Sotsiolohiia: teoriia, metody, marketynh
Digest, 2008-2009

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Editor’s Introduction

Ukrainian Sociological Review is a special publication that includes selected papers from the academic journal Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing established by the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences, in 1997. This journal is the only one scientific-theoretical periodical in sociology (in the Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages). The Institute of Sociology is the leading sociological organization in Ukraine, and the Sociological Association of Ukraine is functioning on its basis. The Institute has more than 50 research workers who possess both academic degree and great experience in scientific research. For a long time, the Institute has been conducting a series of large-scale joint projects (e.g., the European Social Survey) with colleagues from the US and European Union. The results of these researches are published both in Ukraine and abroad. Besides, the Institute conducts an annual monitoring of social changes in Ukraine. The data of the monitoring polls, which are based on a representative sample of the adult population in Ukraine, are presented in a large number of monographs in the Ukrainian and English languages. Detailed information about our Institute’s work can be found on the website (www.i-soc.com.ua).

The sixth issue of the Ukrainian Sociological Review represents the papers published in 2008-2009. The main goal of this issue is to acquaint English-speaking readers with the most interesting scientific works of Ukrainian sociologists.

Modern Ukrainian sociology focuses its attention primarily on the problems of sociological theory and research in tendencies of the post-soviet social transformation, as well as political, economic, social, and cultural aspects. The articles published in the Review allow receiving relevant information about contemporary state and the main developmental tendencies in Ukrainian society. Besides, the papers of foreign scholars are published.

I am grateful to all those who helped to create and maintain this Review: Tetiana Gerasymenko who translated two articles into English; Olha Maksymenko who spent much time and efforts editing the English translations of the articles; Ben Hicks who assisted in the preparation of the materials; Vira Glomozda and Mykhailo Roik who made this issue ready for publication.

Yevgen Golovakha
Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology,
NAS of Ukraine
Place and Time of Sociology

Abstract

It is well known that periodical statements of crisis of social sciences proved constantly to be new turns and vistas revealing each time un-tapped resources of sociology. The essence of modern claims sociologists agree with is in evident weakening of referentiality — sociology is losing the contact with “society”, with that which constituted it both as a science and as a special intellectual practice. This fact seems to prejudice the very ability to be a “modern science about modern society”. The authors believe that the paradox of the current situation lies in the parallel existence both of uncertainty about the key point of the discipline and concern about adequacy of methods, as well as in quite convincing experience of combining tradition and innovation in the works of N. Luhmann, P. Sztompka, L. Thévenot and L. Boltanski, J. Urry, that engenders the phenomenon of “new old sociology”. The article deals with metamorphoses of temporality the social disciplines are concerned with while describing local and extremely wide spaces of human coexistence.

Today’s situation looks as if the utopian energy ran out, as if it left the historical thinking. The horizon of the future has shrunk, and the spirit of the time, like politics, substantially changed... The intellectuals’ response reflect the same helplessness as in politicians... Let the situation be objectively opaque. Meanwhile, the opaqueness is one of the functions of

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1 Translated by Tetiana Gerasymenko from the Ukrainian text “Mistse i chas sotsiolohii”, Sotsiolohiia, teoriia, metody, marketynh, 2008, № 1, pp. 11–32.
readiness for actions, for which the society thinks itself to be capable. The matter is in the confidence of the Western culture of in itself.

*Jürgen Habermas*

The idea about the end of sociology as a project (how it was conceived and born) has sounded clear and eschatological overtones are ready to reach peripheral discourses. Twenty years ago the topic premonitions seemed to be reasonable only in some refined statements and cult texts, while sociological practices, multiplied on the mass legitimacy of the social knowledge, were hardly bothered about that. Criticism of sociology and the set of methods and representations called the social sciences was predetermined by the decision (sanctioned by Modern) to turn the investigation of people’s coexistence into an authentic scientific discipline, that is to pass this investigation to the “operators of science” who would reduce, according to Laurent Thévenot questionable normativeness of a measured regularity. Futilities and inconsistency (usually accompanying the assumptions of such transformations) always led to critical reflection, outer and interdisciplinary, and dramatic results of discussions on identity of sociology that promised to be unbiased in modeling economically conditioned orders but did not separated from political and moral philosophy as well as from humanitarian knowledge itself. Sociology has always been reproved for redundancy or deficit of the abovementioned influences: critical analysis of the modern system of supremacy vs. the latent apology of positive knowledge, etalons of strict science vs. relativism, etc. At the same time, regular statements about crises in social sciences have led to further and confident advancement, new turns and prospects, while sociology demonstrated its unspent resources. The 20th century is called the century of social sciences (Peter Wagner), taking into account the scale of their representations on the world of people, which not only contained autonomous knowledge but were able to serve as public arguments for serious political actions.

**Statutes of Decline**

We cannot say that this ability was realized enthusiastically and everywhere. Behind presentations of the history of a discipline, one can see the measured evolution that did not expect large-scale shocks or crush of the initial project basis; due to its general format, the project was open for further fillings and revisions. Of course, the measured evolution did
not exclude the tension. However, it was not determined by inconsistency of sociological answers to social demands. Evidently or not, this was a part of the project: the process of discovering laws meant to collect the useful knowledge for better management of common wealth, conditions and processes. Nevertheless, the era of “optimistic scientism” (André Malraux) was not realized: it was stopped between two atomic bombardments and any further prospects for scientifically based discussions were closed. At the same time, the “thirty bright years” of humanitarian sciences (after the war and later) actively appealed to sociologists and represented development programs. The appeals were often ritual or formal because of legitimate status of academic science of social and humanitarian kind, and elites should have correlated with it to keep posted. However, namely that status took sociology from participation in political decision substantiation — it was insensitive and taking no initiative in practical interest. Both sides found effective political marketing more attractive for them. For example, Ukrainian academic social sciences have to repeat publicly that sociology is not only political ratings.

The tension in sociological evolution has been caused by competition of perspectives, directions, organizational centers and schools as well. Only in an analytical sense they can be divided into archaists (fundamentalists) and innovators, which react with different speed, rigidity and intuition to changes on their territories and public expectations about possible danger or good of those changes. By the end of the last century the competition had become evident and reshaped the space of social thought: the mainstream channel was narrowed and an image of multiple sociology appeared. The picture was so impressive that people began to think about revision of sources and serious discussions on whether that split of sociological imagination could be caused by generic flaw and how it is possible to be sure in former integrity stated by the social science idea. “Are there any theses common for all great authors of sociological tradition, whether of a latent or an evident kind?” This was the question for discussion at the symposium in Paris (2003) dedicated to perspectives of common sociological theory under globalization [1]. This time is more difficult to overcome the crisis: even the subject and the method of sociology are in doubt.

Experts and sociologists agree that the reason is that reference feature of the science has evidently weakened: sociology lost its contact with “the society” that stated it as a science and a special intellectual practice. The last congress of the International Sociological Association
in Durban (2006) has not contest that. The thesis can be divided into a number of contexts explicating disproportions of the main notions, ways of scientific explanation and claims of sociology on “being a modern science about the modern society” [2, p. 41]. By now they have been discussed in details and it would be enough just to name them.

**Dismantling of the key concept.** Representation of social life with the help of “society” idea turned to be a happy godsend for substantiation of the subject of sociology and enabled to affirm sociology as a discipline about the human and the state. The initial option — to measure laws of the whole by basing on functioning of “elementary” particles of sociality, like masses, collectives and social groups — was not the only model for consideration. The final indecomposable unit has been always a separate individual with his habit to act that regulates an order in human communities [1]. An artificial nature of the “society” concept could be accepted until the concept has convincing structural and functional excuses. However, the “society” idea has never been evident or natural. It has been always constructed and should be recognized as the utmost developed and complex approach to kinds of behavior and social organization; it was stated by Alain Touraine at the 15th World Congress of Sociology in his report “Sociology without Society” [3]. Being applied to the changing modern world, the constructed item more and more reveals its own logical redundancy in units, willfulness of the general assemble, and these features impede unbiased perception of the integral image, the aggregate of institutions and actors.

“Society” as a double and alter ego of the nation-state is losing its ontological and gnoseological universal nature, and as to globalization prospects, it is revealed as a mutually taken position, or even truism, comprehensively illustrated by Ulrich Beck in his “container theory of society”. The society, limited within a national state, is no longer the main unit of social interactions because the social features are realized also over the limits of the national space of actions, in new integration forms of economics and politics, in post-national constellations (Jürgen Habermas). However, the direction towards society is still dominating, especially if we talk about organization of a survey. Ulrich Beck said that connection between sociology and a national state is so close that the image of “modern” regulated separate societies, which, together with strengthening of organizational and political model of national state, became compulsory and, due to the claim of social science classics on fundamentality in its best sense, was absolutized as a logically inevitable image of the society at all [2, p. 50]. It would be hard to imagine that,
for example, national sociologists, as well as others, could reject search for “their own”, Ukrainian in our case, society without seeing it in accordance with the commonly adopted model; though, at the same time, they would not perceive it as an auto-referent small universe, in which everything takes place in reality. This can be confirmed by a widening range of cross-cultural monitoring surveys, in which the model of national sample serves as an ideal of the reality. Rigid nature of practices, their direction towards the patterns that proved their success on many occasions is that what adds even more inconsistency to the general picture. Is our decisiveness to accept ourselves only as a variation of the global world so strong and deliberate?

Method is not relevant to the subject matter and vice versa. Because of initial deliberateness applied to creation of a sociological discipline, there existed some strange feeling: the idea supposed to separate as much as possible and contrast the social and the natural orders, but to investigate the first with the means traditionally used for investigation of the latter [4, p. 11]. In order to see the human world as a matter ready for observation and analysis by a naturalist, and later by an interpreter free of value judgment, it was necessary to follow the intellectual credo and accomplish a complicated intellectual work. For example, it was necessary to accept that social facts are of compulsory nature; this issue led the late Durkheim to interpretation of society not only as an empirical reality but, to a significant extent, as a transcendent and sacral one, a source and a receptacle of all high values. Or as a resource of understanding, there could be accepted historical “ideal types” determined by Weber as constructions with the “nature of utopia that was achieved with the help of intellectual strengthening of certain elements of reality” [5, p. 389]; it was namely the reason of complexity he came across dealing with his “aim-rational action”, which is a “pure” construct of the mentioned kind, as well as Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Or it is possible to realize phenomenological reduction imposing refrain from statements on existence or non-existence of objects from outer world, or like Schütz suggests, it is possible to refrain from all doubts about them in order not to hamper vivid perception and experience of the world. In most cases empirical results do not exceed statements of common sense; they confirm the known facts related to personal or collective (including sociological) experience. There are radically alternative practices: links and dependencies of variables are determined with more keen means, but they do not bring the feeling that the representation describes the social world more precisely and expressive. Becoming evi-
dent, the fact that the way of collecting knowledge is far from technological deprives sociologists of their status of “experts”: it is not “breaking the spell” cast over the world (as Max Weber expected from a social scientist), but a repeated mystification presented as a written text, triumph of sociological autarchy, a fruit of methodologically thorough work done by sociology for sociology.

Discussions on problems of sociology and with sociology have a wide range of tones: from “collapse of classical sociology”, because a society itself splits into parts [3], to a brave manifest for the discipline that lost its central concept [4, p. 20]. Decline and expectation of changes in sociology go with a wide discussion on the current condition of social and humanitarian sciences where behind a variety of dissatisfaction and bad prospects we may notice a stable wish of researchers to work in their spheres and be keen on new perspectives. In some scientific communities of the European space such discussions become open, even public; in others, they prefer not to talk about this at official meetings. Aspects of dealing with the crisis by French intellectuals and their Russian colleagues were brightly described in the book by Dina Khapaeva “Dukes of Republic in the Age of Translation”, telling about transformation of notions in humanitarian sciences [6]. Discussable issues are regularly presented by the non-fiction column of the “Magazine Hall” on the site magazines.ru. However, in the age of translations, as Khapaeva called the present time, the idea of what going on in sociological or humanitarian spheres of other language cultures cannot be fully perceived because of irregularity of the translation flows related to many reasons secondary for the topic of discussion (joint projects, traditions of contacts, preferences and aims of publishers)

Rapid changes in the intellectual atmosphere for the recent decade, which cannot be considered to be a simple change of scientific trends as it was in the case of postmodernism, testify not only for methodological instability or lack of resistance but for radical rethinking of priorities and possibilities of “social sciences”. History, being the ideal of Enlightenment according to Jörn Rüsen, falls apart in our hands [from: 8, p. 187]. If the idea of “total history” still exists in the modern project of Annals, then it should be in the second or the third wording and with a

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1 For example, the work by Philippe Corcuff “New Sociologies” (Les nouvelles sociologies) on the current state of sociology in France and some other works on humanitarian issues were published within the program “Pushkin” and supported by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Embassy of France in Russia [7].
stronger interest in the actor than simple acknowledgement of his participation in the history, mediated by structures [1]. There is a variety of “new” histories; some of them enable to see succession and can be presented as a “structure of long duration” (the term by Braudel) [8, p. 188], others cause perplexity and you try to combine academic strategies with “new political history”, “conceptual history of politics” or “social history of politics” [6, p. 87]; that is the modern field for imagination to play. Depragmatization of history in favor of direct experience of the past as an experience of historical culture was mentioned by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht in the chapter “After Lessons of History” of his book about the year 1926 [9, pp. 465–495]. The same determination was manifested by Otto Gerhard Oexle, who says that historical sciences have no right to indicate how life has to be organized but they should see to it that as much as possible must avoid oblivion [10, p. 22]. Of course, revisions of history cannot avoid its didactic function, as truly was stated by Natalia Yakovenko and other Ukrainian historians [11], but claims of history for being “magistra vitae” have been significantly lowered.

Sociology has always dealt with the current reality, its aim was to correspond to the time, and this intention has been always encouraged and raised. Of course, the changed reality put in a claim to sociology in the first instance. Sociological language happened to drop behind; it is difficult to use it in the new reality. We do not say that sociological lexicon is outdated; for example, with the modern communication means the national practice quickly mastered patterns of intellectual language, newly introduced or freshly translated. We cannot say that long sociological narratives, realized in prospects of structures, actions or culture, usually understood as a complex of values and norms, lost their convincing nature. However, something went wrong, evidently or subtle. Even if we leave aside the Key concept, which was deconstructed by the many or involved into deconstruction, it is impossible to avoid the everyday aporia: sense slips out of sociological interpretations, which yesterday were adequate and explained tendencies; despite redundancy of words, there is a lack of those necessary for articulation of the current features. In any case, we mean that the language is incapable of expressing the current changes or catch the reality [6, pp. 96–100, 196]. The trivial example is when not only ordinary people mix political right forces with the left ones but they are also mixed in the expert consciousness. If you take into account the widely referred arguments by Reinhart Kozelek, development of a conceptual dictionary could take a couple of decades. One of the ways involves a shift (in historical notions) of the balance between uni-
universal meanings and specific experience towards the latter, that is in favor of the “proper noun logics” without breaking links with the “general statement logics” [12, p. 222]; this seems to mean the replacement of hyper-metaphors by metaphors close to literal description. But it looks like what post-structuralism has told recently. So far this dictionary includes one notion “Europe” [12]; although, on the same basis, “Africa” may be added too, we mean “not a continent but a notion” [2, pp. 54–56]. Anyway, representatives of regional sociologies connect rethinking of universalism aspirations to a decline of its Eurocentric matrix [13]. As to local languages and sociological dialects, they have been formed intensively, and their symbolic rows do not often convert into each other and remain unreachable for strangers. The same difficulties relate to paradigms, especially if you take into account their ability to be easily reproduced by adepts.

New Old Sociologies

At the same time, the number of new sociologies is no less than histories or kinds of cultural, anthropological or linguistic research; in philosophical environment, it is considered as “continental diseases” (Daniel Andler). Practicing sociologists are not unanimous as to the revealed pathologies: accents are distributed between rigorism and freedom. Presenting a generalized image of social science at forums of the European Academy of Sociology in 2002-2003, Raymond Boudon and John Goldthorpe, with the same opinion, determined four ideal types of sociology: aesthetic or expressive, socially committed or critical, descriptive or cameral, and at last “real” (‘sociology that really matters’), cognitive or scientific sociology [14; 15]. Only the latter — SSS (sociology as social science) — is worth unconditionally to have an academic status. Namely it has to be supported by all means in order to preserve the good reputation of sociology as a clear alternative developed on experience of arbitrary going through the expressive model and the driven norms, moral and political, (ideology) of critical reflection. Performing the mission to explain unclear phenomena of social life, SSS begins to cooperate fruitfully with the cameral (descriptive) sociology, the best invention of which is the sample polls, vital to a modern social science, like telescopes for astronomy or microscopes for biology [15, p. 99].

Modifications of suggestions for renovation of sociology do not include unexpected or unimaginable ideas. Mainly, they are familiar or less ordinary combinations of traditional perspectives with a strong
structural component and, at the same time, a deliberate penetrating look at actors’ actions and their place identification regarding the structure or system, whatever it is: temporary, accidental, sought for, desirable or deep-rooted and incurable. Vagueness in fluctuations and hesitations of individuals under the distributed space integration of societies, intersected by communications, is taken into account for construction of system images as well. More often, an individual can avoid special space conditions and change them for others due to their mobility. As this has become a social norm, Niklas Luhmann thinks that it is necessary to change the concept of an autopoietic system in order to imagine the system limits as mobile too, they do not have to rise high as the system borders, skin layers or the membrane, being the means used by the system to strengthen itself and fencing off [16, p. 151].

As a rule, the most famous projects, designed compositionally and presented as a monograph, hardly can be determined as a mesoscale survey because each of them is worth their own autonomous position, comfortable for a full value review of the socially interconnected world of people. They will also hardly find their place in the above-mentioned classification design, as far as each of them tries to involve advantages of all models of sociology, being connected, though differently, with their parental paradigms; they intend to represent mechanisms and practices of new humanitarian knowledge production by different actors, to make it correspond to modern conditions of coexistence. There are a couple of expressive examples.

In sociology of mobility by John Urry the reconstructed social science takes away the outdated “society” concept and concentrates on “mobilities” realized over barriers of territories, geographical and socially marked, which structure the global space. “Newer” rules of sociological method demand introduction of metaphors, more suitable for representation of the mobile reality being in a continuous movement, emergent regulations and imperatives of temporality than for the statics, structure and social order [4, p. 18]. Mobilities involve almost all kinds of human activity, starting with physical, imaginative and virtual movements of subjects of various types and ending with “intellectual mobility”, with the help of which, in some special environments of “creative marginality”, they carry on innovations in social sciences, and the mobility that supplies sociology with “emancipated interest” of new social movements [4, pp. 220-221]. There are inevitable participants of mobility, like objects of material world, surrounding the active subjects and constructing with them common hybrid
formations. That is why “to regard things as social facts” is one of the natural rules of the renewed method [4, p. 18].

Interaction between people and the world of things, technology and environment that are able to affect decisively subjects’ behavior and actions, no matter whether the world is alienated or taken by human communities, becomes more and more significant in various conceptual projects with different methodological dominants, starting from models of net transitions of actors by Bruno Latour ending with the environmentally oriented statements by Ulrich Beck. Sociology of a plurality of regimes of action by Lauren Thévenot and Luc Boltanski can be included into the same set. However, its main idea is to construct a highly generalized, even universal, structure that will present how actions depend on generally meaningful principles or “greatness orders”, by basing on which people look for consent in the public or any other space in order to get justification and achieve recognition. Combination of the “orders of greatness” and situation typologies creates segmentation of various regimes related to the actors’ involvement in their coexistence, from the everyday communication and solution of professional disputes to creativity configuration in humanitarian sciences, like technocratism, market configuration, reputation regime, civil, inspired or patriarchal regimes [17; 7, pp. 153–162]. The authors illustrate with their work the simultaneous accessibility (for an individual) of various involvement regimes; they regard the work as belonging to “pragmatic sociology”, as well as close to activity of political philosophers and theorists of justice, because the work represents the ways and kinds for expression of common feeling of injustice in a way of a model, rules and demands [17].

So complicated structural construction, realized through “regional” models (it means that supposes isomorphism of regimes organizing various spaces of life), was needed in order to avoid the “relativism”, like Max Weber’s, and “even more culturological fundamentalism”. As to Thévenot, this is possible due to the fact that the value issues as regarded from the points of view of numerous greatness orders; when those orders are oriented to universality and significance for the mankind, they make values of different societies and cultures commensurable [17].

Sociology of trust by Piotr Sztompka intends to confirm the claim of social science (still maintaining its “sensitivity to important social issues”) for a role of the society’s self-consciousness [18, p. 19]. His book “Trust. Basis of Society” (Zaufanie. Fundament społeczeństwa) can be undoubtedly added to epic sociological texts with prevailing tradition and classical patterns of notion explication; by the way, they are com-
mon for the newest lexicon as well. Through “eyeglasses of trust” are seen moral bases of modern society, in which the culture of trust opposes the “culture of cynicism”. In the large-scale representation of the trust phenomenon, including its idea, kinds, basis, social links, functions and manifestation in various spheres of social life, the author uses the culturological approach and “methodology of eclecticism” in the strict Merton’s sense [18, p. 19]. Namely the shift of sociology (of similar kind) towards cultural representation of people’s coexistence, with taking accents from the notion of progress to chances and risks of subjects, including new collective actors, in the badly predictable world, is the most popular issue connected to the prospects of the social reality investigation [3].

Towards the Art

At last, on the freedom pole of methodological emancipation and saving from over-care of tradition, there is another perspective for sociology and humanitarian sciences. Its horizon shows the image of art, attractive for everyone who deals with texts or creates them; the image reveals in various contexts and comes to sociology from various directions. Magnetism of this eternal “attractor” can be noticed not only by the humanitarians who found themselves “on the brink of confusion” (Michel Houellebecq); in that case it would be natural to expect a trick of methodological restlessness. But the same effect is reported by the respectable sociology and other humanitarian sciences. Talking about renovation of the initial project for social sciences as a whole and sociology in particular, Lauren Thévenot suggests remembering of the ancient meaning of the word “science”; it puts a science close to the instrumentally oriented art of interaction [1]. Nikolay Koposov connects the overcoming of crisis in social sciences with their ability to move towards “free arts”, meaning the necessity of transformation from universities-supermarkets to colleges of liberal education going terminologically to “seven free arts” (septem artes liberales) and corresponding (to a greater extent) to pedagogical tasks of the global post-industrial society [12, pp. 234–239]. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht insists on the same; he explains why humanitarian sciences would better prefer being “Humanities and Arts” and calls them for breaking the “icy hug of scientific character” [19]. They see “Humanities and Arts” as a “space providing opportunities for risky thinking”, the thinking that moves towards imagination and intuition. That thinking is not burdened by routine demands of practicality and,
that is why, able to fulfill its main function: to broaden and develop individual minds, while societies and institutions are still open for changes [19]. The project does not include disproof of etalons; there is no need to refer to them regarding them as criteria of the intellectual search correctness. Art does not occupy the general and the universal, as well as the standard and the lawful. It is tuned to, subtle, unlike and hardly seen things, its result is not truth but details, seen for the first time or presented differently, an unexpected view capable of changing our attitude to seemingly evident. With the help of associations between sociology and art, professionalism and desirable perfection of efforts could be affirmed, as well as subtle, accidental or unstable things could be raised to much higher levels of the humanitarian and social significance than it is used in social sciences. These details fill the human life but cannot be steadily registered by the "operators of scientific character", because they are programmed for the norm on the peak of its uninterrupted functioning or at the moment of its end.

While its paradigm and descriptive sources come to exhaustion, sociology feels a strong attraction to the risky thinking and ingenious literary style. But they need a high price. "Expressive or aesthetic" version pays, where it is acceptable, by academic indulgence, though the author’s literary gift (ensuring them success) is regarded, instead of analytical might, as an “ability to catch Zeitgeist”, even if it is “opportunistic” [15, p. 98]. There were practices, like manifestation of new historicism in Russia [20] that was met negatively by the orthodox sociological criticism [21] or new historicism in modern American historiography that was not accepted even by “methodological liberals” because of high claims for the writing aimed constructively at the “creation of history”; they also criticized its excessive metaphoric character that prevented historical reality from representing itself [6; 9, pp. 469–475]. Failures of such practices remove the project of “sociology as an art” to the field of possibility.

Moreover, on the market of intellectual pleasure sociology would hardly outrun the monopolist of literature; we mean a legitimate storyteller. Fiction has no taboo of “extreme subjectivity”: it has always managed to describe phenomena and actions of any actors including those who were characterized by social senses or related to social discourses, and it does this with more sincerity. Acknowledged literature (for example, awarded professionally) does not stand aside from issues of people’s coexistence, their wish or unwillingness to live together; this aspect brings authors closer to the humanitarians who try to see in the vacillat-
ing world “a chance for a new way to be humane” (Gianni Vattimo). There is no need to call somebody of modern writers “social” and make their tasks easier, but we have serious grounds for considering “sociology by Michel Houellebecq” or “sociology by Katzuo Ishiguro” being able to compete with investigations by sociologists, culturologists, anthropologists, and linguists. As to Houellebecq (Grand Prix, Interallié, a number of other awards), there are accurate descriptions of an ordinary European’s everyday life, their shrill aloneness in phantasmagoria of circumstances and the last hope for “possibility of island”, charm and farce of “new social movements” and inability of the global communications society to talk [22; 23]. His reflections on intellectual climate of French and also European environment are full of sad irony about uselessness of the “scientific” cognition of social links, “ontology of social communities”, for which they try to change understanding and explanation of human problems and people’s solidarity. Houellebecq told with words of his scholar-character that in hetatic ontology particle are indiscernible, while defining them one should confine himself to the aspect of their observable “quantity”. The only essences capable to be distinguished and defined in this ontology are the wave functions and the vectors of state determined by means of these functions — hence, there is an analogous possibility to restore the meaning of the notions of fraternity, sympathy and love [24, p. 389]. On the contrary, Ishiguro (The Man Booker and other prizes), without irony, in the classic form of English novel, consecutively and slowly, shows how the unimaginable, cultural and with good intentions (the mass production of human clones for medical needs), turns into new social inequalities, new exclusions with usual and worked through mechanisms of their reproduction, with old paradoxes of progress. “A lot of new potentialities have suddenly appeared; most diseases which physicians could not overcome before, became curable. That was the first, which the world saw, the first it wanted... Yes, there were arisen some discussions. But by the time when people became anxious about alumni, by the time they became interested in conditions you are brought up and should they give birth to you at all, it was already late. It was impossible to put it into reverse. How can you require, that the world, which has already accustomed to the thought that cancer is curable, to renounce this treatment and return to old gloomy times?” [25, p. 149].

Literary reminiscence of sociology causes at least two important reflections. Firstly, the relevance of its evident movement towards self-reference condition, “art for art”; we mean not only the interpretive versions and narrative practices that broaden expressive lexicon of sociological
texts, but also the thorough sterilization of abstractions, digital formats and methodical transparency. Legitimate correspondence to the discipline is still clearly formulated within the demands to the authors of leading sociological editions, where attention to the everyday dilemmas, conflicts, rules, conventions and stylistic freedom is not very welcome. At the same time, the right to create narratives about typical actions of ordinary actors is nearly usurped, in an extremely simplified way, by TV series and day talk shows, and, in a refined way, by high fiction. That is accompanied by continued outing of sociological arguments and pushing them to the public debates periphery about a vibrating space of people’s coexistence, with its vague differentiations and unstable stratification orders, by growing distrust in claims of public sociology for “knowing better than others” about social problems (this can be revealed not only in Ukrainian environment) [27, pp. 11-12]. Discussions on weakening of “public voice” of sociology, vulnerability of its civil value, controversies of “professional” and “public” social sciences are held at prestige meetings of sociologists and in columns of specialized editions [28]. An important role in determination of status quo is played by differentiation between the language of sociologists’ reports and social discourses by media that set orientations and explanations for the mass consciousness nowadays. However, we have to admit that “construction of the Ebony Tower” maintains the ability of sociology to stay within thoughts about society, as a special intellectual practice being unaccountable to political and state pragmatics [19], with useful effect expected in the future, fingers crossed.

1 If, as Amitai Etzioni supposes, editions of the American Sociological Association (ASR and others) got “anonymous” essays by Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, Robert Bellah, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Herbert Hans, Charles R. Mills or any other of the most significant public sociologists, they would be “rejected” [26, p. 377].

2 The discussion on “public” sociology, activated by the speech of Michael Burawoy, President of the American Sociological Association, at the annual meeting of 2004, was supported by a number of leading and regional sociological journals, like the British Journal of Sociology, in which the topic was discussed by Ulrich Beck, Craig Calhoun, John Hall and other famous sociologists [28]. The talk is about possibility of sociology to take a full part in social transformations, the need of society in public sociologists, capable of appealing to the wide audience and taking a special place in “division of sociological work” [29, p. 431]. However, it is inevitably connected to a rise of “populism” and provinciality of sociological practices, which do not eliminate academic superiority in social sciences. According to Ulrich Beck, to get the “public voice”, sociology has to be reconstructed; otherwise its public and non-public forms will turn into “museum pieces” [30, p. 335].
The second, to be precise, the main issue being in the center of the sociology and art comparison, it is articulation of cultural and scientific worries about the Reality: it happened so that the literary invention can serve as an adequate projective method for understanding and representation of the Reality, while a rigorous research project may be limited by a poor pattern. On the other hand, impetuous constructivism can multiply the images, pretending to be real, and imply that pre-conditions of referent’s existence are doubtful, while “investments in shape” (Thévenot), conducted by adherents of scientific canons, may strengthen the idea about sustainable interdependencies between numerous actors and structures of modern social world. It leaves us with the main intrigue of sociology, constantly supported especially under deficiency of conceptual and imaginative context, ensuring the opportunity of substantial, individually and collectively significant interpretations of empirical information.

**Metamorphoses of Temporality**

The wish for (or the need in?) new, other sociology seems to be justified and unquestionable. In addition to its old, not completely discredited images, sociology has to be especially sensitive to the world of people — globalizing, mobile, vacillating, fragile, full of risks and uncertainty. We talk about gaining experience of mobile sociological description and interpreting of a “new reality”, even time itself, if we look more generally. It is so because description of fluid, changeable and fickle reality looks like metaphors of time in the first place, this fact was stressed convincingly by John Urry [4, pp. 1–20]. Another thing is with the help of what stylistic and compositional methods the texts, relevant to the time, should be produced. There are no conclusive and didactic answers yet. Especially as, the space dominant of the recent sociology — due to numerous reasons, like urgency of global and local subject fields, authoritative methodology of social space within Bourdieu’s school, cultural articulation of the present, visual presentation of “elegant decisions” and many others — has regularly caught the time experience and moved accents to stable positions and measured dynamics. However, the passion for processes of “place production and consumption” (John Urry), manifested by modern culture and sociology (according to its orientation towards social discourses) weakens outside temporal contexts or involvement in different time regimes, because achievement of places (statuses) indissolubly connected with the time implications, like speed and peri-
ods of individual and collective lives. We can say that, in the cultural perspective, time gains revenge on space by turning its images into metaphors of temporality.

It is known that the era of Modern radically revises the concept of social time. In the 19th century knowledge and sense of its speeding flow were available for specialized consciousness first and then to the mass one. In the 20th century, as Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht showed by basing on fiction, social philosophy, historical research and to a lesser extent on sociology (Niklas Luhmann), it was, in the same thorough way, revised the idea of succession of historical time: in the suddenly broadened present — the world of simultaneity — the sequence of the temporal modi has been cut down, taken away, it is indifferent. The past does not determine the present, the present is not a reason for the future: the reasons either absent or it is impossible to see the means for their determination. Only an active subject renews the time links by differentiating their modi and setting them in a settled order [9, pp. 475–477]. In the available for us language spaces of scientific communities, a story of “presentism” triumph — new experience of time — is described by Dina Khapaeva [6, pp. 194–219]. What had been delicately and astutely narrated by fiction by the middle of the last century, in the end of it became “collective wisdom” of scholars of social sciences, the issues that can be repeated only after some confusion.

Simple paradox of the present relates to the seeming short duration of the present; people consider it as a border between the past and the future that is easily crossed, while for an individual it is continuous, because in each moment of their life they physically exist in the present, “here and now”, in all its materiality, with all possible eventualities and effects, the most significant for an individual happens. From the present to the quite vague “back”, facts and details of individual’s life slide. Beginning their work, sociologists find their objects — individuals — in their continuous “today”. At the same time — as leaders of scientific opinion make us see it and understand — it is “wide”, because “the present” seems to colonize the past and the future; and it is the “reducing present” (German Lübbe) — being under speeding delegitimacy of past individual and collective experience because of thickening of innovations and their competition [31]. However, behind the paradox’s simplicity, it is seen a real complexity of what is described as “wide but at the same time reducing present”; we mean that it is formed of layers, non-organic, hardly imaginable and characterized. That is why the following scenarios are approximate, rough, not
final descriptions of the present structure, and they are presented through perception of the play characters.

In the national sociology special research on time is not popular. It is also difficult to find a style corresponding to description and representation of continuous, coming and leaving reality embodying the time flow. However, there can be seen some movements towards the issue. Recently, Irina Markovna Popova presented the book “1989–1991. Diagnosis of Time (Odessites about Themselves and Changes in Society)” and determined its genre as “historic and sociological essays” [32]. The noticeable allusions relate to those aspects of sociology’s status, its heuristic and “ontological” suppositions, ambitions, possibilities and limits, which were revealed in debates at the last two congresses of the International Sociological Association and in the mentioned publications.

The historical and sociological architectonics of the book, when the chronological vector — from year to year — determines the order of presentation of sociological evidences, imply a special narrative way with two voices, constructed by the author for herself. One voice is collective, it consists of the author’s one and voices of her carefully referred colleagues, represented by materials of the periodicals in Odessa and reports on public opinion surveys of the corresponding period. The second voice is the author’s one from the present, the middle of the first decade of the new century, with assessments of the previous assessments of the situations and of those who assessed: aspiration for reinterpretation of what was commented once; it is a legitimate method, though being not used in our country. Two voices are separated by fifteen years. Readers can see the diagnoses of the time that was “the present” first, at the moment very close to the end of the survey, and of the same time but when it became a distant “past”, different from “the future”, or to say it better “the new present”, in which the expert exists in the first decade of the next century. It is the difference of times that truly or only imaginary brings the heuristic horizon nearer. The locality determined as the “old present” or “past” is characterized as “crisis of perestroika” [32, p. 11], its “evening”. The meaning is supported not only by the idea that direct participants cannot know that the “evening” of the event has come: because only being in the future, after the event had ended, you got a chance for its periodization, as just one of the supposed scenarios about the event development happens to be realized. In “the new present” sociologists have the improved knowledge, as if gained a “new sight”. There is an indication of the principle, practically never meant or discussed in sociology: although the continuous actual temporality is socially struc-
tured, identification of the structure components is very difficult or even unrealizable.

Either deliberate or automatic ignorance of self-reflection by sociologists — we mean the interest in determination what schemes of perception and explanation organize and structure our thoughts and texts, when an observer is within the time of the situation or out of it, being within other situation or other experience — urges on a number of reasons, vague and impossible for specification. To talk about them, we need to appeal for the time as well.

**Approach I. Models of Temporal Regimes**

French historians, to whom the substantial essay by François Hartog is devoted in particular [37], are famous masters of “work with time”, and they were more successful in determination of its heterogeneity (of many indices) than other social and humanitarian researchers. A pattern — serving at the same time as an example how such work can be done — was suggested by Fernand Braudel [38].

According to him, a historian has three models of temporality. Firstly, it is a short time or a time of event; that is what is happening. The events do not root in the present; they are replaced by the next events, coming after them. The short time looks like a kaleidoscope of events, some configurations of which are fixed by historians, although their mutual or separate logics rarely can be reconstructed. In the essence, it is the poli-

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1 Apart from the work by the authors from Kyiv, mentioned in the book [33], we can name others [34], and also archives of sociologists from Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, L'viv surely include numerous reports, certificates, clips from publications in local newspapers. However, all those who wrote about that time at that moment (our list is, of course, not complete), seem to leave that heritage for future historians of Ukrainian sociology: their chance for gaining factuality has not lost yet, while the corresponding publications have already formed an archive, available for them. The similar situation is in Russia. Recently the journal “New Literary Review” (Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye) presented a collective work by historians, literary critics, sociologists and philosophers about 1990 [35] — the project of as full as possible reconstruction of events and corresponding mass and individual experiences, inspired by the realized effort by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht to create, in structures and images, the left behind world of conditions, actions and emotions [9]. However, Aleksey Levinson and Boris Dubin (Yuri Levada Analytical Center) appeal exclusively to the information collected by VTsIOM (All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion); this might be because the project developers were asked to recreate the situation rather than reinterpret the data gained in that time. Poly-disciplinary talk about the “long” 1970-ies was supported by the journal “Reserve Fund” (Neprikosnovennyi Zapas); it confirmed and affirmed mutually complementary differences between those two kinds of experience, sources of which are direct and alienated feelings, knowledge and understanding [36].
tical time, “a patter of political history”; people try to listen to it professionally but keep wondering its weak coherence. Initially, by commonly used semantics, history was a narration and knowledge about events [39]. Secondly, it is a time corresponding to prolonged cycles and changes. In it, events form an evident consequence with its beginning and end (cycle) or are characterized by a broken vector of changes. Not of many years, but a middle-term order can be seen in this time. Fernand Braudel called a historian’s story about it “recitative of conjuncture”. Thirdly, it is a slow time, “slow history on the brink of invisible flow”, where we can see the basic structures, which fragmentize the space of people’s coexistence and ensure succession of experience and culture. Nations, civilizations are agents of the slow time (“great history”), and they are the subject of a historian-researcher’s investigation.

