'Raise your voices and kill your animals': Islamic discourses on the Idd el-Hajj and Sacrifices in Tanga (Tanzania); authoritative texts, ritual practices and social identities

Bruinhorst, Gerard C. van de

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‘RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS’

In Tanzania, the Idd el-Hajj is the local celebration of the Islamic Sacrificial Feast, marking the end of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). Although its three most important elements (prayer, sermon and sacrifice) identify the ritual as a text-based phenomenon, this study shows how, despite its conformity to authoritative texts, the Idd is shaped by a dialectic of global and local events. Within these various influences, Muslim groups use the Idd el-Hajj as a tool to symbolically express their sense of belonging to the global Islamic community as well as to more local groups such as the Tanzanian nation-state and various urban mosques. Through discussions and performances of the Idd, they assume a position within an imaginary spatial and historical continuum that sometimes emphasises elements of the shared Muslim legacy, while at other times it stresses their need to differentiate themselves from other groups.

GERARD C. VAN DE BRUINHORST

Gerard van de Bruinhorst (1973) received his M.A. in Cultural Anthropology and Arabic from Utrecht University and an Advanced Masters degree (with distinction) from the research school CNWS, Leiden. He conducted research on Islamic rituals in Northern Ghana and Tanzania.

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‘RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS’

ISLAMIC DISCOURSES ON THE IDD EL-HAJJ AND SACRIFICES IN TANGA (TANZANIA)

Authoritative Texts, Ritual Practices and Social Identities

Gerard C. van de Bruinhorst

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Islamic Discourses on the Idd el-Hajj and Sacrifices in Tanga (Tanzania)
Authoritative Texts, Ritual Practices and Social Identities

"Verheft uw stemmen en doodt uw dieren"

Islamitische vertogen over de Idd el-Hajj en offers in Tanga (Tanzania)
Gezaghebbende teksten, rituele praktijken en sociale identiteiten

(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

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*adhan*  
first call to prayer

*akika*  
1) funeral feast for a young child;  
2) birth ritual including hair-cutting and animal sacrifice

*AMYC*  
Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre, a reformist group in Tanga

*amir*  
commander, but in Tanzanian context equivalent to  
director, chairman

*arobaini*  
ritual festivities that conclude the forty-day seclusion  
period after childbirth

*AS*  
abbreviation of Arabic ‘alayhi salam (upon him be peace);  
used parenthetically after the names of angels and of pre-  
Muhammadan prophets

*BAKWATA*  
National Muslim Council of Tanzania known by its Swahili  
acronym Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania

*baraza*  
assembly, entrance hall, reception room, veranda; hence  
also a public meeting on the Islamic festivals like the Idd  
el-Hajj

*bid’a*  
religious innovation (usually negatively valued hence  
eretical doctrine)

*chapati*  
pancake, flat bread fried in oil; served with tea as breakfast

*daku*  
last meal taken before sunrise during fasting month of  
Ramadan

*da’wa*  
mission and outreach to non-Muslims

*darsa*  
religious lesson usually in the mosque

*dhabh*  
throatcut essential for a valid animal sacrifice

*dhikri*  
remembrance, commemoration, repetition of formulaas in  
praise of God and Muhammad

*dua*  
Islamic prayer, supplication, request to God

*EAMWS*  
East African Muslim Welfare Society, abolished and  
replaced by BAKWATA in 1968

*fard*  
highest category of religious duty in Islamic jurisprudence:  
obligatory. Other categories are *haram* (forbidden),
‘RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS’

makruh (reprehensible, offensive), mubah (indifferent) 
mustahhab (desirable).

fatwa 
authoritative statement on religious issues

di’ta 
jurisprudence in Islam

fitna 
dissension, discord

futari 
(ritualised) breakfast, usually in the fasting month of 
Ramadan

hadith 
narrative relating deeds and utterances of the Prophet and 
his Companions

hajj 
pilgrimage to Mecca

haram 
absolutely forbidden, unlawful; one of the five moral 
judgments of human behaviour in Islamic Law

hijab 
woman’s veil

hijra 
emigration of the prophet Muhammad from Mecca to 
Medina in 622, marking the beginning of the Islamic 
calendar

hilal 
new moon, crescent

hijra 
see khutba

ibada 
worship, devotional service, religious duty

‘id al-adha 
(see Idd el-Hajj)

‘id al-fitr 
(see Idd el-Fitr)

Idd el-Fitr 
the Feast of Breaking the Ramadan Fast

Idd el-Hajj 
the Feast of the Pilgrimage, Sacrificial Feast

ihram 
1) state of ritual consecration of the Mecca pilgrim; 
2) seamless white garments of the pilgrim

ijma’ 
consensus of the authorities in a legal question

ijtihad 
independent judgment in a legal or theological question

‘illa 
cause, reason underlying particular logical arguments

IM 
international moon sighting; one crescent sighting 
anywhere in the world should be sufficient for all Muslims 
everywhere to start a new lunar month

IPC 
Islamic Propagation Centre, Dar es Salaam; publishes 
educational material and the newspaper an-Nuur

iqama 
second call to the salat in the mosque, indicating the 
imminent beginning of the prayer
jamvi  plaited floor mat

jihad  religious duty, spiritual or physical battle against non-Muslims, exertion

jinn  invisible beings, created by God, that interfere with human lives

Ka’ba  near-cubic stone structure in Mecca, focus of some ‘umra and hajj rituals. Nowadays enclosed within the Great Mosque

kadhi  Islamic judge

kafara  reparation, expiation, atonements distributed to the poor or the jinn; sacrifice made to avert evil

kafir  irreligious, unbeliever, atheist

kanzu  long sleeved outer garment of men

k(h)anga  bright coloured printed cloth with sayings and proverbs in Swahili, worn by women

khalifa  deputy, successor, caliph

khitma  reading of certain Qur’anic passages and prayers on festive occasions or a funeral

khutba  sermon, public address, lecture

kilemba  cloth worn as a wrapper round the head; turban

kisimamo  ‘standing’ on mount Arafa; most important part of the hajj taking place on the 9th Dhulhija; also called wuquf or waqf

kofia  cap, often white and embroidered

LM  local moon sighting; the start of a new month depends on the sighting of the moon in a restricted area

maandazi  (the singular form of the word andazi is hardly used) doughnut-like type of sweet bread; confectionery, pastry

madrasa  religious school sometimes connected to a mosque, offering a twelve grade course or part of it. Most common synonym in Swahili is chuo (pl. vyuo).

makruh  reprehensible (one of the five moral judgments of human behaviour in Islamic Law)

manasik  guidebooks for pilgrims

matali  ‘horizons’, referring to the different times of rising and setting of the sun and moon due to the different geographical position; ittihad al-matali (the whole
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>globe as one horizon</td>
<td>refers to the IM point of view and advocates a single Idd celebration for the whole world;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ikhtilaf al-matali</td>
<td>acknowledges differences of time in ritual performance (the LM point of view)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matanga</td>
<td>formal mourning period lasting from three or four to ten days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mawlid</td>
<td>celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, also metonymically used for the songs and poems performed on that occasion and at any festive time like birth, marriage or the purchase of a new car</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mihadhara</td>
<td>(pl.) religious gatherings, often public, usually on the differences between Islam and Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mufti</td>
<td>scholar who issues fatwas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mujtahid</td>
<td>scholar applying ijtihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mustahhab</td>
<td>recommendable, one of the five moral judgments of human behaviour in Islamic Law; Omission of a mustahhab act is not punished by God, but performance is rewarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mutawwif</td>
<td>pilgrim’s guide in Mecca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mwalimu</td>
<td>learned man, teacher, usually Qur’anschool teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niya</td>
<td>intention, purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pilau</td>
<td>rice cooked with spices and meat; common Idd dish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qiyas</td>
<td>deduction by analogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qunut</td>
<td>(lit. obedience to God), special prayer containing the Arabic words which can be translated as ‘protect me from the evil you have decreed’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>abbreviation of Arabic radhi Allah ‘anha/’anhu/’anhum with the meaning may God be pleased with her/him/them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rai</td>
<td>subjective opinion, decision based on one's individual judgement (not on Qur'an and Sunna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rak’a</td>
<td>lit. bending but also indicating a a sub-cycle of the prayer consisting of genuflection, prostrations and bending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ruqya</td>
<td>healing from spirit possession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sadaka</td>
<td>alms, ritual offering, sacrifice, gift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sahaba</td>
<td>(pl: masahaba) contemporaneous of the prophet Muhammad; following generation is called mutabi’un (successors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salat</td>
<td>daily ritual prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAW</td>
<td>abbreviation of the Arabic eulogy sala Allah ‘alayhi wa salam, written after the name of Muhammad, with the approximate meaning of ‘God bless him and grant him salvation’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shahada</td>
<td>testimony, Muslim creed ‘there is no god but God and Muhammad is his messenger’, first pillar of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shamba</td>
<td>small farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharia</td>
<td>body of Islamic Law; in Swahili discourse also ‘law’ in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sharif</td>
<td>respected, esteemed person; title of the descendants of Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sheikh</td>
<td>influential person, teacher, elder, chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shirk</td>
<td>polytheism, idolatry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siku ya Mwaka</td>
<td>Day of the Year, celebration of the Swahili solar New Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sira</td>
<td>the biography of Muhammad; also taught as school subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sunna</td>
<td>usage sanctioned by tradition; Muhammad’s sayings and doings established as legally binding precedents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sura</td>
<td>one of the 114 chapters in the Qur’an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWT</td>
<td>(Arabic: subhana wa ta’ala, God be praised and exalted); written and pronounced after mentioning the name of God (Mwenyezi Mungu, Allah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tafsir</td>
<td>commentary, especially on the Qur’an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taghut</td>
<td>false god, seducer; in Swahili context usually political leaders who rule by laws other than the law sent down by God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>takbir</td>
<td>exclamation ‘Allahu akbar’ (God is great)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tahlii</td>
<td>exclamation ‘la ilaha ilal Allah’ (there is no god but God)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>talbiyya</td>
<td>exclamation ‘labbaika allahuma labbaika’ (Yes here I am O Lord. There is no partner for Thee. Verily the Praise and Bounties are thine and the dominion is thine); chanted by pilgrims during the hajj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAMTA</td>
<td>Tanzania Muslim Teachers Association, Tanga based society linked to the large Shamsiyya mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tarawih</td>
<td>long Ramadan prayer after the final daily salat (‘isha’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tasmiya</td>
<td>‘naming’; = basmala (use of the formula bismillah)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TMHT  Tanzania Muslim Hajj Trust

ua  courtyard

ubani  incense

udhiyya  animal sacrifice as part of the Islamic Sacrificial Feast (‘id al-adha)

umma  world wide Islamic community of the faithful

umra  Lesser Pilgrimage or minor hajj, which, unlike the hajj proper, need not be performed at a particular time of the year

utani  joking relationship between certain relatives or social groups

wajib  required, obligatory, but slightly less than fard

wuquf  (see kisimamo)

zafa  ritual procession often to a tomb or shrine; also protest demonstration

zakat  religious tax, ‘tithe’

ziyara  visit; in the context of the pilgrimage a visit to historical sites and mosques; also ziyara al-qubur (visit to shrines or tombs of saints)
Acknowledgements

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Some stylistic idiosyncracies

The system of transcribing foreign words used in this book reflects the inconsistent and flexible way in which Swahili Muslims deal with this issue. Not only scholars but also non-Muslim Swahili native speakers have severe difficulties with the spelling of Arabic loan words. It took a long time before a participant in the scholarly discussion of the sentence “msada wa kidini kwa mahujaji” (www.linguistlist.org) ‘discovered’ that the word mahujaji contained the Arabic word hujaj (pilgrims).

In most cases I keep as close as possible to the most common Swahili way of transcribing Arabic words. I therefore do not use diacriticals: for example instead of dhū al-hijjdja (one of the Islamic months) I use the spelling Dhu hilija; the word for Islamic festival known in English as Eid (Arabic ‘id), I transcribe according to the most common Swahili form Idd. The living Swahili Dictionary, ‘the Kamusi project’ (www.cis.yale.edu/swahili) proved to be a useful tool in verifying current meanings and orthography of Swahili expressions.

In some cases I deviated from this self-chosen system in order to increase readability for a larger audience. Arabic words which have found their way into common English dictionaries, I spelled according to the English rules of orthography: for example sheikh instead of shaykh or shehe. Also a word like mawlid (celebration of the Prophet’s birthday) is better recognised in this spelling than the Swahili form maulidi. Also I write umma (Islamic community) rather than the Swahili umati; Qur’an instead of the Swahili Kurani. The letter ‘ayn in the middle of a word is transcribed by Swahili writers by a duplication of the next vowel (jum’a becomes Ijumaa). In well known Islamic words I kept the apostrophe (as in rak’a and Ka’ba). If the ‘ayn is the first or final letter it is omitted in the transcription (Arafa instead of ‘Arafa, tamattu instead of tamattu’). I preferred to pluralise words according to the English rules rather than Swahili or Arabic (hence the plural of madrasa in this book is madrasas instead of madaris [Arabic] or madrasa [both singular and plural in Swahili]).

In the case of the Arabic kh sound (as in khalifa) which is usually represented by h in Swahili words, I choose the Arabic version for the sake of clarity. Following the Swahili spelling often leads to misleading etymologies as Landberg (1977:377) shows when she derives the word tahlii (chanting the creed ‘la ilaha illa Allah’) from the Arabic khalil (bosom friend, lover). As the Madan/Johnson Swahili-English dictionary writes: “… the kh sound is often used by persons imitating or influenced by Arabic pronunciation, and
sometimes in words in which it never existed” (s.v. *kh*), for example *kharamu* (Arabic: *haram*). Sometimes a deliberate distinction is made between the two spellings: *khutba* (religious sermon) is used next to the common Swahili derivation *hotuba* (secular speech, public lecture).

Furthermore I omitted the transcription of the final *ta marbuta* in most words (*umra* instead of ‘*umrah*) except very common words like *salat*. For the same reason I do not follow the common Swahili way of adding a letter to distinguish between Arabic sounds: instead of *swala* (prayer) I have chosen the better known *salat* and substituted *tahara* (purity) for the Swahili spelling *twahara* or *tohara*. Double consonants in Arabic words (as in *kaffara* or *zaffa*) have been spelled with single letters (*kafara* and *zafa*).

With regard to names I follow orthographic self-presentation of authors. If more than one spelling exist (which is often the case as may be illustrated by the name of a famous Zanzibar preacher Bacho/Bachoo/Bachu and Bachu), I chose a single consistent spelling throughout the text. I use the personal names Allah and God interchangeably.

All dates are according to the Common Era, if otherwise the year is followed by H. (Hijri). For a Hijri-Gregorian conversion or the other way round the reader may wish to consult one of the many tools available on the internet such as www.islamicfinder.org.

If not otherwise stated, all hadith translations are from the MSA USC Hadith Database (http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/searchhadith.html). For most Qur’an translation I preferred the rendering of Yusuf Ali, the most common English translation available in Tanzania.

References to secondary sources are according to the author-date system, but because a substantial number of my primary sources is anonymous and without bibliographic details I choose to refer to them in footnotes with the name of the author (if available), a full title and no date of publication.
Figure 1: Tanga, Tanzania and neighbouring countries in Africa.

COURTESY OF MARIA FLORIJN
INTRODUCTIONS
1. Introduction

1. The social relevance of Idd el-Hajj

Maryamu is a strong, capable woman in her late twenties who was born and raised in the Tanga region of the east coast of Africa (Figure 1). Her Wittiness makes her everyone’s favourite companion in the yard. Friends and neighbours often ask her to plait their hair in fancy patterns. Her lively four year-old daughter Saida was born of a pre-marital relationship.

In 2000, Maryamu married a long-distance bus driver with whom she had a son in 2001. While she belongs to one of the autochthonous ethnic Tanga groups, her husband is an ‘Arab’. Apart from their different ethnic backgrounds, both spouses held differing opinions on religion and religious behaviour. Maryamu’s husband wanted her to wear a scarf in the courtyard, while before her marriage she always worked bareheaded. Maryamu was very fond of Saida and allowed her a great deal of freedom, but when her stepfather was at home she was often severely beaten as part of a ‘proper Islamic education’.

The birth of Maryamu’s son made things even more complicated. Due to her extreme poverty, personal relationships with other tenants living in the same house as her were essential. During her pregnancy, Maryamu used to be alone for long periods when her husband was on the road. She would not have been able to afford all of the necessities for her delivery without a financial loan from a neighbouring Christian couple. When she finally delivered a sound baby boy her husband was not present, but when he returned in November 2001, he named her son Osama. Maryamu was quick to hide her embarrassment and explained the meaning as “Arabic for lion, brave man”. Her husband, however, made clear that the reference was to Osama bin Laden, the personal hero whose image he proudly wears on his clothes.
Maryamu looked forward to the social festivities (arobaini) held on the fortieth day following her son’s birth, as are common in Swahili cultures. Again, however, her husband had some surprises for her: these ‘arobaini’ celebrations were obviously not Islamic, as he concluded after making some enquiries at the mosque. For this reason, the only activity Maryamu could expect was her family-in-law’s visit and the recitation of some incomprehensible Arabic prayers.

One morning, a few weeks later, on the last day of the fasting month of Ramadan, Maryamu and Saida left their room in holiday dress. While Saida was cheerful and exuberant, showing off her new dress, Maryamu apparently felt awkward. All of the women in the yard, busy with washing and preparing the next day’s holiday celebration, saw her new garments and greeted Maryamu with the common holiday greeting “Idd mubarak” (blessed Idd) which she responded to with “ma’al-fa’izin” (with victories). All of the women silently understood Maryamu’s awkward position, understanding that she would have liked to celebrate the Idd together with the majority of the Tanga, one day later. They also interpreted Maryamu’s behaviour as reflecting her acceptance of her husband’s opinion, rather than as her own choice. A few months later, Maryamu also celebrated the second major Islamic holiday, the Idd el-Hajj, one day ahead of the other families in the house. By that time she appeared to be more confident and could explain some of the theological reasons behind these variable dates.

This book is about the relationship between Islamic text, ritual practice and social identity as exemplified by a variety of discourses surrounding the annual Islamic Sacrificial Feast. Maryamu’s case shows some of the social implications of Islamic ritual behaviour in an urban Tanzanian context, which is the main subject of this study. Her story emphasises the complex emotional background of the rituals discussed in this book, the importance of social identity, and of overlapping loyalties towards different people and groups. For example, a wife’s obedience and respect for her husband coexists with her sense of belonging to another social or ethnic group. It also makes clear that although most of the discussions regarding Islamic rituals are male dominated, the outcome of this discourse also affects women’s lives. The personal stories of Tanzanian women and men, acting within different structures and constraints, are the canvas on which this book’s discussions are painted. The particular opinions on the practice and significance of the Idd el-Hajj rituals described in the following pages reflect the spe-
pecific religious needs of real people. The need to belong to a social entity, an identifiable group or a moral community is centrally located amongst these religious needs.

I have written this book with people like Maryamu in mind. Even where the discussions seem to be dry and technical, they must never lack the social involvement of real human beings. Most Muslims I talked to were perfectly able to describe the meanings of the ritual discourse even if they were not always well-versed in the ritual’s intricacies themselves. Maryamu and other women and men acquired relevant knowledge of the discussions and found their own way to explain their ritual behaviour. When talking about the proper lunar date of the Idd el-Hajj, for instance, they usually put forward one or two arguments in favour or against a position, but at the same time emphasised the underlying problem of the endangered community. Just like Maryamu, most Tanga citizens would have liked to celebrate the Idd all together on the same day. These two dimensions (proper performance and the social meaning of the ritual) were almost always present in discussions. Talking about the birth of the moon and fearing the demise of the (moral) community were two sides of the same coin. The abundance of the material, both oral and written, on this issue testifies the social significance of the ritual discourse in contemporary Tanzania. Although the discourse on other elements of the Idd el-Hajj (such as the choice of animal or the place of sacrifice) often lacked the same intensity so characteristic of the moon sighting discussions, its relevance for real people was always in the foreground. Rather than being understood as an elitist discourse limited to the well educated, most of the topics treated in this book can be (and have been) discussed with market women, bus drivers and schoolboys.

2. **A general overview of the Idd el-Hajj in Tanga**

The Idd el-Hajj is the local celebration of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). Every year, the hajj takes place from the 8th until the 12th Dhul-hija, and the Idd festival is celebrated on the 10th of that lunar month. On the Idd el-Hajj in Tanga, at between 7.00 and 8.00 a.m., people (mostly men) flock to the mosque or the prayer-field. From the early morning onwards, mosque speakers and pedestrians alike shout or mumble the festival takbir formula specifically associated with the Idd el-Hajj: “Allahu akbar, la ilaha ilallah” (God is great, there is no god but God). Most of the believers arrive early at the prayer venue, often more than an hour before prayer itself is due to start. After the short salat (prayer), the sermon (khutba) is pronounced.
the whole congregation remains seated. Apart from the Arabic introduction and some Arabic supplications at the end, most of the Tanga mosques have at least some Swahili content in their Idd el-Hajj sermon. References to the Qur’anic sacrificial story regarding prophet Ibrahim, his wife Hajar and their son Ismail are also common. The congregation hears how Ibrahim received a divine dream in which he slaughtered his son, about the satanic attempts to obstruct the prophet’s obedience, and of the final heavenly interruption and the acceptance of an animal substitute. Another important element in these holiday sermons is the drawing of boundaries: who belongs to Islam and who does not, what kind of behaviour makes one acceptable to God and which acts result in the believer’s displacement from the fold of Islam. Another of the sermon’s topics is the correct date of the celebration. The simultaneous observance of the holiday alongside pilgrims in Mecca, or observance according to the local lunar date, becomes an important marker of social identity.

Apart from prayers and sermons, the final textually mandated ritual act on the Idd is the animal sacrifice. Although theoretically the slaughtering can, and should, take place immediately after the salat, private sacrifices more frequently only occur after the khutba. Very few people leave after the salat, and believers apparently perceive both the festival prayer and the sermon as an integrated whole. Some groups in Tanga sacrifice a few animals in public immediately after the khutba, but most of the designated sacrificial animals are slaughtered privately or in the abattoir sometime between 8.30 and 9.30 a.m. However, if people sacrifice more than one animal (often chickens, in addition to a ‘real’ sacrifice), they slaughter the first one early in the morning in order to have a meal ready when the men come back from the mosque. It is difficult to prepare breakfast using meat from the sacrificial animal if it is slaughtered after the salat or the khutba, because time is often too short to both kill and dress the animal and prepare the food. Although there is a significant correlation between the day people pray and sacrifice, a relatively large group has disjointed the two practices, with sacrifices occurring a few hours (and sometimes even one day) earlier in order to have the meat ready for breakfast. The textual warning that such an animal sacrifice is ‘invalid’ and that the improper timing turns it into a mere sadaka (charity, gift) is often taken for granted, given that the ritual itself is already interpreted to be a sadaka. Here, text gives way to other considerations.

Many people fast on the morning of Idd el-Hajj, and some do so in conscious obedience to a prophetic custom. Most people do not find this fasting particularly demanding since they usually wouldn’t have breakfast.
before 9.00 or 10.00 a.m. in any case. Women start preparations for this luxurious holiday breakfast the day before by making the dough for *maandazi* (doughnuts) and *chapati* (pancakes). Not all men return home after visiting the mosque or prayer-field, but may go to have their breakfast elsewhere. These exclusively male gatherings can take place in *madrasas* (Qur’anic schools) or on the mosque premises. It is only after attending this ritual breakfast that these men return to their other chores, including slaughtering on command. At this time, the house is still extremely busy with women preparing dishes. When a man is invited to do the sacrifice as well as additional praying and incense-burning for deceased family members, he enters this female domain but stays only for as little time as possible.

Only after lunch do women get ready to wash themselves, change into their festive clothes, wash the dishes and go out. More elaborate tasks like dying hands and feet with henna have been completed a day or a couple of days before. The afternoon is used for visiting friends and family, sitting outside or attending games. Often, these proposed visits are not particularly successful given that people are extremely mobile on the Idd day. Sitting outside my communal house meant seeing lots of people entering and greeting each other, asking “Is Mrs. X at home?” When responded to in the negative, the visitors would leave. At the end of the afternoon people return home, their children tired and crying. The next day (*Idd pili*) lacks most of the festive flavour of the first Idd (*Idd mosi*). It continues to be a national holiday, but all except civil servants gradually return to work.

3. **Islam, authoritative texts, ritual practices and social identities**

a. **Local and global Islamic discourses**

Although the primary intention of this study is not to offer a contribution to the debate regarding the complex relations between local, global and ‘glocal’ entities, Islamic ritual cannot be fully understood without an in-depth awareness of the tensions which exist between universal and particular ‘Islams’. The question of how we should study the Idd el-Hajj, is basically a question about the nature of Islamic (ritual) practice. Such practice can be explained either as the expression of a global Muslim community and as based on the widely spread Arabic authoritative texts, or as a very particular local celebration which mainly reflects cultural foci. From the global or universal perspective, the Idd el-Hajj as practised in the Tanzanian town
of Tanga is not aberrant or strikingly different from those Sacrificial Feasts practised elsewhere in the Muslim world. The Idd el-Hajj is the Swahili indication of a common Islamic holiday called in Arabic ‘id al-adha (Sacrificial Feast) or ‘id al-kabir (Major Feast). The three most conspicuous elements of this calendrical holiday are widespread in most Islamic communities, being, firstly, a short ten-minute ritual prayer; secondly, a sermon by a preacher; and thirdly, the killing of an animal.

In fact, this is the perspective of most of the Tanga citizens I spoke to. I vividly remember my first acquaintance with one of the major madrasas (religious schools) in Tanga. After asking whether it would be possible for me to discuss the meaning and practice of the Idd el-Hajj with students in several grades, I was offered a tour by a graduate student. During two days I ‘participated’ in all the classes, and upon my arrival every teacher was instructed to devote 15 minutes to reading a classical Arabic text on ‘sacrifice’, ‘slaughtering’, and the ‘Sacrificial Feast’. The image of the Idd el-Hajj presented in this way reflected an unchanging core of essential doctrines, only modified by increasingly complex glosses in the higher grades. After this tour I was no longer welcome in class because the subject had been treated ad fundum, according to the director.

This essentialised image is also the interpretation offered by Orientalists who perceive Islam to be a theological, scriptural system that, following its formative period in the first three centuries, has never changed (cf. Tayob 1999:5). This timeless and rigidly structured set of beliefs and practices can penetrate local culture and can start to colonise it. The Idd el-Hajj is, in this perspective, the result of such a successful penetration. Indeed, those details that do not exactly correspond with ‘correct’ textual prescription indicate the particular transitional phase of ‘Islamisation’. The final stage of this process is imagined as a complete similarity between text and practice. With reference to East Africa, such analyses have been offered by Tringham (1964) and Bunger (1972). From this viewpoint, Islam is an alien body and a foreign entity that can be ‘applied to’ the existing local culture. A title like Anderson’s Islamic Law in Africa (1954) reveals this perspective. Even an eminent scholar like Lazarus-Yafeh is biased by this text-centred approach when she writes: “It seems that whereas in Judaism festivals and the calendar have almost become the touchstone determining a dissident sect, Islam treated and still treats the whole subject of the calendar rather casually…” (Lazarus-Yafeh 1981:46). While her conclusion seems to be justified if we only read Islamic texts, talking to Muslims reveals a different picture as will become clear in the following chapters of this book.
A second approach towards Islamic practices takes its starting point in local phenomena and tries to relate them to local and historical contingencies. Applying such a perspective to the Tanga context would result in a book stressing the ‘local’ and ‘Swahili’ elements in the Idd el-Hajj, for example the meals prepared and held in honour of a family’s ancestors and incense-burning in the days before the Idd. The local culture approach assumes that major differences exist between Muslim cultures and describes Islam as a plural phenomenon (Manger 1999; el-Zein 1977). This perspective can even lead to an increasingly localised nomenclature based on nationality, topography or ethnicity like ‘African Islam’, ‘Black Islam’, ‘Moroccan Islam’ or ‘Swahili Islam’ (Westerlund and Evers Rosander 1997; Hock 1987; Soares 2000). While the ‘global’ approach often deals with real texts, the local study of Islam uses oral sources and metaphorical, behavioral texts. Often, global Islamic discourses and texts appear to be absent from the local society, individuals and behaviour which are described by the anthropologists adopting this particular perspective. For instance, Konaté and Touré’s study of the role of sacrifices in Ivorian towns makes hardly any reference to Islamic ideas, beliefs or interpretative paradigms (Konaté and Touré 1990:63-70).

Both of the aforementioned approaches are equally unsatisfactory since they cannot explain why, in certain times and places, a particular ritual takes on a particular form and meaning. The Tanzanian Idd el-Hajj certainly has similarities with other Sacrificial Festivals elsewhere in the Muslim world but it cannot be reduced to an exponent of a single, timeless essential Islamic practice. Failed attempts to pray the festival prayer on the Idd el-Hajj together on the same prayer-fields (as favoured by the Islamic schools of jurisprudence) cannot be explained without reference to a long tradition of friction between the several Tanga madrasas. On the other hand, local practices are influenced by global discourses, and Tanzanians do read Arabic authoritative texts that influence their (ritual) practice. For instance, the large Tanzanian expatriate labour force in the Gulf states frequently contacts their families in Africa to inform them when the new moon is sighted in Saudi Arabia, and thus influences the discourse regarding when the new moon starts in Tanzania as well. Both conformity to the text and multiple forms of local divergence from texts must be explained, and even a superficial conformity to the text cannot be taken to prove textual primacy. Sometimes a practice is apparently derived from a global Islamic textual norm, but the time or manner of influence may not be discovered (Soares 2000: 281). During my fieldwork I came across a woman who provided me with an astonishingly lucid, almost learned, explanation on the legal differences between the con-
sumption of pork and alcohol from the Islamic point of view. Whereas the woman had not had the benefit of any religious education, her argument was very close to what I heard later in a higher-level madrasa discussion. As an anthropologist I can do nothing other than mention these two facts, and wonder about a possible connection between them.

The global and the local approaches to analysing, interpreting and understanding Islamic (ritual) practice have hardly been integrated in academia. Apparently, anthropology of Islam is dominated by non-Muslim and/or non-Arabic-speakers having hardly any access to Arabic textual discourse. Philologists may have the necessary Arabic-language skills but often lack the knowledge to grasp the interpretative discourse in relevant vernacular languages. In this study I will investigate both realms: the universals and the particulars, as mediated by local discourses. The textual production, dissemination and interpretation of Arabic and Swahili texts are essential in order to understand the interface between textual authority and ritual practice. For East Africa, and especially Tanzania, this task is relatively easy because Swahili is increasingly many Muslims' first language and also the lingua franca of Islamic interpretative discourses. However, despite the fact that Swahili is promoted as the symbol of one homogeneous national identity, the language as it is used by Muslim Tanzanians and as it is printed in the kind of Islamic texts this research is based on, often reflects different ideologies and critical views on the secular nation-state.

This book offers an ethnographic account of discourses on the Islamic Idd el-Hajj. I argue that the Idd el-Hajj is neither just an exponent of a universal, textually mandated, ‘canonical’ Islamic ritual, nor a typical case of local, traditional and orally transmitted Swahili custom. Rather, it is the outcome of a complex interaction between local and trans-local discourses. The book is therefore not about text or ritual in the first place, but rather gives primacy to human beings who perform, discuss and interpret rituals and texts. The Tanzanian Idd el-Hajj is part of ongoing discursive traditions that define the centres and peripheries of imagined communities (Asad 1986; Anderson 2002). It is, for instance, not a foregone conclusion that the centre of Islam is in Saudi Arabia, even if the subject of the Idd el-Hajj is closely linked to that place. This book shows the ways in which some Tanzanian groups discursively ground their Idd el-Hajj community in different places.

To overcome false dichotomies between universals and particulars, I pay equal attention to texts and discourses as I do to the social and ritual practices of the Idd el-Hajj. These aspects are illustrated by the title “raise your voices and kill your animals.” The title refers to a saying attributed to the
prophet Muhammad in which a believer asks the Messenger of God what the best ritual is. The prophet answers in rhyme: “al-`ajju wa al-thajju” (shouting and killing). According to the most common exegesis, the first part refers to the formula that pilgrims shout during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (the hajj). During this five-day visit to the sacred sites on the Arabian Peninsula, the pilgrims continuously shout “labbaika, allahuma labbaika” (At your service, O Lord). While the expression is quite archaic and not completely clear, I have taken the liberty of using the term ‘shouting,’ in the general sense of discourse: reflective, exegetical and sometimes aggressive assertions of the proper meaning and significance of an Islamic ritual. I treat this discourse as any ethnographic phenomenon: embedded in a social context and only meaningful for human actors. The second term of the title, ‘killing,’ is equally ambiguous. It refers to the ritual animal sacrifice on the Idd el-Hajj, concluding the pilgrimage in Mecca but also celebrated all over the world in Islamic communities. A second connotation of ‘killing’ is found in the allusion to a wider discourse in Tanzania on the marginalisation of Muslims in society. One of the major bones of contention is the violent clash between police and Muslims near the Mwembechai mosque in 1998. At that time, several people were killed, and subsequent commemorations of the event also resulted in bloodshed. Whenever the Tanzanian state is discussed in relation to Muslim affairs, the killing of Muslims by a non-Muslim government remains an important issue. It need not surprise us that the Idd el-Hajj and the animal sacrifice are ideal situations to discursively link both acts of killing.

The performance of ritual is often described by theorists as lacking any discursive reflection (Lightstone 1995:31; Platvoet 1995:36). However, most Islamic rituals consist of at least some kind of conjoined myth/ritual in which verbal discursive reflection in the form of sermons or edification also takes place as part of the ritual performance. Fasting, circumcision, sacrifice and giving alms are often immediately ‘explained’ in concomitant sermons in which the significance of the practice is constructed in close conjunction with the ritual itself. It is misleading to look for ‘pure’ ritual, in contradistinction to this ritual mixture of discourse and practice (some parts of Smith’s theory [1992] hint at this dichotomy). The sermon in the Idd el-Hajj often provides quite a bit of reflection and discursive explanation. However, most of the discourse takes place before and after the ritual itself. In this study I approach discourse as a process, a debate taking place in several layers of society both among highly educated religious experts and among lay people. The lingua franca is mainly Swahili and that opens the floor for
many more participants than Arabic alone would have allowed. Discourse is a structuring device attempting to create order, rather than the structure or order itself. It is one of the tools that human beings like Maryamu use to make sense of the predicaments of daily life.

Plate 1: Idd el-Hajj sacrifice Tanga, 2002

b. Text and ritual

Without attempting to summarise the vast literature on ritual, I will now highlight two aspects of ritual theory that are especially noteworthy in this study: ritual rules and ritual as identity marker. No ritual theorist has overlooked the importance of regulations and prescriptions in ritual performance. However, it is not necessary to assume that God-given, hard and fast rules exist independently of human actors and participants. What is most important, rather, is the assumption that these rules exist and actually matter in the ideal situation. The question of whether these regulations have a direct influence on behaviour is not always relevant:

Even when neither observers nor participants can agree on, understand, or even perceive ritual regulations, they are united by a sense of the occasion as being in some way rule-governed and as necessarily so in order to be complete, efficacious, and proper. (Parkin 1992:15)
Most of these rules regarding Islamic ritual at one time or another appear in writing and print, and thus become an object of study in the discourses surrounding Islamic ritual. Amongst other things, these rules provide important spatio-temporal frameworks (Douglas 2002; Smith 1992; Platvoet 1995). When and where one is to perform a ritual conveys important messages and makes participants and others aware of particular social and religious facts. However, while rules for Islamic rituals might appear to be fixed, in reality these allow for considerable fluidity in interpretation. How texts influence (ritual) practice remains a complex phenomenon. Until the last fifteen years or so, contemporary Islamic ‘orthodox’ rituals like the salat (prayer), Ramadan fasting and the Sacrificial Feast were neglected by scholars of Islam or left to philologists and historians. In the Orientalist and philological perspective of a rigid, timeless and unchanging Islam dominated by fixed texts, the contemporary performance of these rituals in modern societies were not perceived to be interesting, because, in their opinion, the rituals had not changed after the formative period of Islam (the first three centuries). After that era, the scientific consensus was that the doors of free interpretation (ijtihad) had closed and blind imitation (taqlid) had taken over. Despite the fact that philological studies focusing on the early Islamic period show how these texts reflect a changing ritual practice, the idea of a fossilised Islam based on monolithic rituals took root (cf. Chelhod 1955; Goitein 1966; Goldziher 1890; Graf 1959; Kister 1980; Lech 1979; Mittwoch 1913; Rubin 1987; Wensinck 1914). However, the reality of this closure of the ‘doors of ijtihad’ must be questioned and it is very likely that the process of interpretation has never stopped (Hallaq 1984). In fact, my book shows how ijtihad is practised on a daily basis in the Swahili internet-fora, as well as in the newspapers and on the street-corners of the town of Tanga itself.

Anthropologists who have studied Muslims and their rituals have tended to focus on ‘aberrant’ and ‘deviant’ local practices, like rites of passage, visits to tombs and shrines, and the mystical recitation of God’s name by Sufi groups, rather than on the ‘orthodox’ textual rituals (Graham 1983:56-57). Fortunately, this negligence has changed in the past years with the completion of studies on sermons (Gaffney 1994), communal prayers (Bowen 1989; Parkin and Headley 2000), and also on the hajj and the Muslim sacrifice (see chapter 2). These studies demonstrate the problematic relationship that exists between ritual and texts, often indicated by the absence of such a connection due to the authors not explicitly addressing this question. For example, on the one hand, Ramadan fasting in Morocco is described from the local perspective as being “based on fasting precepts derived from two
On the other hand, however, the process of interpreting these same precepts and the nature of textual influence are considered to be irrelevant (ibid.). Equally, while Lambek (1993) eloquently describes Islamic discourses in Mayotte (East Africa), and also gives ample attention to local perceptions of Muslim prayers and social activities, he excludes a discussion of the discourses surrounding ‘text based rituals.’ The two Islamic sacrificial practices (the *akika* after child birth, and the *Idd el-Hajj*) are passed over respectively in four lines and one paragraph (Lambek 1993:56,116-117).

On the other hand, many researchers give primacy to texts as independent factors rather than focusing to human beings and their agency. “Of course, in Islamic society, myth and ritual are highly conventionalized expressions of the orthodox texts and practices,” Lindholm claims (1998:817). Virolle (1999:183) uses Ghazzali (who died in 1111) as proof of a particular analysis of current Berber sacrifices. Scholarly studies of the Sacrificial Feast in Morocco, Egypt and France (described in chapter 2) heavily rely on global texts without making clear what the local relevance of these texts is. Rather, the way people deal with texts, the nature of textual authority and the diverse influences of text on ritual behaviour and identity often remain obscured. Far from being integrated, the global, philological or universal approach and the local, sociological or particular methodology remain separated to a large extent.

I will give two examples of writers who produced a static relationship between text and ritual practice. Although I find Woodward’s subtle analysis of the Javanese ritual meal *slametan* (1988) quite convincing, his attempt to transcend the normative/popular distinction of Islamic ritual via a more complex typology is not particularly helpful for the Tanzanian context. As will become clear, the *Idd* as performed by many Tanzanian Muslims contains elements from all of his categories (universalist, essentialist, received and local Islam) and the distinction between them is often blurred. Woodward gives the *hajj* and the *Idd* celebration as examples of universalist Islam being formed by “rites specifically enjoined by universalist texts”. Yet his strong focus on the exclusive importance of textual knowledge in the interpretation of these two instances can become a barrier to seeing other aspects of the Tanzanian *Idd el-Hajj*.

Another view of the relationship between text and ritual can be found in Abu Zahra’s critique of Tapper and Tapper’s study of the *mawlid* ritual in Turkey (Abu Zahra 1992; Tapper and Tapper 1987). She observes “the absence of Islamic sources” (1992:10) in Tapper and Tapper’s analysis. Rather
than the current, local context, Abu Zahra suggests that the *mawlid* poems should be analysed in relation to the first specimen that was written during the Prophet’s lifetime. Abu Zahra is interested in the “distinction between what is Islamic and therefore common to all Muslim communities, and what is not Islamic and may be peculiar to Turkey” (1992:11). According to Abu Zahra, Islamic beliefs embodied in texts penetrate popular culture (ibid.:28) but can still be discriminated from their contexts. Like Woodward (although much more extreme) Abu Zahra can distinguish a kernel of “Islamic traditions … common to all Muslims regardless of the national economic policy of their government” (ibid.:23).

This study is an attempt to go beyond these dichotomies and describe the local discourses from the point of textual authority and ritual practice. Despite the neat separation of the terms as they are presented here, in reality the relationship between discourse, ritual and identity is multilayered and quite complex. Discourse reflects, discusses and helps re-create ritual experiences. The *hajj* is a good example. Pilgrims’ experiences alongside not only the meanings of the rituals performed in Saudi Arabia, but also the proper performance and the right spiritual disposition, have all shaped a rich *hajj* discourse in Tanzania. At the same time, however, this discourse is used as a preparation for would-be pilgrims and therefore arranges certain mindsets and expectations for this holy journey and influences the *hajj* experiences themselves. The actual performance of the *hajj* is to a high degree dominated by the Saudi Arabian ideas of what proper *hajj* behaviour entails. Where this powerful enforcement of ‘proper’ interpretation of texts fails, new rituals can emerge from the confrontations between authoritative text, local discourse and the need for ritual expression. In order to explore this phenomenon, in chapter 11 I describe a political demonstration held on the Day of Arafa (one day before the Idd el-Hajj). On this occasion, the spontaneous performance of a ritual was neither limited by texts, nor prescribed by them, but even so neatly tapped into the local discourse on the *hajj* and the social meanings of the *hajj* rituals.

Ritual can be the direct result of the reading of a particular text and the acceptance of a particular interpretation of that text. Muslims who performed an *akika* ritual after birth rather than the more common local rituals completed after death, were apparently inspired by textual prescriptions. In other cases, however, I found that people felt themselves constrained by texts rather than stimulated by them. Maryamu, in the case mentioned above, wanted to have a ‘proper’ *arobaini* ritual forty days after the birth of her son, but her husband first wanted to check at the mosque to confirm
what kind of Islamic regulations applied to that situation. The result could be interpreted as a quite meagre and impoverished performance (this was Maryamu’s view), but perhaps her family in law gained satisfaction from obeying the ‘proper’ rules.

What then is the nature of textual authority? People can and do use texts, but their behaviour is not (always) reduced to a text. As a reader of the Swahili newspapers remarked in his letter to one of the papers: “Only if Botha’s behaviour should be attributed to the Bible then Idi Amin’s conduct is caused by the Qur’an.” As many philologists and anthropologists admit, textual authority is never absolute. The normativity of Islamic Law as discussed by Islamic scholars is much more complex than the above-mentioned cases show (Masud 2002; Abou El Fadl 2001:30-69). Looking for some essential core elements of Islamic rituals in religious texts does not appear to be so interesting to the aforementioned Islamic scholars. For example a Tanga student wrote on one of my questionnaires about the sacrificial akika ritual: “the religious akika ritual follows the Book of the Qur’an in its performance”. The student himself would not be particularly surprised to hear that, in ‘fact,’ the akika ritual has no Qur’anic basis at all. However, that does not make his statement false or untrue.

Indeed, when it comes to translating Qur’anic authority into practical guidelines, power, politics and a multitude of other factors come in (Lambek 1990). Earlier studies have shown that the elements shared among (lay and expert) participants in a ritual are considerably fewer than anthropologists assumed (Fernandez 1965; Swartz 1991:20, 138-139; Lambek 1993). As stressed by Parkin (1992:15), this sharing is not essential for an effective ritual. What they do share are more general notions like the absolute authority of the text, the importance of the social and religious unity, etc.. It is often assumed that in literate societies rituals are less amenable to change (Barnes 1999:263), but this certainly does not imply that their significance and practice are fixed and homogeneous.

Central to this book are the contestation, construction, and discussion of the meanings of Islamic rituals and the way these rituals transform the social communities involved. The social organisation of knowledge in a particular setting is, in my opinion, more relevant to the meaning of the ritual than the corpus of texts themselves. The focus on Arabic jurisprudence suggests that there is only one knowledge-system, while in fact several systems co-exist. For example, Islamic fiqh is relatively silent on the date of the Idd holiday, and in discussions Tanzanians also refer to modern science, common sense and other forms of knowledge (including emotion
and bodily experience). In a continuous interaction, these systems compete, and some come to carry more weight than others (Parkin 1995). In Tanzania, one of the main arenas for this competition is the vernacular press. In these newspapers, books and pamphlets a highly democratised public writes and discusses Islamic behaviour, moral codes and political points of view.

c. Ritual and social identities

Against the theoretical background sketched above, I approach Islamic ritual as fluid and capable of change, despite the constraints of authoritative texts. Because of this flexible character, texts can be used to construct rituals in order to meet local concerns, to express cultural foci and bolster social identities. When text is no longer perceived as the rigid charter that people submit their identity to, the academic arena is open to interrogate the interface between text, ritual and identity. The potential of ritual to ground, construct, support and transform the identities of individuals and social entities is mentioned by many scholars. The naming rituals of children are an important example of how a society attempts to impart a certain identity on a newborn (Cohen 1995). Nation-states express and construct a national identity via common symbols and rituals. Often these rituals are both inclusive (stressing unity and solidarity ad intra) and exclusive (underlining differences and drawing boundaries ad extra) (Platvoet 1995:36; Lightstone 1995:30-31). My conceptualisation of ritual is close to the Durkheimian school, in so far as ritual is perceived as reflecting (some aspects of) moral communities. Nonetheless, the data presented in this book emphasises more conflict, change and inequality than Durkheim did. Instead of focusing on dichotomies (sacred/profane, text/practice, global/local) this study asks how and why ritual reflects different moral communities and social order. I agree with Launay’s conclusion to his study on Islamic ritual in a West African town: “Questions about Islam are questions about the nature of communities and of their relationship to how individuals define their own identities and those of their neighbours.” (1992:229)

To understand the Idd el-Hajj in all its different forms, Arabic text is important as far as people acknowledge its significance and/or act upon this normative text. While books, pamphlets and newspapers all present discursive reflections on rituals like the Idd el-Hajj (for instance regarding the time and place of performance as well as other details), the motivation for particular ritual choices often lies in the notion of identity (cf. the contributions in Platvoet and Van der Toorn 1995). People deliberately change, adapt and construct new forms of ritual behaviour in order to express, construct
and adapt their social identity. Identity is by definition plural: all social actors have more than one social identity. Being a woman, a Digo, a Christian or an ex-slave are not exclusive identities but may refer to the same person. In different (ritual) settings the actor may underline a particular identity. In this sense, hegemony in discourse is achieved via processes of inclusion and exclusion. The authoritative status of Arabic texts can be achieved by devaluing other forms of non-authoritative knowledge like intuition or experience. To claim a particular identity works in the same way: other identity markers must be downplayed, and you distance yourself from them (Cohen 1995:120). Such dynamics are essential when new, emerging groups go to great lengths to distinguish themselves in order to create their own identity.

One of many ways to underline a particular identity (or set of identities) is by way of (public) ritual. In relation to non-canonical or recent Islamic rituals lacking an elaborate validation of ‘orthodox’ text, this flexible adaptation to local identities has been established by many studies. The mawlid performances along the Swahili coast are good examples. Celebrating the Prophet’s birthday in their own way was one of the “new ritual practices to open doors to economic and social opportunity” for former Zanzibar slaves, according to Fair (2001:267). Further, in Lamu and in other Swahili communities, different kinds of mawlids are performed by different social strata and simultaneously form occasions for rivalry, competition and self-representative communication (Lienhardt 1959; Bunger 1972:162; el-Zein 1974:109,124 passim; Boyd 1981 passim). This is not different in Tanga, as Landberg (1977) and Constantin (1983) have observed. In these different rituals, ceremonies do not reflect a homogeneous and ideal society but rather, tensions and competition are always present within a single ritual celebration (Launay 1992:212).

Other ritualised forms of behaviour used to construct social identity, and to include and/or exclude other people, often depend on the specific usage of language, particular greetings, myths and nomenclature. For instance, Loimeier (forthcoming) mentions a discussion between Zanzibari men regarding the question of whether a non-Muslim was allowed to greet Muslims with the Arabic “as-salaam alaykum.” The Shirazi myth of origin and narratives of conquests were used by Swahili patricians to distinguish them from other social strata (Glassman 1994:146). Using Arabic or a non-Arabic language can be an important marker for a particular discourse in or outside the mosque (cf. Wiegers 1995). Most of the polemics in Tanzania are conducted in Swahili, while Arabic is reserved for some of the most heated inter-factional debates. This apparently serves as an important exclusive fac-
tor, claiming an élite religious identity and showing off the debaters’ language skills. Names are perceived as powerful indicators of religious identity in Tanzania. Indeed, changing one’s names in case of conversion is more or less expected, although the use of the new name only slowly becomes known. Although religion is not included in the national statistics, conclusions about religious affiliation (for example the relation between religion and crime) are based on name records.

Other ways by which it is possible to express one’s adherence to a group or to claim a particular social or religious identity involve physical appearance, including variations in dress, hair and body marks. Slaves in Zanzibar were forbidden to wear particular clothes (Fair 2001:266). The Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) in Tanga and affiliated groups are strict in cutting their trousers above their ankles. Growing a wild beard and bearing a trimmed moustache are also important expressions of belonging to the true followers of the Prophet. ‘To grow a beard’ (kufuga ndevu) is a popular theme in reformist discourse. Islamic headgear can be laden with meaning (Van Koningsveld 1995) and donning the wrong one has led to physical violence in Tanzania. Tai na suti ya kizungu (tie and western suit) are contrasted to the proper Islamic clothes kofia, kilemba and kanzu. Some Christians object to wearing kanzus to a Christian funeral, or at least during the supreme moment of filling the grave with soil. Muslims feel that a musician wearing a kofia, kanzu and a western jacket on top (i.e. the normal Muslim dress on festive occasions) while singing non-Muslim songs is a hypocrite. The calluses on a Muslim’s head and feet caused by the specific prayer postures point towards a pious behaviour and therefore contribute to a particular social and religious identity (Purpura 2000:124).

These few examples taken from a much wider field will suffice to show how ritual can be strategically used to construct and define social identities. With Cohen (1995), I believe that these rituals, or the powerful actors behind these rituals (such as he chairman of a mosque, a nation-state, a father), never totally determine the identity of any human being (like a believer, a citizen, a child). Rather, in the complex interaction of structures (mosques, nations, families, textual canon), actors (individual agents or social groups) and events (ritual performance, discursive structuring), there is no monopoly assigned to any of these three components. In this book the process will be central rather than the outcome.

The important question is when ritual behaviour starts to carry particular meanings. When do people feel the need to mark their boundaries through distinctive rituals? One such instance is when religious communi-
ties emerge and the old legacy must be transformed into new myths and rituals. The early history of Islam reveals this process, admirably documented by Kister (especially Kister 1989), but in fact it never stopped. Of course, a consensus regarding the legitimacy or authenticity of the two major Islamic feasts, the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj, more or less exists. Thereafter, any claim to a particular social or religious identity must be phrased in a very subtle manner, leaving the authoritative core texts unharmed. The nascent 19th century Ahmadiyya movement started to number the verses in their translation of the Qur’an differently from the mainstream Islamic groups. In the sacrificial myth, the Ahmadiyya stress the figure of Ismail more than other Islamic groups do, obviously to distinguish the different Christian and Islamic religious genealogies. They also vehemently attack Christian rituals like Christmas, probably because of the perceived similarities between Christianity and Ahmadiyya Islam.

Ritual distinction may also be desirable in the case of a social minority wishing to distance itself from a powerful majority. Throughout the feast discourse, the warning voices of Islamic preachers stress the importance of being different from, and rejecting, the attitudes espoused by the corrupt West. A magazine produced by the Kenyan Islamic Foundation states, with reference to the important lesson of the sacrificial feast:

It is the commandment of God to assume the distinctive appearance of Muslims and pious people and to adopt Islamic culture and to desist from resembling and aping the unbelievers.14

The discourse on beards, moustaches and male clothes is loaded with warnings not to resemble the unbelievers (makkāfiri) nor be like women (kutojifananisha na wanawake). In the following chapters we will encounter many such arguments which are meant to define Islamic identity by virtue of its difference from other Muslims, Christians and westerners.

d. A working definition of ritual

My position regarding the academic problems outlined above (the primacy of local discourse, the flexible relation between text and ritual, and the potential of ritual to express communal identity), directed my attention to a definition of ritual emphasising these aspects. Fernandez defines rituals as: “the acting out of metaphoric predications upon inchoate pronouns which are in need of movement” (1968:23). Whereas I do not claim this definition fits all rituals, it is very useful in the analysis of the Idd el-Hajj.
In the first place this definition explicitly connects ritual and identity. I argue in this thesis that it is partly the need for a cultural, communal identity (“inchoate pronouns which are in need of movement”) that is fulfilled by the Idd el-Hajj. Because the ritual is connected to the global phenomenon of the hajj to Mecca, the image of the worldwide Muslim umma is omnipresent in the festival. Within the current social and political context of Tanzania dominated by a pervasive sense of marginalisation (“inchoateness”), Muslims use differences in the ritual form of the Idd el-Hajj to express different conceptualisations of Islamic identity. Not surprisingly in the turbulent period of the 1990s the ‘global’ images offered by the hajj and the Idd el-Hajj were embraced as a means to transcend the constraints of more locally defined identities. In terms of Fernandez (1986: 205-206): “Particularly in times of stress – where literal routines break down and where we are constrained by false or moribund categories – do we turn to figurative language and the argument of images for a wider and more transcendent view of things.”

In the second place Fernandez definition of ritual draws a parallel between the way literary imagery works and how ritual creates its images. This is particular useful in the case of Islamic ritual in which language, texts and tropes play important roles. Muslims consult, legitimate or delegitimate texts not only to find the real, ‘true’ form of the ritual but also to underscore their choice of particular images. I do not doubt the sincerity, piety and the religiosity of the believers handling these texts. However, despite the fact that quite a few details of the Idd el-Hajj seem to be unmoveable and located in an authoritative corpus of received texts, people sometimes also accommodate their ritual behaviour to local and personal needs regardless these texts. It is through associative images derived from other domains of social and bodily experience that ritual actually empowers actors and transforms the social world (Fernandez 1986:28-62; Bell 1997:72-79). Whereas a particular ritual act like sacrifice may be derived from a textual source, the performative metaphor underlying this image can be different according to the contexts. Sacrificial metaphors we will encounter in this book like “animal is Muslim community” point towards the imagery of martyrdom and victimhood. But the metaphor “animal is immoral conduct” connects the ritual killing to a completely different domain and defines the Muslim as one who purifies his heart. And “animal is enemy of Islam” describes the significance of sacrifice as an outright call to defend religion and attack its opponents. As we will see in this study, texts and textually transmitted paradigms offer excellent possibilities for these performative associations. Islamic ritual and the discussions on this topic are influenced by the cultural domain of Arabic.


'RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS'

authoritative texts, the cultural sphere that Fernandez calls ‘quality space’. The use of a literary model, based on the working of language allows us to look for ‘predications’: how metaphors and metonyms create connections between ‘subjects’ (e.g. in this case: social groups) and ‘predicates’. These subjects are ‘inchoate’, not yet defined or properly developed, and rituals are able to give these pronouns identity through predication. Changes in the ritual metaphors will also create changes in social identity.

In the third place Fernandez definition can (partly) explain why the Islamic Idd el-Hajj sacrifice has been neglected in anthropological research. In most works on Islamic ritual the relation between acts, symbols and their objects is described as primarily conventional: initially based on arbitrary convention but after the formative period of Islam fossilised in a textual canon. For this reason sacrifice by Muslims is often perceived as a mere formality, an empty shell. The few studies who explicitly address the way (Islamic) sacrifice ‘works,’ either explicitly or implicitly assume that in sacrificial rites the existential connection between the body of the animal and the social or physical body of the actors are paramount (cf. Combs-Schilling 1989:36-45). "[…] Sharing a victims' flesh puts participants in existential relation with the victim ("connected with it as a matter of a fact"), and with one another” (Jay 1992:6). However, the complex relationship between symbol and significance cannot be reduced to a single connection. Just like other rituals several connections between symbolic action and its meaning are closely intertwined as Ruel (1987) shows in his analysis of two East African rites. For example the significance of the Muslim prayer (salat) is not primarily conventional or existential but often shows iconic features: it does not symbolise its object but exhibits it like a map. The neat rows, the gender separation, the orientation towards Mecca all exhibit their object: the ideal community in worship (cf. Bowen 1989). Failure to distinguish the different metaphors within an ‘orthodox’ ritual resulted in scholarly neglect.

A final reason why Fernandez ideas are useful is in because he explicitly addresses rituals of literate communities. In contrast to for example structuralists who were mostly interested in myths and rituals of non-literate people. Rituals in Fernandez descriptions are not based on neat syntactical blueprints but rather full of contradiction and continuously moving. Whereas ritual in his theory is mainly performative, non-ritual discourse applying the same linguistic predications is primarily persuasive and expressive. The discourses surrounding the Idd el-Hajj, using different metaphors and metonyms to express different conceptualisations of Islamic identity are enacted and performed in the ritual. Looking at ritual from this dual per-
spective (expressive and performative) enables us to understand the Idd el-Hajj discourses as establishing metaphorical and metonymical relationships in order to transform the community as well as the individual believers. A major advantage from this approach is that discursive and non-discursive elements of rituals can be analysed in the same analytical framework. While for example most practice theoreticians are interested in symbolic discourses of daily activities, they usually neglect ritual behaviour (Combs-Schilling 1989:34-36; Bell 1997:76-79). But by only focusing on ritual, one tends to neglect the powerful role of discourse in Islamic ceremonies. In my opinion both lenses to look at social and religious reality must be combined. A discursive topic like the Islamic sermon, treated as a symbol that receives its meaning within the wider contexts of mosques, imams and interpretative traditions is in this hermeneutic structure equal to the more dramatic and less discursive symbols like animal sacrifice (cf. Gaffney 1994 and Tayob 1999 as good examples).

4. Research, questions and methodology

This thesis’ guiding question is: “how do Muslim groups construct identity through ritual practices and discourses related to the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania”. The three major parameters within which I approach the Idd el-Hajj are text, ritual and identity. This book centres on the politics of an ‘orthodox’ Islamic ritual in a local context. It describes meaningful differences between practices and ideas and relates them to the construction of social identity. The study questions the connection between textually transmitted ritual prescriptions and the dynamics of social practices. The discourses regarding these events cover a wide array of social and religious issues. My intention throughout this study is to give a voice to the local Muslim Swahili discourse on the Idd el-Hajj. I take this discourse on face value: for example, it is not my task to interrogate Muslims’ claims that the Tanzanian community’s existence is threatened by Christian and Western forces. Nor do I deny counterclaims of suppression by other strata of Tanzanian society, such as the Christians on Zanzibar. What I do examine in this book is how different groups portray the image of the ideal Muslim community as reflected in the Idd el-Hajj.

Each of the three concepts (text, ritual, identity) is approached through a set of questions. Firstly, I am interested in the role played by authoritative texts in the performance and discourse on the Idd el-Hajj. Which texts are used and by whom? How do Tanzanian Muslims refer to Islamic texts? Do
people follow textual ‘rules’ and, if so, through which domains is this conformity revealed? What is the nature of this textual authority? How is textual knowledge on ritual organised and reproduced? What language and media are used to bridge the gap between text and ritual?

