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WHAT BOUNDARIES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SECURITY ACTOR?

Monica OPROIU*

Abstract. The European Union’s discourse as a security actor evolved after 2003 most spectacularly in its spatial dimension, determined by both internal developments of the EU and external ones of the security environment. As a security actor consecrated in the first decade of the years 2000 by means of the European Security and Defense Policy and as a pacifying force on the European continent through the process of enlargement, the EU gradually aimed further and further, in order to stabilise states and regions, to promote a comprehensive concept of security and to protect its citizens, according to the dictum that „the first line of defense starts abroad“. Hence the continuous expansion of the geographical scope of both the EU’s representation as a security actor and of its actions This paper aims at exploring the discursive construction of the EU’s security identity, with a special focus on the geographical boundaries of the EU’s self-representation as an international security actor.

Keywords: security, identity, European Security Strategy, European Security and Defense Policy, security frontier, geographical boundaries

Introduction

According to the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the five objectives of the newly established (at that time) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were the following: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways (my emphasis); to preserve peace and strengthen international security (my emphasis); to

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promote international cooperation and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU, 1992). As general and vague as they may be (Smith, 2008: 6), they mark the beginning of the European Union’s endeavours as a foreign policy actor, with a nascent security component which would later be developed through the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In addition to this, it is highly relevant to remind that the Saint-Malo Declaration of the French-British Summit – considered the impetus for setting-up the ESDP – stated that “The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage”, meaning that the EU aimed at „having the capacity for autonomous action” in the fields of security and defence (Chaillot Paper 47, 2001: 8). Gradually, the defence project of the EU focused mainly on the security component and developed capacities for both civilian and military crisis management which became operational in 2003. This enabled the EU to claim such roles as „security actor” or even “global player”, thus fueling the debate about EU’s nature as an international actor and its place on the world stage (White, 2004; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006).

This paper aims at exploring the discursive construction of the EU’s security identity, with a special focus on the geographical boundaries of the EU’s self-representation as an international security actor. The analysis of the way in which the EU constructs its security identity through discourse is underpinned by the fact that the EU has included the promotion of peace and international security among its main objectives in foreign policy since 1992 (in the Maastricht Treaty) and since 1999 it has developed a security and defence component aimed at dealing with threats in the 21st Century.

The main research questions of this essay were the following: Which are the geographical boundaries of the EU’s representation as a security actor? Where does the „security frontier” begin for Europe in performing threat management? How does the EU communicate this “security frontier”?

The hypothesis of the paper is that the EU’s discourse as a security actor evolved after 2003 most spectacularly in its spatial component. This discourse was determined by both internal developments of the EU and external ones of the security environment, triggering the expansion of the geographical scope of both the EU’s representation as a security actor and of its actions.

1. Theoretical background

In the beginning of the ’90s, when a comprehensive concept of “security” emerged as an original contribution from Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School, this amounted for a mini-revolution not only in the
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Theoretical and academic fields, but also in the practice of international relations and national security policy of the states. According to the primary definition provided by Barry Buzan, security (in international contexts) refers to “the capacity of states and societies to maintain an independent identity and their functional integrity” (Buzan, 2000: 30-31), while the categories of threats which could emerge were military, political, economic, societal and environment-related. Consequently, in the post-Cold War era new elements were added to the discourse on security in Europe, such as: the environment, migration, ethnic conflicts, terrorism or organized crime (Buzan, Weaver, 2003: 356); without being absolutely new, they were acknowledged at that moment as the main security issues for the 21st Century.

The literature on the European Union and security is relatively rich and diverse, addressing issues such as the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with its complementary European Security and Defense Policy (at present CSDP), the emerging strategic culture of the EU, including the adoption of a European Security Strategy, the nature of its power – civilian/military – or the challenges faced by EU as a security actor and its need for a “grand strategy” (Cameron, 2007; Laidi, 2008; Howorth, 2007; Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009; Vennesson, 2007; Howorth, 2011). A recent strand of literature draws attention due to the complexity of the arguments and the “cultural turn” of the analysis, focusing on the discursive component of the EU’s security policy (Gariup, 2009). As the European Union is increasingly accused of not matching words with deeds or even worse - of substituting action by declarations - the discursive approach serves to better understand the most visible side of EU’s presence in world politics – its plethora of documents, strategies, discourses and declarations on CFSP/ESDP and the philosophy behind them.