The following analogy is not the best interpretative technique but it is justified as the first step to start a discussion and to invite for it. Of course, the wide present is not socially homogeneous, but we should take into account something more that its evident heterogeneity, like occupational differentiation (work, study, leisure, etc.), being in the field of regular interests of sociology. The factual character of the present reveals (there is no other way) in its temporal multi-component structure that was pointed by Fernand Braudel, though he talked about the historical time. There can be found all that time flows, different by rhythms of staying, constituting the temporal plurality of present, its simplest mental card. However, the idea of a “place of residence” in temporality loses its certainty. At the same moment, the human (a respondent and a sociologist himself) stays in all three times: in a “hot” flow of events, in a rather “fresh” flow of cycles and in a flow of “slow” time, hardly perceptible. Their taste and ability to locate in the temporal plurality of the present become an organic component of social competence of an individual and professional competence of researcher.

Becoming more rapid “time of events” is not a token but a sign that fully represents the modern vacillating and changing world arrangement. Innovations of technological and cultural nature come to it regularly and more often; they accelerate substitution of occurrences and facts in the “time of events”, but the possibility for further acceleration is not exhausted yet. The nearest consequence is that the “time of events” becomes very thin and unable to supply its own fractions and fragments for the formation of trends in the “time of cycles”: the rapid flow of “time of events” slides on it, leaving no trace and seizing, with unexpected result, the world of individuals’ feelings and desires. The supposition that
a desire to study the environment is a characteristic of individuals and they are happily striving for understanding what is going on becomes more difficult to justify and prove empirically. Referentiality is no more an element of game “designation and names” — anything can be told about the “time of events” that becomes very thin. No “history” is born in it to continue and develop. There is no matter where to go: because the ways are not paved or lead to nowhere.

The book with a diagnosis of 1989–1991 starts with a chapter called “Events of Perestroika”; the temporal modality of that time present, that became the nearly forgotten past, can be surely identified. Of course, it was another intention: the author wanted to remind a reader what happened in the diagnosed period of time. After that mention, we can understand to what the people questioned by sociologists from Odessa reacted. As to the perspective of the discussed temporal modus, the way how they reacted happens to be symptomatic. In the quoted statements of respondents, there are “nothing is happening”, “perestroika goes on the TV”, “all that is no more than chatter” — this refrain is regularly repeated in commentaries to the questionnaire answers [32, pp. 45–47]. People directly talk about “non-tactileness” of events, even more about their doubtful reliability than the fact that they were out of people’s immediate experience. The events look like light, ephemeral, going without a trace and not bringing other events. Becoming very thin, the “time of events” is represented as an inauthentic time.

Inauthentic time has nothing to share with the “time of cycles” and to pass it, there is nothing to turn into tradition. Having no new formations, in our social and cultural space the time of cycles becomes also empty due to accelerated annihilation of ideological images of the recent past, like socialism being a step to communism or developed socialism as a stage of socialism. Perestroika itself pretended for the “cycle” status in the evolution of socialism. The time of cycles loses its subjects and contents, turns into an empty cover, uselessness of which is realized even individually. Generations, entering the life, have nothing to correlate with the biological cyclic character of life: youth, maturity, old age can be hardly correlated with cycles of a society’s evolution: in the time of cycles the social is substituted by the individual and biographical, and the feeling of belonging to what is habitually called “society” weakens.

Thick great time — “historical time” — is left as a receptacle of archetypes and types, facts and artifacts of collective memory, ways and criteria for the formation of national and cultural identity, and many other things (there is no national idea there but we can call for its intellectual
search). Authority and reputation of historical time are ensured by the materialization, happened within the evolution of nations in a way of institutional structures (like a national state) and a special way of life. A sequence of republics, reichs, rzeczpospolitas fills the time of cycles to some extent, and this confirms the ability of mental orientations and sociocultural practices to live, as well as lack of ruptures in temporalities of various kinds — that is what people use to regard as a history of nation. On the background of continuity, the changeability makes somehow neutral — maybe less and less convincingly — doubts about reliability of tradition that sound on the current stage of globalization. In many post-Soviet countries, when the time of history jumps over the time of cycles and gets directly in the time of events, the situation is formatted absolutely outstandingly. Actions of actors open corridors for those jumps, so that what is happening to people becomes filled with the great time of total history, as we saw it in the autumn and winter of 2004 in Ukraine.

**Approach II. The Present: Growing Hateful, Desired, and Impossible for Identification**

In the regime of history that was substantiated by the New Time and evidently exhausted itself in the past century, enlightenment and illumination come from the future (François Hartog). The exhaustion happened because potential of unexpectedness (unpredictability) of the regime was significantly higher than even the most capable futurologists could see. The future of ideologists, as an alternative to the current condition of society and to a supplier of concepts for interpretation of the present, has been radically rejected by the flow of events. However, the unrealized “trend” future by the prognostics who oriented at the Club of Rome, only confirms that tendencies of the past do not commit the future to anything. What is destined for the point of observation has closed and suggests stopping and thinking in front of justified or only imaginary independence of human deeds and uncertainty of human achievements and results.

Nevertheless, sociology, apart from its Marxist version, is not affected by that. At the same time, the regularly used statements about its weak relevance to society mean that traditional explanatory perspectives — structural, cultural and of an action — do not cover something significant, while sociological narratives about human world become less representative. It is evident that fragmentation of what that orients or is
able to orient the behavior of individuals happened to be finer than fragmentation of a discipline’s dictionary. In other words, over-individual tuning of sociological instruments needs to be revised: the initial putting should be relations of individual with himself and then his relations with the world, without distrust in traditional heuristic and conceptual settings. The fact of existence in the temporal modalities of the present leads to this way. We do not suggest reanimation of microsociological perspective or individualistic (Weber’s) approach; the idea is to distance deliberately from the structural, value and action arguments for description and interpretation of the world of people, to transit into another space of terminological and imaginative probabilities.

Accelerating time of events serves as a plain symptom of intensification of life, while the intensity call is the most persistent and loud. To be dynamic, mobile, flexible and renewable (the demand “to be younger”) means to correspond to the time, to be socially adequate. However, there is an opposite side of existence in the world of intensive time of events, as it was described by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht in one of his last books, the opposite side is tiredness and an acute desire for a moment of rest [40, pp. 134–151].

Apart from intensity, tiredness has other sources. The growing concentration of innovations and the speed of their supply broaden significantly not only limits of the new but of what is impossible to identify. TV programs explaining “How it’s Made” or “How it Works” do not help because the principles of tools and mechanisms’ work become harder to explain. Use of things distances from the knowledge about their production or technology, it forms the “new unawareness” or even new ignorance. As a result, the world of objects (“the present of things”) together with the “world of knowledge” are no more common for all of us, they are more subdivided than by generations; it is nearly impossible to determine who can and who cannot be regarded as contemporaries. Having no empirical evidences about the facts whether people notice the mass character of what is impossible to identify or not, about their emotional and behavioral reactions to this process, about the distribution of what is impossible to identify between various social categories, layers and groups, the status of tempting supposition goes to any idea about such differentiation of every temporal modality.

However, volatility and fleetingness of the time of events together with aggression of all shining and well-groomed in advertising postulate the nearly dominant prevalence of unattractive and plain, as well as miserable and repulsive. All that serves as a conclusive feature of the “dehu-
manized time”, and this was determined by the name of an old book by Jean-François Lyotard [41]. Common human values and aims were excluded from the time of events, while it is has being captured by objectivity. As to the condition and feeling of disorientation, being characteristic of time and individuals, this topic seems to be discussed, to the most extent, by José Ortega y Gasset in his essay “Theme of Our Time” (El tema de nuestro tiempo), though it was written over fifty years ago, it looks like a sociological description of the current situation: “Imagine for a minute such a shift, when the great aims, which imparted yesterday a great architectonic to our space, have lost their clearness, attractiveness and power over us, though something, which is destined to replace them, has not assumed obviousness and necessary persuasiveness. In such epoch the surrounding space seems broken, unsteady, fluttering around the individual, whose steps become uncertain because the reference points are washed out. The way, as if it is slipping under your feet, acquires tricky vagueness... The western man has taken ill with a strongly pronounced disorientation, and does not know in what stars believe” [42, p. 264].

There is less confidence in the fact that a step back in attainability of vitally important values and aims was only temporary. Nothing has come to substitute them: in the past decades, people seem to get used to the uncertainty and society as a whole has learned to live in time without reference points and gained the necessary experience. What was thought as an annoying deviation (pathology — literally by Emile Durkheim), turned into a norm. The periods of time being determined as those that lost their attractiveness and grown hateful, become shorter. Assessments of the time of events by people or experts are nothing more than manifestation of that grown hateful. For example, “pre-term” elections to legislative bodies turned in routine practices, legitimate normality of which is not contested. However, the dynamics of grown hateful in the way of claims or ultimatums stresses the great value of desirable, despite dim ideas about it. Having no object or concept, the desirable and the smoldering anguish of something different do not leave the time of events, while tension between the desirable and the grown hateful leads to either rhetorical figures or practical actions.

Described in the book about Odessites from two points of view, simultaneous and post-factum, perestroika appeared as an event that destabilized coherence of temporality models. It suggested a possibility of another time, not so alternative conditions and circumstances of coexistence. Perestroika declared the eventualty of transition from one time of events to the one of different kind — from grown hateful to desirable.
Temporality, which was planned to be overcome, went to a group of fruitless and sham times, like a receptacle of social and political plots, are being carried out but not fully realized or left untouchable at all. Apart from everything else, politicians have to ensure that the power gives people access to the desirable in a short-term or a long-term perspective by mobilizing collective and individual hopes in accordance with its own wishes and intentions, either displayed or not. Of course, a published program of actions is always accompanied with publicly formulated fears that inertia of the current time of events will not yield to the efforts in favor of transition into a “new” time of events. Or certain specific efforts will meet the resistance. Here temporal expectations of the power and of people inevitably part: if results of unintentional actions or inaction of political elites were recognized as dominant, then it would mean recognition of professional incompetence of politicians, cutting down of “political” perspectives, coming to the “end of politics”.

Assessing the year 1990, Russian colleagues talk about the “shock of irrevocability” [43]. They mean the feeling and understanding (immediately appeared) that the old order has been discredited valuably and cannot be renewed, it is impossible to do. At the same time, a source of the shock like that may be widespread doubts in fruitfulness of the current time. Many people determined the perestroika events as inauthentic, so the desirable, as a whole or partially, looks like unattainable in this case too. Inseparable from a period of social transformations, nostalgia reveals itself as symbolic coming back, when the valuable and the respected go from the desirable but inaccessible future to the “old present”, the time of events left behind.

The feeling that transitions in the time of events are irrevocable, together with understanding, intuitive and imaginative or conceptual, chances of which to fulfill the desirable are going down, form the focus of individual and group presence in the “time of cycles”. The time could be sustainable with hardly eliminated discord within the declared aims, plans and technologies for their achievement, as well as the results gained after their implementation. This concerns sociological practices in the same way as all others.

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Hard times, like easy ones, inevitably pass. It may happen according to a spiritual poem from “Notes and Extractions” by Mikhail Gasparov: “So cruel time is now, cruel time that has remained. Morrow, it will be
more cruel, and more cruel will remain” [44, p. 117]. We will see what
time comes for sociology.

References


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Elite and Leadership Change in Liberal Democracies

Abstract

The authors make an attempt to describe and explain the power relationships in a society. At the outset they emphasize that the way in which leaders and elites affect each other is a knotty problem in political analysis. If a shift toward more forceful leaders is occurring in liberal democracies then a comparable shift in elites must also be occurring. From the essential principles underlying Vilfredo Pareto’s, Max Weber’s and other well-known elite theories, the authors intend to explore the thesis that this is a time of increasingly forceful leaders embedded in more aggressive, tightly organized, and mutually antagonistic elites in at least some liberal democracies. Upon this basis the searches examine elite and leadership changes that appear to be impelled by extraordinary conditions during the past twenty-five years.

Starting with the ascendancies of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Helmut Kohl in the 1980-ies, there has been a perceptible shift in the character and style of political leadership in liberal democracies. This is the rise of leaders less inclined to engage in a politics of compromise and consensus and more disposed toward peremptory actions backed by force or its threat. These leaders gain executive office through steadily more plebiscitary electoral contests in which their ostensibly

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1 The report was presented at the 4th International Seminar “Strategic Elites and Expansion of the European Union: Reactions by, and the Prospects for, East European States Currently Left Out” (6-7 October 2006, held by the Network for Study of Strategic Elites and European Enlargement (supported by the British Academy of Science), Embassy of the United States in Ukraine and Federation of Employers of Ukraine; coordinator Prof. Dr. Olga Dm. Kutsenko (f_ok@iatp.org.ua).
superior instincts are glorified and their competitors’ alleged defects are savaged. In office, they concentrate government power in core executives at the expense of legislatures and bureaucracies, and they wield power with greater impunity than predecessors. The shift is not uniform across all liberal democracies, and in the countries where it is most noticeable it has not been linear — there are ebbs and flows. But a trend toward more determined and resolute leaders — or, at least, leaders widely perceived as such — is evident: George W. Bush and Tony Blair; Junichiro Koizumi and Silvio Berlusconi; Australia’s John Howard and Denmark’s Anders Fogh Rasmussen. José Zapatero in Spain, Stephen Harper in Canada, and Angela Merkel in Germany may prove to be further instances, while the aspirations of forceful individuals to national leadership elsewhere should not be ignored — Nicolas Sarkozy and Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Carl I. Hagen in Norway, for a time Jörg Haider in Austria, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands before his assassination. Although the label may be overly dramatic, “Ceasarist” leaders who gain power by plebiscitary means form a trend somewhat reminiscent of European politics during the interwar decades (cf. Linz 1978; Linz and Stepan 1978; Lukacs 2005; Paxton 2004).

This apparent shift in the character and style of political leaders is not the full story. In complex liberal democracies leaders are embedded in, and their effectiveness significantly depends upon, political elites: tiny groups of strategic position-holders with the organized capacity to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially (Higley and Burton 2006: 5–8). Leaders with forceful images are in important degree creations of elites — horses they ride to power. The image of Ronald Reagan as a decisive leader was initially the handiwork of a public relations firm in California, and from start to finish his presidential leadership was carefully choreographed and staged by power-holders who knew much more about politics and issues of the day than Reagan ever bothered to learn (Cannon, 1982). This is transparently the case with the unworldly George W. Bush, who, possessing a household name, has been the puppet of a neoconservative elite that plucked him from the politically innocuous Texas governorship in order to bull itself into executive power (Lind, 2003). In some situations a leader’s aura of strength may stem primarily from disarray among an opposing elite. Margaret Thatcher, who never won a majority of votes, owed much of her leadership image to chaos in the Labor Party elite, just as Tony Blair’s image has owed not a little to the Tory elite’s wanderings in the political wilderness.
The ways in which leaders and elites affect each other is, of course, a knotty problem in political analysis. Few would deny that their relations are reciprocal: leaders galvanize and orient elites, but without the power and influence that elites possess leaders can accomplish little. It is also obvious that relations between leaders and elites display much variation. Like Reagan and Bush, some leaders appear to be not much more than front men for well-formed elite groups. But like Tony Blair and John Howard, other leaders impose their wills on the elites they head. Everywhere, leaders act within the norms and structures of elite politics, some of which allow leaders wide latitude while others tightly constrain them. At present in the U.S., for example, a considerable part of the political elite is threatening to punish George W. Bush and his White House mandarins and cabinet secretaries for breaching norms about the scope of presidential power and the degree to which it can be exercised unilaterally. Beyond loose or tight norms, leaders must contend with elite structures that may be quite concentrated or fragmented. A fair amount of research shows that in liberal democracies elite structures consist of extended circles and networks of political influence and personal acquaintance that tie together several thousand of the uppermost figures in politics, government administration, business, trade unions, the media, a bevy of interest groups, and so on. Such complex and far-flung elite webworks usually stifle a leader’s single-minded pursuit of his or her political aims.

These considerations suggest that if a shift toward more forceful leaders is occurring in at least some liberal democracies then a comparable shift in elites must also be occurring. We intend to explore the thesis that this is a time of increasingly forceful leaders embedded in more aggressive, tightly organized, and mutually antagonistic elites in at least some liberal democracies. We conduct this exploration from the standpoints of Vilfredo Pareto and Max Weber. Specifically, we combine Pareto’s discussion of how fox-like elites governing “demagogic plutocracies” give way to leonine elites and more forceful rule (1935: esp. paras. 2178, 2190, 2221–29, 2231–36, 2257, 2480) with Weber’s discussion of how “leader democracy” (Führerdemokratie) needs charismatic leaders to be sustainable (1978: 1121–7, 1458–60). Given the philosophical differences between Pareto and Weber, combining their insights may seem problematic, although it has been argued that the two theorists, who were contemporaries, engaged in an “unacknowledged dialogue” (Sica, 1988: 225–49). Both viewed politics from an elite and leadership perspective; they observed and diagnosed the same political trends in Euro-
pe (and to a lesser extent the U.S.) during the stormy early years of the twentieth century; they held unsentimental views of democracy and regarded effective elites (Pareto) and charismatic leaders (Weber) as crucial for its workings. In spite of different philosophical underpinnings — Pareto’s positivism and Weber’s neo-Kantianism — their political analyses were complementary. Pareto saw individual leaders as displaying all manner of foibles and stupidities, so he thought it more profitable to concentrate on the overall psychosocial physiognomies and dispositions of elites. Weber, as his concept of “leader democracy” implies, regarded charismatic and statesmen-like leaders as vital, and he paid little attention to the characteristics of elites as wholes. Pareto largely ignored the social-historical and institutional contexts in which elites act, while Weber paid close attention to such contexts. When combined, however, the visions of Pareto and Weber dissect the vertical aspects of democracies. Pareto attacked the shortcomings and failures of their elites; Weber worried about the quality of their leaders in the era of parliamentary and mass party politics; both outlined elite and leadership changes that would or should occur.

These visions are a springboard from which to examine elite and leadership changes that appear to be impelled by extraordinary conditions during the past twenty-five years. Principally and in a nutshell, these conditions are the Soviet Union’s collapse and the globalization it spurred; recent threats to security posed by terrorism; and the massive numbers of migrants fleeing failed or failing non-Western states. First, the Soviet Union’s collapse spurred an almost universal embrace of three principles: the worth of private and deregulated capitalist markets; the superiority of popularly elected governments; the necessity for liberty in the form of an unrestricted circulation of information. But the whole-hearted embrace of these principles has tended to disorient elites and leaders in liberal democracies, causing them to adopt unrealistic expectations about what can be accomplished in domestic and international policies. Second, the specter of terrorism encourages more assertive and zero-sum political competitions, especially in the domain of national security. Widely publicized terrorist threats, accompanied by portrayals of the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a life-or-death “global war against terror”, are used by aggressive elites and forceful leaders to rally popular support, devastate political competitors, and justify large expansions of executive power as necessary to counter external and internal enemies. Third, migrations of millions of people from failed or failing non-Western states are increasingly viewed as under-
mining the social and political integration of the liberal democracies to which the migrants flee. Technologies for instant worldwide communication and rapid transportation — also key aspects of globalization — facilitate transnational identities among migrants that make their allegiances to host countries uncertain. Migrant communities perceived as semi-allegiant or even non-allegiant ignite host population support for rising elites and leaders who promise illiberal crackdowns on these communities, the sealing of national borders against illegal migrants, and greatly reduced immigration intakes.

These three conditions exert powerful centripetal pressures on the politics of liberal democracies. Our enumeration is hardly exhaustive. The specters of disease pandemics and global warming, the volatility of petroleum and other commodity markets, as well as a host of employment insecurities and the economic consequences of aging populations can readily be added. Our claim is simply that centripetal pressures stemming primarily from the conditions we have mentioned are a root cause of the changing elite and leader patterns in which we are interested. They intensify discords in liberal democratic politics, promote executive power concentrations, and favor putatively leonine elites and forceful leaders. One of Pareto’s dicta is pertinent: “When centripetal forces are dominant, the central government will be called on to provide it. Whenever circumstances turn in favor of this centripetal phase, a pre-existing central government, or a central authority new both in form and substance, asserts itself sooner or later” (1921/1984: 47).

Elites and Leaders

It is well known that Pareto and Weber saw rule by elites-cum-oligarchies as inescapable in all societies, regardless of the form governance takes. Pareto famously claimed that everywhere there exists a governing class. Whether universal suffrage prevails or not, it is always an oligarchy that governs. (1935: para. 2183). Weber just as famously wrote that everywhere the principle of the small number — that is, the superior political maneuverability of small leading groups — determines political activity. In mass states, this Caesarist element is ineradicable (1978: 1414). Both believed, nonetheless, that different elite and leader modes are associated with different kinds of political regimes. Pareto depicted ruling elites in “demagogic plutocracies” — his pejorative term for parliamentary democracies — as consisting of a far-flung alliance of fox-like politicians and profit-seeking “speculators” who, through innumerable
deals and deceptions, prevent an alliance of more leonine politicians and “rentiers” from governing. Parliaments, Pareto held, are the arenas in which the dominant fox-speculator alliance arranges the chicaneries necessary to keep itself in power. Similarly, Weber portrayed the early Weimar democracy and most other democracies of his time as essentially “leaderless”, with members of elected parliaments engaged in a chaotic horse-trading of sectoral interests.

Neither man thought that the situation he described could persist indefinitely. Pareto believed that the despoilments by which the fox-speculator alliance keeps itself in power ultimately undermine the economy and the state’s fiscal viability, opening the door to a take-over by the opposing lion-rentier alliance (1921/1984: 71; see also Femia 2001: 80-81). However, the latter’s dominance eventually proves so excessively coercive and tight-fisted that it provokes a new crisis propitious for the fox-speculator alliance’s return to power. And so modern history proceeds, in endless cycles of alternating fox-like and lion-like elite rule. Weber was not quite so pessimistic or resigned. He searched for a way by which “mass democracy” could be saved from itself. Holding that any such democracy is necessarily a “leader democracy” (Körösényi 2005), he theorized that rule by professional politicians who live “off” politics, always feathering their own nests, might be transcended in “unusual situations” by charismatic leaders not beholden to narrow sectoral interests and possessing a keen concern for the national good. If directly elected rather than chosen by parliaments, such leaders, living “for” rather than “off” politics, would use their charisma and “demagoguery” to create powerful mass followings and loyalties that would enable them to pursue national interests and goals. The result would be a “plebiscitary” or “leadership” democracy, which Weber regarded as mass democracy’s only sustainable form (Beetham 1984: 264–67).

The foregoing is, of course, a pastiche of the complex and subtle analyses made by Pareto and Weber. But their analyses are sufficiently familiar to most students of elites and leadership to make another exegesis unnecessary (see, inter alia, Finer 1965, 1968; Parry 1969/2006; Parkin 1982; Beetham 1974/1985; Femia 2001). A few elaborations will, however, be useful. First, Pareto’s metaphorical distinction between elites as “foxes” and “lions” is at odds with any typology based on elites’ declared ideological commitments. Pareto dismissed ideologies as “derivations” — rationalizations-*cum*-rhetorical devices — and instead anchored his distinction in allegedly deeper and more basic psychological predispositions (“residues”) that shape elites’ modes of rule. Lions, mani-
festing the residues of “group-persistence”, are tough, stubborn, and aggressive; they do not hesitate to use violence to achieve and hold on to power, typically framing and merchandizing their actions in terms of mass ethno-nationalist and religious loyalties. Foxes are cunning, clever, and astute; they use wit, manipulation, and diplomacy, rather than force, and frame and merchandize their exercise of power in terms of economic prosperity and their ostensible representation of diverse public interests. Unlike ideological leanings — which elites often alter — these predispositions and proclivities remain constant. So do accompanying leadership styles. Foxes never roar; they always behave in guileful and stealthy ways. Lions never shed their manes and grow bushy tails; force and fear are their preference.

For Pareto, as we have noted, elite circulation always takes a cyclical form: foxes displace lions and new lions then displace the foxes (1935:2221-2229ff.; 1921/1984:47). In the one cycle, centrifugal conditions decentralize power, and this favors opportunistic and cunning elites adept at combining dispersed pieces of power in order to ascend and rule. In the other cycle, centripetal pressures force power’s recentralization, and this favors aggressive and forceful elites adept at wielding it more unilaterally. Each cycle inevitably comes to an end because each elite type is prone to characteristic dysfunctions that produce unsustainable “disequilibria”. Lions fail because they exaggerate the effectiveness of force, and when they overstretch its use they are outmaneuvered by foxes. But foxes become soft and indecisive (“humanistic”), enabling lions waiting in the wings to exploit these weaknesses. The mode of this circulation varies in depth and violence between societies and within them over time. In general, lions tend to displace foxes and impose themselves through sharp power takeovers; foxes take power through gradual penetration and permeation of a lion-dominated governmental arena. If lions enter that arena from outside it, their seizure of power takes a revolutionary form: if they displace foxes from within the arena via factional politics, their takeover is less abrupt.

This embryonic theory of elite circulation (implied rather than stated in detail by Pareto) resembles a path-dependency account of political change. Pareto seems to suggest that each elite cycle is brought about by the preceding cycle’s accumulating ills (disequilibria), which flow from the distinctive weaknesses of whichever type of elite is then ascendant. The failures of cunning foxes in their Machiavellian excesses of deception and stealth open the way to blunt lions and their Hobbesian excesses of coercion and force. This cyclical circulation is shaped not only
by the elites’ qualitative deterioration, but also by sharply asymmetric sentiments (residues) between the governing elite and the masses — in which case the circulation tends to be revolutionary — or by a less dramatic asymmetry of sentiments within the elite stratum itself — in which case circulation is likely to be more peaceful. The elite cycles also tend to coincide with economic and cultural oscillations: the predominance of lions and their rentier allies accompanies periods of economic decline involving revivals of nationalism and religiosity; the ascendancy of foxes and speculators accompanies periods of economic prosperity and secularism. This is more an elite “path-dependency” sequence than a “circumstances/conditions” construct (Timasheff 1965:68; Parry 1969/2006: 57–63).

Pareto’s elite types never appear in pure form and never operate in isolation from each other. The predominance of each is always a matter of degree. Behind every leonine elite in power there is always a foxy one waiting for the lions’ dysfunctions and errors to create a political opening, and vice versa. Because such dysfunctions and errors are inevitable, neither lions nor foxes are inherently superior. When ascendant each degenerates, which is why, in Pareto’s view, elite rule seldom stabilizes for any long period of time.\(^1\) History is not only the graveyard of elites replacing each other, it is also the stage on which oscillations and stylistic successions are played out without end. This cyclical and cynical (but realistic?) view of history formed a powerful counter-vision to optimistic liberal-democratic scenarios of progress, and it was, of course, a fundamental retort to Marxism.

Although Weber expounded his concept of “leader democracy” and his hoped-for alternative of a more charismatic and plebiscitary “leadership democracy” in a fragmentary way, his analysis helps us to understand the socio-historical and institutional contexts in which changes in leaders occur. According to Weber, charismatic leadership “always results from unusual, especially political or economic, situations” (1978: 1121). These are situations of crisis or of sudden and unexpected develop-
opments that trigger collective excitements, anxieties, and expectations culminating in “surrender to heroism” (1978: 1132). The situations or developments are transitional and are followed by more stable forms of authority, but so long as they last the transitions are tension-filled. Charismatic and plebiscitary leadership emerges as “the most important transitional type” of authority (1978:267) — a sort of halfway house between charismatic domination and the legal-rational form stable political institutions must ultimately take in modern societies. Under condition of mass democratization — in particular, the direct election of political leaders by masses of voters — charismatic and plebiscitary leadership may emerge and rest on popular acclamation (elections) and public trust. Leaders will act “on behalf of the people” and legitimate their decisions in terms of the “will of the people”. This “will of the people” is evoked and cultivated through leaders’ direct appeals and their use of demagogy (1978: 241–71, 1111–1155).

Charismatic and plebiscitary leadership, Weber observes, extends to a leader’s administrative staff — what might also be thought of as the elite surrounding the leader. Staff members worship the leader (the charismatic principle) and bask in the confidence the masses have in him or her (the plebiscitary principle). This staff elite — typically the leader’s trusted confidants — cannot easily be integrated into a hierarchical authority structure because the foundations of its power rest outside the institutional realm. Therefore, instead of an integrated hierarchy charismatic and plebiscitary leadership tends to produce centralized and autocephalous spheres of authority and diluted staff elite competencies. In this situation, top figures in the elite exercising executive power cannot be controlled by parties or parliaments and cannot be dismissed without the leader’s approval. Their political fate is determined by the leader’s trust in them and the “confidence of the people”, rather than by their administrative competence.

In Weber’s view, by paving the way for persons skilled in demagogy, rather than just gifted orators like lawyers, the plebiscitary principle favors “the type of individual who is most spectacular, who promises the most, or who employs the most effective propaganda measures in the competition for leadership” (1978: 1451). Under plebiscitary leadership, then, politics display the emotional and irrational features typical of charismatically led orders, and they militate against deliberative policy-making and long-term rationalization. However, charismatic and plebiscitary leadership does not preclude further transition to a more rationalized, orderly, and workable “leader democracy”. Whether this fur-
ther transition occurs, as well as its speed, depend on adopting a functional division of powers and forming a strong party machine that takes over as the locus of political allegiance and mobilization of public (electoral) support.

In a well-functioning leader democracy, according to Weber, and as Andras Körösényi (2005) ably elucidates, a charismatic and plebiscitary leader can be insulated from immediate public pressures and subjected to some collegial control. The leader and the staff elite surrounding him or her still impose themselves on the people, but their political success depends on winning competitive elections — on proving themselves effective in generating mass support. This support is at once diffuse and personalized. Political rivals use rhetoric and image manipulation to engineer personal support, inspire personal loyalty, sway public opinion, and generate trust, especially at the crucial moments of electoral contests. Public support is, in other words, the product of the political process, not of some bottom-up aggregation of pre-existing interests and views (Körösényi 2005: 365). If successful in using rhetoric and image to generate support, a charismatic and statesman-like leader secures public trust, loyalty, and respect. The mass demand for leadership is satisfied, the confidence of the masses is won, and, most important, an aura of responsibility is created and sustained. This, in turn, enables leaders to work with parliamentary colleagues and pursue “continuous and consistent policies” (Weber 1978: 1459).

Pareto and Weber were close observers of politics in their respective countries, Italy and Germany, and of European developments more widely, during the twentieth century’s early years. Agonizing over Italy’s post-World War I political turmoil, which culminated in the “March on Rome” by Mussolini and his Blackshirts in 1922, Pareto identified the ascending fascists with lions. Initially, he pinned on them his hopes for Italy’s renewal, although he recognized that the fascists were ultra-nationalists coming from outside the governmental arena and therefore likely to take power in a revolutionary and violent manner; they were profiting ruthlessly from conditions of social, economic and political crisis, and their repressions of opponents were ugly to behold. In relatively short order (albeit after Pareto’s death in 1923), Mussolini and his elite assumed dictatorial power, displaying much aggressiveness, corruption, and brutality, the early signs of which Pareto condemned in a political testament written from his deathbed. Weber, observing only briefly before his death in mid-1920 the already devastating consequences of the Treaty of Versailles for Germany, believed that his country’s authori-
tarian heritage, political extremism, now leaderless bureaucracy, and
dispirited masses pointed toward “a polar night of icy darkness and
hardness” unless a charismatic and appropriately demagogic leader
emerged and headed off this fate (quoted by Antonio 1995: 2370-71). As
things turned out, of course, it was Hitler who emerged as Führer, mim-
icking Mussolini’s title of Duce. The ascendancies of the two leaders and
elites induced a proto-leonine shift in ruling styles throughout Europe
and parts of the Western hemisphere, which even an echo in far-off Aus-
tralia in the form of an incipient fascist movement, the New Guard (Linz

We encapsulate this familiar history in order to observe that the bel-
ligerence and brutality of the fascists/Nazis discredited, so to speak, the
image of leonine elites and charismatic leaders. Following their rules by
terror, wartime atrocities, and the racism and ultra-nationalism they
spouted, the leonine fascists/Nazis were regarded with contempt and
hatred. Their grievous over-reaching and consequent defeat in World
War II were the start of a shift in elite and leader types ascendant in
post-war liberal democracies.

**Elites and Leaders after World War II**

Pareto and Weber lived in countries and at a time when elite conflicts
and rivalries between leaders were — and had always been — largely un-
checked. Following national unification in Italy and Germany, deep ideo-
logical chasms and mutual distrusts separated opposing elite camps.
They disagreed fundamentally about the political institutions on which
their new national states rested and they strove to defend or destroy gov-
ernments of the day according to their conflicting stances and bases of
support. The elites that Pareto and Weber knew best were, in a word,
deeply disunited. In Italy, to be sure, right-wing monarchical and
left-wing republican elite camps fused in the famous trasformismo of
1876, but this proved too narrow to accommodate spreading popular
mobilizations of peasants and workers suffering the harshness of in-
dustrialization and led by emerging Catholic and socialist elites who had
no place in the fused elite and thus no stake in the regime (Cotta 1992).
Exacerbated by foreign misadventures such as the Libyan War in 1912,
the elite power struggles became steadily more explosive during the
years before and after World War I, and they led to fascist dictatorship af-
ter the assassination of Socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti in June 1924
and the withdrawal of Socialist deputies from Parliament. In the German
Reich authoritarian rule by Bismarck and his successors and by elites associated with them kept the lid on a boiling political pot. But the Imperial regime was reviled by elites leading bourgeois and working-class organizations and movements, and the lid finally came off in the “leaderless” Weimar Republic, the inception of which Weber witnessed.

The disunited condition of Italian and German elites was mirrored in nearly all other European countries (and in all countries of Latin America) before and after World War I. The exceptions were Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland where, in much earlier and highly contingent circumstances, basic “consensual” unifications of previously disunited elites had occurred — England’s “Glorious Revolution” in 1688-89; elites in the Dutch Provinces banding together to free themselves from Spanish colonial rule in the late sixteenth century; Sweden’s constitutional revolution in 1809; the unification effected by elites in the aftermath of Switzerland’s short civil war during 1847-48. Politically, those four countries, with stable liberal oligarchies governing them, constituted marked deviations in a European landscape suffused by unbridged elite divisions and unstable, mainly authoritarian, regimes (Higley and Burton 2006: 33–54). Pareto and Weber thus drew their lessons primarily from a particular pattern of elite relations — disunited — and from the capricious leaders and regimes to which it gives rise.

It is interesting to speculate about how their analyses might have been tempered if Pareto and Weber had greater knowledge of the consensually united elite pattern. In it extensive communication and influence networks integrate competing factions and leaders who share an underlying consensus about most norms of political conduct and the worth of most existing political institutions. Elite factions and leaders accord each other significant trust, cooperate tacitly to contain explosive conflicts, and compete for political power in comparatively restrained ways. Power sharing is the hallmark of a consensually united elite, and the periodic, peaceful alternations in executive power that mark liberal democracies are its principal manifestation (Higley and Burton 2006: 8–15). Pareto’s grudging admiration for the politics practiced by Swiss elites and Weber’s praise for William Gladstone’s leadership role in British politics suggested an awareness that elites are not always and everywhere as blinked as Pareto found them in Italy, and that “leader democracies” are not always as bereft of capable leaders as Weber observed of Germany.