The second term (ritual practice) is descriptive and limited to the questions: when, where, who, what and how. I primarily deal with the temporal and spatial parameters of the festival. The discourses on the time of the Idd (what is the proper date of the Festival) differ because of the local differences in the visibility of the moon. The spatial framework of the Idd refers to the relationship with the *hājj* in Mecca and the local festivities in Tanga and Tanzania. Is there a meaningful relationship between the two and how is this constructed? What is the practice, and is it distinctive from the discourse?

Finally, the third issue (social identity) links the text and practice and is approached through the question: why do people perform a particular ritual the way they do? How does this practice, or refraining from practice, affect their sense of belonging to a particular moral community? Is there a connection between general self-representative material produced by the group and their particular points of view on the Idd el-Hajj? How is their opinion of this particular ritual related to their view of other social phenomena? How are differences in performance based on texts, and how do these differences deviate from texts, and how are these differences used to create distinctive imagined communities? Further, how does this imagined community relate to other communities (the nation-state, for example)?

The major tools used when answering these questions are textual analysis of primary material, interviews and participant observation. My initial acquaintance with the field dates from early 2000 when I conducted a four week pilot-study devoted to the collection of Islamic literature in Kenya and Tanzania (Van de Bruinhorst 2001). My first period of extended fieldwork took place from October 2000 to April 2001, followed by a final period from October 2001 until June 2002. I spent the majority of my time there living in the town of Tanga, where I rented a room on the 20th street. During May and June 2002, I lived in one of the villages to the north of Tanga.

The analysis presented in this book is based on six different sources. Firstly, whilst in the field I collected a substantial amount of written sources: pamphlets, books, magazines and newspapers. In particular, the more than thousand copies of 19 different Swahili Muslim newspapers and magazines provide important material on Islamic discourses. I only refer to my collection of more than 2000 non-Muslim newspapers when the Muslim sources...
explicitly refer to them. The older newspapers (my first issue of Mapenzi ya Mungu was published in 1962) are especially useful in providing some idea of change and historical development. This collection is representative of the written Islamic Swahili discourse produced in the last fifteen years.

I collected oral material in the form of video and audiotapes. As both are sold in the public domain, their importance goes beyond the personal recordings of an anthropologist. When sermons and religious discussions are taped and turned into commodities, this appears to indicate that the topics have some relationship with real, human interests.

These collections formed the background for the interviews I completed during my 13 months of fieldwork, which is my third source. I conducted more than 150 interviews ranging from very informal (without making notes) to extremely formal (interviewee behind a desk flanked by secondary members of staff and pupils). The format was mostly semi-structured (with a topic list), and about half of the talks were recorded on tape. During the research cycle of questions, data gathering, analysis and new questions, the topic list continued to change. I obtained important insights at a late stage of interviewing (for example, that people used different methods for the dating of Ramadan and Idd el-Hajj), revealing the lacunae of earlier conversations. Initially I met most of my informants through visits to mosques and madrasas and these informants were mostly from amongst the learned and educated population. At a later stage I also approached people I came to know through neighbours and friends, and these interviewees represent other social classes, immigrants, manual labourers and merchants. More than the tapes and the printed sources, these interviews focused on real behaviour and discursive reflection. Important elements in the talks were the recollections of sacrificial practices (what did you slaughter this year during the Idd el-Hajj?).

A fourth source is data collected during participant observation. I observed and participated in Idd celebrations, I audited classes in three schools (for approximately 50 hours), observed the sacrificial practices of seven abattoirs in Dar es Salaam and Tanga (both urban and rural), and attended about 45 regular reading-group sessions held in AMYC mosques. I obtained permission to audit classes in both madrasas and secondary schools thanks to the co-operation of the staff. This provided me with important background regarding the transmission of Islamic knowledge in formal education.

In an attempt to obtain some more structured data, I constructed a questionnaire (see Appendix I) which I distributed among pupils from six
secondary schools and one madrasa. This fifth source is an excellent tool since the Idd el-Hajj is only performed once a year and the possibility of direct observation is therefore limited. However a serious caveat must be kept in mind whenever I refer to this questionnaire: the situation where students filled in the questions was far from ideal. I had to use the classroom situation where pupils often discussed questions with peers and the teacher sometimes introduced the questionnaire as “an examination” (inti-han). Nonetheless, I feel that most of the conclusions drawn from this questionnaire are sufficiently substantiated by at least two other sources. The questionnaire also provided information on ethnic and demographic background as related to (ideas on) sacrificial practice.

Finally, in order to establish some historical depth to my study I consulted archival sources from Dar es Salaam and Tanga. I especially looked for the interface between government and Islamic rituals in the past: how the state was involved in ‘Muhammadan slaughtering’, facilitated the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and was invited to mawlid celebrations, but also how the police invaded mosques and reacted to Muslim complaints. The archival texts provided some essential insights regarding the question of how Muslims and their rituals participated in the nascent imagined community of Tanganyika/Tanzania. The material is biased in favour of national, usually non-Muslim institutions.

In general, I met quite a lot of mistrust and caution, especially after the US September 2001 attacks. Due to a tactical error on my contact’s behalf, in one village I was asked to move on to another place “because since they did not know me I might even have AIDS.” All contacts had to be made directly and in a personal fashion and often took considerable time to establish. Attempts to collect pilgrims’ social/biographical data through hajj organisations were obstructed by bureaucratic delaying techniques. Trying to come into contact with people who performed the akika ritual was ultimately unsuccessful, but took up a considerable amount of time. While private and government clinics were very helpful, and I succeeded in getting into contact with Islamic parents who had delivered and planned to celebrate an akika ritual after birth, none of these contacts resulted in my being able to observe the ritual itself. Finally, a woman took pity on me and told me the possible reason behind the refusals: parents did not like to talk about something they perceived as a funeral ritual (instead of a birth ritual) as they were afraid that this would harm the baby and might even cause her death. To repair this gap I conducted 49 interviews with Digo elderly men regarding the akika ritual. Another Islamic sacrificial event I would have
liked to witness is the New Year’s day (siku ya mwaka) usually called ‘sadaka la mjii’ in the villages in the Tanga region. Here also, my only data come from interviews. I describe both of these rituals in chapter 5 to provide a comparison with the Idd el-Hajj. The primary language which I used whilst conducting interviews was Swahili, followed by English and, rarely, Arabic. For interviews with Wadigo I had to rely on a Swahili interpreter, although the original Digo tapes are available for further analysis.

The relevance of this study lies in the inclusion of written sources as well as the social context in which they function. In a difficult field where most actors are aware of the negative repercussions of their expressions, newspapers, pamphlets and video/audio material in the public domain are essential information and provide a good preparation for interviews. Due to the wealth of available written sources it might seem that oral information and personal experiences of live actors are secondary. However, this is certainly not the case. Although the embeddedness of the ritual in political, social and economical environment is not always as clear as I would have liked it, I would like to emphasise that this study is not a study of texts but of human beings using texts, interpreting and thinking about them. A real weakness is the male bias in all of the sources, including the questionnaire. Female voices are almost excluded and this certainly warrants new research on this topic.

5. The organisation of the book

As I intend to give equal attention to Islamic texts and Islamic practices within global and local discourses, the introductory section to this book is (unfortunately) extensive. In chapter 2 I begin by introducing the reader to the global framework of the Idd el-Hajj. How do Muslims refer to the Qur’an and the body of prophetic recordings (hadith) in order to provide an authoritative base for the Sacrificial Feast? Further, what is the relationship between the general theories on ritual sacrifice and the Islamic Idd el-Hajj? To illustrate these findings I provide an overview of three monographs on the Idd from Morocco, Egypt and France.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 move the topic from the global to the local level. The facts and history of the political, social, economic and religious arena of Tanga and Tanzania are presented in chapter 3. Beyond the bare facts, I also present the discourse of the threatened Muslim minority against the powerful Christian state. Local texts, their production, dissemination and reading are described in chapter 4. I also briefly describe the relevance of the
academic orality/literacy debate for the Tanzanian context. Chapter 5 has a comparative quality. The basic characteristics of the Idd el-Hajj (sacrifice, prayers and sermons) are compared with two other local and regional rituals: a lifecycle and a New Years’/crisis ritual. I argue that rather than assuming that the central element in the Idd el-Hajj is the ritual killing of an animal, it is the discourse regarding this sacrificial practice, and the construction of imagined moral communities through ritual, that should be the basis for comparison.

The core of this book consists of three parts: time (part II), place (part III) and chronotope (part IV). Following Denny’s advice on the need for more attention to be paid to Islamic ritual, to “texts and contexts,” and to “spatio-temporal dimensions and orientations of Islam for purposes of better understanding Islamic symbolism as it is understood from within” (Denny 1985:71), I decided to make time and space this research’s two major sub-questions. To describe the particular time/space quality present in the Idd el-Hajj I have borrowed the term chronotope from Mikhail Bakhtin who applies it to “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (1990:84). The two parts of the word, ‘chronos’ (time) and ‘topos’ (place), lead to a meaning close to the term ‘timespace.’ To describe the Idd el-Hajj rituals as chronotopes allows us to see creative connections between the time and place of performance. I do not explore the theoretical and linguistic details of the term in this book.

In part II (chapters 6, 7 and 8) I pay ample attention to the time frame of the Idd el-Hajj. Chapter 6 shows how the reckoning of time is interwoven with socio-political issues and power. The assumption that an ‘orthodox’ ritual like the Idd el-Hajj is dominated by a hegemonic Islamic calendar is only valid to a certain degree. It is true that all Muslims accept the temporal calendrical revolution of the Prophet Muhammad who removed the intercalary month Nasi’ and made the ritual calendar a purely lunar one. Nonetheless, the Swahili also have a solar year with its own ritual pace. Further, even if there is agreement on the calendar in relation to the date of the Idd el-Hajj, its place in the national calendar as a public national holiday is far from uncontested. Time as a sociocultural concept (Zerubavel 1981; James & Mills 2005) is neither given, nor unequivocally derived from some sacred text, but is rather constructed in a highly sensitive sociopolitical arena. When the boundaries between ‘normal time’ and ‘Idd time’ become blurred, the existence of the moral community itself becomes endangered.

This is illustrated by the choice of a particular holiday date, dependent on the sighting of the new moon. Is it necessary to wait for the moon to
appear in Saudi Arabia or does a local moon sighting suffice? This choice is often a very emotional and personal one, and has important social consequences. The vast amount of recent written and oral discourse on the topic is summarised in chapter 7. This chapter is the most ‘textual’ one, paradoxically because the topic is not treated in Qur’an and only very succinctly in the earliest prophetic traditions. The need for textual guidance is painfully present. Praying the Idd prayer is perceived as the joining of a particular imagined temporal community, often phrased by the preacher in his sermon as “today we join our brethren in…”.

I describe this construction of four imagined temporal communities in chapter 8. For all Tanzanian national citizens to celebrate the Idd el-Hajj on the same day might be attractive for some, but for others, the nation-state is a horrible reminder of the colonial unbelievers who drew its borders. A second option, joining the world community of believers and harmonising the day of the Idd el-Hajj with the hajj itself, is a powerful alternative. However, for many Muslims the connection with the important hajj event at Arafa is stained by the political influence of Saudi Arabia and its ‘Wahhabism.’ The different Idd dates in Tanzania fuel the continuous discussions about the lack of a central Muslim authority. I describe these discussions in contrast to a third temporal imagined community, that of the Ahmadiyya who follow a central leader in determining their Idd date. Finally, the chapter deals with the problematic character of local custom. Several Tanga madrasas have developed a special method to find the correct Idd day and they base this decision on Shafi‘i custom.

The simultaneous performance of the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania and the hajj in Mecca leads us to ask whether, and why, this synchronising is important or not. Further, however, I also take into account the phenomenon of concomitant festivals, those holidays which tend to be performed immediately after or preceding the Idd. This phenomenon has been described in the Moroccan context by Hammoudi (1993). The author argues that as the bacchanalian masquerade follows the Idd el-Hajj, neither festival can be properly understood unless analysed together as complementary systems of meaning. I make a similar argument when I analyse a political protest demonstration held in Dar es Salaam in 2001, one day before the Idd el-Hajj. In both cases, the linkage between the Idd el-Hajj and another festival is obvious, although the exact meaning of the connection is more complex.

Space is the focus of part III (chapters 9, 10, 11). As Muslim authors on the five pillars of Islam often stress, time is much more important for the effectiveness of the ritual than place. However, there is one exception: the
Together with the increasing awareness of the wider global Islamic community, the local consciousness of what happens during the hajj is also greater than ever. Together with Fernandez (1986:28-70), I believe that ritual actions and metaphoric expressions enable human beings to move themselves through “quality space”. However, more so than Fernandez, I wanted to emphasise the construction of this quality space by ritual. It is therefore essential to examine the connection between the hajj and the Idd el-Hajj.

In chapter 9, the facts ranging from the preparation to the performance of the pilgrimage are described. Often, less than a thousand Tanzanians go on hajj in a given year (which is quite a small proportion compared with the absolute numbers of Muslim Tanzanians). Several of them go more than once and that means that, for the majority of the Muslim Tanzanian population, the hajj is far beyond reach. The accusation that the Tanzanian hajj is just a tourist trip for a few wealthy Muslims may have a kernel of truth.

When it comes to the meaning of the hajj (chapter 10), two major strands of interpretation emerge in Swahili discourse: one focusing on purification and healing, and the other zooming in on empowerment and battle. In the light of the temporal contest described in part II, it is understandable that the marginalised and politically sensitive groups of Muslims greatly favour the empowerment and battle metaphors rather than the symbolism of healing and purification. However, these discourses differ and regularly change with the agendas of the different groups.

In chapter 11 the argument moves closer to the Tanzanian field and the performance of real rituals when the historical paradigms of three major Islamic sites (Badr, Arafat, and Mina) are compared with actual contemporary Tanzanian rituals. All three sites provide powerful symbols for a marginalised community: Badr as the battlefield of the first martyrs, Arafat reverberating with the prophet’s farewell sermon and Mina as the place of the primordial sacrifice. Just like time, the notion of place is also thickly covered with multiple layers and is continuously (re)constructed. Sacrificial paradigms like the prophet Ibrahim’s willingness to slay his son Ismail (usually located at Mina) can easily be discarded in favour of the mountain Arafat and its connection with Muhammad’s farewell sermon. The tendency for ritual to merge and blend sacred sites with mythical and historical events makes them excellent carriers of local meanings. This happened in March 2001, when the Day of Arafat was used to re-enact the Arafat ritual as part of the hajj but also turned it into a political demonstration against the government and against the vicious clashes which had taken place one month before. The follow-
ing Idd el-Hajj sermons easily borrowed meanings from the Arafa sermon of the prophet, linked them to the sacrificial idiom and turned the feast into a political image of a victimised community.

Part IV (chapters 12, 13, 14) deals with the actual performance of the Idd el-Hajj in Tanga. All chapters are clustered around the idea of chronotope: the Idd el-Hajj as a constructive process meant to draw the boundaries of a moral community by creating particular ‘time spaces.’ References to real time, historical time and mythical time result in differently perceived and performed rituals. The prayer (salat) and sermon (khutba) of the different groups are presented in chapter 12. The choice of the liturgical place (mosque or field), the sacrificial place (field or home) and the associations between sacred sites and other places are constituent elements in the final form and meaning of the ritual. In the sermons, the community’s boundaries are phrased as the limitations of behaviour: the Idd day foreshadows the day of judgement and that should heighten the awareness of holiness and moral purity. However, the sermons described in this chapter also raise the question of identification figures. For men and boys it is easy to see morally attractive examples in the heroic behaviour of prophet Ibrahim and his son Ismail. For women however the role of Ibrahim’s wife Hajar is much less clear. The Qur’an is silent about her words and actions and therefore tradition and local culture are necessary to represent her to the female listeners as the obedient, submissive wife. The sermons show that the reproduction of the moral community is closely linked to the behaviour of women.

Chapter 13 presents the visual image of the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice: what is the implication of slaughtering at home, on the field or at the abattoir for the image of the moral community? Is the sacrifice the ‘grand moment’ of the ritual or is it only secondary? Who are the sacrificers who perform the rituals and what does that mean for the ritual itself? Is it a re-enactment of Ibrahim’s sacrifice, an intimate family affair, or just an exchange of favours and commodities?

Finally, in chapter 14, the animal and its role as a basic template for the Islamic community take a central position. Are the Idd animals “good to think with” or is the choice just a result of contingencies? The slaying seems to be very much influenced by texts but the social significance is not very important. On the other hand, meat distribution and the discourse on commensality can easily turn into important markers of social identity. In the concluding chapter I return to the initial questions on text, ritual and identity.
2. Introduction to the Literature

1. The Idd el-Hajj, the hajj, and sacrifice in the Qur’an and Sunna

In this chapter we explore three literary sources, each of which provides us with a different angle for the study of the Idd el-Hajj. To start with, we examine the Qur’an, hadith and Muslim interpretative reports in order to explore the possibilities and limitations of using these authoritative texts to legitimate the Sacrificial Feast. In the second part we turn to scholarly works on sacrifice, and examine the ways in which Islamic sacrifice is perceived there. The works of historians of religion and philologists are of particular importance in this section. In the final part of this chapter, a discussion of three ethnographic monographs on the Idd el-Hajj in Morocco, France and Egypt will indicate the extent to which this book’s questions (the relationship between text, ritual and identity) have been addressed by anthropologists.

a. The Qur’an and the Idd el-Hajj

Most Tanzanian Muslims experience the Idd el-Hajj as a festival authorised by the Qur’an. Such a claim can mean three different things: a) the Qur’an literally prescribes the Idd el-Hajj; b) the Idd el-Hajj is joined to the hajj, which is itself a Qur’anic imperative; c) the Idd el-Hajj is a re-enactment of Ibrahim’s sacrifice described in the Qur’an.

The first statement (the Qur’an literally prescribes the Idd el-Hajj) is derived from a single, unclear verse: Q 108:2 “So pray to your Lord and sacrifice (fa-anhar).” The Arabic verb n-h-r (derived from the word for upper portion of the chest, hence also slaughtering) is employed here and is read by most Muslims as a reference to the yaum al-nahr (Day of Immolation), a common expression for the Idd el-Hajj. Whereas most Muslims and western scholars alike uncritically accept this evidence or do not wish to question it (Brisebarre 1999:96), some others doubt the historical veracity of this assup-
motion that fa-anhar is a reference to the Day of Immolation (Peters 1994:365; Luxenberg 2004:308). Further, many Muslim (as opposed to western) scholars find this evidence unacceptable. The major problem for believers is that the verse appears in a Meccan sura, which is too early to be connected with what is commonly accepted to have been the later introduction of the Idd el-Hajj. It would imply that God had ordered Muslims to participate in a pagan sacrificial rite long before it had been Islamised!

Four other loci in the Qur’an are used to legitimate current ideas on sacrifice. Words related to the stem q-r-b (to approach) appear in connection with animal sacrifice (e.g. 3:172; 5:27). The second text is especially important because it is related to the animal sacrifice of Habil, the son of Adam. Although the Qur’an itself is silent about the details and significance of this sacrifice, Muslim interpreters have indicated this verse as the first direct reference to the later practice of the Idd el-Hajj. Ibn Kathir (ca. 701/1300-774/1373) explains that Habil’s ram was received by God, preserved in paradise and again lowered to Earth during Ibrahim’s trial, before finally being slaughtered again. Thus, the link between the first sacrifice and the Idd el-Hajj is established by later commentators rather than by the Qur’an itself. A second word cluster (dh-b-h; to cut, to slaughter) is used in relation with a heifer slaughtered by the prophet Musa (2:71), sacrifices to the idols (5:3) and the animal given as a substitute for Ibrahim’s son (37:107). A third word (h-d-y; to bring, to guide) explicitly refers to animal sacrifices in the context of the rituals near the Meccan sanctuary. However, this offering is sent only as a compensation for those pilgrims who are not able to partake in the rituals themselves. Instead of sacrificing at home (as is done in the Idd el-Hajj), the hady underlines the importance of the Ka’ba and the rites performed there. Q 5:2 makes explicit that these animals are sacred and that killing them violates a taboo:

O ye who believe! Violate not the sanctity of the symbols of Allah, nor of the sacred month, nor of the animals brought for sacrifice (al-hady), nor the garlands that mark out such animals, nor the people resorting to the sacred house, seeking of the bounty and good pleasure of their Lord.

A final word which can have the connotation of sacrifice is mansak (pl: manasik or nusuk) which also appears in the descriptions of the hajj (2:196; 22:34, 67). However, the most common explanation of this word is ‘religious rite’, ‘worship’, or ‘expiatory sacrifice’ to pay for certain transgressions (but see Lech 1979:166).
To conclude: there is no definitive rule in the Qur’an prescribing the obligation to sacrifice or to celebrate the Idd el-Hajj. However, the quotations above also show the acceptance of the ancient *hajj* and its related sacrificial rites by the young Muslim community.

b. The Qur’an and the hajj

When Muslims claim that the Idd el-Hajj is a Qur’anic-based ritual this can also signify that the Idd el-Hajj is perceived as being intimately connected to the *hajj*, which is indeed a Qur’anic imperative. Several Qur’anic statements command the *hajj* and a whole chapter is named after the pilgrimage (Q 22). Among scholars there is no serious discussion about its religious status. The *hajj* is presented as part of the ‘*din Ibrahim*’ (the religion of Ibrahim), and consists primarily of a visit to the house of God (the Ka’ba) as rebuilt by Ibrahim and Ismail. The most common references show the intimate link between Ibrahim, the Ka’ba and the *hajj*:

Q 3:
95. Say: “(Allah) speaketh the Truth: follow the religion of Abraham, the sane in faith; he was not of the Pagans.”
96. The first House (of worship) appointed for men was that at Bakka: Full of blessing and of guidance for all kinds of beings:
97. In it are Signs Manifest; (for example), the Station of Abraham; whoever enters it attains security; Pilgrimage thereto is a duty men owe to Allah,- those who can afford the journey; but if any deny faith, Allah stands not in need of any of His creatures.

Q 2:
124. And remember that Abraham was tried by his Lord with certain commands, which he fulfilled: He said: “I will make thee an Imam to the Nations.” He pleaded: “And also (Imams) from my offspring!” He answered: “But My Promise is not within the reach of evil-doers.”
125. Remember We made the House a place of assembly for men and a place of safety; and take ye the station of Abraham as a place of prayer; and We covenanted with Abraham and Isma’il, that they should sanctify My House for those who compass it round, or use it as a retreat, or bow, or prostrate themselves (therein in prayer).
126. And remember Abraham said: “My Lord, make this a City of Peace, and feed its people with fruits,-such of them as believe in Allah and the Last Day.” He said: “(Yea), and such as reject Faith,-for a while will I grant them their pleasure, but
It becomes apparent from the way in which the Qur’an deals with the hajj, that it is not a new institution but rather an ancient practice which was known to all. That the hajj festival was adopted from pre-Islamic practice is widely acknowledged among Muslims. It was therefore deemed unnecessary to describe the rituals in detail, but rather to reflect on ad-hoc questions. See, for example, the following verse (2:203):

Celebrate the praises of Allah during the Appointed Days. But if any one hastens to leave in two days, there is no blame on him, and if any one stays on, there is no blame on him, if his aim is to do right. Then fear Allah, and know that ye will surely be gathered unto Him.

In the extensive literature on the hajj this is explained as referring to the final three days of the pilgrimage (11 till 13 Dhulhija) which may be shortened to two days.

This succinct way of describing ritual obligations makes it difficult to derive current practices directly from the Qur’an. This becomes clear when we turn to the topic of sacrifice. We have already noted that the Qur’an speaks about animal sacrifice in a variety of ways, but there is no direct, unequivocal prescription regarding if and how Muslims should sacrifice their hajj-animals. The following quotations show the most explicit references to animal sacrifice within the framework of the hajj.

Q 22:28-37:
28. “That they may witness the benefits (provided) for them, and celebrate the name of Allah, through the Days appointed, over the cattle which He has provided for them (for sacrifice): then eat ye thereof and feed the distressed ones in want.
29. “Then let them complete the rites prescribed for them, perform their vows, and (again) circumambulate the Ancient House.”
30. Such (is the Pilgrimage): whoever honours the sacred rites of Allah, for him it is good in the Sight of his Lord. Lawful to you (for food in Pilgrimage) are cattle, except those mentioned to you (as exception): but shun the abomination of idols, and shun the word that is false,”
31. Being true in faith to Allah, and never assigning partners to Him: if anyone assigns partners to Allah, is as if he had fallen from heaven and been snatched up by birds, or the wind had swooped (like a bird on its prey) and thrown him into a far-distant place.

32. Such (is his state): and whoever holds in honour the symbols of Allah, (in the sacrifice of animals), such (honour) should come truly from piety of heart.

33. In them ye have benefits for a term appointed: in the end their place of sacrifice is near the Ancient House.

34. To every people did We appoint rites (of sacrifice), that they might celebrate the name of Allah over the sustenance He gave them from animals (fit for food). But your Allah is One Allah. Submit then your wills to Him (in Islam): and give thou the good news to those who humble themselves.

35. To those whose hearts when Allah is mentioned, are filled with fear, who show patient perseverance over their afflictions, keep up regular prayer, and spend (in charity) out of what We have bestowed upon them.

36. The sacrificial camels we have made for you as among the symbols from Allah. In them is (much) good for you: then pronounce the name of Allah over them as they line up (for sacrifice): when they are down on their sides (after slaughter), eat ye thereof, and feed such as (beg not but) live in contentment, and such as beg with due humility: thus have We made animals subject to you, that ye may be grateful.

37. It is not their meat nor their blood that reaches Allah. it is your piety that reaches Him: He has thus made them subject to you, that ye may glorify Allah for His Guidance to you and proclaim the good news to all who do right.

To conclude: sacrifice is among several of the pagan hajj institutions that are accepted by the young Muslim community, but they are hallowed by pronouncing the name of God and stressing the spiritual nature of the ritual.

c. The Qur’an and Ibrahim’s sacrifice

Many, if not all, Muslims find the ultimate Qur’anic base of the Idd el-Hajj rituals in the story of Ibrahim. Q 37 relates how Ibrahim is tested by God, asking him to sacrifice his son Ismail as follows:

Q 37:
102. Then, when (the son) reached (the age of) (serious) work with him, he said: “O my son! I see in vision that I offer thee in sacrifice: Now see what is thy view!” (The son) said: “O my father! Do as thou art commanded: thou wilt find me, if
Allah so wills one practising Patience and Constancy!"
103. So when they had both submitted their wills (to Allah), and he had laid him prostrate on his forehead (for sacrifice),
104. We called out to him “O Abraham!”
105. “Thou hast already fulfilled the vision!” - thus indeed do We reward those who do right.
106. For this was obviously a trial-
107. And We ransomed him with a momentous sacrifice:
108. And We left (this blessing) for him among generations (to come) in later times:
109. “Peace and salutation to Abraham!”

Despite the absence of any Qur’anic obligation to re-enact this “momentous sacrifice”, we will see how the link between the hajj, the Idd el-Hajj and Ibrahim’s trial is greatly stressed in Tanzanian sermons. Although most Muslims accept that there is no particular Qur’anic command to perform the Idd el-Hajj, others condemn the pronouncement of such statements as a sin. However, all agree that the role of the prophet Muhammad in the institutionalisation of the Idd el-Hajj must be recognised.

d. The Idd el-Hajj and the Prophet Muhammad

Two revolutionary developments changed the pagan hajj ritual into an acceptable Islamic festival. One had to do with the place, the other with the time. The spatial development from a local cult based at a sacred centre (the Meccan hajj) to a global phenomenon involving the whole Islamic community (Idd el-Hajj), and the temporal change dissolving the bond of the solar season and religious ritual, were very effective binding elements for the young community. What is crucial in these developments is that by sundering the relationship between the Mecca sanctuary and the Idd, the ritual became replicable in other locations (Smith 1992:94).

Both changes expressed a general trend towards a more spiritual significance of the hajj. When the significance of the rituals was slowly removed from the specific places of worship, sacred mountains, wells and the Ka’ba, the hajj could be transported to other places. The figure of Ibrahim probably simultaneously facilitated the new spiritual, trans-local meaning of the hajj. The assumption (most vocally expressed by Snouck Hurgronje [1880:187, passim] but see also Bell [1933]) that Ibrahim only became important after Muhammad was expelled from Mecca, has largely been discarded by most scholars (cf. Chelhod 1955:38-39; Paret 1971). The origin of the Idd el-Hajj as
either a prophetic plot to attract the Jews with an 'Abrahamic' festival or an attempt to conciliate the Meccans after Muhammad’s rupture with the Jews from Medina can historically not be proven (cf. Haarmann 1975). It is more likely that Ibrahim already functioned as a real ‘héros civilisieur’ (Grandin 1978) in pre-Islamic Mecca. However, the link between Ibrahim and the hajj, together with the changing emphasis from Isaac to Ismail in the sacrificial myth, must be dated to the Medinian period (Platti 1994:165). It is unlikely that these changes coincided with the changing nature of the hajj and sacrifice. Rather, it must have taken place sometime between the flight from Mecca and ten years later (10 H/632), when Muhammad performed his final pilgrimage.

There is no reason to doubt the traditional account that the first Idd el-Hajj took place on the 10th Dhul Hijja of the first or second year after the flight from Mecca to Medina, corresponding with 3 June 624 (Bell 1933; Mittwoch 1971; Platti 1994; Brisebarre 1999:96). One theory argues that after the battle of Badr (Ramadan 2 H.), when the sending of hady animals to Mecca became impossible as a result of the hostilities, the Prophet changed the ritual and made the animals themselves the true “symbols of Allah” (Q 22:35) instead of the visit to the Meccan sanctuary (Bell 1933). Rashed (1998:21-25) proposes that the social and psychological effects of the Badr victory supplied the necessary conditions for a new community festival to express the common identity of the Muslims from Mecca (muhajirun) and those helpers from Medina (ansaar). Spatial changes such as an Idd el-Hajj no longer dependent on the Meccan sanctuary and a new prayer direction (from Jerusalem to Mecca), together with temporal innovations like a new weekly day of congregation and the change from a solar to a lunar calendar, provided in the course of only a few years a strong social cohesion for the new religious group.

Together with the changing significance of the natural phenomena of the hajj, the original temporal framework also became obsolete. In the first place, the link between hajj and autumn festivals developed a new meaning when Muhammad introduced the lunar calendar. Throughout the variety of solar seasons, the worship of the monotheistic divinity remained the same. The other major seasonal Arab festival, the umra, had been celebrated in the spring but was eventually joined to the hajj. Both had a different spatial focus: the umra was a typical Meccan festival consisting of the ritual circumambulation around the Ka’ba and running between two sacred hills. The hajj, on the other hand, was located around the plains of Arafat (figure 2). As we will see in chapter 9 most Tanzanians still perform the two together, as
‘RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS’

is allowed in the Qur’an (2:196). The Ibrahimian model was laid over all of these distinctive rituals and provided them with a meaningful purpose.

Apart from the disconnection between agricultural and solar seasons on the one hand and the hajj rituals on the other, another temporal innovation took place in these years. The Idd on the 10th Dhulhija became known as ‘‘Id al-adha’ and that day’s sacrifice as udhiyya or dahiya, from the same root, d-h-y (to become visible, to appear). The word dahiya has a twofold meaning of forenoon and sacrifice. Although the Qur’an does not mention this word, ‘Id al-adha’ has become the most common label for the Idd el-Hajj in most parts of the Islamic world. When these hajj practices took over, the Muslim community felt the need to separate them from any unwanted pagan connotations of sun worship. It therefore became necessary to perform the prayer and the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice after sunrise, as indicated by the new name (Hames 1998:8-9). The same ritual mechanisms we see in the development of the prayer times culminate in an absolute taboo on prayer during sunrise and sunset (Rubin 1987).

The spiritualising trend visible in these spatial and temporal changes took place in the relatively short period of ten years which passed between the Flight and Muhammad’s demise. Indeed, it is not possible to pinpoint the exact time at which all of these elements were introduced. For example, it is unclear if the festival prayer (salat) had already started to be practiced in the first year of the Hijra or whether it was introduced together with the Idd el-Hajj in 2 H. (Rashed 1998:65). It remains obscure if the obligation to perform the hajj was revealed five or six years after the Hijra.⁶ In 6 H./628, Muhammad announced his plan to perform the umra that year, but he was stopped by the Meccans at the place Hudaybiyya. They promised the Prophet that he was welcome to perform the umra the next year, 7 H., which he did. In 10 H./632, the Prophet led his first and final Pilgrimage accompanied by 90,000 other believers. On the Day of Arafa, Muhammad repeated the major points of the Islamic religion in his farewell sermon (see Appendix I). He emphasised that all practices of the pre-Islamic period had been abandoned (‘under your feet’), but that the sacredness of the spatial and temporal elements from the hajj remained intact.

The short period which elapsed between the Flight from Mecca and the Prophet’s death, and the fact that Muhammad only once performed the hajj himself, suggests that the major processes of acceptance and modifications of the hajj took place during the formative period after Muhammad passed away. The authoritative collections of prophetical sayings and customs (sunan) collected and written down in the first three centuries of the
Islamic community provided the solid juridical base for the Idd el-Hajj as we know it today. The following example is from Bukhari:

I heard the Prophet (praise be upon him) delivering a sermon (khutba) saying, “The first thing to be done on this day (first day of ‘Id al-adha) is to pray; and after returning from the prayer we slaughter our sacrifices (in the name of Allah) and whoever does so, he acted according to our Sunna (traditions).”

Another extract from the Abu Dawud collection reads:

I witnessed sacrificing along with the Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) at the place of prayer. When he finished his sermon, he descended from his pulpit, and a ram was brought to him. The Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) slaughtered it with his hand, and said: In the name of Allah, Allah is Most Great. This is from me and from those who did not sacrifice from my community.

The sunan collections usually put references to the Idd el-Hajj under separate headings, such as ‘kitab al-dayaha’ (book on the hajj sacrifices) or ‘kitab al ‘idayn’ (book on the two festivals). They contain detailed prescriptions like the qualification of the animal, time and place of slaughtering, or the way the Prophet held his foot while sacrificing.

This concise survey of some scriptural sources indicates clearly that the relationship between authoritative source and practice leaves ample room for debate. It also shows that the scripturalisation of oral traditions is never the final destination of a ritual practice but rather that these texts become “objects which are part and parcel of the on-going process of religious change” (Olsson 1998:206). The diversity and polyvalence of written sources is inherent to all Muslim rituals, not only during the formative period of Islam but also in contemporary times (cf. Haarmann 1975). One of the theses which I present in this book is that the exegetical room between authoritative texts and ritual practice is used as an arena to express and define social identity. Seen from this perspective, it should not surprise us that some Muslims are able to defend animal sacrifice as part of the Idd el-Hajj, while others using the same sources claim that true Muslims should be vegetarian (cf. Foltz 2006:105-127).
2. **Theories on Islamic sacrifice**

As a result of the academic and conceptual dichotomy described in chapter 1, Islamic sacrifice was formerly squarely controlled by philologists and historians of religion, rather than anthropologists and sociologists. The majority of these academics have denied Islamic sacrifice any autonomous status as a ritual deserving to be studied on its own terms. Some even rejected the designation ‘festival’ for the Idd el-Hajj (Bell 1997:125). Therefore, it is not surprising to find a widespread reluctance to incorporate Islamic animal sacrifice in general theoretical works on sacrifice. Some authors even state that Islam does not have any ‘real’ religious sacrifice (Bousquet 1949; Grandin 1978:96; Firth 1984). Instead these authors emphasise the spiritual nature of the rituals, the visit to the sacred city, the religious disposition of the believer and, in general, the orthodoxy rather than the orthopraxy. Islamic sacrifice, in its ideal, essentialised form, is described as austere, with a strong emphasis on the spiritual value, rather than on the effectiveness of the sacrifice itself (Graham 1983; Peters 1994:368 n. 140). I agree with Platti (1994:159) that “effectivement, en Islam aussi, le sacrifice et l’effusion du sang de la victime ont été complètement marginalisés en faveur d’une réforme spirituelle”.

Some Sufi groups have taken this attitude to an extreme and perceive the sacrifice solely as the abnegation of bad habits:

Qurban [Idd el-Hajj sacrifice] is not slaughtering chickens and cows and goats. There are four hundred trillion, ten thousand beasts in the heart which must be slaughtered. They must be slaughtered in the *qalb* [heart]. After these things have been slaughtered, what is eaten can then be distinguished as either *halal* (permissible) or *haram* (forbidden). Everything that is seen in the world is *haram*. What is seen in Allah alone is *halal*. Please eat that.

In chapter 10 we encounter the same attitude expressed among Ahmadiyya authors in Tanzania, emphasising that the Idd sacrifice is meant as the immolation of the animal nature found in the human heart. In the same vein, some Shi’a innovators are willing to discard the practice of animal slaughter in favour of a more spiritual ritual. Annually on the occasion of the Idd el-Hajj, voices are heard throughout the Muslim world asking that charity substitute the animal sacrifice. That raises the question of whether something such as ‘Islamic sacrifice’ exists. In the following section we examine a few of the most important clusters of meaning, mechanisms and aspects that scholars from both fields have associated with Islamic sacrifice.
The first deals with the expulsion of or separation from evil (exclusion); and the second is based on the notion of gift-giving, joining and the creation of a meaningful bond between the human sacrificer and the divine recipient (inclusion). Both clusters of meaning can be loosely attached to the Islamic words *kafara* and *sadaka*, which are used in both Arabic and Swahili.

a. Kafara: expiation, redemption, atonement and purification

The major significance of the pre-Islamic *hajj* sacrifice (*hady*), is commonly explained as a protection, to ward off evil, to purify one from pollution or to wash away the sins of individuals or the community. It is likely that the sacrificial meanings of the *hajj* and/or the *umra* were influenced by the Jewish religion and especially by the Pesach celebration (Chelhod 1955:151). Perhaps the researchers’ choice to interpret sacrifice in this way might also be seen as a symptom of their crypto-Christianity reflecting the Judeo-Christian western heritage rather than the available data from that period (cf. Bloch 1992:29). In reality, the most common explanations of Islamic sacrifice (and other Islamic rituals) also heavily rely on Jewish practices (Dozy 1864; Snouck Hurgronje 1880; Becker 1912; Wensinck 1914; Zwemer 1916; Morgenstern 1966 to mention a few).

Evidence for the *hajj*-sacrifice as an act of separation, expiation and purification (instead of joining, communion and integration) can be found in the context of the *hajj* itself (Platti 1994:171). Within the temporal *hajj* framework, the sacrifice is one of the last rituals and takes place together with the ritual stoning of three pillars and the ritual haircut: all three of which are exit rites of expulsion, or in terms of Hubert and Mauss’s scheme: “rites of desacralisation”. It is only after this sacrifice is completed that the pilgrim can re-enter normal life again and bring his pilgrimage to an end with the final circumambulation of the Ka’ba. This explanation is corroborated by early traditions forbidding the pilgrims to eat from the *hajj*-sacrifice: a common rule with piacular, atoning and expiatory sacrifices (Chelhod 1955:177-178).

Further evidence can be found in the notion of *kafara* (expiation), a common Arabic word for all sacrifices that should be immolated as payment for particular *hajj*-transgressions. Even the ‘real’ *hajj*-sacrifice used to be the compensation for not performing the *hajj* itself but rather a particular combination of *hajj* and *umra*. In exchange for this ‘omission’, an animal should be slaughtered. We will find both the word *kafara* and the connotation of expiation in the Tanzanian sacrificial rituals described in chapter 5 on the *akika* and *siku ya mwaka* rituals. It is also present in the notion of commer-
cial slaughterers who perform a kafara ritual to pay for their bloody and violent work. However, kafara appears seldom in the Idd el-Hajj discourse itself; purification and expiation are usually attributed to more spiritual acts like giving sadaka or praying.  

b. Sadaka: gift, homage, communion and exchange

Rather than the separation from or expulsion of bad, evil or sin, a second cluster focuses on the attempts of the sacrificer to create a positive connection with supernatural powers or joining social groups together. Edward Tylor, perhaps one of the first modern theorists publishing on sacrifice, was mostly interested in the origin and evolutionary development of the phenomenon. He saw gift-giving as the original stage of sacrifice, followed by the homage to the divinity as expressed by the shared meal, and finally the abnegation of something valuable. He describes Islamic sacrifice as an example of the final phase in this evolutionary process. Giving away food or simply abandoning the carcasses in the valley of Mina “in spite of a growing conviction that after all the deity does not need and cannot profit by it” is “unreasonable,” but “the worshipper may still continue to measure its efficacy by what it costs him” (Tylor, quoted in Carter 2003:26). Tylor, focusing on the sacrificer and his intentions, describes Islamic sacrifices as a late development and not an original ‘primitive’ ritual.

Chelhod’s (1955) theory is also derived from the gift, but this is no longer a gift that is perceived as benefiting Allah, but the respectful homage from a slave to its Master. It is not primarily commensality that serves as the essence of pre-Islamic sacrifice but the gift-giving and the hospitality, as he shows in his analysis based on literary sources. The fearful power of the gift seeks not only to ward off evil influences, but also obtains the favour of invisible powers and attempts to create an alliance with them. The same mechanism at work in bloody sacrifice is also visible in sharing salt, milk or perfume. In all cases, the gift provokes the desired effect. The Islamic spiritual revolution which stressed that the meat and blood does not reach God but only the piety of the Muslims caused, according to Chelhod, that sacrifice lost its raison d’être (1955:201).

Chelhod critically assesses Robertson Smith’s theory of sacrifice as a communion between man and his god. According to Robertson Smith, ‘primitive men’ perceived a totemic relationship between the deity and his human offspring. The totem (plant, animal or object) was imagined as the supernatural ancestor. In ordinary circumstances the sacred totem animals
were not killed, but when the community was threatened or in any other ambiguous situation the ritual killing of the totem and the subsequent eating of its flesh created a mystical union (cf. Carter 2003:53-55). Eating the god was seen as the ultimate form of communion. Even Chelhod admits that some aspects of Islamic sacrifice points towards the notion of communion with God. The Qur’anic words related to the root \textit{q-r-b} (approach) can in particular be interpreted as denoting the sense of communion and the wish to come close to the divine presence (Chelhod 1955:183). However, according to Chelhod, it is not the commensality that creates the bond between god and human being but rather the gift of food, blood or salt.

What most theories in this cluster have in common is the notion of exchange: the reciprocal relationship between giver and recipient. The gift is never unilateral but always involves some positive return from the deity. Often, these benefits can be appropriated through eating the meat of the slain animal. Many Muslims imagine that the powerful blessings of the \textit{hajj} are manifested in some portions of the animal, such as the liver. However, because most Muslims feel that to call the Idd el-Hajj a communion between God and man tends to reduce the necessary distance between Creator and created this meaning is hardly developed in Islamic discourse.

The notion of gift-giving and exchange is most prominently visible in the label of \textit{sadaka} attached by Tanzanian Muslims to the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice. The recitation of the prayer of acceptance during the dedication of the animal to God, implies that the sacrifice is a gift. The voluntary giving away of a substantial amount of the slain animal is done as a token of submission and obedience to Allah. Whereas the rules for \textit{sadaka} sacrifices are much less rigorous than those for \textit{kafara} rituals, the first often functions as an umbrella term and is employed in a wide range of social and religious contexts (cf. Parkin 1994:180). Frequently, notions usually connected with \textit{kafara} continue to be present despite the relabelling of \textit{sadaka}. We will explore how these ambiguous terms are applied in local sacrificial rituals in chapter 5.

c. Fidya: substitution

In general, Islamic sacrifice does not involve elaborate schemes and mechanisms. We will consider two of them: substitution and sacralisation. The mechanism which is often at work in the atoning and expiatory sacrifices described above is that of substitution, assuming an existential relationship between the victim and the ritual participants. The animal becomes something else, it bears the sins of the sacrifier, it turns into the evil or the disasters afflicting the community, or it stands for the firstborn that must be
offered to the deity. The basic metaphor underlying this discourse is: “animal is sacrificer/sacrificer.” This notion is suggested in the Qur’anic story of Ibrahim and his son who was ransomed (fadaynahu) by a great sacrifice. God asks Ibrahim to sacrifice his son because it belongs to Him; Ibrahim consents and his willingness is rewarded by an animal substitution. This notion has influenced the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice to such an extent that in some parts of the Muslim world (Negev, Palestine) the word fidya (substitute, ransom) is used to designate the hajj-animal. This idea of humans being substituted or ransomed by animal sacrifices runs through Curtiss’ book (1903: passim). Interestingly, the author notices a similar use of fidya (substitution) and kafara (expiation). Further evidence of this mechanism is found in the Islamic prayer sometimes recited before the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice in parts of the Muslim world: 

Its blood for my blood, its flesh for my flesh, its bone for my bone, its skin for my skin, its hair for my hair. (Cf. Lane 1987:191; Brisebarre 1998:29)

However, apart from this literary evidence, the hajj sacrifice itself lacks any kind of ritual identification between animal/human being such as physical contact or the laying-on of hands (Grandin 1978:96). The modern abattoirs in Mecca no longer provide the physical proximity between sacrificer and animal. Anthropological studies show that in some areas this mechanism of substitution is indeed emphasised by close contact with animal and sacrificer for a couple of days (cf. Rashed 1998; contributions in Brisebarre 1998; Bonte, Brisebarre & Gokalp 1999).

Anthropologists often maximise their usage of the assumed substitutionary character of Islamic sacrifice to underscore their own theories. An example is Westermarck’s The origin and development of moral ideas, (1906-1908), one of the first theorists to base his ideas on his own fieldwork. In this work, he devotes one chapter to the theory of human sacrifice and therein he explains the “Muhammedan Great Feast” as an example of the substitution theory. According to Westermarck, the Idd el-Hajj animal is in fact considered as a real human sacrifice. It is an attempt to persuade the gods and to propitiate them. Due to the contact between the sacrificial animal/’human being’ with the supernatural entity, the former is endowed with supernatural power. “A man dressed in the bloody skin of the sheep which has been sacrificed on that occasion, goes from tent to tent, and beats each tent with his stick so as to confer blessing on its inhabitants” (Westermarck in: Carter 2003:101). The power somehow derived from the deity to which it is offered,
“is ascribed to various parts of the sacrificed sheep, which are consequently used for magical purposes” (ibid.).

Evans-Pritchard (in Carter 2003:192-209) adopted the communication theory developed by Hubert and Mauss (1964). These authors claimed that sacrifice relies on a universal scheme consisting of three stages: 1) entry rites consisting of the consecration of the sacrificer, place and instruments; 2) consecration of the victim and its destruction; and 3) exit rites of desacralisation and re-entering the profane world. Dependent on the function of the sacrifice, communication with the supernatural could be stressed, or its opposite: the wish to bring unwanted contact with the supernatural to an end. Based on this scheme, Evans-Pritchard took Islamic sacrifice as an example of the substitution theory: the life of the sacrificial animal is substituted for the life of the sacrificer himself. The author states: “Indeed, it is quite explicit in some religions, in particular in certain Vedic, Hebrew, and Muslim rites, that what one consecrates and sacrifices is always oneself, […]” (ibid.: 201). Although Evans-Pritchard does not give any more details, he appears to refer to the Islamic hajj. Seen through the lenses offered in Hubert and Mauss’s scheme, the hajj sacrifice is, together with the haircut, one of the final exit rituals of the pilgrimage. The sacred bond created by the entry rites must be slowly dissolved, and the Muslim should return to the world of the profane. The exit sacrifice can perform this function in so far as it may pay for certain transgressions perpetrated during the ritual (Hubert & Mauss 1964:46).

As is clear throughout this book, substitution plays a minimal role in the Tanzanian Idd el-Hajj discourse. Indeed, only in the akika ritual described in chapter 5 we will encounter this mechanism. One reason for Muslims’ negative connotation of the word fidya is its use by Christians to denote Jesus Christ’s redemptive sacrifice and atonement. Two other Swahili rituals using this Arabic loanword are related to ancestor cults (siku ya vijungu) and the healing rites performed in case of a severe illness (Middleton 1992:180). Most Muslims reject any conscious connection between these fidya sacrifices and the ‘proper’ Idd slaughtering.

d. Bismillah: consecration

The second mechanism that has received much attention in theories regarding sacrifice is the consecration of the animal by the words: ‘Bismillah, Allahu Akbar’ (in the name of God, God is great). Apart from the proliferation of ‘primitive elements’ and ‘animism’, it is this consecration to God that is often mentioned by scholars as the only noteworthy characteristics of Islam-
ic *hajj*-sacrifice (cf. Rappaport 1999:333; Bell 1997:5). An example is Burkert’s *Homo Necans*, published in 1972 (cf. Carter 2003: 212-238). In his book, Burkert argues that sacrifice is the oldest form of religious action. Like Tylor, he uses an evolutionary perspective and perceives hunting as the pivotal development of human social life. The hunted animal was a perfect target for inter-group aggression. Being cathartic, the hunt became ritualised into animal sacrifice. Islam is brought to the fore to explain the persistence of this basic religious ritual. “Not even […] the emergence of Islam could eliminate animal-sacrifice” (ibid.: 217). According to Burkert, the *hajj* is the “highpoint in the life of the Muslim” (ibid.: 217) and the animal slaughtered in Mecca is consecrated by the formulas “In the name of Allah” and “Allah is merciful”. In his view, Islamic sacrifice is an empty formality, a survival from the hunting stage of civilisation indicating the strong, universal and homogeneous psyche of humankind. In the light of the emphasis that Islam puts on spiritual values, it surprises Burkert that Muslims still practice animal sacrifice. As an explanation of Islamic sacrificial practice this formula doesn’t bring us very far. It is indeed an important sign of submitting any following act (ranging from a meal to sexual intercourse) to the one and only true God. It is an act of confirming the central tenet of Islam, a belief in pure monotheism, but it can not explain the profound differences between the Isalmic sacrifices all similarly dedicated to Allah.

e. Questioning the “thing” of sacrifice

Most of the aforementioned theories are concerned with the question of whether Islamic sacrifice exists, in essence, if it is. It seems hard to define ‘Islamic’ sacrifice or to reduce the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice to one particular meaning such as the differentiating *kafara* notions or the integrating *sadaka* connotations. Nor can the ritual be reduced to the sacrificial mechanisms of substitution and consecration by mentioning the name of God. All of these scholarly ideas on Islamic ritual are derived from preoccupations about what ‘real’ sacrifice is. These essentialised images are often made into a blueprint and laid over ethnographic data from Muslim communities. It is no wonder that the latter should fall short and be unable to live up to these expectations. If sacrifice is “one of the most critical acts” or “the heart of a religious system” (Firth 1963:13) then, indeed, sacrifices performed by Muslims may fall below the required qualifications.

On a superficial level the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice is a clear *sadaka*, cementing the community together. Its most visible ritual mechanism is the consecration of the animal to God, thus proclaiming that there is no god but Allah.
But the obvious social and religious forces to reduce Islamic sacrifice to these two concepts have never succeeded. Every year Muslims from different communities all over the world raise the question whether it is allowed to substitute the animal sacrifice by a monetary offering, but these requests are mostly answered negatively by Islamic scholars. It is precisely the tension between the pure monotheistic understanding of sacrifice on the one hand and the continuous search of new meanings for these austere rituals that characterises the Islamic Idd (cf. Lazarus-Yafeh 1981:47). Time and again notions perceived as “un-Islamic”, for example associated with the animals’ blood or with spiritual creatures, appear as important keys to understanding Islamic sacrifice. To interpret these data as an indication that Islamic sacrifice ‘really’ is a pagan survival or ‘in reality’ only a symbolic charity is nothing less than introducing a false dichotomy.

I believe that Islamic sacrifice does exist, but not as a ‘thing’ and rather as something like Mauss’s concept of a ‘fait social total’ (Durkheim 1938:1-13; Chelhod 1955:200) existing outside but not independent of individuals. However, more so than Durkheim, Mauss and Chelhod, I would like to view the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice as Strenski (1996) does, as “conventional, provisional, and constructed for particular purposes”. In the present book, while the link between Idd el-Hajj and the hajj proper is essential, every Tanzanian Muslim group establishes this link in its own way, constructing its own imagined community. Texts from the Qur’an, the hadith and Islamic theology function not only to create the imagined community but also to contest it. Although social unity and cohesion is a major theme in the Idd el-Hajj discourses, it is exactly the lack of this unity and the absence of cohesion which is emphasised in Tanzania. It is the notion of an essentialist, eternal meaning of a (sacrificial) ritual that must be challenged.

To focus on the social function of the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice (what does it do, rather than what is it?) also allows us to look at contextual practices and phenomena which at first sight seem not to be related to the ritual killing of animals. Good examples of this approach are Jay’s book on the relationship between sacrifice and patrilinearity (1994) and Bloch’s account regarding the politics of religious experience (1997). Both authors look at sacrifice through completely different lenses but they agree that sacrifice can only be understood in their own social and symbolic contexts. At the same time, they state that the mechanisms at work in something called ‘sacrifice’ can also be seen in other forms of social behaviour such as marriage rites or initiation.
From this perspective not only the actual killing of animals will be the topic of this book, but also practices, ideas and symbols that are discursively connected to ‘sacrifice.’ Texts and their interpretations are used in this arena as tools and means to an end rather than as actual descriptions of religious practices. In order to make sense of a Muslim sacrifice one should not start with a priori assumptions regarding the general significance of blood, as many scholars in the structuralist tradition do (cf. Abdelsalam 1999). Although the Ibrahimian myth, the sacrifice of Ismail, the birth of Isaac, a martyr’s death and a possession ritual certainly can be meaningfully related to each other, this cannot be derived from global Islamic texts, but should rather be proven from local interpretations of these texts. Islamic animal sacrifice seems to delude common categories understood as sacrifice. To understand Islamic ritual, firstly on its own terms but at the same time acknowledging the social function evoked in ritual performance and discursive reflection, a close ethnographic study of the phenomenon must be undertaken.

3. Ethnographies of Islamic sacrifice

a. The Great Feast in Morocco

M.E. Combs-Schilling’s Sacred Performances: Islam, Sexuality and Sacrifice (1989) on the Moroccan Idd el-Hajj is a well-written and powerful analysis based on fieldwork completed in the 1970s and 1980s. Among the three monographs described in this section, her work stands out as the most daring and thought-provoking. Her main argument is that the annual Great Sacrifice in Morocco was used by the ‘Alawi rulers to strengthen monarchical authority. Through several rituals, such as the mawlid (Prophet’s birthday), first marriage and the sacrifice, male authority vested in the king became inscribed. In the 16th and 17th century these three pre-existing rituals were reworked in order to substantiate the truth of the new political order of the ‘Alawi rulers. Men were represented in these rituals as the representatives of God, and in them, national and eternal hope was embedded. Since men have the ability of ‘aql (control of natural inclinations) they are able to transcend nature, something which women are not capable of doing. Both myths and rituals make use of ‘natural’ colours and bodily experiences like sexuality to present the divine status of men and especially the king.

According to Combs-Schilling, the Idd sacrifice is “the single most powerful canonical ritual in Islam” (1989:222). Consequently, the act of kill-
ing/penetration and the spilling of blood are the primary events of both the sacrifice and the marriage consummation. Both acts represent the male as the (pro)creator and the female as the passive victim. To link political power, religious sacrifice, male domination and ultimate hope within the individual’s psyche, contestations of these images result in damaging one’s own self-image. When the king sacrifices a ram in front of the nation, this is an icon of masculinity, a reflection of the Prophet Muhammad and an embodiment of the male *par excellence* through whom one can transcend natural limitations and achieve eternal hope.

Of particular note in her book is the author’s emphasis on the possibility of change. Although certain symbols, colours and practices are perceived as intrinsically being more powerful than others, the linking of identity to these powerful symbols can be located and is a historical and social fact. Consequently, she describes a rather fluid relationship between text, ritual and practice. The sacrificial myths and rituals are so profoundly anchored in people’s souls and are so extensively repeated throughout human history that texts and their interpretation are all but absent. Although, according to Combs-Schilling, the reformulation of the Idd el-Hajj is modelled on Muhammad’s own performance, it remains unclear how exactly the new rulers had access to the Prophet’s ritual example. It is difficult to imagine how in this dominant discourse, different readings of authoritative texts and hermeneutical counter paradigms can emerge.

Since the publication of Combs-Schilling’s book many scholars of Islamic sacrifice have reacted to her audacious theses. Delaney (1998:182-183) finds Combs-Schilling’s study convincing and uses extensive quotations to undergird her own ideas that sacrifice in general and the Abrahamic sacrificial narrative in particular has played a significant role in allowing for a continued construction of inequality between genders. Indeed, both authors emphatically use essentialised images in talking about the Ibrahimian sacrifice: “Etched viscerally into the sentiments of all Muslims is the sight, sound, and smell of that sacrifice” (Delaney 1998:163; emphasis added). While this might be true for Morocco, Turkey (Delaney 1992), Egypt (Rashed 1998), Germany (Spuler-Stegemann 1998) or other Muslim communities, animal sacrifice in Tanzania certainly does not dominate the meaning of the Idd el-Hajj, as I hope to make clear in the following chapters. Nor is the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania “the holiest day of the Muslim calendar”, as Delaney (1998:163) boldly claims. Just like Combs-Schilling, Delaney no longer presents her data as that obtained from a particular Turkish village, but wishes to transcend the boundaries of individual cases. This is a laudable effort and I think that

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her book is a very good overview of the wider ramifications of the dramatic story. Her extensive knowledge enables her to link court cases, Freud, the three monotheistic religions and child abuse in a very readable and thought-provoking text. Combs-Schilling’s and Delaney’s good descriptions of how the two patriarchal figures, Ibrahim and Muhammad, merge and conflate in several narratives, were very useful for me while I interpreted Idd el-Hajj sermons and examined how people can switch between several paradigms. However, both authors are forced, to some extent, to discard local practices and interpretations in favour of their own theories.

Munson (1993:121-124) is much more critical towards Combs-Schilling’s ideas on the relationship between (national) ritual and (national) identity. He severely criticises her book as being too far removed from Moroccans’ actual ideas and interpretations. According to his informants,

the king’s sacrifice is no more significant to most Moroccan families than the American president’s lighting “the national Christmas tree” is to Christian families in the United States (ibid.:123).

According to Munson, Combs-Schilling gives too much attention to grandiose rituals and neglects more ordinary performances, like prayers. Again, both standpoints should be proven by a proper discourse analysis. The way these rituals function, the context of their performance and the inclusion or exclusion of ritual participants and how they talk, write and publish on these rituals should be the core of any interpretative study.

Perhaps the most thorough, and in my opinion the best, critique on Combs-Schilling comes from John Bowen (1992). He disapproves of Combs-Schilling’s idea that the Moroccan Idd sacrifice in its essence can only be interpreted as patriarchal. According to Bowen, Combs-Schilling “eliminated the possibility of alternative, culturally specific elaborations of Muslim traditions” (ibid.:658). In his article, Bowen tries to “capture both the power of scripture-based tradition and the variations in its local interpretation” (ibid.).

