Who were the Danish nazis? A methodological report on an ongoing project

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Konferenzbeitrag / conference paper

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

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Who were the Danish Nazis?
A Methodological Report on an Ongoing Project

Introduction

The research project presented here centers on an analysis of the largest of the Danish inter-war Nazi parties, the DNSAP (Danmarks National Socialistiske Arbejder Parti), which was formed in 1930 and disbanded at the end of the Second World War. The broad questions I am setting out to answer fall in three parts:

Empirical:
1. Who were DNSAP's members? (Aggregate description)
2. Were they as 'population' typical/atypical of the Danish population as a whole?

Explanatory:
3. Are there social/economic/political explanations of the membership distribution found?

Comparative/theoretical:
4. Are there recruitment bases of the Danish DNSAP and the Norwegian NS similar?
5. What implications for generalisations on imitator fascism can be drawn from the comparison with NS?

The source material for the study of the party membership is the so-called 'Bovrup-kartotek', primarily the original membership application forms, supplemented by various other files giving information on membership annulments, leadership etc.¹

DNSAP — Background Information

Antecedents

Various small anti-parliamentary groups had formed in the twenties, but had found little support, and mostly survived only for a short time. In 1925—26 a blackshirt movement on the Italian Fascist model got some attention ('Nationalkorpset', led by Einer Møller). In April 1927, Ritmester Lembcke tried to create an anti-parliamentary group, but it ceased to exist already the following October. In 1930 Lembcke formed the DNSAP, strictly on the German Nazi model. Not only Lembcke, the first Leader (capital L) of DNSAP, but most of the early lea-

¹ See appendix A for a more detailed archive description.
ders (lower-case 1) of the party came from these groups: furniture dealer Carlis Hansen, grocer Einar Jørgensen, and labourer A. Langgaard Nielsen. The latter two miraculously survived the years of factionalism and in-fighting, and were still holding prominent positions in DNSAP during the Occupation.\(^2\)

**DNSAP and its rivals**

There was no shortage of right-wing parties and organisations during the life-time of DNSAP. In the period 1930—1945, I have counted no less than 24 formations of parties with full-blown and self-proclaimed Nazi ideology. The timing of their appearance, together with some of the military and paramilitary voluntary corps, is charted in fig. 1. It shows that Nazi political party formation began with Hitler’s success in the early thirties, that the sharpest rise in activity occurred in 1940 and 1941 after the arrival of the Germans in Denmark, and continued almost till the end of the war; the activity in 1943—1944 reflecting the splitting of Nazi ranks after DNSAP’s disappointment in the 1943 elections.

Throughout the period, Danish Nazism had too many chiefs and not enough Indians, but it is hard to assess the exact numerical (in)significance of these parties, as most membership lists have been lost. In the absence of these, the voting figures for those which participated in the elections may serve as a substitute, as it may be assumed that many members of such of the smaller groups as put up no candidates of their own voted for other right-wing groups.

In effect, this means that we may use the votes obtained by DNSAP as a guideline to estimate the support of all hard-core Danish Nazi groups. Many of the smaller Nazi parties were splinter groups from DNSAP, or were at some time amalgamated with it — and aside from formal amalgamations, people were often members of different groups in turn. This means an estimated high point support of hard-core Danish Nazism of no more than 45 000, the approximate number of votes obtained by DNSAP in both 1939 and 1943. This represents 1 % of the population, or 2 % of the electorate, and is probably rather generous as an estimate. The German minority in South Jutland represent a separate problem. Their Nazi party NSDAP-N was in this period effectively represented in the Danish parliament through 'Slesvigsk Parti', which obtained 15 000 votes in 1939, or 15,9 % of the regional poll.

In summary, anti-parliamentarism appealed to a very small section of the Danish population, and outright fascism to an even smaller group — but of the latter, most belonged to DNSAP. Where the other Danish Nazi parties were counting their members in hundreds, DNSAP achieved a high point membership of about 22 000, and in all appr. 40 000 people passed through its membership lists. DNSAP, to all intents and purposes, was Danish Nazism.

\(^2\) Poulsen, Henning, Besættelsesmagten og de Danske Nazister, S. 24 Sources to Fig. 1: Alkil, Niels, Besættelsesstidens Fakta yielded most of the information. The rest has been taken from various general histories of the period.

