1839 (Fuehr, 1915). But this status would not benefit Belgium, exposed to German military aggression and occupation both in WWI and WWII, all of these committed in order to achieve a quick and surprising invasion of France from the least expected flank.

The post-war founding member status of WEU and NATO offered Belgium the necessary security umbrella at last. The decisions taken by the French president Charles de Gaulle in the mid ‘60s out of grandeur foreign policy caused the relocation of both NATO and main EEC institution headquarters from Paris to Brussels which will backfire and facilitate in return great visibility and soft power to Belgium and its stance in the world.

During this time, the domestic politics have been dominated by the complicated geometry of keeping together the ethnic and linguistic mosaic, the balance of power between its main Walloon and Flemish components contributing to the 180 years of existence of the Belgian state. Drawing a parallel to Germany, one could conclude that the latter has only 20 years of unified existence to which could be added the periods of the II and III Reich (1871-1918 / 1933-1945) and the Weimar Republic (1919-1933).

Same History, however, gives us more episodes of societal fractures between the Walloon and Flemish communities starting with the Revolution of 1830 whose main goal was to put to an end the political domination of the southern Francophone community by the Netherlands. In response, the Walloons strongly supported by the industrial centers of the South dominated the politics of the new state. Flemish became an official language only in 1896, following pressure and militancy of the Flemish Movement, an organization initially cultural, then political. The first official version in Flemish of the Belgian Constitution will not be issued until 1967.

Belgian statehood dichotomy is perhaps best described by two representative historians, Henri Pirenne and Hervé Hasquin. If the first author, a Belgian renowned academic figure, defined over a century ago the Belgian identity to be based on the common civilization of the Belgian people and not on the core ethnological elements: race, language, borders (Pirenne, 1899),

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2 French ambassador to London at that time.

latter, otherwise a well-known Walloon liberal politician, depicted Belgium’s monarchy of German origin as an overnight erected tent which will not endure after the storm is over. (Hasquin, 1996: 22) The reason behind such prediction was the nationless of the Belgian Kingdom despite the existence of provinces and political parties.

Moreover, is mandatory finding the answer to the question whether the Belgian monarchy is the main bond and guarantor of statehood and union between Flemish and Walloons. Chronologically speaking, the continuity of the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha as opposed to the Bourbons of Spain, for example, may represent a logical argument for the scenario to maintain the kingdom and the federal coexistence. A constitutional monarchy, Belgium has no special enshrined powers for the sovereign, different to other similar forms of states such as the Netherlands or the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The functional symbolism of powers and the protocol displayed at the royal house’s major events represent legitimizing elements for the Belgian political imaginary. A monarchy of foreign origin, the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha is now the highest common political denominator for the two ethnic and linguistic communities. Rebranded nationally as the National House of Belgium it follows the pattern of other branches of the royal house of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, namely the House of Windsor (United Kingdom) or the House of Bragança (Portugal).

The Philosophy of History gives us many arguments based on the success of succession to the throne as a precondition for the sustainability of monarchy. The incumbent monarch Albert II is reigning Belgium since 1993 and the presumed successor is his eldest son, the Duke of Brabant, Prince Philip. The latter is married since 1999 with a descendant of an old Walloon noble family, Ghislaine Mathilde d’Udekem d’Acoz, presumably the first queen of Belgian origin. The Crown Princely couple has four children, and if the line of succession will not be altered by unexpected events, the crown of the kingdom would be taken forward and for the first time in the Belgian history by a woman, Princess Elizabeth. A general of the Air Force and a graduate of the famous Oxford and Stanford universities, the Crown Prince is characterized by the Belgian public opinion as a conservative, not at all inclined towards liberal political innovations.

His brother, Prince Laurent, is portrayed especially by the Flemish media in the recent years as the black sheep of the royal house. Involved in 2006-07 in an extensive corruption scandal concerning the embezzlement of 2.2 million Euros of the Navy budget, including the renovation of his official residence at Tervuren (Villa Clémentine), Prince Laurent⁴ (Castle, 2007) was

⁴ He is provided annually from the state budget with the sum of 295.000 euros for his princely status. For a picaresque characterization of the prince see Stephen Castle,
forced by royal decree to be the first royal family member ever to be questioned by police and court as a witness. Although the prince has escaped prosecution, the leaks to the media of allegations against him formulated by the indicted former officials or about the deteriorating relations between King Albert II and his son contributed to the erosion of the royal image.