His three-level analysis (public form, social meaning and the comparison of the ritual in other societies) challenges Combs-Schilling’s thesis of a ritual based on powerful, innate symbols. Although Bowen does not contest the public form (expressed by males, sanctifying patriarchy, and representing males as divine channels of God’s power and grace), he draws attention to counter-paradigms which also contribute to the social meaning of these rituals.
Bowen clarifies this second level of analysis by referring to Hammoudi’s work *The Victim and Its Masks* (1993; French edition 1988; cf Lindholm 1995:817-818). The author describes a rapidly disappearing bacchanalian masquerade in the south of Moroccan in which participants play the role of an androgynous monster called Bilmaww, dressed in the skin of the sacrificial sheep, and other masked characters. Here, the Great Sacrifice is not only the unique, orthodox event dominated by men, but closely related to a complex ritual cycle stretching over several months. Based on this study, Bowen’s argument is that the visible, public forms of a ritual not always suffice for a proper analysis. The women who are absent in Combs-Schilling’s description of the Islamic sacrifice are prominent on stage in Hammoudi’s masquerade. The grand, national festivals like the Prophet’s birthday and the Great Sacrifice should be compared with these local concomitant feasts like Hammoudi’s book shows.

Finally, Bowen describes his own data from the Gayo on Sumatra, showing that the killing is not *per se* the ritual’s most salient event and that patriarchy is not inevitably the cultural focus. He shows, via two different cases, how groups conceptualise the event differently. For one group, most of the sacrifices receive little notice and are hardly public. It is not the killing but the transmission of benefits and the ritual meal (*kenduri*) which are the core of the ritual. The animal will also provide future benefit on the Day of Judgement. A second, more modernist, group emphasises devotion and obedience, rather than the transmission of benefits. This is accompanied by a shift in focus from the private, shared, domestic realm to the public prayer areas, a similar move to that which we will see in Tanga. The modernist interpretation further challenged the village model of transaction, and consequently paid even less attention to the killing of the sacrificial animal. Instead, they performed cathartic family confessions before parents or grandparents.

What all of these critiques have in common, and what is neatly described by Abdulkader Tayob, is the particularly unsatisfactory essentialist nature of Combs-Schilling’s analysis (Tayob 1999:7). Actual practice has to be ignored to some extent in order to salvage the theoretical model. “For Islamic culture, Combs-Schilling imposes a permanent and unchanging interpretation of the Qur’an on male and female relations and ignores the contradictions inherent in how men interpret them” (Tayob 1999:8). In my opinion, the absence of debates and Muslims’ discussions, including those which contest the meaning of the Idd el-Hajj symbols, is a major stumbling block in Combs-Schilling’s analysis.
b. The Sacrificial Feast in Egypt

A totally different study is Mohammed Rashed’s *Das Opferfest* (*Id al-adha*) *im heutigen Ägypten* (1998). Like Combs-Schilling however, the author claims that the Sacrificial Feast in Egypt is among the most important of the Islamic festivals. In his book, Rashed attempts to provide a complete picture of the festival including historical, theological, socio-political, psychological and ethnographical aspects. Instead of the actual slaying and its symbolic meaning, Rashed mainly focuses on social activities of the community: breakfast, prayer, grave-visiting, and entertainment. The merits of this study lie in the amount of detail which the author was able to collect. It provides invaluable insight into the social status of the ritual as illustrated by a wide range of examples: the recipes for the sacrificial sheep, local stories, cartoons, psychological advice for children traumatised by the cruel sight of the slaughtering, Idd cards etc. However, for an interpretation of this festival, we need another study.

Rashed’s book, although very rich in detail, lacks a sharp focus. The author’s sources include all different sorts of primary and secondary material, but the importance of these documents for Egyptians’ daily practice remains unclear. Debates and arguments are almost absent. For example, in an attachment, Rashed includes the Idd sermon (both in Arabic and German), directly copied from the official state-approved book, while in his main text he mentions that some preachers do not follow these official guidelines. The reader who wishes to know more about these (perhaps peripheral- or counter-) discourses is disappointed. The same applies to the classical moon-sighting discussion that plays a role in almost all modern Islamic communities (and takes up a substantive part of my own study). Rashed dutifully mentions the different points of view, and even draws attention to a heated debate which took place in Egypt in 1992. That year the Grand Mufti condemned all followers of the ‘wrong’ moon (i.e. a lunar date other than the official one). However, Rashed leaves us in the dark when it comes to the repercussions for individual believers, the different standpoints of the social groups involved and the relevance of the discussion. Further, the quite different position between the moon-sightings for the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj is obscured by Rashed. The murder of President Sadat (1981), immediately preceding the Idd el-Hajj, is mentioned, but the way in which this event might have influenced the meaning of the feast, is only shortly touched upon. The author mentions the different points of view concerning the festival prayers and the legal status of animal sacrifice, but if and how these differences are emphasised or neglected in real practice, is not clear.
In addition, contested practices like visiting cemeteries are described from classical sources rather than based on Egyptians’ current ideas and perceptions.

The book is strong in pointing out the vast scriptural tradition of the Idd el-Hajj. The author devotes quite some space to the historical origin of the festival, and the status of sacrifices in pre-Islamic Arabia, as based on secondary sources. The role of the government is also greatly emphasised: state officials clean the cities, inform pilgrims, acquire animals, assign legal prayer places (as well as the politically correct imams!) and organise the traffic. According to Rashed, the Egyptian state tries to show its power, stability and social face towards the population. But the book is not helpful in answering the question of whether, as Combs-Schilling described for Morocco, a similar relation between nation, national identity and this particular national holiday exists. The study does, however, show a clear distinction between practices in urban and rural places, illustrating the possibility of different performances of a single ‘canonical’ ritual.

The whole overall description reflects an uncritical, homogeneous idyllic family festival, with only minor ‘aberrations’ from the general atmosphere of hospitality and peacefulness. The book is based on the assumption that trans-national practice also has a trans-national supra-local meaning determined by texts rather than by Muslims in local contexts. He often writes sentences like “just as in other Islamic countries” (1998:28). The author rarely describes real discourse, but makes often moral evaluations (“based on misinterpretation”) and suggests, for example, that some groups ‘abuse’ the festival to win sympathy for their ideas (1998:197-98). He has clear ideas regarding the use and abuse of the sermon (khutba), but does not give proper examples of either.

c. The Sheep Festival in France

Anne-Marie Brisebarre’s edited book, La Fête du mouton (1998) is the result of a long-term project conducted amongst North and West African Muslims in France. Her own contribution takes up most of the book (pp. 7-188). More so than Combs-Schilling and Rashed, Brisebarre vividly portrays the kind of discussions emerging when ritual practices travel. Debates on hygiene, on animal welfare, public health and environmental pollution make this study quite different from the former analyses. Further, the context of French towns and a culturally and religiously mixed population are notably different from the rather homogeneous Moroccan and Egyptian examples. Just as the title suggests, the sheep is the focus of the ritual: its purchase,
killing, preparing, distribution and eating define the festival. Consequently concomitant social activities like the prayer and the sermon receive much less attention. In addition, comparison with other rituals is absent, although subsequent work closely related to Brisebarre’s study repaired this omission. The edited volume *Sacrifices en Islam* (Bonte, Brisebarre & Gokalp 1999) extends the interest in Islamic animal sacrifice across cultures and beyond the strict limits of ‘orthodox’ Islam. Both books are influenced by the French structuralist tradition.

Brisebarre describes the relation between the place and the meaning of the sacrifice. Some French Muslims continue to slaughter their sheep in the domestic realm, but the French government is increasingly forcing them to make use of publically assigned places and abattoirs. More than Combs-Schilling and Rashed, Brisebarre shows how the Idd el-Hajj changes when it is performed in different settings. Each place has its own limitations. The French private home does not have the facilities one needs, so the sheep has to be killed in the bathroom or on the balcony. Making use of the official abattoirs often changes the meaning of the ritual beyond recognition. It involves waiting for long times, or not being able to touch your own animal, or being prevented from performing the sacrifice yourself (perceived as essential by many Muslims).

The ‘Feast of the Sheep’ provides a way to study the social network that people are involved in. The farm where the animal is bought, the choice of the sacrificer, the neighbour who is to receive part of the animal, all make the ritual different from the one performed in the country of origin. One of this study’s results is that the festival tends to remain a family event, rather than the celebration of the global Islamic congregation (*umma*). Contact with believers from other ethnic groups caused amazement and even horror, rather than connection and *communitas* (Brisebarre 1998:34). Sometimes the whole family went to the farm to select a proper animal, but usually the gendered labour segregation was maintained: men selected, bought, killed and flayed the animal, while the preparation and cooking remained the work of women. The meat was distributed amongst quite a narrow social, religious and ethnically homogeneous group. Many French Muslims felt unable to follow the religious injunction to distribute meat among the poor “because there are no poor in France”, an opinion shared by Muslims in Belgium and England (Dasseto & Hennart 1998; Werbner 1998:208).

Brisebarre’s edited book shows that the sacrifice remains important for immigrants, but that the meaning changes. Informants often told the author that “to be a Muslim is to kill a sheep”, showing how religious iden-
tity in a pluralistic society was constructed with the help of the sacrifice. At home, where Muslims were in the majority, sacrifice was not so closely linked to religious identity. At the same time, the collective sacrifice provided the Muslim migrant community with a public face, and triggered latent racism disguised as animal welfare.

Brisebarre’s study is extremely rich in detail. Often, the reader is offered extensive extracts from interviews. Islamic sources are embedded in the social context since only those books which are cited by informants are mentioned by the author. More so than the two other books, the link between textual knowledge and social practice emerges. It is therefore quite strange that debates and discussions within the different Islamic groups based in France are not more extensively described or analysed, but only mentioned in passing. The moon-sighting issue is neglected as only being inconvenient for employees and in other Muslim countries: “ces fluctuations de dates sont sans importance puisque tout le monde sera en congé pour la fête” (Brisebarre 1998:92; cf. p. 134). Although clearly present, this element seems to be taken for granted rather than interrogated by the author.

d. Summary: text, ritual and identity

What can we conclude from these comparisons? How helpful are these books in an ethnographic study on texts, ritual practices and the construction of meaning and identity? The three authors describe the relationship between text and practice as being rather unproblematic. Whereas all of them dutifully mention the Ibrahimian myth, it remains unclear how this story in particular, and Arabic texts in general, might contribute to the meaning of the Idd el-Hajj. Combs-Schilling assumes a conflation of patriarchal myth, monarchic power and male superiority, but she argues that this process of signification is not based on texts but on a strategic choice of powerful, bodily images. In her analysis she sometimes fails to establish the crucial chains between textual or orally transmitted myth and practice. In contrast, her historical descriptions of the ritual innovations of the Prophet’s birthday, the first marriage ceremonies and the Great Sacrifice are thoroughly accounted for. Both Rashed and Brisebarre fill this gap in their own way: for example, by providing the full texts of a sermon and including extensive quotes from prose, poetry and interviews where the story is retold, thereby enabling the reader to develop an idea of the local perceptions of these texts.

From this uncritical approach towards texts and their interpretation, it follows that none of these studies actually address the problem of dif-
ferent readings among different social groups. Combs-Schilling meticulousl
ously describes a single, historical change in the 16th and 17th century but it
appears from her account that after that time, the tradition was trans
mitted without any counter-paradigms. Her book emphatically deals with
the problem of identity but she approaches the subject primarily through
the lens of gender. Both text and ritual spring from the same (un)conscious
strategy to establish male dominance and to present patriarchy and patri-
linearity as divine tools to channel God’s grace. Any employment of text as a
means of establishing group identities through the Idd el-Hajj rituals seems
to be absent. Rashed and Brisebarre do recognise different social groups
(e.g. migrants or ‘radicals’) but when it comes to their differing opinions con-
cerning date, place, performance and the significance of the Idd el-Hajj, the
authors remain silent.

Concerning human agents it is safe to state that any study of the Idd
el-Hajj in a modern society should pay considerable attention to the state
as an actor. In Morocco, Egypt and France, the state is present not only in
marginal issues concerning the logistics of the feast but also as a partner or
opponent in discourse. The king’s sacrifice in Morocco as an icon of the state
takes on public and vital importance when all male sacrificers wait until the
monarch has slain the national ram. Bowen (1992:665) mentions examples
of the “state saturated nature” of the Idd el-Hajj in Indonesia, where the sac-
rifice is linked to the development of the country and the worship service is
preceded by a speech by the district military commander. Rashed describes
the Grand Mufti’s speech before the festival, which included an call to har-
mony and unity as well as an offer of congratulations to the Egyptian presi-
dent and the Egyptian state (ibid.: 28). Further, the Egyptian sermon explains
the Idd sacrifice as the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the benefit of the
nation. When president Sadat visited the graves of war victims immediately
after the sacrifice and the festival prayers, he discursively linked these prac-
tices together as having something in common (Rashed 1998:28,89,98). In
France the discussion of how and where to sacrifice made the French gov-
ernment a major player on the Idd stage. Throughout my book, the Tanza-
nian nation-state will be present in the discussion on the national calendar,
the moon-sighting discourse, the hajj and elsewhere.

Finally, it is important to include a short note on the units of analy-
sis used by the authors. Combs-Schilling centres on the Prophet’s birthday,
on marriage and sacrifice and links these practices to the social institutions
of monarchy and patriarchy. Without contesting her analysis, her method-
ology seems debatable. However, where her analysis is corroborated by
informants, her daring approach opens new vistas. She is the only one of
the three analysts who attempts to explore what these rituals do, or more
precisely: how societies mobilise rituals to different extents (Combs-Schill-
ing 1989:13). Rashed’s approach is more conservative: he takes the day of
the Idd as his analytical unit. Practices on this day include not only prayer,
sacrifice and visits to the graves, but also circumcision and marriage. Apart
from the similarities between the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj, both festi-
vals have a distinct flavour: the former often coincides with the engagement
of a couple while the second Idd is the occasion for the marriage (Rashed
1998:131). Finally, Brisebarre’s book is strong in emphasising the place of
sacrifice and the implication this has for social networks and the meaning
of rituals. However, the author does not make clear how the sacrificial feast
relates to other rituals, although she makes comparisons with the Muslim
“baptism” (‘aqiqa) ritual that also contains the sacrifice of an animal (Brise-
3. Local Contexts: an introduction to the field

1. Tanzania

a. Socio-economic situation

The United Republic of Tanzania is an independent East African state which was established after the merging of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1961. Tanzania has an estimated population of 37 million people (2005).¹ The country is poor, ranking 164 (out of 177) on the Human Development Index (see Table 3.1), and is flanked by other poor countries.

Table 3.1
Tanzania’s position in the Human Development Index in relation to neighbouring countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>H.D.I. ranking (out of 177)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>154</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>159</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>164</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>165</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>166</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>167</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005
Despite the impressive economic growth which Tanzania has showed over the last five years (5.8 %) and 6.7 % in 2004, the current economic forecast is quite gloomy. Dependency on donor money remains high (46% of the 2005-2006 budget), privatisation projects develop slowly, and approximately 20% of the population earns less than one US dollar a day. Tanzania is still one of the least urbanised countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, and agriculture continues to be the most important source of income (57 % of the GNP, but 82% of employment). This dependency on agriculture makes the country particularly vulnerable to changes in market prices. When the sisal market almost disappeared, the Tanga region was severely hit because the whole area depended on that single crop. Other important economic sectors are services (26%), building and mining (9%) and industry (8%). Coffee and cotton are the most exported products. Tourism is also an important revenue earner.

Positive developments are the emphasis on Universal Primary Education (UPE) and the subsequent increase in youth literacy rates (from 69.4% in 1980 to 91.6% in 2004), which is very good compared with other Sub-Saharan African countries. The overall adult literacy rate, however, is less impressive and shows a significant gap between genders and place of residence: more men than women are literate and the functional literacy class is more often than not located in the urban areas. The decision that primary education should be provided in Swahili might have been helpful to achieve this increase in youth literacy rates (cf. Whiteley 1969). Further, Former President Benjamin Mkapa reintroduced free primary education at government-owned schools (“Universal Primary Education”). However, most of the Tanzanians with whom I discussed these topics, had only completed primary education and were disappointed that they do not speak English, like their Kenyan neighbours. The medium of instruction in higher education remains a sensitive issue.

A high literacy rate in the national language, Swahili, cements the more than 100 ethnic groups together. The largest groups are the Sukuma, Nyamwezi, Swahili, Hehe, Bena and Makonde, but the most influential, best educated and overrepresented groups in the government are the Chagga and the Haya. Muslims point out that these groups are predominantly Christian. Ethnic conflicts between the groups are very rare, which makes Tanzania one of the most stable countries in East Africa. In fact, the Tanzanian media show some pride of the country’s mediating and intervening role in regional conflicts, reflecting something of the former pan-Africanist dreams of a united peaceful continent where Swahili is the hegemonic language.
In 1979, the Tanzanian army defeated the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin (1924-2003). As of 1995, the Tanzanian state is hosting the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha and is stimulating peace talks in Burundi.

However, on the regional level major social problems are caused by the huge influx of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda in the west of Tanzania. Child abductions, robbery and manslaughter in these areas are attributed to the refugee camps. When I travelled throughout that area of Tanzania, whenever the train stopped at small stations, thieves would literally attack the wagons, attempting to crawl in through every unprotected window. A substantial part of the market commodities offered for sale near Kigoma (buckets, clothes, sheets, blankets) bear the UN insignia.

Infrastructure is only good between the towns of Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Moshi and Arusha to the north, and Morogoro and Dodoma to the west, but stops short immediately after that. When in 2002 my wife and I travelled from Tanga to the northwest of the country we were advised to take the bus to Nairobi (Kenya) to avoid the bad or non-existing roads in Tanzania. There is a slow but regular train connection spanning the east (Dar es Salaam) and west (Kigoma). Unreliable connections between the Dar es Salaam region and the south frustrate economic development and create regional inequalities. The extent of the infrastructural vulnerability was demonstrated in 2002 when one of the bridges for the road from Dar es Salaam to Tanga simply disappeared in the swollen river. For several days after, most of the daily newspapers were not for sale in Tanga.

b. Modern political history

After the presence of the Portuguese (16th century) and the Omani Arabs (17th –19th century), Germany colonised Tanganyika from 1885 -1890. Tanga, that lent its name to the territory (Tanganyika means ‘Tanga’s hinterland’), played an important role in this process. Resistance against the Germans started in the region South of Tanga when German soldiers invaded a mosque on the Idd el-Hajj (Tullemans 1982; Glassman 1995; but see Chande [1998:42] for a different date). The rebellion quickly spread but was violently extinguished by sheer military force. As a result, the town of Tanga was bombarded in 1888 and was nearly totally destroyed. In Muslim discourse, the colonial period is seen as the starting point of a repressive regime by ‘the Christian system’ (mfumo kristo).

After defeating the Germans in World War I, the British took over in 1919. The movement that finally led to independence started in the 1940s,
with Muslims playing a large role (Said 1998). In 1954, Nyerere (1922-1999) founded the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). With this new party (which was in fact the new name used to refer to the Tanganyika African Association founded in the 1920s) Nyerere won elections and, Tanganyika became independent in 1961.

The first president of Tanganyika was the Roman Catholic Julius Nyerere, who is remembered as Baba wa Taifa (father of the Nation) and Mwalimu (teacher). From 1961 to 1962 he was prime minister in the first government, followed by two years as president of Tanganyika. He held the presidential position of the United Republic of Tanzania (after the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar) from 1964-1985. He founded the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), a party resulting from the merger between TANU and the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP), which is still in power. He is well known for his 1967 Arusha declaration, which started a period of socialistic experiments (*Ujamaa*). Dissident exiles and freedom fighters from Mozambique, Congo, South Africa, Malawi and former Rhodesia found a home and training-camps in Tanzania. This won him fame in the socialist world (particularly China and Russia) and in the Pan-Africanist movement (Thompson 1999:42-44), but in general the outcome has been dramatic in terms of economic development. Muslims are ambivalent towards Nyerere's influence: on the one hand, they praise the free education which is available for all and his contribution towards independence, while on the other hand they feel that Muslims in particular suffered as a result of the deterioration of Tanzania's development. They also blame Nyerere for abusing his presidential power in favour of the Catholic church.

Sometimes this discourse takes the form of outright conspiracy theories: “We have also discovered that Mwalimu Nyerere entered into a contract with the British colonialists, that Tanganyika would be led by Catholics on behalf of Britain”, a Muslim leader is quoted as saying.

When it became clear that the socialist experiment had failed, Nyerere voluntarily stepped down from office in 1985 and handed over the presidency to a supporter of free markets and liberal economics, Ali Hassan Mwinyi (born 1925). Mwinyi became known as Mzee Ruksa (Mister Permission) because of his liberalisation politics; a more negative connotation of his nickname is the widespread corruption and tax evasion that took place during his reign. He introduced multiparty politics in 1992 which led to elections being held in 1995. In Muslim discourse he is generally portrayed not only as the first Muslim president of Tanzania but also as a weak leader. Furthermore, he is blamed for not doing more for his marginalised co-believ-
ers. Even Muslims agree that the education system provided under Catholic president Nyerere was better than in Mwinyi's era.

Tanzania’s third president (1995-2005) is Benjamin William Mkapa, who was born in 1938 and is a devout Lutheran. After a career as a journalist for the Nationalist Uhuru and the Daily News, he established the news agency Shitata. Under Nyerere he became spokesperson (1974-76), and later on the minister of External Affairs, before being elected president. His spear points were: foreign investment, liberalisation and privatisation. Despite the opposition’s fear that Mkapa would strive to achieve the ‘Sultanate’ by extending the legal limitation of his 10-year period (as did the Ugandan president Museveni), in December 2005 he cleared the way for his successor, Jakaya Kikwete (born 1950). He, again, is a Muslim.

If modernity is understood as “a broad synonym for capitalism or industrialization” (Spencer 1996:378), then Tanzania is struggling to become a modern nation-state. The government is privatising large, unproductive parastatals, it has introduced VAT and generally complies with IMF guidelines. Multiparty politics have lead to the official registration of 17 political parties (2002). However, the nation-state still encounters problems in the field of freedom of press and dealing with minorities. What is more, Muslims feel threatened by the unequal representation of Christians and Muslims in higher education and better paid jobs.

2. Tanga

Tanga is the name of one of Tanzania’s 26 regions (mkoa), one of 129 districts (wilaya) and, in the most restricted sense of the word, it is an urban centre (mji) situated near the Indian Ocean. Except when stated otherwise, I will use the name Tanga to refer to the town. This Tanzanian city lies on the north-eastern coast, close to the border with Kenya and is attractive for economic and logistical reasons: good roads connect the city with Dar es Salaam, Moshi and Arusha. Mombasa (Kenya) is also accessible although the road has some badly pot-holed stretches. The port provides work for many citizens and connects the town with other harbours across the Indian Ocean. During the period of fieldwork, the sisal trade had lost most of its importance for the region. According to the people I spoke with, they could not survive in the liberal market which favoured the more mechanised Kenyan sisal industry. Consequently, the Tanga harbour operates far below its capacity and cannot function properly. Most ocean-steamers choose the better equipped deep-sea harbour near Mombasa. Tourism revenues have
all but disappeared: very few travellers between Arusha/Mombasa and Dar es Salaam choose to spend the night in one of the two tourist hotels located near the bus-station in order to visit Tanga’s major attraction, some caves at the near-by village of Amboni. Apart from trade, the education facilities (both religious and secular) attract many students from other regions. When I travelled through the country and talked to Qur’anic school-teachers, many could trace their religious pedigrees to one of the Tanga-based schools. Tanzania’s former *mufti* was born and educated in Tanga where many of his family still live. More than Dar es Salaam, Tanga is perceived to be a Muslim town and the best place to order Islamic charms and amulets, as some mainland Muslims told me. However Tanga also has social problems associated with the declining economic situation: for instance, many Tanga women work as prostitutes on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba.12

The social and ethnic constitution of the town is continuously changing: civil servants move to other posts, retired traders return to their villages to continue farming among their loved ones, and new students arrive. The questionnaire distributed among Tanga students (Appendix I) revealed that most mothers work at home, are involved in informal labour (selling food, etc.) and have a *shamba* (town/garden). Most men are involved in agriculture, small-scale trade, or have a job as a civil servant. Studies on the social stratification of Swahili ‘stone towns’ (cf. el-Zein 1974) can certainly not be applied to Tanga. Stratification exists but is more along the lines of ethnic and economic status rather than the freeborn/slave friction lines described for other Swahili towns. The major ethnic group in my survey is Digo, followed by Sambaa, Zigua and Pare. Smaller groups consist of Segeju, Zaramo, Chagga and Bondei. These numbers are not per se representative of the whole town. Chande (1998:51-67) mentions a different ethnic ranking for Tanga: first Digo, followed by Bondei, Sambaa and Segeju. Inter-*madrasa* conflicts take place between Segeju clans and to a lesser extent the Digo and Zigua are also involved.

Tanga is completely different from the well-known ‘stone towns’ of Lamu, Zanzibar and Mombasa, with their narrow alleys, carved doors and mysterious attractiveness. Perhaps more than any other Tanzanian town, Tanga still reflects the German influence of the late 19th century. The town of Tanga is a German-planned, colonial administrative and economic centre and the oldest buildings date from this period. Since the colonial era, Tanga and Dar es Salaam replaced earlier towns like Bagamoyo and Pangani. The colonisers not only connected the city with the Kilimanjaro area by a railway, but they also built the oldest state school in Tanzania (1892), and developed
the characteristic symmetrical street plan of the centre Ngamiani. The railway divides the town in two parts: the northern area with ocean view contains the former European buildings and here we still find the business centre: banks, shops and post office. Following the coastal line to the east we find private clinics, car dealers, a swimming pool and the dwelling places of the rich. South of the railway we find a totally different image of Tanga. This area was designed by the Germans for the ‘blacks’ and ‘Africans’. Reflecting the view of the former colonisers, the area is also called ‘Uswahilini’ (place of the Swahilis). All Africans were removed from the northern European quarters and resettled in the southern part.

Nowadays, the Ngamiani area is the real heart of the town: here we find the new bus station, a market and most of the 180,000 urban inhabitants of Tanga. Many houses are shared by poor immigrants, such as Maryamu, the woman who appeared in the introduction to this book. Rent for a single room in Ngamiani commonly ranges from 4,000 to 7,000 Shilling (USD 4 to 7) a month. It is also in Ngamiani where I spent the better part of my fieldwork period and where I witnessed most of the sacrificial rituals described in this book. All major mosques and madrasas are situated here or in the area’s immediate periphery. The north-south and east-west orientation of the streets makes the mosques hardly recognisable at first glance (prayer direction is north). The street system also makes it easy to turn the street temporarily into a prayer area adjacent to the mosque during festivals and Friday prayers. The religious processions (zafa) mostly circumambulate this busy centre, and the joint madrasas’ mawlid celebration takes place at the Tangamano field close to the bus station. This field is also the centre of the Idd el-Hajj festival and hosts the Muslims when they pray, listen to the Idd sermon and sacrifice.

3. Islam in Tanzania

a. General

Muslims have settled for many centuries within the social, political and physical environment of Tanzania and Tanga. Exact statistical evidence on contemporary religious groups in Tanzania does not exist. For almost four decades religion has been left out of every census, much to the Muslim population’s regret. The 1967 census counted 37% ‘Traditional Believers’, 32% ‘Christians’ and 30% ‘Muslims’. Nowadays government sources as a rule-of-thumb assume that the population is divided between one third Muslims,
one third Christians and one third other religions on the mainland (van Bergen 1981:64-65), but other estimations range from 25% to 65% Muslims. For Zanzibar, Islamic sources claim a population of close to 100% Muslims. It is clear that both monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam grow fast at the expense of the so called Traditional African Religions, but who can claim the largest number of followers remains a sensitive issue.

Islam in the region has a long history. At some time between the year 830 (the foundation of the mosque on Pate Island) and 1332 (when traveller Ibn Battuta described the coastal inhabitants as Muslims), the new religion must have entered the area and established a firm foothold. Until German colonisation, Islam was mainly limited to the coast and caravan routes. The Arabian Peninsula and especially the Hadramaut are the main geographical areas exerting their influence on the religious and cultural system usually called ‘Swahili Islam’. The large Swahili-speaking diasporic community in Southern Arabia still produces a substantial part of the Islamic books sold in Tanzania (an example is the Omani author Said bin Abdullah Seif ‘I-Hatimy who published some 20 books for the Swahili market). With German occupation, Swahili spread as a lingua franca throughout the administrative system and as the primary medium for formal school education, thus providing the possibility for Swahili to transcend its status as a ‘Muslim’ language. (Early Christian missionaries considered Swahili too Islamic to use it as a tool for transmitting the Gospel). The colonial period was also the start of the politicalisation of Islamic groups (cf. Nimtz 1980; Chande 2000:359). Islam, as well as the emerging Swahili language, proved to be an integrating factor in the battle against the oppressors. The Maji-Maji war (1905-07) is a good example.

The British colonial system of ‘indirect rule’ favoured local chiefs rather than Muslims, and as a result the latter became more and more alienated from power. Education increasingly became to be associated with Christian missionaries creating fear and distrust among Muslim parents to send their children to school (cf. Kahumbi 1995). Subsequently this excluded Muslims from the better paid jobs, reinforcing the idea that Muslims were intentionally marginalised by the Christian ruling powers. It is the British colonial era rather than the German period of occupation that Muslims identify as having been the most detrimental to their situation. The abolishment of the kadhi’s office (Islamic court) in 1924 is generally believed to be an example of the British attitude towards Muslims.

The absolute majority of Muslims in Tanzania are Sunni and they follow the Shaf’i school in their theological orientation and application of law.
The remainder of Tanzanian Muslims can be divided into three groups: Shi'ite, Ibadhi and Ahmadiyya. The Shi'ites branch off into Imami, Ismaili and Bohora groups: most of them attract only Asians, but mission work among 'Africans' is increasing. The assumed equivalence between 'Asians' and 'Shi'ites' (an estimated 0.7% of the population), together with Asian ethnic and class supremacy over the vast majority of Africans makes Shi'ism rather unpopular in Tanzania. The most important, in terms of visibility and activities, is the 12'er Imami group Bilal Muslim Mission (cf. Penrad 1988). Apart from a continuous stream of books and leaflets, they also publish the magazines *Sauti ya Bilal* in Swahili and *The Light* in English. Their first missionary, Saeed Akhtar Rizvi, produced more than 100 publications, many of them in Swahili. Isma'ilis are a small group but are very active in welfare and charity activities, building hospitals and schools (Kaiser 1996). In Tanga, their community building is a real architectural landmark that can be rented by other groups for official receptions and celebrations. With their own schools, clinic, cemetery, mosque and housing they stay detached from the rest of Tangan citizens. Ibadhi believers belong neither to the Sunni nor to the Shi'ite sects, but trace their descent back to the sectarian Kharijyya movement in the early history of Islam. In Tanga, as elsewhere in Tanzania, Ibadhi mosques almost exclusively cater for (Omani) Arabs. A final group, the Ahmadiyya, believe in the coming of a second prophet in the 19th century, Ghulam Ahmad. Because I extensively discuss their discourse on the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania, a further introduction is presented below.

Among the majority of the Sunni mainstream Muslims, an estimated three quarters belong to mystical brotherhoods, the so-called Sufis. The largest of these groups are Qadiriyya, Shadhiliyya and Alawiyya, and each of these are represented in Tanga. All of these groups are quite recent, most of them not being older than a century. Ritual recitations of God's name (*dhikr*), annual processions (*zafa*) and the *mawlid* celebrations are among their most public activities (cf. Ahmad & von Oppen 2004). The high degree of the brotherhoods' social organisation made them very effective tools in political change, as shown by Nimtz (1980). While, in general, Sufi support for the government before and after independence continued, current reformist movements are also backed by many Sufis (cf. Loimeier, in print). The critical newspaper, *an-Nuur*, to a large extent reflects the brotherhoods' views.

Within this pluralform religious landscape, I pay particular attention to three groups: the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC), the Ahmadiyya and the Islamic Propagation Centre (IPC). The reason for selecting these groups...
is twofold: 1) all three have distinctive views on the Idd el-Hajj; and 2) they have published extensively on the issue as well on other topics, thus providing sufficient data to contextualise their ideas.

b. ‘Pure Islam’: the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC)

Among the three Islamic groups whose views I discuss in this book, only the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) was founded in Tanga (Chande 1998:218-224; Loimeier, in print; Becker 2006:591).19 It started as the Tanzanian Muslim Youth Union (UVIKITA) in the 1970s, and was finally registered in 1988 as the AMYC. During my stay, I listened to countless amplified sermons, classes and speeches poured out over the neighbourhood (my house happened to be around the corner from their central building). Apart from their three-storey headquarters in the centre of the town, they have a religious school and a secular primary and secondary school in Msambweni (southern suburb of Tanga). In 1990, they started to publish the magazine al-Fikrul Islami, followed in September 1999 by al-Haq. The current director is Salim Barahiyan, whose sermons and publications are widely distributed in Tanga, Tanzania, East Africa and on the internet.20 Their centre is efficiently organised and close cooperation with national and international organisations makes them quite effective. Local donations of zakat (religious tax) and sadaka (charity) allow them to run an orphanage and other welfare activities, while their commercial enterprises also generate income. On the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj, the AMYC are among the largest distributors of meat. In the public space, AMYC followers are often very visible: the men wear a special shortened dress (to avoid the ritual pollution caused by the dress touching the soil, called isbaal), clipped moustaches but unrestricted growing beards, and many women are completely veiled, with some of them donning socks and gloves. The Tanga AMYC is now one among several groups loosely structured in a national movement called Ansaar Sunna. Most of these local branches have been founded by Tanzanians who studied in Saudi Arabia for a considerable period of time.

The AMYC’s major aim is moral reform: to teach Muslims the right way of the Prophet and the Salafiyya (pious ancestors). Their name, ‘Ansaar’, refers to the first ‘Helpers’ in Medina who supported Muhammad when he was expelled from his hometown, Mecca.21 Instead of fundamentalists (wenye itikadi kali) or ‘Wahhabiyya’, as they are often called, I prefer to identify them as pietists. Among many of them whom I know personally, I often found a strong personal urge for purity and piety, rather than a desire for political reform. Unsurprisingly, this often led to the creation of tension in
their family. The questions posed after mosque classes often reflected the conflicts which emerge from the wish to be pure and the necessity to live in an impure world (one of Barahiyan's sermons is published under the title "Rules regarding living in the towns of the kafirs"). Consequently, the relationship between the AMYC and the Tanzanian state is tense. In 2000, Barahiyan called on believers not to take part in the national election, a view not shared by all Muslims. In sermons and articles one often finds remarks on the illegitimate nature of the nation-state, on the corrupt situation of modern Muslims and on the current state of Islam, which has returned to a new era of moral ignorance (jahiliyya).

**c. ‘Marginal Islam’: Ahmadiyya**

In 1889, the Ahmadiyya movement started in British India with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the promised Masih. After Nuridin's death, the first successor of Ghulam Ahmad, the movement split into a Qadiani/Rabwa branch and a Lahori offshoot. This book is only concerned with the Qadiani branch, the first Muslim movement in Tanzania to use Swahili extensively. Immediately after his arrival in the 1930s, the missionary Mubarak Ahmad Ahmadi started to work on a Swahili translation of the Qur'an, which he finally published in 1953. This product challenged the Sunni reformist Saleh Farsy to deliver a "better" one in 1967. The Ahmadiyya still rely heavily on the influx of Pakistani missionaries. However, they have an active Swahili missionary, Bakri Abeid, who is the son of the well-known poet and Minister Kaluta Amri Abedi (1924-1964), who also collaborated with M.A. Ahmadi on the first Qur'an translation (Lacunza Balda 1991:31). Bakri Abeid used to live in Tanga but during my stay there he moved to Arusha. Under his inspiring guidance the movement expanded from one mosque to five congregations in the region and several more are under construction. In Tanga a small, new mosque has been erected next to the missionary's house. One teacher runs a small madrasa and daily prayers are attended by less than a dozen believers (but more on Friday). Their newspaper, Mapenzi ya Mungu ('The Will of God'), is sold at a normal newspaper stand in the centre of Tanga, and appears twice a month.

The main Ahmadiyya doctrines concern the continuing prophethood after Muhammad, although Muhammad is still seen as the most important among all prophets. A second difference between the Ahmadiyya and the Sunni fold is the former's opinion that Jesus, after a fake crucifixion, continued to live and finally died in India where he is also buried. Consequently, their ideas regarding eschatological events and the Last Day (in which Jesus
'RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS'

plays a large role according to mainstream Muslims), differs substantially from the Sunni creed. Another recurrent theme is the extent to which Muslims may embrace modern science, especially (an adapted form of) the theory of evolution. For this reason, the Ahmadiyya have had to sacrifice the idea that Adam was the first human being, contrary to what most other Muslims believe.29 In September 1974, these heretical beliefs led to their excommunication in Pakistan, and in 1984 it became a criminal offence for Ahmadiyya believers to call themselves Muslims. In Tanzania, Sunni Muslims regularly address the heretic ideas of the Ahmadiyya, but physical violence occurs only infrequently.30 In turn, Ahmadiyyas polemically address the Christian viewpoint and ritually define their identity contra Christian behaviour rather than Sunni ritual.31 Tanga Muslims are fond of the regular polemical debates organised by the Ahmadiyya and, despite their heretical position, Ahmadiyya scholars are valued for their thorough knowledge, well equipped libraries and debating skills.32

The relationship between the Ahmadiyya and the Tanzanian state is a very good one. According to the Ahmadiyya, a proper Muslim should obey the national government.33 Before their annual meetings, they receive laudatory letters from the Head of State, President Mkapa, which they publish in their newspaper. Also, the former Muslim president, Hassan Mwinyi, reacted positively to the Ahmadiyya welfare activities, education and medical services.34 In return, the Ahmadiyya community officially prays for the nation-state, and always congratulates the new president after his elections.35

d. ‘Political Islam’: the Islamic Propagation Centre (IPC)

Unlike the AMYC and the Ahmadiyya, the IPC cannot be defined in particular theological terms (cf. Chande 1998; Chesworth 2000; Loimeier, in print). Nor is the IPC a clear-cut political organisation, although their mission evidently has political overtones. They like to present themselves as an organisation of Tanzanian Muslim intellectuals, and they closely cooperate with other groups such as the writers’ collective WARSHA, the Council of Imams (Shura la Maimamu), and the Committee for the Protection of Muslim Rights (Kamati ya kutetea haki za Waislamu), and the Tanzania Muslim Professionals (TAMPRO). They started their work in the 1980s with the publication of a basic correspondence course on Islam (Elimu ya Kiislamu kwa Posta).

Only in the 1990s did the IPC turn into an important political factor due to the launching of their newspaper, an-Nuur, and their cooperation with the new institution Baraza Kuu la Jumuiya na Taasisi za Islam (Supreme
Council of Islamic Organisations and Institutes). The Baraza Kuu was estab-
lished in January 1992 as a rival organisation to the ‘official’ supreme council
for Tanzanian Muslims, BAKWATA. After 23 years of “repression and injustice”
it was high time to have a real Islamic institute defending the rights of citi-
zens, they declared in their constitution papers. At approximately the same
time, the IPC started to publish their Swahili newspaper, an-Nuur. Both the
IPC and the Baraza Kuu are similar in their goal (the emancipation of Tan-
zanian Muslims as equal citizens who make use of their civic rights) and in
their main topic: Islam provides a framework for political action; there is no
separation between religion and politics. This specific national outlook is
illustrated by the space devoted to topics related to “Islam in Tanzania.” Both
organisations have close links and the same names appear in their social
and political circles. Both have connections with the opposition party, CUF.
For instance, an-Nuur prints the CUF program every 5 years when they run
for elections. They try to achieve their goal by higher education, increasing
awareness of Muslim rights, and increasing cooperation between Islamic
groups. They publish official statements condemning state violence, prepare
manifestos and demonstrations, and produce political analyses, in addition
to the Baraza Kuu owning the radio station Kheri. Their critical points of
view often lead to their members’ arrest.

Their common enemy (the ‘Christian’ state) provides a strong sense of
identity. Consequently, the editors of an-Nuur must be careful when describ-
ing theological cleavages. For example, their attitude towards the Ansaar is
very cautious. Although many of the writers personally disagree with this
group, they occasionally offer the Ansaar some space for their Qur’anic exe-
gesis and give short reports of their Idd sermons. The main group of moral
supporters of the IPC are Sufi oriented Muslims. References to their funeral
rituals (khitma), mawlid celebrations and general information on the broth-
erhoods appear frequently in an-Nuur. Although many of the groups loosely
connected with the IPC were blamed for only cataloguing Muslim grievanc-
es without offering any solutions or counter programs, things seem to be
changing now. For example, in 2004 the Muslim Development Foundation
backed by (among others) the IPC, the Baraza Kuu and the Shura ya Maim-
amu, achieved a major success in the establishment of the Chuo Kikuu cha
Waislamu (Islamic University) in Morogoro. Other notable improvements in
the field of national Muslim development are the setting up of a radio sta-
tion and the foundation of the Bait ul Mal which should become responsible
for the central collection of Islamic tax (zakat).
4. The memory of oppression: Muslim grievances

Current Islamic discourse repeatedly lists a small collection of incidents proving that Islam is deliberately treated as inferior to Christianity, and that Muslims are secondary citizens compared to Christians. The government is depicted as separating Tanzanian Muslims from the world umma by supporting their internal fighting. This memory of oppression, as represented by (among others) the newspapers an-Nuur and Nasaha and extensively referred to in interviews, starts in the colonial period and is described as a conspiracy designed by the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC). The major enemies are identified as the Tanzanian state and, even worse, their Muslim allies such as the national Muslim council BAKWATA. According to this paradigm, the relationship between Muslims and the state has historically been troublesome, and this situation has even deteriorated in the 1990s (Van Bergen 1981, Campbell 1999, Njozi 2003, Loimeier, in print). Especially when Muslims in power, like former President Hassan el Mwinyi and the Vice President, side with the current ruling government, their attitude is criticised by their fellow Muslims. In this paragraph I present some of the relevant highlights.

In 1913, the Germans started a pig-breeding project in order to thwart Muslims and persuade Africans to develop a taste for pork (cf. Nimtz 1980:13). According to current discourse in an-Nuur and Nasaha, pigs and pork are among the major weapons through which Muslim children are bullied and brought into contact with pollution. According to this discourse the negative colonial attitude toward Muslims was perpetuated in the period after independence. For example the law of marriage and inheritance (sheria ya mirathi) was introduced during the period 1967-1971 and was perceived by Muslims to be a direct threat against the sacred law of God (Sharia). The minimum age of 18 for boys and 15 for girls may be legal for the Tanzanian courts, but for Muslims only the standards set by the Prophet are binding.

The abolishment of the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS) in 1968 and the establishment of its successor, the National Muslim Council (BAKWATA), in the same year, continue to be a bone of contention. The EAMWS was founded by the Aga Khan in Mombasa in 1945; its goal was to promote Islam, and the majority of their supporters were of Asian origin. It certainly had pan-Islamic ambitions. In 1961, it moved to Dar es Salaam, where Nyerere perceived it to be a threat to the ruling party. The banishment of the popular Sheikh Hassan bin Amir in particular angered many Muslims. With the help of the government, BAKWATA took the place of the EAMWS. Consequently, the national Muslim council became an easy target for Mus-
lims as a timid and ineffective state organ (Nimtz 1980:89–91; Chande 2000). Its ‘palm tree justice’ is ridiculed and its knowledge of Islamic Law contested (Awadh 1997). However, BAKWATA also called on the government to reinstate Islamic courts in 1987, and on the local level they do a lot of work in, for example, marriage counselling and improving slaughter facilities.

Another incident took place on the western side of the country, in Mwanza. In 1984, a gang of Sungusungu (anticrime bands functioning as a quasi-official security force in the rural areas) severely harassed a couple of Muslims. The Mwanza group reportedly polluted the Qur’an by throwing copies on the floor. To make things worse, BAKWATA Sheikh, Mufti Hemed, said that this was not a Qur’an but ‘only’ Sura Yasin. Sofia Kawawa suggested in May 1988 that the ruling party CCM should change inheritance law and abolish polygamy in order to provide more equality between the genders. In subsequent riots that year about 30 people were arrested and half of them were sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Two people in Zanzibar died in these riots. Another example: after complaining unsuccessfully about the sale of pork in their neighbourhood, Muslims attacked butcher shops in Dar es Salaam in 1993. Three slaughterhouses were destroyed and over 30 people arrested. After a long trial most of them were released. Further, a more technical accident like the sinking of the vessel MV Bukoba on 21 May 1996, killing between 800 and 1000 passengers, is also attributed to the failures of the Christian government.

In February 1998, the police killed at least two Muslims at the Mwembechai mosque in Dar es Salaam after a priest claimed that Muslims had slandered Christianity (Njozi 2001; 2003). Three years later, on 27 January 2001, the police killed between 30 and 70 people (all alleged to be Muslims) after mass demonstrations against the presidential elections on Zanzibar. In August 2001, the Muslim Dibagula was sentenced to one and a half years imprisonment because he declared that “Yesu si Mungu” (Jesus is not God). On the 13th February 2002, a policeman and a carpenter were killed during demonstrations in rememberance of the Mwembechai victims of 1998.

This discourse of oppression and marginalisation is reproduced in numerous ways. Certain key texts function as metonyms for the whole discourse. Swahili works like Sivalon’s book Kanisa Katoliki na Siasa ya Tanzania Bara 1953 hadi 1985, is continuously reworked and interpreted like a real ‘sacred’ text in order to prove the sense of Muslim marginalisation as scientifically correct. Books in this genre mainly consists of quotations of other written texts and reproductions of court rulings, letters and declarations. This text dominated discourse is further illustrated by other media and pub-
lic events. For example in the discussion about the destruction of an Islamic school in Moshi, one of the very old and feeble (wakongwe) EAMWS members was invited to relate on the same spot how the organisation was involved in founding this particular institution in the 1950s. The contrast between the EAMWS efforts in the past and the current plans for demolition of the building are used to illustrate the contemporary predicament of Tanzanian Muslims. In a similar way the Mwembechai trauma is visibly inscribed on Muslim minds by an amateur videotape shown at meetings all over the country. On this tape one of the policemen is shouting to an unwilling young colleague: Mpige yule! (Shoot him!). It seems likely that new media technologies and the urban population’s higher literacy rate make it possible to continually reproduce this mindscape. The pictures of and references to Chuki Athumani, wounded in Mwembechai and now in a wheelchair, are time and again reprinted in Islamic newspapers, even when there is no clear connection between the Mwembechai conflict and the topic of the article. However, I have also found references to “Sofia Kawawa”, “the Yasin controversy” and “the inheritance conflict” at more popular levels of discourse. For example, the AMYC preacher, Barahiyan, mentioned the marriage law in his Idd sermon in 1997 (see Appendix IV); a Tanga Maawa-l Islam teacher discussed the 1984 Yasin incident in the classroom in 2001. Even illiterate people showed a remarkably detailed knowledge on these incidents.

Despite claims that “our situation in the last 40 years has never been as bad as today,” a closer look at historical reality might reveal another picture. The invasion of mosques by police forces have occurred throughout the history of Tanzania, but in totally different circumstances. Two examples from the Tanga region: one mentioned by Jonathon Glassman (1995) which took place in Pangani in 1889 and another on 5 June 1930 in the Bohora mosque. While the first one eventually resulted in a massive rebellion supported by a large part of the society, the latter was peacefully resolved and the responsible police officers removed. None of these incidents are remembered or received a place in the collective consciousness, unlike the Mwembechai invasion. Also, the imagined ideal situation of the EAMWS, where all Muslims, regardless their tribe, colour or religious school of law, happily lived together might have been more nuanced than is remembered today. What appears to be the common denominator in the construction of this paradigm of marginalisation is the representation of the government as an active agent in some negative event. Where the actor is alien and clearly not related to the government, like the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, the event is not included in the mental landscape.
What Muslims deduce from these memorised events is that the country is ruled by *mfumo Kristo* (a Christian system), and all Islamic institutions are infiltrated by state agents. According to many of them attempts by Zanzibar to join the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) were deliberately frustrated by the Christian government in order to bar Muslims from economic development. Muslims are eager to show that the CCM government does not live up to their political adage that “the government does not have a religion” (*serikali haina dini*). In fact, even the national currency shows a Christian cross, according to the well-known preacher, Hashimu Mbonde. If there were a strict separation between church and state (*dini na siasa*), one of the hallmarks of western modernity (in theory at least), then Muslims would have more access to education, more chances to obtain better-paid jobs, and the administration wouldn’t hinder demonstrations and other expressions of religious ideas and beliefs. Instead of a neutral and secular state, according to most Muslims, the Tanzanian public sphere is Christian.

As of 1990, Islamic discourse has shown an ambivalent attitude towards the multi-party political system. On the one hand, Muslims welcomed this opportunity to share the power of decision-making. On the other hand, however, it soon became clear that parties based on ethnicity or religion were not allowed to enter the political arena. This functioned as a disadvantage for Muslims. While Christian Haya and Chagga are well represented in the government, Muslim Digo ministers are extremely rare according to the citizens of Tanga. In fact, multi-party politics were manipulated in favour of the ‘Christian’ ruling party CCM. The values of the ‘kafir civilisation’ (*utamaduni wa kikafiri*) including democratisation, multi-party politics, human rights and the free market dominate the Tanzanian state and only hide its Christian nature. According to the Islamic Tanzanian press, the introduction of the multi-party system marks another beginning of the tensions between Christians and Muslims. Most Muslims are disappointed by what the multi-party system has brought them.

Tanzanian discourse (both state and Islamic) presents the introduction of multi-party politics and the subsequent elections as a watershed separating the past from the modern present. The clashes between the state and Muslims are often explicitly linked to Tanzania’s emergence on the threshold of a new era. The new world Order, the Free Trade, Globalisation and Democracy are considered as enemies for the Islam. In the wake of the Dar Es Salaam pork-riots (1993), the Minister of Internal Affairs Augusto Mrema (a Christian, of course, the Muslim print media underlined), declared that some “elements” abused Islam and the freedom of the multi-party system to
create disorder in society. From this perceived connection between modernity and social turbulence, the call for religious unity (umoja) and cohesion (mshikamano) rather than national unity, is understandable.

However, despite the pervasiveness of this memory of oppression and the feeling that Muslims are doomed to be denied access to power, agency and development, Muslims have created some positive initiatives. In 1981, Muslims attempted to turn two schools (in Tanga and Dar es Salaam) into Muslim seminaries. Indeed, with increasing freedom for private initiatives, nowadays several seminaries exist. The AMYC has successfully integrated Islamic and secular education, and Maawa-I Islam has done the same, opening a secondary school next to their traditional madrasa. The spirit to fight this aporia is conceptualised by most Muslims as “a return to Qur’an and Sunna.” However, the way they deal with the problem is clearly modern and summarised as “Tujisaidie naye atatusaidia” (Let us help ourselves and He will help us), reflecting the adage that God helps those who help themselves.

This response is typical for a literate, modern society: the evil of division and chaos can be overcome by educated intelligence (Stock 1983:110). A contributor to a Swahili internet discussion on the Idd el-Hajj writes about the conflict which exists between different Tanzanian factions on ritual topics such as “sighting of the moon, Arafah day, mawlid Nabawiyyah, Taraweeh prayer, Dua Qunut among others.” The way to solve this problem according to this author is very modern:

to better ourselves (…) restructuring our education system, (…) building more schools, colleges, laboratories, engaging in more research, establishing our businesses, enriching our neighbourhoods, cleaning our cities and more importantly loving each other as brothers and sisters as Islam is demanding us.
4. **Local Texts:**
production, dissemination
and consumption

Within the field described in the last chapter, Tanzanian Muslims produce, distribute, read and discuss religious texts for a variety of reasons. Several elements of this process, such as the language of the texts, venues where these texts are transmitted, the audience and the form of transmission (for example, formal teaching, oral discussion, via a sermon, radio broadcast or silent reading) influence the final reception of the message. The Islamic public sphere has expanded through the use of new media (cf. Eickelman & Anderson 2003), and the rising literacy has stimulated the awareness of ‘proper’ ritual behaviour (Gaffney 1994:49), but this development also enabled the dissemination of counter ideas. New media often function in their formative period in the same way as, or only slightly complementary to, the old media. What we see, for example, is that people publish complete books in Swahili on the internet rather than create a new genre. The new media technologies increase the possibility of publishing rather than create completely new ideas. Furthermore, the new media’s impact is limited by socio-economic factors (poverty, no electricity, lack of computer skills). Perhaps the major ‘new’ medium which is highly relevant for current Islamic discourse is the regular publication of Muslim newspapers since the 1990s. In this chapter, I can only present the outlines of a very dynamic and rich textual discourse in Tanzania. In the first paragraph I present three of the major venues of textual transmission: the madrasa, the mosque and the government school. Far from being neutral places of study, each of these appears to be a place of contest and struggle for power. In the second part I give an overview of the traditional religious madrasa literature and the texts published outside this school system, such as books, pamphlets and newspapers. In the final section, the mode of transmission is central: in what sense is the academic distinction between orality and literacy relevant for understand-
ing modern Muslim discourse in Tanzania? Further, to what extent does the particular linguistic situation in Tanzania influence these discussions?

1. Venues of textual transmission

a. The madrasa

In the 19th century, the Swahili scholar Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari reflected on the work of a madrasa teacher:

Teaching children is hard work for little reward, because when children qualify, the teacher does not always get his money. More are taught for nothing than those who pay, and when a child qualifies they cheat the teacher and give him nothing.²

The same complaints were shared with me in all different kinds of expressions whenever I talked to teachers (walimu) in the town of Tanga.³ Students should pay between 200 and 300 Tanzanian Shilling (USD 0.2 – 0.3) per month, but more often than not they fail to do so. Teachers mentioned the
difficulty of forcing pupils to pay: they are supposed to do their work “in the Path of God,” that is to say, voluntarily. The 200 Shilling cannot be mentioned as a fee (ada) but a mere charity (sadaka). That means that sometimes their income is as low as 20,000 Shilling (20 USD) a month. Another teacher also received money from his retirement, and in this way increased his income to 78,000 Shilling (USD 78) a month. The most important source of income comes from individual sponsors who promise to devote their voluntary alms (sadaka) or religious income tax (zakat) to the spiritual wellbeing of the next generation.

A common madrasa day (from Sunday to Thursday) starts at around 8.30 a.m. All of the students line up in front of the porch (baraza) and recite a supplication in Arabic (dua ya kuingia). Every school has its own poem, usually composed by its founder. One of the elder students leads this chanting ritual while the children respond. Boys take up the front rows and girls are lined up behind them. The end of classes is marked by the noon-prayer. Most madrasas lack the uniform dress-code that public government schools prescribe. All girls cover their heads but only the older ones wear scarves. The full veiling which some girls wear, must be taken off within the school premises. Pupils in the lower classes carry wooden boards and pieces of chalk to write their Arabic lessons. Older pupils have their own copy of the Arabic book which they read with a tutor, and they bring paper notepads, counter books and pens for making notes. Since teachers are often late, children are supervised and set to work by older students. Most of the smaller madrasas lack classes: every student reads his individually-assigned portion of the Qur’an. The rooms are often very noisy (children recite at the top of their voices) and chairs or benches are usually absent. Many of these schools are run by a teacher or advanced student in his own house and lack an official syllabus. Better organised schools use the al-Minhaj al-dirasiy manual written by the Shamsiyya madrasa or an adaptation of this curriculum.

Pupils learn by rote and higher level students get an interlinear or word by word translation of the text. Despite the western image of this traditional education system as being old-fashioned, irrelevant according to modern standards and not very successful in terms of the actual achieved skills and competence, I found that the system was not as rigid as I had initially expected. Especially at the higher levels, there is ample room for discussion, posing questions and exchanging ideas. For example, students showed astonishment that a sacrificer is not required to face Mecca during the ritual killing. They asked questions and wrote clarifications and translations in their textbooks. Teachers started and concluded the class with a revision or mukhtasari (summary).
of the lesson. They also added information when reading the source text or explained particular statements using examples from the urban context of Tanga. For example, the matter of whether a Muslim traveller may shorten or even skip one of his daily prayers will depend, among other factors, on the distance and the environment of his journey. The teacher explained this rule by giving a real life example of someone travelling from the madrasa to the nearby village of Korogwe. This lively style (with occasional questions like 'what would happen if the car breaks down?') may also depend on individual teaching skills, but in general, I found that classes in those madrasas which I attended were geared towards understanding rather than only a reproduction of texts. Having said this, it remains true that the madrasa system is the most 'text bound' form of teaching in Tanzania. In their examinations pupils only have to show that they have mastered the particular text they have read. Knowledge of Arabic is rather passively acquired and usually comes as a by-product of intensive reading.

Children start madrasa education at approximately five years of age. After having mastered between four and six juzuu (one thirtieth part of the Qur'an) they continue with the vitabu (books): easy hadith collections, basic jurisprudence and simple Arabic secular stories. In the lower levels (up to their early teens), girls are in the majority with few exceptions. After that age, boys increasingly dominate the madrasa system, and those who actually complete the curriculum are almost without exception boys. Both girls and boys use the same texts, with the exception of books related to marriage, marital rights and child education. An example is the lower level textbook Ta’lim al-Banat (Education of the Girls) which is a girls-only subject. Most teachers are men but in madrasas for girls both male and female teachers are employed.

Education continues under individual scholars, and diplomas for teaching (ijaza) can be obtained for each subject. Only some of the Tanga madrasas offer a full 12-year course of religious education including primary (ibtida’i), middle (mutawassit), and secondary (thanawi) level. Study at Islamic Universities in Saudi Arabia is quite common, but often requires some additional (language) training before Tanzanian students are admitted. Future prospects for graduated madrasa students are bad: they either found their own madrasa or choose another career. Most madrasa teachers finished primary education up to standard VII. Some of them followed modern education till form IV in secondary school. I did not encounter any who finished the whole secondary school (cf. Chande 1998:206-209).

Six major Tanga madrasas (out of an estimated 60) are involved in continuous, small-scale ideological warfare. Chande (1998) describes how these
conflicts reflect ethnic differences rather than religious ones. The religious field in Tanga is dominated by the ethnic Segeju madrasas Shamsiyaa and Zahrau, whereas the major ethnic group, the Digo, have only one madrasa, Maawa-l Islam. During the period of my fieldwork two major collisions appeared in public. On 15 October 2000, a senior staff member of the oldest madrasa, Shamsiyaa, started his own school: Shams al-Ma'arif. Many of the smaller Shamsiyaa branches joined this new school. The extent to which this new cluster of madrasas will reflect the founder’s ethnicity (he belongs to the Digo) is difficult to predict. A second inter-madrasa conflict focused on the political affinity between the Msikiti wa Vijana Barabara 9 (Youth Mosque of the 9th street) known as MV9 and the political opposition party CUF. The Tanzania Muslim Association in Tanga (TAMTA), which is linked to the Shamsiyaa madrasa, disapproved of this political ‘revolution’ (mapinduzi) and explained their point of view in a series of letters sent to all mosques and to the police.

What is clear from these two examples is that the differences between the schools are not primarily doctrinal. All parties involved stressed that they still are on friendly terms and, emphatically, they accept each other’s invitation for the mawlid. As others have stressed before, the mawlid is the most important ritual arena to express their identity. The length of the celebration, the number of participants from the region and beyond, the status of the guest of honour, the quality of the food and the mwalimu’s skill in religious debating turn the mawlid celebration into a real contest. Starting with a common celebration on the birthday itself, during the following months all the major madrasas perform their own celebration in public. Cars and buses bring in all of the supporters from other branches. (Maawa-l Islam has 22 branches; Shams al-Ma’arif has 41; Shamsiyaa madrasa has more than 60; Zahrau claims 110 offshoots in the country.)