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RATE OF CREATION OF DANISH NAZI PARTIES AND PARAMILITARY CORPS 1930-1945.

1935 ELECTIONS: DNSAP VOTES AS % OF VALID VOTES.
Leadership

In 1933 Ritmester Lembcke, the founder of the party, was replaced as leader of DNSAP by Frits Clausen, a fervently patriotic 40-year old Danish doctor from South Jutland, which had been German until 1920. It is popular to ridicule Frits Clausen, and to explain the failure of Danish Nazism by his lack of charisma. For Denmark as for other countries, however, the charisma explanation is probably too easy, and again, Frits Clausen may not have been quite as hopeless as all that. Probably his best vindication is that he was taken seriously by the Germans as potential (puppet) head of state, although this never became a reality. Clausen remained the leader of DNSAP almost to the end of the war.
In both ideology and organization, DNSAP was a close imitation of German National Socialism. Its first program was an almost direct translation of Hitler's 25 points, the main difference being that the demand for the abolition of the Treaty of Versailles (through which Denmark had regained North Schleswig—South Jutland) was replaced by the demand for the abolition of the Danish Communist Party. 'Lebensraum' was still demanded for Denmark's population of just under four million, however.  

3 DNSAP's original program, published November 9th, 1930 by Lembcke.
Although officially anti-semitic, the party was not very serious about this part of its program most of the time — a difference no doubt aided by the difficulty of finding any Jews in South Jutland, the starting place and all-time stronghold of the party.

Size Membership and Support

Due to incomplete information it is extremely difficult to calculate DNSAP's membership figures accurately at any one time. I offer the following figures as my most recent estimate, subject to revision: The recruitment to the party in the thirties was slow and steady, reaching about 5,000 by the end of 1939. After Germany occupied Denmark in April 1940, there was a rapid increase in membership, especially during 1940 and 1941, reaching its maximum number of members in March 1943 with appr. 21,500. Following the election in March 1943, when DNSAP did very badly, membership again decreased rapidly, as relations in Denmark with the German occupying power worsened, and military fortunes changed. At the end of the war, appr. 12,500 people remained as members of the party.

With nearly four million people in Denmark, this means that at its peak, appr. 0.5% were members of the party, and that altogether 1% passed through its lists. The latter corresponds to the highest number of votes obtained by DNSAP in any election (1% of the population, 2% of the electorate), and reflects a high organisation percentage in relation to votes.

In 1939, DNSAP was represented in Danish parliament for the first time, with three members. By the time the 1943 elections came round, the party talked confidently of 20 mandates, having been backed, although never wholeheartedly, by German money and influence for three years. In the event the German support proved fruitless, for once more DNSAP won only three places. With 149 MP's overall in the Danish parliament, this was perhaps not quite insignificant, but also nowhere near enough to have much impact, as all but a few of the other party representatives consistently opposed any measures proposed by the Nazis (see election maps).

Some reasons for the failure of DNSAP

In assessing the chances of DNSAP, a sharp dividing line has to be drawn at April 9th, 1940, when the Germans occupied Denmark. If DNSAP ever had a chance of getting into power by their own efforts before 1940, they had none after, being seen universally as the Germans' lackeys.

4 These figures are based on a recent analysis of the ten percent sample of members being analysed. They differ slightly from those put forward by Henning Poulsen and myself in a forthcoming article, in: Who Were the Fascists?, edited by Hagtvet, Bernt, Larsen, Stein U., Myklebust, Jan P., Oslo and New York 1980.

It is easy to explain the failure of Nazism in Denmark before 1940 by negations of the most widely accepted pluralist explanations of fascism: Danish nationalism was not expansionist by tradition, and had just been satisfied by the return of North Schleswig (South Jutland); the Danish Jews were little in evidence, and well integrated; communism was weak, and not seen as a serious threat; democracy was firmly established and generally accepted; the economic crisis was not severe in comparison with other European countries, and the Social Democratic government, in cooperation with the other major parties, was doing much to alleviate the worst effects. But when all this is said, perhaps the most fundamental reason for the failure of DNSAP was the impossibility of propagating a nationalist ideology so obviously modelled on the country which was the main threat, and later the declared enemy, of the party’s own country. This was a contradiction which DNSAP never solved — and which the Occupation made it impossible to solve.