On the other hand, a review of the existing scholarly work provides some authors with the conclusion that as rich and diverse as it might be, the literature on the EU as a security actor does not essentially keep up the pace with the comprehensive definition of security consecrated by Buzan, hence maintaining the field prisoner to a narrow quasiiexclusive politico-military approach (Zwolski, 2009). Although it may be true, this “narrow” approach is somewhat justified by the fact that through the ESDP the EU has focused its actions on the hard security elements (mostly crisis management), while the more softer ones – such as tackling with climate change effects – remain underdeveloped for the moment. Nevertheless, the EU remains the only international actor/organization which promotes a comprehensive approach to security in general and to conflict in particular, benefitting from a wide “toolbox” that enables it to address conflicts, for example, from the prevention phase to post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development. In addition to this, the EU possesses highly developed mechanisms for humanitarian aid –
operated by the Commission – which provide relief for third countries (and member states, if necessary) in case of natural or man-made disasters, as part of the same comprehensive approach to security, which addresses both human security and the potential spill-over effects of instability.

Other authors reflect on the question of whether the EU is a security provider (an active actor) or a security consumer (passive actor) (Duna, 2010: 20). Their conclusions point to the fact that throughout all its short history the EU benefitted from US security guarantees through NATO, which allowed it to develop as an island of peace and prosperity in a turbulent world – especially during the Cold War years, but in the years after the collapse of the USSR as well. And although the European States are still highly dependent on NATO and US military power – some would argue that this is actually the reason why – the European Union forged its own security and defense policy aiming at advancing a new approach to security and dealing with security concerns on the continent and beyond it. Dacian Dună credits the EU only with “being able, at best, to intervene in the final phases of conflict management, like peace-keeping or post-conflict recovery and reconstruction” (Duna, 2010: 20), whilst also acknowledging that once the economic crisis is over, the EU could advance towards acquiring the capabilities to intervene in the „whole spectrum of conflict management activities”. In fact, the Lisbon Treaty provided for a significant extension of the range of the so-called Petersberg tasks, from the higher to the lower end of conflict management, enabling the EU – at least from a legal point of view – to approach conflicts in any stage and in any part of the world.

This paper builds on the existing scholarly literature on the EU as a security actor and touches upon the discussion about identity in international relations, exploring the geographical representation of the EU’s “area of privileged interests” as it emerges from the main documents in the security domain: the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008).

The discussion about identity has gradually gained great importance in the social sciences as it lies at the intersection of various fields of academic inquiry – social psychology, sociology, political sciences, etc. In International Relations the analysis of the national identity of a state or the ethnic and religious identity of a community proved extremely relevant. The unique features of the European Union as a locus of institutional socialization among states or sub-statal and trans-national structures determined the broadening of the discussion about identity, emphasizing the possibility for creating and transforming identities in supra-national contexts (Kryzanowski, 2010: 74). In European Studies, at least two strands of research are worth mentioning here: on the hand, the transformation of the member states’ national identity due to the input of EU institutions and policies (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003;
Graziano, Vink, 2007) and on the other hand, the crystallization of an identity of the European Union as a whole, by consecrating specific approaches, preferences and a common perception of “Europe”.

In this paper “identity” is understood as “the image of individuality and distinctiveness held and projected by an actor and formed through relations with significant others” (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein, 1996: 59). Karen Smith points to the fact that the EU’s policies, activities and objectives – produced in a very complex policy-making environment where no one state or institution decisively shape the outcomes – help distinguish the EU both from each of its member states and from other international actors (Smith, 2008: 17), thus providing it with a specific identity. As identity is in fact a social discursive construct designed in specific historical or institutional contexts, it is useful to approach it by exploring its discursive dimension and the context that underpins its development. That is why this paper looks at the security identity of the European Union through the discursive geographical delineation of its security interests stated in its main policy documents of the field and at the context in which they were produced and communicated to the „significant others”.

