Globalisation, migration and integration have shaken up identity processes and identity dynamics as never before. But in a post-colonial, multi-ethnic Europe, what is identity? How is it constructed? This book endeavours to answer these questions and more. Eleven of the thirteen chapters present empirical case studies from the Basque Country, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Portugal – thus resulting in one of the first international volumes to highlight Portugal’s diverse and complex migration flows. Transnationalism also takes centre stage in several contributions that survey various types of informal and formal networks in local communities and across national borders. Via American studies, anthropology, cultural studies, ethnology, history, social psychology and sociology, the authors come from an array of disciplines as dynamic as the continent about which they write.

Charles Westin is a professor of migration and ethnicity studies at Stockholm University. José Bastos is an associate professor of anthropology at the New University of Lisbon. Janine Dahinden is a professor of transnational studies at the University of Neuchâtel, where she is also director of the Center for the Understanding of Social Processes (MAPS). Pedro Góis is a lecturer in sociology and methodology in the faculty of fine arts at the University of Oporto and a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra.

"A welcome addition to current discussions tackling the question: how shall we all live together in Europe? As this volume illustrates, there is no one disciplinary approach, nor one single solution. Taken together, these essays advance our collective knowledge about intercultural relations – and perhaps take us some steps towards more positive ways of living together."

John W. Berry, Emeritus Professor of Psychology, Queen’s University, Canada

"Combining theories of cultural change, representations, networks and identities, this volume offers an innovative comparison of situated studies. Westin and colleagues provide an outstanding source for students, researchers and policy leaders."

Steve Fenton, Professor and Senior Research Fellow, Department of Sociology and Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, University of Bristol, UK

"Europe today is a multi-ethnic immigration continent in search of an umbrella identity of identities. This excellent book is an interdisciplinary eye-opener into these social, cultural and mental dynamics."

Klaus J. Bade, Chair, Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, Berlin, Germany
Identity Processes and Dynamics in Multi-Ethnic Europe
IMISCOE
International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe

The IMISCOE Research Network unites researchers from, at present, 25 institutes specialising in studies of international migration, integration and social cohesion in Europe. What began in 2004 as a Network of Excellence sponsored by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission has become, as of April 2009, an independent self-funding endeavour. From the start, IMISCOE has promoted integrated, multidisciplinary and globally comparative research led by scholars from various branches of the economic and social sciences, the humanities and law. The Network furthers existing studies and pioneers new scholarship on migration and migrant integration. Encouraging innovative lines of inquiry key to European policymaking and governance is also a priority.

The IMISCOE-Amsterdam University Press Series makes the Network’s findings and results available to researchers, policymakers and practitioners, the media and other interested stakeholders. High-quality manuscripts authored by Network members and cooperating partners are evaluated by external peer reviews and the IMISCOE Editorial Committee. The Committee comprises the following members:

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Identity Processes and Dynamics in Multi-Ethnic Europe

*edited by Charles Westin, José Bastos, Janine Dahinden and Pedro Góis*
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Preface

This volume is the result of a coming together of social scientists representing different academic traditions, disciplines and countries, and hence different approaches towards the issues at hand. The book evolved from workshops occurring within the IMISCOE Network of Excellence, in a cluster focusing on questions relating to inter-ethnic relations, identity, representation and discrimination. Discussion at these meetings concentrated on relations between national, ethnic, ‘racial’, religious and cultural groups in diverse multi-ethnic societies. Inter-ethnic relations entail in some instances a focus on majority-minority relations in the nation-state. In others the focus is rather on relations between a native-born population and migrants with their descendants. In most of the current EU-27 member states, inter-ethnic relations apply to both majority-minority relations and to native-born-migrant relations.

The cluster has met ten times since the start of IMISCOE (which as of April 2009, came to be called the IMISCOE Research Network). At the second workshop, held in Coimbra in 2004, it was decided that the subsequent work package would involve writing a book on identity questions in relation to inter-ethnic relations. At the Paris workshop in spring 2005, several papers constituting the core of this volume were presented and discussed. This work continued at workshops in Osnabrück in 2005, Lisbon in 2006, twice in Vienna in 2006 and in Stockholm in 2007.

An editorial board consisting of José Bastos, Janine Dahinden, Pedro Góis and myself was appointed by the cluster at the Osnabrück conference. The committee met at the cluster workshops and conferences but also separately in Stockholm in June 2006. Much of the editorial work was done by email. I would like to thank members of the editorial board for their work on this volume. Many thanks also to all the contributing authors. Thanks are also due to those cluster members who have not written chapters but have participated in workshops and seminars, and given input and feedback on papers sent out to them. Finally, let me express my gratitude to the IMISCOE Editorial Committee, the anonymous reviewers and their excellent suggestions for reworking sections of the manuscript, Karina Hof and Amsterdam University Press.

Stockholm, January 2010

Charles Westin
1 Identity and inter-ethnic relations

Charles Westin

Introduction

This volume is about inter-ethnic relations in Europe with special emphasis on identity dynamics and identity processes. Here the concept of inter-ethnic relations comprises a broad range of encounters, between people and groups of diverse origins, taking place in contemporary societies. Much of the literature emphasises the problematic dimensions of these relations, pertaining to various aspects of social exclusion – racism, discrimination, segregation, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, inequality and injustice. However, inter-ethnic relations should also be understood to encompass processes of social inclusion, referred to under various headings such as incorporation, insertion, acculturation, assimilation, integration and even absorption. In other words, inter-ethnic relations may refer to the rigid preservation of national, cultural and religious boundaries between groups and collectives on the one hand, and to processes of cultural development, innovation and societal transformation on the other. Broadly speaking, inter-ethnic relations may be understood as concerning failed or successful forms of diversity management.

Social identities are of crucial concern in this context. Collective social identities stand out and are articulated when groups from different social, cultural, ‘racial’, national, ethnic, religious and linguistic backgrounds share societal space in public arenas, in housing estates, at workplaces and in schools. ‘Race’, ethnicity and nationality are represented in these identities. In 1915, Durkheim coined the concept of collective representations to refer to these images of self and other (Durkheim 1982). Half a century later, Moscovici addressed the same idea (Farr & Moscovici 1978). He referred to these images as social representations. In this book, we employ the concept of representation in the Durkheimian sense of collectively shared identities of self and other or, using the terminology of American social psychology, autostereotypes and heterostereotypes. The concept of representation may, however, also be understood as pertaining to issues of power and influence in political assemblies. This is an important connotation demonstrating that power, and more specifically the differential distribution of power in society, is at the heart of identity dynamics.
One challenge confronting us in compiling this volume was the great diversity of the contributions. How to best assemble them so as to create some cohesion? Obviously the answer to this question depends on how we view the nature of diversity. We recognise a multifaceted diversity arising from different sources. One source of this diversity lies in the fact that the authors represented in this book come from a wide range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. While this fact certainly may appear to produce non-uniform contributions and modes of analysis, it is not problematic. Multidisciplinarity lies at the heart of the IMISCOE initiative and is one of its strengths. An anthology such as this one, reflecting multidisciplinary approaches to specific research questions, is demanding. A book presenting a wide range of viewpoints relating to several different theoretical traditions, and employing various research methodologies and empirical techniques, can hardly be classified as easy reading. What we present is a richness of perspectives on the elusive phenomenon of identity. This book does not present streamlined and definitive answers.

Another source of diversity in this book lies in the fact that the authors come from various European countries, and are inspired by, and reflect upon, the specific conditions for inter-ethnic relations and identity construction in settings familiar to them. One editorial technique to deal with this kind of diversity among conference papers is to establish some sort of comparative analytic grid; that is, to ask authors from different countries to address similar, or preferably the same, questions. We have refrained from doing so. One implicit condition for such an arrangement would most likely have been for different countries to be represented by a roughly equal number of authors. This is not the case with our book.

Seven of the twelve authors are Portuguese. Some might say that what we have here is basically a Portuguese book, with a few additional chapters dealing with conditions elsewhere. However, this is an inadequate description. Some of the Portuguese authors are not concerned with identity dynamics in Portugal per se, but with conditions in other countries. The predominance of Portuguese authors in this volume is definitely one of its merits and strengths. The Portuguese voice on identity and inter-ethnic relations has not often been heard outside the Portuguese-speaking world. We contend that it deserves a European audience. While Portuguese society does share some post-colonial experiences with France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, certain aspects of these experiences make Portugal unique as a multi-ethnic society. This helps us better understand the complexities of multicultural and identity dynamics in Europe.

This introductory chapter consists of three subsections. The first subsection presents an overview of the ethnicity discourse from the 1960s
until the mid-1990s, when other interests and topics assumed prominence in the migration arena. The second subsection presents a subjective overview of some debates and problems pertaining to identity studies. In the final subsection, the issue of diversity is approached and there is a brief overview of some of the questions that the chapters included in the volume address.

On ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations

The anthropological background

The term ethnicity is derived from the Greek words for people – *ethnos* and *ethnikos*. It is an umbrella concept, denoting the specific quality characterising a people’s understanding of itself as a collective. It is about identities, categories, groups, collectives and relations. Though ethnicity is a fairly recent addition to social science vocabulary, it has been known much longer in compound words such as ethnography, ethnology and ethnocentrism. Ethnicity is a collective identity. It is emotionally and cognitively significant to the individual, and ascribed by self and others. It is about the sense of belonging, in many (though not all) cases a people with common language, traditions and in some cases also territory. This understanding of ethnicity implies that majority populations are ascribed ethnicity. Awareness of one’s own ethnicity is context-dependent.

In various Western languages, there is no noun corresponding to the adjective ‘ethnic’. Instead, ‘ethnic group’ is used. However, as Rex points out, this is unsatisfactory because the term ‘group’ will create an impression tending to underestimate a people’s actual numbers. The alternative compound ‘ethnic collective’ is also problematic, because it does not adequately convey the sense of belonging and cohesiveness usually ascribed to ethnic awareness (Guibernau & Rex 1997: 271). French has the noun *ethnie*, which is used by some theorists in English (Smith 1986).

Recent debates have explored whether the ethnicity concept is at all useful. Some regard it as superfluous, since the social positions covered by ethnicity can be more adequately treated by concepts such as class, nation and ‘race’. Explanations of social inequalities, the argument goes, will tend to focus on cultural differences, as ethnicity is about common culture, identity and origins. An ethnic focus on group relations will tend to reduce the importance of power relations in explanations of social dominance and subordination. In post-colonial terms, people in dominant socio-economic positions ascribe ethnicity to the other, that is to those in subordinate socio-economic positions. In this analysis, the ethnicity approach tends to essentialise the culture of the other as the ‘problem’.
The ethnicity concept was introduced to social science discourse mainly from three sources: the anthropological study of non-European societies; political and historical studies of nation-building processes; and finally through studies of migration (including domestic rural-to-urban mobility) and integration in the United States and Europe. Let us first look at its background in anthropology.

Anthropology as we know it today began as the systematic documentation of non-European societies in the late nineteenth century. Several classic founders of cultural anthropology (which should not be confused with physical anthropology) as a discipline employed the concept of ‘tribe’ to refer to the community of people whose ways and livelihood the anthropologist had set out to document. ‘Tribes’ were found in different parts of the world. Though differences in material foundations, livelihood and cultural content (traditions, mythology, kinship systems), the fact that these researchers used a vocabulary consisting of certain common conceptualisations implied that, at a theoretical and interpretative level above raw description, they must have discerned common structures of societal organisation. Concepts such as ‘tribe’ and ‘clan’ are present in the writings of authors including Spencer and Gillen (Central Australia), Malinowski (Melanesia) and Boas (North-Western US). The classical anthropologist Evans-Pritchard mentions the following traits characteristic of a tribe:

A tribe has been defined by (1) a common and distinct name; (2) a common sentiment; (3) a common and distinct territory; (4) a moral obligation to unite in war; and (5) a moral obligation to settle feuds and other disputes by arbitration. To these five points can be added three further characteristics [...]: (6) a tribe is a segmented structure and there is opposition between its segments; (7) within each tribe there is a dominant clan and the relation between the lineage structure of this clan and the territorial system is of great structural importance; (8) a tribe is a unit in a system of tribes; and (9) age-sets are organised tribally. (Evans-Pritchard 1969: 122)

This quote points to the political nature of tribes as understood in early nineteenth-century social science and geographical literature. Today the concept of tribe is used by political scholars of Muslim-dominated states in West and Central Asia and North Africa. In this usage, the concept of tribe does not always coincide with ethnic distinctiveness. One ‘tribe’ in this political sense may include more than one ethnic group, and people who identify with one particular ethnic group as regards certain defining characteristics (language, religion, customs, etc.) may politically belong to several different tribes. The concept of ‘tribe’ represents
one of the roots of the anthropological conceptualisation of ethnic group and ethnicity, but not the only one. The increased favour enjoyed by the ethnicity concept around the mid-twentieth century is (partly) explained by the fact that it solved a number of conceptual problems in applying anthropological terminology for social collectives. It synthesised various ideas associated in earlier literature with concepts such as clan, 'race', people and tribe.

After World War II, the notion of social/cultural Darwinism, which had undoubtedly influenced some early pioneers, fell into disrepute, as did some of the more obvious concepts associated with it. Though several early anthropologists who had described tribes and tribal organisation were by no means social Darwinists, the concept of 'tribe' was nevertheless politically burdened. By the early 1960s, the concept of 'ethnic group' replaced it, at least in mainstream anthropological literature. This was around the same time that cultural anthropology shifted to social anthropology, thus marking an interest in societal organisation rather than in solely cultural content. An important reason for the shift from tribe to ethnic group was theoretical. There was simply more theoretical debate and development going on around the concept of ethnicity as compared to tribe at the time. This debate was sparked by Geertz (1963), Cohen (1969) and Barth (1969), to mention three most influential theorists.

An important debate about the nature of ethnicity in the 1960s was between primordialists and instrumentalists (see Banks 1996 for an overview). The primordial position, supported by Geertz, stated that the roots of ethnic identification lay in the deep subconscious foundations of human existence. Therefore, ethnic organisation differed from other social groups. The most extreme primordial interpretation held that ethnicity had to be explained in terms of the human genetic make-up (Van den Berghe). A more moderate interpretation stressed the importance of first-language acquisition as a unique socialisation into one's linguistic, cultural and ethnic community, providing strong bonds of identification with other native speakers.

The primordial position was heavily attacked by researchers representing an instrumentalist, constructivist and situationist interpretation of ethnicity. Ethnicity, stated these theorists, is not an individual trait or quality; it is not something that people possess. Rather, it is a quality characterising a certain type of intergroup relations. Ethnicity is constructed in certain situations for instrumental reasons, political, economic or other. Cohen (1969, 1974) and Brass (1991) were some of the leading situationists/instrumentalists. Primordialism cannot explain change in ethnic identification, while instrumentalism has difficulty explaining why (some) ethnic identities have endured for long periods of time without any instrumental or organisational support provided by a nation-state.
Looking back on this debate, it appears that the primordial position is closer to popular conceptions and explanations of group cohesiveness, while the instrumental position is more consonant with the views held by political elites. When Milosevic played the nationalism card in the 1991 Yugoslav crisis, he was exploiting a shared, grassroots level understanding of what being a Serb implied. Milosevic, a former Communist, did this for obvious tactical reasons.

The Norwegian anthropologist Barth made an important contribution to the ethnicity discourse in his introductory chapter to the 1969 book *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Culture Difference*. Although Barth set the stage for an instrumental interpretation of ethnicity, there is no doubt that his position is close to the primordialist view. He regards ethnicity as a real, socially meaningful ground for identification and not primarily as a strategic self-presentation for instrumental gain. His basic question is to ask why ethnic groups persist over long periods of time, often throughout several generations. The traditional answer was that a common cultural core will generate boundaries between peoples. This view implies that self-reproducing people will tend to live more or less in isolation vis-à-vis neighbouring people. Barth reverses the logic. The existence and persistence of social boundaries enables the ethnic group in question to maintain its common language, culture and religion. The existence of these boundaries is what needs to be explained.

Ethnic boundaries are permeable, claims Barth. Exchange of people from different groups takes place across the boundaries in conjunction with work, business, marriage and trade. Ethnic distinctiveness does not emerge because people live in isolation from one another but because they engage in social interaction across boundaries. Ethnic identities are defined in relation to one another.

Conditions representing the articulation of group-specific characteristics and identities may be expressed in everyday interactions as restrictions on the possible roles an individual person may assume. Ethnicity thus has much in common with categories such as gender and class, which also limit actions in given social situations. Ethnic identities will be defined in contrast to each other. Definitions of ethnic identity are therefore complementary. They embody the distinctiveness and cohesiveness of each group while, at the same time, constituting their systemic interdependence. If no such complementarities are present, then there will be no ethnic organisation of society.

In his 1993 book *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Eriksen has continued the Barthian tradition. Eriksen examines ethnicity as an aspect of social relationships. The importance of Eriksen’s work is that he discusses ethnicity in a considerably wider context than Barth, relating it to the social analysis of modernity. In recent years, however, mainstream
anthropology has moved away from issues concerning ethnicity. Current interests and debates focus on diaspora, globalisation and transnationalism, and on the study of meaning dissemination in a globalised world. The distinction between cultural studies and anthropology is becoming blurred. For anthropology, questions of ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations were yesterday’s debate, so to say. Interest in ethnicity as a social force has been assumed by other disciplines and research orientations.

**Ethnicity and nation-building**

Since World War II, a number of wars and armed conflicts have been fought, mainly in Africa and Asia. Until the 1970s, most conflicts were related to decolonisation processes, such as wars of liberation in Algeria, Vietnam, Kenya, Mozambique and others. After formal independence was achieved, conflicts continued between different ethnic groups over control of the state. This was the case in Angola, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia and Uganda. These conflicts have hit sub-Saharan Africa particularly hard. On the European scene, several wars in former Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus region are similar examples of ethnic/national conflicts. It was in conjunction with the Bosnian war that the concept of *ethnic cleansing* became known. The state commands an enormous destructive potential, which was unleashed with the breakdown of the Yugoslav Federation.

The peace treaty of Westphalia is acknowledged as marking the birth of the modern state. The nation-state, however, did not emerge until the nineteenth century (Breuilly 1993). The birth of the European nation-state is closely linked to the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, as well as with compulsory education, literacy, democracy and the development of public welfare systems. The European nation-state rests on some important principles: centralisation of power, territorial control, internationally recognised borders and a dominant people – a nation with a certain degree of linguistic, religious and cultural homogeneity in control of the state.

The nation-state successfully managed the transition from an agriculturally based economy and rural society to a modern, predominantly urban society, based today on a post-industrial, diversified, knowledge-based economy. It has managed to distribute welfare and mobilise its population against internal and external threats. Anderson (1983) introduced the notion of the nation-state as an imagined community. This explains its cohesiveness. An essential precondition for this national identification was the countrywide distribution of the printed word, through the popular press and publication of books. People who might never meet face to face could nevertheless identify as a people with a
strong sense of community. Secular national allegiance replaced the role previously held by religion in creating a sense of community.

Gellner (1983) pointed out that cultural homogeneity and national ideology are essential conditions for a modern state. The nation-state developed, he says, in response to requirements of industrial production: literacy, standardised language, centralised decision-making, efficient transportation systems, rational planning, and a separation of church and state. For both Anderson and Gellner, national identity was a product of modernity, and of the way in which the nation-state operates.

An opposing view is given by Smith in *The Ethnic Origin of Nations* (1986). Smith contends that nations, and in the extension nation-states, have their historical origin in ethnic groups. He supports this hypothesis by examples from European and Asian history. The nation is not a product of modernity; rather modernity is a product of the historical process, in which some larger ethnic groups have transformed into nations and ultimately into nation-states. Not all ethnic groups have the potential to develop into nations. One important reason is that not all ethnic groups are territorially concentrated. Population size is another condition. A relatively small ethnic group will have difficulty asserting its national claims, at least when surrounded by other large, populous nations.

While current developments in Europe are tending towards a supranational organisation of states, or possibly a European Federation, numerous states in Africa, Asia and the former Soviet Union are going through a phase of nation-building and state formation modelled on the (earlier) European nation-state. The root cause of the many conflicts in these parts of the world is explained by the strains and tensions in post-colonial state formation processes. An outcome of these conflicts is the politicisation of ethnic identities. Pan-movements aim to unite smaller units into one larger national entity, while other movements seek to extract a smaller unit from a larger one. Both types of conflict may occur at the same time in any given state.

On the international scene, states are the principal actors. States ultimately control territory and thus borders. States grant or refuse citizenship, and hold large arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. States interact with each other, both competitively and cooperatively. The existence of a given state may be threatened by external forces, usually other states, or by the economic power of international capital. The existence of a state may also be threatened by internal forces, either by revolutionary movements seeking to take over power, a general weakening of state authority, often constituted in the rivalry between different elite groups, or through the secession of specific regions. It seems almost inevitable that whenever the government of a given state is threatened,
violent forces with enormous destructive potential are unleashed. The civilian population, made up of individual citizens, is victimised. The state’s interest in protecting itself against dissolution thus clashes with universal norms designed to protect individual rights.

Nation-building and state-formation are two distinct processes, although they often tend to coincide. In English-language usage, the terms nation, country and state are often used interchangeably. However, nation may be considered as reflecting an orientation towards characteristics of a people (culture, language, religion and history), country towards territory (land, resources, economy, geography) and state towards governance (legislation, rule, administration, political control and power). In a very general sense, nation-building is about adapting a group of people with diverse manners, norms and identities to a given territory and power structure. The nation-state ideal is one people, one territory, one state. In cases of dissonance – and dissonance always exists – there are two basic strategies: altering territory and borders to adjust the spatial extension of the state to the distribution of the nation-forming people; or, alternatively, altering people, to adjust to the given territorial extension. Only the state has full power to adjust borders and to suppress regional claims for autonomy. Nation-building is thus about forming one people, with one collective national identity, out of a multitude of regional or local identifications, ethnic, linguistic or whatever. History shows that nation-building has been accomplished by a wide range of internal and external processes.

The ‘altering people strategy’ often involves forced or voluntary assimilation as an essential element. Mass education has played an important role in the nation-building processes. It is a device to shape generalised standards and, at the same time, to implant allegiance to the state. Political participation and citizenship, in many states comprising compulsory national service, are also important in this context. Besides these persuasive means, there are more coercive and brutal tools to foster unity. Social exclusion, expulsion, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide have also been elements of nation-building processes. Although the modern nation may carve its identity out of existing ethnic and cultural elements, the nation-state itself is a fairly recent phenomenon. It is when nation-building processes combine with state formation, often involving elite groupings trying to mobilise people according to their perceived image of the nation – when the full power of the state may be employed to homogenise cultures, languages and identifications – that ethnic conflicts have tended to occur.

‘Altering territory’ in the nation-building process may be a less attractive approach to the state, in the sense that any readjustment of international borders will necessarily affect other states. This approach implies that national territory is either increased through territorial acquisition
from other states, or decreased by conceding parts of one’s territory to other states. It usually takes war to change international boundaries. The large number of refugees in Africa, as well as in the Balkans, may be seen as symptoms of unfinished nation-building and state formation processes (Zolberg 1983). The ‘altering people strategy’ by means of voluntary assimilation is a less hazardous method for the state.

A root cause of the many conflicts affecting the African continent may be traced back to the borders drawn by the principal European colonial powers at the Berlin conference in 1884-1885, which reflected the relations of power between these states at the time. In many, even perhaps a majority of the cases, these borders were drawn right through territories that were inhabited by ethnically and culturally homogenous peoples. The problem is that the post-colonial states in Africa as well as in Asia have inherited the arbitrary colonial borders. This means that most states in Africa are made up of a mosaic of ethnic and language groups, of religions and cultures. Forming a nation-state based on the European model is an almost impossible task, since ethnic heterogeneity is so prevalent. In a situation where one people, ethnic group or ‘tribe’ gets the upper hand within the borders of one internationally recognised state, and imposes its order and agenda on other peoples, ethnic groups or ‘tribes’, who do not share the same convictions, opposition may turn into armed struggle and conflict. The risk for such a development is imminent in states lacking democratic traditions and/or having weak democratic institutions.

The current discourse on nationalism and nation-building is moving away from the ethnic focus it had some decades ago. The European Union is expanding rapidly by admitting new members, but also by gradually turning into a supranational unit, an economic if not military superpower. Although national sovereignty is not challenged by the Union, measures are continually taken to coordinate policies in member states, to establish efficient cooperation between the authorities in different member states, to establish joint policies for common problems, not least in the fields of sustainable energy provision and environmental protection (reducing emission of greenhouse gases), but also in questions pertaining to migration, refugee protection and conflict resolution. An important theoretical discussion has been concerned with citizenship as a means to ensure full participation of the individual in the polity. Transnational citizenship, multinational citizenship and supranational citizenship are some of the issues discussed with essential input from theorists such as Hammar (1990), Brubaker (1989), Bauböck (1994), Kymlicka (1995) and Castles and Davidson (2000).
Weber wrote a short chapter on ethnic groups in his monumental work *Economy and Society*, originally published in 1922. In this chapter, he seeks to identify factors underlying collective action and the strong sense of community evident in biologically self-reproducing populations. He deliberates on ‘race’, exogamy, endogamy, common language, common culture, tribe, people (*Volk*), political community, nationality, cultural status and ethnic community. The defining characteristics of ethnic groups are given in the following quote:

We shall call ‘ethnic groups’ those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent – because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonization and emigration – in such a way that this belief is important for the continuation of nonkinship communal relationships ... regardless of whether an objective blood relationship exists or not. (Weber 1978: 388)

Weber’s conceptualisation has much in common with early anthropological thought on social groups, ethnic or other. Some defining characteristics are similar to the criteria Evans-Pritchard mentions in his definition of ‘tribe’. Weber points to properties that researchers to this day see as defining characteristics of ethnicity: the belief in a common origin, shared culture and distinctive phenotypal features. His definition could just as well have been placed in the section discussing anthropological research on ethnicity. However, he mentions migration (emigration) as a circumstance through which an ethnic group is attributed a distinct identity. Therefore I have placed this brief mention of Weber’s conceptualisation in this section of the chapter. Interestingly, Weber does not mention language, religion or territoriality, conditions which later theorists have regarded as important defining characteristics of ethnic identity.

It took another 50 years for sociologists in the US and Britain to turn their attention towards ethnicity as a socially significant phenomenon. One reason for this ‘delay’ was that the complex of ideas associated with the ‘scientific’ study of racial differences and racial characteristics had to be ousted from the social sciences once and for all. Another element was the social and demographic changes due to large-scale recruitment of migrant labour to the industrial centres of Western Europe. Similarly, in the US, the northbound mobility of the rural African American population, starting in the 1930s, from conditions of poverty and segregation in the southern states to urban settlement in major industrial cities such as New York, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland and
Pittsburgh had an immense social and demographic impact on American society. This mobility was found within the borders of the US, and thus differs from the recruitment of migrant labour from the Mediterranean region to industrial cities in North-Western Europe. However, in terms of changing worlds, domestic mobility and international migration do have certain elements in common. Portuguese peasants recruited to the Renault and Peugeot plants in France, Turkish migrants in Berlin and the Ruhr, and guest workers from Calabria and Apulia recruited to Switzerland would have faced similar experiences of uprooting and resettlement as African Americans.

In the 1960s, the civil rights movement challenged the social injustices of segregation and racism suffered by the African American population. More radical movements among African Americans brought out a young generation of political critics-cum-activists such as Davis, Carmichael, Cleaver, Hamilton and Malcolm X. These activist intellectuals had one theme in common: African Americans were no longer to accept the underdog role in American society, but claim their lawful rights and take pride in their legacy. ‘Black is beautiful’ was the slogan Carmichael coined.

In the wake of the civil rights movement, middle-class Americans of European origin started to take an interest in their own roots, defining themselves not just as Americans but more precisely as Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Polish-Americans and Swedish-Americans and so on. The concept of the hyphenated American was born. Glazer and Moynihan’s classic book Beyond the Melting Pot (1965) questioned the myth of, and firmly held belief in, the American melting pot. They showed how ethnic identifications persisted for generations. A movement among upper middle-class Americans formed, which was referred to as the new ethnicity (Stein & Hill 1977). It attracted public interest in the early 1970s but then seemed to drop off the radar.

Of greater long-term consequence were political initiatives to eradicate the structures of segregation and discrimination in American society by integrating school education for different segments of the population, launching affirmative action programmes, abolishing voter registration practices used to disenfranchise African Americans in the south and so on. Research programmes were initiated. European researchers find it quite remarkable that race (without quotation marks) is a central category in the American census. While it certainly is essential and justifiable to investigate injustices based on racial categorisations, one cannot get around the fact that by using the ‘race’ category in the census, the United States is in actual practice furthering racial stereotyping, which underlies the injustices. ‘Race’ is still a more crucial category than ethnicity in the US. In middle-class self-reflection ethnicity has come to be associated with culture, European origin and self-realisation. ‘Race’, on the other
hand, is associated with slavery, subjugation of the indigenous Amerindian population, the historical conquest of former Mexican territories and the wars fought in East Asia during the twentieth century. Hence the basic racial categories in the census are Caucasian, African American, Native American, Hispanic and Asian. Although some of the most extreme forms of segregation have been abolished, there remains much to be done 40 years after the events in Selma, Alabama, to eradicate racial injustices in American society.

The structures and conditions of incorporation into American society were totally different for African Americans and Americans of European descent. While an interest in one’s ethnic origins may have been passing fad for Americans of European extraction, the impact of race on American society carries much greater weight in community relations at all levels. Glazer, commenting in 1996 on recent US census data, hypothesised that a caste structure appears to be emerging in the US (Caucasians, African Americans, Hispanics and Asian Americans) with little intermarriage between these four categories (Glazer: personal communication). It remains to be seen if the Obama presidency will reverse this development, through policies of reducing social and economic inequalities, and through the role model of the President himself giving inspiration to young African Americans to realise their personal potential.

In Western Europe, the ethnicity concept was re-introduced in conjunction with the post-colonial migration to the former colonial powers and with the recruitment of manpower from peripheral regions of Europe. In Britain, ‘ethnicity’ was introduced at first as a complementary concept to ‘race’, as seen for instance in the title *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*. However, ethnicity soon served as a substitute for the politically burdened concept of ‘race’. Ethnicity became the politically correct term to use when referring in scientific analysis or in journalistic commentary to the significant influx of migrants from former colonies, a majority of whom were British subjects or British-protected persons. The Commonwealth Immigration Act was enacted in 1962. Its objective was to deny former colonial subjects, even those holding British passports, the indisputable right to settle permanently in the UK. However, as networks between former colonies and settlers in Britain had already developed, migrants from South Asia, the Caribbean and Africa were still able to join family members who had previously emigrated and settled in the UK. Most post-colonial migrants were so-called visible minorities due to their phenotypical traits. The ethnicity concept was initially applied to these groups. They were people from cultural and religious backgrounds other than those of the native majority population. For many of these migrant groups, English was not their native language. In the eyes of the majority population they were, to put it briefly, ‘the other’ (Rex & Mason 1986).
In Sweden, which experienced a large migrant labour influx from the 1950s through the early 1970s, ethnicity terminology was also adopted to refer to migrants from the main countries sending workers – Finland, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Later it was extended to apply to other categories of migrants from other origins. In Sweden, ethnicity lacked the implicit connotations of ‘race’ it had in the UK. Rather it was used in reference to the immigrant. Ethnic questions were understood as immigrant questions. In Sweden ‘the other’ was an immigrant.

Labour recruitment ceased more or less simultaneously in Western Europe in the early 1970s. With the downturn of the world economy following the oil crisis in 1973, problems of unemployment started to appear even in states with well-developed social welfare schemes. People of migrant origin tended to suffer more acutely than those belonging to the native majority population. At the same time, right-wing groups and national-front organisations critical of immigration policies started to mobilise and make their voices heard in many European countries, frequently enjoying electoral success in some constituencies. The Brixton riots in 1981 led to a government investigation of root causes, notably the police’s role in maintaining public order (Lord Scarman 1981).

There is no doubt that by the 1990s, racist violence had increased in all of Western Europe. In Belgium, France and Austria (and later in Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands) extreme nationalist parties achieved parliamentary representation. These developments spurred the call for new integrationist policies known under various labels – multiculturalism, diversity management, social cohesion and so on. One central objective in several European countries was to overcome disparities in access to power and influence between citizens and denizens. Most European states conferred citizenship to new members of society through the *ius sanguinis* principle. Exceptions were France and the UK, which employed the *ius soli* principle. Many of the traditional notions of citizenship were re-evaluated – accepting dual citizenship, reducing time requirements for naturalisation, introducing a clause on *ius domicilis* and so on. Sweden additionally extended voting rights to permanently resident foreign citizens, in elections for local and regional government.

European states looked at the experiences of integrating migrant populations into mainstream society in traditional immigrant nations such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US. Australian and Canadian policies of multiculturalism were regarded as viable options even in some European countries – the UK, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. The Parekh report, entitled *The Future of Multiethnic Britain* (Parekh 2000), represented an important step towards rethinking integration issues. Though heavily criticised by the
conservative press, this report attempts to do what no other policy documents had done previously: to present a vision of what a truly multi-ethnic society would entail. One of the first tasks would be to rewrite the national story; in other words, to deconstruct the myths of Britain’s history and formation as a state produced during more than a century of nation-building. All European countries with immigrant populations would need to engage in the same process.

The concept of ethnicity, first appearing in anthropological discourse, was adopted by political scientists and historians in part to analyse the foundations of nations and nation-building processes, but also to examine the many serious, lengthy and bloody conflicts taking place in a large number of post-colonial states. Furthermore, it was taken up by European researchers treating questions of migration and integration (or lack of integration) into European countries. Today ethnicity appears to be associated with negative and problematic social conditions, such as ethnic discrimination and ethnic segregation, not to mention ethnic cleansing.

Do we need ethnicity in the modern world, or is it an atavistic remnant from the past we could do well without? What would take its place? Ethnicity itself once served as a replacement for the concepts of ‘tribe’, ‘nation’, ‘race’ and, in some discourses, even ‘migrant’. Would we merely witness the introduction of some new term, not yet invented, with no political overtones? We know that in many contexts ethnicity serves a password for ‘the other’. Is ethnicity something that mainstream majority society will accept as pertaining to itself? Ethnicity is, above all, an identity, a social and collective identity. I believe that the future role of ethnicity as a conceptualisation is intimately linked with how we understand identity. So what does identity research tell us?

What use is identity?

*Psychological and social psychological approaches*

The identity concept took off in psychology with the publication of Erikson’s books on emotional and cognitive development in a life-course perspective. *Childhood and Society* was published in 1950, and *Identity and the Life Cycle* in 1959. In the 60 years since, the amount of literature published on identity is overwhelming. It is virtually impossible to present an overview of the numerous discourses on identity. However, during the first 30 years, the most important theoretical developments were to be found in psychology and social psychology. The focus was on individual manifestations of identity and on identities constituted through small-group interaction. Books by Laing and Fromm in the 1960s helped to popularise existential identity analyses. Later in this
section, I will briefly discuss three theorists who made significant contributions to identity theory: Erikson, Goffman and Tajfel. Space limitations prohibit a more comprehensive overview.

My impression is that the most influential discourses on identity since the early 1980s arose out of sociology, anthropology and cultural studies. The focus seems to have been primarily on collective identities, constituted in terms of gender, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, ‘race’, ‘culture’ and religion, and informed by emancipatory aims of social groups who were and still are oppressed, invisible or degraded in many instances, rather than by middle-class aspirations of personal self-realisation, as prevalent in early identity discourses. In the past 30 years, the theoretical traditions supporting Erikson and other early identity theorists have been succeeded, or perhaps superseded, by feminist, queer theory and post-colonial perspectives, within a general post-modern framework of constructivism, performativity and discourse analysis. It was no simple task to organise identity definitions within a common conceptual framework 30 years ago. Today it is even more difficult.

One could argue that the table was set when Erikson introduced the identity concept in a psychosocial theoretical context. At least middle classes in Western societies were ready for a conceptualisation that captured and reflected their subjective experiences, their ambitions and their individualism. Social changes begun more than a century earlier with the industrialisation of Western Europe and North America, the political organisation of labour, the struggle for voting rights, the secularisation of compulsory education and public affairs, which are all fundamental aspects of modern welfare societies, implied that the individual – and not the family or village collective as in agrarian society – was recognised as the basic social unit. The individual was invested with specific rights and obligations in relation to the state. Although all members of society stood to gain from modernisation, it was undoubtedly the middle classes that gained most from these developments. These societal changes had repercussions on the organisation of academic disciplines, in particular in the fields of psychological, social and political studies. For instance, social psychology did not appear as an academic discipline until around the turn of the last century, with the writings of McDougall.

One might counter that European philosophers had long written about the soul, the mind, the psyche and the self, often in conjunction with treatises on ethics or politics (Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza and Hegel). Important as these deliberations were for philosophical thought, they had little or no practical bearing on the lives and conditions of regular people. One of the most important foundations of modern psychology may be pinpointed to the groundbreaking treatment of patients with hysterical symptoms at La Salpêtrière asylum in Paris.
Treatment by hypnosis was initiated by Charcot in the 1880s and continued by another pioneer, Janet. This was the start of a whole new school of psychological thought, in which patients’ hysteria was understood to have roots in earlier traumatic experiences. It is commonly known that Freud practised under Charcot at La Salpêtrière. Subsequently, after settling in Vienna as a private practitioner, Freud developed his controversial but soon enormously influential psychosexual theory and treatment. His theory drew empirically on the methods of psychoanalytic treatment he worked out in tandem. Although Freud never used the concept of identity in any of his writings, his direct or indirect impact on identity theory is uncontested to this day.

Mead was another significant theorist for identity theory. In his collection of lectures entitled Mind, Self and Society, published posthumously in 1934, Mead deliberated on the influence of reciprocal action on the subjective constitution of self and other. While referring to concepts of ‘self’, ‘me’ and ‘I’, there is no mention of ‘identity’ in his lectures. Mead inspired later followers to develop the school of symbolic interactionism in social psychology. The first mention of ‘identity’ with reference to subjectivity and social categorisation of self and other, approximating its modern usage in the social sciences, actually appeared in James’ The Principles of Psychology, originally published in 1890. James referred to the term in passing and it did not catch on at the time.

Erikson built his theory upon foundations in Freudian psychosexual theory. Though recognising the libidinal aspect of Freudianism, he downplayed its all-encompassing psychological importance postulated by Freud, placing equal emphasis on cognitive development. Like Freud’s and Piaget’s theories, Erikson’s is one of successive stages. An individual must master the inherent demands of each stage before progressing to the next developmental stage. In contrast to Freud, Erikson stressed the fact of life-long development. Each life-stage is crucial to the development of ego-identity. The oral stage in the infant’s early life, as described by Freud, corresponds in Erikson’s model to the developmental stage, characterised by the conflict of trust experienced by the child towards his or her parent or guardian. Basic trust is the foundation upon which all later identity development must rest, and it is probably Erikson’s most important identity conceptualisation.

The work of Goffman a decade later took the identity concept well into the domains of social psychology and sociology. Goffman, a sociologist himself, introduced a dramaturgic perspective on identity interactions, possibly inspired by Burke’s seminal writing on the grammar of motives. The distinction between backstage and front-stage situations for how identity presentations are managed relates to a context of interaction with links back to the symbolic interactionism of Mead. Two of
Goffman’s most important books on identity theory are *Presentations of the Self in Everyday Life* (1959) and *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1963). Goffman posits concepts such as impression management and passing. Identity negotiations, identity management, ‘altercasting’ and markers are concepts introduced by various theorists following in the Goffmanian tradition with links to social exchange theory, social perception and early formulations of social constructivism.

Tajfel’s social identity theory marked a shift in perspective. Tajfel and his students published a series of edited volumes in the 1970s and early 1980s. One of these volumes is *Differentiation between Social Groups* (Tajfel 1979). Tajfel’s ideas had a strong impact on European social psychology at the time. His theoretical work was based on Festinger’s studies of group comparisons. Tajfel devised a series of well-designed experiments on group conflict, upon which he later developed his theory. In his theoretical writing, he outlines a ‘causal sequence’ involving the four concepts of social categorisation, social identity, social comparison and psychological distinctiveness. The thrust of his theory is that people tend to relate themselves to various social categorisations present in their immediate surroundings and social environments. They do this to distinguish themselves and the group they opt to belong to from other social groups, thus aiming to achieve a sense of positive social identity. Tajfel’s experiments show that virtually any categorisation can function as a building block for social identity. Social comparison in Tajfel’s theory resembles the processes of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’ defined later in post-colonial discourse. Tajfel was criticised for generalising far and wide about discrimination and social exclusion in real-life situations, from the rather specific and unrepresentative conditions created in social psychological experiments. On the other hand, one might argue that the strength of Tajfel’s theorising lay in linking psychological dimensions of identity and categorisation with intergroup processes occurring in a societal context of differential power and competition between ethnic (social) groups.

The concept of identity proved fruitful for the analysis of various social problems. Identity issues seemed correlated to youth rebellion, migrant adjustment, minority rights, social cohesion, nationalism and nation-state formation, ethnic conflicts, discrimination and social exclusion. Consequently a wide range of identity concepts soon appeared in the literature: some of the substantive ones were ego-identity, self-identity, personal identity, social identity, national identity, ethnic identity, collective identity, identity for self, identity for others. There were also evaluative and descriptive identity dimensions, such as positive or negative identity, strong or weak identity, spoiled identity and so on. Although a sizable body of secondary literature on identity had appeared by the 1970s, very few attempts were made to coordinate...
definitions or to outline some kind of taxonomy of conceptualisations. Researchers from different disciplines would meet in conferences on identity and communicate with one another, not always aware that ‘identity’ could mean very different things in their respective disciplines. Analytically, the situation surrounding the identity concept became even more complicated after the first 30 years.

Discursive approaches

Though published more than twenty years ago, Gilroy’s groundbreaking book, *There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack* (1987), has remained an important source of inspiration to students and researchers of ‘race’, class and nation. He introduced to sociologists a new way of analysing racial and national politics by examining racist stereotypes. This was not done using the traditional Katz and Braly questionnaire methodology, but by capturing these stereotypes as voiced in everyday situations. Statements made by politicians, journalists and leading opinion makers are of particular interest because their accounts often become reinforced and disseminated by the media. Central to Gilroy’s analysis is his exploration of black Britons’ resistance to racism in cultural expressions. The book combines sociological analysis of urban movements and case studies with discursive analysis of lyrics by popular songwriters. The expressive culture he highlights is inspired by various musical styles, among them rap, Rasta, reggae and rock ’n’ roll. Gilroy’s work, firmly positioned within cultural studies, provided an entry for the study of popular expressive culture, not only as an object of literary/musical criticism and cultural analysis in its own right, but also to track social undercurrents of change, resistance and identities. Although Gilroy does not refer to the concepts of post-colonialism or to identity as such, his book does indeed explore central themes of social identities in post-colonial British society.

Gilroy has been a member of the international editorial board of *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture* since its inception in 1995. The journal promotes the study of social and collective identities through interpretative analysis of political discourse and cultural expression. Neither in Gilroy’s own writing, nor in the sixteen volumes of *Social Identities* issued so far, do we come across attempts to theorise about the concept of identity itself. This comment is not intended as a criticism of the journal’s editorial policy, but rather as an illustration of how radically different theorising on identity has become compared to the situation in the 1970s. The fact that social identities (or collective identities) exist seems now to be taken for granted. However, according to this paradigmatic view, they exist, ontologically speaking, only insofar as they are referred to or spoken about in various
forms of discourse. The journal’s editors evidently have no urgent need to theorise about subjective or personal experiences of identity, or to problematise such possible aspects of the concept. The entire notion of identity as a subjective experience, as a product of the mind, thought, memory, emotion and intersubjective relations, is discounted. The methodological consequence of such an approach is that understanding identities in society may only succeed by deconstructing the referential discourses. This discursive approach to identity politics was a radical break with the psychologism characteristic of identity discourse during the period from Erikson to Tajfel.

Billig adopted a discursive approach in his innovative discussion of national identity in *Banal Nationalism* (1995). In contrast to other nationalism theorists examining extreme expressions, Billig explores mundane, non-dramatic, everyday situations providing constant reminders of to which nation people supposedly belong, whether they are aware of it or not. Billig demonstrates through numerous examples the commonplace practice of exhibiting markers of national identity in public spaces, in the media and in the everyday use of language itself. His principal argument is that nationalism, or national identity, should not be attributed to a mindset, but to the continuous and repetitive expressions through which the nation asserts itself in daily practice. National identity, like other social and collective identities, is fluid and fragmentary, casual and momentary. It is constituted in discourse. The following year, Hall and Du Gay launched the edited volume *Questions of Cultural Identity*, which includes Hall’s introductory chapter, ‘Who needs identity?’

The problem of subjectivity

Two principal problems of identity theorising should be addressed. The Hall and Du Gay volume may serve as a starting point. This book, published in 1996, brings together a number of leading social theorists, among them Bauman and Bhabha, who examine from various perspectives reasons why there has been such an immense interest in issues of cultural identity. This represents an important statement about the situation of identity theorising in the 1990s. Questions of cultural identity were primarily associated with struggles for recognition and power by various cultural and social groups. Thus the identity concept acquires meaning in political and ideological contexts. It serves as a tool for mobilisation aiming at cultural/political change. The authors present illuminating and sometimes provocative considerations informed by emancipatory interests, post-colonial or other. The authors contributing to this volume basically espouse an anti-essentialist view on identity. So does Hall. However, the position of radical sociologism seems to
trouble him. He devotes a large part of his chapter to the radical Foucauldian disavowal of subjectivity. His own position is neatly expressed in the following words:

I use ‘identity’ to refer to the meeting point, the point of *suture*, between on the one hand the discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be ‘spoken’. Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us. (Hall 1996: 5-6)

Here we see that Hall allows for subjects and subjectivities in his approach to cultural identities, or rather, that he appreciates one cannot entirely dismiss the subjective dimension of identity. The problem he confronts is how the subjectivity of individual experience could be brought into a theoretical framework with a central focus on discursive power analyses. Why do several theorists find it essential to declare their view on identity as anti-essentialist? Is this because subjectivity is equated with essentialism? Hall presents no answer to the question of who needs identity. Perhaps an identity concept is required that does not implicitly reject the subject or subjective experience. The question then follows, what kind of theorisation of subjectivity is compatible with the discursive approach to identity?

One possible answer is hinted at in a reader published in 2000 and edited by Du Gay, Evans and Redman, entitled *Identity: A Reader*, in which Hall’s article once again serves as the introductory chapter. Like the previous book, this volume brings together a series of classical (though different) texts. Hall’s question is raised in a different context. The choice of contributors alone indicates to us where an answer might be sought. One section is devoted to language, ideology and discourse. Another section is on sociology and history. The answer to Hall’s question should (obviously) be sought in the section on psychoanalysis and psychosocial theory. Writers such as Winnicott and Klein are represented here, as is Lacan. If I am not entirely mistaken, the Lacanian interpretation and reworking of Freudian psychoanalysis is viewed as the theory of subjectivity most consonant with discursive analysis of (resistance) identities. A final observation: although the volume was published as a textbook on identity for university students, the concept of identity is curiously absent in this reader.

Coming from a different theoretical field, Giddens also raises the question of including the issue of self and subjectivity in to his work on the sociology of modernity. He regards transformations in self-identity
and globalisation as two poles of the local–global dialectic (Giddens 1991: 32). Giddens embarks on a dedicated survey of psychologists and existential philosophers who have written about self-identity, as the self is reflexively understood by the person in terms of his or her autobiography. Freud is referred to quite frequently, as well as Erikson, Klein and Laing. A sociologist himself, Giddens does not dispense with the psychological dimension of self-identity. Yet, he does expand his theory of modernity so as to include the psychological and reflexive dimension.

Theorisation and empirical support

The second principal problem I wish to raise, returning to Hall’s article ‘Who needs identity?’ has to do with theorisation emanating from a discursive approach. Inspiring as the texts included in the Hall and Du Gay volume may be, from the standpoint of social science research, explicit empirical exemplification is lacking. Let me illustrate the problem with conclusions drawn by two leading social science theorists. Bauman, represented in the Hall and Du Gay volume, is the author of a small book entitled Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi (2004). Bauman reflects on the modern ‘liquid’ world and on the consequences globalisation may have on identity. He points to identities as the incarnation of ambivalence in a ‘liquid’ contemporary setting. A cohesive and solidly constructed identity in these times would be a recipe for inflexibility, a burden and a constraint. In the ‘liquid’ world of modernity Bauman envisions, identities themselves become fluid, shapeless and constantly on the move. Given Bauman’s representation of the modern world, this is a reasonable conclusion.

Seven years earlier, Castells published the second volume of his trilogy on The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. This volume is called The Power of Identity (1997). Castells distinguishes among three types of identity construction: legitimising identity, resistance identity and project identity. Legitimising identities are introduced by the dominant social institutions to extend and rationalise their domination. These identities generate a civil society and were characteristic of industrial welfare societies. Resistance identities generate enclaves of collective resistance against oppression. Ethnically based nationalism and religious fundamentalism, gay and lesbian liberation from heteronormative oppression and post-colonial resistance to racism, as well as feminism and environmental protection, are examples of movements on which resistance identities build. Project identities may be characterised as one step beyond resistance. Collective resistance takes on the form of projects to transform the overall social structure (Castells 1997: 8). Castells’ conclusion is that the traditional legitimising identities are slowly
draining away, along with the institutions civil society erected to support them. While these identities are in a process of dissolution, Castells concludes there is a concurrent rise in resistance identities powerful enough to emerge as project identities, around which new forms of globalised, transnational civil societies will develop. This is aptly put in the following quote:

"This is why identities are so important, and ultimately so powerful in this ever-changing power structure – because they build interests, values, and projects, around experience, and refuse to dissolve by establishing a specific connection between nature, history, geography and culture. Identities anchor power in some areas of the social structure, and build from there their resistance or their offensives in the informational struggles about the cultural codes constructing behavior and, thus, new institutions. (Castells 1997: 360)"

While Bauman projects the demise of identities as social forces with the general fluidity, or dissolution, of a globalised world, Castells says something rather different. Traditional collective/social identities will wither away, but new and in all respects powerful ones will replace them. How we are to understand identity politics in the era of globalisation is ultimately an empirical question. While Castells supports his projections by means of empirical information on various trends and tendencies, this is not true of Bauman. In defence of Bauman, it is only fair to acknowledge that he is a highly experienced social theorist and philosopher. His conclusions are well substantiated. Perhaps the problem is that Bauman and Castells are speaking about entirely different identity conceptualisations. For the very reason that identity is such a widely used tool for social theorising, there is an urgent need for conceptual organisation and stringency.

Theoretical reflection promoting a deeper understanding of our world depends ultimately on some form of empirical input. One problem is that many theorists are precisely just that – theorists, but sometimes theorists who seem to have forgotten that theory and experience must exist a dialectical relationship to one another.

There is no general lack of empirical studies of identity from a discursive approach. However, taking stock of available studies is a time-consuming task and, in this case, it was quite possible there was as yet insufficient data to inform the elite social theorists. By the 1990s, a wide range of tools for discursive analysis had materialised. Benwell and Stokoe provide a helpful overview of methods in their book *Discourse and Identity*, published in 2006. They state that a discursive view of identity can be realised either ‘as a discursive performance or
construction of identity in interaction, or as historical set of structures with regulatory power upon identity’ (Benwell & Stokoe 2006: 29). The former approach was expanded by Butler in her work on performativity. The latter approach, inspired by Althusser, Gramsci and Foucault, leads to a discursive model promulgating an anti-essentialist view of identity. The discursive model presumes that meaning is ‘situated not within the self, but in a series of representations mediated by semiotic systems such as language’ (Benwell & Stokoe 2006: 31). Methods developed for discourse analysis include various forms of narrative analysis, conversation analysis and ethnomethodology. The examples given in the book relate to identities from various discursive contexts and the specific analytical methods related to these: conversational, institutional, narrative, commodified, spatial and virtual.

The position taken by Benwell and Stokoe on the locus of meaning merits comment. It is technically not a problem to separate the expression of meaning in the (conversational) transcript from the individual person, the subject, who at some particular point in time and in a specific situation spoke, and whose speech was recorded and transcribed into a written text. The empirical material that discourse analysts dissect and examine is precisely a written text, a transcription of a conversation, possibly supported by a tape or video recording. The point in question is that transcriptions and recordings, however technically refined they may be, are not the conversation itself. A conversation involves two or more persons in a dialectical exchange of meaning, some of which is verbal and immediately accessible to an external observer, but also much of which is implicitly known by the parties to the conversation and not necessarily openly voiced, remainders from previous meetings, common grounds of implicit understanding, which directly or indirectly will influence the course of the present conversation. This latter side of an interlocution may not be accessible to an outsider, an observer or a recording device. The conversation that once took place and the transcribed text are two very different media, as Ricoeur (1971) so aptly pointed out. It is hardly surprising that the subject, the person, the one who voices meaning, is easily lost in the technology of discourse analysis.

Obviously meaning is conveyed by representations located within language and other semiotic systems. The rules of language entail particular constraints on how the intended meaning is phrased. To claim that meaning is solely situated in representations within a language system, and not in the self, the agent, the intending person, the individual speaker, is a strong ontological statement amounting to philosophical reductionism. One only needs to think of someone with rudimentary knowledge of the language in which a conversation is held, a foreigner, an immigrant. The speaker has a strong sense of meaning she is trying
to communicate but can’t find the right words. Where is the meaning situated? In terms of meta-science, I would claim that Benwell and Stokoe have confused methodology (epistemology) with ontology. As I see it, the danger of losing sight of the speaking subject, and attributing meaning solely to language and semiotic systems, is that it is tantamount to a new form of subject denial akin to the tenets of behaviourism. Meaning and motivation are denied the subject, because the meaningfulness of subjectivity is refuted.

*Identity as a useful tool or as a central theoretical focus*

Identity is a central concept in the works referred to in the preceding pages. Gilroy wrote about the resistance to racism (though not using the term ‘identity’), Billig wrote about nationalism, Hall about cultural identities, Castells about the information age and network society, Bauman about ‘liquid’ modernity and Giddens about ‘high’ modernity. These writers are not only leading social theorists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, they represent the elite. The employed identity concept is a tool. For Hall and Giddens, it serves as a link between the subjective and the structural. For other authors it has different connotations and functions. Giddens’ book on modernity and self-identity is in all fundamental respects a book on the sociology of modernity. It is not principally a book about reflexive identity. Similarly, this observation applies to the other authors. Some define the identity concept, but in several cases they do not. These influential theorists do refer to other thinkers and philosophers, but as far as the identity concept is concerned, most discussions and debates taking place in seminars, journals and reports are unaccounted for. This is of course their privilege, as the leading theorists they are. Despite the fact that the term identity appears in the titles of many books I cite, it is not the primary interest of these writers to develop a theory of identity, as it were. Despite the abundance of literature on identity, there are only a very few recent contributions to the development of identity theory.

One notable exception is a book edited by Baumann and Gingrich, *Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach*, which was published in 2004. This book differs from other recent works noted here. Here identity is placed at the forefront of consideration. The concept is scrutinised conceptually in its own right and does not serve as a tool for the analysis of some other issue. This is a book about processes of ‘selfing’ and ‘othering’. Identity and alterity are fundamentally intertwined processes. They are seen as different sides of the same coin. By using the metaphor of ‘grammar’ to denote the driving force behind identity processes, Baumann and Gingrich are hinting that students of identity processes need to look at rules and rule following, at different levels of
structure, at arrangements and interrelationships in a larger construction and so on. The grammar metaphor also indicates a normative dimension is involved. Baumann, who is responsible for the metaphor, is not the first social theorist to adopt it to condense explanations of human action, but possibly the first social anthropologist. Baumann identifies three sets of grammars, which he justifies and explains using works by Said, Evans-Pritchard and Dumont.

The principle of orientalisation (Said) entails that self and other are constituted by negative mirror imaging, though it may include a dormant or concealed longing for the other. From Evans-Pritchard’s work on the Nuer, Baumann identifies a grammar of context-dependent segmentation with complex fusions and fissions of identity/alterity. The third grammar, inspired by Dumont’s work on hierarchies, is about encompassing and hierarchical sub-inclusion. Differences in relation to those ‘included’ tend to become minimised, whereas differences with the excluded tend to be exaggerated. The applicability of these proposed grammars is cross-examined theoretically and empirically in a number of different social and cultural contexts. The results of the Baumann and Gingrich project are promising. This volume is a positive addition to the theoretical debate on identity. The importance of the book lies in the fact that it combines innovative theoretical thinking with a strong sense of determination on subject theory to empirical examination.

Two critical remarks: first, the grammar metaphor used by Baumann needs to be developed. A grammar is a full set of rules. Instead of speaking about three grammars, an integrated and comprehensive system needs to be worked out. Secondly, and more importantly, this book is written by anthropologists for anthropologists. While it is highly commendable to draw upon the work by classic anthropologists, for instance Evans-Pritchard, to shed light on processes on selfing and othering, this book shows a lack of interdisciplinary collaboration. There is a long tradition of studying processes such as these in sociology, social psychology, political science and economics. In sociology/social psychology, they go straight back to the classic book *Folkways* by Sumner, published in 1906.

In conclusion, the concept of identity has proved to be an exceptionally useful tool for the analysis of a whole series of disparate phenomena within the social sciences. Its analysis is not the exclusive domain of any one particular science. The issues involved in identity theory range from individual self-conceptions to shared national belongings, and from fleeting presentations in social interaction to fixed ascriptions rooted in social structure. The issues involve continuity and change, time and space, the individual and the collective, solipsism and community and so on. The analysis of identity needs to cross borders – national boundaries and disciplinarian enclosures. A variety of examples
from different times and places could be of great help when seeking to develop a theory of identity processes. It is quite possible that the grammar metaphor may prove to be most helpful.

**Diversity and complexities**

*Images of Europe*

This volume is concerned with identity processes and identity dynamics with specific reference to inter-ethnic relations in Europe. Inevitably we need to address the question of diversity. The book reflects diversity on different levels. One source of diversity already mentioned has to do with the contributing authors’ disciplinarian backgrounds. We do not see this form of diversity as an obstacle or a problem. Rather, we see it as a challenge. Analysing identity processes requires interdisciplinary approaches.

Europe is itself a source of complex cultural and ethnic diversity, however we choose to define it. There are various, often contested, ways of thinking about Europe. In some parts, as in the Balkans, diversity is abundantly evident at the local village level. It may be traced back many centuries to population movements, forced or voluntary, resulting from the changing frontier between the Christian Hapsburg and the Islamic Ottoman empires. In other parts of the continent, present diversity is the result of twentieth-century (post-colonial) immigration. Furthermore, the long process of nation-state formation entailed that small, cultural and linguistic minorities were assimilated into dominant nations through the standardisation of written language and educational systems. Urbanisation, draining young people from rural areas, reinforced this process. The forming of nation-states did preserve linguistic and cultural diversity at a national level. Modern European history is by and large a history of colonial enterprise, migratory movements and population displacements, all creating European diversity. While cultural diversity is usually regarded as having been an asset to post-Renaissance art, philosophy and science, a sinister intolerance of the other has been exposed, in wars of religion, endemic anti-Semitism, racism, slavery, purges enforced by the Inquisition, ethnic cleansing and genocide.

How should we think about Europe? Does Turkey qualify? What about Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan? How much of Russia is European? St. Petersburg, undoubtedly, but what about Vladivostok? Our conception of Europe will differ depending on whether our perspective is geographical, political, historical or cultural. An initial approach is to think of Europe’s geographical extension. This would mean identifying its frontiers and centre. In general, Europe is regarded to be
the part of the Eurasian mainland with adjacent islands situated west of the Ural Mountains and Ural River, which empties into the Caspian Sea. The ancient Greeks placed the boundary between Europe and Asia in the Hellespont, Bosporus and Black Sea. The line dividing Europe from Asia through the Caucasus is not clearly defined geographically. Where does this place Cyprus? One could argue geographically that Cyprus is an island off the coast of West Asia. Culturally and, above all, politically, as a member of the EU, Cyprus is certainly identified as a part of Europe. Warsaw is situated fairly close to Europe’s geographical centre of gravity. Historically significant is the fact that Poland has probably been where most wars were fought between major European powers over the centuries. It was the principal site of the Holocaust. Geography, history, culture and politics all need to be considered when we seek to define the ambiguous borders and extension of ‘Europe’.

Politically Europe (geographically defined) consists today of 45 states and some small self-governing territories. Twenty-seven states are now members of the EU. Thus Europe is divided into members and non-members of the EU. The two largest states – Russia and Turkey – are not members. The political centre is Brussels, and significant frontiers are located in the Balkans, in relation to Turkey and to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It is crucial to note that Europe is more than the EU member states. However, within the EU, the concept of ‘Europe’ is shorthand for the union and its member states, including some associated states (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) with special agreements. Fifteen states and at least some of the small self-governing territories are left out in the cold with such a tight definition.

A highly controversial, extended and metaphorical rather than literal interpretation of ‘Europe’ is to see it as those places where European culture, European languages and possibly European legal traditions (Anglo-Saxon law, Roman law or their derivatives), predominate. Such an understanding may appear far-fetched today, but we do not have to go far back in time to see that this metaphorical interpretation did have real political consequences. ANZAC forces fought with the Allies on the European battlefields in both World Wars. The Gallipoli Campaign (1915-1916) and defeat at the hands of the Turkish army is regarded as the birth of national consciousness in Australia and New Zealand (Kapferer 1988). Are Australia and New Zealand in the metaphorical sense still European outposts, or will they find their place in the Asia-Pacific community of states and nations? N. Dias tells us in his chapter that Portugal opportunely altered the legal designation of its colonial territories from ‘Colonies’ to ‘Overseas Provinces’ when faced with UN criticism. This change was effected to regard Angola and Mozambique as extensions of the Portuguese state and territory, similar to the status
that Algeria had held before independence as an integral part of the French homeland territory. European colonialism, imperialism and settlement overseas did, then, in more than one sense extend ‘Europe’ way beyond its customary geographical boundaries.

In his chapter, Machaqueiro develops this perspective still further in an interesting comparative analysis of the significance of European frontier regions. His examples refer to Portugal and Russia. A simplified rendition of his thought is that Portugal (together with Spain) extended Europe into Africa and South America. The logic of colonialism, however, is such that Africa and South America were later brought back into Europe. In a similar vein, Russia may be thought of as a frontier region linking Europe with Asia through the Tsarist, Soviet and now Russian control of North Asia. Similarly, Central, North and East Asia were brought back to Europe through Russian colonisation. Machaqueiro is primarily concerned with experiences arising from a frontier identity, something he connects with the Portuguese and Russian experiences.

Culturally, English has become the dominant global language of communication. While this enables diversity at the national level, it serves at the same time as a powerful force of conformity, in styles and means of expression. London, New York and Los Angeles have become the centres of globalised mass culture. This relates to an ongoing discussion of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2004).

Geography, history, languages, national projects and mobility (domestic and international) all contribute to creating contemporary European diversity. To be European is to celebrate diversity. How should we compare inter-ethnic relations in European countries with disparate historical and modern experiences of diversity, ‘facing’ very different parts of the greater world outside Europe? A specific country’s orientation to the world beyond (a combination of geographical position and historical experience) determines, to a large extent, people’s personal orientations to the world, and thus affects patterns of migratory movements both into and out of the country. N. Dias addresses this question of comparability in his chapter on inter-ethnic relations in Portugal and Britain. His study is about Hindu migrants whose families originated in Gujarat and who, via settlement in East Africa a few generations back, wound up in Portugal and Britain. The author points to many similar experiences in this migrant category, but also alerts us to significant differences. Research on identity dynamics in an increasingly diversified Europe would benefit greatly from more comparative case studies of this kind.

Europe has a poor and also sad record of inter-communitarian (inter-ethnic) violence. One should be careful to pass judgement on acts committed long ago by applying today’s moral standards. However, one
does need to recognise that current expressions of racism, ethnic cleansing, discrimination and social exclusion are part of a long-standing pattern. Anti-Semitism manifested itself in barring Jews from owning land, engaging in certain professions and settling in various cities. In Eastern Europe, Jews were forced into ghettos and were repeatedly the victims of brutal pogroms. The Nazi genocide of six million Jews and four to five million others, including more than one million Roma, is the most heinous crime committed against humanity by a modern nation.

Bauman (1991) points out that the question is not how a modern state like Germany could resort to such barbarity, but to realise that the Holocaust epitomises the possibilities provided by modernity. The Holocaust was the culmination, not the end, of at least five centuries of persecution of Jews, Roma and other minorities in Europe. Many observers agree that the most serious instances of racism and social exclusion in contemporary Europe are directed at the Roma, Sinti and Travellers in Eastern Europe, in many cases in states now members of the EU. The expulsion of Jews and Moors from Spain in 1492 was of historical significance because racial criteria were then employed (for the first time?) to identify even those Jews and Moors who had converted to Christianity (Popkin 1974). Religious persecution was replaced by racial persecution. The expelled Jewry settled largely in the Balkan region, in what was later to become the Ottoman Empire. A smaller group settled in the Netherlands and, from there, quite a few eventually moved into Germany, Poland and Russia.

In her chapter, De Vries writes about identity among Jews in the Netherlands today. Before World War II, the Netherlands had a large Jewish population that was integrated into mainstream Dutch society. Systematic Nazi deportations starting in 1942 and persisting through the end of the War spared only a small fraction of Dutch Jewry. The Jewish community in the Netherlands rarely attracts the attention of researchers. Although problems of integration do exist at the individual level, the Jewish community as such is not identified as one facing social problems, unemployment or poverty. The community is nevertheless vulnerable, but at a personal rather than collective level. De Vries shows that identity issues are of crucial concern to members of this community, especially at a time when anti-Semitism in Europe once again is on the rise, even in the Netherlands.

Migration and ethnicity researchers in the Netherlands were among the first to reflect on the country’s experience of post-colonial and labour force immigration. Lindo presents us with a different picture from the Netherlands. His case study in the Birmingham cultural studies tradition is about young adolescents in multi-ethnic Rotterdam, with ethnic origins in Suriname and Morocco. He describes their strategies to
assert identities in relation to conflicting role expectations from family, school and peers, in a society that is increasingly showing a hostile side to people of non-Dutch origin. These young boys spend much of their time hanging out in the streets. Adult society, represented by social workers and teachers, does not approve of their behaviour. Lindo’s important observation is that these boys are out there, constituting their own meaning by defying stereotyped images.

Cultures and complexities

When we refer to ‘culture’ in general terms, it is usually assumed that we are speaking about national cultures or, to put it differently, products of the nation-building projects occurring in Europe since the mid-nineteenth century. Common culture is taken to be one factor binding members of an ethnic group together. References may be made to ideas, beliefs, traditions and practices. Culture in this sense is seen as the social glue of community cohesion. However, a modern anthropological understanding of culture is not about common traditions and practices within an ethnic or national group. It is rather about the constitution of meaning in thought and emotion, about the expression of meaning in public and about the social distribution of meaning. Hannerz (1992) has elaborated on this in his book Cultural Complexity. Inter-ethnic relations are very much about encounters between differently constituted meanings, different understandings and expressions of meaning reinforced through social interaction. According to Barth (1969), cultural differences emerge between ethnic groups because group boundaries are activated in these encounters. Interactions across boundaries tend to manifest differences, in which identities are moulded. It is fairly obvious that one cannot teach (and hence be a teacher) if there are no pupils. Similarly, your identity as a native-born resident is not exposed if you never encounter the Other, be it a foreigner, a migrant or member of some socially excluded ethnic minority group. This is neatly illustrated by S. Bastos in her rich case study of young British and Portuguese Sunnis in Leicester, who have a family background in Gujarat. Fieldwork was carried out shortly after the attacks on London transport of 7 July 2005, and the chapter highlights the defensive, compensatory and subversive functions underlying processes of subjective identity in the context of this national trauma. Ibarrola-Armendariz posits similar ideas in his chapter dealing with identities in the Basque Country, a region that has experienced substantial immigration in recent years as one of the economically most advanced parts of Spain. The presence of immigrants sheds new light on aspects of Basque self-perception as a minority in the broader Spanish national context.
National cultures are not monolithic. Meaning construction in the nation-state will inevitably vary regionally with the historical conditions through which various regions were incorporated into the present nation-state. Dialects serve as markers of regional identities. In some cases tension is evident between regional and national identities. The Basque Country and Northern Ireland have witnessed movements unafraid of resorting to terrorism as a means to achieve secession from the Spanish and British states. In other cases such tensions are absent. Whatever the situation, these conditions will impact differentially on the meaning of national belonging. Meaning construction will in addition vary with social class, generation and gender. National culture may be understood theoretically as construction of a specific kind. When it comes to purported meaning, those in a position to represent national culture will tend to refer back (superficially) to roots in an “authentic” folk culture, the culture of the people, often associated with rural conditions, simple lifestyles, authenticity in social relations and genuineness, in one word: Gemeinschaft (Tönnies 1955).

While meanings thus may vary within the nation-state context in accordance with social positions, the nation-state enjoys a strong position through its monopoly on symbolic expressions of national culture. The national flag, the national anthem, national holidays, the president or the royal family, the national football team and individual athletes representing the country at international sports events are classic examples of symbols and personalities expressing values of national cohesion, strength through unity, sense of belonging, pride in past achievements, continuity of institutions and trust in the future and in the system of governance despite grievances in other respects.

Ethnography of the kind conducted by the authors of several chapters in this book is often a portrayal of meaning constitution, meaning realisation and meaning dissemination among ordinary people in everyday life. These people’s understanding of the world is what ethnographers record and describe. It is lay explanations, and the concepts and conceptions they use in communication, with which anthropologists are concerned. Folk culture and everyday life, in ethnographical description, is characterised by being local, face to face, personal, spontaneous, intimate and traditional. People are there in each other’s presence. Meaning arises in this context of interaction. It must be understood in terms of the relationship between persons engaged in dialogue. As soon as the situation dissolves, meaning vanishes, only recorded in the memory of those actors who participated in the situation. Meaning in this context is thus invisible and inaccessible to others.

In her chapter, Rosales addresses questions of how hybrid identities have formed as a result of migration patterns within the Portuguese colonial archipelago. She describes how sections of the Hindu Konkani-
speaking population of Goa converted to Catholicism, abandoning elements of Hindu folk culture and adopting aspects of Portuguese folk culture, for instance in their cooking and dress. Quite a few of the converts adopted Portuguese family names. A particularly interesting observation is that despite conversion to Portuguese manners in a number of respects, roots of Hindu culture were nevertheless maintained, as the caste system was never abandoned by the Goans. Everyday life in this sense is what ethnographers record and describe. However, the ethnographers themselves do not just come from some Western country to a society situated in Africa, America, Asia or the Pacific, they also come from academic institutions, thus representing very different conditions of meaning constitution, meaning realisation and meaning dissemination in and through their professional work. Academic work, international as it may be in many respects, is a central part of what here is generally referred to as high culture.

High culture and intellectual work in general is often national with regard to the media of externalisation and distribution. This applies by and large to academic work in the humanities and to a certain extent in the social sciences. On the other hand, high culture is universal with regard to the types of questions it treats, and to the meanings and values conveyed. The written text is the principal mode of externalisation, though other media (art, music, film, etc.) are also important transmitters of meaning. A characteristic of the written text is that it is elaborated and expanded, with its meaning not necessarily related to or dependent upon the author as a person. Meaning is usually multi-layered. Understanding requires acts of interpretation.

Ibarrola-Armendariz delves into the meaning structure of identities in the Basque Country in terms of values, conceptions and mythological ideas by utilising survey data and interviews in order to understand clashing perceptions about social rights among migrants and native Basques. In a deeper sense, his chapter is about perceptions of self and other, with roots in meaning contextualisation in both folk culture and high culture. Following up on the interesting Goan experience, Rosales mentions that the process of conversion to Portuguese ways that took place in Goa several centuries ago was led by the Goan elite, who even adopted elements of Portuguese high culture in their music and poetry.

International migration is today a central part of the globalisation process. One significant criterion relates to swift communication, as compared to earlier stages of the move towards globalisation. Modern air travel allows someone to reach any major city in the world from any other major city in less than 24 hours. Capital transfers between banks occur even faster. Information on virtually any topic is available to any Internet user in a matter of split seconds. As Castells (1996) convincingly has argued, the network society has revolutionised the world.
In the wake of the electronic media age, we now see the contours of a global mass culture. The media and electronic communication facilities are not only essential conveyors of meaning, images, stereotypes and beliefs. They express meaning and even serve to constitute meaning. In this world of mass culture, meanings are ambiguous and diversity is a virtue. Mass culture reaches out to the whole world (an effect of media technology) but because of this, it is rather shallow and short-lived. Deconstruction is the mode of understanding. Fashions, hits and styles succeed one another at a rapid pace.

Different folk cultures will coexist in a multi-ethnic state but not always be accessible to one another. Many products of high culture will transcend ethnic and national divisions, but because high culture depends heavily upon the written word, there will be language barriers that make certain aspects of high culture inaccessible to those who don’t speak or understand the language in question. Mass culture is dependent on a limited number of world languages: Arabic, Chinese, French, Hindi, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and most important of all – English. Multi-ethnicity involves all this diversity.

The speeding up of technological and social change and the shrinking of the globe through modern communications technology, has given rise to new and complex forms of multi-ethnic and transnational relationships. In previously unforeseen ways traditional, elaborate and post-modern cultural expressions of meaning interact across time and space.

Dahinden explores the importance of networking among Albanian-speaking migrants in Switzerland, and how their networks are formative for gender and ethnic identities. Quoting White (1992: 67), she establishes her basis in the observation that a social network operates as a conveyor of meaning. The Albanian migrants she studies depend on the networks formed around social categorisations, where gender and ethnicity intersect. Her chapter clearly illustrates the complexity of identity constructions in the migrant situation. Rosales points out that trajectories are the flipside of networks. Her interviewees now live in Lisbon. She traces their cultural origins by identifying their migratory trajectories back to Mozambique and Goa. She shows us the complexities of identities that have evolved as a result of colonial migration patterns over several centuries and continents. What does it mean – she asks – to be a Catholic Brahmin?

The lessons from Cape Verde

Several authors refer to the Cape Verdean diaspora. This differs from the case studies of the Goan and Mozambiquean diasporas, but it is equally thought-provoking. A large share of the Cape Verdean population has
migrated to Portugal for economic reasons. Many of Cape Verdean origin in Portugal face a situation of socio-economic marginalisation due to poverty, low educational achievement, lack of adequate housing and difficulty gaining access to the labour market. Sardinha’s chapter is a sociological analysis of the roles played by Cape Verdean immigrant organisations and descendants for identity and integration patterns in the greater Lisbon metropolitan area. This is where a majority of the Cape Verdean émigrés settled. He points to the different experiences of the first-generation migrants who, despite their marginalised position, nevertheless accept the situation because they are still better off in Lisbon than in Cape Verde, and young members of the community born in Portugal who do not accept the unequal opportunities they are offered.

Góis presents an analysis of the special and in many respects unique form of transnationalism that has developed within the Cape Verdean communities in the Cape Verdean homeland, in Lisbon and in the wider diaspora in Europe and North America. How does this transnational situation influence the identity of the Cape Verdeans? Complexity – or diversity if you will – is at the very centre of Cape Verdeanness. Góis draws on complexity theory to describe the development of this transnational identity. In terms of the categories introduced in this chapter, it is about folk culture turned into mass culture, the local turning global – and vice versa. There is not one Cape Verdean identity, but many archipelago-like identities. Just as the islands make up an archipelago so do the settlements in the diaspora consist of many local centres symbolically separated by a sea of otherness. Better than most other cases, the Cape Verdean diaspora illustrates the need to transcend sociological analysis beyond the framework of traditional migration theory in terms of push and pull factors, and sending and receiving countries, with the implicit premise that the population ‘back home’ is much larger than the population of the diaspora. In this case, there are probably more people of Cape Verdean origin in Portugal today than on the islands. What this implies for our understanding of Cape Verdean identity is the question Góis addresses.

J. Bastos and his research team carried out one of the largest and probably most demanding surveys of minority peoples residing in Portugal, both traditional minorities such as the ‘Gypsies’ as well as more recent post-colonial arrivals – Sunnis, Ismailis and Cape Verdeans. The research team developed a unique methodology combining the use of quantitative survey data and analyses with qualitative in-depth interviews. The principal aim of this research is to analyse the religio-cultural roots of collective minority identities and to place these identities in a comparative framework. In this chapter, J. Bastos has drawn methodological consequences of the pre-existing diversity in his field of study.
Many contemporary researchers have attested that social identities need to be analysed against a backdrop of meaning given through social structure and historical experience. Age, gender, social class, education, profession, religion, language, ethnicity and nationality are social positions to which identity content is attributed—by self and by others. Lay explanations of ethnicity are very much about hierarchical classification into social categories. Primordialism is thus relegated to the domains of folk culture, while constructivist understandings of ethnicity reign in the high culture of academia. Although I subscribe to the idea that such identities by and large are socially constructed, Lindo reminds us that there is also an individual side to social identities. They are highly subjective, which adds to their complexity and diversity. Góis suggests that social identity needs to be analysed as a system with its own rationale. It can neither be understood solely in terms of structure nor of agency. We need both perspectives in a complex, dynamic interpretation.

In their joint theoretical chapter ‘What are we talking about when we talk about identities?’, J. Bastos and S. Bastos do just what Góis requests. The authors analyse the identity concept with complexity and dynamism. They present an overview of the identity concept from a multitude of perspectives, drawing on classical literature in anthropology, psychology, sociology and philosophy. This chapter makes for hard but rewarding reading. J. Bastos and S. Bastos refer to all the identity icons in the Anglo-American and European literature, but importantly, they place the many ideas about identity in new constellations. Basically, the authors outline necessary paradigms for understanding identity, oscillating between different levels of analysis. This complex, dynamic and highly diverse conceptualisation of identity is an original and controversial contribution to identity theory.