The basic counter-argument could be that this episode of corruption, or the libertine life of king's step-sister, Princess Maria-Cristina (Daphné), or the public criticism against the Crown Prince about his perceived political stiffness / lack of expert advisers fit the pattern of attrition by the media of the image of the European royal houses seen by a part of the electorate as anachronistic. The aforementioned royal houses draw back their origins to the beginning of pan-European feudalism and they have benefited for centuries especially due to the image of the coronation rite of the sacred anointing. To these were added both the strict control of the security forces and the absence of the media scrutiny and public transparency about the state of health or morals of the monarchs and other members of the royal houses.

The contemporaneity brought pressure on the everyday political relevance and actions of the monarchic elite. Their privileges (including fiscal) generated numerous and varied forms of opposition and criticism that culminated in several European countries with coups against the monarchy and the establishment of republican regimes. While not the near future scenario in Belgium, it should, however, be emphasized the reliance of the Belgian state-building on the royal house's ability to demonstrate its necessity and meaning.

The post-Cold War brought forth the dissolution of states which like the Belgian one had decided in a (con) federal way to bringing together two or more peoples with origins more or less common, including linguistic. I were the cases of the former Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Czechoslovak Republic or the independence of Montenegro. The secession of Kosovo is recognized only by a fraction of the international community. Five European Union member states, in turn confronted with the specter of ethnic separatism, are under increasing pressure both from others EU countries and the United States to accept this unilateral act of will of the Albanian community holding the majority in the southern parts of


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old Serbia. On the other hand, Russia and China, out of fear of secession in the forms of Chechnya or Tibet, will use their permanent UN Security Council status and vetoing rights to oppose the deepening of such developments.

But, the recent decision of the International Court of Justice in The Hague for the recognition of the legitimacy of Kosovo’s declaration of independence may be referential in the hypothetical case of a unilateral action of one of the two Belgian main communities. No genocide or ethnic hatred and distrust would be the raison behind it (as it is the case for the latest-born state, South Sudan) but a national will to renew the foundations and to eliminate the otherness, “guilty” of impeding growth and civilizational advance. Creating new frontiers within the Economic and Monetary Union and the EU area of security and freedom can be justified because ultimately everything boils down to majority rule of the elections and referendums. The resurgence of nationalist parties in the last decade at the forefront of political life in Western Europe is a certainty and the monarchs of Europe can be removed once they have exhausted or prove only a limited constitutional charisma.

In fact, the democratic Belgium has already experienced a showcase of royal controversy and public contestation during the WWII and postwar years of reign of King Leopold III. The referendum of 1950 was organised in order for the Belgians to vote on the issue of allowing the king in exile to come back and undisputedly resume his royal prerogatives. The electoral campaign and the official result deepened the gap between the Flemish (70 percent in favor) and the Walloons (only 42 percent for), and their main political options Christian-democracy and socialism respectively. Despite de fact that a majority of 57 percent voted for the king, the ensuing general strike caused by the socialists and the increasing risk of civil war forced the king to abdicated in favor of his son, future to be King Baudoin. Symbolically enough, one of the most relevant displays of Belgian-less happened in Wallonia during the crisis with banners of the Gallic coq replacing the official state flags.

The latest elections of 2010 marked the increase in relevance of the Flemish separatist movement, its main party, the New Flemish Alliance (NVA), managing to surpass the Christian Democrats (CD&V) for the first time in history and win the scrutiny (27.8 percent of the general vote and 27 seats in the Chamber of Representatives). Promoter of the so-called Maddens Doctrine (the continuation of the devolution despite its five phases of state reform since 1970), the Flemish separatists failed to agree in October 2010 over a government formula with the French-speaking Socialist party (the victor in Wallonia with 26 seats in the Belgian Parliament). This event made futile the elections called by the King in order to give Belgians a regular government after third successive resignations of Prime Minister Yves Leterme, the winner of the 2007 elections. The break-up of negotiations aggravated also the rift between Flanders and Wallonia, the leader of the Socialist Party Elio di Rupo publicly
invoking the necessity to activate Plan B\(^6\), the first public announcement on behalf of the leading party of the French-speaking community of the will to split the country as the only viable solution to end the political deadlock which has made Belgium to hold a strange 4-year world record of governmentlessness.