After April 9th, the DNSAP’s only chance of gaining power was through the Germans, as puppet government. They did not achieve even this dubious honour, as the Germans were getting the necessary amount of cooperation from the existing Danish government⁶, with the minimum deployment of troops. When the Germans lost, so did the Danish Nazis.

History of the Research Project

Whether measured by members, votes or power, Danish Nazism never became a movement of much significance, and has attracted relatively little attention from Danish historians and social scientists. Possibly the five years of the Occupation is the most studied period in Denmark’s history, and indeed DNSAP’s place in the Occupation politics is better known than any other area of the party’s history.⁷

With all the attention being focused on the drama of 1940—45, the thirties have been correspondingly neglected. My source material covers both periods, and despite problems of finding comparative material for the thirties, I hope that within its limited scope this project may help to tie the Occupation into its historical setting. Furthermore, my treatment of the party is firmly collective, or if you like, sociological — as a complement to the excellent histories of personalities and political intrigue of the period.⁸

If I do not achieve this ambition, it will not be for want of good sources. ‘Bovruparkivet’, the archive of the DNSAP, resembles a haystack both in size, orderliness,

⁶ Poulsen, Henning, Besættelsesmagten og de Danske Nazister S. 385 nn.
⁷ The definitive work so far on DNSAP during the Occupation is Henning Poulsen, Besættelsesmagten, op. cit. Other historians of the Occupation have been only peripherally interested in DNSAP.
⁸ The only previous attempt at a sociological analysis of DNSAP’s membership has been: Brix og Hansen, op. cit. See S. 14.
and the lack of ease with which you find what you want in it — but includes much first-class and previously unused material. On the 4th of May, 1945, resistance, workers seized the party offices, and 'froze' the contents. During the next ten years, 'Bovrup-arkivet' was moved several times, finally arriving from the police at the Danish State Archives in 1955.

Parts of this archive have been used fairly extensively since then. In particular Henning Poulsen\(^9\) has made extensive use of the correspondence and the financial reports. But apart from a study of the age distribution of the party members carried out about 1955\(^10\), the part which contains the centralised membership lists has not been used. There are a number of these, with some duplication between different lists. The combination which I use for this research forms a more or less complete set.\(^1\) Working with a 10% random sample of this, I have collected as much information on each selected member as it was possible to do in a systematic manner\(^12\).

My first project on this subject some four years ago was rather less ambitious in scope. In 1947, two students at Copenhagen University published a sociological study of the DNSAP membership\(^13\) based on an illegal list\(^14\), which the resistance workers had published just after the war, presumably copied from the card indexes while they were the guardians of the office after the liberation. For a long time this list was thought to be complete — but now we know that it contains only about half of the party’s members. As we don’t know the whole process by which the other half came to be left out, we clearly do not know how far we can rely on the study, even considered as a sample. This I set out to test with my first project, using an occupationally ordered card index file to carry out a series of tests on the 1947 study\(^15\). My results convinced me that it could not be relied on, and that a new analysis of the social composition of the party membership was desirable.

The existence of the source material described above made such an analysis possible. In fact, it is something of a contemporary historian’s dream, and in the field of fascism is to my knowledge equalled only by the material used by Stein U. Larsen and his colleagues in Bergen, in their study of the membership of Nasjonal Samling. In both cases, the material was created by unique historical circumstances. For me at least — and presumably also for the Norwegians — this creates the ironical situation that I am extremely short of comparative material from other political parties in Denmark at the time, to make my figures speak.

The nature and size of the archives clearly dictated the use of quantitative methods by computer. I had no previous knowledge in this field, but miraculously, I seem to

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9 Poulsen, Henning, op. cit.
11 See Appendix A.
12 See Appendix B.
13 Brix og Hansen, Dansk Nazisme under Besættelsen.
14 Bovrup-bogen, 1946.
15 This occupational file was compiled by a Danish government department after the war, but was never quite completed. Hence it was unsuitable for a more systematic study.
have made no monumental mistakes in the planning stage of the project — a fact I can only put down to the patience and helpfulness of the experts I consulted. One saved me from thinking I could dispense with coding sheets, given the regular layout of the archives I was working with. Apart from enabling me to have my data professionally punched and verified, the coding sheets have been a constant reference point, both in error cleaning and recoding/data-rationalising processes. Another convinced me that my ambition to analyse the complete membership of the party, in emulation of the Bergen project, would take fifteen years out of my life. My enthusiasm for a 'definitive study' waned after that.