In ways and for reasons too varied to recount here, between about 1950 and 1980 consensually united elites and the liberal democracies...
they make possible formed in all West European countries where elites had long been disunited (for accounts, see Higley and Burton 2006). Political practices by fox-like elites and relatively prosaic leaders came to prevail. Tripartite deals were cut by government, business, and trade union elites to create neocorporatist condominums (Schmitter, 1974), and state power was used as a regulatory-welfare tool to expand social rights, a practice that was endorsed, more tacitly than explicitly, by all main elite camps. Elites and leaders of nearly all stripes professed to believe that with minor exceptions the activities of each social grouping contributed to the well-being of all groupings. Accordingly, each had an interest in securing the cooperation of others in the common operation of social and political institutions. This sense of social interests meshing in some broad common interest and leaving special interests so limited as to be easily negotiable was widespread among elites and leaders, so much so that it became fashionable to talk about ideology having “ended”. A period of Tweedledum and Tweedledee political contests undergirded by economic expansion unfolded — the “halcyon years” that lasted until the oil shocks and stagflation of the late 1970-ies (Field and Higley 1986). Had he witnessed this, Pareto would have thought his analysis of demagogic plutocracy born out, but Weber might have had second thoughts about the sustainability of democracies with leaders lacking charisma when observing West Germany under Adenauer, Erhard and their chancellor successors; Italy in the time of Fanfani, Moro, and the raft of manipulators who followed them; Norway and Sweden under somnolent father figures like Gerhardsen and Erlander; a U.K. led by the uninspiring but devious Macmillan and Wilson; the U.S. during the gray Eisenhower and crafty Johnson and Nixon presidencies; the game of musical chairs being played in Japan by interchangeable LDP leaders — the list could be much longer. On the other hand, Weber might have found his analysis of leader democracy strikingly illustrated by the charismatic Charles de Gaulle’s rescue of France from its leaderless Fourth Republic.

Building consensus through deals among major sectors, quieting the less well-off with welfare subsidies, paying off other disgruntled groups, and managing public opinion through increasingly powerful mass media triumphed to such an extent during the twentieth century’s third quarter that these practices came to be seen as the natural, or at least normal, form of politics in liberal democracies. In those years hardly anyone wondered if the combination of modern organization and advancing technology might be creating a social order in which it would be difficult to keep a reasonable proportion of the population engaged in ac-
tivities that others could accept as contributing to the common benefit (but cf. Field and Higley 1980). Starting in the late 1970-ies, however, the practices of fox-like elites and sly if largely gray leaders were gradually undermined by problems or “disequilibria” as Pareto would say: the inability of welfare policies to stanch the growth of an impoverished and socially disorganized underclass; structural unemployment impervious to economic growth; high rates of inflation induced by the deficit-financed Vietnam War and OPEC oil shocks; declining state fiscal and regulatory capacities; a proliferation of single-issue parties and volatile voters contributing to the collapse of some of the elite coalitions cemented in neocorporatist pacts.

These problems-cum-disequilibria were highly publicized in the media and in critical analyses questioning the effectiveness, even the legitimacy, of ascendant leaders and elites — in particular, Jimmy Carter and his administration, the premiership of “Sunny Jim” Callaghan in the U.K., Helmut Schmidt’s chancellorship in West Germany. A backlash gathered force and champions of tougher practices captured public support. Economic rationalist and neo-laissez-faire principles that leave people to sink or swim on their own became fashionable guides to policy, and previously marginal elite factions and leaders espousing those principles came to the fore. Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl signified the first wave of more tough-minded governance. Thatcher launched a bold military expedition against Argentina in the Falkland Islands and faced down the previously invincible mineworkers’ union. The elite around Reagan did the same to a union of air traffic controllers, undertook a massive military build-up, armed and bankrolled mujhaddin insurgents against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and anti-Sandinist “freedom fighters” in Nicaragua, and voiced unremitting hostility toward the Soviet Union’s “evil empire”. Kohl acted decisively to reunify Germany, he led the EU’s Maastricht Treaty effort, his government precipitously legitimated Yugoslavia’s break-up, and it unshackled German military forces for previously forbidden foreign deployments.

Because the collapse of Soviet communism between 1989–1991 could plausibly be portrayed, whatever the reality, as a Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl victory, it enhanced the shift toward more forceful elites and leaders. In the U.S. demands for tough market rationalism and “getting government off people’s backs” became drumbeats that in 1994 delivered control of Congress to Republicans under the self-proclaimed “revolutionary” leadership of Newt Gingrich. The alleged folly of decreased US military spending in the wake of the Soviet collapse became the rally-
ing cry of an aggressive neoconservative elite that was now fully formed (e.g., Kristol and Kagan, 2000; Fukuyama 2006). This elite’s no-holds-barred tactics were soon evident in the Clinton impeachment proceedings. When the elite, astride George W. Bush, failed to win the 2000 presidential election outright, it ruthlessly exploited an electoral standoff in Florida to obtain the White House keys from a friendly Supreme Court majority. Donald Rumsfeld and other top members of the elite immediately began talking, albeit in secret, about the need to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq (Suskind, 2004: 80–82); the Vice President, Dick Cheney, quietly concentrated executive power in his office beyond any US historical precedent; and a symbiosis of the elite’s congressional leaders and Washington “K Street” business lobbyists began a thorough deregulation of the energy, communications, financial, and other main economic sectors. In the course of 2001, especially after 9/11, it dawned on observers of American politics that an uncompromising elite had taken over. Coinciding with this US change, Junichiro Koizumi was installed as Japan’s prime minister that April; in May Silvio Berlusconi swept into power in Rome; Tony Blair won a second term, nearly by acclamation, a month later; and in November John Howard played the fear cards of asylum-seeking migrant hordes and terrorism to win a third and crushing election victory in Australia.

**Current Elites and Leaders Assessed**

Elite alignments and alliances during these early years of the new century are much more complex than during the twentieth century’s “halcyon” period. They involve international elite cartels — economic, political, military, and intelligence — whose national components support each other’s positions and policies. Elite positioning in these cartels is as important as positioning in the various national power games. Leaders of the cartels’ national components consult frequently with each other, borrow freely from each other’s policy repertoires, and shore each other up in crises and election campaigns. Non-stop electronic media promote political competitions that are much more stylistic than substantive. Appeals for support focus on personalities and leadership images rather than policy platforms, and they aim at gaining short-term public approval instead of long-term support. But because these changes have occurred gradually, taking place largely within the elite stratum, they are difficult to assess.
More leonine elites and forceful leaders are, nonetheless, evident in some of the most important liberal democracies. Exhibit A is the assertion of America’s geopolitical hegemony by the Bush elite. With its inner core of force-oriented “Vulcans”, its Spartan élan, executive power concentration, and peremptory actions, the elite has clear leonine features (Mann, 2004; Higley, 2006). Efforts by ruling elites and leaders in Japan and several European countries to ameliorate economic stagnation and unemployment are also more aggressive and forceful. In Japan, for example, Koizumi and his associates ended fifteen years of deflation, stoked nationalism and military strength, and broke the hold that the “iron triangle” of bureaucrats, businessmen, and LDP placemen long had on economic policy. Merkel in Germany and de Villepin and his shadow, Sarkozy, in France seek to act in tough ways to dispel high unemployment, especially among young people. Nearly everywhere in the face of post-9/11 security fears, governing elites deploy expanded intelligence-security apparatuses to put mass publics, notably immigrant Muslim communities, under close surveillance. Consider, for example, the Bush administration’s secret and warrantless monitoring of phone calls and e-mails among what is guessed to be 45 million US residents, as well as its secret inspection of international transfers of bank funds by many residents. Or consider the Blair government’s elaborate monitoring and tracking of two score UK residents allegedly intent on blowing up airplanes bound for the U.S. in August 2006. Add to these examples the complicity of European governments in the CIA’s secret transport of abducted terrorist suspects through airports and air spaces in order to imprison or “rendition” them.

A leonine ascendancy is apparent in other respects. Acting forcefully against long Labor Party proclivities, Tony Blair and his entourage have given the UK core executive expanded resources and a streamlined capacity to impose policies (Burch and Holliday, 2004-05), traded peerages and honors for campaign contributions, and provided business firms with lucrative opportunities to invest in the public sector. Like members of the Bush elite, most of those in the core executive elite around Blair have not served party and parliamentary apprenticeships but have instead parachuted into power positions from think tanks, public relations firms, business, and other locations. Blair and his lieutenants took the grave step of participating in the invasion of Iraq despite two cabinet resignations and vociferous opposition in parliament, the Labor Party, and the British public. In Australia John Howard and a surrounding staff elite similar in its extra-parliamentary origins to Blair’s joined
the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq despite intense parliamentary and public opposition. The Howard elite has twice launched risky military peacekeeping missions in East Timor, intervened with force in the Solomon Islands, threatened preemptive attacks on terrorist redoubts in Southeast Asia, and won three reelectios through bare-knuckled campaigns that whipped up voters’ fears. In Italy for four years Silvio Berlusconi and the elite around him played fast and loose with parliamentary and judicial practices, exerted near monopoly control of television, and followed the Bush, Blair, and Howard elites into Iraq in the teeth of public opposition. In Denmark, where public anxieties about immigration have tended to override foreign affairs, Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s government has cut the number of asylum seekers by half, paid Afghan asylum seekers to return home, and restricted the entry of Muslim clerics, without as yet stanching growth of the anti-immigrant People’s Party and its demands for even more stringent measures. As illustrated by Donald Rumsfeld’s six-year tenure at the Pentagon, top elite figures responsible for policy disasters cannot be controlled by parliaments or parties and can be ousted only by the paramount political leader.

Yet it must be asked if this onset of more leonine elites and forceful leaders is really just a blip on the radar screens of liberal democracies. Do we not mistake fairly normal alternations in power, perhaps made sharper by the magnitudes of today’s centripetal pressures, for a basic and lasting change in elite and leader modes? There are many indications, after all, that the Bush elite has in its hubris and miscalculations disastrously over-extended US military power and destroyed the US claim to geopolitical hegemony. Signs are numerous that the US political elite as a whole is deeply disillusioned by the course of events in Iraq and Afghanistan, by gross Bush administration incompetence when responding to Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of New Orleans in 2005, and by corrupt and craven deals between Bush elite allies and sundry clienteles. If Democrats regain control of Congress in the November 2006 mid-term elections the elite’s political paralysis will probably follow, and in any event Bush, Cheney and their top associates will exit power at the end of 2008. Extensive military repairs and yawning fiscal deficits will be crippling bills that their successors will then have to pay. The departure of Tony Blair and his entourage from power in London will precede the Bush elite’s exit. Silvio Berlusconi is, for the moment at least, gone from power in Rome; Junichiro Koizumi vacated Japan’s premiership in September 2006; Australia’s 2007 federal election is certain to be John Howard’s last. Although Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s reelection in Den-
mark in 2005 was the first ever achieved by a Danish Liberal leader, his party, as well as the opposition Social Democrats, lost votes and seats to anti-immigrant and conservative competitors so that Rasmussen’s political dominance is in doubt. And it remains to be seen if Stephen Harper and Angela Merkel and their executive elites can act forcefully in the absence of firm parliamentary control. As regards the jockeying of elites and leaders for presidential power in France, “uncertain” and “volatile” are unavoidable adjectives. In short, the patterns we have been exploring are ambiguous; they may be more ephemeral and putative than central and lasting. Nevertheless, they warrant a few concluding reflections.

**Conclusions**

For a start, today’s seemingly more leonine elites and forceful leaders are quite timid when compared with forebears in interwar Europe. The shift that we have been exploring bears little substantive resemblance to the revolutionary changes that then took place. This difference is at least partly anticipated by Pareto’s thesis that deep and violent elite circulations occur only as the result of wars or other truly explosive crises. Although it is conceivable that the Iraq and Afghanistan military quagmires may produce a major crisis in the U.S., the shift in elites and leaders there and everywhere else has to date occurred more or less gradually within each country’s elite stratum and in conformance, by and large, with established institutions. There has been no clear rupturing of liberal democracy. But although timid by historical measure, the current elites and leaders we have discussed dress actions in nationalist and populist garbs and present themselves as champions of a morally upright “heartland”. They portray terrorist threats to established ways of life as being so dire that harsh and peremptory actions, many of which cannot “safely” be made public, are imperative. In a plebiscitary way they enlist mass support by daily and carefully orchestrated appearances in the mass media where they portray opponents as cowardly and unpatriotic.

Second, and as we said at the outset, the shift in elites and leaders is not uniform across the liberal democracies. Signs of it are fainter and more uneven in Europe than in the U.S., Australia, and, arguably, Japan, where Shinzo Abe, a hard-line nationalist who is an enthusiastic pilgrim to the Yasukuni Shrine, is has succeeded Koizumi as prime-minister. But we should keep in mind that changes in interwar Europe were not uniform either, and they stretched over two decades. Mussolini and
his fascists took power in 1922–24, Stalin did so in 1928-29, Hitler and the Nazis took over in 1933, the same year that Salazar instituted Portugal’s Estado Novo; Dolfuss took control in Vienna a year later, and Metaxas in Athens in 1936; Franco consolidated his regime only after the civil war in Spain. Meanwhile, France, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and the Anglo-American democracies experienced no such basic interwar elite and leader change, although several, like Belgium, came perilously close to it. The current shift is, in other words, no more patchy — although it is certainly less clear-cut — than the interwar one.

Third, the extent to which the shift is a by-product of US developments nags our exploration. Because of US influence — “hegemony” if one prefers — the Bush elite’s aggressive actions promote comparable actions elsewhere. Thus, governments led by Blair, Berlusconi, Howard, Rasmussen, and by José Maria Aznar in Spain joined the Bush elite’s military interventions in Afghanistan and then Iraq, as did governing elites and leaders in most countries of Eastern Europe. They did this for reasons having as much to do with maintaining their alliances and trading relations with the all-important U.S. as with assessments that their own security interests dictated the costly interventions. Likewise, clampdowns on migrant communities that might be harboring terrorist cells appear to be instigated, at least in part, by the demands of US intelligence agencies. It can be asked, in short, whether the shift we detect is mostly a reverberation of what has been occurring in the U.S.

Another question, related to the one just posed, is whether the U.S. developments — the Bush elite’s ascendency and actions — are themselves an aberration or fluke that will soon disappear. Despite a mountainous literature examining the Bush elite, there is no agreed understanding of it. In particular, the decision to attack Iraq continues to baffle those who have studied it from outside the elite’s inner sanctum (e.g., Fukuyama 2006). The 9/11 terrorist attacks, which have been the main public rationale for the Iraq venture, did not change the international situation of the U.S. one iota. Like the air raid on Tokyo led by Jimmy Doolittle in early 1942, the 9/11 takeovers of passenger planes for use as guided missiles were almost certainly non-repeatable, and, dramatic though they were, they exacted a cost in lives far fewer than the 17,000 homicides and 40,000 car accident fatalities each year in the U.S. While retaliating against al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts in Afghanistan was clearly warranted and politically essential, the decision to invade Iraq was either a blunder born of hubris and historic miscalculation about the ability of the U.S. to implant “freedom and democracy” where it has
never existed, or it was part of a much larger, though equally dubious, secret strategy to establish in Iraq a military platform from which the Middle East could be made safe for petroleum supplies and Israel. The consequence, in any event, has been an evisceration of the Bush elite’s political credibility, even its legitimacy, so that it serves decreasingly as a beacon for elites and leaders in other liberal democracies. In this respect, a U.S. stoking of the shift to more leonine elites and forceful leaders may be ending.

Strong centripetal pressures on liberal democracies remain, however, and they are likely to increase. Elites and leaders sense that these pressures require bolder and more forceful responses. With leaders who may be more ersatz than genuinely charismatic, liberal democracies will have still greater plebiscitary features. Appeals for support utilizing emotional and irrational rhetoric and the careful management of leader images are here to stay. Behind their trappings are likely to be more leonine elites that benefit politically from alliances with large and property plutocratic strata. What remains to be seen is how strong and vigorous these elites will be, how much they will value loyalty over expertise and intellectual advice, how sharply they will centralize executive power in a few hands, and, therefore, how prone they will be to errors, over-stretching, and a new penetration by foxes.

References


Subjective Reliability: Theory and Measurement (ISR)

Abstract

The paper provides a substantiation of the new procedure named “The Index of Subjective Reliability” (ISR). The authors examine various aspects concerning respondents’ self-estimation of their own reliability revealed in the responses to single questions, sets of questions and to the questionnaire as a whole. The results of questionnaire testing and evaluation in pilot and large-scale studies are also presented.

1 Translated by Ksenia Ursulenko from the Ukrainian text “Sub’iektyvna nadiiniist’: teoriia ta metod vymiriuvannia (ISN)”, Sotsiolohii a, teoriia, metody, markety nh, 2008, № 1, pp. 166–188. Edited by Olena Petrenko.
Sociologists were long ago divided into two opposition groups. The first one worships discourse and narrative, expecting to find out a clue for understanding of social reality in their own imagination as well as in free stream of thoughts of other people. The other group is filled up with the idea of “quantofrenia” and desire to verify the harmony of social order by means of algebra. Both of them have enough arguments to prove the unsoundness of the opponents. But if for “qualitative sociologists” any criticism is not frightening by definition, as far as, following Protagor, they determine a human, not a number, to be the general criteria, for those who try to measure something in individual or mass consciousness correctly, blaming for inadequacy of measurement is rather annoying. So that, the experts in methodology and empirical research try to discover new possibilities to validate sociological information presented as quantitative data. Emergence of correlation, factor and variance analyses supplemented with mathematical apparatus, which is needed for clear definition of biases in sampling studies, appears to be able to provide sufficient reliability of psychological and social measuring, based on scale ratings that are obtained as a result of application of different survey procedures. And if reliability had been defined only by characteristics of scales, the essential set of reliability indicators that characterize reproducibility and consistency of data would suffice for identification of the extent of measurement reliability. However, stable and consistent data, obtained while asking questions, “obvious validity” of which evokes no suspicions, quite often turn out to have very little to do with social reality, which a researcher aimed to examine.

This is often connected with unreliability of the person as an instrument for measurement of his own social characteristics and psychological states. A striking example of unreliability was given by G. Batygin, who conducted a survey among students. He asked them two questions: “Do you often perform immoral acts?” and “Do you often encounter immoral acts?” In the first case, the answer “often” was chosen by 3% of the respondents, in the second case — by 93%. [1, p. 114-115]. Similar result was obtained by Ye. Golovakha and O. Kronik, who asked young people what qualities they personally lacked and what were those for people surrounding them. It turned out that for oneself firmness, resoluteness and self-confidence were mostly lacking, and for others — gentleness, kindness and fairness [2, p. 108–111]. The matter is that questions associated with self-morality estimation are not reliable because of their sensitiveness. However, there are more reasons for unreliability of person as an instrument of “self-measurement”. Even if technical instrument of a survey (a question or an additive scale) is reliable itself,
survey data may be doubtful because of the personal characteristics, emotional and physical state of the respondent. In addition, very often unreliability of instrument is determined by social environment in which the research is conducted. Absolutely reliable scale elaborated in definite sociocultural conditions can be unreliable regarding people socialized in other culture. For example, some rates of the Bogardus scale were unacceptable for many Ukrainians. That is why the adaptation of the scale to new sociocultural conditions was needed.

The aim of this article is not to review all amount of reliability factors. We confine ourselves to describe the result of using method for “subjective reliability” measurement as a self-estimation of reliability by the respondents in a survey. To attain this goal we had to:

— Analyze the notion of “reliability” in a number of categories that clarify different aspects guaranteeing quality and reliability of sociological information.

— Justify a new category “subjective reliability”.

— Construct additive scale for subjective-reliability-index (ISR) and approbate it in probe researches and mass surveys.

To the Reliability Category in Sociology

The reliability category is used in different contexts related to measuring procedures of the collection of sociological data. Among different definitions of reliability that could be found in methodological literature, the most compact was proposed by P. Alreck and R. Settle who consider reliability as freedom from random errors (contrary to the validity, that is freedom from random errors and systematical biases in sociological data) [4, p. 64]. The conclusion of J. Manheim and R. Rich follows this approach to understanding of reliability, which is accepted in western literature. They argue that, if in recent studies the measurement was convincingly validated, we can use it without taking into consideration its reliability [5, p. 111-112]. This position is supported by Russianmethodologist I. Deviatko, who implies that unreliable test cannot be valid but valid test is always reliable [6, p. 72]. Consequently, if it is possible to validate a procedure following all the rules and not to worry about reliability, why do we need reliability at all? It is only one assumption: if it is not possible to prove validity of measurement, at least it should be proved that completely formally it is reliable even if it is not possible to identify what is measured. Basing on popular among social scientists analogy from the field of exact sciences, we can ask a reasonable question: Why do we need an exact rule to measure length if we try to use it for
measurement of temperature? In other words — why do we need to define a level of reliability if it has no use without validation and after an adequate validation it is not necessary anymore?

The answer to those naive questions is possible if to stretch the meaning of reliability of measurement and not to restrict it by characteristics of stability and reproducibility (correlation between results of repeated measurements) and consistency (intercorrelation for certain indicators of additive index) — which are very sensible. Let us examine the first kind of reliability connected with stability of the data in the course of time. According to the author of fundamental manual about design of empirical social research D. Miller, the idea that test-retest index is the best way to measure reliability is widely spread among social researchers.

We can agree that for most psychological measurements characterizing personal features and fundamental attitudes, stability of data in time indicates reliability of measurement. But regarding measurement of psychological states that are variable and sensitive to the measuring situations, test-retest stability is rather an indicator of insensitivity of an instrument but not its reliability. Moreover, stability may turn out to be inappropriate in those cases when it is about dynamic opinions, social estimations and preferences, which are studied, as a rule, by sociologists in surveys. Regarding the problem of “reliability — consistency”, this indicator, regardless of the choice of definite statistical procedure (division or correlation of particular variables with additive index), is related directly to validity of measurement (convergent validity), as far as correlations in these cases show those variables measure the same phenomena from different points. The above-mentioned Miller does not consider consistency (homogeneity) to be the feature of reliability. He defines it as a self-sufficient criterion of scale evaluation. But the spreading interpretation of reliability brings additional misunderstanding in the systems of notions that relate to the evaluation of quality of sociological information. Likewise, in the “Working Book of Sociologist” which was intended to be the reference book of a sociologist-empiricist, stability of information was not the only part of reliable measurement, but also “rightfulness and reasonableness”. Definition of the reliability implied revealing systematical biases. In general, the process of validation represents a special case for proving reliability measurement [8, p. 233–235]. Such understanding of category of reliability in the Soviet sociology is connected with G. Saganenko and V. Volovych’s works [9; 10]. The same position is supported by the prominent Ukrainian sociologist V. Paniotto in his “Sociological Manual” where he defines validity as one of the main elements of reliability of sociological information [11, p. 195].
Contradictory approaches to the definitions of reliability and validity lead to incertitude in understanding of what should be reliable: the procedure of measurement, the instrument (the scale) or the data obtained as a result of measurement. In methodological literature and manuals one can find all three interpretations of the term “reliability” or concentration on one or two its interpretations. In general, the controversy of understanding of the reliability category has a long history. In the middle of the last century Robert Merton appealed to European sociologists to pay more attention to reliability. He used this term regarding to the researching process and data analyses [12, pp. 449–453]. Modern authors of some sociological dictionaries imply that reliability characterizes the collected data, instruments as well as procedure of measurement [13, p. 413; 14, p. 562]. At the same time, according to Ukrainian recent dictionaries of sociology, the matter concerns only the reliability of instrument (test, scale, etc.) [15, p. 258; 16, p. 356].

According to Russian sociological literature, the authors contribute to terminological confusion while translating the term of reliability as “credibility” [17, p. 106]. As a result, the definition of reliability in Russian translation of dictionary of D. Jary and J. Jary assumes absolutely inappropriate character. It is assumed that credibility is reliability of either collected data or testing, evaluation of its collecting [18, p. 194]. The wordplay that is not in compliance with the rules of Russian language in this particular case, very definitely reflects the common situation with the definition of reliability in the domestic methodological literature. For instance, V. Yadov, while describing this situation, said that there was no common view in interpretation of the “reliability” term of sociological information. In his opinion, the main reason is that some authors understand the term “reliability” widely as a quality of entire research and its results consequently; and others, contrary to this point, consider reliability to be one or another way of its manifestation (e.g., stability of data, its adequacy to the aim of research, etc.). In strict sense, reliability of measuring should be related to the instrument of measuring but not to the data. With respect to data as well as to final conclusions of research it is more correct to say that they are credible (or relatively credible) [19, p. 76]. There are hardly any arguments not to support the position of the Russian sociologist in the issue of division between the categories of credibility of data and reliability of instrument of measurement. This position gives an opportunity to separate reliability from validity and credibility in such a manner: *instrument of measurement (indicator, additive scale, test, etc.) should be reliable, procedure of measurement at all stag-
es of research (including elaboration of instrument) should be valid and collected data should be credible.

Substantiation of the Subjective Reliability Concept

However, with such an understanding of relation between categories of credibility, validity and reliability, there still exists the problem of the self-reliant meaning of reliability as far as creation of reliable instrument for unreasonable measurements has no sense and is even harmful (significant resources providing reliability could be wasted to obtain incredible data). It is not surprising that J.P. Robinson and P.R. Shaver, the authors of the fundamental manual about measurement of social attitudes, define reliability as one of the most vague terms of psychometrics [20, p. 10]. This happens mostly because the instrument of measurement in social research is often elaborated technically as a scale while the person who marks his opinions and estimations on this scale is an instrument (of measurement) himself even if it is very specific. We cannot say that this problem is not discussed. There are works investigating this problem. S.D. Khaitun concludes that in sociological or psychological measurement person is used directly as a “device” while being a respondent or an expert [21, p. 23]. He implies that because of the human nature of this device weak reproducibility manifests itself in the results of social measurement of indicator value. It results in a number of problems concerning objective indicators of stability and consistency of data. But the human’s disadvantages from the point of reliability of measurement may be partially compensated for by the unique capability of a person to estimate his own reliability. If the subjective estimations confirm objective indicators of reliability, there are additional grounds to state that the measurement was conducted with reliable instrument. This approach to understanding and measuring of reliability considers elaboration of methodological procedure that enables respondent to estimate his reliability in the course of interview. Of course, for a sociologist oriented on sample researches the question of reliability of respondent may seem an additional problem as far as any respondent, even if he is “reliable”, should have the same probability to be a part of the sample as an “unreliable” respondent. However, the necessity of subjective reliability measurement is caused not by the perspective to choose “needed respondents”, but by the possibility to create and correct questions, scales and tests that will give an opportunity to maximum possible amount of respondents to feel their self-reliability in the role of respondents.
It is commonly known that the credibility of sociological information received in surveys is greatly influenced by the factors which are connected with a respondent: his knowledge, will to cooperate, correct understanding of questions, ability to concentrate on tasks, to separate himself from obstacles and influence of people around him. The range of procedures was elaborated to find out particular indicators of the “reliability of a person” when he is a respondent. Tradition of studies of a respondent’s competence on the topic of research begins in 1950-ies when the Gallup funnel was invented. Then, the question filters were defined for a respondent’s reliability as a device able to produce formed opinion but not spontaneous reactions to the form or situation of an interview. It has become customary to survey services and academic centers [22, p. 42].

The special attention in methodical literature was paid to the usage of control questions, which in changed formulation that covers their original sense, are aimed to check the respondent’s sincerity [23, p. 85]. The level of sincerity of a respondent’s answers is examined basing on the non-response analyses [24] or using the expert evaluation [25]. The last method implies the estimation of a respondent’s reaction to the questions by interviewer: his freedom or tension while answering the questions, interest in the topic of the interview, his attitude to the situation of interview, etc. Expert methods are used not only to define the sincerity of a respondent, but also to estimate his interest and independence (from an interviewer’s hints) [26, p. 98-99]. Sometimes, the method of combined verification of a respondent’s competence is used. The main sense is that expert evaluations of interviewers are compared with the self-estimation of respondents [27, p. 630].

Existence of knowledge necessary for answering the questions of interview is defined not only through questions-filters, but indirectly as well — basing on denial answer to the question and choosing variants “I cannot answer”, “I don’t know”, “I am not interested”. “Opiniation index” can serve as an example that was counted for each respondent as a sum of his answers to the questions of questionnaire. This index correlates with the level of education of a respondent [28, p. 388].

The other strategy to verify the level of reliability of respondents includes the so-called questions about questions. They are used in sociology to estimate sincerity, stability and adequacy of a respondent’s answers, sensitivity of questions, a respondent’s fatigue in the course of interview, etc. For instance, the respondents were asked to answer the same questions in two-three weeks after interviews. For the first time they were asked to answer with maximum sincerity (for themselves), later — as if they were not sure about confidentiality of the questions or
they did not trust the interviewer [29, p. 93]. “Questions about questions” are especially popular in those cases, when the peculiarities of a respondent’s perception of sensitive questions are examined, that is, the questions about such topics, which may evoke embarrassment or negative reactions of the respondent [30, p. 224].

L. Sharp and J. Frankel used the set of questions to assess how much the Annual Housing Survey exhausts and fatigues the respondents. They distinguish two types of indicators of a respondent’s disinterest or tension: objective, which were recorded by the interviewer (number of the interrupted interviews, refusals to answer, choosing the response category “don’t know”, etc.) and subjective, which actually were questions about interview to be answered by respondents. On the basis of subjective indicators the interest of respondents to the interview was defined, as well as easiness of filling out a questionnaire, satisfaction with the interview, importance of the interview, etc. [31, p. 43]. C. Cannel and M. Axelrod examined reactions of respondents to the interview in terms of accuracy of reported information. The research was undertaken in such a way that after the interview a letter with 10 questions about communication with an interviewer was send to every respondent. Among these questions, there were how interesting respondents found the interview, if they would participate in the interview once again in future, if they thought that the questions in questionnaire were too personal, etc. [32].

One of the most considerable problems that are indirectly connected with reliability of survey results is that it is necessary to generalize individual experiences of certain respondents in the formulation of questions and to adjust them to the experience of large social groups. More generally, it is the problem of excessive generalization. Consequently, the experience of those marginalized social elements (persons or groups) is likely to be lost because their existence is “not noticed” against the background of macrosocial processes and official ideologies. The reason for it is that life experience of such elements is considered to be either insignificant or “inaccessible” for social research. Ability to hear the voice of marginalized groups (for example, ethnic or religious minorities) requires additional skills and forces from researcher and interviewer, as far as the experience of the members of such groups can hardly be included in general terminology or formalized questionnaire. The research process on the experience of marginalized groups includes such strategies of “listening” (that is special behavior of interviewer, methods of interview, formulation of questions) that enable to “hear” the answers of those who were deprived of their voice and who had to tell about their experience in the “language” of dominant group. However, a respondent may have not a good command of this
language or there may be no means to articulate the suppressed experience of this person. This kind of research includes the analysis of frames that are formed by the researcher while defining the subject of scientific research and taking into account relevant difficulties as well as matching the explanation models used by respondent and interviewer. These assumptions allow us to argue that there is a need to introduce a possibility for respondents to report about the problems they face during the interview. Test of subjective reliability can represent such a strategy. It can show not only the formal “unreliability” of a respondent (or some category of respondents) but also draw attention of a researcher to those problems that make the answers of some respondents unreliable due to their membership in marginalized groups.

Even if a sociologist succeeded to “hear” and describe the experience of marginalized groups, another problem arises: how to “translate” this experience into the language of scientific community? This is done by processing of data, including coding, modeling, analysis and “montage” of results into scientific text taking into consideration that this text may be read by a wider audience. R. Hahn suggests that important preconditions of reliable results are: 1) using such questions about which every respondent is competent; 2) additional instrument, which gives an opportunity to define variations from person to person in each question [33].

Another problem connected with subjective factors of subjective reliability is the inability of a respondent to answer correctly to the question of questionnaire. For example, when it is difficult to estimate the discussed phenomenon or when a person is incompetent in a problem and does not want to show it. The level of perception, reflection and sociocultural competence of a respondent may also influence his capabilities to formulate adequate answer. For example, American sociologist P. Blumstein found a relation between the probability of concurrency of moral estimation of a certain activity and stereotype attribution of these actions to definite actors [34].

He corroborates a hypothesis, which states that immoral behavior of a “good” person gains more negative appraisal than immoral behavior of a “bad” one, and vice versa. So, estimation of the same behavior of different actors or social groups may cause significant differences in answers. However, describing the problem, the author lacks for explanations how sociologist may take into account such phenomena in analysis of the reliability of obtained data.

Another procedural problem that may affect reliability and consequently, should be taken into account by sociologists is motivation of a respondent to participate in the interview. R. Hahn suggests that the interview can be called successful if the participant is really interested in
it. Sociologist should take into consideration different motives of participation in the interview, as far as they can cause differences in answers to the questions [33].

R. Hahn proposes to replace standard questionnaire by recorded interview-questionnaire in a form of simple conversation. He suggests that researchers should pay more attention to “anthropology of communication” and use during interview the technique of “thinking loudly about answer”. He supposes that such a method helps sociologists to understand difficulties in comprehending question and in responses of respondents. However, this approach implies another problem: How to record these reflections of respondents and how to process and use obtained information in further researches?

M. Litvin proposes another strategy. He describes Shuman’s method in his work “How to Measure Survey Reliability and Validity?” [35, p. 44]. This procedure represents using of the open follow-ups in randomized probing (an interviewer selects questions by chance). Sometimes researcher defines respondents or certain categories of the respondents who should answer additive qualifying questions, such as:

— Could you please tell me more, what did you mean by your answer?
— Could you please tell me more, what were you thinking about while answering the question?
— Could you please give an example?

Such probing gives an opportunity to find problematic questions and to define a group of people for whom the question was difficult to understand, that is, difficult to answer. This method helps to process and interpret obtained information.

At this stage we would like to summarize that the main idea of recent literature reviewed in this article is that sociological research is conducted in regular interaction and communication between sociologist on the one side, and those individuals and groups that are in the focus of his attention on the other. At the stage of instrument elaboration a sociologist should constantly compare his theoretic-methodological scheme of measurement of the phenomenon with the subjective world of respondents. Imaginary dialog with respondents helps to work out a relevant instrument, which will be clearer and more open for respondent. This influences the accuracy of measurement of a social phenomenon. Nevertheless, while estimating reliability of research, respondents and their thoughts are often not taken into account by researcher. This blunder generates a need to include one more criterion in the estimation of reliability: to consider an opinion of respondent, his subjective perception of objective phenomena. If to supplement this with skills of a sociologist
to translate opinion of a respondent into the language of sociological methodology, it allows providing what we call “subjective reliability”.

In scientific literature about special estimations of respondents concerning interview, a great role belongs to the method of the “self-estimation of reliability”. The point of this method is that respondent defines the level of self-competence, interest and readiness to cooperate with sociologists. But till now there is no procedure, which allows getting integral value of estimation of the phenomenon, which we propose to call “subjective reliability”, and which implies a respondent’s integral estimation of himself as a source of reliable information.

Review of recent literature and general conclusions of large experience in social surveys allow us to define the following components in concept of subjective reliability, which should be estimated: (1) understanding of an instrument or its part; (2) competence, sufficiency of knowledge to answer the questions; (3) interest in the topic of interview; (4) confidence in choice of the most appropriate answer from the whole number of answers to the question; (5) stability of one’s own opinion; (6) independence of opinion; (7) possibility to answer sincerely the questions. We assume that the measurement of the concept of subject-reliability is possible with regard to single questions, blocks of questions or the instrument as a whole.

Possibility of construction of the additive index of subjective reliability, which includes all mentioned dimensions, is grounded on the hypothesis, that if a person has a responsible approach to the fulfillment of the task (interview, for example, is a voluntary fulfillment of tasks of an interviewer), he will find some interest in this task, try to mobilize his knowledge and skills, bring independence of judgments, concentrate on the task to such an extent to be sure in his answers at a certain moment (if the interview is repeated again). This hypothesis was a basis for construction of the index of subjective reliability (ISR). We checked this hypothesis during the pretest of our procedure, which was conducted in course of interview with 100 respondents having different levels of education (from elementary to higher), equal quotes of sex distribution and age adequate to distributions in population. For the pretest, two substantial questions were chosen: about self-identification and geopolitical attitudes. The scale to measure every component of subjective reliability concept was elaborated supplementary (see Appendix 1). The instrument of pre-test research included “scale measuring lie” (L-scale) from the MMPI questionnaire. We assumed that the absence of significant correlations between values of L-scale and values of ISR may be an evidence for the fact that subjective reliability is a special indicator,
which shows not the intentions of a respondent to demonstrate some level of “social desirability” but his possibility to estimate his self-reliability as a respondent.

Results of the pretest showed that Cronbach’s $\alpha$ for the additive ISR equals to 0.8 which we considered to be an argument for the construction of an integral index. Approbation of different modifications of the procedure for subjective reliability measurement was conducted in 2006-2007 as a part of polls “Omnibus-2006” and “Omnibus-2007” that were launched by the Institute of Sociology of NAS in Ukraine and Center for Social and Political Investigations “SOCIS”. We used multi-stage random sample with quota selection at the last stage, which represents the adult population of Ukraine (above 18 years old) regarding sex, age and level of education. Sample size in each survey was 1800 persons.