The link between mawlid performance and social identity sometimes leads to real violence. On one occasion, Zahrau and Shamsiyya supporters threw stones during the annual mawlid procession (Chande (1998:115). While Shams al-Ma’arif immediately accepted this tradition of ritual contest and started to celebrate another mawlid, the Digo madrasa Maawa-l Islam chose another option. Their madrasa festival is also called mawlid but they situated their ritual on the day of the Hijra: the commemoration of Muhammad’s flight from Mecca. Together with their establishment of a secondary school next to their mosque and madrasa, they have been able to carve out a special niche in this way.

Apart from the ethnic friction between the traditional madrasas (often downplayed by most Tanga citizens), more doctrinal conflicts between madrasas and the AMYC also occur. Here, it is not ethnic identity which is at stake
but the purity of the religious community itself. The major conflicts between
the AMYC and the other madrasa factions concern the status of the Prophet’s
Birthday (mawlid) and the reverence of the madrasas for local sheikhs (both
dead and alive). In the early 1990s, a conflict occurred between the al-Nisa
mosque and the AMYC, and as a consequence the latter refused to distribute
the former’s monthly magazine. Letters containing critical remarks, refuta-
tions and comments on sermons and public lectures of rival madrasas are
distributed in the AMYC magazine al-Fikrul Islami. Often, a reference to ‘taped
evidence’ (ushahidi wa kanda tunao) is included. Apart from the ongoing
discursive polemics in sermons, letters and magazines, these conflicts some-
times turn into real physical violence. During my stay, a boy was hurt when
AMYC followers tried to prevent him from ‘begging’: singing Ramadan songs
in return for money.

The second recurring theme in the AMYC-versus-madrasa conflicts
concerns the status of the sheikh (Swahili: shehe). The local sheikhs, teachers
and especially masharifu (who claim to be descendents of Prophet Muham-
mad) receive the respect of many. I once saw two students colliding on the
ground in their attempts to pick up a swirling foolscape from the teacher’s
table. Madrasa teachers approaching the school are met by pupils who take
his bicycle and luggage. Their cars, clothes and general behaviour sometimes
evoke the criticism of other Muslims who comment that ‘Sheikh so-and-so
loves the world too much’. The graves of important scholars and teachers are
the focal point of madrasa processions and their funerals are celebrated with
great splendour. However, the AMYC vehemently attacks all ideas that some
people deserve more respect than others, that some are closer to God than
others, or even that some people are above the law. The Centre once repro-
duced an invitation letter from the Shamsiyaa madrasa in which the first line
showed the name of the director, and only the second line had the traditional
opening of all Muslim epistles: Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim (in the name of
God, the Merciful, the Compassionate). According to the AMYC, it is clear that
the madrasa sheikhs pretend to deserve more respect than God Himself.

b. The mosque

Just like madrasas, mosques are not only quiet places of religious con-
templation and dissemination of divine knowledge; behind this image, the
mosque also appears as the arena of powerful clashes and contestations of
authority. The front pages of religious and other newspapers often report
on conflicts about mosque leadership. Most of the 50 mosques in Tanga
have multiple functions: a cheap hostel for poor travellers, a place for daily
worship, a political platform or a sacred restaurant. Between prayers, people can sleep in the mosque and old men quietly watch the street life. From a religious and social perspective the mosque is a male dominated place, and from time to time some Tanzanian authors (such as Muhammad Nassor Abdulla al-Qadiri) emphatically deny women any access to the mosque. In most Tanga mosques women are allowed to attend the ritual worship in a separate room or behind a curtain. However, when it comes to accessing Islamic knowledge, men and women participate equally as an audience because almost all mosque speeches are amplified by loudspeakers on the building’s roof.

On these occasions, the mosque is the place where texts are created, transmitted and explained. The mosque is a physical place where the Friday sermon, Ramadan lectures and occasionally a congress (kongamano) is situated. The best example of the mosque as a place of learning is the AMYC darsa (lesson), held three times a week in two different Tanga mosques. The darsa takes place between the sunset prayer (maghrib) and the night prayer (isha), roughly from 19.00 until 21.00 p.m. Apart from the month of Ramadan, when attendance is much higher, between 20 and 30 people usually come to the mosque to listen to Salim Barahiyan, the AMYC’s director. Barahiyan squats behind a small reading desk facing the audience. Before the lesson starts, children are allowed to demonstrate their recitation skills over the public microphone.

In every lesson a small part of a book is read, translated and discussed. During my fieldwork, the famous hadith-collection Riyad al-Salihin by Nawawi (d. 1277-78) was read in these classes, and before that, in the 1990s, the selected texts were Kitab al-Tawhid from Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdal Wahhab (1703-1792), and ‘Umda al-Ahkam by Abd al-Ghani al-Maqdisi al-Jamma’ili (1146-1203). The issues treated in the reading group are often repeated in the AMYC publication al-Haq. While the lesson is well prepared (major commentaries are quoted) the text often provides an opportunity for the group’s discussion to digress in the direction of other topics. However, the director never diverted completely and he made a steady progress of about two or three hadith per lesson.

The meeting is an occasion to provide a platform and a voice to the written text. As a real teacher, Barahiyan asks the audience to repeat the Arabic text literally. The expression maandishi yanasema… (“scriptures say…”) is a continuous reminder of the written tradition of Islamic knowledge. After the darsa there is occasion for questions and even outsiders listening in the street are exhorted to write their questions on paper if they don’t want to
enter the mosque. In many of these mosque teaching sessions, reference is made to printed books including the page numbers. Further, references to numbered hadith in these oral performances imply a printed text. A particular edition’s footnotes are read by the preacher as part of the main text, blurring the original distinction and creating a new text. Given that many of these mosque gatherings are taped and sold on the street, their influence is less ephemeral than might be assumed. Neither is this phenomenon limited to the AMYC’s Tanga mosque: I also collected several tapes of Sheikh Nassor Bachu from Zanzibar, who read the modern book Fiqh al-Aunnah by Sayyid Sabiq (1915-2000), reflecting the same kind of reading circles. Whereas the theology, teaching style and treatment of the text by Bachu and Barahiyan are very similar, the mosque classes offered by the more traditional madrasas like Zahrau more closely reflect an average madrasa lesson. The latter contain less commentary and reflection and consist primarily of translation.

c. The state school

The state-approved school system in Tanzania operates on the frontiers of politics, religion and Muslim identity. One of the major Muslim complaints concerns the perceived discrimination between Christian and Muslim
higher education. In 1981, two BAKWATA-owned schools in Tanga (Jumuiya) and Dar es Salaam (Kinondoni) turned into so-called seminaries. The word is borrowed from the Christians and denotes a “Muslims only” school attempting to integrate secular education with Islamic worldviews. The government decided to ban this experiment and forced the schools to open their doors to non-Muslims, which they did and still do. This traumatic experience continues to appear in articles on Muslim education.

Recent attempts to start Muslim seminaries have been more successful. In Tanga, the African Muslim Agency (AMA) schools al-Kheir (for girls) and Noor (for boys) are examples. In the era of liberalisation and privatisation, Muslims grasped the opportunity to establish private schools offering a state-approved curriculum. For example, a substantial part of the 341 privately-owned primary schools (December 2005) belongs to Muslims. Seven out of 18 private primary schools in Tanga are Islamic (five AMYC, two AMA). Among them, the AMYC Arafa primary school (English/Arabic medium) has the longest history in Tanga (it was registered in 1999) and its students’ performance in the national final exams is impressive. The AMYC pays more attention to religious subjects than other Muslim schools: they offer three different courses in Arabic, Qur’an and Islamic Knowledge. Jumuiya only teaches Arabic and Islamic Knowledge while Maawa-I Islam offers only Islamic Knowledge. School fees for primary education at Arafa amount to 44,000 Shilling (USD 44), whereas Jumuiya Secondary School asks parents to pay 80,000 Shilling (USD 80) a year.

While some studies suggest that madrasa education can be complementary and parallel to the government school system, I believe that both systems at the higher level are mutually exclusive. Overall, secular, ‘modern’ education has a higher status than religious schooling according to students in both schools. Many higher level madrasa students pointed out that their decision to study religion was made only when they failed to qualify for secondary education. The director of an Islamic secondary school in Dar es Salaam told me that, because both systems are no longer compatible, he also taught in primary and secondary school during the ‘Maarifa ya Uislam’ (Islamic Knowledge) classes. All of the Islamic Knowledge teachers whom I know of are also madrasa teachers. It appears that close links exist between both systems. Teaching takes place at the same hours and the demands of a secondary education leave little time for the additional burden of madrasa learning. The students I met who participate in both forms of education read with individual tutors or enrol in the madrasa linked to their own school. For example, Maawa-I Islam has both a secondary school and a madrasa on
the same premises. This facilitates arrangements for students following both programs. Out of 187 Maawa-l Islam students who answered my questions on this subject, only 31 were enrolled in both systems.29

The teaching of Islamic Knowledge in government schools is conducted according to a state-approved curriculum, although the teaching material is developed by non-governmental organisations. In the past, the Islamic Propagation Centre (IPC) published most of the schoolbooks, but more recent material has been jointly produced by the IPC and the national Muslim Council, BAKWATA. The text of the books is often written on the blackboard because none of the students are able to buy his or her own copy (sold for 3,000 Shilling (USD 3). Local organisations like the MV9 mosque in Tanga have made summaries of these books. The content of these books is careful and balanced, and shows an awareness of the complex religious situation in Tanga and Tanzania. In the case of sensitive issues like the date of the Idd el-Hajj, or the question of whether women are allowed to pray in mosques, none of the actual players in the religious field are mentioned by name. Each point of view is given and their proofs from Qur’an and Sunna are carefully presented. Other sources are quite rare but in the higher levels (form III and IV) and the A-levels (form V and VI according to the British system), more attention is given to argumentation and the refutation of, for example, atheistic reasoning. The AMYC school-books are produced by Saudi Arabian foundations such as al-Haramain (Riyadh).30

The teaching atmosphere in the government-approved schools is slightly more flexible than in the madrasa system. The class often starts with a revision of the last lesson. More general questions are allowed. When the teacher does not appear (which often happened during my fieldwork), one of the boys performs as an ad hoc preacher and gives an edifying speech. When a teacher comes in, someone shouts “Respect!” as a sign to stand up. At primary level, the acquisition of knowledge is quite passive and geared towards reproduction rather than reflection. The Qur’an class consists of recitation only and is perceived by the students as being quite boring; several pupils use this occasion to finish their homework for other subjects. However, at the higher levels I witnessed more interaction between the teacher and pupils.
Published texts

a. Madrasa literature

i. Jurisprudence from the Shafi’i school of law (fiqh)

Madrasa literature, as it is used in Tanga schools, has changed little over the last century.\(^{31}\) Based on visits to more than 25 madrasas and an analysis of school curricula, the following list gives an indication of the most commonly used titles which are relevant for the study of Idd el-Hajj rituals.\(^{32}\) Unsurprisingly, the list is dominated by the four well-known classical Shafi’i clusters with the texts (matn), commentaries (sharh) and super-commentaries (hashiya). Connections between the books are often physically expressed by publishing two or three books in one volume.

1. **al-Ghaya wa al-taqrib**, written by Abu Shuja’ al-Isfahani (d. 1197?). Its major commentary is **Fath al-qarib al-mujib** by Ibn al-Qasim al-Ghazzi, 72 pp.\(^{33}\) The super-commentary on this sharh by Ibrahim al-Bajuri (d. 1860) is often quoted in the Tanga madrasa Shamsiyya.

2. **al-Muqaddima al-hadramiyya**, written by Abdallah Ba Fadl (1446-1512), 110 pp. Also known as **Mukhtasari** in Swahili.

3. **Minhaj al-talibin**, written by Nawawi (d. 1277-78). Goes back to the Muharrar by Rafi’i (d. 1226)\(^{34}\) and Ghazzali (d. 1111). However, these two titles themselves are never mentioned. Rather, references are made to two other commentaries based on the Minhaj: **Tuhfa al-muhtaj**, by Ibn Hajar, is the most popular of the two, followed by **Nihaya al-muhtaj**, written by Muhammad al-Ramly (d. 1595), which is well-known and often quoted without title (“al-Ramly says…”).

4. **Qurra al-‘ayn**, written by Malibari (ca. 1567). Its major commentary is **Fath al-mu’in** (written by the 16th century South Indian scholar Zayn ad-Din al Malibari, student of Ibn Hajar) and famous super-commentaries are **l’ana al-talibin** (Sayyid Bakri, d. 1893) and **Tarshih al-mustafidin** (‘Alawi al-Saqqaq, d. 1916).\(^{35}\) The commentaries are more popular than the original.

Surprisingly absent in this list is the **Kitab al-irshad** cluster (including the commentaries by Ibn Hajar al-Haytami and others).\(^{36}\) Although the book is quoted in the Swahili literature, it took me a long time before I could finally buy a copy.\(^{37}\) None of the madrasa teachers mentioned the title to me. Perhaps its different character (it is a collection of hadith rather than a real work on jurisprudence) makes it less suitable as a classroom manual.
The shared characteristic of these Shafi'i ‘families’ is their canonical status, which is demonstrated by many quotations and the fact that no Swahili translations exist. Also typical is that the *matn* is never used in the madrasa environment, with an easier commentary being chosen instead. The books are expensive (more than 3,000 Shilling or USD 3) and bookshops usually only have one copy in stock. Not yet a classic, but rapidly gaining wider acceptance, is the Shafi'i manual *Yaqut al-nafis fi madhhab Ibn Idris*, written by al-Sayyid Ahmad b. Umar al Shatiri al ‘Alawi al Husayni al Tarimi. My copy was printed around 1990 but the Dar es Salaam library has a 1948 edition.

A second group of Arabic madrasa literature consists of small text books produced outside East Africa but often translated into Swahili, and which are cheaper than the above-mentioned canonical works.


3. *Mabadul fiqh*, written by Umar Abd al-Jabbar (n.d.). The Arabic text is published in 4 volumes (containing 16, 32, 55 and 64 pages respectively) and was compiled by a modern Indonesian author (cf. Van Bruinessen 1990:249). Al-Jabbar is a popular author in Tanzania; his works on the Prophet’s biography (*Khulasat nur al-yaqin*) are also best-sellers. References to Indonesia found in the original Arabic text are replaced in the Swahili translation by the Zanzibari Majid, *Misingi ya kifiqhi* (vol II, 35 pp).


7. *Riyad al-Badi’a*, written by Muhammad bin Suleiman Hasballah (1817/1818-1916/1917). Printed in Singapore, 55 pp. Also common are the Kenyan pirated editions (originally printed in Kota Baru), sold for 600 Shilling or USD 0.6. Several East African scholars studied with Hasballah, among them the famous Ahmed bin Muhammed Mlomry (1873-1936).

8. *Matn Umda al-Ahkam*, written by Abd al-Ghani al-Maqdisi al-Jamma’ili (1146-1203), printed in India, 128 pp, contains all the five pillars from *tahara* (purification) to the *hajj* (pilgrimage) and the final 50 pages deal with social, financial and dietary issues.

A third group of fiqh used in the schools consists of even easier Arabic textbooks, with complete vocalisation to facilitate reading by non-native speakers. The material is usually offered in the form of questions and answers, allowing for easy memorisation. This group of madrasa literature functions as an introduction to the above-mentioned canonical works. The major producer in this group is the Tanga madrasa Shamsiyya. I mention here:

1. *al-Mukhtasar al-saghir fi ma la budda li kulli muslim*... (anonymous, Delhi, 32 pp).
2. *Risalatan* (two treatises, 13 pp) on basic *salat* postures.
5. *Hidayatul atfal*, written by Amin b. ‘aly al-Mazrui (1890-1949; Mombasa, 64 pp. Cf. Lacunza Balda 1989). Perhaps this title is the most important book in this cluster. The Swahili editions (both in Latin and Arabic scripts) are also sold in Tanga.
It is very likely that references to some of these books would be made in a discussion on the street or in an answer to a particular question. It is also this group of literature that starts to reflect local sensitive issues, often in footnotes.

Plate 4: Bel Hassan, a Tanga madrasa director, in his library

ii. prophetical traditions (hadith)

Apart from the works on jurisprudence, the collections of prophetic sayings are also an important source for Tanzanians. Hadith instruction in primary and secondary school is by rote but the translation is given once or twice. In tests usually only the Arabic is asked and not the Swahili translation. During the whole year, but especially on Idd holidays, hadith-contests take place throughout the country. Major organisers are the Tanzanian Mus-
lim Hajj Trust and the Africa Muslim Agency. In discussions of the Idd el-Hajj, the following *hadith* compilations are essential:

5. *Hadith al-arba‘in*; The famous 40 *hadith* by Nawawi (1233-1278). See, for example, the copy which includes a Swahili translation by Saidi Musa. New anthologies from Nawawi are still produced, like *Hadithi za Mtume Muhammad* (Harith Swaleh).
6. *Bulughul maram*, also by the same author, Nawawi. I bought a Mombasan edition, 352 pp., printed in India.

iii. *other schools and other subjects*

A superficial reading of the listed titles suggests that 1) all of the Islamic texts used in the madrasas are based on Shafi‘i material, and 2) that *fiqh* and *hadith* education constitute the core of scholarship. Neither of these ideas is completely true. The anthropology of subjects related to Muslim texts should go beyond an analysis of formal education. It is true that most of the works cited here are squarely placed within the boundaries of the Shafi‘i school of law, neglecting the Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi and other schools. But in discussions with scholars, books from other factions are also mentioned. The two most important sources are Ibn Rushd’s work *Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid*, an overview of all major schools of law on *fiqh*, and the compact manual *Fiqh al-Sunnah* by the late Egyptian, Sayyid Sabiq (1915-2000). Further, specialist works like a book on female
Islamic Law (*Fiqh al-mar’a al-Muslima*) is used in the Tanga madrasa Irshad al-Muslimin in their course for elderly women but is not limited to Shafi’i jurisprudence. In their *tafsir* course, the Munawwara madrasa in Tanga used the famous gloss on the Jalalayn exegesis by the Maliki scholar, linguist and Sufi, Ahmad Sawi (d. 1241 H./1825). Ahmadiyya *fiqh* is mainly based on the Hanafi school of law and this influence is particularly strong in their rituals.

The Hanbali school of law is a different case because their influence reached the Tanzanian scene via the famous reformer, Abd al-Wahhab. Current books from Saudi Arabia reflect these Wahhabiyya doctrines which are often close to the traditional Hanbali point of view, although in theory their creed transcends all schools of law. The influx of Hanbali-influenced books from the African Muslim Agency and Saudi material is visible, including, for example, the *Muqarrar tawhid wa al-fiqh wa al-hadith*, published by the Saudi ministry of religious affairs, and the book *al-Bayan al-matlub li-kaba’ir al-dhunub*, by Abdullah Bin Jarillah Ibrahim Al Jarillah. A good example of the lower level Saudi teaching material is *al-Tawhid wa al-fiqh li-al-saffa al-awwal al-ibtida’iya* (1998). Most of these books are limited to the AMYC environment, but they also circulate in other madrasas. For example, the classical book by Abd al-Wahhab, *al-Qawl al-mufid fi adillat al-tawhid* (San’a 1993), was shown to me by a mainstream madrasa teacher. Another example is Sheikh Zubeir Ally who owns the Boraska madrasa in Tanga. When I talked to him, he referred to the book *al-‘Udda*, by Bahauddin al-Maqdisi. This is a Hanbali commentary on the well-known work *al-Umda* by Abd Allah Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi (1147-1223). Zubeir Ally’s choice of this work might be indicative for his ten-year stay at the Islamic University of Medina. In the same category are the books written by Ibn Taymiyya and Saleh ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan (1933–). The modern book on child-rearing, *Tarbiya al-awlad fi al-Islam*, by the Saudi professor of Qur’anic exegesis Abdullah Nasih ‘Ulwan, is stocked by most Tanzanian bookshops. The fact that two editions are sold (a luxury edition together with a relative cheap copy) might indicate that there really exists a market for the title.

*Fiqh* and *hadith* are only two of the subjects taught in religious schools, and perhaps they are not the most important. When I asked about the madrasa curriculum, all teachers responded that their main textbook was the Msahafu (the Qur’an; but note that some Christians can also refer to the Bible with the same word). Muslims refer to their madrasa education not by mentioning the number of years they completed but in relation to the number of parts of the Qur’an they managed to master, for example “juzu tatu tu” (just three parts). It is therefore not surprising that after the Qur’an most madrasa teachers elaborate
on the Qur’an exegesis (tafsir). More than 11 Swahili commentaries are available at this moment, but most of them have not been completely published. The most popular complete tafsir is Saleh Farsy’s Qurani Takatifu; whereas Juzu’ ya kwanza by Machano Makame is a popular incomplete tafsir.\textsuperscript{45} Basic Arabic language and grammar is taught in al-Jadid and Nahaw al-wadih. More elaborate books on language include the Matn al-ajrumiyya and its commentary, Kawakib al-duriya. Mawlid poems and related subjects are treated in Thawarat al-Jamia (a commentary on the classical Barzanji poem) and Sint al-durar. Most madrasa students know the latter by heart. The Prophet’s biography is taught from the Khulasatu Nurilyaqin (Swahili) and its Arabic original. Devotional literature in the madrasa is represented by the books Wasilatayn (intercession prayers) and Tayyib al-asma’ (on the names of God). Common books about teaching, learning and discipline include Ta’lim al-mutallim’ by al-Zarnuji (lived about 1203).

b. Non-madrasa literature

i. books

Although the madrasa is by far the most conspicuous place where formal Islamic knowledge is passed on, madrasa literature is not the only form of text produced. In all of the discussions treated in this book, at some point or another reference was made to one of these authoritative madrasa texts. However, many, if not most, Islamic texts are produced, bought and read outside the madrasa. While most scholarly attention is directed to the literature used in the madrasa,\textsuperscript{46} other fields of textual production should not be neglected. While classical madrasa manuals are not usually interactive, other texts are. We have already noted that the small introductory books used at the lower madrasa levels often include references to local practices, social situations and the opinion of local scholars. This connection between real life and written texts is even more obvious in extra-madrasa publications: books and newspapers.

In order to obtain an impression of what kind of books people want to read, I compared the madrasa curriculum lists with the sales administration of a Tanga bookshop covering the years 2000 to early 2002. Furthermore, I asked three vendors to provide me with a list of the 20 most popular books. Unsurprisingly, the sale of Arabic books closely resembles the madrasa book list mentioned above. New titles in this list are: al-Adhkar wa al-awrad (devotional manual), Mawa’idha baligh (devotional exhortations from the Zabur); and Hidayat mustafid (on language). The Swahili list is more revealing. Most
of the popular books have devotional value: twelve of the 20 titles deal with supplication (du‘a) and prayer (salat). Four books on marriage, sex and children must be mentioned. The third category consists of translations from the Arabic best-sellers related to the madrasa setting. A final category is polemic/apologetic and is represented by the title *Uislamu katika Biblia* (on the topic of so-called ‘comparative religion’).

This list seems to give a good indication of the nature of Swahili book production if I make a comparison with my personal list of 681 Swahili titles. Here also prayer, supplication and devotion rank very high (cf. Rippin & Knappert 1986:95-97). Titles in the next section of the cluster consist of ‘bodily’ topics like marriage, sexual reproduction, children and clothes. The polemical literature (some 35 titles) seems to be more popular among the authors than the audience. The same applies for biographies: 53 collected Swahili titles on the biography of Prophet Muhammad, other prophets, or local scholars are hardly sold, according to the book vendors. In one shop I found more than 20 unsold copies of Saidi Musa’s book on his teacher *Maisha ya al-Imam Sheikh Saleh Farsy* (printed in 1986). Scholars’ private libraries reflect another strand of books: practical guides for healing and magic. Arabic titles are the most important for this purpose but English publications like *Napoleon’s Book of Fate* were also shown to me. Within madrasas I also found anti-semitic works like *The Protocols of Zion* and fake anthologies from Talmudic sources like *The Jews* (compiled and collected by al-Mujahid, published by Jason ltd, no date).

Most commonly, people buy books from bookshops and semi permanent bookstalls near mosques. Tanga has six selling points. The AMYC has its own store, and they run a copy shop and sell stationary in the same building. Bwana Masoud also has stationary for sale, as well as books, in front of the bus station. By the newspaper stand near the bus station, the only outdoor salesman is active. An Indian business-man in the centre has a lively shop selling electric hardware, mattresses and also Islamic books. He has a well-equipped stock on Arabic magic. Two other shops are located near the Friday mosque. Finally, the Shamsiyya madrasa has its own shop on their premises, mainly offering school-books for sale. Four out of these six selling points have a secondary line of business to earn a living.

Most Islamic books are original or pirated editions from the Indian Ocean area: Oman, Indonesia, India, and many from Mombasa (Kenya). Western and southern influences are much rarer. South Africa is represented by a few Swahili translations of Deedat’s organisation IPCI in Durban (cf.
A brisk trade in Islamic material takes place from Tanzania to Mozambique and the Congo/Uganda. Local production is often a matter of private instigation: an author writes a book and takes the manuscript to a copy shop where it is typed and bound. Then he takes a couple of copies to local bookstores where a deal is made on the percentage he gets if the book is sold. A prolific writer like Saidi Musa complained to me that many bookshops reproduced his books without paying him anything. Advertisements in newspapers warn readers against buying pirated editions. Sometimes a rich merchant sponsors a particular (often devotional) publication and has his name written in the preface. Publications can be devoted to a deceased parent or sheikh and the readers are asked to pray *Sura al-Fatiha* for them. The translator’s note (*neno la mfasiri*), preface (*dibaji*) or introduction (*utangulizi*) contain interesting material. The author or translator often starts with the pious formula *Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim* (in the name of God, the Merciful and the Compassionate), adds a poem (*shairi*), asks his readers for a prayer, and praises the Prophet Muhammad. Until recently, libraries neglected this ‘grey’ literature in their systematic collections. Also, scholarly work on extra-madrasa literature is still rare (Kaungamno & Ilomo 1979; Knappert 1996; Stringer 2002). Despite a few partial studies in this field, the history of the Islamic (Swahili) press and book production has yet to be written.

ii. **newspapers**

Although some studies exist on Swahili printed materials and their collection (Kayoka 2001; Scotton 1990; Sturmer 1995), Islamic newspapers seem to attract even less attention than books. While madrasa literature reflects the ideal rituals and beliefs, newspapers (*magazeti, vijigazeti, vikaratasi, majorida*) mirror debates, contestations and conflicts which makes them excellent research material. Occasionally, *an-Nuur* requests contributions from Christian writers to respond to particularly sensitive issues. Newspaper articles often refer to earlier publications or critically respond to authors in the same newspaper. This interaction is often enhanced by the editor who adds the word *jibu* (answer) in the heading if it refers to an ongoing discussion. Also, the poems (*mashairi*) printed in newspapers contain *maswala* (questions) and *majibu* (answers). Poem contests in newspapers continue a long Tanzanian tradition of oral ritual debating through poetry (Glassman 1995: 161; Mutembei 2001; Amidu 2004). Newspapers are used in sermons and mosque classes, as I witnessed in the AMYC *darsa*.\(^{51}\)
A general characterisation of the Islamic newspaper genre is difficult, but I will offer a few remarks (cf. Bibliography). The language of publication is predominantly Swahili although bilingual editions exist (for example *al-Imam* is published in English/Swahili; *al-Islam* from the Islamic Foundation is an English magazine with some Swahili articles; *al-Islaam*, published by the student organisation MSAUD, also accepts articles in both languages). The most frequently appearing newspaper used to be *an-Nuur* (twice a week on Tuesday and Friday) but nowadays it appears only on Friday. At the same time, its internet edition has been discontinued and the number of pages has dropped from 16 to 12. Other newspapers appear on a weekly basis (*Nasaha*), twice a month (*Mapenzi ya Mungu*) or as a quarterly journal (*al-Islam*). Newspapers are sold for 100-200 Shilling or USD 0.1-0.2 a copy, and the seller receives 15%. Some people offer half the price and read the paper in front of the stand, before returning the copy for it to be sold again.

The content of newspapers is not religious in the same way that a madrasa book can be said to be religious: rather, it offers a view on current affairs through a specific Islamic lens. “Gazeti hili ni shekhe” (this newspaper is a sheikh) echoes the adage “le journal c’est un monsieur” and expresses the editor’s wish to function as a religious beacon of wisdom. Like a sheikh, it should pass on knowledge found in books and transmit it to readers who do not master Arabic. It contains some ‘lessons’ on hadith and Qur’an, but most of these papers also contain cartoons and some even have a sports page. The most important part in these newspapers is the Editorial (maoni yetu, taharakiri) which sometimes takes up more than a full page. Personal experience is rarely reflected in newspapers although individual opinion is present in the letters to the editor. Shi’ites and Ahmadiyya believers publish conversion narratives in their magazines; the latter even have a regular column called “How I joined the Ahmadiyya”. *An-Nuur* and *Nasaha* are the major channels of communication between Tanzanian Muslims. Examination results, information on school enrolment, invitations for lectures and requests for funds or marital partners are substantial elements in these papers. Most newspapers contain questions and answers, but ‘official’ fatwas are very rare. This has to do with the contested status of religious authority: each self-declared mufti may produce his own legal statements through his own media. The BAKWATA mufti issues fatwas on the radio, but no written collection exists. Saleh Farsy (Kenya) issued fatwas and the Sufi sheikh, Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, also concluded one of his books with a so-called fatwa.

Freedom of the press in Tanzania is slowly developing despite occasional crackdowns and arrests of journalists. Officially, the government still
has the power to ban the publication of newspapers. Islamic booksellers told me that *an-Nuur* regularly becomes the victim of this state censorship but I was unable to have this confirmed by the Ministry of Information. They also complained that the government refuses to advertise in the critical *an-Nuur*, thus withholding a substantial source of income. Nevertheless, even the state-owned *Daily News* and *HabariLEO* are sometimes quite critical towards the government politics.

### 3. Language of transmission

#### a. Arabic and Swahili

The two major languages used for the production and dissemination of Islamic texts are Arabic and Swahili. In general, Arabic is more exclusive and is associated with Islamic worship, whereas Swahili is more often used as the language of instruction, argumentation and polemics. Arabic is perceived as being closer to the religious truth, and newspapers quote religious sources in Arabic using Arabic script. In addition, in the mosque all quotations from the Qur’an and some *hadith* are recited in Arabic. The *salat* and certain parts of the sermons should be in Arabic, and this is often mentioned by Muslims as one of the factors cementing the Islamic world-community together. Although the knowledge of Arabic is not a condition *sine qua non* for teaching religion, many Tanzanians claim that it is. The extradited and controversial figure Professor Hamza Malik was accused (among other things) of not knowing Arabic and Swahili, a de facto excommunication from the Islamic and the Tanzanian community. The Ahmadiyya press insists on printing the name of the cultural capital in Tanzania as “Dar us Salaam” instead of the common Dar es Salaam. Their reason for doing so is derived from rules of Arabic pronunciation. Perhaps Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s claim that all languages derive from the original Arabic has influenced their orthography.

The use of Arabic often evokes strong emotions. Whereas both Swahili and Arabic are used for debate and polemics, the latter language is reserved for the most heated discourses. For example, the debates between the Ahmadiyya and the Ahsaaf Sunna in Dar es Salaam often make use of Arabic, and the Shamshiyah *madrasa* in Tanga attacks its opponents through Arabic-language publications. Some Muslims object to non-Muslims using Arabic greetings and the Swahili greeting *shikamoo* by Muslims is also condemned. It seems that both languages are assigned to specific domains and that trespassing boundaries can threaten the sacred domain associated with Arabic. A tourist pamphlet on
Zanzibar caused upheaval because of the use of Arabic print in association with corrupted western activities. A bookseller in Garissa (northern Kenya) refused to sell me Arabic books because I was a non-Muslim (regardless of the books’ content), while he had no objections to my purchasing Swahili texts. The ritual use of Arabic is essential not only in practices like the funeral rites (khitma) and akika; but also in the Swahili New Year (siku ya mwaka) and in parts of the Idd el-Hajj. In these rituals, the Arabic language is not used to make people understand the ritual, but rather the performance and the speech act itself is central. The Swahili verb ‘to read’ (kusoma) is synonymous with the ritual recitation of particular texts. Kumsomea maulidi or kumsomea hakiki means to read the mawlid text or some prayers associated with the akika on behalf of someone. However, Arabic as a medium of instruction is highly valued: many people mastering Arabic refuse to buy or read Swahili religious books and perceive them as secondary.

Plate 5: Muslim shop owner in Shinyanga, selling books and shrouds

Some of these ‘sacred’ connotations of the Arabic language have been transferred to Swahili in the course of history. For a long time, Swahili has been perceived to be the medium of Islam and many Christian missions have therefore opted to use a local ethnic language rather than Swahili to convey the message of the Gospel (Roger 1998:27-28). In writing, Swahili has made use of Arabic script for a long time, thus underlining its link with Islamic cul-
ture. The minutes of the Tanganyika Muslims Students Federation meeting held on 4 September 1950 mention as one of their resolutions that “in the interest of Islamic Culture Arabic Script in the Swahili language be encouraged as far as possible.” The Colonial Administration’s reaction was negative: the Director of Education thought “this would be a retrograde step” and he drew attention to the example of Turkish students who also abolished the usage of Arabic script in favour of ‘modern’ Latin letters. Most of the Swahili booklets show a distinctive ‘Islamic’ language and spelling; they not only contain many more Arabic loanwords but also use an orthography which is closer to Arabic pronunciation than to standard Swahili. In fact Muslims like to stress the similarities between the role of Arabic for the Muslim umma and the significance of Swahili for the African Muslims.

Now that Swahili has achieved the status of a national language and literacy in this language is increasing, the medium functions as the major vehicle for edification, instruction and polemics. Here the function is to pass on knowledge of a different kind: knowledge that should be acted upon. People should change their behaviour, should be edified and renew their religion. That is the reason why the Friday sermon is increasingly held in Swahili, and people select a mosque on this criterion (Chande 1998:208). Most of the texts used to prepare the Tanzanian pilgrim for the annual hajj are in plain Swahili with no Arabic quotations at all. However, when the topic is of a polemical nature, Arabic is used to reflect the authority and knowledge of the author. The text on one of the hajj tapes was completely in Swahili, except the part where the problematic topic of the grave visit (ziyara al-qubur) was treated: there, the Arabic quotations served to transmit more than plain information. The elaborated moon-sighting discussion on the Swahili internet-fora uses Arabic citations, but the authors almost never succeed in representing the Arabic letters in a readable format for common internet browsers. No one bothers about this because Arabic here functions only as a subsidiary tool, not essential for the dissemination of ideas but rather to prove the writers’ skills and the source’s overall trustworthiness. Other polemical and edifying texts skip the Arabic typography of the quotations and give detailed references to book titles, pages and numbers of hadith. Both methods might have the same function of convincing the audience to trust the speaker/writer and believe his message. These techniques can only function properly if the audience has access to the (Arabic) sources; but without that it is still a powerful tool to establish authority based on textual knowledge.

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Reformists are among the first who start to use vernacular language to pass on their message (Loimeier 2003). Not surprising, the first Swahili translations of the Qur’an were produced by a Christian missionary and the Ahmadiyya sect! Anderson (2002) shows how the vernacular printing-press functioned in constructing the new imagined community of the nation-state. In this study I will suggest that Swahili literacy has democratised the Idd el-Hajj discourse and has opened the floor for a broad, community-wide debate, partly circumventing the ‘traditional’ madrasa texts. A madrasa education and a knowledge of Arabic are no longer essential to participate in the discourse on ritual practice. Swahili has become an important tool in the transmission of Islamic knowledge, although writers acknowledge the superiority of Arabic. Conversion stories as told in the Ahmadiyya newspaper reflect the importance of the Swahili literature for converts. The same applies for people who decide to change the day of the Idd el-Hajj celebration (chapters 7 and 8). They also claim that they were convinced to convert by Swahili language sermons and books. It appears that the (Arabic) truth comes in the cloak of vernacular languages.

b. Orality and Literacy

The topics raised in this chapter make clear that the relation between text and (ritual) behaviour is multifaceted and complicated. It is far more complex than reading a madrasa text, extracting the rules, and implementing them. In fact, it often remains difficult to say exactly how textual knowledge is passed on. For example, I witnessed highly sophisticated discussions between Christians and Muslims on topics of the Trinity, but tracing the arguments to a particular Islamic textual tradition is often impossible. In this book I will often refer to texts, although I recognise that other media such as music, radio and the internet often deserve just as much attention (cf. Askew 2002). However, even these oral media are often influenced by a ‘scriptural mentality’: a pervasive sense that texts reveal an objectified truth. Walter Ong (2000) saw this mentality as a major condition for the development of logic and abstract thinking. Scriptural religions like Judaism, Christianity and Islam represented a higher development than oral religions. However, the idea that these religions are ‘text based’ must be scrutinised and may not hold true for every Jewish, Christian or Islamic group (as shown by Engelke 2004).

In light of the orality/literacy debate in the social sciences we must emphasise that there is no ‘great divide’ between oral and written modes of transmission, but rather that they represent two extremes of a fluid con-
The madrasa education as described above represents the ‘scriptural’ end: the idea that truth exists and is revealed in Arabic texts. Historical and geography have become possible only through the medium of (Arabic) texts. The life of the Prophet, his victories and sufferings have been immortalised through Islamic writings (cf. Goody 1971:461). Discussions regarding the correct calendar and date of the Idd cannot be imagined without the existence and use of texts. Not only Arabic, but also Swahili writing and reading newspapers, books and other texts create a ‘textual community’ (the terminology is from Stock 1983) and evoke the awareness of a community transcending the here and now. The intimate connection between Swahili and the virtues of the Tanzanian nationstate has almost religious characteristics. Legal texts and official documents are the secular counterparts to Qur’an and hadith. Trust in national law (sheria) has many similarities with the belief in Islamic Law (Sharia). Although the languages differ, the common denominator of both communities is their faith in a textual revelation.

In both textual communities (Swahili and Arabic) information, knowledge and wisdom is primarily perceived as scriptural and completely detached from ‘irrelevant’ elements like the context and the author. On this level, only truth and falsehood exist:

We all read books of secular knowledge (elimu dunia) not to follow the author but because of the Knowledge (Elimu) which is inside [note the usage of upper and lower case in elimu/Elimu, GCvdB].

Reading the Qur’an, according to this literate conception of truth, is only useful when it is accompanied by understanding the knowledge contained inside. This idea of text as a container substantially differs from the perception of Qur’an reading my neighbour showed during Ramadan. Before his daily routine of roasting groundnuts and selling them near the busstand he devoted some time to reading the Qur’an in front of his room. Even without ‘understanding’ the text, the act of silently reciting the sacred words in the sacred month was a good start of the day.

However, as in most societies, the interaction between people is mostly oral. Sermons are oral in most cases, albeit this is an orality based on texts, the so-called secondary orality. Discussions on the street are oral, and the preparation of pilgrims is mostly oral as well. There is a distinction between orally and textually transmitted knowledge. Arts and crafts belong to the oral end of the spectrum while madrasa knowledge belongs to the
The two rituals discussed in chapter 5 (siku ya mwaka and the akika) are mostly orally discussed, while the Idd el-Hajj for a large part makes use of textual modes of communication. However, none of them is purely textual or only oral. In many religious and ritual contexts, recitation is privileged over the written text, but this cannot be labelled as a distinctive characteristic of an oral society (Messick 1996:24 against Ong and Goody). Orality and literacy continue to exist side by side.

In line with the work of, for example, Street (1984; 1993), in this study I emphasise the aspects of ideology and the agendas of the different actors in the religious field more than the essentialised image of ‘orality’ and ‘literacy’ as two completely divided states of being. Accusations of insufficient knowledge of Arabic (in religious discourse) and Swahili (in secular discourse) tell us more about the factional debates than about the ignorance of the accused. The subsequent discussions in this book explore the ways in which information in textual discourses on the Idd el-Hajj cannot be read without having the authors in mind, as is the case in oral communication.
5. **Local Rituals**

In this final introductory chapter we turn to the local discourse of Islamic sacrificial rituals. Actors in specific local contexts talk, write and moralise about the proper performance of rituals. In the process, they use the authority ascribed to Islamic texts as they simultaneously create new texts in Arabic and Swahili, both oral and written. In the first part of this chapter we will analyse the ways in which Tanzanians talk and write about the Idd el-Hajj: what are the most common names of the festival, and how do they linguistically identify the practices on the Idd? In the second part we turn our attention to a Swahili New Year’s ritual called *Siku ya Mwaka* (Day of the Year). Approximately the same ritual is also performed in times of crisis. Although the ceremony lacks any scripturally based authority, participants perceive many of the ritual elements as being Islamic. In the final part we describe the *akika* ritual in two different manifestations: an ‘orthodox’ birth ritual and a ‘local’ funeral custom. This book’s central question (the relation between text, ritual and identity) leads to different answers in relation to the *Siku ya Mwaka* and the *akika* rituals. Each of these rituals creates their own imagined community, but at the same time the topics of the ritual discourse show similarities with the Idd el-Hajj discussions in this book.

### 1. Local descriptions of the Idd el-Hajj

#### a. The day of the Idd el-Hajj

Scholars have too often neglected ritual terminology in Muslim societies, as observed by Denny (1985: 77). Although the Arabic words for the sacrificial feasts *‘Id al-Adha* (Sacrificial Feast) or *‘Id al-Kabir* (Major Feast) are extensively used all over the world, local Islamic communities often refer to the holiday with their own term in a vernacular language or popular transcription such as *Bakri Eid* (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan), *Kurban Bayramı* (Turkey) or *Tabaski* (West Africa) (Grunebaum 1951:63). By neglecting these local names in favour of the ‘real’ Arabic word for the ritual, as often occurs, important
information is lost which is necessary to understand its local practice and meaning.

In Tanzania, the most common word for the Islamic holiday is the general word *Sikukuu* (Great Day) or Idd. The label *sikukuu* includes national holidays and religious, non-Islamic feasts like Easter and contested Islamic festivities like the *mawlid* (the Prophet’s birthday). *Sikukuu* is therefore an inclusive term which hides underlying debates and controversies. Idd (from the Arabic *’id*: feast, holiday) on the other hand is exclusive: only the Idd el-Hajj (Arabic: *’Id al-Adha*) at the end of the *hajj* and the Idd el Fitr (Arabic: *’Id al-Fitr*), at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan, are called Idd in Swahili. In some specific contexts, Idd may also be used for the weekly holy day (Friday), but this is reserved for highly theological discourses. Idd is a Swahili word, despite its clear Arabic origins. It can be used in a redundant combination alongside the Arabic term: *Sherehe za Idd Eid-el-Fitr* (celebration of the holiday *’Id al-Fitr*), for example. The use of Idd to refer to Christian holidays is very rare but sometimes appears in connection with Easter and especially Good Friday, the Christian equivalent of the Muslim ‘Sacrificial Feast.’

I have found the following five semantic cores which Muslims use to indicate the Sacrificial Feast in Swahili discourse:

1. *Idd el-Hajj* (festival of the *hajj*)
2. *Idd ya mfungo tatu* (the Idd of the third month after Ramadan)
3. *Iddul Adhha* (derived from the Arabic words for the pilgrimage sacrifice *adha* and *udhiyya*)
4. *Siku ya kuchinja* (day of slaughtering), *Idd ya kuchinja* (Idd of slaughtering), *Idd ya dhabihu* (Idd of the sacrifice)
5. *Siku ya vijungu* (day of the dishes), a concept used to indicate the ritual meal together with deceased ancestors in the period of the final nine days before the Idd al-Hajj. Sometimes the whole ten-day period (including the Idd) is called *siku za vijungu* (days of the dishes).

The first two names are by far the most popular. Idd el-Hajj refers to the pilgrimage to Mecca, and connects the local festivity with the ritual in Saudi Arabia. In the rest of this book, it will become clear that the link between *hajj* and Idd is significant in the attribution of meaning to the festival. *Idd ya mfungo tatu* is a common expression among non-educated, non-reformist Muslims, and its terminology focuses on the time of the festival, rather than on the sacrificial act itself. This name immediately reveals the contested nature of the ritual calendar since ‘the third month’ (*mfungo tatu*) refers to a local time calculation rather than the universal Islamic calendar in which the Idd el-Hajj is
the twelfth month. *Iddul-adhha* is a word borrowed from Arabic and is usually heard and read in 'higher' Islamic discourse: textbooks, reformist pamphlets, *fiqh* discussions in newspapers, etc. Its unfamiliarity forces writers to translate and explain the word. *Siku ya kuchinja* is a more or less literal translation of the third term (*Iddul adhha*) and focuses on the act of slaughtering. Together with *Idd ya kuchinja* and *Idd ya dhabihu*, the (ritual) throat cut is central to these expressions. Finally, *siku ya vijungu* is very rare and refers to a customary practice rapidly disappearing from Islamic written discourse.

b. The rituals of the Idd el-Hajj

In local oral discourse among friends, family and neighbours, the most common verbs which are used to refer to the Idd el-Hajj are ‘praying’ (*kusali Iddi*) and ‘eating’ (*kula Iddi*). This should not surprise us given that most Tanga citizens do not participate in any form of ritual sacrifice. The Idd prayer (and subsequent attendance of the sermon) followed by a copious meal are important religious and social events that identify the Idd as a holiday. Therefore praying and eating at the wrong time and in the wrong social and religious contexts lead to heated debates in the Tanzanian Muslim community, as this book will show. However, if we read ethnographic studies of this festival it is not the praying and the eating that are most prominently present, but rather the slaughtering of the animal. In this paragraph, we discuss some of the terms and expressions which are used in relation to ritual slaughter.

As we have seen in chapter 2 the term ‘sacrifice’ has little explanatory value when discussing the Islamic Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania; indeed, ‘sacrifice’ as an act of ‘making sacred by killing’ does not even have an equivalent in Swahili. The consecration of the act and the animal to God by pronouncing His name is essential, but God’s name is invoked several times throughout the day in a similar way without marking special ‘sacred’ events. Although Middleton (1992:180) comments that “at the heart of Swahili religion lie the rites of sacrifice and purification,” his corresponding footnote only refers to Chelhod (1955). It is unclear how a study intended to shed light on early sacrificial practices in the Arabian Peninsula can contribute to our understanding of Swahili ritual. In his overview of sacrificial rituals, Middleton excludes the Idd el-Hajj, and it therefore appears that the author assumes that the Islamic practice does not fit the label ‘sacrifice’. His category of ‘sacrifices’ are classified in ‘gifts’ and ‘oblations’. While the former ‘sacrifices’ can be understood as expressing dependence and respect, the latter can have purificatory, apotropaic and expiatory functions. As described above, this fits the linguistic labels used by my informants’ classifications of *sadaka* and *kafara*. *Sadaka* indicate a catego-
ry of rituals meant to ‘cement’ the community together and to ‘connect’ the believer to God and the umma, whereas kafara rituals function to get rid of evil and disease and to set the community apart. The analysis of the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice offered in this book will show that this ritual fits into the first category (gift, sadaka, connection) although elements from the second class (oblation, kafara, separation) are also present in Swahili discourse.

The most common verb used to refer to the act of killing animals is simply ‘slaughtering’ (kuchinja), a very inclusive term covering many fields. This word contains most of the meaning of the English verb ‘to slaughter’. The cruel aspect (slaughtering as killing in a way that is cruel or unnecessary) is omnipresent in public discourse, and often has a political context. Kuchinja is used in reports on the American invasion of Afghanistan, the war in Chechnya, the killing of Muslims in Zanzibar and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, to mention but a few examples. Also, the non-ritual killing of animals in abattoirs is called kuchinja. Killing animals (kuchinja wanyama) as a ritual of the Idd el-Hajj mainly refers to the technical act of killing, rather than to its emotional, religious or other meanings. However, the cruel aspect certainly triggers (undesirable) associations. As Salim Barahiyan, the director of the AMYC, mentioned before he started to kill the sacrificial animals: “We Muslims kill (tunachinja) animals, but we are not butchers (wachinjaji), as non-Muslims like to portray us.”

A second cluster of words connected to sacrifice focuses on the aspect of giving up a valuable thing, in this case a life (kutoa muhanga), in order to receive something better (dout des). For example, suicide bombing is referred to using the same term. To sacrifice one’s life and possessions is phrased as the main aim of the hajj. The contexts of these expressions suggest the positive value of the human sacrifice “in the Path of God.” In sermons, the link is emphatically constructed: just as the animal gives up his life, so too should we give up our lives in total submission to the only true God. Needless to say that the close connection between religious sacrifice and suicide bombing indicated by the words kutoa muhanga can easily put to political use in combination with images of martyrdom, jihad (holy war) and the hajj as a training camp for soldiers.

Thirdly, some specific Arabic words are used to describe the religious act of killing an animal: dhabihu, udhhiyya or hady. In contrast to the Swahili/Bantu words kuchinja and kutoa muhanga mentioned above, dhabihu originates from the Arabic root dh-b-h, indicating that the animal was killed by having its throat cut (dhabh). While Christians object to the verb kutoa muhanga being used to describe the redemptive sacrifice of Jesus, they often
use the word *dhabihu* in its place. This might be an indication that the link between the word’s linguistic and semantic origin and its current use is almost completely severed. *Dhabihu* is an inclusive term used for all kinds of ritual slaughter according to Islamic rules, as well as non-Islamic slaughtering. The origin of the words *udhiyya* and *hady* as specific *hajj* sacrifices has been described above (chapter 2).

This brings us to the final means of referring to the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice: *kafara* or *sadaka*. While both words are used for the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice, the latter is far more common and less ambiguous than the first. *Sadaka* is generally known as alms-giving and charity and is considered to be a very benign act, easily associated with the distribution of food on the Idd el-Hajj. *Sadaka* is voluntary, but God will reward this pious act. Meals served at solemn or joyful occasions (such as *arobaini* or funerals) can be called *sadaka*. *Sadaka* food and gifts are used as support for travellers and wandering preachers. *Sadaka* rituals are certainly effective but the result is indirect: God is pleased by the charity and in turn provides the believer with the required help.

Although *kafara* in Swahili Islam is primarily an expiatory sacrifice (as it is in classical Islam), it is closely linked with magic, sorcery and protection (*kinga, kulinda*), and can have malign connotations (Curtiss 1903:39; el-Zein 1974:300). *Kafara* rituals are more powerful and effective but also more dangerous than *sadaka* rites. *Kafara* seems to work more immediately than *sadaka*, although its effect is of course not independent of God’s will. While *sadaka* may be used to protect a child from future harm, the imminent danger of a village (*balaa*) must be countered through the enactment of a bloody or unbloody *kafara* ritual. The use of *kafara* in ‘higher’ Islamic discourse is usually limited to the less conspicuous meaning of a payment made after a transgression (*kosa*). In this sense, people deny any link between *kafara* and the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice because no transgressions are involved in this voluntary sacrifice. A strict separation is constructed between the domains of Swahili religion, traditional healers (*waganga*), sorcery and *kafara* on the one hand, and true Islam, religious scholars, prophetic medicine and *sadaka* on the other. The main difficulty with this distinction is the polyvalence of the words, *sadaka* and *kafara*, as indicated by their use in both domains. *Sadaka* is, for example, also used in the highly controversial act of offering sacrifices to the spirits when a new dhow is launched (Parkin 1994). *Kafara* sometimes emerges in relation to Ibrahim’s intention to sacrifice his son Ismail. The phrasing of this sacrificial founding myth is ambiguous in some accounts; the primordial sacrifice is sometimes referred to as *kumtoa kama kafara* (offering Ismail as a *kafara*) and elsewhere as *kumtoa sadaka* (offering him as a *sadaka*).
It appears that the expiatory, redemptive, protective notion of *kafara* looms at the background. At the same time, Muslims carefully distinguish between the sacrifice of Ismail and that of Jesus. Christians explain the idea of Jesus’ sacrifice as a redemptive payment for transgressions using the words *kafara ya damu* (redemptive blood offering) or (very rare) *muhanga* (self sacrifice, dedication) rather than *sadaka*.

In conclusion: the most common expression for the Muslim Sacrificial Feast in Tanzania is “Idd el-Hajj”. Therefore, the *hajj* will be an important point of reference in this book. Concerning the rituals of the Idd day, the local discourse indicates the problematic character of Islamic sacrifice: the meanings are complex and can easily shift. For that reason it is necessary to examine other local sacrificial rituals and establish the ways in which Muslims attempt to safeguard their Islamic character. I have chosen to focus on two rituals which are usually discussed together with the Idd el-Hajj in Swahili discourse: the *siku ya mwaka* and the *akika*. The *akika* is a Swahili life-cycle ritual completed after the birth of a child but which is usually only performed when the child dies young. The *siku ya mwaka* is a New Year’s celebration performed by village communities and many of its ritual elements are also enacted in crisis situations. Both of these rituals are widely practiced in the Tanga area and both define the boundaries of moral and social communities. They are both occasions to express common values, interests and beliefs, but they also offer us more insight regarding social strata, conflicts and disputes. Another positive feature of focusing on these rituals is their different connection to and usage of Arabic text-linked knowledge: their use of prayers, and the shared sense that the ritual is essentially Islamic although in practice it is sometimes more closely linked to the domain of ‘custom’. Finally, the two rituals and the Idd el-Hajj are examples of specific ‘chronotopes’: how the performance of a ritual in a specific time and place constructs a particular time/space. The New Year’s Day ritual, the *akika* at the beginning or end of a child’s life and the annual Idd el-Hajj each construct a ‘reality of timespace’. In all three rituals, time and space are emphasised.

These elements make the *siku ya mwaka* and the *akika* excellent material to compare with the Idd el-Hajj. Whereas Tanzanians often discuss them together, scholars usually exclude the Idd el-Hajj from their ethnographies on Swahili sacrificial rituals. Middleton witnessed a *siku ya mwaka* celebration (1992:181) at least twice but his description is unfortunately extremely succinct. His portrayal of the *akika* is even shorter and also lacks any reference to local discourse. Much more useful, in this respect, are Landberg (1977, Tanga region), el-Zein (1974, Lamu), and Lambek (1993, Mayotte), although none
of them seems to attribute any local significance to the Idd el-Hajj. Landberg (1977:411) states: "Friday prayers, mawlid celebrations and the yearly fast of Ramadan are ritual activities which link the village with Muslims elsewhere in the world." This is obviously true, but her exclusion of the Idd el-Hajj is striking. Further, the omission of the Idd el-Hajj from Mtoro Bin Mwinyi Bakari’s account Desturi za Waswahili (a written collection of oral traditions dating from the end of the 19th century), is peculiar, especially as he devotes some attention to the akika, the siku ya mwaka and the Idd el-Fitr. Perhaps the author perceived the rituals on the Idd el-Hajj as less ‘Swahilicised’ and less ‘traditional’ as those performed on the Idd el-Fitr after Ramadan. Finally, Lambek includes the mwaka ritual (1993:124-126) in his admirable book on Islamic discourses but, apart from some short comments (ibid.: 56,117), passes over local discussions regarding the akika and the Idd el-Hajj. Underlying all of these omissions there appears to be the general belief that a ‘textual’, ‘orthodox’ and ‘global’ ritual deserves no place in a local ethnography. 

2. Siku ya mwaka: New Year’s Day or crisis ritual

a. The performance

Two different clusters of rituals must be distinguished in relation to the siku ya mwaka celebration: the New Year’s ritual and the crisis ritual. Both of them usually contain the same elements (prayers, circumambulation around the town, animal sacrifice and ritual meal), but while one is temporally fixed, the other is spatially specific. The first ritual is temporally fixed and is always celebrated at the beginning of the Swahili solar year in July or August. The New Year’s Day in Swahili culture follows an ancient solar calendar, probably related to the Nawruz festival of Persian origin, taking place on the spring equinox of 21 March. On the Swahili coast and its hinterland, the visibility of the Pleiades constellation in the sky used to be a central element in ascertaining the proper dates of agricultural activities and the beginning of the New Year (Hirschberg 1974:222-225; Frankl 2000:10; Gray 1955a: 2-3). The inclusion of rain prayers in the siku ya mwaka celebration (as described below) and the association between the Pleiades and the rain season might be connected. Since the solar year comprises 365 days (ignoring the 6 extra hours), it slowly works its way around the seasons. Instead of the Islamic seven day weekly cycle, the Swahili year is calculated in temporal units of ten days (muongo). Labels like kuoga mwaka (washing the year), or just mwaka (year) also refer to this New Year’s ritual.
The second ritual is only spatially fixed and can be performed in any time of disaster, drought or economic malaise. In those cases, the ritual primarily focus on the spatial unit of the town or village and is called *sadaka la mji* (charity of the town) or *kafara la mji* (expiation of the town), or simply *zunguo la mji* (circulation of the town) or *zindiko la mji* (magic protection of the town). The term *khitma ya mji* is also used on these occasions, referring to the reading of the Qur’an at funerals (Frankl 2000:19). While both the New Year’s ritual and the town crisis ritual can be separately identified, I suggest that the boundaries between them should not be drawn too strictly. Focussing on specific details might have led to the erroneous view that the ritual only survived in some “remote” places (Gray 1955:1). However the ritual is still very much alive according to Tanga Muslims. Apart from Tanga, I describe five other *siku ya mwaka* celebrations on the Swahili coast: Lamu (el-Zein 1974), Mombasa (Frankl 1993, 2000), Zanzibar (Gray 1955; Racine 1994, 1998), Kilwa Kivinje (Lienhardt 1980) and Mayotte (Lambek 1993).

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1. **Tanga**

Around Tanga most people talk about *sadaka la mji* (alms of the town), *kafara la mji* (expiation of the town), or *zunguo/zunguo la mji* (circulation of the town). The expression *kuoga mwaka* (to bathe the year) is well known but does not refer to the Tanga rituals given that most of the villages I visited were located some distance from the sea. Many older men remembered the bathing and some of them were convinced that it is still practiced in Pemba and Unguja. The temporal setting of the event is left to divination (*utabiri*), but the date of performance should be at some time near the beginning of the new solar year in July. The time of the ritual is around noon prayer: starting at 10 a.m. (*saa nne*) till noon (*saa sita*) or 2 p.m. (*saa nane*). I was unable to obtain confirmation regarding a possible connection with the harvest; the purification and protection of the village were among the most common explanations offered for the event in Tanga.

One of the major elements of the event is the circulation of the village by the whole community, including a sacrificial animal. Despite the imagined assumption that this ritual is enacted by the complete community, it is recognised and sometimes regretted that nowadays not everybody takes part, but rather only just a few (*moja moja tu*). Landberg (1977: 414-415) and Lambek (1993:126) have previously indicated the same discrepancy between the real number of participants in this ritual and the imagined ideal of a communal ceremony shared by all. A few interviewees stress the relationship between particular lineages (*milango*) in the village and ritual roles played in...
An old man who told me that he only carried out the ritual with some brothers (ndugu tu) might have had the scarcity of participants in mind. However, all people should contribute with cash to buy the animal, or bring products in kind, like sembe (corn or maize flour), mchela (rice or grain), mtama (millet), mhindi (maize), ufuta (sesame) and mkunde (brown beans). Bread called mkate wa majivu (ash bread) is baked from these seven ingredients.

All accounts refer to the mosque as an important place included somewhere along the ritual circulation. However, an even more powerful place to begin and end the ritual is the grave of an important religious leader, as happens in the village of Moa, which is where the khitma funeral text is read. The animal is slaughtered at the exact point where the ritual circulation started. All ritual experts and some other informants claimed that it was necessary to circulate in an anti-clockwise movement although many were not certain if a clockwise movement really endangered the ritual’s effectiveness.