In the end I took a ten per cent random sample of the available membership forms, and located the individuals from this sample in the other files to add more information on each. There was no apparent reason why a systematic sample should have presented any problems, and it would certainly have been faster — but halfway through the coding I discovered that for some years the party had a system of giving blocks of membership numbers to different regions. If there was any regularity in their allocations of numbers, this could easily have made the sample unrepresentative.

To determine sample size, I first carried out a pilot study with the main categories of a few of the most important variables. The pilot study was ten per cent also, but I was hoping to be able to reduce, if it turned out that there were enough cases in the various sub-categories. The result was that although five per cent would have been enough on the later years, when recruitment levels were high, and party bureaucracy efficient, this was not enough to analyse the membership of the thirties adequately. The level of 'no response' on some variables during the early years, as well as the level of subdivision I wanted to work with, made a ten per cent sample necessary for this period at least. I now think that perhaps I should have worked with weighting, rather than take a ten per cent sample throughout — the coding alone took me 8 months of full-time work — but at the time I was unsure of my ability to do this correctly.

A couple of experiences from the codebook-construction and coding stages may be worth recounting. While in theory I was aware of the importance of using standard codes wherever possible, in practice I had not anticipated every stage of my work in sufficient detail to fully realise the importance of this. The result is that I created extra work for myself, having to reclassify a number of variables at a later stage, in order to compare with other data sets and official statistics. Luckily I had originally coded in sufficient detail to be able to do this.

My coding of occupations can serve as an example. One section of the code I based on the official Danish census statistics, another part on status categories worked out by a Norwegian sociologist, who has been working with Danish status mobility.

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16 The pilot study was suggested and superised by Jørgen Wedeby, Statistisk Kontor, and Institut for Samfundsfag, Copenhagen University. My warmest thanks.

17 Svalastoga, Kaare, Prestige, Class and Mobility, Gyldendal 1959. One of Prof. Svalastoga's
These are apparently as they should be, and present no problem; but I found out too late that a Scandinavian occupational code exists, which the Bergen team used for their study of NS. Before a detailed comparison of my results with those of the Norwegians will be possible, I have to recode mine to suit theirs. The fact that I coded each occupational title makes this possible, although it will be quite time-consuming.

For my area code, again I did use one devised by a Danish ecological archive for the period — but I used it in a slightly modified form which suited me better, without realising that I would wish to use this very archive for comparison later. I now face the task of modifying it back to the original version.

One coding mistake which I shall not be able to correct concerns membership type. It is clear that instead of coding the first section of the party which a new member joined (Party Member, SA, Youth Groups), it would have been more interesting to code the most militant type membership in a member's entire career in the party. I'm afraid it would now take considerable effort to retrieve this information.

Analysis so far

After the coding, punching and error-cleaning was done, I still had number of 'data-rationalisations' to do before I could get much out of the data.

First, little-used categories were grouped together, to avoid empty cells in the analysis of my low-level variables. Working with SPSS, I have done this in the system file rather than in the original data set, to prevent the loss of detail which could be useful in the future.

Second, the entry and exit dates were manipulated, so that instead of operating with two entry dates, one local and one for arrival at Headquarters, I calculated the average 'bureaucratic delay' between the two for individual years, and used this delay to estimate local entry for those where it was missing. For exits, I only had a Headquarters date. To make this comparable with the entry date, I subtracted the same bureaucratic delay from the Headquarters exit day, to obtain an estimate of when the member actually asked to leave the party.

colleagues, Tom Rishoj, has compiled a status index from this project, based on the individual job title. I used this version as a starting point.

18 Nordisk Yrkesklassifisering, Arbejdsdirektoratet (ed), 1965. (Norwegian version)
20 This mistake was pointed out to me by Gerhard Botz, University of Linz, in a fruitful discussion in summer, 1976.
21 See appendix C.
The usual way of storing dates as three separate variables (day-month-year) is obviously very limiting in analysis, as one can normally only use the year as a continuous variable, and hence lose a lot of accuracy. I think I have got round that problem by creating an almost-accurate metric conversion of the dates on the formula: date = (day/30+month)/12+year. It seems to work very well.