**Construction and Statistical Analysis of the Index of Subjective Reliability (ISR)**

The questionnaire of 2006 included a block of questions about self-estimation of respondents concerning two rather different questions that had been used in pilot research (pretest). After each question respondents were asked to answer seven questions of the procedure for measurement of subjective reliability. Grounding on the answers of respondents, two blocks of dichotomic variables were constructed. One block measured the components of subjective reliability concerning the first question — about self-identification, and another block — about foreign policy orientations. Both blocks appeared to be rather consistent internally, which was a ground for construction of relevant indices (as a sum of dichotomic values for each block). Both blocks are characterized by the same value of Alpha ($0.79$). This value is high enough not only to be sure that there is a sufficient level of internal consistency but also to provide an opportunity to regard subjective reliability as a concept, in this case, concerning two substantial questions. It is noticeable that the Alpha index is the same for both instruments of measurement, although the questions, about which ISR was measured, are absolutely different in a number of characteristics (subject; number of answer variants; difficulty, etc.). It is also remarkable that two indices of $ISR_1$ (indicator for the question about self-identification) and $ISR_2$ (indicator for the question about foreign policy orientations) highly correlate with each other: Pearson’s $r_{12} = 0.80$. This result confirms the statement that subjective reliability is not connected with a single definite question of the questionnaire.
Procedure is constructed in such a way that every question concerns both substantial questions: about self-identification and about foreign policy orientations. Analysis of estimation distributions shows that the majority of respondents (from 90% to 98%) estimate equally both questions. E.g., 91.5% of respondents estimated the difficulty in comprehension of both questions as the same, 93% — sufficiency of knowledge to answer both questions, 93% — interest in these questions. The fact that a respondent estimates simultaneously two questions can also serve as a ground for definition of correlations between values. That is why it is necessary to explore in what extent estimations of questions or blocks of questions that are hardly connected by meaning correlate with each other.

In 2006 the questionnaire included the block of questions concerning attitudes to NATO and questions measuring subjective reliability regarding this block of questions. The scale for measurement of subjective reliability in this case resembled a Likert scale (see Appendix 2). Self-estimations enabled to find values of ISR for the block of thematically related questions. Results of self-estimation had a high level of consistency (Alpha = 0.78). At this stage we computed additive index of subjective reliability for block of questions — ISR_3. Indicator ISR_3 correlates significantly with earlier constructed indicators ISR_1 (r_{13} = 0.54) and ISR_2 (r_{23} = 0.57). This, however, is a considerably lower correlation than that one between ISR_1 and ISR_2 (see above). These results could suggest that the increasing of “distance” between questions has a negative influence on the correlation of ISR for these questions. As far as the correlation between indicators of ISR for different questions (even for close ones) is not constant, we may preliminarily conclude that ISR characterizes not only a respondent but also the features of an instrument. In other words, the value of ISR is dependent not only on respondent but also on the instrument in the survey.

We have additionally examined the relationship between ISR and refusals of respondents to give a definite answer (choice of “don’t know” response). It is logically to assume that such an uncertain response is connected with low subjective reliability.

The list of answers to the question about foreign policy orientations included “I don’t know” answer, which was chosen almost by 11% of respondents. Results of the single factor analysis of variance show that the level of subjective reliability is significantly lower in the group of respondents who have chosen “I don’t know” answer to the question in comparison to other respondents (see Table 1). Within other groups, there are no significant differences in mean values of ISR, except the groups of re-
spondents who support strengthening of relationships with CIS and the Alliance of East Slavs.

Table 1

The mean values of ISR for the groups of respondents who answered the question “Which way for the development of Ukraine do you support?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of answers</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mean ISR</th>
<th>Standard deviation ISR</th>
<th>Mean ISR</th>
<th>Standard deviation ISR</th>
<th>Mean ISR</th>
<th>Standard deviation ISR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First of all, to extend relationships within CIS</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To develop relationship mainly with Russia</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First and foremost, to strengthen the Alliance of East Slavs (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus)</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First of all, to establish relationships with developed western countries</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To rely on own resources and strengthen independence</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different regions of Ukraine should choose their own way</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similar results were obtained regarding $ISR_1$ and $ISR_3$ relative to other parts of the questionnaire (correspondingly, question about self-identification and block of questions about NATO). As Table 1 shows, the group of respondents who avoided answering question about external political orientations was characterized by the lowest value of $ISR$ for both substantial questions and block of questions. The respondents who chose “I don’t know” answer to the question about external political orientations, had the lowest values just of the $ISR_2$. In general, mean value of $ISR_2$ was higher than mean value of $ISR_3$. We made such comparison of means in the groups of respondents who chose the same answer to the question about NATO. As a result, the lowest values of all three indicators of $ISR$ belonged to the respondents who hesitated to answer. The difference was better observed concerning values of $ISR_3$ in the case of answering questions about NATO. The results described above show clear and consistent evidence of relationship between uncertainty in answers and level of subjective reliability. Those who try to avoid answering question are characterized by lower values of $ISR$.

We investigated relationship between $ISR_3$ and number of choice of the response “I don’t know” in the block of questions about NATO. Considerably high value of negative correlation ($r = -0.53$) shows that within the block of questions subjective reliability is associated with the choice of such variant of response as well. So, the higher subjective reliability is, the fewer intentions has a respondent to avoid a direct answer.

As it has been mentioned, we have three measurements of $ISR$: two — for separate substantial questions and one — for block of questions. All three measurements correlate with each other. This allows us to assume the existence of the subjective reliability concept irrelatively to form or sense of a single question and to measure it. Three correlated measures suffice to build a factor using factor analysis (principal components analysis method). The factor that appears as a result describes 76% of total variance.

Table 2

| Component matrix for analysis of the three measurements of subjective reliability |
|---------------------------------|---|
| $F_1$                           |   |
| $ISR_1$                         | 0.903 |
| $ISR_2$                         | 0.916 |
| $ISR_3$                         | 0.790 |
The factor accumulates a considerable part of total variance for three measurements of subjective reliability. We evaluate it as an additional evidence for possibility of its consideration as an integral index, which is not connected with separate question or block of questions. On the other hand, this factor highly correlates with simple sum of all three measurements of ISR, on the basis of which the factor was built ($r = 0.96$). Therewith, the whole range of indicators used for the construction of ISR (14 dichotomy indicators and 7 indicators measured with the help of 5-point scale) is rather highly inherently consistent (Alpha for all complex of indicators = 0.85). All these reflections enable us to suggest that simple sum of three measurements of subjective reliability gives the same result as integral index, which is not connected with definite question or block of questions in questionnaire. Using simple linear transformations, we obtained an index with values range from 1 to 5 (higher value of index presents higher confidence of respondent in his/her answers, higher level of subjective reliability of a respondent as a source of information in social research).

Up to the present time, there is no experience in using this instrument (to discuss a dynamic of changes), consequently, we have no criteria for constructed ISR. Our interpretations of index values could be based only on its distributions.

Mean value of the integral index is 4.22 for the survey data in 2006. Confidence interval is rather narrow (for confidence probability 0.95 it is $4.22 \pm 0.03$). Median value of index equals to 4.33 (half of sample has lower and another half — higher value of index). Distribution of index values is skewed to the right (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decile 1</th>
<th>Decile 2</th>
<th>Decile 3</th>
<th>Decile 4</th>
<th>Decile 5</th>
<th>Decile 6</th>
<th>Decile 7</th>
<th>Decile 8</th>
<th>Decile 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we have mentioned before, sociological instrument in 2006 included L-scale from the MMPI questionnaire. Indicator of reliability for this scale is rather high (Alpha = 0.76). The index of “lie” has no statistically significant correlations with measured values of subjective reliability. We interpret this fact as an evidence for existence of the ISR concept, which differs substantially from the phenomenon that L-scale aims to measure.
ISR that was constructed while focusing on the data of “Omnibus-2006” has the following characteristics:

— There is no relationship between age of a respondent and level of subjective reliability ($r = –0.03$ and is not statistically significant on the level $p < 0.05$).

— The respondents who had higher levels of education showed commonly higher level of subjective reliability. ISR correlates positively with education of respondents ($r = 0.14$, $p < 0.01$).

— Respondents with higher level of income have higher values of ISR ($r = 0.1$, $p < 0.01$).

— Townspeople demonstrate higher level of subjective reliability in comparison with country people. Mean values of index differ significantly between appropriate groups on the level $p < 0.05$.

— Employed respondents have higher values of ISR than unemployed. Mean values of index differ significantly between corresponding groups on the level $p < 0.05$.

As for the subjective reliability concerning whole questionnaire, we also provided the analysis of non-response while choosing the answer “I don’t know” and refusals to answer the questions. This indicator characterizes difficulty of the questionnaire for respondent. The more answers a respondent avoids, the more difficult the questionnaire is. This difficulty may be caused by the topic of an interview, absence of one’s own opinion or lack of information about this topic, with inappropriate formulating of a question (too difficult, incomprehensible, etc.). If a respondent adequately estimates the difficulty of a questionnaire, there must be a relationship between his estimation of subjective reliability and difficulty of question or the whole questionnaire. This correlation was revealed in the data of 2006 ($r = 0.39$). In the survey “Omnibus-2007” we tackled the central problem of evaluation of subjective reliability of the whole questionnaire. The final part of the questionnaire included 6 questions that measured principal elements of the subjective reliability concept on the dichotomic level. These elements are: comprehensibility of questions, sufficiency of knowledge to answer questions, interest in the topic of interview, completeness of the range of answers, self-estimation of stability of one’s own opinion, self-estimation of independency of the opinion from people around (see Appendix 3). These six dichotomic variables turned out to be rather consistent (Alpha = 0.68) to construct appropriate index on the basis of these indicators.

Using simple mathematical transformations, we obtained an index with range of values from 1 to 5, similar to the index described above.
Most questions from the questionnaire of 2007 are not the same as in 2006. But regarding the number of questions, difficulty of formulations and diversity of topics, these two instruments are very similar. Likewise, non-response analysis shows that these questionnaires are very similar in the number of refusals to answer and choosing “I don’t know” variant. In the data of 2007 the correlation between subjective reliability and difficulty of questions \( r = 0.35 \) hardly differs from correlation between the same variables in the survey of 2006 \( r = 0.39 \).

Both surveys were conducted on the basis of similar sample. Even though in 2007 subjective reliability was measured with another procedure, the results of measurement in two questionnaires similar by their structure and difficulty were alike. Confidence interval for the mean value of \( \text{ISR} \) in the research of 2007 (confidence probability: \( p < 0.95 \), confidence interval: \( 4.26 \pm 0.04 \)) is rather similar to the confidence interval in the research of 2006. In 2006 and 2007 different people were interviewed, but the structure of sample is analogous in socio-demographical parameters. This fact allows us to assume that \( \text{ISR} \) is connected not with psychological features of individuals but with their social characteristics. For example, in data of the “Omnibus-2007” \( \text{ISR} \) correlates with education of respondents \( r = 0.22, p < 0.01 \) and the level of their income \( r = 0.12, p < 0.05 \), as we have shown before on the data of 2006. Data analysis finds that in 2007, as well as in 2006, townspeople demonstrated higher level of subjective reliability in comparison with country people and employed respondents had higher values of \( \text{ISR} \) than unemployed.

We argue that two similar measures of the same concept in two similar questionnaires may be considered as an argument for reliability of constructed instruments and stability of \( \text{ISR} \). The study of relationships between indices allows us to formulate a hypothesis about the structure of \( \text{ISR} \). We imply that it is composed of two dimensions: 1) dimension connected with social characteristics of a respondent; 2) dimension concerning problem of research and peculiarities of the instrument of research. To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to provide further experiments. The problem of taking subjective reliability into consideration during the stage of data interpretation is also of theoretical and practical interest. For example, the methods of construction and using of special indicators of weight in the analysis can be elaborated with the aim to characterize subjective reliability of respondents concerning a single question or the questionnaire as a whole.
Subsequent methodological studies should be undertaken to provide methodological advantage of the measurement of subjective reliability. Growing experience in using such instruments would allow specifying the meaning of the concept of subjective reliability and, on the other side, to interpret more distinctly the intervals of the index values. Finally, ISR could be regarded not only as a characteristic of instrument (comprehensibility of questionnaire, actuality of research problem for respondents, etc.) but also as an indicator for credibility of the information obtained in the process of social research.

**Appendix 1**

1. **Whom do you consider yourself to be first of all?** *(Note one, the most appropriate variant of the answer)*

1. A country-dweller, dweller of the district or town (city) where you live.
2. A dweller of the region (oblast or several oblasts) where you live.
3. A citizen of Ukraine.
4. A representative of the former Soviet Union.
5. A citizen of the former Soviet Union.
6. A citizen of the world.
7. Other *(please write)*

2. **Which way for the development of Ukraine do you support?** *(Note one the most appropriate variant of the answer)*

1. First of all, to extend relationships within CIS.
2. To develop relationship mainly with Russia.
3. First and foremost, to strengthen the Alliance of East Slavs (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus).
4. First of all, to establish relationships with developed western countries.
5. To rely on own resources and strengthen independence.
6. Different regions of Ukraine should choose their own way.
7. Other *(please write)*
8. I don’t know.

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Translated by Olha Maksymenko.
To help us improve the wording of our questions from here, please answer the following questions:

1. Can you say that you have comprehended the meaning of the above questions (No. 1 and No. 2)?
   - 1 — The meaning of the both questions is absolutely clear to me.
   - 2 — Only the meaning of the first question is clear (the second one is not completely clear).
   - 3 — Only the meaning of the second question is clear (the first one is not completely clear).
   - 4 — The meaning of the both questions was not absolutely clear.

2. How do you think, have you enough knowledge to answer these questions?
   - 1 — My knowledge is enough to answer both questions.
   - 2 — My knowledge is enough to answer the first question (it is insufficient to answer the second one).
   - 3 — My knowledge is enough to answer the second question (it is insufficient to answer the first one).
   - 4 — My knowledge is not enough to answer both questions.

3. Can you say that it was interesting for you to answer these questions?
   - 1 — Answering both questions was interesting to me.
   - 2 — Only the first question was interesting.
   - 3 — Only the second question was interesting.
   - 4 — I did not feel any interest while answering.

4. Are you sure that you have chosen the answer reflecting your opinion best of all?
   - 1 — I am sure of the both answers.
   - 2 — I am sure only of the answer to the first question (I am not sure about the second one).
   - 3 — I am sure only of the answer to the second question (I am not sure about the first one).
   - 4 — I am not sure as to the answer to the both questions.

5. Can you say that your answers to these questions will not change if you are asked in several days?
   - 1 — I am sure that my opinion on the both questions will not change.
2 — I am sure that my answer only to the first question will not change (the answer to the second one will change).
3 — I am sure that my answer only to the second question will not change.
4 — I am not sure whether my answers to the questions change or not.

6. Can you say that nobody of your surroundings had any influence on your opinion while answering the questions?
1 — Nobody had any influence on my opinion when I was answering the questions.
2 — Nobody had any influence on my opinion when I was answering the first question (I was under some influence answering the second question).
3 — Nobody had influence on my opinion when I was answering the second question (I was under some influence answering the first question).
4 — Answering both questions, I was under the influence of my surroundings.

7. Are there any circumstances that could prevent you from frankly answering to these questions?
1 — There were no such circumstances when I was answering both questions.
2 — There were such circumstances when I was answering the first question (they were absent when I was answering the second one).
3 — There were such circumstances when I was answering the second question (they were absent when I was answering the first one).
4 — There were such circumstances when I was answering the both questions.

Appendix 2

1. What is your attitude to Ukraine’s entering NATO?
1 — It is rather negative.
2 — It is a difficult question.
3 — It is rather positive.
2. **Why do you support (do not support) the entry of Ukraine into NATO?** *(Note all appropriate variants of the answer).*
   1 — It has an economic advantage for Ukraine.
   2 — Ukraine’s membership in NATO will lead to additional state expenditures.
   3 — It will strengthen Ukraine’s security.
   4 — NATO is an aggressive military unit.
   5 — This entry will support the authority of Ukraine in the world.
   6 — This is a step against Russia.
   7 — Ukraine’s membership in NATO will decrease the influence of Russia on Ukraine.
   8 — It will make Ukraine more dependent on western countries.
   9 — Ukraine should be a neutral state.
   10 — Other *(please write)* ______________________________
   11 — I don’t know.

3. **What is NATO, in your opinion?** *(Note only one variant of the answer).*
   1 — Defensive unit.
   2 — Aggressive military unit.
   3 — Peacemaking organization.
   4 — Other *(please write)* ______________________________
   5 — I don’t know.

4. **Would NATO defend Ukraine in case of aggression or aggressive threat on the part of a foreign state?**
   1 — It would be in any case.
   2 — Yes, if we were NATO members.
   3 — No, it would not.
   4 — I don’t know.

*To help us improve the wording of our questions, answer the following questions, please:*

1. **Tell us please, was it absolutely clear to you the meaning of the questions about NATO as a whole** *(No. 1–4):*
   1 — The meaning of these questions was absolutely clear to me.
   2 — The meaning of these questions is rather clear.
   3 — It is difficult to say, whether it is clear or unclear to me.
   4 — The meaning of the questions is not rather clear.
5 — It is not clear at all.

2. Was it interesting to you to answer these questions?
   1 — Yes, it was.
   2 — It was rather interesting.
   3 — It is difficult to say whether it was interesting or not.
   4 — It was rather uninteresting.
   5 — It was not interesting.

3. What do you think, have you enough information to answer these questions?
   1 — I have enough information.
   2 — Information that I have is fair enough.
   3 — It is difficult to say whether it is sufficient or not.
   4 — It is rather insufficient.
   5 — It is not sufficient.

4. Are you sure or not that the answers you have chosen reflect your opinion in the best way?
   1 — I am absolutely sure.
   2 — I am rather sure.
   3 — It is difficult to say whether I am sure or not.
   4 — I am rather unsure.
   5 — I am not sure at all.

5. How do you think, will your answers to the questions about NATO change if you are asked in several days?
   1 — They will not change.
   2 — They remain rather unchanged.
   3 — It is difficult to say whether they will change or not.
   4 — They will rather change.
   5 — They will change.

6. How do you think, had your surroundings the influence on your opinion when you were answering the questions?
   1 — They had not any influence on me.
   2 — They rather had no influence on me.
   3 — It is difficult to say whether they had any influence on me or not.
   4 — They rather had some influence on me.
   5 — They had influence on me.
7. Are there any circumstances that could prevent you from answering openly these questions?
   1 — Such circumstances exist.
   2 — Such circumstances rather exist.
   3 — It is difficult to say whether they exist or not.
   4 — Such circumstances do not rather exist.
   5 — There are no such circumstances.

Appendix 3

1. Can you say that the meaning of most questions was clear to you?
   1 — Meaning of most questions of the questionnaire is clear completely to me.
   2 — I cannot say that meaning of most questions of the questionnaire is clear to me.

2. Do you think you have knowledge sufficient for answering most questions of the questionnaire?
   1 — I have knowledge sufficient for answering most questions.
   2 — I cannot say that I have knowledge sufficient for answering most questions.

3. Can you say that you answered most questions with interest?
   1 — I answered most questions with interest.
   2 — I cannot say that I answered most questions with interest.

4. Are you sure that you could choose answers to most questions which reflect your opinion in the best way?
   1 — I am sure.
   2 — I am not sure.

5. Can you say that your answers to the same questions could change in several days?
   1 — My opinion concerning most questions could not change.
   2 — My opinion concerning most questions could change.
6. Can you say that nobody of your surroundings had influence on your answers to the asked questions?

1 — Nobody had any influence on my answers.
2 — Yes, some people of my surroundings had influence on my answers.

References


The Occupational Structure of Ukrainian Society in Time and Comparative Perspectives

Abstract

This research is aimed at the study of the occupational structure of Ukrainian society, in particular the population distribution in Ukraine by occupational groups (which were derived according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations ISCO-88). Statistical data demonstrates that a significant dynamics of occupational differentiation of Ukrainian population took place during the last twelve years, namely a shift from blue-collar occupations in the industrial sector to the sphere of trade and services. Comparative data of the ESS project indicates a principal similarity of occupational differentiation of the post-socialist societies in contrast to the Western countries (particularly, the number of white-collar positions in the occupational composition in the West is considerably higher, while for the blue collars it is correspondingly lower). The obtained data point out the importance of the determinants of gender and age for the analysis of the occupational structure of post-Soviet societies. The author reveals the patterns of both the horizontal and vertical gender segregation. Peculiarity of the occupational positions of different age groups lies in the so-called age “edge effect”: the youngest (below 20 years old) and the oldest (above 60) groups have a specific occupational structure against the middle groups.

Introduction

It is generally acknowledged that the nature of the work executed by an individual determines his social status. That is why sociologists have

always regarded occupational positions as a factor constructing social stratification. In sociology the notion “occupation/profession”\(^1\) is involved in the current interrelated issues. Studies on occupational structure deal with the aggregate distribution of occupations classified according to their skill level, economic function or social status in society [Durkheim, 1996; Sorokin, 1992; Parsons, 1991; Blau, Duncan, 1967; Erikson, Goldthorpe, 1992; others]. Studies on occupational mobility include movement of occupational groups or their representatives in the stratified social space [there are two main directions: when occupational achievements of parents and children are compared and when a sequence of posts within a career is studied for various generations] [Erikson, Goldthorpe, 1992; Ganzeboom, Treiman, Ultee, 1991; Featherman, Hauser, 1978; Burton, Grusky, 1992; others]. Studies on occupational prestige are aimed to obtain differentiated social appraisals related to occupations (they reflect what people know about occupations, what material and symbolic values are associated with them, how occupations are ranked) [Goldthorpe, Hope, 1974; Treiman, 1977; Ganzeboom, Treiman, 1996, 2003; Duncan, 1984; Wegener, 1992; Orth, Wegener, 2006; others]\(^2\). Studies on occupational segregation by some characteristics (sex, age, race, ethnicity or religion) reflect the labor division, as a result of which representatives of different groups (like men and women) are concentrated in different kinds of occupational roles and form separate labor forces [Feldberg, Glenn, 1989; Dex, 1985; Anker, 1998; Glove, Branine, 2001; Shanas, 1968; others]. Serious attention has been paid to methodological development of occupational classifications being preconditions and bases of all abovementioned studies on occupational dif-

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\(^1\) In Western sociology, occupational belonging has been described by two notions “occupation” meaning any kind of activity bringing earnings and “profession” characterized by a high skill level and special training (see: [Aleksandrova, 2000; Luksha, 2003; Collins Dictionary, 1999: v. 2, p. 105]). However, the main attention is paid to studies on “occupational mobility”, “occupational status”, “occupational prestige”. The Ukrainian tradition uses them as “professional mobility”, “professional status” and “professional prestige” but it is generally known that they mean “occupation”. It could be because of the fact that Ukrainian and Russian languages do not form adjectives from a noun “occupation”. In the article the words “occupation” and “profession” have been used as synonymous and mean any kind of activity bringing earnings.

\(^2\) The above references include names of Western researchers, who developed basic ideas about occupational structures, mobility and prestige. In Soviet sociology the abovementioned phenomena were studied as well by many researchers (there are only some works on this subject: [Filippov, 1989; Cherednichenko, Shubkin, 1985; Sotsial’no-professional’naya, 1973; Chemovolenko, Ossovskiy, Paniotto, 1979; Makeev, 1989]).
differentiation [Treiman, 1977; Duncan, 1961, 1984; Ganzeboom, De Graaf, Treiman, 1992, 1996; Goldthorpe, Hope, 1974; Hoffmann, 1999; Leiulfsrud, Bison, Jensberg, 2005]. Structures and kinds of professional knowledge, culture and languages of professional groups, identities of professionals, their everyday practices, processes of professionalization and professional socialization, gender models of professions, power and ethical orders in professions and other are the subject of sociology of professions as a separate sociological field 1 [Abbott, 1988; Friendson, 2001; The Sociology, 1983; The End, 1997; Professions, 1990; The Formation, 1990; Davies, 1996; Perkin, 1988; MacDonald, 1995].

The article mostly deals with occupational structures, and they, as is known, reflect the aggregate distribution of occupations in society 2. A description of occupational differentiation in general is determined by specific features of the methods chosen by a researcher for identification of occupational groups. The way of choosing a classification scheme of occupations should be discussed because, for more than fifty years of studies on occupational stratification, numerous schemes have been developed according to the analysis aim, theoretical approaches of a researcher or those criteria which were of top priority.

The first kind of occupational classifications is used to reflect distribution of occupational groups picked out in accordance with skill levels and specialization. Initially, such classifications were developed by statistical agencies of various countries and were of specific and national nature. However, for the past twenty years a tendency to unify occupational identification of individuals in statistical and sociological data has been revealed. To do this, there are widely used categories of ISCO-88. This typology has been applied within my study (details will be discussed further). Occupations are also used as a basis for the second

1 There are analyzed mostly classical professions that need long-term theoretical training, with strict ethos, strong professional associations and group identity. Under social transformations, sociologists especially attentive to how values and worlds of certain professions (doctors, advocates, others) change, how new professions appear and get institutionalized (social worker, manager, web-designer, others), how old professions degrade and die [Sotsial'naya dinamika, 2007; Mansurov, Yurchenko, 2008; Aleksandrova, 2000; Professional'nye gruppy, 2003].

2 In Western tradition researchers focus more on social and occupational mobility than structures. For both topics, the research methodologies do not differ in principle: distribution of individuals by occupational groups and their movements from one group to another have been realized with the same methods; the only difference is that when we study mobility, some additional parameters are used (occupational status of parents or first place of work), as well as special coefficients.

It is obvious that the idea of occupational distribution depends on the study aim, grounds and levels of occupation grouping. The most general grouping of occupations deals with differentiation between manual and non-manual labor (used by the author in the article). Difference between those involved in manual and intellectual labor is traditionally (in Western sociology) reflected in the terms “working class” and “middle class”, “blue-collar” and “white-collar” workers [Collins Dictionary, 1999: v. 2, pp. 173-174; Dictionary, 2005: p. 379; Mills, 1951]. The “blue-collar worker” means those who work manually and get a piece-rate or per-hour payments, while “the white-collar worker” is applied to those who are employed in professional or relatively routine office and administrative jobs of non-manual labor and get a fixed salary.

It is well known that occupational structure is not stable. It has been formed and changed due to various factors: “the economic structures (the relative weights of different industries), technology and bureaucracy (the distribution of technological skills and administrative responsibility), the labor market (which determines the pay and conditions attached to occupations); and by status and prestige (influenced by occupational closure, life style and social values)” [Dictionary, 2005: p. 459]. Researchers do not choose any of those factors as determining; even more, they say that the factors’ roles in formation of occupational structures change along with changes of society. For example, at the early stage of European industrialization the dominance of manufacturing led to a decrease of manual occupations. In the past decades a decline in

\(^1\) The mentioned class schemes were constructed on different theoretical grounds, they also differ by operational models and sets of classes. Besides a profession, they include some other criteria (e.g., occupation status, level of competence, volume of powers, occupation conditions, economic branch of occupation and others). By the way, the most known and currently popular stratification scales (CASMIN, EGP, ESeC) are derivatives of the universal ISCO-88.
industrial sector and growth in service sector and bureaucratic system created the expansion of the white-collar occupations. During the last years researchers noticed that the difference between occupations of manual and non-manual labor has become not very distinctive as well.

Since social and economic changes modify the occupational structure, any particular classification is able to reflect this structure in time only within certain limits [Dictionary, 2005: p. 456]. However, it is necessary to renew classification schemes regularly, despite the fact that the process of change identification in occupational structures in time becomes more difficult (like the ISCO being renewed every 20 years: there are versions of 1968, 1988, 2008).

In Western sociology studies on social and occupational structures of society (within all the above-mentioned topics) form traditionally one of the main directions in stratification analysis; numerous discussions have formed conventional theoretical and methodological approaches to research on the named phenomena. The common methodology of occupational and social class measurements has been developed, and it is widely validated in comparative international projects and so on. In Ukrainian sociology of the post-Soviet period, despite the fact that a number of works deal with social and occupational structures, mobility and prestige [Kutsenko, 2000; Klassovoye obshchestvo, 2003; Oksamitnaya, 2003; Kon, 2005; Oksamitnaya, Patrakova, 2007; Simonchuk, 1999, 2006]. In the author’s opinion, this direction is not on the main road: there were no serious attempts for development of original typologies based on grouping of occupations. According to the number of publications, there is no wide interest in these topics, and this fact limits essentially our knowledge about Ukrainian social structure. In modern Russian sociology the situation is significantly better: there are examples of developed and applied authors’ social and occupational stratification schemes (like those developed by T. Zaslavskaya [Zaslavskaya, 1997], O. Shkaratan and his colleagues [Shkaratan, 2006, 2007])1; interesting projects on the corresponding issues have been realized [Profesional’nye gruppy, 2003; Popova, 2004; Antropologiya professii, 2005; Sotsial’naya dinamika, 2006; Shkaratan, Il’in, 2006; Shkaratan, Yastrebov, 2007, 2008; Anikin, Tikhonova, 2008]. Unfortunately, joint studies

1 In my opinion, specific features of the schemes’ construction were not sufficiently described for autonomous application by a wide range of sociologists, the schemes are not available as syntaxes for construction of classes in particular, contrary to popular schemes of Western sociologists.
on social and occupational structures in the post-Soviet countries were not conducted and correlated work on development of common methodology for creation of occupational schemes was not implemented (or it is not described in sociological publications). During the last years, being involved in large-scale international sociological projects — European Social Survey (ESS) and International Social Survey Program (ISSP) — Ukrainian sociologists began using traditional for Western researchers occupational classifications (ISCO-88) and class schemes, developed by J. Goldthorpe, G. Esping-Andersen, E.O. Wright [Ukrainskoye obshchestvo, 2007; Kon, 2005; Oksamitnaya, 2003; Patrakova, 2009]. So, there appeared the perspective for the national researchers to create a multilateral comparative picture of national and European social realities, to describe the Ukrainian occupational structure in particular.

**Study Tasks and Method**

Phenomena of occupational structure, mobility and prestige are traditionally interesting for national sociologists, however, for a long time, realization of such projects was kept back because there was no reliable universal means for fixation of occupations in sociological survey. In the past decades, such commonly accepted methodical instrument for social researchers (including sociologists) in studies on occupational structures has become the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) and its national versions. In Ukraine on ISCO-88 basis has been developed and applied since 1996 Ukrainian Classification of Professions; in Russia, it is All-Russian Classification of Occupations. In national sociological projects the variable of profession, coded according to ISCO-88, has been used recently — for the first time, it was involved in the database of ESS in 2004 and in the Monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine in 2008. The presence of this variable in national databases enables to use it, *firstly*, as a main variable: for example, to study distribution of Ukrainian population by occupational groups (the topic of the article); *secondly*, as an independent variable for analysis of many sociological phenomena, like political attitudes, levels of collective solidarity, cultural practices, standards of life, distribution of family roles and others; *thirdly*, as an additional variable

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1 A story about creation of this classification, its conceptual and operational grounds, spheres of its application can be seen in [Hoffmann, 1999; Simonchuk, 2008; Antropologiya professiy, 2005].
(one of the main components to construct schemes of social class and socioeconomic status). It is known that ISCO-88 is very important and useful tool for sociologists but rather difficult for construction. To get the occupation variable, researchers include in a questionnaire a block of variables/questions, including: a name of respondent’s occupation and his main tasks and duties executed at work; level of education and necessary qualifications for conducting the work; an industry and status of employment; the number of employees, the managerial function and number of subordinates. These questions are applied to respondents employed at the moment of the study and to those who were employed before. Then, basing on the obtained information, the specially trained people according to ISCO-88 (COM) code the data, and a new variable goes to the database.

The availability of this variable in statistical data and databases of international and national sociological projects made it possible to conduct the research aimed to study occupational structure of Ukrainian society. In particular, there were the following tasks: firstly, to analyze distribution of population by occupational groups (the author wanted to compare and contrast the data of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine and sociological projects, ESS and Monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine); secondly, to study dynamics of occupational composition for the past decade; thirdly, to compare occupational structures of Ukraine, Russia, the countries of Eastern and Western Europe; fourthly, to analyze gender, age and place of residence profiles of occupational composition.

The occupation variable is usually represented by 4-digit code, and this enables to use any of four possible levels of grouping. In this study there used occupations in the most general grouping into 9 occupational categories (see Table 1). Then, the distribution data by the determined occupational groups were analyzed one by one according to the specified tasks. The corresponding data are presented for the respondents employed at the moment of study and for all respondents who has ever been occupied.

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1 With the help of special SPSS-programs, in the databases have been constructed variables of class schemes by J. Goldthorpe (EGP), E.O Wright and G. Esping-Andersen, as well as International Socioeconomic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) by H. Ganzeboom and International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS) by D. Treiman [Leiulfsrud, Bison, Jensberg, 2005].
## Table 1

**Employment, by occupational groups, %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Groups</th>
<th>State Statistics Committee (among the employed)*</th>
<th>ESS-2006/7**</th>
<th>Monitoring-2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Among the employed respondents</td>
<td>Among all respondents</td>
<td>Among the employed respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The elementary occupations</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of respondents (thousand)</strong></td>
<td><strong>20904.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>.784</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.784</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** The ESS data were weighed by design.

### Results

**The first task** — to compare occupational composition of Ukrainian population by the data of official statistics and different sociological projects — is important because, for Ukrainian sociologists, construction of
occupation variable (in particular, development of the block of necessary questions, collection with its help of information about occupation and its further coding according to ISCO-88) is rather new practice. That is why similarity and stability of corresponding data in different projects are regarded as a sign of the data validity.

An analysis of Table 1 shows that in the sociological projects the data on occupational distribution of Ukrainian population are rather close, deviations are acceptable and can be explained by different methods of collecting information on respondents’ occupation (in ESS, it was an interview, in the Monitoring, it was a hand-out questioning) and principles of a sample construction (random and quota correspondingly). The data of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine differ from those of sociological projects; the most significant difference relates to the category of the elementary occupations among the employed population (in the statistic data, their part is essentially bigger).

Allowing for the average data of all projects, we can present the occupational composition of Ukrainian society as follows (Figure 1).

![Figure 1. Employment in Ukraine, by occupational groups (by the data of ESS-2006), %](image)

Among all the employed population, one tenth of them perform managerial or administrative functions (legislators, senior officials and managers). (Sociological studies usually include in this occupational group
managers of enterprises / departments with over 10 subordinates and managers of small enterprises with 2–9 subordinates.) From one fourth to one third of all the employed are skilled non-manual workers, among which there are *professionals* (scientists, engineers, doctors, lawyers, economists, architects, lecturers, teachers and so on) and *technicians and associate professionals* (nurses, inspectors of customs, tax and finance services, brokers, social workers, sports coaches and so on). From 3% to 6% of the employed are *clerks* — an occupational group of those who fulfill auxiliary functions in the work of professionals (secretaries, computer operators, librarians, administrators, insurance agents, tax collectors and so on). About 15% are *service workers and shop and market sales workers* (salespeople, hairdressers, security guards, firemen, cooks, waiters, stewards, conductors and so on). Over one fourth of the respondents are employed in skilled manual work, among them, 1–2% are *agricultural and fishery workers* (cattle-breeders, milkmen and women, forest-guards, bee-keepers, gardeners and so on), 13% are *craft and related workers* (painters, joiners, parquet floor layers, welders, metalworkers, assemblers, electric mechanics, printers, seamstress and so on) and 13% are *plant and machine operators and assemblers* (drivers of motor and cargo transport, train drivers, crane-operators, borers, furniture assemblers, workers of automatic assembly lines, workers who operate melting furnaces, pipe equipment, boilers, refrigerators, water purification systems and so on). From 10% to 25% (different sources) are employed in the *elementary occupations* (cleaners, warden, porters, window-cleaners, concierges, laundresses, unskilled agricultural workers and so on).

Occupational distribution of all respondents ever employed\(^1\) (see Table 1) differs from the distribution of the currently employed mostly in the bigger part of unskilled workers (elementary occupations) and at the same time in a lower part of high skilled non-manual workers (professionals), senior officials and managers.

To compare occupational profiles of the employed and all respondents, the author has grouped the nine mentioned occupational categories according to the criteria of manual and non-manual labor and got a group of *white-collars* (first four categories from Table 1) and a group of

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\(^1\) Apart from the currently employed, in this category are those who do not have paid job at the moment of the study but had it before. They include housekeepers, disabled, registered unemployed and pensioners. Namely pensioners form the main part of the non-employed and affect significantly the distribution.
blue-collars (the next five categories). The ESS data revealed that the correlation between both groups is 39% and 61% among all respondents and 49% and 51% among the employed. So, it is evident that now the occupational structure tends more to the white-collar positions: there are fewer positions in agriculture and industry but more in the sales, intellectual, social and personal services. The most general explanation for these differences between the population as a whole and the employed can be found in macro-economic changes and corresponding dynamics in the workplace structure.