Conclusion

One of the classic canons of scientific explanation is known as Occam’s razor. It states that in the choice between two equally valid explanations, one should choose the less complicated. It is about economy, simplicity and parsimony of assumptions. The razor implies that assumptions not contributing to improving predictions should be discarded. While this tenet of reductionist philosophy served the Newtonian and pre-Einsteinian natural sciences well, my contention is that it has little to contribute to the social sciences and virtually nothing at all to contribute to identity theory. We do not need to reduce identity. Rather, we need to understand it holistically. We need to understand its complexity and diversity.
All chapters of this volume are about identity and diversity in some way. The aim of this introductory chapter is to convince the reader that the diversity of research problems, theories, methods and content in the following chapters should not be taken as a problem or as a lack of editorial energy.

Diversity, though often used interchangeably with variety, distinctively stresses the marked differences or divergence of the individuals, parts or elements, and seldom suggests even a class or categorical likeness. (Webster’s New Dictionary of Synonyms 1973: 855)

Diversity is not chaos or total entropy. It is about multiformity and there is order in this variety.

The remaining task here is then to account for the order in which the chapters follow. In the true spirit of diversity, the chapters may be read in any order. The first and the last chapters are theoretical, as are the eleven chapters in between, though these additionally draw upon, present and discuss empirical data. All the chapters present and discuss complex issues. None of the chapters employs reductionist thinking. The order in which the chapters are given reflects a movement from the somewhat superficially familiar (though in actual essence still rather unknown) situation of the Dutch Jews, via various migrant minorities in several countries, to the Cape Verdeans of whose conditions little is known outside Portugal.

Notes

1 A parallel strand of research starting in the late nineteenth century was the comparative historical study of languages. It is quite conceivable that this research – with its focus on language, culture and people – and early cultural anthropology influenced each other reciprocally. Language studies have undoubtedly had an impact on how anthropologists thought about ethnicity and its links to language. A fairly recent work relating to comparative historical linguistics is Renfrew’s (1987) book on the spread of Indo-European languages. He places this process much further back in time than previously understood. Renfrew argues that Indo-European languages were intrinsically linked to the spread of agriculture from the Fertile Crescent of West Asia.

2 On secession see Bauböck (2000) and Wellman (2005).

3 A third option is represented by cultural and/or regional autonomy and federalism. The Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain, for example, enjoy a certain degree of regional autonomy. The Swiss confederation has proven functional over a very long period of time, whereas the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke down as a result of internal strain and conflict only eleven years after Tito’s death. However, a nation in the process of forming a state is unlikely to have federalism or regional autonomy as
a top priority. These options emerge if and when the nation-state in formation encounters serious opposition in parts of the territory which it claims to control.

Each conflict or crisis in whatever part of the world needs to be analysed in its historical and geo-political context. There is enormous variation among conditions and circumstances. It is an inescapable fact, however, that most African and many Asian states are still heavily burdened by the colonial legacy. This not only refers to fixed state borders; colonialism has also had lasting effects on institutions, (official) language, governance, economy and general infrastructure. Kibreab (2003) and Hassanen (2007) have written about different phases of the political conflict haunting Eritrea after independence from Ethiopia was recognised. The Eritrean dispute may be seen as one case study of complicated ethno-political conflict. This seemingly never-ending conflict is fuelled by regional, ethnic, religious and language differences within Eritrean society, against a backdrop of colonial history (Italy) and Ethiopian claims to dominance.

In Anglo-American literature, territoriality is usually not given as a criterion of ethnicity. Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 3-14) mention a ‘link to a homeland’, but this is not the same thing as territoriality. An exception is a recent publication by the American political scientist Toft (2003), who analyses ethnic violence in relation to identity and territory. Scandinavian literature places more emphasis on territoriality as an important criterion of ethnicity, possibly because of the presence of ethno-territorial minorities in Finland, Norway and Sweden. Language and territory carry much greater weight as distinguishing ethnic characteristics than phenotypical markers, religion, culture or traditions in this part of the world. Let me cite some examples.

First, constitutionally, the Swedish-speaking population of Finland is one of the two founding nations of the state, the other being Finnish speakers. In everyday life, however, the Swedish speakers of mainland Finland may be regarded as an ethno-territorial minority. Language, territory and ethnicity are closely intertwined (Allardt & Stark 1981; Sandlund 1982). Urbanisation in the Helsinki region is however changing the intricate balance between mono-linguistic and bilingual municipalities. Secondly, both Norway and Sweden have Finnish-speaking minorities in the north. These are territorially concentrated in Finnmark in Norway and in Torndalen in Sweden. The results of a comprehensive research programme on Finnish-Swedish relations, entitled Interaction across the Gulf of Bothnia, was published in a four-volume series from 2005-2007. These volumes cover joint history from 1500-1809 (Bladh & Kuvaja 2005), majority-minority relations, ethno-territorial changes and migration (Junila & Westin 2006), economic development and welfare schemes (Aunesluoma & Fellman 2006) and language policies in both countries (Kangas & Kangasharju 2007). Thirdly, the indigenous Saami people of northern Scandinavia identify a territory known to them as Sápmi. It extends across northern Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Kola Peninsula of Russia. This is more than a homeland in the sense referred to by Hutchinson and Smith. Conflicts over land rights and land use between the Saami, on the one hand, and the state, mining companies, hydro-electric schemes, forestry and non-Saami farmers, on the other, occur frequently. Barth, whose seminal writing on ethnicity (1969) is referred to earlier in this chapter, was influenced by his colleague Eidheim’s research on Saami-Norwegian relations (Eidheim 1969; Eriksen 2004). The American/Swedish anthropologist Beach (1993) has published extensively on a number of issues pertaining to Saami livelihood, ethnicity, territoriality and rights. Finally, several Swedish historians working in the field of comparative conflict analysis, including Gerner (1993) and Tägil (1995), have a territorial approach to analysing ethno-political conflicts, not only in the Nordic region but, above all, in their work on Russia – studies which have later been extended to cover the Balkans and the Caucasus.

'Altercasting' is a term that was introduced by Weinstein and Deutschberger (1963: 454-466). It implies that, besides presenting an idea of who, the 'I' wants to be seen as in a particular social interaction, 'I' also conveys an image of who 'I' thinks the Other should be, or what role he should conform to, in that encounter.

Katz and Braly (1933, 1935) published two articles in which they developed an empirical methodology for studying racial stereotypes. Respondents (in the original study, students at Princeton University) were handed a checklist consisting of 84 adjectives and another list encompassing the names of ten national/ethnic groups. Respondents were then asked to indicate individually which qualities, traits or properties they thought were most characteristic of each respective national/ethnic category. Additional adjectives not given in the checklist could also be used. Katz and Braly proposed ad hoc that the least number of adjectives answering for 50 per cent of the attributions should be regarded as prevalent stereotypes with regard to a given national or ethnic group. Their original study generated a wave of replications and developments in the US lasting into the 1960s.

A similar point is made by one contributor to the Hall and Du Gay volume (1996: 88), Grossberg, who questions whether it is not time for cultural studies to move on from its position of resistance towards an articulation of transformative practices.

A somewhat ethnocentric British understanding of 'Europe', at least before the UK joined the European Community, was the 'Continent', as opposed to including the British Isles. A similar folk understanding of 'Europe' exclusive of one's own country is found in Scandinavia. Although popular EU scepticism prevalent in these countries has complex roots, it is hardly a coincidence that Denmark, Sweden (in referenda) and the UK have chosen not to join the Eurozone and Norway has opted not to be a member of the EU to any degree.

ANZAC is short for Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

In many European countries today, the term 'Gypsy' and its equivalents in other languages (Zigeuner, cingari, gitane, etc.) is not politically correct because of its degrading connotations. A cover term adopted in Northern and Western Europe is 'Roma'. Not all groups accept it, however. Hancock (2002: xix-xx) therefore proposes the term 'Romani', which all groups accept to describe themselves. According to J. Bastos, neither negative nor derogatory connotations accompany the Portuguese term 'Ciganos' as corresponding terms do elsewhere in Europe. As such, the term 'Gypsy' in his chapter is used as the literal translation of Ciganos.

References


Hancock, I. (2002), *We are the Romani People*. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press.


2 Jews in the Netherlands and their various ties with Judaism

Marlene de Vries

Introduction

As a consequence of granting full civil rights to Jews in the European nation-states around the beginning of the nineteenth century, a difference between Jewish religion and Jewish culture could start to develop. In the Netherlands, or rather, the Batavian Republic as it was known at that time, civil emancipation became a fact in 1796. Once promoted to Dutch citizenship (or French or whatever), Jews no longer had to rely on the kehillah, the Jewish denomination, that previously not only served as the religious, but also as the social and cultural home base for every Jew. Membership in a denomination was no longer a must, but a choice, and in fact only had religious significance. As a result, the pathway to secularisation and assimilation was opened up (Zwiep 2005). In practice, however, the integration of the Jewish minority turned out to be a laborious and long-lasting process. For instance, at the beginning of the twentieth century, more than a century after their civil emancipation, less than 10 per cent of Jews in the Netherlands were married to a non-Jew. Until 1920, few Dutch Jews (around 0.5 per cent) were unaffiliated with a Jewish denomination.

After 1920, however, the number of unaffiliated Jews in the Netherlands rapidly increased, and there also was enormous growth in mixed marriages, especially after World War II (Van Solinge, Liefbroer & Van Poppel 2001). There were similar developments elsewhere in Europe, so that now assimilation seems imminent, or already a fact, for large groups. The British historian Wasserstein therefore offers modern European Jewry the perspective of ‘vanishing diaspora’ in his book of the same title (1997). He makes an exception for the small groups of ultra-orthodox Jews, for whom he foresees a more protracted existence. Wasserstein founds his prediction on established demographic facts for Jews in Europe (ageing, low birth rate, mixed marriages and secularisation) and on his opinion that a secular Judaism contains little potential for the future. Not everyone agrees with the latter, and the last word about this issue has not been yet said.

Worldwide debates have taken place on what the exact relationship is between Judaism as religion and Judaism as culture and, more
specifically, whether the Jewish people can continue to exist as a collective without the Jewish religion. In other words: is there a future at all for a secular, i.e. ethnic Judaism? Many Jews are non-religious but consider themselves Jewish, and that feeling can be very intense. Obviously the question is whether this can guarantee Jewish continuity, and the answer is largely dependent on how ‘Judaism’ is defined. There is simply no consensus about this issue, which cannot be answered scientifically anyway; therefore I will not deal with it in this chapter.

What I will do is paint a picture of the Jews in the Netherlands and particularly of the nature of their ties to Judaism and the factors influencing them. Then I will explore the potential for continuity of the observed forms of attachment to Judaism, regardless of whether these contribute to the continuity of Judaism. (I will return to that question in the last section, though). I pay particular attention to the ways in which secular Jews, born after World War II, are connected to Judaism. For this purpose, I largely rely on two recent Dutch studies. The first of these is a survey of 1,036 Jews aged eighteen and older (Van Solinge & De Vries 2001). The study addressed a number of demographic issues. These included: How many Jews live in the Netherlands? What education and occupational levels do they have? Where do they live? It also focused considerable attention on how strongly, and in what ways, the respondents felt ties with the Jewish people, religion and culture. I refer to this study as ‘the survey’. The second study was a follow-up to the survey. It was a qualitative study based on interviews of 30 post-war-born, secular Jews (drawn from the survey sample), which explored their bond with Judaism more deeply (De Vries 2004). I refer to this study as ‘the qualitative study’. In both studies, an almost equal number of male and female respondents were interviewed. The interviews almost always took place in the respondents’ homes.

The sample

According to Halachah, Jewish religious law, a person is Jewish if born of a Jewish mother or if he has converted to Judaism under the authority of an Orthodox rabbinate. This means that people with two Jewish parents, as well as those with a Jewish mother only (matrilineal Jews), are Jewish in a Halachah sense, as are converts. People with a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother (patrilineal Jews) are not considered Jewish according to Halachah, nor are people who have converted to Judaism through a non-Orthodox (e.g. Liberal) rabbinate. In the survey, we applied a broader definition. The study was not limited to Halachah Jews, but included patrilineal Jews too, as well as a few people who had converted through a non-Orthodox rabbinate. The interviewees were
asked whether they had one or two Jewish parents and, in the case of one Jewish parent, they were asked if that concerned their father or mother. This enabled us to distinguish between Halachah and non-Halachah Jews, as well as to separate Halachah Jews into persons with two Jewish parents, persons with a Jewish mother only and converts. Such distinctions in terms of parental lineage are to my knowledge unique to the present survey, making it different from previous studies of Jews in the Netherlands and also from research elsewhere. This approach proved highly fruitful. It emerged that the type of parental lineage indeed made a difference in several important aspects, such as choice of partner (Jew or non-Jew) and the upbringing of children, as well as the strength and nature of a person’s ties to Judaism; if someone has two Jewish parents there is a greater chance that he’ will be brought up Jewish. This considerably enhances his likelihood of a Jewish partner and also of a stable relationship. People who have been raised Jewish and have a Jewish partner are the most likely to be strongly tied to Judaism.

Potential respondents for the survey were all people living in the Netherlands, with at least one Jewish parent, or who had converted. In addition, they were required to be at least eighteen years old. Although we were keen to obtain a representative sample, we certainly could not guarantee that, because there are no databases containing information about all Jews in the Netherlands. As it was therefore impossible to draw a random sample, we chose an alternative method, based on a reasonably representative public database: all the listed private telephone numbers in the Netherlands. A random sample of ‘presumably Jewish names’ was drawn from the Amsterdam phone register. The Dutch telephone company then provided names and addresses for all telephone numbers linked to these 453 names, from which subsequently a random sample was drawn. We ultimately selected the bulk of our sample (84 per cent) randomly from the bearers of these names. We deliberately did not select the entire sample from this source, since that would have excluded certain categories of Jewish people such as those with non-Jewish names, Jewish women in mixed marriages, persons with a Jewish mother only and people with unlisted numbers or no telephone of their own. To fill this gap, we asked people already selected for the sample to refer us to relatives or acquaintances belonging to these categories. Respondents contacted via the snowball sampling by phone comprised 16 per cent of the actual final sample. The entire sample consisted of 1,036 people, of whom the youngest was eighteen and the oldest 95. All respondents were asked whether they had one or two Jewish parents, leaving it up to them which criteria to apply. This introduced a subjective element into the sampling, which probably produced some bias, but we do not
know in what way, or to what extent. Generally, we could not establish in what way and to which degree there was a selective non-response. It is quite obvious that the most assimilated Jews are underrepresented, because these may often have refused to participate in the study, not wanting to have anything to do with being Jewish and possibly not considering themselves Jews. Since no benchmark database existed, the true extent of the bias could not be determined, but it did become clear during the data analysis that the percentage of respondents affiliated with a Jewish religious denomination was higher in the sample than in the estimated reference population. This means that the data about attachment to Judaism are probably biased in a positive sense. We did however use a weighted sample, adjusted for some aspects, but not for the membership of a congregation.

Social-demographic characteristics of the Jewish population in the Netherlands

The sampling method we used did not permit us to estimate the total Jewish population of the Netherlands. This was achieved by applying two different calculation methods in combination, making use of the 1966 census data and three different databases maintained by the Jewish Social Work Foundation (JMW). According to these calculations, the number of Jews under the definition applied here (including patrilineal Jews) can currently be estimated at between 41,000 and 45,000 – with 43,000 as the most probable figure. This includes about 8,000 foreign Jews, i.e. Jews born abroad who live in the Netherlands (first-generation immigrants). Israelis form the largest group, with an estimated 5,000. Furthermore, there are about 900 Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union. About 70 per cent of the current Jewish population of approximately 30,000 are thought to be Halachic Jews, while most of the rest are patrilineal. In the weighted sample, 47 per cent had two Jewish parents, 24 per cent had only a Jewish mother and 29 per cent only a Jewish father. One per cent had no Jewish parents, but had converted. The proportion of persons with two Jewish parents is largest in the oldest age category (born before 1925). The increase in mixed marriages in later generations has reduced the percentage of Jews with two Jewish parents and increased the number with just one Jewish parent. This has slightly increased the total number of Jews since the 1960s, but this growth conceals a substantial shift in the composition of the Jewish population in favour of persons with only one Jewish parent, including non-Halachah patrilineal Jews. We expect this trend to continue, implying a long-term decline in the Jewish population in the Netherlands. This is because children with one Jewish parent are much
more likely to receive a non-Jewish upbringing and to choose non-Jewish partners than those who have two Jewish parents. Chances are high, then, that either they or their offspring will be lost to Judaism.

The results of our survey indicated that Jews in the Netherlands are an older, highly educated and urbanised group – a socio-economic and intellectual upper crust. More than one in five persons is above age 65. The proportion of university graduates is four times that of the population at large. The labour market participation of women is remarkably high. Almost a quarter is in scientific professions, compared to 9 per cent of the general population. The income position is good. A very large segment, 44 per cent, lives in the greater Amsterdam area, compared to 5 per cent of the total population of the Netherlands. Marriages to Gentiles/non-Jews have sharply increased, especially since World War II. Of the respondents born after 1964 who had a partner, 66 per cent had a non-Jewish partner.

**Religious and ethnic ties with Judaism**

Obviously, the ties respondents felt to Judaism are highly varied, both in intensity and content. In the large majority of cases, the focal point of these ties is not the Jewish religion, but an awareness of being Jewish (or of Jewish descent) and of belonging to a group with a common history. The process of internal secularisation is at a very advanced stage. Religious proscriptions, such as keeping kosher and rules against travelling on the Sabbath, are observed by only a small percentage of the respondents (7 and 4 per cent, respectively). Ties to Judaism are hence far more likely to be ethnic than religious in nature, and a large majority of respondents did not regard themselves as religious Jews. Orthodox believers made up only 5 per cent of the survey sample, as Table 2.1 shows.

The table reveals how differently the respondents with various types of Jewish lineage described themselves in relation to the Jewish religion. The religious categories defined here – liberal, traditional and orthodox – together represent minorities among both bilineal and unilineal Jews, but the type of parental lineage does make a difference. An exceptionally low number of patrilineal Jews see themselves as belonging to any of the religious categories, whereas matrilineal Jews do so in greater numbers and bilineal Jews most of all. The intermediate position occupied by the matrilineal Jews is worth noting. From a Halachic viewpoint, they hold the same status as the people with two Jewish parents, which might lead us to expect similar religious distributions. That this does not prove to be the case is presumably linked to our finding that far more matrilineal Jews received non-Jewish upbringing than
bilineal Jews. If we bear this in mind, then the contrast between matrilineal and patrilineal Jews is also revealing. Two factors are apparently at work: the fact that matrilineal Jews are recognised according to the Halachah, plus the fact that their Jewish background plays a less dominant role than it does for people with two Jewish parents.

Although most Jews in the Netherlands apparently do not regard themselves as religious, they sometimes do make use of religious symbolism to express their bond with Judaism. Some 45 per cent of our respondents reported observing with some regularity certain Jewish religious holidays (in particular, Passover and Chanukah); that is some 20 percentage points more than the proportion who considered themselves religious.

### Ties with Judaism: a reduction to two factors

A sense of attachment to Judaism may also be expressed in other ways not directly related to religion, such as through a bond with other Jews or with Israel (usually accompanied in the latter case by a hefty dose of criticism), or through a certain kind of family culture that is considered ‘typically Jewish’. The various ties with Judaism have been examined in the survey by asking the respondents numerous questions. These questions included how the respondents defined themselves from a Jewish perspective (as a Jew, as someone of Jewish descent, etc.), what their religious practices were, if they participated in Jewish institutionalised life (both religious and non-religious), how their circle of friends was composed in terms of Jews and Gentiles/non-Jews, what anti-Semitism and

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**Table 2.1 Religious self-definition in relation to Jewish parental lineage (in %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious self-definition</th>
<th>Jewish parental lineage*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two Jewish parents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-practising</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-religious but observing some Jewish holidays and traditions</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal religious</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional religious</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox religious</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N = 482</td>
<td>N = 243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents with one Jewish grandparent only (N = 13) and converts to Judaism not of Jewish descent (N = 12) were omitted because of the small numbers in these categories.
World War II meant in terms of their sense of being Jewish and what their attitude and feelings were towards Israel. By means of factor-analysis, we explored how all these various variables (there were about a hundred) in relation to Jewish ties connect to one other. This resulted in two substantive factors that explain relatively much of the variance.

The most important factor is the socio-cultural bond, a traditional way to be tied to Judaism, its culture, traditions, religion and people. Of both factors, this factor explains the greatest variation, that is to say 18 per cent. That means that 18 per cent of all differences in Jewish attachment are accounted for by this factor. It is a cluster of feelings, attitudes and behaviour with multiple dimensions, both secular and religious. The socio-cultural bond tells us something about the degree to which someone observes Jewish holidays and feasts at home, considers the Jewish faith and affiliation with a denomination as an important part of being Jewish, has Jewish friends, feels connected with other Jews and with Israel, reads Jewish magazines and participates in the Jewish community. There is coherence in Jewish attachment in all these domains, in the sense that if a person is strongly tied to any one area of experience, he usually will be to other areas too. For instance, if someone observes Jewish holidays at home, then there is a greater chance that he also feels strongly connected with Israel and has Jewish friends. This does not mean, however, that all those who are strongly tied in a socio-cultural sense are Orthodox or belong to a Jewish denomination; mostly this is not the case. Some traditional or religiously coloured behaviour, such as the observance of Jewish holidays and keeping up certain traditions, usually is an important element of this type of attachment, but most interviewees who are strongly tied in a socio-cultural sense do not observe religious proscriptions like the dietary laws and rules against travelling on the Sabbath. Therefore we could say, somewhat paradoxically, that the traditional, religiously inspired behaviour of many has been secularised to a high degree. Or, alternatively, that people – including those who do not consider themselves religious – express their ethnic ties with Judaism by symbols which are religious in origin.

Another source of Jewish identification derives from World War II and from anti-Semitism, and is often accompanied by sensitivity to criticism of Israel by non-Jews. This second factor, a bond deriving from World War II and anti-Semitism, explains 7 per cent of the variance. This factor tells us something about the degree to which someone feels connected with other Jews as a result of the War, as well as the degree to which the War leaves a mark of sadness on his awareness of being Jewish. In addition to this, the factor is determined by the degree to which someone’s sense of being Jewish is activated when he is
confronted with World War II, anti-Semitism or by criticism of Israel by Gentiles/non-Jews.

The degree to which someone is socio-culturally tied to Judaism tells us nothing about the degree to which he is tied to Judaism as a consequence of the War and anti-Semitism. Obviously, the reverse is also true. Someone can have high scores on the first factor and, at the same time, score low on the second factor, or the reverse.

One could think of several explanations why someone would score high or low on either of these two factors. These explanations could include the number of his Jewish parents, the degree to which he was brought up Jewish, whether or not he has a Jewish partner, the period in which he grew up (before or after the War) or his place of residence (in or outside Amsterdam). Using variance analysis, we explored which specific impact the various social background characteristics have on both aspects of someone’s bond with Judaism (socio-cultural and deriving from the War and anti-Semitism). From this it appeared that the circumstances, which, in particular promote someone’s social-cultural bond are his family background (an upbringing in which considerable attention was paid to Jewish holidays and traditions) and, above all, a Jewish partner. Having a Jewish partner is apparently of great consequence, as many people with one Jewish parent and a Jewish partner expressed a stronger bond with Judaism than people with two Jewish parents and a non-Jewish partner. Yet, the very likelihood of finding a Jewish partner is greatest for people who have two Jewish parents and a Jewish upbringing. A Jewish upbringing thus appears to be a good predictor of someone’s socio-cultural bond later. Starting a relationship with a Jewish partner is something that may derive from this bond and can also reinforce it. People who have a Jewish father only, who are not brought up Jewish and who spend their lives with a non-Jewish partner – three characteristics that frequently occur in combination – appear the least likely to develop ties with Judaism in a socio-cultural sense. Nevertheless, they may still feel a bond with Judaism that derives from World War II or anti-Semitism.

Completely different background variables are at work in the case of the bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism. Here, someone’s level of education and the period in which he was born are of great importance. The less well educated appear to be much more sensitive to the War and anti-Semitism than those with a higher level of education – a remarkable finding that is hard to explain from the current data. Less surprising is that the War and anti-Semitism play a role in the Jewish identification particularly among those who were born in the period between 1925 and 1944, which is to say those who experienced the War as a small child or as an adolescent. For those who came into the world after the War, that role is considerably less prominent. The
youngest interviewees, i.e. those born between 1965 and 1982, are the least tied to Judaism as a result of the War and anti-Semitism. It can therefore be concluded that this influence is diminishing over the generations, though it has by no means disappeared. For a very large number of Dutch Jews, awareness of being Jewish is inseparably linked to the War, even if they did not experience it themselves. In this form of attachment, someone’s Jewish background (one or two Jewish parents and the way he was brought up) also plays a role, but a completely different one than in the socio-cultural bond. The likelihood of being strongly tied to Judaism through the War and anti-Semitism, namely, is greatest when someone has one Jewish parent and has not been brought up Jewish and smallest when someone has two Jewish parents and has received an observant Jewish religious upbringing. This finding is quite remarkable, too, and cannot be explained very well either from the survey data. The qualitative study, however, can lend a helping hand. This study showed that in several families with one Jewish parent the War was the most important, or even the only, link with Judaism.

This concerned families in which mixed marriages (between Jews and Gentiles/non-Jews) had already been common for generations, where the Jewish faith was not practised, and the Jewish traditions and customs were no longer current, or hardly so. Most probably interviewees from such families would have felt less tied to Judaism, or not at all, if there had been no World War II. However, precisely in families where attention was paid to the Jewish holidays and feasts before the War, and where the thread was picked up again after the War – incomplete and broken as those families had become – the bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism appears to be much weaker. It seems that there were more opportunities to compensate for the sorrow and horrors in the latter case, for instance because the way of life entailed participation in institutionalised Jewish settings where one met companions in misfortune, or because the traditional and religious rituals contributed to the ability to cope with the grief and problems caused by the War (De Vries 2004: 44, 54). The small sample of the qualitative study (N = 30) does not allow us to be too definite on this point, but it is in line with the survey findings that traditional-religious and especially Orthodox Jews are the least likely to be tied to Judaism as a result of the War and of anti-Semitism (see also Table 2.2 below).

The bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism can be explained less by the social background characteristics than the socio-cultural bond: 31 per cent as opposed to 44 per cent. It therefore seems plausible that the bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism is more closely connected with personal characteristics than the socio-cultural bond.
A profile

In this section I discuss in which ways and how strongly the interviewees are tied to Judaism altogether; how they statistically scored on both ‘bonding factors’ in combination. We made a distinction between high, medium and low scores on both factors, which resulted in nine combinations. It should be noted however that these scores do not say anything in an absolute sense, based on objective criteria, about the strength of someone’s ties with Judaism. A division according to standards based on content cannot be made, so that the scores of the entire sample have been divided equally into three categories: one third high, one third medium and one third low. In order to obtain a clear profile of the respondents’ ties to Judaism, we studied the five categories of the Jewish religious self-definition (see also Table 2.1) in relation to their combined scores on both factors of their bond with Judaism. This gives us the following profile:

Table 2.2 Religious self-definition in relation to combined scores on factors 1 and 2 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious self-definition</th>
<th>LL</th>
<th>LM</th>
<th>LH</th>
<th>ML</th>
<th>MM</th>
<th>MH</th>
<th>HL</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>HH</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-practising</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N = 584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-religious but observing some Jewish holidays and traditions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>N = 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal religious</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>N = 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional religious</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>N = 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox religious</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>N = 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>N = 1,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Factor 1 is the socio-cultural bond; factor 2 is the bond deriving from World War II and from anti-Semitism. The various combinations of factors 1 and 2 are represented in abbreviated form: L = low score, M = medium score, H = high score. The first letter represents the score on factor 1, the second letter the score on factor 2.

The survey sample was composed such that there was no pre-selection with regard to attachment to Judaism. In this light it is notable that only 12 per cent of the interviewees did not feel tied to Judaism, or hardly. The proportion of such people in the entire Jewish population could be a good deal larger, however, as it is plausible that those who are little concerned about their being Jewish will have frequently refused to take part in the study. The rest of the respondents felt themselves more clearly tied to Judaism, but in a range of different ways as well as in different degrees of intensity.
The non-practising respondents were with 57 per cent the largest category in the survey sample. Their proportion among the entire population of Jews in the Netherlands is probably bigger, because, as already stated, the sample was slightly biased towards religious Jews. The majority of the non-practising respondents (65 per cent) had one Jewish parent, mostly the father, and 77 per cent had a Gentile/non-Jewish partner. High and medium scores on the second factor, the bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism, were found much more frequently than for the first factor, the socio-cultural bond. A strong socio-cultural bond was hardly found, whereas a weak one was found in about half the cases. Not surprisingly, only a few non-practising respondents (4 per cent) belonged to a Jewish denomination, and presumably these were short-term convenience memberships in order to be able to marry Jewish or something similar. Participation in non-religious Jewish community life was also very low. About one fifth brought up their children ‘somewhat Jewish’ by selectively paying attention to Jewish holidays and/or traditions. About half of the non-practising respondents brought up their children in a family atmosphere that they characterised as ‘somewhat Jewish’ because of the typical humour, word usage and the like, but that was the only Jewish element of the upbringing. By far the most non-practising respondents had either predominantly or exclusively Gentile/non-Jewish friends.

The non-religious respondents who observe some Jewish holidays and traditions were the second largest category, but with 17 per cent considerably smaller than the non-practising respondents. Approximately 60 per cent of them had two Jewish parents, while nearly 40 per cent had one Jewish parent, mostly the mother. Somewhat more than half of those who had a partner had a Jewish partner. The non-religious respondents who observed certain Jewish holidays had mostly medium or high scores on the socio-cultural factor; only few of them had weak ties in this respect. Their ties deriving from the War and anti-Semitism varied more, from weak to strong. Only one third of these respondents belonged to a Jewish denomination. Most of them observed at least some Jewish holidays and feasts, and the children were brought up accordingly, but they were brought up much less often in an observant Jewish religious way. A small majority of the non-religious respondents who were observing certain Jewish holidays had a predominantly Jewish circle of friends, and the rest had predominantly or exclusively Gentile/non-Jewish friends.

The liberal respondents formed 12 per cent of the sample. Slightly more than half of them had two Jewish parents; the rest had one Jewish parent only, generally the mother. Of those with a partner, 63 per cent had a Jewish partner. Most liberals had strong socio-cultural ties to Judaism. The intensity of their bond deriving from the War and anti-
Semitism varied, but a strong socio-cultural bond combined with either a medium or strong bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism was observed by practically half of the liberal respondents. About two thirds of them belonged to a Jewish denomination, usually a liberal congregation. The vast majority of them observed Jewish holidays at home and brought up their children accordingly, even though these holidays were not always considered very important. There was less emphasis on religion in a strict sense in the upbringing of their children. About three quarters of the liberals had a circle of friends consisting of at least half Jews.

The traditional respondents made up 9 per cent of the sample. The vast majority (85 per cent) had two Jewish parents and 80 per cent also had a Jewish partner. Most of them had a strong bond in a socio-cultural sense; a weak bond hardly ever occurred. Usually they combined their strong socio-cultural bond with a low or, less often, medium score on the second factor, the bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism. Strong ties deriving from the War and anti-Semitism did not appear often. Most respondents (80 per cent) belonged to a Jewish denomination, usually an NIK congregation (see note 2). Many of them observed the Jewish holidays, feasts and customs at home. Practically all parents brought up their children in a religious way, albeit not always very strictly, and the family atmosphere was generally described as ‘typically Jewish’ (word usage, humour, Jewish friends and acquaintances as regular visitors). About three quarters of them had a predominantly Jewish circle of friends.

The Orthodox respondents only made up 5 per cent of the sample. Nevertheless, they were a rather heterogeneous category as to the number of Jewish parents: there were people with two Jewish parents (around 60 per cent), unilineal Jews (usually the mother) and no less than 13 per cent of people without Jewish parents who had converted to Judaism under the authority of an Orthodox rabbinate. Almost all partners of the orthodox interviewees (90 per cent) were Jewish. The vast majority of them were strongly tied to Judaism in a socio-cultural sense; weak ties in this respect did not occur at all. This strong socio-cultural bond usually was combined with a weak bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism. One fifth occupied an intermediate position as to ties deriving from the War and anti-Semitism, whereas strong ties of this type hardly ever occurred. Almost everyone belonged to a Jewish denomination, observed the Jewish holidays and feasts at home and had a circle of friends that consisted of at least half Jews. Usually the children were brought up in a Jewish religious way and mostly in a stricter sense than the children of traditional respondents were.

Summarising, we can state that both the secular categories (the non-practising respondents and non-religious respondents who observe
certain Jewish holidays) differed most among themselves as to their Jewish ties. Liberal, traditional and Orthodox respondents were more uniform. These three groups frequently had a strong bond in a socio-cultural sense in common, and in that they differed from both the secular categories. The three religious categories differed among themselves, however, in the degree to which they were tied to Judaism as a consequence of the War and anti-Semitism. Orthodox respondents had the weakest ties in this respect, whereas traditional respondents showed slightly more variation and liberal respondents the most. Of the three religious categories, the latter displayed most frequently a strong bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism.

Continuing ties? The case of the secular, post-war-born Jews

The extent to which Jews will feel tied to Judaism in the future will largely depend on their socio-cultural bond. The fact that the strongest bond deriving from World War II and anti-Semitism was observed among those born before or during the War, plus the fact that this bond is decreasing in each subsequent generation, may justify the expectation that this kind of bond will gradually erode, ceteris paribus. The continuity of Judaism passed down from parent to child in a socio-cultural sense seems to be safeguarded best in the diverse religious milieus, where marriages with Jews are most common and the children are brought up Jewish. However, for the future of Judaism, at least in a quantitative sense, it is important to examine how the identifications of secular, post-war generation Jews have developed and which potential these ties may hold for future generations. In the qualitative study among 30 secular post-war-born Jews that I carried out as a follow-up to the survey, I categorised different kinds of ethnic identification with Judaism, each of which holds different potential for future generations (De Vries 2004). I will turn to this now.

The 30 people I interviewed grew up in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, an era in which both individualism and multicultural ideology reigned supreme. Ethnic and cultural difference was not only more accepted; it was increasingly appreciated. For many, ethnicity became something rewarding: a means to distinguish oneself from the grey, anonymous mass. At the same time, ethnicity also became increasingly something free of commitment, something to ‘do something with’, but which can be put aside at other times (Vermeulen 2001). During the same period, it also became more common for both men and women to pursue careers as well as to perform household tasks, and this tended to make people’s lives more fragmented than those of their parents. These general, societal developments – the rise of the multicultural ideology in
the course of the 1970s, increasing individualism and women’s emancipation – coincided with a growing self-awareness among Dutch Jews. During World War II, about three quarters of the Jews in the Netherlands were killed (Van Imhoff & Van Solinge 2001). The attitude towards those who survived and returned from their hiding places or a concentration camp was more often distant and chilly than empathetic and warm-hearted (Begemann 1988; Hondius 1998). Families had been decimated, and the survivors had to continue living with the awareness that much of what had been familiar and cherished to them was forever gone. At the beginning of the 1960s, the majority of Amsterdam Jews were still haunted by fears from the War and by feelings of inferiority (Wijnberg 1993: 393), but this gradually started to change in the second half of the 1960s. The military successes of Israel in the Six-Day War in 1967 provided a tremendous psychological boost for self-confidence and pride among Jews. Israel became the symbol that Jews could now defend themselves (Brasz 1995: 393). Our survey indicated that especially the post-war born generations showed this increased self-assurance. For instance, they increasingly tended to give Jewish or Israeli names to their children; the younger they were, the more they did so. The fear of older generations that their children could be recognised as Jews seems to have disappeared largely in their case.

All these circumstances had some influence, and the result for many respondents was that Judaism became far less of a governing force in many areas of life than had been the case for their parents or grandparents. It has become less self-evident, as it were. The fact that about half of them had only one Jewish parent, thereby having Jewish relatives on one side only, contributed to that, as well as the fact that because of the War, there were usually few Jewish relatives left. In addition, the respondents were strongly devoted to free individual choice, also in Jewish issues. Many felt that they have had to face the decision of whether or not to ‘do something’ with their Jewish heritage – thus making the continuance of Judaism a matter of personal choice. They often advocated this for their children while, at the same time, in their hearts, hoping for Jewish continuity. All in all, the people I spoke to had very different ties to Judaism, but what they did have in common was their strong individualism.

As a result, their ties, especially in a socio-cultural sense, had a highly eclectic and individualistic character. Through their parents, most of whom were born before or during the War, the interviewees felt the impact of World War II, albeit to different degrees. This depended on their parents’ experiences and even more so on how their parents coped with them. This influence could strengthen their Jewish identification, in the sense that they felt morally obliged to continue Judaism in some form, as they had very little family left due to the War and were among the
few still bearing their surname. It also could weaken their ties or make them quite ambivalent, in the sense that some respondents felt hesitant about identifying fully with a group that had been subjected to genocide.

I could roughly identify three different patterns of ties to Judaism among the 30 people I interviewed. For some respondents, their ties consisted primarily of an awareness of their Jewish origin and the associated emotions, which derived mainly from their family histories in the War. A certain pride about being part of the Jewish people, at a distance, was an element of their bond with Judaism too. As a rule, these were people with one Jewish parent to whom few, if any, Jewish traditions had been passed on, and who mostly had Gentile/non-Jewish partners. Their score on the first factor, the socio-cultural bond, was very low.

Another category of people experienced a bond that extended beyond awareness of and emotions about their Jewish origin and who found expression in the (selective) attention they devoted to certain Jewish traditions, holidays and feasts. Most of them had two Jewish parents and had been brought up in a similar atmosphere themselves. They internalised the heritage they got from their parents, but adapted it in such a way that it was compatible with their personal needs and did not interfere with the rest of their lives. No lengthy preparations for the Friday evening meal (traditionally starting with chicken soup and followed by several dishes), but, for example, pizza delivery instead; and ‘back to normal’ right after the meal. Their identification with Judaism was often underlined by a certain group affiliation, as reflected in having Jewish friends or (mostly sporadic) participation in institutionalised Jewish life. Few of them had Jewish partners.

For yet another group, the bond with Judaism occupied a place somewhere between the two categories outlined above. Most of them had one Jewish parent and a non-Jewish partner. Their bond with Judaism consisted largely of an attenuated form of traditional Jewish culture, an ‘intimate culture’, characterised by ‘habits of the heart’ like certain types of humour (‘to turn tears into laughter’), word usage, interaction (‘friendly bickering’, ‘joking attempts to get one up on someone’) and food. This intimate culture is a residue of an all-embracing culture, and it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between ‘objective’ culture and family idiosyncrasies. In other words, it is not always clear, not even to those involved, whether a certain family culture is typically Jewish or just typical of their family. Obviously, that applies even more to people who have known few other Jews outside their own family.

It is very likely that each type of attachment holds different potential for continuity. At one end of the continuum are those whose connections to Judaism consist of little more than an awareness of their Jewish origin and their emotions about it. It is not easy to hand down
such an attachment to one’s children, because it is a rather individual bond, that is tied mainly to someone’s older or already-deceased Jewish parent or parents, and it usually receives no new stimuli. These people were the personifications of a completed assimilation process. Their children or grandchildren may follow a course similar to that of the Dutch descendants of the Huguenots; they may be aware of their origins, if only because of their name, but this will generate few emotions and no real basis for an identity. It seems likely that this condition is now already a reality for an unknown number of Jews and descendants of Jews in the Netherlands. They form a category that most probably fell largely outside the scope of both studies. People at the middle of the continuum are not only aware of their Jewish origins, but observe some remnants of Jewish traditions and customs in family settings, too. They may pass on their identification with Judaism to their children more readily than those of the previous category.

Some of them indeed made attempts to do so, but they often lacked sufficient knowledge of Judaism, as well as the aid of a Jewish partner. For many of them, their ties with Judaism had already largely been reduced to the level of family idiosyncrasies, and these ties were only nurtured by a Jewish environment consisting of little more than the parents (or only one Jewish parent) and some Jewish relatives. Probably, then, any identification that their descendants will feel with Judaism will be marginalised even further and will not carry much potential for Jewish continuity in the long run. The greatest potential seems to lie in the attachments maintained at the other end of the continuum, of which loyalty to certain Jewish traditions form an integral part. This relationship with Judaism is more readily transmitted to subsequent generations because the transmission is accompanied by rituals and traditions. The bond engendered here also tends to stimulate some degree of group affiliation (a circle of Jewish friends, membership of Jewish congregations or organisations). These can reinforce the bond, if only because they instil knowledge of Jewish religion or culture and facilitate contacts with other Jews – which can also boost the chances of marrying a Jewish partner. But not always! Some mentioned their difficulties in finding a Jewish partner, especially the few of them who grew up in more or less traditional families and who visited Jewish schools and were members of Jewish youth clubs. They complained that their age-mates of the opposite sex, with whom they spent a large part of their youth, were not interesting to them as partners. They had become too familiar with one another and as a result ‘not exciting anymore’, as they put it. Looking abroad for a Jewish partner entailed other problems, especially the decision where to live in the case of marriage.

Obviously, developments in the outside world (both Jewish and non-Jewish) will also have their impact on the potential of continuity of the
observed forms of attachment. Much will depend, for instance, on the
general social climate, which until recently was amenable to the cultivation
of ethnicity. Current developments, however, do not exactly seem favourable to Jews (or Muslims, for that matter). Anti-Israel sentiments
have increased since the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 and
there was, at least temporarily, a revival of anti-Semitism in the
Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. Since 2003, however, there has
been a slight decrease in reported incidents in the Netherlands. In
general, Jews seem to have profited from the growing ‘multiculturalisation’
of the Netherlands, in the sense that they have become less visible
and ‘being different’ became more usual. As it is, the outside world,
both Jewish and non-Jewish, does not interfere with Jewish interests,
and therefore the Jews have opportunities both for full assimilation and
for the cultivation of ethnicity and religion in various forms.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the ethnic ties of Jews, as members of
an ethno-religious group that is both highly assimilated and secularised.
I have paid special attention to the ways in which post-war-born, secular
Jews experience their ties to Judaism. The reason for this is because secu-
lar Jews represent the largest group, and post-war-born Jews may give
the best indications in what direction ties with Judaism are developing,
as the influence of World War II is gradually diminishing and will di-
iminish further over the subsequent generations. According to some
authors, being tied to Judaism has changed from a ‘bond of fate’ into a
Even though one can question whether this is entirely true, there most
certainly is an ongoing shift to optional, intermittent ethnic identifica-
tions. Such developments have been observed in other ethnic groups as
well by many researchers, such as Alba’s (1990) and Waters’ (1990) ob-
servations concerning the third- and fourth-generation descendants of
European immigrants in the United States and De Vries’ (1999, 2009)
observations of the second- and third-generation descendants of Dutch
Eurasian immigrants in the Netherlands. Subjective perceptions of cul-
tural differences and the construction of identities based on a selection
of these perceptions are at the heart of the social science debate now;
one might even speak of a highly fashionable and overemphasised
focus.

My feeling is that two aspects remain underexposed in these descrip-
tions and analyses. The case of the Jews may clarify these. The first as-
pact concerns the role of the semiconscious or subconscious and its
possible impact on the transmission of ethnic ties. Committed as my
secular, post-war-born respondents were to free individual choice, also in Jewish matters, and prepared as they claimed to be to accept the non-continuance of Judaism by their children if they choose to do so, they also appeared to be hoping for Jewish continuity. Most were hardly aware of that and, when it came up in our talks, they readily admitted not contributing very much to realising this apparently deep-seated wish. Perhaps, however, their contribution is their transmission, subconscious or otherwise, of this hope to their children. This may indeed not amount to much, in the sense that it may not offer a viable basis to their children to found an identity upon, but I feel that this issue should not be neglected altogether, in this or in other groups. One could object to this, in so far as the subconscious is beyond the scope of social sciences; but my experience is that in-depth interviews can be quite revealing. The second factor concerns the question of what ethnicity is about, after all, and the lack of an objective standard to establish where ethnicity ends and fantasy begins.

In the introduction to this chapter, I mentioned the debates on what Judaism is and should be, and whether or not there is a future for ‘secular Judaism’. The debate boils down to the question whether substantive and prescriptive criteria (be they religious, traditional or Zionist) should be applied to determine whether the label ‘Judaism’ can be rightfully claimed, or whether less substantive, non-prescriptive and more symbolic standards suffice – meaning that ‘feeling oneself Jewish’ is enough, almost without regard for the actual content. Likewise, discussions about the ethnicity of other ethnic groups are much less common today. From the perspective of the prevailing postmodern social sciences, it even seems to be old-fashioned to bring up such questions, as only the subjective and situational approach of ethnicity matters to them. Of course it makes sense to study whether and how people have internalised their ethnic heritage, adapted it to the current situation and selectively used it to give meaning to their lives or merely to add some lustre to it. But the question whether or not such a highly personalised form of ethnicity contributes to the continued existence of ethnic groups, or what the boundary is between this form of ethnic identification and any interchangeable lifestyle, is asked only too rarely.

Notes

1 Where I use ‘he’ or ‘his’, ‘she’ or ‘her’ can be read as well.
2 In the survey sample, 38 per cent of the Halachic Jews belonged to a Jewish denomination (non-Halachic Jews are not allowed to join). In the estimated total population of Halachic Jews in the Netherlands, however, only 28 per cent are thought to be members. The majority of respondents who belonged to a Jewish denomination (38 per cent) belonged to the orthodox NIK, the Organisation of Jewish Communities in
the Netherlands. This is the largest Jewish denomination in the Netherlands, numbering 32 congregations. Only 26 per cent of the members of the NIK, however, defined themselves as orthodox. Most of the other respondents belonging to a Jewish denomination belonged to the much smaller LJG, the Liberal denomination (nine congregations), comparable to Reform congregations elsewhere (Van Solinge & De Vries 2001; De Vries 2006).

3 The sample has been compared to a reference population on age, sex, number of Jewish parents and marital status. The reference population was constructed using estimation procedures and other databases (Van Solinge & De Vries 2001).

4 Most of those who did so were patrilineal Jews who had officially converted to Judaism.

5 In total, 25 per cent of the differences in Jewish attachment is explained by both factors (18 per cent of the socio-cultural bond and 7 per cent of the bond deriving from the War and anti-Semitism). In social science, such a percentage of explained variance generally is considered quite acceptable. In addition to both factors mentioned, the factor analysis also yielded several other factors. These do not explain much variance, however, nor can their content be interpreted very well.

6 Several respondents from the qualitative study related this to me. For instance, one of them, ‘gritting his teeth’ as he said, became a member of the Orthodox congregation in order to have a chupah (religious marriage ceremony), but was planning to annul his membership soon after the marriage. Someone else renewed her membership, and felt quite ambivalent about it. She mainly did so to have her son ritually circumcised.

7 It should be remembered that the categories of the religious self-definition are self-defined categories. If a person defined himself as liberal, this did not automatically mean that he also was affiliated to a liberal denomination. It rather meant that he could identify himself with the Jewish liberal-religious range of thoughts.

8 Nearly 70 per cent of the respondents of the survey sample who were born after World War II reported being secular, in the sense that they either defined themselves as non-practicing or as non-religious but observing certain Jewish holidays or traditions. The 30 respondents of the qualitative study all belonged to either one of these two categories and were all drawn from the survey sample. They were born between 1953 and 1974. At the time of the study they were 28-49 years of age. They have been interviewed at length; there was an average of more than three and a half hours of conversation.

9 This estimate is a rough approximation. There are no statistics or other sources available that can give a precise answer to the question of how many Dutch Jews, or Jews living in the Netherlands at the War, survived the War. Generally, it is supposed that 70 to 80 per cent of the Jews in the Netherlands were killed. Van Imhoff and Van Solinge (2001) give a clear insight into the availability or non-availability of data to estimate the number of Jews of different categories (relevant to the occupier) before and after the War.

10 I have borrowed the concept of intimate culture from Epstein (1978), who contrasts it with public culture. By intimate culture, he means the more subtle forms of ethnically linked attitudes, values and behaviours that manifest themselves chiefly in in-group situations. I have borrowed the concept of habits of the heart from Gans (2002) who borrowed it from De Toqueville.

11 The number of reported incidents of anti-Semitism of various kinds in the Netherlands was 326 in 2004, 334 in 2003, 359 in 2002 and 168 in 2001 (Hirschfeld & Van der Sluijs 2005: 60).
References


3 A streetcar named desire: lifestyle and identity of street kids in multi-ethnic Rotterdam

Flip Lindo

Introduction

In 1996, youth workers in one of the boroughs in the southern part of the city of Rotterdam started using a converted local bus to visit places where local youth were loitering on the streets. Problems with young people in several districts of the borough, but especially a neighbourhood called Pendrecht, were the main impetus for this new strategy. Pendrecht is mostly made up of working-class housing projects (mainly blocks of flats some five stories high), constructed right after the War for dockworkers and other labourers. From the 1970s onwards, families have moved out when they could afford better housing in other parts of the city. The indigenous Dutch population that has remained is ageing quickly, and from the 1990s immigrant families have begun settling here in growing numbers. Since 1997, the bus has functioned as a mobile hangout. It pulls up to places where young people congregate and elderly residents complain of overlast (inconvenience, trouble). The inconvenience consists of noise in the late evening and at night, litter in the streets and on the pavement, and, more seriously, a heightened sense of insecurity, caused by a sharp rise in street crime and violence over the last few years, intensified by extensive media coverage of this development. In 1999, in search of a location to conduct fieldwork, I met with Mark, a youth worker with the local welfare service, coordinator of the Bus Project, and the only driver (and mechanic) for the bus. During the course of a year, I was able to follow a group of street kids who frequented the bus on Wednesday nights. The team on the bus allowed me to do research and, in return, I offered my services as their assistant. As I got to know the boys better, I accompanied them on other evenings as well, beyond the surveillance of the workers. As I did not voice explicit criticism of their indulgence in cannabis and was not ‘giving them away’ to the youth workers on the bus (who did not allow cannabis use during bus evenings) they started to trust me after a while. The fact that they appreciated my acceptance of their hashish smoking is in itself interesting. Although cannabis use is tolerated and even legal in the Netherlands, minors are not allowed to use it, or to have it in
their possession. All the same, the boys used it incessantly and exces-
sively. In this chapter, I will describe some of my experiences with
these boys. I will say some things about how they spend their leisure
time and how we can best understand their day-to-day relationships
with their friends. The data were collected over ten years ago. The de-
scription is not representative of the behaviour of street kids of what-
ever ‘origin’ and, worse, it is a very incomplete picture of these particu-
lar boys. Nevertheless I think it provides ample material to buttress a
few comments I will make here and in the concluding paragraph on
matters pertaining to identity and identification processes. My com-
ments focus on the function of peer relationships for the reconciliation
of each adolescent’s individual self-image. They regard the question of
to what degree collective identification among peers and its related sym-
bolic behaviour should be seen as an act of volition that can also be
changed or abandoned at will.

Identification of social groups (including ethnic groups) is essentially
of two sorts; we can discern processes of internal and external defini-
tion (Jenkins 2003). Firstly, there are the processes in-group members
go through, defining their own identity, indicating it in the process to
others belonging both to the same group and to outsiders. These pro-
cesses of internal definition are individual and psychological, but simul-
taneously social, as they elaborate upon already existing structures of
meaning and refer, implicitly or explicitly, to members of the in-group
and to out-groups, without whom identification processes would make
no sense. Secondly, there are processes in which primarily others are
defined. Processes of external definition can confirm these others’ inter-
nal definitions, but could also be different and negative, defying experi-
ences and affecting possibilities for those categorised in this way
(Jenkins 2003: 60). External definitions are always generalising, while
internal definitions, however categorical, always pertain to an individual
personality and biography.

Concerning external definitions, my account illustrates and under-
pins some of the fundamental critical points formulated in the 1980s
and 1990s against ‘ethnographic realism’ (Marcus & Cushman 1982).
In the multi-ethnic urban environment under study, the culprit could
well be dubbed ‘policy realism’ or ‘practitioner realism’, as it pertains to
the way ‘groups’ of youthful troublemakers with an alleged common
ethnic background are perceived by others, be they researchers, print
journalists, television reporters, politicians, policy officials, social work-
ers, policemen or public opinion in general. These ‘street kids’ are
widely seen as a social composite with shared ethnic and geographical
origins, shared values, shared problems due to the pre-migration legacy
and migration history of their parents (usually alluded to by using the
word culture) and, by implication, a shared identity. This compound
entity is hence constructed with the help of fixed spatial and temporal categories. To provide for our tendency of grasping reality by classification, this externally constructed entity is ‘mapped’ as demarcated social units in a geographically bounded space, ‘onto the concept of locality’ (Marcus 1994: 46) and, I would add, onto the self-explanatory notion of a common historical or even genealogical background.

Identities, though socially constructed, should not be seen as formed by structures of community and shared history only. The ambiguous notion of ‘collective identity’ is a case in point here. As long as it signifies ‘the consciousness of belonging to a group that exists in time’ (Epstein 1978: 122), all is well. On the other hand, when it permits hypostatization of objectified features of that group on an individual’s supposedly internal drives and subjective identity, we have been misled (Berger & Luckmann 1967: 194, 233 n.40). This seems a superseded argument, redundant since we have moved on from situationalism to post-structuralism and further to post-positivist realism; nonetheless, where policymakers, social workers and researchers meet with their boots in the muddy depths of everyday practice, ‘policy realism’ and ‘practitioner realism’ are present and potent theories and, unfortunately, because of this, ‘ethnographic realism’ has all but died out. One of the reasons for its perseverance might well be that such a way of problem identification seems convenient for practical and political purposes. Brubaker (2002: 164) has called attention to an analogous inclination he calls ‘groupism’, which he defines as

the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis.

In this process, categories of people are transformed into collectives by attributing to them agency, motives, and a social identity. Brubaker has pointed to the persistence of this predisposition in public and social-scientific discourse, despite the dominant trend in diverse traditions of social theory challenging the reification of social categories (Brubaker 2002: 164). He warns us not to confuse categories for groups and recommends that we, as social scientists who, like everyone else, engage in defining the other ‘externally’, consistently distinguish between them so as to be able to ask the question, and to find out, how much ‘groupness’ an identified category actually possesses (Brubaker 2002: 169). Related to this inquiry is the question to what degree and in what measure a putative social identity is in fact a collective identity, and in what measure, and to which individuals associated with this category such an assumed identity can be justifiably attributed. In the meantime, there is
every reason to continue to assert that social identities are, first and foremost, subjective constructions of an extremely individual kind. In addition, they are indeed polyvalent and, even more importantly, prone to multiple interpretations.

However, and this is the central argument in this chapter, we should reject the idea that their construction is entirely ‘dialogical’, and multiple in the sense that one can discard at will a specific idea of one’s self previously adopted because of its lack of usefulness or appeal in some other situation. This in fact comes down to equating social identities with social roles. When social roles are performed, segments of the self are utilised or emphasised, but we should not forget that the roles are played by complete persons (Cohen 1974: 54-64). The complete self is involved. Individuals are constantly engaged in safeguarding the ‘wholeness’ of their selves; this is even more necessary when they have to play roles that, in their view, are extremely segmented and reflect a partial self-image in a painfully unequal relationship. In general, adolescents often find themselves in such an – admittedly subjective – quandary, be it at home or in school. In circumstances where the situation can also be objectively described as difficult, as is the case with young people living in run-down urban areas, often from immigrant backgrounds, and relegated to the bleakest forms of lower vocational education, the task of maintaining or achieving an integrated image of the self is indeed a formidable one. My point is that, for young people, informal relations among peers are all the more indispensable in these circumstances. In what follows, I will give an account of activities of, and relations among one peer group as I have experienced them. In the conclusion I will come back to my point and develop the argument further.

The boys, the bus and the workers

The group of boys who get together at the terminal for tram line 2 has been dubbed ‘the Moroccans’ by local policymakers and social workers. However, the group does not consist solely of boys from Moroccan immigrant families. The quotation marks not only refer to their origin, but could be applied to ‘group’ as well. ‘Group’ implies a bounded and defined entity, and therefore does not apply well to the ever-changing company that assembles Wednesday evening at the tram stop. There is, however, a nucleus of eleven boys who are there regularly: six boys of Moroccan-Dutch background, four Surinamese-Dutch boys and one white Dutch boy. But even these boys are not present every time. Besides this more or less steady group, there are about fifteen other boys, of mostly Moroccan-Dutch origin, and three girls (white Dutch, Surinamese-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch) who join the group
intermittently. The large majority is between 12-18 years of age. Everyone knows each other and between many boys longstanding friendship ties exist, in some cases dating from kindergarten. Also, strong friendship ties exist between boys of different ages. Within the group there is no individual occupying a clear leadership role.

We used to meet up with more people. Last summer we were 30. We’re not only Moroccans, but ‘negers’ [Negroes] and Dutch and one Russian guy. Many of us are at the [...] school. We are friends, but each of us also has other friends, not only in Oud-Charlois and Pendrecht, but everywhere in Rotterdam. And nobody acts the boss, just everybody, you know. For instance, we just all listen to each other. That one says we’re going to do this, and the other, let’s do this. It doesn’t matter, you know. We’re not like: who’s strongest, let’s listen to him. Because, the only one that sometimes quarrels, is Hassan, you have seen that yourself. For the rest, [we’re] just quiet. (Hamid, 15)

The bus started coming to this place because the workers were supposed to pacify the situation in the adjacent small pre-War housing project of tiny one-storey houses on the outskirts of Pendrecht, immediately adjacent to the harbour. This small neighbourhood is inhabited by six to seven hundred indigenous Rotterdammers who have lived there for over two generations now, and have started to intermarry. In contrast to the rest of the district, the indigenous inhabitants have not moved out. De Wielewaal, as it is called, boasts a community centre and a small youth club. In the summer of 1998, a group of predominantly Moroccan-Dutch youth, mainly boys, came to the community centre when there were activities and parties, and trouble started between the local youth population and this group. That summer a kind of weekly ritual of fights developed between the ‘Moroccan’ group and ‘De Wielewaal’ boys.

The mills of government, however, grind slowly. It took some time before workers and policymakers made up their minds to put the bus into action, because they identified some dilemmas as well. The stationing of the bus on regular nights for an extended period in this particular part of the neighbourhood might, it was expected, encourage the Moroccans in their belief that they had the right to demand a place of their own in or near De Wielewaal. When, finally, the decision was made to bring the bus to De Wielewaal, the weekly mêlée had already died down. The Moroccans who continued to see each other at the tram stop – a public space signifying the boundary between Pendrecht and De Wielewaal – and subsequently came in contact with the bus remember the fuss during the summer of 1998, but took part in it only
marginally. Two of them (one of the Surinamese-Dutch boys and the white Dutch boy) live in De Wielewaal. Although the networks of most De Wielewaal youth are separate from that of ‘the Moroccans’, they know each other and, on several occasions, I did not observe any antagonism between them.

The Bus Project, run under the auspices of the welfare services foundation for the borough, is not meant as a facility to be used permanently by the same group of boys. Generally, the workers approach groups of young people where they hang about, as the bus is parked near them at fixed hours on a fixed evening in the week. The workers then start inviting them to frequent the bus on this evening. Through a short-term programme offering alternating activities, the aim is to motivate the boys to display more socially acceptable behaviour among themselves as well as in their relations with others in the neighbourhood. The method the workers use to achieve this goal – and which all the activities are part of – consists of two mainstays: so-called ‘challenges’ and ‘bonus points’ (‘premie op actie’ in Dutch). The group, as a collective, can be offered several challenges: for instance, cleaning a playground together or organising a meeting with older residents from the neighbourhood. A successfully completed challenge earns a collective reward that varies, according to the size of the challenge, from a treat at McDonald’s or a round of indoor go-carting to an outing to Six Flags or a ‘survival weekend’ in the countryside. With the ‘action points’ method, youth social work tries to put an old adage into practice – teaching young people to assume collective responsibilities. When they, in the eyes of the social workers, have given enough evidence of this, the ultimate remuneration follows, which simultaneously signifies the moment they have to take leave of the bus. The group is then passed on to a youth worker from a different unit of the service, who will assist the boys in running a weekly club evening in a venue allocated by the local welfare foundation. The ideal situation is when they are eventually able to run their evening relatively independently. Such an evening otherwise only lasts from half past seven to nine, as it is not possible to engage service staff for longer hours in the evening. Anyhow, the bus can then be deployed to visit other places to help solve new ‘inconvenience problems’ (as they are called) elsewhere in the neighbourhood. In this way, the Bus Project serves as well to funnel street kids into the regular supply of activities run by the borough’s social work departments.

To the bus workers, ‘the Moroccans’ seem far from ready for this. The challenges successfully completed by other (white Dutch) groups of youngsters, are for them ‘still a step too far’, as phrased in euphemistic social work-speak. The Moroccan group is considered ‘unapproachable’ (onaanspreekbaar in Dutch) for two reasons. Firstly, the social workers
cannot get anything done when there are more than six or seven boys on the bus. When a larger party gets on, they can no longer predict the interactions between the boys mutually and between the boys and themselves. The boys grow reckless, leading to things regularly getting broken on the bus, and sometimes arguments develop into a scuffle. The workers’ feeling is that, because of this, it is impossible to make agreements with the boys to engage in activities over a longer period. Secondly, every week the workers see different faces on the bus. They interpret this as a lack of group cohesion and mutual solidarity. To be able to forge a close-knit group within which the boys can take responsibility for each other – as said, a classical objective of youth work – the individuals who are going to form this collective should come into view first. The professionals want to work with the same group as much as possible, while adhering to the formal prerequisite that their ‘clients’ should be residents of the burrough’s specific district in which the Bus Project is active.

Because of this, the workers decided to restrict the group to the boys they see most and therefore know best. These boys would be provided with an ID card with photo, name, address, telephone number and age. The youth workers found this ID system indispensable to keep the group limited to a fixed number of boys from the neighbourhood. Also, they hoped to get some more background information about the boys and to be able to contact their parents. Not having concrete knowledge about the home situation of each individual boy is a thorn in their side. Although the workers deemed it essential for the success of the project, they did not manage to introduce the ID system, partly because of a lack of bus staff – during the period of my research, three colleagues with whom Mark decided on the ID system went on sick leave – but first and foremost because only one or two of the boys divulged their address and home telephone number.

The network

These boys see to it that their life on the street and their life at home are kept separate as much as possible. One of the attractions of the bus is exactly that the authorities at home and on the bus do not have any contact with each other. The boys are afraid that their doings will become known to others outside their peer group, especially significant others within their direct social environment, such as teachers, social workers, local cops, neighbours, but especially parents, other kin or acquaintances within the Moroccan-Dutch community. The distrust that Moroccan immigrant families feel towards each other is documented (Van Gemert 1998). Children especially fear the all-seeing eyes of the
Moroccan-Dutch community in the neighbourhood and anticipate their parents’ fear of exposure to malicious gossip. This is an important cause for the considerable mobility ‘the Moroccans’ display in their free time. As a Moroccan-Dutch youth worker commented:

Here in the district where you live, you are known. When you do something wrong, your parents will hear it, from family, a neighbour or a friend. You try to avoid this in all kinds of ways. Somewhere else in town, where you are unknown, but again have friends, there you go to do some things. That’s typical for Moroccans.

The ‘things’ that this worker is referring to are activities that the boys themselves judge to be illegal or subject to criticism; criticism they especially fear from other Moroccan-Dutch. These vary from having fun together and smoking cannabis, driving scooters and cars without permits or driver’s licenses to shoplifting, street theft and selling or trafficking drugs.

During the fieldwork I found it difficult to build up a relationship of trust with ‘the Moroccans’ of tram line 2, irrespective of their ‘real’ origin. All the boys have an extensive repertoire at their disposal to put the researcher and the youth worker or teacher or any professional ‘from the outside’ to the test and lead them up the garden path. For the rest, reserve and taciturnity prevail.

Within their peer network, the boys rely on, and confide, in each other to a considerable degree. They are acquainted with the pros and cons of consorting with each other in different combinations.

When for the first time one of the youth workers shows me around in the bus, she points to the broken folding table in the back. It was wrecked last week on a hectic ‘Moroccan’ evening. ‘They didn’t do it on purpose, but things get out of hand because within the group nobody is taking responsibility. Then things like this happen,’ she states. A week later is my first evening with ‘the Moroccans’ on the bus. Four boys show up, it looks like it is going to be a quiet evening. Shortly after entering the bus, Fouad (13) points to the still un repaired folding table, and angrily exclaims to me: ‘He [Mark] surely told you that the Moroccans have done this. They don’t fix it; it stays like that to shame us. But that’s what you get when you want to work with such a large group at all costs.’ Then, turning to the front of the bus: ‘Come on Mark, what are you waiting for man, let’s go!’

The boys are acquainted with the group dynamics. They know that there will be more commotion as more boys gather; they know that almost inevitably things get out of hand. The commotion is attractive; however, when you opt for an evening without fuss, why not see to it
that your company is smaller in numbers? The boys of tram line 2 look around for, or steer clear of, contacts to create a situation that suits them best at that particular moment. This is their solution for controlling collective processes. To accept collective responsibility in a situation that is imposed on them is, in their eyes, a stupid idea. The boys’ solution (and this applies to the Moroccan-Dutch, Surinamese-Dutch and all other boys in the network alike) is: keep your options open and make the best possible decision according to the situation in which you find yourself. The boys can fall back on a relatively extensive network to put this motto into practice. The network is open-ended, which means that the composition of the group as it gathers on Wednesday evenings near the bus is different every time. In fact, the youth workers do not meet with a group, but with an ever-changing and shifting segment of a larger youth network, which does in fact lack strict boundaries. Many of the participants of this network are friends, even soulmates, but that does not imply that they feel they should consort with the same group of ten to twelve every Wednesday night. Besides boredom, the weekly pattern of these street kids also contains commotion and disorder. When the bus comes, many boys prefer to do something pleasant with a small group of four or five. This is why those who arrive first invariably insist on leaving at once. ‘Why should we wait?’ they ask. ‘Nobody else will be coming!’

Each boy’s circle of friends is wider than the group that meets in an ever-changing composition to get on the bus. Most of the boys on the bus have regular and often intensive contacts with current and former classmates, friends and also cousins who live elsewhere in southern Rotterdam. They meet those friends on other evenings, in other parts of the town, and undertake other activities. Of the boys on the bus, some have larger networks than others, networks that may also contain older adolescents and even adults.

The boys are on the street each night. Some complain that there is so little to do: ‘Rotterdam is dead.’ Others stress that they are never bored. To spend leisure time at home is not an option. The home situation is of course not the same for all. Some elements, however, fall under a common denominator. At home, they do not see any opportunities to dispel boredom. Neither does anyone of their household ever insist or convince them to spend the evening at home. Fathers – be they Moroccan-Dutch, Surinamese-Dutch, Antillean-Dutch or white Dutch – are completely out of the picture or are home only sporadically. While growing up, none of the boys seems to be encouraged to engage in any activity that might be attractive because of some expected future benefit. Generally, they avoid spending their time in a way that somehow could be managed, supervised or controlled by others. An exception is sport, and especially football. Three of the boys I met played for a club, but
two of them have stopped in the mean time because of arguments and
scuffles with coaches and officials. For everyone there is only one way
to fight boredom: the company of peers outside the range of family,
and the distraction that can be found there, preferably of the exciting
kind, in the here and now.

Most of the boys leave the house early, around six in the afternoon, if
they have been home at all.

I go to see everybody. At the meeting places where they are. [...]
We are nomads [laughs]. We wander about, no fixed place. We
walk and walk, settle ourselves sometimes here, then there.
(Mounir, 17)

The image of the nomad should of course not be taken literally. It is
not the homelessness – and lamenting about it that appeals – but the
identification with freedom and being unbounded.

I come home, but most of the time I am outside immediately. I
say hi-bye! (Fouad, 13)

All of us are outside, always. That’s normal. We only go home
when our eyes stay [closes his eyes] like this, when they sleep.
Then we go home! And when you do not have money in your
pocket, you go home. You only go home when you have a crisis,
then my mother sees me. Then she can see me all day [laughs].
(Winston, 16)

Trash-talking

In the bus Kenneth (15) joins us at our table. ‘You have jonko [‘joint’]? Please roll one for us. I am boel nuchter [‘too sober’], man.’ [Talking to
me:] ‘That little man is choking [toking] the whole time till he is suf
[‘drowsy’].’ He asks the others for a cigarette. Karim (15): ‘Hey, siki, do
you know how much I gave your brother [Winston just took three of his
cigarettes for others in the front of the bus]. Hey, hey, you have to sign,
Moroccan association. Moroccans have priority over Negroes. Oh yes!
Just sign here [points to imaginary form on the folding table]. Now you
are with the Moroccan Union, MU! Now say [yelling]: I am a Moroccan!’
Kenneth remains imperturbable and takes his cigarette. The youngest
(and smallest) Moroccan boys’ trash-talk the worst: ‘Hey, dirty black
man, the bus is forbidden for Negroes!’ The rejoinder of the
Surinamese and the Antilleans on the bus comes nearly always in the
same dutiful sounding formula: ‘I don’t mix with those goat fuckers.’
Verbal violence is a specialty of the Moroccan-Dutch boys, and is tolerated by the boys of Caribbean descent. When horsing around and in friendly scuffles, the Moroccan-Dutch are no match for the much stronger and faster Surinamese-Dutch and Antillean-Dutch boys, who also often have relationships with girls, which they brag about, and whose stories about sexual adventures are not disputed by the others, but listened to respectfully. The boys of Moroccan-Dutch background associate party culture – dress, dance, music (hiphop) – to a large degree with black culture and, by association, with Surinamese and Antillean (Caribbean) culture. All Moroccan boys frequenting the bus know several texts by heart of black rappers, including the late but still the much-admired Tupac Shakur.

Just before we drive off, someone outside knocks on the bus. It is Mike (17). Hassan (13): ‘Hey, that nigger belongs here, too!’ Hassan opens the back door and shouts: ‘You’re black!’ Fouad adds: ‘Three black heads on the bus is enough!’ Karim: ‘Get lost, you teringaap [‘sick monkey’]!’ Mike enters the bus unfazed. He is the biggest and strongest of the group, and has an impressive police record related to his irascible temper. Mike is not a talker, but the others recount his encounters with the authorities respectfully, as acts of heroism.

Bickering, preferably in ethnic-pejorative terms, is an indelible part of the colloquial language of the group and, because of its coarseness and abusiveness, it took time for me to understand that it expresses a sense of intimacy, a tool to bridge, especially phenotypical, differences. Dutch friends are often called kankerkaaskop (‘cancer-ridden cheeseheads’). Simultaneously, Moroccan boys have a great sense of relativity concerning their own ethnic and phenotypical heritage. All the boys sing (often self-made) rap songs in which Moroccans figure as sukkels (‘oafs’).

We are Rotterdamers. We talk dirty. We talk dirty but we don’t mean it. It’s just normal. You say: ‘Hey, kankerlijer [‘cancer patient’], how are you, long time no see... You know how it goes, while, well, you’re having a normal conversation. (Mounir)

Earnings

Hassan: ‘I have never done anything without getting something in return!’

Within the group one may encounter boys with different degrees of respectability, together with social outcasts of all sorts. Most of the boys are not of the completely marginalised kind, in the sense that they still
have relationships with our most central social institutions of family and school and have not become complete outsiders in their respective origin communities in Rotterdam. However, some of the boys have lost some of these contacts, or are in danger of losing them. The majority of the boys regularly overstep the mark. In five cases, you could even speak of an organised (petty) criminal vocation, nonetheless combined with a – be it unassuming – school career (see also Faasen 1997). Although boys are not banned from the group if they abstain from criminal activities – quite a few do not partake in these activities at all – it does not add to your prestige if you’re boasting about your paper route.

On the bus, Youssef (14) lets slip that he has 75 guilders in his pockets. ‘He showed it to me,’ says Hamid, who has joined us in the back of the bus. It turns out that he earned it at the Hobbema market in The Hague, in the booth manned by his uncle. Hassan and Fouad show sardonic disapproval. Hassan: ‘I don’t have to work, I have brothers!’ Fouad agrees. Another time, Omar, an irregular guest on the bus, asks me if he is allowed to go work in a supermarket when he is fourteen. He receives howls of derision. Hassan: ‘Don’t you have brothers? Are you going to work for juvenile wages?’ As do several other kids, Hassan wears golden jewellery (a chain and a big ostentatious ring). ‘Real gold!’ the others comment. Besides, thirteen-year-old Hassan has more money on him than the others do most of the time, and always has quality Moroccan hashish. The money he gets from his older brothers, whom he calls ‘rich’, and who drive expensive BMWs and Mercedeses. Fouad also has a prosperous older brother and, at the start of summer, the two boys extensively review the air-conditioned cars with which the family will go on holiday to Morocco. Hassan has, besides an allowance from his brother, other sources of income. ‘He deals,’ the boys say about him. Hassan stays unaffected and does not deny it. Neither does he want to talk about it.

One of the marks of an open-ended network is that participants are well informed about opportunities outside their own neighbourhood, including chances to supplement their spending money by working in the twilight zone of the economy, for instance selling or trafficking drugs, bringing customers to the pusher’s apartment (drug-running), fencing or shoplifting. New ideas are conceived and adopted, new chances created and new tricks learned by the members of the network, with its relatively wide geographical dispersal and opportunity for new members.

Visiting some youth workers in the field (without the bus) I am watching a football game organised by the workers in a small square in the neighbouring borough Feyenoord, where only Moroccan-Dutch meet, mostly children and adolescents, but young adults and mothers
as well. Two boys of about eighteen appear on the scene and start shaking hands with everybody including persons like me whom they have never seen before. They sit down on a bench and soon a crowd has assembled around them. One of them has a mobile phone for sale, new, still in the box. We walk towards the group and listen. The boy extols the virtues of his merchandise; it is an expensive cell phone worth 1,200 guilders. Bargaining has started. Ahmet, one of the workers, intervenes informally in the discussion that takes place in a mix of Dutch and Tarifit (the Berber language of the Moroccan Rif). While taking our leave, Ahmet confirms that it is a stolen phone they are selling: they want 250 guilders. I share my observation with him that the bargainers do not seem to act at all distrustful towards us; they are obviously not afraid the workers will inform the police, with whom they are in close contact, as everybody knows. ‘Yes,’ says Ahmet, ‘if we would do that [inform the police], we would never think of coming back here.’ The transaction is completely out in the open. Within the community living around this little square, criminal activities like these seem to have become the most natural thing in the world.

Stealing cell phones is the most important activity and source of income for five boys in the ‘core group’ on the bus. A few others join them sometimes. Within the group, everybody knows this. After having spent a night with the group in the Dutch countryside (a drop-in session in summer 1999), they informed me of this. Kenneth: ‘Fouad once said, “Join us tonight.” We came along, and we liked it, earning money and a lot of it, too.’

The telephones are stolen from shops. At late openings, and in the weekends, the boys set out to do it in the smaller towns around Rotterdam, where their activities have proven most successful. They take the train, and travel without a ticket. The double-decker trains are especially suitable because it is relatively easy to evade the conductor. This way of travelling is called piepen, which simultaneously connotes peeking, popping up and off and fixing a job.

Hassan: Look here, it goes like this. You take the train; in the train you go piepen, to Leiden or some other place. You just go into a telephone shop there, you pinch a few telephones, V series or something similar, and then you sell them.

Where do you sell them?

Well, simply to someone who wants them and has money.

OK, but you’re not waving with them in the street, yelling that you have phones for sale; how do you sell them?
Well, of course to people who have bought them previously, and who sell them again.

*How many of you go out stealing them?*

Winston: With... hey, ai, this is not going to the police, hey?

*No, of course not, don’t you trust me?*

Yes, of course I do. Eh, four or five. We go everywhere, but outside Rotterdam. We collect twelve, fifteen. We have keys. Keys to those locks.

*Of the display cases?*

Yes, those, too. But also the large cabinets. Then you just stand around each other. Someone ducks and opens the case.

*Then it must be crowded in the shop...*

No, of course not, that is really not necessary.

*Don’t they see it?*

Yes, they see it... but what can they do, when they see a group of five boys like us? It happens, that an assistant... yes, hello... he was beaten black and blue.

*So they are afraid?*

Yes, but sometimes we just wait, two or three employees are working, and we wait till they have customers all three of them. And then, when they’re not paying attention. Or someone is diverting that shop assistant. We take the most expensive ones. Lately I had the last model, the most expensive one. That is a very small one.

*V series?*

Yes, the one you can fold out. Hamid has got it as well, didn’t you see it?

*How many times a week are you doing this?*
Two or three times.

*A week?*

Do you know how rich I am? [laughs]

The boys who set off on these expeditions form occasional coalitions with others they know from their network, a network that extends over the whole of southern Rotterdam. Among the boys who meet on the bus, not everybody is involved in phone theft, but most of the time the subject is openly discussed among them. Only two boys who intermittently come to the bus are not trusted. When one of them approaches, the subject is changed. Within the group, telephone theft – and shoplifting, in general – does not diminish your status. It is seen as an exciting activity, which demands guts. The fact that television networks have described this new form of criminal behaviour makes it all the more interesting. It adds to your prestige when not only the police and shop workers are your opponents, but also a celebrity such as Peter R. de Vries, the Netherlands’ most conspicuous crime journalist. The following conversation took place in the back of the bus, one evening when we made a trip to the coast. Except for Winston and I, there were three other boys, of whom two who are not involved in this kind of criminal activity. They listened attentively, without mingling in the conversation.

Winston: That thing is now big with Peter R. de Vries, did you know that?

*What?*

That thing, those telephones. It’s going on already for two and a half years, you know, and millions, billions of phones have gone, in guilders, eh. [Kenneth makes assenting sounds.] Two of my buddies were in touch with him, and they were caught. Two friends of mine – Peter R. de Vries went asking them: ‘Who steals? Who deals? Who buys?’

Kenneth: When they catch somebody, all of the blame comes on that person.

Winston: ... all of the blame on his head.

Kenneth: Yes, kill. Maybe it’s your first time, eh, but you just get screwed!
Winston: ...you get screwed for everything.