Re-entries were identified by sorting cases into order by birthdate, selecting those with identical birthdate and sex, and going back to the archive to see how many of these 'candidates' were in fact the same. The result was that an estimated 3000–3700 of the 42 000 cards in the boxes were re-entries (0.05 confidence level). These will be controlled for in a number of the subsequent analyses.

From the results achieved so far, it is possible to outline some of the membership characteristics.22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>1935 DNSAP</th>
<th>1945 DNSAP</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15–20</td>
<td>17% (+)</td>
<td>11% (+)</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21–25</td>
<td>21% (+)</td>
<td>15% (+)</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–30</td>
<td>18% (+)</td>
<td>15% (+)</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31–40</td>
<td>19% (−)</td>
<td>24% (+)</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41–</td>
<td>26% (−)</td>
<td>35% (−)</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two features in this table are noteworthy. The first is what might be expected, a distinct overrepresentation of the younger generation,23 a feature characteristic of fascist parties, or perhaps of any new party. The second is the increasing average age of the party.24 This seems to be a combined effect of the young staying a shorter time in the party and the general ageing of the membership 'core', rather than the age of recruits getting generally higher.25

Taking the next 'classical' variable, sex, we find that the recruitment of women increased over time. How big an increase we are talking about can be seen from the fact that whereas women's overall percentage of the membership was 21; this conceals an increase from about 10 % in the early thirties to about 30 % at the end of the period. Whereas in Norway the NS female members were found to be notably younger than the men26, this was not the case in Denmark; sex crosstabulated against age at entry gives an almost identical distribution.

22 Most of the following preliminary results will appear in Poulsen, Henning and Djursaa, Malene, Social Basis of Nazism in Denmark: The DNSAP, Op. cit.
23 Note, however, that the very youngest age-group, 15–20, moves to underrepresentation by 1945.
24 This is clearly illustrated by the bracketed crosses (overrepresentation) and minusses (underrepresentation) in the table; the overrepresented age groups move one to the right over the ten years.
25 Age at entry by entry year, Pearson's $r = -0.0264$ — negligible. Age at entry by length membership, $r = 0.1324$, sig. = 0.001, $n = 3581$. This is still a low correlation, but probably accounts for at least some of the variation in the table above.
26 See articles forthcoming by Jan Petter Myklebust and Stein Ugelvik Larsen, in: Hagtvet, Larsen & Myklebust (eds), Who Where the Fascists?
Initially the party was strongest in the countryside, but at the end of the 15-year period the urban members predominated. Crosstabulating degree of urbanisation against year of entry, we get this clear picture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cap. + suburbs</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns + suburbs</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad (Germany Workers)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx:</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There may be a connection to be found between the rising recruitment of women, and the increasing urbanisation of the membership — for it appears that women constitute more than twice as high a percentage of the town members as of the country members; from the capital and suburbs, 29% were women, from towns and suburbs 24%, but from rural areas only about 13%. Establishing the nature of the connection between increasing urbanisation and female recruitment could be more problematical, however, as it can't automatically be assumed that town women are politically more active. Maybe a line of argument combining 'recruitment in closed circles' as the Nazi party members became socially more isolated during the Occupation, with the fact that the recruitment drive in the last phases of the party's existence centered on urban areas, could prove satisfactory.

The first results on the distribution of the DNSAP membership over different social classes show that the dimension of time also here reveals a set of results different from that achieved by static averages. It has not yet been possible to compare figures of DNSAP membership with ecological data for the whole of the Danish population, but it seems that using an overall average description, there is little about the distribution of social classes within the party which is remarkable. If the period is divided up, it appears that the higher groups joined earlier than the lower:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Per cent which had joined by the end of 1940:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower upper class</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle class</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle middle class</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle class</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper working class</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle working class</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 These results are closely analogous to findings from NS — See Stein Larsen's paper Higher status formed the party — lower status filled the ranks, presented at the QUANTUM-conference „Quantitative Analyses of National Socialism“ Bad Homburg, October 1977.
The election results from Copenhagen further confirm this trend. In 1935 the Nazi party had a larger share of the votes in well-to-do districts dominated by the conservatives, while they were quite insignificant in the working-class districts. In 1939 and especially in 1943 this difference was no longer discernible.²⁸

Taken as an average, a very large number of DNSAP's members left again before May 1945, when the party was dissolved — as many as 67% approximately. Some groups were more likely to get out than others, however; whereas 80% of the functionaries and 75% from the trade category got out 'in time', just under 60% of housewives, school-schildren/students and the agricultural group left the party.