The former Flemish Prime Minister and current \textit{ad-hoc} caretaker Yves Leterme has not only coined Belgium as “an accident of history” (Quatremer, 2007) but he is also representative for the failure of the cohabitation between Flemish and Wallons. Born in a mixt family (father – french-speaker / mother – Flemish), the controversial leader of an electoral coalition between CD&V and NV-A failed to ensure during his tenures as prime minister the continuation of devolution to the benefit of Flanders and a radical solution to the \textit{BHV} (Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde) issue. Commented by the foreign media as “a polite form of ethnic cleansing” (The Economist, 2007), the scenario of abolishment of the bilingual political and judicial rights of approximately 150,000 French-speakers residents of the Flemish suburbs of Brussels failed to get the parliamentarian approval, but fueled once more the distrust between North and South.

Using the SWOT analysis methodology, the next logical step should be finding response less to the question whether secession is feasible (even from a unilateral side) and a lot more on the net benefits of such strategic decisions.

The strengths and opportunities of the secession should rely on the very existence of the Belgians in three linguistic communities (including a slim German-speaking one within the Francophone region), which means an already existing division for decades. Mutual accusations of burdening the state budget were fueled by the dynamics of progress and regress between the Flemish north and Walloon south. This could be replaced by what is mentioned above, namely the absence of otherness, thus focusing on developing their own unrestricted economic growth. The political parties would be forced to have natural doctrinal stance and positive action in the absence of abnormal left-right,
Flemish-Walloon alliances lately in the kingdom, and the competitiveness policy should prevail over nationalist agendas already fallen into disuse with the ultimate goal already reached.

But the weaknesses, risks and threats are not at all negligible. In an independent existence, both Flanders and Wallonia would be much less important in the absence of the integrator and capacitor pattern named Belgium. Of course, the European Union and the map of Europe itself contain small states like Luxembourg, Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino and the Baltic states. Even in the scenario of a shrewd and balanced partition (including a hard-to-reach solution for the creation of a free metropolitan region of Brussels), the weight dilemma in the European and international power balance remains. Antwerp was the capital of banking, gems and cloth markets in Europe prior to the three days of Spanish Fury in 1576, then lost prominence. Antwerp of the year 1944 was the most important port of the second front both for the Americans (in order to secure the success of post-landing operations in Normandie) and the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes. Flanders alone will be weaker in military terms than Belgium - an influential member of both NATO and the EU. Wallonia, by contrast, will lose the exit to sea - a vital geopolitical asset. The lack of Brussels would be very counterproductive for both entities since either symbolically or strategically, whoever controls the capital of Europe’s diplomatic community can possess major influence. Completely divided, the two communities would have on the long term mainly the scenario of belonging to the Netherlands or France respectively, meaning the dependence on already established and consolidated majorities regardless of the rhetoric and imaginary of the same blood and language roots.

A paradoxical argument to continuity of the Belgian monarchy and State in the nineteenth century was the fact that King Leopold II had managed through perseverance and diplomatic wit to claim and get as a personal domain Congo, one of the largest and richest in natural resources African colony. Pompously called the Congo Free State (1884-1908), this private domain generated by the brutal exploitation of indigenous labor tremendous benefits both for the monarchy and the Belgian State - a creditor of the colonial ambitions of Leopold II. The scandal and international pressure ignited by the revelations on the grim fate of the exploited natives will generate the only solution that allowed the colony to remain under the control of Belgium, namely its annexation by the government. What initially sounded like a crazy and expensive initiative on the part of the monarch of a small country, incapable of great geopolitical ambitions, became a significant asset in the European balance of power, dominated by the theme of colonialism. Belgium’s ambitions and postwar recoveries were fueled by the resources of Congo and based on the joint Wallon and Flemish continuos enterprise in colonial industry.
and trade. Not accidentally, Belgian population (mainly Flanders) in the Belgian Congo increased from more than 1,100 in 1900 to nearly 90,000 in the year of the Congolese independence (1960).

The recent WikiLeaks scandal showed the interest of the United States in fuelling the Belgian political imaginary and diplomatic assets as an emerging European power in return for help in accepting Guantanamo inmates and the continuous presence of US nuclear weapons. Washington’s goal to boost Brussels at the EU level as a counterweight to Paris and Berlin could facilitate a new Congo for Belgium. The head of the European Council is the former Belgian prime minister Herman van Rompuy, the most important school in European Affairs is the College of Europe in the Belgian Bruges and the Belgian diplomacy played important roles in crafting the EU Treaties and secondary pieces of legislation by merely hosting the majority of EU summits of the last decade. In times of global financial crisis, the governmentlessness of Belgium could prove to be a paradoxical asset of laissez-faire politics, very beneficial to the Belgian located business, Wallon, Flemish and international alike, while the Belgian bureaucracy could influence the dynamics of European Union to its interest.

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