Kenneth: You get all the blame.

Winston: All 40 cases. You just get fucked.

Kenneth [referring to De Vries and getting really excited and angry]: That guy, I’ll do him in, I swear!

Winston: My friend, the one I sell my phones to, he’s bugged by the police.

Kenneth: Uhh? Is he...?

Winston: That’s why! You know I had that small phone? I got rid of it immediately, you know what I mean.

Kenneth: You shouldn’t have a telephone.

Winston: When I talk on the phone, we only say funny things, silly things, you know, like ah where are you, how are you, who are you with, this and that... and then you know where you are, you go there and you can continue talking. Not over the telephone, never. That’s how we are. Peter R. de Vries, that’s bad, dude, you really have to watch. Peter R. de Vries always gets you.

Kenneth: I haven’t watched in a long time.

Although being associated with ‘the phone thing’ (as these delinquent activities are known) does not secure one’s role as a leader in the group, it does contribute to one’s image as a sharp hand. Among the boys, cunning is a highly valued quality. I have not been able to obtain a clear picture of the financial gains. My impression is that the boys, also towards each other, exaggerate the ‘profit’ they make on each stolen telephone. They have, however, a few ways to display the fruits of their criminal activities: owning the most expensive telephones and posh clothing. Besides, within your family you can make people happy.

**Spending and the market of love and happiness**

Although the networks bring opportunities within reach to earn some money, they affect the lifestyle as well, by bringing attractive role models into view. Networks in which Moroccan-Dutch boys between 12-18
years of age participate are often multi-ethnic. Surinamese-Dutch peers are, as regards language, clothing and lifestyle, in general, an example for them. Moroccan young adults – their clothes, scooters and sometimes cars and (Dutch) girlfriends – are also models for emulation. Sometimes these alternatives for the good life are represented by Northern African young men with an urban background, who came to the Netherlands on the off chance. They know how to behave in public places and maintain relations with women of Moroccan-Dutch and white Dutch descent (see Viskil 1999). Open-ended networks such as these provide ‘an open door’ as a Moroccan youth worker phrased it. Behind the door, opportunities and role models present themselves ‘in real life’, but this does not of course bring these within reach immediately. However, opportunities present themselves to earn a little extra in the twilight zone, to at least be able to make a start in copying the lifestyle of their successful, often slightly older, ‘examples’ in the network. Most of the time, this does not give them a ticket to operate in the market of love and happiness. Because they are young, and Moroccan-Dutch to boot, they usually find their access to regular nightlife venues blocked. In daily leisure time activities, a lopsided and, for most boys, exclusive orientation towards male peers dominates. Their toughness and bravura is calibrated to this everyday interaction. What amongst them counts as the proper outfit and cool behaviour does not impress the ‘white chicks’ in the trendy discotheques very much, provided the boys are admitted to these places of entertainment.7

A number of boys regularly carry impressive amounts of pocket money, sometimes hundreds of guilders. Their ‘earnings’ are, however, not stable; besides, the money is quickly spent. Ask them where they spend their money and they make clear that ways to influence their status by conspicuous consumption are restricted, regardless of the amounts of money they sometimes have at their disposal. In this respect they have but a modest repertoire: clothing, shoes, some trinkets like rings and chains, cell phones; the modern urban nomad (as the boys like to see themselves) carries his distinguishing marks close to his body.

Exactly because of this, most of these status symbols have a short shelf life. Most gadgets soon lose their lustre – an expensive coat looks grubby after two weeks living on the street, and portable devices lose their novelty relatively quickly. Money to replace them is often not available. Because of this, none of the boys consider their way of life a feasible prospect. Regularly I lent them some money for cigarettes or a snack, and treating them to a hamburger meal at the expense of the Bus Project or my research budget was gladly accepted.

*How do you spend your money?*
Hamid: On clothes. I’m not stupid, you know. I know exactly what I want. Sometimes you buy a small bag or whatever, you know, that’s only normal.

_A small bag?_

Yes, for the _jonko_. And that’s normal. And food, McDonald’s everyday if possible. I need to have money every day. Except now, because I lent all my money.’

_And you?_

Abdel (18): On everything. Cinema, McDonald’s, hookers, and saving for a scooter, or whatever.

_You own a scooter?_

No.

_Do any of you own a scooter?_

No, but I want a car, too.

_Do you have a license?_

No, but I don’t need one.

Abdel, and the other boys a bit older than the rest, often talk about cars they covet. They agree that some small, fast cars about ten years old (like the Volkswagen Golf GTI) are attractive and within their means. Twice, a boy announces that he has bought one and will go and collect it that week. During the period of my fieldwork, I never saw a car. Sporadically, one of them rode a scooter, invariably a dilapidated specimen with parts falling off, which had disappeared from sight the next week.

The lifestyle of these kids is in large part determined by their age. Those boys who regularly get slipped something by their older brothers, the phone boys, all realise that the money they get does not permanently affect their situation for the better.

_Where do you like to go to eat?_

Steven (14): ‘Depends on the money I have. If I have a lot of money, I go to McDonald’s. If I don’t have much, I go elsewhere,
some chips at Moos (neighbourhood snack bar) or something like that. That’s only 2.25. Because chips, you can’t buy them separately at McDonald’s, you get them only with the menu. And a menu is easily a tenner.

*But if you sell a few cell phones, you can easily go to more expensive places...*

Yes, but you don’t do that. A boy of fourteen doesn’t eat in a restaurant. You’ll get kicked out immediately, as far as I know! And regardless of the money you have, at fourteen you’re not admitted to the disco.

**School and the future**

Most participants in the group are at the same school, a large comprehensive school (*scholengemeenschap*) for lower general and vocational secondary education in southern Rotterdam. Most of them are hardly motivated to learn, but this is not exceptional for students in lower vocational education. They skip school whenever they feel like it, and discipline in getting up (and arriving on time) is often not part of daily routine and not supervised by parents or other household members. In front of teachers and school management, thin excuses are concocted for their regular absence. Sanctions and prodding to better their behaviour from the teaching staff make no impression, as the boys’ stories demonstrate. Four boys spoke to me about ‘an argument’ they were having with a teacher; this turned out to be a euphemism for the use of violence – or threats in that direction – of, in their view, legitimate behaviour for confronting discrimination and acts of disrespect.

The school they attend is notorious in the district. In and around school, violent incidents abound. Some months before I started the research, a pupil stabbed a teacher, who was in hospital for a considerable length of time. As students cause trouble when on break and hanging around the school grounds, the gates remain closed during all intervals between classes, and they have to stay on the premises. When on school outings, pupils have misbehaved so badly that the school now finds the gates of most amusement parks closed.

From third year of secondary school (approximately at age fifteen) onwards, many pupils use cannabis regularly and excessively, smoking dope before the start of classes and during breaks, even though it is strictly prohibited, under penalty of expulsion from school.
Most boys in the group lack the motivation to succeed in school. Some of them have repeated years several times, and two of them are in danger of being expelled from school because of severe and often violent misbehaviour, connected to rows with teachers. Nevertheless, not all of them are poor students. As several of them are promoted to the next grade each year, boys aged fifteen and eighteen are in the same grade. It is possible that a majority of them will finally be able to round off their lower vocational training successfully. All of them state that they want to finish school. Life on the street, with all its excitement and returns, is seen by everybody as temporary, a part of being young. It is not seen as an alternative for the future.

So a lot of pupils have quite a bit of money because of all kinds of odd jobs...

Why would you still fancy finishing school?

Steven: Of course you do. For instance, you’re twenty, you’ve got a wife and kids – you’re not going to steal telephones, are you? What good does that do you when you’re twenty? You might have 1,200 guilders, for you, your wife and your kid. That doesn’t bring you very far, does it?

Conclusion

The boys of tram line 2 feel that their behaviour belongs to the phase they are going through in their lives. One might be tempted to regard this feeling as an underpinning for the thesis that their ‘subculture’ described in this chapter should be classified as a lifestyle. After all, besides its admitted transience, it merely concerns the self-conscious and emblematic use of selected cultural elements, with the aim of creating a common bond, an imagined community of equals that distinguished itself from others. Elements considered exemplary for this dimension of culture (street language, behavioural codes, preferences for clothing and music, rituals of the jonko) occupy a prominent place in their behaviour. The boys, moreover, self-consciously relate a number of aspects of their life on the street to their identity, which they picture as unattached and cosmopolitan. These elements of behaviour are generally considered to belong to a ‘youth culture’ which participants shed when they enter adulthood.

This might be true, but it does not help us much further in understanding their behaviour. The ‘culture as lifestyle’ concept, stressing consciousness and voluntariness, becomes even more problematic
when it is posited against ‘culture as way of life’ (Vermeulen 2001). Culture as a way of life is the internalised sediment of the whole of experiences that we carry with us. It is, according to Vermeulen, the lens through which we see the world and our guideline for action, without us being aware of it. Conversely, culture as lifestyle is ‘more or less a coat one is able to put on or take off’ (2001: 14; my translation). Likewise, Bauman finds that traditional discourses and customs (‘harnesses’) used to keep communities together are wearing off, being replaced by convertible and negotiable culture. Our age is what Bauman (2000: 169) calls ‘the liquid stage of modernity’ in which ‘only zipped harnesses are supplied, and their selling point is the facility with which they can be put on in the morning and taken off in the evening (or vice versa).’ By positing this antithesis, and by presenting culture as lifestyle as a booming social phenomenon, while pointing to an alleged decline in the diversity of ways of life, it seems as if these two dimensions of culture are extremes on a continuum of cultural forms, which almost independently, and exclusively, help to circumscribe and explain behaviour of different social groups, in different eras. For example, the first generation of labour immigrants mainly ‘possesses’ culture as way of life, while, conversely, their children raised in the destination country increasingly have culture as a lifestyle – and less and less culture as way of life.8

This antithesis does not aid in understanding the boys I have described in this chapter (and I suspect that it is too unequivocal a representation in many cases). The paraphernalia of their lifestyle cannot be comprehended outside the context of their way of life, of which these are, one could say, the inevitable or necessary adornment. The reference in the title of this chapter to Tennessee Williams’ classic play is a little more than just a droll allusion to the tram shelter where they swap tales and plan short-term excitement, or the bus that brings them diversion on Wednesday evenings. It also means to hint at the paradoxical process of purposive symbolism with which they try to make sense of their predicament (the monotony and restrictedness of their adolescent lives) while simultaneously concealing it by embossing it beyond reality. For most of the boys on line 2, life in the streets is tied to their situation at home. For them, it is completely self-evident that, except for food and sleep, there is nothing to keep them at home. The mothers of most of the boys would be surprised if they would stay home in the evening, and ask if something were wrong. It is more or less a law of nature: just as one tries to satisfy one’s hunger by looking for food, one chases away boredom by going in the streets to look for one’s friends. Subsequently, their possibilities are framed by the conventions of the community and the district where they grow up, the school they attend and their record there. In all these overlapping fields, the negative stereotypical image
that others have of Moroccan-Dutch, Surinamese-Dutch and Antillean-
Dutch kids plays an important role.

Choices for most of the boys are limited. It is not a coincidence that 
most of them hang out in the street and that you will not find them in 
trendy discotheques. Hanging around, chasing away boredom, the re-
current and excessive use of cannabis; the possibility of forming shift-
ing new coalitions and shunning strained mutual relations within open-
ended peer networks; the gross mutual rebuff that actually aims to keep 
ter-ethnic relations inside the group informal and natural; the crim-
inal behaviour, the mistrust of and reticence towards outsiders; all these 
interrelated behavioural patterns should be seen as an adaptation to the 
circumstances in which these boys grow up, and as having the function 
to make their life as pleasant and meaningful as possible. By and large, 
these are daily behaviours, prompted by a habitual pattern drawing 
upon and reworking cumulated experiences and knowledge, to be able 
to manage, for better or for worse, limitations and problems one en-
counters. Part of this behaviour is so patently obvious that it hardly re-
quires conscious deliberation. The fact that this patterned behaviour is 
‘fleshed out’ and embellished, made suitable for internal and external 
consumption, by manifestations that are commonly classified under the 
header ‘lifestyle’, does not underscore the voluntarism and conscious-
ness of the behaviours. At this stage of life, the boys described in this 
chapter do not have an alternative for the networks in which they parti-
cipate. Consequently, they cannot renounce the behavioural accessories 
that forge these networks in an imagined (and moral) community, all 
the more so because their more consciously wielded lifestyle is bounded 
with aspects of their internalised behaviour, in a way that does not give 
them insight into these processes.

Seen like this, their participation and activities in peer networks re-
semble coping behaviour, in the sense that there is little room for delib-
eration and choice. Indeed, I think this is the case. However, having 
highlighted their restricted possibilities and the unwittingness of their 
actions, we should not forget, and try to explain, their mostly positive 
accounts of their subjective experiences generated by their mutual rela-
tionships and activities. The relationships and practices in which these 
street kids are engaged fill an important need. Park has highlighted the 
importance of ‘sentimental groups’. These groups counterbalance the 
more instrumental and single-stranded relations in which people in 
modern, industrial society are involved. Sentimental groups resemble 
primary groups such as the family, in that they provide for intimate, 
face-to-face association, but differ from these in that they lack an ecolog-
ical basis and an existence over a long period of time. Sentimental 
groups offer a newly created culture, and its members ‘share a mystical 
or mythical connection’ (Lal 2003: 46). When you are young, such
sentimental groups are of vital importance, especially because many, perhaps even most adolescents, perform the most important social roles imposed on them, like those of a student or a child, only reluctantly. Peer networks perform the function of involving the complete person, offering its participants the opportunity to reinterpret existing experiences threatening disintegration of their self-image, experiences that more likely happen to children like the ones I write about in this chapter than to others. In the eyes of the boys on line 2, their friends and acquaintances in the street are the best available relationships to reconcile their self-esteem and authenticity.

Making sense of the outside world and grasping the meaning of one’s selfhood are subjective processes that are intertwined in one’s consciousness and sub-consciousness to such a degree that discerning the two, and thus becoming conscious of one’s selfhood, takes place only when one experiences inconsistencies between the different roles one plays. As this, however, is a common lot in life (but some individuals and groups experience this more often and more severely than others), people are faced with the necessity to reconcile the incompatible roles with each other, and with the unity of their person. Cohen, in *Two-Dimensional Man*, highlights man’s ability to symbolise as his chief resource to resolve this predicament. Nearly all social behaviour contains symbolic and contractual elements. The ideal types of contractual and symbolic action can be seen to occupy the extreme ends of the spectrum.

At the one end are the segmental roles, played out in simple and instrumental relationships; at the other end pure symbolic action is situated, in which the complete person is involved. Symbolic action always involves the totality of the person, and is aimed at reconciling his or her selfhood (Cohen 1974: 54-60). Symbolic action, in contrast to contractual action, can be expected to take place in informal social relationships. In social settings where behavioural norms and social positions are least prescribed, there is room to manoeuvre for individuals, expressing symbolically, for themselves and for others, a self-image in accordance with the roles one plays in all domains of society, legitimating possible repressed parts in their role repository, or shedding these as irrelevant by signifying other dimensions of the self. This can only be achieved while in interaction with others who are able to acknowledge the self-presentation and the symbolic act in which it is fashioned, and to reciprocate with similar symbolic behaviour (this is probably what Park means by ‘sharing a mystical or mythical connection’). As these sentimental groups are informal (and sometimes illegal) social constellations not organised according to explicit rules, while a clear division of roles is lacking, the total involvement of the self is not only allowed, but also prescribed, expecting unconditional commitment, and
provoking condemnation of the complete person, if he or she has violated group norms.

This is why youth groups abound in regalia of lifestyle, worn mostly close upon the physical person. The notion that one can adopt or discard such a lifestyle as a coat one can put on or take off is reminiscent of the perception of identities as multiple forms of presentation of the self, alternatively, and more or less volitionally, deployed in different social settings. I hope to have made clear that my argument against such a purposive and conscious definition of the notion of identity follows a similar course to what I have contended above regarding lifestyle.

Notes

1 Charlois is, for the large part, a working-class borough that experienced major decline in the late twentieth century.
2 In the media, the contribution of Moroccan and Antillean youngsters in criminal offences is systematically highlighted. For 1999, official statistics report percentages for Moroccan and Antillean boys (age 12-18) who are suspected of crimes to be six times higher than those for indigenous youth the same age (http://statline.cbs.nl/).
3 The fieldwork constituted part of a research project among Moroccan and Antillean street youth in Amsterdam and Rotterdam carried out by the University of Amsterdam and funded by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (Lindo 2001).
4 I functioned as a volunteer from March 1999 to March 2000. My offer to help was gladly accepted as, in spite of the enthusiastic response the project soon generated among local policymakers from Charlois and surrounding boroughs, the budget remained small, and Mark was chronically in need of assistants.
5 As my research was funded by the Ministry of Health, a major goal was to find out about drug use and the way this is connected to deviant behavioral patterns. From surveys among young people, the picture that steadily emerges is that Moroccan and Turkish youth generally use fewer ‘hard drugs’ (such as cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, amphetamines), and that their use of ‘soft drugs’ is significantly below average. Among policymakers – and within institutions to combat drug use – it is widely held that this picture is distorted. The reasoning is that, firstly, respondents are inclined to avoid answers viewed to be socially unacceptable, a tendency which is supposed to be stronger among immigrants in view of the taboo that rests on drug use within their communities, and secondly, because of the fact that, for a large part, ongoing surveys among Dutch youth are conducted in educational institutions. One surmises that the category of youth most prone to excessive drug use has prematurely dropped out of school. As the drop-out rate among immigrant children is much higher than among non-immigrant children, the unproven supposition is that a drug problem among teenagers of immigrant background exists that is hidden from view. The funding for my research was partly based on this reasoning.
6 The fieldwork dates back to the pre-euro era; 1 guilder equals about 0.45 euro.
7 Discrimination against people of Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch descent at discos in the Netherlands has been documented, and is commented upon regularly in the media.
8 Vermeulen sees otherwise, with both aspects being constantly subject to change (2001: 13-14).
References

4 Discrepant perceptions on health and education issues in the Basque Country: 
\textit{del dicho al hecho...}

\textit{Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz}

\textbf{Introduction}

Although immigration in the Basque Country has grown exponentially during the past twenty years, it is still insignificant (2.33 per cent of the region’s population in 2003) in comparison with other areas of the EU. Between 1996 and 2003, the immigrant contingent quadrupled to nearly 50,000 people, and the trend seems to point towards an even faster increase in years to come. Still, almost as important as this substantial increase in the numbers of immigrants is the fact that a vast majority of Basque people (88 per cent) have the impression that the foreign population has ‘skyrocketed’ in the last few years (Ikuspegi 2004: 7). As a result of this enhanced awareness of the phenomenon and its persistent presence in the media, a series of surveys and studies have been carried out recently (Ikuspegi 2004; Deusto University 2003) to explore both the situation of immigrants in the region and the attitudes shown towards them by the native-speaker population. In most cases, the principal aim of these projects has been to stimulate the implementation of social intervention measures designed to facilitate the process of integration of the newcomers into the receiving society (see Heckmann & Schnapper 2003).

Interestingly, though, what these studies invariably reveal is the huge chasm existing between the perceptions and views held by the two groups – immigrants and natives – with regard to several subjects (e.g. labour, education, housing, health, welfare, etc.) that seem most integral to migration research. A survey entitled ‘Percepciones, valores y actitudes de la población vasca hacia la inmigración extranjera’ (‘Perceptions, values and attitudes of the Basque people towards foreign immigrants’), published by the Basque Observatory of Immigration in December 2004, is a case in point. The survey presents several conclusions that quite blatantly contradict the opinions expressed by immigrants on similar topics. Far from showing a consciousness of the kinds of obstacles and problems faced by the newcomers, it evinces some self-complaisant and ethnocentric attitudes (LeVine & Campbell 1972) still prevalent among the native-speaker population. To make matters worse, in domains in which the culturally different prove most
vulnerable – such as labour, education or health – the disparity between the perceptions of the two groups becomes most conspicuous.

My contribution offers a descriptive and interpretative analysis of the discrepancies observed between the above-mentioned survey and 30 semi-structured interviews with immigrants conducted in Bilbao by a team of sociologists from the University of Deusto in the summer of 2003. By comparing the results of these two projects, I hope to demonstrate that notions such as ‘comparative group worth and indigenous legitimacy’ (Horowitz 1985: 185-228) still hold great relevance in areas of twenty-first century Europe. I will focus primarily on the discrepancies in the domains of education and healthcare because, as noted above, tensions in ethnic relations seem to be more frequent in these realms.

Paradoxically, although the Basque government provides public schooling and health coverage to anybody residing in the territory, immigrants feel that the conditions under which these services are provided set them at a clear disadvantage in relation to the native population. While it is a fact that several cases of ‘subjective discrimination’ – that is, instances in which the complaints made by parents or patients have an arguable basis in reality – have been detected, it is no less evident that most of the protests and lawsuits seem to be well justified by attitudes and behaviours deeply rooted in what Tajfel (1978: 61-67) called ‘socially derived value differentials and the cognitive “mechanics” of categorisation’. The ultimate aim of this chapter is then to show that, in spite of the efforts of the Basque administration to deter discrimination against and segregation of newcomers, there are still some elements suggesting that negative social representations and categorisations are a widespread practice among native Basques. In order to pursue this aim, I will delve into three different questions that, from my perspective, go a long way in explaining the perceptual and attitudinal discrepancies that centre my discussion.

1 Which historical experiences, cultural values and habits of mind – or even myths – can explain the inordinately high opinion that Basques hold of themselves as a receiving society?

2 In what specific domains do immigrants feel that the Basque population is not meeting the standards set by their own ‘discourse on immigration’?

3 What specific steps need to be taken to bring the perceptions and understandings of both groups closer to each other in the future?

Before I move on to tackle these questions, it would make sense to present an overview of the history of migratory movements in the Basque
Country and to comment, if only very briefly, on the design and objectives of the data sources that will feed my analysis. This is important because, as will be observed, both authorities and the population all around the Iberian Peninsula have been unexpectedly faced with a phenomenon in the last two decades which they had never had previously confronted in their history (Izquierdo 1996). Predictably, one of the most noticeable consequences of this rapid transformation from a sending country to a receiving one is that the rhetoric/discourse on immigration is always ahead of the praxis one observes on the street. This turning point in the history of migratory dynamics is further complicated in regions like the Basque Country, due to its juxtaposition in time with a heightening consciousness of ethno-territorial differentiation and the pursuit of its own ideals apart from the government in Madrid (Conversi 1996). In my opinion, one of the major effects of the convergence of these two processes has been that, although the community is frequently encouraged to appreciate and value cultural diversity and difference, there is still a widespread sentiment that one’s culture needs to prevail against the threatening forces of economic and technological globalisation. To some extent, many of the contradictions I am going to discuss in this chapter could be explained by two conflicting ideas. One is a politics of identity based upon ‘unstable and ever-changing points of identification and suture’ (Hall 1990: 225-227), while the other believes in the ‘bond of fate’ uniting allegedly homogeneous human groups to which De Vries refers in another chapter of this volume. This identity schizophrenia, and the frictions between culturally heterogeneous groups, can only be avoided by achieving a conscientious balance between exercises of fluent intercultural communication and a respect for the cultural memories and rights of peoples who may have seen elements of their culture confiscated at different historical junctures.

Migratory processes in the Basque Country

Although researchers have shown that the Basque people – especially fishermen and explorers – have a long history of travelling to distant regions of the planet (Kurlansky 1999), I will restrict my discussion to this last century, for it is during this period that migratory processes have had a greater impact on Basque society and its cultural identity. Like many other parts of Europe, the Basque Country fell into a collective identity crisis at the turn of the twentieth century, as a result of its accelerated modernisation and incipient immigration arriving from other regions around Spain. It was at this time that the Basque nationalist movement began to develop in resistance to the dizzying changes.
their society was undergoing, from the new industrial middle-classes and some other more accommodated sectors, particularly in the urban centres. This period also witnessed a peak in the Basque diaspora, with a large number of young men travelling to South America and North America in search of their dreams of wealth.

Thus, the first three decades of the twentieth century were characterised, with respect to human movements, by increased immigration from other parts of the peninsula and a smaller migration of Basque individuals to Europe and especially to the Americas. Meanwhile, Basque nationalism was starting to define its agenda for the constitution of an independent state. In the decade before the Spanish Civil War (1923-1932), Basque industry attracted migrants from less developed areas of Spain, such as Galicia and Extremadura. During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, some small towns and communities experienced a dramatic transformation of their population’s cultural make-up. In certain cases, over 50 per cent of an area’s residents had been born in other regions. Often this gave rise to an exacerbated ethnic nationalism that was all-too-prone to categorise and label Spaniards from other regions as ‘maquetos’ or ‘coreanos’ (both highly derogatory terms). By the time the Civil War broke out, the Basque Country was already a culturally contested space, where part of the population sought their identity in a sense of belonging to an imagined community that was, they felt, endangered (Anderson 1983; Smith 1986), while the other half was trying to adapt as best they could to a new landscape – physical and human – and cultural values.

Franco’s long authoritarian regime (1939-1975) did nothing but aggravate the frictions between the native-speaker population and the newcomers. As his centralist government was intent on quenching any signs of the Basque cultural identity (language, ancestral institutions, folklore festivals, etc., were forbidden), they promoted massive immigration from other parts of the nation to ‘Hispanicise’ the region as much as possible. Both during and after the War (1936-1939), many Basques decided to abandon their homeland to escape the disfranchising and repressive regime. Again, most of them travelled to countries in South America, such as Venezuela, Mexico, Uruguay or Argentina; but others followed the steps of many other Spaniards (over one million) who, after World War II, sought their future in Northern European countries that needed workers. Finally, when Franco’s dictatorship became weaker, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of Basque professionals and entrepreneurs began to move out to other provinces in Spain (Andalusia, Madrid and Levant).

One important point to be made is that, from the last decades of the nineteenth century on, the rapid industrialisation of the Basque region has brought workers not only from other Spanish regions but also from
abroad. Although usually much better qualified, citizens from Britain, Germany, France, etc., have been a constant presence in the Basque Country. Even today, statistics reveal that 25 per cent of the immigrants arriving in the autonomous region are Europeans. Of course, the general trend is that their relative weight is quickly decreasing in comparison to that of the South Americans and Africans. Nevertheless, as Del Olmo (2004: 168) has explained, it is important to bear in mind that even as late as 1998, over 40 per cent of the immigrants in Spain were EU citizens. Lest we offer a distorted image of the immigrant contingent, it is therefore crucial to acknowledge that in the case of Spain – and to a lesser degree of the Basque Country – the motivation to migrate is related in many cases to climate and lifestyle rather than to economic reasons.

With the passing of the Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country in 1979, the political situation was partly normalised in the region. By the early 1980s, as a result of a profound economic depression, immigration from other areas of Spain had dwindled significantly and, in fact, there were slightly more Basque individuals moving to other autonomous regions than there were coming in. In some instances, migration away from the Basque Country was due to both the crises in the traditional industries and ETA’s violence, which placed a heavy toll on some entrepreneurial activities. Still, probably more important than this, Basque people began to find better opportunities in other parts of the country that had not been available before. In the mid-1980s, it became apparent that due to the demographic evolution and to the resurgence of Basque emigration, the territory was going to lose population in the ensuing years. In 1988, for instance, the migratory balance indicated that the number of emigrants exceeded immigrants by 10,000, which in a population of barely 2,000,000 people was thought by some analysts as a troubling fact.

By the early 1990s, however, it was clear that the growing contingent of immigrants arriving in the Basque region would soon compensate for the negative demographic growth. Puyol (2001) maintains in his timely and enlightening volume, La Inmigración en España: ¿Un Problema o una Necesidad? (Immigration in Spain: A Problem or a Necessity?) that for societies, like Spain’s, with declining birth rates and the population becoming older, immigration may well turn out to be the only solution to a difficult puzzle. Despite the initial doubts and fears that the phenomenon caused in the Basque Country, most social agents have come to realise that the prospects of their society depend centrally on the influx of foreigners into the region. In fact, when in February 2003 Eustat brought to light the news that, after 25 years of ‘enduring’ a negative migratory balance, Euskadi had managed in 2000 to attract more immigrants than the number of
individuals leaving the Basque Country, the information was greeted with general approval.

Still, despite this awareness of the necessity and inevitability of immigration – and of the ever-growing amounts of money invested by institutions and organisations in programmes to try to assist the newcomers – it remains unclear whether people in our society will be willing to make the indispensable changes in their mindset to provide space for the new social realities. Not long ago, Basque Counsellor for Social Affairs and Immigration Madrazo, declared: ‘Immigration is a gift of the new times, which gives us a unique opportunity to enrich ourselves as a people and as human beings [...] so that we develop our full potential.’ Nevertheless, as some surveys and reports have recently shown (Colectivo 2000), this view is far from being widely held by the native population in Spain, who in many cases keep viewing the immigrants as a threat to their cultural identity and a costly burden on the economy of the nation. Maybe the Basque Country has proved a bit more progressive and tolerant than other regions in dealing with the phenomenon of mass immigration (see Ibarrola 2004) but, as I will show, there is still a long way to go before we can speak of a truly pluralistic and egalitarian society. One important step forward would be the articulation of ‘a politics that treats difference as variation and specificity, rather than as exclusive opposition’ (Young 1995: 165), which would definitely contribute to better understanding the interspersion and heterogeneity in all human groups – including the Basque people.

Design and objectives of the data sources

The two data sources I am using share a number of features, that, I believe, it is important to explain at the outset of my analysis. On the one hand, both sources gather the results from research projects sponsored by different departments of the Basque government (i.e. Social Affairs and Education). This fact speaks very positively of the kind of attention that the subject of immigration has recently received from the Basque administration.7 On the other hand, although the goals of the two projects are conspicuously different, the opening pages of both documents overtly state that they aspire to become tools for the elaboration of measures of social intervention for the successful integration of immigrants. Therefore, at least in spirit, these studies try to transcend the habitual purpose given to data collections and reports of this kind, to have a more immediate impact on social dynamics and institutional policies. Whether this will be in fact the case, it is still too early to say, but the intention is there.
The survey of perceptions, values and attitudes

The survey ‘Perceptions, values and attitudes of the Basque population towards foreign immigration’ was designed by Ikuspegi (Basque Observatory of Immigration), with over 1,700 questionnaires having been distributed and collected in June 2004. Most of the items were closed questions, but there were a few in which the respondents could briefly elaborate on their answers. The conditions of eligibility for the sample were: 1. resident in the Basque Country; 2. aged eighteen or older; and 3. resident in the Basque Country at least five years. The sample was stratified only by gender and province of origin, and the size of the samples was slightly larger in the three capital cities (Bilbao, San Sebastian and Vitoria). The estimated level of reliability of the results was in all cases above 95 per cent.

The nature of the survey’s results was, according to the authors (2004: 5), ‘purely descriptive and general’. The answers from the respondents were clustered around three different dimensions: immigration (or the movement of people across national borders), immigrants (different groups of foreigners and their cultural characterisation) and integration (or models of cohabitation in receiving societies). The first of these dimensions covers aspects such as the perceptions and responses to the size and evolution of immigration in the Basque Country, impressions on migratory movements in general; perception of the effects of immigration on the receiving countries; rights of the immigrants. The second dimension of the study investigates issues such as who should be considered an ‘immigrant’; how immigrants are looked upon; whether all immigrant groups are being treated the same way; certain characteristics attributed to particular groups. Finally, the third dimension of the research, which only takes a few pages of the report (2004: 57-60), considers the preferences Basque people show towards different models of social interaction and integration – and which of them they attribute to specific groups of immigrants.

It is interesting to note that, even within the results of the survey, the authors already pinpoint a number of questions that elicit seemingly contradictory responses from the Basque population. For instance, while over 85 per cent believe that ‘the number of immigrants has increased a lot in recent times’, only 26 per cent say they live in neighbourhoods with many immigrants. Likewise, when asked whether ‘it is good for a society to be made up of different cultures, ethnic groups and religions’, more than 70 per cent of the interviewees agreed with this statement. Yet, a vast majority of the population (80 per cent) also thinks that ‘it is much better that everybody speaks at least a common language’. But perhaps the most puzzling paradox in the whole survey is to be observed in the questions related to the effects natives expect
immigration to have on Basque society and identity. On the one hand, 70 per cent of the sample disagreed with the statement that ‘immigrants should forget their culture and traditions to be accepted in the receiving society’, and more than 80 per cent expressed their rejection of homogenising and assimilationist policies. However, when asked about the possible loss or changes in Basque language and identity, nearly 70 per cent thought that ‘the arrival and settlement of foreign individuals’ would not affect them in any substantial way. The authors of the survey explain these apparent paradoxes by saying that, of course, there is always a significant gap between people’s perceptions and social realities. Moreover, in other cases – such as those concerning questions on cultural diversity and homogenisation – they argue that the respondents may be referring to different phases of the integration process. As such, while immigrants would preserve their cultural specificities in an initial stage, by the time second and third generations are born, they would already be fully assimilated into the dominant Basque society.

The comparison of some of these data with the opinions expressed by the immigrants themselves reveals, however, that there may be other underlying reasons to explain the contradictory positions held by many Basques on these issues. As the authors of the survey (2004: 60) recognise in the closing lines:

> a more detailed analysis of other variables may be needed to determine if in fact the idea that, sooner or later, a kind of cultural convergence will absorb all differences is just some sort of balsamic notion not to openly acknowledge the existence of homogenising practices.

In light of what immigrants say, we will observe that beneath the veneer of pluralism and interculturalism the regional administration is trying to promote among Basque citizens, many of them are still very much inclined to conceive their culture as what Lindo, following Vermeulen, calls in his chapter ‘a way of life’, a sort of immutable lens through which we see reality and which determines our behaviour. Rex (1996: 142) has called this understanding of minority cultures ‘regressive’, since it fails to recognise that immigration and globalisation are causing their society to develop in unprecedented ways. As Rex has also explained, though, when nationalist and immigrant issues overlap, the project of multiculturalism usually becomes much more challenging.

Ikuspegi considers this survey to be an important step in the research activities proposed to understand more deeply the problems and needs of the Basque society. It is described as ‘urgente y prioritaria’ in the presentation of the report because ‘knowing the axiological and attitudinal context of society’ (2004: 3) is condition *sine qua non* to define the
measures of social intervention that need to be taken. Apart from filling up a preoccupying informational lacuna, one of this survey’s main objectives was also to diagnose which perceptions, values and attitudes found in the Basque society regarding immigration issues may be incorrect or distorted and, consequently, might lead to some kind of prejudice and discrimination. Although the inconsistencies pointed out above seem to suggest that, indeed, a great deal of distortion is present in these perceptions and attitudes, the authors of the study were only able to conclude that

there is not a definite discourse on the model of conviviality [or intercultural relations] that the Basques would prefer. The single evident conclusion of the survey is a dearth of preferences for any particular model, which may lead to contradictory interpretations. (2004: 64)

Interviews with immigrants

The 30 interviews with immigrants in the Bilbao area were part of a larger project called ‘Del multiculturalismo a la hibridación cultural y el mestizaje’ (‘From multiculturalism to cultural hybridity and mestizaje’), conducted between January 2002 and December 2003. The main idea of the project was to study the dynamics of cultural interactions in the Basque Country in the light of contemporary theories of hybridity (Bhabha 1994), ‘contact zones’ (Pratt 1992), border identities (Anzaldúa 1987) and the like. Of course, in order to establish what kind of intercultural relations were taking place between the Basque people and the new immigrants, it was essential to assess how the latter felt about the process of settling and incorporating in the receiving society. For that purpose, an open, semi-structured interview script was prepared and followed by a team of researchers from the sociology department at the University of Deusto, Bilbao. Although the questions were predetermined and they appeared in a definite order in the interview (personal data, motives of migration, labour, housing, health, education, language, religion, inter- and intra-group social relations, connections with country of origin, etc.), the interviewers were encouraged to improvise and elaborate on them when it was considered pertinent. The fundamental idea was to make the interviewees grow as comfortable as possible during the conversation so that they would express their views candidly and without any constraints.

The interviews were held in June and July 2003 and, except for two that had to be repeated, the results were highly satisfactory. The sample of immigrants was chosen on the basis of the 2002 census, with slight modifications for the Asian and European groups, which were too low...
and too high, respectively, to be easily accommodated into the figures. All the interviewees were adults, with equal numbers of females and males (again conforming to current statistics: 49/51 per cent). On average, the immigrants had been in the Basque Country for almost three years, and the number who had regularised their legal situation was somewhat superior to those who had not. Again, we have to bear in mind that nearly 25 per cent of the immigrants were European citizens. One last important fact: six out of the 30 interviewees were either leaders or spokespeople of immigrant associations who had offered their collaboration in the early stages of the project. Although we were reluctant at first to have this significant percentage of representatives in the sample, it was eventually decided that their answers might be especially rich sources of information.

As mentioned earlier, the questions in the interview were clustered according to a variety of topics. However, interviewers were advised to put special emphasis on several of the topics – housing, health, education and language – since there had been much controversy about these issues in the media. Interestingly, although frictions with employers and local authorities were fairly generalised in the respondents’ answers – as well as comments on the necessity to send remittances home – it was precisely those four topics we selected that took up much of the conversations. This fact may well suggest that the newcomers’ perceptions and opinions are also greatly influenced by the prominence certain issues are given in the media.9

With regard to the general objectives of the project, it could be fairly argued that most were accomplished. On the one hand, the authors were given the opportunity to compare the results of these interviews to similar inquiries done in the Madrid and Salamanca areas, both of which had a longer tradition of receiving immigrants. The main observation to be made about these comparisons is that, the phenomenon being much more recent in the Baque Country, the numbers are still manageable in the region in ways that they are not in other parts of the peninsula. Moreover, there was a widespread feeling among the immigrants that the Basque administration was being more progressive and liberal than the Spanish one in the application of laws and regulations. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly in view of the final aim of the study, the interviews also revealed that, if not a ‘primordialist multiculturalism’ in which all the various groups remain separated by the differential gaps between their cultures, the Basque society could well be described as a ‘civic multiculturalism’ in which the newcomers can become members of the community, ‘but only by participating in the local practices and institutions and by slowly adopting its customs’ (Tempelman 1999: 18). That is, the interviews repeatedly indicated that, far from a process of continuous exchange and transculturation –
bidirectional borrowing and lending between cultures – what the Basque Country exhibited is one human group still anchored in the collective project of its native community.

There is no need to clarify that any attempts to create new forms of ‘cultural hybridity’ are doomed in such contexts because, as Young (1995: 21) has explained, these new forms imply ‘an imperceptible process whereby two or more cultures merge into a new mode.’ The persistence of that collective project, sometimes verging towards ‘nativism’, precludes the emergence of relational and multiple identities, which may certainly contain traces of their past, but mostly concentrate on what they are to become thereafter. As I intend to show below, one of the major obstacles to the possibility of such identities is the fear that volatile situations will deprive people of their cultural unity and coherence, without which they would allegedly be left with no sense of purpose or direction.

Although the answers to the questions were not very hopeful about the appearance of new cross-cultural formations, they did hint at some of the attitudes and practices that are preventing this from happening. The respondents’ comments on their difficulties to obtain decent housing, their frustration with regard to some medical protocols, their discontent with the inattention and exclusion their children are enduring at school or their marginalisation due to their limited linguistic competence, are immensely valuable to define the lines of action that should be prioritised in any integrative efforts. If the survey on the perceptions of the Basque population did not make it clear which model of conviviality the natives preferred, this other study does show that they do not seem to be ready yet for a truly plural, dialogic and inclusive model of culture. Or as Bhabha (1994: 4) would put it, the Basque society has not found yet that interstitial passage – or ‘third space’ – between fixed identifications that engenders the possibility of ‘a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy [...]’

The following section will show that, for a number of historical and ideological reasons, many Basques still believe they have a ‘core’ and primordial cultural identity with its origin in their shared ancestry and heritage. Giving up on this identity by becoming ‘an Other’ is sometimes felt to be a betrayal to their community, which will contribute to its eventual dissolution over the course of time.

**Imagining a receiving community**

A couple of years ago, Basque Counsellor of Education Ángeles Iztueta noted in a press conference that
the Basque Country has a long history of sending emigrants abroad. We were always warmly received in other countries and we shall do the same now that the process has been reversed.10

Comments in this vein have become habitual in the media in recent times. The assumption is that because Basques have historically moved to other lands, and because the territory became the preferred destination for many Spaniards in more recent times, the population is better ‘qualified’ to relate to the new immigration. In the opinion of Director of the Basque Institute of Criminology de la Cuesta: ‘Basque people are especially sensitive to the problems faced by migrants. They know what being abroad feels like.’11 What these observations overlook, though, is the key fact that neither did the Basques travel under the same conditions to foreign lands, nor did they have comparable migratory projects in mind when they left. As Marxist critics have often insisted, all social processes of this sort need to be first ‘historicised’, if we do not want to wrongly interpret social realities. My impression is that these reminders of the ‘sensibility’ of the Basque people to migration issues is part of a larger discourse, trying to highlight the difference between the region’s responses to the phenomenon and what has happened in other areas of the nation (Ibarrola 2004: 229).

The problem is, of course, that these confident and self-complaisant attitudes frequently fail to register the radical differences – in size and composition – between the immigration arriving in those territories, and merely employ convenient data that maintain an image of the Basque society as much more open-minded and tolerant than in other parts of the peninsula. Ignatieff (1998: 65) has rightly observed, though, that one of the main characteristics of ethnic nationalism is a narcissistic gaze ‘which only contemplates the Other to confirm its own difference. Then, it lowers its eyes and turns them upon itself. In fact, this gaze never gets involved with the Other.’ To maintain that the history of the Basque people makes them more sensitive to and sympathetic with the problems of immigrants is a dangerous argument. It may in fact obscure some of the more pressing concerns of the newcomers.

Yet, the major critique of the Basque people’s self-perception as an open and plural society – which, in fact, rarely requires a change in ‘the cultural habits of immigrants as a condition to be accepted’ (70 per cent of the respondents in the Basque Observatory of Immigration; Ikuspegi 2004: 24) – does not derive so much from the insights of discourse analysis, but rather from the immigrants’ opinions. Since I have opened this section with the words of the Basque Counsellor of Education, it would probably make sense to take some time to check if, in fact, the school system and educators are proving so respectful and open to the cultural habits of immigrant children. María, an eighteen-year-old
Colombian, went through some unpleasant experiences in the school (Ibarreko a) that her sister and she eventually ‘decided’ to leave three years ago.

We were very poorly treated. My younger sister and I were always the ones excluded from the games. Our classmates threw chalk, papers, erasers and the like at us, and the teachers did absolutely nothing about it. We were the only Colombians in the school and the other students often told us to go back to our country.

In the end, María’s sister decided to drop out of school and she herself feels that in her new school the students do not seem much interested in talking to her either: ‘They say that I am not very friendly and that I do not talk to them, but I am the new student and they should make that effort.’

Although cases as dramatic as María’s and her sister’s are quite unusual – only two other interviewees (10 per cent) referred to similar instances of bullying or abuses suffered by their children – the fact that in all these incidents the immigrants thought that teachers and school officials did little to intervene is, to say the least, worrisome. Apart from these prejudiced and exclusionary practices, a major concern raised by many immigrant parents is that minority cultures are hardly represented in the materials that their children cover in school. While the immigrant parents are happy with the knowledge and skills their children acquire, and they feel that they are given similar opportunities, they also believe that the host society’s values are invariably imposed and their own culture’s are hardly ever contemplated. Rex (1996: 38) has remarked on this point that ‘schools [are] the principal site of the conflicts inherent in the concept of multicultural society itself and it is where ‘the contradictions and difficulties of the two domains [i.e. standards and diversity] become obvious.’ Although it is never easy to find a balance between increasing demands for qualifications and a diversified curriculum representing minority cultural values, in the case of the Basque Country, it is evident that this second domain has been most clearly neglected.

One second characteristic of the Basque society, sometimes referred to when scholars and politicians try to explain the ‘swifter process of adaptation’ of some immigrant groups, is that, because Basques form a minority within a larger culture, they usually show more empathy for those who feel uprooted and marginalised. It is a fact that some of the literature on multiculturalism and minority rights (see Young 1990; Kymlicka 1995) sometimes subsumes the difficulties faced by smaller nationalities within nation-states and those that result from the movements of human collectives. However, although it is true that episodes
of abuse and discrimination are possible – and often habitual – in the case of both types of minorities, it is more than arguable that they derive from similar causes and could be avoided by applying similar policies. As a matter of fact, what may easily happen when the two phenomena occur at the same space and time is that one of the minorities (often the dominant one) may appropriate some of the narratives of resistance and victimisation of the other in order to serve its own purpose. Madrazo, the Basque Counsellor of Social Affairs, was doing something of the kind when a few years ago, he maintained that ‘Aznar applied to the Basque political conflict the same intransigence and intolerance that he was showing in immigration issues.’ Without denying that President Aznar’s handling of either question was ever my cup of tea, I must say that it does not make much sense to defend one’s views on immigration in this way. Fishman (1973: 6) explained once that one of the defining features of ethnic nationalism was ‘the constant adoption of new differentiating elements that would make evident its ethnocultural uniqueness and would move beyond the traditional primordial differences.’ One need not stretch the imagination to see that the Basque society’s alleged openness to other cultures can be adopted as one more distinguishing feature in its attempts at self-definition.

It is interesting to note, though, that it is not just the native-speaking population that may buy into this rhetoric of the oppressed and the deprived. Several immigrant respondents (five in all; 17 per cent) also expressed the opinion that they felt the Basque Country was a ‘much friendlier receiving society’ precisely because of its historical conflict with the Spanish state. To some extent, it is understandable that a Croatian or an Irish immigrant would bring the two topics together in this manner, but this was far less expected from individuals from Argentina or Portugal. For instance, Joaquín, a 48-year-old social scientist from Lisbon, said:

It took me a while to fully comprehend the question of Basque nationalism but, after some months as a foreigner here, I grasped the issue completely. This fact made me much more respectful towards the local population because you learn what it means to live here and to have to cope with all kinds of pressures. But now I understand it [...] I have discovered the soul of these people.

In a similar line, Pablo, a 23-year-old Argentine, noted:

I had to spend four or five months here before I could understand the problem. But what I have noticed is that those who come from countries where they have suffered some political
repression or even ‘racism’ seem to understand the problem much better.

Of course, it is well documented that ethno-territorial nationalist affections are not the province of the native members of the community alone; what seems striking, though, is that some immigrants would think of this layer of their identity as more central than their status as foreigners. Thus, one cannot help but be partly shocked when Pablo explained that ‘if any immigrant has difficulties here, I am sure that it is not the Basques’ fault. It must be the immigrant who is not able to integrate properly.’ It may be true, as Castles and Davidson (2000: 1-25) have explained in the introduction to Migration and Citizenship, that one’s citizenship – in a broader understanding of the term – is no longer necessarily related to one’s nationality but, as they also come to admit, ‘in a world of migrants and ethnic groups, [it] cannot be blind either to cultural belonging.’ When migrants begin to identify closely with socio-ideological trends in the receiving community, the suspicion can hardly be eschewed that traditional dynamics of nation-building are still at work.

Finally, one last element sometimes interpreted as a sign of the solidarity Basques show towards the newcomers is the fact that the younger generations frequently appropriate some of the habits and symbols of people from faraway lands. According to some cultural critics, this is a pristine indication of how much Basque society values forms of cultural interspersion and mixing. Likewise, the fact that the Basque language is sometimes creolised by blending with foreign idioms is also interpreted as a telling example of the kind of ‘dialogisation’ (Bakhtin in Holquist 1981) that the discourse on some topics is undergoing as a result of the immigrant influence. Indeed, it has not been unusual in recent years to see groups of youngsters replicating certain behaviours and habits that were initially thought of as characteristic of migrants. These include squatting vacant buildings, displaying their music and crafts at public sites, wearing shawls and scarves à la the Middle East, borrowing terms from the class and ethnic struggles in distant places of the planet – Chiapas, Kurdistan or Palestine.

At face value, all these activities could be interpreted as examples of an interpenetration occurring between radically different human communities in the Basque Country. There are, however, a few objections that make their status as ‘authentic’ intercultural processes very problematic. On the one hand, as Horowitz (1985: 218) notes:

Symbolism is effective in ethnic conflict, because it clothes ethnic claims in ideas and associations that have acknowledged moral force beyond the particular, thereby masking something that would otherwise be controversial.
When the observer sees that it is precisely the most radically nationalistic groups of young people taking up these ‘signifying practices’, the issue of whether they are indicative of heterogenising and hybridising trends becomes much trickier. After all, their choice of cultural habits and symbols proves very selective, and it is very rarely related to a presence and interaction with the foreign culture.

On the other hand, everyone is aware by now of how easily certain expressions of minority and immigrant resistance can be ‘commoditised’ by the dominant society, either to clear its conscience or to serve an alternative set of values – and in the worst cases, to do both. Amelia, a 50-year-old Peruvian widow, who had been in Euskadi for over two years at the time of the interview, raised a protest when she said that:

It would be better if they did not organise so many festivals of Andean folklore and South American arts [...] What we really need is to be looked upon as normal human beings who wish to be treated as everybody else. The rest of it is just un teatro [a dramatic performance] to keep us quiet.

Although nearly 50 per cent of the respondents felt that expressions of their native culture of this kind were important for their community and the receiving society – and in fact took active part in them – there were also four (over 10 per cent) who spoke of them in highly censorious terms. In some cases, they perceived these ethnicity-enhancing activities as a serious hindrance to their longed-for integration and some found them ‘artificial and unnatural’ because mainly their object was to satisfy some need of the mainstream culture.

**Most serious discrepancies in perceptions**

When Basque people were asked about ‘the rights that the immigrants should acquire as soon as they arrive’, the two categories that ranked highest were medical coverage (65 per cent) and children’s education (55.4 percent). For a majority of Basques (Ikuspegi 2004), providing the newcomers with these services for free seems to be a crucial step towards their integration. As a matter of fact, the next categories on the list (welfare, permission to bring the closest kin, subsidised housing, etc.) were all below the 35 per cent mark, which gives us a clear idea of the relative importance conferred to healthcare and education. Not even 2 per cent of all the respondents would deny any immigrant – regular or irregular – the right to access and to use these public services. While issues like the right to vote or to be eligible for subsidised housing proved much more controversial – both rights should only be granted
to citizens, said 57 per cent of the sample – hardly anybody questioned the idea that immigrants should enjoy the same health and educational benefits as the native-speaker population. As the authors of the survey observed:

Basque society seems to think that while healthcare and education are the prerogatives of all human beings, and thus should be a universal right, the rest of social privileges are more of an ‘aristocratic’ type, which should be limited and never ‘universalised’. (2004: 34)

Given the great support received by the ‘equal-benefits’ policies in these two domains, one would have expected the funds funnelled into them and the campaigns launched to publicise their magnanimity to have had a significant impact on the immigrants’ opinions about these services. To everybody’s surprise, however, these were precisely the spheres of their experience in the Basque Country – followed closely by work – in which their answers were more negative. Nearly 50 per cent of the 30 interviewees thought that there were aspects of the educational system that made it difficult for immigrant children to integrate adequately, and slightly over 40 per cent had gone through trying experiences in hospitals or healthcare centres.

Interestingly, the Basque government has issued specific programmes for the attention of foreign individuals in both areas, and the authorities are convinced that the professionals have all the support they need to do their work efficiently. A few times union representatives have raised their voices to argue that, although the facilities are well equipped to face the new challenges, there are still important deficits concerning the training of personnel. This is, in fact, one of the areas where much of the criticism was targeted by immigrant adolescents and parents. For Imad, an eighteen-year-old Moroccan welder, who has been in the Basque Country for three years, his teachers had never been ready – or able – to handle his literacy problems.

Language is always the principal obstacle. Yes, it is the language and also... well, they never help you to make friends with your classmates and you cannot communicate with anybody [...] so, in the end, the best option seems to learn a trade where you do not need to relate to other people.

Although the Basque public school system defines itself as an institution that seeks ‘the participation of all the individuals involved, the compensation of inequalities, and the integration of diversity’, it is difficult to see how these objectives can be met when some of the most basic
linguistic and social skills are not being provided. If, as Fullinwider (1996: 3) has remarked – ‘Multicultural education is what good schools do to assure that “cultural” factors don’t get in the way of equal educational opportunity and high student achievement’ – then it is evident that without closer attention to the language and alternative forms of communication, this battle is lost before it is even fought. Furthermore, this problem is not just restricted to the students, but the parents themselves, who also feel frustrated when their conferences with the teachers fail to reach the mutual understanding they expected. Such is the case of 44-year-old Yolanda, from Poland, who has two sons and, despite her eight years in the country, still has serious difficulties discussing her concerns and hopes with the teachers.

These teachers, their tutors ... they never seem to understand what I want for my children. They think they are like the other boys but, but their mother is not from here and she is divorced, and they have to help me with things at home. So, finally, I always end up speaking about our problems at home instead of the kids’ school work. I don’t know...

Out of the sixteen parents with school-aged children interviewed, only two of them felt satisfied with their involvement in the children’s education and school activities. While these barriers between parents and teachers, immigrant students and their peers, local and foreign cultures remain, there is little hope that the public school system will achieve its goals of integration. As Romo and Bradfield (2004: 4) have noted, multicultural education should ‘systematically attempt to bridge the gap between immigrant students’ homes and the school, so that the transition is smoother.’ Likewise, educators in these schools should recognise the immigrant students’ linguistic and cultural backgrounds, and design a curriculum that meets their particular needs. This way of proceeding is no doubt more demanding and time-consuming at first, but it is the only one that warrants the transformation of a system of power and values that will otherwise eject anyone unfamiliar with it. Bourdieu (1977) has repeatedly warned us about how culture and social systems get reproduced through a pedagogic action that simply replicates in form and content its own ideas and values.

There are two other issues in the domain of education that also appeared fairly often in the immigrants’ observations. On the one hand, some of them (4 parents) complained that although the tuition was free, there were a number of other expenses that they had to struggle to pay, such as books, meals, transportation, etc. They admitted that they could apply for assistance to cover some of these extra costs, but usually the amount of paperwork and the delays in administrative
decisions dissuaded them from doing so. Yolanda observes, for instance, that:

the beginning of the school year is always a nightmare. So many things to buy..., so many arrangements to be made... The teachers are never aware of the difficulties we have to get the materials they ask for and get the boys ready for school. We tell them... but they feel we are always complaining.

Also, a few other parents (three) pointed out that the school schedules and the curriculum are not perceived as supplying and meeting the children’s and parents’ needs, which usually differ from those of the mainstream group. In their opinion, it is almost impossible for a single parent to keep a job if she or he also has to take care of the kids. In this regard, Amelia, the Peruvian widow, thought that although the standards of the education are very good, the students are taught to follow traditional and outdated patterns of socialisation:

Our children come home believing that today’s families are like those of 50 years ago, and they find it difficult to understand why their parents have divorced, or decided to move to another country, or simply profess a religion which nobody else seems to care about.

Evidently, although the indoctrination of dominant values and behaviours is not as cruel as the exclusionary attitudes that María and Imad experienced, there is no question that they do not contribute to making the transition of the newcomers into the system easier either. It is important that the rhetoric of the Basque Department of Education should advocate principles of equality, tolerance, solidarity and integration, but if the cultural differences present in the lives of immigrant children are not given some recognition, and the discontinuities between school and community are not investigated, it is difficult to see how the breach between the two ‘worlds’ is ever going to disappear. Au (1993: 92-106) has convincingly argued that in order to overcome these problems, the school system should ‘build opportunities for the students to use and negotiate both cultures’ and ‘break through some of the familiar patterns of instruction’, which unwittingly perpetuate values and norms very foreign to immigrant children.

In 2005, the Basque Counsellor of Health, Inclán, declared at a conference entitled Health Assistance to Immigrants that his department had started to take urgent measures regarding immigrants’ healthcare ‘well ahead of the other autonomies around the country.’ Since 1997, when the national legislation only addressed cases of emergency and
pregnancy, the Basque Health Service has provided full medical assistance to all the residents in the territory – regardless of whether their situation had been regularised. Incidentally, almost 70 per cent of the respondents acknowledged that, all things considered, health assistance in the Basque Country was better than the one they had enjoyed in their country of origin. This section of the sample included not only individuals from the Third World and developing countries (Guinea-Bissau, Colombia, China or Poland), but also immigrants coming from Britain, Ireland or the United States. Still, despite this fairly generalised agreement on the excellence and efficiency of the service, there were also an unexpectedly large number of interviewees who thought that the treatment they had received was not commensurate to that given to the natives. In most instances, the source of the complaints was not so much connected with the diagnoses, the medicines prescribed or the medical skills of the physicians, but rather, to the doctor-patient relationship.

These relationships can become quite baffling if workers in the health profession do not develop a minimal cultural competence, allowing them to have effective and fluent communications and behaviours when working with persons from other cultures (see Cross et al. 1989). My own inquiries to three physician friends in Bilbao revealed that during their higher education in the early 1990s, there was practically no reference to this type of competence. Although recent conferences and workshops suggest that there is an incipient interest in these questions, this usually takes a great deal of time to have a real impact on the curriculum. Meanwhile, I am afraid we will keep hearing grievances like those of 35-year-old Julieta, a Mexican woman who thinks that doctors in Osakidetza do not dedicate the time they should to their patients.

They have always treated me properly but... well, you know, the doctor never spends with you more than ten minutes. You can hardly explain to him what your problem is. You are in and out in a blink of an eye. Not bad professionals... but they are always on the run.

The fact that most of the South Americans interviewed (eight) made similar remarks indicates that either they were used to very different procedures in their countries of origin, or that their cultures hold different expectations about physician-patient relations. In any case, it is clear that knowledge of the attitudes and beliefs culturally diverse patients bring to their appointments would make it much easier for the professionals in medicine to make the necessary psychological ‘contact’ that so vastly improves their performance. As some of the interviews attest, even when practitioners were keen to provide a satisfactory service,
some of the immigrant users thought that their attitudes and skills, especially in communication, could easily become a source of concern.

A second problem, which may also bring the perceptions of patient and physician to opposite extremes, is that migration quite frequently causes a series of physical and psychological alterations in the person, with unique symptoms and consequences. Again, while some studies have been done on the topic (Ward et al. 2001), this is an area of scholarship that still needs much work – by the medical profession and psychologists, primarily – to come to clear conclusions about its effects. What seems evident is that, as things are at the moment, factors such as the experiences lived through during the migratory process, the degree of difference between both cultures, and the kind of social support upon arrival can have serious consequences for the health of the immigrants. This was certainly the case of Geta, a 42-year-old Romanian who came to the Basque Country with a problem in her glands. Soon after she arrived, she began to experience more serious symptoms of anxiety and suffocation. Only after gaining a remarkable amount of weight did she decide to visit her new doctor.

I felt from the beginning that the doctor was not taking the matter seriously. I don’t know if I did not make myself clear… you know, I still had problems with the language or it was simply that she just would not listen to me. She kept telling me that I had to learn to cope with the pressure on my breast. I could not believe it; she would not even give me any medicine to alleviate the pain!

After several months, Geta decided to correspond with her homeopath back home and she has even asked him to send medication from Romania. It is difficult to believe that she will manage to improve her condition by trying to tackle her health problems in this manner. Still, her case is very illuminating because most scholars agree that misunderstandings and non-compliance are much more common among patients from other ethnic groups. There is no question that language and cultural barriers, as well as the illnesses typically associated with migratory movements, are important factors in the poorer quality of the service that immigrants get from the health system. Nevertheless, one cannot help suspecting that at least some of the fear and mistrust that some of them develop may derive from the lack of interest – and sometimes even negligence – that some practitioners show.

Again, during the conversations with my three physician friends, they remarked on several occasions that although they tried to provide an equally effective treatment to native and immigrant patients, sometimes they came across the obstacle of the latter’s beliefs and expectations
about healthcare from their countries of origin. This may well have been the case of José, a 25-year-old Ecuadorian, who has lived in the Basque Country for two years with his wife and child, aged three. José’s son has visited the Emergency Room of one of the hospitals in Bilbao twice, and José protests that both visits caused him much distress.

> We were terrified because our child did not seem to recover. Maybe medicine is different here but the paediatrician did not seem to give much importance to his temperature. He had had it for five days the second time and the doctor did not even give him an injection. That is what doctors did at home with other children... We could not understand it and felt really anguished.

Like Geta, José and his wife eventually decided to make an appointment with a private physician. Yet, to their surprise – not to say outrage – they found that her diagnosis and the treatment she prescribed was very similar to her colleague’s in the public health system. One can logically assume that having spent a little more time in trying to explain and reach a mutual understanding about the nature of the illness would have saved these immigrant families much money and anxiety. Often practitioners in the receiving country find that their scientific knowledge and practical skills are not enough to deal with the kind of health problems that immigrant patients bring to their office. Syenko (2002: 18-19) has shown that in order to offer a ‘culturally appropriate service’, these professionals need to develop other attitudes and skills that will make their communication with this specific type of patient more fluent and functional.

To conclude, a brief note on a clash in perception between natives and immigrants that somehow runs against the most common expectations. While the Basque population is almost equally divided between those who believe that immigrants are getting too many benefits from the health and welfare system and those who think they do not receive enough (Ikuspegui 2004: 13), several interviewees (three) argued that the system is bound to collapse in the near future, if the number of immigrants keeps increasing at the current rate. George, a 43-year-old Englishman who has lived in the Basque Country for nearly fifteen years, complained that

> the waiting lists in Osakidetza have become just unmanageable with so many foreigners enjoying the same health benefits as the long-term residents. It is quite an experience to go to a hospital or consulting room today... You hardly see any fair-skinned person. Things were far easier and faster a few years ago before this massive arrival of people from all places around the planet.
Of course, the few – but somehow vehement – complaints in this direction came from immigrants who have spent a good number of years in the Basque Country, and whose culture is not so distant from the one they are living in now. As was the case with the handful of newcomers who ended up empathising with the Basque nationalist movement in a relatively short period of time, here again we are surprised to see that some immigrants may in fact take positions that replicate the train of thought of the most conservative factions of the native population. Not unlike some Cuban- and Vietnamese-Americans (see Rumbaut & Portes 2001), a number of long-established EU immigrants into the Basque region are proving more reactionary to the progressive legislation being passed in the regional parliament than a majority of the native-speaking people. Such is the variety – and paradoxes – across immigrant minorities in a territory that, not long ago, was utterly unfamiliar with this phenomenon!

Conclusion

The main object of this chapter has been to compare and contrast the opinions held by native Basques and immigrants living in the region on issues related to health and education. For this purpose, I have analysed in some depth two data sources that can be said to display quite accurately the perceptions both groups have and the attitudes they show towards each other. The most evident conclusion one reaches by placing these two studies side by side is that there is still a long way to go before both human contingents can see eye to eye on most issues. While there is no denying that the regional administration has taken several important steps to make the integration of new immigrants easier, and the native population seems quite willing to collaborate with these efforts, there are a number of factors – both structural and attitudinal – which are interfering with this process. The old Spanish proverb Del dicho al hecho hay un gran trecho (‘From word to deed is far indeed’) may well capture the key problem behind the disparate perceptions I have delved into throughout my analysis. This problem could be summed up in the following terms: although Basques seem to believe in the possibility of a truly plural and open society, where shape can be given to cultural identity by creating points of identification with different groups, there are other forces at work which promote ideas of continuity and similarity to constitute a collective identity. These other forces become particularly problematic when, as has been noted, they make their appearance disguised in clothes of difference and variation, only to activate those fears of losing all sense of direction and purpose latent in all human beings (see Ignatieff 1998: 60). Probably it is these very fears
that explain some of the inconsistencies found in the Ikuspegi report. Hence, the survey could contend at once that the Basque people clearly prefer a society made up of different cultures and ethnic groups, but that they do not foresee their language, values and identity changing substantially in the near future. Such inconsistencies are already suggestive of the lack of a definite model of integration and of the reluctance to give up some cultural values and patterns that have guided life in the region for some time now.

Still, it is in the interviews with the immigrants where the discrepancies of most Basques’ discourse on and attitudes towards newcomers become most flagrantly apparent. Although the sample of opinions I have discussed in this chapter may seem limited in number, they are remarkably expressive of the main obstacles and difficulties that immigrants face in the Basque Country. A close reading of the transcripts of the conversations has allowed me to detect: a) the areas of most evident disparity between the immigrants’ perceptions and those of the natives and b) the kinds of actions that should urgently be taken to bridge the gap between their currently out-of-sync positions. As I have argued above, many of these actions would involve a profound change of paradigm with respect to how Basques conceive their ethnic character and outlook. In order to bring about this change, it is essential that they dislodge from their collective unconscious the idea that their cultural identity will only survive if what they deem to constitute its ‘core’ features remain constant and authentic (Fishman 1973: 7-10). One significant move in this direction would be, in Hall’s (1990: 223) words:

Instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, [...] we should think [of it] as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not without, the representation.

Of course, this different conceptualisation of identity would involve a reconstruction of a fragmented cultural heritage in the light of present-day needs and demands. The new migration into the Basque Country should play an important role in this process of prefiguring what kind of cultural identity we want to develop in the future, and it would be wise to turn an attentive ear to the immigrants’ comments on the kind of social practices that they feel are blocking the possibility of taking ‘alternative’ positions on the identity scene.

Based on some of the opinions expressed in the interviews, I have prepared a series of fairly simple recommendations which, I believe, would contribute to reducing the distance between both groups’ perceptions and generating points of identification on which individuals from either group could converge. It is important to stress, though, that
immigrants are not free from their own share of responsibility in this radical change of paradigm. As my discussion above has demonstrated, they may sometimes be as prone – if not more so – as natives are to entertaining ‘regressive’ attitudes towards some of the changes. Or, in other instances, their judgements on the assistance and services they are receiving from the host society tend to evince a noteworthy bias, as they often compare them to those they had enjoyed in their country of origin, which are generally considered more adequate. Still, it is clear that although immigrants should become prominent social actors, it is mainly for the receiving society to implement a number of measures – in our case, in the domains of education and healthcare – in order to make the process of integration of newcomers smoother.

In the Basque Country’s public education system, for example, teachers and school officials should show absolutely no tolerance for bullying behaviours and should try to help immigrant students feel accepted and comfortable in the classroom. Likewise, negative images of particular ethnic or religious groups should be combated in every instance and occurrence. This anti-bullying and pro-inclusion agenda, however, is not enough, since teachers should also promote an interest in the cultures those children represent and provide materials to learn more about them. Deep changes are needed towards a constructivist approach to pedagogy that allow migrant children to see their cultural identity reinforced, but also help mainstream students to see how their values and knowledge are being broadened by this close contact with different worldviews (see Castells et al. 1994). Naturally, in order to achieve these aims, it is essential that educators revise and adapt the curricula to these specific contexts, and that they introduce instructional patterns more suitable to satisfy the language and socio-cultural needs of their new clientele. A fact that became very clear throughout the interviews is that immigrant adolescents are likely to end up segregated and frustrated if they are not given the opportunity to catch up with the literacy and attitudinal standards established by the system. Last but not least, schools need to encourage active involvement from parents and the community in their children’s education. This can be done in various ways – regular conferences, adult learning, seminars on specific topics, etc. – but what seems evident is that while the cultural breach between home and school is not closed, there is little hope for successful adaptation.

In several ways, the problems and misunderstandings emerging in the context of healthcare institutions find their root in similar shortcomings in the receiving country. Even if the public health system in the Basque Country is frequently praised for the scope and the efficiency of its services, there are still areas in which their practice could be significantly ameliorated. For instance, students of medicine are
rarely required to take subjects on intercultural relations or alternative forms of medicine around the world. As a result, they are usually unaware of the difficulties that foreigners may initially have to understand their medical procedures and to follow their prescriptions. It is also advisable that doctors receive some instruction concerning the type of illnesses – very often psychological – most common among immigrants. This would greatly help all practitioners better understand the worries and anxieties that sometimes increase the chances of these groups falling ill on an almost regular basis. Ward et al. (2001) have shown that the 'culture shock' upon arriving in a different country is often the cause of physical and mental ailments that can hardly be dispelled by simply resorting to the arts of conventional medicine. As is the case in the school context, patience, empathy and learning to listen to what the immigrants feel about their condition are important prerequisites to try to come to the best solution for their problems. If the medical profession fails to embark on this transformation of its practice, we would have to admit again that the burden of a particular history and a conception of identity deeply rooted in local mores and ways of seeing is still too heavy to allow new ‘spaces of difference’ to emerge, in which new and diverse cultural and identity formations coexist.

Notes

1 I am aware that other authors may prioritise these ‘areas of vulnerability’ differently. My own sense of their salience is derived from the number of ‘cases’ taking place in these domains that have been brought to court or taken to the Defensor del Pueblo (Defender of the People) by immigrant parents and organisations in recent years.
2 This policy has always been in effect in the case of education and it was started in 1997 in the health system.
3 Even today, a mere glimpse at the line-ups of any of the football teams in these countries will reveal the impact of Basque emigration during those decades.
4 The growing presence of retirees from Northern European countries, such as Germany, Britain or Russia, in Andalusia and the Balearic Isles has frequently been the object of media analysis, as the local populations are often afraid that these immigrants are taking possession of most of the properties in the areas.
5 ETA stands for Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom). It is an armed group that began fighting for the independence of the region in the late years of Franco’s dictatorship.
6 This acronym stands for Euskal Estatistika-Erakundeak (Basque Institute of Statistics). The press note referred to in the text was distributed 26 February 2003.
7 Among the other activities related to immigration that the Basque administration has embarked on these last few years, the following should be mentioned: the creation of a Forum for Immigration (in 2002, composed of immigrant associations, lawyers, NGOs, representatives of institutions, unions, researchers, entrepreneurs, etc.), a bi-monthly journal on the subject, organisation of conferences and workshops (two held in June 2004), creation of a network to receive the newcomers, circulation of informative brochures with new norms and regulations and so on.
8 I had the privilege of being the head researcher of this project. On top of preparation and analysis of the interviews, this role involved the organisation of an international conference at Deusto in spring 2003 and the edition of a book including immigrant narratives to be used in secondary schools (see Ibarrola & Blave 2004).

9 This is an area of research that has hardly been investigated, but which should gain some visibility in the near future. While analyses of the impact of media treatment on the natives’ discourse on immigration have been carried out (see Bañón 2002), its influence on the views and opinions of immigrants has barely been studied.

10 El País 4 September 2002.


12 According to María, the fact that her sister had ‘darker skin colour and more marked facial features’ made her the target of cruel insults from other students.


14 See the comments in this direction of Counsellor of the Health Department Gabriel Inclán in El País 2 February 2002. See also Iztueta in El País 9 April 2002.

15 This section of the Law of Public Schools is extensively quoted in the document ‘Programa para la atención del alumnado inmigrante’ of the Basque government available at www.1.hexkuntza.ej-gv.net.

16 This is the Basque Public Health Service, which has been recognised as one of the top healthcare providers in several specialties in the country.

References


Introduction

The proverb ‘You are who you know’ is the title of a scientific article on social networks (Smith-Lovin & McPherson 1993) that concisely illustrates the worldview of network researchers. The basic premise of network analysts is that the social embeddedness of actors in a web of specific relationships says a lot about their position in society. In contrast to current approaches, especially in sociology, which concentrate primarily on examining certain categorical variables like age, gender or level of educational, network researchers do not regard social systems as a collection of isolated actors with certain characteristics. Their attention is instead directed towards examining the relationships among the actors in a social network and attempting to describe this pattern in the hope of gaining information about the possibilities and constraints affecting the actors’ scope of action. Social relations, particularly if they occur repeatedly or endure, create certain order patterns between the actors that display structural characteristics (Schweizer 1996). These patterns of embeddedness in social relations do not emerge by chance, but should be regarded as structural patterns. The aim is therefore to produce relevant evidence on social practice, by focussing one’s attention on the structure of these linkages in the social networks (Marsden 2005; Scott 1991; Wasserman & Galaskiewicz 1994).

What, however, are the main elements of the network researchers’ worldview? The main argument is that the social embeddedness of actors is intrinsically linked with the possibilities, as well as the constraints, of their social action; thus, it influences the resources available to these actors. To give an example, a study in the United States showed how the personal networks of illegal immigrants from Guatemala living in Houston, Texas, gradually became more varied over time. This differentiation was shaped by the varying labour market situations of the two sexes. While the men often worked in grocery stores, with the public and in teams, the women were employed as live-in domestic workers in...
private houses, looking after the children and the household. In time the men were able to build up an extensive network through their workplace, something that the isolated women could not do. Over time this difference had a marked effect on the integration process of the two groups, in that their access to the legalisation programme for illegal immigrants turned out to be different. Information on the existence of this programme and procedures for application circulated primarily in the men’s networks and much less in those of the women; men had access to regular residence permits far more often through their network relationships (Hagan 1998).

On the other side, a social network is also a ‘network of meaning’ (White 1992: 67; Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994). Which people are contacted and in what context when paid help is required has to do with the normative conceptions assigned to certain relationships. For example, gender-specific patterns can often be found in the network structures of actors (McPherson & Smith-Lovin 1982: 67; Moore 1990). In most Western societies, adult men and women have similarly extensive networks available to them, although relatives more often appear in women’s networks. Life-cycle factors are regarded as particularly important for such gender-specific effects in social networks. While there is not usually a basic difference between the network structures of young men and women, this often changes suddenly after the birth of a child; within a short time of the birth, women accumulate more women in their networks, while the men extend their workplace networks, which are often more predominantly male (Munch et al. 1997). This example shows how cultural representation can seemingly have an effect on network structures through the gender roles – for instance, in that childrearing is ‘allocated’ to the women and, following this logic, it is they who look after the children, while the men pursue their occupational careers as before (Mahler & Pessar 2006).

Perhaps one of the most important principles determining network structure, with far-reaching consequences for social practice and identity, is the homophilic principle, which applies when a more than coincidental similarity in characteristics and attitudes can be observed in people linked by a certain kind of social relationship. Aristotle complained that people ‘love those who are like themselves’. This early observation has been confirmed empirically by many studies in social research. In principle we can differentiate between two forms of homophily. With status homophily the similarity is based on informal, formal or attributed status and comprises the large, socio-demographic dimensions, which stratify society: i.e. attributed or acquired characteristics like ethnicity, gender, age, religion, education or occupation. Value homophily, on the other hand, is based on shared values, attitudes and beliefs. Most important to this chapter is the idea that homophily limits
people’s worlds in a way having powerful implications for the information they receive, the attitudes they form, and the interactions regarding the information they receive.

Using a concrete example, I will show the forms that migrant social networks take, how they are structured and the resulting effects on social practice. As an example, I use Albanian-speaking migrants from the former Yugoslavia. The first part will explain the extent to which gender, in combination with other social categories like national origin, education or type of residence permit, structures the supporting networks of these migrant groups in Switzerland. Furthermore, I will show how the structure of social networks is connected with the specific position of these immigrant groups in Swiss society. At the centre of these explanations will be the link between gender and ethnicity. I demonstrate how different – and multiple – social forms of stratification and exclusion mechanisms work simultaneously. In the second part the support networks of female returnees in Kosovo will be presented. The emphasis in this part of the chapter is on the relationship between gender and identificatory classifications. I will show how migration transforms ideas about gender and in what way these developments make the reintegration process for female returnees that much more difficult.

**Analysis of Albanian personal migration networks: research design**

Although network analysis has a long tradition in urban anthropology (Bott 1971; Mitchell 1969; Rogers & Vertovec 1995), few studies attempt to grasp in detail the forms that migrant social networks take. In addition, despite the potential variability in the form and composition of migrant networks, scholars tend to treat networks exclusively as circles of relatives (and sometimes friends), excluding all other forms of social relations (Gurak & Caces 1992). In order to overcome these weaknesses, this study used a methodological procedure specifically designed to address the detailed questions of form and function within migrant networks.

The intention was to grasp not only the form and composition of these Albanian migrant networks, but also to study which persons in these networks give what kind of support, or which persons take on what roles. Interviews were conducted with 40 Albanian-speaking migrants from the former Yugoslavia now living in Switzerland, and eleven returned families in Kosovo, in line with a ‘multi-sited’ ethnography (Marcus 1995).

The key persons interviewed in Switzerland were heterogeneous in gender, origin, arrival, type of residence permit and working situation. The sample in Switzerland consists of 24 men and 16 women, most of
them from Kosovo, but some from Macedonia and Serbia. Among the interviewees were asylum seekers as well as guest workers. Some lived in precarious situations, with uncertain legal status or inadequate employment. They were all first-generation migrants who had arrived at different times.

Among the interviewed returnees were six single men, three single women and two male/female couples. Eight of this group returned from Switzerland, three from Germany and one family from the Netherlands. The returnees had spent between two and a half and fourteen years in the foreign country and returned to Kosovo after 1998.

The network data were gathered according to a procedure developed in traditional network analysis, an adaptation of the single-question instrument previously developed and tested in network analysis (Marsden 2005; McCallister & Fischer 1978). It is characteristic of the analysis of egocentric networks that the reference persons in the network will be generated with a specific set of questions (the so-called ‘generators of names’), representing a choice of typical situations and interactions. The concept of social support was operationalised using five dimensions: emotional, economic, instrumental support, counselling and social activities. To gather the names of persons offering support in each specific interaction a specific set of questions was formulated for each dimension. For instance, to ascertain who was involved in providing instrumental support, I asked for persons who helped in finding a job or an apartment or for persons who provided some support in their integrating into Swiss society.

Background information about the reference persons was collected in a second stage. I asked for place of residence, age, gender, profession, educational level, nationality and country of origin. Assessing the quality of the relationship between the persons mentioned and key persons were also of interest. Accordingly, I asked questions about the length of the relationship, as well as the intensity and frequency of contact (for critical methodological reflections see Marsden 1990). While gathering network data, semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to understand the migration history of the key persons. All data were gathered through intensive fieldwork and face-to-face-interviews I performed myself (for details see Dahinden 2005).