At regular intervals (near crossroads), the whole group turns towards the ritual prayer direction (kibla) and recites the first chapter of the Qur’an (Sura al-Fatiha). Also, other parts of the Qur’an, like Sura al-Nuur, Yasin, al-Mulk and Waqi’a are recited. Arabic supplications such as the beautiful names of the prophet Muhammad, including Tayyib al-asma’ (compiled by Nabahani), or protective prayers like Hirizi al-khalisa are often mentioned as part of the ritual circumambulation. A rain prayer (dua ya mvua) is frequently also inserted. Written sources mention that the Hal Badiri is read (the invocation of the martyrs died in the Battle of Badr), although I was unable to confirm this practice. During the recitation, ubani (incense) is burned. Fasting for three consecutive days before the performance of the sadaka la mji is highly recommended and will enforce a better effect of these readings.

Finally, the animal is slaughtered, prepared and eaten together with the bread. People appeared to be rather confused regarding the details of the ritual meal, for example if salt and spices are allowed or not. However, most informants agreed that roasting the meat was the only valid means of preparation. Both meat and other foodstuffs should be finished the same day and outside the village, and every participant should eat at least a small morsel. Landberg (1977:415) mentions the animal as a sheep, but most of my informants remembered the sacrifice of only goats and bulls (corroborated by Gray 1955). In 2001, a white, male goat together with a black chicken was slaughtered. Most of my older interviewees mentioned a cow as a sacrificial animal in the past. The colour of the animal depends on the outcome of a divination session with a Muslim soothsayer (mtabiri).
ii. Lamu

On the north of the Swahili coast, el-Zein (1974:281-321) describes the ritual *kuzingu kuzinguka Ngombe* (leading the bull around). His analysis of the *mawlid* performance makes clear that this ritual is associated with the *sharifs* (descendants of the Prophet), whereas the *kuzingu kuzinguka Ngombe* reproduces the special status of the *wangwana* (freeborn) in the highly stratified society of Lamu. Both rituals, according to him, ritually define the town of Lamu and classify its inhabitants. The circulation of a sacrificial bull can be performed whenever the number of deaths in the town exceeds the norm, or when children get sick. It is not limited to the beginning of the New Year but is more associated with sudden crises. Whenever the decision is made to perform the ritual, it must take place on a Friday, before the communal prayers. In el-Zein's structuralist analysis, the ritual is performed to re-establish the distinction between purity and impurity and to draw the boundaries between the town and the bush. The Lamu participants describe the ritual as *sadaka* (charity), but it contains also elements of *kafara* (expiation).

The colour of the bull and the area in which it has to be purchased are divined by a soothsayer. Only the freeborn (*wangwana*) may contribute to its purchase. The night before the ritual, all of the freeborn assemble in the mosque and read *Sura Yasin* in addition to a special supplication. The following morning, a green flag is fastened on a pole and is given to a *wangwana* child, who takes it outside. Five different groups inside the mosque start reading the poems *mawlid Barazanji, Burda*, the supplication by Nabahani, the Badr prayer and the *Tayyib al-asma*. Then, all groups follow the flag and the bull which had previously been tied near the mosque. They start the circumambulation in an anti-clockwise direction until they reach the hill. During the procession they recite the Qur’an and other supplications.

When they finally arrive at the hill, a separation takes place between the freeborn and the slaves. The *wangwana* return to the town, take a bath and perform the Friday prayers while the slaves stay in the bush and prepare the sacrificial meal. The *khatib* (preacher) returns to the hill together with the freeborn children. The latter are ordered to return to the town again and collect bread from all of the houses in a clockwise movement. The children arrive at the hill with their bread where the bull has already been slaughtered and skinned by the *khatib*. The meat is boiled without salt and spices. Part of the liver, bread and soup is presented to the *jinn* (spirits), while the other part is given to the slaves. All other food is then consumed by the people present. No food is allowed to be taken home. People take a bath before entering the town.
iii. Mombasa

Frankl (1993, 2000) describes the ritual as a multiple-day event which always takes place in the context of the beginning of the new solar year. Due to the absence of a reliable system, the date is difficult to establish, and therefore the solar year is not a ‘true’ astronomical year. The *siku ya mwaka* often depends on the lunar year: the previous year’s Hijra lunar date is taken as a reference point, and 11 or 10 days are added to find the next New Year’s Day (Gray 1955a:3-4). Other places near Mombasa used to perform the ritual in the days after the *mwaka*.

In the past, on New Year’s Eve the fires were allowed to go out and the ashes were deposited on crossroads or smeared on the walls. In the early morning, people went to the sea to bathe and “wash away the old year.” In contrast to small social units like villages, the circumambulation of the *siku ya mwaka* was never a complete circuit around the huge city but only a route inside the town. Nowadays, the procession has been discontinued, but originally a bull was led in front of a large crowd, while everybody read Qur’anic verses aloud. The traditional route had seven stations, most of them mosques.

Before dawn, the men and schoolboys reached the climax of the circulation, the grave of Shee Mvita. Here the women had previously gathered. The ox was slaughtered near the grave after the *khitma* recitations had been completed.

Afterwards, a *gungu* dance was performed (men dancing and women singing and clapping). The poor people now came to eat from the boiled meat and the different kinds of bread that each household had prepared. It was forbidden to take anything back into the town, because it was labelled as *sadaka*, “intended to avert calamity from the island during the years ahead” (Frankl 1993). The bones of the bull were collected and thrown into the sea together with golden ornaments. With them, the plagues and other sicknesses were also expelled from the coastal town. The New Year was symbolically started with a common activity (schoolboys returned to school for a short while, a tailor might sew a button, a farmer would dig in his field, etc.). The singing of obscene songs and the enactment of other carnavalesque rituals took place on this first day as well.

More recent *mwaka* celebrations (based on observations by Frankl in 1992 and 1995), did not include a procession, but rather a crowd of men, women and children gathered at Shee Mvita’s grave just after the dawn prayers. The ritual was held on the preceding Sunday (the actual *siku ya mwaka* being a few days later). The 30 printed parts of the Qur’an (*majuzuu*) were distributed among those present and the reading of the *khitma* began. At the end of the meeting everyone received a ‘silver’ coin, some fragrant rose water and a
handshake from an elder. Married men also received a folded betel leaf. After the readings and prayers an ox, a goat and a hen, all of the same colour, were slaughtered. Finally the gungu was danced again. In the afternoon, poor people came to Shee Mvita's shrine to eat from the boiled meat and their own bread.

iv. Zanzibar

To the south east of Tanga on Unguja island (Zanzibar), the mwaka has changed considerably since Gray (1955a) wrote about it and actually turned into a tourist attraction, as described by Racine (1994, 1998). Both of these authors' data originates from the Makunduchi region inhabited by some ten thousand people. The siku ya mwaka is associated with spirits (mizimu) located at a cave in the rocks or a hut surrounded by trees and brambles (plate 6).
Every lineage has its own mizimu, who act as the protectors of the lineage and as intermediaries with God. The traditional mwaka ceremony has two stages which are separated by a week, and are marked by liminal behaviour, unpunished lawlessness and saturnalia-like status-reversals. During the first part of the ceremony, the participants ask the spirits to grant them prosperity for the coming year, and make an offering of a loincloth as well as pieces of white and red cloth. Six days later, a second round of sacrifices and prayers to the mizimu take place during the evening and night preceding the New Year’s Day. According to Racine (1994) the following day, the festival starts with a public sacrifice in the early morning, although Gray does not mention any sacrifice at all. (Gray [1955a:11-15] speculates on the possibility of human sacrifices having been made in the past, but the evidence is weak). Neither Gray nor Racine mentions any kind of circumambulation, but Gray describes the metonymical representation of the whole community by collecting pebbles from every spiritual haunt of the island and burying them in a ceremonial hut. Between 11.00 and 12.30, a mock fight between men (some of them clad as women) takes place while women sing obscene songs (cf. Gray 1955b: 71). At this point, two separate groups of ritual experts start offering honey, meat and biscuits to the mizimu spirits, while a hut of millet straw is built. The hut is set on fire while the crowd shouts “we extinguish the sickness” (Racine 1994:172). People return to their houses to bathe or go to the beach. Fires are extinguished and the ashes are deposited near the crossroads or applied to the back of the house. In Gray’s account, both genders play highly differentiated and complementary roles in cooking, dancing, singing, mimic warfare and other rituals, while Racine shows how the female role in the mwaka celebrations has diminished over the last few decades.

Since the 1980’s this ‘traditional’ siku ya mwaka ritual has been followed by a commercial and political festival which lasts from three to five nights. A New Year Committee (baraza la mwaka) invites an official political guest, giving the mwaka festival an equal status and similar form as the other two Islamic Idds. Folkloric groups perform ‘traditional’ dances, and tourist pamphlets outlining the new invented tradition are printed and distributed by Zanzibar tour agencies. This ritual performance has turned into a political platform for the ruling party CCM. Instead of the village, it is the nation (taifa) that is simultaneously performed and imagined, and whose customs and culture are celebrated. Racine (1998) interprets the folklorisation of the mwaka celebration as an attempt to underline the community’s
common African cultural heritage, despite the religious and political tensions on the islands.

v. Kilwa Kivinje

Lienhardt (1980) mentions a ritual called zinguo mji (ridding the town of evil) which he discussed in 1959 with inhabitants of Kilwa Kivinje, at the southern border of the Swahili coast. The ritual was supposed to be performed in times of severe droughts and Lienhardt does not mention any association with the new solar year. His informants stated that on such occasions a black he-goat or black bull was normally led around the village, and that the banner of the Sufi Qadiriyya order was carried along with it. Every household contributed three rounds of bread (mofa) made from millet flour. They called it mikate ya sadaqa, (charity loaves). After the circulation of the town, the men took the animal to a particular place and spent the night there in their best clothes. The women slept outside of town in a different place associated with anti-sorcery rituals. The next day, the animal was slaughtered, preceded by the recitation of “little Arabic prayers in rhyme each repeated seven times over” (Lienhardt 1980:295). The men wore two white cloths around their waist and shoulder. Some put their hands on the animal before it was killed. The meat was cooked in town and eaten there, unlike the practice in a nearby village where the meat had to be prepared and eaten in the bush. Bones, hooves and hide were buried in the bush under a specific tree where the spirits used to dwell.

vi. Mayotte

Lambek (1993:124-127) portrays a similar ritual further south in Mayotte, an island that is part of the Comoros. The author witnessed celebrations in 1975, 1980 and 1985. There, the ceremony was called ‘washing the year’, or just mwaka. The date was not completely fixed but rather was scheduled annually by a ritual expert (fundi), with the ceremony usually taking place in July or August. However, each year the ritual moved one day ahead in the week cycle, that is to say that if the mwaka was performed on a Tuesday one year, the next year it would be on a Wednesday, etc (cf. Frankl 1993, 2000 for the same phenomenon in Mombasa). The time of the day also differed according to the cosmologer’s advice. Just after dawn, women, men and children gathered together near the mosque to perform a shijabu (blessing ritual using Qur’anic verses), while tossing grains of raw rice. Later in the day a red goat was slaughtered before the mosque. Together with incense, the manual containing the Badr supplication was held over the smoke while the
goat’s throat was cut. Meat was divided among women’s age groups and all inhabitants received a morsel of the goat’s liver. Blood and bones were buried before the mosque. After the sacrifice, some men and boys recited the Badr supplication in the mosque, followed by the anti-clockwise circumambulation of the village including every outlying house. The ritual was perceived as medicine or purification, constructing a shield around the village and a defense against evil influences.

b. Text, ritual and identity in the siku ya mwaka

The Tanga material and the five comparative cases show how the rituals performed in diverse circumstances covering a large geographic area and a period of more than four decades are loosely connected by a sort of family resemblance without any fixed textually mandated format. In this ritual, while Arabic texts cannot be used as a source of rules and prescriptions, authoritative texts do play an important role on at least two different levels: in the ritual recitation and in the reflective discourse. Recitations of parts of the Qur’an take place in every case described. Important sections like the first chapter of the Qur’an (al-Fatiha) and other protective prayers are used in their textual, printed form. Apart from the oral/aural mode of transmission, the Arabic writings can also be dissolved in a bottle of water by a Muslim healer or transmitted by the smoke of burning incense. An important common link is the Badr prayer (although it is not clear from Lienhardt’s account (1980:298) if this prayer was really perceived as a constituent element of the zinguo he describes). This invocation of the first Islamic martyrs, those who died in the battle against an overwhelming Meccan majority, is perceived as being highly efficient against all sorts of evil. It also establishes a link between the real time/place of the village and one of the major sacred sites of Islamic history. The ritual use of Arabic texts is on a par with the other protective acts like the circulation of the town, but more so than other rites, Arabic functions here as a powerful tool of transcendence.

On the second level (the reflective discourse), texts function as media used to critically assess or condemn the siku ya mwaka rituals, although the space devoted to the subject in written discourse is extremely small. It appears that the debates and discussions regarding this matter are primarily oral. The rituals are often absent in the long lists of warnings or only deserve a passing comment. The most common attack on the siku ya mwaka rituals in these written media is that the ritual lacks any precedent in Qur’anic or prophetic practice. However, not all Muslims consider that this lack of authoritative texts is a convincing argument to completely condemn the
ritual. Indeed, those who accept the validity of the siku ya mwaka discuss the meaning of the ritual in terms of its compatibility with ‘the texts’. For example, when asked about the effect of the ceremony, many people I talked with were reluctant to call it a kafara, telling me that kafara only meant the offering of something in repair of a particular transgression (being the ‘orthodox’ Islamic meaning) and not the expiatory significance attached to the word by Swahili. Here again we see a conscious linkage between text and discursive practice: the popular Swahili label kafara is compared with the Arabic word kafara and people decide if the two are compatible.

Also, particular elements of the ritual were perceived by interviewees as contrary to Islamic written texts. Practices like the propitiation of spirits (mizimu), for example, were often described as un-Islamic. Some Digo Muslims stated that the ritual was very close to sorcery (uchawi) because it actually put a charm (fingo) on the town, protecting it from future danger, and healing (tiba) it from past evils. According to this perspective, these acts, although effective, do not belong to the realm of human beings, but rather pertain only to God. Not surprisingly, the Mombasan scholar Mazrui translates the ritual in his Arabic madrasa manual, which is used in Tanga, as Ruqya al-balad. Ruqya is the Arabic designation of the healing from spirit possession and magic spells. It is important to note that he discusses the siku ya mwaka ritual under the heading ‘al-Salawat al-masnuna’ (the prayers sanctioned by prophetic custom). Mazrui explicitly describes the prayers of the siku ya mwaka in contradistinction to the other communal ‘proper’ prayers, like the ldd el-Hajj and the salat al-istisqa’ (rain prayer).

Sheikh Abdulla Saleh Farsy does not attack the prayers but mainly the sacrifice as being un-Islamic:

They believe that if they don’t sacrifice in this way the Shetani of the coming year will harm them. Well, if this is their opinion, then this animal will be haram, and should not be eaten as is (written) in our religious books.

Farsy invokes two well-known Shafi‘i manuals to underline his condemnation of the rituals. Both books are commentaries on Fath al-mu’in, a 16th century work. The first is Tarshih al-mustafidin, written by Alawi ibn Ahmad al-Saqqaf (d. 1916); the second text is l’ana al-talibin by Sayyid al-Bakri ibn Muhammad Shatta’ al-Dimyati (d. 1893). The Arabic sections which Farsy refers to deal with sacrifices intended to ward off the dangerous influence of jinn. The crucial difference, according to the quoted texts, is whether the animal is devoted to God the Creator (bi-qasd al-taqarrub wa
al-`ibadat Allah) or to the creatures (including the jinn). In the first case, the ritual will work because the intention of the sacrificer justifies the ritual act, and God will meet all of the slaughterer’s requirements. Therefore the sacrifice will become an ordinary madhkat (properly immolated animal) because it is slaughtered for God alone. In the second case, when the sacrificer has the jinn in mind (biqasdihim), the sacrifice will turn into an unlawful act and the animal becomes carrion. The intention is of paramount importance: the objective of worshipping someone other than God (be it jinn, the sultan or a saint) turns the Muslim into an unbeliever. On the other hand, if a Muslim performs a sacrifice for human messengers or for the Ka’ba building, that may be allowed if the intention is to magnify the messengers of God and the House of God.

Strangely enough, the quotations do not explain Farsy’s condemnation but rather bolster the opinion of the mainstream Tanzanian Muslim who finds that the rituals are not completely incompatible with Islam. Usually, the sacrifice is defended by exactly this argument: the animal is dedicated to God, and not to the jinn. It is not the act, but the intention that hallows the ritual. The question of the animal’s edibility is explained with reference to the same distinction between animals slaughtered for God and those dedicated to other beings. In the same way, Habib Ali Kombo answers a question about the legal status of the New Year’s sacrifice (muhanga wa mwaka):

It is shirk (polytheism) if you slaughter this sacrifice (muhanga) with a machete or in the name of a panga (kwa jina la panga). But if it is performed as protection from evil (dafaal-balaa) in the beginning of the year it is not bad. 52

This line of argumentation ties in with the sadaka/kafara debate: when the ritual is defined as sadaka, then the ultimate power of God is acknowledged and the ritual can still be performed, leaving the major monotheistic paradigm unharmed.

Since the ritual is not directly related to any authoritative text, the ways in which the siku ya mwaka rituals are practiced show more variety than, for example, the Idd el-Hajj festival. Two elements might be read as influences of ‘textual Islam’. In the first place, the three-day fasting period which is mentioned in Tanga as being a necessary element of the ritual has similarities with the ‘orthodox’ fasting practiced to expiate for certain transgressions (such as mentioned in the Qur’an, 2:196). Swahili literature refers to this practice as funga za kafara (expiatory fasting). 55 The outcome of the questionnaire (Appendix I) shows that Muslim students have very clear
ideas regarding what to do in case of personal difficulties: their advice is to pray, (66.5%), donate alms (40.7%), fast (39.0%) or recite an Arabic supplication (27.8%). Only a small proportion suggested that a visit to a mganga (traditional healer) or a mwalimu (Islamic healer) would be the best option in times of trouble (3.2 % and 2.6%). Whereas it is doubtful that this reflects real practice, it is clear that fasting is perceived as a proper, Islamic protective and healing practice.

A second element where textual influence is suggested is the circulation around the village. This practice bears a striking resemblance to the tawaf (circulation around the Ka’ba) as part of the hajj. The similarities on this point between the six cases are noteworthy. Almost all of my Digo interviewees were adamant that the ritual direction was anti-clockwise (like the tawaf). Further, the regular interruption and praying in the direction of the Ka’ba happens in both ceremonies. The Tanga-based AMYC warns against tawaf-like circulations around tombs and graves, referring not only to the mawlid processions (zaafa) of the local mosques but perhaps also to the siku ya mwaka. Thus, it might be the resemblance between the two circumambulation rituals that causes the uneasiness, rather than the discrepancy between text and practice. Of particular interest is Lienhardt’s narration of the Muslims in Kilwa wearing “two white cloths, one round the waist and the other over the shoulders (a style of dress reminiscent of the ihram costume of the pilgrimage when the pilgrims are in a state of purification)” [Lienhardt 1980:295]. Perhaps the tendency to discuss and shape local rituals in connection with more accepted ones might have led to certain elements being borrowed.54

However, it seems that it is not the text, but rather the need to create a distinctive social identity, that is the more influential factor in the siku ya mwaka. It is clear from the descriptions and narratives of the six cases outlined above that the ritual is an important means to construct local identities. In most cases, the ritual unit is the village or a small region. The form of the moral community is different for each locality but the ritual is always more expressive in its messages ad intra than ad extra. The identity of the ritual unit is rarely defined in contrast with other communities, although in some cases (Tanga and Mombasa) a cluster of villages performs their own rituals in a fixed sequence, thus expressing a certain hierarchical relation between them. By performing the mwaka rituals in this way (connected, for example, by the same ritual experts, but also separate in time), the identity of a particular village in relation to others can be expressed.
The Zanzibar mwaka in its recent tourist form contains important identificatory messages for politicians, Tanzanians from the mainland, tourists and Zanzibaris: the ritual magnifies a presumed 'Africanness' as a common denominator. The strong centrifugal forces threatening to divide mainland and island, Christian and Muslim, should be neutralised by the shared ethnic inheritance. The imagined community is a political and national one in which the ruling CCM party plays a large role. The differences with the older reports on the siku ya mwaka are striking. It seems that the significance of the ‘original’ ritual was limited to the village locality. This is illustrated by the invocation of local spirits. These mizimu do not have jurisdiction beyond their immediate dwelling-places, like caves and wells. Also, the strong connection which some of the rituals show with the tombs and graves of local ancestors (in case of the Mombasa, Zanzibar and Moa; cf. Gray 1955a:15) reflects an imagined community confined to a specific place. However, the extension of links with other powerful imagined communities like the Islamic umma (through the invocation of the Badr martyrs) or the Tanzanian nation-state illustrates the ritual’s resilience. It is exactly this characteristic of creating links with different imagined communities that most resembles the Idd el-Hajj. The two rituals share a strong local character (such as praying for deceased ancestors or visiting graves; cf. Hirschberg 1974) as well as the possibility to connect the festival with political communities.

None of the mwaka celebrations is static. In the two cases where authors explicitly addressed the case of change (Mombasa and Zanzibar), this affected both the time and place of the ritual. The circulation of the town was discarded in Mombasa, and replaced by a more solemn mosque ritual. In Zanzibar, the ritual moved from the bush towards the centre of town. Temporal changes in Mombasa included moving the pubic ritual towards the preceding Sunday, allowing more people to attend the performance. In both locations, the transformation of the ritual was influenced by the public media and especially local TV. The state and state-linked institutions increasingly dominate the public celebration of the ritual: governmental permission is essential first and foremost, state officials represent political bodies and BAKWATA (the national Muslim Council) performs most of the religious roles.

The moral community as portrayed in the mwaka rituals is not homogeneous, with the rituals demonstrating the creation and reproduction of internal relations between social strata and their power inequalities. The role of different families and lineages (milango) is an example of this stratification in Tanga. Landberg (1977:414) describes how specific groups of women
perform their own circulations around the village and do not partake in the communal ritual. Essential elements for one of the dances in Mombasa can only be provided by a specific social group (Frankl 2000:13). The sacrificial animal in Lamu and Mombasa is purchased by a select group of people and not by the whole community. In both localities, the rich and freeborn perform the most important parts of the ritual while the poor and those with a slavery ancestry play only minor roles. Regarding Zanzibar, Racine mentions apparent tensions between different groups of religious experts, between old and young and a diminishing role of women in the ritual in favour of men. Also, the dances and mock fights clearly show how explicit gender differences form a constituent element of the ritual. As several authors explain, the *siku ya mwaka* can easily be used for political ends, expressing conflicts and underlining power inequalities (Trimingham 1964:89; Glassman 1995:171-173; Lambek 1992:126). In the early 20th century, the British colonial power forbade the ritual on Zanzibar in order to protect the Asian community who often became victims in the rebellious, lawless period preceding the *mwaka* (Racine 1998:211). It is clear that not only inclusion, but also exclusion, from the imagined community can be achieved through ritual.

3. **Akika: child birth or funeral ritual**

   **a. The performance**

   In East Africa, two forms of the *akika* exist: one after birth, and one performed after the death of a young child. In addition to the birth ritual, Middleton (1992:158,180) also mentions *akika* in the sense of a ‘feast of goat’s meat to mark a child’s first tooth cutting,’ which none of my respondents mentioned to me. Contrary to the secondary literature consulted (e.g. Hock 1987:93), almost everyone in Tanga who had performed an *akika*, said that they did so after the death, and not after the birth, of their (grand) child. Akika after a child’s death is generally compared to the normal funeral rites of an adult. The latter consists of ritually chanting the Islamic creed (*Tahlili*) and a communal reading from the Qur’an (*khitma*). Unlike the adult funeral customs, however, the *akika* attributes more significance to the animal sacrifice and the subsequent ritual meal.

   Whenever a child dies young, the father or grandfather spends the money he gets on this occasion on the purchase of a sheep. Sometime after the child’s burial (some interviewees mentioned the fortieth day as being auspicious) the animal’s throat is cut, and the blood is drained into a hole.
in front of the house. Before the actual slaying, prayers are said and incense is burned. Sheep are selected because of their fat, broad tails. This tail (mkia) together with the liver (maini), coffee-beans (buni) and corn (bisi) is roasted and mixed with honey (asali); sometimes the kidari (breastbone) is also mentioned as an ingredient. The mixture is served with rice bread (mkate wa mchele) and the two bereaved parents feed each other. Afterwards, all other participants eat from the cooked animal. Landberg (1977:385) mentions that the ‘sweet foods’ (chakula kitamu) were only served to adult women who had borne children. Finally, the unbroken bones and the skin are wrapped in a white linen cloth (bafta or kitambara) and buried in the same hole as the sheep’s blood was poured into. The hole is covered with a heavy stone right in front of the porch “to continually remember the dead child,” as one of the interviewees told me (plate 7).

The structure of the akika as it is practiced in Tanga can best be understood as a dual movement: the parents return from their nocturnal mourning vigil (mkesha) and are allowed to resume normal sexual relations after the performance. That is, they return from death to life. Through the ritual, the child goes from life towards paradise. The sheep is used as the medium, and is finally resurrected as a horse (farasi) on the Day of Judgement. The physical, nourishing elements of the sheep remain with the living parents while the spiritual character (the sheep as carrier of the infant’s soul) serves the child. One way to describe this movement is by focusing on the balance of the four Galenic elements (dry/wet/cold/warm). Mutton is perceived as hot and wet as opposed to the goat’s meat which is hot and dry (Swartz 1991:215). In the course of the ritual, several elements are transformed and obtain a new place in the Galenic system. Bones and skin are dried and become cold (death). The liver, used as a common element to join people such as in blood brotherhood, joins the parents in their renewed sexual relationship and their return to life. It is accompanied by enlivening food: the bitter coffee, the sweet honey and the nourishing corn bring the parents back to life. Roasting is a mediating preparation which reduces the moist nature of the original ingredients. The roasting is essential in the first stage of the akika ritual, while the second part is dominated by ‘normal’ cooking: if two goats are sacrificed, then one of them is roasted and eaten with rice while the other one is cooked and prepared with honey and spices.

A second way of approaching this ritual movement is through the use of space. All of the sheep’s internal vital organs return to the place that the child had come from: the father and mother’s body. In Swahili, the words for lineage and entrails are the same: tumbo. So the sheep’s tumbo returns
to that of the deceased child. This may explain why the *akika* is held in different places (and not always at the child’s house): as vividly described by Landberg (1977), it actually defines the kinship ties. The same movement is visible in the burial places: it is in front of the house that the sheep is killed and his bones and blood buried, while the baby used to be buried at the back of the house, which is perceived to be the ‘wild’ side. (The back of the house is likened to the *fisi*, the wild counterpart of the sheep). Nowadays, when children are buried in the common cemetery, the sacrificial remains are either buried before the front porch of the house or near the child’s grave. The killing of the animal and cooking of the meat takes place in front of the house and is done by men only. The father brings the first morsels to the secluded wife and that marks the beginning of their renewed sexual activity.

66 A (simplified) structural representation is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Subject/Actor</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Front</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Killing, cooking, praying</td>
<td>Definition of male authority over sexual reproduction and transcendent hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Waiting, eating, being fed</td>
<td>Restoration of reproductivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back</td>
<td>Child</td>
<td>Being dead</td>
<td>Gift of potential to intercede with God</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The important position of the *watani* (joking relatives) further emphasises the mediation between these (binary) oppositions. The ritual ends the liminal period of mourning (*matanga*) in which many things are reversed (men cook instead of women, for example). The male actors are the ones who take the sacrificial victim’s life but also regenerate reproduction and vitality. It is the men who endow women with reproductive forces and the dead children with the possibility of intercession.

b. Text, ritual and identity in the akika ritual

To what extent can this Swahili ritual be labelled a ‘textual’ ritual? Most anthropologists are quick to point out the orthodox, canonical status of the practice, based on the similarities between the Arabic discourse on the ‘*aqiqa*, and the East African *akika*. However, the ‘*aqiqa* ritual is widely performed all over the world and shows a remarkable flexibility to adapt to
local diverging meanings. The Tanzanian madrasa literature on the subject is clear and shows a static picture: seven days after the birth of a child, the parents should name the boy or girl, slaughter one sheep (when the baby is a girl) or two sheep (in case of a boy) and shave their hair. The meat of the sacrifice should be given to the poor. Some sources also indicate that the equivalent of the weight of the shaven hair in silver or gold should be donated as charity. Most of the Swahili educational publications devote a few lines on the ritual and repeat this advice.

As we saw above, the practice in Tanga is different. Not only is the naming and shaving excluded from the akika context, but the whole ritual is performed as a funeral ceremony rather than as a thanksgiving meal for a living baby. The first, most superficial, layer of discourse is therefore not surprising: the Tanzanian ritual is wrong, because the temporal setting is not according to the scriptures. The AMYC discourse, for example, does not go beyond this statement. Also, many students from Tanga schools and madrasas were clear about the distinction between correct and incorrect rituals: the religious akika is performed after the birth of the child and the customary akika is after death. As might be expected, this last topic was especially popular among those Muslims who had at some point in their life had close contact with major channels of Islamic knowledge, like the madrasa system. The difference between ‘custom’ (mila) and ‘religion’ (dini) was not expressed in terms of distinctive ritual acts but simply as a matter of proper timing. ‘Being late’ in the performance of the ritual (celebrating the akika ‘just anytime’) is phrased as un-Islamic, careless and disobedient behaviour, and as being totally senseless. But recognising the God-given (aliyoipanga Mwenyezi Mungu) temporal framework for the akika shows that you take your religion seriously. From this perspective, a textually correct akika is performed as a birth ritual: all other practices, despite their similar names, are not endorsed by the authoritative scriptures.

However, it is harder to identify whether people’s real choices have been influenced by texts or by other factors. We will briefly describe the influence of texts on 1) the choice of the sacrificial victim; 2) differences in the performance of an akika for a boy and a girl; 3) the attribution of meaning to the akika ritual. Authoritative texts allow for sheep, goats, cows and camels to be fitting akika victims, but show a little preference for white rams. From 49 Digo men who had all performed at least one akika (but most of them more), 36 remembered the species of the animal: 20 sheep and 16 goats, all of them male. At first glance, we have a perfect congruence between the textual preference for sheep and the practice. However, we
should look further. In the first place we note a significant difference with the Idd el-Hajj, when most people slaughter goats, despite the same textual preference for sheep. In the second place, people mention that due to a general increase in Islamic knowledge, the number of goat sacrifices is also rising. In the past, Digo men emphatically state, every *akika* performed after the death of a minor child used to involve a sheep, (and this is confirmed by other ethnographies of the region). However, some men stated that nowadays it no longer matters anymore if you sacrifice a goat or a sheep.

The most important factor influencing the choice of the animal seems to be the perceived function of the ritual, rather than texts. Talking about the effect of the ritual, a pattern emerged whereby informants who downplayed the ritual mechanism of the *akika* usually favoured a goat, while others preferred a sheep. There was no difference between the performance of the ritual after birth or death in this respect. When informants stressed that the ritual should be completed while the baby was alive and attributed something other than a purely spiritual significance to the sacrifice, they emphasised that the animal should be a sheep. In both the birth and funeral ritual, a strong identification between the sheep and child was established, while the relation between goats and children was much weaker. The identification between the sheep and child was constructed by rubbing the living baby (in case of the birth ritual) with some of the sheep’s gravy, or whispering the child’s name in the sheep’s ear (in case of both a birth and a funeral ritual).

Identification between the dead child and the sheep was established by using the same white funeral cloth to bury both of the bodies or by choosing the same burial spot. The careful treatment of the bones in the birth and funeral *akika* was explained in two different ways. Firstly, bones which are in one piece will protect the living child whenever an accident may occur. On the other hand, the untouched bones in the funeral ritual stood for the idea that the animal would be resurrected and reassembled on the Day ofJudgement. When only the spiritual effect of the ritual (alms-giving, for example) was stressed, people usually chose a goat. In that case, the ritual details (e.g. sweet and bitter ingredients) were also left behind.

Just like the discourse on the *siku ya mwaka*, the same distinction between *sadaka* (charity) and *kafara* (expiation) is visible here. When the *akika* was described as a ‘mere’ token, then the meat distribution was ‘just’ a *sadaka*, and the animal was usually a goat. When the ritual sacrifice was ascribed a real effect (either protection in this life or spiritual benefits in the next) it was more common for the label *kafara* to be attached to the
The latter designation did not imply that the child had sinned, but just underlined the protective quality of the sacrifice. People were often more reluctant to describe their own ritual as *kafara* when it was performed after the death of the child. In that case, notions of gift-giving and *sadaka* dominated the discourse, thus portraying the ritual as more Islamic. When people talked about 'others' who performed the more traditional *akika*, they used to call that ritual *kafara*.

Perhaps we can identify an Islamic influence in the *akika*, in particular due to its general downplaying of any magico/religious significance of animal sacrifice. If there is no longer a compelling ('magic', religious) reason to sacrifice a sheep, then people feel free to slaughter a more delicious goat. A similar tendency Landberg (1977:127) witnessed in the ritual washing of corpses; in the past only *watani* were entitled to perform this task, but in the 1970s Islamic experts had taken over. According to a Tanga student, traditional rituals have many rules and regulations, but Islam has made things easier and the proper *akika* therefore has no conditions whatsoever (*haina masharti yoyote*). While this idea can be attributed to Islamic influence (the Qur’an states that “their flesh and their blood does not reach Allah” Q 22:37), the effect is not directly mediated through Arabic texts. With respect to the *akika* animal, the majority of Tanzanian textbooks and written Swahili discourse simply state that the *akika* is “the goat you slaughter”, contrary to the Arabic texts which usually prefer a sheep sacrifice. Perhaps the authors are implicitly reacting to the East African sacrificial rituals where the ambiguous sheep play an important role (cf. De Wolf 1983; Parkin 1991). Although the choice of the animal might be the direct result of reading a text, the data suggests that the ritual function is more important.

We now turn to the differences between the *akika* performance for boys and girls. Arabic texts prescribe two animals for a boy, and only one for a girl. Although this gender inequality also appears in Digo practice, the ritual details are quite different. Only 7 girls (against 29 boys) had an *akika* performed when they died; 6 of these sacrifices consisted of a sheep. This might be due to the fact that girls are said to reach puberty earlier than boys, and after puberty it is not an *akika* but a normal adult funeral that is performed. One Digo sheikh stated that boys up to the age of twelve years of age received an *akika* funeral while only girls under the age of six counted as children. A second reason may be that the ritual is meant to enable the child to perform a mediation role for their parents if they want to enter paradise. This role is generally not seen fit for women ergo there is no need for an *akika*. Looking at other rituals, however, we see a different picture: Swahili...
initiation and marriage rites are more elaborate for women than for men (Middleton 1992:158; Swantz 1986, 1995). Also, spirit possession guilds are more attractive for women than for men (Lambek 1993). Large burial conflicts reaching the front pages of Swahili newspapers usually refer to women, and not to men. Perhaps the social and moral ambiguity of women expressed in many of the Swahili rituals is not yet present in very young girls.

In the third place we will now consider if and how authoritative texts may influence the attribution of meaning to the *akika* rituals. I was not surprised that most Islamic students in Tanga choose to interpret the *akika* as thanksgiving, charity, protection for the child and imitation of Ibrahim’s example (table 5.2.). I asked them to mention the three most important meanings of the ritual and deliberately left it to the respondent to interpret the *akika* either as a birth or a funeral ritual (Appendix I, question 3.9). Some referred to the *akika* as having the same effect as paying your insurance contribution (*bima*), as an investment for future use, which might or might not yield any benefit. It seems that the ritual that most of them had in mind was to be performed during the lifetime of the child. The setting of the questionnaire distribution (*madrasa* and school classes) appears to have influenced the answers, which closely conform with Islamic texts as understood by the students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Meaning of the <em>akika</em> ritual</th>
<th>% of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thanksgiving to God</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Charity (<em>sadaka</em>)</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Protection (<em>kinga</em>)</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Following Ibrahim</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Obedience to God (<em>utii</em>)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Intercession for parent (<em>shufaa</em>)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Expiation (<em>kafara</em>)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the questionnaire completed by 296 students the potential of intercession and the expiatory significance of the ritual are among the least important meanings attributed to the *akika* ritual. That is to say that
from the meanings listed, these two are the ones which least fit the students’ ideas regarding an ideal Islamic ritual. Apparently, the students favoured the more spiritual connotations of thanksgiving and *sadaka* as being more in line with the Islamic nature of the *akika*. However, this certainly was not forced upon them by any authoritative texts. Intercession is described in many (Shafi’i) *fiqh* manuals as one of the benefits of the ritual. In Swahili discourse, this aspect is seldom mentioned, but is by no means absent. Despite the fact that not only Prophet Muhammad, but also angels, prophets, normal believers and young children are endowed with the possibility to mediate between God and Muslims on the final Day of Judgement (Wensinck 1997; Lane 1987:191,196-197), the issue is very sensitive. It may easily infringe on God’s unique status as omnipotent Creator and Judge.

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*Plate 7: Stone covering the remains of an akika sacrifice, village near Tanga*
The significance of the ritual is closely connected with the ‘correct’ performance of the *akika*. ‘Correct’ performance is in accordance with ‘the texts,’ as many interviewees explained. When people reflect on the differences between a ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ performance of the *akika*, several themes appear. In the first place, the source of authority is different: a valid *akika* is authorised by the Prophet Ibrahim (*mila ya nabii Ibrahim*), Islamic Law (*sheria*), the teachings of the Prophet (*mafundisho ya mtume*), the Holy Scriptures (*vitabu vitukufu*), or the instructions of the prophetic *hadith* (*maagizo ya hadithi ya mtume*). Corrupt performance of the *akika* is based on the customs of the old people (*mapokeo ya watu wa kale*), not sanctioned by God and against Islamic Law (*kinyume na sheria*). The idea that the good rituals are ‘in the book of the Almighty God’ (*iko katika kitabu cha Mwenyezi Mungu*) while the wrong ones are absent from the sacred sources, is very pervasive, but rather unspecific.

In the second place, Muslims discuss the spiritual beings who are addressed in the *akika*. In a valid performance this is, of course, the only God (*Mungu, Mwenyezi Mungu, Allah*). On the occasion of a traditional *akika*, the performers (also) address lesser beings (*mashetani, majini, mizimu*) or even idols (*sanamu*). Sacrificing an animal for God is like a thanksgiving ceremony to express gratitude for having received a divine blessing, but the traditional *akika* is only to congratulate the parents with their child (*kumpongeza mzazi kwa kupata mtoto*). So this argument treats the ritual independently from any temporal conditions. It is the Muslim’s spiritual disposition and his awareness of God’s sovereignty that makes the *akika* an Islamic ritual.

Other respondents denied any simple dichotomy between a un-Islamic, customary funeral practice and an Islamic, textual birth ritual.

> I don’t really see the difference because even in the traditional *akika* ritual there is also an unavoidable religious component (*lazima udini uwepa*) because the *madrasa* teachers (*maustadh*) are invited to read the *akika.*

According to this female respondent, the very fact that an Islamic expert comes and reads an Islamic text (intercession prayers, *mawlid*) makes the ritual into a religious event. Many people believe that something like an *akika*-book (*kitabu cha hakiki*) exists, which is read during the ritual. The idea that Arabic text recitation hallows the ritual performance is very common. One *madrasa* student remarks that both *akika* rituals are Islamic because parts of the Qur’an are read during the ceremony. We encountered the same argument above in relation to the *siku ya mwaka* celebrations: according to most informants, the recitation of Arabic texts and Qur’anic verses expressed the celebration’s Islamic
character. For large strata in Tanzanian society it is not the textually transmitted commandment which is essential to perform a ritual, but rather it is the 'readings' of Islamic texts and the intention behind the practice which classify the ritual as an Islamic one.

Finally, we look at the relation between akika and social identity. The funeral akika is very much a family ceremony and is geared towards the benefits of the bereaved parents and the mourning relatives. The processes of inclusion and exclusion, the distinction made between 'strangers' and family, and the allocation of roles in the akika ritual are described by Landberg (1977). The birth akika reveals another ritually-created imagined community. Several interviewees referred to the akika as an expression of “belonging to the Islamic umma” by following Ibrahim and Muhammad. Some respondents declared that they could not outline the customary akika for me because every ethnic group had its own ritual with ever-changing details. Fortunately, the Islamic akika was one, and its unity was guarded by the 'commandments of the book' (maamrisho ya kitabu). The emphasis on a single ritual blueprint transmitted by textual sources resembles the Idd el-Hajj discourse. The AMYC and Ansaa Sunna followers in particular like to compare both rituals. The akika and the Idd el-Hajj have the same religious/legal status (confirmed prophetic custom, or sunna mu’akkida) and some elements are also identical. The chairman of the Islamic youth movement at the Usagara Secondary school in Tanga showed me the following quotation:

The aqeeqah ceremony, as we’ve seen consists of two acts: the shaving of the hair (head) and the sacrifice of the animal. There is a peculiar link between the two acts and these acts are among the religious practices of Millat-u-Ibrahim. In Haj, too, they go together – where the pilgrims have their hair (head) shaved after the Adhiyah. Thus, aqeeqah also, is a practical demonstration of our association with Nabee Ibrahim (A.S.) and of the fact that the child, too, is a member of the same community.

Only the Idd sacrifice and the akika are called mila wa Ibrahim. This discourse shows a strong identificatory element: by performing the akika ritual as an initiation into the Islamic community, you deliberately demonstrate your identity as a good Muslim by virtue of being different from the ritual practices of your neighbors. It forms a counterpart to the practice of celebrating a birthday, spending money, amplified music, the intermingling of the sexes and drumming just like ‘the customs of the enemies of Islam.’ The choice for any imagined community (family or Islamic umma) often implies the rejection of
the other. Performing a family akika may cause faithful Muslims to compromise their religious beliefs. The choice for the ‘real’, Islamic ritual may involve social alienation and misunderstanding.

c. Summary

Comparing the two local rituals, siku ya mwaka and the akika, with the Idd el-Hajj regarding the question of textual knowledge, ritual practice and social identity, reveals several important factors to be taken into account in this study. Firstly, the notion of Islamic sacrifice is problematic in most of the discussions. With respect to textual Islamic knowledge, the siku ya mwaka shows the least Islamic involvement. However, most of the ritual elements are perceived, beyond any doubt, as being Islamic. The ritual slaughtering in the name of God, the central place of the mosque or the madrasa, the recitation of sacred texts and supplications to ward off evil all make it into an Islamic practice. The akika is generally perceived as being completely Islamic and as endorsed by authoritative texts. Teachers can discuss at great length the special merits of goats and sheep, the animals’ minimal age, and the sequence of the proper rituals, all according to ‘the texts’. However, actual practice of the akika at birth is rare: many people complain that they don’t have money to perform the ritual at the proper time. It is only when the child dies that the customary large monetary gifts provide the opportunity to perform a proper funeral ritual. Text is important in both rituals: ‘reading akika’ is the common way of referring to the ritual, emphasising the role of Arabic text and prayers.

The ritual practice of both the siku ya mwaka and the akika is diffuse and ambivalent. The rituals do not have a consistent form, time, place or meaning. The circulation ritual of the siku ya mwaka can be performed at many different times, such as approaching disasters, or the beginning of the new solar year. The akika ritual has at least two different faces, coinciding with the time of performance: after the birth of a baby or as a funeral rite. Consequently the significance attributed to the ritual will change in these different contexts. The ritual mechanisms in both cases are visible, although the tendency to downplay any ‘magical’ effect in favour of a spiritual benefit is also present. The material suggests that the shifting from sheep to goats reveals a parallel shift from ritual effect towards spiritual dispositions. The ambiguity of distinctive ritual forms bearing the same names is the rule rather than the exception. The polyvalence of sadaka and kafara rituals allows for completely different practices under the same umbrella term. The akika, siku ya mwaka and the Idd el-Hajj can be referred to as either sadaka or kafara, depending on the time and place of performance. Another example is the initiation ritual called jando.
People felt the need to elaborate on the distinctive patterns of *jando kimila* (traditional initiation) and *jando kidini* (Islamic initiation). The differences are often phrased in temporal and spatial terms: we do our traditional initiation in the bush, but the Islamic initiation is performed in town. Regardless of the actual practice, rituals associated with *mizimu* (spirits) are often mentally mapped as taking place in the bush, while ‘pure’ Islamic festivals take place in town (Racine 1994:168). So, practices could be imagined as alike (by having the same name and often including the same practices) but could also be imagined as different (because they take place at different times or places). It is not primarily the texts or the practice that create this particular meaning, but rather the imagined chronotope of these rituals as evoked in discourse.

Social identity is in both cases expressed through the ritual marking of boundaries. In the circumambulation this is quite literal when the animal purchased by the community is led around the village, including all houses. The ritual constructs the village as a unit. However, this unity is imagined and the ritual clearly shows the inequality which exists between genders, lineages and classes. The *akika* is in the first place concerned with family and kinship ties and uses the house as a ritual unit. In both instances the animal sacrifice and the preparation and distribution of food play important roles in defining the moral community. Both rituals leave physical commemorative elements in the landscape: the *akika* remains are buried under a stone (see plate 7) and the place of sacrifice in the *siku ya mwaka* is often marked by the mosque, a tomb, some stones or ritual objects associated with the *mizimu* cult. Only a minority perceives the *akika* ritual as a means to establish a link with the global Islamic *umma*. For this group, textual prescriptions become important because they safeguard the ritual (comm)unity.

**Table 5.3**

**Comparison between the rituals siku ya mwaka, akika and Idd el-Hajj**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Siku ya mwaka</th>
<th>Akika</th>
<th>Idd el-Hajj</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Animal</strong></td>
<td>Bull/goat/sheep</td>
<td>Sheep/goat</td>
<td>Goat/sheep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Town/Islamic umma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td>New Year, crisis</td>
<td>Birth, death of a child</td>
<td>Fixed lunar date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place</strong></td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Town/mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Important elements</strong></td>
<td>Prayers, circumambulation, sacrifice</td>
<td>Prayers, sacrifice, ritual feeding</td>
<td>Prayers, sermon, sacrifice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Part II

TIME
6. The Idd el-Hajj and the Contest of the Calendars

1. Introduction

While the sacred postulate of Islam “There is no god but God” is not restricted to a particular time or place, Islamic rituals performed to express and underline this postulate are influenced by frameworks of locality and temporality. The *siku ya mwaka* and the *akika* rituals described above illustrate how the time and place of performance change the significance of the practice. It is not wholly justified to assume that the Idd el-Hajj is only subjected to the fixed rules of the trans-local Islamic calendar and would therefore show much less variation. In this chapter, we look at the influence of three temporal frameworks on the Idd el-Hajj: the Islamic calendar, the Tanzanian national calendar and a ‘sacred’ calendar that presupposes differences in qualities of time. In the following section we discuss the three different Islamic calendars. The Idd el-Hajj is situated in the generally accepted lunar calendar, in use since the first Islamic century. However, two other Islamic calendars will serve as examples of how temporal frameworks can influence the perception of rituals: the Swahili lunar calendar closely follows the Islamic one but puts the major emphasis on Ramadan and the Idd el-Fitr while the marginal Ahmadiyya solar calendar is an example of how calendars can be used to underscore the identity of new religious groups. The latter is ‘modern’ in the sense that it advances in accordance with the western calendar but it is also Islamic in the sense that it starts at the same point in history as the Islamic calendar: 622. In the third paragraph we look at the Idd el-Hajj as a national holiday, asking: how do Muslims perceive the Idd el-Hajj in comparison to Christian national holidays? In the final part we deal with a more elusive topic: sacred time. Is it possible to identify differences in temporal experiences and, if so, how do they relate to authoritative texts?
2. The Idd el-Hajj and Islamic Calendars

a. Three Islamic calendars

The calendar is a key factor in the formation and reproduction of the identities of new religions and movements. Not only did Christianity, Judaism and the French Revolution initiate their own era by starting a new calendar, but so did Islam. The Qur’an contains several remarks on the new method of time reckoning and this may prove the importance of the calendar for the nascent Islamic community (cf. Q 9:36). Pre-Islamic time-reckoning used a lunar/solar calendar which corrected the differences between the lunar and the solar year by an intercalary month (Nasi). The abolition of this intercalary month replaced the former linkage between natural phenomena and religious festival. As we mentioned above, this connection between the seasons and religious celebrations was particular strong in the hajj. This calendrical reform was helpful in establishing the transition from polytheism to monotheism (Platti 1994:167; Bell 1997:102). The crescent was adopted as both a symbol of the new calendar and simultaneously as an iconic representation of the new religion.

The moon has become an important factor in determining many Islamic ritual practices, such as the waiting period before divorce, and the two Iddas. Muslims receive every new moon-sighting with a special supplicative prayer (dua), although there is nowadays no religious ritual as, for example, in the Jewish tradition. In the formative period of Islam, Muslims celebrated the Shawwal crescent (indicating the end of Ramadan) with particular sacrifices.

Together with this calendrical revolution, the new community adopted two major annual festivals from their religious ancestors. Rather than wiping out the earlier calendar and its communal feasts, Islam appropriated them and filled them with new meaning. This cultural appropriation of festivals seems to be “a very common and highly effective strategy in places where one set of religious practices encounters and tries to dominate another set” (Bell 1997:104). The fasting month of Ramadan and its concluding Idd el-Fitr is almost certainly based on Jewish examples and the Idd el-Hajj continued many elements of its predecessor: the pilgrimage to Mecca. The two major religious practices of the pre-Islamic and Jewish community (fasting and sacrifice) were retained, but adopted new forms in these two festivals (Kister 1971:194; Lazarus-Yafeh 1981:17-37).

However, in the perception of most Tanzanian Muslims, the Prophet Muhammad did not adapt Jewish and pagan rituals, but rather purified them and restored them to their former glory. From this perspective it is
possible to read the Old Testament in search of information on the Islamic hajj. According to Muslims, this process of purification makes the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj totally different from Christian holidays. Christmas, for example, was not introduced by Jesus but was adopted, much later, from a pagan festival. An additional advantage of the new calendrical feasts was their unifying potential as non-ethnic rituals:

When the chief leader (kiongozi mkuu) of the Muslims, Prophet Muhammad, moved to Medina he met the inhabitants of that city: the Aus, Khazraj and the Jews who all had their own different holidays. The Prophet forbade these celebrations and told the people of Medina that Allah had chosen only two Idds as Muslim holidays: the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj.

It took as long as nine years after Muhammad’s flight from Mecca to Medina before the two Idds and the lunar calendar reached their final form. The official introduction of the new calendar was not accomplished before the second caliphate. By that time, the Islamic year consisted of twelve months, each having 29 or 30 days. In Swahili spelling (but using Arabic loanwords) the twelve lunar months are: Muharramu, Safar, Rabii Awwal, Rabii Thani, Jamad Awwal, Jamad Thani, Rajab, Shaaban, Ramadan, Shawwal, Dhulkaada and the final month Dhulhija. In Swahili print, these names regularly appear in most newspapers, and Muslim teachers write these dates on the blackboard at the start of their lessons. In this temporal system, starting with Muharram and concluding with Dhulhija, the Idd el-Fitr occurs in the ninth month, and the Idd el-Hajj is celebrated in the final (12th) month. That makes the Idd el-Hajj a potential temporal boundary marker for the end of the year. This is what happens in some Moroccan ethnic groups where the meat of the Sacrificial Feast is preserved from the 10th Dhulhija to the next Ashura festival taking place on the 10th of Muharram (Bousquet 1949:100-101; Brisebarre 1998:126). By this means, one year is ritually connected to the next.

However, in the Swahili lunar calendar (not to be confused with the Swahili solar calendar that starts on the siku ya mwaka) Muharram is not the first month, as is the case in the Arabic calendar. The Islamic Swahili annual cycle commences with Shawwal which is called Mfunguo mosi (the first releasing). The following months are numbered from Mfunguo pili (second releasing) until the Mfunguo tisa (the ninth releasing). The last three months retain their Arabic names, Rajabu, Shaabani, Ramadani. The Swahili calendar, starting with the Idd el-Fitr as the first day of the next cycle, emphasises
the centrality of the month of Ramadan to the year: the first of Shawwal, the day of the Idd el-Fitr, is here as significant as New Year’s Day. Here, the calendrical cycle stresses the Ramadan/Shawwal boundary more than the division between Dhulhija/Muharram. During Ramadan, groups of dancing children take leave from the fasting month and the old year. Many parts of Tanzania enact status-reversal rituals on the Idd el-Fitr, and other carnival rites resemble the *siku ya mwaka* festivities (Glassman 1995:172).

A third calendar, that used by the Ahmadiyya community, can further illustrate the formative power of temporal systems as solidifiers of in-group sentiments. In the 1940s, the second Ahmadiyya Khalifa introduced a new calendar. It is a 12-month solar calendar running simultaneously with the western calendar, but it starts with the Hijra event of the year 622. The year 2006 therefore corresponds with the Ahmadiyya year 1385 (2006 minus 621). The names of the months refer to important Islamic events that took place in that month. At the same time, these names can be read as an encouragement to moral virtues or religious ideals:

1. **Sulha** (January), “Peace treaty” between the forces of Medina and Mecca at Hudaibiyya.
2. **Tabligh** (February), “Mission activities” of the Prophet Muhammad.
3. **Amaan** (March), “Protection” for all people, announced during Muhammad’s farewell pilgrimage (6 March 632).
5. **Hijrat** (May), the month of the Prophet’s “Hijra” from Mecca.
6. **Ihsaan** (June), “Benevolence” demonstrated to prisoners of war taken from the Hatim Tai tribe.
7. **Wafaa** (July), “Loyalty” from the Masahaba (companions of the Prophet) in the battle of Dhatir Riqa’ (dhat al-riqa’).
9. **Tabuki** (September), battle of “Tabuk.”
10. **Ikhaa** (October), “Brotherhood” established between the citizens of Mecca and Medina.
11. **Nubuwwat** (November), Muhammad receives his “Prophethood” from God.
12. **Fat-ha** (December), “Victory”: Mecca is taken by the Muslims of Medina.
This solar calendar (called Hijri-Shamsi, or HS) has not replaced the Islamic lunar calendar (Hijriyyah Qamariyya, or HQ): the Ahmadiyyas still use the HQ for ritual events “just like the Almighty God has commanded us” (ndɪvya alɪvyaɔɑmrɪsha Mwenyezi Mungu). But the HS combines the practical benefits of the solar calendar with the ideological importance of a calendar starting with the Prophet’s Hijra. The use of two calendars is justified by the Qur’anic text (6:96): “He made the sun and moon for the reckoning of time.” Twice a year, the editors of the Ahmadiyya newspaper Mapenzi ya Mungu wish their readers a happy New Year: in the first month of the Hijra calendar (Muharram) and in January/Sulha.

The Ahmadiyya newspaper Mapenzi ya Mungu originally started with only the western indication of time. In 1968, however, the editor announced that after a period of transition in which both dates (Ahmadiyya and Christian) would be printed in their newspaper, only the Ahmadiyya calendar would remain. However this transformation never materialised. In 1972, the editor silently surrendered to the temporal supremacy of the Islamic lunar and the western solar calendars, and he started to add the mainstream HQ date to the Christian and Ahmadiyya dates. He even removed the brackets that used to keep the Christian date in its place. From then until the present, Mapenzi ya Mungu shows the three time indications on equal footing for example the frontpage from the May 2002 issue: Safar 1423/Mei 2002/Hijrat 1381.

This de facto recognition of western temporal hegemony can be witnessed in most of the Swahili Islamic discourse. Newspapers like the Mombasa Sauti ya Haki use the Swahili calendar for the official heading, written next to the western solar date (for example May 1973/ mfungo saba 1393). Nasaha only writes the western solar date; the AMYC paper al-Haq started with just the lunar date heading but eventually reached a compromise in their next newspaper, al-Fikrul Islami, where they added the Christian solar date. The Zahrau madrasa’s first stone mentions its founding on Rabi II, 1408 next to its Christian equivalent, 3 December 1987. Most Islamic gatherings take place on a Sunday or a Christian holiday for the practical reason that even Muslim employees are free from work on these days. Important Islamic demonstrations are almost without exception organised on Sundays, a public day of rest in the hegemonic Christian temporal structure. And even the Swahili solar calendar must give way to western time.
b. Three Idds: great or small?

Within the Arabic textual discourse, the word Idd (Arabic: ‘id) is employed to indicate the annual Idd el-Fitr, the Idd el-Hajj and also the Friday holy-day, “your personal Idd day” (siku yako ya Iddi). According to Swahili interpreters, the most likely etymological derivation of the word Idd is from the Arabic root -w–d (to return, come back). According to Tanga preachers, it is possible for each day that Muslims regularly come together for worship to be called an Idd. On the Idd el-Hajj 2002, the preacher of the al-Nisa mosque emphasised that “Idd returns every year, it returns every year.” The repetitive character of the Idd creates the transition from one temporal unit to the other, thus providing the “hidden rhythm” of social time (Zerubavel 1981). The three Idds perform this function in their own manner. The Idd el-Fitr establishes the transition between the year’s final and holiest month, Ramadan, and the first month of the next annual cycle, Mfungo Mosi (the first releasing). The Friday Idd connects the final and holiest day of the week to the first day of the next week, Juma Mosi (Saturday, literally First Day). This special transitional function of the Idd is emphasised by the Swahili names that significantly differ from the Arabic ones. Whereas Ramadan (the 9th month) in the Arabic calendar is followed by Shawwal (the 10th), the Swahili calendar stresses the start of a new temporal cycle after the Idd by calling the following month Mfungo Mosi (the first releasing). In the Arabic weekly system, the Friday (yaum al-jum’a, the Day of Congregation) is followed by the Saturday (yaum al-sabt, the seventh day), while the Swahili week starts anew with Juma Mosi, the First Day. Although devout Muslims regret this mismatch between Arabic and Swahili names, the new names actually emphasise the importance of both Ramadan and Fridays: “Ramadan is the lord of all months (bwana wa miezi yote) just like the Friday is the lord of all the week days.”

In the Idd el-Hajj discourse we also find this explanation of the Idd as a repetitive, conclusive and transitional festival. The most common comparison between the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj is that they both draw challenging religious practices to a close: the Idd el-Fitr is the end of the difficult fasting month and the Idd el-Hajj is the conclusion of the demanding hajj performance.

Islamic celebrations are pivotal to show our thanks to God who enabled us and gave us the strength to finish our obligation and to accomplish great and heavy religious obligations such as Ramadan fasting and finishing the pilgrimage.
Apart from the repetitive character we now come to a second common denominator of the Idd: the experience of joy after hardship. Fasting, commemoration and feasting tend to come together. The Idd el-Fitr is preceded by the Ramadan fast. The Friday Idd follows the voluntary Thursday fasting, the day when the revelation of the Qur'an is especially remembered. The Idd el-Hajj follows the fasting Day of Arafā (9th Dhu-l-Hijja), and many Tanzanian Muslims fast for the whole nine days preceding the Idd el-Hajj. In Swahili, this period is called *majuma tisa* (the nine days), *majuma 10* (the ten days) or *siku za vijungu* (days of the dishes). Islamic discourse across all denominations describes the sequential structure of these two activities (fasting precedes feasting) as meaningful. Just as the Idd el-Fitr is preceded by the final ten sacred days of Ramadan, the Idd el-Hajj is preceded by the ten sacred days of Dhu-l-Hijja. Sometimes the idiom to describe fasting and the subsequent celebration of the Idd is derived from the classroom: *mtihani* (examination/trial) and *shahada* (certificate/diploma). The crux of the argument is that if you fail your examination you won’t get the certificate. If you do not observe God’s commandments, you don’t deserve the joy of the Idd. What is strongly suggested in many Idd sermons is the upcoming final trial and what I call the “Super Idd”: the day of Resurrection and the subsequent entry into Paradise for those who have passed the test. The ‘problems’, ‘chaos’ and ‘trials’ preceding the day of the Idd are set within the framework of “following the prophet and his companions until the day of resurrection.”