The second task is to analyze dynamics of occupational composition of Ukrainian population, and this can be realized only basing on statistical information: the corresponding data have been collected by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine since 1996, while the Monitoring project on occupational structure started only by the ESS 2004 and the Monitoring of 2008.

Before studying the dynamics of occupational groups in 1996–2007 let us consider the tendencies in changes of the total number of the employed (see Table 2). From 1996 to 2002, as it was revealed, the number of the employed decreased gradually from 24114.0 to 20400.7 thousand persons (by 14%)\(^2\). Since 2002 some rise or at least stabilization (20904.7 thousand in 2007) has been registered on the labor market. In the regarded period, along with changes in the number of the employed, there were transformations in the labor market segmentation by occupational characteristics (see Figure 2).

Among the employed, the biggest losses were registered in some groups of the working class. The quickest fall was in the numbers of skilled workers employed in agriculture, forestry and fishery — from 5.0% in 1996 to 1.3% in 2007. As we know, it happened because of the agricultural reforming, collapse of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, crush of the institutional basis of agricultural sector and establishment of new social and economic relations in the country [Allen, Goncharuk, Perrotta, 2001; Lerman, Sedik, Pugachov, Goncharuk, 2007]. At the same time, the part of craft and related workers (mostly occupations of the industrial sector)

\(^1\) For this kind of grouping, the fifth occupational group (the service and sales workers) can be considered as blue- or white-collar. There are researchers who prefer the first or the second option. In the article this category was regarded as the blue-collar.

\(^2\) The lowering tendency in numbers of employed had been registered since the end of 1980-ies but in the article, we regard it since 1996 because of the statistic data available on occupational categories.
decreased by over one fourth — from 17.0% in 1996 to 12.6% in 2007. It can be probably explained by restructuring of economy, bankruptcy of enterprises, their reorientation as a result of ownership change and a decrease in industrial occupation numbers correspondingly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>108.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>238.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>153.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The elementary occupations</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>104.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N(thousand people)</strong></td>
<td><strong>24114</strong></td>
<td><strong>22998</strong></td>
<td><strong>20420</strong></td>
<td><strong>20401</strong></td>
<td><strong>20730</strong></td>
<td><strong>20905</strong></td>
<td><strong>86.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the period under study negative processes were registered in occupational groups of non-manual labor as well. The part of professionals reduced from 13.4% in 1996 to 12.6% in 2007, the part of technicians from 13.5% to 11.4%, correspondingly; the part of clerks decreased nearly twice (from 6.6% to 3.6%). It is obvious that losses among professionals and technicians were less significant than among clerks and workers. This can be explained, on the one hand, by lack of significant reforming in health care, education and science, as well as corresponding changes in work place structure of the budget sector, and on the other hand, by the fact that specialization and long years of education have a stabilizing effect on the labor behavior; as a result, careers of professionals and technicians are usually more stable and consequent than of low-skilled white-collars, for example.

The registered outflow of intellectual workers (because of low salaries and prestige of their work, and career perspectives) had a number of directions, like labor migration abroad (the phenomenon known as brain drain), to business or governmental service [Simonchuk, 1999]. The tendency to lowering the number of intellectuals and corresponding occupational categories shows that declarations by the political leaders about a necessity of Ukrainian economy transition to the innovation basis are still no more than just declarations.

Among those occupational groups, which essentially strengthen their positions on the labor market, there are the service workers, their part has grown 2.4 times (from 5.7% in 1996 to 13.6% in 2007), and the equipment and machinery operators and assemblers, their number has increased 1.5 times (from 8.2% to 12.6% correspondingly). Basing on the empirical data and everyday observations by researchers, one can say that namely the sales and service sphere took the main flows of dismissed or resigned workers from other occupational groups. This sphere was attractive due to higher and more stable salaries (contrary to other sectors), flexible employment, lack of barriers, like certificates or work experience, wide opportunities for self-employment and small enterprising. At the same time, in this sphere “shady” relations were formed in employment and salaries. There is one more occupational group, in which there was registered a growth in employment for the regarded period (from 7.0% in 1996 to 7.6% in 2007), — we mean legislators, senior officials and managers of various levels.

As to the category of the elementary occupations, the data are not so straight: for 1996–2000, its part decreased by one fourth (from 23.7% to 17.7%), but by 2007 it was restored (to 24.7%). There may be various ex-
planations: as a result of the mobility processes that took place on the labor market (like dismissed agricultural workers or the flow of unskilled workers who went abroad looking for a job and came back then) or because of mistakes in measurement of the occupational variable (it is very probable as far as the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine had changed the calculation methods several times during the period).

So, the processes of occupational mobility (variously directed) took place in Ukraine in 1996–2007, on the background of a decrease in the number of employed (1.2 times). In five occupational groups, the numbers of employed decreased (the most losers happened to be skilled workers of agriculture, tool workers and clerks and, though a bit less, highly educated occupational groups — professionals and technicians). At the same time, in three groups the numbers have grown (among winners, there are the service workers, equipment operators and assemblers, legislators and managers). The upward and downward mobility flows in occupational sphere can be explained mostly by structural changes in economy and ownership relations, although we should not forget about the influence of technical and technological changes (like new occupations and growing employment in the IT-sphere: the internet-service, computer technologies and others)¹.

Compared to Ukraine, the radically different processes were observed in the occupational structure of Russia (see Table 3 and Figure 2). Firstly, for the decade (1998–2007)² the total number of employed had grown steadily (by 20%), but not decreased as in Ukraine. Secondly, despite significant restructuring of occupational space in both countries, this process in Ukraine differed from the Russian one by its direction and intensity of changes. In Russia positive dynamics was registered in four occupational groups: the part of senior officials and managers and professionals had grown by one third, the part of the service workers and skilled workers of agriculture had grown by one fourth. At the same time, we can see that the most decrease in the number of employed relates to blue-collars: the part of those who are employed in the elementary occupations had fallen by one fourth, the part of operators and assemblers

¹ In sociology of professions, there are interesting studies on appearing and institutialization of new professions, like social worker, sales manager, web-designer and others, on changes in status characteristics, values and living worlds of certain professions (doctors, advocates, etc.) [Antropologiya professiy, 2005; Sotsial'naya dinamika, 2006].

² The State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics has supplied the data on occupational distribution of population according to All-Russian Classification of Occupations since 1998.
had fallen by 15%, the part of craft and related workers by 10%, while a
decrease in the part of non-manual workers was not so essential: the
part of technicians had decreased by 5% and the part of clerks by 9%.

Table 3

Employed population in Russia, by occupational groups
in 1998–2007, %*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>134.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>130.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>94.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>122.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>125.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (thousand persons)</td>
<td>58437</td>
<td>65273</td>
<td>65766</td>
<td>69189</td>
<td>70814</td>
<td>121.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we compare dynamics of the white- and blue-collars employment in both countries, according to Table 3 and Figure 2, then in Ukraine, this correlation in 1998 was 40% : 60%, in 2007 it was 35% : 65%, correspondingly. In Russia, the correlation was 39% : 61% and 44% : 66%. It means, if we trust the data of official statistics, that the dynamics of occupational composition in two post-Soviet countries had different directions: in Russia the flow moved from categories of blue-collars to white-collars and the sales and service sphere (this can be regarded as a movement towards the post-industrial structure of economy), in Ukraine the flow moved mostly to the sales and service sphere. Negative tendencies within the occupational structure were less extended in Russia than in Ukraine.

![Table 2. Dynamics of employed population in Ukraine and Russia, by occupational groups in 1996–2007 (by the data of official statistics), %](image)

To realize the third task — to compare occupational structures in Ukraine and Russia with countries of Eastern and Western Europe\(^1\) — we used the data of European Social Survey of 2006/2007. European countries, which participated in the project were grouped by regions — “the countries of Eastern Europe” (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Estonia) and “the countries of Western Europe” (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain,

\(^1\) It is known that namely in comparative studies, the data on distribution by occupational groups are the most vulnerable, because of national differences in identification of qualification levels of various occupations in particular. To minimize it, in the international statistics of labor strict rules for the data comparison were developed (see: [Hoffmann, 1999: point 35]).
Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden). We compared the corresponding data among the respondents employed at the moment of survey and the respondents employed before it.

By the data of ESS-2006/2007, occupational profiles of population (respondents ever employed) have similarities and differences in the regarded countries (see Table 4). In all the countries the part of legislators, senior officials and managers is about 8–9%, except Russia, where it is 4.9% (however, it can be due to mistakes of coding applied to Russian unit, because according to the official statistics data in 2007, this category numbered 7.4%).

In Ukraine the total part of skilled intellectual workers (professionals and technicians) is 24.7%. That is more than in the countries of Eastern Europe (19.2%) but less than both in Western Europe and Russia (30% both). (This conclusion is also supported by the abovementioned data of the official statistics). Among the countries of Western Europe, there are essential differences in the total part of skilled white-collars: for example, in the most developed countries — Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland — it is 36–37%, while in Spain and Portugal it is 13–16%.

In all post-socialist countries the part of clerks is almost the same (6–8%), that is a half less than the average part in Western countries (13%). The same picture has been revealed as to the service and sales workers, in post-socialist countries, their part is 11–13%, that is less than the average in Western Europe (15%), where the service sector of economy started to develop much earlier.

The parts of skilled workers employed in agriculture are close in Ukraine, Russia and on the average in Western countries (2–3%), but they significantly differ from the average in the countries of Eastern Europe (7%) — mostly owing to Poland and Bulgaria where the part of farmers goes up to 10%, while in the rest of post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe it is about 2%. As to this category, there are differences between countries of Western Europe as well: the part makes 5–7% in Spain, Portugal and Finland, while it is 2% in the United Kingdom and Denmark.

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1 According to recommendations of ESS coordinators, the data on Ukraine and Russia were weighed by design-effect, the data on countries of Eastern and Western Europe was also weighed taking into account the population numbers in the grouped countries. About weighing the data in ESS see: http://ess.nsd.uib.no/files/WeightingESS.pdf.

2 In Ukraine and Russia the main part of the employed in agriculture consists of unskilled workers who belong to the category “elementary occupations”.
The total part of skilled manual workers (craft and related workers and operators and assemblers) is nearly the same in post-socialist countries (the average in Eastern Europe is 28.4%, in Ukraine, it is 27.5% and in Russia it is 32.1%), but it is principally higher (1.5 times) than the average in Western Europe (19.3%). (However, there are significant differences between the parts of skilled blue-collars in various Western countries: it is 12–16% in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland and it is 23–32% in Germany, Spain and Portugal.)

The part of employed in the elementary occupations is the biggest in Ukraine (18.8%) and in the countries of Eastern Europe (16.4%), it is almost 1.5 times higher than in Russia (11.8%) and the average in Western Europe (11.4%). More detailed analysis shows that these differences can be explained by higher parts of the employed in simple agricultural occupations.

So, the occupational profiles are close in all post-Soviet countries and at the same time principally differ from developed Western countries. For example, correlation of white-collars (the first four categories) and blue-collars (the next five ones) is 40% to 60% in Ukraine, 42% to 58% in Russia, 35% to 65% on average in countries of Eastern Europe, and 51% to 49% on the average in Western countries.

Comparing occupational structures, the author understands that the picture of occupational differentiation is rather rough because of significant differences in qualitative characteristics: for example, in developed Western countries and post-Soviet societies, groups of professionals (lawyers, doctors, university lecturers and others) differ by the level of work autonomy, power positions in society, social prestige, life standards and so on. Essential differences are in the work and market situations of skilled agricultural workers in different countries.

1 In Ukraine the part of craft and related workers is less than in Russia and countries of Eastern Europe, while the part of plant and machine operators and assemblers is nearly the same (12–14%).

2 Professionals and technicians and associate professionals forming the so-called “new middle class” have significant differences in different countries. In the times of bipolar world, this class had been formed in both systems independently, while now it develops under the globalization influence. Russian sociologist V. Il’in thinks that developers of production technologies, infrastructures, etc. are concentrated in the most developed countries, from which the developed products are spread to other parts of the world, while in post-communist countries the new middle class has been formed by occupations maintaining sales of important goods, by managers who organize production according to schemes and technologies developed abroad [Il’in, 2008: p. 11].
### Table 4

**Occupational structures in Ukraine and Russia, countries of Eastern and Western Europe (by the data of ESS-2006), %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational groups</th>
<th>Among the employed respondents**</th>
<th>Among all respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>784</strong></td>
<td><strong>1244</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data on Ukraine and Russia are weighed by design, the data on countries of Eastern and Western Europe are weighed by weight2 = dweight*pweight.

** Data calculated only for the employed respondents, we mean those who have a paid job.
However, the picture of occupational composition differs if we analyze the data for the employed population only\(^1\) (see Table 4). Compared to all people ever employed, in the part of currently employed population, in all countries, the part of senior officials and managers, professionals and technicians is higher, while the part of those occupied in the elementary occupations is lower. (Other occupations do not differ statistically.) Correspondingly, there are differences in the total correlations between white- and blue-collars: in Ukraine it is 49% and 51% for the employed (40% and 60% for all population), in Russia it is 47% and 65% (42% and 58% correspondingly), in Eastern Europe the average is 42% and 58% (35% and 58%), in Western Europe the average is 56% and 44% (51% and 49%). So, in all countries, we can see a shift towards the white-collars employment. This fact reflects dynamics in workplace structures of past decades, it moves to the sphere of management and skilled non-manual labor.

An analysis of the data on occupational composition of Ukrainian population by gender, age and place of residence, according to the fourth research task, enabled to register a number of interesting laws.

There are many sociological works on interrelations between gender and occupational employment [Hakim, 1996; Anker, 1998; Feldberg, Glenn, 1979; Dex, 1985; Gender, 1988, 1989, 1994; Bliznyuk, 2004; Zhurzhenko, 2001; Lavrinenko, 2003; Mal’tseva, Roshchin, 2006; Pratsia zhinok, 2003]\(^2\). Studying gender profile of occupational structure, researchers usually concentrate their attention on horizontal segregation — uneven distribution of men and women by industries and occupational groups — and on vertical segregation — social barriers for career growth of women, work discrimination, payment differences and so on\(^3\).

According to the data of ESS and official statistics, the gender profile of occupational groups among the employed population of Ukraine and Russia is asymmetrical, reflecting the fact of horizontal segregation

---

\(^1\) In all national samples the employed (with the paid employment at the moment of survey) make up around a half of all respondents: in Ukraine — 42%, in Russia — 51%, in countries of Eastern Europe — 47%, in countries of Western Europe — 53%.

\(^2\) About interrelations between gender and social classes (class schemes are based on profession classification by ISCO-88) see: [Goldthorpe, 1983; Leiulfsrud, Woodward, 1987; Oksamitnaya, 2003; Simonchuk, 2007].

\(^3\) Various aspects of measuring occupational segregation by sex and corresponding data see: [Hakim, 1996; Antonchenkova, 2004].
(Table 5 and Figure 3). Men take positions of legislators, senior officials and managers 1.5–2 times more often than women, positions of craft and related workers 4–5 times more often than women, positions of the plant and machine operators and assemblers 3–5 times more often than women. There are twice more women among professionals, technicians and associate professionals and the service and sales workers. Correlation between women and men is 4:1 in the group of clerks. There are more women among unskilled workers (the elementary occupations).

So, the described gender profile of occupational groups is similar to the well known horizontal segregation of the occupational labor market: men dominate on high managerial positions and among manual workers, while women can be more seen in positions of non-manual work — both high-skill ones, needing educational certificates (professionals and technicians), and routine labor, mostly in the sales and service sphere. Despite differences between the data of ESS and statistics on distribution of occupational categories of the employed population by gender, features of the revealed laws are absolutely similar.

When comparing the corresponding data of ESS for the currently employed respondents and all those who has ever been employed, we can see very similar gender composition of occupational groups, except for one parameter: among all respondents, there are significantly more women employed in unskilled labor (the elementary occupations). So, despite serious dynamics in occupational groups, the essence of horizontal gender segregation does not practically change.

It is interesting to compare gender profiles of occupational composition in Ukraine and Russia on the background of European countries (see Table 6). According to the data of ESS-2006/2007, laws of gender segmentation of occupational composition of the society are the same for all post-socialist countries: domination of men among managers and skilled manual occupations and significant domination of women among occupations of skilled and routine non-manual labor. In Ukraine and Russia gender similarities can be also seen in directions and intensity of labor markets (this fact is confirmed by the data of official statistics and sociological projects) while in the countries of Eastern Europe the intensity of gender differences is something different for some categories. For example, in Ukraine and Russia the ratio between men and women among managers is 3:1 while in the countries of Eastern Europe it is not so sharp. The same can be said for technicians and craft and related workers.
Table 5

Employed Ukrainian and Russian population, by sex and occupational groups, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational groups</th>
<th>Ukraine (The data of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2007*)</th>
<th>Russia (The data of ESS-2006/2007***)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents (thousand)</td>
<td>10.140</td>
<td>10.765</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*** The ESS data were weighed by design and calculated only for the employed respondents, we mean those who have a paid job.
We also noticed significant gender differences in occupational labor market between post-socialist countries (Ukraine, Russia, Eastern Europe) and developed ones of Western Europe. One of the differences is correlation between men and women among professionals (1:2 in the post-socialist space and 1.2:1 in Western countries). In Western Europe, like in post-Soviet countries, women dominate among technicians and associate professionals but the gender correlation is less sharp. So, the data confirm obviously that in post-Soviet countries the greatest part of professionals and technicians consists of women, while in Western Europe the composition is close to gender parity. It is well known that in our countries these occupations in the state sector are related to rather low salaries and prestige while in Western countries intellectual work is paid and socially valued (as a rule) according to educational levels and qualifications. Another difference can be seen in sharper gender disproportion related to other occupational groups if we compare situations in Western and post-socialist countries. Among service and sales workers, the ratio between men and women is 1:3.3 and 1:1.9 (in Western and post-Soviet countries, correspondingly), among craft and related workers, the situation is opposite with domination of men — 6:1 and 3.5:1 correspondingly. At the same time, there are gender similarities in Western and post-Soviet countries: men dominate among senior officials and managers and operators and assemblers, women dominate among representatives of routine non-manual labor (clerks) and elementary occupations.

Figure 3. Employed population in Ukraine, by sex and occupational groups in 2007 (by the data of official statistics), %
Table 6

Employed population in Ukraine, Russia, countries of Eastern and Western Europe, by sex and occupational groups (ESS-2006), %*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational groups</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Countries of Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Countries of Western Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1193</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data on Ukraine and Russia are weighed by design, the data on countries of Eastern and Western Europe are weighed by weight2 = dweight*pweight.
So, according to our data, gender disproportions in employment are kept in all countries, both in Western and post-socialist ones. The spheres of women’s employment are mostly routine white-collar labor as well as sales and service; the spheres of men’s employment are blue-collar labor and managerial positions. However, in different countries these phenomena manifest differently [Collins Dictionary, 1999: v. 2, p. 128]. Our statements correspond to conclusions on horizontal gender segregation of European labor market presented by the abovementioned works by sociologists and reports of international organizations (like [Report, 2006; Global, 2007; Pratsia zhinok, 2003; Rivnist’, 2006]).

The next issue is *vertical gender segregation* in occupational sphere, in which traditional research topics are discrimination of women by salaries and labor conditions, career promotion, differences in social and occupational prestige of women’s and men’s employment. The data available for the author enable to analyze gender differences in salaries and position distribution.

* Differences in salaries between men and women within occupational groups* were analyzed by the author basing on the Monitoring data collected by the Institute of Sociology in 2008 (Table 7). The data confirm empirically the following well-known facts: firstly, there is a significant difference in salaries by sex (among the employed, the women’s salaries make up on the average 72% of the men’s ones); secondly, being employed on the same positions, women get less in all nine occupational groups¹. Correlation between women’s and men’s salaries is the most critical among senior officials and managers, as well as skilled workers employed in agriculture. Disproportion in labor salaries is also significant among those occupational groups, with women’s domination (technicians, clerks, sales and services).

Among the employed, the correlation between men’s and women’s salaries is 72% on the average, and it is 64% among all the respondents. As far as the most part of the latter category is formed by pensioners who were employed earlier, the dynamics confirms indirectly a positive tendency towards lowering inequality in salaries by sex. International expe-

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¹ The State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine traditionally collects information on average salaries by kinds of economic activity and sex. They reveal significant differences in payments by sex. In 2007, in the economy as a wholly, this difference made up 27% in favor of men. The payment differences were revealed in all economy branches (even where women dominate, like health care, education, services and others). The highest difference (up to 35%) in payments between men and women was registered in the industry, communications, culture and sports, finances, while the lowest difference (up to 9%) was in the agriculture, forestry and fishery [Dity, zhinky ta sim’ya, 2008: p. 147].
rience shows that the gender inequality in salaries may be eliminated by mechanisms of trade union and women’s movements, as well as by laws. Ukraine makes steps in this direction: in 2006, the Law of Ukraine “On State Guarantees of Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men” was adopted. However, laws do not provide real chances: for example, in the United Kingdom, despite adoption of the Equal Pay Act (1970) and Sex Discrimination Act (1975), women still get only about 75% of what men get per hour [Collins Dictionary, 1999: v. 2, p. 129].

Table 7

Average salaries, by sex and occupational groups
(the Monitoring data-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational groups</th>
<th>Among the employed</th>
<th>Among all the respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women, USD</td>
<td>Men, USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>446</strong></td>
<td><strong>516</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gender differences in position promotion. The available data published by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine reveal interesting facts on distribution of government employees (including managers and professionals) by range and gender (see Table 8 and Figure 4). Women obviously dominate as government managers, however, in the system of post categories, career promotion of men and women looks like an overturned pyramid: moving from managers of lowest (sixth) range to the highest (first) one, the part of women decreases while the part of men increases. The same picture relates to career promotion of government employees-professionals\(^1\). Similar situations can be seen in the sphere of education, health care, politics, industry and business. According to the report of UNDP Equal Opportunities Program (2006), the part of women is 38% among the entrepreneurs involved in individual labor activity in Ukraine; women are heads of 26% of all small enterprises, 15% of middle ones and 12% of large ones; industrial business managers make up only 2% of women [Rivnist’, 2006]. Only 11% of farms are managed by women [Zhinky i choloviky, 2001: p. 86].

So, a great part of women involved in managerial activity in the economy, but the common rule is the higher posts, the less number of women take them. The lower position profile for women can be explained by the so-called “glass ceiling”: invisible institutional barriers and social prejudice preventing women from getting high managerial positions [Probivaya “steklyannyi potolok”, 2002].

One of the popular issues of sociological research is interrelation between age and occupation [Riley, 1987; Ageing, 2001; Glover, Branine, 2001; Samorodov, 1999; Work, 1994; Ashton, 2007; Furlong, Cartmel, 2006]. Age is regarded as an important differentiating factor of occupations, because it predetermines all stages of individual working life — from involvement in social and labor relations to further occupational socialization and working career up to retirement. Age determines labor behavior, we mean that members of different age groups have different needs, social-labor aims and value orientations. Age determines differences in state of health, leisure, social weight in society, as far as in different age groups there are different volumes of qualification, power-position, income and other resources.

\(^1\) The same picture was registered on numbers of managers and professionals employed in local governmental bodies (by sex) (see: [Dity, zhinky ta sim’ya , 2008: p. 93]).
Table 8

**Government employees, by sex in 1995 and 2007, %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government employees</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of total number of government employees</td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of total number of government employees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered number of workers taking positions of managers and professionals</td>
<td>208081</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>265315</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>54688</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>70559</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among them those of the following categories:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The second</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The third</td>
<td>2493</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>3331</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fourth</td>
<td>5745</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>7743</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fifth</td>
<td>21189</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>19693</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sixth</td>
<td>24460</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>38165</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>153393</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>194756</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among them those of the following categories:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The third</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>3577</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fourth</td>
<td>1715</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>3379</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fifth</td>
<td>14960</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>26043</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sixth</td>
<td>51631</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>69873</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The seventh</td>
<td>84198</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>91892</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age groups are often associated with inequalities in many social spheres, like the labor market. Discrimination, or the holding of irrational and prejudicial views about individuals or groups, based on their age, are fixed in the term “ageism” [Dictionary, 2005: p. 8–9]. In Western societies, the oldest and the youngest age groups are perceived as rather incompetent and excluded from many spheres of social life. It is a serious
social problem of employment, and there are special age-sensitive laws in many countries, including Ukraine (like ban on age limits for hiring or assignments for university graduates). Despite its orientation to research of all age groups, the age sociology pays special attention to the ageism issue, to the youth labor market and seniors’ employment in particular. We know that nowadays, the first and the last age groups suffer from exclusion and limits on the labor market, but there were times when elder age was not perceived as an obstacle for occupational realization (for example, under the late socialism, senior men even occupied high managerial posts).

Studying the age profile of occupational structure according the data of statistics and ESS, we discovered a number of essential differences (see Table 9). We compared six age groups: young people under 20 and of 20–29, people of middle age (30–39, 40–49, 50–59 years old) and elderly over 60.

The data of statistics and ESS confirm that nowadays some part of young people under 20 is involved in various kinds of occupational training, while opportunities of the other part — those who begin their working lives just after graduating from school — are limited on the labor market, they are mostly represented by unskilled manual work and the sales and service sphere (64% and 12% respondents of this age).

Having got initial professional education, young people over 20 take positions of all range among white- and blue-collars, however, they twice more rarely (comparing to older age groups) are engaged in jobs related to managerial functions (legislators, senior officials and managers), because it is well-known that the power resources are concentrated in middle and older generations. Youth under 30 rarely takes positions of professionals as well.

1 Discrimination practices by age are widely popular in Ukraine despite the fact that workers are protected from age discrimination by laws. The Clause 24, Constitution of Ukraine, and the Labor Code of Ukraine declare equal rights and freedoms for all citizens no matter of sex, age and other features. There are also known facts of age discrimination of university graduates having no experience, workers of pre-retirement age, whose interests are not taken into account by staff policy, retraining or improvement of professional skills. Age discrimination exists in Europe as well, that is why there are many studies by Western sociologists on ageism.

2 On the growing research interest in this issue and specific constructions of “elder age” in different cultural and time conditions see, for example: [Riley, 1987].

3 By the data of the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine, only 15% of youth (14–19) are involved in economic activity [Zhinky i cholviky, 2001: p. 47].
By the data of statistics and ESS, managerial positions are concentrated in generations of 30-, 40- and 50-years old. Even as a whole, representatives of those age groups have similar occupational profiles. Middle-age workers, as a rule, reach peaks of their occupational realization and rewards for their work with high power and skill resources.

Compared to representatives of middle-age groups, the workers over 60 have different occupational picture: they are twice more rarely employed in occupations of skilled intellectual work (professionals and technicians and associate professionals) and five times more rarely employed in the routine (sale and service), but they are twice more often employed in unskilled manual work (elementary occupations). It means not only manifestation of ageism but the fact that the structure of working positions, in which those who are currently over 60 were involved, had much more occupational positions in the agriculture and industry than in intellectual labor, sales and service. There are also some specific features of behavior on the labor market manifested by people of pre-retirement and retirement age: this age category can be characterized by consequent de-professionalization — forced or voluntary lowering of occupational and social status.

If we compare occupational differentiation of various age groups in Ukraine, Russia and European countries, then the principal similarity will be revealed (see Table 9). First of all, we would like to stress the same picture (described above) of occupational profile related to workers under 20 and over 60 in comparison to middle age groups. Occupational structures of those who are 20-, 30- and 40-years old are close as well. In all the compared countries workers, who reach 30, have already passed all necessary career stages and take occupational positions, the main functions of which consist of managerial tasks, that is why the part of managers is the highest among those of 30–50.

The data of statistics and ESS confirm that age is a meaningful differentiating factor of occupational structure in all compared countries. It relates mostly to the youngest and oldest age groups on the labor market — their occupational pictures significantly differ from the ones of the middle age groups. The phenomenon can be described as the age effect.

---

1 Based on the monitoring-2008 data, the author’s comparative analysis (of monthly salaries by professional groups and age) revealed that salaries of workers of 30, 40 and 50-year-old are higher than of the 20 and 60 ones. These differences are the most evident among governmental executives and managers, as well as professionals and clerks. On age segregation in labor payment in Western countries see: [Ageing and income, 2001].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational groups</th>
<th>Ukraine*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Russia**</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of respondents (thousand persons)</strong></td>
<td><strong>493.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>4862.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>5184.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>5514.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>3712.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1136.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>1211</strong></td>
<td><strong>16297</strong></td>
<td><strong>17134</strong></td>
<td><strong>19460</strong></td>
<td><strong>14203</strong></td>
<td><strong>2509</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The countries of Eastern Europe***     |          |          |          |          |          | The countries of Western Europe*** |          |          |          |          |          |
| Legislators, senior officials and managers | 2.8      | 4.4      | 9.6      | 8.7      | 7.6      | 9.3      | 0.9      | 4.1      | 8.5      | 9.5      | 10.0     | 10.1     |
| Professionals                          | 0.0      | 8.9      | 14.1     | 10.7     | 7.0      | 5.5      | 1.1      | 9.7      | 17.0     | 13.8     | 15.2     | 10.4     |
| Technicians and associate professionals | 7.0      | 10.1     | 10.8     | 9.2      | 12.6     | 9.5      | 7.2      | 17.5     | 19.5     | 18.6     | 17.0     | 14.8     |
| Clerks                                 | 5.6      | 10.4     | 8.0      | 8.1      | 7.0      | 5.9      | 12.2     | 13.5     | 12.3     | 13.4     | 13.0     | 12.1     |
| Service workers and shop and market sales workers | 26.8     | 22.2     | 13.3     | 12.6     | 11.5     | 8.7      | 30.8     | 23.8     | 14.8     | 14.7     | 13.6     | 11.3     |
| Skilled agricultural and fishery workers | 5.6      | 2.4      | 5.3      | 7.6      | 6.1      | 12.8     | 4.7      | 1.1      | 1.5      | 2.1      | 2.3      | 4.7      |
| Craft and related workers              | 15.5     | 17.2     | 17.3     | 17.5     | 17.2     | 15.9     | 18.5     | 14.0     | 11.2     | 10.9     | 10.7     | 14.4     |
| Plant and machine operators and assemblers | 1.4      | 10.0     | 10.8     | 10.1     | 13.1     | 12.3     | 2.1      | 4.8      | 6.5      | 6.6      | 7.7      | 8.6      |
| Elementary occupations                 | 35.2     | 14.4     | 10.7     | 15.5     | 17.8     | 20.1     | 22.6     | 11.4     | 8.8      | 10.4     | 10.4     | 13.6     |
| **Number of respondents (persons)**    | **71**   | **662**  | **729**  | **802**  | **854**  | **1192** | **665**  | **2982** | **3936** | **4941** | **3896** | **6414** |

* Data were given by Ukrainian Derzhstat for authors request.
*** Data ESS-2006 on countries of Eastern and Western Europe are weighted by weight2 = dweight*pweight.
of edge in the space of occupational positions. In the edge age groups, there are also accumulated changes managerial to transformation of occupational structure: for example, in the youth groups new professions are intensively mastered, while in older groups the occupations, dated and tending to extinction, are more concentrated.

**Place of residence profile** of occupational groups in Ukraine (according to statistical and sociological data) seems to be quite expected (see Table 10 and Figure 5). Urban population prevails indisputably by all positions related to managerial powers and skill-education resources: they twice or thrice more often than rural residents have occupations of managers, professionals or technicians (by statistical data, clerks and craft and related workers as well). At the same time, among rural population the part of those employed in elementary occupations is 3–5 times higher than that among the urban one, and the most part of skilled agricultural workers belongs to the country residents\(^1\). However, among urban residents, there are also significant differences: professionals and clerks are concentrated in Kyiv, as in any capital, while occupations, like craft and related workers, are more represented in cities and towns of high industrial potential. It is evident that correlation between white- and blue-collars employment is cardinal different by the place of residence — it is 44% : 56% among urban population and 17% : 83% among the rural one.

It is of interest to consider the residence profile of occupational portrait of Ukrainian population in comparison with Russia and European countries (see Table 11). By the data of ESS-2006, the place of residence structure of employment is similar in all post-socialist countries\(^2\). The similarities are the following: parts of managers, professionals, technicians and clerks are significantly bigger among the urban population, while parts of agricultural workers, operators and assemblers, and elementary occupations are bigger among the rural one. In the countries of Western Europe the place of residence profile of employment is not characterized by significant differences between urban and rural population (apart from the occupational group of skilled agricultural workers, and this is obvious).

---

\(^1\) It is known that in 2005 in 49.3% of Ukrainian place of residences, there were no subjects of economy [Prybytkova, 2009]; that is why many rural residents were forced to work either in personal household or at places where they did not live.

\(^2\) The data of the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine and the monitoring reveal more distinct differences in occupational compositions between urban and rural population than the data of ESS-2006; however, the tendencies are the same.
### Table 10

**Employed population, by place of residence and occupational groups, %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational groups</th>
<th>Data of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2007 (among the employed)*</th>
<th>Data of the Monitoring 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Among the employed respondents</td>
<td>Among all the respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban population</td>
<td>Rural population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of respondents (thousand)</strong></td>
<td><strong>14310</strong></td>
<td><strong>6595</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11

Employed population, by place of residence and occupational groups in Ukraine, Russia, the countries of Eastern and Western Europe (ESS-2006), %*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational groups</th>
<th>Ukraine Urban population</th>
<th>Ukraine Rural population</th>
<th>Russia Urban population</th>
<th>Russia Rural population</th>
<th>Countries of Eastern Europe Urban population</th>
<th>Countries of Eastern Europe Rural population</th>
<th>Countries of Western Europe Urban population</th>
<th>Countries of Western Europe Rural population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>628</strong></td>
<td><strong>1167</strong></td>
<td><strong>1480</strong></td>
<td><strong>566</strong></td>
<td><strong>2835</strong></td>
<td><strong>1845</strong></td>
<td><strong>1620</strong></td>
<td><strong>8623</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data on Ukraine and Russia are weighed by design, the data on countries of Eastern and Western Europe are weighed by weight2 = dweight*pweight.
Discussion and Conclusions

The multi-purpose research conducted by the author enabled to draw the following conclusions.

Firstly, the data of different sociological projects on occupational composition of Ukrainian population are comparable (and that is why reliable), although they have differences, which could be mostly explained by different strategies in sample designs and methods for collection of information. Significant differences between the sociological and statistical data need additional explanations, special discussions with representatives of the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine responsible for the data collection on distribution of population by occupational groups, and (what would be ideal) elimination of this problem with the help of bringing both methodical strategies closer (mainly on the stage of coding).

Secondly, the comparative data of the ESS project confirm, on the one hand, that occupational compositions in all post-socialist societies (Ukraine, Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe) are radically similar (this is explained by similar social, economic and technological grounds, which formed occupational profiles in the countries of former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and still preserved); on the other hand, that there are principle differences from the developed Western countries (like the part of white-collars in the occupational structure...
in Western countries is essentially greater, while the part of blue-collars is less correspondingly). However, this conclusion needs further discussion about comparative differences in qualitative parameters of representatives of various occupational groups (like professionals, farmers and others).

Thirdly, for twelve years (the period of collecting data on occupational distribution), a significant dynamics has been registered in differentiation of population by occupational groups. If we trust the data of statistics, in Ukraine and Russia, the dynamics had different directions and intensity. In Ukraine, on the background the total employment decline, the blue-collar occupations of the industrial sector shifted to the sales and service sphere, while in Russia the dynamics tended to transformation of the employment structure into the post-industrial pattern: on the background of the employment rise, the blue-collars shifted not only to the sales and service sphere but to white-collars as well. To assess the reliability of this conclusion, we need to use the data of other researchers.

Fourthly, the collected data show that sex, age and place of residence are important for analysis of occupational structures of post-Soviet societies. Among the revealed phenomena, we would like to stress horizontal gender asymmetry in the occupational distribution (women dominate in the sphere of high skilled and routine non-manual work, while men dominate in occupations of skilled manual work and high managerial positions; the gender differences of the labor market are similar in all compared countries) and vertical segregation represented by gender differences in salaries (in all occupational groups, men’s salaries are significantly higher than women’s ones) and by the position profile (the higher a position status in the position hierarchy, the more rarely it is taken by a woman). An analysis of the age profile revealed some features of occupational positions of different age groups. There was registered the so-called age “edge effect”: the youngest (under 20) and the oldest (over 60) age groups have specific structures of employment, different from the middle age’s ones (from 30 to 60), which are the most numerous, active and realizing the whole range of modern society occupations. Young people under 20 are mostly involved in unskilled manual work, sales and service, while the people of retirement age can be divided into two groups, bigger of which is employed in elementary occupations and the other is involved in the sales and service sphere. Occupational profiles of those who are in their 30-ies, 40-ies and 50-ies are the most similar, while the young people in their 20-ies differ from them by the lesser part of senior officials and managers. In all compared countries we revealed
the same correlation between age and occupation. Place of residence profile shows radical differences between occupational compositions of urban and rural population, in skills in particular: representatives of elementary occupations are mostly concentrated in the country, while managers and skilled workers live mainly in cities and towns; however, there are differences among the urban population: most high skilled white-collars are concentrated in the capital and the blue-collars prevail in cities and towns. We mentioned above only those features of occupational structures of Ukrainian and Russian societies, which are convincingly confirmed by the data of the official statistics and sociological projects.