Another way of looking at who was likely to leave the party again is equally interesting. If we take the rural-urban split once more, the figures are approximately these:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent from area which left the party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital + suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns + suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country districts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further Analysis

Some of the main problem-areas I am currently working with are:
Patterns of in- and outflow of members; implications of an acceleration of both entries and exits over the years?
Positing more 'ideological' entries in the thirties, and more 'opportunistic' entries during the Occupation, these two groups will be tested for differences.
Patterns of in- and outflow will be expected to reflect societal stimuli, especially during the Occupation — e.g. fluctuations in economic fortunes, the military situation, the actions of the Danish government in relation to the Germans, the general tolerance-level of the Germans in the Danish population, etc. At another level, DNSAP tactics and propaganda drives, and internal politics in the party, can be expected to be reflected in membership curves.
Regional distribution of members; South Jutland will deserve detailed analysis, as the undisputed stronghold of the party. One possible approach could be to compare areas with a large German population (e.g. Tonder) with those where the Danes predominated more heavily (Sonderborg), using 1920 plebiscite results as basis.
Aside from the special case of South Jutland, differences were small and few, and most of these can probably be explained by organisation- and personality differences within the party.

²⁸ Poulsen, Henning, From Poulsen, Henning and Djursaa, Malene, Social Basis of Nazism in Denmark, op. cit.
Rural-urban development: Of much more import than regional differentiations (aside from South Jutland) is the clear development which takes place between country and town predominance in the party. This was accelerated, but not started, by the German Occupation, and must be constantly kept in mind when analysing the party membership — so often, an overall average conceals extremely marked and interesting developments.

Stratification: Aside from the usual analysis of social classes/status groups, I hope to be able to look in detail at at least some individual occupations, a) to show processes of inter-group recruitment, and b) to see if there were any discernible differences in the propensity of thriving vs. threatened occupations to enter the party.

In fact, however, I do not expect too much from the testing of 'structural' explanations of fascism on the Danish case. The Danish party did not gain a mass base, a fact which leads me to ask if societal/structural incentives to join the party were largely absent, and if motivations for membership were more individual than in countries where fascism gained mass support. This does not mean, of course, that I can neglect to look for structural explanations of the DNSAP membership — indeed, it is not until I have assiduously looked for and failed to find these that I have any justification to posit individualistic motivations for membership. But if this should indeed be the outcome of my investigation, I will not feel this to be a negative one; the questioning for the Danish case (and the Norwegian?) of the explanations which hold for the prototypes of fascism could be an important step towards exploring differences in recruitment patterns between originator and imitator fascist movements.
Appendix A: Archive Description

Bovrup-arkivet, and Bovrup-kartoteket; from Centralkartoteket, Rigsarkivet in Copenhagen. From this:

1. The original membership application forms. These are the most complete, and form the basis for my ten per cent random sample.
2. A card index of people, who were still members when the party was dissolved in 1945.
3. A card index of anulled members.
   2 and 3 together make up a more or less complete set of cards, but still lack a few in relation to 1. Both were produced by the party.
4. Personnel forms. These were filled in by DNSAP leaders. From here I have taken information on leadership posts — highest rank achieved, no. of leadership posts held, dates for appointment to and 'being relieved of' leadership posts. Red nos 177–183.
5. Leader protocol. On the whole, this gives the same information as 4. I have use it as a control, and to fill gaps from missing personnel forms. Red no 284.
6. Request for anullment of membership. These state the reason for leaving the party, but are not complete. About 50% are answered meaningfully. Red nos 224–266.
7. Request for re-entry into DNSAP. Red nos 204–205.