Social support networks of Albanian-speaking migrants in Switzerland: reflecting on the overlapping of various exclusion mechanisms

Albanian-speaking migrants from the states in former Yugoslavia form an important immigrant group in Switzerland today. The first young
Albanian-speaking men from former Yugoslavia arrived in Switzerland as early as the 1960s as seasonal workers. They lived secluded lives and accepted unskilled work in the lowest wage category. They always regarded their stay as temporary and many of them intended to return to their home country after a while (Maillard & Leuenberger 1999). From the 1980s onwards, and even more so in the 1990s, the pressure to emigrate from the area that was formerly Yugoslavia grew (Malcolm 1999). At the same time, the Swiss passed a radical immigration law reform. The new recruitment of workers was made virtually impossible through the introduction of the *three-circle model* in the early 1990s. Migrants from former Yugoslavia were ascribed to the outer ring and therefore no longer had the right to a residence or work permit, not even as seasonal workers (Swiss Federal Council 1991).

In practice, however, these immigration policy measures had little effect on the increased influx of Albanian-speaking migrants. In view of the political and economic development in Kosovo, former seasonal workers gave up any thought of return and began instead to take advantage of the right of family reunification. Wives and children increasingly arrived in Switzerland. Applications for asylum grew, with the political and economic deterioration in Kosovo. Many who sought temporary asylum in Switzerland during the civil war in Kosovo have since returned (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2001).

Until the 1980s, the Albanian-speaking migrants remained relatively unnoticed by the Swiss public. Since the 1990s, however, they have come to the attention of the media. Drug dealing, patriarchal culture and family structure, crime and high unemployment are the buzzwords associated today with this segment of the population while census data point to the precarious socio-economic status of the migrants in this group, particularly women (Wanner 2004). Occasionally, there is a tendency to explain the observed integration problems by stressing the cultural peculiarities and differences – or even the cultural ‘incompatibility’ – of the Albanians. This involves the danger of an unproductive tautology, as does the culturalisation of social problems (Baumann 1996). This happens when the cause of integration problems is simultaneously deduced from the starting point of the argumentation. Then the stereotypes of the specific Albanian culture are seen as leading to these problems. The social category ‘gender’ is often relevant in these categories; Albanian women are generally described as being oppressed and passive creatures, without any rights (e.g. Whitaker 1981).

The poor status of Albanian women is attributable to the traditional patriarchal system, in which men dominate and in which the family was, and is, the decisive factor, controlling social, economic and political relationships. At the same time, it is postulated that these patriarchal
family structures raise big problems when it comes to integration in Switzerland. The Albanians’ gender-specific role models vary greatly from those in the host country, which again results in integration problems. These discrepancies are purported to surface in, for example, violence towards female family members. In other words, here culture is automatically deduced from the place of origin, like ‘permanent baggage’ that accompanies the Albanians in all situations and determines their behaviour (for critique towards this kind of ‘cultural essentialism’ see Grillo 2003; Hannerz 1999). If we understand culture as the way people make sense of their world, then we have to analyse how they do it. I suggest that the situation of these migrants in Switzerland is considerably more complex and cannot be reduced to ‘cultural essentialism’. In my hypothesis, it appears that such gender-specific forms of repression in the immigrant situation in Switzerland are eclipsed by other forms of social exclusion. I would like to explain this in detail using a network perspective. First of all, I shall describe the structure of the network and then seek explanations for the main characteristics found.

Who gives Albanian migrants social support?

The 40 interviewees named a total of 317 people in answer to the question of from whom they received any sort of social support (see Table 5.1).

Relatives were overwhelmingly most often named by the interviewees. The proportion of relatives in the so-called reference group amounted to 48 per cent (or 152 out of the 317 named). For the male interview partners, friends and acquaintances were equally important as kin with regard to social support in Switzerland. For women, though,

<p>| Table 5.1 Gender and the role of the reference group for social support |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Gender of the interview partners | Gender of the reference person | Role of the reference person |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender of the reference person</th>
<th>Relative</th>
<th>Friends, acquaintances</th>
<th>Persons from institutions</th>
<th>Employer, supervisor</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.7%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Of the people questioned in Switzerland, 26 were male and 14 were female.
the relatives remained the most important resource for social support, with a good half of the people named being related to the women interviewed (55 per cent, 74 cases). In other words, although the women's networks are more affected by family relationships than the men's, nearly half of the people named are not related to them. Among these are many friends.

It seems interesting that, independent of the gender of the interviewee, two different network patterns were found, in particular with regard to relatives. While men primarily fall back on their cousins, brothers and marriage partners for social support, for women the brother, sister and mother are central (no illustration). The men turn to relatives in the paternal lineage, while the women mobilise the relationships with their own family – an exception to this is the relationship between married people. This pattern can be regarded as generally relevant. In fact, various researchers have already pointed out the complementary network structures of Albanian women and men (e.g. Backer 1976; Kaser 1994). It is nevertheless surprising that this pattern remains so prominent even in the immigrant situation, although the familial relationships are usually divided physically and geographically.

These details tell us that the stereotypical image of Albanian women as being completely embedded, almost clan-like, in familial networks in Switzerland is not confirmed, even if the family provides such important social support. A deeper analysis of the interviews shows that relationships in the maternal lineage are of symbolic importance for the women, as Reineck (1991) claims, and that these relationships give the women scope for action, and are crucial for categorical identification. This female reference group is an important source of information and support of different kinds. They receive emotional support from the people in the maternal lineage, but they also often spend time in their company with their children. When it comes to sending money, the women usually send this to people in the maternal lineage, often even without the knowledge of their husbands.

Looking at the individual support dimensions a little more carefully, we find that certain support forms have gender-specific effects. A female reference group provides rather more emotional support, whereas a male one tends to offer financial help. When asked whom she could talk about relationship matters, one young woman said:

With my mother, but probably not with my father. He takes everything a little too seriously and is rather traditional. You know, it's true that he thinks that I should look for someone whom I like and then marry him. But then marry immediately. With my mother I can also talk about love, she doesn't take it so seriously. My father often doesn't dare to ask. For example, my
sister fell in love on holiday in Macedonia. She was here, he was there. And four years they spent like that. Obviously she went there on holiday more often. But my father didn’t really know what was happening, and he didn’t dare to ask either. (Interview 39)

Nevertheless, we should take into consideration the weak connection between the variable gender and emotional support. More surprising, however, is the fact that for the other dimensions of social support, no gender-specific pattern can be observed; no interpretable correlations between the gender of the reference group members and instrumental support, advisory support or even the organisation of leisure time could be determined. Although Wellman and Wortley (1990) state in their study on personal networks in Toronto that ‘men fix things and women fix relationships’, this appears to describe the situation of the Albanian migrants in Switzerland only partially.

From these results, it can be concluded that the gender-specific aspects of the structure of these social support networks are also relatively weak. When they do appear, they relate to the type of person involved. This is surprising because the ethnographic literature available on Albanians assumes strong segregation along gender lines (Denich 1974). On the other hand, if one examines the structure of social support networks generally, a strong pattern emerges, not necessarily primarily gender-specific, but subordinate to other characteristics.

**Ethno-national homophily: drawing up boundaries?**

McPherson et al. (2001: 420) claimed:

> Race and ethnicity are clearly the biggest divide in social networks today in the US, and they play a major part in structuring the networks in other ethnically diverse societies as well.

With this statement they have hit the nail on the head, at least with regard to the ethnic group under discussion. Examining the tendencies to homophily in these Albanian support networks, we find that ethnicity is the first structuring criterion. Further network segregation is according to age, the kind of residence permit, type of migration and, to a lesser degree, education and gender (see Table 5.2). I should like to explain these results briefly.

The main characteristic of support networks for Albanian migrants is their marked ethnic homogeneity. Many Albanians receive social support from other Albanian-speaking people, almost three quarters (72 per cent, 228 cases) of the reference persons named in the study in
answer to the question on social support were Albanians. Reference to Swiss people or other nationalities only occur in these support networks in the area of integration assistance. The numbers of Swiss are negligible. This result applies to both female and male interviewees.

In view of the ethnic homogeneity in the networks of Albanian migrants in Switzerland one could speak of an ‘Albanian ethnic social field’ – but it must be made clear that we are not dealing here with a ‘transnational social field’. Albanian migrants’ transnational relations are only secondary in their social support in Switzerland. Many of those named by the Albanian interview partners in connection with social support reside in Switzerland (87 per cent, 276 cases). A good three quarters of them even live in the same canton as the person interviewed. If transnational relations do emerge in the networks, they are of importance exclusively in the emotional area and often refer to women in Kosovo (for more detail and explanation for this ‘missing transnationalism’ see Dahinden 2005a).

It appears that the ‘Albanian-speaking community’ around Zurich, where the interviews were conducted, has built a network that aims to fill a gap. They find work and accommodation for each other and spend leisure time together; only in exceptional cases do they mobilise the relatives in the home or another country. This creates a picture of an Albanian community that is almost hermetically sealed and which, to a great extent, is severed both from Swiss society and that of the home country.

How did this relative isolation occur? We do know that such closure along ethno-national boundaries, such demarcation of a territory, is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Correlation according to Spearman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of residence permit</td>
<td>0.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of migration</td>
<td>Phi = 0.542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As an expression of the strength of homophily, we used a correlation coefficient for the evaluation of the association between the corresponding characteristics of the interviewees and the reference groups. The possible value of the correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to +1, whereby the sign shows the direction of the association. If we are dealing with dichotomous or ordinal variables, the correlation according to Spearman is used as the association; with nominal variables Phi is used. As there was no one of Swiss origin among those interviewed, it is not possible to calculate the correlation coefficient for homophily regarding ethnicity; here the following frequencies apply: 72 per cent (228 cases) of the named people were Albanian, 23 per cent Swiss. Being Albanian means here Albanian-speaking; nationality is therefore ascribed.
always the result of dialectic processes and historical variables, relative and subjective (Barth 1969; Weber 1978; Wicker 1997; Wimmer 2008; for the Albanian-speaking migrants see Dahinden 2008). So were the Albanians more or less forced into this ethnic homophilic principle – for example, because of lacking contact with the Swiss – or to what extent did they contribute to this? Do Albanian-speaking migrants only trust people of their own kind, or have they no possibility of forming relationships with others, or both? Are we dealing with the ‘normal’ tendency of the first generation of migrants to an ethno-national homophily described by McPherson et al. (2001), or are specific exclusion mechanisms at work here?

Various mechanisms of social exclusion can indeed be determined here. Albanian-speaking migrants are repeatedly the target of racist remarks and stereotyping and are definitely affected by discrimination. As an example of this, let me mention a study which shows that young people with an Albanian name are clearly at a disadvantage when looking for a job, despite having the same capabilities as Swiss applicants, i.e. the same qualifications regarding language, school and occupation, as well as an identical curriculum. In western Switzerland, for instance, 24 per cent of the Yugoslavs with an Albanian surname suffer discrimination when looking for a job. In the German-speaking part of Switzerland, the figure is even higher, 59 per cent (Fibbi et al. 2003). It is well known that rejection and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or nationality can be expressed in processes of ‘self-ethnicisation’ and other reactive actions, thereby strengthening the ethno-national boundary. In this respect the observed ethno-linguistic homogeneity could be interpreted as the result of, and possibly the reaction to, status deprivation and marginality, as well as an attempt at self-assertion.

On the other hand, one should not forget that over the past few decades Albanians were confronted with exceptionally strong ethno-nationalism in their home country – which they in turn influenced, as these processes are also of a dialectical character. The ethnic community formation of Albanians in Switzerland could also have to do with the fact that the flow of Albanian migration was at least partly ‘forced’, which might explain the condition of isolation found. If this ‘departure’ implicates a flight from national or ethnic repression, on the one hand, and the possibility of at last ‘being Albanian’, on the other, capitalising on these ethno-linguistic links in the migration situation seems to be logical and even reasonable behaviour.

The ethnic homogeneity of these networks might also be interpreted as class-specific segregation in the sense that – taking the Albanians as a socio-economic group – class-specific segregation accumulates or correlates with ethnic/national segregation. In other words, we would be dealing with a kind of ethnic underclass, and the observed homogeneity
could be regarded as socio-economic exclusion. We pointed out above that previous studies have shown that numerous Albanian migrants in Switzerland must contend with integration difficulties, live in precarious circumstances, are affected by health problems and, in comparison to other groups, are often unemployed or found in the lowest income bracket (Von Aarburg 2002; Wanner 2004). Even after a long stay, almost no social mobility had been observed among the first generation – as new analyses have shown – but, rather, a permanent place in the lowest strata of society had been established. A short excerpt from the interview with one of the women clearly shows this precariousness, which is also due to low educational capital.

For one and a half years, I have been working there in the household. I work 50 per cent, but, unfortunately, it is not a permanent job. It's always for six months. My boss has now said though that she will see that I get a permanent job. I have no fixed plan.

*How did you find this work then?*

Through the Unemployment Office. I went there, they paid for two German language courses and I had someone in charge of my case. He found this work for me. What shall I do? I didn't have much schooling, not at home. I can't speak good German. That's why I am content, I would just like a permanent job.

(Interview 21)

Within this boundary determined by language and ethnicity, however, strong differentiations can be found. Internal segregation in the support networks can be observed, which as already mentioned manifests in the form of various homophilic principles. Age, type of migration, type of residence permit, as well as education and gender are the central to structuring here; young Albanians turn to young Albanians when they seek social support, asylum seekers to other asylum seekers, guest workers to other guest workers, those who have settled to others who have settled. Within these social categories women turn to other women, well-educated women to well-educated women, asylum-seeking women to asylum-seeking women. Conversely, women with a residence permit only seldom turn to someone seeking asylum and well-educated men only seldom to men with less educational capital. To put it in a different way, people with little personal capital (i.e. less education, precarious residence status) turn to other people with similar personal capital for social support; consequently, social exclusion develops. As a result of this exclusion migrants occupy the lowest social positions. Even well-educated Albanians with stable residence status remain trapped within
the ethno-linguistic borders when it comes to social support; the quality and quantity of the reference person’s personal resources, as well as the available social capital (Bourdieu 1980, 1983), are often low. The option to utilise the multiplier potential implicit in social relations is practically non-existent. It seems, therefore, that the ethnic homogeneity observed under these circumstances has a direct effect on the social capital available, in that the resources are very limited and the social capital low.

Figuratively speaking, the network structure is permeated by its own grid, in which the Albanian-speaking migrants are organised into clusters. Various social categories have a structuring effect, as does gender, but this is always linked with other social categories and is subordinate to the ethno-national category. Anthias (2002: 276) suggested the concept of ‘translocational positionality’ in order to capture the linkages in the different social categories, and the symbolic as well as structural effects. A translocation positionality is, according to Anthias, ‘one structured by the interplay of different locations relating to gender, ethnicity, race and class (amongst others), and their at times contradictory effects.’ The concept proposed by Anthias does capture the often simultaneous and multiple forms of the social-stratification and exclusion mechanisms, as they appear in the network structure of Albanians. Albanians, too, always occupy positions in different categories, like ethnicity, class and gender, simultaneously. The category ‘women’ or ‘men’ in the example discussed here is no doubt inadequate to explain the network structures, or to do justice to the life realities of the heterogeneous biographies of this group of migrants. Rather, it is apparent here that repression and social exclusion manifest themselves in multiple linkages, while several aspects are dominant. Exclusion mechanisms on the basis of ethnicity, in the case of Albanians in Switzerland, carry more weight than does gender. This also means that in modern immigrant societies, new forms of social inequality may emerge, closely linked with this ‘translocation positionality’. The varied – often simultaneously occurring – stratification factors here bring about a very specific result. We have therefore in Switzerland an ‘Albanian-speaking community’ whose boundaries are drawn along ethnicity and ‘locality’: They keep to ‘themselves’ and we do not find a relevant ‘network transnationalism’. Thus the boundary of social exclusion is complete, as transnational resources cannot compensate for those missing locally.

After the return: contested gender roles

At the time of the interviews, the people interviewed in Kosovo were all faced with the task of settling down after their return against the backdrop of wartime destruction. For many returnees (and also those who
remained), it was a matter of rebuilding demolished homes and organising financial aid and materials for the reconstruction efforts. In this situation the support networks, as they existed during the process of re-integration, were investigated. Based on the analysis of these support networks, I would like to widen the perspective regarding gender, because in the social networks of the female returnees, a gender-specific element was clearly visible. Female migrants often formed no new relationships after their return and did not find access to the local women’s or men’s networks. The men, as the networks showed, were more often able to join local networks after their return. This specific characteristic of the networks of female returnees can be partly explained, according to my argument, by ‘distinction and exclusion’. With this term I describe, as per Bourdieu (1982: 104), the discourse and practices of exclusion on the part of the female returnees vis-à-vis the women who remained; that is, those who did not emigrate. What is meant by this understanding of ‘distinction’? To explain my reasoning, I will examine a specific case in greater detail.

Mrs. Rifati is a 40-year-old Albanian, who fled to Germany with her family in 1991 because of the political persecution of her husband. From the very beginning, Mrs. Rifati intended to return to the home country with her family – her husband and four children – as soon as the situation in Kosovo improved. She put this plan into practice in 2001 within the framework of the aid programme for returnees. Mrs. Rifati emphasised, time and again during the conversation that she returned voluntarily and was not deported. She also insisted she was very glad to be back in her native country. At the same time, however, she added that she is often bored during the day now. While Mrs. Rifati led a very active and absorbing life in Germany, she is now alone at home most of the time and has only limited contact with the other women in the village.

Mrs. Rifati’s support network consists of two parts, which have completely different characteristics both geographically and regarding quality (see Figure 5.1). Firstly, social support is seen as a cohesive as well as a local phenomenon, in which the female relatives and the husband dominate (see left side of diagram). As observed in the social support networks of Albanian-speaking migrants in Switzerland, this woman relies on her own matrilineal family for different dimensions of social support. Emotional support and social activities run through this network, consisting mainly of women and her husband. The cousin should be mentioned here, as she is a resource for another kind of help. Mrs. Rifati turns to her when she requires information of any sort. This could be about a job prospect or other matters related to the children. During her absence some things have changed in Kosovo and Mrs. Rifati is gradually being informed about these changes by her cousin.
For example, she received relevant information on the reform of the school system from her.

Despite her return, Mrs. Rifati still maintains very strong emotional ties with her German friends in Germany (right side of diagram). There are certain matters in her life that Mrs. Rifati discusses exclusively with these persons, and they have already all been to visit her in Kosovo. These friends are also important from the economic aspect, as they send money regularly to the whole family. Moreover, on their last visit, the German family brought presents of considerable value with them, for example, a satellite dish for the television and a telephone. The friends who live in Germany also pay the telephone expenses for the Rifatis. A network-transnationalism is therefore important in emotional as well as economic dimensions. The emotional attachment to the former host country can also be seen in another way with Mrs. Rifati. She said that at home the television is on from morning till night and she always watches the German channel.

One important characteristic of this network is the fact that, since her return, Mrs. Rifati has formed no new relationships. So where are the attempts at discursive and practical distinction in this example? One distinction is apparent for Mrs. Rifati, seen in the kind of clothing she wears and in the type of house she occupies. Mrs. Rifati lives with her family in a large house surrounded by a Western European garden – in the style of an ‘English lawn’. The house is built with different materials and varies in style from others in the neighbourhood, and therefore gives the impression of an exotic oasis in the middle of an Albanian village. The Rifatis describe themselves symbolically as ‘returnees from Europe’ and are no doubt seen as such by the village inhabitants. Distinction is also apparent in the young female returnees, although this is a generalisation, for similar things were observed for many of the women questioned and not only for Mrs. Rifati and her family. The body is used to distinguish the women from others, for example, in their language and behaviour. Thus, the youngest daughter of Mrs. Rifati tells us that in school she has joined a group of young people who used to live in Germany or Switzerland. They differentiate themselves from the others – those who remained in Kosovo – by wearing their ‘gear’ from Germany and speaking German with each other in the break.

Another interview partner relates that her daughter wears the kind of clothes that the other young women here would never wear, such as short skirts. She feels the daughter would certainly not want to relinquish the ‘mentality’ acquired in Switzerland. The other girls of her age (seventeen years) stay at home all day and are not allowed to go into town – however, she does not forbid her daughter to do this, otherwise the daughter would probably be even unhappier about returning than
she already is. In these examples, there is no doubt that clothing not only has a practical function, but is also employed to mark a symbolic division and can therefore be interpreted as one form of distinction. The symbolised body is necessary for the female returnees as a ‘mark’ not only to give them self-awareness, but also to enable them to relate to themselves and others – here the ‘traditional Albanian women’ – and to possibly distinguish themselves from them. We observe in this case again a kind of demarcation. However, this time it occurs not along ethnic, but along specific gender lines – between women.

The central theme of the female returnees’ discourse on distinction concerns the social gender roles. These are polarised by the women who have returned, into European equality and Albanian inequality. The female returnees go through fundamental changes – they go ‘from one extreme to the other’. In other words, the women who return approve of this change, which they see as positive and connected with a European lifestyle.

Female returnees like Mrs. Rifati distinguish themselves from a supposedly traditional ‘Albanian’ femininity with concrete strategies and, at the same time, they construct a European ‘Albanian’ feminine identity. The returnees demonstrate this division symbolically and place themselves outside the ruling order when they return. The wearing of certain clothes, like short skirts, the use of make-up, the use of the emigrant language instead of Albanian with other returnees, the defiance of
traditional female behaviour in the form of an evening stroll through town, are all examples of such attempts to distinguish themselves from others in everyday practice. This discourse, interestingly, is held primarily by women and weaves around the transformation and construction of gender, hinders not only access to a secondary social environment but also any kind of local belonging. In general, the Albanian women named very similar characteristics to describe the ‘traditional Albanian woman’. Key items were, for instance, being bound to the home, having no possibility of making decisions or exerting influence within the family, no school education, etc. The women refuse the postulated ‘Albanian’ femininity and use their bodies, not in order to overcome opposition to or pose a dichotomy between men and women, but more to stake a claim to a new, different and more positive female Albanian identity. The boundary-making is not taking place between men and women, but between women who have been away and the ones who stayed in Kosovo.

In this context the emotional importance of friendship in the former host country, as observed with Mrs. Rifati, is more easily understandable and explainable. These relationships represent the exact reversal of distinction, namely a belonging to the European ‘modern age’. Interesting in this example, too, is the fact that ethnicity seemingly sneaks in through the back door. Although ethnicity in the situation of the returnees is not in itself a relevant social category for social stratification – one is with the people of the same ethnic group – ethnicity here virtually has a transnational globalisation effect, in that the migration experience influences women’s gender representations. The friends represent the category of ‘European women’, who in turn represent the ideal femininity and symbolise a form of belonging for Mrs. Rifati. Here a kind of transnationalism has taken root, which should not be underestimated, and which has an ethnic connotation, however, almost the opposite to the traditional understanding of ethnicity. Finally, these processes lead on the action level to a concrete result. In the everyday life of most of the female returnees a similar pattern can be observed: they make little contact with the other women in the neighbourhood. They feel ‘foreign’ and only with difficulty find friends in the village or in the neighbourhood, if at all. Mrs. Rifati said:

I cannot find myself here at all. It is rather difficult, it is a different life. The mentality here is completely different. I don’t feel like mixing with these women, because many only went to school for eight years. So I don’t have much contact. I am not so close to the people here.
This distinction, operating dialectically – whether on the symbolic level or in practice – can lead to a situation where access to the secondary social network, indispensable for reintegration, is very difficult. Another female interviewee said:

I sit sometimes for two or three hours with a woman from here and just listen. What shall I say? Here everything is completely different ... at the moment I am like a foreigner in Switzerland. In my country, but like a foreigner.

This kind of 'new ethnic' boundary between the 'traditional Albanian women' and the 'Europeanised Albanian women' is erected according to similar mechanisms of exclusion we observed in the case of the Albanian migrants in Switzerland. But this time gender is highly relevant for forming the 'us' and 'them' groups and has its effect on symbolic as well as practical dimensions.

**Conclusion**

I attempted to illustrate the interaction between ethnicity and gender and other social categories by means of the discussion on the structure and composition of the social networks of Albanian-speaking migrants. The structure of social networks of Albanian-speaking migrants was presented at two moments of their migration process: Albanian-speaking migrants and their social support networks in Switzerland, and social networks of returnees.

These two examples show that migration processes influence gender and ethnic relations and conversely that gender and ethnicity are intrinsically linked with the migration process. Under no circumstances, however, is it possible to see at the beginning which way these transformations will go. The communality of ethnicity and gender is that they both serve – according to the analysed network structure – as important elements in boundary-making and deemed important in processes of social exclusion. First, ethnic boundaries are reflected by ethnic homophily in the network structures of Albanian migrants in Switzerland, and they stand for social exclusion. Gender is in this case socially only relevant in interaction with other social categories. Thus, exclusion mechanisms based on ethnic origin predominate in Switzerland over those based on gender.

Second, gender can also draw boundaries. Under the conditions of globalisation gender is culturalised or ethnicised – the repressed Albanian women, the emancipated European women – and thus has, at least indirectly, social stratification potential. The negatively valued Albanian traditional femininity is contrasted with a positively interpreted European
modernity. This is the case in both the host country Switzerland and among the female returnees in Kosovo. The meanings of the two terms ‘tradition’ and ‘the modern age’ have historically undergone a transition, but they must always be seen in connection with global power structures (King 2002).

Third, interestingly enough, gender defines a boundary between men and women, but even more importantly between women, the salient element being ‘having migrated or not’. The effect is that returned women are displaying a distinction which renders their reintegration process difficult, as they do not join the other women in the region.

Finally, I would like to conclude with some reflections about transnationalism. In Switzerland there is an ‘Albanian-speaking community’ with boundaries closed along ethnicity as well as according to ‘locality’. We do not find a relevant ‘network transnationalism’; transnational relations are of minor importance in everyday life and for social support of Albanian-speaking migrants. Given the ethno-national exclusion, this makes the boundary of social exclusion complete, as missing local resources can obviously not be compensated for by transnational ones. We do not know if these immigrants develop a kind of transnational belonging in spite of ‘absent network transnationalism’– this was not within the scope of the study presented.

In the international literature transnational linkages are generally mainly defined from one specific perspective only. The starting points for analysis are usually immigrants and their relationships to their home countries – as in the first example. But analysing the phenomena from a different perspective gets very interesting as well. The question then becomes: to what extent are social relations maintained in geographic space after return and what roles do they play? In the examples of the returnees network transnationalism was highly relevant after return, in emotional but also economic dimensions, having concrete effects on the lives of the women interviewed. Returned women develop a kind of ‘transnational belonging’, identifying themselves with a European ‘femininity’. Such results can give us new insights into transnationalism.

So, when asking Are you who you know? we might simply respond with a ‘yes’. However, we need to add a proviso; if we attempt to develop a network theory of ethnicity and gender, we need to answer many more questions. The most important might be: How do you know who you know? and What roles do ethnicity, gender and transnationalism play in knowing who you know? For answering such questions we have to go back to the field, analyse other examples, compare them and work towards a more generalised model.
References


Introduction

The preference for an anthropological reflection upon identity processes as a means to overcome the micro-macro dichotomy that has hampered the development of the social sciences (Calhoun 1996) immediately faces a number of obstacles. A strategy of total subjective and relative social research, reduced to micro-dimensions (limited to the construction of the self and interaction), may impede an analysis of the relationships between socio-historical groups. Similarly, a strategy of conceptual and theoretical babelisation of the concept of identity (and its derivatives) may lead to the loss of its analytical function in understanding historical dynamics.

Within these strategies any reference to socio-historical groups, to shared identifications at the macro-group level, to collective representations of identity differentiations and the value attributed to these differences and to inter-group relations, could immediately be accused of essentialism, reification and promotion of stereotypes. This is because the humanist perspective, as stated by Popper (1996), neglects the identity impact of the geo-strategically organised world system. In humanism only individuals and relations between individuals exist so that any attempt of a trans-group approach, or one using a comparative method, besides supposedly falling into the essentialist trap, could be labelled as an illicit act from the epistemological perspective; this is because it interrelates phenomenological incomparables supported by worldviews which are unique and inaccessible to the external researcher.

But within a perspective that avoids both essentialisation and reification, ever since the seminal work of Barth (1998: 13-15), it has been accepted that the ‘ethnic ascription’ which classifies a person in terms of his basic, most general identity ... provides an organisational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems’ or at different historical moments; and that, from this point of view, ‘the critical focus of investigation ... becomes the
ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.

At the same time, we should keep in mind that contact and movement of individuals or families across social frontiers, in an attempt to stabilise the historic and social organisation of cultural difference, do not alter the permanence of ethnic categories, which are based on the ‘continuing dichotomisation between members and outsiders’. In other words, if a Fur may, for personal reasons, become a Bagarra, or a Pash tun a Baluch, this barely affects the socio-historic existence of their former groups, or inter-group relations based on their historic differentiation. It may, however, tend to alter the cultural content within these identity frontiers.

This perspective is wholly compatible with the fact that, when listening to those we accuse of essentialising or reifying, we find the production of discursive strategies of strategic essentialism (Spivak 1987). These are more or less shared in an attempt to strengthen the capacity to struggle against or negotiate with dominant socio-historic groups. It is convergent with the fact that we very frequently find alternative ways of conceptualising identity difference, which explicitly emphasise the historically contextualised transformation of strategies of identification and de-identification of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983).

Moreover, both identity processes veer towards conservatism and symbolic and cultural homogenisation, based on continuous dichotomisations with rival socio-historic groups (neighbours or otherwise). The processes of identity change and pluralisation based upon differentiated diasporic trajectories may display different patterns and result in new identities or sub-identities, which are themselves perceived as identity specificities in certain socio-historic dynamics (Brah 1992). In effect, when the personal subjectivity underlying each voice is taken as a methodological lens, we rapidly realise that identifications (and de-identifications) are never either complete or definitive. Rather, they are ambivalent efforts, which may even attempt to deny and/or hide the constitutive and structuring ambivalence of the relation to the other, within or outside the ‘Us’.

On the other hand, we believe that deconstructivist approaches (Hall 2000) to the concept of identity have hampered the analysis of numerous phenomena as identity processes i.e. as inter-subjective processes, associated with the construction of a value image of subjects and groups, mediated through interpersonal and inter-group comparisons as ‘immaterial’ processes seeking social objectivation through materialisation and/or symbolisation. In this sense, controlling others, social and economical success, etc., are supposed to ‘materialise’ an opportunity to construct a quest for identity superiority. Therefore, those
without access to these materialised forms of identity superiority will: 1) participate in ‘superiority’ through identification with their ‘superiors’ and/or the services they provide them; or 2) defensively seek ‘moral’ and/or symbolic forms (namely religious, ideological and artistic) of dissent and rhetorical subversion of the forms of historical materialisation (personal, class, national, colonial, etc.) of the material superiority of others; or 3) actively struggle for the subversion of materialised hierarchies, thus creating new hierarchies and different modalities of materialisation, i.e. an advantageous social production and organisation of differences and distinctions (S. Bastos & J. Bastos 2006).

Our answer to the numerous attempts to drain the concept of identity of its conceptual and theoretical value is that: 1) its heuristic value lies precisely in its ability to reveal the economy of the identificatory, vulnerable, always unstable and more or less open construction of personal identities; 2) the advantages of articulating the construction strategies of personal identities with the strategies of investment and/or disinvestment of group identities (national, ethnic, etc.); 3) the gains deriving from the multidimensionality of identity representations, permitting strategic use of variable and simplified presentations of the subjects’ multidimensional identity in variable contexts; and finally 4) its ability to sustain the transformation into theory of the processes of subjectivation that underlie objectivised and discursive practices, be they material and ideal or ideological, through the analysis of their strategic potential, their biased economy and the dynamics of material and/or symbolic, individual and/or group power, which motivate and constantly renew them.

Lastly, we have to consider that identity processes are, first and foremost, cognitive-emotional processes, associated with the social construction of self-image and self-esteem. The urge to belong and the intense emotions of shame and pride associated with it may be the most powerful forces in the human world, and when these forces are deflected or subverted, cataclysmic upheavals result. Since ‘the emotions are the psychological side of social relationships, just as relationships are the social aspects of the emotions’ (Scheff 1996: 277, 298), the collective and shared identifications of subjects in relation to their ‘imagined communities’ are not irrelevant, simply because these communities are imagined. On the contrary, they can provide fairly stable feelings of imaginary superiority towards rival groups, which tend to be vilified and fuel states of euphoria and identity triumph – which may prove transitory. Depressive feelings of humiliation and shame may occur, which can trigger a profound identity rage against the source of humiliation, both contextual and historical.

Framed by this perspective and based on a case study in identity relations, this chapter analyses the impact of the supra-sociological and
geo-strategic dimension of historical relations between the different competitive components of the colonial and post-colonial world-system (Wallerstein 1974) upon the political dimension of personal identities. Our arguments will be developed on the basis of fieldwork among British and Portuguese Muslims of Gujarati origin settled in Leicester, United Kingdom, conducted shortly after the events of 7 July 2005 (herein referred to as 7/7).

**The management of post-colonial power dynamics on the basis of different reinterpretations of the colonial world-system**

*Our colonisers were better than yours*

At least two identity groups of Gujarati Muslims coexist in Leicester. They share genealogical references, experiences and memories of migration to the colonies, protectorates or other African territories under the colonial administration of either the Portuguese or the British. Both underwent periods of great identity insecurity during the processes of decolonisation. Both groups have been living for over twenty or thirty years in European countries (in the former territories of the empire). They maintained and continue to establish (material, symbolic, etc.) connections and family ties. Since the 1980s, many Portuguese Muslims emigrated to Leicester and other areas where their peers from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, etc., had already settled. However, and despite all this, the two groups consider themselves profoundly different.

The identity debates between them still call upon their distinct colonial pasts, and their ambivalent identification with their respective colonisers (the Portuguese in Mozambique and the British in the territories of East Africa) as the main reason underlying their understanding of the experienced history, and the identity differences which they reciprocally attribute to one another.

Kenya was the most developed territory from the economic point of view, because it was a British colony and there was much European investment. ... So Kenyan Indians were usually the most affluent, the most educated, those who had a more European, more British lifestyle. Then I would say came the Indians of Uganda, and then those of Tanzania, and only after that those of Malawi and Mozambique. ... So, when Indians from East Africa arrived in England, 30 years ago, already they were more distinguished than those who came from Mozambique. (Asif)
Portuguese Muslims oppose the obsessive attention paid to the criteria of socio-economic and educational progress in outlining the distinctions (i.e. of relative identity superiority) which underlie the colonial and post-colonial hierarchy produced by their British peers. They, too, draw upon (mostly shared) reconstructions of Portuguese and British colonial history. They favour a system of values (regarded as Portuguese) – which promotes familiarising interaction and the affective personalisation of inter-ethnic relations – over another system (regarded as British), which valued the flaunting of the hierarchies of the world-system and racial and civilisational segregation. The Portuguese Muslims thus relativise the subtle accusation formulated by their peers, and strengthen their Portuguese identification, branded an ideal.

The friendship of the Portuguese was very different from that of the British. The British were pure rulers. In Mozambique, many Portuguese and Indians had personal relationships. [...]. Friendships such as ours were not possible in Uganda, Kenya and much less so in Rhodesia and South Africa. And I know full well what apartheid was. ... These differences are still noticeable today. The British in general are more reserved, more rigid. You always have to be thinking in the words you are going to use, even amongst Muslims. The Portuguese, however, are more sociable, more transparent and they like to joke around. Look, there’s a word to sum it all up. The Portuguese – be they Catholic, Muslims or Hindus – are more familiar.10 (Jamal)

They say that they were connected to a great power, while Portugal was a backward, peripheral country. They say that they were very satisfied with British rule in East Africa. But that British rule is still reflected nowadays in their way of life. Spinney Hills, Highfields, Evington, Belgrave, they’re all ghettos. The Indians segregate themselves. There are areas in Leicester where you don’t need to speak English. You just have to speak an Indian language. Sometimes, I tell them that most Indians in Portugal speak Portuguese, and that many have Portuguese friends. And they are surprised. But this comes from Mozambique. The Portuguese were not as racist as the South Africans or the Rhodesians. The Indians did not live in segregation. There was a lot of personal interaction between Indians and Portuguese. ... In the region of Beira, however, it was worse, there was more British influence. That area was dominated by Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd, which had the Companhia Comercial de Moçambique as a branch. So much so that, when we speak of racism in Mozambique, we need to say it all: there was a time, in
Beira, when even the Portuguese were segregated by the British.11 (Amad)

Moreover, the two value systems – associated with lasting ties to the way of being of the Portuguese colonisers (in Mozambique) or the way of being of the British colonisers (in the territories of East Africa) – serve as an explanation of the main difference they detect in each other. These are differences of character, but also differences in the degree of inter-racial, ethnic and religious openness; the ways in which public space is appropriated; the type of social and cultural integration; their strategies of openness or isolation to inter-ethnic relations; and the ways in which they live and communicate their religious difference in non-Muslim migratory contexts. As happens with their peers, their narratives, too, tend to transform perceived differences in identity ‘qualities’.

In Leicester, Muslims prefer to live in areas where other Muslims live. In Portugal, Muslims, at least those who came from Mozambique, do not attempt to live all clustered in the same area. They like living near non-Muslims, they have normal contacts with their neighbours, they are friends with many people of other religions. Many have shops, as you know, they have to deal with clients, they do so on a more personal basis, they know their clients by name … and it is not just a question of business. I am not saying that there aren’t exceptions, but the British are more individualist, detached, unlike the Portuguese, both Muslim and non-Muslim. In Mozambique it was already so. I believe that this coexistence of ours makes us very well-integrated people, both economically and culturally. The only thing that sets us apart is our religion. But this doesn’t mean that we have to keep separate and neither do we have to constantly be stating that we are Muslims, the way they do.12 (Fauzia)

I understand that someone made in India or even in Pakistan, right, when they come to a new place, they tend to prefer to live in that sort of place. We Portuguese Muslims are not like that, we really need to have people around, people of all styles and all religions, because we are used to that. Precisely because we all came from Mozambique, and in Mozambique it was so, and in Portugal it is so.13 (Soraia)

This same narrative context also produced a number of the most pejorative opinions expressed by the Portuguese Muslims upon their British peers and their (colonial and post-colonial) reference for identification and/or integration. As well as pointing out the colonial imperfections of
the English, i.e. the strength of their racism and their cunning in dividing and conquering, they explain most of the hidden racism and the apparent public tolerance of difference, matched by a posture of self-isolation (religious, sectarian, within the caste, etc.) of which they accuse Muslims of East African origin, as a result of a prolonged (and ambivalent) relationship with their British colonisers.

Muslims of Indian origin also have to shoulder the weight of their colonial history with the British. First in India, then in East Africa. This is noticeable even today ... in the way they relate to the Europeans, in their hidden racism against Africans, in how they live their religion and relate to other religions. They segregate themselves, isolate themselves, they have difficulty in joining inter-faith activities and pay great attention to their caste – they will only marry within their caste. They love clubs, where all members are men, all from the same caste, and all from Malawi, Kenya or Uganda.14 (Gulamo)

Here, mosques are easily come to resemble political parties, and many clerics contribute to that. Us, them, us, them... And in that, the British are very cunning, in dividing to rule. A British man, when he speaks to someone, will never tell them their opinion, he’d rather say, ‘You are right.’ He speaks to someone who tells him the exact opposite, and still he says, ‘You are right. And when he has the chance, he sets one up against the other. It happened in India, it happened in East Africa. (Jamal)

One last Portuguese argument to neutralise the hierarchy constructed by their peers is related to the statement that, due to racial segregation, the incorporation of ‘British culture’ on the part of Indian Muslims was very varied in the territories commonly known as East Africa. A number of Portuguese interviewees partially invert the historical narrative produced by the former, and propose an alternative system for the hierarchical organisation of civilisations more advantageous to the Mozambicans from an identity perspective. According to their arguments, the identification with ‘Portuguese culture’ – and with ‘European life’, thanks to the influence of South Africa – on the part of Mozambican Muslims was more intense than that experienced by their peers in Uganda and Malawi. Moreover, this advantageous differentiation in their selective cultural integration of Portuguese (and European) ecology was maintained and even accentuated, after decolonisation, in the European territories where the two groups settled.
In Mozambique, those from Kenya were considered to be the most sophisticated, the most cultured, the most British, those who had a more European life and more economic power, too. Especially the Hindus and Ismailis. But the Sunni Muslims from Uganda, at least those I spent time with, were very un-European. Even less European than certain Mozambican families. ... Maybe because we frequently visited South Africa, and except for that deplorable situation of apartheid, South Africa was a very modern, very European country. As to those who came from Malawi, who account for over 60 per cent of the Muslims who live in Leicester, I have noticed that they did not absorb as much of British culture, either there or here. In Malawi, most families lived in villages, with almost no contact with British culture, and they tried to safeguard their Indian and Muslim heritage. For example, they speak mostly gujarati or kutchi, which they learned at home, and the language of Malawi, since they needed to speak the local language to trade with the natives. So their English was rather superficial, with the exception of those who continued their studies or the minority who lived in urban centres. When a law was passed, forbidding Indians to own shops in villages, many thought that starting again in the cities would be more difficult, and decided to migrate to the UK. When they got here, they all stayed together in Highfields, where rents were lower, and emphasised their Muslim identity ... Whereas Mozambican Muslims absorbed many elements of Portuguese culture, integrated very well in the colonial society, and later in Portugal.15 (Firoza)

Each of the interviewees seems therefore to be constructing a version of colonial and post-colonial subjectivities by selecting positive identity qualities and reasons for pride, while forgetting or minimising traumatic events and finding imperfections in the Other’s past, as well as some room for identification and even comparative virtues. We heard that the Portuguese – albeit in an ambivalent form – agree with their British peers with a policy regarding greater investment in education and the professions; while the East African Muslims share with their Portuguese counterparts the belief that the Portuguese colonisers, though perhaps more oppressive from a religious standpoint, ‘did not exploit differences in skin colour as much as the British.’

According to British rule, the whites were the superior class, then came the Asians, and at the bottom of the hierarchy were the Africans. ... It was an unofficial apartheid, but segregated areas did exist. The Europeans lived in a fantastic area, then
came that of the Asians, where you would see no Europeans or Africans, and then that of the Africans, where Asians and Europeans did not enter, not least because they could be mugged. And in the workplace, the same. At the top of businesses and large companies, the Europeans; in the middle, Indians as accountants and bookkeepers; and then the boys, as we called them. In the area of commerce, the Indians provided the Europeans numerous products and services, and a whole set of essential goods to the Africans who lived in rural areas. And on public transport, the same. For example, in train stations, there were three kinds of restrooms. ... The colonial authorities did not interfere in religious issues. If we wished to build a mosque, we asked for a permit, and we would obtain it. Portuguese rule was more oppressive, less tolerant towards religion, but, in exchange, the Portuguese did not exploit as much the differences in skin colour as the British did. (Manzoor)

However, according to East African Muslims, at least on a discursive level the former colonisers’ greatest ‘imperfection’ is not merely related to the fact that they exploited the opposition between white and non-white as a criterion for hegemony, domination and exclusion (Pina-Cabral 2001). As with the representations of the Portuguese, they point to British mastery of the divide and rule policy (Hindus against Muslims in colonial India; Africans against Indians in East Africa and, more recently, Christians against Muslims) as their prime political weapon, but also as the main character defect of the English, both in their colonial past and in the post-colonial period. Despite the heightened Islamophobia when we were conducting our interviews, the memories evoking the strongest emotions were those linked to anti-Indian discrimination and the diaspora of terror (Appadurai 1996), subtly promoted by the British colonisers during the processes of decolonisation (that is, precisely by those by whom they felt protected).

Indians felt comfortable, protected and content during British rule. There were no conflicts between whites, Indians and Africans. Those only began after independence. The Indians had always helped the whites, when they were in trouble, because they worked for them, they supplied services and goods, so the Africans thought we were on their side. On the other hand, the whites were very smart. They began to say that the Indians were to blame, we were the exploiters, we only wanted to earn money and send it abroad, we were the ones who did not want African countries to develop. To cut a long story short, that the Indians were the great saboteurs of African economies. The exact
opposite was actually true, because the whites stole the riches. They had the great monopolies on cotton, coffee, oleaginous plants. After that the hierarchy changed: in first place, the Africans, in second place, the cunning whites, who had blamed the Indians, and lastly, the Indians. Discrimination began again, but this time against the Indians. They now had two sets of enemies, the whites and the Africans. The English are masters in the policy of divide and rule. That’s why there is no better nation.17 (Jalangir)

When Indians arrived in Leicester, there was much hostility against them. They looked like they got here with nothing, but they already had their money in the banks. When the British government decided to help us, their decision was mainly political. They knew our money was here, in Britain. If they sent the Indians away, they would go somewhere else and empty the banks.18 (Zuneid)

On the other hand, a significant proportion of Portuguese Muslims’ memories regarding the post-colonial period in Portugal and Mozambique, despite being equally painful, stress the importance of personal relationships, and even inter-ethnic friendships, constructed in the colonial period, in the choice of migratory routes and post-colonial processes of integration. Moreover, the idioms of opportunistic cunning and individualism, of betrayal and deception applied to former colonisers (or even the argument, labelled as purely instrumental, which inspired the political decisions of the British government following the Indian exodus to the UK) are substituted by the idioms of generosity and reciprocity, springing from the family-based values attributed to the Portuguese in general, and especially to Mozambicans. We repeatedly heard how these values and feelings, prevailing in the private sphere of inter-ethnic relations, enabled the Indians of Mozambican origin to overcome Portuguese bureaucracy and the scant support granted by the Portuguese government.

You ought to be like us: cultural hybrids and ‘cosmopolitan’

The narratives of both groups of interviewees evoke ‘profound cultural differences’, associated with both colonial and post-colonial inter-subjectivities. The most frequent perception is that Portuguese Muslims deploy a strategy of double differentiation, both from the dominant pattern of the culture of their ancestors, as reshaped by the dominant colonial influence of Mozambique, and of a number of patterns of current British public culture, as reshaped by their British peers.
The first great difference is cultural. The Portuguese Muslims speak Portuguese to each other, they speak a European language, while here most people speak Indian languages: Gujarati, Punjabi, Hindi. They can speak Gujarati too, but they prefer Portuguese. Another cultural difference, maybe this is something very personal, or maybe not, has to do with their behaviour, with the way they relate to people. I’ll give you an example. One of my neighbours in Highfields comes from Portugal. If he meets someone he knows on the street, whether the other person is Portuguese or not, he greets them very warmly, he may even cry out to them to attract their attention, if he sees them on the other side of the street; he will slap them on the back, he may spend ten minutes talking about his own life or asking about the other person’s. I don’t feel 100 per cent British, but I have lived for more than 30 years in the UK, and this is shocking to me. But I think this has to do with the Portuguese culture, doesn’t it.19 (Ebrahim)

In Mozambique things were already like that. I, too, come from Malawi, but a large part of my family lived in Mozambique, in the region of Beira, and I spent my holidays there every year. The Portuguese always were more sociable than the British. And the Mozambican Muslims picked that up from the Portuguese. As soon as they meet someone, they treat them like they’re family. And that way they have of always joking around, that’s very Portuguese.20 (Ismael)

Some of these highly familiar practices are described as inappropriate and/or divergent from ‘British’ patterns of public behaviour. However, others are classified as indices – ambivalently admired or criticised – of ‘Westernisation’. In particular the latter is true for those who touch upon areas of identity-related social presentation, such as clothing, food, malefemale relationships, patterns of marriage or the degree of interethnic openness. The Portuguese Muslims, while recognising the ambivalent or even derogatory tone used by certain of their peers in calling them ‘baglás’ [white], actually recognise themselves in most of the identity traits projected upon them, and emphasise that these were established in Mozambique during the colonial period.

The greatest difference is cultural. It has to do with the way of speaking, relating, dressing, eating, with their very lifestyle which, in the eyes of most Muslims, is codified as baglá, that is, more European. Mozambican Muslims never use Muslim dress, nor have beards like ours. They dress in the Western way, men
and most women. The latter rarely use headscarves or hijabs and, as far as I know, there is not much separation between men and women. They also mix more than we do. I personally think it is a shame [that we do not do the same], because we are reduced to our own small world.21 (Jassat)

The locals sometimes call us ‘baglás’: ‘You are like baglás’, ‘You speak like baglás’, ‘You live like baglás’: that is, they think we are too European. Because we speak a non-Indian language, but a European one, Portuguese, because we speak a lot of Portuguese, even at home. Take my sisters, for example: they studied in Britain, speak Gujarati and are married to non-Mozambicans, and still, when they speak to their children they use those sentences: ‘Vamos lá fazer chichi’ [‘Let’s go pee-pee’], or ‘É preciso lavar o rabinho’ [‘Time to wipe your tushy now’] .... Baglás, because we like Portuguese food: cod, prawns, chicken with chilli, because not many days go by without having some strong black coffee, and we go to Portuguese restaurants. Baglás, because we follow Portuguese football. Baglás, because we do not dress the Muslim way. Baglás, because even in Mozambique, we were very accustomed to living with Europeans. (Firoza)

Even more interesting is how they define their unique identity, which they do not see — as some of their British peers suggest — as merely the result of prolonged mimicry (Taussig 1993; Bhabha 1994) in their relationship with Portuguese colonisers. Quite to the contrary, Portuguese Muslims are said to be a distinct case, a unique mixture, combining the best elements found in the traditions of their forefathers with all the best elements derived from centuries-long contact with the Portuguese colonisers. They therefore melded both ancestral and colonial repertoires, to which multiple African references were added.

Indian Muslims from Mozambique are a unique instance. You will not find any other Indians in East Africa like them. Their community was the most mixed, integrated the highest number of coloured and mixed-race people. And from the cultural point of view too, you will not find any other community which combined so many references, Indian, African, Portuguese, in their ways of speaking, living, feeling, eating and relating to others. And I know what I am talking about, because a large diaspora originated from our village.22 (Abdula)

You know, we who came from Mozambique, we were always very cosmopolitan. I’ll give you an example, my brothers. Abdula
married a Pakistani woman from Punjab; the next brother, a Muslim girl of surti caste from Mozambique; the third one, a girl of memom caste, also from Mozambique; the following brother a girl who’s Afro-Malayan or Chinese, I’m not sure; another brother, like myself, married a surti girl from India and Burma. My sister married a Croatian man, a baglá who converted to the Muslim religion, my other sister married a Pakistani man, and my younger brother is going to marry a Bangladeshi from London next Saturday. Such openness to difference is impossible to those from Malawi.23 (Latif, brother of Abdula)

Yes, that’s true, Mozambican Muslims are by far the most integrated. Those who came from Malawi, they still cling to certain traditions.24 (Zabir, maternal uncle of Abdula)

This possibility – that they define as ‘cosmopolitan’ – could itself be read as the product of ‘an orientation, a willingness to engage with the other’ (Hannerz 1996: 103), which results in a ‘power’ of understanding of the world as lived by others, a power of translation (between languages, including those of natives and colonisers) and improvisation (using the language of the other). It may also be seen as a transformative power for oneself and the other (Van der Veer 2002), promoted by the different circumstances of the (inter-racial, cultural, religious, etc.) encounter during the colonial administration and by specific traits attributed to the Portuguese cultural ecology.

These cosmopolitan powers, however, were not completely neutral. Applied to relations with the native population, they enabled increased economic and identity success among Muslim Indians, who also constituted a moral, religious, economic and political ‘threat’ to the colonial regime, an alternative power responsible for the rising paranoia (Bhabha 1994: 101) apparent in the Portuguese colonial discursive production upon the Mohammedans of Indian origin in the colony of Mozambique.25

I met an Indian Muslim on the beach at Manica who lived in a village near ours. I called him ‘Dada’ [paternal grandfather]. He had been a hunter of elephants, and all the Africans thought he had great magical powers. ... To the African, a man who goes into the jungle, kills elephants, sleeps in the jungle, and is not attacked by wild beasts, had to be a powerful man. One day, I asked him, ‘Where does this idea about your power come from, Dada?’ And he answered me, ‘My power is my gun, which I always keep at my side’. Another time, I found him at his house, sitting on the floor in front of a trunk. The number of Africans
who went to visit him struck me. They spoke to each other and then each of them left some money on top of the trunk. When this ended, I asked him, ‘Dada, what are they doing?’ And he said, ‘All these men who come here, they are witch doctors. They are asking me to protect them from other witch doctors. They believe that only I can protect them. And this is why they give me money. If they didn’t, they wouldn’t feel protected.’ I saw this, otherwise I wouldn’t have believed it. Such power the Indians had in Mozambique, see! Their reputation was such that even the governor had to have good relations with him, if he wanted to stay there. They even say that once he had a heated discussion with the governor, and all the Africans turned against the latter, and he had to be transferred. Such was the power of Dada. (Abdula)

However, this cosmopolitan heritage was also largely responsible for their current ways of thinking, living, relating, marrying, even for their identity self-presentation as Mozambican-Portuguese and Muslim, but more than anything, for their special enjoyment of inter-personal contact which contravened supposed borders and absence of (religious, ethno-cultural, gender, intergenerational, etc.) communication, which is manifest in their post-colonial cosmopolitan options.

I am leading a project for the construction of a new mosque. Already in the time of the prophet, the mosque was more than anything a space for encounters. What we wish to do is to open the mosque, invite people of different faiths, to talk, to eat together, Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, Catholics. And also to invite other Muslim brothers, to try and end all the rivalries between mosques. (Jamal)

We are trying to organise a Portuguese club... for Catholics, Hindus, Muslims, atheists, it doesn’t matter. We are setting up an introductory meeting. We are going to get women and men together in the same room, serve some olives, cod cakes, Portuguese cheese, samosas and shrimp, and we already contacted some boys who are going to sing fado. Imams here forbid music, but we are going to have music, they insist upon the separation of men and women, but we are going to get everyone together at the same table. Against religious sectarianism, we are going to get together Catholics, Hindus and Muslims. We are going to mix, to show people here, Muslims or not, that we have a different way of life. And we are going to speak Portuguese. (Amad)
Portuguese Muslims do not answer the surreptitious accusation of excessive mimicry – contained in the expression ‘You are (like) baglás’ – by a strategy of simple symmetry, such as accusing their Muslim neighbours in Highfields or Spinney Hills of parochialism. The emphasis upon the specificity of their colonial and post-colonial cosmopolitism is a wider strategy of construction of admirable exemplarity, drawing from colonial models of both the Portuguese and the British (themselves considerably different), and the post-colonial options of involvement with the other, displayed both by their current hosts and their Muslim peers.

‘We were even accused of being anti-Islamic: “You ought to be like us, moderate and ‘liberal’”’

A number of community leaders believe that the Muslim population living in Leicester has a strong awareness of their differences and religious rivalries. Despite that, at least in the public space, the Muslim ideal of equality, matched by an attitude that rejects criticism of brothers and a posture of apparent acceptance of intra-religious differences, is seen as better suited to certain values of British multiculturalism. This context helps explain the fact that criticism and/or a harsh tone are more frequent in the discourses of Portuguese Muslims (especially the most recently arrived) concerning their British peers, than the inverse.

Usually the Muslims who came from Mozambique are more moderate, more liberal, more critical of religious sectarianism. I, for example, was even accused of being anti-Islamic. Here you cannot be critical of other brothers, otherwise you will not enter Paradise. ... But at home, especially the elders, they spend their whole time saying, ‘Don’t go to that mosque, they are deoband’, ‘You cannot marry her, because her family is salafi and ours anti-salafi.’ (Moshin)

Portuguese Muslims are in fact characterised as moderate, largely uninterested in factional rivalries and being against radicals by a number of British interviewees who identify with the same attitude. The group is presented to counter the clear increase in their view – at the local, national and international level – of fundamentalism and religious sectarianism (on the part of Muslims, Christians, Hindus or Sikhs). In the eyes of a number of religious and community leaders, however, the main distinguishing element is the way they articulate their cultural, national and religious identity and how they present it to others.
The leading sheik in Leicester believes that Muslims who came from Mozambique and/or Portugal clearly contrast with Indian Muslims (including their Gujarati Surti peers who came directly from India), defined as those who most practise ‘religion as a way of life’ and ‘are more careful in observing all religious laws and values’. They are also differentiated from the Pakistanis (in particular, the older generations) who ‘condense their religious, national, linguistic and cultural identity into one’. Finally, they also differ from a significant percentage of East African Muslims who, despite sharing a number of cultural references (of origin, caste, previous context of migration, etc.) emphasise their Muslim identity. They are described as being different in how they emphasise the specificity of their identity as Portuguese Muslims.

From the religious perspective, I do not think that there are significant differences between the Sunnis who came from Portugal and those who came, for example, from Malawi. They are relatively moderate people in religious terms. But if you ask me how I feel, how I define myself, I will tell you I am of Indian origin, I was born in Malawi, I learnt to speak the native language and through it also absorbed much of the African culture and ways of thinking, and that I have been living in Leicester for many years. I have numerous references, but my strongest identity is being a Muslim. However, if you ask those who came from Mozambique and Portugal how do they define themselves, I suspect that they will answer they are Portuguese of Muslim religion.27 (Yossuf)

The Portuguese Muslims recognise themselves in religious moderation, lack of interest in arguments and factional struggles and in the presentation of their identity as Portuguese or Mozambicans of Muslim religion. The main criticism they direct at their brothers relates to the ways in which these reconstruct, experience and enunciate their religious difference in non-Muslim contexts. Besides insularity and ethno-religious sectarianism, the act of making Muslim identity visible – and particularly the issue of the veil and hijab – is a frequent theme in their narratives.

It was a surprise to me. I thought this was a progressive country, and when I arrived I realised that British Muslims are very conservative. In Portugal and even in Mozambique we were more liberal. ... Our women, they, too, are very religious, but they do not go around completely veiled.28 (Sodagar)
They are more conservative than us during the day. At night it’s all very different. If you go to town on a Thursday or Tuesday evening, you will find a disco ... where they go, very elegant and carefully styled, they drink, dance and then when they go back to Highfields in private cars or taxis, they put that back on and veil their faces. *Purdah* is a pretence. But, you know, there is much hypocrisy here. (Moshin)

In Leicester, most girls cover their heads, especially if they live in a Muslim area. Some use the veil because of their faith, because it has a special significance to them. But there also are those who are forced by the parents to veil completely. ... It is not even a question of covering the head, they cover everything. But these same girls get to school and they may change clothes and go around in miniskirts. There is such repression here in certain families, that’s morbid and is not at all part of Islam. ... I do not feel that the veil is an obligation. In our religion, we have obligations, and we have what you may call discretionary acts (...) and the veil is among the discretionary, almost compulsory. ... I am very proud to say that I am a Muslim, but I do not need to cover my head.29 (Nadia)

As I usually say, a Muslim who lives in Portugal, who has lived in Mozambique, he has Satan in his eyes, in a manner of speaking. I’ll explain ... In my religion, we usually say that woman, when she ventures outside the house, she is turned into Satan, because with her sensuality she may ensnare whomever she wishes. ... I would like to cover myself, for myself, but I need to see unveiled people ... Saying this is a sin for a Muslim like me, but it is true. And if many of us prefer life in Portugal, this is because we like to have in our eyes exactly that which each person sees. (Soraia)

From the perspective of numerous interviewees, the veil is used because of the obligation/repression of family and community. This is frequently a catalyst for identity compartmentalisations and divisions. Women choosing to wear the veil is an act and expression of personal faith, independent of family, community and other non-Muslim spheres. These two situations are mostly associated with the British context. In Portugal however, the absence of the veil, and especially the rejection of full-body veiling, are more common postures. The absence of the veil is articulated as a much more internalised and intimate relationship with God and religion. Because the self-esteem of the Muslim woman is not vulnerable and therefore does not need to be exhibited,
the female subject is able to evade the inherently negative power associated with the veil, specifically that of female sensuality, magical and omnipotent, capable of subverting patriarchal values to affirm the power of every woman. Likewise, in Portugal as in Mozambique, the family-based patterns of inter-personal relations would question the unassuming intention to see, be seen and see oneself.

The subalternisation of post-colonial microcosms to the geo-strategic relations of the current world-system: ‘The blood of a Muslim is worthless, after all’

Werbner (2002) and Geaves (2005) believe that peaceful disagreement, resistance and indignation demonstrated by a significant part of the UK Muslim population in the Stop The War Coalition temporarily brought rival Muslim groups and sub-groups together. This in turn weakened representation and argumentation struggles between them while simultaneously indicating a change in their mobilisation and political participation. The ongoing debates on identity between Portuguese and British Muslims did not escape unscathed by these encounters. The precise historical circumstances and the surrounding cultural ecology itself, both at the local and national level, seem to have a considerable influence upon inter-identity dynamics.

The majority of Portuguese Muslims living in Leicester, like their British peers, disagreed with the invasion of Iraq and with the Portuguese government’s support of Prime Minister Blair and President Bush. Especially after 7/7, even those who stated that they understood in part the position of the British Prime Minister, as well as Labour Party supporters, stated that the war had been a mistake that urgently needed correcting – or at least, acknowledging – on the part of the governments involved.

I believe that Blair was morally and legally wrong. He made a mistake, and he can still correct it. But from the point of view of national economy, he could not refuse to support Bush, because there are thousands and thousands of Britons working in the US. And by supporting Bush, he also solved the problem of the IRA, because the IRA was mainly financed by the Irish in the US ... The Leicester council had been dominated by Labour for 30 years, and because of general discontent, on the part of Muslims and non-Muslims, on the invasion of Iraq, Labour lost here. And Leicester was a Labour bastion. (Amad)

Recent British policies in Afghanistan were the trigger. I know the various Muslim communities in the UK well, both older and
younger members, and most were against the invasion of Iraq. International politics by itself does not explain Muslim suicide bombers, but that certainly was the trigger. And Labour, sooner or later, will recognise this. (Yossuf)

Despite the opinions of their peers in Portugal regarding the impact of the London terrorist strikes on Muslim communities in the UK, all the Muslims interviewed (Portuguese and British) mentioned without any external encouragement their concern with terrorism, foreign and national politics. Notwithstanding their anxiety relating to the new legislation limiting freedom of expression, none of them renounced their democratic rights to oppose or question British governmental policies, as well as Anglo-American geopolitics itself.

Equally relevant is the way they expressed to a non-Muslim interlocutor that 7/7, especially, had at least temporarily pushed certain ideological, factional, political, religious issues to the background. Firoza was one of the first to recognise this when he thought it was strange that Rahim, from Mozambique, a barelvi, had warmly recommended I speak with Faruk, from Malawi, a deobandi Asif, from Uganda, reacted with surprise upon learning that Amad, born in Mozambique and whose antipathy to Wahhabism was well known, had given me the phone number of Rafik, born in the UK, whose religious education had been carried out in Saudi Arabia. In another instance, Jamal, born in Mozambique, a member of the Labour Party and advisor of PM Blair on religious issues, enthusiastically supported and was present for the public speech after the London bombings delivered by sheik Yossuf, from Malawi, a known Stop The War Coalition activist. Such reactions cannot simply be attributed to an emphasis of Muslim unity detected in various interviewees – especially speaking to non-Muslim researchers, whose explicit or implicit intention lay in uncovering and analysing intra-religious rivalries (King 1997: 133). The period after 7/7 and the local context itself – with a clear and documented effort to create a common Muslim front to negotiate with political authorities (Vertovec & Peach 1997: 30) – provides a better explanation for the attenuated (though temporary) lack of unity within and among the approximately 30 mosques in Leicester.

Issues such as Islamic terrorism, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the unresolved problems of Palestine and Kashmir, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the armed struggle in Chechnya, or the strategies of ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims frequently arise in interviews with Portuguese and British Muslims. This suggests we should consider the impact of the supra-national and geo-strategic dimension of historical relations between the various competitive components in the dynamic restructuring of personal identity systems.
Specifically, the attempt to understand and rationalise the recent terrorist attacks in London clearly emphasised the need to articulate recent international political history with long-term identity processes. The latter in turn had to be analysed in terms of local identity processes which reconfigure them, and provide the necessary identifications and emotions, both for violent actions, and for peaceful, locally rooted, resistance and struggle.

I do not believe much in sociological explanations. There are many impoverished young people, unemployed, who are also targeted by racism ... Somalis, Moroccans, Sikhs, etc. They, too, have problems of social exclusion, but they do not explode bombs in the Tube. It was some Muslim youngsters, British Muslims and not political refugees, but youngsters who were born here, who have a high level of education, and who are not particularly poor. And why? I believe that the explanation is more political. These young men began to understand through the TV and the internet what had been going on with Muslims all over the world. Even I, when I remember all the atrocities committed against Muslims, civilians, innocent, I feel incensed. And this is where radical clerics come in, those who are called radical Islamists. But it also is where international politics comes in, supplying very powerful arguments to demonstrate that this is a war against Muslims. Just think about Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is easy to reach the conclusion that the blood of thousands and thousands of Muslims is less important that the blood of British and American soldiers, that the blood of a Muslim, after all, is worthless. This causes much pain, rage, humiliation. (Yussef)

The first aspect to highlight is that the sociological explanation, centred upon the detection and correction of racist inequalities in the organisation of daily life – housing, education, health, work within a specific social context (in this case, the British), as well as the attempts to document, monitor and correct them with legal action, was revealed as irrelevant, or excused as a necessary but insufficient condition to justify the motivations of terrorist action. In the words of various interviewees, 9/11 could not be explained by the characteristics of American society, nor 11 March 2004’s Madrid train bombings by Spanish culture, nor the 7/7 attacks in London by British society.

Similarly, the distinctive characteristics of Muslim populations integrated into different local and national contexts, the rekindling of sectarianism and religious fundamentalism, as well as the proliferation of ideologies defined as radical and extremist, were not by themselves
sufficient explanations to understand the motivation of the young Muslims involved in the attacks.

Despite what people say, we live in an increasingly less tolerant world. There is an increase of fundamentalism, in all religions. Islam is no exception. That does not mean that people become more religious. On the contrary, they are ever more sectarian, divided. Here, there are far more differences in thought between Muslims, much more than in Portugal. And I have also noticed that there is more of a religious influence, which at times turns towards radicalism. The Wahhabis are the most radical. Indeed, they created jihad. The prophet only spoke of war in defence, a defensive jihad. Even the conquest of Mecca was peaceful. The prophet believed, as Gandhi did, in pacifism. Of course there were times in history for offensive jihad, to conquer. There were men who took advantage of religion, who spoke in the name of Islam, to fire jihad up. Then, as now, these radicals brainwash young people, promising them paradise after death. I cannot accept these suicide bombers. But let it also be known, this is not just religion. British foreign policies have been a great mistake. But this could still be corrected, I hope. (Abdula)

Several community leaders are also implicated, people supposedly more preoccupied with the prestige-laden control of community activities than with the emergence of ‘extremist cells’. They blame parents for not investing in the political and religious identifications of the younger generations and especially an expectation that local solutions at the community and/or family level would be found for the bombings of 7/7.

The government blames community leaders for not keeping Islamic radicalism under control and now wants us to solve the problem. For example, I come into contact almost daily with the police, I volunteer information, I give them contacts. But we cannot be the only ones investigating, and keeping an eye out. That’s why we pay our taxes. And we work hard to make a living, ... indeed, we were the first to communicate to the authorities that there were a number of emerging extremist cells; I myself sent a number of letters expressing my concern regarding the presence of certain more radical imams. And the government did not do a thing. Only after all this happened do they want to deport them. You’d be justified to think that they let all this happen so that they would have reasons enough to change the laws on freedom of expression and they could assert control over the political, economic and religious life of the Asians. (Asif)
Some blame the parents because they did not control their offspring. But the young will not tell their parents that they were contacted by Hizb-al-Tahrir or Al-Muhajiroun or any other Islamic extremist group. It doesn’t happen in the madrassas, where small children go, that they are brainwashed. They do not deliver their speeches in the mosques of Leicester. Not even at university, they were banned. It mostly happens over the internet and in some places we know nothing about, that’s where the radicals attempt to mobilise the young. They ask questions that these young people, that we ourselves cannot answer. ‘Why have Western countries only attacked Muslims over the past few years?’ ‘Why were Bosnian Muslims the victims of such atrocities?’ Because they were Muslims, that’s their answer. Why are there bloody conflicts in Palestine and Kashmir which governments have no interest in solving? Because they involve Muslims. Why did Westerners invade Afghanistan and Iraq? Because they are anti-Muslims. These extremists divide the world between bad guys and victims. The victims are always Muslims ... These arguments have a lot of impact on certain youngsters, they provide them with a cause. They are very excited with the idea that they can change the world, they can see justice done to Muslims, that they can overturn all the humiliation and suffering which thousands and thousands of Muslims have undergone. From that to encourage them towards self-sacrifice, it’s just one step. And religious reward, if you press the detonator, you can go straight to heaven, it ends up working. But world leaders do not wish to understand that international policies which have systematically attacked and humiliated Muslims, will strengthen radicalisation, the politicisation of religion, as they say now. (Gulamo)

Most interviewees agreed with the need to carry out a political and historical analysis of the effects on identity of an asymmetrical war between the Anglo-American block and certain extremist segments of Muslims. Whether this came as a consequence of ousting the leadership in Muslim states and/or their crushing defeats in military confrontations, the result was the same – the transformation of the religious leaders into sole witnesses to the traumatised sensitivities of suffering and humiliated populations. The dimension of identity thus became more relevant to understanding and potentially solving the very acts they condemned.
Conclusion

If we agree with Scheff (1996) in supposing that emotions reflect the psychological side of social relations, then the empathy for the suffering of Muslim communities, the identity-based rage over the fact that ‘the blood of a Muslim, after all, is worthless to the eyes of Westerners’ and the resulting feeling of humiliation could be the prime movers behind violent, vengeful or compensatory action. These emotions are difficult to elaborate, and they would therefore push certain young men to retaliatory actions. They may see such actions as capable of restoring hope, by subverting the degrading status quo and restoring dignity lost in the context of non-diplomatic relations. The inter-identity respect resulting from a policy of recognition had vanished from the equation.

Most Muslims, at least here in Leicester, are very conscious of the double standard of British politics. Blair and Bush first defended Saddam Hussein, then attacked him. They speak of democracy, but they support the regime of Saudi Arabia, where there are different laws for nationals and foreigners, and Musharraf in Pakistan, who seized power with a coup. They speak of the war on terror, but they support Israel. When thousands of Palestinian civilians are killed, they call it war, when the Palestinians set off a bomb and kill Israeli civilians, they call it terrorism. Thousands and thousands of Muslims already died in Iraq. Muslims and non-Muslims were together against the war. Most Britons were against the war, and they took to the streets to say so. But Blair said ‘No.’ Is this democracy? (Firoza)

When 52 people die in London, it is a tragedy, it is painful for me and everybody else. They are innocent civilians, Muslims, Catholics, Jews, it doesn’t matter. But when thousands of Muslims in countries such as Iraq die, it doesn’t seem to matter. It’s unfair, angering. Almost as if the blood of a Muslim was cheap, nobody wants to know, the more the better, for the interests of Blair and Bush. I have to make an effort to be rational here. We live in a democracy, full of imperfections, but in which I believe. It may take ten, twenty, thirty years, but I am not going to set a bomb off to see justice done. (Moshin)

When confronted and moved by similar emotional dilemmas, our interviewees refuse to ‘react to a mistake with the same mistake, because two wrongs will never make a right.’ Despite the widespread recognition of the double standard of the so-called democratic practice – and in particular of the way it actually promotes the interests of a few leaders
of the world-system, providing moral legitimacy to their decisions – they still believe in the long-term effectiveness of forms of negotiated transformation for a world-system they currently consider unfair and traumatic.

Were we to listen to their voices, it would not seem too bold to suggest that micro-sociological ideas of the concept of identity are somehow subalternised from the theoretical perspective. The preference would be for increased analytical articulation between political history, socio-cultural organisation, the relative positioning of groups and groups segments and of subjects within groups and the processes of investment of hierarchised macro-group identities competing within the world-system. Moreover, to return to their preoccupations (which are indeed shared by many non-Muslims), it seems fitting to reach the conclusion that the much-quoted ‘clash of civilisations’, more than anything else, seems to serve as a veil in order to conceal a lasting and profound crisis in the democratic system. The crisis results from its contradiction with the instrumental and counter-diplomatic interests perceived as the moving forces behind dominant strategies.

Notes

1 This chapter is part of a larger research project entitled ‘From Mozambique to Portugal and other opportunities: A study of transnational ethnic minority elites’, which was coordinated by J. Bastos, developed by the Centre for the Study of Migration and Ethnic Migration of the New University of Lisbon (CEMME) and founded by The Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT).

2 We define ‘identification’ as the permanent process of transformation of the self in order to become a significant ‘other’, as well as the cumulative, pluralising effect of said process in a person’s history and biography. In this sense, identification is based on love, admiration and envy, i.e. it is a form of ambivalent love, of idealisation and respect for the ‘other’.

3 The UK’s 1991 census recorded Leicester as the British city with the fifth-largest non-European population (28.5 per cent). Leicester was also the city with the second-highest percentage of Indian-origin residents (63,994 people, 23.7 per cent of the total population), with 58,875 of them having been born outside the EU. Their presence was mostly the result of the independence processes of African territories under British colonial administration. The families of Gujarati origin arrived in large waves, raising serious concerns within the local Council. They were concentrated in wards such as Spinney Hills, where the percentage of non-white residents in the early 1990s reached 82.6 per cent (of which more than 70 per cent was Asian). A strategy of spatial concentration, where identity rivalries based on religion were central, actually led to the concentration of Gujarati-origin Muslims in Spinney Hills and Highfields, while Gujarati Hindus mostly came to reside in Belgrave ward, a few miles away. In a context of de-Christianisation and alteration of customs among the younger generations of locals, Muslims experienced the most marked growth, from 12,322 in 1983 (4.3 per cent) to 30,885 in 2001, while Hindus and Sikhs experienced hardly any changes.
The genealogies we recorded show both groups mainly originated from Kutch, Khatiawar and Surat. They frequently came from the same village or town and, in many cases, were related by family or caste.


The literature concerning migrants settling in the territories known as East Africa and, after independence, in the UK is extremely rich. Among the many titles see Morris (1968), Ghai and Ghai (1970), Twaddle (1975), Salvadori (1989), Clarke, Peach and Vertovec (1990) and Ballard (1994).

There is no statistical source for Portuguese-speaking Muslims in the UK. However, the interviews allow us to estimate that the first migratory flow of Luso-Mozambicans Muslims to Leicester happened in the late 1970s. Those who chose to emigrate directly from Mozambique or after a short stay in Portugal already had a network of contacts and support, based on caste and family relations (often with their peers from Malawi). The integration of Portugal into the European Community (in 1986) and the opportunities for professional development and the conditions for education and social assistance offered by the UK significantly increased the number of Portuguese Muslims who settled in Leicester between 1998 and 2000. Since 2001, the migration has continued at an even higher level, thanks to the global context of economic crisis and labour market contraction, with the effects more marked in Portugal than in many EU countries.

We have chosen to use aliases for our interviewees. This is not in any way an attempt to deny their voices (they themselves did not require anonymity); rather, it is an attempt to guarantee that these voices may continue to contradict local and national knowledge, values and practices without fear of any repercussion. We held a total of 39 in-depth interviews. The Muslim associations, which are common in Leicester, emerged as a strategic point for the initial encounters with East African Muslims. On the other hand, the multi-site fieldwork we conducted with Portuguese-speaking Muslims (in Mozambique and Portugal) enabled us to follow friends and relatives of some of our previous informants (with highly diverse socio-economic status). Interviews with both groups were initially oriented towards recording memories regarding their migratory histories (in Africa and Europe) and tracing the development of their identity strategies (economic, matrimonial, religious, etc.) through the generations.

Asif, born in Uganda, has been living in Leicester since 1978 and works as a financial consultant.

Jamal, born in Mozambique, has been living in Leicester since 1992 and is a retired shopkeeper.

Amad, born in Mozambique, has been living in Leicester since 2002 and is a retired accountant.

Fauzia, born in Portugal, visiting family in Leicester, is a student.

Soraia, born in Portugal, on holiday in Leicester, is a student.

Gulamo, born in Mozambique, has been living in Leicester since 1998, is a retired businessman.

Firoza, born in Mozambique, has been living in Leicester since 1978, and is a business manager.

Manzoor, born in Kenya, has been living in Leicester since 1970, and is a retired economist.

Jalangir, born in Uganda, has been living in Leicester since 1972, and is a lawyer.

Zuneid, born in Kenya, has been living in Leicester since 1969, and is a retired accountant.
Ebrahim, born in Malawi, has been living in Leicester since 1970 and is an Islamic cleric.

Ismael, born in Malawi, has been living in Leicester since 1974 and is a computer scientist.

Jassat, from Malawi, has been living in Leicester since 1972 and is a shopkeeper in Highfields.

Abdula, born in Mozambique, has been living in Leicester since 1980 and is a lawyer.

Latif, born in Mozambique, has been living in Leicester since 1979 and is a trade manager.

Zabir, born in Malawi, has been living in Leicester since 1978 and is a businessman.

Particularly since the 1930s and unlike Hindus and Khojas (Ismailis), Sunni Muslims (notably the great importers, exporters, warehouse owners and traders of the northern shore) began to be described by the colonial administration as active agents in the dissemination and conversion of Africans to Islam. They were accordingly defined as potential enemies of Catholicism and the expansion of the Portuguese authority. This colonial representation of the Muslim progressively acquired a political dimension. Religious proselytising among the ‘indigenous population’ was, from the mid-1960s, seen as an instrument for political proselytising against the colonisers.

Moshin, born in Mozambique, has been living in Leicester since 2003 and is a supervisor in a food factory.

Yossuf, born in Malawi, has been living in Leicester since 1978 and is a senior member of the Muslim Council of Britain and the Leicester Council of Faiths.

Sodagar, born in Daman, has been living in Leicester since 1995 and is retired.

Nadia, living in Portugal, has several family members living in Spinney Hills.

Leicester is a good example of the success of Muslim Labour Party candidates in local governmental elections. According to Vertovec and Peach (1997: 35), over ten years ago, ‘The city of Leicester not only has produced a number of Muslim city and country councillors, but also a Muslim Chief Executive (alongside a Muslim Police Superintendent)’.