In conclusion, it should be noticed that this study on general aspects of occupational differentiation of the Ukrainian society in the comparative and time perspectives can be regarded as only one of the necessary steps to complex research on occupational structure. National studies on various kinds of occupational mobility, occupational prestige, various indices of sex and age inequality in the sphere of employment are urgent now. Another perspective direction is development of sociology of professions that is practically absent in Ukraine as a field of research. As a result, we lack reliable information about the national cultural features of separate occupational groups (like doctors, managers, teachers, lawyers, social workers, IT-specialists), changes in status of occupations under social transformations, emergence and institutionalization of new professions.

References


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**The Master’s Portrait through a Fortune of the Service Class and Its Sociological Conceptualizing in the 20th century**

**Of Professor Helmut Steiner’s Blessed Memory**

Paraphrasing Max Weber’s famous saying about politics as a profession, there are two ways of making profession out of sociology: either to live “for” sociology or to live “from” sociology. For Helmut Steiner sociology has become not just a profession but a passion. It determined the path of his life. Probably, he has made an accidental professional choice, but sociology has shaped his “interior life” by making it meaningful. Thus, his life serves the highest values of vocation that cannot exist without critic of society. Helmut Steiner imposes this moral imperative on himself and on sociology. In his article “Self-understanding and the Function of Sociology” he writes:

“...if sociology wants society to take its competent and critical judgment and wants to regain its own recognition among wide public and political scientists, it should turn to its inherent function to **criticize society**. This is also one of the lessons of sociology in GDR” (Steiner 1995:230).

But who is able to effectively act as “a critic of society”? Who can truly live sociology as a vocation? The search for answers to these questions penetrates Helmut Steiner’s professional work. It started from the research on the changes in social structure and the status of employees (Steiner 1967). Is the issue still topical? If the answer is yes, then to what extent and why?

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1 Translated and edited by the author. The Russian and Ukrainian version was published in the journal “Sotsiolohiia, teoriia, metody, marketynh”, 2009, № 1, pp. 32–40.
In the second half of the 19th and over the 20th centuries the number of employees has grown substantially and thus filled middle-level “niches” of opportunities in social structure. Under the influence of the scientific and technological revolution and together with the rise of welfare-state policies the service sector expanded. This change had far-reaching consequences in the structure of social inequalities and in the system of social relationships. As a result, it raised serious conceptual problems before sociology in general and before Marxist sociologists in particular.

Sociology as a discipline responded to the changes with intensive debates on meritocracy, “new middle class”, “white-collars”, “new working class”, “new petty bourgeoisie” and on the relations between industrial and post-industrial trends in social development. The latter topic became a key issue in the discussions about class structure and modern social inequalities. Each new generation of social scientists used to develop its own view of the changeable social order by discovering new ways to interpret the same phenomenon. These views and debates belong to the modern classics in sociology — from the technocratic ideas of T. Veblen and J. Burnham to “the new little man” presented in White Collar: The American Middle Classes by C. W. Mills (Mills 1951), and to the discussions on the post-industrial theories of “knowledge class”, “intelligentsia and intellectuals” developed by D. Bell and A. Gouldner. Debates on the theories about the “service class” by R. Dahrendorf and J.H. Goldthorpe increased the complexity of the intellectual puzzle. As G. Ross put it, “the theme of new middle classes could give rise to an entire history of sociology: either in a misleading form of ‘revolution of managers’, ‘white collars’, ‘new working class’, or ‘new petty bourgeoisie’, — manifestation of intermediate stratum in advanced industrial societies would be rediscovered more often than a wheel was found” (Ross 1978: 163).

One important reason for these theoretical debates concerns the fact that social scientists themselves belong to this “new class” and this motivates them to plunge into self-reflection. Moreover, the heterogeneous composition of the new class raises the issue of its difficult identification in the system of social relationships. Nevertheless, the topic of the middle class occupied the very center of research on new social inequalities because of its growing impact on the present-day society and its capacity for self-renewal by undertaking independent social actions and forming various political alliances due to its intermediate social position. At the same time, there are important questions, which remain open: To what extent can a variety of “new middle layers” be conceptualized within the frameworks of the class analysis? What positions do these layers occupy in the structure of social relationships? How can their own development
change the social relationships? What is the relevance of acquisition, power and organizational impact in these processes?

The idea of society marked by power based on monopoly of knowledge rather than on property and wealth has haunted social sciences since long ago. As early as in the first volume of *Capital* (1867) K. Marx observed that the development of joint-stock companies tends to generate a separation of the management from the ownership of capital. The former is conducted by a growing army of officers [managers] and NCOs [supervisors]. They command the work process on behalf of the capital. In the period 1870–1873, debating with the Marxist scenario for potential development of socialism, Mikhail Bakunin wrote in his work *The Knouto-Germanic Empire and the Social Revolution* and *Statism and Anarchy*, that the forthcoming “non-capitalist government” could hardly be satisfied with political rule alone. In addition, it would exercise economic control based on extensive knowledge. This situation presupposed the establishment of “a hegemony of the scientific intelligentsia … It will be a new class, new hierarchy of genuine and ‘so-called’ scientists and scientific workers, and the world will be divided into a minority with power stemming from knowledge and an overwhelming majority of ignorant” (Cit. on: Szelenyi 1994: 723).

The research on the new class of knowledge started in the first decades in the 20th century. It was the time of serious doubts about K. Marx’s expectations concerning the deepening polarization between capitalists and workers. Instead, the new middle layers of those engaged in management and the service sector began mushrooming. A number of young researchers proved that the new middle classes represented a new social phenomenon, which originated from the growth of the industrial, commercial, trade and state bureaucracy. In sociological writings of the 1930-ies appeared the claims that a new class of bureaucracy, technocrats and managers had occupied (or was still occupying) dominant positions in the power structure in both Western capitalism and in state socialism. Those works were theoretically heterogeneous. For some authors, a new class was considered as made up exclusively of “Stalinist bureaucracy”, while for others — of “American managers”. There were also works presenting the new class as restricted to the Soviet state. Other authors saw the development of a new class in both socioeconomic systems. However, what all authors held in common was the idea that *class power based on individual capital ownership is replaced by different structural positions providing an opportunity for economic command, acquisition and control*. The approach under consideration was independently developed by A. Bogdanov, T. Veblen, A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, L. Trotsky, and
others. In the early 1940-ies J. Burnham, a follower of L. Trotsky, formulated the theory of the “revolution of managers”, claiming that managers’ revolution was a worldwide historical phenomenon with managers turning into the main revolutionary force of a new era (Marshall 1996: 302). This approach was deeply rooted in an influential sociological school whose central theme was the idea of technocratic managerial transformation of current industrialism. As early as in the 1960-ies the “bureaucratic theories” of a new class gave way to neoconservative theories (J. Galbraith, D. Bell), and further — to a theory of radical philosophy (A. Gouldner) focusing on the highly educated layers of the population and on their specific culture. The change was associated with qualitative shifts in modern society and personality transformation accompanied by changes in social relationships and life chances.

In the period of intensive theoretical interest in the educated middle strata analyzed through the prism of the technocratic approach, a different view on the “new class” underwent a parallel development. The central emphasis was placed on specific features concerning class-consciousness and psychology. Attention was also paid to other questions: What makes totalitarianism plausible? What are the social and psychological characteristics of numerous and well-educated strata, who become able to adopt political irrationality? Studies on these issues were carried out in Germany in the 1920–1930-ies by E. Lederer, J. Marschak (Lederer, E. and J. Marschak 1995) and H. Speier. In their book *The New Middle Class* (1926) E. Lederer and J. Marschak engaged in a thorough analysis of the professional, organizational, status, political and individual identification of the middle layers of German society when the fascist roaring could be already heard. In 1932 Hans Speier published his book where he made a comprehensive sociological analysis of the psychological and political orientations typical for the “new middle class” in Germany, by particularly focusing on the social and economic factors dividing “blue collars” and “white collars” (Speier 1995). H. Speier was the first to concentrate on some differences between the social and psychological dispositions of the new middle class and the “blue collars” despite the impact of the proletarianization process in Germany during the Weimar period. In particular, the author pointed at the link to the status ideologies of the previous middle strata manifested by acquiring the values of social autonomy, and historically conditioned understanding of prestige by the new middle class.

Analyzing various cases of professional groups of the new middle class in their relationship to social prestige and accompanying status positions, H. Speier reaches the conclusion that *the new middle class is*
not petty bourgeoisie. Above all, according to him, it is made up of a variety of specialists and clerks. These groups include specialists of different-level administrators, supervisors of non-manual workers, technicians and engineers, typewriters, secretaries, bank officers, inspectors, social workers and state employees. Each group occupies its own place in the hierarchy of prestige. The analytical part of H. Speier’s research served as a model for further investigations on European and American middle classes. This was the case with C.W. Mills. Special significance had H. Speier’s assumptions about the aspiration of the new middle class to make its status claims fulfilled by radically opposing the working class and its internationalism by establishing “a common nationalism” together with the idea of Gemeinschaft. Also of importance is his conclusion about an existing conflict between workers and “white collars” in the sphere of education and culture, despite some non-essential distinctions between them in social and psychological dispositions.

The idea about so-called “white collars”, or “employees” as a new class being formed among educated people engaged in non-manual labor reflected the processes of substantial changes in labor and the intensive growth of this social group. As early as at the turn of the 1960-ies the industrially developed countries with market economy witnessed a slowing down of the growth of the “white collars” group and an intensive growth of other highly educated middle class groups. As a result, a series of theoretical speculations appeared. Among them was the thesis about the “embourgeoisement of working class” together with “proletarianization of the middle class”. D. Lockwood, J. Goldthorpe and their colleagues empirically examined these hypotheses in their study on the British society in the early 1960-ies (Goldthorpe J. H., D. Lockwood 1969). Important for them was not only the analysis of social-economic positions, but also of behavior, life styles as well as political views of the “middle class” and industrial workers with high incomes. The authors’ central conclusion was that class distinctions could change only superficially. It discredited to a certain degree the idea about “embourgeoisement” of the working class.

This conclusion was independently proved by Helmut Steiner as an East German sociologist. His book on the class status of the employees in West Germany (Steiner 1967) was a pioneering research conducted in the Eastern European countries by applying a Marxist holistic approach. One of the most difficult issues in social stratification theory was put under scrutiny, namely the criteria of class identification. Helmut Steiner reexamined the dimensions of social class and highlighted the determining importance of the relation to the means of production and its connection to people’s living conditions and interests. In addi-
tion to D. Lockwood and J. Goldthorpe, who stressed the significance of behavior and consciousness for class analysis. Steiner stressed the necessity to differentiate between the historically varying forms of existence and manifestation of essential class characteristics. Thanks to this methodological refinement, the author managed to investigate the origin, composition, working environment, class identification and life chances of the rapidly growing army of salaried employees (Angestellte in the German original) and to reveal the class dialectics as “historically transient within the framework of capitalism” (Steiner 1967: 99). The empirical analysis was carried out in the light of the relations of production. All other class characteristics were considered as dependent variables.

This approach led to the conclusion about the emergence of a “new proletariat”, rather than a “new middle class” in the social-economic system of the Western capitalism. Thus, Helmut Steiner proved that the difference between “blue-collar” workers and great part of “white-collar” employees is mostly of interclass nature. The differences between workers and employees in their leisure time and in the consumption structure arise from the specific features of their labor and are not underlying their specific class position. Like his blue-collar counterpart, the white-collar worker becomes increasingly “exchangeable” and, in the absence of strong unions, even more vulnerable to fluctuations in the labor market. As white-collar occupations are increasingly standardized and programmed, and as the fragmented tasks increasingly require functional rather than substantive rationality (according to Mannheim), one might assume that the lower level white-collar worker is likely to experience alienation as his blue-collar counterpart. Like in H. Speier’s earlier works, Helmut Steiner addressed some not essential distinctions between social and psychological dispositions of the new middle class and “blue-collar” workers in the context of proletarianization of the labor environment.

In the 1980 and 1990-ies the thesis about proletarianization of lower level middle class, ambiguity and contradiction in the position of “white-collar” employees in modern industrial society underwent empirical revision by the research carried out by E.O. Wright (1985), N. Abercrombie, A. Warde (1994), and G. Marshall (1988). The group studied the increasing social discord among clerks-employees and lower service personnel (sell assistants, registers and others), the discord being manifested above all in marketplace and work settings, as well as in life chances. According to N. Abercrombie, taking a complex of parameters like status situation and political behavior into account one can argue that a group of lower service personnel is being proletarianized (Abercrombie N., A. Warde 1994: 183-184). As E.O. Wright sees it, the situation of the USA
employment testifies an increasing share of proletariat not only by work environment and economic ownership relationships, but also by manifestations of class-consciousness and behavior. G. Marshall analyzes the proletarianization of the British middle class in four dimensions: proletarianization of the class structure as a whole; individuals within the structure; certain kinds of employment; social consciousness of individuals and groups in society. The results obtained allow the author to arrive at the conclusion that although the change in class structures as a whole “does not reflect the process of so-called proletarianization”, the service personnel is subject to proletarianization (Marshall 1997: 126). This results from the disqualification of their labor, the decrease in their working autonomy, as well as from the closeness of their political and social attitudes to those of manual workers.

As early as in the mid-1960-ies, Helmut Steiner arrived at similar conclusions that certain strata of “service employees class” are involved in proletarianization and demonstrated that the social structure of current capitalist society is complex. In it, the “white-collars employees” are rather heterogeneous. In this structural environment substantial differences arise in the access to positions of intellectual work and management for people belonging to different social classes. As a result, a social gap exacerbates the difference between highly educated employees, top managers and lower service personnel. However, it testifies the change in the shape, rather than in the content of exploitation of employees by capital. The latter idea leads directly to the necessity for reexamination of the central concept in Marxist sociology, namely the concept of “capital” and the variety of its forms. Referring to works by P. Bourdieu, Helmut Steiner recently undertook a review of the concept. Arguing with Bourdieu’s methodology, he elaborated on the reasons for a conclusion that the socioeconomic factors of social inequalities preserve their fundamental significance in the late 20th century. He also justifies the necessary to prove “non-linear associations, mediation, metabolorphoses, transformations of economic capital into political, social, cultural, and symbolic in a historical process of self-organization, socialization of production and social life as a whole” (Steiner 2003: 51).

The above ideas aroused an intense interest among researchers trying to explain the stratification patterns of advanced industrial market societies and to properly interpret the inequalities in state socialist countries together with the processes of their post-communist restructuring. Some similar views about the metamorphoses of structural resources altering the forms of social inequalities in state socialist societies were developed in the 1960–1970-ies by the Polish sociologists
W. Wesolowski (1979) and K. Slomczynski (2002), the Czech sociologist P. Machonin (1997), the Soviet sociologist O. Shkaratan (1996), the Hungarian sociologists G. Conrad and I. Szelenyi (1979), and some others. These authors proved that social differentiation under state socialism could be relatively deep on the basis of the acquisition of cultural resources and along with organizational resources of control, which constitutes a core element in the system of state socialism. The analysis of the relations between the state bureaucracy and part of intelligentsia in exercising political control revealed both conflicts between them and a certain symbiosis. On the one hand, a strengthening new ruling class of “nomenclature” used the resources of power and informal social nets in the given socioeconomic system to enhance its cultural resources (especially for their children). Eventually, it led to a remarkable strengthening of the impact of ascriptive factors on life chances and to the growth of cultural inequalities along with economic and political ones. As seen from another point of view, under the command-distributive economy and in the framework of limited opportunities to accumulate material resources, people strove to express and reproduce social differences by means of accumulation of available cultural resources.

As a result, on the basis of the ownership on cultural capital a heterogeneous middle class appeared whose higher layers — intellectuals and technocratic intelligentsia — did not occupy a dominating position in society. However, they were skilled and competitive in the state-controlled labor market and had opportunities to extend their own life chances. D. Lane may be right with his conclusion that the class of intelligentsia was a latent, or ascendant, acquisition class, which had a potential power in the period of “mature socialism”, but whose class interests were controlled by then dominating political-administrative class (Lane 1996: 149-150, 164–170). Under these circumstances, in the state socialist societies a major class conflict was emerging between the dominating political-administrative class and the higher layers of the middle service class, or the “latent” class of intelligentsia-intellectuals. The conflict required a solution and was likely to determine the post-communist development of these societies.

Besides, the conflict seemed to possess not merely specific but also universal features. Within the framework of the conception of reflective sociology in The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (1981), A. Gouldner identified “new class of intellectuals and intelligentsia” in a milieu of “white collar” workers and bourgeois and argued that the new class is a worldwide historical phenomenon, which slowly evolves throughout the world both in the late capitalist countries and in
the states of autocratic socialism (Gouldner 1994: 711, 713). He also stressed the “split” character of class made up of “intellectuals” and “technical intelligentsia” because of its conflicting relationships with representatives of “old” middle and higher classes — ranging from businessmen to party leaders controlling public economy.

How can the use of the related notions “intelligentsia” and “intellectuals” together with their distinct opposition in characterizing a “new class”, contribute to the interpretation of social relations and their dynamics? Here it will be relevant to apply Helmut Steiner’s inference that one should differentiate between essential class characteristics and their historically changeable forms of manifestation.

In the Western European social science and philosophy the notion of “intellectuals” has been in traditional use by linking it to the group of those who have skills to think in a philosophical and scientific way, and to articulate their views (Marshall 1996: 251). In other words, this is a group of individuals professionally involved in the creation, development and dissemination of theoretical knowledge, ideas and symbols (Etzioni-Halevy 1985: 9). In Europe, starting with the Renaissance, the social group of intellectuals was the creator of high culture and achievements in science, with its representatives being philosophers and innovative scientists. The evolving spirit of a new epoch — the era of intellectuals and the Enlightenment, is reflected in an invitation addressed to readers to “make their contribution to the Great Design of achievements of Natural Knowledge and perfection of all Philosophical Arts and Sciences” (Royal Society 1963: 2), prepared by an editor of the first volume of Philosophical Transactions (1665) of the British Royal Society. Over that period of time, intellectuals’ social life was characterized by their relative independence from the government and by the unique position of “educated people” in contrast to mass illiteracy in society. According to S.M. Lipset and R.B. Dobson (1972), as early as the 19th century the term “intellectuals” referred, above all, to letter people with critical and radical thinking skills, who opposed themselves to the social environment.

Further, the concept looses its political connotation and comes to denote a category of professionals involved in the production and dissemination of knowledge and ideas. But, because of the development of democracy and the massive spread of education in the 20th century, the positions of “educated people” were no more unique. In the context of those developments, the first part of the 20th century witnessed a gradual decline in popularity of the concept. From the 1930-ies it came to be replaced by alternative ones — “white collars”, “employees” reflecting the realities of broadly educated society. But, again, at the end of the
1950-ies, serious changes took place in the milieu of the educated middle class: rapid growth of not just educated, but highly educated people, rise in qualification requirements to specialists at their jobs, increase in influence of scientific and technical proficiency, as well as social reflection in society. The formation of a new class should be considered as a process reciprocal to the structural and cultural growth. Here we can agree with C. Rootes’ idea that “the growth of the class of employees was so rapid and with so relatively small base, that its numerous positions were inevitably filled in the course of ascendant social mobility” (Rootes 1995: 203). In this case, some retardation of the class self-identification is natural and gives an incentive to an active process of its “rediscovery” and interpretation. The questions concerning the relationships between this new class and the class of property owners, the conversion of resources-capitals, and the tendencies towards proletarianization of the lower middle class strata with respect of multi-dimensional resources-capitals have not been theoretically solved yet.

This situation determined the need for a new theoretical orientation. Through the works by J. Galbraith and D. Bell (1965) the concepts of “intellectuals” or “knowledge class” regained theoretical confirmation of their functional value. “Intellectuals” and “intelligentsia” are considered, as it was the case at the turn of the 20th century (Struve 1990: 1959–1963, 1972), not as “public” living fashionably in high society, or just as “educated class”, or as “people of mental work”. Intelligentsia and intellectuals differ from “educated class” as “somewhat spiritually special”. Intelligentsia expresses an ideal-political force of the society’s historical development, what can be defined in the terms of the Russian philosopher from the early 20th century G. Fedotov (1990: 404–410) as “critically thinking personalities”. A. Gouldner emphasizes the specific role of the “culture of critical discourse” for this group, its ability to speak on behalf of a “mute majority” — a role that turns out to be significant when society has no complete entrance to the political arena.

Any society, as well as any state needs critic, “non-quietness” of the state in which they are. There is a constant need for responsible reexamination and increase of the level of moral standards. “Non-quietness” marks the social role of intellectuals and intelligentsia as a structural core of “new class” having the aspiration to be not just the holder of a lofty titles but holder of highly professional creative activity, a “missionary” (in K. Mannheim’s meaning of the term) “serving the society” and striving to make society humane according to the priorities of Moral and Personality. These qualities are difficult to combine, but what is even more difficult is their affirmation regularly by opposing institutional, so-
societal and cultural pressures. Only few are successful in these efforts. But this is the achievement of intellectuals and intelligentsia as a core of a “new class”, whose fulfillment will make society more transparent by overcoming the gap between society and state and by “transferring” people and their communities to the level of humanity.

The identification of the new class born in the conflict between traditional society and rising modernity occurs through the control over cultural capital and on the basis of the “ties” of the higher education, culture of critical discourse and specific relations of confidence. Affirming itself through the culture of critical discourse, the new class develops a specific post-material culture and thus becomes the major mobilizing force in social transformations and in the development of new forms of public relations. The specific role of this class is performed by the intelligentsia serving as the principal “keeper” and “generator” of spiritual and moral foundations in society and initiating the humanization of society. The “new class” function is the major social actor in the modern social transformation bringing post-material humane ideas and values, the ideology of professionalism and social responsibility into society like intellectuals of the Enlightenment did.

The maturing of this new class brings about new social inequalities based on differences in education, intellectual work and life chances determined by them. This does not mean that there have been no similar differences in previous periods of societal development. The real issue is that these differences are gradually becoming the major factor underlying social inequality. They pluralize and, to a certain degree, individualize social world, for developed self-reflection and critical discourse increase the relevance of the “Self” and elevate the position of the “observer” (in Z. Bauman’s interpretation) to the position of the “designer” of social processes.

Human and cultural capital, social consciousness and activity of intellectuals and intelligentsia determine their national and civil self-identification, the contradictory critical inheritance of national historical experience and culture in combination with the culture of humanism, moral and post-material values. It is for this reason that this group can become or is becoming a real force of transformation in society, the creator of the new social experience arising from our own history.

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“Dismissing Wealth” and Changes in the Social Perception of Inequality

Abstract

Renunciation of answer to the question about wealth gives us important information about the actual perception of the meaning of social inequality. Social position of this disposition has changed essentially and “unexpectedly” during the last seven years. To argue for this statement, sociological and cinematic discourses are analyzed.

Observations of everyday life and ordinary reactions of our fellow citizens tell us that the attitude to attributes of the new post-socialist reality such as chic foreign cars in the streets, restaurants and shops with expensive goods, private residential buildings in the park zone and expensive clothes, has essentially changed. They no longer cause strong feelings of delight/anger, or raise indispensable rhetorical questions about the reasons and ways of acquiring the wealth by their owners, or, moreover, epithets (“profiteers”, “thieves”, “bandits”, etc.) that accent antisocial or criminal character of their activity. What is behind such habitua-

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1 Translated by the author Yuliia Soroka from the Ukrainian text “Vidmova vid bahatstva’ ta zminy u spryiniatti sotsial’noi nerivnosti”, Sotsiolohiia: teoriia, metody, marketyh, 2008, № 1, pp. 222–236.

2 Besides, it is necessary to remark that we have got used to scenes opposite to social success: bums and beggars in the streets and underground crossings became a customary part of our reality, and do not cause any strong feelings in us.
tion and how deep the changes in social perception are — all these questions remain open and draw our attention to the problems of social inequality. Habituation of these phenomena makes us assume that the way the society perceives itself, the space of social positions, the way public wealth is distributed, its correlation with an ideal of justice and the very ideal have changed; in other words, perception of the complex of problems connected with the phenomenon, as well as the concept of social inequality and attitude towards it have changed.

However, the complexity of the phenomenon of social inequality, the nature of this concept, as well as its correlation with scientific and ideological thinking rather than everyday thinking — all these factors do not allow social inequality to be positioned as an integral, unsegmented object of social perception. At the same time, categories of perception “maintaining” the topic of social inequality [1], such as “justice”, ”right”, ”freedom”, ”property”, ”wealth”, ”poverty”, can become an object of analysis.

Communicating with people on an everyday basis, it is difficult to receive from them an answer to questions about the meaning of such concepts as good and evil, wealth, poverty, force, truth, etc. Nevertheless, these categories are used in everyday speech at different levels of social hierarchy, in various institutional contexts as a basis for argumentation or evaluation. Social sciences and arts, using specific methods for the analysis of reality, constantly offer “instant cuts” of interpretation of these concepts which are topical for any society and its everyday actors. Comparison of the results of these investigations as complementary, in our opinion, is interesting and fruitful for the social sciences and sociological understanding of the events that take place. In this article we compare sociological and cinematic outlooks on the problem of “dismissing wealth”, which are considered as facts of perception of the social reality realized from different positions (a sociologist answering a question of a questionnaire of an everyday actor and of a feature film character).

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One of the key aspects of the post-socialist cultural and ideological transformations is the change of publicly recognized meaning of the wealth category. It is really possible to say that the wealth category became an axis of meanings and senses that were moving economic and

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1 An exception is probably a situation of communication in which an adult and a child participate. This communication scheme was described in the famous poem by V. Mayakovsky.
political transformations during the last 30 years. Reevaluation, or rather a change of the meaning (both as a range of publicly recognized and declared meanings, and topical meanings for everyday actors) of the wealth category is connected with difficult and painful experiences intrinsic to a society and culture in transition.

The block of questions suggested in the questionnaire of sociological research, “Social structure of the Ukrainian society at the turn of the century” (November-December 2000, \(N = 1800\), the sample representative by age, sex, education, geographic region and locality; scientific advisor — O.D. Kutsenko) became, in our opinion, a display of such a “terminal experience”. This block of questions consisted of question № 175 “For the sake of gaining wealth, one can sacrifice something” and nine questions concretizing it (№ 176–184) that suggested such variants of a “sacrifice” as: moral principles, trust of colleagues, trust of friends and relatives, profession, career, working conditions, household conveniences, peace of mind, and health.

Initially, this question raised attention not because of the reference to the wealth category, but rather because of the fact that nearly half of the respondents evaded answering. The amount of those who evaded answering the specified questions fluctuates from 50.28% to 50.44% of all those who participated in the poll. Beside that, as the analysis showed, absence of answer was not caused by technical reasons or careless attitude of the interviewers; so, the presented data can be considered accurate.

**Refusal to Answer as Substantial Information**

The analysis of refusals to answer questions from a questionnaire of a sociological research is traditionally performed in the plane of methodical problems of advancement of the apparatus, interview procedure, and interviewers’ qualifications. Thus, the unwillingness of the respondent to answer is understood as a demonstration of inadequacy of the question in terms of qualitative criteria, such as logical, sociolinguistic, social and cultural (including national and cultural), as well as psychological [2]. Sensitivity to non-responses is considered to be one of the quality criteria of the apparatus as those respondents who “refuse to answer” differ from those, for example, whom the interviewer did not find at home. Such respondents can turn out to be well-educated and informed, in contrast to self-confident and “semiliterate” ones [3].
V.A. Yadov considers “non-responses” as a potential reaction to difficult questions that demand from the respondent to know or remember something, the questions which purpose or the nature of an expected answer did not seem clear to the respondent, and also “sensitive” questions which the respondent is not inclined to answer frankly. Overcoming such situations is considered by the author to be a problem of the interviewers, and he gives rather detailed recommendations for them. As questions of the questionnaire express program requirements of the research, an interviewer’s task consists in explaining to the respondents or letting them know what is expected from them and receiving an answer to the questions [4].

G.S. Batygin considers such refusals to answer questions to be some kind of the systematic sampling errors. Examining the causes of refusals, he differentiates more accurately the factors of question content, a respondent’s attitude to the interviewer (negative attitude), and the external circumstances interfering with contact between the interviewer and the respondent. G.S. Batygin’s approach allows distinguishing refusals to answer from respondent’s unwillingness to cooperate, the latter of which can and should be overcome by a capable and skilled interviewer. Thus, a high rate of non-responses (up to 30%) is routinely observed with questions connected to subjects of income or intimate life. Besides, referring to the experience of polls and censuses in the USA, the author gives an estimation of the total of refusals (5%) and a list of categories of people refusing to answer more often than others: white inhabitants of cities who have higher education. Thus, refusal to answer is interpreted as a variant of a respondent’s normal reaction, and the “difficulty” of the question is connected with the fact that its topic approaches border between public and private spaces of the respondent [5].

Cognitive analysis of the polling apparatus, the object of which are mental processes activated by the situation of an interview, considers non-responses to be a variant of semantically inadequate answers [6]. The attention is drawn from lexical and logical correctness of questions to their semantic adequacy to the topic, i.e. to the processes of respondents’ interpretation of the verbal material of a question. Such a direction of analysis is connected with the realization of the necessity to overcome respondents’ predisposition for telling what is expected from

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1 We should point out that G.S. Batygin himself uses quotation marks writing about general amount of refusals that varies from 5% in the USA censuses to 30% in some “difficult” examinations that, for instance, are connected with income or intimate life [5].
them. Referring to observations of American sociologists [7, p. 38], D.M. Rogozin draws attention to the assumption of the necessity of an answer implied by the very existence of the question, as a result of which the respondent who does not answer a question or who has difficulties with answering a question bears a certain psychological discomfort, a feeling of inadequacy, as well as cognitive dissonance. The main attention of the respondent, continues D.M. Rogozin, is directed not to the questions, but to the interviewer’s verbal behavior, the ways of presenting the questions and perception of possible answers. Trying to overcome the cognitive dissonance caused by the situation of an interview, respondents think about a question, specify the question or their own answer and justify their inability to give an answer. As a result, to get a semantically adequate answer from respondents becomes problematic and the probability of receiving a “false answer”, which equals to a non-response, increases. Thus, cognitive analysis of the polling apparatus sees the reasons of non-responses or semantically inadequate answers in the very method of interview and principles for structuring.

This position was substantiated in the framework of P. Bourdieu’s reflective sociology [8]. However, we are less interested in his shocking statements about polling practices than in the consequences of these ideas concerning respondents’ refusal to answer questions.

The ability “to produce an opinion” is not general; it is socially allocated according to cultural competence, i.e. to the characteristics of the social and cultural spaces, to the principles of “division of labor”, responsibility and knowledge accepted in the society; for example, on the basis of gender or age. So, according to P. Bourdieu’s observations, political problematics in contemporary society is to a greater degree in the competence of men, in contrast to “female” matters of interpersonal relations, family, children, etc.

Cultural competence defines the ethical dimension of perceptions and opinions, whereas the fact of interview transforms them into political ones. In other words, the observable order of things that is actualized in an individual’s perception in the categories of what is “proper”, is actualized in a poll in categories of “possible” or “desirable”. If the topic of the questions is not connected with social interest of any category of respondents, for them it lies beyond the zone of relevance. So, the interview turns into an imposition of a problematics, a collection of opinions that do not have real power. As P. Bourdieu notes, the proportion of an-

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1 In this case, we use A. Schutz’s concept of everyday knowledge (See [9]).
swers to questions about the education system is very much connected with the degree of respondents’ affinity to the very system, and the probability of existence of an opinion fluctuates depending on the probability to have the right to manage the sphere about which the opinion is expressed [8, p.173].

The public character of interview procedure is based on the assumption that questions asked during an interview deserve discussion or are open to discussion. However, consensus on this issue does not always exist in a society. Moreover, what causes the problem here is not obscene or ridiculous, in other words, taboo areas of social knowledge, but topics that lie beyond the limits of relevance for a concrete category of respondents. In this regard, Bourdieu writes that one can find a fantastic spread: there, where a student who belongs to one of the leftist movements distinguishes 15 political trends that are more left than the United Socialist Party, there is nothing for a middle link [8, p.166].

These discrepancies are shown through respondents’ refusals to answer the questionnaire, so, ignoring non-responses means consensus simulation. In other words, non-responses should be considered as substantial information. The observations made by P. Bourdieu allow generating the basis for their interpretation. For instance, the proportion of those who did not answer was higher among women than among men, and the political character of questions promotes increase in refusals. The level of education influences the proportion of those who did not answer questions concerning knowledge and learning. The proportion of non-responses to questions of ethical character is not sensitive to a difference in education. Finally, the closer a question is to the problem generating a conflict, to a “knot of contradictions”, the more often are refusals to answer.

These ideas sound clearer when interpreted in the context of the 

**problematics of social perception**, where a sociological poll can be considered a specific situation of social perception.

A sociological poll (or interview) as a situation of social perception differs essentially from the process of perception in real conditions of social interaction. In the real situation processing the information from the external environment brings to the foreground one or another category of perception that is “suitable” for this situation, capable of the most adequately capturing a situation in its particularity and assuming further reference to a certain set of reactions and actions of an individual. In the situation of an interview the individuals are forced to operate with the category offered in a question, and their freedom is limited by a possibil-
ity to agree or disagree with applicability of the given category and/or with a configuration of the categories to the analysis of a situation offered in a question.

Gaining an answer to a question from the questionnaire, in this case, is the degree to which the category of perception constituting the question of the questionnaire is familiar to our respondents, used and appropriated by them. In categories of A. Schutz’s [9] concept of everyday perception, this idea sounds as follows: we can expect an adequate answer from respondents if the category of perception constituting the question is within the limits of their relevant knowledge of the cultural group life, in other words, whether this category is included into their actual schemes of perception of the social reality and what place it occupies (for example, closer to the center or to the periphery).

On the other hand, respondents’ willingness to publicly discuss the categories offered in a question is significant for gaining an answer from them. In a situation of a poll, respondents find themselves in a public\(^1\) position of experts, and their non-response also turns into the fact of non-acceptance of such a position. Willingness to speak about something publicly is defined by a connection of the category that is of interest to us with the position of the social and cultural spaces occupied by the respondents who refused to answer, in such aspects as social interest and cultural competence. Non-responses can be caused by a discrepancy of the field of cultural competence and the meaning of the category, as well as by the value of the category in the context of social interest of this group of respondents. Paraphrasing P. Bourdieu, we can point out that non-responses signalize exclusion (for ethical and/or political reasons) of the category from the list of the subjects authorized for public discussion.

Thus, the statistical data analysis concerning “those who refused to answer” gives substantial information about the importance of this question, and also about the examined group of respondents. The approach described above allows to formulate a number of hypotheses explaining the fact of non-responses on account of the sociocultural situation of the research, the nature of the question, as well as of the characteristics of the respondents who did not answer.

The present article focuses on one of the categories of perception of social inequality — “wealth” — which connects various aspects undergoing transformations of the sociocultural space: cultural symbols and

\(^{1}\) That is in E.Goffman’s categories [10] for a position regulated by the rules of public interaction.
practices of its everyday and scholarly use. The data collected by inter-
view and analysis of distribution of respondents’ answers and non-re-
responses allow to define the sociocultural sense of the given category that
is topical at the moment of the research.

**The Nature of the Issue: Wealth as a Sacrifice**

Before checking the hypotheses formulated on the basis of under-
standing non-responses as substantial information, we will analyze the
question itself, its construction and meaning.

Construction of the question, in our opinion, clearly shows the au-
thors’ inclusion in the processes of changes happening to the structures
of social perception not only as researchers but also as everyday actors
under conditions of social destabilization. “In order to gain wealth, one
should sacrifice something” — these words demonstrate a reflection of
actual plurality of value orientations and action criteria in relation to
wealth. Moreover, the fixation of polarity of the ideological frames is
aggravated with recognition of insufficiency or impossibility of a well-
grounded and certain choice between them.

The question, in fact, includes opposite dispositions to wealth. It is
perceived as a value, which is expressed in the formulation of the ques-
tion, in putting the wealth category at the beginning of the sentence and
in use of the modal verb “should”. On the other hand, wealth is denied as
a value, which is expressed through its identification with a sacrifice.
The drama of changes is lamenting in the lines of the questionnaire: we-
alth obviously exists, has power and makes others take it into con-
sideration. Wealth emphatically manifests itself in store signs written in
different languages, as well as in bright labels, seductive goods, expen-
sive things — clothes, furniture, cars. However, the known ways of its
achievement assume dismissing other values — up to moral principles.