2. Empirical material

The empirical material to be used in the analysis consists of two EU official documents produced in the first decade of the years 2000 which can be considered essential for the EU’s approach to security in the post Cold War era: the EU Security Strategy (2003) and the Report on the Implementation of the Security Strategy (2008). The first document was drafted by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and his team and adopted by the European Council in December 2003, in the aftermath of the US-led invasion in Iraq. The second document was adopted in December 2008, in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian War in August and was meant to assess the implementation of the EU Security Strategy of 2003 and the new security environment after the forceful come-back of power politics in Europe.

The EU Security Strategy (2003) is a very complex document, depicting clearly and concisely the approach that the EU has towards security at the dawn of the 21st Century. In essence, it sets three core strategic objectives: addressing security threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime or a combination of all these); enhancing security in Europe’s neighbourhood and creating an international order based on „effective multilateralism” and the strengthening of the UN (Smith, 2008: 7).
The Report on the Implementation of the Security Strategy (2008) is the longest and most complex text articulating the EU’s strategic approach to global affairs and was meant to become complementary to the 2003 Security Strategy, while assessing the EU’s achievements and shortcomings during the five years after the latter’s adoption. The main topics of the text are: the security challenges the EU was facing at that moment, the EU’s achievements in the field of security between 2003 - 2008, the international cooperation needed for counteracting these challenges and EU enlargement which altered significantly the strategic environment in Europe.

3. Context

The context in which the European Union articulated a common discourse on security in the 21st Century has two dimensions – the first refers to the security environment of the first decade of the new millennium, marked by the terrorist attacks in the September 2001, while the second focuses on the internal evolution of the EU (both deepening and widening through institutional development and enlargement). The analysis covers the period from December 2003 to December 2008.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the international security environment was transformed – from then onwards, the focus shifted to terrorism and failed states as the new challenges to the Western world. The Kosovo issue had barely come to an end two years before with NATO intervention on the ground in order to stop the violent repression of the Albanians in the Serb province; that war triggered a fierce debate about humanitarian interventions and drew once again the attention of the international community towards ethnic conflict in the Balkans. In 2001 the EU member states and the US were still slowly recovering from what had been a litmus test for NATO – the intervention in Kosovo - and turned their eyes to the Middle East, where the Second Intifada ravaged the Palestinian territories.

The September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States were singular due to the scale of the destruction, the boldness of the endeavour and the cruelty of the *modus operandi*. The enemy was soon identified and localized; the United States started a military campaign in Afghanistan in order to uproot the Taliban regime which had allowed al-Qaeda to transform the country into its training ground. Many EU member states joined this operation, while the international community acknowledged the entering in an era of new challenges and threats. The 2003 Iraq war was a decisive moment for the EU-US relationship: major European powers like Germany and France opposed the United States initiative of invading Iraq with the purpose of deposing Saddam Hussein. It was then that the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
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articulated the discourse on „Old Europe versus New Europe”, with the former questioning the United States endeavour in Iraq and the latter endorsing it and joining the „coalition of the willing”.

What was surprising for many was that in the midst of the debate Old versus New Europe, the EU released in December 2003 its own Security Strategy which proved the determination of the member states to forge a common strategic culture by assessing jointly the threats the EU faced. The EU document thus represented a huge leap forward due to both its scope and content, but also to the timing of its release. Until 2008, the security environment in Europe and beyond was mainly shaped by the terrorist threat; the 2004/2005 attacks in Madrid and London proved that the threat was real and that terrorism had to be addressed with all available instruments. Homeland security took the forefront, but security concerns started further away from the national borders – in the Caucasus, in Africa and in the Middle East, anywhere the terrorists could train or set up cells. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were draining the resources of the United States and of those European states engaged in them. Nevertheless, the European Union was entering the most flourishing period of its history which culminated in the huge enlargement waves of 2004-2007 and the Constitutional Project.