The perception communicated to me in Portugal (before the trip to Leicester) was that the Muslims in the UK were being subjected to ‘strong pressure’, that a number were being kept under surveillance and questioned by the authorities or interviewed by journalists. They were believed to be feeling harassed and fearful of Islamophobic retaliation and would therefore be avoiding mosques for fear of being attacked and insulted, as well as because attendance could potentially lead to their association with ‘fundamentalist’, ‘radical’, ‘extremist’, ‘terrorist’ elements. They wished to be ‘left alone’, to concentrate on their professional and family life. And, most significantly, they would be reluctant to talk to non-Muslims at such a critical moment.

The deobandi movement, not unlike other reformist movements which emerged in India in the nineteenth century ‘questioned the genuineness of the conversion of large sections of the Muslim population, as well as the Islamic knowledge of the religious elite, both ‘ulama’ and pirs. (...) This brought them into direct conflict with the Sufi worship of saints and tombs, which they condemned as innovations’ (Van der Veer 1994: 58). Also created in the second half of the nineteenth century, the barelvi movement attempted to oppose the deobandi, explicitly supporting a ‘popular expression of Islam’ (King 1997: 134), ‘more infused with superstition, and also syncretism’, which emphasised ‘belief in miracles and powers of saints and pirs, worship at shrines and the dispensing of amulets and charms (...) detested by the Deobandis as un-Islamic’ (Haliday & Alavi 1988: 81-84). The main divergence between barelvis and deobandis does not appear to be their support of values and Sufi ways of spiritual
training, but rather the competitive quest for ‘superior’ paths to mysticism (Metcalf 1982; Van der Veer 1994). However, most interviewees (both Portuguese and British) tend to ground the antagonism of the two movements in an opposition between Sufism and anti-Sufism.

33 Wahhabism appeared in Mozambique during the colonial period. According to Carvalho (1999), the transference of Islamic influence from the islands of the Indian Ocean (in particular, since 1964, Zanzibar) to Saudi Arabia, and the colonial attempt to construct a counter-power based upon religious conflict among the elites of Indian origin, contributed towards its emergence. The antipathies we recorded against the Wahhabi movement are partially explained by the growing influence of Saudi Arabia in post-colonial Mozambique (a significant number of the religious leaders of Islamic associations and mosques created following independence studied there), as well as with their association to the political powers in charge.

34 This front was the Leicester Federation of Muslim Organisations.

35 A number of interviewees stated that the basic division among Sunnis of Indian origin is between barelvis and deobandis, both followers of the hanafi Islamic law school. Most barelvi mosques appear to be the result of the significant presence of Muslims of Pakistani origin in the UK. Deobandi mosques are less numerous. They are attended mainly by Indian Muslims, mainly Gujaratis, who came directly from India or who have spent time in East Africa, as well as by Pakistani muhajirs, who are the descendants of Indian refugees in Pakistan after 1947 (see King 1997).

36 A quote from the public speech delivered by Yossuf at the Masjid Umar in Evington, Leicester, on 23 July 2005.

References


7 Introduction to a study of comparative inter-ethnic relations: the cases of Portugal and Britain

Nuno Dias

Introduction

This chapter is based on my PhD research, entitled ‘The Voyages of Rama: Hindu Diasporical Identity Constructions in Colonial and Post-Colonial Contexts in Portugal and England’. The objective of the study is to approach inter-ethnic relations in a diachronic and comparative perspective, focusing in particular on the trajectories of early Hindu migrants from Gujarat to East Africa. Following the independence of these territories, many East African Hindus migrated to Portugal and Britain.

The trajectories of these diasporic populations are explored through life histories. The study describes the social, economic and political contingencies of this multistage migration. It relates individual migration stories to a macro-historical perspective. These Hindu populations were important actors on the colonial and post-colonial scenes, contributing essentially to inter-group dynamics in East Africa and later in the former imperial centres.

Comparative analysis sheds light on certain arguments that have crystallised through time and history, in particular a nationally based and patronising rhetoric justifying the colonial enterprise, a recurrent self-assigned feature in Portuguese as well as in British colonial history to the present day.

While numerous studies report discrimination on the grounds of skin colour in both Portugal and Britain the local mainstream media frequently attribute the causes of discrimination to social disruption and delinquency prevalent in non-white migrant communities. Negative representations of these populations held by the host society are reinforced alongside self-images of tolerance and compliance towards migrants in the two receiving societies, suggesting that Portugal and Britain are facing similar problems arising from immigrants’ alleged weak ability to integrate. Our reading suggests that a situational understanding of inter-group tensions is frequently ignored by policymakers and mainstream media, which instead appear to be more inclined to advocate a sense of national self-absolution.

Cosmopolitanism, and in some cases even an acceptance of crossing cultural boundaries, is common in the history of most former colonial
nations, a myth that usually consolidates itself when confronted with other colonial nations’ competing narratives. Britain and Portugal are examples of this tendency.

In this chapter we present a brief outline of how the increasing migratory influx from former colonies led to important changes in the legal framework on migration and citizenship in both Portugal and the United Kingdom that were implemented without giving up cherished self-images of being inclusive nations with impeccable records of treating colonial subjects and minorities humanely.

We hypothesise that a similar trend characterises management strategies implemented by other Western European states when former colonial subjects started to arrive. Whether policies of integration aimed at total acculturation (cultural assimilation) or ‘mere’ incorporation (legal assimilation), post-colonial nations transformed stereotypes from the colonial times into discriminatory categories at home. Discriminatory practices are evident in segregated housing and in unequal opportunities in education and the labour market. Be it in multiracial Britain, republican France or multicultural the Netherlands, Europe today is facing the result of overestimated national models aiming to integrate ethnic minorities. The long history of riots involving ethnic minorities in Britain, the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands and the 2005 uprisings in France have acutely demonstrated this point.

In spite of dissimilarities in migrant flows and legal borders, we have come across some interesting similarities in the recorded patterns of discrimination in Portugal and Britain, as, for instance, both countries opportunistically suspending the citizenship entitlement colonial subjects once enjoyed. Public statements when colonial achievements are celebrated also illustrate a blatant disregard of colonial and post-colonial discrimination.

**What are we really talking about when we say ‘ethnicity’?**

In their proposal that the word ‘race’ should be replaced by some more scientifically adequate concept (Huxley & Haddons 1935), the authors argued:

> It is very desirable that the term race as applied to human groups should be dropped from the vocabulary of science... in what follows the word race will be deliberately avoided and the term (ethnic) group or people employed. (1935: 91-92)

Their suggestion was not well received at the time.
A global change in migratory flows took place as a consequence of World War II. Revelations of the magnitude and brutality of Nazi race policies had a marked effect on international debate on issues of race. It was strongly felt that the scientific debate on race had to be abandoned. In 1949 UNESCO’s Department of Social Sciences, led by the Brazilian Ramos, set up the Committee of Experts on Race Problems in Paris, whose members included Ginsberg and Lévi-Strauss, to critically examine the question of race. At the end of the meeting, the document ‘Statement on Race’ was prepared and circulated to biologists, physicists, geneticists, psychologists, sociologists and other scientists around the world requesting their comments before being reviewed and subsequently published in July 1950. The UNESCO report established that the term ‘race’ should be replaced by the expression ‘ethnic group’, a concept that was less politically burdened. The sixth paragraph of the UNESCO document states:

National, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups; and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated genetic connection with racial traits. Because serious errors of this kind are habitually committed where the term ‘race’ is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term ‘race’ altogether and speak of ethnic groups. (Montagu 1972: 59)

The experts agreed that the biological principle of race was an unsubstantiated and irrelevant device by which to classify human beings. As for the proposed new concept, it was established that ‘ethnic group’ refers specifically to human populations which are believed to exhibit a certain degree, amount or frequency of undetermined physical likeness or homogeneity [...] and which individually maintain their differences, physical and cultural, by means of isolating mechanisms such as geographic and social barriers (Montagu 1972: 6).

While ethnicity was thus envisioned as a reliable analytical tool for researching ‘difference’ and ‘discrimination’ this initial mise en scène left the ‘ethnicity’ concept vulnerable to many of the limitations and fallacies attributed to the concept of ‘race’. In itself the issue of ethnicity is quite complicated and not only because of its shared academic platform with the concept of ‘race’. Ethnicity means different things in different contexts. For example, ethnic groups referred to in the successor states of former Yugoslavia are very different to ethnic groups spoken about in Britain and most other European countries of immigration, though this does not mean that ethnic minority groups in different parts of
Western Europe cannot be compared. As Barth (2003: 30) pointed out more than 30 years after the publication of *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, ethnic identity should be empirically understood as a characteristic of a particular social organisation, more than a glazed cultural expression.

The social significance of ‘ethnic and racial distinctions’ does indeed vary from one society to another (Banton 2002) but the consequences of discriminatory processes are usually pretty much the same, varying, we believe, only in degree, time and space as is evident in the differential treatment ethnic minorities and the white majority population experience in housing, education and labour. Can we identify some common patterns in the emerging segregation models or the exclusion of certain groups across national borders?

The research field is a labyrinth of questions and answers about what appear to be similar social realities. We have to agree with Banton on this particular point that: ‘… at present the field of study (ethnic and racial studies) is a thing of shreds and patches is no argument for its remaining so’ (2002: 193).

It is surprising that this field has not benefited from comparative research despite the ever-growing number of theoretical or empirical studies and the large number of journals on ethnicity and/or race that have appeared since the mid-1990s. Comparative research between countries reflecting individual constitutional frameworks, politics of migration, integration strategies, economic modes of incorporation and generations, based in two or more states, cities or regions should improve our knowledge of discrimination. The recommendation of the UNESCO Committee of Experts on Race Problems remains important.

If we focus on the processes of exclusion, rather than on abstract interpretations, we should be able to develop a balanced conceptual framework for analysing contemporary inter-ethnic relations in Western societies. The challenge to find an operational definition of ‘ethnic group’ remains. Cohen’s proposition (1974) is still sufficiently valid to be applicable in the field of ethnicity analysis. Cohen stresses the importance of a situational perspective, as a complement to the subjective dimension of self-assigned and hetero-attributed ethnic definitions. This widens the space of the ethnicity definition. Sharing certain normative patterns of behaviour that distinguish a certain group from society at large is a sufficient criterion for considering that group an ‘ethnic group’.

The main problem we face here is one of language and its performative effect on society. Ignoring this fact will have obvious consequences on the daily lives of ethnic minorities. The colonial authorities imported a system of categories, racial and/or ethnic to structure colonial society. Present-day Portugal and Britain inherited the colonial categorisation
systems with their stereotypes, expressed in the post-colonial situation as a tendency to regard overseas migrants as people who carry the onus of guilt for problems of integration.

The concept of ethnic minorities appeared for the first time in Portugal in the XII Constitutional Government Programme (1991-1994), seventeen years after the fall of the Salazar dictatorship. The concept of ‘ethnic minority’ is not defined in the Portuguese constitution; the authorities did not think it necessary to determine the legal meaning of this concept, since ‘race’ is regarded as fully adequate to address issues of discrimination. According to Article 13:2 of the Portuguese constitution:

No person can be privileged, favoured, injured, deprived of any right or exempted from any duty by reason of ancestry, gender, race, language, territory of origin, religion, political or ideological convictions, education, economic situation or social situation. (CRP 1997: 4)

Article 35:3 establishes that computerised storage of information on persons shall not record information about a person’s ideological or political convictions, party or trade union affiliations, religious beliefs, private life or ethnic descent (CRP 1997: 11). The same regulation applies to statistical data referring to ethnic or racial traits.

The apparent unreliability of available information on racist offences (given the discrepancy between discriminatory and racist actions brought to public attention by anti-racist NGOs and officially recorded instances) led to distrust of official information. Official data on ethnic minorities within social indicators (for instance, housing, employment and health) have still not attracted much attention in the debate on discrimination and exclusion of certain social/ethnic groups in Portugal.

It is less problematic to collect data based on ethnic criteria in the UK. Earlier problems in defining racial groups under the 1976 Race Relations Act have been circumvented. Though not uncontested, ethnicity was introduced as a category of self-identification in the 1991 national census. In both the 1991 and 2001 census, respondents were asked which ethnic group they considered themselves to be. The question asked in 2001 was more extensive than that of 1991. In 2001 people were for the first time given the option of ‘Mixed Ethnicity’.

The two countries have different ways of statistically defining minority groups; as we shall see, both have tended to react in similar ways to new migrant flows and both still use the term ‘race’ in official documents.
Post-colonial migration and the creation of a public opinion on immigration

At present, Portugal and Britain seem to maintain a positive self-image of relations with migrant and ethnic-minority populations. Both countries have a colonial past and several times in history both have reinforced that positive self-image, enjoying an exceptional ability to integrate and incorporate alien populations, a capability other nations are believed to lack. This image was at the centre of a self-absolution for the oppression and exploitation of colonised peoples and it has continued into the post-colonial era.

The UK criticised the inhumane treatment of native populations in Portuguese colonies on several occasions. Since the mid-nineteenth century the UK was Portugal’s main critic in the League of Nations and the United Nations concerning indentured labour schemes in its African colonies. After World War II liberation movements in British, French and Dutch colonial territories demanded political independence from colonial powers. Portugal, however, modified its position to avoid granting independence to its colonies. Under pressure from the UN the Portuguese regime altered the legal designation of its territories from Colonies to Overseas Provinces, justifying its policy as a ‘metaphysical bond’ between the colonial territories and Portugal itself. Formal differences were not made between colonies, so consequently legal distinctions were not made between colonised and colonisers.4

The main argument to justify exploitation and mistreatment of native populations in overseas settlements, the native populations’ alleged lack of skills, had served as a powerful argument to legitimise colonial oppression in both Portuguese and British colonies and subsequently became an argument for fair treatment in the official Portuguese rhetoric, in particular after international criticism of Portugal’s colonial rule intensified.

The ‘white man’s burden’ theories, stressing the responsibility civilised nations should feel towards less developed and ‘less sophisticated’ populations, had defenders in Britain as well as in Portugal. The most advanced European nations had a mission to civilise, according to these theories, and as a central task to convert South Americans, Asians and Africans to Christianity. British colonial practices were often called upon to justify the Portuguese position regarding its colonies. Defenders of Portuguese colonialism pointed to various similar experiences and policies with British colonial rule, disregarding critical or sensitive differences. Slavery in Portuguese colonies was justified by an imperative shortage of manual labour.

Both nations were convinced of their special capability to relate to colonised populations. According to national mythologies and
schoolbooks, history proved that civilisation was an achievement made possible for African, American and Indian populations by the skills handed down to them by the British and the Portuguese.

Political preemptiveness: anticipating an onset invasion

The period after World War II represented a turning point in the migration flows for nearly all colonial powers. The reconstruction of European cities, industries and communications after the war required a much larger labour force than was available domestically in Britain, France or Germany. A significant number of European migrants were joined by migrants from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.

The British Empire started its process of decolonisation after World War II. In 1947 independence was granted to India and Pakistan, formerly British India. Britain’s African colonies were granted independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was not until much later and after long armed conflicts that the most important Portuguese colonies were granted self-determination. We find a considerable lag between the arrivals of migrants from former colonies to Britain and to Portugal. Migration to Britain started after the war, driven by the urgent need of unskilled labour, whereas in Portugal it was not until the late 1970s/early 1980s that the flow of migrants from former colonies became significant.

Today nearly all European societies are confronted with growing and ever more diverse contingents of immigrants coming across their borders. People are made aware of social problems in the wake of increasing immigration through media reports and calls in political oratory for stricter control of migrant flows.

More than 150,000 Poles and a significant number of Italians were not enough to satisfy post-war Britain’s labour demands. On 22 June 1948, 500 West Indians disembarked in London from the *Empire Windrush*. That date became a landmark in British immigration history. The independence of Canada in 1946 and India in 1947 compelled Parliament to define the rules of British ‘belonging’. The unity of the empire/commonwealth was reaffirmed in the British Nationality Act of 1948. All citizens under the umbrella of this ‘imagined community’ were to enjoy the same rights and privileges as citizens of the British Isles.

Developments in the 1950s brought an increase in racially motivated conflicts, while migration flows from former colonies to Britain continued. In 1958 an unprecedented flow of immigrants from Pakistan and India started to worry the authorities, as these newcomers seemed to have little or no knowledge of the English language. The debate
initiated in the media made its way into Parliament; the government decision that legislation was not required remained in force until the 1958 riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill. Under heavy political pressure Parliament changed legislation several times, ending up with the conspicuously discriminatory Immigration Act of 1971.

Since 1949, immigration control had focused mainly on people coming from Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent, not immigration in general. In 1961, non-whites accounted for just one quarter of the general migrant population of Britain and were far behind in annual entrances during the 1950s compared to Europeans and Irish. Nevertheless, the riots in 1958, along with the economic recession Britain then faced, affected public concern about non-European immigration. Housing and employment were seen as core problems. The rise of Indian and Pakistani immigration also helped deepen the perception of immigrants as serious competitors for scarce resources, a tension that, in turn, affected national politics. In July 1962, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was passed, shutting off the right of free entry for people from commonwealth countries. In 1965 the Act was taken a step further, reducing the work-voucher scheme and restricting the entry of migrants’ dependents. The treatment of white migrants coming to Britain differed considerably. ‘Generally speaking, British immigration control had become more political than economic and therefore promoted a racialisation of immigration in British politics’ (Jones & Gnanapala 2000: 11-12). The inclusive empire and the all-embracing commonwealth’s free market for goods and people faced a fierce test of its ideals. Multi-racial Britain was in the making, but it was not going to be the peaceful birth of a nation.

Repressive Africanisation policies in some East African countries after 1967 drove large numbers of East African Asians holding British passports to Britain. These flows triggered a new crisis in immigration, which was amplified by the media and exploited by some members of Parliament. The most controversial statements were made by Enoch Powell in his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in 1968. He projected that the numbers of migrants would snowball, and demanded that immigration should be stopped immediately. The Labour government, surrendering to right-wing demands and public opinion, approved the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1968, making the commonwealth link irrelevant by requiring that persons seeking residence in Britain had to prove their British ancestry. These immigration acts of the 1960s did not reduce the number of migrants from former colonies. So the Immigration Act of 1971 introduced even stricter rules of control and also introduced the ‘grandparent clause’.6

After 1975, from the beginning of the Thatcher era, the causes of various social problems affecting Britain were attributed to difficulties in
integrating migrant populations. The problems of exclusion facing many of these migrant populations led to social conflicts portrayed in the media as race riots, which further deepened the divisions between immigrant and non-immigrant populations, particularly in the two groups’ perception of each other.

During the Portuguese colonial era, legal distinctions of nationality were not made between colonisers and colonised. Anyone born in a Portuguese overseas territory was a Portuguese citizen. *Ius soli* was the legal principle applied. After Portuguese decolonisation in 1975 a massive migration to Portugal from its former colonies arose and had to be dealt with. Concern about anticipated problems led to immediate legal consequences. In Decree 308-A/75, *ius soli* was replaced by the *ius sanguinis* principle. This legal adjustment was triggered by the obligation felt by the infant Portuguese democracy to accept the white population from the former colonies, whilst rejecting Africans fleeing from social and political instability. Anyone wishing to migrate to Portugal had to prove Portuguese ancestry (having an ancestor born in European Portugal or adjacent islands) at least three generations back. There was, however, one exception. Anyone born in Portuguese Indian territories before 1961 was, if required, considered Portuguese. The same decision applied to the majority of Indians in Mozambique. This exception and the rights granted to the population of Indian origin settling in Portugal could explain the different discrimination patterns affecting Indians living in Portugal and Indians living in Britain.

The white population, or ‘returnees’, as they were called, fleeing social unrest in the former colonies, numbered more than half a million in 1975. They encountered considerable resistance and mistrust in Portuguese society at the time, but state assistance and their skin colour facilitated their integration.

The Decree of 1975 was formalised into law in 1981, corroborating the principle of *ius sanguinis*, which, according to Pires (2003), contributed to the perception of immigration as a threat. This law suspended the rights that migrant populations had formerly enjoyed. The strategic aim was to dissuade immigration from former colonies (Pires 2003: 128). Yet, at the same time, privileged status was paradoxically granted to immigrants from former colonies. Only six years of legal residence was required to apply for nationality, as compared to ten years for immigrants from other countries. Some changes in the nationality law were introduced in 1994, but the main orientation remained.

The high level of immigration into Portugal continued through the 1980s and the 1990s, rising to unprecedented numbers and generating significant reaction in some segments of Portuguese society. We present some data below on the representations of immigration and ethnic diversity in both countries. We can compare changing perceptions in
Britain and Portugal as migration increased and ethnic diversity become more apparent.

**Representations of immigration and ethnic minorities**

In 1990 Tebbit sparked uproar by suggesting that not supporting the English cricket team was a sign of disloyalty to one’s country. This comment expressly targeted the Asian populations living in Britain. Thirteen years later, the same Mr. Tebbit argued that the ethnic diversity present in the English national football team was living proof of the success of the English assimilation policy, the unarguable positive effect of people consciously adopting the mores and ways of the receiving society.

While campaigning in April 2005 the Conservative Party member Howard said:

> For centuries we’ve welcomed people from around the world with open arms. We have a proud tradition of giving refuge to those fleeing persecution. And we have always offered a home to families who want to come here, work hard and make a positive contribution to our society.9

Giving a subtle hint about the association of insecurity and high crime rates with immigration, Mr. Howard added that Britain had:

> an enviable record of racial integration (...) Over the years, hundreds of immigrant communities have successfully integrated into British society (...) They have rightly held on to their traditions and culture, while also embracing Britain’s and playing their full role in our national life.

However, ‘any system of immigration must be properly controlled.’10

In 2002, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) published its Second Report on Portugal. The report recognised that some legislative and administrative improvements had been made to counter discrimination against African immigrants from former Portuguese colonies, who were more obvious victims of racist treatment than recent migrants from Eastern Europe. An official Portuguese comment on the ECRI report was:

> As regards the concerns expressed by ECRI in its report, namely the concerns relating to discrimination due among other factors to the physical appearance, Portugal does not have indicators of
the existence of such cases. One of the reasons is that Portuguese and African nationals have a long history of mixed community life. We may in fact consider that the workers coming from Eastern countries are integrating well. They are all over the country and not only in the urban zones (mainly in the Lisbon region) as, generally speaking, it happens to be the case of African communities (...) another very important factor, namely the fact that people living outside towns and cities feel more sympathetic towards the immigrant population. (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Second Report on Portugal 2002: 29-30)

This official reply is evidence of a biased understanding of inter-ethnic relations in Portugal, which in turn may be due to insufficient interest in Portugal’s academic circles to research questions of migration, inter-ethnic relations and diversity. There is a common perception that people are friendlier to one another outside the principal urban areas. On the other hand, the Romani people’s experiences appear to prove this perception untrue. A significant number of Romani live outside of what we could call ‘major cities’ and yet have repeatedly experienced conflict and discrimination.

While campaigning in 2001, former Minister of Defence Portas sparked controversy by declaring that ‘Portugal has 400,000 unemployed and 400,000 immigrants.’ As a result, according to Portas’ judgment, the Portuguese people only had to do the maths to understand his position on immigration control. After conflicts between youth and the police in a troubled area of Amadora, a municipality on the outskirts of Lisbon, Portas commented that Portugal needed a tough programme to combat crime and, simultaneously, to put an end to unrestrained immigration. This inopportune correlation between immigration and crime was advanced without any information about the nationality of the implicated individuals.

To sum up, we detect similar hostile political reactions to immigration in both countries, although there is no nationalist party in Portugal resembling the British National Party (BNP). The Renewal National Party (PNR) is the only Portuguese political party that openly propagates an anti-immigration agenda. On its website the PNR openly and unambiguously promotes a xenophobic agenda.12 Although without electoral success so far, the PNR has increased its visibility since 2001, when for the first time its candidates campaigned in municipal elections.

What is interesting is that, despite a growing feeling of resistance to immigration and distrust of ethnic minorities, the positive self-image of Portugal as a country with an accepting view of diversity seems to endure. We must ask ourselves how the majority’s representations of
immigration and ethnic diversity have really evolved in these receiving societies.

A brief survey of representations and attitudes

According to the 2001 UK Census, more than 4.5 million people living today in the UK belong to an ethnic minority, totalling 8 per cent of the population. As the concept of ethnic minority is not legally defined in Portugal the collecting data based on the criterion of ethnicity is unconstitutional in formal terms. The fact that an ethnicity criterion is employed by an institution under the Portuguese Ministry of Education indicates that legislation relating to ethnicity is not taken too seriously. Statistics from the Ministry for Labour and Social Solidarity in 2004 give the number of immigrants at 490,000, approximately 5 per cent of the total population. These numbers, which are almost equivalent to numbers issued by the Borders and Foreigners Bureau (SEF), do not, however, include ethnic minority populations with Portuguese nationality, like the Romani people or former immigrants and their respective descendants.

We will now turn to some tendencies regarding the inter-ethnic scenario in both countries. Significantly more research on attitudes towards migration and diversity has been carried out in Britain than in Portugal. This is one reason why comparability of data is limited. According to the ‘British social attitudes’ survey, the British public is gradually becoming less racially prejudiced. In 1987, almost four in ten (39 per cent) declared that they were racially prejudiced. By 2001, this figure had fallen to 25 per cent, rising again to just under a third (31 per cent) in 2002 (Park et al. 2003).

Another CRE study from 1998 on ethnic stereotyping presented some differences in victims’ perceptions of racism. Although South Asians still experienced racism both on grounds of colour and culture, they thought that race relations on the whole had improved over the past twenty years. Afro-Caribbeans felt that racism was endemic in British society and an inescapable fact of life. They experienced racism as a black and white social dichotomy based on negative stereotypes about black people (CRE 1998).

In 2002, the BBC News Online carried out a survey on ‘race’ issues. The report, providing a great deal of information, serves as a primary source on meanings of ‘race’ in present-day Britain. The outcome was hardly unexpected. More than half the respondents think that Britain is a racist society (51 per cent). However, 52 per cent believe that immigrant communities in Britain could do more than they are doing to promote integration. This feeling is probably a strong reason why a
majority of the respondents believe that immigration over the past 50 years has done more harm to Britain than brought benefits to the country. In the field of personal relations, more than half of the respondents admit to having a friend from a minority group. But, as we know, friendship between individuals of different social belongings (ethnic or other) does not immunise a person against discriminatory behaviour.

Stereotypes about different ethnic groups persist in spite of good relationships between individuals. It was clear from our group of white people 25-45 years of age in Birmingham that their black and Asian friends and neighbours were seen as exceptions to the general rule (CRE 1998: 11).

Ballard (1999) advocates an historical approach to analyse discriminatory ethnicisation processes in Britain in general and in England in particular. These processes are intrinsically linked with how British and English identity were, and are, constructed. There are British and American examples of how certain groups (for instance, the Irish and the Jews) have achieved invisibility, because there were no obvious phenotypical markers by which these groups could be identified.

This also seems to hold true in the Portuguese case. In a survey directed by Garcia (2000) of Portuguese attitudes regarding immigration, 70 per cent of the respondents answered that they recognise an immigrant by his or her skin colour.

The Portuguese High Commissioner for Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME) sponsored a study of Portuguese impressions of immigrants. The three most common impressions of immigrant and ethnic minority populations in Portugal were: Africans, Brazilians and Eastern Europeans. Africans were perceived to be the most differentiated group with regard to religion and education. Of the three groups, Africans, the group in Portugal for the longest period of time, experience racism in Portugal more directly than the other groups. This is similar to the experiences of Afro-Caribbeans in Britain.20

The same study shows a significant increase in criminal offences committed by migrants and people of migrant origin between 2002 and 2004. Negative stereotypes of these three migrant categories were accepted uncritically by an increasing number of Portuguese. According to the common stereotypes, Africans were associated with drug dealing activities, Brazilians with prostitution and Eastern European immigrants with organised crime. The media disseminate stereotypes. According to a report from SOS Racismo, one of the most visible Portuguese NGOs, more than one quarter of all news items in the media relating to immigration or immigrants referred to criminality or delinquency (AAVV 2004).

Opinions on and representations of immigration are superficially quite similar in both countries though. Deeper analysis is needed to
better understand which variables lead to similar outcomes and which variables have outcomes that differ between Britain and Portugal. Comparative analysis may help us identify critical conditions that are root causes of discrimination that in turn should enable society to take action to reduce disruptive tensions between social groups.

Conclusion

In both countries, people of African – including Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Brazilian – descent are singled out as victims of prejudice based on skin colour. We find similar patterns of discrimination against groups with different historical trajectories. What appears implicit from the data is an apparent similarity in racist notions and actions, despite dissimilar national and historical contexts. Both countries regard themselves as models of integration. This was an argument that evolved with colonial rule; in Portugal, as in Britain, legislation reflected growing fears within the majority population of an influx of non-British/non-Portuguese colonial subjects. Legal provisions were introduced to prevent unrestricted movement of former colonials. People’s reactions to continued post-colonial immigration and growing ethnic diversity are creating new social and political challenges. Mainstream media tend to apply ethnic and racial filters to non-white social expressions. Black communities are most prone to be affected by this stereotyping.

It would be wrong to assume that the global standardisation of behaviours would not include racist beliefs and xenophobic ideologies. This drawback of globalisation demands imaginative reactions to both old and new problems of inter-group pressures. A welcoming and hospitable attitude is challenged when the numbers of immigration increase and ethnic diversity is intensified. Some studies show that social contexts can experience unexpected tensions in the wake of new immigration fluxes and changing ethnic landscapes, if they are not adequately understood.21

According to our reading, there are two major obstacles to understanding inter-ethnic conflicts in contemporary European societies: On the side of minorities the idea of an inescapable exclusion from the mainstream community persists, based almost exclusively on skin colour, being therefore a very difficult barrier to cross, unless in case of a significant social rupture. As Gilroy (2002) states: ‘(Black communities) were irreducible to their class positions because racism entered into the multi-modal processes in which classes were being constituted’ (2002: xx). On the side of official authorities the image of immigrant and minority populations often designated as communities, as ethnic ‘others’, endures. These populations are perceived as collective entities, as in
cultural/skin-colour principles and communally bounded. They become understood as homogeneous groups, thus reinforcing the representation of these populations as irremediably culturally marginal.

The politics of integration seek to prevent social disintegration by designing inclusion strategies aiming at the most vulnerable groups. It is true that the way in which ‘others’ are represented can change over time. Skin colour has structured societies, conditioned and ruled life experiences of non-whites for generations. In Britain, as in Portugal, identity is discussed politically through rather rigid notions of ethnicity, culture and even nationality (see Banton 2002). The issue of ethnicity and its association with phenotypical markers carries the integration agenda to the field of visibility and invisibility for minority groups.

Several studies confirm that racism and prejudice persist in both countries despite official discourses that point to a situation of satisfactory integration, with the qualifying observation that immigration needs to be reduced. A kind of multiracial harmony as well as an established ability to integrate minorities is a self-image presented in official documents in both countries. Successful integration is laid down as an historical legacy affecting current policymaking. This delusion, part of the normative discourse of the nation, continues to conceal facts about social inequality, thus jeopardising analyses of the root causes of racism.

Notes

1 See inter alia Lucassen and Penninx (1997) for the Dutch case, Ballard (2009) for the British case and, for example, Banton (2002) for the French case.
2 Three more statements on race were later published: one on the nature of race and race differences (in 1951), a second on the biological aspects of race (in 1964) and a third on racial prejudice (in 1967). For a detailed account of these four statements see Montagu (1972).
3 Peach (1999) identified certain segregation models when comparing the spatial distribution of ethnic minorities in London and New York and correlating this with more vast social processes.
4 For a historical analysis of the racial relations in the Portuguese colonial empire see Boxer (1963).
5 For a more detailed account of these numbers see Spencer (1997: particularly chapter 4).
6 The grandparent clause determined that to have access to the UK, one had to prove that one’s parent — or at least one’s grandfather — was born in the UK. This was a way of singling out former colonial subjects. A similar measure was adopted by Portugal after decolonisation.
7 Portuguese Indian territories (Goa, Daman, Diu, Dapra and Nagar Aveli) had been claimed by India since its independence and were finally taken over by the Indian Union in 1961.
8 For detailed research on the process of integration of the ‘returnees’ and for a discussion of the Portuguese nationality law see Pires (2003).
Portugal, Greece and Italy were the only countries of the EU-15 that did not have any type of monitoring body for racist offences implemented. For a particular analysis on each of these countries see the reports from National Focal Points of the European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia, available at www.eumc.eu.int/eumc/index.php.

Entreculturas is the cabinet of the Ministry of Education that presents a comparative ranking of student achievement using the ethnic categories Lusos (a controversial historical/mythical designation for Portuguese) and Romani with other social categories based on the students’ fathers’ birthplace. See www.acime.gov.pt/docs/GEE/Estatisticas_GEE2005.pdf.

See the immigration statistics gathered by the Portuguese High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic minorities in 2005.

No official estimate of the number for Portuguese Romani is available. Yet, we can resort to some studies that estimate the Romani in Portugal to be between 40,000 and 60,000 (AAVV 2001).

All references to this survey are available at http://bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk/2002/race.

However, another study from the CRE (2002) found that the majority of the population (59 per cent nationally and 67 per cent among ethnic minority groups) agreed that the UK has good relations between people from different ethnic backgrounds, confirming the idea that sometimes the same question asked in a different way will get divergent answers. This survey also found that 61 per cent of the overall British population felt that there were too many immigrants living in the country.

ACIME, the state cabinet, was created in 1995 and is responsible for immigration and ethnic minority issues.


See, for instance, the study carried out in Sparkbrook by Rex and Moore (1974).

References


Introduction

Postmodern and post-colonial discourses have praised hybridity and ambivalence as enriching traces of identity-building in our age of multi-directional migrations as if only travelling between and across cultures through transnational dislocations could provide the experience of developing diasporic, hyphenated or deterritorialised identities. But some authors are beginning to challenge what may be too narrow a perspective of the social conditions from which such identities can spring. The Portuguese sociologist Santos recently highlighted the fact that since its inception Portuguese colonialism has always been an experience of ambivalence and hybridity in the relationship it promoted between the coloniser and the colonised. The relation of each with their own self-conflicting images was ambivalent long before post-colonialism could establish itself as a new political and social paradigm (Santos 2002: 40-41).

Drawing inspiration from Santos (1994) and from the anthropology of identity processes opened up by the work of J. Bastos and S. Bastos (1995, 2001, 1999b), I will argue in this chapter that both identities ‘on the move’ and national identities can present the dynamics of hybridity and ambivalence. I will argue that, in the dialectic of migration, a hybrid national identity in a host country can affect the identity-building process for migrants, especially if these come from former colonies. The main theoretical insight framing my position is the idea that hybrid and ambivalent identities are the effect of a move to a foreign land as well as of the position a country occupies in the world-system hierarchy. Identity strategies depend on the core, peripheral or semi-peripheral inscription in the modern world-system. I would suggest that the social and psychological experience of being at the semi-periphery tends to promote intermediate identities.

A particular sign of semi-peripheral identity-building is what I would call ‘frontier identity’, using a concept that is making inroads in anthropological studies. By frontier identity I mean a culturally and socially constructed self-image with some distinctive traces. In small- or medium-term processes of identity-building, a frontier identity exhibits the
kind of transitional hybridity that social scientists find in so many instances of migration, when the subject’s self-representation is mixed, though internally divided in its identification with competing models. The word ‘transitional’ is used to underscore the provisional nature of these identities, invariably paradoxical, frozen in their own movement or living on the edge. Such identities are unable to make a definite choice between an archaic self-image representing to the subject the past he must break with, and a modern self-image representative of the future. The transition from one to the other may be indefinitely suspended because the subject hesitates or is unable to distinguish between those conflicting images. At its most salient, the wavering in frontier self-identifications, shows the indecision Santos emphasised (2002: 44-46, 54), displayed whenever the tense relationship between alternative or opposed images prevents the subject from taking a final stand and to stick definitely to one rather than the other. The crossing of this hesitation with a cultural ‘deep-rooted structure’ causes frontier identity processes that are overstretched in the long term. Such indecision always goes hand in hand with ambivalence, which I understand as the love-hate seesaw people ride between opposite positions. This back and forth is inherently indecisive.

The notion of frontier identity has some interesting theoretical effects. First, it adds complexity to Barth’s idea that the continuity of ethnic units ‘depends on the maintenance of a boundary’ that differentiates the in-group from the out-group (Barth 1998: 14-15). In fact, if we take differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as one of the major identity strategies, with all its criteria for inclusion and exclusion, then frontier identities are those in which such a strategy is always problematic, open-ended and never resolved. In frontier identities hybridity means that ‘they’ are inextricably connected with and immersed in ‘us’, no matter how much ‘we’ try to exclude, expel or deny ‘them’. On the other hand, if we base national identity on some ethnic community, real or imagined (Smith 1991: 19-41), we will have to acknowledge that national identities built on frontier processes are always unable to locate the boundary upon which one is able to assert and ascribe ethnicity. In short, the ethnic boundary is what really defines the group and ‘not the cultural stuff it encloses’ (Barth 1998: 15). I would say that in frontier identities, the determination of boundaries, ever unstable or open to questioning, is the major content of culture.

Finally, it is all the multidimensional polarity in the process of identity-building that has to be reconsidered in the context of frontier identities that highlight the structural ambivalence underlying that process. One’s present identity arises from a confrontation and a synthesis between positive and negative prototypes (Erikson 1994: 58, 299, 303, 304), to which we should add the denied prototypes and the idealised
ones (J. Bastos 1995: 932-937; 2001: 28). According to J. Bastos, subjectivity is the space of articulation between a ‘beneath identity’, defined by the ambivalent relation to the negative and denied prototypes, and a ‘beyond identity’, defined by the ambivalent relation to the positive and idealised prototypes. What seems to me typical of frontier identities is that, because of its indecisiveness, the referents that represent to the subject its ‘beneath’ and ‘beyond’ identities are never fixed or stable, but always switching between the two hierarchical positions.

Before going further I feel it is necessary to introduce a principle of theoretical caution. I am not intending to plunge into what J. Bastos has called the ‘nationalist ethnic psychology’. This approach, where an author pretends to have a privileged connection with the identity essence of a people, used to be highly rated by some philosophers and others in the humanities and was prized among those anthropologists who served nationalist ideologies, leading to an uncontrollable essentialism that was harmful in its epistemological and political effects. The aim of analysing ethno-national identities is not to say what a particular people are. Yet, I am aware of how easily the notion of frontier identity can be caught in the trap of essentialism by drifting into the rhetoric of a national ‘soul’, whose ‘essence’ would be precisely a never-ending indecisiveness. In such a scenario, the historicity would be swept away and we would be left, not with an identity analysis, but with another identity construction smuggled through a pretentiously scientific speech. To avoid that risk it is important to insist on the elaborative and relational dimension of identity. But we must also discern the several meanings subsumed within the concept. As such, frontier identity can be understood in at least three ways: 1. in an ontological sense, as the actual form of most of identity representations that social actors, both individual and collective, have built in different circumstances and times; 2. in a rhetorical sense, as a discourse intellectual and political elites have been producing on national identity when contemplating that identity, those elites-created representations that we may reasonably describe as being ‘frontier’; 3. in a theoretical sense, as an explanatory model that strives to identify and synthesise the underlying logic in some recurring trends of identity-building, especially those related to national self-image. Although these three meanings can coexist in the following analyses, one should take care not to blend them blindly. Having said this, I will move on now to consider some expressive details of Portuguese and Russian frontier identities.

I do not intend to make a short history of frontier identity in Portugal and Russia. Even though we are able to detect changes or cyclical trends over centuries, it is the structural patterns, many of them transcending single historical periods that interest me.
The frontier location

Frontier imagery in Portugal and Russia starts with a connection to their particular geographic position and the kind of symbolisation it inspires. Both are located in ‘frontier’ zones: Portugal in the extreme west of Europe, almost cut off from the core European countries, but open up to South America and Africa by an Atlantic Ocean serving both as a barrier and an extension. Russia, a highly complex intersection of ethnicities and cultures, partly European and partly Asian, is a huge space whose boundaries, expanded and redrawn over the centuries, were porous enough to allow invasions from west, east and south (Hosking 2003: 3).

The frontier location of Portugal and Russia can be understood in a much more substantial way, since both countries could be seen as functionally located at the semi-periphery of the capitalist world-system. According to Santos, Portugal served as the core of a colonial empire and the periphery of Europe for many centuries. It performed the systemic function of intermediary between core and peripheral countries, lending it the dual character of a simultaneously colonial and colonised country (Santos 1990: 107, 1994: 58-59, 130-132, 2002: 42-45). Its transition to post-colonial times did not put an end to Portugal’s semi-peripheral condition (Santos 1990: 107-150). As the Portuguese sociologist I am quoting has said, this country is defined by a contradiction between consumption patterns characteristic of core countries and a production model specialised in segments not highly valued in international markets. Migrant networks emerge in today’s Portugal, simultaneously a society of emigration and immigration, based on the historical and cultural links between the host and its former colonies. The dual condition of Portugal in transnational migrations is, however, both a cause and a consequence of its intermediate position between core and peripheral countries. Its identity images could not but suffer from this duality. Social representations typical of core societies coexist with social representations typical of peripheral societies in often paradoxical configurations (Santos 1994: 60). It would be possible to prove how this ambiguous and dual identity has shaped the attitudes in respect to migration, bringing forth a degree of complexity to the inter-ethnic and cross-cultural relationships. Indeed, as Santos has pointed out, Portugal’s duality and semi-peripheral quality can be summarised by this situation. It was probably the only empire whose citizens who moved to its colonies were perceived as immigrants rather than colonisers.

Historians’ views have tended towards the same idea in Russia. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Russia was an ambiguous hybrid entity in an intermediate position between feudalism and capitalism,
wavering between the modernising appeal from Europe and the archaic influence from Asia (Dobb 1948: 34). Wallerstein, author of the world-system approach, used the notion of semi-periphery to describe the intermediate function of Russia in the world economy and the interstate system, a definition applicable both to tsarism and the entire Soviet period (Wallerstein 1979: 27, 31, 87). In spite of the economic growth that made Russia the fourth industrial power on the eve of World War I, autocratic policies, either in tsarist or in Soviet garb, never allowed that country to overcome its handicaps. It is almost unnecessary to emphasise that today, after the collapse of Communism and the social and economic crisis that followed, Russia is once again haunted by downward categorisations.

At this point, it is important to keep in mind that what I am calling frontier identity is essentially a modern phenomenon; ethno-national self-consciousness cannot be found before the age of modernity. In this sense frontier identity is a peculiar variation of a modern type of identity-building. In Portugal the major impulse for a generalised sense of belonging to a national macro-group started in 1890, the year of the Ultimatum, by which the European imperialist powers put an end to Portuguese colonialist pretensions, thus igniting a popular wave of reaction never seen before in the country (Mattoso 1998: 38-39) as if national self-awareness in Portugal could not be based on anything but a traumatic event and a wounded collective narcissism. Russia had to wait for Peter the Great to force nobles into modernity by an artificial mimicry of the West and to begin to face the problem of how to define Russia’s position in the world hierarchy. Nevertheless, the question of Russian identity remained for a long time almost exclusively an issue preoccupying urbanised cultured classes and did not affect the immense peasant class. Russian rural villages in 1917 still observed a tension between the frameworks of peasant localism and nationalism that came from the multi-ethnic overlap in different rural areas of the Russian Empire, together with a dominating family culture among the peasantry, thus promoting only localised forms of identity and hampering the translocalism crucial for developing a national consciousness (Suny 1993: 45-48, 50-51, 80-81). If social construction of identity depends on different scales, then we can say that the scale of peasant identity on the eve of the Russian Revolution was entirely ill-suited for the purposes of national identity.

So one must not lose sight of the idea that all elements of national identity in Portuguese and Russian societies that referred to real or mythical events preceding the modern age were late acquisitions, stemming from a projection of new identity issues onto a symbolically reconstructed past (Mattoso 1998: 39-40). Despite its referral to modern history, the ambivalence and indecisiveness endemic to
frontier identity are long-term trends, enduring now for more than a century.

In the identity competition as power relationship, a frontier image may be just a reflection in the mirror of group consciousness. Portuguese and Russians shared the experience of having been vilified in many observations made by foreigners, especially when those foreigners imagined themselves as possessing a superior identity. Since at least the fifteenth century, travellers, merchants or diplomats from Northern Europe arriving in Portugal or Russia portrayed the inhabitants of these countries using the same debasing qualifiers ascribed to the ‘primitive’ or ‘savage’ peoples of Africa or the New World (Boxer 1992: 328-329; Santos 2002: 48-52). They in fact resorted to the same imagery used by the Portuguese to construct negative identities for the native peoples they encountered in their colonies. In such an identity strategy the inferiority, associated with the most extreme otherness (where ‘human’ yields to ‘animal’), the identity least appealing to the subject was represented by the blacks Portuguese navigators had confronted in their explorations (Bender 2004: 205; Margarido 1984: 516-518). The Portuguese did not lag behind any other European colonisers in stigmatising native peoples, nor did they shy away from contrasting the natural resources sub-Saharan Africans or South American natives enjoyed with their idleness and supposed inherent inability to exploit them. In this way a stereotypical narrative of a squandered Eden shaped the European view of non-European others. One commonplace misconception that the English projected onto the Portuguese identity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the contrast between the paradisiacal richness of Portugal’s landscapes and the ‘sluggishness’ of its people (Santos 2002: 49-50). Portuguese were seen as neither civilised, nor even white by the core colonialist countries or even by colonised peoples – a pattern repeated in Portugal’s colonies and in former British or French possessions. This phenomenon could not help but deeply affect the self-image of the Portuguese as colonisers and the self-image of the colonised others, considering their simultaneous construction and inextricable connection. As Santos so strikingly put it, having internalised the debasing properties foreigners ascribed them, the Portuguese were never able to externalise completely the negative ethnic identities. Otherness has always been a part of their identity make-up, even when the purpose was to disclaim it (Santos 2002: 42). This complex and traumatising self-identification haunted the Portuguese well into the twentieth century.

Russians, too, have acquired mixed feelings about themselves from negative descriptions by foreign visitors. When those descriptions were fixed in writing for the first time in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, travellers like Von Herberstein and Olearius laid down enduring
stereotypes of the Russians (Baron 1991). If the Portuguese had black Africans to mirror their inner negative reflection, Russians were forced to mirror themselves in a barbaric Asian image. Western prejudices about Russia persisted through the twentieth century. Lockhart, an English diplomat and spy who witnessed the fall of tsarism, said that prior to the 1917 Revolution the members of the local British colony considered the Russians to be good but immoral savages neither safe nor fit for social interaction (Lockhart 2003: 15).

Three identity strategies

We are considering two instances of frontier identity: the Portuguese vacillation between an European self-image, denied them by some foreign imperialist discourses and a primitive blackness or non-European otherness that threatened their identity pride; and the Russians having a long tradition of dislocation between a Western European and East Asian identity (Figes 2003: 66, 380; Hosking 2003: 4-5). The indecisiveness of these frontier identities is evident in that neither the Western nor the non-Western extreme was particularly negative or positive. Both varied from one to the other of the two axiological landmarks, along the several identity strategies through which Portuguese or Russians attempted to compensate for all the downward identifications, termed here as ambivalence.

Ambivalence, however, is a complicated experience. Nobody really enjoys dwelling in ambivalence. The main strategies in frontier identities are therefore aimed at reducing or overcoming ambivalence and, consequently, the accompanying indecisiveness. This effort of course requires eradication of the identity duality and replacing it with a cohesive mono-identity or a way of changing that duality into a happy experience; frontier identity desires to move towards the centre. I submit that we can synthesise those strategies into three categories.

The first assumes the negative identification of ethno-national identity, but does not accept the essentialisation of it, desperately trying to gain recognition from the higher or advanced identities by showing them that its wrongly debased identity belongs, after all, to their group, since it is able to overcome its worst drawbacks.

The second strategy is a differentiation or de-identification, simultaneously performed from the negative and the positive models presented to the debased national identity by the dominant foreign discourses. The positive model is criticised and rejected while the negative identification is, in the psychoanalytical sense, simply denied. The subject strives to develop a third way, stating that his national identity belongs to neither the positive nor the negative model.
The third strategy is diametrically opposed to the first, reversing the hierarchy of good and bad marks given to identity models, changing the positive into negative and vice versa. This strategy aims to challenge the dominant identities in the world-system power relationships, redirecting the same debasing qualifiers at them that were used to justify subaltern identities.

We must not forget that in frontier identity all these strategies are tainted by their intrinsic indecisiveness, which means they do not operate in a pure form. They are idealised types and nothing prevents a single subject from shifting between them. In the following pages I will analyse only the first two identity strategies. I will not treat the third one, for reasons of space and also because until now, in my research, I have never come upon significant Portuguese instances unmistakably representative of that identity strategy. I believe it is easier to find such a strategy in counter-cultural movements developing in former colonies, although that third strategy is also pervasive in the Russian trend of Eurasianism. Since I am adopting a comparative perspective, I will examine those phenomena that, we can say with some degree of assurance, were shared by Portuguese and Russians.

The first of those identity strategies in Russia’s history corresponded to the Westernism current among the intelligentsia (Herzen, Turgenev and Belinsky) during the 1840s and 1850s. They wagered everything on a supposed European universalism they believed could overcome Russian localism and redeem the country from its backwardness. The equivalent in Portugal was the 1870s Generation, a group of intellectuals including the great novelist de Queirós and the poet and philosopher de Quental, all of whom were concerned with what they called the decay of Portugal. The positive identity referent was, once again, Western European.

In this identity strategy, based upon identification with a Western or Northern European model, colonialism was another means of improving national self-image by leaving the frontier behind and moving to the core. As usual, though, neither Portugal nor Russia were not quite at a vantage point.

Until the late nineteenth century, without financial, organisational or human resources to occupy the extensive territorial possessions of Africa, without being able to institute a real colonial state and forced to hire the local populations to perform many of the administrative tasks, Portuguese colonialism had been self-delusional (Santos 2002: 58-59). It could try with all its might to join the restricted club of European imperial powers, but it had neither the means nor the causal dynamics to fulfil that pretension. Colonialism arose from the logic of capitalist development, a logic whose pressure had long been felt in Portugal (Santos 2002: 65-66). In this way the first type of strategy rehearsed to
overcome the anxiety of ambivalence was structurally doomed to fail be-
cause it simply shifted the ambivalence to the very core of the colonial
project, cased by attempts to differentiate the Portuguese national iden-
tity from that of its negative others. The end of the nineteenth and the
beginning of the twentieth centuries were the golden age of forthright
racist statements by the Portuguese authorities and intelligentsia, pre-
senting an image of otherness that concentrated all the trivialities about
‘coloured’ people we find in any racist construction.

Parading a Northern European colonialism style required the super-
ior identity of the Portuguese to be distinguished from the inferior
identity of Asians and African natives. Many colonial ideologists in-
sisted on a recurring image of black Africans as idle, prone to drunk-
kenness and viciously sensual or sexual – a commonplace depiction
that betrayed the existence of the anxieties of sexually repressed
Europeans about open sexuality. They were also seen as incapable of
constructing any real civilisation without the help of higher (i.e. white)
races, more animal than human, with a limited childlike intelligence.2
The idea took hold that one should give up hope of civilising African
black people through Christianity – the project of religious accultura-
tion – for that hope had been based on the ‘humanitarian but erro-
neous idea’ that blacks were bright enough to penetrate the subtleties
of Christian theology. Assuming they are not, one should attempt in-
stead to civilise them through forced labour. This became a real obses-
sion, running the gamut from those who thought perhaps slavery had
not been such a bad idea, to those who justified the oppressive and ex-
ploitative burden of forced labour with lectures on its ‘moralising’ and
‘pedagogical’ virtues. Portuguese colonial legislation did not delay in
incorporating the new idea of civilising African natives by forced la-
bour and the law. In the first years of Salazar’s dictatorship any sem-
b lance of humanitarianism was cast aside and replaced by the more
realistic or pragmatic, though no less ideological, view espoused by the
anti-liberalists at the end of the nineteenth century. In this way, the
ideology of colonialism was striving to redeem the poor image some
Northern Europeans had attributed to the Portuguese, as lazy and not
quite white. The ideologists sought to reverse this image by copying
the approach Western colonisers had used in their African posses-
sions. After some time, work stopped being seen as a civilised distinc-
tion and took on a degrading trait. Work was ‘only good for dogs and
blacks’ was a popular saying among the Portuguese who migrated to
the African colonies during the 1960s and who, in spite of their lower-
class origins and low level of education, did everything to avoid
manual work and to employ black servants as much as possible
(Bender 2004: 225-226, 228-230) to elevate their identity above the
lowly position of colonised people. This observation confirms the
importance of comparing hierarchical status levels for the assessment of one’s identity self-esteem.

In spite of all this effort Portuguese colonialism was never able to bypass its semi-peripheral matrix. Colonialist ideologists and politicians such as Enes were among the first to acknowledge how much Portugal depended on foreign capital and aid to improve its colonies and how little it counted in the bigger picture of the truly imperial powers (Enes 1946: 26-27, 59-60). Whereas Portuguese colonialist practices exhibited the external signs of colonial domination, they concealed the fact that Portugal, as a colonial power, was nothing but a semi-peripheral intermediate presence among Western core countries’ interests in Africa. When those interests began to shift to a neo-colonialist strategy in the 1960s and 1970s, Portuguese pretences inevitably lost all foreign support. That Salazar’s policy adhered to the colonies against world opinion only reveals the importance colonialism had in the national self-image of authoritarian political elites.

Even here one can find astounding contradictions, expressive of identities not at ease with their frontier condition. Until 1961, the year of the nationalist upsurge in Angola that triggered the colonial war, Salazar’s colonialism had been conspicuous for its ambivalence. One of the dictator’s first gestures when he came to power was to lower drastically the colonial ambitions Republicans such as de Matos had nurtured (Pereira 1987: 92-94). Salazar was aware that Portugal could not afford such dreams. For three decades he managed to be a reluctant colonialist, raising a wall of bureaucratic intricacies for everyone wishing to migrate to the colonies and ambivalently juggling two opposite discourses. One reinforced the image of the Portuguese as a ‘small and humble people’, the other indulged in a mythomaniacal compensation, which redrew Portugal as an exemplary country, puffed up to become a trans-European and multi-racial empire (Lourenço 1982: 30-31, 59). What transpires from this dual portrayal is a way of unthinking the frontier identity.

In the nineteenth century colonialism had been an option for Russians to climb the Western status ladder. But in a country already a self-contained empire, so vast and with so many allogeneous ethnicities and where the proportion of ethnic Russians never surpassed 50 per cent of the whole population, tsarist power could transplant European colonialism internally, rather than in outward expansion. In 1881 Dostoevsky predicted how the frontier identity of Russians could become the very stage on which they would act as European colonisers, that is, of Europeans tout court (Figes 2003: 415). Note that his argument was symmetrical to the Portuguese one; if the Portuguese were the Africans of Europe in such a way that only in Africa could they be real Europeans, then by the same token the Russians were the Asians...
of Europe, who only in Asia could be in touch with their European side. The complex strategy underpinning Dostoevsky’s discourse betrayed an anxiety about the subject’s identity placement. We would find it difficult to expose such anxiety in the nationalist rhetoric of the British, Germans or French. First of all, Russia’s colonial or imperial design – the conquest of Asia – was entirely subordinate to the requirements of identity self-assurance. Russia needed to prove that in Asia, its America, they could be as European as the Western Europeans – by owning colonies and civilising savages. Needless to say, the positive referent of this discourse, the Western European, did not have to prove anything. The Russian therefore had a handicap when being compared to his reference model. This identity project was also burdened, from the start, with a negative consciousness that an imaginary person born in a core country would never reveal. According to Dostoevsky, Russians could not escape a double standard in their identity – considered Asians in Europe and Europeans in Asia. The denial of inferiority through the reproduction of the European colonial model, and, at the same time, the recognition of an unavoidable underlying ambivalence, were indelible stains on the Russian elites’ relationship with ‘their’ Asians at the turn of the nineteenth century.

Unavoidable and unbearable, or unbearable because unavoidable, that ambivalence was the target of countless strategies seeking to reduce, deny, or ideally suppress it. One wagered on the inequality system, by devising an asymmetrical relationship between the superior Russian and an inferior Oriental. To establish this hierarchy, employing a well-known mechanism that reproduces unequal power relations, one had to displace from the Russians to the Orientals’ those very signs of inferiority previously believed to be Russian – something not far from what the Portuguese were doing with the African natives. Only this way would it be possible to separate the Russian essence, either European or Slavic’ from all the non-European, impure, or backward elements – qualifiers that tended to coalesce into a single meaning. Such a separation, at the heart of tsarist imperial ideology, resorted to an expansive generalisation. All the non-Christian tribes, regardless of what ethnic or religious identity they presented (Shamanic, Muslim, and Buddhist) were subsumed into the same generic category of Tartars, the Russian equivalent for Asians. Such an identity-smashing operation covered territories as heterogeneous as Siberia in the north and Central Asia and the Caucasus in the south, all of them labelled ‘Oriental’. Still, Georgia and Armenia, belonging to the Caucasus but codified as part of a Muslim Orient, were in truth some of the oldest European regions that had adopted Christianity even before the Byzantine Empire (Layton 1997: 81-82; Figes 2003: 377-378). For the colonial imagination of the Russian Empire, the first benefit
of this identity overlap and misconstruction was to create a screen on which it was possible to project the primitivism and barbarism usually attached to Russians by Western visitors.

There was, thankfully, an Asian face of barbarism. All this served the purpose of normalising Russia as a Western nation. In 1815, Karamzin, who was an influential nationalist historian, could declare with pride that ‘like America, Russia has her savages’ (Karamzin 1978: 118).

As in the Portuguese Empire where, since the beginning of the twentieth century ethnologists and anthropologists were busy measuring bodies, skulls and the physiological or psychological characteristics of African and Asian natives to prove their biological inferiority, Russia also cultivated ‘scientific’ approval for what was an intricate identity and ideological strategy. Russian ethnologists serving the empire had conceived a hierarchy whose top was occupied by the sedentary agriculturists, naturally the Orthodox and Slavs. Then came the nomadic herdsmen and, at the lowest point, the peoples composed of equally nomadic hunters and gatherers. By putting the Russian sedentary peasant on the top of the list it was as if the imperial ideology was denying the nomadism that Chaadaev, the forerunner of the Westernisers, had signalled as part of Russians’ identity. In the dichotomies inherent in this internalised colonialism, agrarian work was the path to civility and citizenship, as opposed to the uncontrollable wanderings of the nomad. We may find here a suggestion of a work ethic quite similar to the one Portuguese colonisers said was the base of their civilising project. The Russian administrative and military personnel dealing with Orientals during the late nineteenth century thought converting them into peasants meant civilising the primitives, be they Chechens or inhabitants of the Caucasus Mountains, Central Asia or Siberia (Suny 1993: 27; Jersild 1997: 107).

**Assimilation and nativisation**

The ethnologists’ hierarchical axis portrayed a power relationship, showing clearly the rising direction for the assimilation of the ethnically strange. The unambiguous identification of the assimilator and the assimilated was ensured through hierarchisation and the asymmetry established in the identity field. The assimilator was Slav, sedentary and Christian Orthodox; the assimilated was non-Christian and more or less downgraded to the status of Asian. Assimilation meant justification; Russification meant, above all, conversion to Orthodox Christianity, considered the hallmark of Russian distinctiveness in spite of not warranting, by itself, inclusion in a superior identity (Sunderland 1996: 809-810; Khodarkovsky 1997: 20-1). The final outcome would be
annihilating alien peoples’ identities, even if the myth of a peaceful and willing assimilation denied its violence. Such myth was perfectly conveyed in the words of theologian Tsarevsky written in 1898:

The not very distant past shows what a potent service the Orthodox faith renders to the Russian cause: by accepting Orthodox Christianity, Mordvinians, Tatars, Chuvash, Cheremis, and other aliens, even [sic] Jews, before our very eyes are so naturally and quickly reborn and attached to the Russian nationality that in two or three generations it is difficult to detect in them any tribal features of their alien origin. (cited in Rancour-Laferrière 2000)

There is a parallel between this kind of allegation and the Darwinist arrogance shown by some of the Portuguese colonisers, who trusted that assimilation – understood as absorption – of a weaker, inferior ethnos (or race) into a superior one would imply, in time, its complete erasure from the face of the Earth. The irony of all this is that such racist faith was to be bitterly disavowed through the kind of traumatic discovery destined to expose the frontier identity supposedly buried and whose ambivalent self-image was so painful to endure. At the end of the nineteenth century, Russian ethnologists in the eastern areas of the empire discovered the exact opposite of what Tsarevsky had predicted. In the northern Caucasus, in the region between the Volga and the Urals, near modern-day Kazakhstan, in the extreme north of Siberia, in the entire wilderness where Russian colonisers had settled, it was themselves and not the natives who had undergone assimilation. Russians adopted the beliefs and pagan rituals of the surrounding peoples; Russians converted to Islam; Russians only spoke the local or some hybrid languages; Russians dressed and ate like natives; dark-skinned Russians looked like Mongolians. Instead of natives’ Russification, the ethnologists were confronted with an ontological scandal: the nativisation of Russians. We can imagine the bewilderment, the existential doubts and identity anxieties raised by such an embarrassing finding, soon followed by a racist backlash, where outlawing miscegenation with inferior races was a vain attempt to re-establish a boundary that had disappeared.

Nativisation was a process Portugal knew well. It had in fact haunted Portuguese colonisation from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries – before the mimicry of the Northern European colonialist discourse and practices. Considering that the Portuguese did not have the means to implement a real colonial empire, they had to interact with natives, especially on the east African coast, in a non-forceful way so that trading could be done safely. These interactions evolved easily from commercial activities to the absorption of local cultures and languages and
to the creation of multi-ethnic families (Santos 2002: 55). Thus another kind of frontier identity emerged, one that Santos calls ‘cafrealisation’ – from the word ‘cafre’, which originally meant the non-Muslim black, but, gradually, ended up being used as a pejorative term to stigmatise all blacks. The testimonies of those Portuguese who witnessed cafrealisation, which Santos includes, portray extensively the dismay they felt when they saw how nonchalantly their countrymen could display those negative traces they associated with savage blacks: laziness, open sexuality, non-Christian values (Santos 2002: 55-57). Although the ease of cafrealisation was rationalised as a phenomenon characteristic of the second-rate Portuguese being sent to the colonies (some of them convicted criminals), it had always been a source of embarrassment to an identity strategy that was willing to identify Portuguese as rightful Europeans. Cafrealisation could erupt in every corner of the empire, casting its ominous shadow on the identification of the Portuguese as unequivocally Western. In a book written by Galvão, an army officer who was initially a supporter of Salazar’s dictatorship but later became its foe, there is the story of a lawyer, born to an old family from the north of Portugal and raised Christian, who went to Angola looking for fortune and fame. After staying there for some time and doing well, he suddenly vanished, only to be found some years later in a native village living like all the other blacks and indistinguishable from them in his demeanour (Galvão 1929: 174-178). As we will see, only this lasting indecisiveness between opposite identity models, with all the attendant embarrassment, explains why the Portuguese ideologists of colonialism kept on returning to the subject of miscegenation, either to rebuff or to extol it.

Nativisation and cafrealisation challenged the soundness of Russian and Portuguese identities. People from the two societies, whenever they engaged in a Western identity-building, never felt completely sure of themselves or at ease in their own skins. Colonial anthropologists accurately expressed this uneasiness. The Portuguese bio-anthropologist discourse during the first decades of the twentieth century was obsessed with proving the superior value of the Portuguese race – a race that, unfortunately, insisted on being volatile. Against its devaluation by Northern Europeans, based on the ethnically mixed source of Portuguese people, the anthropologists strived, almost desperately, to establish the unitary, stable and white character of their national race. Already in 1919, Correia sang the country’s praises, stating that

in spite of having hosted, in all times, people from so diverse origins, Portugal is today, from the somatological point of view, one of the less heterogeneous European countries. (Correia 1919: 81)
This bio-anthropologist dismissed ‘the assertion of some authors that, especially in Lisbon, a great part of the population is composed of mulattos’ (Correia 1919: 80). The thought of having Negro blood running in Portuguese veins was something these scientists were not even willing to contemplate. For, if an admissible inferiority of the Portuguese could be overcome in a near future, Correia did not believe it was also possible for certain black races, such as the Aborigines of Australia or the Pygmies of Asia and Africa (Correia 1919: 82). Later, in 1940, the man about to assume control of the Colonial Superior School and the Board for Colonial Research felt the need to confront all the Western scientists and ideologists, mainly those of Nazi Germany, who were persisting on ascribing a black genesis for the Portuguese race and who presented as proof the fact that in some African areas Portuguese were distinguished from Europeans. Correia could not do much more than resort to the same anthropometrical evidence that he felt pointed to one conclusion. Portuguese had nothing in common with Negroes, but belong, by their own right, to the European block (Correia 1940: 211-214). All these arguments were strategies to disavow what had always been obvious to foreign racists: the bio-ethnic impurity of the Portuguese, their frontier nature – a sign of an unredeemable inferiority.

The failure of the Western strategy, when in the real West those identities perceived as impure did not feel at home, triggered the reaction I have defined as the second identity strategy. It simultaneously rejected the positive Western referent and the negative African or Asian referent, while trying to create a third space that does not assume any frontier hybridity and simply refuses to be identified with those two opposing images. In Russia, this strategy had its main support in Slavophilism, an intellectual current emerging in the 1840s and 1850s whose influence extended far beyond the nineteenth century. As a backlash against Westernism, the Slavophile trend re-designated Russia’s difference as something that should be cherished instead of being undervalued (Kireevski 1978: 180). Slavophilism was a possible version of Russian nationalism – though not with the support of tsarism, which thought Slavophile ideas too subversive in spite of all the praises that the thinkers of the movement shouted in favour of autocracy. But one must understand what that brand of nationalism entailed. Being a reverse reflection of Russia’s Western representations, its dismissal of a supposed proper identity was appealing to those Russians who felt that Europeans were excluding them from Europe. At the same time, it reacted against imminent identity destruction. This was perceived if not as an actual threat resulting from the unequal relationship between Russia and the West then as a phantom capable of awakening reactive feelings. So Slavophile nationalism was, above all, a reactive nationalism. Targeting Europe and the West for criticism, Slavophiles thought Westernisation
was at the root of all evils in Russia, because it tried to destroy the identity core of the Russian people. This kind of anti-Western rhetoric had two interconnected motives: the idea of authenticity and of identity cohesiveness. For Slavophiles, as occurred later in Eurasianism, the assimilation of Western European culture was tainted. A Westernised Russia was entirely inauthentic, a wounded and fragmented national body.

These intellectuals set off in search of that elusive national authenticity, something irreducible to either West or East and defining the uniqueness of Russia. The answer most of them thought they had found came not in the urbanised, perverted space, but in the peasant world, that store of virtues resistant to the invasion of Westernism. The idealisation of the peasantry and the rural provinces, the inner sheltered part of the country, is something many nationalist ideologues had in common, especially those engaged in a tug-of-war with a frustrating modernism. Portugal presents intriguing similarities with Russia in this aspect. At the end of the nineteenth century, when a wind of nationalism began to blow over the Portuguese intelligentsia, the old dichotomy was resurrected, which pitted the rural or natural country against the city. We have here a recurring motive in identity-building processes challenged by confrontation with external influences perceived as a threat to a cloistered identity, no matter of what this externality comprises, be it modernisation, Europeanisation or simply industrialisation and urbanisation.

The main point is to discern how important the identity opposition is between an imaginary good space – rural traditional – and an imaginary bad space – urban modern. The indecisiveness towards these two spaces is also typical of frontier identity constructions. In fact, research by J. Bastos clearly shows that the dichotomy opposing a positive rural model to a negative urban one is far from exclusive to intellectual elites since it is also pervasive in greater samples of Portuguese surveyed. An inquiry undertaken in 1997 has confirmed that, in their inter-regional identity strategies, Portuguese who live in rural-urban areas tend to ascribe negative traits to their countrymen inhabiting macro-urban areas and to impute those same qualities to foreigners, especially Spaniards and Northern Europeans. Rural-urban Portuguese are essentially joyful, loyal, peaceful, dreamy, etc., unlike the totally urbanised Portuguese who, like their foreign counterparts, are ambitious, nery, aggressive, domineering, selfish, etc. (J. Bastos 2001: 17-20). Here the underlying identity construction means that belonging to a rural traditional space is axiologically better and more Portuguese than belonging to an urbanised space. Curiously, people from the macro-urban areas disown the labels others ascribed to them, refusing to be identified with those negative urban-foreign traits and claiming for themselves the very same good Portuguese rural qualities (J. Bastos 2001: 22). This persistent and
trans-regional fixation on an idealised ruralism in Portuguese identity strategies is remarkable, all the more so when we think that, for the last twenty years, Portugal has been going through an accelerated process of urbanisation that has concentrated most of the population on the west coast, a process that goes hand in hand with the desertification of its rural inner provinces.

Still, none of these social changes seems to touch the deeper layers of identity-building, unless we consider that its strategies are the reflections we might expect of those changes. The Portuguese are approaching their urbanised modernisation with a burdened consciousness and a sense of guilt directed towards both their countrymen and foreign modernised countries. I suggest that this projection, together with an ongoing shame when faced with more developed nationalities (J. Bastos 2001: 23), can be construed as a sign of the ambivalent and wavering feelings found in frontier identities.

The role of religion

In the particular cases of Russia and Portugal, religion was central to the strategy that sought to uplift the uniqueness of those countries. Religion was, in fact, instrumental in the narcissistic compensation for inferiority feelings. Russians and Portuguese were represented as much better peoples than the other Europeans, because they followed the true religion – Orthodox and Catholic, respectively – and practised it in a ‘higher’ way. This argument is clear in the Slavophiles, who championed the idea that Christian Orthodox religion was inseparable from the Russian identity, thus allowing Kireevski to oppose a superior Russian being with an inferior European being, playing with the dichotomy between authentic and inauthentic, natural and artificial, country and city.

Religion is a central self-image of the Portuguese, for the purpose of underscoring a supposedly exceptional identity differentiated from the rest of Europe. J. Dias, probably the best-known anthropologist who worked within Salazar’s ideology, has voiced this myth, which he tried to cloak in scientific fashion. For him:

The pure Christian doctrine presents a very special character, because it supports love and forbids violence. The true believer is the one who believes Christ’s message and complies with it, looking to convert through love, and not to superimpose himself on the doctrine and answer with hatred and cruelty to whom was not yet enlightened with grace. (J. Dias 1957: 61)
Now the Portuguese, according to J. Dias, ‘is, above all, deeply humane, sensitive, loving and kind, without being weak. He does not like to make one suffer and avoids conflicts’ (1986: 25). Only when ‘wounded in his pride’, he adds, can the Portuguese be ‘violent and cruel’. Therefore, in J. Dias’ construction of national identity, ‘Portuguese’ and ‘pure Christian’ were interchangeable terms. Having established such a correlation, the most pleasant implications about Portuguese exemplarity could be drawn, particularly in the field of colonialism. At the end of the 1950s, when Portugal was beginning to feel the international pressure against colonial power, it was compelled to adjust its official ideology; it turned away from the Westerner-as-superior pose to a deliberate de-identification with Western European colonial style and with Western Europe in general. The image now treasured was no longer that of a people belonging to the European block, superior to races naturally and legitimately less favoured. The Portuguese people now depicted, namely by J. Dias, was almost cosmopolitan, embracing all races and cultures, having a paradoxical non-ethnocentric ethnocentrism (once again, a compound idea that betrayed its frontier matrix) (J. Dias 1957: 59). This discourse killed two birds with one stone; it nurtured Portuguese self-esteem, rescuing it from its frontier ambivalence and, at the same time, justified the colonial permanence of Portugal in Africa at a time when that was becoming untenable. Such a self-pleading argument needed the negativisation of the West and the praise of Portugal as an alternative. The West was definitely not the best.

It is not necessary to insist on how contradictory it could be to detach a new tolerant strategy from the former style of an aggressive and unashamedly exploitative colonialism. The ambivalence of Portuguese colonialists towards their black otherness did not vanish, and it could not, because that ambivalence mirrored the insecurity Portuguese felt concerning their own score in an identity competition. The ambivalence was, in fact, barely whispered and the need to express a sense of superiority in respect to natives frequently cracked the veneer of tolerance. Whenever the ideologists of colonialism said that the Portuguese ‘never felt repugnance for other races and have always been relatively tolerant to alien cultures and religions’ (J. Dias 1986: 53), this should be translated as meaning that the Portuguese ‘has known how to respect the natives’ values that are acceptable and consistent with the Christian doctrine and moral, and with certain fundamental principles of the Western civilisation, based upon Christianity’ (Leite 1961: 11). Indeed, the idea that the white is the bearer of a superior culture, either material or spiritual, was an article of faith for all these ideologists, who professed a tolerance that was nothing more than poorly disguised paternalism. Bender is right when he says that this contradiction was a blind spot in Portuguese scholars’ ideology on colonialism (2004: 209).
Much of this new identity framework for idealising the Portuguese approach to colonised natives had been nurtured by the thought of a Brazilian scholar, the sociologist Freyre. Freyre had invented the concept of lusotropicalism, which celebrated two interlinked aspects placing Portuguese colonialism completely apart from and above Western European domination. The two aspects were the Catholic touch, thanks to which Portuguese colonial societies had been more Christocentric than ethnocentric (Freyre 1961). It also allowed Portuguese to promote miscegenation with other races without any second thoughts. Colonial ideologists in Portugal enthusiastically welcomed such ideas. The fact that they came from a former colonised country with the symbolic importance of Brazil gave them even greater weight. Freyre was heralded as well for raising Portuguese self-esteem by placing their behaviour above that of the Northern Europeans.

The contact with Freyre’s masterwork (1983), which could be seen as the scientific rehabilitation of mestizage, triggered a wave of praise for the Portuguese ability to promote miscegenation, something that was supposed to highlight superiority in contrast with their fellow European colonisers. All of this was of course just a big denial operation, whose aim was to gloss over the uncertainty and indecisiveness of Portuguese identity positioning. Far from being a comfortable position in which the Portuguese could dwell with no problem whatsoever, miscegenation and mestizage were disturbing experiences, even when the authorities encouraged them as a strategy to control territories too vast to be simply colonised. Some of the oldest documents we have discussing the Portuguese attitude towards miscegenation hardly illustrate that cordiality so lauded by J. Dias. Testimonies from Jesuit missionaries, written at the end of the sixteenth century are quite clear in the way they show reluctance to accept Asian or Euro-Asian natives as members of the Company of Jesus in the Indian regions controlled by Portuguese authorities. One of those documents reported that, as for the mestizos, ‘... the more native blood they have, the more they look like Indians and the less cherished they are by the Portuguese’ (quoted in Boxer 1992: 248). Much later in 1944, in the period of transition from the first to the second Western colonising strategy, which was supposedly original and Portuguese, the discourse on miscegenation reflected a characteristic ambiguity.

For the ideologists of colonialism, pondering on the value of mulattos served two purposes in the process of identity-building: upgrading the Portuguese white identity in comparison to that of the mulatto, and of course denying it any mulatto traces. The consequences of such ambiguities were foreseeable. In 1958, J. Dias still complained about the fact that in Mozambique, many children of mixed heritage were being classified under the category of natives, which meant that whenever their
white fathers did not recognise them they were lumped together with ‘Negroes’, according to the hierarchical ethnic labels created for racial discrimination. Furthermore, J. Dias saw how the rest of the white society tended to marginalise the mixed couples, invoking cafrealisation to describe the union of a white man with a black woman (1958: 75-76). However, blind to his own contradictions, J. Dias kept on insisting that the truly Portuguese way was to legitimate the children of mixed heritage, even if, at the same time, he had to count on the ‘Christian and anti-racist spirit’ of the missionaries to enlighten the prejudiced minds of his coloniser countrymen (1958: 74).

**Conclusion**

I am going to conclude with a few remarks on the impact these identity constructions can have in migratory processes. It is interesting to find that people who were previously ruled by the Portuguese and who are now experiencing emigration have actually incorporated in their own identity devices some traces of the second strategy I have just analysed. The studies conducted by J. Bastos and S. Bastos (1999a: 186-187) among the immigrant communities in Portugal have shown, for instance, that a significant group of Luso-Angolans ascribe to themselves, either in their national image or in their personal and ideal self-representation, a large number of traits they also consider Portuguese, such as adaptable, adventurous, religious and sentimental. All these traits, together with others the Angolans express in their view of the Portuguese, such as curious, ambitious, or jealous, are equally present in the image the Portuguese constructed as a national identity (J. Bastos 1995: 548). As one could expect, the agreement rate in the ascription of each trait differs among the immigrant Angolans and the Portuguese hosts. The fact remains that there is a high coincidence in both processes of identity-building, which raises the need to study the cultural and historical links, the identity exchanges between Portuguese and Angolans that likely unified those processes. Another coincidence that deserves to be highlighted is the fact that these identity constructions, made by common citizens, seem so close to the one that coloniser anthropologists and ideologists made. This should not be read as a confirmation of the colonisers’ argument on Portuguese identity, but simply as a sign that the elites’ perception of national identity is not necessarily out of sync with the national self-representation created by normal people.

Of course none of these coincidences should allow us to forget that underneath there are very different identity processes at play. In the case of the Portuguese the identity ascription is part of a differentiating
strategy to escape a frontier condition. On the other hand, the Luso-
Angolan immigrants are looking for the most self-rewarding strategy to
fit into a foreign society, having to deal with a very complex framework
of layered power relations. On one level we can witness how the ethnic
migrant relates to the host ethnic macro-group; on a second, under-
ground level, we can see how the first level is affected by the memory
of the former unequal relationship between coloniser and colonised.