In other words, two meanings of the word “wealth” are incorporated in
the question. The first is instrumental, expressed through the word
“gain”. In this sense wealth is understood as a result of purposeful activ-
ity, and such a perception of wealth is possible for a person whose posi-
tion (real or desired) assumes or presupposes such a possibility. The sec-
ond sense is “estimated”, which is expressed through the words “for the
sake of” and “to sacrifice”. Such an interpretation of wealth is character-
istic of a position which does not identify itself with this phenomenon, an
outside, observant position of reflecting and comparing possibilities.
Whereas the instrumental interpretation associates with “positive” estimation of the phenomenon of wealth, the “estimated” one is coupled with “negative” estimation that appears through the word “to sacrifice”. Wealth here means dismissing other significant values (or their replacement) and actually shows the impossibility of simultaneous achievement, their conflict. Otherwise, there would not be a category called “sacrifice”. Instead of this, a different category, for instance, “means” would be used in the question. Perhaps, it is not necessary to explain that the association (in fact, identification) of wealth with sacrifice is characteristic of the ideology denying the value of material wealth, underlining its immorality. If the respondents who gave some kind of a substantial answer to these questions thereby made a choice between the values contrasted in the question, then those who evaded the question showed disagreement with the very dilemma.

The research results published by T.I. Zaslavskaya in 1997 can serve as an empirical confirmation of the claims stated about the meaning of the wealth category [11, p. 182-183]. She points out that the majority of Russians (to some extent, these properties can be also attributed to Ukrainian society) “do not connect wealth with work, energy or talent, but first of all with dishonesty”. Among the wealth factors, in public opinion, there are (in decreasing order of significance) connections with the necessary people (77%), the economic system allowing the rich to make profit at expense of the poor (70%), and only then go talents and abilities (41%), the opportunity to get a good education and job (40%), luck (28%) and persistent work (21%).

Besides, by refusing to answer, the respondents that are of interest to us confirmed the dismissal of wealth as a category of social perception and cognition. Thereby they demonstrated that the wealth category is unnecessary and alien to them, and is not included in actual schemes of social perception either. (We remind the reader that the question’s context did not presuppose the possibility of interpretation of the wealth category in the meaning of non-material values). Since the schemes of perception, actual for the individuals or groups, give us an idea about their reality in categories of relevance, possibility, as well as in categories of obligation [12], exclusion of the wealth category literally means dismissing wealth. This “dismissal of wealth” is possible in such a space of social

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1 Using quotation marks, we emphasize that the opposition of positive-negative does not reflect all the complexity of the ideological orientations presented in the question, but only denotes their contrast.
perception and action where wealth is not present in any of the embodiments of this category, any objects associated with wealth are excluded, and “wealthy” people are always on the other side of the “we/they” borderline.

Going back to the main objective of our analysis — to clarify the characteristics of the social position of those who refused to speak about wealth, as well as to understand the meaning of a refusal to answer (on the basis of ideas stated above), we will formulate the basic hypotheses for the analysis of empirical material. The first hypothesis is that the wealth category lies beyond the limits of relevance to the group of respondents who did not answer. In that case, “the poor” should dominate among the respondents. The second one is that the question is read by respondents as a political one, which does not coincide with their cultural competence. Thus, women and older people should dominate. At last, the wealth category directly infringes their interests and so is negatively interpreted. Then, political and ideological orientations correlating with such a disposition should be indicative of those respondents.

Characteristics of the “Dismissing Wealth” Position

The proportion of those who refused to answer the question that suggested an option of “sacrifice” for the sake of wealth fluctuates from 50.28% to 50.44%. For the convenience of our description, hereinafter this group of respondents will be called “those who refused”. What are the characteristics of the social position of this group and its difference from the others? For the analysis of empirical material we used the procedure of array filtration and subsequent comparison between characteristics of those who refused to answer and other respondents.

The research data are presented below. Differences are statistically significant; \( p = 0.01–0.05 \).

**Sex:** the proportion of women among “those who refused” is 60%, while for the other part of the array the ratio of men to women is 48:52.

**Age:** most of “those who refused” (66%) are people from 21 to 50 years old. At the same time, among “those who refused” the proportion of respondents grows with age and reaches its maximum (29%) for the age group older than 60. In other words, among “those who refused” the proportion of people older than 50 is 1.5 times larger than among the others.

**Education:** the level of education of “those who refused” is a little lower than that of the others. Here the proportion of respondents with primary and incomplete secondary education is considerably higher than in the
other part of the array (16% versus 9%). At the same time, the proportions of people with secondary education and vocational training are identical in both groups.

Choosing the *language of the interview*, “those who refused” spoke in favor of the Ukrainian language more often (44%). The proportions of respondents who were ready to speak both Russian and Ukrainian were almost identical — 28% against 29%.

“Those who refused” answered the question about their religious beliefs with more confidence. 66% considered themselves *religious* (57% among the others), and the proportion of those who found it difficult to answer this question was more than 1.5 times lower than among other respondents.

Characterizing the distribution of the respondents according to the *types of localities*, it is possible to note that the most remarkable distinctions concern those who live in the country. Among “those who refused” the proportion of country dwellers is the largest — 33%. Besides, the proportion of those who live in the capital city is also higher than among the others (7% vs. 3%).

The nature of *social and class self-identification* of “those who refused” has the only essential difference: here the level of self-identification with peasants is twice as high as that of the other respondents and reaches 18%. Among “those who refused” we also do not find businessmen, entrepreneurs, government officials or farmers. There are 2% of both highly qualified specialists and unskilled workers among “those who refused”. 5% and 3% respectively identify themselves with intelligentsia and office workers, and 4% — with qualified workers. On the other hand, the proportion of those who could not make up their mind among “those who refused” was lower and equal to 66% (72% among other respondents; differences are statistically significant, \( p < 0.01 \)).

The investigated groups of respondents do not differ substantially as to the estimation of their financial situation. About 80% of the respondents who took part in the poll experienced considerable difficulties in satisfaction of their basic material needs, and only one sixth of these respondents were capable of providing for themselves (14% of “those who refused” and 16% of the others). At the same time, the observable distinctions in answers show that “those who refused” are inclined to estimate their financial situation worse than the others.

Estimating *their family lives*, “those who refused” are generally pessimistic. 35% of them answer that it is extremely difficult for them to live (compared to 28% among the others). “Those who refused” evaluate the
life perspectives of their families also quite pessimistically: 38% (29% among the others) do not anticipate improvements in the foreseeable future. The proportion of those who anticipate improvements in the nearest year (or two) is more than 1.5 times lower among “those who refused” (10%) than among the others (17%).

It is necessary to connect the pessimism of the group of “those who refused” with the nature of their ideas about what their own lives depend on. Thus, 70% of “those who refused” recognize the priority of external circumstances. The proportion of those who recognize only the importance of external circumstances is higher (34%) in comparison with 28% among other respondents. At the same time, the proportion of those who recognize the priority of their own abilities over the pressure from external circumstances among “those who refused” is 1.5 times lower (11% and 16% correspondingly).

Characterizing their emotional condition, their feelings concerning the present situation, “those who refused” on the whole share the same mood as the rest of the array. Most often they point to feelings of alarm and anxiety (58%), more rarely — to interest and hope (41%). Least often they point to satisfaction (5%) and enthusiasm (3%). However, among “those who refuse” the proportion of those who feel fear is twice as much as among the others (9% vs. 4%), while the proportion of those who have interest and hope is slightly lower (18% vs. 23%). (Differences are statistically significant; in the last two cases \( p < 0.01 \), in other cases \( p < 0.05 \)).

Estimating the tension existing in our society in relations between “the rich and the poor”, “the higher and the lower classes”, “those who refused” are more categorical: the proportion of those who had difficulties in answering among “those who refused” was lower (1% and 3% correspondingly). The proportion of those who recognize the presence of such tension among “those who refused” is a little higher than among the others (77% vs. 72%, and 72% vs. 67% respectively). This can give evidence of a little higher sensitivity of “those who refused” to their perception of the distinctions between “the rich and the poor”, “the higher and the lower classes”. And if, answering this question, they identified themselves with the pole of the poor and lower classes (this identification completely corresponds with how “those who refused” estimate their financial position), then these answers show a greater distinction in the perceptions of “those who refused”, between the rich and the poor, as well as between representatives of the higher and the lower classes.

At the same time, facing the concepts of the political and ideological content which are not the part of their everyday lexicon (for example, “de-
mocracy”, “market reforms”, “economic system”, etc.), “those who refused” have difficulties in answering questions more often than the others. Thus, for the statement “Democracy is better for the rich than for the poor”, the proportion of those who had difficulties in answering was 5% higher among “those who refused”. As for the questions about the presumable future and possible changes of the situation (for example, the question “Who will gain from market reforms?”), “those who refused” answered in a similar way.

The same tendency is observed in the answers of “those who refused” to questions on freedom. The proportion of those who had difficulties in answering the question whether they felt free in their families, collectives and in the state was 3–5% higher among “those who refused” and made 7%, 18% and 28% respectively. At the same time, “those who refused” feel a lack of freedom to a lesser degree compared to other respondents: they feel free in their families and in the state by 2% and 3% respectively. Translating the abstract concept of freedom into the everyday language in the question “What does freedom mean for you?”, “those who refused” repeat the tendency general for all who participated in the poll, but are less sure of the conclusions. “Those who refused” chose the options of the answer less frequently (from 1% to 9%). It is interesting to note that among “those who refused” such “dimensions” of freedom as life independent of anybody, independent choice of activity, property rights and freedom to move, for example abroad, have lower significance.

The level of interest of “those who refused” in politics is also worth noting. The proportion of those who are regularly interested in political events among “those who refused” is 5% less than among the others.

Thus, the tendency to refuse answering questions about wealth in the analyzed array of the year 2000 was more frequent among women, older people and respondents with low levels of education, among people with lower self-esteem and in a worse financial situation, and among the country dwellers identifying themselves with peasants. These characteristics of a social position of “those who refused” are combined with such dispositions as feelings of fear, depression and pessimism in the estimation of the present situation. They recognize the priority of external forces and circumstances before their own abilities to influence their lives. They are inclined to seek support (first of all moral) in the collective. “Those who refused” demonstrate a lower level of competence in political and ideological topics, a lowered value of personal freedom, negative expectations in relation to “the wealthy” and to “the higher classes” and a considerable social distance from them.
Going back to the hypotheses formulated in the previous section, it is possible to say that the social and cultural space of “those who refused”, the world of their ideas (as far as we managed to reconstruct it) has preconditions to exclude the wealth category from the actual schemes of perception and action. This fact in turn characterizes a special way of social perception of inequality: first of all, the wealth category is not relevant to the discourse of social inequality. Besides, as we should assume, fixing the maximum remoteness of the “wealth” position from their own, not perceiving it as a value and, hence, excluding accessible and decent strategies of its achievement (see above) do not form the basis of discourse of social inequality. That is to say, any preconditions to a formed ideal of equality as an ideological precondition of perception of reality in categories of social inequality are absent. In this case, the discourse of inequality is either excluded or transferred from the sphere of reality to the symbolic ones — religious or ideological, or, in other words, spiritual spaces of another perfect world of divine justice or a social utopia.

On the whole, “those who refused” show a lack of cultural competence. They are very close, according to their social-demographic and dispositional characteristics, to those who refused to answer “political” questions described by P. Bourdieu. At the same time, the hypothesis about a connection between the fact of non-response (about “dismissing wealth”) and the interests of the respondents, or to be more exact, their political attitudes and ideological positions, an expression of which could be a conscious and ideologically grounded dismissal of wealth as a value, does not find an obvious confirmation. However, there are no sufficient grounds to completely exclude this hypothesis either. It is necessary to note that half of the respondents participating in the poll who had a PhD degree also refused to answer the questions about wealth. In opinion of the one sixth of “those who refused”, their lives do not go badly: 5% of them are well-off, nearly the same number of interviewees identify themselves with intelligentsia. 34% of “those who refused” appreciate freedom of speech, 30% are regularly interested in politics and only 4% approve of freedom from moral restrictions.

Going back to identification of refusal to answer with dismissing wealth (that only partly has a metaphorical character), we will point out that in the sociocultural situation that was examined, a refusal to answer the question “For the sake of wealth one can sacrifice …” is more

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1 These ideas obviously have a speculative character and need substantiation and empirical confirmation, which would go beyond the limits of the present paper.
than justified. To perceive the question as a political one (in P. Bourdieu’s categories), the respondents do not have sufficient cultural competence. Reading it as an ethical question, they show unwillingness and the impossibility to subject to public discussion (in a situation of an interview) the basic principles of their vital orientations.

**Development of the “Dismissing Wealth” Position: A Topical Cinematic Version**

As stated above, the question about wealth as a sacrifice was asked in the poll of the year 2000, and later was not repeated. Therefore, it is not possible to track whether the position of the respondents who had refused to answer changed or not. This fact and the nature of the question that connects incompatible dispositions concerning wealth and expresses “a drama of changes” on the pages of the questionnaire, allow considering this material in the logic of “case studies”, as a single case analysis.

However, absence of the corresponding polling data does not mean that the disposition designated in the question disappeared from the space of actual social and ideological perceptions. The categories we are interested in relate to the topic of social inequality in literature, cinema, advertising slogans, as well as in everyday speech reproducing and expressing the indicative social positions. In this regard, Yu. Levada notes that the data received by researchers (from polls, deep interviews, statistics) belong to visible “terminals” of a complex, unseen by the naked eye, and integrated “mechanism” of culture [13, p. 305]. In other words, the dispositions and values that are of interest to us and presented in materials of the sociological research can be found in other cultural texts and cultural products and compared as well.

An interesting version of the disposition of “dismissing wealth” presents contemporary Russian cinema, namely the **“Piter FM”** (feature film, Russia, 2006). The attention to this film, which is in our opinion successful¹, is based on the fact that here the disposition that is of interest to us meets an absolutely different position of social space than in presented materials of the sociological research conducted seven years ago. The person who dismisses wealth is a 25–30 years old man who has a prestigious profession, clear self-identification, and ambitious purposes.

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¹ Here we mean the connection of the film with topical processes of social perception (See [14]).
Some information about the plot of the film. The protagonist Maxim lives in St.-Petersburg, in an attic of an old building, and works as a janitor at the housing maintenance office. He is the architect who came from Nizhny Novgorod. Being inspired with remarkable monuments of St.-Petersburg, Maxim spends all his spare time creating building designs. His project wins at an international competition for young architects, and he receives a job offer from a leading architectural bureau in Germany. Maxim speaks very little German but it does not worry him — after all, his dream is coming true: he will be able to work in his profession (instead of working in humiliating conditions), live in comfort (instead of a cold and damp attic), that is to have a decent, wealthy and interesting life abroad. Friends envy Maxim (although in a kind way), his girlfriend has left him for another guy, the housing maintenance office complies with his request in exchange for “half a liter of vodka” — in other words, nothing can stop this self-assured, successful young man.

However, Maxim refuses the contract and does not leave his home for Germany. The reason to stay becomes a lost cell phone that belongs to a certain girl, Masha. Throughout the film Maxim tries to meet Masha and to return her phone. The insignificance of reason and its accidental character emphasize the depth of the ground for the refusal. Telephone dialogs between the principal characters let us know that the decision to leave has not been made yet. The image of prestigious work and wealthy life abroad is not only indistinct and unclear to Maxim but also absolutely alien. It is no more than idle talk, and there is nothing behind the exclamations “Cool!”, “Great!”, only emptiness. An ambition to have a prestigious life abroad that is normal, habitual and almost obligatory for an individualistic person, has nothing in common with true values of the protagonist.

The protagonist’s refusal of a beneficial foreign contract is a dismissal of wealth in the abovementioned sense. In fact, the word “wealth” is not pronounced in the film; only numerous variants of this cognitive category are presented (prestige, success, benefit, comfort, etc.). However, the protagonist’s decision brings him nearer to those respondents who refused to answer in 2000; they reject the wealth category as alien to their social position and values. The choice between “wealth-achievement” and “wealth-sacrifice” is made in favor of the second meaning, and owing to the actions of the main character becomes verbal and concrete.

Although the victory at the international competition is his personal achievement, Maxim rejects the contract: wealth with which the award is
associated, is not related in his interiorized perceptions and cultural categories to achievement. The attributes of wealth connected with future work at the architecture office in Berlin rejected by the protagonist, and this makes him refuse his own achievement. In our opinion, this choice is predetermined by an actual for the protagonist meaning of “wealth-sacrifice” that makes him think about wealth with mistrust, and more often — with contempt, associating wealth with deceit, as well as with moral and financial untidiness. On the other hand, recognition of “wealth-sacrifice” becomes for the person who has accepted any embodiments of wealth (for example, the contract rejected by Maxim) a reason for constant self-accusations and torments. After all, all steps on the way to a status associated with wealth, any means of its achievement are a priori painted in colors of deceit and dishonesty.

In other words, the attributes intrinsic to the achievement of wealth cause the protagonist’s refusal. The doubts and worries connected with his choice make the basic content of the film. Moreover, this choice is designated for Maxim in the moral, but not in the rational dimension. The choice is not connected, for example, with the estimation of the problems of living in a different cultural environment, difficulties with further “converting” international career success in the Russian market or other possible negative sides of forthcoming crucial changes. It may seem surprising but the protagonist’s choice does not lie in an aesthetic plane, apparently important for an architect: Cologne, Dresden and other cultural centers in Germany or Europe does not exist for him; he does not even aspire to see them with his own eyes.

The protagonist’s internal struggle is going on silently, at a pre-reflexive level of intuition. That is why he often keeps silence, gazing at the decaying facades of Petersburg, wandering around the city, randomly talking to people (to a bum rummaging through a garbage bin, to a Gypsy fortune-teller, a beggar, to a half-naked man sitting on a bench because the wife keeps him out, etc.). Therefore, it seems so attractive to talk to a stranger girl with a wonderful voice whose phone he finds and who is also carrying the burden of moral choice. Masha is losing interest in her fiance who is worried about the external attributes of prestige, success and wealth that are supposed to mark their wedding and all their life together. Leaving her fiance for whom the difference between Cadillac and Lincoln is so important, Masha obviously refuses to accept the attributes of wealth that are also alien to Maxim.

Due to the main characters of the film, the disposition of the dismissal of wealth assumes a new embodiment and acknowledges its
growing significance in the symbolic space of ideas. It is especially interesting with regard to the improving well-being of people (in comparison with the year 2000), social and economic stabilization, democratization, etc. The “dismissing wealth” strategy acquires greater importance in the context of production and consumption of cultural symbols. From dark corners it comes to the front of the society’s ideas and values, carrying over inherent perception of social inequality that excludes the concept of wealth and prospects for its achievement.

Revealing a tendency for change of ideas about values also allows to ask some questions. How widespread are the ideas of inequality in the Russian-language social and cultural spaces? Do they have potential to dominate in post-Soviet societies? Is the dependence between these changes and characteristics strong in the present-day Russia? What can we say about their social base in Ukraine?

**References**


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Ukrainian Sociology: Social-Historical and Ideological Context of Development

Abstract

The paper analyses the peculiarities of the development of Ukrainian sociology in the context of social, historical, ideological and political transformation of Ukrainian society from the end of the 19th century up to the current period. On the basis of historical-sociological studies and the archive materials, firstly involved in scientific usage, the authors characterize the historical stages and social logic in the development of Ukrainian sociology within the framework of Ukrainian humanities. There are distinguished proto-sociological, academic, the early Soviet, the Soviet and the current periods in the development of Ukrainian sociology; the historical specificity and social-political logic of appearance in functioning of sociological sciences are also characterized. The authors conclude that the self-reflexivity of sociology in its historical context is an actual prerequisite for identification of problems and perspectives of the development of Ukrainian sociology as the sphere of science and social expertise forming its educational tradition, values and standards of sociological community. At the same time, contextual research of the history of sociological thought turns out to be historical-sociological study of socio-structural, political, economical, and cultural factors that have conditioned the corresponding sociological orientations and approaches.

1 Translated by Tetiana Gerasyumenko from the Ukrainian text “Ukrains’ka sotsiolohiia: suspiil’no-istorychnyi ta ideolohichnyi kontekst rozvytku”, Sotsiolohiia, teoriia, metody, marketynh, 2009, № 2, pp. 23–46.
Studying formation of any sociological tradition, researchers come in the context of its development, historical and ideological first of all. The context is also important for understanding what the logic of Ukrainian sociology formation is. In this article we discuss some aspects of this process regarded on the background of Ukrainian society transformations, such as social, ideological and political. We try to find the development laws, historical stages and social logic of Ukrainian sociology as a young scientific social and humanitarian subject in the area of national social knowledge. This historical and sociological self-reflection is also very important for determination of problems and prospects of the national sociology as a branch of scientific knowledge, a kind of social expertise and a research and educational tradition; we discuss sociological institutions and collectives, formation of sociological community values and professional standards.

Study of the history of sociological thought and traditions involves historical research of social conditions, social, structural, economic and cultural reasons and factors influencing sociological orientations and approaches. The first sociological theories by Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer had been formed along with establishing bourgeois social relations. The latter needed secular, or positive, that is free of religious or ideological aspects, explanations for the laws of historical social development, preconditions of the early bourgeois society development and its functioning. So, the state and tendencies of the present-day Ukrainian society can be studied and objectively interpreted if we are grounded on sociological understanding (especially, historically determined and interpreted by the sociology of that time) of previous social traditions, institutional, political, cultural and structural remnants of the Soviet past. Those inert social and historical phenomena are manifested in the value orientations, political culture, ethos and practices of the everyday life. It means that since its beginning, sociology has been formed and developed as a historical and contextual science.

According to the history, sociology develops when the social need in objective self-understanding of society, laws and factors of social development appears. The need becomes especially acute under serious social transformations, like historical transition from traditional to modern society in the end of the 19th century in Europe. The beginning of the 21st century in Ukraine, characterized with many-sided transformations, presents the same stimulus, and the national sociology has a good chance for its further development and strengthening. However, development of science is not a straight process. Manipulation with public opin-
ion, commercial effect on the science, regarding sociology as a political tool, parodying it in far from professional studies — all those can cause social prejudice against sociology. How must sociology meet those challenges? Will the national sociology use its good chance? Will it become a full member of the world sociology? We will not answer all these questions because the article is limited in size, but if we even only determine these topics, it will be useful, in our opinion.

Ukrainian Sociology: Looking for Traditions

The established approach to determination of historical periods in the national sociology is to divide into proto-sociological, academic, early Soviet, Soviet and modern periods of its development. It would be natural that since the beginning of 1990-ies, when Ukrainian sociology had been established as an independent branch of science, the above-mentioned approach has been meeting the need in the national history and traditions, helping self-identification and supporting the appreciation abroad. Unfortunately, it does not solve the problem of national identity of Ukrainian sociology, mostly because it has no serious sociologically articulated tradition. Contrary to France (M. Mauss, E. Durkheim), Germany (M. Weber, W. Sombart, G. Simmel), Poland (F. Znaniecki), USA (Chicago School, G. Mead, T. Parsons), in Ukraine, despite a quite productive period of sociological studies in the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, due to historical, political and ideological reasons, they did not manage to form a sustainable historical tradition of sociological knowledge, to keep and develop the sociology as an independent and objective social knowledge. The national sociological tradition was interrupted and on the decline in 1930-50-ies.

However, this does not mean that Ukrainian humanitarian knowledge was historically isolated from the world social studies or European in particular. In the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th centuries, when in Europe the social knowledge was formed and sociology was established as a science of full value, Ukrainian social thought actively perceived sociological ideas of that time. It is impossible to overestimate what Mykhailo Hrushevsky (who admired ideas of A. Komte, E. Durkheim and W. Wundt) did for introduction, popularization and adaptation

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1 The same approach, apart from determination of early Soviet as a separate one, is used by almost all modern historians of the national sociology; it is a standard for all university textbooks and manuals.
of European sociological ideas to the national humanitarian knowledge. Those efforts are presented in his work “Beginnings of Citizenship, or Genetic Sociology” published during his emigration in Vienna in 1921. Also, we have to name sociological approaches and socio-political ideas by M. Dragomanov, S. Podolynsky, B. Kistiakivsky, V. Lypynsky [Burlachuk, Molchanov, Stepanenko, 1996]. Ukrainian social knowledge boasts about serious achievements in ethnography and ethnology, for example, works by M. Ziber, M. Sumtsov, M. Kovalevsky, F. Vovk. We have to mention that namely this knowledge — within the tradition of “cultural anthropology” — was a powerful incentive to development of European sociology, British in particular.

At the same time, mostly because of the West European origin of sociology and the most sustainable tradition, in the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, in western societies sociology was regarded as a universal science (without national differentiation). It was considered not only able to explain but to offer a model of optimal social development. Thus, according to I. Wallerstein, such “universalization” of social knowledge was based on objectivity of western societies; others, non-western, became a subject for studies on cultural anthropology, oriental studies and so on.

The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries was the time when Ukrainian academic sociology started to develop. The main attention was oriented to development of original concepts substantiating the right of Ukrainian nation to the national self-identification. Historical transformation from “national” to “universal” (read: Western-centric) paradigm in development of social sciences and sociology in particular can explain theoretical difficulties met by Ukrainian social researchers. Being able to apply sociological methods to their studies, they could not use the theoretical models developed for “typical” developed industrial societies; and that is why, according to the logic of sociology of that time, they had to deal mostly with interdisciplinary or ethnographic research.

As a result, in the end of 19th and beginning of 20th centuries, the totally articulated scientific sociological tradition was not fully established in Ukraine, because in science tradition is grounded on succession and school. Thus, to say it right, at the very beginning of sociological tradition in Ukraine, it was interrupted in the political and administrative way — Ukrainian proto-sociology did not develop into a mature science; under political power of 1920–30-ies, the roots could not go deep. Ironically, the first national sociological institution — Ukrainian Sociological Institute — was established by M. Hrushevsky in Vienna in 1919. Later
M. Shapoval (1882–1932), an Ukrainian scientist and public activist who can be called one of the first national professional sociologists, in 1924 founded another sociological institute in Prague — Ukrainian Institute of Citizenship. Scientific works and sociological ideas by M. Hrushevsky, M. Shapoval and their colleagues still wait to be fully involved into the national sociological inheritance and scientific circulation of modern Ukrainian sociology.

Early Soviet period of the national sociology is characterized by efforts to make it a fully institutionalized science and by successive decline in sociological research as sociological approaches transformed from the Western positivism and neo-Kantian paradigm to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine being the only truthful social knowledge. It seemed that this extremely controversial and special period did not leave any “useful heritage” and destroyed all achievements of the “pre-bolshevik” era. However, over a decade (until the end of 1920-ies) in Soviet Ukraine, like in other Soviet republics, sociology fought for appreciation by developing in two parallel directions: as sociologically oriented social knowledge (those who represented this direction tried to make the European classic sociological tradition institutionally organized in Ukraine) and as a Marxist sociology.

Despite all unsuccessful efforts of M. Hrushevsky to relocate Ukrainian Sociological Institute from Vienna to Kyiv, in the end of 1920-ies and beginning of 1930-ies the first network of sociological centers was created; for example, within the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, there were founded chairs and commissions that worked according to plans of Ukrainian Sociological Institute: Section of Methods and Social Substantiation of History of the Research Chair of Ukrainian History (headed by O. Germaine); a study of primitive culture supervised by the same chair and headed by Katerina, M. Hrushevsky’s daughter; Commission on Cultural and Historical Heritage and History of Songs attached to the History and Philology Department of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (see: [Kondratyk, 1996: pp. 25–31]). At the same time, Marxist sociology develops and starts to dominate: in Ukraine, its center was based at Philosophy and Sociology Section, Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Kharkiv, Department of Social and Economic Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the UkrSSR, research chair of Marxism-Leninism on the basis of Marxism-Leninism Seminar of the AS of UkrSSR (see: [Chernysh, 2004: pp. 478–487]). In 1921 another institute was founded in Kharkiv — All-Ukrainian Institute of Labor ruled by F. Dunaevsky. It studied and coordinated the work of labor laboratories related to industry and transpor-
tation on various aspects (from psycho-physiological to social and organizational). So, the institute’s activity formed a basis (to some extent) for the further development of sociology of labor in the former USSR and Ukraine in particular. It was a direction of Soviet sociology research that dominated in 1960–80-ies.

However, political and ideological circumstances of that time destroyed all efforts of sociology oriented to realize the classic European tradition. Revolutionary society of the early Soviet period, being ruled according to the communist political and ideological design and party directives, did not need sociology as an objective science on laws of social development. That is why inspiring organizational efforts of M. Hrushevsky aimed to strengthen sociology in Ukraine did not get any support, while in the beginning of 1920-ies in communist Russia P. Sorokin became “undesirable” as well. In that period humanitarian and social sciences found themselves under obtrusive political and ideological control of the ruling party bodies. Analysis of the situation in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, conducted by the power commission in the end of 1920-ies, had a conclusion — “undeveloped social and economic departments, where economy, finance and Soviet laws are not studied at the necessary level; ideological aspect of work does not connected to the new Marxist sociology” (italic by the authors) [History of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1993: p. 52]. Practically, the conclusion was a precondition for crash of sociology (Marxist in particular) in Ukraine in the future.

It is difficult to predict the further possible development of national sociology if the sprouts of tradition, which appeared in the academic period, could survive and the first scientific efforts could grow into their own original theoretical concepts. Discussing stages of the world sociology development, I. Wallerstein tells that soon after the Second World War because of objective need, regional and area studies were started again in the USA, and this fact brings doubts about the dominating identification of sociology as a science about the “typical” western society [Wallerstein, 1999]. Unfortunately, by that time in the USSR even the term “sociology” had been already forbidden.

Ukrainian Soviet Sociology: A Stage of “Rehabilitation” Establishment

In the end of 1950-ies, even in the former USSR, the objective need in positive social knowledge starts to develop.
The phenomenon of “Soviet sociology” can be assessed differently but it is the fact that modern Ukrainian sociology was formed within the Soviet sociologic tradition. Formally (but not in fact), the national sociology has to be characterized as a science oriented to aspects of Ukrainian social and cultural community and legitimized as a national sociology since a determined historical period, namely declaration of independence of Ukraine in 1991. According to this approach, history of Ukrainian sociology can be presented as an integral part of the national renaissance history. At the same time, it would be naïve to understand foundation and development of a scientific branch as a sparkle or a fixed event like a child’s birth. Modern Ukrainian sociology did not appear unexpectedly, even despite the important historical period of its institutionalization in the end of 1980-ies and beginning of 1990-ies. It developed as a part of the whole Soviet sociology.

Various and difficult reasons led to a growth of interest in sociological knowledge and its legitimacy in the USSR. There appeared a need in something similar to a response of society to the powerful “all-knowing and almighty” ruling center. All kinds of control over social life became objectively more complicated; they could not be limited by dogmatic schemes of communist administrative and political planning any more. In the end, even in the USSR, social and humanitarian sciences made some headway and somehow perceived the world tendencies of social knowledge development and sociological on particular. It is evident that a new interpretation of ideological dogmata could not be the knowledge needed for analysis, planning and prognoses of social development.

After the Second World War the logic of sociology development in the USSR can be explained by combination of the following social factors, processes and actors: 1) social need in objective social knowledge; 2) constant fight of the knowledge against ideology; 3) the world influence on development of social sciences and sociology in particular as a “Western science” in the former USSR; 4) activity of those people who chose the way of scientific sociology and supported (even if subconsciously) its autonomous and self-sufficient scientific status.

In the first years after Stalin’s death, even before the known 20th Congress, sounded propositions to “rehabilitate” sociology in the USSR (see: [Alberg, 1994: pp. 88–114]). In 1955, in the central Soviet philosophy journal “Philosophical Issues” was published the article “Sociology and Statistics” by V. Niemchynov, in which the author substantiated the necessity (without any conflict with Marxist-Leninist philosophy) of conduction of concrete sociological studies based on historical materialism.
It is really the time when the necessary social information could be provided only by sociology. According to a Russian researcher R. Alberg [Alberg, 1994: pp. 88–114], in the second part of 1950-ies, when industrial transformation entered its final stage, the Soviet social system became more complicated than the Marxist social model supposed. Social processes caused by rapid development of industry could not been explained by laws of historical materialism; on the other hand, went out of control by the Soviet bureaucratic management, totally unprepared to this. Neither traditional administrative means nor moral appeals were able to stop social mobility that caused doubts about the idea and practice of economy planning. The management had to admit that they did not know a thing about the reasons why the migration process intensified in the industry and other spheres. Powerful nomenclature had to agree to new scientific means in order to get information, important for planning, on motives of people’s migration and the labor fluidity in economy.

In the second half of 1950-ies the foreign policy doctrine of the Soviet state becomes softer; for example, in perception of possible peaceful competition coexistence of countries with different social systems. It was another factor in favor of sociology rehabilitation in the former USSR. In the year 1956, the Soviet delegation took part for the first time in the World Sociological Congress held in Amsterdam. Direct communication with foreign colleagues, “test of strength” in scientific discussions revealed methodological weakness and mythological character inherent in Soviet social sciences temporarily preserved. However, this “test of strength” pushed the national social researcher (we mean not only Ukrainians but all representatives of the former Soviet republics) to adapt new ideas and approaches, to intensify their efforts for getting really objective knowledge.

We can see that the end of 1950-ies created very favorable conditions for sociology renaissance in the USSR: the power and society needed reliable social knowledge, political regime became more liberal and representatives of the higher leadership were oriented to reforms (the so-called Thaw), scientific contacts with foreign research centers were established with the feeling that scientific environment should not be self-isolated. Lost positions quickly started to return their former achievements. In September 1957 and January 1958 in Moscow were held international sociological conferences on peaceful coexistence; and in June 1958 was founded Soviet Sociological Association. In the end of the year, in the book “History of Sociology as a Science” by Soviet academician G. Aleksandrov, the term “sociology” was firstly in a couple of de-
cades used without ideological casting a slur on it. In 1960, for the first time in the country, were founded sociological research departments (a sector of new labor and life forms supervised by the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Science of the USSR, later in 1966 reorganized into the Department of Special Sociological Research) and sociological laboratory of the Leningrad State University; since 1960 first sociological projects of large-scale have been conducted mostly in big cities and industrial centers of the former USSR, like Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and others [Novykova, 2000: pp. 140-141; Osypov, 2004: pp. 25–30].

At that time Soviet sociology developed in two main directions: (1) as an academic discipline but submitted to methods of historical materialism and formed mostly in academic centers of the country and (2) as a special empirical research especially oriented to sociology of labor or as so-called industrial or factory sociology. Namely sociological aspects of labor, labor motivation and professional orientation determined, at least for two Soviet decades (1960–1980), the main development direction for theoretical and applied research of the whole Soviet sociology and Ukrainian in particular. Ideological and practical aspects of new incentive formation in socialist production (and this was a social demand of the Soviet state to sociology and sociologists) not only legitimized existence of Soviet sociology but also made possible for the first Soviet sociologists to improve theoretical, methodical and empirical tools of their science.

New tendencies in social studies kept spreading in the republics and the UkrSSR in particular. In 1960, in the Institute of Philosophy (AS UkrSSR) was organized the first in Ukraine group for sociological research that already in autumn of that year started active special sociological study at one of the plants in Kyiv [DAIF: list 1, ref. 344, pp. 8, 88–99]. Since then such studies have become more and more popular [DAIF: list 1, ref. 593, p. 2; ref. 871, pp. 50–54]1] they have been a base for scientific articles, books and theses. For example, in 1964 was published the book “Communism and Inner World of a Person” by L. Sokhan (Kyiv), in which the data of sociological research was widely used; in 1966 was published (by a number of authors from Odessa) the collection of works “From Experience of Special Sociological Research”; in the

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1 DAIF (Documentary Archive of the Institute of Philosophy, NAS of Ukraine) consists of three lists. Archival resources were introduced for scientific use by one of the article’s authors, when he worked on his thesis research “Ukrainian Sociology: Traditions, Factors, and Reference Points for Development (from 1960-ies to the beginning of the 21st century)”. 
same year Department of Atheism (Institute of Philosophy, AS UkrSSR) introduced a collective work (also based on a special sociological research) “The Main Tendencies and Reactionary Essence of Ideological Adaptation of Modern Religious Sectarianism”. Apart from certain ideological aberrations of that time, this study and others actively used data and outcomes of special sociological research — and this was important.