The reform envisaged by the Nice Treaty signed in 2001 was only a temporary measure in view of the imminent EU enlargement; even before the Treaty was ratified, the EU had launched the process of debating on its future through the so-called European Convention. It all started with the Lacken Declaration on the Future of Europe in 2001 and in October 2004 the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome. The EU was moving at rapid pace – first it adopted its very own Security Strategy and then a Constitution. Moreover, in May 2004 the EU accession of eight former communist states from Central and Eastern Europe plus Cyprus and Malta became official. The Union now had 25 member states, soon to be joined by two others. In the mean time, the EU’s first military mission of crisis management was launched (in 2003) – hence the European Security and Defense Policy became operational, a new tool to be used for the EU’s endeavours as global player. In the summer of the 2005 the referenda in the Netherlands and France failed to approve the Constitutional Treaty, triggering the end of the ratification process. A period of reflection followed, completed under the German Presidency in 2007, who pushed for the signing of the Lisbon Treaty meant to reform the EU and simplify its functioning. Romania and Bulgaria joined the club in January 2007, thus extending the borders of the EU further in Eastern Europe, to the Black Sea shores and former “limes” of the Soviet Union.

As the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty began, with the explicit purpose of streamlining the EU system and endow it with a unique and more
powerful voice in foreign affairs, in August 2008 the Russian-Georgian War offered the European Union the chance to match words with deeds. The return of violent conflict and conventional warfare in Europe triggered a prompt reaction of the EU, then under French Presidency. Nicolas Sarkozy mediated a cease-fire while the Russian troops were getting close to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. An extraordinary European Council decided to send an EU monitoring mission to Georgia in order to oversee the observance of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Georgian territory; the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia became the fastest ever deployed ESDP mission and began its mandate in October 2008. By the end of 2008, as the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty faced the negative Irish referendum, while the EU had gained confidence from its concerted action in Georgia, the global financial crisis took the forefront. The economic hardships became the focus in Europe and all over the world, while security matters fell into the background. Nevertheless, an EU of 27 member states and a shaky process of internal reform held an ambition to make a difference in global affairs, both financial and security ones.

4. The geographical boundaries of the EU’s “grand strategy”

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was considered by some authors a foreign policy strategy and a statement of purpose in this area rather than a strategy listing all challenges the EU faced under the label of “security threats” (Biscop, Andersson, 2008: 12). For others, the ESS had all the ingredients of a “grand strategy” for the European Union, since it aimed at identifying European interests and intentions (shaping those of the member states as well) and at relating ends and means (Vennesson, 2007: 13).

Basically, what the ESS did was to assess the security environment – highlighting a series of threats and challenges – and to set objectives for tackling them – according to the EU’s perspective on international relations and on the sources of insecurity/instability (bad governance, state failure, regional conflicts). But what is interesting is how the EU defines itself as a force for good in the world, together with the United States, but especially on the continent, where it emphasizes the direct link between its enlargement and the promotion of peace. Hence, the ESS states that “successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent (ESS, 2003)”. Although focused on the continent, the EU „inevitably” performs as a global player as well, due to its capacity of projecting force at great distance with the aim of ensuring security for all. It is at this point that the ESS highlights for the first time the geographical areas where the the EU can and did act: „In the last decade European forces have been deployed
abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC” (ESS, 2003). Consequently, the Balkans are no longer the limes of Europe. Nevertheless, they remain an issue of concern and a reminder that “war has not disappeared from our continent” (ESS, 2003).