An even more remarkable example of the coincidences can be
gleaned from the research conducted by J. Bastos and S. Bastos among
the migrant communities of Gujaratis, either Hindus or Muslims, who
went from Portugal and Mozambique to England, more precisely to
London and Leicester, in the 1990s (S. Bastos & J. Bastos 2002). Having
lived under Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, those com-
Communities use that experience to improve their position in an identity
competition with other Gujarati Hindus and Muslims settled in the
same British cities, though with a different trajectory and a different co-
lonial history (coming from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, African areas
formerly colonised by the British). The ethnic context initially had a
striking aspect; the Gujaratis who came from former Portuguese colo-
Nies tend to complain about the racism displayed against them by those
Gujaratis who had lived under the British rule. The point is that such
complaints seem to echo the feelings of the Portuguese whenever their
identity was debased by Northern Europeans. The second aspect is even
more impressive. To rise above the Anglophile Gujaratis, those coming
from Portugal engage in a competition between colonialisms, assessing
Portuguese colonialism as less racist, less exploitative, more humane
and racially inclusive than the type of colonialism experienced by the
Gujaratis from African territories which suffered British rule. In doing
this, the Gujarati Hindus and Muslims who migrated from Portugal
are, in fact, regurgitating the whole package of lusotropicalist argu-
ments (S. Bastos & J. Bastos 2002: 144-145). It would be quite interest-
ing to retrace the genealogy of these arguments from Gujarati voices to
ascertain whether or not this version of lusotropicalism ensues, among
other factors, from the internalisation of Portuguese colonial ideology.

Scholars in Portugal today have a new field for research on frontier
identity phenomena connected with migration. Since Russians have be-
gun to take part in the transnational flow of migration to Portugal, I
find it a fascinating sociological and anthropological research topic to
study how the Eastern frontier identity of Russians passes through the
experience of living in a frontier version of the West such as
Portuguese society. What happens when the two frontier identities meet
is a fit subject for future research?
Notes

1 The 1890 British Ultimatum was delivered to Portugal in breach of the Treaty of Windsor of 1386.

2 The examples of such massive identity devaluation are legion. For a small but significant sample see Pinto (n.d.: 231), Enes (1946: 48-50, 69, 72-76), Galvão (1929: 64, 67, 85-96, 121) and Montenegro (1929). For a history of racist and exploitative attitudes of Portuguese colonisers in Angola see Bender (1980: 199-333). We should add to these traces, aimed at ‘naturalising’ the identity of black Africans, another common occurrence: the representation of cannibalism as a natural psychosomatic tendency embedded in their behaviour (Pereira 1987: 94). See also Santos (2002: 68), who shows how the colonised Africans applied the accusation of cannibalism back at the Portuguese colonisers.

3 On the cross-cultural and cross-ethnic relations between the eastern peoples or tribes and the Russian settlers see Figes (2003: 381). On the nativisation of Russians who settled in the Asian regions of the empire and the reactions of ethnologists investigating this phenomenon see Sunderland (1996).

References


9 The Goan elites from Mozambique: migration experiences and identity narratives during the Portuguese colonial period

Marta Vilar Rosales

Introduction

Hall (2000) presents two ways of thinking about cultural identity. The first position defines cultural identity in terms of one shared culture among people with a common history and ancestry where cultural identities reflect the mutual historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as ‘one people’, with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions of the present. The second position, although related to the first, recognises that as well as the many points of similarity there are also critical points of significant difference which constitute what we really are, or rather, what we have become. Cultural identity in this second sense is a matter of becoming as well as of being. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere and have histories but, like everything that is historical, they undergo constant transformation.

This theoretical perspective promotes a non-essentialised notion of identity, stresses the pertinence of observing its politics and expressions (Gardner 2002; Gilroy 2003) and points towards its strategies and outcomes (Bhabha 2000; Baumann 2003), as resulting from ongoing and complex negotiations between different groups in specific historical, social and political contexts. As Hall (2003: 237) argues:

Cultural identities are points of identification, the unstable points of identification or suture, which are made, within the discourses of history and culture. Not an essence but a positioning. Hence there is always a politics of identity, a politics of position.

Based on the life narratives of five families currently living in Portugal, this chapter aims to contribute to the analysis of the trajectories, positions and integration strategies followed by the Goan Catholic Brahmin elites that migrated to Mozambique during the nineteenth century. In line with the arguments expressed, my main objective is to highlight, even if in a descriptive and synthetic manner, the discourses and the
evaluations this group of families produced about their past colonial identities. These identities are, as every one of them stated numerous times during the interviews, rather different and not representative of their present identities.

The Goan migration is a long and complex process involving various motives, destinations and social groups. The first migrations occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when Portuguese colonial policies of implementing a mass conversion to Catholicism in Goa forced Hindus to seek refuge and protection on the neighbouring Indian territories from Portuguese religious intolerance and heavy system of taxation in the colony. Records show that in the same period there was a small but interesting movement of Goan Catholic migrants to Portugal and its colonial territories in Africa and Brazil. Given their connection to the Portuguese colonial administration in Goa, this group represents a very specific faction of the population, since it integrates a considerable number of members of the ‘cultivated converted Goan elite’ (Thomaz 1998: 269).

The migration of the Goan Catholic elite became especially intense during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to economic problems in the territory. Emigration was highly encouraged by the Portuguese authorities in Goa. The two main destinations were Bombay, Karachi and Calcutta in British-ruled India and parts of the African continent, particularly the Portuguese colony of Mozambique (Gracias 2000: 425) coinciding with the beginning of the effective occupation of the Portuguese African territories in need of human resources to expand their administrative structures (Thomaz 1998: 283; Malheiros 2000: 384; Zamparoni 2000: 211; Sardo 2004: 101).

Historical records of the Goan presence in Mozambique are scarce. Nevertheless, three main guidelines helped me to conduct this research. First, the Goans, and especially the elite who had converted to Catholicism, seemed to occupy a unique position in the colonial social structure, quite different from the positions taken by other non-European social communities. Secondly, and directly related, this particular position seems to be understood by the other communities as a privileged relationship with the colonial authorities (C. Bastos 2002: 62-63), resulting from the cultural proximity between the Portuguese and the group. Thirdly, despite the two first characteristics, the dominant colonial group nevertheless perceives the Catholic Goans as other (C. Bastos 2002; Zamparoni 2000).

To better understand the reasons behind these guidelines we should start with a brief overview of the Portuguese colonial experience in Goa, where the Portuguese were confronted with a deeply entrenched social structure. Although a non-permanent Portuguese population governed the political, financial and military spheres, they had to adjust somehow
to the indigenous social organisation and seek cooperation with the local groups controlling internal power relationships, as a way of consolidating their colonial presence (Sardo 2004). Portuguese authorities looked for the support of local elites who, in turn, were interested in maintaining their privileged positions. The cooperation between colonisers and colonised established the basis for a relational process that, although fixed by the first group, was controlled by both (Sardo 2004).

The imposition of a Portuguese way of life in Goa began in the sixteenth century with the establishment of local Catholic seminaries and schools. These were largely attended by the local elites from the Brahmin and Chardó castes converted to Catholicism, and use of Konkani, the Goan local language, was prohibited (Sardo 2004: 93-94). This strategy aimed at the formation of a local civil servant class, but also allowed some members of the local elites to achieve prestigious social positions in medicine, law and teaching. Additionally, another set of measures was taken to reinforce the proximity between the two communities. The Goan Catholic elites changed their original family names into Portuguese ones (usually the surname of their godparents), integrated Portuguese cultural elements into Goan music, poetry, cooking and even in dress codes (the sari was disdained), as ways of stating their embrace of a ‘western life style’ (Thomaz 1998: 272; Sardo 2004: 108).

The process of Portugalidade in Goa resulted in a complex social matrix formed by a plurality of social categories which, by the mid-nineteenth century, stabilised into three major groups: the Goeses (individuals of Goan origin, regardless of religion) the ‘descendantes’ (individuals of Portuguese descent who were born in Goa), and the Portugueses (individuals who were born in Portugal and tended to return to Portugal after some period of time in Goa). In addition, within the Goeses group, both among Hindus and Catholic converts, the caste system of social stratification was maintained.

The Goan migration to Mozambique

The major emigration flow to Mozambique that took place during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was made up mainly of Catholic-convert Goans from various castes followed in numbers by Hindus and descendantes. The social diversity of these migration movements was an important part in the strategies developed by the Goan Catholic elite in the new colony and was crucial to the understanding of why it is impossible to think of the Goans from Mozambique as a unified homogenous community.

The social position occupied by the Catholic Brahmins in colonial society reflected two main features. Firstly, their professional and
educational skills were, from the colonial power point of view, a surplus value due to the lack of qualified people in the territory. Secondly, and as a result of the Portuguese colonial policy in Goa, familiarity with the Portuguese culture allowed the group to develop a very different relational model with the Portuguese colonial elite. The fact that they were Catholic, spoke the official colonial language, had adopted Portuguese family names, knew and incorporated many Portuguese cultural habits affected the way the group was evaluated by the colonial power.

Even though this brief outline strongly suggests the existence of objective conditions for successful integration in Mozambique, there are some more obscure dimensions that indicate the opposite. To observe them more accurately we need turn to the families’ statements about their lives in Africa.

The main idea linking all the families’ statements is that the Catholic Brahmins in Mozambique lived a life very similar to the Portuguese:

We lived in a very good neighbourhood and had a very nice relationship with our neighbours (Portuguese). Our lives were almost the same. Well, you know, we had a Western upbringing. (...) We are educated people, with a certain pose.

Well, you should be aware that our community was not black, although it wasn’t white either. We had highly qualified people. At some point, the most important places in the colonial administration were occupied by many Goans.

Almost all the statements gathered during my fieldwork are similar to these two. The proximity to the Portuguese way of life is affirmed by all families as a way of illustrating that they were not submitted to a social policy of exclusion by the Portuguese authorities like the other non-European migrant groups. To emphasise this argument, all families focused on the similarity of the two groups’ lifestyles and on the proximity of their cultural capital. The idea of belonging to the same social networks of the Portuguese, however, is absent from their statements. In a very subtle and discrete manner, the Goan Catholic elite opts to describe their experience in Mozambique without mentioning the exclusion and subordination mechanisms present in the Portuguese colonies at that time which affected their lives, too.

This impression turns the analysis towards a complex field of discussion – the Goan identities – since, as one of the informants assured, “We, the Goans, are neither “water nor wine.”” If, as stated earlier, the proximity of the Catholic and the Portuguese elites in Goa was ‘from the identity point of view, evidence’ (Sardo 2004: 107) which resulted in major difficulty identifying and systematising a set of elements
capable of asserting and pronouncing ‘the uniqueness and unity of Goanidade’ (Sardo 2004: 109), the same thing happened in Mozambique.

**Identity markers: what does it mean to be a Catholic Brahmin?**

If not totally Portuguese, how do the families describe themselves? What does it mean to be a Catholic Brahmin in Colonial Mozambique? The analysis points towards the existence of five major identity elements: origin (Goa), the family, the proximity to the Portuguese culture, caste and religion. The Goan origin is an important element of identification for all subjects and most of the families speak about their origin with great detail and intensity. Even though all of them were born outside of Goa (in Mozambique) and many never visited the territory, the discourses about Goa and the Goan social and cultural realities are often invoked by the description of their families’ histories, large houses and properties.

That’s a funny thing. I was born in Mozambique and my parents were born there too. I had never been in Goa and the first time I visited (1992), I felt that, somehow, I was home. I think that happens because family is very important to us Goans. You know, I still have family there. And, when I arrived I went to visit them. They have never seen me and I never have seen them but they knew who I was and I knew who they were. It was a fabulous experience! I loved it.

Origin and family are almost always connected in the subjects’ statements. Contact with the family members who stayed in Goa was mainly by mail. The younger generations learned the details of daily life in Goa through stories told by their parents. These narratives included the family’s memories plus detailed stories of other closely related Brahmin families. The existence of old and profound alliances among the Catholic Brahmins are always present in and constitute a very meaningful part of these stories.

The significance of the family as an identity element is particularly visible in social networks formed in Mozambique. These networks were based on previously existing contacts and relationships between the families in Goa. As a result, all the networks and social associations created by the families were constituted by individuals from the same caste, who shared a common past and often belonged to families that were related in Goa. This feature is important in understanding the
The testimonies regarding the Portuguese reveal at first the assertion of an effective relationship between the two groups as well as a positive evaluation of Portuguese specific habitus (Bourdieu 1979). This is a significant aspect because it allows us to envision a possible continuity in Mozambique, of the mimetic processes begun in Goa and, accordingly, the development of a strategy of proximity to the dominant colonial group. This representation is present in the majority of the discourses about the Portuguese, primarily described as ‘our neighbours’, ‘school and work mates’ and ‘friendly folks’, with whom the Catholic Goans shared a similar lifestyle.

When talking directly about their intimate friends, however, the subjects’ statements undergo an important inflection. The families clarify their effective social belonging to a group with a shared past, long-term relationships and alliances. Except for the families who lived part of their lives in small villages, all the informants stated that their social networks in Mozambique’s larger cities were exclusively constituted by Catholic Goan Brahmin families.

My family knew some Portuguese families, but all my parents’ friends were Goans. Back in Goa all our families were closely related. So, even though my parents were very ‘open-minded’ people, their best friends were all from Catholic Brahmin families.

The sociability with the Europeans was normal. They came to our social clubs and we went to theirs. Well ... maybe less. I would say that there was certain racism in Mozambique. Marriages between the two groups simply didn’t exist. To be honest, the two communities didn’t mix up.

It is also through the description of the social networks that the existence in Mozambique of a series of social and racial segregation mechanisms becomes evident. Even if described as a cultural influence imported from the British Colonies (Rhodesia and South Africa), almost all the subjects tend to affirm that the Portuguese did not easily accept them into their more intimate social circles.

It was very difficult to participate in their social activities. They didn’t invite us to their homes and social clubs. Maybe they thought that we did not know how to behave.

This sarcastic remark points to another relevant issue that stood out during the analysis of this particular dimension. Again partially
contradicting their initial comments, depicting the Portuguese community as a homogenous group, the Goan families made clear, even if very discreetly, that the ‘Portuguese were, after all, a very plural group’. Due to their cultural capital, the families tended to establish a plain differentiation between the Portuguese elites who, like them, were educated people and the other Portuguese population. This subtle distinction helps us understand that when the Catholic Brahmin families say that their lives in Mozambique were very much like the Portuguese way of living, they are not talking about the Portuguese in general but only the better-positioned factions of the group, the ones who, like them, hold high cultural capital. The evaluation made of the Portuguese population shows that, besides ethnic boundaries, class was important in the ways society was depicted by the group.

The statements about the constitution of the families’ social networks in Mozambique were significant to the discussion and analysis of caste, another major identity factor. The Goan Catholic Brahmins describe the caste system as ‘an Indian class form of social categorisation’. Since all the religious elements were eliminated from the concept, they tended to justify the maintenance of caste as a form of social stratification similar to the Western class concept.

To talk openly about caste is very difficult for Catholic Goans. Even if justified as ‘more or less the same thing as your social classes’, the families adopted a way of describing the characteristics of their own caste, which carefully avoids any kind of comparison with the other Goan castes. The most relevant factors mentioned were education, the appreciation of the fine arts and a great level of familiarity with and knowledge of the Portuguese language and culture.

When asked about their relationships with members of other Goan Catholic castes, all families explained that in Mozambique, like in Goa, the Brahmins tended to be a ‘quite restricted group’.

Marriages between people from different castes were simply not allowed. Brahmins can only wed Brahmins or Europeans. We met people from other castes, in school or at work, but that was all. It’s quite interesting that we have converted to Catholicism but still cannot let go of the caste.

All Brahmin families were related. We had a very intense social life in Mozambique, lots of parties and outdoor activities, but only with people that had the same kind of education as we did. This was a major cause of concern to our parents.

The existence of boundaries between the several Goan castes was also visible in the public sphere. In the larger cities (Lourenço Marques,
now Maputo, and Beira), the Catholic Goans created three different social clubs according to caste. So, despite all the ruptures and new circumstances that all migration processes entail, the group managed to reproduce in Mozambique a relational model very similar to the one they had in Goa.

The argument used to illustrate the relational models held with other migrant groups and with the African populations are much the same as that described above. The subjects clarify that, despite their geographical origin or religion, their contacts with other migrant non-European groups were strictly formal ‘at an institutional level. We met for sports and nothing more.’ According to the families, the distance maintained between the different migrant groups was required by the colonial authorities to promote the segregation of the groups.

We maintained a detached relationship with all the others. That was also good for the Portuguese authorities because there was no space for any kind of conflict to emerge. It was a peaceful society with no hostilities amongst the different groups, but also a fragmented society, with fixed boundaries separating the different social and ethnic groups.

A similar point of view is presented in the ways the relationships with the African populations are portrayed, with an exception made for domestic workers. Although adhering to a rigid hierarchical code, the fact that they were in permanent contact resulted in the emergence of very strong links between the families and their African employees. Even if restricted to the few individuals who worked in their houses, all families stated they truly miss them and some still maintain contact.

The arguments presented to describe the relationships held with the other ethnic groups raised, for the first time, the explicit discussion of the Portuguese colonial policy of social segregation. All subjects made reference to the existence of strong mechanisms that promoted social distance and marked ethnic distinctions, especially to do with the African communities on which the statements are ambivalent. Most of the families were not openly critical about this reality, almost always characterised as softer and less rigid than the situation that prevailed in the neighbouring British colonies. Nor do they deny it or try to somehow promote and validate its existence. This dual perception is explained by the subjects as the result of the special position held by the group in the colonial social structure. As one of them stated:

The fact that we were discriminated against by the white community did not prevent us being racists, too. It would be a lie to say that Mozambique did not have racism. There was a lot of racism
in the colonial society, especially regarding the black communities. In their own land, they were ‘nothing’. There are many Portuguese and Goans that do not like to hear this, but it is true. The blacks were our servants and they did not have access to anything.

Finally, regarding religion, two major testimonies emerge. The first establishes that the Goan Brahmins are particularly devoted Catholics. The second launches another factor of differentiation between them and the other migrant groups, especially the Hindu population. As Catholicism was the official Portuguese religion, to be Catholic constituted another reinforcing element for the families of their proximity to the Europeans and, at the same time, a statement of commitment to their cultural principles. As one of the informants stated:

Our nearness to the Portuguese was stronger because we not only embraced the culture but also the Catholic religion and that was very significant in the colonial context. I think that the fact that we were Catholic was the most visible principle of differentiation from the other Indians for them.

My family is very devoted to our patron saints. My mother used to go to church every day and she participated in many church activities.

The Goan Catholic women didn’t wear saris because the Hindu women did. In Mozambique there was a clear differentiation between the Catholic and the non-Catholic so it would be stupid of us to use the saris.

Conclusion

Although partial and descriptive, the information gathered in this study tries to present a brief overview of the social positions, integration strategies and self-representation models of a restricted group of families integrated into one of the many communities that produced and shaped the Mozambican society during its long colonial period.

According to the testimonies presented here, the Goan Catholic Brahmins developed an original way to position themselves in the colonial Mozambican society. Their integration strategies resulted from a combination of proclaiming their Portuguese way of life while erecting an invisible wall that disconnected them from all the other non-European migrant communities. As one of the informants stated:
We Goans never assumed our Indian origins. We do not speak Konkani because only the lower Catholic castes and the Hindus did. The women would not wear saris because we didn’t want the Portuguese to see us as Indians, especially after the Indian invasion of Goa. At that time to wear a sari would be a disgrace. It would have meant that we were against the Portuguese Regime.

This tactic was based both on the maintenance of the mimetic process that had already started in Goa and on the reinforcement of all the features that guaranteed their closeness to the Portuguese elites (cultural capital, religion and routine daily practices). This particular identity strategy constitutes a fine example of colonial mimesis, in the sense defined by Bhabha: ‘The desire for a reformed, recognizable other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite’ (2000: 86). Initiated and actively promoted by the colonial Portuguese policies in Goa and Mozambique, this strategy served the interests of both the coloniser and the colonised by allowing each a privileged position in the Mozambican social structure. The Catholic Brahmin elite were nearer to the Portuguese than any other non-European community, and had access to almost all domains of the colony’s public sphere.

Even though the Goan elites strongly affirm their Portuguese way of life, however, the colonial elites did not fully integrate them into all of their social arenas. Even if the Goans shared the same residential areas, schools, churches and workplaces with the Portuguese, they were excluded from their social networks and associations. The same happened with marriage and friendship.

The detached form of social closeness that bound the two groups placed the Goan Catholic elite in a singular position. The group developed an explicit strategy of social demarcation from all other non-European migrant groups, including those of the same origin. Based mainly on caste and religious arguments, this policy ended up being a powerful mechanism of social reproduction, which prevented them from losing their privileged position within the colonial social structure, but also placed them in an ambivalent situation regarding all other non-dominant groups in the colony. As a result, the majority of the families left Mozambique following independence and now live in Portugal.

Notes

1 The data gathered here resulted from the ethnographic fieldwork conducted during my PhD research programme. As did most of the European population, the Catholic
Goans abandoned Mozambique during the transition period to independence (1974-1975) or shortly after. This group of families has been living in Portugal since then.

The term ‘Portugalidade’ designates the Portuguese colonial implementation of a Portuguese way of living in Goa. Although a formal policy of spatial segregation did not exist in Mozambique, the various ethnic communities occupied specific and visible marked territorial spaces in the colonial cities and towns. According to Henriques, the urban organisation policy followed by the colonial authorities established ‘white zones’ (Henriques 1999: 262) off-limits to the African population and to the majority of the other non-European inhabitants. As a result of this informal policy, the African population was pushed to the peripheries and the other communities (Chinese and Indian being the largest ones) submitted to a ‘racial hierarchy that resulted in a physical and spatial separation of bodies’ (Zamparoni 1999: 193).

The Portuguese term ‘Goanidade’ is used here as an equivalent to Goan identity.

According to the informants, the Goan Catholic families in small villages tended to integrate the ‘small local elites’. This was mainly due to two factors: their high cultural capital and the exercise of professional roles related to the colonial administration, education and health systems.

References


Identity, integration and associations: Cape Verdeans in the metropolitan area of Lisbon

João Sardinha

Introduction

The phenomenon of immigration is becoming increasingly significant in present-day Portugal, particularly in the Lisbon metropolitan area. In the 2001 census, 55.3 per cent of the documented foreign population resident in Portugal, live in the Greater Lisbon and the Setúbal Peninsula municipalities, representing 5.1 per cent and 3.7 per cent, respectively, of the total resident populations.

As one of the longest-standing immigrant communities, Cape Verdeans have made their presence felt in Portugal for more than three decades and across three generations. Despite their long domicile the association movements made by Cape Verdeans have attracted very little academic attention, leaving fundamental questions yet to be investigated. The subject of this study is the identity patterns and integration strategies adopted by the Cape Verdean population living in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA). I will approach these topics from the perspective of Cape Verdean associations, or associations primarily focusing their activities on the Cape Verdean population in the LMA, taking into consideration the ways in which these organisations may contribute to the identity structures and integration processes of the populations they represent.

As the Cape Verdean population and, above all, their descendants can be seen as being at a disadvantage when compared to Portuguese nationals and consequently inherit a series of factors potentially impeding their integration and influencing their identity formation, this chapter seeks to do the following:

1) to identify the role of associations in influencing the identity formation and integration processes of Cape Verdean immigrants and their descendants;

2) to assess and analyse the conditions that influence patterns of integration and identity formation of Cape Verdeans in the LMA from the perspectives of association leaders.
Identity formation in the age of transnationalism

As human beings we all possess multiple identities. Gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality and religion are just a few variables that make up one’s identity. While some identification variables are fixed – gender, race – others are fluid and dynamic, self-constructed or constructed by others, by states or by processes such as mobility. Numerous authors have argued that one’s identity is dynamic and ever-changing (Hall 1992; Maalouf 2002). Hargreaves (1995: 93-94) defends this same notion: ‘as the pattern of meaning and value by which a person structures his other life, it is clear that this involves a dynamic process rather than an immutable condition.’ Furthermore, as explained by Chambers (1994: 24):

Our sense of being, of identity and language, is experienced and extrapolated from movement: the ‘I’ does not pre-exist this movement and then go out into the world, the ‘I’ is constantly being formed and reformed in such movement in the world.

Thus taking these arguments into consideration, identities, it is then argued, are prone to ‘detours’ throughout one’s life (Gilroy 1997).

Beyond its dynamic characteristics, identity refers to lived experiences and all the subjective feelings associated with everyday consciousness; suggesting that such experiences and feelings are embedded in wider sets of social relations (Rose 1995). Individuals construct meaning and value with the aid of cultural codes shared by particular groups. Identity is in this sense inseparable from socio-cultural identity. As emphasised by Hall (1995), culture is one of the principal means by which identities are constructed, sustained and transformed. Hall (1990) approaches cultural identity from two angles: 1) identity is seen in terms of one shared culture – ‘one true self’ – reflecting the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide its people with frames of reference and meaning; 2) the recognition that identity is formed in relation to the way we see others as different from ourselves. Thus, an immigrant’s identification with an imagined community is an essential aspect of identification.

Various authors (King 1995; Rose 1995; Basu 2001) argue that the meaning of place is important in constructing identities. Rose (1995) identifies three distinct ways in which emotions felt towards a place can be connected to the notion of identity: 1) identifying with a place; 2) identifying against a place; 3) not identifying. For an immigrant, the first and third variables can take on a deeper meaning. Identification with a place implies their country, region or town of origin and the symbols and history that accompany that place. Not identifying, on the
other hand, implies being a stranger in a strange land and possessing feelings of not belonging and unfamiliarity with the symbols and landscapes that compose the host society. The reality is that in idealising the place left behind one frequently overlooks the reasons for having left in the first place. In the long run they become no more than imagined places, for, as King (1995: 28) points out, ‘these places have been changed by the migrants’ act of leaving.’

It is also common for an individual to compound identities in order to satisfy his other necessities and objectives in the host society. As argued by Elliott and Fleras (1992: 148):

> Our capacity for multiple identities, diverse loyalties, and numerous and overlapping memberships ensures an identification with the past over a range of situations and circumstances. It is the identification with select aspects of that cultural lifestyle – not the degree or intensity of involvement – that is crucial.

To cope with multiple worlds hyphenated identities are often created (Rex 1987; Bhabha 1994 1996; Pang 2000). As suggested by Rex (1987), hyphenated identities tend to highlight the problematic nature of collective attachments: the clash of interests experienced by translocal groups that arise from their multiple and multi-scale attachments and commitments. The stress is always on the hyphenation of ethnic identities to the exclusion of other forms of identification. Yet, the latter may potentially cut across ethnic attachments and generate quite different forms of sociality and alliance based on, for example, class, gender, lifestyle, religious zeal, political tendency.

Alongside the concept of hyphenated identities is hybridity, a concept that various authors (Hall 1992; Bhabha 1994; Chambers 1994; Papastergiadis 2000; Kalka et al. 2005) have tied to human mobility, diaspora and globalisation. As applied to migration and diaspora, the most common accounts emphasise hybridity as the process of cultural mixing, where the diasporic arrivals assume aspects of the host culture and rework, reform and reconfigure these traits in fabrication of a new hybrid culture or hybrid identities (Chambers 1996: 50). According to Bhabha (1994: 227), it is through this process that ‘newness enters the world’.

As applied to migrant communities, Hall (1992: 310-314) makes a strong link between the development of hybridity and the changing character of diasporas. According to him, the world is marked by two contradictory tendencies: 1) the globalisation route, which endorses homogenisation and assimilation; and 2) localism – notably in the form of ethnicity, nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Although these tendencies appear incompatible Hall emphasises that new cultural
identities are emerging from this incompatibility, drawing on different traditions and harmonising old and new without assimilating or abandoning the past. Similarly, Papastergiadis (2000: 3) advances that cultural hybridity is the outcome of the ‘twin processes of globalisation and migration’ and, as a result, modern metropolitan societies are today more complex and move beyond the models of assimilating and integrating migrants into host societies. Papastergiadis explains that as members of migrant communities come to prominence ‘within the cultural and political circles of the dominant society’, they begin to act ‘in favour of new models of representing the process of cultural interaction, and to demonstrate the negative consequences of insisting upon the denial of the emergent forms of cultural identity.’ Hybridity is thus a key component in this new modelling, intertwined within the coordinates of migrant identity and difference (Kalka et al. 2005). Accordingly, the new world-system does not result in socio-cultural homogeneity in so much as it represents an assortment of interrelations; many different kaleidoscopic cultural arrangements, amounting to no disjointed total, but instead, a heterogeneous and interpenetrating conglomeration (Hannerz 2002).

The concept of transnationalism is an important determinant of the available options concerning immigrant identities. When referring to persons and organisations upholding sustained ties across the borders of nation-states, be they of a weak or strong institutionalised nature, we are referring to the transnational networks created by them, which, in turn, can be seen as the basis for, or as a form of, transnational social fields. Based on the definition of Basch et al. (1994), within transnational migration research, the term social field can be summed up as a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relations through which ideas, practices and resources are exchanged, organised and transformed. This paradigm assumes the circulation of ideas, values and material culture flowing within these networks of social relations, although in an unequal form. Social fields are multi-dimensional, encompassing interactions of differing form, depth and breadth, such as organisations, institutions and movements (Basch et al. 1994).

As various authors point out (Faist 2000a, 2000b; Levitt & Glick Schiller 2003; Glick Schiller 2004), the concept of social fields also calls into question the division of connection into local, national, transnational and global. In one sense, all are local in the sense that all connections penetrate the daily lives of individuals living within a specific geographical setting. Within this setting a person may participate in personal networks, or receive ideas and information from another nation-state, across borders without migrating. In conceptualising transnational social fields as crossing the boundaries of nation-states it is important to note that individuals within these fields are, through their
everyday activities and relationships, influenced by multiple sets of laws and institutions. Their daily rhythms and activities respond not only to more than one state at the same time, but also to such social institutions as ethno-cultural associations or religious groups within a variety of states and across their borders (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2003).

Levitt and Glick Schiller (2003) argue within these social fields for a differentiation between *ways of being* as opposed to *ways of belonging*. Ways of being refers to the social relations and practices in which individuals engage. Individuals can be rooted in a social field but not identify with any label or cultural politics related with that field. Social fields of various levels, however, contain institutions, associations and experiences that generate identity categories attributed to or chosen by individuals or groups. These are accessible or optional ways of belonging that individuals may or may not opt for at different phases of their lives, or in different social frameworks. Individuals may have some kind of connection to a way of belonging, through memory, nostalgia or imagination, etc., which allows them to be part of a social field. Thus, as Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) advance, when individuals self-identify with a particular way of belonging, they may associate with like-minded individuals and create a social field. When a transnational social field is both formed and named, it becomes a transnational social space. These connections mean that daily practices,
as well as ideas, may be shaped by forces not confined to the nation-state. Ways of being and ways of belonging are, therefore, transnational.

Additionally, the formation of transnational social spaces can vary from short-lived exchange relations to long-lasting transnational interactions. Whether or not individuals forge or maintain some kind of transnational connection depends on the extent to which they wish to remain attached, or in the case of immigrant offspring, on the way in which they are reared in a transnational space (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2003: 15). Transnational activities may not be as central to the lives of most of the second generation, and those who do engage in them might not do so with the same frequency and intensity as their parents. In fact, in their writings concerning post-immigrant generations in the United States, Portes and Rumbaut (2002) argue that these ties will weaken among the children. The authors contend that since these individuals are only occasional transnational activists, and their activities are confined to very specific arenas of social life, they are likely to have minimal long-term consequences. The process of identity becoming weaker from generation to generation, according to Portes and Rumbaut (2001), occurs with all ethnic groups, but to varying degrees. The erosion of ethnic identity, explain the authors (2001: 150), will occur in a three-generational span as cultural heritage and, above all, the ethnic mother tongue, for example, will cease to have any sort of importance in the lives of the third generation.

Conclusively, we then take our cue from Faist (2000b: 215), who argues that immigrant identities and culture ‘cannot be seen as baggage or a template, nor as something to be figuratively packed and unpacked, uprooted (assimilationists) and transplanted (cultural pluralists).’ Certainly, the ongoing dissemination of transnational meanings and symbols through social and symbolic ties in transnational social spaces helps to maintain the multi-fold transactions across borders. Under auspicious conditions – such as modern technologies (distance-bridging mass communications, affordable short-term long-distance travel), liberal state policies (polyethnic rights and anti-discrimination policies), changing emigration policies (remittances, investment and political support), and immigrant capacities to mobilise resources (organisational, social and human capital) – transnational syncretism of identities and culture finds a fertile breeding ground (Faist 2000b).

**Immigrant associations, identity and integration: making the connection**

The intrinsic characteristics of migration, along with the processes of integration, influence not only the insertion of migrants into receiving
societies, but also the identity patterns individuals choose to adopt. The life trajectories of migrants may lead to lifestyle changes as well as personality and behaviour modifications. These alterations will vary depending on the migrants’ adaptation experiences in the new physical, social and cultural space as well as the host society’s receptivity to the newcomers (Saint-Maurice 1997). Upon arrival in a ‘new’ country, the obstacles encountered during the process of integration will influence the way immigrants organise their actions (Jenkins 1988), as well as the way in which they pattern who they are. As a defence mechanism against these obstacles and processes, informally created immigrant groups will, for example, give way to formal structures that link individuals that are united by a common origin and cultural heritage. The outcome of creating these more formal structures is often migrant associations.

According to Albuquerque, Ferreira and Viegas (2000: 11-12), immigrant associations can provide a space for social organisation, socialisation, communication, solidarity, exchange of information, reinterpration of traditions and mediation between the country of origin and the host nation. Generalising from these points, one can argue that associations try to meet two types of fundamental needs felt by the immigrants. First, they try to consolidate and affirm the immigrants’ cultural heritage, along with consolidating their feeling of belonging based on identity and affiliation, important variables in the migratory and integration process (Rex 1994). Second, associations often assist in realising material objectives, including the need to integrate immigrants into the host society’s social context and to participate civically and politically (Cheetham 1988). The primary functions of associations, therefore, become either cultural or political or of course both. In one way or another the associations then proceed in a relatively constant manner, aiming their goals and objectives at solidarity, recreational or cultural activities, as well as in protecting and advancing their rights by lobbying policymakers, political and economic power brokers and the legal system of the host society.

In characterising an ethnic and/or immigrant association, one can then make the case that they can be described as combining an effective tie with a common interest (Glazer & Moynihan 1975; Jenkins 1988). In other words, while it is common for immigrant associations to be founded to preserve the ethnic identity and culture of their members, inevitably these associations prominently assist the settlement processes of their members and encourage their active involvement in the host society (or not). Immigrants can come together and create formal associations to protect mutual interests, to mobilise support over issues of concern and to make demands and pressure political authorities concerning their welfare. A distinction can thus be
drawn between what an immigrant association is and what it does (Layton-Henry 1990). In terms of what it is, an immigrant association can be defined as an organisation formed by individuals who consciously define themselves as members of a group based, for example, on such variables as country of origin, common cultural heritage, ethnicity, language, religion and consciousness of kind within a larger context. In terms of what it does, on the other hand, an immigrant association may exist for a wide variety of reasons: social, recreational, political, cultural, religious, professional, business, service or a combination of some or all of these intentions.

The apparent paradox of associations being committed to the defence of ethnic culture and identity, while likewise engaging in the battle for equal rights, representation and integration in the host society, means that associations frequently find themselves in a middleman position. The dichotomy between associations functioning as vehicles for identity affirmation as well as integration is thus worth highlighting. Consequently, associations frequently find themselves moving across receiving–sending country contexts in relation to community identity formation. It is common for multiple identities to be negotiated, since this is one way through which these immigrant associations acquire their spheres of influence. Associations will often not end up belonging to this or that context as exclusive entities, but rather, look for the opportunities to belong to both, often evaluating and negotiating according to what best suits the needs of the association, as well as community members.

In seeking to shed light on the relationship between identity and integration, we can hypothesise that an identity crisis of any sort can hinder successful integration. However, it is worth emphasising that the relationship between these two aspects is not straightforward, even if an analysis of the issue of identity and other related aspects can tell us something about integration. In other words, I do not by any means wish to imply that because an individual identifies himself as being Cape Verdean, he or she will automatically be poorly integrated into Portuguese society. Nor do I suggest that those identified as Portuguese do not experience social exclusion and marginalisation (Possidónio 2005). Rather, I seek to explore the link between identity and integration and the ways associations perceive and assist in forming identities and how those identities in turn may influence integration.

Given the above arguments, I assert that undertaking an analytical study of immigrant integration and identity formation, for the purpose of better understanding the role and views of immigrant associations, is of considerable importance and justified. The goal of analysing Cape Verdean associations lies in the need to obtain critical perspectives of the subjects framing the study on behalf of the entities closest to the community and their problems.
Research design and geographical considerations

To acquire the information needed to execute this study I chose a strategy of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with leaders of Cape Verdean associations or with leaders of associations focusing on the Cape Verdean community. These interviews had some characteristics of a normal informal conversation. The topics and questions, however, were pre-selected and were presented in a structured order. The period of the interviews was between February and April 2001.

To obtain the necessary information and to achieve the set objectives, 31 associations located in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area were pre-selected, 27 of which were then interviewed.6

The LMA was chosen as the geographical area of study because the great majority of Cape Verdeans resident in Portugal live there.7 So most associations are in the LMA and mainly in the peripheral neighbourhoods (Malheiros 2000; Esteves & Caldeira 2001). Of the 27 associations contacted, fifteen work specifically at the neighbourhood level.8 Considering that the municipalities of Amadora, Oeiras and Lisbon have the largest concentrations of Cape Verdeans in the LMA, most of the associations are in those municipalities. Also, taking into account the three quarters of the associations pre-selected for this study are in three municipalities (ten associations in Amadora, seven in Lisbon and six in Oeiras). Figure 10.1 illustrates this spatial distribution.

Framing the Cape Verdan communities and the associations

Before discussing in detail questions concerning the identity and integration patterns of the Cape Verdan community in the LMA, it is essential to first point out that the Cape Verdeans in Portugal are a segmented community, or perhaps better understood as segregated communities. On the one hand, there is a minority group that possesses a high social status – mainly technical and administrative professionals who, because of their favourable socio-economic situation and their longer presence in Portugal have had an easier time integrating into Portuguese society. Most of the individuals in this group were in Portugal before 1974. On the other, there are those immigrants with lower educational and professional qualifications who migrated to Portugal after 1975, a group that constitutes the majority of the Cape Verdeans in Portugal. They experience great difficulties in integrating into Portuguese society, frequently suffering social, cultural and economic marginalisation (Amaro 1985; França 1992; Saint-Maurice 1997). Although it is easy to identify these two sectors within the Cape Verdan community, the tendency is always to see the predominant sector, the
more numerous group and assume that all community members fall within those characteristics (Gomes 1999). This is clearly not the case, as these two groups are very distinct from one another and thus experience different integration processes and identity formation patterns.

Reflecting the the population they represent, Cape Verdean associations in the LMA are not homogeneous organisms but are instead a series of socially, economically and politically stratified organisations (Carita 1994). They range from a group of elite associations made up of sub-groups of well-established individuals already well integrated into Portuguese society, to an opposing stratum of associations focused on bettering conditions for immigrants, particularly community members with low levels of education or qualifications who are often socially, culturally and economically marginalised. These are the associations that can be found in the peripheral shantytowns or in neighbourhoods of social housing projects, close to the people they represent. This study makes no a priori distinction; both types of association were examined. The analysis presented here will focus primarily on the group that has experienced greater integration difficulties in Portuguese society.

In attempting to establish the importance of the associations and to analyse their functions, the association leaders were asked to highlight their roles and activities in relation to community integration and identity.

First, associations are sources of solidarity for the immigrant population, providing a place where they can network, obtain information and maintain links with the home country. The associations become a reference point for those who know little about Portuguese social service mechanisms. The Cape Verdean community can turn to these organisations for valuable advice. The associations are centres of communication and familiarity.

The associations know the difficulties of the community and act as community representatives and lobby groups, making demands on behalf of the people they represent. As one of the interviewees points out:

To intervene in government bureaucracies is essential, mainly when it comes to the initiatives carried out by the municipalities to improve people’s living conditions. This is why the associations are important. Also, the social problems that arise from the illegal situation some Cape Verdeans find themselves in, leads them to search out the services of the associations. Being undocumented does not permit access to many of the support services such as, for example, social security, the national health system, employment and training and other rights of citizenship. The associations thus represent the people and bring the people together to fight for their equal rights.
The organisations’ activities are key to the provision of recreational alternatives for the youth in the community, with the goal of keeping them ‘off the streets’ and providing them with healthy activities that also promote self-esteem. The associations work to broadcast the idea that integration is a ‘give and take situation’, and that it is important to live in harmony with other ethnic groups and, above all, with the host society. At the same time, they exist to bring visibility to cases of discrimination and xenophobia against the community. This may include discrimination in the workplace, in the schools or by the host society’s public service structures. Worth highlighting are the close relations maintained with anti-racism NGOs (i.e. SOS Racismo, Frente Anti-Racismo) in combating such issues as labour market exploitation and the lack of workers’ rights, housing market discrimination and the lack of rights of citizenship.

In relation to the community’s cultural integration, noteworthy actions include the association’s capacity to organise cultural events, bringing a bit of Cape Verde to those who are far from their homeland and to other interested parties. For those who find themselves without any family and social ties, the associations become a second home; a place where they can meet with fellow countrymen, share memories and experiences and maintain contact with their Cape Verdeanism, as well as discussing issues of life in Portugal. The associations work as cultural intermediaries, bringing together the host society and the distant homeland. It is significant that the most important task of the associations is to frame community members within the culture with which they identify, be it Portuguese, Cape Verdean, African, Afro-American or any other. This is primary when dealing with youth.

The associations act as a communication link between the residents and the political powers about matters of the community’s residential integration. They provide information and support residents with issues they may have concerning the re-housing processes from the shanty-towns to the social housing neighbourhoods. In relation to professional integration, a number of associations have developed a variety of projects in the fields of education and training, primarily aimed at the youth population to help combat high school drop-out rates (extremely high among the Cape Verdean youth community), as well as to provide a professional labour option for those with few skills, so they can compete in the labour market.

Lastly, also notable are the close ties with Cape Verde and with the Cape Verdean diaspora maintained generally through cultural exchanges and such specific projects as providing aid. Cultural exchanges in this case consist primarily of youth exchanges, cultural or sports groups or through exchanges of information. Aid projects, on the other hand, imply the distribution of food, clothing, medicine and technical
supplies. It is also worth mentioning that some associations have signed development protocols with specific regions or municipalities in Cape Verde.

Taking into consideration that the associations maintain dialogue with the host-society institutions, as well as with the country of origin and other communities in the Cape Verdean diaspora, I wish to underscore the importance of these associations as transnational social spaces in that they strategically adapt resources, ideas and circulate values and cultural flows within the networks of the social relations they maintain. Similarly, as associations that play various fronts, they will adapt to what best suits the community. In adapting an identity it is important to ask who or what influences the identity alterations? Do the associations influence the community? Does the community influence the associations? Or is it the host society that influences these changes?

Patterns of identity and integration: the view of association leaders

The goal of this section focuses on the views and perceptions of Cape Verdean association leaders, first in relation to the difficulties encountered by Cape Verdeans in their integration and identity patterns in Portuguese society and second, the main difficulties encountered by the descendants of Cape Verdean immigrants with the same variables.

Cape Verdeans in Portuguese society

The difficulties felt by the majority of Cape Verdeans have generally to do with their socio-economic position, characterised by poverty and marked by low education and professional qualifications, precarious job market participation and lack of adequate housing (Amaro 1985; França 1992; Saint-Maurice 1997; Gomes 1999). A culture of resistance and opposition to the wider society is most likely to be found in highly marginalised neighbourhoods in which people experience severe social problems (Possidónio 2005). Living in these areas and coming into daily contact with situations of poverty and other social issues is frustrating for residents of these areas with very few means available by which they could detach themselves from their marginalised lifestyle. An association leader explains the self-reinforcing phenomenon.

It’s a vicious circle; the Cape Verdeans have no economic resources. They live in shacks, and due to that situation, they are tossed aside by the rest of society. They are discriminated against and when you’re discriminated against, you can’t get a better job
and when you can’t get a better job, you can’t better your economic situation ... and the cycle continues.

When asked for the reasons behind these social problems, the lack of an appropriate integration policy on the part of the Portuguese state is often blamed.

The biggest problem is that the Cape Verdeans were never welcomed into the heart of Portuguese society, but were instead placed at the periphery in all aspects of life. Portugal has never prepared itself for us [immigrants]. We’ve suffered because of that, but the lack of an immigrant integration policy means that Portugal suffers as well. By an integration policy, I mean sociocultural integration! I mean equal rights as citizens! I mean proper housing! ... I don’t think anyone is proud of having these shantytowns and these ghettos in their society. They’ve taken us out of the shacks and put us in these cement blocks. Is that what they call an integration policy?

Even though shantytowns have gradually been eradicated, with residents being re-housed in social housing areas, it is the actual modes of re-housing that are blamed for keeping Cape Verdeans segregated from the rest of society. Often blamed is the fact that social housing neighbourhoods are usually located in the peripheral areas of the city, geographical spaces with very low spatial mobility, far from the rest of the urban fabric, affecting the time taken to commute to work and to access services and facilities. Social housing neighbourhoods have in turn become labelled as neighbourhoods of the poor and are often subject to social and spatial discrimination, which filters down to the residents.

Racism and discrimination are identified as serious issues blocking integration into Portuguese society. Labour and housing are cited as two examples where Africans are not given equal footing due to skin colour. In relation to the housing issue, for example, neighbourhood associations express how when a re-housing scheme is planned for a specific neighbourhood, where the majority of the population is middle-class Portuguese, the residents of that neighbourhood do not welcome Cape Verdeans (and Africans in general) because, as one association leader put it: ‘There is always that stereotype that the people who come from the shacks are thieves and drug traffickers who will only bring problems to the neighbourhood’. Concerning the job market, the same philosophy applies.
Cape Verdeans, like most other black individuals in this country, work as construction workers or as domestic workers. Even if their qualifications are superior to a Portuguese person, [...] the Portuguese individual will be given the job because the black individual is viewed as ‘not being one of us’. This is something black individuals go through in other countries – in other European countries as well – and Portugal is no different.

In the cultural identities and cultural integration strategies of the Cape Verdean population it is evident that although some cultural characteristics are unique and different from Portuguese culture, there is great concern that their cultural differences are not always taken into consideration or respected. As one interviewee explains:

What is most essential are the cultural resources that the Cape Verdeans bring with them when they come to Portugal; items that are not always valued or respected. You see this in the way they don’t take our cultural elements into consideration in the re-housing projects they build for our community, for example, when things are like this, cultural integration will not happen.10

Also worth highlighting is the way in which cultural integration should be achieved, with the majority of the interviewees stating that they are in favour of an intercultural model, in which both Cape Verdean as well as Portuguese culture are equally celebrated and respected; abandoning the notion of acculturation or assimilation, in which discarding Cape Verdean culture would be encouraged in favour of Portuguese culture. The following statement confirms this opinion.

Cultural integration is something that happens slowly. Of course when we arrive there is that initial culture shock, but with the passing of time, we begin to acquire certain Portuguese cultural traits. But as we do, it is also important not to forget that cultural integration is not the acceptance of everything that is Portuguese and the complete renunciation of what is Cape Verdean. Cultural integration means preserving one’s own culture, respecting the culture of the country that welcomed us, and also that the immigrants’ culture be respected by the host society.

The informants quoted above belong primarily to the first generation of Cape Verdean immigrants. It is, however, important to draw attention to the fact that in relation to the descendants of these immigrants, other influences and concerns end up moulding ‘who they are’, as we will now observe.
Descendants of Cape Verdean immigrants

Conflicting identity issues facing the Cape Verdean youth community are of particular concern to the associations interviewed. In reference to the confusion that frequently exists when it comes to immigrant descendants’ identity formation, one association leader expressed the following:

Portuguese society doesn’t see them [youth] as Portuguese because of skin colour. The mentality that exists is: ‘They are black, therefore they are African.’ On the other hand, the younger generation doesn’t know Cape Verde and they don’t identify with their parents version of being Cape Verdean. As a result of that, they end up not knowing who they are and how to define themselves and, because of that, they start searching for an identity and end up finding it in other forms of being.

For the youth population, the problems primarily stem from situations of unequal opportunities. Unlike their parents – whose standards come from their country of origin and who therefore feel that they are better-off than they were before emigrating, and better-off than their fellow countrymen who chose not to emigrate – the reference points for Cape Verdean youth are that of the Portuguese middle class (Possidónio 2005). Their cultural youth identity is, however, the result of a range of influences from Portuguese culture, Afro-Americanism to variations on African culture and blackness (Contador 2000). Having much greater expectations than their parents, this population does not easily conform to being relegated to a lower social status. Feelings of reactive ethnicity arise when they come to feel they are not being given the opportunities to ascend the stratification ladder, i.e. the materialisation of a sentiment of mutual belonging that is cultivated by being labelled against their own will, subject to discrimination and described in a pejorative manner by the host society (Portes 1999).

Upon feeling neglect and repression, certain symbolic cultural elements are recreated, reinvented and combined with elements from other sources, particularly Afro-American ghetto culture, to symbolise and transmit the feelings of revolt felt by the youth community. Evidence of this is seen in their daily lives as well as in their geographical spaces, marked with these symbolic elements of their cultural references, i.e. artistic forms of expression such as graffiti and rap music, clothing, language and behaviour. Contador (1998, 2000) identifies a type of Creole – which reinvents and incorporates elements of and influences from other African languages and cultures, from parallel forms of urban slang created in major American and European cities and
from their own neighbourhoods in Portugal – to create their own urban slang dialect which serves to unite and identify the African youth population. The use of this specific type of Creole is a prerequisite for the integration of these youths into a group of peers and into the wider black youth culture. Geographically, this phenomenon is most evident on a micro-scale, primarily in areas and neighbourhoods where there is a high concentration of immigrants and immigrant descendants and where social problems are most evident.

In addition, cultural references and identities are formed around strategies for changing both the surrounding environment and their own social and residential mobility. Cultural identities for Cape Verdean youth are often built upon feelings of rejection by, as well as discrimination from, the host society, in the media and from the state. An association leader points to the nationality law as an example of how the Portuguese government has discriminated against children with foreign parents:

In terms of where they’re from, these young individuals are Portuguese, but when it comes to nationality, they’re Cape Verdeans... It’s true, they are born here and they live here, but they are not entitled before the law to too many rights because they are not seen as being Portuguese. If they are born here, why doesn’t Portugal give them Portuguese citizenship? This is something we don’t understand and we’ll continue to battle to have this law changed until the day it is changed.11

The school system is blamed for the Cape Verdean community’s lack of integration, with the teachers and the schools themselves being at fault, along with the school curricula which make no considerations for the African communities.

The educational system is at fault for a lot of the academic failure within our community because it refuses to capture the attention of this population. Besides that, inside of the classroom, the Cape Verdean student is stereotyped as a student that will, sooner or later, be sitting at the back of the class not interested in what’s being taught, and will eventually drop out of school altogether. Our young people are not respected.

This form of rejection is externalised in the form of scholastic failure and unemployment. As a result of such rejection, illegal activities frequently become another form of expressing their unrest, the only way to lift oneself out of poverty (Possidónio 2005).
It leads this community to carrying out certain acts that, on one hand, should be condemned when it involves the destruction of property but, on the other, it should also be understood, because it is a form of calling out for attention over the revolt that they feel. These are poor kids that have been brought up that way and see no way out of it because the system that surrounds them won’t permit it.

The family and living situations in which many of these youth find themselves often have a negative influence on their future, as expressed by one association leader.

It is important not to forget that most Cape Verdean parents work long hours. Portugal is not like Cape Verde in that one can leave the children with another relative. From a very early age, children are left home alone or abandoned on the street while their parents are at work. It is common, for example, for the oldest who might be no more than nine or ten years of age, to be taking care of the other siblings. As a consequence of the parents not being around, this leads to the children not studying and not doing their homework. Many end up following in the steps of their parents, but the reality is that many also don’t want to work hard like their parents do and, in the end, it’s the bad influences in the neighbourhood that lead this young population into the world of criminality; this is always much easier than going to work on the construction site or cleaning up other peoples’ houses.

It can then be argued that the situation in which many Cape Verdean youngsters find themselves in is due to a variety of reasons, ranging from the lack of acceptance by the host society to their disjointed family life. Their identity strategies thus become a reflection of their social positioning, combined with feelings of abandonment by a system that neglects them and does not provide them with equal rights as citizens. Symbolic representations are thus normally a call for attention to the issues that concern them. At the same time, the family and neighbourhood culture often implies that they will end up inheriting their parent’s socio-economic position, their culture of poverty. As one association leader sums up: ‘The Cape Verdean youth community is a grey community that wanders around lost, screaming for attention and doing what they think it takes to get that attention.’

In light of such arguments, it is worth bearing in mind that cultural traits and identity strategies which immigrants bring with them to a new society tend to weaken and even disappear with the passing of time, from one generation to the next. Once upon the soil of the host country, there is often a loss of identity vitality as individuals, some
more than others, will back away from their home country identity, given that collective economic and cultural resources will be lost. This will especially be reflected in the second generation, whose members will most often shun what they consider weak community references and will affiliate with international or modern cultures (i.e. hiphop music, brand-name clothing, modern information and communication means, etc.) (Wierviorka 2002). Cape Verdean immigrant descendants are no exception to this rule.

Conclusion

Migration brings about a change to identity, constructed around such variables as language, traditions, culture and values shared by a community and internalised in the socialisation processes in the country of origin. With the passing of time and the introduction of new cultural references the immigrant’s identity, primarily based on the country of origin, is progressively replaced by an identity of multiple belongings and differentiated references, malleable, flexible, dynamic as well as problematic. It thus becomes more than apparent that immigrant integration and identity formation is not a uniform, clear-cut issue.

Besides functioning as intermediaries between the community and host society institutions serve as a focal point or unified voice uniting and representing a community. The Cape Verdean associations can be transnational social spaces that function as transmitters of integration and identity options within a transnational social field. They are sites where globally diffused models of social organisation and individuals’ local responses converge and produce new mixtures of beliefs, values and practices.

In ways of being and belonging and identity options, Cohen (1994) argues that the primary conceptual and organisational categories are gone – what we have now are ‘multiple subject positions’ that serve to define the individual. Within this framework it is common for associations, just like the individuals they represent, to end up not belonging to this or that context as exclusive entities, but rather, looking for the opportunities to belong to both the native and the host country. Another reality is that, beyond group or associative identification, other identity purveyors exist. A different set of allegiances and identities are formed outside the group or the association. Thus a homogeneous image of identity does not exist, no matter how much an association may work towards that goal. What emerges is what Bhabha (1994) refers to as a third space of identity belonging, a space that combines multiple identities and practices where belonging, resources and rights from different national contexts are constantly negotiated. Consequently, much like the
individuals they represent, associations cannot be identified as repre-
sentative of a single nationality (the country of origin), but instead as
hyphenated associations, for they may end up pursuing what they con-
sider to be the best of both worlds, based on the opportunity structures
offered to them by the different national contexts they negotiate.

For the first-generation Cape Verdean immigrants, time-space dimen-
sions, along with coexistence and interaction among different socio-cul-
tural systems, greatly influence the protagonists. Time-space dimen-
sions in this case entail what was before (the old country) and what is
now (the new host environment). But coexistence and interaction imply
relations between us (what is ours, familiar and known) and them (the
other, different, strange and unknown) (Lopes 1999). These relation-
ships and interactions imply conflicts and inequalities, serving to influ-
ence and transform self and group identity, which, in turn, can do
much to determine the degree of integration. The first-generation Cape
Verdeans in the LMA are characterised by poverty, low levels of educa-
tion and poor professional qualifications. They are also characterised by
precarious involvement in the job market and lack of proper housing,
blamed on the ‘vicious circle of poverty’, on social problems, on racial
and social discrimination and on Portuguese society for not implement-
ing policies to assist in resolving these issues.

Scholars have suggested (Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997) that the path-
ways of immigrant descendants to adulthood are often segmented, de-
pending on a variety of conditions and contexts, vulnerabilities and re-
sources. Cape Verdean youth are fighting the same crusade against pov-
erty their parents did before them. Factors such as territorial and
academic exclusion, lack of citizenship rights (nationality) and socio-cul-
tural labelling have posed barriers to their integration while leaving
them in search of who they are – answers they usually find in
Portuguese, Cape Verdean, African, Afro-American references.

Finally, it is worth adding that, through the voices of Cape Verdean
associations, this chapter has analysed how the institutions view the in-
tegration and identity strategies of their respective community; and sec-
ondly, how these movements, through their roles and activities, play an
integral part in the transition processes and decompositions or recom-
positions of immigrant identity formation and community integration.

Although a privileged voice has been given to association leaders in
the conduct of this study, it is important to remember that other paral-
lels and arguments conflicting with those gathered here, do arise from
community members, immigrant social service workers and members
of the host society.
Notes

1 Although very little has been investigated in relation to Cape Verdean association movements, a few studies do stand out, namely Sardinha (2002), Gomes (1999), Carita (1994) and Carita and Rosendo (1993).

2 One such example comes in the form of the Portuguese nationality law based on *ius sanguinis* principles that does not permit second-generation immigrant descendants the right to nationality at birth.

3 For this chapter, ‘descendants of Cape Verdean immigrants’ implies the second- and third-generation Cape Verdean youth, being those born on Portuguese soil, while also taking into account those individuals who came to Portugal in their childhood or early adolescence (generation 1.5) and whose primary socialisation has taken place in Portugal.

4 Transnational social spaces, according to Faist (2000b), can be distinguished in three different forms: 1) transnational reciprocity in small groups (usually kinship collectives), 2) transnational exchange in circuits and 3) solidarity within transnational communities.

5 One does not need to go through much of the literature on the concept of integration before it becomes clear that the concept has many different meanings and is used in many different contexts. For the purpose of this chapter, integration in migration research stands for the process of including migrants in the core relations, statuses and institutions of the receiving society. According to Heckmann (2003), immigrant integration can be understood as processes of placement, culturation, interaction and identification.

6 It is worth noting that the Cape Verdean association universe is in constant flux due to the fact that new associations are constantly being created and others expire, so that it becomes impossible to know exactly the number of Cape Verdean associations or associations orienting their activities towards this community.

7 The Portuguese National Statistics Institute (INE) census data for the year 2001 shows that nearly 90 per cent of the Cape Verdean population legally residing in Portugal lived in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA). The LMA is made up of the following twenty municipalities: Amadora, Azambuja, Cascais, Lisbon, Loures, Mafra, Odivelas, Oeiras, Sintra and Vila Franca de Xira on the north bank of the Tagus River; and Alcochete, Almada, Barreiro, Moita, Montijo, Palmela, Seixal, Sesimbra and Setubal on the south bank. A second tier of government within the municipalities is the parish (*freguesia*).

8 Among the neighbourhood associations interviewed, it is worth pointing out that some cater exclusively to the Cape Verdians residing in a given neighbourhood, while others cater to individuals residing in a given multi-ethnic neighbourhood, the majority of which are Cape Verdians. In addition to aiming their activities at residents of specific neighbourhoods, other groups the associations target include youth, professionals, students and senior citizens. Most of the associations aim their activities at more than one group.

9 The programmes PER (Decree-Law 163/93 and Law 34/96) and PER Famiли́as (Decree-Law 79/80) were implemented by the state in conjunction with the municipal authorities with the goal of eradicating all shacks and re-housing all individuals living in shanty town dwellings in the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Oporto.

10 Often, re-housing is seen as a mere issue of funding and construction, with authorities frequently overlooking the real problems of the people for whom the houses are intended. Very little if any planning consultation is ever carried out with the future residents of these neighbourhoods.
The Portuguese Nationality Law (Law 37/81 altered by Law 25/94; Decree-Law 322/82 altered by Decree-Law 117/93, Decree-Law 253/94 and Decree-Law 37/97) favours ius sanguinis over ius soli where the offspring of immigrants born in Portugal acquire the nationality of their parents. However, it should be noted that alterations to the nationality law were approved by the Portuguese government on 16 February 2006, eliminating certain requirements that, in the past, prevented many descendants from acquiring nationality (i.e. a declaration of will from the time of birth – something that prevented many descendants from acquiring nationality given that many parents fail to provide such a statement at the time of birth – as well as bureaucratic interpretations of the previous law. The five substantive modifications that the legal term ‘valid residence authorisation’ had gone through since 1994 had contributed to a less transparent interpretation of the nationality law (Silva 2004). Under the current law, nationality is now automatically attributed to third-generation immigrant descendants (born in Portugal and whose foreign parents were also born in Portugal) and granted to second-generation descendants when at least one parent has been residing legally in Portugal for at least five years (under the previous law, it was six years for foreigners from Portuguese-speaking countries and ten for all other third-country nationals, and only those with residence authorisation were accepted). Naturalisation is given to immigrant second-generation youth born in Portugal whose parents have been legal residence for five years or who complete the first cycle of elementary school in Portugal. Lastly, naturalisation will also be granted to second-generation immigrant descendants born in Portugal upon reaching the age of maturity as long as they have resided in Portugal during the last ten years (even if in an undocumented situation).

References


Cape Verdeanness as a complex social construct: analysis of ethnicity through complexity theory

Pedro Góis

Introduction

Emigration was an economic strategy for Cape Verdeans from as early as the eighteenth century. It has become an important element of Cape Verdean social identity or, as this identity also has been called, Cape Verdeanness. In a situation where there are more Cape Verdean emigrants and their descendants outside Cape Verde than living within the archipelago itself, traditional theories of migration and/or national identity placing more importance on origin than on all other features in the process of identity construction seem misplaced.

Research we conducted in some of the destinations of Cape Verdean migrants (Góis 2002), together with data collected within the Cape Verdean archipelago, led us to hypothesise about the reciprocal influence that Cape Verdeans from both locations have on identity formation and identity modification. Easy access to rapid transport and communications brought about by globalisation together with the renewal of factors important to Cape Verdean identity, especially in expatriated communities, has sparked an ongoing development of Cape Verdean identity, encompassing a transnational dimension. We find an identity based on an ethnicity that somehow, in its development, transcends factors traditionally attributed as defining characteristics. A traditional understanding suggests that sharing a culture or cultural background and language facilitates differentiation in relation to the other. In the Cape Verdean case, however, we find a construction that challenges such traditional notions. In this chapter we shall try to explain what makes Cape Verdean identity processes unique. Our contention is that this case provides a model for transnational identity analysis.

The deterritorialised nation as a basis for a transnational identity

In our example of Cape Verde, the constant flow of individuals from this one community will lead ultimately to what theoretically could be understood as a deterritorialisation of the concept of nation. What we
see emerging is a deterritorialised transnational nation (Pries 2000; Glick Schiller et al. 1992), which finds itself within a new and emergent transnational social space (Pries 2000). This social space is necessarily and clearly conceptual; it embraces the Cape Verdean world. The emergence of this space is one of the possibilities suggested by Pries who describes the emergence of transnational social spaces as social realities driven by international migration. Migration inevitably pits social identities against one another, identities that distinguish themselves by their relations with one another (Pries 2001). The outcome is a paradox and a complexification of the variables enabling us to conceptualise the Cape Verdean world. While Cape Verdean identity is the result of previous migrations; further current migration patterns keep it alive.

Cape Verde’s scale, dimension, small resident population and scattered migration patterns, as well as the existence of a huge and diversified set of studies about this country and its emigrants, make it almost unique at the global level. For the purpose of our analysis, we need to distance ourselves from the theoretical paradigms usually employed to analyse migration. We must question traditional basic assumptions and introduce a transnational perspective. Furthermore, we need to extend our analysis by looking at identity as a systemic concept. This can be achieved by applying complexity theory.

A look at Cape Verde’s recent history shows that the development of the transnational social space, in which there are political, cultural, social and economic interactions, is the outcome of the country’s migratory history. This involves an accumulation of collective and individual capital in which the social and cultural capital (organised in a network) are highly important. Such transnational social space is not limited by the geographical or political borders of the traditional nation-state; rather, it appears to consist of a web of social networks. The space evolved and was sustained through several waves of Cape Verdean migration from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Several of these migratory flows formed the bulwark of what earlier was regarded as a contemporary labour diaspora. Today we see that these flows lay the foundation of today’s transnational community (Góis 2002). In its early stages, it might be referred to as low-intensity transnationalism (Góis 2005).

We should indeed mention that long before the concept of transnational communities was coined, the Cape Verdeans already had formed their own archipelago-like experiential world, where they always felt at home. The Cape Verdean world comprised a *terra longe* (a distant place where the emigrants currently reside) and the *nha terra* (the homeland). The mythical Cape Verde was the social synthesis of both. The geographical archipelago of Cape Verde extended into the migratory archipelago, extending its origin far beyond the Sahel islands.
The map of this archipelago (Malheiros 2001) is well consolidated in the imaginations of those who left and of those who stayed behind (Carling 2002). Recent research allows us to probe deeper into how these identity and symbolic connections among members of this transnationalised nation are organised, and to reflect on whether this may be an example of a nation with a transnational identity (Gôis 2002).

The attribution of a unique national identity to all these individuals, who do in fact share the same ancestral or imaginary origin and some features of a shared, specific culture, does nevertheless seem to be a gross generalisation. We are instead led to consider identity as a transnational phenomenon in which the inhabitants of the migratory archipelago share and integrate features of identity from the archipelago of Cape Verde and, at the same time, influence and participate in the creation of a new deterриториised transnational identity, which is extended to all Cape Verdeans from and in Cape Verde.

Migration and transnationalism

During the last two decades there has been a shift in focus in the study of migration, in the analysis of immigrant communities and in the way migrants and their descendants interact with the receiving societies. Since the 1990s, the body of literature on transnationalism has been growing in the Anglo-American social science community. From a paradigm based on the analysis of simple and linear unidirectional relations (for instance, origin-destination, return migration, family reunion, temporary or permanent migrations), we have moved to a complex multidirectional analysis that involves circular migration, remigration, transmigrations, cross-border migration, transnational communities and transnational practices. Several authors suggest that we can classify studies of migration according to their underlying rationale (Vertovec 1999; Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002). In traditional countries of immigration, these studies have focused mainly on the integration/assimilation processes of immigrants. In traditional sending countries, on the other hand, research on emigration has focused mainly on contexts of departure, return conditions and issues of split families. The underlying rationale in these studies separates the sending society from the receiving society in two independent and non-overlapping realities, exemplifying what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) have termed methodological nationalism and from which sociology is still struggling to free itself.

A new paradigm emerged in the 1990s, introducing the idea that migrants redefine but do not forsake the bonds linking them with the home country. Full assimilation/integration in the host countries does not usually take place, but rather, a complex mutual exchange between
the two or more societies. According to this paradigm, immigrants in different areas of social action create a series of bonds that transcend national borders and make migrants’ social relations with the home and host societies more complex (Faist 2000). In contrast to traditional assimilation theories, these studies direct our attention to the stable links connecting many of the first-generation migrants and their descendants to their places of origin and providing a solid, enduring bond between origin and destination. This paradigm came into being when Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992) were studying migratory patterns of the late twentieth century and insertion into various host societies. The results of this work led to the adoption of the concept of transnationalism to understand migration.

The concept of globalisation points to ‘the processes through which sovereign nation-states are criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks’ (Beck 2000: 11). One of these actors was described by Glick Schiller et al. (1992) as a transmigrant. In their innovative contribution on transnationalism and transnational communities, Glick Schiller et al. have developed a research framework on international migration that goes beyond the traditional concept of space and societal requirements. In this analytic field the paths taken by transmigrants are not one-time and unidirectional, but form an extended social field incorporating both present and former areas of residence (Pries 1999). The spaces connected by transnational activities are more than the sum of each of them. According to the position taken by Glick Schiller et al. (1992), deterritorialised social spaces emerge, above and beyond the individual and concrete territorial space. As Sassen, Portes and other sociologists suggest, transmigrants are constructing a social field in which they link their country of origin with their host country. In these transnational spaces, transmigrants are leading figures with their economic and social relations, their political activities and their identities, which transcend classical frontiers, benefiting from global economic processes within a world divided into nation-states.

There is a large body of theoretical literature on transnationalism, basically originating from debates in the US and the UK. These works try to explain transnationalism as a combination of civic-political memberships, economic involvement, social networks and cultural identities linking people and institutions in two or more nation-states. The concept has, so far, exhibited numerous manifestations in the social sciences; in sociology it is understood as a form of organisation, spanning borders through networks, or as a state of mind permitting multiple identifications and loyalties. In cultural anthropology, the concept has been interpreted as a process of cultural interpenetration, finding its reality in everyday practices; while in the economic sciences,
transnationalism has been understood as a factor in global financial currents and trade, as much as an outflow of global restructuring of production modes. Finally, in the political sciences, the significance of transnationalism lies in new forms of political engagement, as demonstrated by migrants’ mobilisation in the host country and their activities in the home country. Such mobilisation is taken as an indicator of an upcoming global civil society (Castells 1997; Beck 2000).

This rationale has necessitated looking at migration from a perspective that takes the home society into account, even when the integration of migrants into host societies is the analytical focus. It became clear that perceiving migrants as being quickly assimilated into host societies led to an approach which in simplistic terms sought to explain the relative immobility of these flows, categorising migrants as temporary (those who moved around) or permanent (the sedentary). By establishing these categories the classic studies on migration did not take the complexity of contemporary flows into account and were, therefore, incapable of providing any deeper understanding of this complex reality. For example, these studies failed to understand that migrants maintain a large set of relations with the home society, not in opposition to, but in connection with, leading one’s life in the host society. A transnational approach to migration will pay close attention to the emergence of

![Figure 11.1: The web of identity](image-url)
social processes that cross geographical, cultural and political borders and which create unexplored fields of analysis beyond national confines.

According to the transnational perspective, analysing the social processes deriving from the interaction of specific migrant groups (in our case the Cape Verdeans) and the use of their networked social capital with or within different nation-states (home and host countries) allows us to visualise the emergence of a transnational social space (Pries 2001). We glimpse the appearance of a deterritorialised nation, where a country’s people can live anywhere in the world and still be part of that nation. In practice, these communities deterritorialise the nation, by physically detaching it from the nation-state to which they belong, but without severing the social ties binding them to it. In doing so these communities create a form of socio-spatial organisation that supplements, enlarges and, in many cases, goes beyond the limits of the nation-state. For these authors, these new types of migrant, community and globalisation are objects of study that erode classic theories of migration and lead to the emergence of a less West-centric approach, more conciliatory with the reality of the home and the host countries. This approach must therefore consider the complexity of the social processes involved. Besides overcoming methodological nationalism, it must go beyond some highly simplistic paradigms, which have been used to analyse extremely complex social processes.

**Transnationalism and identity**

Portes shows that transnationalism is not a new phenomenon, but rather, a different perspective on phenomena that already has been known to exist (Portes et al. 1999). There has always been some kind of circular movement of people between countries. We could even discuss some historical transnational communities as the outcomes of diasporas and expatriated enclaves, which combine features of both the home and host societies (Meintel 2002). However, if this is so, then we must answer the question of how migratory processes have changed in such a way over the last few decades that many of the most recent migrants no longer are integrated in the dominant or mainstream ideology, but, on the contrary, appear to have developed new transnational identities that allow them to maintain complex social links (e.g. inter-, trans-, pluri-) with a large number of diasporic communities.

These actors are interlaced between an international and national legal system, finding themselves in a legal space occupied by a body of increasing norms and conventions shaping a form of post-national membership (Soysal 1994). Though receiving entitlements within the
limits of a national space, transmigrants refuse to ascribe their identity exclusively to one polity only. In a world of rapidly growing migration, such exclusive legal rights and entitlements would never be an enduring acquisition, which is why transmigrants are trying to leave more than one option open, transferring their social, political and economic capital from one political system to another when necessary. Transmigrants try to shape their identities by adapting themselves to the needs of the world-system and therefore cultivate multiple allegiances to place (Van Hear 1998). They form dense networks across political borders in their quest for economic advancement and social recognition. Through these networks an increasing number of people are able to live dual lives. Participants are often bilingual, move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require their presence in both (Portes 1999).

In a multiple social integration, transmigrants create several social identities and, even though they may organise their socialisation mainly or preferably within the limits of one national space, transnational migrants and their descendants refuse to confine their identity exclusively to the social references of the space in which they reside. The classical approach to migration defined such migrants and/or their descendants as not assimilated, as hyphenated nationals (e.g. the Cape Verdean-American) or by using similar expressions, whose purpose was to show the assimilation process was still incomplete but possibly irreversible. From a transnational perspective such migrants and their descendants are no longer seen as uprooted. On the contrary, they are seen to move freely from one place to another, across international borders and/or different social systems and cultures. These migrants and their descendants influence changes in both communities and places of belonging through their social or economic remittances as well as transnational political, cultural and social practices (Bryceson & Vuorela 2002).

In a world in which the time-space dimensions are compressed, adaptability is the golden rule. The existence of a social identity with multiple references is a competitive advantage for these migrants and their descendants. This option leads the individuals to try to model their identities on the countries with which they have established a referential relation (e.g. home or host country). It involves the creation of a multiple social identity, a shared social identity and a transnational social identity that migrants and their descendants share in the same transnational social space.
National identity, transnational identity and complexity

Anderson (1983) explains how the development of printing technologies at the dawn of modernity in Europe enabled individuals to imagine a national community beyond the limited group of persons with whom they interacted in their daily lives and, thus, how national identity was created. It seems fair to assume that with the development of modern communications and mass media, which reach people outside the national borders, it is now possible to imagine ethnic communities that extend beyond the national borders. One may also imagine that this process will be the basis for the appearance of transnational identities. Dismantling territorial borders and, consequently, deterritorialising identity as limiting the maintenance of a group identity/social identity is a conquest of the recent past, mainly as far as ways to sustain this identity are concerned. Several authors identify this deterritorialisation as a central feature in the process of globalisation and emphasise the disintegration of the economic, cultural and political borders as one of the characteristics of the contemporary world. However, we must stress that territoriality still has importance. The existence of a territory, mythical or real, is actually an essential condition for the maintenance of this type of identity. As long as ethnic meetings are possible some coherent and significant ethnic identities may be created without the actual presence of the object of identification. This is illustrated, in spite of the great geographical gaps between the spaces of belonging in the Cape Verdean case, by *nha terra* and *terra longe*. If there is a coherent and consistent contact among the Cape Verdeans of the different nodes of the migratory archipelago, then Cape Verdeanness will have found its source. In this case, ethnic identity tends to perpetuate itself even though it will necessarily assume shapes that differ from the Cape Verdeanness of Cape Verde or of other moments and places by interacting with and in the contexts in which it evolves.

The non-linear multifarious character of Cape Verdean identity makes it particularly suitable for complexity theory analysis, allowing us to frame and consider several configurations that the different aspects of identity may assume. While working on a theoretical analysis of the Cape Verdean identity we came across complexity theory and its applicability to this kind of phenomena. According to Urry (2003), this could be the type of phenomenon to propel sociology towards the paradigm of complexity. Cape Verdean identity is an example of a complex social phenomenon that goes beyond a simple rationale explained by a national approach. At a time when the theoretical borders of sociology, and especially of the sociology of migration, are being released from the national character of their object, the international, transnational and multinational dimensions become central elements in a more
thorough explanation of the phenomena. Cape Verdeanness is a complex and dynamic phenomenon, though not unexplainable. As of yet, it tends to remain obscured by various incomplete explanations. To explain complex social phenomena we need to return to Durkheim’s influential idea of ‘treating social facts as things’ or of ‘explaining the social by the social’. In so doing we look at social identity as a system with its own rationale independent of the individual mind. The social needs to be explained by the social. It is neither a structure nor an agency but both, being complex, dynamic and intricate.

**Personal identity and social identity**

The concept of identity has lately assumed an increasingly prominent place in the social sciences. Analysis of the development of social identities themselves has become an important focus of research. Scholars using social identities as the building blocks of social, political and economic life have attempted to account for a number of discrete outcomes by treating identities as independent variables. The dominant implication of the vast literature on identity is that social identities are among the most important social facts in our world (Abdelal et al. 2001). Identity is a multidimensional and complex concept, frequently referred to both in everyday life and by the social sciences and humanistic studies, albeit rarely coherently defined. The scholarly literature on the definition, meaning and development of ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, gender and class identities is now extensive and covers a large number of disciplines and sub-fields. As a starting point, we are going to assume that there is at least some consensus about what the concept of identity refers to. This common ground is the conceptualisation of two different (and simultaneously intertwined) categories: social and personal identity.

This means that identity can be defined either socially or individually. Fearon (1999: 11) clarifies these two definitions:

A personal identity is a set of attributes, beliefs, desires, or principles of action that a person thinks distinguishes her in socially relevant ways that (a) the person takes a special pride in; (b) the person takes no special pride in, but which so orients her behaviour that she would be at a loss about how to act and what to do without them; or (c) the person feels she could not change even if she wanted to. (Fearon 1999: 2)

A social identity, on the other hand, is a collective identity; an identity that denotes a group of people. A social identity ‘refers simply to a
social category, a set of persons marked by a label and distinguished by rules deciding membership and (alleged) characteristic features or attributes.’ Departing from this minimum consensus, a multiplicity of definitions has been proposed relating to different theoretical perspectives.

Let us take the example of an individual identity. Among the variables that contribute to the formation of this type of identity we can point to age or sex, which are logically self-contained, or to wider and more explanatory variables such as ethnicity, family, work or education. The choice of variable determines the form of our explanation and leads us to stress just one factor and omit all other possible explanatory variables. But even if we were able to isolate all other relevant variables and provide an explanation which would include their impact, that explanation would not be sufficiently coherent to explain our starting point: personal identity. The whole, as in so many other cases, is more than the sum of its parts.

From this perspective, personal identity resembles a web. A system and its parts, or fragments, cannot be analysed without understanding the framework as a whole. This web must be understood as Castells (1996) defines it: the parts of the web, connected by nodes and centres, are autonomous yet dependent on its complex system of relations. The interrelations of this whole with its parts (and vice versa) cannot be explained logically without losing some of the features of the system. This type of analysis is called complex thought, because there is no logical explanation for these apparently systemic relations. This is what Morin (1996) calls ‘the order within the disorder’ or the ‘certainty of uncertainty’, also known as complexity theory. This way of conceptualising identity is based on mathematical language and a set of concepts to describe non-linear complex systems.