The trial of Ramadan is obvious for everyone who attempts to fast. However, because fasting before the Idd el-Hajj is not compulsory, the trial is less evident, and therefore remains more spiritual and has to be consciously constructed. The Swahili translations of the Qur’an mention the intended sacrifice of Ibrahim’s son as a *mtihani* (examination) or *jaribio* (trial). Tanzanian pilgrims describe the *hajj* experience in the same terms, as tests and ordeals. Nonetheless, Muslims celebrating the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania do not directly undergo these personal experiences of hardship. Swahili preachers therefore, do their utmost to identify what kind of hardships should be overcome in the Idd el-Hajj. Starting with Ibrahim’s experience, Muslims link up with this theme and label the self-sacrificial attitude of the believer as the real trial which is rewarded on the Idd el-Hajj. Some Swahili sources devote one of the fasting days preceding the Idd el-Hajj to Ibrahim’s trial.

The tendency to magnify the physical, moral or spiritual hardships of the Idd el-Hajj and thus increase the significance of the holiday, are
partly caused by the Arabic names of the Idds. The two major festivals in the annual cycle are called, in Arabic, ‘id al-saghir (Swahili: Idd el-Fitr) and ‘id al-kabir (Swahili: Idd el-Hajj): the minor and the major festival. The Arabic names suggest that the Major Festival (Idd el-Hajj) is preferred to the Minor Festival (Idd el-Fitr). Indeed, in some Islamic communities this preference is reflected in a larger number of national holidays allotted to the Idd el-Hajj (Rashed 1998). The reason to do so is often found in the practice of the hajj. Whereas the Day of Sacrifice on the 10th of Dhulhija is perceived as the final day of the pilgrimage, throughout the course of the following three days (11, 12 and 13 Dhulhija), pilgrims still have to carry out the final hajj obligations before they may leave. These days (ayyam al-tashriq) are often also included in the Idd el-Hajj holiday elsewhere in the Muslim world. On the other hand, the Idd el-Fitr is followed by a period of six voluntary fasting days that reduce this festival to a single day. Another Islamic author explains the difference between ‘small’ and ‘great’ holiday in terms of the educational value: Ramadan is just an exercise involving bodily restraint and the Idd el-Fitr is therefore a Minor Festival. The hajj is concerned with spiritual values, and contains a real trial (the sacrifice of your own blood) and the Idd el-Hajj is therefore the Major Festival.

Corresponding to the Arabic names of the Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj, some Tanzanian sources faithfully translate the festivals as Idd ndogo and Idd kubwa (the minor Idd and the major Idd). In one of his Festival sermons, Lassenga writes: “Leo ni siku ya idd kubwa” (today is the day of the Great Feast). Because Allah Himself has ordained these festival names, they must have a profoundly deep meaning (“ni lazima ziwe na undani mkuba na wa maana sana”). Understandably, Muslim discourse attempts to explain the difference between the two divine festival names. For example, Idd el-Fitr is small because Muslims only give money and food as alms (sadaka) on this day. In contrast, the Idd el-Hajj is big because of the blood which Muslims sacrifice, a metonym for one’s own self. Sometimes the reference to the Great Festival fits one of the writer’s strategic aims. For example, an-Nuur reported on a congress when the government suspended the workshops on the Christian Sunday while the Muslim Idd el-Hajj was treated as a normal working day. In this context, the an-Nuur journalist referred to a violation of the Major Festival (idd kubwa). Within the Ahmadiyya discourse, a preference for Idd kubwa instead of the common Idd el-Hajj sometimes indicates their particular vision of the ritual as locally-based, and as not being directly connected to the hajj in Saudi Arabia.
Surprisingly, western scholars usually reproduce this theological discourse without too much reflection. The difference in name between the two Idds is often taken as an indication that Muslims everywhere perceive and experience the two feasts accordingly. In her book, *Sacred Performances*, Combs-Schilling describes how the 'Great Feast' in Morocco "lives up to its name" (1989:223). Delaney attributes this local Moroccan meaning to all Idd el-Hajj celebrations everywhere: it is "the holiest day of the Muslim calendar" (1998:163). Ursula Spuler-Stegemann writes about "[d]ieses grösste islamische Fest" (1998:164) and Gaffney describes it as "the feast commemorating Abraham's sacrifice ('id al-adha), the greatest of Islamic holy days" (1994:85). However, it is the Arabic identification of the Idd that urge Swahili Muslims to explain the festivals in terms of 'major' and 'minor,' rather than social practice or individual perception. Of course, this discourse is in itself a social fact that can influence the meaning of the Idd el-Hajj. But rather than being inherently embedded in the festival itself or derived from its Arabic name, the ritual takes on a particular local meaning in a social, cultural and political field.\(^44\)

So far we encountered two different mechanisms highlighting that the Idd el-Fitr is the more important of the two rituals, in the experience of Tanzanian Muslims, despite being named the 'small festival.' The Swahili calendar stresses that the Idd el Fitr is the New Year's Day and the experience of fasting and hardship lend a specific flavour to the Idd el-Fitr which the Idd el-Hajj lacks. Together with studies completed in other areas of the Muslim world (Juynboll 1930:111; Grunebaum 1951:63; Mittwoch 1971; Constantin 1983:58; Lane 1989: chapters 3 and 25; Buitelaar 1991:139; Rashed 1998:19)\(^45\) these findings point toward a higher social significance of the Idd el-Fitr, exceeding that of the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania. A Zanzibari relates:

The Festival after the fasting month of Ramadani is known as "Sikukuu Ndogo", literally the small festival but actually the first festival. This is Idd el-Fitr. 'Sikukuu-kubwa" literary [sic] the big festival but actually the second festival is Idd el-Hajj.\(^46\)

"In spite of its name, it is actually a very minor ritual event in coastal Swahili communities," Landberg (1977:606, n.4) writes in her village study in the Tanga region. Trimingham concludes the same: "Although called the 'Great Feast' it is not an occasion of such rejoicing as on the lesser 'id, but is spent more quietly paying and receiving visits" (1968:67).\(^47\)
Some Muslims explicitly told me that they enjoy the Idd el-Fitr more than the Idd el-Hajj, especially when they are not able to purchase a sacrificial animal as is often the case in Tanga. One of the Idd sermons contains an unusual reference to the Idd el-Fitr as the "Big Idd" and the Idd el-Hajj as the "Small Idd". Other circumstantial observations also point in the same direction. For example, Tanga citizens often buy new clothes before Idd el-Fitr, but not always before the Idd el-Hajj. Discussions regarding when the Idd el-Fitr will take place start immediately at the beginning of the fasting month, while the 'Great Festival' is not so frequently discussed throughout its preceding month. Tanzanian Muslims recently started to send the Idd cards which are known in other Muslim societies (cf. Rashed 1998:129-130), but these are only sent on the occasion of the Idd el-Fitr and seldom at the time of the Idd el-Hajj. Newspapers often depict cartoons on Ramadan and Idd el-Fitr but hardly any on the Idd el-Hajj. The popular differences in valuation are recognised by the government in the number of holidays allocated, as we will see below.

The mawlid

The mawlid festival marks the Prophet Muhammad's birthday and is unrivalled in its popularity among most East African Muslims (cf. Lienhardt 1959; Bunger 1972; el-Zein 1974; Landberg 1977:532-577; Boyd 1981; Constantin 1983; Swartz 1991:83 passim; Middleton 1992:167). It is a major national holiday, taking place on 12th Rabi' al-awwal of the Muslim lunar calendar or Mfungo sita according to the Swahili calendar. On this day, a national mawlid is performed in Tanzania and each town performs a joint celebration together with all madrasas (in Tanga even several Shi'ite schools take part). During the weeks following the official mawlid day, all major Tanga madrasas hold their own mawlid celebration. These performances show a considerable degree of rivalry and competition between madrasas: The mawlid is an occasion to outshine rivals through recitations of devotional poetry, the preparation of gorgeous meals, the number of visitors and the performative skills of students. Often, the date of the mawlid celebration is connected to the foundation of the madrasa and the festivities include memorial prayers for the deceased founder (hauli) (cf. Ahmed & Von Oppen 2004). They also include ritual processions (zafa) and visits to the graves of important sheikhs. Buses and cars loaded with singing women, children and men arrive from all madrasa branches outside Tanga. The school premises are prepared to lodge and feed all visitors for a couple of days. In the weeks before the joyous occasion, the grass is cut,
stones lining the paths are whitewashed, and sometimes small trees are planted and watered. The major activities take place in the afternoon and evening: singing, dancing, and presenting religious speeches which focus on the role of Muhammad and the importance of (religious) education. Other madrasas are invited and their leaders are respectfully welcomed.

The word mawlid also refers to the poems recited on this occasion, and kusoma maulidi (to read a mawlid) is therefore a popular expression regarding the religious recitation on the occasion of a birth, or the acquisition of a new car. A festive meal is always included but often takes place several hours later. The word mawlid is employed for many different activities and the ritual mawlid reading can easily be performed on diverse occasions and in various contexts. Except for their name and a few common elements, like the recitations of Swahili and Arabic poems (such as the Mawlid al-Barazanji and the Simt al-durar), these private mawlids are different events. They lack the competitive element of the large-scale madrassa or national mawlid celebrations.

No other Islamic ritual in Tanzania (with the single exception of the salat) has led to the production of more texts than the mawlid. Strong affections for the Prophet Muhammad, the music and poetry, and the competitive elements attract many people. The absence of authoritative texts prescribing binding rules for the performance (the ritual only started to spread after the formative period of Islam, cf. Kaptein 1993) makes the mawlid flexible enough to adopt local cultural influences. The time, place and form of the performance differ in each town. For example, in the north-western town of Bukoba, the mawlid used to be held after the hajjis returned from Saudi Arabia and included practices like public auctions.

In Tanga, the communal mawlid might be described as the mirror image of the AMYC Idd celebrations. Both rituals are performed on the Tangamano fields in the centre of the town. In the rituals, the ideal of a homogeneous, timeless, moral community is expressed. Intra-group differences (between Sunni’s and Shi‘ites or between madrasas) are transcended, whereas extra-group differences (between Muslims and non-Muslims, but also between Sufis and reformists) are emphasised. For example, none of the mawlid celebrations in Tanga fail to refer to the AMYC’s condemnation of the mawlid, and none of the AMYC Idd performances lack references to the mainstream Muslim ideas on the proper Idd day. Both the mawlid and the Idd el-Hajj evoke strong, trans-local symbols to express their group identity. The Tanga madrasas claim to be the pious Muslims who praise the Prophet Muhammad as the best example to follow and who respect-
fully remember their deceased sheikhs. AMYC preachers deny this localised Islamic identity and use the *hajj* and the Muslim global community as their ritual frame of reference, as we will see below.

The lack of textual authorisation, the enormous popularity and the strong linkage between ritual and social identity makes the *mawlid* into perhaps the most debated Islamic ritual on the Swahili coast. Most Tanzanian Muslims agree that the ritual was not celebrated in the Prophet’s time and that the *mawlid* is thus not a *sunna* in the strict sense. However, most believers find this commemoration perfectly adequate to express their praise of the Prophet. A Kenyan school-book on this controversy reads:

> Meelad un nabi was neither celebrated during the life time of the Prophet nor did his companion after him [...] it is not part of worship. It is advisable for Muslims not to use celebrations as the cause for division for example those who celebrate the *mawlid* in respect and honour of the holy Prophet are doing a good act of remembering the life and good character of the holy Prophet. Those who do not celebrate it in accordance with the Prophets non observance of such a celebration are doing a good act of maintaining the Prophets Sunna.

In Tanzania, three major points of view regarding the *mawlid* can be found. On the national level, the government quietly recognises the popularity of the *mawlid* and gratefully acknowledges the possibilities which it offers to reach Muslims. The Tanzanian state has officially recognised the *mawlid* celebration as a public holiday on a par with the two other Idds. Just like the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj, BAKWATA celebrates a national *mawlid baraza* in one of the major cities, and newspapers extensively write about the event and print pictures. Since the colonial era, state officials have been invited to Muslim *mawlids* to hold keynote speeches.

A second and totally opposite view, is that of the AMYC and the Ansaar Sunna, who vehemently attack the celebration. “The only difference between us and them is the *mauled*,” Barahiyan answered when I enquired about the differences between Tanga madrasas and the AMYC. According to this view, any ritual that cannot trace its genealogy back to the acts and sayings of Prophet Muhammad is condemned as an innovation (*bid’a*). The true followers of the Prophet imitate his behaviour rather than celebrate his birthday.

A third ambiguous position is represented by several other groups. The IPC schoolbook *Maarifa ya Uislam* does not condemn the practice,
although the authors describe the *mawlid* as an innovation only initiated after the Prophet’s time. Furthermore, they provide pupils with a better alternative: fasting every Monday, which was the day of the Prophet’s birth. In the same vein, *an-Nuur* prefers to neglect the discussions and describes the *mawlid* as a good occasion for transmitting knowledge, raising political awareness and building the Islamic community. The Ahmadiyyas show the same attitude: neither an unconditional approval like that expressed by BAKWATA, nor the extreme condemnation of AMYC, but rather a careful balance. Singing, dancing and the mixing of the sexes are to be denounced, but reading the Prophet’s biography (*sira*) on this day is a good alternative. To avoid the word *mawlid*, they call it *siku ya seeratun nabbiiy* (day of the Prophet’s biography), and they thereby salvage a popular practice by renaming the ritual. An additional advantage of the *mawlid* for Ahmadiyya believers is that they can publicly counter the accusation that they downplay the role of Prophet Muhammad in favour of the promised Messiah, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

**d. Other Islamic festivals**

Minor events in the Islamic calendar include the Shawwal fast, the commemoration of the Hijra, the Islamic New Year, Ashura, Laylat al-Qadr and Laylat al-Isra’ wa al-Mi’raj. Ritual performance or non-performance on these occasions continues to evoke criticism. However, the surrounding discussions usually only remain on a local level, unlike the *mawlid* and Idd debates. The Idd el-Fitr is followed by six voluntary fasting days in the month of Shawwal. After the completion of this popular fast, a large feast is celebrated in Zanzibar starting the 8th of Shawwal and continuing for 4 days and nights. Senior Zanzibaris argue that this celebration primarily takes place because the youth like the *starehe* (entertainment), in the form of discos and dancing. They attribute this custom to the morally corrupt western towns, such as Tanga and Dar es Salaam. In Ramadan 1966, the editor of *Mapenzi ya Mungu* showed his concern about Muslims fanatically adhering to the fasting practices of Shawwal. He wrote that it is important to keep in mind the differences between *fard* and *sunna* practices.

The Hijra festival reminds Muslims of Muhammad’s flight to Mecca. The Maawa-I Islam *madrasa* in Tanga takes this date to celebrate a three-day festival that closely resembles the other *madrasas’ mawlid* performance, including a *zafa* and a *dhikr*. Many mosques celebrate the Islamic New Year in Muharram with a special prayer, and some attention is paid to the festival in the Friday *khutba* preceding or following the New Year. The
date is used as a suitable occasion to summon meetings (mihadhara). The topic of these religious seminars is usually not related to the New Year’s celebration but concern the social problems of Muslims in a marginal position.\textsuperscript{70}

Ashura, the tenth of Muharram, is celebrated among the Shi’ites as a commemoration of Hussayn’s death at Karbala, and as such, the Shi’a Bilal Muslim mission has published a lot on this Feast. The Shi’ite discourse on the Sacrificial Feast cannot be understood completely without reference to Hussayn’s martyrdom, as we discuss below. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Ashura date is not so important in public Sunni discourse, although special prayers for this day are published in small popular prayer books, and the supererogatory fasting on this day is recommended.\textsuperscript{71} Finally, the \textit{Lailat al-Qadr} (the night when God takes decisions for the coming year) and the \textit{Laylat al-Isra’ wa-l Mi’raj} should be mentioned. Especially the latter, in commemoration of the Prophet’s Night Journey to heaven, is used as the topic of many popular publications.\textsuperscript{72}

To summarise: Tanzanian Muslims acknowledge that according to the textual authoritative base, the Idd el-Hajj together with the Idd el-Fitr should be the most important yearly Islamic holidays. Both feasts share important Islamic rituals with the Friday Idd, like the communal salat and a ritual sermon (khutba). Despite the textual preference for the Idd el-Hajj as the most important festival, the common Swahili calendar attaches more importance to the Idd el-Fitr. In terms of social identity, the mawlid is the most influential ritual in the Muslim year. This popular festival, in which madrasas play an important role, is vehemently contested in public discourse. It is not at all surprising that heated debates about ritual content, practice and meaning not only occur in the context of the Islamic calendrical festivals, but also in the national arena where Muslim rituals have to compete with Christian and secular festivals.

3. \textbf{The Idd el-Hajj and the national calendar}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Religion and national identity}
\end{itemize}

The Idd el-Hajj is a national holiday in Tanzania and it shares this status with other Islamic, Christian, and political feasts. In 2002, the Republican government labelled sixteen days as national holidays (table 6.1).
Table 6.1.
Tanzanian public holidays in 2002

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<tr>
<td><strong>Christian</strong></td>
<td>Ijumaa Kuu (Good Friday, variable date)</td>
<td>Jumatatu ya Pasaka (Easter Monday, variable date)</td>
<td>Kuzaliwa kwa Kristo (Christmas, 25 December)</td>
<td>Siku ya Kupeana Zawadi (Boxing Day, 26 December)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim</strong></td>
<td>Idd el-Fitr (End of Ramadan, 1 Shawwal, variable solar date), 2 days</td>
<td>Idd el-Hajj (Sacrificial Feast, 10 Dhulhija, variable solar date)</td>
<td>mawlid (Birthday Muhammad, 12th Rabi' al-awwal, variable solar date)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National/political</strong></td>
<td>Siku ya mapinduzi ya Zanzibar (Day of the Zanzibar Revolution, 12 January)</td>
<td>Siku kilioanzishwa Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Founding day of the ruling party CCM, formerly known as ASP, 5 February)</td>
<td>Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar (Union Day, 26 April)</td>
<td>Sabasaba (Peasants’ Day, 7 July)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nanenane/Siku ya wakulima (Farmers’ Day, 8 August)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International/Western</strong></td>
<td>Mwaka mpya (New Year's Day, 1 January)</td>
<td>Siku ya wafanyakazi duniani/Mei Mosi (Labour Day, 1 May)</td>
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The Tanzanian government carefully guards its public calendar and is anxious to show that the Republic is neutral. On national holidays, state institutions are closed and all civil servants, regardless of their religion, are given a day off work. All official and semi-official activities are strictly forbidden on a national holiday. On Muslim, Christian and political national holidays, the Head of State is visible in representative acts like gift-giving, usually consisting of money and food. The careful distribution of the sixteen national holidays for the year 2002 (8 religious, 8 non-religious) is an example of this governmental guarding of public, national time. The celebration of the state is clearly the centre of gravity on six occasions throughout the year. If we consider the Labour Day to be an expression of the (former) socialist identity of the Tanzanian Republic, then the religious (8 days) and national parts (7 days) of the national calendar are also in balance. However, this neutral national identity is perceived as being very fragile, and transgressions are severely punished. ‘Mixing religion with politics’ is regarded as a capital sin against the presumed neutrality of the state. When Sheikh Taqdiri dared to express his opinion concerning the number of Muslims on the TANU list in 1958, Nyerere sacked him immediately. It was not the expression as such that caused this reaction, but the time and place: the national mawlid baraza in Tanga (Chande 1998:190).
As a result of increasing liberalisation, public space and time cannot be defended in as strict a manner as in the past. However, the dominant presence of the political non-religious holidays in the public space is still visible in the traditional female *khangas* (multicoloured cloths with a short Swahili text printed at the bottom; cf. Hongoke 1993). I found only one *khanga* referring to the Idd holidays: *Furaha ya idd, shukuru mola* (Joy of Idd, Thank the Lord) and one Christian *khanga*: *Heri ya krismas na mwaka mpya* (Merry Christmas and Happy New Year). Far more common are the political holidays such as *saba saba 1989; Furaha ya jamhuri* (Joy of the Republic/ Independence); *Miaka 10 ya uhuru* (10 years of freedom); *Tusherehekee miaka 25 ya uhuru* (Let’s celebrate 25 years of freedom). The existence of these *khangas* might be an indication of the popularity of these festivals, given that printing these cloths is usually a commercial enterprise. However, it is more likely that these *khangas* are gifts distributed during state-sponsored festivals: on these occasions, often all women dress in the same *khanga*. In the past, the Tanzanian state showed considerable interest in the Swahili texts printed on the *khangas* and even subjected them to censorship (Hongoke 1993). The superabundance of ‘political’ *khangas* clearly correlates with the government’s view of the *khanga* as an original African dress, fitting for political rallies and national holidays. However, because *khangas* are considered to be the clothes of the poor, *Tanga* women prefer to wear a modern western dress on the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj.

The governmental view on the Idd el-Hajj as a public holiday compared with the two other Muslim Feasts, Idd el-Fitr and the *mawlid*, is illustrated in Appendix II (indicating the number of public holidays for Muslim feasts in the period 1961-1994). In the colonial period, the Tanganyikan government had declared two Islamic feasts as public holidays. Both were to be celebrated at the end of Ramadan, the Idd el-Fitr. These two days were always week days: if the first day of the Idd el-Fitr was a Sunday, then the following Monday and Tuesday became the national public holidays. The Idd el-Hajj, on the other hand, was not a public holiday, although it was officially identified as a Muslim religious day. Local authorities were allowed to grant two hours’ leave for employees in addition to the fixed two religious holidays per annum. This arrangement allowed religious groups to celebrate their own days, for instance, the Imamat day and the birthday of the Aga Khan. Every year, the central government sent around circulars containing Christian, Hindu and Muslim additional festivals. For example, in 1960, Muslim civil servants were entitled to have two hours off during two days to be chosen from the following: 1 Ramadan, 21 Ramadan, Idd el-Hajj,
10 Muharram or the \textit{mawlid}.\textsuperscript{79} Muslims who wanted to partake in the Idd prayers were allowed to do so, but they had to return immediately after they finished their religious duties, by 10 a.m.\textsuperscript{80} Of course, this arrangement led to many complaints.\textsuperscript{81} Especially in the case of school children walking long distances from home to school, two hours were not sufficient for the dense programme of a religious holiday. According to a letter of complaint from the District Commissioner at Handeni, Tanga Region, it meant, in fact, that the teacher remained at school with five to ten pupils. If pupils returned to school but did not arrive on time (before 10 a.m.), they could expect severe punishment, and some were even threatened with dismissal, as described for Moshi schools.\textsuperscript{82} In order to avoid these “problems and murmuring” (\textit{shida na manung’uniko}), the District Commissioner proposed to divide the two days for the Idd-el Fitr and give one to the Idd el-Hajj.\textsuperscript{83}

The era of independence, ushered in on 9 December 1961, showed an increase in national holidays obviously intended to bolster the new national identity of Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{84} The Idd el-Hajj was one of the first celebrations to benefit from this boom: 15 May 1962 was declared a public holiday. In addition, many secondary rituals were recognised as Islamic religious days even if they were not eligible for a national free day. The 1962 governmental circular mentioned “Miraj”, 15 Shaaban, 1 Ramadan, 21 Ramadan, 1 Muharram, 10 Muharram and the \textit{mawlid} as occasions when Muslims could be granted additional leave.\textsuperscript{85}

The next remarkable change in the national calendar coincided with the Zanzibar Revolution (January 1964) and the birth of the Tanzanian nation (26 April 1964). From that time onwards, the \textit{mawlid} was recognised as the third Muslim public holiday. After the merging of the island with the mainland, the \textit{mawlid} received its own place in the official records as a public, national holiday. Apart from the population’s high esteem for the \textit{mawlid} day, one of the reasons for its inclusion in the national calendar might have been the increasing tension between Christians and Muslims. As opposed to the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj celebrations that need to be performed in the morning hours, \textit{mawlid} festivities almost always take place in the late afternoon and evening. From this perspective, there was no need for a free day to participate in religious obligations like the Idd prayers.\textsuperscript{86} The government probably felt the need to acknowledge an Islamic counterpart to Christmas, both centring on the birth of a religious leader.\textsuperscript{87} A second possibility might be seen in the shocking January 1964 Zanzibar revolution and the subsequent need to have another Muslim national holiday to strengthen the new Tanzanian national identity. On Zanzibar, the \textit{mawlid} had been
granted the status of a national holiday since the beginning of the 20th century (Fair 2001:181).

It is unclear why the Nyerere government decided to celebrate two days for the Idd el-Hajj in 1965 and 1966. These years also show the highest total number of holidays granted. From 1967 onwards, the picture practically doesn’t change. The Republic of Tanzania reduces the number of holidays for the Idd el-Hajj to one, whereas the one day for the mawlid and the two holidays for the Idd el-Fitr remain unchanged. Also, the role of the minor groups’ secondary religious national holidays remain the same: on these occasions, the government sends official letters of congratulation, praising the good relations between the state and that particular religious group.88

b. Inequality and calendars

The recognition of religious holidays as public holidays can be read as the recognition of the religious group itself. Discussions regarding religious national holidays are part and parcel of most modern societies which are dealing with real or perceived religious minorities.89 The Tanzanian case is no different. In current discourse, Muslims stress the inequality between Christian and Muslim public holidays. Despite the government’s insistence on equal treatment with regard to national holidays, Muslims claim that the Christian holiday time is structurally favoured:

Partiality (upendeleo) in the number of public holidays (siku za kupumzika). For example, New Year, Easter (four days), Christmas (two days) in total seven days for the Christians. But on the side of the Muslims there are only four days: Eid el-Fitr (two days), Idd el-Hajj, and the mawlid, while [Islamic] New Year is not a public holiday.90

Although the Muslim mathematics of this calculation are not shared by the government (the latter do not include the Saturday and Sunday between Good Friday and Easter Monday as public holidays, nor do they count New Year’s Day among the Christian holidays), many Muslims agree with the spirit of this article. According to them neglecting the Islamic calendar in favour of the ‘Christian’ calendar starts with the very first day: the Christian New Year is celebrated with alcohol and dancing, but nobody cares about the first of Muharram.91 Some Muslims feel offended to receive Christmas and New Year’s wishes in December instead of a ‘good fasting’ or ‘Idd Mubarak’ on the occasion of the Islamic Idd.92 However, when the Coca-Cola Company wished their Muslim customers a “Mfungo Mwema” (good fasting)
on the occasion of Ramadan 2001, Muslims doubted the sincerity of this American enterprise. According to Muslims, they are excluded from many national holidays because the gifts donated by the state officials consist of *haram* food like pork and beer. The message conveyed is clear: the Tanzanian nation-state is for Christians only.

The perceived inequality between Christian and Muslim time is highlighted on the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj. Here, Muslims observe the same pattern: on Muslim public holidays the Parliament gathered together to make important decisions concerning the annual budget, something which would never happen on a Christmas day. A student complained that he had to be present at college at the Idd el-Hajj 2003, which he did immediately after the festive prayer. He compared this attitude with the Christian Easter holiday when everybody gets a day off. The results of the Standard VII examinations were delayed in order to allow Christian children to celebrate Christmas untroubled, but the Form IV examinations started on the Idd el-Fitr, January 1999. Muslim parents in Mlandege (Iringa) complained when it was proposed that their children in Standard VII should attend school on the Idd el-Hajj 2000, while the school was closed on the Christian holiday “siku ya Majivu” (Ash Wednesday). Through their reactions, Muslims demonstrated bitterness by asking why Christians should have their Christmas Day, their Boxing Day, their New Year’s Day and the Remembrance of the Revolution Day on Zanzibar (12 January), while the Idd was so easily cancelled. In 1997, Tanesco provided its employees with the possibility of having a 100,000 Shilling (USD 100) “Christmas loan” to have electricity during the holidays. Muslims who asked for the same favour some weeks later when the Idd el-Fitr was celebrated were told that the loan was also meant for the Idd. Instead of a “Christmas loan,” the management declared, it would have been better if it were called “special allowances,” without referring to any Christian or Muslim religious holiday.

The Tanzanian government not only disregards the two major Idds, but the weekly Friday Idd is also neglected. While Christians and Jews have their days of worship recognised as national holidays, Muslims are forced to miss the Friday Sermon by their employers, or because their school does not allow pupils to leave early. During the elections in 1999, Mohammed A. Mohammed observed that some of the polling stations were closed throughout the period of the church services (the elections were held on Sunday). His complaint was that Christians always have the freedom to practice their religion while Muslims have to fight for every right. Even if students are allowed to participate in the Friday prayers, this is only achieved
by shortening the tuition hours on Friday morning which in turn affects their right to an education. Christians never have to compromise between their basic rights for education and worship.103

The government refers to the Sunday as a day of rest (siku ya mapumziko) developed out of a historical (i.e. colonial, western) practice rather than a religious day: “It should be remembered that Sunday is conventionally taken as a rest day rather than a religious day.”104 For this reason all meat inspection on Sundays was cancelled in 1972:

The purpose of this circular letter is to inform you that, Sunday being conventionally a rest day NO MEAT INSPECTION WILL TAKE PLACE ON SUNDAYS. Consequently no slaughters will be allowed on Sunday [emphasis in original, GCvdB].105

Prior to this circular the government had allowed slaughtering to take place on Sundays due to the lack of cooling facilities. The meat inspectors could claim an extra holiday or payment for their extra work on this day.106 Nowadays, meat inspection takes place seven days a week.

Most Islamic groups are similar in their critique on the hegemonic Christian system of time-reckoning. In several articles, the Ahmadiyya claim the right of Muslim citizens to pray on Friday.107 The Islamic Propagation Centre regularly produces publications regarding the violation of Islamic holidays while the Christian days are respected. Only the AMYC, in their denial of the Tanzanian state, do not feel the need to discuss the inequalities on the national level. Although the AMYC Arafa school week follows the ‘Christian’ week (running from Monday to Saturday), the schedule offers ample opportunity for prayers. Daily tuition is from 7.50 a.m. to 13.00 p.m., but teaching hours are reduced on Fridays and Saturdays. Due to their status as a private school, they are allowed to negotiate their own holidays. On national holidays like 26 April, the AMYC schools teach as normal, but pupils have at least one week off around the two Idds. This is indicative of the value they attach to the Tanzanian nation-state compared to religiously ordained holidays. Other private Islamic schools also use this freedom to emphasise their own (religious) identity. Madrasa-linked schools like the Tanga Maawa-I Islam organise their vacations in such a way that pupils can attend the annual mawlid celebrations.108

The hegemonic calendar is not enforced by the state but Muslims sense its threatening influence in many disguises. We have already mentioned that the indication of time in Islamic newspapers is often according
to the Gregorian calendar. Commemorative events usually take the solar date as the starting point and not the lunar date. For example, Mwembechai victims are honoured on February 12 and not the corresponding lunar date of this 1998 event. On the other hand, the death of the Shadhili sheikh Hussayn was transported to the lunar calendar for strategic purposes, rather than religious ones (Ahmed & Von Oppen 2004:95). The Khoja Shia Ithnaashara Jamaat (KSI) publishes lunar calendars, but the copy that I have in my possession (1422 H) is manually ‘corrected’ in order to use it as a solar calendar. The Zanzibar Istiqama organisation distributes a western solar calendar showing pictures of completely veiled women and bearded men, but no indication of Islamic time. The regular call for a return to the Islamic lunar calendar in these godless days is the expression of a religious minority attempting to mark its identity, rather than a serious challenge to the solar, hegemonic time-system.

The best example of how the real Islamic calendar with its respective holy days is threatened by rival celebrations from the western calendar is Valentine’s Day. In Swahili, this day is called Siku ya wapendanao (lovers’ day), and is rapidly gaining popularity among urban youth. Though neither a public holiday nor religious, the press extensively covers this celebration every year and always traces its origins back to the 3rd century Christian saint, St. Valentine. The postal services stimulate their commercial interests through advertising, and apparently with success: the Vadgama company stated that it sold 19,000 love-cards in 2001-2002. This new ‘ritual’ evokes protest from religious and non-religious sides alike as an “offence to tradition,” “an incentive for Aids,” “an African imitation of a Western ritual in honour of one of the filthiest human beings in the world.” It is not the day of those who love one another, but the day of those who infect one another (siku ya waambukizanano). Although Muslim discourse to some extent resembles Christian and non-religious protest voices, the former particularly stresses the imitation (kuiga) of western, non-Islamic culture as loathsome. Valentine’s Day is presented as the mirror image of the Idd: instead of celebrating a Christian saint’s day through immoral behaviour, Muslim youth should follow the Prophet of Islam and his two lofty Idds. Muslim identity is negatively expressed by not participating in Valentine’s Day and positively by emphasising the Idd el-Hajj and the Idd el-Fitr.

The Idd el-Hajj has to be protected against the onslaught of this western supremacy and moral corruption, illustrated by the Valentine’s Day practices. In a web-forum discussion on the Idd el-Hajj 2003, a question was posed regarding whether the Idd el-Hajj as an Arabic cultural practice had
anything to do with ‘black African’ culture. A suggestion that Swahili Muslims neglect their own cultural heritage in favour of an imported Islamic ritual prompted vehement reactions. A person nicknamed Barubaru and apparently a Muslim, responds:

X-mas, Good Friday, Valentine’s Day etc., whose culture is this? I don’t know what tribe you are from if you go to the toilet, you wipe yourself with [toilet]paper (makaratasi) and then you walk away and celebrate with the filth (uchafu) on your body (mwilini)?

Here Christmas, Easter, Valentine’s Day and the use of toilet paper (instead of the clean, Islamic practice of cleansing with water) are all presented as western culture, and therefore filthy. Islam, by contrast, is a hygienic and moral religion. The Idd el-Hajj is therefore a much better alternative to these western imitations. Barubaru goes on to state how Muslims should celebrate the Idd el-Hajj and the preceding Day of Arafa, the sacrifice of animals and the distribution of the meat between the family, the neighbours and the poor. In these discussions, the nation-state is absent as a scapegoat. Religious identity is presented here as the result of a well-informed personal choice in favour of the Idd el-Hajj and other scriptural rituals, against the western cultural hegemony.

4. The Idd el-Hajj and the sacred calendar

a. Time and ritual

Both Islamic believers and non-believers often state that, for the Muslim, time has different qualities or degrees of sacredness. The discussions described above confirm that the ‘holiness’ of the Idd el-Hajj changes according to the perspective of each calendar. The Idd is ordained by God, restored to its former glory by Prophet Muhammad, recognised as a national holiday and, according to Muslims, sometimes violated by the ‘Christian’ Tanzanian state. However, the importance of the Idd el-Hajj is neither timeless nor eternal. For example, the Idd which takes place on a Friday is valued more highly than on other days. The social experience of Idd celebrations performed on different days (to be discussed in the next chapters), forces Muslims to consider if something like a correct Idd time exists, independent from human interpretation and social construction.
It is difficult to answer the question of whether it is the ritual that makes time more or less holy, or the time that lends its sacredness to any deed, or the place that influences both time and action. Even mundane activities like sexual intercourse have their preferred time and place, but labelling this time as equally sacred to the sacred Idd time is hardly justifiable; if it is perceived as such, this sanctity is derived from the invocation of God by the formula *Bismillah*.

Neglecting this subtle relationship between the act and the correct time and place to perform this act can have dire consequences. The actions performed on the Swahili New Year (*siku ya mwaka*) will endow the actor "with increased strength and ability to do whatever he did" during the rest of the year (Gray 1955a:18), but the very same acts completed in the dangerous liminal period preceding the *siku ya mwaka* may turn the perpetrator into stone, as happened to some unlucky sailors in Mombasa (ibid.: 8-9). Having sexual intercourse during the Idd el-Hajj will result in the birth of a child with either four or six fingers on each hand. People undergoing a *ruqya* (healing of a *jinn* possession) are particularly vulnerable to the entry of new unwelcome spiritual beings. During this time, they should be very careful to avoid watching specific TV programmes and reading Swahili newspapers which report on entertainment and erotic stories. The highly rewarding *salat* should not be performed during sunrise, sunset or in polluted areas. A special prayer which is recommended to pilgrims as part of the hajj rituals is strictly forbidden outside Mecca. Neither sexual intercourse, nor watching TV or praying the *salat* is in itself holy or dangerous, but the constellation of time, place and action might yield a dangerous situation. The Swahili discourse on the correct time of the Idd el-Hajj offers an insight into the relationship between time and ritual in modern Tanzania.

Time does not have a sacred quality in itself: all space and time belong to Allah. The days of the week are *siku za Mungu* (days of God). Many Idd sermons contain the warning that “there is no special day or month for worship” meaning that Muslims should serve and praise God every day throughout the year. This belief, not contested by any Muslim, can result in several divergent ideas. One is the tendency to downplay the role of time in ritual performance. Doing something only in Shaaban or Ramadan might easily lead to denouncing God as a seasonal deity (*Mungu wao ni wa msimu*). This opinion refutes many Tangan Muslims’ fear to marry in the month of *mfungo nane* because of its perceived bad luck (*nuksi*). Indeed, God has made Islam easy for His believers, so the temporal margins for rituals are large. For example, sacrifice on the Idd el-Hajj can be performed any day from 10 till 14 Dhuhiha. Praying the Idd *salat* is not limited to a special time,
but should be done together as God’s community. All time is equal, and
within the boundaries of a few explicit scriptural commandments, only the
spiritual disposition counts before God. These ideas are closely linked to the
modern attitude presenting time as an asset, as capital, and all temporal
units are basically of the same quality and are interchangeable. Time ‘lost’ in
Ramadan can be ‘recovered’ at some other time. Notions of wasting time and
using time properly should spur the Muslim to act like a good bookkeeper.\textsuperscript{128}
Together with money (sadaka, mali) and blood, time is the most essential
property a Muslim should sacrifice on the Idd el-Hajj.\textsuperscript{129}

A second opinion acknowledges the same idea that all time belongs
to God. However, some acts can sanctify particular times: for example
time can be consecrated by ‘holy,’ ritual activities like the call to prayer (adhan)
and reading the Qur’an. For instance, early one morning in Dar es Salaam,
a group of murderers temporarily suspended lynching a thief when the call
of the minaret sounded. Not for long however: “Barely had the Azana ended
when the beating resumed.”\textsuperscript{130} I was also once interrupted by an old Digo
woman during an interview: she stopped our conversation until the adhan
had ended.\textsuperscript{131}

A third opinion shows that both the performance of a ritual act and
the time itself are closely intertwined. Both ritual and time can reinforce
each other, but only on one condition: there must be a textual authority that
connects the two. It is this opinion that can be found in most of the discus-
sions on the proper Idd el-Hajj date:

What is meant by sacred time? Sacred time simply means that certain select
time periods are consecrated and enjoy superior status in relation to ordinary
time. The concept of sacred time forms the basis of my thesis that any Islamic
celebration can only take place in some consecrated time period, whose method of determination has been clearly spelt out by the Sharia’ah. (My emphasis)\textsuperscript{132}

What makes it similar to the second opinion is that it presumes a
difference between time elements. However, this is not a ‘magic’ influence
radiating from the ritual itself, but rather is derived from the obedient read-
ing of a sacred text. It is therefore an elaboration of the first opinion that
only God can differentiate between the equal temporal units. It is a modern
opinion in the sense that it assumes the existence of something like ‘real
time,’ independent from ritual performance and human interpretation. But
Muslims need to carefully read the transmitted text to find out which at par-
ticular moment a particular ritual must be celebrated. It is not the ritual that
sanctifies the time, nor the time that hallows specific acts, but rather God’s command (embodied in texts) that defines the beginning and end of rituals. This conception of time is different from the mystical perception of sacred time expressed by those who suspended all activities during the call of the prayer. Both attitudes regarding ‘sacred time’ and ‘correct time’ can involve strong religious sentiments, as we will see below.

The increasing awareness of ‘correct’ ritual time is one of the characteristics of ritual change in Tanga. In this environment, eating the last meal in a Ramadan night (daku) just before the morning prayer instead of late at night defines your status as a proper Muslim.\(^{133}\) It is not the intrinsic quality of the time that forces the believer to eat this meal, but rather obedience to a divine text. While the siku ya mwaka can be performed in a variable ‘properly’ auspicious time, the Idd el-Hajj has only one, correct Islamic moment.\(^{134}\) Whereas both rituals can be performed at the wrong time, in the first instance the repercussions will be felt in the physical world, whereas in the case of the Idd the negative consequences of the improper timing will be more spiritual. The time of performance of the akika after the death of a child depends on many aspects, but not on the notion of ‘correct time’. Its counterpart, the akika as described in the Arabic texts, can only be performed at one, absolute, real moment in time: the 7\(^{th}\) day after birth, or otherwise the 14\(^{th}\), 2\(^{1st}\), etc. Without the concept of ‘real time,’ few of the discussions on the Idd el-Hajj can be understood.

These different conceptualisations of time often lead to rather humorous speculation. In particular, the binding and releasing of the jinn before and after Ramadan reflects the difficulties of a notion such as a ‘correct’ time independent from place. The Prophet stated that all evil spirits are locked up during Ramadan. However, when every group starts and ends Ramadan on a different day, what are the implications for the fastening and releasing of these spirits? One of the answers given by some authors is that annual turmoil is actually caused by these malign creatures: “It is to be feared that all the jinn from Saudi Arabia come here to Tanzania where they can roam for another day or two because here Ramadan starts later!”\(^{135}\)

b. Time-bound rituals

Inspired by Qaradawi (who saw many of his works translated into Swahili), I describe the most important time-bound rituals: the daily salat, the weekly Friday prayers, the annual Ramadan and hajj once in a lifetime. Each ritual has a ‘correct’ time of performance as defined by texts. The believer will only receive his spiritual benefits if these temporal conditions
are respected. Not praying the salat in time is heinous and often depicted as a horrible sin. Pictures visible at mosques and other popular places warn that Muslims who neglect the proper timing will be eaten by a terrible snake. The preacher of the an-Nisa mosque in Tanga mentioned that praying too late is just as bad as not praying at all. Kuchunga nyakati (taking care of the correct time) is essential, because of the Qur’anic commandment “stated times” in Q 4:103. Otherwise the reward (thawabu) will turn into a horrible punishment (adhabu kali mno). A one-page pamphlet written by Hamisi and collected at a Dar es Salaam mosque reads:

He who depreciates the salat (mwenye kupuuzsa sala), praying sometimes and sometimes not or not praying at the proper moment (hasali kwa wakati wake), Almighty God will give him 15 punishments: 6 here in this world, 3 when he dies, 3 at the grave and 3 when he leaves the grave.

The exact time of the salat is astronomically calculated, converted to the local clock time and printed on sheets inside or outside of the mosque. The muezzin can abruptly interrupt important lectures, as frequently happened in the evening sessions held at the AMYC mosque in Tanga. Many booklets explain how to make sure you pray on time. Businessmen who rent real-estate owned by the AMYC must close their shops during the prescribed prayer times.

In the weekly cycle, the Ijumaa (Friday) is prominent. If the Idd el-Fitr or the Idd el-Hajj falls on a Friday, two Idds coincide (sikukuu mbili siku hiyo hiyo moja). The Swahili press clearly emphasises the difference between the Islamic Ijumaa on the one hand and the Christian Sunday and Jewish Sabbath on the other. In contrast to the latter, Muslims are allowed to work on Friday, as long as they attend the Ijumaa service. Although several men wear their best clothes on Friday, the boundaries between normal weekdays and Friday are not particularly marked. Two other days in the week have a special character: Monday and Thursday. Individual fasting on these days is lucrative because “the doors of Heaven are opened and forgiveness is swift.”

Together, Ramadan and the Idd el-Fitr create the ritual core of the Swahili calendar. It is a sacred month (mwezi mtukufu), a blessed month (mwezi wa Baraka), or a graceful month (mwezi wa neema). Some other months claim the same status: Shaban, Dhulhiija and Rabí’ al-awwal, the final two because they contain the Idd el-Hajj and the mawlid celebrations. Based on older (pre-Islamic) traditions, one can find several traces of other
‘sacred months,’ for example the so-called \textit{ashhur al-hurum}: Muharram, Rajab, Dhulkaada and Dhulhija. The three ‘months of the Pilgrimage’ (\textit{ashhur al-Hajj}) start immediately after Ramadan and include Shawwal, Dhulkaada and the first ten days of Dhulhija. Some Muslims perceive this two and a half month period to be the ritual heart of the Islamic year (Wolfe 1993), but in Tanzania Ramadan stands alone as the ‘sacred month.’ Ramadan days lend a special importance to ritual (for example, the tiring tarawih prayers at night) and non-ritual activities such as visiting friends and attending mosque lessons. Several of these Ramadan activities depend on fixed temporal conditions for their ritual validity. Fasting, for example, is compulsory during the daytime, but is forbidden on the Idd el-Fitr. Before the end of Ramadan, the special tax \textit{zakat al-Fitr} should be paid. Islamic lore has it that the whole of Ramadan is made useless by paying the \textit{zakat al-Fitr} too late. The temporal boundaries of Ramadan are marked by the annual discussion regarding when to start and end the fasting month. These debates resemble the moon-sighting discourse before the Idd el-Hajj, to be described below.

The \textit{hajj}, performed once a lifetime, is the ultimate test for the Muslim. No other Islamic ritual is more dominated by temporal and spatial conditions than the pilgrimage. The awe-inspiring character of the \textit{hajj} is reflected in the liminal period before the ritual. Whereas non-pilgrims cannot physically join those Muslims who are able to perform the real \textit{hajj}, they can temporarily join them by observing particular rules. Ritual meals with ancestors stress the bond between the living and dead members of society. Swahili sources emphasise that the believer should refrain from clipping nails and cutting hair, and fasting is recommended during these ten days and especially the final day before the Idd el-Hajj. Muslims buy photocopied leaflets extolling the virtues of each of these days. Through fasting, the believer can spiritually join the respected prophets Adam, Yunus, Zakariya, Issa, Musa and Muhammad (day 1 to 6). Each day yields specific benefits for the non-\textit{hajji}, such as: forgiveness of sins, positive responses to supplications, deliverance from poverty, alleviation of the suffering of the grave, or mercy on the day of the Resurrection. On 7 Dhulhija, the doors of Hell are closed until the 10\textsuperscript{th} of this month. For those fasting on this day, God will open 30 doors of ease and close 30 doors of difficulty. 8 Dhulhija also has a reward but nobody except the Almighty God knows its content. Fasting on the Day of Arafa (9 Dhulhija) will result in the pardoning of sins committed in the previous and coming year. On the final day, the Idd el-Hajj, fasting is prohibited and the non-\textit{hajji} may slaughter an animal. The obedient Muslim will be rewarded for this act by having his sin forgiven and being resurrected.
on the last day, and the scales of reward on the Day of Judgement will be heavier than the mount Uhud.

These simultaneous rituals continuously remind Tanzanians that the hajj is being completed in Mecca. This temporal connection is reinforced by the Swahili press. Newspapers show advertisements of well-wishers and news of general interest like hajj-related accidents and travel delays. Photographs depict departing pilgrims, activities of the hajj or the town of Mecca.\(^{150}\) Readers’ responses in the form of letters to the editor or mashairi (poems) illustrate that people are aware of the pilgrimage and sometimes use this medium to express their hope to be a hajji in the future.\(^{151}\) Sermons stress the fact that “our brothers over there at the sacred places are ready to accomplish the fifth commandment of Islam. We, who didn’t have the luck, should honour this month and especially the first ten days by fasting.”\(^{152}\) Even in Tanzania, where few Muslims perform the pilgrimage, many handbooks are sold describing the hajj rituals during the six days of the pilgrimage.

5. \textbf{Conclusion}

The Idd el-Hajj has a different place in each of the three temporal systems discussed in this chapter: the Islamic calendar(s), the Tanzanian national solar calendar and the sacred calendar marked by regularly repeated God-given rituals. The different calendars place the Idd in a different framework and construct thereby a different meaning. As a result of the various solar, lunar and lunisolar time systems, the Idd el-Hajj continually moves with respect to other calendrical rituals. Sometimes these changing ritual constellations due to the different speeds of the calendars involved may influence the course of history, as happened during the 1888/1889 revolt when the Idd el-Hajj, the siku ya mwaka and the festivities of returning caravan personnel coincided (cf. Glassman 1995).

The Idd el-Hajj is a major ritual, justified by authoritative traditions, and firmly embedded in the lunar calendar developed on the Arabian peninsula at the beginning of the Islamic era. All Islamic groups in Tanzania honour this link between the sacred Arabic calendar and the local Idd celebration. However, the existence of two other Islamic time systems illustrates how calendars may construct a different perception of the ritual. The Swahili lunar calendar closely follows the Arabic lunar timereckoning but has changed most of its names into ordinal numbers starting with the first month after Ramadan. The result is a particular emphasis on the Idd el-Fitr as the first day of the new annual cycle, and the Idd el-Hajj is celebrated in mfungo tatu, the
third month after the Ramadan (and not the twelfth and final month as in the Arabic calendar). This is in line with the perception of most Tanzanian Muslims who consider the social significance of the Idd el-Hajj as often less than that of the Idd el-Fitr or the mawlid. A second example of a rival Islamic calendar is the solar system developed by the Ahmadiyya community. While following the hegemonic Western annual cycle of twelve solar months, its starting point is the same as the Arabic lunar calendar: Muhammad’s Flight from Mecca to Medina. The dual character of this calendar (partly Western, ‘modern’, and partly Islamic, traditional) is reflected in the Ahmadiyya’s attitude towards the canonical festivals such as the Idd el-Hajj as we will see in the next chapters on the moon-sighting controversy.

Despite the Idd el-Hajj, the Idd el-Fitr and the mawlid having been incorporated into the national Tanzanian calendar for more than four decades, Muslims still perceive public time as being dominated by Christian holidays. The national calendar is, according to Muslims, primarily a Christian calendar. Muslims emphasise the celebration of the Idd el-Hajj as an important expression of Islamic social identity against the cultural hegemony of western holidays like Christmas, Easter and Valentine’s Day.

Finally, the Idd el-Hajj is part of a system of cyclic, returning moments of heightened religious awareness which might be called a sacred calendar. Together with the daily salat, the weekly Friday, the annual fasting month of Ramadan, the hajj is a culminating point of a temporal cycle. The local Idd el-Hajj is intimately linked with the ‘sacred’ pilgrimage centre of Mecca, and sometimes perceived as having a different quality distinct from other calendrical festivals. This linkage is emphasised by simultaneous rituals in the first 10 days of the hajj month. Whereas the salat, the Friday services and the Idd el-Fitr are independent from place, the Idd el-Hajj has a strong spatial dimension which makes the festival different from the former celebrations. The notion of ‘sacred time’, present in most rituals, seems to give way in modern discourse to the concept of ‘correct time’: an absolute, exactly identifiable clock-time. In the next chapter we will see the importance of this discursive construction of correct Idd time in Tanzania.
1. **Introduction**

The discussion regarding the date of the Idd el-Hajj does not concern the legitimacy of the lunar calendar as such: the temporal location of the festival, 10 Dhulhija, is accepted by all Muslims, as we have seen in the last chapter. The problem is how exactly to determine the moment when the lunar month of Dhulhija starts. Classical Arabic texts prescribe that the ‘sighting of the crescent’ (*ru‘ya al-hilal*) brings about the new month. However, the classical method of sighting the moon with the naked eye yields different results in different latitudes of the world. Consequently, the Idd el-Hajj (and, for that matter, any festival in the Muslim lunar calendar) is celebrated on different dates. Since the last century, modern media have increased the awareness of these differences enormously. The question has arisen as to whether Muslims should synchronise their Idd celebrations and thus preserve the image of a solid, unified Islamic community, or continue the traditional method of sighting the crescent according to locality. This brings about the problem of authority: for example, should an Iraqi moon-sighting in American-occupied territory be treated as equally valid as a Saudi moon-sighting? Another question concerns the use of modern scientific methods to predict the exact moment of the new moon.

All over the globe, Muslims pose these questions but answer them differently. As a result, local communities are ripped apart by the celebration of different Iddas on as many as four succeeding days. Whereas the arguments and discussions are global phenomena, historical and social contingencies make the Tanzanian case rather unique. The most important distinctive character is that the moon-sighting discourse is not limited to the Arabic-speaking elite but rather, due to the high degree of Swahili literacy, the debate has been democratised and is performed in the vernacular language. In the second place, Tanzanian discussions on the date of the Idd el-Hajj differ from debates on the Idd el-Fitr, an aspect neglected in many studies. Many scholars assume that moon-sighting issues affect only or mainly Ramadan fasting and feasting (Peters 1969; Rashed 1998:26; Brisebarre 1998; Jamila & Yahaya 2000:577-582; Schimmel 2003:137). However, the debates on the two Iddas show that while the argu-
ments are related, they are not similar.\textsuperscript{1} In the Idd el-Hajj discourse the notion of place is far more important than in the Ramadan controversy. This is already indicated by the name of the Idd. Instead of talking about the ‘Sacrificial Feast’ or ‘Major Festival’, Tanzanian Muslims consequently speak of the ‘Idd el-Hajj’, the holiday of the pilgrimage. The extent to which this connection to the Islamic pilgrimage centre of Mecca can be grounded in authoritative texts is one of the topics of this chapter.

In sections 2 and 3 I describe the questions on moon-sighting and the answers given by Islamic texts and their interpreters. Paragraph 4 shows how these texts are unable to solve the deeper problem: the perceived threat to the moral community. Celebrating the festival on different days reveals the uneasiness and internal fracture-lines of Tanzanian Muslim society.

2. **The questions**

   a. **How to determine the start of the new lunar month?**

      Whereas some of the issues raised in this book are only of limited interest to Muslims in Tanzania, the moon-sighting debate is certainly not among them. The question of the beginning and ending of the two Idd months of Ramadan and Dhulhija belongs to the most intensively discussed subjects in East Africa. To give the reader an impression of the centrality of this issue, I present here a selection from the most important Swahili publications dealing only with the moon-sighting controversy:

      **Books:**

      - Ali Darani, *Uzushi wa kufungwa na kufungwa kwa taqeeem Ummul Quraa*, ca. 1999, 27 pp.\textsuperscript{2}
Internet:

Tapes:

In this overview I have not only excluded books written in English and Arabic, but also the overwhelming number of Swahili newspaper articles, shorter chapters in books, pamphlets, oral discussion and the books I could not purchase but are known to exist (such as Abdillahi Nassir, Mzozo wa mwezi). In the period 1966 to 1995, Bachu mentions at least fourteen international seminars on this topic, four among them held in East Africa. As we have seen in the case of Maryamu (chapter 1), the moon-sighting affects people’s lives and is very much part of their identity as Muslims. The amount of Swahili literature published on this topic is further evidence of that.

i. sighting

Muslims can apply three different methods to decide the beginning of a new lunar month:
1. Sighting the crescent
2. Counting 30 days since the appearance of the previous moon
3. Astronomical calculation.

Each of these techniques is defended, attacked or at least contextualised in the extensive Swahili discourse mentioned above. These publications show the awareness of the two parameters within which the question of the ‘correct’ Idd date is discussed: on the one hand, the moon as a real, physical reality subjected to natural laws, and on the other hand, divine textual prescriptions independent from astronomical realities. The question of when the holy months of Ramadan and Dhulhija start must be answered in light of both modern astronomical science and Islamic scriptural authority. Many Muslims tend to attribute more authority to the moon-sighting criteria established in Islamic Law than to the human, fallible efforts of
(western) science. However, modern astronomical sources are presented to underscore traditional points of views. For example, the authors of a small pamphlet entitled *Kuzaliwa na kuandamana kwa mwezi* explain the birth of the moon from a scientific angle. Without mentioning any classical Islamic source or contemporary writing, they defend the traditional position of local naked eye crescent sighting without the use of astronomical science: “Those who waited for the sighting for the moon did so according to the Prophet’s command!” By means of references, they cite from the internet site www.moonsighting.com and the CD-ROM “The challenge of the universe.”

However, both knowledge systems can easily clash. It often happens that authoritative, valid ‘sightings’ according to the Muslim set of criteria are denied as physically impossible according to (Muslim) astronomers. To illustrate the complexity of the issues at hand we can look at the Idd el-Hajj 2005. The Idd was expected for Friday 21 January according to the sightings. However, on the second day of the month, two old Bedouins (opponents suggested they were senile) suddenly came out of the Saudi desert and claimed they had sighted the moon three days earlier. According to all Islamic criteria, these sightings had to be accepted, and so the planning of the Idd, including the *hajj*, moved one day forward. Despite the fact that astronomers (including the six official Saudi Hilal sighting committees) emphatically denied the possibility of naked eye sighting on this particular latitude, most parts of the Muslim world followed the new Saudi Idd el-Hajj date. Suddenly, Muslims had to re-align their expectations of the coming Idd with the new moon-sighting. What put the temporal chaos in order again was not divine help, but only the power of the Saudi Kingdom’s Supreme Judiciary Council.

This case, which is not uncommon, forces Muslims not only to reconsider the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia to decide on the date of the Idd el-Hajj but also the validity of the archaic means of crescent-sighting by naked eye. However, all Muslims pay at least lip-service to this method as the most Islamic way to decide the exact date of the two ritual months, Ramadan and Dhulhija. Crescent-sighting for Ramadan has the best testimonials in the Qur’an and Sunna. The most outspoken is the prophetic report: “Do not fast till you see the new moon, and do not break your fast till you see it.” Many Muslims present this single hadith as sufficient evidence that the employment of any other technique than naked eye sighting is forbidden. However, the modern age prompted new questions, for example concerning the validity of the sighting through artificial aids like binoculars. Some Muslims answer this question in the affirmative, and in the colonial period...
they even used a helicopter to facilitate the crescent-sighting in Tanganyika (Trimingham 1964:93). These Muslims claim that Islam is a very modern religion and is not against the application of modern science, as long as the basic religious values are not endangered.\(^9\) The Maawa-I Islam headmaster explained to me that the use of binoculars and other modern instruments to facilitate the crescent-sighting is no problem: "It is the same as with the mawlid controversy: because God did not explicitly forbid this celebration, everything within the general boundaries of right and wrong is allowed."\(^10\)

For this reason, many Muslims do not rely on astronomical calculation because they perceive it as being against the explicit demand for sighting, but they feel free to use modern media like telephone and the internet to share moon-sighting information or calculate the visibility of the moon.\(^11\)

More pertinent to this book’s theme is the question of whether a hadith on Ramadan fasting can be used as proof that the same method must be used to find the correct day of the Idd el-Hajj. As will be clear in this chapter, answers differ and so do references to authoritative texts. However, most Tanzanians claim that naked eye sighting is essential to determine both dates of the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj.

**ii. counting**

If sighting is impossible because of clouds, smoke or conditions limiting eyesight, the new month starts when 30 days of the previous month have passed. Because of this uncertainty, the final day of the month is called *siku ya shaka* (day of doubt). Just like naked eye sighting, this method has good canonical testimonials. The quoted hadith ‘Fast when you see it’ is concluded in some versions with the text: ‘...and when it is cloudy, complete the 30 days.’\(^12\) The Muslim World League decided in 1981 that in the case of a country with almost permanently clouded skies, the date of the festivals should rely on the crescent-sighting of the nearest Islamic town, rather than on counting or astronomical calculations (Jamila & Yahaya 2000).