Among the main threats listed by the document (terrorism, WMD proliferation, organised crime and to a certain extent state failure), the regional conflicts are the only ones with a precise geographical location - in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region, the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East. Although in this part of the document only a few of the regional conflicts which can „impact on European interests directly and indirectly” (ESS, 2003: 6) are mentioned (those in the South Caucasus and Transnistria notably being absent), they represent the geographical benchmarks of the EU’s strategic perception. In other words, it is in this regions that the EU’s security or insecurity (understood as a perception, not necessarily a as fact) begins. That is why it is puzzling that Afghanistan and Central Asia are not explicitly included in this section, whilst there is a reference to the Korean Peninsula and remains unclear what direct European interests are present there (Gariup, 2009: 174).

Further on in the document, it is stated clearly that “in an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand”, providing the justification for the expansion of the EU’s strategic horizons. This argument is taken a step further when stating that “with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad” (ESS, 2003: 7); this marks a clear separation from the Cold War era, when the biggest threat – that of invasion by Soviet troops – originated from within Europe and even a distancing from the immediate post-Cold War period of the 90s when the threat of instability and spillover of violence came from the Balkans. By arguing that the EU perceives threats at strategic distance, the ESS implicitly (and explicitly in the first page, as shown before) underpins the EU’s ambitions as a global security actor, expressed both through discourse and practice. The latter mainly refers to the EU missions under the ESDP and the EU member states involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Although limited in scope and actual number of troops (with the exception of ISAF in Afghanistan), these ESDP military operations gradually consecrated the EU as a global player, which can deploy troops from Afghanistan to East Timor in Indonesia and DRC in Africa. Nevertheless, the EU maintains focus on its immediate neighbourhood as well, admitting that „even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important” (ESS, 2003: 7). Consequently, defence may start abroad, but the strategic priority remains the close vicinity, where security and good governance

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1 In the 2001 EU Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflict, the Balkans were the only geographical area mentioned as a matter of concern and focus of the EU’s efforts for conflict prevention in Europe.
go hand in hand: „it is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed” (ESS, 2003: 7).

Many scholars have debated the EU’s promotion of security as a global public good (GPG), which links security with good governance and democracy and explained it by a generous vision of the EU about international relations, based on liberal values entitling the EU to the label of „positive power” (Vennesson, 2007: 15-16; Biscop, 2010: 74-75). The EU as a normative power debate is beyond the scope of this paper, but that approach was worth mentioning because it emphasized the EU’s original concept of security (and implicitly of the threats to it) which determines a policy line with certain geographical implications. It is only in the section dedicated to the neighbourhood that the ESS mentions the conflict in the South Caucasus and it does so euphemistically, as „the problems in the South Caucasus” which „will in due course also be a neighbouring region” (ESS, 2003: 8). The situation will change dramatically with the Russian-Georgian War of August 2008, as will be seen in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS.

Other neighbouring areas of concern for the EU were in 2003 the Balkans, the Middle East and the Mediterranean area, while the Moldovan/Transnistrian issue is not even mentioned and Russia is presented only as an actor helping to stabilize the Balkans and possibly the Middle East. This can be explained by the fact that the ESS was launched before the 2004 enlargement which altered significantly the strategic landscape on the continent (together with NATO’s enlargement in 2004) and before Russia’s military intervention in Georgia.

As shown in the previous chapter, the Report on the Implementation of the ESS was released in 2008 in an extremely tense international and European context and was meant from the beginning to complement – not to replace – the original ESS as consensus on a new security strategy was no longer reached.

The 2008 document built on the EU’s remarkable achievements of the five years that had passed since the original document – the two-wave enlargement in Central and South-East Europe, the continuous development of the ESDP and the reformed agreed in Lisbon in 2007. In addition to this, it acknowledged the return of war to Europe in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian War of August, for which the French Presidency managed to successfully negotiate a cease-fire. As the strategic outlook changed, the EU became more and more aware of, and explicit about, its global role and unique mission: “Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history. The EU remains an anchor of stability” (Report, 2008: 1).