If we assume that personal identity and social identity are systems and that they are sub-systems of a larger whole, we are faced with two theoretical possibilities: they are either static systems (and the positivist perspective assumes that these systems can be described in full) or dynamic systems that resist analysis by reductionism.

**Primordialism versus constructivism, and a third way**

Two paradigms have dominated the theoretical debate on social identity. On the one hand, there are those who define identity as static, essential and one-dimensional; i.e. identity is determined by certain irreducible conditions of human nature. On the other hand, there are those who see identity as fluid, socially constructed and multidimensional. This means that we can either study identity as an independent variable (in fact, as a constant or invariable), or as a dependent variable. As
independent variable, identity has been used to explain conflicts, war, aggression and cooperation, etc. As a dependent variable, identity appears in studies of national attitudes and ethnicity (Croucher 2004). Generically speaking, we refer to the first approach as primordialist or essentialist. The second approach is conventionally referred to as constructivist or social constructivist (for discussion, see also chapter 1).

Recent contributions from cognitivist theories with a more process-based approach have led to new ideas about identity analysis. These contributions stress the importance of mental schemes – stereotypes, supporting mentalities, social representations and categorisations – in the construction of the identity architecture, irrespective of whether they are ethnic, racial, nationalist or cultural. The cognitive conceptualisation of identities allows us to delve into the process of identity formation itself. According to this perspective, the primordialisation and instrumentalisation of identity are two parts of one system of producing difference, i.e. they are two sides of the same coin. The cognitive approach brings out a third side, which is conceivable at the level of the process and, thus, becomes a third way. In the remainder of this chapter, however, we are going to focus on the social constructivist perspective.

Identity as a social construction: ethnic identity

For us, identity is a contextual social category, because it depends on the contexts of interaction. Identity as we see it is socially constructed and historically contingent. It may change over time and, since it is socially constructed, it may also change across space. If we ask ourselves what identity is, we can come up with several different answers depending on the context. Therefore identity is by definition a plural concept. Every individual has access to a large number of social identities without any fixed limits. So any single individual ‘belongs’ to several social identities at the same time. These identities are not static, but created; they change, evolve and may even disappear. According to Fearon (1999: 17), ethnicity is a clear example of an identity, which depends on one or more complex sets of social rules.

Coming back to our example, the social invisibility of Cape Verdeans (Bryce-Laporte 1972) in several countries where they settled (such as the US, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Argentina and France) is an identity marker. It is the outcome of the community’s self-enclosure (nos ku nos) and of incomplete integration (non-assimilation) of the Cape Verdaen migrants into the host societies (Góis 2002). Not only does integration lead to social convergence in the host societies, it also leads to detachment in relation to the societies of origin. In other words, the more
assimilated, the less Cape Verdean they are. This phenomenon, which is well portrayed in the study of the Bostonian Cape Verdeans conducted by Sanchez (1998), led to a distinction within the émigré group itself between the American Cape Verdeans (the Merkanu), who arrived at the beginning of the twentieth century and the more recent arrivals (the Kriolu). This dual Cape Verdeanness in the diaspora generates conflicts, debates and perplexities. It affects all varieties of Cape Verdean identity, because the influence of the terra longe (foreign land) on the nha terra (homeland), or the reverse, is of such importance to identity construction.11

Theoretically speaking, the need to negotiate a collective social identity, which is often socially invisible on a daily basis and in several social contexts, forces the Cape Verdean émigrés and their descendants to rethink and to rebuild their own identity, because, as Bourdieu points out, social identity emerges mainly through differentiation in relation to the other (Bourdieu 1979: 191) – an other that changes in time and space. The acceptance of the Merkanus and the Kriolus as two Cape Verdean identities is a token of the degree of co-ethnic acceptance. Accordingly, social identity arises in the form of a sense of belonging to a common social category: Cape Verdeanness.

We have here an example of how a definition of ethnic identity is based on a set of characteristics that restrains the individual regardless of his will. In the Cape Verdean case this ethnic identity is the result of a process of historical construction, of identity differentiation and re-grouping. Both the individuals who were born in the archipelago and their descendants, who never had any (direct) personal contact with the ancestral archipelago (the Cape Verdeans of the migratory archipelago), participate in the construction of this identity. As for the former, contact with the origin set in motion the struggle for independence and the reconstruction of the nation (in the nha terra or in the terra longe) in the post-colonial period. As for the latter, the sharing of symbols (such as Creole, food, music and the ancestral myths) gave rise to a sense of belonging. For example, in the American case, we can have the so-called ‘cachupa’ Cape Verdeans versus ‘true’ Cape Verdeans, who differ from the former because they keep in close contact with their cultural origin. The former have developed a non-participant relationship with the community, a merely symbolic relationship (Gans 1999), while the latter participate in the social movements of the community recreating their own identity and interacting with the original archipelago, for instance, through their remittances.
Operationalising the concept of ethnic identity

There is inconsistency in the use of the concept of social identity, and even ethnic identity, and no unanimity about how to operationalise social/ethnic identity. The Cape Verdean social identity is constructed from a variety of factors and dimensions such as a collective ancestry, a set of shared historical memories, a common culture, motherland, language, religion and race. In the Cape Verdean case, these dimensions are measured through a group of indicators upon which researchers agree. The language (Creole or Cape Verdean) is the most relevant element of identity, but music and dance, literature, the celebration of Christian rites such as baptism, first Communion, weddings and funerals, traditional food, the family and social relationships which generate morabeza also serve as indicators of Cape Verdeanness.

But Cape Verdeanness cannot be measured. There is no single, unambiguous or coherent answer to the question: What is a Cape Verdean? Were we to have an answer, as when we talk about ‘reconstructed identities’ (Saint-Maurice 1997), we would revert back to a primordialist (albeit unconscious) premise in which we establish an earlier concept of the Cape Verdean for analysis of developments from that initial condition. In a text about methods and techniques to measure identity, Abdelal and colleagues (2001) explain why the social sciences are unable to measure identity per se. The fact that we do not have standardised, coherent and durable instruments to measure indicators is a sign of this inability. The identity concept is devaluated in much of mainstream social science precisely because it resists operationalisation (Brubaker & Cooper 2000). To operationalise this concept involves the assumption that identity is a variable, which is a highly questionable assumption. Abdelal and his collaborators put it:

to conceive of identity as a characteristic of individuals or groups that varies along some metric or value in such a way that it has a systematic, independent, positive or negative effect on some other variable. In principle there are three types of variation: 1. dichotomous (present or absent); 2. categorical (different types, mutually exclusive, exhaustive); 3. interval (numerical, continuous valuation along some metric). It may make little sense to treat identity as a dichotomous variable – present or absent. Since a group exists by definition through having an identity, some kind of identity can never really be absent (though in historical studies, the emergence of previously non-existent social identities, in particular national identities, is one of the most studied issues). Thus, in terms of categories and intervals, identity
can vary in three fundamental ways: content, intensity, and contestation. (Abdelal et al. 2001: 9)

With this definition it becomes possible to establish certain parameters of identity, but not to operationalise and measure it. First, because it may be placed in doubt that objective and/or identity dimensions exist, it is the individual himself (or the group) that creates the categories which make sense of the surrounding world. Secondly, because individual and/or social identity is always relational and situational (it is obviously a network of social categories or dimensions), it challenges the outer world and depends on specific contexts of interaction. Thirdly, because complexity is visible since the individual (as a social actor) is the bearer of an unlimited number of simultaneous social identities, several categories may be activated at the same time, depending on the social context. This multiple and simultaneous belonging will influence the individual’s behaviour as member of a certain social group and relations to other social groups.

Identity and complexity

Taking into account that social complexity is an important feature of modern societies, the study of identities is a problematic task, particularly when we look at the construction of identity as an open, dynamic and complex process; it is no longer possible to describe and analyse this phenomenon from the perspective of the classic identity theories in which the process of understanding the whole is to split it into elementary parts. The dynamic of the system does not, however, allow us to isolate dimensions that constitute it or to isolate variables for analytical purposes. The interdependence between the parts of the system makes it prone to chaos (organised complexity), which is caused by slight fluctuations of its parts, known as the ‘butterfly effect’.13

A complex system is characterised by: 1) the existence of a network of linked elements; 2) the existence of diffused control through its components, which means that there is no centralised control but a bottom-up process; 3) the existence of several hierarchical levels of organisation; 4) the ability to anticipate without necessarily being aware of it; 5) high adaptability.

When characterising social identity from one of its parts, ethnicity, we become aware of the complexity of identity and the entropy established in the system. Since ethnicity is only one of several social categories (or dimensions) of identity, the definition of an ethnic identity is a metonymic definition, leading to a reversal of the usual meaning of the words by which it is described as, for example, speaking of cause
rather than effect, or whole rather than part. The question ‘What is a Cape Verdean?’ becomes highly problematic because of the multiplicity of contexts of interaction, of different social roles and positions and of transient rules applying to interaction in different societies. Being a Cape Verdean in the US is different from being a Cape Verdean in Cape Verde; therefore, space becomes a significant dimension, as a framing variable of Cape Verdean identity. Moreover, whether one is a Merkanu or a Kriolu, both in the US, is defined in relation to the dimension of time. The dimensions of time and space interact with many other variables such as sex, age, social class, education and phenotypical characteristics, which, in turn, interact, producing a feedback effect on the representation, meaning and perception of the variables. They interact with and in the system as a whole, which interacts with its parts and modifies them. This is when the concept of autopoiesis becomes important.

The application of the theory of autopoiesis to the social sciences was developed by Luhmann (1995) to conceptualise the reproduction of making distinction. Autopoietic systems are defined as systems that produce the conditions of their own existence. Operations are their constitutive element, in the sense that autopoietic systems maintain themselves through operations recursively attached to preceding operations. Consequently, a system only exists as an actually ongoing operation for the time period between the preceding and the following operation. As a result, autopoietic systems are characterised by an autonomous consciousness of time, in the sense that no direct equivalence exists between a system’s internal time consciousness and time consciousness in its surroundings. Every change within a system takes place according to the system’s own tempo and in the system’s own rhythm. Consequently, the conclusion is that it is not only according to the calculus of indication, but also according to the theory of autopoiesis, that social systems should be understood as phenomena operating in their own time.

**Ethnic identity and autopoiesis**

To define and to ponder the concept of identity is no easy task. Nor is it to ponder, define and quantify ethnic identity. As Horowitz wrote:

> The minimal definition of an ethnic unit ... is the idea of common provenance, recruitment primarily through kinship, and a notion of distinctiveness whether or not this consists of a unique inventory of cultural traits. This is close to Max Weber’s conception of a ‘subjective belief’ in ‘common descent’ ... whether or
not an objective blood relationship exists. To this I would add a minimal scale requirement, so that ethnic membership transcends the range of face-to-face interactions, as recognized kinship need not. So conceived, ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by colour, language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes’, ‘races’, ‘nationalities’, and ‘castes’. (Horowitz 1985: 53)

A definition such as this one gives anyone the implicit possibility to identify with the ethnic origin she or he would like to, thus making a conceptual definition of ethnic identity even more difficult. Because of the complexity of Cape Verdean history, which incorporates several origins for the rise of a Creole ethnic group through miscegenation, the assumption that creolisation would end at a certain point seems to be a mistake that many neo-essentialist theorists stubbornly repeat.

We must realise that there is not and never can be one (single) universal Cape Verdean ethnic identity. What we are talking about is a multiple ethnic reconstruction, which is different in each of the countries where there are immigrant communities and in the archipelago of Cape Verde itself. On the one hand, this is due to the confrontation with the differentiating others, and, on the other hand, to the contexts and conjunctures in which that interaction takes place. This ethnic identity refers to the way an individual uses racial, national, cultural or religious concepts to identify and establish relations with others. Ethnic identity thus conceived incorporates, complementarily, both an element of self-attrtribution and of attribution by others (hetero-attrtribution). This specificity reconfigures itself; recreates itself, in a complex concept of (self- and/or hetero-) Cape Verdean identity, of self-Cape Verdeaness and hetero-Cape Verdeanness.

As Saint-Maurice (1997: 157) points out in her study of the identity reconstruction of Cape Verdeans in Portugal, identities emerge from the perception of difference which takes place in the contexts of interaction with significant others, relevant interaction partners, members of their group or of some other group. In the Portuguese case ethnic origin and social class are main dimensions that, in the confrontation with the other, enhance that differentiation, and consequently bring about the notion of Cape Verdeanness. By assuming an ethnic origin as a pre-existing variable, Saint-Maurice defines it without operationalising it.

The Cape Verdean identity, created from (and within) the diaspora, must be seen as a social recreation in time and space. It is a process that implies a close relationship between the cultural claim and the political claim. Its ultimate referential would be the other along with society and the nation-state in which they are inserted and the socio-political conjunctures in which that integration takes place. As França et al. (1999: 20) point out:
It is in the interaction with the host society that groups create their identity, by difference or opposition, that is, they delineate their outsiderness from the way they represent the others and themselves. Thus, identity is only outlined from the moment in which there is a perception of the difference.

The concept of ethnic identity, which is part of a larger social identity, is here part of a system that is not only dynamic but also non-linear. According to the premises of complexity, this is also called a self-organisational system (autopoietic). We are trying to extrapolate the concept of autopoiesis (which comes from biology) for the realm of the non-biological: the realm of the self and of personal identity, as Luhmann did.\textsuperscript{15} The objective is not to start a new movement of biological reductionism, but to extend the concept of autopoiesis to an area for which it was not originally intended. The point is that the maintenance and constitution of an identity are functionally related to biology and to the autopoietic organisation, not on a molecular level, but in terms of production. Identity is the constant source of autopoietic updating and maintenance. One of the main changes proposed by Luhmann in his analysis of social systems was to replace the concept of an open/closed system with the concept of autopoiesis (autopoietic system). Autopoiesis means that a complex system, aided by its own elements, reproduces its elements and its structures in an operationally closed process (Luhmann 1995). This system is duly framed by time and space.

This means that its present is largely explained in relation to its future, i.e. with the representations of the future in an autopoietic and self-referential process (Luhmann 1976, 1990, 1995) but, which, at the same time, contains all the past which supports it,\textsuperscript{16} and emerges only because of the daily confrontation with the other. Thus, we can only apprehend Cape Verdeanness in relation to its colonial past and with Portugal, but to fully understand Cape Verdeanness we need to think about how we anticipate the future. The time dimension is therefore essential. To embrace the space dimension, we must consider the two archipelagos, Cape Verde and the migratory archipelago (the diaspora). We should consider this relation as multipolar and complex, in which everyone is influenced by each and all players. The existence of an archipelago of origin and of a migratory archipelago, the \textit{nha terra} and the \textit{terra longe}, is a distinguishing feature of Cape Verdeanness in relation to other identities. The fact that Cape Verdean migrations consist of different stages (Góis 2002), and the fact that these migrations are made up of distinct individuals with varied personal identities adapted to the circumstances in which they develop, is a complexifying element.
Conclusion

One of the most important principles of explanation in social sciences states that social facts occur because of other social facts. This principle has met strong resistance, both in the practical knowledge, and in the forms of representation. The conflict between common sense argumentation and the analytical demands of research is well known. If common expressions such as ‘treating social facts as things’ or ‘explaining the social by the social’ are used, instead of attempting to generalise according to models developed by the natural sciences, we should define social as a concept with its own logic, independent of individual minds. The analysis of Cape Verdean identity assumes implicit and explicit shapes, which, originally, almost always possess the characteristics that gave place to the debates about central issues, such as the relationship between nature and culture, individuals and society, or the relation between different groups and cultures (us versus the others). Sociological research has always tried to fight common sense by questioning it, but, in this case, common sense is an important feature of Cape Verdeanness. The social sciences and, obviously, sociology, aim to explain a certain social fact from a critical and external point of view, not from an individual perspective that considers culture, ethnic group, geography or the mores of a certain group as almost natural features. But as far as identity is concerned, these self and hetero definitions of Cape Verdeanness are based precisely on such characteristics, with the aggravating consequence that they are seen as essentialist and, in one sense, immutable. In a certain way, we are faced with a situation in which common sense reduces social complexity to a lowest common denominator, giving it a name that, in our opinion, is already a sign of prejudice.

Facing all these contingencies, we arrive at the conclusion that, ultimately, ethnic identity, being or not being Cape Verden, depends on an internal condition of the individual (self-attribution), which is therefore subjective; but, on the other hand, it also depends on a hetero-attribution (local and contingent) which is, once again, subjective. In this complex process, the borders of identity are the outcome of this daily confrontation. The existence of a singular Cape Verden identity is compromised, whereas the existence of a complex Cape Verden identity, a transnational identity, can be proclaimed but not empirically checked. It seems to us that we have to start from the beginning and consider the definition of Cape Verdeanness as indefinite. It is too complex and contradictory to be simplistically assumed, but, if there is a Cape Verden identity, it will be founded on a transnational rather than a national basis. As this hypothesis aims only at questioning consensus we obviously need to launch a debate about all these issues.
Notes

1. We are speaking here of hundreds of thousands of Cape Verdeans and their descendants in Portugal, the United States and Western Europe.
2. We refer to this world as ‘archipelago-like’ because it is and was discontinuous in space.
3. The concept of ethnic identity is re-emerging in the study of contemporary migration even though it is not widely accepted (see Kaplan & Brady 2004).
4. A system may be an atom or a galaxy, a molecule, a cell, a living being or a society. A system is a combination of different elements (Morin 1990).
5. For example, on ethnic identity see Horowitz (2001); on race see Appiah and Gutmann (1998) and Waters (2001); on national identity see Citrin (1990), Gellner (1994) and Walzer (1990); on linguistic identity see Laitin (1998); on religious identity see Weber (2001); on gender see Scott (2001); on class see Willis (1990).
6. As we use it now, an ‘identity’ refers to either a) a social category, defined by membership rules and (alleged) characteristic attributes or expected behaviors or b) socially distinguishing features that a person takes a special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential (or a and b at once). These two social categories may be termed ‘social’ and ‘personal’. (Fearon 1999: 3)
7. These webs are not material structures, like fishing nets or spider webs. They are functional webs, networks of relation between several processes. In a cell, for instance, these processes are chemical reactions among the cell’s molecules. In a social network, they are, mostly, communication processes.
8. When we think about complexity, the idea that comes to our minds is chaos, disorder and darkness. However, such an impression is almost the opposite of the etymological meaning of the word. The word comes from *plexus*, which means interlaced, woven together.
9. Luhmann (1995) defines complexity in a system as a line beyond which it is no longer possible to establish relations among all the elements of the system. For Luhmann the concept of complexity is related to the impossibility of establishing relations among all the elements of a unit. Thus, complexity means that a selection becomes necessary in order to update the relations among the elements. The differentiation between elements and relations, which allows us to observe a situation of selective bonding, is, therefore, essential for the definition of complexity. The complexity of the system is an organised complexity, made up by the selective connection of the elements of the system; it is the selective organisation of the auto-poiesis.
10. Most of the research in social sciences has been based on what Fearon (1999) defines as social identity and, in particular, what he calls ‘type identities’ (class, sex, race, ethnic origin, religion, etc.) as opposed to ‘role identities’ (father, lawyer, etc.). See also a discussion of the primordial-constructivist debate in chapter one of this current volume.
11. See several debates that take place on the internet about the Cape Verdean identity: to be or not to be African, to be or not to be black American.
12. It is not our intention to get polemical about these concepts in this chapter.
13. Lorenz (1963) coined the expression ‘butterfly effect’ to explain how small random fluctuations may lead to unpredictable outcomes in a complex dynamic (or non-linear) system.
14. The possibility that this non-singular identity, which is constantly being recreated, is one of the distinguishing features of the Cape Verdean ethnic identity is one hypothesis we bear in mind. In this case there would always be a single Cape Verdean ethnic identity, which would obviously assume different content and intensities according to the context in which the individuals associated with it are integrated. In this
particular case the dynamic of the identity system would paradoxically be an identity feature. We will analyse this possibility in further studies.

15 Luhmann considers self-organisation and autopoiesis to be two different concepts. The first concept refers to the creation of structures of the system through operations of the system itself. The second concept refers to the determination of the status from which other operations are possible through the operation of the system itself – the former appears to refer to the structures of the system and the latter to the operations of the system (Luhmann 2004).

16 With the intention of applying the concept of autopoiesis to sociological theory, Luhmann realised that the theorem of self-organisation had already been applied in the biochemistry of cognitive processes by the Chileans Maturana and Varela. They coined this concept from the Greek word ‘poiesis’, which means ‘production’. Therefore, autopoiesis means self-production. The word appeared for the first time in international literature in 1974, in an article published by Varela, Maturana and Uribe to define living beings as systems that reproduce themselves. An autopoietic system is therefore both product and producer.

References


Fearon, J. (1999), ‘What is identity (as we now use the word)?’, unpublished paper. Stanford University.


12 Different children of different gods: a structural-dynamic approach to using religion in processes of differentiated social insertion

José Bastos

From thought to action: an outline of the project

Objectives and methodological options

In this chapter we wish to research the role of both non-organised religiosity and affiliation with various religions and sects, organised at a community level, in the development and/or partial hindrance of processes of differentiated social insertion among groups and sub-groups of ethnic-minority populations in Greater Lisbon, Portugal.

The methodological hypotheses supporting our objectives are: 1) that micro-family dynamics are a strategic unit of analysis in the study of the impact of different types of religion in the process of differentiated social insertion (DIS) – a concept we prefer to integration, as it is free from ideological motivation; 2) that religion and religiosity are symbolic resources used to strengthen the identity both of ethnic groups and their ethno-religious segments, and to oppose the – real or potential – humiliation present in social hierarchisation (intergenerational, inter-ethnic, between classes, intra-ethnic, etc.) (Scheff 1996); 3) that research which respects the complexity of inter-ethnic phenomena appeals to a task-oriented methodology (J. Bastos & S. Bastos 2000a) that enabled us to articulate traditional anthropological methods (participant observation, focused and in-depth interviews), with the creation ex-nihilo of a research tool: a questionnaire on inter-ethnic attitudes (designed to allow for comparison of all culturally differentiated groups and segments); 4) and lastly, that structural-dynamic analysis (S. Bastos & J. Bastos 2000) is better suited to analysis of this kind of complexity, and to the preference afforded to identity processes and strategies present in the hierarchical organisation of the world-system.

In accordance with the main trends in European research, we directed our research towards the de-essentialisation and de-homogenisation of the ethnic categories under review, to avoid fusing the concepts of culture, community, ethnicity, identity and religion. Ethnic groups with the same culture, without losing their more encompassing ethnic identity, based on ‘the fact of continuing dichotomisation between members and outsiders’ (Barth 1969 1998: 14), can segment themselves by
making different uses of religiosity, producing different identity sub-
communities with different strategies of intra- and inter-ethnic
competition.

At the level of inter-ethnic relations this reflection is therefore com-
parative and the various ethno-religious groups were selected for con-
trast and comparison with other groups included in the research.
Specifically, the criteria were: a) recent migrants (post-1974) vs. mi-
grants with a long-established presence (since the early 1500s); b) 
Portuguese-speaking groups (from Portuguese-speaking African
Countries or PALOPs) vs. new, non-Portuguese-speaking migrants; c) 
groups or ethno-religious sub-groups with a congregational organisa-
tion vs. sub-groups with non-organised religiosity; d) among 
Portuguese-speaking groups: Africans (Cape Verdeans) vs. Afro-Asians
(specifically Hindus, Ismailis and Sunnis from Mozambique); e) 
groups who share the same religion, but have different ethnic roots
(like Sunnis and Ismailis); and f) groups or sub-groups which the
media, social scientists, or the groups themselves have labelled as pro-
blematic vs. non-problematic groups in Portugal.

The last criterion was fundamental in the construction of the compara-
tive series. Numerous investigations on the post-colonial period in
Portugal (after 1974) show that various ethnic groups – e.g. Gypsies4 and
Cape Verdeans – display much higher than average indicators of proble-
matic insertion in schools and society. The percentage of prison inmates
(both male and female) in sub-groups of these groups is also of concern,
and much higher than that of both nationals and other migrant groups,
which in some cases hovers around zero. These data have led social
scientists to suspect the existence of judicial and legal racism (Seabra
1999; Moreira 1999; Cunha 2002). We therefore selected two sub-
groups of Gypsies (traditional, i.e. non-practising Catholics vs. Neo-
Pentecostal) and four sub-groups of Cape Verdeans (traditional, i.e. non-
practising Catholics, practising Catholics, Evangelical and Nazarene).

At the other extreme were such groups as those who constitute the
‘new Islamic presence’ (Tiesler 2000) in Portugal, who report indicators
of social insertion, socio-professional and economic mobility above the
national average and demonstrate a lack of conflict and discrimination
distinguishing them from their European peers. This led us to select
two Muslim groups, Sunnis and Ismailis (khojas); both originating in
Gujarat, and having lived for several generations in Mozambique (since
the second half of the nineteenth century). These two groups occupied
the position of middlemen minorities and achieved rapid and generally
successful social integration in post-colonial Portugal, in many cases
with the support of their community’s elite. To add complexity to our
comparative series we introduced a further sub-group of Indian origin:
Hindus, who have a similar migratory history and strategies of social
insertion to Indian Sunnis and khojas (S. Bastos & J. Bastos 2001; S. Bastos 2005), but practise a different religion. Sikhs, the fourth ethno-religious community of Indian origin (like Bangladeshis or Pakistanis), migrated to Portugal only very recently. They speak little Portuguese and are in the incipient phase of family reunification. They therefore represented a significant means of comparison for the other sub-groups of Indian origin, who have a long-standing acquaintance with Portuguese cultural ecology.

Our methods included a first phase of research, during which five families in each of the above-mentioned sub-groups – selected in order to obtain a maximum degree of heterogeneity – were studied using classic methods of social and cultural anthropology. In the second phase, to increase comparability, we expanded upon an attitudinal questionnaire (comprising 183 items, mostly directly derived from our fieldwork), which was administered to 40 subjects from each subgroup.5

Initial results: The discovery of four factors structuring variable inter-ethnic strategies

The factor analysis of the completed questionnaires led to the identification of four factors accounting for 55 per cent of total variance. Explaining the rest of the variance would require us to discuss additional factors irrelevant to the desired explanation, due to their minor cumulative change in accounted variance (Scree Test). These variances are neither statistically or semantically significant.6

The first factor: ‘Agonistic Religious Fundamentalism’ [FUND]

The first factor identifies an independent cluster of eight items; when semantically analysed, these may be grouped into five types of assertions: 1) affirms an early and intimidating form of male control of female sexuality, fertility and autonomy (items no. 57, 135 and 147); 2) close association of that control with the endogamic relationships illustrated by item 99; 3) articulates religion and inter-ethnic relations, through the concepts of offence, revenge and violence (items 98 and 62); 4) grounds inter-ethnicity in territorial control, and threatens group fragmentation (item 163); and 5) redefines the concept of racism by thus labelling fragmented intra-ethnic relations (item 38).
### Table 12.1  The first factor: ‘Agonistic religious fundamentalism’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>‘Women must be controlled by their fathers and husbands, to defend the honour of men, families and the community’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>‘I may have a Portuguese boyfriend/girlfriend, but I can only marry someone of my religion/race/community’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>‘If someone offends my religion, I must take revenge for the offence’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>‘I always defend my neighbourhood, even against someone of my race/religion’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>‘Girls should marry early, therefore they must not study too long’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>‘Men always have the last word, women should just obey’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>‘In some cases, God demands that we be violent’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>‘In my race/community, there is a lot of racism, even against our own people’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This first factor accounts for 17.8 per cent of variance, and it expresses a possible foundation of the socio-historical ‘us’ based on an
assemblage of upon three-fold violence: (i) of men against women within the group (gender violence); (ii) of each territorialised subgroup towards others (segmentary violence); and (iii) of the group as a whole towards ‘outsiders’, as a reaction to identity offences (‘fundamentalist’ religious violence).

Built upon this three-fold violence, the us defensively closes upon its ranks, associates its honour with endogamy and control of its women, and establishes diplomatic relations with the outside, with the defensive expectation of offence from the outside. The apparent contradiction of this modus operandi seems to reside in the dynamics of intra-group fragmentation and competition. These dynamics make the larger identity in-group somehow more fragile and create a centripetal dynamic within the group.

The second factor: Accusation of racism as a rationalisation of failed identity establishment effort in an inter-ethnic context

In Factor 2, seven items emerge as statistically connected, accounting for a further 17.1 per cent of the variance. Semantic analysis reveals that the factor integrates five types of assertions: 1) naturalises the break-up of inter-ethnic identity respect (item 122); 2) anchors the accusation of racism in the rejection of the family group and its descendants, by denying them integration (items 30 and 109); 3) uses racism as rationale for the relative lack of success in achieving material wealth and establishing identity in an inter-ethnic context (items 119 and 126); 4) attributes identity causality of this traumatic pattern to the arrogance of members of the dominant group (item 63); and, finally, 5) tells us that political organisation of an emancipating and/or retaliatory response at a group level is halted, as influenced by the dominant identity ecology (item 55).

The systematic accusation of others could be interpreted as a means to conceal the failure of the project of ethnic hierarchical/patriarchal organisation of self-esteem expressed by Factor 1.
Unlike in the first factor, the us subjacent to Factor 2 is unstructured, at least on the political level. Without God or leaders, reduced to a plurality of subjects and family groups affected by an interruption of diplomatic relations, this us suffers from a lack of respect and willing dishonour (at the hands of the Lords of the earth) and also from the

Table 12.2  Accusation of racism as a rationale for failed identity assertion in an inter-ethnic context [ACCUS]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>They will never respect us because of our skin colour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>In Portugal, “white people” do not like to see us in the houses and neighbourhoods were they live</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>In Portugal, “white people” do not like our children to attend their schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>We did not succeed more only because “white people” keep the best opportunities for themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>We did not succeed more only because many people are racists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>The Portuguese are arrogant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>In Portugal, we learned not to like politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike in the first factor, the us subjacent to Factor 2 is unstructured, at least on the political level. Without God or leaders, reduced to a plurality of subjects and family groups affected by an interruption of diplomatic relations, this us suffers from a lack of respect and willing dishonour (at the hands of the Lords of the earth) and also from the
understanding, gathered from the cultural ecology of the destination country, that political retaliation against others is not a viable strategy for the group.

The forces of dispersion and fragmentation are now superior to the forces of congregation, organisation and cohesion; antagonistic acculturation (Devereux 1985) augments the gap, hindering positive or, at least, diplomatic inter-ethnic relations.

Factor 3: ‘Religious Communitarism’ [COMMUN]

Explaining 10.2 per cent more of the variance, Factor 3 integrates four types of assertions: 1) a recognition of the importance of the gaze of the other and positive inter-ethnic relations in the construction of individual and community self-esteem (item 105); 2) suggests an ideal political investment in democracy as a result of opening a negotiation space (albeit imaginary) replacing the rejection and closure recorded in Factor 2 (item 137); 3) associates these positive developments with a religion which is both personal and has a strong community (though not necessarily congregational) dimension (item 90); and lastly 4) simultaneously reveals a blockage which is no longer external, but rather, endogenous – the envy of personal development from members of one’s own family and community – and its possible usage to rationalise the relative failure of one’s projects of individualisation and affluence in an inter-ethnic context (item 14).

The most significant dimension introduced in Factor 3 appears to be the articulation between the positive transcendental gaze and the
Table 12.3  Factor 3: ‘Religious communitarism’ [COMMUN]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'When someone compliments someone from my race/religion, I feel happy'</td>
<td>.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Our community should attempt to elect local and national representatives to stand for our interests’</td>
<td>.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Religion has a fundamental role in my life’</td>
<td>.674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'We did not succeed more only because we did not want to cause the envy of family and community members’</td>
<td>.532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.3  Structural-dynamic interpretation of factor 3: Religious communitarism [COMMUN]

Positive transcendental gaze

[Ideal experience of relational and negotiated construction of self]

Positive gaze of the social ‘Other’  
Ideal of relational and negotiated construction of the ‘we’ space  
Religious nucleation of individual self-esteem  
Non-negotiated negative gaze of close relations [‘envy’]

recognition of the importance of the gaze of the (ethnic) other in the construction of individual and community self-esteem, as well as the
possibility of positive or even assertive inter-ethnic relations; the move
to integration is based in positive identity acceptance, in that opposing
the defensive violence manifested in factor 1 and the discredit presented
in Factor 2.

In this factor religion is not an organiser of group violence turned to
the interior of the group and managed as a defensive tool against disre-
spect, but an organiser of inner identity in those persons fighting for re-
lational success and for a negotiated construction of the us space.

**Factor 4: 'Social and inter-ethnic openness' [OPENN]**

The fourth factor explains 8.4 per cent more of the variance and results
from the articulation of five assertions: 1) states the independence of re-
ligious experience which structures the self from congregational forms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>&quot;You don't need to go to the temple to be religious&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>&quot;Women are more religious than men&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>&quot;Nowadays, divorce is no longer a great problem; when couples do not get along, it is best for everyone that they should split&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>&quot;There are no leaders in our community&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>&quot;Most of my friends are Portuguese&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12.4  Factor 4: ‘Social and inter-ethnic openness’ [OPENN]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>Weight</th>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>&quot;Women are more religious than men&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>&quot;Nowadays, divorce is no longer a great problem; when couples do not get along, it is best for everyone that they should split&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>&quot;There are no leaders in our community&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>&quot;Most of my friends are Portuguese&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of religious life (item 22); 2) posits religion as a locus of female superiority and/or superiority of women in using religious resources (item 168); 3) withdraws women (their sexuality and fertility) from male control through the naturalisation of matrimonial dissolution (item 93); 4) associates these rationales to the refusal of inter-masculine hierarchisation (item 23); and finally 5) states a greater openness to positive inter-ethnicity with no loss of identity diversity (item 138).

The most significant aspects of Factor 4 are, on the one hand, the tendency to regard religious experience as something personal; that is, not just as a resource which results in benefits in external relations (with the group and with God) but, above all, as something necessary to the construction of self; and, on the other hand, to the attribution of a higher religious power to women.

These elements make it clear that Factor 4 is at the opposite end of the scale from Factor 1; divorce is a natural solution to conjugal divergence, that is best for everyone; women are more religious than men and have a relative control of religion (especially managing rituals carried out within the family); finally, the religious congregation (which also is a congregation of men and a political congregation) becomes almost irrelevant.

The inter-ethnic arena

For the analysis of the inter-ethnic space we used Correspondence Analysis (using SPSS Anacor, 4.0 version). The mathematical space defined by the first two dimensions of our analysis accounts for 96.5 per
cent of the inertia, thus making the third dimension – which would complete the analysis – almost redundant.

Dimension 1 (horizontal axis) is mostly explained by the opposition between the accusation of racism (.797) and its opposite (non-accusation of racism), associated at the analytical group level with the opposition between Catholic Cape Verdeans (.272) and the pair formed by Ismailis (.153) and Hindus (.156), who are more heavily represented in the openness factor. This Dimension 1 accounts for most of the variance of Indian-origin Sunnis (94.1 per cent) and Ismailis (68.7 per cent), as well as that of Catholic Cape Verdeans (72.5 per cent), traditional Cape Verdeans (67.9 per cent) and traditional Gypsies (63.7 per cent), located near the first extreme.

Dimension 2 (vertical axis), on the other hand, is mainly explained by the opposition between fundamentalism (.792) and its opposite (non-fundamentalism) and, at the group level, by the opposition of Sikhs (.388), with a higher association to the fundamentalism factor, and Hindus (.276), the group closer to the openness factor. This dimension explains most variance among Sikhs (76.4 per cent), traditional Gypsies (69.9 per cent) and, at the opposite extreme (non-fundamentalism), Hindus (59.2 per cent).
The fact that all groups appear in all the factors with different weights highlights the structural-dynamic complexity of socio-historical groups and prevents any essentialising typological reduction (such as the classical patterns of culture devised by Benedict). Groups are not homogeneous, cohesive, balanced, stable, or exempt from contradictions; they are on the contrary ridden with internal contradictions and dynamised by tensions – namely between genders, generations and sub-groups, projects and desires which diverge on the correct pattern for desirable inter-ethnic relations. Despite this, we may observe that in our case study – without acceding to essentialise socio-historical groups – the interviewees of Indian origin, who have a strong religious underpinning to their community organisation, distance themselves significantly from the various Gypsy and Cape Verdean sub-groups (which are themselves very different when compared). We may also attempt an interpretation of the different effects which different types of religiosity have in the construction of group identity security and in the creation of more or less positive inter-ethnic relations.

**Connecting the correspondence analysis with the voices from fieldwork**

*Revisiting the honour/shame complex: The ethno-religious fundamentalism of Sikhs*

Sikhs are the ethno-religious group which most closely identifies with Factor 1 among those studied. The stated power relationship (of men towards women – wives and daughters), as well as insistence upon the fact that the honour of men (izzat), vulnerable and needing constant confirmation, depends on the sexual, matrimonial and family behaviour of their female relatives (i.e. what is frequently defined the honour/shame complex) is maximised in the worldview of the Sikhs we interviewed. The evocation of the concepts of insult, revenge and violence in the articulation of religion with inter-ethnic relations, i.e. what we define as vulnerable inter-ethnic posture (and which has its counterpart in an agonistic response when threatened), also emerges as one of the chief distinguishing traits of this sub-group.

During fieldwork we discovered that their agonistic response is oriented towards historical enemies: the Muslims, who attempted to convert Sikhs during the Mughal Empire, and against whose rule the ten Sacred Gurus created Sikhism; as well as – more recently – Hindus, a hostility based upon recent memories of the promise of autonomy made, then broken, by Indira Gandhi and by the fact that she ordered her troops to attack the Golden Temple at Amritsar in 1984. Until now, the agonistic response of Sikhs has not been activated in their relations
with the Portuguese, even in the case of an attack made five years ago by people of various ethnic groups upon the Sikh gurdwara in Pontinha, on the outskirts of Lisbon. The agonistic stance of Sikhs therefore seems to be based primarily upon a historical trauma, which also makes it possible to disregard even contextual negative or hostile inter-ethnic relations.

More recently, Sikh support of the Portuguese in the Euro 2004 football championships (which included multiple appeals to their God to help the Portuguese win) makes it possible to hypothesise that their current hosts are largely seen as an alter-ego, as someone who, from an unfavourable position common to the small (Erikson 1967), may obtain the same victory over greater groups which Sikhs have pursued for centuries on the Indian subcontinent.

A further structuring dimension of Factor 1 was the element we defined as dynamics of fragmentation and competition within the community. Despite the Sikhs’ recent arrival, and similar to what happened in Britain, the tensions confronting among Sikhs – for example, in management of gurdwaras – has already become apparent in Portugal. In that confrontation our interviewees recast (as in other European contexts) differentiating and hierarchising idioms and beliefs, related to the Sikh organisation of caste (and, in particular, to the reciprocal accusations between jatts and labanas).

The combination of Factor 1 (fundamentalism) and Factor 3 (religious communitarism) thus appears to protect Sikhs from a feeling of racialised persecution (Factor 2), but also clearly reduces their ‘inter-ethnic openness’ (Factor 4). Certainly this is not unrelated to their recent arrival in Portugal, their mostly ‘diplomatic’ relations with their ‘hosts’,11 and their migratory supermasculinity (which somehow facilitates the reinforcement of the masculine organisation of their religious and family life).

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Table 12.5  *Relative positioning of Sikhs in the four factors*10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fundamentalism</th>
<th>SK 66.7</th>
<th>TG 58.3</th>
<th>EG 45.8</th>
<th>SN 31.5</th>
<th>TCV 24.1</th>
<th>CCV 14.8</th>
<th>IS 12.9</th>
<th>H 7.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accusation of racism</td>
<td>TG 76.2</td>
<td>CCV 57.1</td>
<td>TCV 52.4</td>
<td>EG 47.6</td>
<td>SK 23.8</td>
<td>SN + H 14.3</td>
<td>IS 9.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious communitarism</td>
<td>SK 83.3</td>
<td>TG + EG 80.0</td>
<td>CCV + TCV + H 66.7</td>
<td>SN 58.3</td>
<td>IS 50.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>TG 80.0</td>
<td>H 66.7</td>
<td>SN + TCV 60.0</td>
<td>EG + IS + SK + CCV 53.3</td>
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</table>
The articulation of ethnic fundamentalism and complaints about racism among Portuguese Gypsies

The strategies of traditional Gypsies

In the absence of any politico-religious foundation, the protection of male honour emerges as the main organiser of identity of the subgroup of Gypsies we labelled traditional and is mainly expressed in the defence of endogamy and female virginity, within the ideal that a woman should belong sexually to a single man, in the period between her leaving (as soon as possible) her parents’ home and widowhood, which is to be observed until her death, in permanent mourning (whereby she is to dress in black, cut her hair off with scissors and wear a headscarf).

Despite this, within families, education to these ideals is highly asymmetrical. The virginity of daughters must be defended at all costs, even by resorting to physical violence, while sons, who have much greater freedom, must be kept from drug addiction and thievery. This would therefore be a tradition of respect, which in ancient times used to approximate Gypsies to the Portuguese in a similar morality, based upon the monitoring of modesty, honour and respect (i.e. obedience out of fear, by younger people of older people and by women of men); a tradition of respect which the Portuguese unduly left behind. Gypsies therefore picture themselves as being the representatives of a tradition based upon respect and dignity, which used to characterise the society of the Lords (Senhores).

They always call me for weddings, because I know about honour. It is the most important thing in the world, the most beautiful! Virginity, which is honour, is seen when I show the panuello where everybody may see the flowers [spots of blood] that the mother-in-law asked for previously, because she is the custodian of her daughter-in-law’s honour, together with the other women.
if any. It can be very bad when there is no virginity, then we have *lacha* for all the family, what a shame, my God! [...] Nothing, nothing is as valuable as our honour. [...] It is almost like death, if there is *lacha* [shame]. [...] Gypsies still nurture great hate, which leads certain families to have *contrários* [opposite]. For example, if a girl cheated, it would result in a lot of serious problems. [...] I had to escape to Mozambique because someone wanted to kill me, my husband and one of my sons, it’s such disgrace, you can never be safe, always on the run. [...] This would also happen if a widow were to remarry, she’d make ‘opposites’ [...]. I don’t want to change. I will not change, it would be a disappointment. Thank God, I am 100 per cent Gypsy and also a Catholic!

On the other hand, breaching this tradition could lead to the death of family members of a bride who lost her virginity before marriage. Arranged marriages of cousins agreed upon by their fathers (frequently brothers or brothers-in-law) are contracts of honour, which must not be broken. Once the marriage is agreed upon, the groom cannot reject the bride; in exchange, her parents have full responsibility for guarding her virginity until the wedding night, when it will be ritually verified by her mother-in-law, who will keep its proof as a treasure. Despite this, the bride – in agreement with her parents – has the right to break off the contract rejecting her prospective groom and allowing a new matrimonial contract to be drawn up. However, the loss of virginity, since it implies the infringement of a contract of honour, may have devastating consequences. From that moment on, the families become enemies, and the bride’s family may have to flee the region and possibly even the country, leaving businesses and properties behind. Should any of its members be located and discovered by a member of the offended groom’s family, they may be killed, thus giving rise to a cycle of deaths and blood feuds which may continue for years.

But it is not this foundation of Gypsy law which is seen as sexist, in particular since the woman can reject the groom and break off the promise. What does indeed seem sexist to numerous interviewees is the way in which a supposed masculine superiority is imposed, the lack of male involvement in the responsibilities of the household and in the education of children, the lack of trust in the wife’s management of family expenses, or the fact that some men take out the frustrations and humiliations suffered outside the family, or deriving from having been forced to marry by their parents, by beating their wives and daughters. Within family life, however, in particular the management of the household and in the education of children a certain degree of female power is acknowledged.
In their intra- and inter-ethnic relations, Gypsy interviewees attribute great value to solidarity in situations of crisis, while selecting as a problem the ongoing envious and competitive rivalry among themselves, which is one of the structuring dimensions of Factor 1. Racism (Factor 2), as lived in relations with the Lords, was expressed both as a personal experience and as experiences recounted by friends and family members. In both cases emphasis was laid on the vicious circle of discrimination; they were nomadic and stole food because the others did not allow them to stand still and refused to give them work; and they did not give them work, because they were afraid of them because they stole and were nomadic.

While defending Gypsy law and denouncing the racism of the Portuguese, Gypsy interviewees also attempted to moderate fundamentalism and display inter-ethnic openness, namely by stating their Portugaliness and rejecting the creation of separate schools and neighbourhoods. Gypsy law, which defines Gypsy community life as potentially or actually dangerous, is relatively favourable to inter-ethnic openness. This same Gypsy Law has founded the cultural persistence of Gypsies in recent centuries in unfavourable contexts; but, it also continues to be responsible for most detentions for crimes associated with blood feuds between opposites (contrários).

The identity strategies among members of the Gypsy Church

The main transformative effort of the Church of Philadelphia, created ex-nihilo in the 1960s, consists in the elevation of a transcendental father figure in the place of old Gypsies, respected men, to convince men to resist the temptations of gambling, alcohol, drugs, drug trafficking and especially the Law of Opposites (concerning the infraction of pledges and of debts of honour). The Church of Philadelphia is an ethnic, Neo-Pentecostal church which has been referred to in the past as the Gypsy church (Rodrigues 2000).

Evangelical Gypsies explicitly recognise their disagreement with the Law of Opposites as a struggle for the observation of a law higher than Gypsy law, the Law of God, according to which ‘Thou shalt not kill’ and ‘Forgive those who trespass against us.’ Despite this, a number of interviewees present the attenuation of Gypsy law as a result of the concurrent modernisation of Gypsies themselves, which has produced a general evolution in traditions and customs, or in the new attitudes embraced by non-racists. This modernist posture, which was not borne out by observation, leads to a fantasy of generalised miscegenation, semi-Christian and semi-modern, in which all ‘races’ would combine – at least ideally. That is a fantasy not in the least supported by everyday life and, quite to the contrary, characterised by a strong defence of
endogamy, within the ‘race’ and especially among the faithful of the Gypsy religion.

[female virginity] is a tradition of old people. [...] That was before. Not anymore, not anymore. It is all very modern now, very different. Before, it was nothing like this. If a woman did not have [her honour], she would not marry. Now, I’ll be honest with you: it’s all the same to me! [...] Sooner or later, all races will be mixed: blacks, Gypsies, your race. There will be no races, everything will be mixed. [...] I always had non-Gypsy friends, I even almost married a non-Gypsy, because I never was racist!! (Male)

I always liked to have both Gypsies and non-Gypsy friends. I never had any trouble. [...] I am Portuguese, of the Gypsy race. And I do not want to follow any tradition. [...] As to my children, there’s no point in them speaking ‘calon’! That’s no guarantee of a future! It’s old stuff, it belongs to old Gypsies! [...] I believe that the children will have a future if they know Portuguese things, because they are Portuguese. (Female)

One of the consequences of this change is visible in gender relations, where a greater power-sharing between Philadelphian spouses is observable. While men still insist in showing their wives that they have the last word, they avoid drunkenness, violence and the destruction of their wives’ china (the pride of the Gypsy woman). Two other consequences of conversion to an Evangelical church are the end of visits to witches, now equated with agents of the devil and of discrimination against others (Gadjés, blacks, etc.), which leads these Gypsies to stress the fact that they are Portuguese, but of a different religion. The wish to put an end to evil (criminal violence). Becoming closer to the Portuguese is central to the mission of Gypsy Evangelism. The Christian dialectic of good and evil is thus confirmed by an ambivalent stance in the arena of inter-ethnic relations, which refuses fundamentalist closure and preaches openness to the other, without any loss of identity distinctiveness.

You are asking how could a Gypsy, after someone killed their mother, forgive? If a Gypsy killed one of my children, and I wasn’t a man of God, of course I would have to kill him, even if it took me a hundred years, and if I couldn’t kill him, I would kill his son, or his son’s son. Tell me how could such a great transformation happen in a Gypsy without such help [...] do you really think a man on his own is capable of such a thing [...] How could I, amidst all that violence, all those deaths [speaking of families of opposites], be different, have the strength to
change, on my own? Without the help of God? [...] If a Gypsy has opposites or enemies, and does not kill them, he cannot live near them, because he may... give in [...]. I am being open to you, it is us who are making Gypsies more open towards you. Do you think that you would be sitting here talking to me and to them? [referring to two other Evangelical Gypsies also present]. We are bringing other Gypsies closer to you, we are opening up the Gypsy community, which is very, very closed to the rest of society. Do you think a Gypsy would sit here and speak to you, tell you these things? Do you think that a Gypsy, were he not a man of God, would invite you to his daughter’s wedding? (Male Evangelical pastor)

At this stage, openness towards the Portuguese is matched by religious closure towards other traditional Gypsies, who are seen as a source of temptation (i.e. emissaries of the devil). In this sense, religious conversion becomes a tool for social stratification amongst Gypsies and uses moral exemplarity as a criterion for in-group superiority.

Our cult changed deeply the Gypsy man, take my word, it really did, very very much. [...] Evangelical Gypsies no longer go to certain places, they cannot go to certain weddings, they cannot drink, they don’t drink, they can only spend time with each others, people from church, no one else. [...] They have more money, they are calmer, they do not get messed up with certain things, they don’t go here and there, they only spend time with each other. And even if someone insults them, they do not react [...] They turn around and say: ‘May God our Lord bless you’, they turn around and leave, it’s true. They see things differently, you see, they think differently. [...] I, too, I went to the cult and all that, I participated in the cult here in F[...], and saw that they really do cry, they do, and they have such faith [his wife challenges him and disagrees, saying that everybody has faith]. [...] Only they have it, their own, and that’s that. They only look to themselves, their house, their wife, their children, nothing else. They don’t care if I drink, or that someone parties, or that another parties less, they say: ‘Let them party, let them have fun, I don’t care for such shit, I want to live for God, nothing else.’

The idealised project of Evangelical Gypsies is not exempt from contradictions and regressions, if we are to trust the statements of one of their pastors. While they oppose the Law of Opposites, they reproduce a number of the central Gypsy traditions, such as the importance attributed to virginity, early marriage for women (in contrast to continuing
education) and further the general disdain for higher schooling, even among men. They use different rationalisations (e.g. obedience to the word of God), to obtain the same objectives of antagonist acculturation (Devereux 1985), simultaneously achieving significant increases of self-esteem in relation to traditional Gypsies. Pastor [X], in a public session, introduces himself thus:

Good afternoon. I am Pastor [X] from [Y] church, and the first thing I wish to tell you is that I only went to school for four years. The truth is, I never felt the need for more education. We Gypsies do not need it!

The same pastor, in another public session, years later:

My daughter has already become a woman, and I am going to take her out of school. Let the police come to my house and say that I must send her to school. No way! Over my dead body!

Confronted with such change, borne from their cult, other traditional Gypsies have ambivalent answers, which combine a certain admiration with the desire to provoke and test the new-found godliness of those who follow the cult and the need to emphasise that to have faith one need not formally worship because all Gypsies are believers.

Complaints of racism in Cape Verdeans and its articulation with non-fundamentalism

The identity strategies of traditional Cape Verdeans

Unlike Sikhs and traditional Gypsies, the traditional Cape Verdeans, with high Christian-inspired religiosity and a lack of congregational organisation, display lower indexes in Factor 1. This means that they do

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 12.7</th>
<th>Relative positioning of Cape Verdeans in the four factors¹⁸</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>SK 66.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accusation of racism</td>
<td>TG 76.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious communitarianism</td>
<td>SK 83.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>TG 80.0</td>
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not organise their social relations on the joint articulation of male domination of women and male gerontocracy.17

On the contrary, their young are freed from parental control early on, adolescent sexuality is widespread and virginity and monogamy are not highly prized. They do value endogamy, but local fragmentation is also significant among them. Our fieldwork points towards a naturalisation of adolescent sexuality, which is not controlled either by adults or by any community or religious code and matched by extra-marital sexuality. These trends result in relatively high percentages of single mothers and grandmothers who function as substitute mothers of their grandchildren. This means women have a much more prominent role in the education of emerging generations who in fact receive much of their education from peers and on the streets. The non-fundamentalist pattern, based on the alliance of women, contributes to increase their identity security and has negative consequences on the organisation of couples and the family of subsequent generations, causing feelings of masculine inferiority, which are then mobilised to strengthen male individualism, macho-posturing and the accusation of racism as an expression of an identity malaise within the group, which goes beyond inter-ethnic relations and indeed hides behind them.

In the neighbourhood, there are many young women who at fourteen already have children, they just show up pregnant and we don’t know who the fathers are. Usually, it is always the woman who is branded. I think that young people just want to have sex, and don’t think of the consequences. They do it and take no precautions, they end up pregnant and know that the parents will be angry, but will not kick them out. There’s young people who have children and don’t care about them, they know that the grandmother will take care of them. I know of a woman who has around twelve grandchildren in her house, of various children.

Look, there’s always casual affairs, the problem is that, if it’s a man who is married and goes with another woman, he will be called a ‘stud’, and he accepts the label, he’s a ‘malhão’ [a stallion], while if it’s a woman cheating on a man, we all know the name everybody will call her, don’t we?

This picture is complemented by resorting to Portuguese racism19 to justify the relative failure of their project of identity affluence in Portugal (Factor 2). In fact, and counter to expectations, many of the Cape Verdeans we interviewed express an identity trauma because they did not feel protected in Portugal and lamented the lack of positive differentiation from other Africans some of them came to expect in
colonial times, when they considered themselves offspring of whites and did not see themselves as Africans.

Cape Verdeans were primed to be sent to other African countries, as leaders. They were unlike Africans.

Cape Verdeans believe that they are above other Africans, but this is a consequence of the colonial period, when the Portuguese taught us that we were closer to them, that we were second-class Portuguese, so the racism of the Cape Verdeans towards other Portuguese-speaking African Countries is a Portuguese legacy. The result is that we tend to create closed groups, and that other Africans are unlikely to enter these groups.

In Cape Verde, all non-Cape Verdean Africans are called ‘manjacos’. What’s bad is manjaco. I am ashamed of even repeating this, but since I was a child I always heard my father say, ‘Manjacos are worse than monkeys!’

In Cape Verde, there was no distancing, Portugal was a protective father. When they come to Portugal, Cape Verdeans are disappointed because things are not as they imagined, they do not work that way; Portugal becomes a bit of a step-mother, there never were any integration policies.

The rather different experience of verbal, residential and professional discrimination has led many Cape Verdeans to a sort of intra-group isolation and to the reactive strengthening of their patriotism and their wounded identity pride. At the same time, life in the shantytowns was described as highly problematic. Academic failure and school withdrawal are frequent, delinquency is on the rise and the police are increasingly brought in; police repression, particularly when contrasted against familial tolerance, is seen as racist. On the other hand, many shantytowns engender such a bad reputation that local youths have difficulties in finding jobs, which in turn is seen as racially motivated and the source of resentment, a rebelliousness used to legitimise the delinquency which produced the bad reputation in the first place, creating a degenerating cycle of accusations and counter-accusations (Scheff 1996). The descending spiral at times has even led to deaths (both among police officers and young Cape Verdeans).

I feel that many young people are marginalised by the authorities because, when they are looking for work, if they say they come from the Bairro 6 de Maio [a shantytown], they will not be
picked. After a number of attempts, if the answer is always the same – ‘no’ – resentment is natural.

We frequently have problems with the police, because they are racists. Living in Portuguese shantytowns is worse than living in Africa, isn’t it? Africans will never be respected as long as they live in this precarious situation.

I have already been discriminated against by banks, when I tried to obtain credit. [...] just because I don’t have a permit to stay, I cannot ask for credit, nor can I stand as security for someone else [...] As for the National Health Service, I have the same opinion. [...] I am being treated, but it never ends because all that is very drawn-out and unjust.

Whites have preconceptions about all blacks as a whole, they think ‘they’re all hooligans’ and stuff like that. The Portuguese show their racism subtly.

According to numerous interviewees, current Portuguese legislation strengthens the perception of discrimination. Youngsters born in Portugal are not Portuguese, even though they have always lived in the country;²⁰ long-term Cape Verdean university students are barred from work and they are not allowed to ask for bank credit by the law controlling residence permits; the sluggishness of social services, coupled with some racism, is easily perceived as generalised racism of a more or less subtle nature.

Cape Verdeans and their conversion to various Christian churches and denominations

Membership of organised religions such as Catholicism within the Cape Verdean diaspora in Portugal appears to exploit the idiom – typical of the majority of traditional Cape Verdeans – according to which the family and not the church or community is at the core of identity organisation. They ground this idiom in the authority of revelation. The religious strengthening of family is not merely discursive or conceptual, it introduces – or at least proposes to introduce – behavioural alterations which strengthen conjugal bonds and the role of women within the marriage, while condemning adultery, regarded as the main cause for the destruction of homes.
Family is sacrosanct, untouchable, no one should mess with a family and the preservation of their home, because family is a divine institution, created by God ... no man in his right mind will take any decision that could threaten the stability of his family ... and that includes adultery. Adultery means looking for another woman. And that can lead to the destruction of all you created. It takes years to establish a happy home, but it takes only minutes to destroy it. I speak of adultery because it is one of the most harmful things, but there also are alcohol, drugs, these are other weapons for the destruction of homes. Adultery begins with a lustful look towards someone else’s spouse.

According to numerous practising Catholic interviewees, the issue is not limited to a defence of the nuclear family; it extends to the attempt to transmit to the younger generations born in Portugal traditional values defending and supporting the affective networks of extended families, which do not seem to be replaceable by religious social networks. Practising urban Catholicism demonstrates its compatibility with the aspiration to reenact the values of traditional Cape Verdeans.

The generation that was born here was integrated in kindergartens, creches or pre-schools in their early childhood and later in schools, they learn more of the Portuguese culture... Now we attempt to inculcate the values that our parents transmitted and that are deeply rooted in our country, such as family, respect for the elderly, for grandparents, while the younger generations have a restricted idea of family, their father, mother and children. But we had an enlarged view of the family, grandparents, uncles and aunts, cousins, etc. These are the values that we, the Cape Verdeans, are struggling to transmit to this new generation, which is somewhat different, and this is because of the times we live in. (Male, practising Catholic)

Catholic Cape Verdeans adopt different strategies against racism than Evangelical Gypsies. When they place a transcendental father figure in the place traditionally occupied by respected elders, they do not promote a modification of their practices which would enable them to become closer to white Portuguese. Rather, they stress the accusation of racism against other church members who distance them, instead of coming together in the name of a common father. They do not relinquish their resentment, but rather, transform it into a righteous cry of resentment before the almighty.

On the other hand, the internalisation of apparently European values (e.g. arguing for the education and economic autonomy of women)
vindicates them with regard to a traditional Cape Verdean framework which strengthens a pattern of male-female misunderstanding and consequently of family break-ups and the formation of one-parent families.

Any responsible parent worries about the future of their child. ... Now I’m less worried and preoccupied, because my concern was that my daughters should have university degrees, so that they could have good jobs, and would not live off the salary of the man they will find later, because when a young person has a degree and a job, if they find a partner and things go badly, she will not hang on. Sadly, I see many young women with two or three small children, and they don’t have jobs to support their family decorously. My daughters are not engaged yet, they are not married, they live with me ... If I were to die now, as we say in crioulo, I will not die cross, because my daughters have the tools to make their own way in life.

Religious communitarism and social inter-ethnic openness in three ethno-religious groups of Indo-Portuguese Mozambicans

On the other hand, groups of Indian origin who emigrated from Mozambique after decolonisation are less likely to mention racial discrimination as a justification for their social insertion. Their distinctive position appears to be based upon (i) a reinterpretation of colonial history according to which, in Mozambique, a considerable number of white Portuguese (baglás) did not use race as a univocal boundary for domination and exclusion, as evidenced by the number who established inter-personal relations with persons of Indian origin – unlike what they say that happened in neighbouring South Africa, Uganda and Kenya; (ii)

Table 12.8 Relative positioning of three Indo-Portuguese groups coming mainly from Mozambique in the four factors

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<th>TV</th>
<th>CC V</th>
<th>IS</th>
<th>H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fundamentalism</strong></td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accusation of racism</strong></td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>T G 57.1</td>
<td>T CV 52.4</td>
<td>E G 47.6</td>
<td>SK 23.8</td>
<td>SN + H 14.3</td>
<td>IS 9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Religious communitarism</strong></td>
<td>T G 83.3</td>
<td>T G + E G 80.0</td>
<td>C CV + T CV 66.7</td>
<td>IS 58.3</td>
<td>SN + C CV + H 50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Openness</strong></td>
<td>T G 80.0</td>
<td>H 66.7</td>
<td>SN + T CV 60.0</td>
<td>IS 53.3</td>
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the perception that the idiom of racism is used differently in the Portuguese post-colonial context, being directed mostly against Gypsies and certain groups of African origin; as well as in the perception that the Portuguese cultural ecology is tolerant of religious diversity, at least that of Muslims and Hindus living in Portugal. This was made evident by the fact that the new Islamic presence in Portugal before, during and after 9/11 (and also after 11 March 2004, the train bombings in Madrid, and after the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam) was not accompanied by significant episodes of tension, conflict or discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims. Neither did it result in controversial statements in the public arena and among public opinion.

Unlike Sikhs, significant percentages of Indian-origin Hindus and Muslims reject Factor 1. The fact that female interviewees in all three groups do so more decisively confirms that the honour/shame complex, based on the control of females by males, is a distinctly masculine idiom.

Our Sunni interlocutors are the first to recognise clear asymmetries between women and men among themselves though they frequently justify them as the consequence of cultural traditions based on well-defined gender roles and assumptions that have been vital in the education of the emerging generations i.e. to avoid their experiencing processes of descending social assimilation, to the perpetuation of family enterprises and to the preservation of community respect for the family and its name. It is therefore not surprising that several define themselves as privileged in comparison to Portuguese women:

Muslim women are very privileged, despite what they say. They say Muslim women are oppressed – they’re not. Firstly, in the education of their children, because most Muslim women have the privilege of staying at home and educating their children the way they see fit, a privilege many Portuguese women do not have. ... Secondly, Muslim husbands give great importance to their wives, because we are the mothers of their children. We take care of the organisation of the home and the education of children, while our husbands are concerned with family business. We are very privileged, it is well worth it to be a Muslim woman.

Our Ismaili interlocutors (both male and female), self-defined as practitioners of a modern and progressive Islam, not surprisingly emphasise equality between men and women, recognise and accept the possibility of divorce, describe parental investment in the educational and
professional evolution of their daughters as equal – or even superior – to that of their sons.

The sub-group in this series displaying the lowest index in Factor 1 is Hindus (especially Hindu women). Hindus – both male and female – also identify religion as a locus of female superiority and/or affirm the superiority of women in the use of religious resources. The correspondence between the female gender and symbolic power cannot be read as a simple migratory disorder, even though in the main colonial migratory context religion was indeed restricted to the female sphere. Gujarati migrant women were the dynamic force behind the reconstruction and transmission of religious beliefs and practices and also learned to officiate at religious ceremonies, traditionally performed by brahmins and goswamis in their homelands. Apart from their ritual specialisation, these women recreated Little Traditions that matched ‘the everyday forms of resistance’ (Scott 1985) employed by their Gujarati non-migrant counterparts against several local systems of dominance.

Emphasising the incorporative, metamorphic and porous nature of all beings, as well as the fluid, mutable and reversible relations between them (Daniel 1984; Freeman 1999; inter alia), these traditions make a diplomatic encounter with the stranger possible, since the stranger is only illusorily alien and external (one of the fundamental components of the concept of maia). Hindus refuse to turn the different into an absolute other and seek alternative solutions to identity postures that recur to agonistic vulnerability, to the closure and impermeability of us, or to assimilatory surrender to the other.

Conclusion

We carried out comparative research on six ethnic or ethno-religious groups whose arrival to Portugal stretched back as far back as over five centuries. This enabled us to discern the significance of strategies of family and religious self-organisation in the differentiated social insertion processes that place them in the framework of the host society.

At the level of family dynamics (S. Bastos & J. Bastos 2008) the greatest differentiation is initially seen between 1) groups where the power of the parental generations is still very strong and 2) a single group (Cape Verdeans) where this gerontocratic dynamics has weakened over the past few generations, resulting in a dynamic of emancipation of the younger generations. The high incidence of teenage pregnancies, the preponderance of de facto unions, the ambivalent acceptance of sexual freedom for both sexes, of infidelity and informal polygamy, the high percentage of divorces, the strong prevalence of female single-parent families approximate this dynamic to the evolution of the centre of the
world-system (namely, English-speaking countries) and also of Portugal since the 1960s.

On a secondary level, between ethnic or ethno-religious groups with an active gerontocratic dynamic (albeit weakened in the most recent generations and/or in the migratory context), the opposition between two paradigms becomes relevant: one of violent masculine power (honour crimes, blood feuds, aggression against women, extreme imposition of gender segregation, etc.); and one, taking transitional forms, whereby the position of women is exalted. Such a magnification of the mother figure displays cultural and religious variations. It can derive either from the ambivalent admiration and respect of female sexual self-control and from the religious and family-based deification of human mothers associated to it in the case of Hindus or from the progressive acceptance of the modern discovery of the great capabilities of women in the management of both family and business interests, with a role complementary rather than competitive to that of men, who maintain formal primacy within the communities (in the case of Ismailis and Sunnis).

At the level of social applications of religiosity, these groups also manifest varied dynamics, from: 1) identification with ethnic religions to 2) belonging to international religions and 3) the attempt to compensate for the dominance of non-organised forms of religiosity. This last compensatory dynamic employs two strategies; the ex-nihilo creation of ethnic churches within international religious networks, or the direct conversion to supra-ethnic churches that, in Portugal, encourages

![Figure 12.6 Religiosity, family dynamics and power](image-url)
multicultural approximation and mixed marriages within the congregation, while also promoting religious endogamy.

The two groups seen as problematic (Seabra 1998; Moreira 1998) from the outset are, in this series, those with the least community self-organisation and also those who belong to the latter dynamic, in which minority strata seek conversion in order to promote greater integration through pre-existing religious organisations, dispersing themselves among different Christian churches (Cape Verdeans), or through one purpose-created, in the case of the Gypsy church. With one significant difference: the religious integration of Gypsies within an ethnic church tends to strengthen control upon the sexuality of young females, and its most significant intervention is in the area of intra-group aggression, the use of alcohol and drugs (both consumption and trafficking) and domestic violence against women; while the main objectives of the conversion of Cape Verdeans are the promotion of self-control of extra-marital sexual activity, especially for males (with the abandonment of informal polygamy as a marker of masculinity) and the reestablishment of family dynamics marked by the dominance of males (ratified by religion), in the hope this will result in the end of crime and the immorality of young people, matters of great concern to Cape Verdeans as an imagined community (Anderson 1983).

At the level of inter-ethnic relations the increase in group self-esteem among converts, i.e. in the case of Gypsies, seems oriented towards maximum openness to the world of gadjés (while keeping firm fundamental elements such as education of children), together with a distancing accompanied by feelings of superiority towards the majority of Gypsies and their non-organised religiosity. In the case of Cape Verdeans, specifically practising Catholics, it seems to take the form of a fantasy of political leadership of fellow nationals, increased accusations of racism against their hosts through an ambivalent dynamic that tends to reinforce inter-ethnic distancing. This is actually, in both cases, a process of creation of ethnic elites which, through different strategies, deploy a project of community reconstitution allowing processes of ascending integration without assimilation (Portes 2001). They thereby attempt to invert the dynamic of problematic integration so far experienced by their most underprivileged and disorganised strata.

The issue of the effect of host cultural ecologies upon the migrant ethnic groups cannot be dealt with here but nor can it be ignored, especially given an increasing wealth of research data indicating the peculiarity of the Portuguese case within Europe, in particular Mediterranean or Catholic Europe (J. Bastos 2000, 2002; S. Bastos & J. Bastos 2008), and the cultural approximation of Portuguese minorities to dynamics and values idealised in Portugal and their distancing from inter-ethnic dynamics based on confrontational values and on the
hierarchisation of civilisations (S. Bastos & J. Bastos 2005; S. Bastos in this volume), prevalent in certain contexts of the centre of the world-system.

Notes

1 This chapter is part of the CEMME research project ‘Different children of different Gods: Uses of religion and differentiated social insertion’, 1ME/ANT/49893/2003, financed by FCT and ACIME, under the direction of S. Bastos and J. Bastos, with the cooperation of L. Soczka, D. Rodrigues, A. Brinca, L. Nicolau, A. Costa, F. Batoréu, A. Correia, A. H. Tavares P. Guardini, E. Rodrigues, N. Carvalho, S. Costa, I. Banze and F. Mourão. We wish to thank our Indian, Mozambican, Cape Verdean and Portuguese informants for their willingness to participate in this project.

2 This belief is based on three grounds. It is within the family (nuclear, extended, multiple and/or fictive) that religious views, experiences and practices are transmitted, re-created, reinterpreted and transformed. Family relations themselves (between genders, generations, consanguineal and affinal relatives, etc.) involve micro-political phenomena which religion attempts to elaborate, legitimise, subvert, etc. Power dynamics at a micro-familial level are frequently a privileged language to understand and manage wider power relations, within and without the group, and even at a supra-social, geo-strategic level.

3 Believing that the internal organisation of the groups and their external relations, as well as their ideological production, are primarily aimed at stabilising a certain social organisation of identity subjectivity, necessarily biased (Leach 1954) to simultaneously both reveal and withhold the relations of force which underlie the system (Godelier 1996).

4 In Portugal, these populations define themselves as Gypsies (‘ciganos’) and define their cultural orientation as obeying Gypsy Law (‘lei cigana’). Speaking Portuguese as their mother tongue and referring to themselves as ‘Portuguese Gypsies’, they recognise ‘Hungarian’ and ‘Romanian’ Gypsies as different kinds of Gypsies. In identity terms, the word ‘Roma’, if known, means almost nothing to them.

5 We identified ten different ethnic or ethnoreligious groups represented in the sample (N = 310). The acronyms used in the tables are given as follows: SK = Sikhs, IS = Ismailis (Khojas), SN = Sunnis of Indian origin, H = Hindus, TG = Traditional Gypsies, EG = Evangelical Gypsies, NCV = Cape Verdeans (Nazarene Church), ECV = Cape Verdeans (Evangelical Church), CCV = Cape Verdeans (practising Catholics), TCV = ‘Traditional’ Cape Verdeans.

6 Kaiser’s rule was not followed when looking for the maximum substantial meaning within the context of the current research. In a second phase of this project we will promote a significant expansion of the database, both of the total number of interviewees and in the inclusion of new groups or sub-groups, enabling us to detect further factors.

7 The only group whose explanation in this analysis remains under 95 per cent are Gypsies (91.1 per cent for Evangelicals and 83.3 per cent for traditions) and the only factors inadequately explained remained Religious Communitarianism (71.9 per cent) and social and inter-ethnic openness (90.7 per cent).

8 The main migratory fluxes of Sikhs in Portugal (unofficial figures point to 5,000 to 7,000 people) reveal a number of patterns: the largest group has migrated directly from the Punjab to Europe since the early 1990s, especially after 1996; at the same time, a second group came from different regions of the Indian subcontinent.
(Jammu-Kashmir, Haryana); and a third, smaller group from other nuclei of the Sikh diaspora (namely, the UK and US). Upon arrival, the majority became employed in temporary jobs in the area of construction, in the case of men, and cleaning (domestic or industrial) for the women; some men and women found work in restaurants (as kitchen helpers or waiters). Some later succeeded in opening their own businesses.

9 A compromise formation between the adoration of Lord Krishna – the Only One in Bhagavat Gita – and of ‘the Book’ instead of ‘idols’.

10 For key to acronyms, see footnote 144.

11 In Portugal, Sikhs say: ‘Jessa desh, bessa desh’, (‘In the land of others, we are like the others’). This leads them to westernise their appearance; they stop using the turban and other religious emblems, cut their body hair, etc., in order to become less visible in school and in the workplace.

12 We can estimate that there are almost 50,000 Portuguese Gypsies, dispersed throughout the country.

13 These display non-organised forms of religion, close to the Portuguese popular religion, a mixture of non-practising Catholicism and cults associated with ancestral spirits, possession, prophecy and witchcraft.

14 For key to acronyms, see footnote 144.

15 This is why, as girls get older, their mothers increase pressure and vigilance for their daughters to ‘be discrete’. Most girls are taken from school at puberty because the ‘time to marry’ has come, and even the possibility of any flirtation with the sons of the Lords, i.e. the Gadjés, must be avoided (Mourão 2002).

16 Gypsy law, as regards arranged marriages, is also a law of endogamy, thus imposing the avoidance of marriage to people of different ‘races’ – namely ‘whites’ (Gadjés) – and, in practice, with other Portuguese.

17 Losing relevance to Brazilians and East Europeans (Ukrainians, Russians, Moldavians, Romanians, etc.), Cape Verdeans still make up the major ethnic minority in Portugal, estimated at almost 80,000 (J. Bastos & S. Bastos 1999; 2002).

18 For key to acronyms, see footnote 144.

19 The accusation of racism placed on the Portuguese actually contains many contradictions, tensions and identity debates. Examples include those between Sampadjudos and Badios, i.e. those who come from different islands in the archipelago; the widespread identity conflict with Angolans, with Manjacos (Africans coming from Guinea-Bissau and other continental countries) and with Africanness; the identity tension between those Cape Verdeans who recognise themselves in a recent, revolutionary African identity and those who consider decolonisation to have been a mistake because it deprived Cape Verdeans of the chance to be a part of the European Union; the identity tension between those who pride themselves in being pure Cape Verdeans, i.e. neither African nor European and those who wish to recover the bygone family-like proximity to the Portuguese; the identity tension between those who feel they are Portuguese in Portugal and those wishing to leave the country as soon as possible, headed for Northern Europe or the US; between those who benefit from the richness of creolity and feel they belong in two places and those who fall between two cultures, deprived of any recognisable – or recognised – identity; and so on (J. Bastos & S. Bastos 1999; Tavares & J. Bastos 2006; J. Bastos 2006).

20 Recently, the socialist government changed the situation, reintroducing ius soli and thus attributing the Portuguese nationality to children of immigrants born in Portugal.

21 We can estimate that 9,000-11,000 Sunnis of Indian origin and 6,000 to 8,000 Ismailis as well as 8,000 to 10,000 Hindus currently live in Portugal.
22 In Portugal, people of Indian origin are generally perceived as ‘non-problematic’ or even ‘envied’ by certain segments of Portuguese society (as a result of their family history, and their successful socio-professional, educational and economic insertion).

23 For key to acronyms, see note 5.

24 In the context of the present chapter, and from a local point of view, we define ethnic religions as those that, in the opinion of both the migrant community and the host society, are seen as supporting local communities of relatively homogeneous origin (Indian – Sikh and Hindu – or Gypsy) and as non-expansionist or even closed. In Lisbon, Ismaili church is also closed and restricted, but the Ismaili movement is clearly international and Aga Khan is adored at distance almost as the living presence of God on earth. In this context, Catholic and Islamic churches are seen as international, ethnically heterogeneous and expansive, as it happens with some Christian churches (like IURD) but not with those created exclusively for ethnic congregation.

References


13 What are we talking about when we talk about identities?

José Bastos and Susana Bastos

... in our fast globalizing world ‘one thing that is not happening is that boundaries are disappearing. Rather, they seem to be erected on every corner of every declining neighbourhood of our world. (Friedman 1999: 241)

‘Seeking safety in an insecure world’?

In two texts written 50 years apart, Erikson (1972: 274) and Bauman (2003) both attribute the relatively recent preoccupation with identity processes to the great economic and social transformations which destroyed community life, made subjects and families culturally vulnerable and created mounting internal and international migratory fluxes which temporarily increased tolerance to uncertainties (Appadurai 1998). Erikson developed his cluster of identity concepts within a relatively closed community, based on intergenerational recognition, and characterised by an antagonistic exteriority that conveniently sanctioned its relative closure. On the other hand, Bauman (2003: 16) theorises on community fixation, in line with Fromm (1941), less as the result of the need to belong than as characteristic of fearful and anxious individuals, prompted to surrender their freedom. In the former, the dramatic and problematic perspective, there is the need to explain the rapid changes in the world-system and the resulting migration and inter-group readaptations; in the latter, the classic educational or civilisational perspective, there is only the need to generalise the supposed maturity of certain elites.

The creation of instability and vulnerability resulting from the destruction of old models of identity, ways and styles of living, as well as the reactive dynamics of identity reconstruction among large exiled groups, stimulated the strengthening of their own self-conscience, the need to defend and improve their position in the world and increased their self-esteem. This gave rise to a multitude of discourses and identity analyses that, as is well known, preoccupied the carriers of hegemonic discourses (an issue we will consider later in this chapter). The reaction of the Anglo-American intellectual elites (neo-Kantian, sociological,
or both in an emancipatory association) is well documented. The creation of new disciplines of study (e.g. cultural studies), the elevation of the concept under erasure (Hall 1995), its systematic deconstruction, together with the invention of essentialist opposites, to sabotage its most dynamic and less passive-adaptive dimensions, the reduction of individuals to subjects chained by language, or the pure and simple return to the hegemonic positions of modern objectivist thought to better reject it, are all hallmarks of the new approaches.

Erikson (1972: 274) asserted that ‘the study of identity becomes as strategic in our time as the study of sexuality was in Freud’s time’. This could have led him to conclude that the same intellectual, political and religious powers interested in the repression of sexuality in Freud’s time would be interested in the scotomisation and denegation of identity processes and strategies in our time. Indeed, both are strong emotionally ambivalent processes linking the self-contradictory organisation of the mind to the self-contradictory organisation of the world; they begin in the bonds of individuals to their parents and siblings in families and communities of descent and that of personal identities to familial, communitarian, ethnic and national identities (and sometimes religious identities), in ways that state politicians and bureaucratic managers, philosophers or social scientists cannot control or manage.