In this period of sociology development the young science suffered not only from theoretical and methodological problems but also from organizational, staff and institutional ones. Lack of staff resources pushes to improve preparation of specialists able to understand methods of special sociological research. In 1966 the Scientific Board of the Institute of Sociology, AS UkrSSR, recommends to defend a number of theses prepared with the help of sociological research materials: P. Gopchenko “Reactionary Role of Modern Adventist Eschatology”; A. Kapto “Social Activity as a Moral Feature of Communism Builder”; I. Stogniy “Capacity for Work as a Moral Feature of Person”; Yu. Sikorsky “Aesthetic Value of Technology and How It Depends on Modern Material Production” [DAIF: list 1, ref. 593, p. 2; ref. 871, pp. 50–54]; in 1967-69 over ten sociological theses, at least in the form of used sociological data, were prepared1. In Kyiv by the end of 1960-ies had been published the first specialized collection of scientific works, called very meaningfully “Sociology in Ukraine”. Today it is easy to be ironical as to the sociology of that time; it was a strange combination of real social knowledge, apology of social, economic, political and administrative practices, ideological and theoretical grounds of the so-called “bourgeois sociology” as a “positive science about society”. It happened because the only recognized as a methodological, philosophical and ideological basis of Soviet sociology was historical materialism, an integral part of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

So, despite its quick start under the liberal conditions of 1960-ies, the real sociological science has not been formed consistently and smoothly in Ukraine. The main reason of this was political and ideological obstacles and the power striving to prevent from crash of one of the Soviet ideology bases — historical materialism. When they understood what the real danger sociology could be as an independent science of full value, ideologists in power started at once a severe fight for determination of its subject limits, methods and hierarchy subordination in the structure of Soviet social sciences. As a result, in 1962 at the annual meeting of Academy of Sciences of the USSR I. Il'ichov, responsible for science in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, clearly said that Soviet sociology is not independent science but only methods and technique of sociological research (see: [Alberg, 1994: p. 102]).

This position reflected in Ukraine in a totally predictable way. At the annual general meeting of the Department of Economy, Philosophy, History and Law (AS UkrSSR) held in 1963 the concluding resolution stated: “To improve radically development of methodological aspects of social sciences... It is extremely necessary to combine efforts of philosophers and representatives of other social scientists for development of methodology in special sociological research. Starting base for development of methodology and rise of methodology levels for all social sciences research is the Marxist-Leninist theory, historical decisions of 20th, 21st and 22nd Congresses and CPSU Program...” [DAIF: list 1, ref. 504, p. 17].

This paradox — when on the one hand processes of scientific development of sociology are quick, and on the other hand they are hampered with the idea that sociology is only “empirical component of the only right theory” — had led to a serious split in the Soviet social research environment. Over a decade (1960-ies and the beginning of 1970-ies) sociological scientific community was involved into discussions on sociology subjects, the main topic of which was relations between sociology and historical materialism. Various ways out were suggested: to recognize dualism of philosophy and sociology within historical materialism; to divide social relations between historical materialism, applied sociology and scientific communism; to determine sociology as a separate independent science (see: [Chagin, 1971: pp.194–196; Sokolova, 1997: p. 351]). As a temporary position, G. Glezerman, V. Kelle and M. Pylypenko (1972) have chosen a three-level model. It supposed the following structure of sociology:
1) Historical materialism as a general sociological theory and a methodological basis of all social sciences.

2) Branch sociological theories (the authors regarded them as chapters of scientific communism).

3) Special sociological research as applied tools for collecting of sociological data.

The beginning of 1970-ies was a period when ideological repression against sociology came back: rout of the Institute of Special Sociological Researches (ISSR) in Moscow, persecution of the most active researchers, ending of studies in certain research directions. It was the beginning of “dullness age” in Soviet sociology according to V. Shlapentokh, a Russian immigrant sociologist (see: [Batygin, 1998: pp. 23–38]). It was time when to study theoretical and methodological aspects of sociology was even danger — dogmata of historical materialism were implemented by powerful methods inherent in the Soviet political and administrative system. Persecution of the authoritative Russian sociologist Yu. Levada, because of “theoretical freedom of thought”, was typical in that time. Arguments of ideological ostracism are presented in memorandum of the Moscow City CPSU Committee after a discussion on lectures by Yu. Levada. The following quotation states: “Lectures are not based on the basic theory and methods of Marxist-Leninist sociology, historical and dialectic materialism. They are lacking in the class and party approach to exposition of social reality; the role of classes and class struggle as a decisive force for society development is not elucidated, essential aspects of ideological fight have not been described in full; there is no criticism of bourgeois sociological theories” (the quotation was taken from: [Pugacheva, 1994: pp. 158–172]). The case produced an echo, however, it was not unique but rather revealing fates of those who passed the forbidden subject and methodological “limit” and that meant that they doubted in “sacral” political and ideological doxies.

Analyzing the archive of the Institute of Philosophy AS UkrSSR, we found a document [DAIF: list 1, ref. 915, pp. 46–50] on the situation similar to the case of Yu. Levada. That happened to a research fellow of the Institute at the same time and for the same reasons. In the end of 1970, a senior research fellow of the Department of History of Philosophical and Sociological Thought in Ukraine was severe criticized at one of the department meetings. It happened because of the article “Methodological Aspects of History of Philosophy” by V. Gubenko published a couple of years earlier and included into collection of materials at the Conference on History of Philosophy in 1967 in Kharkiv. According to the criticism,
V. Gubenko “allowed formalistic and scholastic statements, which manifest his enthusiasm for certain neo-positivism methods” (here and later the italic is by the authors): “enthusiasm for unnecessary terms prevent” the talented scientist, “he manifested his aspiration for solving problems of dialectic materialism but not history of philosophy”. Concluding decision does not need commentaries: “1) to condemn V. Gubenko’s methodological mistakes in his work; 2) to declare that V. Gubenko’s tenure in position of a senior research fellow of the Department of History of Philosophical and Sociological Thought in Ukraine is inexpedient; 3) to ask the direction for use of V. Gubenko as a research fellow at other post”. We have got only one document of this case, and so it is difficult to see all logic of its reason and consequence links, apart from the fact that in 1968 the senior research fellow V. Gubenko was absent in a list of the department staff.

Receptions and Criticism as Forms of the National Sociology Development

Dual and contradictory methodological situation of sociology in the Soviet period led to theoretical and methodological “smuggling” of sociologic techniques and methods for special sociological research from the world technical collection of empirical sociology; on the other hand, it became possible to acquaint oneself with Western fundamental or macro-level sociological theories in a form of Marxist-Leninist criticism of “bourgeois sociology” as a part of “bourgeois social knowledge” (the “criticism” was often used as a ritual procedure included in introduction for Soviet sociological publications on sociological theories).

In Soviet times to criticize foreign sciences was an obligatory special direction for all social and humanitarian disciplines. Soviet sociology was not an exception. Critical assessment of “bourgeois sociology” had been carried out for the whole Soviet period. At the same time, “criticism” was the only way for Soviet sociology to communicate with the world sociology, to enter, even if it was deformed, the world sociological context, and so it became and important stage of its own development.

We want to stress the main kinds of the “criticism”. This will help us to show its contribution into the general sociological development.

— The most popular kind, which practically all Soviet sociologists had to use, was obligatory negative and critical assessment of
works by the Western authors mentioned in the publication, even if their concepts were used in the author’s own research\(^1\).

— Publication of analytical articles and books, in which conceptual views of Western specialists were described from the position of Marxist-Leninist criticism.

— Speeches at international, all-union and republican conferences, symposiums, congresses, meetings of various formats with foreign scientists, where it was possible to test critical assessment of their work during discussions.

Critical form of Soviet sociological communication with the world had also specific features of its historical development. Ritual criticism of the first half of 1980-ies significantly differs from criticism of ideologically severe years just after the Second World War.

As we have already mentioned, renaissance of sociology in the USSR became possible in the time of Khruschev’s liberalization; in Ukraine these processes started only in the beginning of 1960-ies. The center of them was the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the UkrSSR. According to documents, even in 1957 “criticism of modern bourgeois philosophy and sociology” was one of the main directions in work of this institute [DAIF: list 1, ref. 219, p. 1], and in the end of 1960-ies the institute had a special “criticism” department — of modern foreign philosophy. One of the first its studies was “Actual Aspects of Criticism of Modern Bourgeois Philosophy” (in this context, the theoretical sociological topic “Theory of ‘Convergence’ in Modern Bourgeois Philosophical and Sociological Systems” was studied in particular). In 1972-75 the department was studying the topic “Anti-Communism and its Philosophy of a Person”; in 1975 appeared the topic “Research and Critical Analysis of Modern Bourgeois Ideology”, and in its context, one of the studies was of theoretical and sociological nature — “Criticism of Modern Bourgeois Theories on Development of Society” [DAIF: list 1, ref. 1144, pp. 85-86].

In the beginning of 1980-ies documents again reveal at least ritual importance of criticism for Soviet sciences. In the 11\(^{th}\) five-year term the Institute of Philosophy (which, as we have already mentioned, was a primary organizational institute for the national academic sociologists)

\(^1\) Practically all works of the Soviet period, officially published, can confirm this statement; all authors had to include in their texts elements of the “references to Marxism-Leninism” and “criticism of bourgeois scientists”. This norm could be avoided only in illegal self-published works.
had to fulfill the following tasks of a “great theoretical and practical value” [DAIF: list 1, ref. 1342, p. 2]:

— To study theoretical aspects of developed socialism, laws of its turn into communism.
— To develop features of social relations improvement, formation of a new person; to develop features of socialist way of life, to study the public opinion.
— To study scientific and technical revolution.
— To develop criticism of anti-communism, bourgeois and revisionist theories; to reveal those who falsify Marxist-Leninist ideas.

However, even in the end of 1960-ies appear the first substantial studies by Ukrainian scientists. They include analytical survey of the non-Marxist social and sociological theories though in a critical way. Their examples can be “Moral Ideal [Criticism of Some Bourgeois Sociological and Ethic Theories]” (1969) by M. Polishchuk, “Criticism of Idealist Interpretations of Practice” (1976) by V. Tabachkov’sky, “Criticism of Philosophical Concepts of American ‘Cultural Anthropology’” (1978) by O. Sobol and others.

As we have mentioned before, in the Soviet period meetings of national and foreign scientists took place at least ritually but not often, and during discussions, critical assessments of their works were tested. Of course, these meetings were in favor of alternative (different from historical materialism) methods and helped them spread in sociology, as well as enabled direct cooperation (though incidental) between national researchers and representatives of Western sociology. One of those contacts was a meeting of research fellows from the Institute of Philosophy (AS UkrSSR) with the President of International Association of Sociologists, Prof. J. Freedman (January 1958). In May 1964 T. Parsons, the master of the world sociology, talked in the Institute of Philosophy about directions and methods of special sociological studies in the USA; in 1974 R. Turner, Vice-President of the International Sociological Association, visited Ukraine; in 1984 took place a visit of E. Massini, President of the International Association of Researchers of the Future (see: [Rybschun, 2006: pp. 341–351]).

There is one more feature related to the “critical form” of the national sociology development. We mean its function of latent education for national researchers: their sociological and humanitarian outlook became wider. Soviet criticism of “bourgeois sociology”, maybe without any intention, began to spread actual scientific information and even involved national sociologists in studying theoretical ideas of “ideological oppo-
nents”. For example, in 1950-ies, in one of his speech at a scientific session on humanitarian sciences in Ukraine (29-30 May 1958), O. Bakhitov, Deputy Director of the Institute of Philosophy (AS USSR), talked about drawbacks of struggle against “bourgeois ideology”, referred to necessity of detailed orientation to the problem fields of “opponents” and gave as an example his own experience when he profoundly studied aspects of the Western micro-sociology (J. Moreno, G. Gurvich) in order to criticize them effectively in the future [DAIF: list 1, ref. 264, pp. 165–178]. Another example of education through criticism is a preparation of theoretical reports by research fellows and post-graduates in the Institute of Philosophy (AS UkrSSR) in 1970–1980 in order to present them at department meetings. While analyzing the mentioned above archive, we found a lot of such reports, and this fact confirms certain systemic character of the approach and practice among first Ukrainian professional sociologists [DAIF: list 1, ref. 1224, pp. 26–29].

Since the middle of 1980-ies, when the former USSR started liberal reforms of perestroika, Ukrainian sociology has undergone serious transformations as well. For the national sociology, they started when, according to the Decree of the Presidium of Academy of Sciences of UkrSSR (No. 76, 23 February 1984), in the Institute of Philosophy (Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) was organized the Department of Sociology, and all previous sociological departments of the Institute were collected in it [DAIF: list 1, ref. 1540, p. 2]. Within the further institutional reforming of national sociology, Presidium of Academy declared that in October 1990 a new independent academic institution was established on the base of sociological department of the Institute of Philosophy — Institute of Sociology, NAS of Ukraine; though it can hardly mean that in the beginning of the 21st century Ukrainian sociology has already completed its perestroika. On the background of deep social, political and historical changes “criticism of bourgeois theories” seems to vanish. Leaving its ideological “husk”, it becomes a base of national history related to foreign sociological studies. So, even that “critical stage” of entering the world sociological context was extremely important and necessary for professional development and theoretical self-recognition of sociology and sociologists in the former USSR and Ukraine in particular.

According to numerous examples, including the above-mentioned, of sociological topics, the Soviet sociology sometimes had to “build” their conclusions on the already determined schemes-directives, like “elimination of social differences” between the urban and rural population, intellectual and physical work or improvement of social homogeneity in
Soviet society and formation of a “new historical community — the Soviet people”. However, in 1970-80-ies sociological surveys, conducted in professional and thorough way, revealed many differences and contradictions between the declared ideal picture of Soviet socialist society and the actual social reality. We know that outcomes and objective conclusions of those surveys had few chances to be published, but, in any case, the Soviet historical stage made a serious contribution in development of sociology as a science in Ukraine. The term “sociology” itself was legalized. To tell the truth, in the official Soviet social knowledge sociology was not the “central discipline”, and the attitude of communist ideologists to it had often been suspicious and distrustful. At the same time, there appeared people who call themselves “sociologists”. In the end of 1960-ies the whole branch of scientific knowledge was founded in the USSR (we put aside discussions about its features), and the further logic of its development had inevitably bring its “fruit”, sometimes unpredictable even for those who initiated organization of sociological institutions and sociological studies in Soviet society.

Although the Soviet sociology had been formed totally according to authoritarian and centralist principles of the whole social life regulation, which meant severe subordination to the center, ideological, cultural and scientific, in the namely Soviet period (the end of 1980-ies and beginning of 1990-ies) the national sociology institutionally adopted itself as a structure as an aggregate of institutes and collectives of professional sociologists. Creation of scientific and research sociological centers at governmental and non-governmental institutions, foundation of a separate institute of sociology in the system of Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (in the autumn of 1990), and organization of the national sociological association — all that can be an evidence of the fact that national sociology has legalized its professional and scientific status. At that time a new faculty at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv was founded, aimed at preparing professional sociologists.

**National Sociology under the National Independence: Achievements and Development Features**

As an independent scientific discipline, Ukrainian sociology met again the problem of self-realization in a new stage of development. Contrary to sociologists of the “Soviet rehabilitation” era, Ukrainian sociologists of the beginning of 1990-ies did not have to start the science from scratch. They had at least a basis for the science functioning; we mean a
material base of just organized staff and an established scientific tradition of Soviet sociology with all its achievements and problems. The time demanded to rethink over this heritage, to transform sociology in an actually objective social science, free of dogmata and ideological prejudice; its potential and development directions have to be adequate to social needs of a transforming society. Involvement of national sociology in the world sociological context was and still is an actual component of the above-mentioned tasks.

The tasks related to a new quality of national sociology demanded many methodological aspects of its further development as a part of the world sociological knowledge to be comprehended. In the first years of independence national sociologists determined and introduced the challenge in their works [Tancher, 1993: pp. 77–87; 1998: pp. 18–27; Stepanenko, 1993: pp. 88–98; Mimandusova, Kazakov, 1993: pp. 247–252; Chernysh, 1994: pp. 122–129; Shulga, 2000: pp. 170–177]. We have not gotten enough well analyzed information about this extremely difficult and important period in development of independent national sociology, so it is impossible to write straight and unbiased conclusions. Instead of this we can, at least roughly, describe an image of the modern national sociology with all its problems and obvious achievements.

As we have already mentioned, the modern national sociology is based on the Soviet sociology, and so, in the new independent country, the young science possesses some characteristic features of Soviet sociology (apart from the discussed above):

— Humanistic orientation, active interest of sociologists in actual living world of society and person.

— As a result of anti-ideological and anti-mythical character of young scientific discipline, alert to fundamental theoretical thinking that seems to be strange for sociological outlook and “dirty” of its relation to ideological positions of Soviet time.

— Hyper-attention to techniques and methods of empirical sociological research, development of quantitative mathematical methods and disregard to the qualitative ones; so, sociology starts to be understood as the tool knowledge, conclusions of which have to be based on empirical and statistical surveys.

We can state that since its foundation in the Soviet period the young Ukrainian sociology has been seriously influenced by rather positivist, American in particular, sociological canon than European sociological traditions and “understanding sociology” in particular. The latter was often, even talking about a discipline, regarded as belonging to “social phi-
losophy”. It seems that in the times of their foundation and strengthening the Soviet sociology and the new national sociology were “unlucky” with those times. Due to inert adaptation of foreign scientific knowledge and approaches, the national sociology happened to be more affected by significant influence of more developed, in the after-war period, American tradition of structural and functional analysis, associated with T. Parson’s name and works, and so by the positivist approaches and ideas about this science.

Also, having retracted dogmata of Marxist methodological paradigm and manifesting prejudice against theoretical generalization, the national sociology found itself especially vulnerable under universal processes of methodological crisis of sociology, when its modern theoretical paradigms are too numerous and scattered, and the modern world sociology suffers from development problems, like a gap between sociological theory and practice, contradictions between micro- and macro-level approaches, problems of theoretical synthesis and renewal of classic traditions and others [Tancher, 1993: pp. 77–88]. On the other hand, it proves that reception and recreation of the developmental problems, common for the world sociology, by the national one means its successive, though rather slow, integration into the world sociological space and common professional context.

Having gained a certain experience of independent existence, Ukrainian sociology, step by step, leaves the unified standards of Soviet sociology and creates its own unique face. The best way to see this is to analyze the weightiest achievements and actual problems. Among the achievements of the national sociology in this period, the weightiest ones are:

— The main stage was completed in institutional realization of sociology as a field of scientific knowledge, scientific discipline and community of professional sociologists (there appeared faculties and specialization for preparation of sociological specialists at universities, as well as sociological nomenclature of the Higher Attestation Commission; Sociological Association of Ukraine was founded; there have been published special sociological journals, like “Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing”, scientific and theoretical bilingual edition founded by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine in July 1997, scientific sociological works and so on) [Reznik V., Reznik O., 2004: pp. 22–46];

— Professional principles and values for sociological community and sociologists’ activity were determined, like Code of Professional
Ethics for Sociologists developed by Prof. N. Panina and other leading sociologists of Ukraine [Panina, 2004: pp. 5–8].

— A network of the professional all-national sociological centers for public opinion polls was created (SOCIS-Gallup, Kiev International Institute of Sociology, or KIIS, Social Monitoring Center, Ukrainian sociological service, sociological service at the Razumkov Center and others).

— Systematic empirical studies on transformation of Ukrainian society have been carried out (like the unique project by the Institute of Sociology, NAS of Ukraine, “Monitoring of Ukrainian Society”, which has been conducted since 1992); those sociological projects formed an empirical basis for a whole complex of the middle-level theories for transforming society developed by modern Ukrainian sociologists.

— Comparative international sociological surveys were held with participation of national sociologists; the surveys studied Ukrainian society and the public opinion of the country in various dimensions; in 2004-2005 Ukraine and national specialists were for the first time involved in a large-scale European comparative sociological survey (European Social Survey), in which over 20 EU countries took part.

— Reception and adaptation of the world sociological theory have been successful (modern and post-modern sociological theory represented by modern authoritative scientists, like E. Giddens, P. Bourdieu, U. Beck, Z. Bauman, G. Alexander, I. Wallerstein and others, adaptation of sociological conflict theory, sociology of culture, the word-system analysis, studies on global society and new information and communication technologies, transformation of social structures, new institutionalism, the “network” theory, sociological aspects of civil society, etc.).

— A qualitative level of sociological research has been raised and the subject field of the national sociology has been broadened (history, theory and methods of sociology, social structures and institutes, transformation, sociology of culture and mass communications, electoral sociology, political sociology, economic sociology, agricultural sociology, ethnosociology and others).

Qualitative transformation in the subject field of the national sociology not only confirms its successful realization as a real and actual scientific discipline but also reveals logic and stages of its development related to dynamics of transforming society. Regarding topics of Ukrainian
sociology under socialism and in the time of its modern renewal, we can conclude the following.

Soviet industrialization and unexpected spontaneous social movements brought changes in the system of labor distribution; so, the Soviet state bureaucracy was in need of accurate information about the social change motivation (because the potential of historical materialism was discredited); as a result, in the beginning of 1960-ies, empirical social studies on social structure of Soviet society, cultural and technical levels of working class, budget of time, social aspects of labor, education and family were restarted.

In time, practical differentiation and specialization of sociological studies have led to the separation of branches in sociology, like sociology of labor, family, young people, leisure time. In 1970-ies significant attention was paid to social planning and social management; theoretical and methodological grounds of social psychology were formed at a rather good quality level. However, the field of sociological research lost all acute problems of Soviet society, existence of which was against the official ideal of socialism. The problems were like growing nationalism, strengthening of party-nomenclature’s power, lack of legal security, manifestation of deviant behavior and others. That situation existed until the middle of 1980-ies, when, under perestroika and reforms, the need for theoretical and empirical information, of better quality, amount and content, rose significantly. In the post-Soviet period the applied studies were still dominant in Ukrainian sociology but their topics changed. Modern Ukrainian sociology studies mostly social and political issues, electoral behavior and consumer markets.

On the successful background, a complex of problems seems to be no less important for the national sociology development. To understand them and develop mechanism for their solution are actual tasks for the current and future professional sociologists. We would like to stress some of the problems that can be characterized as “problems of growth” and still actual for the national sociology.

Institutionalization of public opinion as a real social actor and inspector of the power has not been completed yet, as well as dramatic formation of civil society in Ukraine. It means that Ukrainian society still has a social need for an objective sociological knowledge.

The national sociology is still lacking in attention to theoretical generalization and sociological theory as a whole — we deal with the old stereotype of sociology being a pure empirical science, which cannot be “aggravated” by conceptual theoretical additions, its role is to supply “em-
pirical and statistical raw material”. However, this and many others are common problems of the post-Soviet sociology. V. Yadov, an authoritative Russian sociologist, among the factors influencing tendencies of the post-Soviet sociology development, determined “traditions of Soviet sociology”, like explanation of empirical data from the mono-theory point and then development of practical recommendations, to be the first in line [Yadov, 1995: pp. 5–9]. Ukrainian sociology has not gotten rid of such “soviet complexes” as well.

The need for production of the own theories and concepts for transforming society is still actual. Describing similar issues in modern Russian sociology, S. Barsukova, a Russian researcher [Barsukova, 1999: pp. 104–112], mentioned what restrains sociology under new conditions (we think that Ukrainian sociology meets the same obstacles). Firstly, some social links and social processes “go to the shadow”, and those “shadow” (even in the real sense) social and, especially, political and economic processes objectively impede studying and analyzing them; secondly, if you compare the modern society to the Soviet one, the latter was more stable, while the first is more dynamic in all aspects. So, sociology meets the problem of “late effect”, and this makes it less practically efficient. Sociologists do not have to limit themselves with just explanation of social processes and their dynamics. At the current stage of society, when the deep social transformation has not been completed, scientific prognoses of social processes are of extreme importance.

By-side consequences of commercialization are also contradictory for development of sociological science and expertise: we mean dilettantism and lack of professionalism of numerous “sociological recruits”, lack of theoretical and methodological grounds for studies, subjectivity and danger of political manipulation. In the above-mentioned article V. Yadov says about the contradictory issues of involvement of post-Soviet sociology in market relations: “Positive aspect is a competition of professionalism. Many decent researchers get a deserved support in a way of scientific grants and commissioned studies, while those, who are less professional, have either to catch up with them or leave the job and find something else. The negative consequence is a direct result of the current spontaneous economy. Like in business, in the community of sociologists, there appear ‘corporations that develop their product from nothing’, but manage to flourish until their clients find out forgery” [Yadov, 1995: pp. 5–9].

Another problem of the national sociology development is an implementation of professional and ethic standards, maintenance of socio-
logical principles and values, declared by Code of Professional Ethics for Sociologists. In particular, the most acute issues concern relations between sociologists and the power, as well as development of optimal format of their cooperation [Sociological Knowledge and Power, 2005]. The problem of relations between sociology and the power is not new and exists not only in post-totalitarian societies. As we have said before, the power’s position determined development of sociology in the Soviet time [Firsov, 1994; Russian Sociology of 1960-ies, 1999; Shlapentokh, 1987]. Under the independence, problems in the field of “sociology versus power” relations could not be avoided as well.

On the one hand, Ukrainian power and the national sociology more and more understand their objective interdependence: effective management has to be based on generalization, explanation and prognoses developed by science, while the science cannot exist without support (material, resource, symbolic, status and other) of the power bodies (we have to remember here the statement by M. Foucault about the immanent nature of knowledge and power). To confirm that sociology was realized to be important in processes of social transformation, we can remember the Decree by the President of Ukraine “On Development of the Sociological Science in Ukraine” (25 April 2001), which was aimed at “creating favorable conditions for development of sociological science in Ukraine, raising of its role in social, economic and political reforms, strengthening of democratic basis of society and provision of reliable prognoses for social processes”. Unfortunately, many good statements of the decree have been still declarative, like the one about financial support of sociological studies by the government.

On the other hand, social knowledge used by the power often serves as a mean for control and manipulation in order to maintain and recreate the current social order and ruling system. The power and politicians often perceive sociology in the utilitarian way — as a new effective mean for manipulation of public opinion. As Natalia Panina said, “in present-day Ukraine, like in most countries, the power is interested in sociology very specifically, characteristic features of the interest are of a ‘seasonal nature’ (interest in sociology vanishes after they have fixed in power), a ‘personal nature’ (interest is concentrated on measurement of political ratings) and ‘publicity’ (interest in the results provided by sociologists reveals only after their publication)” [Panina, 2005: p. 146]. Doubtful role of pseudo-sociology as a political and technical mean of “black PR” and falsification of the real electorate’s will in politically commissioned surveys is especially obvious during elections in the country. In such sit-
uations fragile conventional borders between science and politics, truth and interest, moral and unfair play become especially vulnerable.

The problems confirm the fact that in transforming society the role of social (and sociological in particular) knowledge has two sides: it works in favor of social emancipation, democratize itself and others; at the same time, being used by power, it often serves as a mean of social control and manipulations of public opinion. In such situations social and moral responsibility of sociologists and professional expects who produce and spread the social knowledge, is especially important — the time demands from the national sociology to follow an old ideal when knowledge and public virtues are united.

**Prospects of Development of the National Sociology in the World Science Context: From Criticism and Receptions to a Dialogue**

Prospects of the national science development as an objective science of full value with its own voice in the world sociology context depend not only on personalities practicing sociology, its existing institutions and the power’s attitude to its development, but also on social needs and demands on the science. Will the national mass consciousness be able to overcome the myth character of social reality perception? Will it overgrow the condition of social *moods* and become the *public opinion* of full value? To what extent will the power and society need objective information and knowledge about themselves? The future development of the national sociology will be essentially determined by positive answers to these and other important questions.

The current tendencies in Ukrainian social development give a hope. Most sociological indicators reveal that more people have “sober” attitudes and a will to live in the real world. The real scientific sociology is able and has to contribute to it. Also, the features of national psychology, like traditional inclination for common sense and developed feeling of reality, can work in favor of the further spreading and strengthening of objective sociological knowledge in Ukraine. When processes of public self-organization “wake up”, political culture of population grows, the social need of self-studying, objective information about the nature and mechanisms of the power and society functioning appears, then the national sociology gets real tasks to solve for its further development. However, the science itself does not ensure that a certain problem will be solved. Its goal is to make an objective diagnosis and prognoses on social
processes, as well as develop possible ways for their solution. Of course, in such conditions the role of sociologists as social experts in proposals to the power and society has to grow obviously.

The national sociology is still rather young science, despite its active development in independent Ukraine. As mentioned above, many of its problems relate to “difficulties of growth” and complicated processes of optimization and transformation in scientific knowledge and its role in the new social and political situation. Logic of the national sociology development in the future, its involvement in the world scientific context can include, in our opinion, three interconnected directions.

The first deals with revival and thorough reconstruction of the best achievements of its own interrupted proto-sociological tradition and comprehension of the Soviet sociology heritage. The latter has a lot of things still meaningful, especially if we take into account that it is an organic component of the national and cultural context. We mean sociological ideas by M. Dragomanov, O. Potebnia, M. Hrushevsky, M. Shapiroval, B. Kistiakivsky, S. Podolynsky, V. Lypynsky, and achievements of the national ethnographic school.

The second direction relates to studying and adaptation of the world sociological tendencies, introduction of theoretical schools and approaches. In other words, to turn sociology in a science of full value, the national scientists have to be more open for various ideas and opinions, develop not only receptions and adaptation of sociological knowledge, but also a dialogue (or even a polylogue). Formation of its own “sociological voice” and activity for representation of it on the world sociological arena, organizational attention to international cooperation, development of international projects, involvement in the world sociological community life—all that is very important for realization of this strategy.

And at last, the third direction means that the national sociologists have actively use the unique conditions of living in a social “live laboratory”, develop theories and concepts of transforming societies as to all numerous aspects of the deep and large-scale social transformation combined with the world social dynamics.

Government attention to development of sociology as an indicator and stimulus for society democratization, creation of conditions for healthy competition in sociology, the meritocratic approach to its development, support of young professionals, wide range of new ideas and approaches at the national sociological market, further involvement of national sociology in the world sociological community, maintenance of ethical and professional norms in sociological studies, care about im-
provement of sociological culture of power and society, strengthening of intellectual property rights on sociological research achievements — this is only a part of important factors for the national sociological science development.

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The Biography of Natalia Panina

Natalia Panina was born on December 10, 1949 in Sochi. Her father, Victor Ivanovich Panin, was a professional engineer, born in Leningrad in 1930. During the repressions of the Kirov affair, his parents were arrested as representatives of the nobility and later executed. Her mother, Ada Mikhaylovna Panina, was a physical therapist, born in Sochi in
1930. Her father was a red commander during the revolution and later worked in the office of the Sochi public prosecutor. At one point, he broke the official locks on a granary and passed out the bread to starving villagers, among whom were his wife’s relatives. Soon afterward he was struck and killed by the car of his own office. Ada Mikhaylovna Panina died in 2003 in Sochi.

Natalia Panina graduated from Sochi’s High School 22 in 1967 as an honor student. During her school years she was the winner of the local and regional mathematics, physics and biology Olympics and was very active in sports (she played tennis, volleyball and was a tourist instructor).

In 1967 she entered the Department of Psychology at Moscow State University. In 1969 she married her classmate Yevgeniy Ivanovych Golovakha, who is presently working at the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. In 1970 she gave birth to her daughter Inna. (Inna Golovakha-Hicks is a Ukrainian folklorist).

During her university years Natalia Panina specialized in psychopathology under the supervision of Prof. Bluma Zeygarnik (Kurt Levin’s apprentice). Panina’s first student term paper created strong discussions among scholars of the psychopathology department, because it contained empirical data, which clearly showed as groundless the conclusions of some research done at the department, based on which the dissertation was defended and articles were published. During her university years Natalia Panina continued to play sports, and was on the university volleyball team.

After graduating from Moscow State University in 1972 Natalia Panina began to teach psychology at the Kiev Institute for Foreign Languages and in 1974 she went to work at the Institute of Gerontology of the Academy of Medical Sciences, were she concentrated on the sociological aspect of the preparation of the elderly for life after retirement. After just a year of work in the Institute, the 25-year-old Natalia Panina was chosen to be on an expert (USSR) jury in the Podol court. Regardless of her young age, anyone who personally knew Panina was convinced that her opinion in the court would always be honest, fair, and humane.

In 1976 Natalia Panina entered the graduate school of ISI of the USSR Academy of Science, where, under the supervision of Prof. Anatoly Kharchev, she prepared and defended in 1980 her dissertation “Problems of the Social Adaptation of the Elderly to the Status of Pensioner”. Working first as a Junior Scholar, and since 1981 as a Senior Scholar, Panina received recognition as a leading specialist in her area of specialization.
She participated in a series of international comparative studies on the social problem of the elderly, which were organized by WHO and UNESCO. During this time she was actively publishing articles in scholarly Ukrainian, Russian, Georgian, and German journals.

In 1985, wistfully, she left the Institute of Gerontology, and for two years had to look for a job, because she did not want to become a member of the Communist Party, and all attempts to hire her were cut short by the Kiev party leadership. In 1987 she began to work as a junior scholar of the Department of Information of Social Sciences of the USSR Academy of Science. From 1989 to 1991 she was working as a leading scholar of the Central Ukrainian branch of the VCIOM (under the leadership of N. Churilov). Together with N. Churilov she created the first opinion poll network in Ukraine, and developed methodical aspects of the building of the representative samples for adult population in Ukraine.

In 1991 she began to work in the Institute of Sociology of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. In 1993 she defended the doctoral dissertation “The Way of Life and Psychological State of the Population During the Transformation from Totalitarian Society to Democracy”. She was the head of the Department of Social Diagnostics, and from 1995 she held a position of the head of the Department of Social Political Processes, and was a main scientific researcher of this department since 2001.

In 1992 in the Institute of Sociology Natalia Panina had begun the development of the project and approbation of the conducting methodology of the Sociological Monitoring, which became a main source of the systematical sociological information for the politicians, scholars, and Ukrainian public. Based on the monitoring results (1994-2006) were written dozens of books and hundreds of scientific and sociopolitical articles.

Under Panina’s guidance was created a unique archive of sociological data in the Institute of Sociology, and were developed organizational and methodic bases for the creation of the national sociological archive.

Natalia Panina was a leading Ukrainian specialist in a number of directions of the sociological science’s development, especially those related to the study of social adaptation and transformation of the society, national tolerance, political culture, monitoring and epidemiological research. She adapted and widely used a number of well known western methods and developed her own. An “Integral Index of Social Well-being” and “Index of Destabilization and Protest Potential” developed by Panina are being widely used in scientific research and in practice of social management. Natalia Panina added a number of new categories to sociologi-
cal terminology: age-role expectations, anomic demoralization and others. These terms help to disclose important aspects of new social phenomena.

Natalia Panina participated in a number of international projects in collaboration with the specialists from the Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Sciences, VCIOM (presently Levada’s Analytical Center), and with specialists from the Poland, Hungary, Cambridge, London, Georgetown, and New York (at Stony Brook) University. She also collaborated with a few scholarly organizations in Germany, Switzerland, Holland, France, and the Slovak Republic. She has published in scholarly editions of these countries. She conducted epidemiological research of the psychological state and health among children and mothers from Chernobyl. This project led by Professor Evelyn Bromet (State University of New York at Stony Brook) received acknowledgment among specialists from many countries. Special public response and acknowledgment received Panina’s articles on national tolerance in Ukraine. Her works on this topic were reprinted in many editions and quoted a number of times.

Natalia Panina published over 200 scientific works, among which are her textbook “The Technology of Sociological Research”, books “The Psychology of Human Mutual Understanding” and “Social Insanity: History, Theory and Modern Practice”, and a number of books and articles based on the results of sociological monitoring.

Natalia Panina was a member of a number of international scientific organizations, a chair of the commission on Professional Ethics of the Ukrainian Sociological Association. She prepared “Codex of the Professional Ethics of Sociologists”, which became an official document in 2004 at the Congress of Ukrainian Sociological Association.

Natalia Panina was born on December 10, Human Rights Day. In her entire life, above everything else, she put human honor and dignity. She never compromised when she saw that decency or professionalism were not respected. Everyone knew that Natalia Panina did not allow a careless or dishonest attitude toward work. And the same demands, she put before herself all her life. Living for the most part on painkilling medicine, knowing that long hours in front of her computer were damaging for her health, she still was doing her job, putting a great deal of time and effort into it, in order to perfect it. Her works were quoted much more frequently than others, and not only in Ukraine. One of the most recent articles about Ukraine in the leading Polish newspaper “Gazette
Vyborcha” ends with a quotation taken from Panina’s article, published earlier in the prominent Ukrainian weekly “Zerkalo Nedeli”.

It is symbolic that after Panina’s resignation, a new chief of the Commission on Professional Ethics of the Ukrainian Sociological Association was not elected. This is in main part due to the fact that Natalia Panina represented the honor and conscience of Ukrainian sociological scholarship.

Natalia Panina died on August 8, 2006.