However, in Tanzania counting as a method to determine the Idd is only relevant for the Idd el-Fitr and not for the Idd el-Hajj. In Ramadan, the day of the Idd is intimately connected to the preceding month of fasting. Muslims are anxious not to reduce the number of days in the holy month. It is common practice to blame those groups who perform their Idd el-Fitr prayers earlier than mainstream Tanzanians, because they decrease the load of God’s command. Bahasaniy explains this by the following hadith: “Two months are not shortened (the months of the holidays) the month of Ramadan and Dhulhijja.”\(^13\) Muslims like to be on the safe side and to complete the
full 29 days of fasting, based on another report claiming that every Islamic month has 29 or 30 days. Of course, state organs prefer the counting method in Ramadan rather than the naked eye sighting. By counting 30 days, the exact date of the holiday is known well in advance and practical arrangements can be made. In Kenya, for instance, the counting method is therefore used by the government as a convenient way to determine the date of the National Holiday: it is the 30th day after sighting the Ramadan moon. However, most Muslims rely on eye sighting and the national holiday often differs from the ‘real’ Idd. In Tanzania, this method is not institutionalised and the Idd el-Fitr barazas are therefore announced for the second day of the Idd. Invitations are sent well in advance mentioning as the date “Idd pili” (the second Idd), making sure that Muslim organisations have an extra day to arrange things. For the Idd el-Hajj, the period of 10 days between crescent-sighting and festival is sufficient to coordinate the logistics of the holiday.

iii. astronomical calculation

The major problem concerning the legal validity of astronomical calculation is the absence of this instrument in Prophet Muhammad’s time. Explicit references to this tool are therefore not available in the Qur’an or Sunna. Those groups that rely on astronomy for their Idd date usually quote an alternative rendering of the hadith mentioned above, “Fast when you see it and break your fast when you see it,” is followed by the sentence: “and if the sky is clouded then calculate.” The command ‘calculate’ (Arabic: fa-qadiru) is interpreted as: calculate by all available means. In the current era, these means include astronomical prediction.

While astronomy is a good method to establish calendars for civil use (as Saudi Arabia does in its Ummul Quraa calendar), scientific prediction of Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj is rejected by most Muslims. Swahili sources quote the Prophet Muhammad with the following statement: “We are an illiterate community (usiojua kusoma) and can not calculate that the moon is such or such.” Together with the maxim “our religion and its law is easy” (nyepesi), based on Q 87:8 (“We will make it easy for thee to follow the simple Path”), it is used to condemn astronomical calculation as being too difficult for ordinary people to use to perform their rituals (ibada). The ‘simple path’ is, for most Muslims, to use the naked eye. However, others claim that Allah has foreseen scientific development and astronomical calculation should therefore be accepted by Muslims as a way to make things easy, according to the Qur’an.
A second problem related to the application of astronomical knowledge to determine the correct date of the Idd ritual is the definition of the Arabic word *ru’ya* (seeing, sighting). Many Muslims state that a prophetical *hadith* ‘Fast when you see it…’ emphatically declares the importance of *sighting* the moon, and not proving its *existence*. When the moon is sighted and appears to be two or even three days old at that moment, but sighting has only occurred for the first time then, this sighting is binding and the next day is the first day of the month (and not the third or fourth). Determining the first day of the month retrospectively as Saudi Arabia does, is un-Islamic according to many authors. A *hadith* proving this is often quoted in the moon-sighting discourse. Between the astronomically calculated birth of the new moon and its visible appearance in the sky, some 18 to 30 hours usually elapse, and sometimes as many as 50 hours. The time when the sun sets, the crescent’s distance from the horizon, and the general condition of the weather may cause errors in the calculation of the moon’s visibility and is not absolutely reliable.

A third problem inherent in this method of calculation is the authority of the religious bodies involved. My informants state that, in Tanzania, the use of the astronomically calculated ‘Invisible Moon’ (with or without making amendments for its visibility) is only practiced by Muslim heretics: the Bohoras, Ahmadiyyas and the Saudi Wahhabis. Countries using the Hijra calendar, like Saudi Arabia, claim that they follow the invisible, astronomical new moon as calculated by astronomers, but in the cases of Ramadan and Dhulhija, they add a couple of hours to comply with the Sharia command of visibility (*ru’ya*). The Ahmadiyya community, for example, applies this method: all sightings within 18 hours after the birth of the new moon are discarded. Most Tanzanian Muslims do not doubt the legitimacy of this method as such, but rather they do not trust the proper execution and the authority of the religious institutions.

Ali Darani, for example, doubts the faithfulness of Saudi Arabia and claims that most of their moon-sightings have been scams: they rely on the calendar rather than on sighting. He states in *Uzushi wa kufunga na kufungua kwa taqweem Ummul Quraa* that following an astronomically calculated calendar directly collides with the Book and the Prophet’s guidance.

Darani’s summary of the whole discussion is useful to complete this section.

1. Only naked eye sighting of the crescent is the religious rule for determining the religious festivals of Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj. Authoritative scriptures do not leave any possibility for doubt.
2. This implies that differences between geographical latitudes lead to differences in the crescent’s visibility, and subsequently to differences in Idd dates. These “variations of horizons” (*khitilafu ya matlai*) have to be taken into account both according to the Sharia and common sense (*kisharia na kiakili*).

3. Astronomical calculation does not depend on any of these principles and hence should be discarded as un-Islamic and invalid. Saudi sightings should be suspected for the same reason.

b. Whether crescent-sighting at one place has consequence for other places?

If sighting of the new moon is preferred to counting the days or astronomical prediction, then the question arises whether all Muslims should personally see the moon before they decide when to fast, break their fast and celebrate their Idd el-Hajj. The answer to this question is unequivocally “no.” Muslims may rely on crescent-sighting by other believers from other places. The problem is to define the distance between the actual place of sighting and the place where this sighting no longer influences the timing of religious rituals like fasting and feasting.

Even if there is a majority who accepts the method of naked eye crescent-sighting as the only valid means to determine the start of the two ‘holy’ months, there continue to be many different opinions regarding the place of the moon-sighting. Neglecting most of the details, four different opinions can be distinguished, three of which are represented in Tanzania:

1. Local moon-sighting for both the Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj: only moon-sightings reported from a limited area, either countries or particular latitudes, are accepted.

2. International moon-sighting (*mwezi wa kimataifa*) for both the Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj: any sighting wherever in the world is evidence for the start of the new month.

3. Local moon-sighting for Idd el-Fitr but international moon-sighting for Idd el-Hajj.

4. International moon-sighting for Idd el-Fitr but local moon-sighting for Idd el-Hajj: one true Ramadan/Shawwal sighting suffices for the global Islamic community, but in the case of the Dhulhija month, every community should wait for a local sighting. As far as I know, this position is not represented in Swahili discourse. However, non-Tanzanian theologians devote quite some attention to it.
In most of the discussions, the problem is simplified to two options: local moon (LM) versus international moon (IM) for both Idds.

c. Whose sighting is valid?

Apart from the place where the crescent has been sighted, Islamic Law also deals with the question of the authority of the sighter. Ultimately, Swahili sources unanimously agree: no sheikh, no radio announcement, no authority whatsoever can rule over the personal conscience of a believer. If a Muslim is convinced about a particular date as being the correct time to perform his personal religious ritual, God will him reward anyhow. However, if a Muslim has not seen the crescent personally, he has to rely on others and this is when the problem of authority arises. It is allowed to trust a witness and celebrate the Idd according to his message, but on whose authority should Muslims decide to celebrate the Idd el-Hajj?

The Ramadan crescent should be seen by at least one sane, adult, trustworthy male Muslim, just as the moon of Dhulhija. The Shawwal moon-sighting is more sensitive because in that case it is not the start of a religious obligation (ibada) which is at stake, but rather the end of the religious practice. Therefore, at least two Muslims should witness the new Shawwal moon which ends Ramadan fasting. Other than the normal conditions regarding legal witnesses (male, adult, sane, Muslim), nothing special is required. Swahili sources often quote the following hadith to this extent:

According to Ibn Abbas who said: a Bedouin came to the Prophet and he said to the Prophet: really I have seen the appearance of the Ramadan crescent. The Prophet said: do you confess there is no real god except Allah, he said: yes. He said do you confess that I am Allah’s Messenger. He said: yes. The prophet said: Bilal, call the adhan, the people should fast tomorrow.

This prophetical report, known as the “Bedouin hadith,” states that every Muslim able to express the basic confession “There is no god than God and Muhammad is his Messenger” is an authoritative moon-sighter and his crescent-sighting must be accepted by other Muslims. De jure, everyone who can give this shahada is authoritative, as the quote suggests. De facto, however, some Muslims are more authoritative than others. In Transvaal (South Africa), a moon-sighting was not accepted because the witness was clean-shaved. The Iraqi moon-sighting of Shawwal 2003 was rejected by many Tanzanian Muslims because the country was ruled by an American-installed interim government, a fiendish attacker of Islam.
In Tanzania also, the crescent-sighting debates reflect differences in power and social tensions rather than textual hermeneutics. Two of the most important players on the Tanzania moon-sighting stage are BAKWATA and the Ansaar Sunna movement to which the Tanga AMYC belong. Both publish statements in advance, often signed by the mufti, the amir or by their secretaries. In the case of BAKWATA, the final announcement is broadcast by the national radio and television, a practice going back to colonial times when these notifications were published both in English and Swahili. Not surprisingly, each party uses these statements to express its point of view regarding moon-sightings. For instance, in Ramadan 2004, the Ansaar Sunna secretary emphasised:

> It is the task (jukumu) of every Muslim to seek notice of the appearance of the moon wherever in the world by all different media (kwa njia ya mbalimbali) in order to celebrate Idd el-Fitr.

This quotation shows how the question has shifted from personal authority (can the sighting be attributed to a valid, Muslim witness?) to the media involved (how can we get the message of the new moon as quickly as possible?). This emphasis must be understood against the Ansaar’s background as sworn upholders of pure Islam. One of the AMYC’s distinctive characteristics is their anti-hierarchical attitude, defined against the veneration of saints, sheikhs and Sufis of the local madrasas. Their reliance on modern media to receive the crucial information on any crescent-sighting enables them to transcend dependence on the locally-rooted networks of traditional scholars or national crescent-sighting committees like BAKWATA. Modern media such as internet and television are presented by these international moon-sighters as something the Prophet would have used if they had been available in his time. The Prophet did everything he could to strengthen Islam, and Muslims should therefore use the new technology as well, according to the IM.

However, from the local moon-sighting perspective, personal authority and local tradition remain more important criteria to judge the validity of any sighting. LM deny the IM’s claim that differences in Idd celebrations in Muhammad’s era must be ascribed to the poor communications in those times. Bahanani, for example, states that God has never been limited by communication problems. He mentions eight examples from the Qur’an and Sunna proving that God can provide His servants with supernatural senses to miraculously receive and send information. If the moon issue were so important, then God would have done the same in this age of modern technology, he claims.

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Most of my informants obtain their information regarding Ramadan and Shawal sightings from the radio and television, but often wait for further evidence from local scholars, relatives and friends. One interviewee told me that he received a phone call from his brother working in the Emirates. For the Idd el-Hajj, the problems are somewhat different. Here the decision for the individual believer is: should I follow the same date as the pilgrims do in Mecca or is the celebration of the Idd a local religious duty? The period between crescent-sighting and Idd is 10 days and that gives Muslims more time to decide and discuss the matter than in the case of the Idd el-Fitr, which must be decided in one night. Complaints about the late announcement of moon-sightings always concern Idd el-Fitr and not Idd el-Hajj. Nonetheless, in all cases, the acceptance of a particular sighting is often related to the authority ascribed to the major representatives of this standpoint.

3. The answers

a. The Qur’an

The method of sighting, the spatial boundaries within which the sighting should occur and the religious authority ascribed to the group claiming the sighting, are all expressed by references to authoritative texts or proved by classical hermeneutical techniques. Because the Qur’an and hadith (the two major authoritative sources) are often difficult to understand or even remain silent in this respect, the field for personal interpretation is wide. Texts do not give final and definite answers, but they are nevertheless presented as the only trustworthy sources in the discourse. For all groups, it is clear that the opponents “do not fear the words of God.” A popular Qur’anic quotation in this context is: “It is not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by Allah and His Messenger to have any option about their decision” (Q 33:36a). The same argument, stating that the problem can be solved just by following the rules expressed in Qur’an and hadith, is proposed by an anonymous preacher:

[…] I don’t feel the need to stress the importance of unity among us [in celebrating the Idd on the same date]; both for scholars and laypeople (wasiokuwa wanavyuoni) unity is very important, but not only unity but the unity of grasping the rope of God and us and I have said before that this rope is the rope of God consisting of two parts (maneno mawili) […] Qur’an and the guidance of the Prophet’s Sunna.
Except for general spiritual exhortations to follow God and his Prophet in the moon-sighting issue, the Swahili discourse on the correct date of the Idd el-Hajj is dominated by only two Qur’anic texts. The first and undoubtly the most popular is the Ramadan text 2:185. “… fa man shahida minkum al-shahra fal yasumhu…” (“…He who witnesses the month should fast…”).

The first major problem is the double meaning of the Arabic word shahida (to witness/being present). The different meaning is used by the two parties to express their own opinion in their translation. Several of the local moon-sighters interpret the word shahida as ‘witness’ and explain the verse as: ‘he who watches the new moon with his physical eyes at the place where he lives…”46 A further difficulty of this translation is the Arab word shahra (month). ‘Watching the month’ is impossible, so in these translations this word often takes on the meaning of ‘moon’. Conveniently, in Swahili both words are homonyms and are represented by the word ‘mwezi’. Finally, LM point to the fact that shahida is singular, and if all Muslims were to be commanded to follow a single moon-sighting in the world, one would have expected a plural verb in this address.

Those who accept any moon-sighting as authoritative, the international moon-sighters, do not feel the need to introduce the ambiguous word mwezi and therefore usually render the Arabic shahida as ‘being present’ (in contrast to those who travel).47 If the word mwezi is used at all, they clarify it as not being ‘moon’ but month:

Our view is that the ‘mwezi’ which is talked about here is the day of the month (the first, second, third of the month until the 29th and the 30th). It is not the moon (si mwezi ule ni huu ‘moon’). Our argument here is that Almighty God does not tell people to witness, or to see [the moon] but those who are present among you [to fast].48

In Swahili sources, this translation is the most common; the verse is glossed as “He who is present in town during the month of Ramadan, he should fast.”49 This translation is close to the mainstream Arabic exegetical works and from a linguistic point of view is probably the most correct.50 Therefore, the choice for this particular translation does not mean that the author necessarily belongs to the IM camp; Sheikh al-Amin bin Aly al-Mazrui, for example, used to be a LM paragon, but he refuses to employ this text to defend his point of view in the crescent-sighting controversy.51

Nassor Abdalla Bachu, a Zanzibar Muslim preacher and probably the most vocal member of the Ansaar Sunna movement, claims that the transla-
tion of shahida shahra as ‘being present during the month’ is the only correct one. He presents two arguments: one based on authority and the other on language. According to Bachu, the majority of the classical tafsirs translate shahida by ‘being present’. It is difficult to imagine, Bachu assumes, that so many sound scholars have gone astray in their interpretation. The second argument is a linguistic one: the Arabic word shahra cannot mean ‘moon’ but must be rendered as ‘month’, although in Swahili both words are homonyms. If God had meant to talk about the moon then he would have used the Arabic word qamar, or hilal (crescent) or badr (full moon). Therefore “this verse cannot be translated by ‘atakaeuona…’ [he who sees] because the month cannot be seen with eyes, what you can see with them is the crescent” (p. 13).

Whereas Q 2:185 only refers to the fasting of Ramadan, a second Qur’anic text refers more explicitly to the time of the hajj:

They ask thee concerning the new moons. Say: They are but signs to mark fixed periods of time (mawaqit) in (the affairs of) men, and for Pilgrimage. (Q 2:189)

The word here translated as “new moons” (ahilla) is the plural of hilal (crescent), thus indicating that every place has its own moon, according to the LM camp. This text is used as a proof that the hajj is determined by the local crescent-sighting and also by the Idd el-Hajj elsewhere in the world. The appearance of the moon in one place does not affect ritual practice in other places. On the other hand, the IM use this text to point out that in (physical) reality only one moon exists, and therefore the plural ahilla can only mean ‘different phases of the same moon’. Furthermore, the IM claim that ‘they ask thee’ is written in the plural, and this indicates the paramount importance of the hajj. The plural means that many people asked the Prophet when the hajj should take place. Likewise, Bachu states, today all people should ask about the proper date of the hajj and celebrate their Idd el-Hajj according to the time of the pilgrimage in Mecca.

b. Hadith

Apart from Qur’anic text, the exemplary behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunna) explains God’s divine will. When the Qur’an fails to give a clear-cut answer on the date of the Idd el-Hajj, believers turn towards the prophetic traditions (hadith) for further guidance. Among the most authoritative collections are those of Muslim and Bukhari. These referential works contain the above-mentioned hadith that dominates the moon-sighting discourse in many variant readings:
If you see it then fast, if you see it then break your fast and if for you (the sky) is veiled for you, then calculate (30 days).  

Both parties accept this cluster of hadith as authentic, but the interpretations differ. The LM explain it as: ‘fast and break your fast only when you see the crescent in the area you live in,’ while the IM gloss the text as ‘fast and break your fast immediately when the crescent has been sighted anywhere in the world.’ According to the LM, the words ‘and if for you (Arabic: ‘alaykum) the sky is veiled’ indicate a particular place (‘and when at your place the sky is veiled’). To facilitate this reading, local sighters prefer the Swahili word kwenu (your place) as a translation of the Arabic ‘alaykum. It is only when at your particular latitude the sky is clouded, that the general rule of local moon-sighting is substituted by the counting method. Consequently, the Prophet himself was a local moon-sighter, because it is difficult to imagine that he spoke about a worldwide clouded sky! The IM, on the other hand, use this hadith to claim that the Prophet did not give any local restriction on moon-sighting, and therefore the hadith means ‘when the moon is sighted anywhere in the world, fasting is obligatory for all Muslims as soon as they hear the news.’

A second source, which is less authoritative but still important, are hadith-reports not mentioned by the two main collectors Bukhari and Muslim. Among these other authoritative collections, those of an-Nasa’i, Tirmidhi, Ibn Maja, and Abu Dawud stand out. The following tradition is transmitted by Tirmidhi and Ibn Maja:

Fast at the day you (all) fast, break the fast at the day you (all) break your fast and slaughter the day you (all) slaughter (Swahili: kuchinja ni siku mnayochinja).  

The reference to slaughtering is difficult to understand. The oldest reports employ the ancient Arabic word nusuk and probably refer to sacrificial practices on the Idd el-Fitr (cf. Lech 1979:166-167). This might be the reason why Muslim and Bukhari did not include the report in their collections. However, younger editions replaced the word nusuk by al-adha, a clear reference to the only other orthodox, accepted ritual: the Idd el-Hajj. In these latter versions, the report can be used to prove that both the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj must be celebrated together. Any suggestion about un-Islamic practices is circumvented.

The implications of this hadith are diverse. Some Swahili authors quote this hadith in order to state that any moon-sighting (Ramadan, Shaw-
wal or Dhulhija) must be corroborated by at least two witnesses. Others use this tradition to stress the importance of fasting and feasting together, but the text does not give sufficient evidence to conclude the size of this community: local, national or global. The LM suggest that those who follow the International Moon crosscut this local community (jamaa) and do not act in the spirit of this *hadith*.\(^{60}\) Bachu, on the other hand, attributes a central position to this *hadith* to prove his IM point: according to him, there is no doubt that this tradition can only mean that there is one holiday for the whole world. Even if there are a few hours’ difference between the appearance of the crescent at different latitudes, this is no reason to postpone the celebration of the Idd. Fasting, the Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj are all one for the whole umma.\(^{61}\)

The two traditions introduced above are examples of reports attributed to Muhammad, and these *hadith* have a particularly high status in any discussion. However, a third source contains many traditions that cannot be linked directly to the Prophet. One of these is called the ‘Kuraib *hadith*,’ after its main transmitter. The LM derive their strongest argument from this post-prophetical *hadith*, attributed to the Sahaba (companion) Ibn Abbas:

Kuraib narrates that Ummul Fadhl Bintil Harrith sent him on an errand to Mu’awiya in Sham (Syria). He said: ‘I went to Sham and fulfilled her requirement and while I was still in Sham the crescent of Ramadan appeared over me. Thus, I saw the crescent on the night of Friday. Then towards the end of the month I came to Medina and Abdullah Ibn Abbas questioned me. He then spoke about the crescent and said: ‘Did you (i.e. the people in Sham) see the crescent?’ I said: ‘We saw it on the night of Friday.’ He said: ‘Did you see it?’ I said: ‘Yes, and the people saw it and fasted. Mu’awiya too fasted.’ He (Ibn Abbas) said: ‘But, we saw it on the night of Saturday. Therefore, we shall continue to fast until we complete thirty days or we see it (i.e. the crescent at the end of the 29th day).’ Upon hearing this Kuraib asked Ibn Abbas: ‘Don’t you consider as sufficient the sighting of Mu’awiya and his fasting (in Syria)?’ Ibn Abbas answered: ‘this is how the messenger of Allah instructed us.’\(^{62}\)

Despite the fact that this *hadith* is not a literal quote from the Prophet and does not even reflect a consensus among theologians, the individual opinion of the Prophet’s companion Ibn Abbas is supported by many scholars.\(^{63}\) Often, Muslims present this report as the only clear, unambiguous and conclusive evidence in the moon-sighting debate. LM claim that this is sufficient proof that every place should celebrate its Idd dependent on the
appearance of the local crescent. They claim that at the time of this narration (a few years after the death of the Prophet), the Idd was celebrated on different dates in Syria and Medina. This practice should be continued because “this is how the messenger of Allah instructed us.”

The IM clearly have difficulties in rendering this textual evidence harmless. Bachu devotes some 30 pages in proving that this hadith is not applicable to underscore a local moon-sighting perspective. He heavily relies on Shawkani’s Nayl al-awtar. In his line of reasoning, Bachu claims that there is no possibility to use this hadith for qiyas (deduction by analogy) because there is no cause or reason (‘illa) mentioned why Ibn Abbas did not accept the moon-sighting from Syria (LM assume it is the difference in geographical position, but the text is not explicit about this). Because of this deficiency, his opinion does not have any legal value and cannot serve as a source for new jurisprudence: it remains the individual judgement of a pious Muslim. Another reason why Ibn Abbas might have rejected Kuraib’s testimony is that for a valid moon-sighting two witnesses are necessary, and this story only mentions one, Mu’awiyah. Undoubtedly Ibn Abbas would have accepted the sighting if two witnesses were mentioned. If this is still an unsatisfactory method of explaining away this evidence, Bachu mentions 11 fatwas by Ibn Abbas which are rejected by many of the Islamic scholars. It appears that the authority ascribed to the Prophet’s companions does not automatically result in binding Islamic Law. Msabaha presents the same arguments as Bachu in defending the IM position. In addition, he highlights Ibn Abbas’ desire to know if the moon has appeared in other places like Syria. This attitude should lead to the IM opinion that every Muslim should do his utmost to find out where the new moon has been sighted. Finally, this hadith leads the preacher to ponder about the practical problems: if you follow local moons this implies that eventually every small spot will have its own Idd. If there is not one single moon for the whole Islamic umma, then how many crescents should we expect: “six, seven, forty, ten thousand, a million?”

A fourth source often listed among the hadith evidence consists of non-authoritative textual additions and explanations. The best known is the Arabic sentence written by some of the hadith collectors as a chapter heading: ‘Li kulli balad ru’yatuhum’ (‘For every country their own crescent’). The local moon-sighter sees this as evidence that the Islamic community used to rely on local sighting and that this is the true Islamic tradition to be followed even in our modern times. The IM attack the weakness of this text, since it is only a superscription in a hadith collection, not corroborated by the Qur’an or Sunna.
c. Ijtihad

The few examples presented above from the Qur’an and hadith texts show that these sources cannot provide crystal-clear, definite answers on the Idd el-Hajj dating questions. Even the explicit Kuraib report refers only to Ramadan fasting and the Idd el-Fitr. Therefore, Muslim scholars have to turn en masse to the available hermeneutical techniques to underscore their point of view with any evidence available. This interpretation is called *ijtihad* and is a valuable, Islamic method to derive new rules from old texts.

However, *ijtihad* is restricted by many conditions and the outcome of these hermeneutical experiments is therefore always contested. One of the first conditions is that *ijtihad* can only be applied in those cases where no text is available. Any accepted authoritative text excludes *ijtihad* (*penye andiko huwa hapana ijtihadi*).72 Any opinion on the Idd el-Hajj date must by all means come to terms with the textual evidence presented in the last section. Applying *ijtihad* without using the available sources will seriously undermine one’s status as scholar. The Omani Juma al-Mazrui has a separate chapter refuting his opponents’ ‘street arguments’ (hoja za mitaani) as incompatible with the scriptures (maandiko) and therefore ineligible for *ijtihad*.

In 1999, Maalim Bassaleh one of the most influential preachers at the moment, proposed to the international moon-sighters that they postpone their Idd el-Hajj celebration until the local moon-sighters celebrated their holiday.73 To defend this idea he applied *ijtihad* to a hadith in which Muhammad also postponed his Idd prayer.74 Bassaleh claimed that every *ijtihad* will be rewarded as long as the intention is good. A wrong *ijtihad* is a contradiction in terms.75 His intention was to preserve the unity of the Islamic society and therefore this solution of the moon-sighting problem should be accepted as legally valid. This interpretation was rejected by Anaphy Said who responded that although Muslims applying *ijtihad* will indeed be rewarded by God, every one who follows the (wrong) outcome reached by the scholar will be punished, because in this case the textual evidence is clear even for lay people.76 Ordinary believers have the obligation to follow only the true opinions and not fly with any banner (*bendera fuata upepo*). Even the great Jewish King Daud listened to his son Sulayman because his opinion was sounder than his own (Q 12:78-79).

The most common technique used by *mujtahids* (scholars applying *ijtihad*) is deduction (*qiyas*): one well-founded case can serve as an example for the new problem, based on a common cause (*illa*). If the question is whether whiskey is allowed or not, then the *qiyas* reasoning might be as follows: there is textual evidence that wine is prohibited. The (assumed) reason for this prohibition is because it contains alcohol. Whiskey contains alcohol, ergo whiskey is
prohibited. The following two examples show how the reality is slightly more complex.

LM apply *qiyas* to determine the correct Idd time. They present the *salat* as an analogy because both the Idd celebration and the *salat* are religious rituals (*ibadat*). The opinion that the *salat* relies on local sun-time is corroborated by authoritative texts, and differences between places are not disputed; Muslims have reached a consensus that every place has its own sun and therefore *salat* times differ according to the latitude. The *salat* is so dependent on local temporal conditions that when somebody travels from east to the west, after performing his *salat* according to his local time, when he comes to a place where he again hears the call to prayer (*adhan*) then he is obliged to pray once more according to the local prayer times. However, when a Muslim hears the *adhan* for the *salat* on a foreign TV or radio station, no sane believer will stop his activities and perform the *salat*, but rather he prays according to his own local time. Just like the *salat* is determined by local time, so other *ibadat* rely on local time. Ramadan fasting, for example, is from dawn to dusk (Q 2:187), dependent on the sun and therefore differs according to the latitude. Just like the two other *ibadat* just mentioned, the Idd el-Fitr should be celebrated according to local time. According to the LM, there is no difference between the sun and the moon as temporal indicators because God has ordained both of them in this function. It is generally accepted that this even may lead to a fasting month of 31 days when someone travels between two places during Ramadan: another proof that fasting and the breaking of the fast is according to local time. The analogy is pushed one step further when the LM claim that both the Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj are equal in this respect.

A second example of *qiyas* is applied by the IM to prove that the Idd el-Hajj should be celebrated on the same day as the *hajj* in Mecca. The *illa* between the two terms of the comparison is to be found in the ‘Day of Arafa’: the day when the pilgrims stand before God on the Mount of Mercy. The starting point for this comparison is a *hadith* which prescribes fasting for non-pilgrims equally binding as the ritual standing for pilgrims on this day. Several reports make explicit that Muhammad did not fast when he visited Arafa as a pilgrim, but fasted in those years when he did not participate in the *hajj*. According to the IM, this makes fasting by non-pilgrims dependent on the ritual standing on Arafa by pilgrims; and likewise the time of all other related rituals (for example the Idd el-Hajj one day after the Day of Arafa) depends on the time of the *hajj* at Mecca. Otherwise, the Arabic reports would not have used the word ‘day’ (*yaum*) but rather ‘date’ (*tarikh*). The local moon-sighters in Tanzania contest this form of deduction. It is not the Arafa rituals of the *hajj* that lead non-pilgrims to fast, but
rather the crescent-sighting that takes place at their own specific location. The ‘Day of Arafa’ is simply 9 Dhulhija, that is to say, nine days after the new moon has been sighted. Just as the Arafa rituals near Mecca rely on local moon-sighting in that area, so too do fasting rituals elsewhere. In this case, the two objects compared are not equal, and therefore the qiyas is not accepted.

This contestation often takes place if someone does not accept the common denominator of the two things compared. In the example of the Kuraib hadith mentioned above, the IM claimed that Ibn Abbas refused to accept the Syrian crescent-sighting due to an insufficient number witnesses, while the LM assumed that the reason was to be found in the geographical distance. Likewise, Bassaleh’s qiyas of the Prophet postponing the Idd salat was rejected because the ‘illa was not accepted by Said. The latter argued that the cause of the Prophet’s behaviour was the late reception of the moon-sighting news. In present day Tanzania, this cause is absent because many media enable Muslims to quickly receive the news of any sighting. Therefore, Bassaleh’s decision to postpone the Idd might be noble but lacked any legal base for deduction.
Even *qiyas* does not mechanically result in a community-wide consensus (*ijma*), so many arguments rely on personal opinion (*ra'i*). Bahasaniy's book is called *Rai za wanazuoni* ("Opinion of the scholars"), indicating that the field of the Idd date controversy is open to many different interpretations. Apart from the authoritative text and the strict application of deduction, these scholars often derive knowledge from arguments such as the human experience of the 'natural condition' (*maumbile*), logic (*akili*) or the idiomatic characteristics of the Arabic language. The following section offers a few examples.

Based on the experience of the daily sunrise and sunset, some respected Islamic jurists have ruled that moon-sightings from the east must be accepted by the west, but not the other way round. In the east, the sun sets earlier and the probability of a crescent-sighting is therefore higher in the east. This argument is extended by IM into the belief that a single moon-sighting in the world is binding for Muslims anywhere. Therefore, according to Juma al-Mazrui, it is illogical and against the natural condition of the world to fast together with the Arafat rituals in Mecca. Because of the time difference related to the daily round of the sun, the two practices are never completely simultaneous. Even if we take the day (instead of the date) of Arafat as binding for other areas in the world as well, the Arafat rituals near Mecca will still only start at noon, while fasting for non-*hajjis* will start earlier, at sunrise. For these natural facts, grounded in daily experience, Muslims don't need Qur'anic proof.

According to the IM, logic alone, without textual evidence, is sufficient to understand that the technical improvement of communication (television, telephone, Internet) results in a different moon-sighting practice. They claim that this improvement must lead to the opinion that one sighting in the whole world is sufficient for the religious obligations of fasting and feasting. They assume that the Prophet in his time was modern, and therefore Muslims of this era should also use the modern technologies available to them.

Finally, most of the Swahili scholars evoke their language proficiency in Arabic in order to corroborate their *ijtihad*. Juma al-Mazrui claims, for example, that the expression 'Day of Arafat' is idiomatic for Arabic, as in the expressions 'day of Uhud' and 'day of Badr.' This simply indicates the importance of a particular historical event which took place at particular historical place. However, in none of these cases do these expressions enforce any religious act elsewhere. Al-Mazrui states that to take 'Day of Arafat' as the *illa* for a fasting practice elsewhere in the world, can only be ascribed to an insufficient knowledge of the Arabic language.
Most of the written sources discussing the subject of the correct Idd dates assume that all interpretation is completed along the strict rules of Islamic legal reasoning. However, this is in practice not the case. Many Tanzanian Muslims provide their own arguments to accept or reject a particular reasoning. Quite often, these arguments are original or only partly and indirectly derived from the written discourse. “The Arafa rituals at Mecca and the Arafa fasting must be treated independently,” according to a Tanga madrasa director. “If a war occurs in Mecca, no hajj will take place, but we will still perform our Arafa fasting,” he said.

Emphasising the same point of local moon-sighting, a teacher remarked: “All religious rituals (ibadat) must be treated as self-reliant: salat, saum, hajj, etc.. No ibada is dependent on any another ibada.”

Some of my informants perceived a significant difference between the moon-sighting of Ramadan and Shawwal on the one hand, and the beginning of the Dhulhija on the other. Their argument involved an aspect which I did not come across in any of the written sources consulted: the difference in religious experience between Ramadan and the hajj. Only God can judge if a Muslim obeys the divine command of fasting during the month of Ramadan. Fasting reinforces the personal bond between individual and God. He alone will know whether someone has fasted according to His will or if he has been overcome by hunger and transgressed the rules. According to them, this personal aspect of Ramadan is reflected in the practice of local moon-sighting. On the other hand, they presented the hajj as something that binds a religious community together. In contrast it is not the pious experience of fasting that is central in the hajj, but the ritual representation of the community itself: “every Idd has its own weight (uzito).” They therefore favoured one single crescent-sighting for the Idd el-Hajj, as it is binding for the whole umma. Rather than a technical, scholarly debate, this reasoning is an excellent example of how ijtihad is in reality a social practice, reflecting Muslim concerns about their own society.

4. The moral (comm)unity endangered

At the heart of the discourse concerning the date of the Idd el-Hajj is the fear that one day every Muslim will perform his own individual duty without any communal relationship. The anxiety underlying the different discourses transgresses the boundaries of textual evidence and may even lead to the marginalisation of these texts. Al-Gheyoushi quotes the ‘Kuraib hadith’ (the differences in moon-sighting between Medina and Syria) in full and then concludes:
Undoubtedly their case [i.e. LM’s] is the stronger of the two [but] above all is the spirit of religion which desires people to be united. So this former view [i.e. the IM] is the most acceptable.⁹³

The same tendency to discard a too literal reading of tradition and text in favour of a higher value (a strong, viable moral community) is revealed in many articles and books on the subject.⁹⁴ Apparently, by accepting a particular moon-sighting and by praying the Idd salat on a particular day, Muslims construct an imagined, temporal, divine and moral community in which they belong.

In the first place, the Idd community is imagined: most of its members remain invisible for those Muslims who pray together at a particular field or mosque. The extensive discourse on the choice of the correct Idd day evokes images of co-believers performing the same rituals at the same time. Members of other imagined communities become extremely visible when they gather together for their prayers at a different time. The case of Maryamu showed how difficult it is to celebrate a festival in an environment where the majority of Muslims start their Idd one day later.

In the second place, it is a temporal and fluid community which changes every year. For example, those who take ‘Arafa’ as the touchstone determining the true Islamic community pray and sacrifice at the same time, but in other discussions they might become the fiercest enemies. For example, in his book Kitabu Arafa, the Sufi sheikh Muhammad Nassor Abdulla al-Qadiri accepts the AMYC reasoning that the Idd el-Hajj is to be celebrated one day after the ‘Day of Arafa’. However, as a Muslim mystic he has hardly anything else in common with the Ansaaar reformers.

Despite this ephemeral character, the ritual presentation is that of the Muslim umma celebrating its Idd together as a divinely sanctioned community of believers who follow the Book of God and the custom of the Prophet. The simultaneous performance of religious duties promotes the “spirit of unity and belonging within the Muslim umma.”⁹⁵ In many discourses on moon-sighting, reference is made to this supreme divine ‘imagined community’: one God, one world, one moon, one prophet, one language, one Fatiha, one salat, one kibla.⁹⁶ The editor of the Nairobi-based reformist magazine Nasiha wrote on the occasion of the Idd el-Hajj 1995:

…let us utilise this great occasion [sic] to forge an Islamic Unity and to avoid all the deviding [sic] elements, as we Muslim Ummah are one nation since our book (Qur’an) is one, our Kiblah is one, Our [sic] rituals (i.e. prayers, fasting and
pilgrimage) are performed at one given time by all Muslims around the world in a complete uniformity, beside our spiritual and emotional unity.\textsuperscript{97}

God Himself declared: “Your community is one community and I am your Lord” (Q 23:52).\textsuperscript{98} Not performing the rituals at the right time is seen as an act of exclusivism: a de facto excommunication from the fold of Islam. As we have seen, this image of one Islamic \textit{umma} is particular strong in the \textit{hajj} and differences in Idd el-Hajj dates are therefore often more painfully experienced than the Idd el-Fitr controversy on the same issue.

In the fourth place, the Idd community is therefore a moral community in which guilt and remorse, obedience to God, and punishment for transgressions all play an important role. A worried Muslim wrote to the newspaper \textit{Mapenzi ya Mungu} about his decision to celebrate the Idd el-Fitr together with his local community although he had not see the Shawwal moon himself. The editor congratulated him for having taken the right decision. He said there was no necessity to fast for an extra day as compensation, but the letter writer might do so if his conscience was bothered by the issue. “Only the sheep of Israel get lost but not the sheep of Islam,”\textsuperscript{99} the editor stated. However, it is more frequently the case that the moon-sighting debate reflects precisely this concern: that Islamic sheep do get lost.\textsuperscript{100}

The temporal community of Idd celebrators is a moral community of those who have made the right decision. As described above, both the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj are preceded by important fasting days: Ramadan and the Day of Arafa. Celebrating the Idd days at the ‘wrong’ time automatically involves a transgression of the connected fasting practices. On authority of a sound \textit{hadith} collected by Abu Dawud, several Tanzanian authors claim that not fasting on one of the Ramadan days cannot be compensated in all eternity.\textsuperscript{101} Therefore, those who celebrate the Idd el-Fitr according to the international moon stop fasting ‘too early’ and violate the Ramadan rules by feasting on a fasting day.

On the other hand, fasting on an Idd day is even more horrendous.\textsuperscript{102} The official secondary school syllabus mentions five occasions when fasting is prohibited for Muslims: the days of \textit{tashriq} (11-13 Dhulhija), the ‘day of doubt’ (the last day before Ramadan), any Friday (if not in Ramadan) and the two Idds. Each prohibition is corroborated by an authoritative \textit{hadith}.\textsuperscript{103} Therefore, all those ‘BAKWATA Muslims’ who are one day behind the Ansaar calculations, fast on the 10\textsuperscript{th} Dhulhija (the Day of Arafa according to their local moon), but in ‘reality,’ according to the Ansaar Sunna Muslims, this is the day of the real Idd. Instead of having ones sins forgiven as a reward for
fasting on the Day of Arafa, they enact a dreadful sin by fasting on the wrong day. Likewise, in Ramadan, all those who are one day behind the ‘correct’ lunar date eat on the first fasting day and they fast at the Idd: again two offences. When Tanzanian Muslims fast on the Idd because they think that it is the Day of Arafa or the last day of Ramadan, they not just execute a ‘normal’ sin, but it is in fact a much more horrific act. Transgressing divine rules on a holy day is heavily punished as if it were the Judgement Day: “kufanya dhambi siku ya Idd ni sawa na kufanya dhambi siku ya kiyama” (sinning on the day of Idd is equal to sinning on the day of the Resurrection).

Drawing the boundaries of the moral community along the lines of the Idd celebrations is perceived by others as too narrow-minded. Sheikh Azzan from Zanzibar would have liked to see the moral fury raised by the different Idds to be directed towards prostitution, alcohol and usury on the islands. Bahasaniy said it would be better to fight selfishness (ubinafs) instead of the standpoints of the other moon-sighting party. However, in all these reactions we see that it is not the date of the Idd as such that is the most important element, but the issue gives an opportunity to discuss the nature of the moral community and the threats that it faces.

Often, the simultaneous performance of the Muslim Idds is perceived as a strong solidifier of in-group moral sentiments. Consequently, differences in Idd celebration are perceived as threats to this moral community. A Lybian writer on the moon-sighting issue states:

[Simultaneous Idd celebration] is one of the strongest elements which tie Muslims to one another in all the countries […] especially the Arab Muslims who are in need to be reconciled, and unified against their enemies who are awaiting them from every side.

Not surprisingly, notions of protection and guarding (kukinga, kulinda) the moral community are among the ones most often heard in the discourse of the Idd date. The major enemy threatening this community is not the state but rather the National Muslim Council, BAKWATA, who is held responsible for these divisions of the umma:

At the moment when the monopoly of announcing the new moon will be taken from BAKWATA (a body installed by politicians in our first government), I believe that the solution of the problem can be easily achieved. But if the muftis from the government will be left with their power to decide this matter, I am sure that this problem will remain as it is. People who protect this Council
without the support of the believers, they will increase the sin of eating during Ramadan and fasting the day of the Idd.\footnote{111}

5. **Conclusion**

In this chapter we have analysed some characteristics of Tanzanian discourse on the Idd el-Hajj date. The subject of the correct time of Idd celebration is rooted in a long historical tradition and also the deductive process of *ijtihad* is a classic means to reach valid conclusions within Islamic jurisprudence. However, the content of the discourses reflects local concerns, cultural influences and historically contingent arguments.

Islamic lunar months start with the appearance of the new moon. The most common method employed to determine whether the month has started or not, is by sighting the crescent without any technical instruments. Two other accepted methods (counting 30 days after the beginning of the previous month and astronomical calculation) are secondary and only valid when the naked eye sighting is impossible or to be employed to corroborate a crescent sighting. Most of the Tanzanian discussions focus on the religious authority of the witnesses and the place where the sighting occurred. The number of authoritative texts dealing with the issue of the Idd date is fairly limited and almost exclusively concerned with the Idd el-Fitr instead of the Idd el-Hajj. Apart from a single ambiguous verse, the Qur’an is silent about the topic. The *hadith*-texts prescribe naked eye sighting as the primary means to establish the start of the new month and reflect an early historical practice of different Idd el-Fitr celebrations in different geographical situations.

The absence of explicit rules on the Idd el-Hajj date compels Muslims to choose among the available scriptural sources. These texts need interpreters and translators. It is clear that all actors involved share a common desire to defend their own position by authoritative (Arabic) texts. Through an ongoing process of re-interpretation in which some texts are emphasised while others are sidelined, the different standpoints are proposed in written and oral media. However in the Idd el-Hajj discourses also extra-textual evidence from the fields of common sense, modern science and human experience is considered. Apart from the increased quality of communication which allows for fast spreading the news of crescent sightings, the most important arguments are derived from the connection between *hajj* and Idd el-Hajj.

One of the major conclusions reached in this chapter is that the discourse on the Idd date reveals important aspects of present day Muslim Tan-
zania. The discussions reflect a strong anxiety about the frontiers and borders of the moral community. The debate does not primarily revolve around the reading of texts but, rather the Idd date is perceived to be an indicator of the moral well-being of the Muslim umma and the place of Islam in a secular nation-state. The choice people make in deciding when to sacrifice and pray appears to reflect their vision on the nature of the moral community itself. In the next chapter we will see how the (construction and contestation) of some of these imagined temporal communities reflect different agendas of social groups.
8.

**Time and Identity:**
the construction of temporally-specific imagined communities

1. **Introduction**

The decision to hold the Idd festival on a particular date is only partly based on the interpretation of authoritative texts, as described in the previous chapter. Indeed, texts proved to be insufficient to allow for a consensus to be reached on this topic. I suggested that the discussions surrounding the Idd date in fact reveal Muslims’ concerns regarding the nature of the Islamic moral community. In this chapter, therefore, the discussion moves beyond the technical texts and details to explore what kind of temporally-specific imagined communities emerge as a result of the moon-sighting discourses. Precisely when Muslims choose to pray is a public statement of belonging to a particular community and at the same time highlights their ideas regarding the nature of the moral community. Not surprisingly, the descriptions people give of these choices are highly emotional; when they change their ‘moon position’ this is often labelled as a conversion from one community to another.

Here we will see how four different groups have chosen a single element, value or institution and how they build this into the focal-point of a characteristic imagined temporal community. The Ahmadiyya hold their Idd according to the date of their London-based Khalifa. When he changed his opinion on the date of the Idd el-Hajj the whole community changed with him. Apparently, it was not the particular method of determining the Idd date that was essential for their sense of identity, but, rather, following their God-chosen leader. A second group links the date of the festival to the *hajj* as performed in Mecca, Arafat and Mina. The Idd el-Hajj must be celebrated on the day after the ‘Day of Arafat,’ according to this community. The nation of Tanzania constitutes the point of reference for a third group. According to this group, because of the marginalised position of Muslims in the Tanza-
alian nation-state, the differences in Idd celebration should be diminished as
much as possible. Finally, some Tanga madrasas follow a different system to
answer the question of what constitutes an Idd community. Their Idd date
is derived from any valid moon-sighting in a limited area defined by geo-
graphical coordinates. Despite the apparent neutrality of the tool, this Idd
community is often dominated by madrasas who adopted this method.

Both the supporters and contesters of these temporally-specific
imagined communities do not belong to single, clearly defined factions.
This book’s opening case showed how Maryamu celebrated the Idd el-Hajj
together with her new husband and simultaneously with the reformist
AMYC centre. However, in her clothes, behaviour and social networks she
still belonged to the more traditional Tanga madrasa communities. Some-
times opponents share the same Idd community although their backgrounds
greatly differ. While on the surface of these discussions only textual refer-
ces to the Qur’an, Sunna and other authorities play a role, the four case
studies described in this chapter reveal how these Idd discourses also tie in
with problems of religious authority figures (khalifa, kadhi, mufti), the politi-
cal problems of a Muslim minority in a modern state, inequality between
Christians and Muslims in the public sphere, and madrasa factionalism.

2. Ahmadiyya

a. One khalifa...

The Tanzanian branch of the Ahmadiyya belongs to the Qadiani group
which follows the spiritual and practical guidance of the London-based Kha-
lifa. To determine the date of the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj they rely
on his directives as broadcast from the Headquarters. For many decades,
the common method for identifying the Idd el-Fitr date has consisted of
naked eye crescent-sighting with only one restriction: any moon-sighting
within 18 hours after the birth of the Astronomical New Moon is rejected as
physically impossible. Via this method they can predict the Idd date reason-
ably well, which they then used to publish in their newspaper, Mapenzi ya
Mungu. Except for a short interval in the early 1970s, to be described below,
the same method is also used to determine the Idd el-Hajj date. The moral
community expressed in the Ahmadiyya Idd celebration is defined by 1) a
strong, central religious authority, 2) a specific sensitivity towards Islamic
history, and 3) the claim of modern rationality.
In the first place, the Ahmadiyya Muslims are proud of their Khalifa who cements the Muslim umma together just as his four predecessors did immediately after the death of the Prophet (632-661). Tanzanian Ahmadiyya’s continuously stress that the moon-sighting problem is not caused by a lack of clear texts but is rather a problem of religious authority among Muslims. The editor of *Mapenzi ya Mungu* states:

The problem here is not which *fatwa* is right and which is wrong but rather that Muslims fail to recognise an imam (*Waislamu kukosa Imamu*) who could issue this *fatwa* and force all Muslims to obey him in this final decision (*uamuzi wa mwisho na wote wakamtii*).  

The central authority of the Khalifa is, according to the Ahmadiyya, the worthy continuation of the first Muslim leaders. The current Muslim community needs a form of leadership like that embodied in the Ahmadiyya caliphate. One single khalifa would restore Muslim unity, including a single Idd for all Muslims on the same day. In discussions with Ahmadiyyas on the correct day of the Idd this Islamic unity is reportedly threatened by two contesters: the national Muslim council (BAKWATA) and Saudi Arabia. BAKWATA’s religious authority and their announcements of the Idd dates are contested by the Ahmadiyya, as illustrated by the poem ‘The Idds of BAKWATA’ by Bwana Fadhili Abdallah Mshamu:

*We don’t wonder, this started long ago*  
*When they fail to know the answers, their work is derisive*  
*They don’t have any shame, they lie about the moon*  
*Those Idds of BAKWATA, they surprise me very much*

[...]

*On the radio they announce, that is their way*  
*Without investigation, they cheat their followers (*wanaghilibu wenzao*)*  
*They despise us, unless we pray their Idds*  
*Those Idds of BAKWATA, they surprise me very much*

*This way is not recent, it is very old*  
*They don’t have tact (*siaso*), they wait till we sleep*  
*The prophets they persecuted, they even killed them*  
*Those Idds of BAKWATA, they surprise me very much*
Despite the fact that BAKWATA is not among the most prominent opponents of the Ahmadiyya (such as Christians and the Ansaa Sunna), the Idd date is one of the few arenas where the two groups regularly meet each other. The major complaint expressed by the Ahmadiyya is that the BAKWATA religious authority lacks any Islamic foundation; their mufti is just a "1001-Night-Shaykh."

Another enemy of Muslim unity, for Ahmadiyya followers, is Saudi Arabia, which also claims to be invested with the authority to decide the correct Idd el-Hajj date. Why should Muslims wait for Saudi Arabia when the moon may also be seen in other parts of the world, the Ahmadiyya editor asks rhetorically? The 'Islamic fatwa' commanding that the Idd el-Hajj should take place simultaneous with the hajj in Mecca is indeed nothing more than a 'Saudi fatwa' and there is neither a religious nor a logical reason why Muslims should follow this opinion. The only thing the Saudis want is religious hegemony over the Islamic world: "It is their plot (mipango yao) that the whole world will come after them. They don't rely on the moon but on their calendar." Following the Saudis in this respect involves rejecting the divine method of moon-sighting and adopting the un-Islamic method of a fixed calendar. However, it is, of course, much better to follow the Prophetic custom and stick to local moon-sighting.

The claim that it is not the Saudi calendar but the 'Arafa-calendar' which dictates the simultaneous celebration of the Idd el-Hajj and the Mecca hajj is untenable, in the opinion of the Ahmadiyya. They suggest that there is no such thing as universal, real time: since the hajj is a local phenomenon, it follows local time-reckoning. Fasting and other rituals outside Saudi Arabia, like the Idd el-Hajj, also follow their local calendars. The Ahmadiyya present further evidence through the example of the Hijra commemoration's lunar date. It is true that the Muslim lunar calendar is tied to this event, but not to a specific season or place. If the Prophet migrated in the dry season (kIan-gazi) or the cool season (kipupwe) does that mean that every year the start of the Hijra calendar is also in the same season? Certainly not! Therefore, in the case of the Idd el-Hajj this date is not defined by the geographical place of Arafa but only by the local moons. The editor summarises his argument by stressing that Muslims should not be deceived by the Saudis or anyone else.

In the second place the Ahmadiyya community is defined as having a special relationship with Islamic history. They refer to the fact that the 'Kuraib hadith', as the only hadith confirming the different dates of the Idd in different places, originated in the first period after the four rightly-guided
This, they claim, demonstrates how the Islamic empire started to disintegrate at this time. In 661 Muawiya, the founder of the Ummayyad dynasty chose Damascus as the capital of the new empire. It is the Ahmadiyya and especially the Qadiani branch that restored the rightly-guided community under the Masih Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. After his demise, the leadership of the umma was taken up by a khalifa. Therefore, the recurrent theme in the Ahmadiyya discourse on the moon-sighting is the reference to Islamic history as characterised by the legitimacy of current practice. The custom of the Muslims (desturi ya Waislamu) as well as the complete history of Islam (historia yote ya Uislamu iliyopita) shows that the local moon-sighting of the Ahmadiyya community has always been the rule. For all Tanzanian Muslims it is, of course, important to phrase their own view as a continuing unchanged tradition, but for the Ahmadiyya, as the youngest offshoot, the need is even more pressing to claim their rightful belonging in the Islamic fold. The fact that they have a Khalifa (which makes them similar to the first Islamic community) is perceived as an enormous blessing and the only way to achieve unity. Just like the first four rightly-guided khalifas, the current Ahmadiyya leader is also contested. In fact, the Ahmadiyya claim, this resistance proves his legitimacy. While other Muslims ‘just celebrate the Idd whenever they feel like it’, the Ahmadiyya’s follow the announcements made by the Muslim leader, and so continue a long historical practice which started with Prophet Muhammad. The Ahmadiyya method is the only feasible one which will preserve unity.

Finally, the Ahmadiyya moral community is defined by logic (jambo la kiakili), science and, in general, adherence to elements defined as ‘modern principles.’ As well educated, ‘modern’ Muslims, their opinion on the moon-sighting troubles are often quoted in the non-Muslim press. Their rival branch in Lahore claims to be “peaceful, tolerant, rational, inspiring” and they share these values with the Qadianis to a large extent. Tanzanian Ahmadiyya’s reproach their fellow Muslims for rejecting science when calculating the Idd moon, but accepting it in other religious matters, like the salat. Why do they follow the calculated sunset for salat times, but do not wait for an eye-sighting? In contrast, the Ahmadiyya use astronomical science to predict the proper Idd dates. The modern Ahmadiyya have put aside the old-fashioned ways of the past. The outdated method of naked eye-sighting without using any scientific insights can be compared with “entering your houses from the back” which is forbidden in the same Qur’anic verse that deals with the crescent-sighting (Q 2:189):
They ask thee concerning the New Moons. Say: They are but signs to mark fixed periods of time in (the affairs of) men, and for Pilgrimage. It is no virtue if ye enter your houses from the back: It is virtue if ye fear Allah. Enter houses through the proper doors: And fear Allah. That ye may prosper.  

The “proper doors” are compared with astronomy and modern science. However, at the same time, the Ahmadiyya adhere to this Sharia rule of eye-sighting: in fact they calculate the crescent’s visibility rather than the actual appearance of the moon. After 18 hours they assume that the new moon is visible given a few conditions like the time of sunset and the distance between the crescent and the horizon. Despite the fact that there is only one moon, the visibility depends on time and place (nyakati mbali mbali katika maeneno tofauti). And, of course, all expected dates are accompanied by the pious “In-sha-Allahu Ta’ala” (Almighty God willing). This scientific method reduces the annual doubt about the Idd date: “While all Muslims were in doubt if the hilal was sighted on 21 or 22 of July, we Ahmadiyyas just knew in advance that it would be impossible to see the crescent on the 21st. And so it happened.”

The Ahmadiyya moral community, as expressed in their choice of a particular calendar and method of calculating the correct day of the Idd, must be understood within the historical development of the last century. On the one hand, the Ahmadiyya claim a Muslim identity, with Muslim rituals linked to Muslim sacred events and places, and guided by a Muslim khalifa. On the other hand, their excommunication (1974) and persecution in the 1970s and 1980s led to their displacement and the removal of the Headquarters from Pakistan to London. Actually being banned from the hajj, and in Pakistan even from performing the Idd el-Hajj rituals, has been a traumatising experience. It is linked to the eschatological events, the return of the Mahdi, and the persecution of all the Qur’anic prophets and martyrs. With no place for them in the Islamic world, time has become an important tool of identification with Islamic heritage. Their calendar is on the one hand the closest link to historical, Islamic events and on the other hand the most modern and western method of time-reckoning.

In the 1970s, the period of persecution and turmoil, the Ahmadiyya Qadianis started a short experiment to link the community again to the sacred centre of the hajj. Although it is difficult to provide hard evidence, it is telling that both the Ahmadiyya Qadiani and Lahore branches changed their point of view concerning the Idd dates in this turbulent period. In 1972, the Qadiani Khalifa ordered that from that moment on, the Idd el-
Hajj should be celebrated together with the *hajj* in Mecca. In an editorial published in April 1972, the decision of Khalifa al-Masih III is translated and explained for the Swahili community. Unlike the AMYC discourses that focus on the essential link between Arafa and the Idd el-Hajj, the Ahmadiyya articles focus on the place of Mina and the day of Sacrifice, rather than on Arafa. The reason, according to the writer, is that if the sacrifice were to take place on another date, the meaning would be different from the pilgrimage ritual. Those Muslims who could not participate in the *hajj* should share in the joy of the pilgrims, and the simultaneous performance of *hajj* and Idd el-Hajj is therefore essential. The local moon-sighting method in use for the Idd el-Fitr should be discarded for the Dhulhija month. It is not the local visibility of the moon that is essential for the Idd el-Hajj, but rather the religious rituals taking place at Mecca. Because there is only a clear statement of the Prophet concerning the local moon-sighting for Ramadan (and not for the Idd el-Hajj), the latter celebration should follow the Mecca moon, according to the Ahmadiyya editor.

However, only 9 months later, in January 1973, the new method had already been abolished. On the occasion of the upcoming Idds in 1973 and its concomitant problems of the correct date, the *Mapenzi ya Mungu* editor refers to an article published the previous month. He mentions the calculated time of the Ramadan moon as 16.54 in the evening of 26 September. After 18 hours (10.54 the next morning) the crescent would be large enough and the sun would set that day at 18.28, so the first day of the fast would be 28th September 1973. The same local moon-sighting prescriptions were given for the 'Idi Kubwa' (Idd el-Hajj) without any reference to the Day of Arafa or Mecca. It appears that the 1972 flirtation with the *hajj* was only a short-lived experiment.

In subsequent years, local moon-sighting at least 18 hours after the birth of the Astronomic New Moon, also remained the rule for Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj. What is surprising in the many articles on the subject is that the name of Arafa never plays any role at all; in fact the authors seem to shun the name. For example, the 9th Dhulhija is called “the day of the *hajj*, one day before the Great Idd.” The simultaneous performance of Idd el-Hajj and *hajj* is attacked as un-Islamic and baseless. In contrast, the Ahmadiyya newspaper emphasises the legal possibility for non-*hajjis* to sacrifice and even to pray on the second or third day of the Idd. In one of the very few instances where Arafa is mentioned, it is explained in the context of the highly spiritual meaning of the *hajj*, and certainly not as the focal point of the Muslim universe.
What is important in the Ahmadiyya Idd el-Hajj discourse is spiritual unity, preserved by the Khalifa. Physically, this bond between the London headquarters and the Tanga backwater is expressed by a large satellite dish on the mission house. On many occasions, including the Idds, it is from here that Ahmadiyya believers can watch the Khalifa’s sermons. The Idd el-Hajj is a celebration to share the joy of brothers and sisters from the community who made it to Mecca, but the focus is not on Saudi Arabia but rather on the Khalifa’s residency. The Idd “brings unity and love in the society.”

There is one God, one Prophet, one holy book, and these three unities should lead to unity in the (Muslim) world. Islam provides equality (usawa) between human beings, black and white, male and female, rich and poor, and therefore this religion enables real human unity. One leader and one political party (!) is the most desirable and desired thing in a country. African politics do not need the opposition of many parties as in western countries. In this imagined community (many local branches united by a strong Islamic leader), the simultaneous celebration of the Idd el-Hajj together with the hajj is not stressed. The physical places of Mecca, Arafa and Mina have drifted out of focus. This coincides with a strong preference in naming the ritual not Idd el-Hajj, as other Tanzanian Muslims do, but ‘Idd Kubwa’ (major Idd) or ‘Idd al-Adha’ (Idd of Sacrifice). Both of these names are closer to the Arabic original. In general, the Ahmadiyya stress the importance of learning Arabic, equalling the zeal of reformist groups like the AMYC. Having lost access to the real, physical sacred places like Arafa, the Ahmadiyya diaspora cultivate their links with Islamic history, calendar and language as lifelines to a Muslim identity.

b. …or Islamic authority contested

The Ahmadiyya’s situation of one community listening to a single religious leader is, of course, envied by many other Muslims. Most, if not all Tanzanian groups, pay at least lip-service to the restoration of the caliphate. It is not the theoretical notion of a single Islamic leadership that is contested; the Qur’anic text Q 4:59 is often cited to emphasise the need for authoritative direction of the Muslim umma:

O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if ye do believe in Allah and the Last Day: That is best, and most suitable for final determination.
Although Muslims are proud that they do not have a clergy like the Christians, the necessity of strong leadership and religious authority sometimes pops up in Idd discussions in Tanzania. The themes of ‘unity’ and ‘leadership’ rank high among the topics discussed in newspapers and formal meetings. However, when it comes to practical plans, all claims of Islamic leadership in Tanzania are heavily contested.