Hegemonic traditions are known to attempt to banish intermediate variables such as family, community, religion or ethnicity (significant when individuals seek safety in an insecure world), or try to reduce them to the private sphere. Thus they could present isolated and featureless individuals – sexless, ageless and with no family connections, devoid of their loves and hates, with their family ties reduced to the name of their parents (if known) and their marital status, their private loyalties to others and themselves scotomised. Individuals reduced to their documents by the process of social levelling produced by the acts of registered classification, enumeration, bureaucratisation (that is, eradication of subjectivity) and citizenship inspection by Big Brother, the state.

The end result is known: in the myth of citizenship, ‘all men are equal under the state’, individuals are protected by the state in relation to others, against the potential criminals among them and, last but not least, against the dangerous others who threaten the state and its children from within, or in an ideal case, from outside. In the absence of a true external threat to the state there will always be the paranoid belief in an Other who may threaten us. The fact that the state variously threatens its own members (e.g. women, blacks, dissidents and inferiors, Kurds or Roma) is irrelevant, since the state is, by definition, impartial and just, as parents are supposed to be towards their offspring. The most relevant point, however, is that the state is supposedly devoid of
emotions. Rational as the elites and cognitive intellectuals constituting the state apparatus are purported to be, they are driven only by common interest and the Search for Truth. Certainly, in this myth, the state is not a web of powerful individuals and families who control powerful institutions such as political parties, parliament and courts, the police force and banks, industrial organisations and ideally also the unions, the military and educational apparatuses, media groups and so on. Rather, it is a transcendental institution, quite separate from individuals and their imperfect humanity, which coincides with society at large and its historical best interests. In this rational myth, states, societies and citizens exist as entities (not as concepts) and are rational, constantly and meticulously calculating costs and benefits. The bureaucratic state, with its belief, now, in rationality and efficiency, uses this as a mark of identity. Inasmuch as Europe is seen as the home of reason, being bureaucratic in various ways means being European. To Weber, moreover, the rise of bureaucracy was accompanied by that quintessentially European virtue, individualism (Herzfeld 1992: 67). Despite all this, and counter to the perpetuation of the myth, at certain moments (e.g. when international competition becomes harsher, capitalism has one of its habitual crises, or the numbers of immigrants of other colours or religions rise excessively), these rational entities become anxious and promote or mobilise violent collective emotions, like nationalism, patriotism, ethnicity, counter-religiosity or xenophobia, producing fortresses and wars.

If we look beyond the apparent enigma of the irrational outbursts of the rational state and its apparatuses, to the analysis of relevant historical conflicts, the question of identities is invariably present. Also present is the puzzle of growing diversity and the dynamics leading to the pseudo-speciation of humankind (Erikson 1968). This includes all the associated issues to the comprehension of the alternate dynamics of socially organised violence and the construction of periods of peace (which have remained mere transitional periods). It further includes the alternate dynamics of solidarity and exploitation, imperial overt or covert control and self-determination, ethics and the search for supremacy, the primacy of law and the execution of genocides, directly or by indirect actions, the social production of starvation or the tactical non-control of epidemics, or the political exportation or exploitation of civil wars, both in the convenient continents.

**Intellectual contenders**

*Revisiting four anthropological paradigms*

Theories rest on paradigms. A paradigm becomes visible at the point of exhaustion. No longer a taken-for-granted way for
organizing the world, it appears in retrospect as a set of tricks of analogy and metaphor. (Strathern in Ingold 1996: 63)

Although the very concept of human nature is unfashionable at the moment, it serves as the unnoticed backdrop of every investigation in human conduct. (Scheff 1990: 3)

If we wish to reflect upon the proliferation of discourses vying for hegemony in the theoretical framework of socio-historical action, at least four great versions of anthropological knowledge arise; all are grounded in particular philosophical roots and very unlikely to break free of these structural constraints.

The two classic essentialist positions are differentiated by the way in which they either posit the existence of one single domain, with its own laws (nature), or recognise the existence of two superimposed but distinct domains, nature (homo hominis lupus) and reason (homo sapiens sapiens), while declaring, in different neo-Kantian statements, that the great axis of the process of becoming human is related to the unmediated passage from nature to culture, so that ‘it is not possible to explain the social phenomenon, and the state of culture itself is incomprehensible, if symbolism is not treated by sociological thought as an a priori condition’ (Lévi-Strauss 1947: 527).

‘Homo hominis lupus’

Actually, the phenomena of History, as they endlessly repeat, do not have rational causes. ... The absence of reason and non-rational human nature lead two nations to compete with each other, despite the absence of any economic need for this; they also lead two political parties or two religions, whose programmes are amazingly similar, to fight implacably. (Lorenz 1973: 247)

The former position, backed by socio-biology, evolutionary psychology and the new discoveries in genetics and neurology, maintains that human behaviour is an extension or evolution of animal behaviour and as such can be understood through evolutionary animal psychology. It believes that the human mind has no specificity and that there has not been any anthropological leap for hominids. The similarities between animals, the brain and machines are not seen as merely analogical or ideological and lead to research in classical brands of sociology (organicism or mechanism) and in the new cognitive sciences. ‘The developing mind is a series of dedicated, small-scale, automatic machines specialised in very limited inferential tasks’, and ‘the mind is described as a
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Naturalistic positions</th>
<th>Essentialist approach</th>
<th>Dramatic positions</th>
<th>Evolutionist positions</th>
<th>Sociological positions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fitness, natural evolution</td>
<td>‘Predation and the victory of the fittest, that is, the stronger ones, is natural’</td>
<td>‘Reason is at the same time intrinsic to the species and to the struggle of elites against emotions and illusions’</td>
<td>Survival, adaptation, cohesion and order</td>
<td>‘Social order is at the same time natural and constructed to seem natural; men are “chained” to the social order’</td>
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<td>‘Social sciences’</td>
<td>Socio-biologist approaches</td>
<td>Platonic and neo-Kantian philosophies and ethics</td>
<td>‘Selfish reasons and delusions are the main organisers of history, but the triumph of the weakest is a question of integrated development, persistence in struggle and time’</td>
<td>Integrative and structural-dynamic approaches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calvinistic liberalism</td>
<td>neo-eugenics</td>
<td>Rational ethics</td>
<td>Differential egalitarianism</td>
<td>Change from sado-masochism to a voyeuristic-exhibitionistic paradigm in social relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Darwin to Sumner and from Lorenz to Wilson</td>
<td>Homo hominis lupus</td>
<td>Juridical emancipation</td>
<td>From Marx to Freud and from Roheim to Morin</td>
<td>Homo sapiens demens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homo sapiens sapiens</td>
<td>Knowledge, control morality and progress</td>
<td></td>
<td>Love, freedom, justice and happiness</td>
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“Swiss-army knife” composed of specialized cognitive adaptations’ (Boyer 2003: 218-219).

According to this creed, nature has its own laws (diversity, violence, hierarchisation, predation, the sacrifice of individuals to the selective reproduction of the best genetic lines, etc.), which must be respected and before which the human will is powerless. Imperialism, colonialism and savage capitalism are viewed as mere historical applications of natural laws (survival of the fittest, evolutionary differentiation, merit, with winners and losers turned into racial essentials and white pride into the natural supremacy of Western civilisation). The eugenic management of reproduction would complete, in an accelerated form, the slow transformative action of those natural laws.

As every other domain, science, too, falls under the scope of the laws of competitive survival, and leads to ‘a theory whereby scientific progress is found to consist not of an accumulation of observations, but rather, of the overcoming of less satisfactory theories’, so that there is ‘a competition between theories – an almost Darwinian struggle for survival’ (Popper 1986: 87). This change, which gives primacy to the deductive method, in its anti-positivist dynamics, opens the way to the rhetorical turn, the understanding of scientific work as a rhetorical struggle between authors and schools (Simons 1989), and turns the dominant consensus (which, in the case of anthropology, may vary between countries and even single universities) into an epistemological criterion (Kuhn 1962, 1970). In social and human sciences, a change of consensus (which may merely mirror intellectual fashion) produces an epistemological revolution and the dominant intellectual products become goods to be exported in a globalised market that will determine if (and for how long) they will be dominant (bought) or remain on the shelf (forgotten).

‘Homo sapiens sapiens’

In order to make itself valid as a free being and to obtain recognition, self-consciousness must exhibit itself to another as free from natural existence. ... The absolute identity of the Ego with itself is essentially not an immediate, but such a one as has been achieved through the cancelling of sensuous immediateness, and the exhibition of the self to another as free and independent from the Sensuous. (Hegel in Fromm & Xirau 1968: 191)

Neo-Platonic and neo-Kantian philosophy and law, the inspiration for ethically oriented civic movements and politically correct behaviour (especially in the United States), subscribe to the view that man is a rational, reflexive and moral being despite exceptions, governed by
reason and by a categorical imperative which, once out of the primitive cave, orients him towards the quest for good, beauty and truth and therefore towards the value of defence of any life form and of justice, searching for ‘the absolute identity of the Ego with itself.’ The unmediated relation to values makes investment in a group undesirable; ‘the struggle for identity reveals itself as based in claiming a distinctive moral order, rather than in maintaining national, ethnic, or other sorts of mappable boundaries’ (Battaglia 2003: 119). Moral alienation is a characteristic of the masses, and moral dis-alienation is obtained through a process of self-realisation (inspired, as Weber would point out, by Calvinism) in exceptional beings that should unite to spearhead the moralisation process of the whole of humanity. Since ethics concerns ‘the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport à soi’ (Foucault 1984: 352), subjects should live in a constant state of moral alertness (Shepper-Hughes 2005). The moral process is possible and voluntary. Evil is external to the activists and must be fought; it is explained either by power, which is morally corrupting, or by the evolutionary underdevelopment of peripheral peoples and uncultivated, unenlightened masses. Education, good practices, law and the courts, as well as the institutional and political implementation of moral universalism, make the prospect of a rosy but hard-to-attain future possible. Women obviously have a fundamental role to play in the re-education of men, and children in the re-education of their parents. Personal and group identities must be submitted to the rational values stemming from the social contract and democracy (Gutman 2003). Those who adhere to this current of methodological individualism (Popper 1966) may develop supra-national world citizen or cosmopolitan identities, and withdraw investment from their national identities, which are seen as non-ethnic. This foreshadows a spiritualised world, metaphorically diaphanous, with no form of its own or constant contents and a liquid society (Bauman 2000) scientifically governed by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and therefore unknowable through any of the traditional structural-dynamic scientific models, since these are concerned with conditions in which boundaries and differentiations, albeit unstable and changeable ones, do exist.

In opposition to these classic worldviews, featuring strong essentialist components (based on the founding postulates of nature and reason), two later worldviews emerged, with the ability to inspire significant social movements. These paradigms are non-generalist and thereby non-essentialist. Nor are they based on dichotomies or exceptions. The difference between these two perspectives resides in the primacy of a dramatic, psycho-historical vision, or that of a sociological and culturalist (neo-Durkheimian), normative and self-regulatory perspective.
The thing owned is in the same relation with its owner as the part with the whole; and the part is distinguished from the whole, and belongs to it (...). (Aristotle, Politics 1977: 12)

To this third paradigm, whose post-Durkheimian formulation is founded on neo-Kantian premises (Dahrendorf 1968), the secular concept of society is crucial. The self-sufficient monad is no longer ego-centric man, but a society that is supposedly transcendent (in itself or through the state) and supportive and therefore also selfish, i.e. ethnocentric and self-contained, as a rationally organised cave with no transcendent light other than its own. Applying a top-down perspective: ‘Society can maim and kill. Indeed, it is in its power over life and death that it manifests its ultimate control over the individual.’ (Berger & Luckmann 1967: 181) Thus, in this perspective, identity has a transcendental monopoly on the social monad, instituted as a super-individual organised as political actor in the arena of international competition. Man is a potential being, unconditioned by nature, born a tabula rasa and subsequently conditioned, moulded and determined by his different surrounding contexts (environmental, economic, technological, historical and cultural) and social roles (which are themselves laden with functional identities, as subsystems of the social organism). He harbours no internal, differentiated and specific worldviews or drives of his own, i.e. no identity, other than that springing from the modelling action of society or the state. The concept of subject is either non-relevant or mythological, and merely resides in the illusions of common sense.

Thus the successfully socialised individual is incapable of functioning sexually with the ‘wrong’ sexual object and may vomit when confronted with the ‘wrong’ food. [...] the social channeling of activity is the essence of institutionalisation, which is the foundation for the social construction of reality. (Berger & Luckmann 1967: 181-182)

Nor are the dynamics of history the result of the contradictions between soma and psyche, between selves and their various ‘others’, socially organised in asymmetrical forms, and between one ‘us’ and their ‘others’, separated by the identity boundaries (Barth 1969, 1998) everyone builds. This understanding comes from the belief that, as a society, individuals have neither an unconscious mind nor contradictions and that their progress is millimetric and inexorable, thanks to reflexive processes, which are sociologically monitored. ‘The self is despicable and
has no place between Us and Nothing’ (Lévi-Strauss 1955). ‘Sociology is an enemy of the self’ (Touraine 1973).

When multiple identities form within an individual, with no coordination or systematisation enforced by an ego endowed with internal dramatic powers and personal identity (and therefore, lacking any boundaries of the self), such identities become mere reflections of the roles played by the subject in different contexts. When collective identities manifest, they are merely reflections of a self-organising world headed towards economic, media and cultural globalisation, which will purportedly lead to desired homogenisation — thus supposedly guaranteeing social cohesion. The outward presentation of self in everyday life annihilates the self in the mirror gaze of the comprehensive other (Goffman). Given the epistemological primacy of synchronic and microfocalised studies into daily, normal, or normalised life, research into historical processes of world organisation and the geo-strategic and migratory tensions and traumas they cause (e.g. to millions of refugees) are ultimately irrelevant. This happens because they are beyond what is really important, the social monad and the closed relationship between the supposed whole (‘more than the sum of its parts’) and the parts themselves, temporary and replaceable.

To (adaptative, i.e. institutionalised) individuals there are just contexts in which identities are ideally subsumed, in processes of chameleonic adaptation (see the film Zelig by Woody Allen). Each social monad, each isolat (Augé 1992), ideally homogeneous or at least integrated and devoid of conflict (Shils 1992: 113-114) is a case unto itself, and must be contextualised and, when possible, microscopically described. The immersion into community and inter-personal adaptation is functional, and therein resides the rationality. Comparison is undesirable (except for the production of monitored international statistics) and there is no viable science of socio-cultural variability, since variability is the only comprehensible socio-cultural law. The complete determination of individuals by their strategically reified cultures and/or societies must be monotonously demonstrated over and over again at all levels, namely in the case of emotions.

Intolerance for diversity of social forms, individuals defined as consumers and providers of services, relationships rendered invisible – we see here the outcome of a long established habit of abstracting society as an object of thought. (Strathern in Ingold 1996: 65)

Structural-functionalist ethnographic description puts an end to culturalist anthropological research, and brings it to the service of the ‘construction of Empires’ (Stocking 1992), whose promise to bestow fraternity and equality upon the primitives has never been honoured (Malinowski 1975: 204). Thousands of indigenes and dozens of tribes and languages are made extinct each decade (Lévi-Strauss 1984: 19).
The reflexive sociological monitoring of heterogeneous variables produces information relevant to the project of rational management of social life (Giddens 1996). By way of its association to this rationalist worldview, the state becomes bureaucratic and produces indifference.

Indifference is the rejection of common humanity. It is the denial of identity, of selfhood. We may thus suspect that its appearance in state structures arises from competing claims over the right to construct the cultural and social self. (Herzfeld 1992: 1)

‘Homo sapiens demens’

Nihil humani a me alienum puto. (favourite saying of Marx in Rubel 1970: 95)

In this integrative paradigm the construction of multidimensional and generative anthropological models intersects (in variable proportions) with a dramatic and problematic perspective upon biography, gender and intergenerational relations, as previous organisers of class relations and of the cleavage between the state and the people, the ambivalent balance of cooperation and domination in social life, and technological, economic, political and ideological, geo-strategic and historical relations. Such an approach is closer to socio-biological theories, given its evolutionist (albeit not naturalist) component. Dynamics of violence, aggression and oppression, common to these theories, intersect with those of love and morality, which are alien to them. This combination, however, moves away from socio-biology by introducing infra-sociological and supra-sociological approaches. We define structural-dynamic and integrative from the epistemological standpoint.

These structural-dynamic models, as bottom-up models, rest upon research on the great bi-directional articulations of the organisation of the soma with that of the psyche (Freud), and the organisation of the psyche with that of the world at large (Marx, Freud, Piaget et al., Erikson, Marcuse, etc.). They also build upon typologies, based upon phases, transitions and crises, linked to the great historical, cultural, cognitive and psychopathological tendencies of the structural-dynamic organisation of the contradictions of the psyche (Freud) and between actors of social life and history, e.g. those between genders, generations, social classes, civilisations, states or ethnicities (Marx and Freud) and variable scales and geometries, as generators of oppression, defensive resistance and emancipatory struggle. The emancipatory construction of the self (which ‘attempts to be moral’) is central in both perspectives. In the first, it topples the state, as the representative of exploitative elites, a source of ideologies and transcendental models, ‘to realise its
personality’ (Marx, 1845-1846). In a complementary perspective, it seeks critical autonomy from the social Super-Ego (Freud 1930), a transcendent instance comprising local top-down ideologies (divine/paternal/cultural) which is ‘immoral and may be crueller than the Id’. This instance, once internalised, cooperates in the repression of the ego, removes its cognitive and creative aspects, strips both its fantasy (symbolic, unconscious, a product of psychic realities) and capacity for synthesis, which are its main resources (Freud). In both cases, a rejection of the belief in the inferiority of women and their identity submission to men (typical of totalitarian, macho, top-down perspectives) and the discovery that the discontents of civilisation maybe overcome through the bottom-up triumph of love and concentration (Marx in Rubel 1970: I, 94) – i.e. of femininity and connectedness (with maternal generosity as a model) – over dispersion and virile hate, as experienced by reactive and vulnerable masculinities, uncertain in their identities (Klein 1927; Freud 1930; Horney 1933; Fromm & Maccoby 1970).

The aforementioned models, types, phases and transitions are supposedly comprehensible and a source of knowledge, precisely because they are structural and structuring (when analysed in a structural-dynamic perspective), within a spectrum resulting from the variation of predictable combinations, which become increasingly complex with the progression of history. This occurs despite the fact that their contents may be highly variable and contingent upon geopolitical and socio-cultural history, which defines the rules of the game, the relative positions of groups in inter-group hierarchies, of individual families within local hierarchies and of genders and generations within families. It is thus possible for theory to be more encompassing of long-, medium- and short-term temporal dimensions and to include multiple articulated levels of analysis, ranging from geo-strategy and the world-system, to categorised, exploitative, compensatory and emancipatory intra- and inter-social relationships, to somato-psychic (instinctual), psycho-cultural and historical (identity) dynamics.

In this approach, contradictions and the social and psychological suffering they cause at all levels (Freud, Marx) may favour either alienation (socio-cultural and psychopathological) or gradual and/or revolutionary change. However, the civilisational trend towards the juvenilisation of humankind (Roheim 1967: 501) and to the triumph of the weakest (Marx) is clearly detectable. This is despite the fact that revolutionary changes are reactive, rather than rational, and that they do not allow us to envisage any final ideal state or the end of history (Freud 1930). Analysis (historical and psychoanalytical) becomes possible and contributes to changes, though not necessarily to idealised moral progress. The lack of analysis, i.e. of an understanding of the non-rational dimension of humans, turns collective action into something idealistic (Freud
1927, 1930), while a lack of action applied to the transformation of the world, makes analysis merely adaptive.

The two great theories and those resulting from their Marxist-Freudian combination, as previous anthropological constructions, were the result of times in which migrations were not a problem. They therefore do not offer a direct analysis of the generalised migratory processes that are threatening the nation states and modern (liberal citizenship as simultaneously universal, legally egalitarian, sociologically asymmetrical and exploitative) and postmodern ideals (a boundary-free cosmopolitanism in liquid societies with no violence and reduced to language games).

New directions in anthropological analysis

Competing with these traditional models, two further directions have emerged in Anglo-American countries (specifically the US and UK) in recent times. One takes as its starting point French post-structuralists and, in particular, Foucault and his critique of power relations, disseminated in social life, to follow the politics of identity, playing upon the classic philosophical dialectics of oppression, empowerment of the victims and emancipation. The other appropriates the politics of recognition, based on the Freudian hypothesis of reinforcing love and respect against megalomania and hate, and submitting the main principal aggressor, the omnipotent state (Freud 1915), to the demands of ethics, oriented to short-circuit the destructive infernal machine of humiliation, unconscious shame and retaliation (Scheff in Calhoun 1996).

The politics of men chained by language

A twofold transformation is the basis of the new stance. In the first place, there is the movement of substitution of the transcendental society by the immanent unconscious (personal and collective, through the unconscious dimension of super-ego ideologies); followed by a second movement, whereby the place of the immanent unconscious is taken by a new transcendental – language – represented (during the nineteenth century) as a collective unconscious, and since the work of Whorf and Sapir, as transcendental culture.

This substitution of transcendental society by the language/culture pairing, common to Peirce, Saussure, Lacan, Benveniste and Lévi-Strauss, constituted the basis for what different authors named the ‘linguistic turn’, the ‘interpretive turn’, the ‘deconstructionist-semiotic turn’ (Rabinow 1986: 242), oriented to textualisation, using ‘translation’ (Geertz 1983)” or dialogical ‘interlocution’ (Clifford 1982) as devices.
These humanistic turns, using positivism as their bad object and negative identity, opened the way, through structuralism, to a new wave of neurologist/cognitivist/socio-cybernetic systemic transcendentalism and, in another reactive and postmodern direction, to post-Derrida and post-Foucault cultural studies.

The exclusion of history and violence, language, the mediation between the adaptive flexibility of the social rhetoric of ideologies and the rigidity of the hierarchised neurological brain, becomes the new philosophical transcendental, which restores legitimacy to rhetoric and literary studies. From now on, social scientists will no longer research social realities and dimensions; they will write or deconstruct texts.
(Clifford 1986: 2), in alliance or competition with philosophers, essayists, novelists, journalists and even poets (Geertz 2000).

Paradoxically, as in classic Marxism, the transformations heralded are presented, on the one hand, as imminent and independent of human will (we are supposed to have already entered new eras without realising it); while on the other they are announced as emancipatory political projects carried out by new politically correct avengers against the oppression of diffused oppressive powers upon well-defined categories of citizens who until the present were made invisible or marginalised. This is the framework within which Hall (1995) defines identity as:

> to refer the meeting point, the point of *suture* between, on the one hand, the discourses and practices which attempt to ‘question’, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be ‘spoken’ to. Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us. They are the result of a successful articulation or chaining of the subject into the flow of discourse ... (Hall 2000 in Du Gay et al. 2003: 19).

The rejection of the mechanicist rigidity of the cybernetic-structuralist approach governed by neurologists, linguists and IT engineers, experts in artificial intelligence, opens the way to the articulation of

> a tenebrous sense of survival, living on the borderlines of the ‘present’, for which there seems to be no proper name other than the current and controversial shiftiness of the prefix post:- *post-modernism, post-colonialism, post-feminism*... (Bhabha 2000: 1)

and the celebration of the acceleration of time with all its ramifications and/or issues: liquid societies (Bauman), lives on the move (not only as a fact but as a new ideal and duty), diasporas, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, fragmented, *decentred*, contradictory, ever-adapting multiple identities, hybridity and syncretism, all of which would realise old emancipatory ideals and/or permit a better adaptation to the new era of survival within the process of globalisation of precariousness.

These authors aspire to invert the logic of modernity, defined as ‘not just a binary but a particular kind of binary-producing machine, where binaries become constitutive differences in which the other is defined by its negativity’ (Grossberg 1996: 94). However, they themselves appear imprisoned by the very machine they condemn, since they apply a post-modern kind of binary-producing machine against modern
thought; they merely replace the ‘strategic forms of modern logic’ (difference, individuality and temporality) with the strategic forms of post-modernism (syncretism; liquid societies, fragmented identities and cosmopolitism; trans-spatiality on the move). The problem here of course is that this substitution belongs to the logic of binarism, which has been understood as the negative foundation of the structure of transcendental langues since Saussure. It is therefore unsurprising that the same author considers that:

it may seem somewhat ironic that just as we discover that not only particular identities, but identity itself is socially constructed, we organise political struggle within the category of identity, around particular socially constructed identities. (Grossberg 1996: 93)

To create another intellectual vanguard these authors conceal the weakness of their intellectualising constructions in three ways. Firstly, they hide the extent to which their constructs are formalised to serve an idealistic vision of postmodernity (Tololyan 2000: 12). Secondly, falling back on the modern binary strategies they are supposedly discarding, they define their thought as anti-essentialist, while constructing the faceless – and nameless – figures of essentialists as the evil object to be brought down. Accordingly, these authors state the obvious when they write, presenting it as a scientific discovery, that one thing that the idea of identity does not signal is a ‘stable core of the self, unfolding from the beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without change.’ (Hall 1996: 3; our emphasis). It would have sufficed to avoid pilfering Erikson or Barth or to have read Camões, a sixteenth-century Portuguese poet, in order to understand that, both in biography and in political history, there is no other thing but difference and change and that underneath each name (of an individual or a nation) there are ever new qualities emerging. Lastly, these authors still conceive agonistic dualisms in a simplified form – between the dominated and the dominant, men and women, whites and blacks, heterosexuals and homosexuals, the normal and the stigmatised, etc. – and they do not present these categories as reciprocally intersecting in variable geometries, organised not in a binary, but rather in a triadic form (Freud 1923; Caplow 1968).8 The question cannot therefore be solved merely by changing analytical parameters, but rather by leaving behind forms of thought bound to categories, which are a product of the Simplifier Thought (Morin 1981: 21-22), which scotomises the most dramatic dimensions of realities beyond language (as hunger, violence or terror),9 and which are revealed as mutilating (Morin 1992) (as the binarised categories are),
as ‘troublesome dichotomies’, in relation to much wider and more complex registers of possible languages and dynamics).

The dramatics of ‘over-expansive and defensive vulnerable subjects of historical relations and dynamics’

A different development of Freud’s theories and analytical models of socio-historically organised human lives spawns what we have labelled the subjectivist turn in the social sciences. This approach leads from the ideals of positivistic objectivism to the scientific analysis of subject-based social action, namely to the introduction of the analysis of identity processes, contradictions and strategies, crucial to the link of macro-analysis with micro-analysis.

This approach regards emotions, identity suffering and the quest for self-realisation and respect (at the interdependent personal, group and category levels) as crucial: ‘The emotions are the psychological sides of social relationships, just as relationships are the social aspects of the emotions.’ (Scheff 1996: 298). Identity relations are dynamic, oriented towards identity triumphs (Kasterzein 1990: 31), i.e. towards the expansive self-realisation of individuals and groups or, at least, to the affirmation of some superiority upon strategically produced and designated ‘inferiors’ (J. Bastos 2000, 2002), and attempting to evade identity defeats through the implementation of defensive processes barring others from watching and judging oneself, or by responding to these – real or potential – judges with symmetrical counter-judgements, based on different criteria (S. Bastos & J. Bastos 2005). Social actors, in person or through their investment in group endeavours, use their margin of autonomy to construct identity strategies they deem advantageous (Camilleri et al. 1990) in their defence, valorisation or expansion of their identity space in the appropriate contexts.

By concentrating upon the structural-dynamic processes (not merely contingent or accidental), which produced traumas affecting the individual, it is possible to theorise a shift from sado-masochistic patterns, once hegemonic (e.g. in sociology), towards emerging patterns that are rather voyeuristic and exhibitionistic, libidinally invested and prevailing over the pleasure of violence and aggression. These new voyeuristic-exhibitionistic patterns, associated with the celebratory dynamics of the ‘society of the spectacle’ (Debord 1967) and the ‘society of consumption’ (Baudrillard 1970), may be thought as defensive processes against new personal and collective depression in a society in which community connections, previously attacked, tend to re-emerge in new forms, in a ‘time of the tribes’ (Maffesoli 1988). The transition from narrative to media participation, from the presentation of elites to the presence of common subjects and from learned feats to everyday performance
introduce a postmodern loss of enchantment at the same time as they lead republican and populist revolutions, the movements of emancipation and liberation of women and the young, and the sexual revolution of the 1960s to their ultimate consequences (J. Bastos et al. 2001). They bring on a new enchantment, i.e. the possibility of escaping repression, invisibility and anonymity, seeing and showing oneself as a participant in a social life which is ordinary in its most minor details. None of this reduces the appetite for enchanted narratives (J. Bastos 2006), as is patently observed in the resurgence of religion as a social force, back-to-nature and environmentalist movements, the exaltation of travel to exotic locales, adventure novels and romanticised journalism. And none of this has, so far, succeeded in overcoming the domination of the most violent, the media and political industry of violence, and projection of one’s own insecurity over others.

Multiculturalism as a movement therefore ambivalently appears as the industry of the future, still very underexploited, as the place where currently the options between disjunctive violence and the celebration of the charms of unity in diversity are at stake. This troubles those who worry about the loss of social cohesion of nations as discrete, homogeneous and self-contained, while causing powerful reactions on the part of different kinds of hooligans, both the marginalised and those included in convenient state apparatuses.

To make the analytical dimension of this new anthropological perspective operative we will summarise the main aspects of the cluster of identity concepts (identification, personal identity, category and group identity, identity processes, identity strategies, etc.). In parallel, our proposal for synthesis will attempt not merely to avoid the multiplication of interpretations around this cluster (which in recent years has seen the continuous increase of simplistic definitions, in the context of various disciplines and sub-disciplines). We intend to build a basis for productive debate and progress, and especially to validate the use of the cluster of concepts associated to inter-ethnicities and nationalisms, as forms derived from identity processes with a socio-historical relevance.

The most significant aspect is that related to the shift from a simplistic definition of identity as a feeling of being whereby an individual experiences that he is an I, different from others (Taboada-Leonetti 1990: 43), to a much more complex psycho-historical definition. According to the latter, identity is a process and a strategy through which subjects build, defend or expand their space by taking sides and relating (albeit in an unstable and non-homogeneous form) to the categories and asymmetrical socio-historical groups which face others (subjects, categories and groups) in the socio-historical organisation of the world. Thus they attempt, through alliances of variable geometry, to profit from the inherent contradictions and instabilities, which incessantly announce the

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emergence of new international orders, which may or may not come into being. While the first, granular definition is universalistic and devoid of dramatic components, the latter, while avoiding individualistic reductions, considers the position of single subjects, categories and groups in an instrumental and ideological organisation of the world, which is contradictory and conflictual, and therefore potentially traumatic. At the same time, the aforementioned organisation of the world – while pre-existing and somehow defining groups and subjects who nonetheless retain a degree of desire, ideal, freedom and responsibility to themselves and others – constitutes their starting point in the adventure of life. Consequently, the organisation of the world is always subject to change and is always changing.

Towards a sustainable definition of the cluster of identity concepts

It seems an obvious first step – albeit one not always taken – that any discussion of a conceptual field begin with a non-simplistic definition of the main concept. If we wish, calling upon the principal authors, and not on those who provided simple comments or disseminations, to attempt a succinct definition of the concept of identity, while preserving its complexity, multidimensionality and dynamics, it soon becomes clear how much is truly at stake. Identity is the guiding term bestowed by those theorists who, based on direct analysis, developed this conceptual cluster to include at the very least the following dimensions:

a) a process of humanisation of human youth, based on a sequence of identifications and de-identifications, emotional investments and de-investments in people, categories, social positions and groups (more or less transitory, with regards to the biography of subjects) (Freud 1921), oriented towards an ever-increasing (but limited) scope of action (Erikson 1968: 316), that matures any newborn into an adult, with an ambivalent position within the world-system, in such a way that no one can occupy all the possible positions – since most of those positions are external to the subject and his affiliations13;

b) ‘a process of increasing differentiation’ (Erikson 1968: 23) based upon ego synthesis and the constitution of self-esteem (Freud 1914), which structures the existential struggle, with its advances and retreats, alliances, breaks and substitutions, to negotiate the constitution of a strictly viable, safe, dignified subject space (and of the groups it belongs to), accepted and respected by significant others (J. Bastos 2000), based on the primacy of ‘life drives’ (Freud 1919,
1933, 1940) and the desire to grow into ‘big’ from ‘small’ (Freud 1905; Erikson 1968), in a process that produces narcissistic wounds. In this process, research has established an imaginary primacy of subjects upon the groups in which they were born and bred, since, through the processes of inversion of group identification, subjects may abandon their initial groups and transfer their identification to others for reasons of identity strengthening and not merely for instrumental and ‘opportunistic’ motives (Barth 1969; Tajfel 1981; J. Bastos 2000), a fact which modifies the life of the subject but has no effect on the organisation of the world;

c) a structural and structuring process (Freud 1895, 1913), socially ‘anchored’ (Erikson 1980: 29), that progressively produces cleavages and boundaries between the Ego (I) and the world’ between the subject and his objects (Freud 1915, 1926; Federn 1927-1949), originating ‘the nucleus of a separate identity in early life’ (Erikson 1980: 95), but also between what is codified as good and bad, familiar and strange, that which represents power and impotence, what is viewed as masculine or feminine, between different categories of ‘we-ness’ and of others, reflected in social stratification (Erikson 1972: 270);

d) a process in which the articulation between the ego-identity and a series of us-identities, ideologically reinforced, tends to link subject, good and real or imaginary familiar to culturally pre-existent ideal prototypes (e.g. deity or nation) and to oppose this identity cluster to evil prototypes of identity which culturally define all that is strange and evil’ as outside the limits of us (Freud 1895, 1915, 1930; Erikson 1980: 29-30); this process results in the formation of a higher-level identity, linking ‘something in the individual’s core with an essential aspect of a group’s inner coherence’ (Erikson 1980: 109);

e) an existential experience of the biographical and historical duration expressed in the conjugation of the verb ‘to be’ (Freud 1921), in all its tenses and modes, at the level of the characterisation of the subject (I), social categories and groups of belonging (us), and the negative, ambivalent or idealised reference (them). This results in social identity representations of oneself, the ‘we’ to which the self belongs and/or with which it identifies itself, and the referential others, idealised or diabolised. It is then possible to empirically record and theoretically deconstruct the multi-dimensional social identity representations which stem from this, in the play of the myriad influences of social life (J. Bastos 1995, 2000, 2002, 2005), thus detecting the trend towards the performative affirmation of civilisational
superiority of subjects over their groups of belonging, and of the moral superiority of the collective (moral, national, regional, local, etc.) groups they identify with upon significant groups of comparison;¹⁴

f) a sense, associated to the reflexive constitution of social subjects, particularly relevant in the period of transition to adult life (or any other transitional period), which identifies all that is and is willed to remain constant (‘an invigorating sameness and continuity’) beyond all desired or imposed change (bodily, relational, group, cultural, etc.); that which is recognised by significant others as permanent, beyond everything that changes within subjects (personal identity in Erikson 1946 in 1980: 22)¹⁵; first and foremost, that they are the subjects of their multiple identities, constituted as a system at the internal level of self-representations of personal identities and of the supporting or opponent (groups of) ‘significant others’ (Greimas 1968);

g) the result of an endo-social intergenerational process of recognition (or non-recognition) of the young by organised society, particularly significant in the period marking the transition towards adulthood, an in-between state associated to ‘the mutual complementation of ego synthesis and social organisation’ and to the emergence of a realistic self-esteem containing ‘the recognition of a tangible future’, related to ‘economic opportunities, realizable ideals, and available techniques’ (ego-identity in Erikson 1946 in 1980: 22, 25, 39, 41); the recognition of the members of a group can be accompanied by accusations directed at the excluded members and other groups situated beyond its borders (ascribed to negative identities);

h) a specific way to organise group experience, associated to specific and differential patterns which are tested in significant inter-group relations, of domination and/or emancipation, and are transmissible as ‘a common mental construction’ (Freud 1926; Erikson 1968: 22) to the following generation, group or cultural identity (Erikson 1980: 20, 32)¹⁶;

i) a process of progressive articulation and involvement with a number of the ‘ideological images of the world, which constitute the framework of all identities’ (Freud 1926: 51-52), namely the formation of ethnic identities, upheld by a systematic production of dichotomies and processes making belonging emblematic (Barth 1969);
j) a negotiated process of diplomatic ‘presentation of the self’ in daily life (Goffman), on the part of an ‘I’ which is made reflexive (and inhibited) by the gaze of ‘significant others’ or a ‘generalised other’ (Mead 1934; Bion 1962; Lacan 2000); when this process is traumatizing, it can lead to the acceptance of attributed or imposed identities, different from those experienced, to the internalisation of negative or devalued identities and, in extreme cases, to surrendering identity at the collective level of affiliation; it can also lead to other identity strategies, such as the quest for invisibility and anonymity, the split between the identity as presented vs. as experienced, opportunistic disinvestment and the creation of a merely instrumental relation with any collective identity (J. Bastos 2000), or the compartmentalisation of identity in ethnically differentiated contexts;

k) a potentially excessive (grandiose) process of expansion and self-vvalorisation of oneself and the various we in which one identifies (sport, religion, nation, civilisation, etc.), based upon the vulnerability resulting from the comparison with others and the identification with idealised objects and ideals (Freud 1907, 1915, 1922), systematic inter-group processes of dichotomisation (Freud 1932; Barth 1998), categorisation (Allport 1958) and social comparison (Freud 1907; Tajfel 1981), as well as in the ‘material construction’ or the ‘invention’ of the group’s ‘superiority’ (Erikson 1968: 299). This is complemented by the production of prejudices and/or the disparagement or diabolisation of others, socio-historically selected to receive the negative identities which subjects and groups need to project, in order to defend their own idealised identities (Sumner 1906; Freud 1930; Benedict 1934; Leach 1954, 1976; Erikson 1968: 25, 41; J. Bastos 2000, 2002). This process – over and beyond the strong euphoric and dysphoric emotions associated with instances of identity triumph or defeat – includes a rhetorical and imaginary dimension in dominant and subalternised groups, who seek, with different criteria, the affirmation of their real or moral superiority. Almost inevitably it also implies, both at the interpersonal and inter-ethnic levels, the establishment or strengthening of modes of international and social domination which, as a reaction, triggers processes of emancipation and reversion of stigmatised identities (Goffman 1963), while keeping alive the ‘struggle of identities’ (Bourdieu 1980);

l) a process in which identity construction is never complete, since new identifications and de-identifications, and new identity syntheses are always occurring, despite the fact that identity is not the centre of the adult development of life, except as a sign of trauma and suffering that hampers self-realisation, threatens previous
identity stabilisations and gains, and reintroduces the dynamics of inferiority (or smallness) and superiority (greatness); in individual terms (an example of this is the case of migrations which destabilise the identity frames of reference constituted in childhood and adolescence); in personal terms, emotional isolation, sterility or stagnation and despair; or in inter-ethnic terms, the loss of social control of immigration fluxes, of symbols of territorial or moral superiority, racism, and unconscious shame (Scheff 1996).

The concept of identity therefore involves: a) a cognitive issue (similarity vs. difference, an internalisation of cognitive categories, usually based on oppositions); b) an issue of elaboration, of internal synthesis of external and individual contradictions and dispersions (contextual, ideological, etc.); c) a moral issue, associated to the widespread development of a double standard of ethics in inter-ethnic relations; and d) an emotional issue, linked to feelings of superiority, value, loss of value or inferiority, all of which are dependent on the selection of the criteria for comparison and competitiveness, whether negotiated or imposed, favourable or unfavourable. The possibility of working towards an identity synthesis therefore depends upon variables which the subjects cannot control, and others they are somehow able to manipulate, elaborate and negotiate, in order to produce identity strategies (Camilleri et al. 1990) which are more or less typical (at the inter-personal, inter-category or inter-group level). Similarities and differences frequently appear at the ideological level, which means that in the ideological market, subjects and groups may adhere to the most favourable identity ideologies (those producing the categories most favourable to processes of over-expansion or emancipatory projects, in defence or compensation of identity situations which are objectively unfavourable to the position of the subject or its group of identity affiliation).

On the other hand, similarities and differences are manipulated to support processes aimed at the creation of identity, material and symbolic hierarchies, which attribute different values to cognitively differentiated categories, groups and group segments in such a way as to tend towards the naturalisation and essentialisation of value differences, which are rooted in favourable criteria (Moscovici 1990); the result is a perpetuation of hierarchies which are in themselves unstable because they are counter-natural (i.e. merely historical) and maintained by the organised force of those who, being most vulnerable, attempt to guarantee a higher degree of compensatory social, political or cultural invulnerability (S. Bastos 2001). The world is therefore constituted, at various levels, as an arena for multiple narcissistic oppositions and identity confrontations (Bourdieu 1980), to which values such as reason, merit, order, progress, etc., are opposed providing an inhibitory function, as are
the bureaucratic processes aiming to the construction of submission to an unfavourable order.

**Figure 13.3** Levels of analysis of identity processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of analysis</th>
<th>Phenomena</th>
<th>Identities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of intra-species differentiation</td>
<td>Dynamics of pseudo-speciation of the human species (differentiation and inter-group hierarchy formation); predatory and juvenilisation dynamics of the species</td>
<td>Asymmetrical identities (‘good’ vs. ‘evil’, ‘superior’ vs. ‘inferior’, ‘advanced’ vs. ‘underdeveloped’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geo-strategic relations</td>
<td>Dynamics of domination and emancipation, exploitation and revolt</td>
<td>Hierarchy-forming, imperial, colonial identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of socio-historic differentiation</td>
<td>Socio-historic differentiation – past, current and emerging; transition from nation-states to plural states, due to the acceleration of migratory processes</td>
<td>‘Collective’ or socio-historical identities + hyphenised and hybrid identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendental relations</td>
<td>Religions as complementary resources for the transcendental defence of identities and the social organisation of superiority and subalternity; imaginary differentiations of responsibility</td>
<td>Identities made ‘morally’ responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group and inter-group relations</td>
<td>Socio-economic power and inter-ethnic social stratification</td>
<td>Materialised vs. emancipatory identities (class, ethnic identities, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal relations</td>
<td>Spheres of presentation of the self in daily life and identity negotiation</td>
<td>Partial identities with variable-geometry presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject position</td>
<td>Space for the formulation of self-image and self-esteem</td>
<td>Personal identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental relations</td>
<td>Binarisations, mediations and codified transformations; triadic dynamics; type of structure of the value system</td>
<td>General processes underlying the construction of categories, relations, systems, ideologies and dynamics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-family and community relations</td>
<td>Organisation of sexed social reproduction, based on control and comparison between genders, generations and lineages</td>
<td>Gender, intergenerational, family and ‘community’ identities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A viable definition of the concept of identity, associated with concepts which depend on it and belong to the same conceptual context, such as ethnicity, nationality, etc., therefore requires that we work upon the articulation between:
a) the body (as the support of an ego-identity, and attributed and/or mobilised related categorical identities, such as sex, race, etc.), the perception of being an individual, differentiated from all others, and the names which signify and symbolise its singularity and its main categorical and socio-cultural ‘belonging’ (Héritier 1977), derived from the construction of spatial, temporal and social connections (Grinsberg & Grinsberg 1999);

b) the feeling of identity vulnerability and the attempt to construct a feeling of (personal and group) worth through the consolidation of belonging to groups and interpersonal, inter-category and inter-group comparison (not necessarily those expected), while attempting to impose a moral superiority that is either natural (physical, ontological, etc.) or constructed, historical, material or, at the very least, moral, in a biased, rhetorical and performative form, manipulating favourable comparative criteria, and deleting the unfavourable ones, in particular supposedly objective criteria; self- and other-attributed identity social representations, incorrectly defined as stereotypes (while they historically predate the formation of the subject) are manipulated by them into forms that are sufficiently similar to enable their inclusion in the group, and sufficiently different as not to inhibit identity self-affirmation (J. Bastos 2000, 2002);

c) the dynamics of power and compensation, revolt or emancipation, which intersect gender and intergenerational positions (themselves identity categories), in spaces of micro-family, community, religion and macro-society, defined by identity boundaries whose artificiality (Barth 1969) and imaginary quality (Anderson 1983) do not make them any less effective;

d) the power dynamics intersecting interpersonal relations, mediated by other social categories (role, profession, etc.), which lead to processes of self-realisation and production of identity status, with competitive, affluent and hierarchising components;

e) the emotional, ideological, pragmatic and identity relation of subjects with their groups of ‘belonging’, and ‘enemy’ or ‘diabolisable’ groups (Scheff 1996), which requires the social and historical construction of group self-esteem, and the dynamics of various kinds of material and identity conflicts (with their victories and defeats, triumphs and depressions, honour and shame, thus reigniting the ‘infernal machine’ of domination and retaliation) and the orthogonal search for security, mutual respect, dignity and peace;
f) inter-group power dynamics, offensive and defensive, with a racialising and ethnicising aspect, more or less supported by the various kinds of subjects who struggle to exacerbate or subvert historically constructed identity hierarchies within the world-system, in the state they encountered it in, while taking advantage of or creating opportunities favourable to their objectives;

g) all types of identity strategies which subjects and groups mobilise in all different types of inter-ethnic relations (Camilleri et al. 1990);

h) the emotional, ideological and instrumental attitudes of the (various ideological types of) subjects to group belongings and individualistic and cosmopolitan alternatives;

i) the (active, passive, inexistente, conflictual, etc.) adherence of subjects to transcendental, juridical, ethical and moral assets, as instruments or resources designed to morally compensate positions of materialised inferiority, or to modify the historical inertia resulting from the organisation of the world-system currently in force, when this is felt as unfair, in its temporary and changeable state;

j) the tension between strategies of identity materialisation (power, leadership, wealth, possessions, etc.), and immaterial identity strategies, moral or moralising (based upon self-attributed virtues), susceptible to combination or opposition (J. Bastos & S. Bastos 2006);

k) the dynamic and ambivalent articulation between time, space, memory (biography, history), desire (ideal) and the pairings power vs. vulnerability and dignity vs. humiliation, as the structural-dynamic poles whose tension generates the creativity which buttresses the instability of variable-geometry identity dynamics (in biography and history);

l) and, last but not least, the theoretical questions related to the articulation of organisation of the mind to the organisation of the world (which is only marginally transmitted through monosemic communicative language), and of identity vulnerability with the quest for material and/or moral powers, since the concept of identity is, in our view, the basic concept which requires and enables us to consider more profoundly this articulation, crucial to future anthropological theory.

Such an approach requires that we consider the multidimensionality of identity processes, entailing complex articulations, many of which are
non-conscious and others that tend to be made invisible by one or more of the six contradictory perspectives illustrated above.

The most enigmatic aspect of all these processes in effect is found in what Erikson labelled ‘pseudo-speciation of the human species’: a dynamic of increasing differentiation, which involves the antagonistic creation of thousands of languages, forms of social organisation, value systems and worldviews, some emerging and others in decline, which result in reciprocal hierarchies, but also dynamics of emancipation, all characterised by a constant, repeatedly recognised by the anthropologists who have studied them: ethnocentrism, i.e. the affirmation of identity superiority of the self-represented group and the reduction of groups of comparison to the derogatory condition of non-human, inferior or monstrous beings.

**Ethnocentrism: the competitive and agonistic dimension of identity processes and strategies**

Ethnocentrism as first defined by Sumner (*Folkways* 1906) is a way to construct group identity based on excessive differentiation, the need to see its supposed superiority recognised, and the derogatory reduction of others used as a term of comparison.

Ethnocentrism is the technical term for the vision of things whereby our own group is the centre of everything, and the yardstick according to which we categorise and classify all others... Each group feeds its own vanity and pride, displays its superiority, exalts its own deities, and looks with contempt to those outside. Each group considers its own customs as the only right ones, and if it discovers that other groups have different customs, it will ridicule them. These differences result in slurs [...] the most significant thing is that ethnocentrism leads people to exaggerate and intensify all that is typical of their customs and sets them apart from others (Sumner 1906 in Tajfel 1982: 366)

Other anthropologists, such as Leach, later repeated similar observations, adding that culture may be seen as a dependent variable (as an effect) of the project for the affirmation of identity superiority of one group on another, a process which tends towards symmetrisation and is revealed as relatively independent of hard facts; since it is actually the criteria of this hierarchy formation which are operational, and they are the result of biased decisions by group members:
Local customs are, in the majority of cases, not simply organised upon the fact that ‘we, people X, do things differently from them, people Y,’ but rather, upon the principle that ‘our X customs are correct; while that disgusting Y people, on the other side of the valley, are obviously barbarians, since they do exactly the opposite! The question of whether a certain community burns or buries its dead, or if their houses are round or rectangular, may at times, have no other functional explanation other than the following: the people in question wishes to prove itself different and superior to its neighbours on the other side of the valley. While the neighbours, whose customs are exactly the opposite, feel equally confident that their way of doing things is correct and superior. (Leach 1978: 76)

Leach, however, adds that the desire for superiority is not only recorded in inter-group relations; motivated by the desire present in each subject of attaining a certain power, its presence is also manifest in intra-group relations, with consequences upon instability and the permanent alteration of the very structure of the group.20

In his book *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Goffman (1963) further studies ‘social information’ transmitted within ‘social relations’, and progresses from the concept of social status to the concept of social identity (‘when an unknown person is introduced, the first aspects that enable us to predict his category and his attributes’), to be able to include subjective criteria (e.g. honesty) along with structural (e.g. occupation) attributes. Goffman places the social identity experienced in interpersonal relations between the virtual and the real social identities. The first derives from categorical and stereotypical expectations upon ‘that which the person in front of us should be’, translated in the expectations that we actually place upon them); the second is ‘the category and attributes he actually proves he possesses’ (Goffman 1975: 12). The sociologist transforms the supposedly homogeneous society and its aspirations (manifest in supposedly homogeneous stereotypes) into something unquestioned. By identifying himself with the dominant we, Goffman naturalises the stigmatisation of those who have failed in satisfying the aspirations of society (e.g. ‘Mennonites, Gypsies, shameless scoundrels, and very Orthodox Jews’), thus shifting the problem of intolerance to difference on the side of the victim who, mistakenly ‘protected by identity beliefs of his own, (…) feels that he is a full-fledged normal human being, and that we are the ones who are not quite human.’ In a language of relations (not attributes), the stigma is defined as the result of the detection of a ‘specific gap between a person’s virtual social identity and actual social identity’, in particular when there is a
significant ‘effect of discredit’. Stigmatisation indeed consists of a process of inferiorisation of another, concealed by a

theory of stigma, an ideology to explain the inferiority of another and to account for the danger he represents, which sometimes serves to rationalise an animosity based upon other differences, e.g. those of class. (Goffman 1975: 15)

From such a perspective, identitarian social relations include attacks on the identity of the socially differentiated other, and defensive or counter-offensive responses on the part of the social subjects or minorities who are thus targeted and marginalised. However, if the stigma-producing attack against the identity of the other is naturalised, the defensive response of the stigmatised may be perceived as a ‘direct expression of his defect’ (Goffman 1975: 15). The stigmatised may, however, not expose themselves as such, by protecting themselves with ‘identity beliefs of [their] own’ or ‘separate honor systems’ which make possible the inversion of the concepts of expectation and failure.21

Such focalisations – merely sociological and with hardly any foundation in analysis – are characterised by their partiality; they present as total, permanent and universal what is local, complex, contradictory and unstable. This version of the existence of societies, which are simultaneously homogeneous and dualistic, i.e. creating marginality, is extremely over-simplifying, especially since significant parts of society often take the side of the stigmatised against high society and its authorities (S. Bastos 1997). However, as Dahinden writes in this volume, to understand this it is necessary to approach the level of case studies, rather than float in the high heavens of socio-philosophical theories, i.e. ideological and normative constructs hiding behind the façade of science, which legitimise the point of view of their elite audiences.

The definition we put forward, unambiguously multidimensional and complex, recognises that identity processes do not entirely match the subject of any known discipline; they are not merely psychological, sociological, economic, political, cultural, inter-ethnic or geo-strategic; they are neither merely individual, nor social or collective, and it is not possible to fully encapsulate them through this non-relevant opposition (J. Bastos 2002, 2006);22 they are neither merely contextual and synchronic, nor merely historical and ‘primordial’ (Roosens 1996); neither are they reducible to the oppositions (also non-relevant) between essentialism, objectivism, instrumentalism, constructivism or situational interactionism (a new version of old theories of adaptation), since these theories only unilaterally accentuate aspects of the complexity of identity processes, while almost inevitably hiding the dark side of identity processes and strategies. They are not merely the problem of others, those
who undergo crises of identity (teenagers, immigrants, the racialised, neurotics, depressives, those with suicidal tendencies, etc.), nor are they merely the problem of the hegemonic masters, who attempt to avoid these crises at all costs by studying the others who, in their otherness, threaten them with a crisis they attempt to delay, intellectualise or deny. Lastly, they are not reducible to over-simplified, one-dimensional and phenomenological definitions, nor can they be eliminated as tricky (Hall) or as scientifically unjustified (Lévi-Strauss 1977), nor do they only exist within a choice of sides in the class struggle (Touraine 1973), since they underlie all the struggles which make up the lives of individuals and the history of socio-historical groups and peoples.

**Inter-ethnic relations and the identity vulnerability of the powerful**

The concept of inter-ethnicity, as a political form of the identity concept, was easily accepted, chiefly since the late 1960s, to refer to the emancipatory struggle of the oppressed peoples or their migrant segments that formed community enclaves within the great Western cities. Acceptance of the fact that the core peoples of the world-system (Wallerstein 1973) also coalesce around vulnerable identity processes has been much harder to win. These processes (which may lead to endogenous or exogenous crises) are related to the reproduction and defence of historical productions of hierarchies that falter in the face of competitive or subversive groups from the point of view of identity or ethnicity. Moreover, the very idea and feeling of vulnerability of the powerful seems to be very recent, albeit increasingly frequent in the ever more numerous essays on identity and in media analyses.

With few exceptions work on ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations focuses on the strategies of dominated minorities, tribally segmented peoples, or migrant and diaspora communities, while avoiding any significant analysis of the national ecology in which these are inserted, and of the reactions of identity panic which are the frequent response to their presence and competitive self-affirmation.

However, the growing identity unease of North American and British patriots, for instance, in the face of the progressive alteration of demographic, political, economic and, more directly, identity relations in their territories, is increasingly clear in recent texts. According to Huntington (2004: 9):

> In the 1990s Americans engaged in intense debates over immigration and assimilation, multiculturalism and diversity, race relations and affirmative action, religion in the public sphere, bilingual education, school and college curricula, school prayer and
abortion, the meaning of citizenship and nationality, foreign involvement in American elections, the extraterritorial application of American law, and the increasing political role of diasporas here and abroad. Underlying all these issues is the question of national identity.

The identity anxiety associated to the increased fragility of the North American WASP supremacy, a consequence of increased non-white migration fluxes, the high birth rate of those minorities, their weak tendencies towards assimilation and, especially, of the ‘multiculturalist movement to replace America’s mainstream Anglo-Protestant culture with other cultures linked primarily to racial groups’ (Huntington 2004: 171), promoting ‘blended societies and cultures’, led Huntington to strategically broaden national identity towards the regressive direction of its Eurocentric and Western roots, depending on the rhetorical convenience of seeking – or not – allies outside the American right. It is clear that Huntington believes that what is at stake is that:

the need of individuals for self-esteem leads to believe that their group is better than other groups. Their sense of self rises and falls with the fortunes of groups, with which they identify and with the extent to which other people are excluded from their group. Ethnocentrism ... is the logical corollary to egocentrism. (Huntington 2004: 25)

This is a simplistic and mutilating theory, which needs to be made more complex with the contribution of different identity positions and less central to the world-system. However, as a political scientist, Huntington recognises an identity dimension which tends to elude interactionist and constructionist psychologists and sociologists; a dimension which since the works of Freud, Erikson and Tajfel, has been clear to the theorists of identity processes: that groups can function as significant identity extensions of personal identities, thus receiving emotional investment; and that significant victories or humiliating defeats of the group – in military, political, technological terms or even merely in sporting events – result in significant variations of identity emotions, even of personal self-esteem, in a large number of subjects, and that this is even truer when these victories or defeats are, in realistic terms, unexpected.

The real or phantasmatic expectation of an imminent identity defeat of WASP supremacy within America itself leads Huntington to foresee, as one of the available hypotheses for reaction, that
the various forces challenging the core American culture and Creed could generate a movement by native white Americans to revive the discarded and discredited racial and ethnic concepts of American identity and to create an America that would exclude, expel, or suppress people of other racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. Historical and contemporary experience suggests that this is a highly probable reaction from a once dominant ethnic-racial group that feels threatened by the rise of other groups. It could produce a racially intolerant country with high levels of group conflict. (Huntington 2004: 21)

But he also suggests a further alternative. He writes:

The dissolution of the Soviet Union eliminated one major and obvious threat to American security and hence reduced the salience of national identity compared to subnational, transnational, binational and other-national identities’, and takes it as given that ‘historical experience and sociological analysis show that the absence of an external other is likely to undermine unity and breed divisions within a society.’ (Huntington 2004: 18)

He believes that the US will find the enemies needed to the survival of its supremacy, by transferring to the religious level all agonistic and confrontational tension; however, he considers that it ‘is problematic whether intermittent terrorist attacks and conflicts with Iraq or other rogue states will generate the national coherence that twentieth-century war did.’ (Huntington 2004: 21)

**A return to theory**

Ethnicity as a potentially conflictual form of social loyalty is constantly being newly created and developed, with both positive and negative social consequences. (Romanucci-Ross & De Vos 1995: 12)

If we review the chapters of this book, in light of the identity theories introduced above, it becomes clear that different researchers are heading into different socio-historical spaces, on different levels of analysis and contextual issues, approaching different ‘types of identity’ (Berger & Luckmann 1966: 174), and that they do not put forward any synthesis which may be later completed or reviewed on the basis of new research.24
Concomitantly, as is common in ‘ethnicity case studies’, the first absence is that of the different types of identity integrating the identity structure and dynamics of the various historical actors at the top of the current Hierarchies of the world-system, whose over-expansive strategies determine the construction of the position of subalternised individuals and groups.

Our proposal of a complex identity field, structurally organised, based on eight ‘types of identity’, does not strive for completeness, which at this point in time seems impossible. We did, however, deem it possible to step beyond the two typical means of identity-type presentation, i.e. individual presentation, influenced by texts and contexts, and a triadic Hegelian presentation, which constantly re-proposes the agonistic or dialectic mode as the all-encompassing metaphor of a history with many other courses and routes.

To this end we attempted to place some of the types of identity found in the case studies in reference to a core pole (US, UK, the Netherlands)

![Figure 13.4 Types of identity in inter-ethnic studies](https://example.com/figure13.4.png)
or a semi-peripheral one (the Basque Country, Portugal), while keeping in mind that one of the factors behind this typological differentiation is related to the existence or lack, in relatively recent times, of the dual experience of coloniser and colonised, or of emigrant and receptor of immigrant fluxes, which is seen as characteristic of semi-peripheral countries with frontier identities (Santos 1994, 2001).

No people can be said to correspond to a single type of identity (given the existence of regional and cultural differences, economic stratification, religious, ideological, and political differences, etc.). However, previous and current research on Portugal (Santos 1994; J. Bastos 1995, 2000, 2002; J. Bastos & S. Bastos 1999) enables us to place the Portuguese, in geo-strategic terms, in the area of defensive identities and the countries of the Core in that of over-expansive identities, traditionally associated with imperialist or colonialist movements, or to the occupation of an identity position consensually recognised as superior. This is clear in the case of the US and UK, while considerably less so for the Dutch who, however, are thus positioned in the series due to their being identified as the aggressors of the Jews. Between these two poles, we place expansive identities, diasporic and tendentially transnational, frequently linked (albeit non-exclusively) to trade and the position of middlemen minorities, so frequently associated to the postmodern hope for the transcendence of territorial, national and/or ethnic loyalties. Lastly, in this first series, and easily recognisable in a typological perspective, we placed at the bottom retractive or symbolic identities which result from intense processes of marginalisation or traumatic confrontation (e.g. the Holocaust).

This series seems to rest on a movement of self-organisation and inter-group relation focused on different organisers: the political, geo-strategic organiser in the case of over-expansive identities and the economic organiser, weakly related to the political level, in the case of the new expansive, tendentially transnational identities; the communitarian/religious organiser in the case of defensive identities; and the retreat into individualistic dispersion and the dissemination within the recipient group in the case of a response to the traumatic contexts, which lead to retractive identities and group disinvestment.

As to the issue of relations with the new European migrations, research carried out in Portugal, focusing directly upon inter-ethnic relations with the receiving group, revealed the existence of two agonistic factors, represented in the above table by accusative identities and diplomatic-fundamentalist identities.

In the study under consideration, Cape Verdeans in Portugal exhibit accusative identities, whose paradigm is the result of the failure of an intergenerational imaginary, of the parents-offspring type, based on dependence. Recently arrived Sikhs, on the other hand, based their
diplomatic position on the affirmation of success of a paradigm which depends upon gender relations, whereby religious and segmentary violence, associated with the concept of honour, contribute to hide masculine violence as the main cornerstone of group closure, endogamic commitment and a policy of juxtaposition characterised by the highest possible peacefulness and respectfulness. This opposition of identities, in the same relational context, brings to the fore something that is usually invisible in descriptive studies: the significance of gender (sexed, of aggressive domination) and intergenerational relations (of dependence, leading to reactive aggression) as models which support the socio-historical organisers of intra- and inter-group relations, investing them with a symbolic dimension. In a different context (Rotterdam; Lindo chapter 3 of this volume) and a different level of analysis (the relations of teenage immigrants among themselves, with local teens, and with adults from the receiving country), these accusatory relations go beyond the level of words (which still seeks a dialogue), and recognise a transition to action, performing certain forms of heroic impotent rebellion, which take forms long defined as negative identities (Erikson 1968: 168); that is, as identities that due to their lack of recognition on the part of the adult community, tend to take provocative, delinquent, and in extreme cases destructive forms.  

The other two types of strategic identity are scarcely present or absent from our studies. This seems to be a result, at least partially, of the identity ecology, since they would have been easily encountered in the US, UK or France. Confrontational identities are the emancipatory ideal for those authors who believe that the existence of human groups is only justified when these are groups for action, instrumental, or emancipatory, in agreement with the premises of Hegelian dialectics; this turns ethnicity and nationalism into incomprehensible, irrational, embarrassing issues for those who believe in homo sapiens sapiens. The utopian identities about which voluntarist ethical minds feel enthusiastic are easily transformed into confrontational (Fitzgerald 1993) or even revolutionary identities, as clearly attested by the French and Soviet revolutions, with their unnecessary millions of deaths. They can also remain at the level of small community movements, from Christian charitable endeavours, to hippies and Flower Power and ‘Make love not war’ slogans of German communitarians of the 1970s and 1980s, to NGOs, which as well as providing a ritual initiation to multiculturalism for many European youths, display more or less noble intentions and more or less efficiency, and significant economic and identity profit.

As can be seen, by proposing a typology with eight positions, we are distancing ourselves from a number of previous proposals, and increasing their complexity. We do agree that a legitimising identity (Castells 1997: 8) is needed to construct a national society; but, in our view,
legitimising identities are very different things in a core state, at the forefront of the world-system (e.g. the US); in other core states with different connections to the leader (e.g. France, Germany or the Netherlands); or in semi-peripheral states or quasi-states (e.g. in Europe, Portugal or the Basque Country). It is therefore relevant to separate a legitimising, over-expansive identity, associated with instrumental, aggressive and dominating values, from a legitimising, defensive identity associated with pacific and joyful values (in the self-definition of the Portuguese). In a similar way, if we can conceive a resistance identity, we should say that all the groups organised by a diplomatic or a defensive identity or, in another, more dependent level, an accusative identity, display very different types of resistance identity, since resistance can have many different forms. By the same logic, project identities are more than simply utopian. Based on ethics, or confrontational identities, founded upon a search for justice, expansive identities are also, even less cognisant of it, projected identities and, as we can see in the hopes of cultural studies ideologists, the more radical, once they subvert borders and frontiers and approaches the ideals of cosmopolitanism. That is to say, maybe the old Hegelian understanding of dialectics as an emancipatory process in three movements will not be the best model to understand the actual and future world, once fighting and opposition (antithesis) are not always the only and proficient way to introduce that kind of diversity and diversification we think that already exists, and is growing without sound and fury in a world whose face is being reshaped not by the winds of history but by the winds of migrations.

**After theory, what?**

A critical approach as the one we have advanced only makes sense if internally coherent. Applied to the field of migrations and inter-ethnicities, this approach opens a door to types of research that has until now received little attention, among which:

a) research upon the self-representation of the natural superiority of the dominants, at the triple level of ideologies, analytical comparison of self- and other-representations of dominant or advanced national identities, and of the identity anxiety of the dominant (and, in particular, of the conservative and extremists among them) when their superiority is not recognised or even menaced;

b) research upon the cultural and identity heterogeneity of the different European types of peoples, who live in different identity ecologies,
based upon processes of antagonistic acculturation (Devereux &
Loeb 1943 in Devereux 1985), thus highlighting the various strate-
gies of semi-peripheral European peoples in the face of dominant
patterns and, at the same time, making these identity and strategic
differentiations and discordances irreducible to rational paradigms
(advanced vs. underdeveloped, postmodern vs. modern, or modern
vs. traditional, etc.) and making room for a theory of socio-historical
positions;

c) research upon cultural and identity heterogeneity of various ethnic
minorities in European countries; processes of antagonistic accul-
turation between various cultural segments, and the creation of tri-
lateral alliances with dominant groups, which make it possible to
succeed in the intra-ethnic competition, without losing identity
specificity;

d) research upon economy and the forms of differentiated or autono-
mous, defensive or expansive, project of minorities (old or recent) in
the European or Western context, to highlight past and current crea-
tivity of their survival strategies (transnational, diasporic, related to
the occupation of available spaces and material and symbolic niches,
to the development of networks and the reconstruction of commu-
nities, etc.);

e) research upon the economy and strategies of cosmopolitanism and
hybridism of the Western i.e. the educated young with their ethnics,
in the form of touristic ritualisations, ethnic consumption, religious
and ideological mimesis, mixed marriages, etc.:

f) research upon the articulations of collective identities within the
world-system with intergenerational and gender identities which
serve as a model and metaphor for a more or less agonistic and con-
frontational binarisation and for alternative models, generally peace-
ful, of organisation of social relations and value systems;


g) research upon gender differentiation and the strategies of women
and their allies to circumvent and subvert male domination;

h) research to articulate the different typological or quantifiable dimen-
sions of identity processes, namely inter-ethnic ones, i.e. voice, in-
tensity, scope, salience, elaboration vs. contrast, profile vs. face, etc.,
with the different theoretical options and issues raised by fieldwork
in various contexts and levels of analysis.
Notes

1 ... the movement to reconstitute the human sciences in rhetorical terms is not an isolated phenomenon. It has been taking place in tandem with structuralism and post-structuralism, postpositivism and critical pluralism, hermeneutics and Habermas’ critical theory, each of which might be said to display its own distinctive rhetorics. (Simons 1989: 2)

2 ‘The absolute identity of the Ego with itself’ – ‘free and independent of the Sensuous’ in Hegel – is the absolute opposite of the ‘identity of the self in the world’ (in biography, social relations and history) first introduced as a concept in the early works of Erikson.

3 Based on what Santos calls ‘metonymic reason’ (Santos 2003: 739).

4 That which Berger and Luckmann (and, as we will see later on, Goffman) see as ‘natural’ or ‘essential’ is scandalous to Freud (1915); within this distinction reside a number of basic differences between sociology and sociopsychoanalysis and between the different subject positions of these authors.

5 In this structural-functionalist paradigm, social and cultural homogeneity is: a) attributed to primitive peoples as their essence, even when ethnographic data say otherwise, namely regarding the differentiation of gender, generation, structuring social positions and acceptable types of personality (Bateson 1936, 1956; Linton 1936; Evans-Pritchard 1956; Leach 1954, 1976; Godelier 1995; Herdt & Stoller 1990); b) the Hegelian objective of nation states; c) the Durkheimian moral duty of citizens; d) the supposed fate of humankind in the new era of postmodernity, media society and globalisation, once more against all evidence (i.e. concealing its status of wishful thinking). Americanisation is the hidden name of this globalisation. The increasing internal diversity of the US and the resulting collapse of any project of internal homogenisation or successful domination of those subject to identity exclusion (i.e. Chicanos or, more generally, Latinos) is widely feared by the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant population of the US.

6 ‘I am a human being, nothing human is strange to me.’

7 In a rationalist perspective, different discourses should be mutually translatable, and this translation is possible and desirable (Kuhn 1981: 239; Geertz 1983; Santos 2003: 751-770). In a dramatic perspective, the plurality of discourses does not point towards a translation. Rather it points towards a structural-dynamic analysis at a higher level. Thus it exposes the economy of expression of paradigmatically incompatible discourses. It does so in pursuit of hegemony, and the desire to abandon one’s scientific project (which looks for solutions for cognitive ‘riddles’) for the creation. It functions according to Darwinian principles of a competitive (‘free’) market of discourses, i.e. of supposedly scientific ideologies.

8 This would recognise the fact that there is a recurring opposition of certain dominants against other dominants, women against other women, whites against other whites. As there are also connivances between the dominant and the dominated against other dominated (or dominant), or alliances between women and men against other men (or women), etc., in forms that transcend the categories of any philosophical or linguistic approach and result in millions of victims.

9 A form of thought that idealises, rationalises and normalises the dark complexities of social life. See also Lyotard (1979: 74-76).

10 ‘Academic discourse is notorious for its tendency to operate in terms of conceptual dichotomies, which are not so much accepted uncritically as indefinitely multiplied in the effort of their resolution’ (Ingold 1996: 5). In this strategy, academic discourse constitutes the other face of positivism, with its insistence on maximum separation of questions, and indeed of everything else. Whatever can be separated on thought
should be thought as separable. A strong tendency towards a kind of atomisation, a granular vision. (Gellner 1990: 55).

We are proposing structural-dynamic approaches to social life as an antidote to this academic collusion of binarism and atomisation.

This is a development suspected by methodological individualism and associated to a process of diabolisation of ‘collectivities’ (collective groups, collective action, collective identities, cultures, societies, stereotypes, etc.), viewed as reified or reifying identities, entities and representations that hinder to ‘converge with the real’, as valued by Benjamin (1978: 177).

The modern concept of identity was born within psychoanalysis and is attributed to Tausk in 1917 (Freud 1935), expanded through Erikson’s sociopsychology (since 1946) and found support in neo-Freudian-Marxist authors (Touraine 1992; Godelier 1995) and in a number of different fields of history and political science. Classic Marxists believe that class identity is born of revolutionary action while, for neo-Marxists (whether Freudian or not), oppression is also micro-social. The oppression occurs between such different categorised asymmetric ‘identities’ as genders, generations, ethnicities, gender orientations, of the normal over the ‘stigmatised’, etc., and leads to emancipatory social movements oriented both by the ‘politics of identity’ and, more strongly, by the politics of recognition of multiculturalism and the diversity of identity, beyond categories that may be reduced to binaries and hierarchised.

The recognition of diversity is a trauma to unconscious desires of totality and supremacy present in early ego formation, and opens the structural space of constitution of self-esteem, in competition and against others, as individuals, categories or groups which are socio-historically organised and ideologically hierarchised. This process leads to the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the positive meaning of any term – and thus its identity – can be constructed... (Hall 1996: 4-5)

The articulation of the verb ‘to have’ is also significant when used with personal (I/we vs. them) and possessive pronouns (mine/ours vs. theirs) to express the characteristics of oneself or others (particularly through adjectives and adjectival phrases), (desirable or undesirable) states of self-representation and the (favourable or unfavourable) organisation of the world (see James 1983: 279).

Independent of all change, what remains are boundaries (wider or more restricted), i.e. the distinction of those categorised as others (based on various external, internal, ideological or cultural criteria). Change is unavoidable and takes place at several levels, with different scopes of consequences, and requires different types of cognitive-emotional and practical elaboration. It may be bodily, psychological or relational, affect social roles or ideology, in the case of the subjects (Erikson 1947). It may also affect territory, subjects involved or culture, in the case of socio-historical groups who struggle as groups for their historical subsistence and/or their emancipation and self-determination (Barth 1969).

In this context, Erikson also cites the concepts of caste identity and race identity (1980: 35), as well as national identity, regional identity and class identity (1980: 36), thus highlighting the anchoring of identity in pre-existing forms of world representation and organisation.

At the sociological level, a trend is observed to only consider the first cognitive dimension. This records similarity and difference, finding an organisational expression, while the level of political science, possibly due to Freudian-Marxist influences, tends to concentrate upon the third level – that of hierarchies and conflict among categories, classes and national or ethnic groups. The intermediate dimension enables Freudian theory to consider the problematic and dynamic articulation of the three
dimensions. It is worth pointing out that, at least in the Portuguese language, these concepts (classes, categories) are laden with hierarchical connotations, are associated to moral and aesthetic values and are somehow essentialising (there are people who are seen as having a lot of class or being of a high category and others who are not).

Currently, there are 205 internationally recognised states (nations) and several dozen semi-autonomous or non-autonomous territories aspiring to statehood. There are thousands of sub-national ethnic identities.

Leach therefore goes further than Barth (1969, 1998), who had overturned the relationship of cause and effect between culture and identity in favour of identity. While emphasising difference through the systematic production of dichotomies and avoiding the desire for affirmation of a value difference, this process lends support to the feeling of identity superiority.

‘Every individual in a society, each in his own interest, endeavours to exploit the situation as he perceives it and in so doing the collectivity of individuals alters the structure of society itself. (...) I consider it necessary and justifiable to assume that a conscious or unconscious wish to gain power is a very general motive in human affairs’ (Leach 1954: 8-10).

‘It seems possible for an individual to fail to live up to what we effectively demand of him, and yet be relatively untouched by this failure; insulated by his alienation, protected by identity beliefs of his own, he feels that he is a full-fledged normal human being, and that we are the ones who are not quite human. He bears a stigma but does not seem to be impressed or repentant about doing so. This possibility is celebrated in exemplary tales about Mennonites, Gypsies, shameless scoundrels, and very Orthodox Jews’ (Leach 1954: 16).

An example of the epistemological embarrassment incurred by ‘social constructionists’ may be detected in authors as fundamental as Berger and Luckmann, who adopt a post-Freudian point of view: ‘The identities produced by the interplay of organism, individual consciousness and social structure react upon the given social structure, maintaining it, modifying it, or even reshaping it. Societies have histories in the course of which specific identities emerge, these histories are, however, made by men with specific identities’ (Leach 1954: 173). However, then they regress to a classic sociological pattern: ‘Identity is a phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic between individual and society. Identity types, on the other hand, are social products tout court, relatively stable elements of the objective social reality’ (Leach 1954: 174).

The objective data in question were clear: after three centuries of white supremacy, new and troubling perceptions are on the rise: ‘Whites are now a statistical minority of the population in four of the five largest US cities – New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Houston – and in larger geographical areas such as New Mexico, Hawaii, and the southern parts of Florida, Texas and California. If current migration and birth rate trends continue, by about the year 2002 whites will be a minority of California’s population; by about 2010, a minority of Texas’s population; between 2015 and 2040, a minority of the population in Arizona, New York, Nevada, Florida, New Jersey, Maryland, and some other states; and by 2055, a minority of the U.S. population (Maharidge 1996). By about 2035, a majority of youths under the age of nineteen will be persons of color…’. (Feagin 1999: 201-202) ‘On the other hand, the exponential increase of Hispanics threatened old military conquests that had materialised American superiority over Spain and its colonies. Mexican immigration is leading to the demographic reconquista of areas Americans took from Mexico by force in the 1830s and 1840s, Mexicanising them in a manner comparable to, although different from, the Cubanisation that has occurred in South Florida. It is also blurring the border between Mexico and the US, introducing a very different culture, while also promoting the emergence, in some areas, of a blended society and culture, half-
American and half-Mexican. Along with immigration from other Latin American countries, it is advancing Hispanicisation throughout the US, as well as social, linguistic and economic practices appropriate for an Anglo-Hispanic society’ (Huntington 2004: 225).

The series of identity types invoked is incomplete in crucial aspects and this partiality – this typical impossibility – of going beyond the case studied to place analysis in the series to which it belongs limits the possibility of identifying certain pertinent traits that only come to the fore if comparison is used as a scientific tool.

In a study by Góis, at a different level of analysis, Cape Verdeans are taken as a current example of a diasporic strategy that leads to low-intensity transnationalism (Góis 2005), organised between the east coast of the US, Rotterdam, Paris, Rome, Greater Lisbon and the archipelago of origin on the west coast of Africa. The fact that the same group, according to different studies, may be classified in two different types clearly demonstrates that we do not wish to characterise minorities, essentialising or reifying them on the basis of typologies. To the contrary, as pertains to a structural-dynamic strategy, typologies are only interesting to identify historical relations, traditional or emerging, that by themselves would remain undetected, rather than to ever statically characterise the (national) elements of the (world) system.

It would be a mistake to try to label one group with one type of identity; socio-historical groups are complex, heterogeneous and dynamic, and their vitality depends on internal and external tensional relations between different religions, political parties, ideologies, sub-cultures, etc. It would also be a mistake to think that the application of the same theoretical label to different groups would reveal the same type of historical dynamics. There are dozens of socio-historical groups revealing a strategy of defensive identity; in the works of Hofstede (1991), the Portuguese appeared – together with countries in South and Central America, East and West Africa, and Asia – as the European group most opposed (in all the four factors structuring the answers to the same inquiry) to the group constituted by English-speaking countries (J. Bastos 2000). But the identity dynamics of the Portuguese in Portugal, Jews in Amsterdam and African Americans in the US are quite different. For an example, ‘as in the situation that Ogbu (1978) discusses in understanding the poor school performance of many American black children, a defensive minority identity can prevent an individual from trying to succeed’ (De Vos & Romanucci-Ross 1995: 370). The type, historical period and context of trauma, the previous type of identity and the new historical context are variables to consider. The fact that we are analysing a state (e.g. Portugal), a colonised group (e.g. the Saami in Scandinavian countries) and an ethnic strata or an ethnic minority in diaspora (e.g. the Jews in Amsterdam) is also relevant.

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