Consequently, the geographical boundaries of its strategic interests had continually expanded and so did the range of instruments it developed to
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discuss them – from the Neighbourhood Policy to the ESDP and the more targeted ones like the Union for the Mediterranean or the Eastern Partnership. Nevertheless, achievements start close to home and the Report proudly states that „The Balkans are changing for the better” (Report, 2008: 2). But the term „the Balkans” designates here more than a geographical area: it refers to a category of actors with a certain impact on EU history and a significant role in its *imaginariu*um of conflict and security. The report acknowledges an improvement of the situation in the Balkans, but naming neither the countries in the region, nor the wars that shattered them fifteen years before. Hence it can be argued that the term refers to a specific phenomenon (ethnic wars in the EU’s neighbourhood to which it reacted chaotically back in the ’90s) more than to a geographical area.

Moreover, in the 2008 document new actors are mentioned – Iran and China – in order to depict two emerging trends – a negative one endangering the non-proliferation system and a positive one pertaining to the benefits of globalisation such as the reduction of poverty (Report, 2008).

Further on, two dimensions of the evolution of ESDP were highlighted - both its geographical one and the diversity of mission typology: the EU’s action as a crisis manager stretches from Aceh, Indonesia to Chad and is as diverse as peace-building and protecting refugees (Report, 2008). The achievements of the ESDP are a result of “a distinctive approach to foreign and security policy”, which consecrates the EU as a reliable global security actor and feeds the high expectations of its citizens. Consequently, the EU sets for itself the goal of becoming “more strategic” in its vision, together with that of a higher efficiency and visibility “around the world”. Some authors found it disappoiting that the Report “makes no effort to outline what these laudable ambitions might require or how they could be achieved” (Howorth, 2009: 16), arguing that this type of approach should not continue as the EU really needs a “grand strategy”.

The other pillar of stabilisation is enlargement, but it can only be used on the European continent, with a focus on Turkey and the Balkans. Again, the great challenge is posed by regional conflicts in the EU’s vicinity, the more so because the enlargement process has brought it closer to new areas of concern – Moldova and Georgia – in addition to the traditional one in the Middle East, hosting the Arab-Israeli protracted conflict.

The Report reiterates that “Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood” (Report, 2008: 17), naming Afghanistan as the main example. It is here that the security of the EU actually begins and where its number one commitment lies. In addition to this, the EU can focus on more and more remote regions because it is expected to act and is endowed with the necessary capabilities to do it.

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Conclusions

The discursive analysis of the EU’s two main documents in the field of security reveals a spectacular evolution of the geographical stretch of the European Union’s strategic horizons and “playground”. As a security actor consecrated in the first decade of the years 2000 through ESDP and a pacifying force on the European continent through the process of enlargement, the EU gradually aimed further and further, in order to stabilise states and regions, to promote a comprehensive concept of security and to protect its citizens, according to the dictum that “the first line of defense often starts abroad”. Both strategic vision and humanitarian concerns guide the EU in approaching regional conflicts or dealing with instability. In the Balkans and Afghanistan the EU struggles with institution-building and even state-building; in its immediate neighbourhood it promotes good governance; in the Middle East it supports the difficult peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians; in Africa it performs crisis management, while also keeping an eye on the conflicts in Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula. Geography may not be everything, but it remains the most important starting point even (or the more so) in a globalized world.

As a global player, the entire world should be a playground for the European Union. But in reality the EU has a limited capacity to project force and even to exercise soft power. Nevertheless, its security perception has very wide boundaries. So does its discursive representation as a security actor: from the Balkans to Iran, Indonesia and the Middle East. Threat management begins close to home, but it can stretch as far as 10 000 km from Brussels (taken as the central point of the radius in strategic planning for ESDP) (Gariup, 2009: 174). Although this cannot be interpreted as a political commitment, it accounts for the geographical range of potential action and defines the EU’s discourse in security policy. And this boundaries are openly stated in EU hallmark documents – the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS – designed for both internal use and external audiences. There’s openness, transparency and determination in shaping and communicating the EU’s security identity through official discourse. The European Union may not be a fully-fledged global player yet, but it remains honest concerning its ambitions and works continually for extending and improving the geographical reach of its action as a “force for good”.

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