Together these lists provide substantial amounts of information on each member. The weak part is the early thirties, especially 1930–33, when there was a different leader of the party. It seems that when he was replaced, he took the membership lists with him, and for those years we mostly only have the names of those who filled in a new form of the new leader. It seems that a substantial number did this. However, it is rather worrying, that a number of early membership lists, which apparently were in the archive, have been lost. In old keys to the archive I have found references to membership lists from the early thirties. These have disappeared from the more up-to-date keys. I instigated a search for these, but it seems that they cannot be found. It is possible that they will come to light, when more people start to use the archives, and we can gradually begin to sift through the haystack. If so, they can be incorporated into the data-set without too much trouble.

From 1934 onwards, very few indeed are missing. Also the quality and consistency of the information improves in the later years, especially during the Occupation, when the bureaucratic machinery became increasingly efficient.
Appendix B: Variable Set

Column

1–5 Sequence number
6–10 Membership number
11 Archive identification no (low no., re-entry, etc.)
12–17 Headquarters entry date
18 Sex
19–26 Occupation
   19–22 Exact occupational title (Alphabetic)
   23 9-point status scale (Svalastoga)
   24–25 Industrial group
   26 Official census status code (based on 1950)
27–32 Birthdate
33–38 Area code
   33–34 County
   35–36 Commune
37–38 Degree of urbanisation
39–40 Trade union membership
41 Honorary post in trade union
42 Telephone (yes/no)
43–44 Club memberships; social, sports, political, etc.
45 Honorary posts in clubs
46–47 Previous political affiliation (incl. supported, voted)
48–53 Local entry date
54–59 Headquarters exit date
60 Member type (PM/KM, SA, NSU/P, AT)
61–62 Reason for leaving
63 Highest rank achieved as leader
64 No of leadership posts held
65–68 Month/year of first leadership appointment
69–72 Month/year 'relieved' of last leadership post
73–76 Personnelnumber — for leaders. (Superfluous, now deleted)
77 Honorary posts, other than trade unions and clubs
78 Means of transport

These variables formed the starting point. I have since eliminated the headquarters entry date, so that I am now working only with a local entry date, of which some are estimated values — similarly the headquarters exit date has been converted into an estimated local exit date. Personnelnumber has been deleted, it was only for identificatory purposes.

To facilitate analysis, I have computed some new variables; all the dates have been
converted from three-variable representations into metric approximations, on the formula
\[ \text{date} = \frac{(\text{day}/30 + \text{month})}{12} + \text{year}. \]
From these, I have computed age at entry into the party, and length of stay in the party.

Should anyone at a later stage wish to recapture the state of my data as it was before my various 'manipulations', this will be possible — a copy of the original, but errorcleaned version will be kept.

I coded everything which I felt was of substantive interest — i.e. I only left out things like the size of the subscription. Other information was thought to be unusable, like previous criminal convictions, which I did a pilot study for and found unreliable. Also names were left out, because of restrictions of identification imposed by the Ministry of Justice.

Appendix C: Error Control

Before reading in the data:
Cards were double-punched from the coding sheets.

After reading in:
Marginals check 1: This consisted of a check for each column that the values were all within the permitted range. For this I used SSRC Survey Archive program FOUNT. To locate the card on which the faulty value resided, I used SSRC program FIND.

Marginals check 2: This covers each completed variable field, but is otherwise analogous to the singlecolumn check. In fact I wrote my own programs for this, but an SPSS Frequencies run in general mode would do just as well.

Logical check: Takes the form: If var A = 1, then var B should not be 2, etc. An example would be mistakes in dates. If I had coded someone's birthdate as 1/1/40, I would not consider this a mistake under the marginals checks. Quite often young children, even babies, were entered into the party. Equally an entry date of 3/5/38 would pass the first tests — and it would not be until the logical check was carried out that the anomaly would appear.

At the end of each phase of checks, I checked off the suspect values against the coding sheets, and corrected the punching errors. A substantial proportion turned out to be shift-errors, where part of the card had been punched one or more columns out. The coding errors I took back to the archive for correction.

I have no illusion that I have found all the errors in my material. Inevitably there will be wrong values which are within the permitted marginals range, and which do not clash with any of the other variables. These, I'm afraid, will stay, and I shall never know how serious they are.
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