One of the candidates to fulfil the role of religious leader is the Islamic judge (kadhi). In the discourse regarding the proper Idd date, Tanzanians often refer to their neighbouring country, Kenya, whose Idd dates are publicly announced by a kadhi. Mainland Tanzania lacks an official kadhi-court, a fact lamented by non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Time and again, (non-Muslim) MPs propose to reinstall the Tanzanian kadhi, and often one of the reasons behind these proposals is the problem of moon-sighting and religious unity. However, Muslim reactions to these plans range from lukewarm to negative, afraid as they are about hidden state agendas trying to control the Muslim population. The opponents of a Tanzanian kadhi refer again to Kenya and claim that the situation there is not much better because the Kenyan kadhi’s decision on the moon-sighting and the date of the Idd is never recognised by the whole Muslim community. The same plea for unity and coherence is also heard in Kenya.

The role of the kadhi in the Idd controversies could also be played by a nationally accepted mufti. The legal requirements for a mufti (a scholar who can issue authoritative fatwas) are easier to fulfil than those of a kadhi. Both Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania have a mufti working under the National Muslim Council BAKWATA that, until recently, held a monopoly over the announcement of the dates of the two Idds. Most of the local madrassa networks recognise him as a ‘national mufti’. When the BAKWATA mufti Sheikh Hemed bin Jumaa bin Hemed passed away in April 2002, the official letter of invitation to participate in the mourning rituals mentioned him as “our national religious leader” (“kiongozi wetu wa Kitaifa wa Kidini Mufti Shekhe Mkuu wa Tanzania”). Opponents, however, denounced him as just a “BAKWATA mufti” or an “imitation mufti” (mufti bandia). The AMYC announced his death as a “great blow for BAKWATA and its stakeholders and even more overwhelming for those who claimed to bring national unity.” An-Nuur managed to hide his death in a few lines on page two, whereas all other newspapers devoted at least half of their front pages to the subject. These oppositional attitudes towards the mufti reflect the widespread discontentment with the Tanzanian government in general and with BAKWATA in particular among urban middle class Muslims. The National Muslim
Council is not only referred to as the “the arm of the Catholic Church,” or “the arm of the enemies who want to separate the Muslims,” or the “arm of America,” but actually as the “most bitter enemy of real Islam and Islamic development.”

The cordial relationship between the state and BAKWATA, expressed for instance by President Mkapa’s attendance at and active participation in the mufti’s burial, makes any attempt to install a central Islamic leadership suspect in the eyes of many Muslims. In 2001, the Law of the mufti (Sheria ya Mufti) raised protests among Muslims who were afraid that the new mufti (to be appointed by the President) would give the secular government even more power in religious matters than was already the case with the BAKWATA mufti (who is not appointed by the state). Also, the plan to restore the kadhi-ship met heavy resistance. Muslims even arranged a public prayer in which they asked God to prevent this godless project. They were afraid that these governmentally-initiated institutions would be used to enforce the state’s agenda, rather than enhance Islamic interests.

It is telling that in all of these initiatives, the synchronising of the Idd played an important role. Apparently, the imagined community of the nation-state perceived itself as one of the major stakeholders in a single Idd. Especially on Zanzibar, conflicts between the Muslim president and secular interests were often ignited in the moon-sighting arena. The Sheria ya Mufti explicitly stated that one of the new mufti’s tasks would be to “coordinate and announce the appearance of the moon” (“kuratibu na kutangaza kuandama kwa mwezi”). The semi-autonomous island would like to have a ‘mufti mkuu’ who issues binding fatwas on the Idd celebration. Magnanimously, Minister Shamhuna allowed some opposition to the current Zanzibar Mufti Kharith Bin Khelief. Indeed, the Prophet Muhammad Himself also met some opposition from the Quraishi, he claimed. However, just as the Prophet used his common sense (busara) and his intellect (akili), so too did the Zanzibar government through its proposal to bolster the restyled mufti-ship. Fadhil Soraga, Secretary of the mufti, supported the government’s wish, and in his Idd al-Fitr speech appealed to the island’s Muslims to respect the unity of “one president, one mufti, one kadhi and one Idd.” Vigorous reactions followed his request. Zanzibar Muslims feared that they will follow the mainland and its problems in this respect. Although they would have liked to be truly united, they even preferred to let each organisation have its own mufti, rather than being again under the power of a state organ similar to BAKWATA. Real unity, according to the ulama of Zanzibar, comes from the leadership of God and should not be contingent on the Zanzibari President.
Karume being a Muslim. Islamic ritual is focused on one God, one prophet and one Qur’an, but not on one president.53

3. Arafa
   a. One place…

   If one perfect, harmonious community lead by one khaliqa, mufti or kadhi is not feasible, then the focal point of the imagined community might be found in the physical reality of the hajj. Just like the Arabic language, the hajj cements the Islamic community together. As we will see in the next chapters, Arafa is a very important place among the hajj stations, and the ritual standing at Arafa on the 9th Dhulhijja is one of the most emotionally impressive elements of the pilgrimage.54 While all groups admit the significance of Arafa within the context of the hajj, not all of them consider the ‘Day of Arafa’ to be the primary factor determining the day of the Idd elsewhere in the world. Nonetheless, those who do so find their legitimacy in the always convincing argument of the tawhid (unity of God) which extends towards all directions in time and place:

   Real unity can only be achieved by returning to the Qur’an and Sunna. There is no reason at all to differ on the subject because our God is One, Our Prophet is One, Our religion is One, Our Book is One, Laylatul Qadr is One and Arafa is One!

The focus on Arafa as a metonym of the larger imagined Muslim community is most prominent among the Saudi-oriented AMYC.55 Their Tanga shops bear the name ‘Makka Commercial Centre,’ and their school names show the link with Islamic times, places and concepts: al-Hijra, Tauhid, Muzdalifah, Swafaa, Avicenna and, the oldest of them, Arafa (established in 1994 and registered in 1999). In Tanga, reference to geographical places in the nomenclature of schools and mosques is quite exceptional. Other madrasas, for example, have more abstract names: Shamsiyya, Zahrau, Ma’wa al-Islam, Shamsul Ma’arif, Nuur, Taalim, or al-Hudda. This pattern is also visible in the rest of Tanzania. Abstract religious concepts rank highest in madrasa naming (al-Jihad, Falaah, Taqwa, Nur, Shifaa, Tarbiya, itiiswam, Sunni or Assasyin). Personal names of pious Muslims like Uthman bin Affan, Abu Huraira, Musab are also popular. Geographical names linked to the hajj or Saudi Arabia are quite rare: I found Qubah, Shaqiqain, Hija, Muzdalifa, Jabal
Hira, Safaa, Riyadh and only one other Arafa Islamic School. Part of the AMYC staff studied for long periods in Saudi Arabia and continue to nurse their contacts through regular visits, for example in Ramadan. Most of the textbooks used in the Arafa primary and secondary schools are printed and approved by Saudi authorities.

The image of the whole Islamic world being connected to one physical centre, Arafa, is discursively constructed in several ways. On the Day of Arafa, 21 February 2002, a radio reporter from Saudi Arabia was broadcast over six large amplifiers on the Tanga AMYC mosque to give an impression of the event over there. By way of this live broadcast, the fact of the simultaneity was greatly emphasised. After this, the Tanga reporter briefly introduced the festivities of the following day. In this introduction, he stated that the whole world was celebrating the Idd, except Tanzania, Zanzibar, and Kenya. This message regarding who was right and who was wrong was driven home the next morning during the festival prayers, when the director addressed the congregation: “Brothers, Muslims, at this moment all the Muslims in the world celebrate the Sacrificial Feast, except maybe some Muslims from BAKWATA.” In the AMYC’s monthly paper distributed the same day, the leading article was headed by the title “LEO NI IDD” (today is the Idd). It opened with the sentence “Muslims from the whole world celebrate the Idd after the pilgrims completed one of the pillars of the hajj yesterday on the field of Arafa in the area of Min-nah, the town of Makka in the country of Saudi Arabia.” The geographical focus of the festival is repeatedly emphasised. In all of the AMYC Idd el-Hajj sermons I attended and saw on video, this connection with Arafa is stressed.

A second strategy to construct the imagined Arafa community is through the usage of Qur’anic and hadith quotations stressing the importance of the Arafa as a place and a hajj ritual. As we have seen, there is no uncontested textual ‘proof’ to defend the position that the Idd el-Hajj should be celebrated simultaneously with the hajj. However, the significance of Arafa, expressed by the Prophet Muhammad who said “the hajj is Arafa,” can be developed into an imagined community with Arafa as the centre. It was, after all, on the Day of Arafa that God revealed the final verse of the Qur’an: “Today I have completed your religion” (Q 5:3). Arafa is one of the few places mentioned in the Qur’an:

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It is no crime in you if ye seek of the bounty of your Lord (during pilgrimage). Then when ye pour down from (Mount) Arafat, celebrate the praises of Allah at the Sacred Monument, and celebrate His praises as He has directed you, even though, before this, ye went astray. (Q 2:198).
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Neither a sheikh nor any other authority can change this Qur’anic reference to Mecca and Arafa in relation with the *hajj*, as claimed by Nassor Abdulla al-Qadiri. His line of reasoning is that if it were not of universal, but only of local, significance, then God would not have mentioned its name in the Glorious Qur’an. A second Qur’anic verse used by the Arafa community is Q 89:1-3: “[I swear] by the break of Day. By the Nights twice five; By the even and odd (contrasted)].” Traditional exegesis ascribes the following meaning to this obscure verse: the Dawn or break of Day is the morning of the Idd el-Hajj. The 10 nights are the first 10 of the month Dhulhija. The even is the Idd day and the odd is the Day of Arafa, the 9th Dhulhija. The common assumption is that, because God swears by the Day of Arafa, no day is more sacred than this day. However, the final conclusion (that the Day of Arafa should be celebrated all over the world at the same time) is not shared by all Muslim theologians.

The practice of fasting on the Day of Arafa is another constructed link between the *hajj* and the Idd el-Hajj. Several *hadiths* state the benefits of fasting for those Muslims who could not participate in the *hajj*. During the 2002 *hajj* month, a printed leaflet attached to one of the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre’s offices in Tanga showed one of them: “Fasting on the Day of Arafa cleanses from sins (*inafutisha madhambi*) of two years: of the past year and the year to come.” The poster added the admonition: “Do not miss this blessing by fasting on this day which will be on Thursday the 21st.” Many other prophetical reports indicate that fasting on the Day of Arafa is equal to the rewards one gets from fasting two complete years. Spiritually joining in this sacred act of Arafa by fasting (something which is strictly forbidden for the *hajjis*) can only be valid if the fasting coincides with the *wuquf* ritual of the pilgrims; therefore the lunar time-reckoning of Arafa is the divinely sanctioned point of reference for the Idd el-Hajj. A rather uncommon tradition reflects questions in the early Muslim community very similar to those of the present day societies. It is a *hadith* on authority of Aisha, the Prophet’s most beloved wife, discussing how Masruq enters the house of Aisha on the Day of Arafa. Masruq asks for something to drink, and the wife of the Prophet responds by asking him if he is not fasting because of the Day of Arafa. He denies it and says that it is the day of the Idd, and not the Day of Arafa. Then Aisha states:

Really the Day of Arafa is the day the Imam (of your town [*Imamu wa mji wako*]) announces as the Day of Arafa, and the day of the sacrifice (*siku ya kuchinja*) is
the day the Imam (ruler of your town [mitawala wa mji]) announces as the day of the sacrifice.67

Only the collectors Tabarani (d. 951-52) and Baihaqi (d. 1066) reported this hadith, more than three centuries after the death of Prophet Muhammad. According to the local moon-sighters, this hadith explains that the Day of Arafa is only the Day of Arafa when the local religious authority declares it as such (after accepting a local crescent-sighting). The same report is explained by the IM declaring that ‘the Imam’ is not a local religious leader but the Imam of Mecca, and therefore Arafa determines the date of the Idd el-Hajj everywhere in the world.68

The AMYC are not the only group who strongly emphasise importance of Arafa for local Idd celebrations. The Dar es Salaam imam, Imam Mtwazi, shares the same opinion that fasting should be practiced simultaneously with the pilgrims standing at Arafa.69 His book is devoted to the salat and only in the last chapter does he deal with the issue of ‘fasting the Day of Arafa’. Apparently, he perceives both rituals as important to cement the religious community together. In 1998, Sheikh Muhammad Nassor Abdulla al-Qadir published his 87-page book on the “most important pillar of the hajj: Arafa.” As a Sufi sheikh, he is a declared enemy of several ‘Wahhabi’ points of view, but he totally agrees with their belief that the Idd el-Hajj should be celebrated one day after the Arafa ritual in Mecca. In his opinion, this makes the Idd el-Hajj different from the Idd el-Fitr which relies on local moon-sighting:

Arafa near Makka, the ninth of Mfungo tatu (Dhulhija) is indeed Arafa of the Almighty God and is indeed Arafa of all Muslims everywhere in the whole world. […] It is necessary for every Muslim to know that Ramadan and the Hajj are two completely different pillars and they should not interfere with each other. At the beginning of the month of Ramadan all Muslims have to follow the date of their own crescent, wherever they are in the world. Exactly the same at the Idd el-Fitr (end of Ramadan) they have to follow their own (local) moon.70

Also, the prolific writer Saidi Musa told me that the Arafa argument was a sound reasoning to determine the date of the Idd el-Hajj. However, for the Idd el-Fitr Muslims should rely on local crescent-sighting.71

Also on the popular level, the notion of Arafa is discussed in a non-religious context. On February 5th 2003, the author SAH on the Swahili forum Youngafrican.com wished all Muslims not “Idd mabruk” but a happy “siku ya
The following discussion thread on the site revealed that there was much confusion about the Day of Arafat, the day of sacrifice and the day of the Idd. So much so that a certain ‘tongue master’ concluded:

I see I don’t have a definite answer for its meaning, these things need clarification so I understand that this issue is sensitive (hii issue ni nyeti).

This kind of discussion is common when Arafat is brought to the stage as a potential focus for the world umma. Even the Arafat promoters themselves do not expect that many Muslims will understand their arguments and join their imagined community. Msabaha complains in his sermon “then you teach the people in the mosques especially about the importance of Arafat, and then they go out at the street and follow someone else!”

b. …or the Saudi hegemony contested

The imagined community created by simultaneous Idd celebration together with the hajj is persuasive for many Muslims. However, apart from the strong religious emotions evoked by the place of Arafat, it is also associated with the political domination of Saudi Arabia, the keeper of the holy places and protector of the puritanical Wahhabiyya. These associations are mostly ambiguous and often negative. On the one hand, the nation of Saudi Arabia is presented in Swahili discourse (based on reports of Tanzanian expatriates and pilgrims) as one of the few economically strong Islamic countries and in many respects an “example to be followed.” In contrast to other prospering countries such as European nations and the United States, Saudi Arabia has been able to prevent moral corruption. Saudi citizens are safe, public transport is good, the Saudi army has a high level of technology, and Saudi economic sectors are booming. East African hajjis praise the condition of the roads between Jeddah, Mecca and Medina.

On the other hand, Tanzanians who have lived in Saudi Arabia often complain about racism against black people. In the political Islamic discourse of the IPC, the Saudi King is presented as a puppet of America and on the same level as other pawns such as President Mkapa, the Secretary of BAKWATA, and the Catholic Cardinal Pengo. This negative portrayal of Saudi Arabia is also displayed in the discussions of returning pilgrims. Some of them were confronted with the unnecessary violent behaviour of the religious police at the holy places. Many Muslims state that because the hajj happens to be performed on Saudi territory, this should not be the reason
for any arrogance. Therefore, the official letter from BAKWATA to congratul-
ate Saudi Arabia for the organisation of the *hajj* is totally out of place and
is to be condemned, according to the Ahmadiyya. (The Ahmadiyya being
banned from going to Saudi Arabia is clearly a sensitive point which would
lead them to criticise BAKWATA’s praise for the country). Just like prayer,
alms and fasting, the *hajj* is a ritual intended to express piety, and it is cer-
tainly not an occasion to praise human beings and even less so the Saudi
government. In fact, many hold the Saudis responsible for the fact that so
many pilgrims return from the *hajj* without any spiritual benefit, apart from
their title ‘Alhajji’.

The uneasiness with an imagined community dominated by Saudi pol-
itics is also present in the discussion about following the ‘Saudi Day of Arafa’
and the ‘Saudi moon.’ The adjective ‘Saudi’ already indicates the contempt
of other Muslims for those who build their Idd community around Arafa. This
negative attitude towards many aspects of Saudi Arabia is also shared by
the Arafa upholders themselves. Therefore, the international moon-sighters
flatly deny that they follow the ‘Saudi’ moon for Ramadan and Idd el-Fitr.
They point towards leading Hanbali scholars like Muhammad bin Saleh ibn
Muhammad ibn Uthaymin (d. 2000) who are convinced that every place
should follow its own local crescent for Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj. Uthaymin
used to be the most influential religious leader in the Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
bia after Ibn Baz, so the accusation that the Saudi state forces all countries
to follow their moon is beside the point, the IM state. For the Idd el-Hajj, the
AMYC and many other international moon-sighters emphasise that congru-
ence with the *hajj* dates is of paramount importance, even if that includes
the following of a dubious crescent-sighting accepted by the Saudis, as hap-
pened in January 2005. Preserving the unity of the umma overrules in this
case the question of authoritative moon-sighting.

Most Tanzanian Muslims present the role of Saudi Arabia in accepting
invalid moon-sightings as their main argument to reject the Arafa-centred
community. According to the Zahrau principal, the Saudis and their friends
the Wahhabiyya lie if they claim to follow any moon-sighting anywhere in
the world: they just pretend. In reality, they wait until the moon is visible in
Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia really followed the international moon, how
can it be that they never see the moon in the Far East (where it is first vis-
ible)? Even classical *fiqh* prescribes that western countries should follow
eastern moon-sightings, but somehow, Muslims stress, Saudi Arabia seems
to be above the law in this respect. “Saudi Arabia claims they don’t follow
the (astronomical, civil) Ummul Quraa calendar for religious use, but their
actions show they do," Darani proves with many examples. Their opponents ridicule the Saudis for their superb eyes: they can ‘see’ the new moon when no one else in other parts of the world can. Saudi Arabia and Tanzania are almost on the same longitude, but how is it that Tanzanians can never see the crescent whereas the Saudi’s can, they ask? This image of Saudi Arabia as being unreliable and dishonest is also underlined in the non-Islamic press covering the Idd controversies.

In the written Swahili discourse, the rejection of Arafa’s centrality in determining the day of the Idd el-Hajj, is not only phrased as a rejection of the Saudi religious authority per se. Several other arguments are presented. One of these is the already well-known experience of the differences in time. Because of the geophysical reality of the world, time differences cannot be ruled out, so celebrating an event everywhere at exactly the same time is impossible, Darani explains. Therefore, to link the fasting of the ninth Dhu’l-Hijja to the real place and time of the Arafa ritual is invalid. A second argument is found in the absence of any classical text in defence of the Arafa community. Though the argument of Arafa and one global umma joined together in worship is attractive, it is in fact an innovation, a bid’a according to the proponents of more local Idd communities. To give Mecca such a prominent status is indeed a totally new phenomenon (hoja mpya), not to be found in legal discussions and the Sharia. The counter-argument of those rejecting the Saudi influence is rhetorically very strong, because it is usually the Ansaar movement which proudly use the bid’a argument to condemn the ritual practices of local Muslims.

A third and most widespread argument emphasises the differences between the pilgrim and those Muslims not performing the hajj. The annual pilgrimage does not have an Idd prayer because the Idd salat is meant as a substitute for the hajj. Muslims participating in the local Idd prayers do so because they cannot partake in the hajj rituals in Mecca. The Prophet performed the Idd many times, but the hajj only once. The Idd celebration started in the first or second year after the Hijra, but the hajj as an essential part of Islamic rituals was only initiated much later. While fasting on the Day of Arafa for non-hajjis is a rewarding pious act, for pilgrims it is forbidden (although the practice is very common). Non-hajjis may sacrifice anywhere they like but pilgrims should take into account many restrictions. Sacrifice for believers at home is incumbent upon those who fulfil certain financial requirements, while sacrifice by the pilgrims is linked to the particular configuration of hajj and umra chosen by the pilgrim (see chapter 9). While the hajj is an individual ibada, the Idd is only valid if it is communally
performed. The pilgrim continually shouts his talbiya, while the non-hajji recites his takbir formula.

A final counter-argument is found in the only Qur’anic text that mentions the place of Arafa (‘…Then when ye pour down from Arafat, celebrate the praises of Allah at the Sacred Monument…’ Q 2:198). Instead of the singular Arafat (as in the expression ‘Day of Arafat’) the Qur’an refers to the plural (Arafat). Therefore, Muslims should talk about ‘days of Arafat’ (siku za Arafat), rather than the singular ‘Day of Arafat’ (siku ya Arafat). This is corroborated by Islamic jurisprudence ruling that non-pilgrims’ fasting on the Day of Arafat can be postponed one day if the local imam so decides. In the case when one single Muslim witnesses the crescent of Dhul hija, but his report is not accepted by the community, he himself will have his personal Day of Arafat according to his own conscience. The community, however, follows their imam and this will result in more than one Day of Arafat.

Ignorance of these arguments is widespread among the blind followers of the Saudi Arabians, Darani claims. He prays for those “who do not understand and do not know.” Bahasaniy opens his book with the motto “None are so blind, as those who will not see; none are so deaf as those who will not hear.” The same anxiety for opponents’ moral perspective is also visible at the other side of the debate. Nassor Abdulla al-Qadiri states that many Tanzanian Muslims only attack the Arafat moon-sighting point of view because they perceive it as a ‘Wahhabi’ and ‘Saudi’ thing. But the author warns them: “… you will oppose Almighty God and there is a great danger that will lead you to the state of apostasy.”

4. Tanzania

a. One nation…

Muslims in a minority position often take the borders of the nation-state they live in as the boundaries of the imagined community expressed by communal Idd celebration. For example, in western countries with (diverse) Islamic migrant communities, this idea to show harmony on the national level is ubiquitous. In Tanzania, Muslims and Christians are more or less equal in number but the former group is perceived as marginalised and oppressed. In this context, both Muslims and the state often articulate their wish for a single Tanzanian Idd for the whole national Islamic community. From the government’s point of view this would facilitate their policy towards ‘Tanzanian Muslims’ as a single group; Muslims share the same desire for a single
Idd in order to show that they are united and steadfast against their many enemies and claiming full-fledged membership in the nation-state. Islamic groups advocating a Tanzanian or East African Idd el-Hajj therefore also strongly support the use of Swahili as a national (and even international) language in all social fields. The major Islamic newspapers an-Nuur, Nasaha and al-Huda are presented as national newspapers: Nasaha claims to be the Voice of the People (Sauti ya Wananchi).

We have already discussed Bassaleh’s attempt to convince the Tanzanian community to postpone their Idd salat and wait for the local moon-sighters. His attempts to apply ijtihad to a prophetic report in which Muhammad delayed the Festival prayers, met a lot of resistance. The interesting part of Bassaleh’s 1999 article to prove that those Muslims who prayed one day early should reschedule their Idd prayers in order to join the majority who were waiting for the national moon to be sighted, was that he took the concept of national unity (umoja wa kitaifa) as his point of departure. Similar to the imagined communities of the Ahmadiyya and the ‘Idd-behind-Arafa’ Muslims, Bassaleh emphasised that unity was more important than the legalistic observance of the ‘correct’ Idd day. The author claimed that the Idd salat was a ‘mere’ sunna, while the unity of the Islamic community was a fard, compulsory. Therefore, for the sake of this unity (basi kwa ajili ya kutafuta umoja), while Tanzanian Muslims should not bother about when to stop and start fasting, the Idd feast was of a higher order and should be done by the whole country (nchi) at the same date.

Bassaleh published the same argument, although phrased differently, in the first Nasaha issue after the Idd el-Fitr 2002. Here he extended the reasoning to all forms of worship (ibadat). The author reminds his readers that the communal salat is 25 or 27 times more valuable than an individual prayer. Ramadan fasting is not valid if it is not practiced in the correct month; the wisdom behind that commandment is that fasting together increases the religious value. It is compulsory that the hajj be performed together, in contrast with the umra, which can be accomplished any time of the year. The ‘Day of Arafa’ is the main difference between the hajj and umra, and the rituals performed there (praying together) show clearly that the Islamic pilgrimage is meant to show usawa (equality) and mshikamano (cohesion, togetherness, communitas). Respect (heshima) and humility are crucial and must lead to an attitude of not condemning the other ‘moon-sighting party.’ Bassaleh gives the example of how Imam Shafi’i abandoned the qunut prayer (which he deemed to be a prophetic sunna) in a Hanafiyya mosque (who ascribed a lower legal status to the qunut) out of respect to his fellow
'RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS'

believers. That Idd prayers are communal affairs is further corroborated by the fact that (even!) women having their menses should be present on the prayer grounds. This unity is necessary to make a front against the enemies (maadui), the preacher concludes.

What Bassaleh actually does in his article is describe the outline of an ideal moral community modelled on the hajj. The active involvement of women, children and men in the hajj and the Idd el-Hajj is representative for the whole Islamic community. Their behaviour in the Idd controversy displays the moral quality of their imagined community. Whereas most Muslims from other Idd communities will accept these values, the connection of this community with the nation-state is often rejected. Among Bassaleh's supporters are many Muslims linked to the IPC organisation. On the national level they feel inequality with Christians as competitors for state-owned assets like the access to education. It is therefore important to show that they are united. "We live in one state with Christians, although our religions differ."103 Despite their severe criticism of the president, politics and BAK-WATA, they do not contest the nation-state as such but try to participate in it and improve the conditions of Muslim Tanzanians therein. Although Muslims severely contested the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002, they praised the aim of the law "to protect the unity of the nation-state" (ili kulinda umoja wa kitaifa).104 Summons to improve the "peace of this nation," and support the president can be found in the an-Nuur editorials.105 Many Muslims opposed the multi-party system introduced in the early 1990s in order to protect the status quo, including the nation-state.106

We can recognise the same loyal attitude towards the Tanzanian state in the Ahmadiyya discourse on the Idd. Sacrificing animals on the Idd el-Hajj is not only performed in obedience to God, but also for "the well-being of the nation-state" (faida ya taifa).107 The Ahmadiyya Idd khutba in Songea 2001 underlined the importance of "obedience to the government" and "loyalty to our country."108 Even in sensitive matters like the Dibagula case (a Muslim sentenced to jail because he claimed that Jesus is not God), the Ahmadiyya support the government in protecting the peace of the nation.109 However, in the moon-sighting issue they have chosen to construct their Idd community within different parameters, not always equal to the country of Tanzania. Not surprisingly, their discourse on this topic is silent about the nation-state.

Not only Muslims like to see national unity in the Idd celebration; the government, of course, is of the same opinion. In the last decade, Tanzanian state officials time and again expressed their urge to synchronise Idd
praying as a “good, modern nation-state.” A few examples may illustrate this point. Immediately after the ‘pork riots’ in 1993 and just before the Idd el-Hajj started, a seven-man delegation of the Zanzibar Sunna Mosque at Raha Leo asked the President permission to hold Idd prayers according to their own moon-sighting, one day earlier than the national holiday of Tanzania. The President tried to persuade them to stick to the national unity of one Idd in the whole country. The government-owned paper Daily News reported on this topic as follows:

The [Ansaar Sunna] sect caused eyebrows here this year when it held the Idd prayers after the end of the holy month of Ramadan a day before the moon was sighted […] because they follow moon-sighting in Saudi Arabia […] On the request by the sheikhs the President advised that it would not be wise for a group […] to go against a tradition […] to avoid fuelling religious conflicts.110

On the Idd el-Fitr of 29 January 1998, the Vice-President Dr. Omari Ali announced that the government would expose everybody who prayed on a different date than the one broadcast by the BAKWATA mufti to a very strict punishment.111 Zanzibar’s President, Salmin Amour, asked at the Idd el-Fitr of January 2000 for a national solution of the moon problem.112 In Ramadan 2001, the police on Zanzibar arrested more than twenty Muslims from the Ansaar Sunna movement because they prayed “too early.”113 On the Idd el-Hajj 2003 (11 February), the Field Force Units (FFU) clashed with the Ansaar at 6.30 in the morning, because their prayer meeting was illegal and against the rules of the Republic and the Union of Tanzania. Zanzibar’s Chief Mufti Sheikh Harith bin Khelef had warned that anyone who did not comply with the national holiday, “would make a big mistake” (atakayekwenda kinyume na agizo hilo atakuwa anatenda kosa kubwa). A few days later, the FFU again disturbed a meeting where Muslims were discussing the disruption of 11 February. 24 people were arrested in the subsequent riots.114 After a quiet Ramadan 2003,115 another wave of confusion rocked the believers when the 2004 Dhulhija crescent was sighted in Iraq (by that time occupied by the American military forces) and not in other places in the Middle East. In Ramadan 2004, the Zanzibar government only asked the Ansaar to “repent” because of breaking their fast one day too early.116

These examples show that the state (especially on Zanzibar) is often actively involved in the Idd date. Within the theoretical framework of this study, I understand these conflicts as a clash between two different imagined communities: the nation-state and the divine umma. Because the Idd
is at the same time a national and a religious holiday, these two spheres can
easily overlap. Differences between the dates underline differences between
the communities and emphasise the potential fracture lines. The blurring
of the boundaries between national and religious communities is essential
for the successful creation of an imagined communal identity. The ritual of
the Idd is able to create this homogeneous identity: we are all Tanzanian
Muslims. However, several other imagined communities may easily endan-
ger this idyllic picture. This becomes clear when Muslims on the pay-roll of
a ‘national’ organisation suddenly appear to belong to another imagined
community. This happened on the eve of Idd el-Fitr 1994, when Sheikh Mkuu
Hemed bin Jumaa announced the national Idd for the next day. However,
he added that he himself would fast on another day! Rumours have it that
he was pushed by President Hassan Mwinyi and Salmin Amour (President of
Zanzibar 1990-2000) to announce the new moon in order to create a broad-
er base of support for one national Idd el-Fitr celebration. Muslims wrote
that this action exposed BAKWATA as just an extension of the state appa-
ratus and that Sheikh Hemed feared the President more than God or the
Prophet. A comparable confusion occurred when Soraga, the Secretary of
Zanzibar’s mufti declared the official 2004 Idd el-Fitr crescent-sighting three
days earlier as invalid. These examples show that people cannot be forced
by state power to belong to a particular imagined community.

b. …or the nation-state contested

The contestation of the argument that all Muslims living in the politi-
cally and geographically defined territory of Tanzania should celebrate the
Idd on a single day is not always fuelled by an outright rejection of the
validity of the nation-state. Critical reactions to ‘national Idd celebrations’
are twofold: those who totally denounce the legitimacy of the nation-state
and those merely criticising the unequal treatment of Islam and Muslims in
the public domain. These positions are roughly represented by the AMYC
and the IPC.

The AMYC rejects the nation-state as a non-religiously founded politi-
cal entity. In 2000, their director, Salim Barahiyan, asked Muslims not to vote
in the national presidential elections. How to live among a kafir majority
in Tanzania is the topic of one of his sermons. In the moon-sighting con-
flict, national boundaries have no legal value whatsoever in a Sharia discus-
sion, according to him. God’s moon does not have national boundaries.
Among the items that Sheikh Barahiyan listed as bid’a (innovation) are “the
fasting and breaking of the fast by following the moon which is only visible
between the boundaries of the nation which are drawn by the unbelieving colonisers” (wakoloni makafiri). In his 1997 Idd sermon he calls the Tanzanian government taghut, the illegitimate powers. Not surprisingly, moonsighting books published by the Ansaar Sunna often include large parts on the Berlin Conference and the English/German occupation of Tanganyika, showing how the national boundaries are a result of historical and political contingency. The nation-state, elections and democracy are not Islamic but rather established by “a secular, kafir system” (taratibu za kisekula ambao ni ukafiri).

A second critical response to the national state as the ultimate imagined community does not condemn the nation as such, but rather its Christian or crypto-Christian policies. It is an extension of the critique on a central Muslim leadership described above. Just like a single kadhi, mufti or khalifa, democracy and the nation-state could also be beneficial for Muslims, but in the current political reality, these institutions are corrupted and infiltrated by the Christian government. It is from this perspective that Bassaleh’s summon to national unity in the 1999 Idd prayers received two critical replies. Neither of these writers contests the authenticity of Bassaleh’s evidence from the Qur’an and hadith, but rather challenge his interpretation of unity as a national unity. In contrast to Bassaleh’s national society, the two writers define their own imagined community which is particularly clearly expressed in the Idd el-Hajj.

Nyello writes that according to the Qur’an, God’s umma is one umma (Q 21:92), without ethnic, geographical, or political boundaries. Speaking and understanding Arabic is one of the most important unifying factors, rather than having the same government: even in China the call for prayer and the Fatiha are recited in Arabic, not in Chinese. Although the prayer on the day of the Idd is legally ‘only’ a sunna, there is no reason to neglect this prophetic example in order to have a parochial, provincial unity (umoja wa kienyeji). “So, mister Bassaleh, will your unity be an Islamic unity (umoja wa kiislamu) or a mere ‘national unity’ (umoja wa kitaifa),” he rhetorically asks. Every act of worship has its own, specific goal and yields specific moral rewards essential for the Islamic individual and society, according to Nyello. The objective of fasting is to teach the individual believer to fear God (Q 2:183), but the aim of the hajj is “to build the brotherhood, unity and the holding fast together (udugu, umoja na mshikamano) of all Muslims in the world.” Therefore, the hajj is an act of translocal worship (ibada), involving the whole Islamic world, and the Idd el-Hajj is the local expression of this global umma. Muslims come from all corners of the world to obey the call of
God Himself, so, Nyello concludes, there is no reason to obey anyone else, as Bassaleh’s seems to claim in his baseless argument for a ‘national unity.’

Anaphy Said reacts in the same way. He contests Bassaleh’s idea of a national unity in a religious issue in which God has left Muslims clear textual indications how to act. “There is no reason whatsoever for the followers of the international moon, to wait for the followers of the national moon,’ he writes. And when Bassaleh proposes that the minority should wait for the majority, “well the majority follows the international moon: all the Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools are united in this respect.” The reasoning that the salat on the Idd is “only a sunna” is not a reason to delay it without reason, because the Prophet said during his farewell hajj: “I leave you the book of Allah and my Sunna.” The Sunna is praying on the Idd day and nothing else! Praying at the correct time, as do the followers of the international moon, gives the other Muslims the opportunity to make a thorough investigation of the problem in order to find out the truth. It is not the nation-state as such that is attacked in these responses, but the writers just present another imagined community. This rival Idd community is not the complete opposite of the national Muslim community, but it has a characteristic identity of its own. Instead of the moral values stressed by Bassaleh (national unity, intention as being more important than the ritual action, cohesion) they emphasise literal truth, meticulous research of the transmitted texts, and correct ritual practice. All of them refer to the hajj and the Idd el-Hajj as particularly important symbols of identification.

Muslims who feel there is no longer any space for them in the imagined community of Tanzania use the Idd celebration to underline their belonging to other communities. To justify their choice, many refer to the moral corruption and wickedness of the secular state, the Christian government and its ‘arm’ BAKWATA:

Let’s remember how the Muslims were robbed of the EAMWS and how BAKWATA was established without their approval, and [let us remember] the following events that separated the Tanzanian Muslims from their fellow believers in the world. BAKWATA was given the monopoly in deciding everything Islamic in the country (inchini). What they [i.e. the BAKWATA leaders] say is presented as the true religion (ibada) of all Tanzanian Muslims. But in reality BAKWATA has not even a single day condemned the killings of Muslims in Kosovo, Bosnia, or Algeria. Over there, even Mwembechai is surpassed! Therefore we ask Sheikh Bassaleh not to strengthen this kind of BAKWATA-unity.
Here the moon-sighting and moon-fighting neatly ties in with the memory of oppression and marginalisation perceived by Muslims. Celebrating the Idd according to the time schedule and within the borders of a state that kills its Muslim citizens (wananchi) will seriously harm the lofty image of the Idd community, according to opponents of national unity. Very frequently, they connect the Idd controversies and political incidents like the Mwembechai conflict. This illustrates, according to these Muslims, that both imagined communities (the Christian nation-state and the Islamic umma) become more and more mutually exclusive: “To be a Tanzanian Muslim is to be a criminal.” However, this development is caused by the Tanzanian government and not by Muslims. It is the nation-state which presents itself as a rival of the Idd community and forces Muslims to choose between them. It was a Christian president who banned the EAMWS (which provided authoritative crescent-sighting reports for Kenya Uganda and Tanzania) and replaced it with its own BAKWATA institute and endowed it with the authority to announce the Idd. But why is it that Muslim Idd conflicts threaten national peace, whereas similar Christian controversies are perceived as belonging to religious freedom, Muslims asked?

Despite the critical position of Muslims towards the Tanzanian state, discussions regarding the date of the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj show, in fact, a broad acceptance of this political unity and willingness to participate in it in order to improve the position of Muslims in Tanzania. Most opponents of a national Idd celebration do not reject the nation-state as such, but on the Idd they prefer to express their belonging to a higher lever community. For example, the Arafat proponent, Kai Mwalimu, prays for national unity, that “Our Lord show our leaders the way, that they may lead our nation (nchi yetu) according to the Sunna of our Messenger and Your Book.” Abu Rayhana’s positive, very practical contribution to the discussion serves as a final example. The author is not really concerned with the different dates of the Idd celebrations and does not perceive them as threatening to the national unity of Muslims. He points towards the religious Muslim leaders Kibaha and Othman Matata. Both side with BAKWATA on the issue of the Idd moon, but they prove themselves to be real champions defending the moral well-being of the Muslim community on other topics. More serious threats to this morality are, according to Abu Rayhana the avarice of religious leaders, swindling with votes after the elections, the Mwembechai case, pigs and pork, the hijab in schools; these are the real enemies for Tanzanian Muslims. Muslims should look to “our neighbours the Christians”: they fight about all their basic creeds: the divinity of Jesus, Christmas, Easter, even their Bibles.
are different! But they show real unity when it comes to real problems. The difference on the Idd days is in fact only a minor problem, but it represents the real issue: the fragile moral community of present day Muslims.

5. Latitudes and longitudes

a. One madrasa...

Finally we will look into a fourth imagined community constructed by a particular method to find the correct day of the Idd el-Hajj. Without a central authority like the Ahmadiyya Khalifa, refusing to accept the Saudi hegemony which arbitrarily decides when the hajj and the Day of Arafa will take place, but also disappointed with the BAKWATA national Muslim council, the Tanga madrasa Shamsiya created its own imagined Idd community. Basically, their system is derived from local moon-sighting, but the innovative aspect is that they only accept sightings within an area of 8 degrees longitude and latitude on all sides.

As we have seen, local moon-sighters accept time differences according to the differences of sunrise and sunset. This concept is known as the ikhtilaf al-matali’ (differences in horizons). All places which are in the same time-zone (ittihad al-matali’) should accept each others’ crescent-sighting. The problem of finding out if a place is close enough to have its sighting accepted is a topic for ijtihad. In order to facilitate the decision on the correctness of a moon-sighting for a specific town the Shamsiya madrasa published “Machimbuko ya Mwezi.” In this small booklet, all major East African towns and a lot of smaller settlements are listed according to their geographical coordinates. It is easy to find out if the message of a moon-sighting is within the limits of 8 degrees. Tanga, for example, is situated at 5 degrees north/39 degrees east. A moon-sighting will only be valid if it takes place in a field of 8 degrees on all sides of the town. Therefore, Tanga is the centre of a fasting community ranging from 3 degrees south to 13 degrees north and from 31 degrees east to 47 degrees east.

The Tanga madrasa closely follows an earlier Shafi’i tradition. The process of ijtihad solving the problem of the correct Idd day is based on the so-called “rule of the masafa al-qasr,” the minimal distance of a journey which permits travellers to shorten their prayers. Classic jurisprudence allowed travellers in certain cases to omit parts of the daily prayers to lighten the load of the five daily prayers. The following Swahili source explains this rule.
Ibn Qayyim (al-Jawziyya) has said: the Prophet used to shorten his salat from 4 raka’s to 2 raka’s from the time he left until he returned to town. And it is not confirmed that he made up for these omissions. And the imams (of the schools of law) agree on this point, except they differ on the legal status of the shortening (qasr): Omar, Ali, Ibn Masoud, Ibn Abbas, Ibn Omar, Jabir say it is compulsory (wajib) and this is the opinion of the Hanafite school as well. The Malikites say it is a proven, trustworthy custom (sunna mu’akkida). The Hanbalites say that the qasr is allowed (ja’iz) but they prefer to complete the salat. And this is the meaning of the Shafi’ites: [complete the salat] when you arrive at your destination.140

Shafi’i scholars ruled that the distance which is sufficient to apply the shortening of the salat should be used as an indication of whether a crescent-sighting must be accepted or not. However, whereas the rule for shortening the salat is not contested, there remains a lot of uncertainty regarding the mode of transport, how far someone has to travel in order to be allowed this lightening. For the application of this regulation to the moon sighting, the distance is especially important. Sources range from one farsakh (three miles), to one iklim (72 miles), up to 560 miles.141 Zanzibar-born chief Kadhi of Kenya, Sheikh Abdalla Saleh Farsy, answered this question as follows:

Is it allowed to fast according to the Meccan or Egyptian crescent in the Shafi’i school? Answer: the most authoritative opinion in the Shafi’i school is that people do not follow [any moon-sighting] further than 8 degrees or 560 miles.142

This point of view cannot be derived from particular Qur’anic or hadith texts but is the result of Islamic scholarship and independent reasoning. Although, in theory, the Idd community defined according to this method depends on a quite abstract geographical pattern, in practice it is often dominated by a single town madrasa. Not only the Shamsiyya (and the related Teachers’ Association, TAMTA) but also Zahrau followed this system in the early 1990s.143 Not surprisingly, this local (madrasa) community and its traditions are defined in the same way as the other three communities described above. It is a divinely sanctioned, moral community for those who belong to it; but outsiders who have chosen another Idd date and thus express their bonds with other communities are to be condemned: “Really issuing a fatwa against local tradition (kinyume na desturi ya mji) is haram.”144 “God will be with the local community,” Bahasaniy claims in this context, suggesting that the other communities must do without His approval.145
Chande’s (1998:156) interpretation that this approach resulted in a new way out of the traditional opposition to BAKWATA might be true. Just as the other imagined communities construct their identity in opposition to each other (Arafa against the nation-state, the nation-state against local madrasas etc.) the Shamsiyya founded their own moral community by strategically employing the niches between text and ritual.

b. ... or local custom contested

The major complaints against the Shamsiyya point of view are its parochial nature, its lack of precedents in authoritative texts and its irrationality. In the first place, it remains too small to provide a truly attractive community. Within Tanga, this initiative is still very much associated with Shamsiyya and its dominant ethnic group. In particular, the Idd el-Hajj evokes a trans-local image of the Islamic umma which does not have any “geographical, national or ethnic boundaries.” Rather than appealing as a safe haven, the Shamsiyya solution promotes more anxiety that every Muslim will celebrate according to his own madrasa and ethnic group.

Secondly, according to its largest opponent, the AMYC, the opinion (rai) of Shamsiyya is baseless because it lacks any proper Sharia precedent: it is completely new (mpya sana). The normal Shafi’i opinion used to be “every town (balad) has its own sighting” without any geographical specifications. Furthermore balad cannot be translated just as ‘town’ because it can also mean country, village, district, region, mainland and many other things.

Finally, the arguments put forward by Shamsiyya are denounced as irrational, and incompatible with modern scientific insights, according to their enemies’ rhetoric. To take the masafa al-qasr rule as the base to develop an ijtihad is null and void. That results in muddling up two religious duties (‘ibadat) that have nothing to do with each other: the salat (based on the position of the sun) and the Idd (based on the phase of the moon). Also, the time differences based on the geographical variation between places can never cause a difference in Idd celebration of more than one day; the maximum time difference between places on the globe is never more than the 24 hours the sun needs to complete his daily round. The current situation in Tanzania showing sometimes three or four different Idd dates cannot be defend by referring to geographical differences. The matali system employed by Shamsiyya madrasa, if rationally applied, should actually be seen as evidence for fasting and feasting together with Mecca, the AMYC claim. Tanzanian pilgrims already know that their watch-
es in Mecca indicate the same time as in Dar es Salaam. Why then should the Idd community be limited to a mere 8 degrees?^{49}

6. Conclusion

The discussion about the correct time of the Idd el-Hajj celebration is really a debate regarding how the Muslim moral community should be defined. Even those Tanzanians who do their utmost to downplay the significance of the conflicts about the proper Idd date and do not want to discuss the topic, emphasise their concerns with respect to moral values: unity, obedience to God, and pious behaviour. Each of the four cases presented in this chapter emphasised different aspects of this ideal community. The sensitive issue of a central Islamic leadership in Tanzania is brought to the fore by the Ahmadiyya community. The Arafa proponents stressed the alliance with the Islamic world umma, symbolised by the hajj. National Idd supporters try to find a practical middle-ground between the local and the global, and underline the importance of a powerful national Muslim community which is able to defend their position against the state. The smallest Idd community is represented by the Tanga madrasa Shamsiyia. They strongly identify with Shafi‘i tradition but at the same time differentiate from the other players in the field by choosing their own Idd celebration.

Each single aspect does not construct a social identity. Obedience to divinely ordained leadership, a sense of belonging to the world umma, the reality of being a Tanzanian Muslim and having a particular relationship with a local madrasa, are not mutually exclusive. Like other social identities, people always have more than one. But in the discourse surrounding the Idd el-Hajj date it suddenly becomes clear that these identities are defined against others. By choosing a particular Idd day one belongs temporarily to a particular community of people praying and sacrificing simultaneously. The heated debates show that, in these Idd celebrations, the moral community itself is at stake. In contrast to one's own community, which is the divine continuation of Muhammad’s umma, the moral quality of other communities is criticised: the corruption of the nation-state, arrogance of the Saudis, or the blindness of those who follow local custom are condemned. The best example is the attitude of the Zanzibar government in the 1990s: by forcing Muslims to adhere to a single national Idd day, they emphasised that imagined Idd communities are perceived as rivals. In this context, praying on a different day became a rebellious act, disturbing the image of the national unity.
Finally, this chapter shows how the notion of time is intimately connected with place. All of these four communities primarily exist in time. Their decision to celebrate the Idd el-Hajj on a particular date makes them into an invisible, but imagined temporal community. Nevertheless, the awareness of place is overwhelming. Tanga Ahmadiyya Muslims watch the television sermon in the mission house on the mosque premises and see the London-based service. The image of Arafa as a place is experienced by the radio connection, remembered in the Idd sermons and emphasised by the nomenclature of schools. Tanzania as a place is visualised by the national Idd Baraza on radio and television and the speeches of Muslim ministers or (vice) presidents. The madrasa community is perhaps the most visible and the least imagined community: it is the local prayer community linked to a physical urban mosque and its rural branches. But the most important place of all, looming large in the Idd el-Hajj rituals, is of course the hajj itself. And now we turn to this sacred site to explore the role of place in the Idd discourse.
Part III

PLACE
9. Preparations and Performance of the Pilgrimage

1. Introduction

The connection between the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania and the hajj performed in Mecca is established on many levels. In the first place the popularity of the designation Idd el-Hajj (Feast of the Pilgrimage) indicates the importance of this relationship. Instead of Arabic loanwords like ‘id al-adha or translations such as Sacrificial Feast employed in other parts of the Islamic world, in East Africa the holiday is primarily associated with the pilgrimage. In the second place we discussed above how a sizeable part of the urban population in Tanzania emphasises the dates of the hajj as decisive for the day of the Idd el-Hajj. It is not only reformist groups like the Tanga AMYC but also many other Muslims who elevate the status of Arafah as determining the proper time of the Idd. Even for Tanzanians who reject the importance of simultaneous celebration of hajj and Idd el-Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca remains a very important symbolic place of identification.

Before we discuss in chapters 10 and 11 how this process of signification actually takes place and how the relationship between the hajj and Idd el-Hajj is constructed through discourse, in this chapter we look into the practical details of the pilgrimage performed and discussed by Tanzanian Muslims. The first section deals with the preparation of the pilgrims in all their mundane and practical details. The logistics, payment, numbers of hajjis and the mode of travel will be discussed. In the next paragraph the Swahili discourse on the preparation of the pilgrim is described. In the final section the performance of the hajj is the central topic. Three distinctive but connected rituals illustrate the importance of place for the pilgrim. The lesser pilgrimage (umra) focuses on a few rituals near the Ka’ba and the Great Mosque in the town of Mecca. The greater pilgrimage (hajj) reaches its spiritual summit during the contemplative ritual standing on the plains.
of Arafat. Finally the visit to historical sites (ziyara), tombs and battlefields provides the Tanzanian pilgrim with physical vestiges or imagined representations of the mythical and historical Islamic past.

2. The hajj prepared

a. Facts and Figures

The annual number of Tanzanian pilgrims as given by the Saudi Statistical Yearbook (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning), together with figures given by secondary and tertiary sources is presented in table 9.1.

Table 9.1
Number of Tanzanian pilgrims related to total number of foreign pilgrims (1968-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number of Tanzanian pilgrims</th>
<th>BAKWATA</th>
<th>Muslim Hajj Trust</th>
<th>Total number of foreign pilgrims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1968-1387 H.</td>
<td>579</td>
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<td>1969-1388 H.</td>
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<td>1980-1400 H.</td>
<td>960 d</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Total number of Tanzanian pilgrims</td>
<td>BAKWATA</td>
<td>Muslim Hajj Trust</td>
<td>Total number of foreign pilgrims</td>
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<td>1981-1401 H.</td>
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<td>320 iv</td>
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<tr>
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<td>215 viii</td>
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<td>2005-1425 H.</td>
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<td>2006-1426 H.</td>
<td>220 xx</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007-1427 H.</td>
<td>1700 (ca.) xxx</td>
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</table>
There are no reliable numbers earlier than 1968. Before that year Saudi Arabia included Tanzania in the category 'Africa', without any specification according to country of origin. More than 25 African states contributed the following numbers:

- 4,890 (1961-1380 H.)
- 2,254 (1962-1381 H.)
- 3,236 (1963-1382 H.)
- 4,071 (1964-1383 H.)
- 3,588 (1965-1384 H.)
- 2,376 (1966-1385 H.)
- 3,444 (1967-1386 H.)

In this period the only sub Sahara African countries with separate entries represented in the Saudi statistics were Chad, Ethiopia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Guinea, Mali and Nigeria. Franz Schildknecht (1969:238) reports on the number of Tanzanian *hajjis* in this period: "Each year about 500 pilgrims leave by plane; many more leave by boat, but there are no statistics for sea passengers."

During the Second World War (1940-1945) the British Government decided to promote the Muslim pilgrimage by providing shipping facilities to Saudi Arabia. This would be to outsmart the Germans and Italians and to prove that Muslims were better off with the Allied Forces. The numbers in these years prior to the independence of Tanganyika were quite low: 10 for Zanzibar (1940); 'negligible' (1941); 'nobody' (1942); 'less than 6' (1943); 6 (1944); 16 (two from Moshi, one from Dar es Salaam and 13 Tanga residents, 1945).

The number of foreign visitors shows a steady numerical increase, enabled by the continuous architectural adaptations of the holy sites by the Saudi government (Fouad al-Farsy 2004). This increase is not reflected in Tanzanian statistics. As far as the scanty data allow any valid conclusions at all, the Tanzanian figures only show a fluctuating number of pilgrims usually just under one thousand. It seems likely that among these pilgrims a relatively high percentage is of Asian origin and belongs to a Shi'ite faction (Trimingham 1964:91).

b. Gender

Based on the Saudi Statistical Yearbook I constructed the female/male ratio of the Tanzanian pilgrims compared to the overall ratio between women and men (Table 9.2). As expected the male *hajjis* still dominate the
scene as in most public Islamic rituals. Burton (1898) tells us how in his time almost all pilgrims were men, many of whom continuously shouted the names of female relatives they represented. However, the last four decades show a considerable increase in female participation. In 1968 (1387 H.) less than half of all the hajjis were women while in 2004 (1424 H.) for every 1000 male hajjis 825 women participated in the holy journey. Looking at the Tanzanian figures three decades earlier, exactly the opposite development is visible. In 1968 male and female pilgrims were almost equally represented (288 women to 291 men). But 9 years later the number of women was just half of the male hajj population (196 women against 384 men).

Unfortunately more recent figures are not available, but there is reason to believe this trend has continued up till now. The results of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in Tanzania have affected women more negatively than men (Bryceson 1994; Omari 1995). Economic development and technical innovations alleviated the workload for men, while the burden for women remained the same or has increased. It might be possible that due to these socio-economic circumstances only single male Muslims are able to perform the hajj. Although the hajj is an individual obligation for every Muslim, a woman can only perform this 5th pillar of Islam in the company of a male relative. While in some circumstances this role may be fulfilled by a non related male sheikh or guide, for the financing of the trip a woman often needs her husband’s salary. Many Swahili women complain about this religious and financial dependency.

The decline in female participation might be attributed to the fact that husbands are not longer able to accomplish this duty and choose to go alone.

When women do participate in the hajj their rituals are much more restricted than the men’s. Guidebooks and preparation classes often include separate chapters dealing with women’s limitations in the performance of the hajj. For example the running between the hills of Safa and Marwa is restricted to men: women may only walk at a brisk pace. While men are proud to completely shave their head after the pilgrimage, women may only shorten their hair. The religious merits also differ: shaving generates three ‘units’ of grace and forgiveness (rihma na maghfira), shortening the hair yields only one part of these blessings. Women’s menstrual periods can nullify the hajj because the very strict taboo on blood shedding does not allow these women to perform the ritual circumambulation (tawaf). Despite the fact that the hajj allows intermingling between men and women, the latter are often harassed by the Saudi religious police, forced to pray at different places and barred access to some historical sites. Also the distinctive
pilgrim ihram garments (two white unstitched cotton clothes) are only for men, while women just receive an ordinary khanga from the Tanzanian hajj organisations. Women often perceive these restrictions as an exclusion from the religious meaningful acts (Shamima Jeenah 2000). The performance, experience and processes of signification by women participating in the hajj are a rich field only just started to be explored (cf. Young 1993; Bremer 1996).

Table 9.2
Gender ratio Tanzanian pilgrims compared to total hajj population 1968-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males total</th>
<th>Females total</th>
<th>Fem./male ratio</th>
<th>Tanzanian males</th>
<th>Tanzanian females</th>
<th>Tanzania Fem./Male ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-1387 H.</td>
<td>215,468</td>
<td>102,679</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1388 H.</td>
<td>253,834</td>
<td>120,950</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1389 H.</td>
<td>274,066</td>
<td>132,229</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0.828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1390 H.</td>
<td>281,757</td>
<td>149,513</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1391 H.</td>
<td>308,475</td>
<td>170,874</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1392 H.</td>
<td>410,730</td>
<td>234,452</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>0.614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1393 H.</td>
<td>384,517</td>
<td>223,238</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>0.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1394 H.</td>
<td>571,513</td>
<td>347,264</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1395 H.</td>
<td>594,593</td>
<td>299,980</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1396/1397 H.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1409 H.</td>
<td>460,250</td>
<td>314,310</td>
<td>0.683</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1410 H.</td>
<td>483,622</td>
<td>343,614</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1411 H.</td>
<td>417,328</td>
<td>302,774</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-1412 H.</td>
<td>576,691</td>
<td>438,973</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1413 H.</td>
<td>565,347</td>
<td>427,466</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-1414 H.</td>
<td>567,879</td>
<td>429,557</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1415 H.</td>
<td>592,201</td>
<td>454,106</td>
<td>0.767</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Tanzania and East Africa

Given the figures presented above it seems that the interest in the holy journey to the heartland of the Islamic religion seems to have been quite low in East Africa. This is quite different from countries in West Africa and Indonesia where the *hajj* has been very popular despite the greater geographical distance (cf. contributions in Eickelman & Piscatori 1990). The 591 Tanzanians are rather unimpressive compared with the 137,291 Turkish pilgrims in 1976; or the 1086 against 104,577 Nigerians in 1977. Quite a few Tanzanians are aware of these differences between East and West African *hajj* participation. Abdalla Jabir from the TMHT said: “In Nigeria even the taxi drivers go on *hajj*.”

Only put side by side with the immediately neighbouring East African countries Tanzania stands out as a major contributor to the *hajj* as is shown in table 9.3. In nine out of twenty years the largest group of East African left from Tanzania. Despite this apparently supremacy in absolute numbers it is striking that often Uganda (during ten years!), Kenya and even Zambia with much smaller Islamic communities produced more pilgrims annually than Tanzania. Apart from the economic malaise this might be attributed to restricting measures being applied by the government up till 1992 in order to limit cash flow leaving the country. For example in 1980 there were 755 applications for *hajj* visa and in 1983 even 2,121 (Constantin 1983:56). The Tanzanian Bank turned down a substantial number of these requests. In
1973 the government decided that adult Muslims were entitled to one hajj-journey in their life, a gesture interpreted as ‘hostility towards Islam’. However, no such restrictions are enforced any longer. As a result of the liberating measures executed by the government in order to meet the demands of the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the World Bank, the only limitations on the hajj numbers come from the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia allows 1 per mille of the whole Muslim population of every country to go on hajj. Jabry, the secretary of Tanzanian Muslim Hajj Trust, assumes that Tanzania has 15 million Muslims. That makes 15,000 potential pilgrims a year. The real number is never more than 1500 so even this restriction does not have any real influence. Every Tanzanian Muslim who wants to perform the hajj more than once and is able to pay for it is allowed. Many of the religious elite, for example the late Mufti Sheikh Hemed, go on hajj every year.

Table 9.3
Main East African countries contributing to the hajj in the years 1968-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Zaire</th>
<th>Comoros</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-1387 H.</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1388 H.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1970-1389 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971-1390 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972-1391 H.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1973-1392 H.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1974-1393 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975-1395 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976-1396 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977-1397 H.</td>
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<td>1978-1398 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979-1399 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980-1400 H.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1981-1401 H.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1982-1402 H.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1983-1403 H.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1984-1404 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985-1405 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986-1406 H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987-1407 H.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS"
Provenance of the pilgrims within Tanzania

Regional provenance of pilgrims within Tanzania is difficult to establish. Constantin (1983:57) presents an overview of the provincial distribution of the pilgrims for 1980 and 1982. After Dar es Salaam (341 pilgrims in 1980; 311 in 1982) and Zanzibar (330 pilgrims in 1982) in these two years most *hajjis* come from Tanga (1980:68, 1982:49). However, the official statistics are unreliable in this respect. Interviews held with TMHT employees and its secretary in Dar es Salaam showed that many of the pilgrims give a post-box number in Dar es Salaam as their real address. Usually a friend or relative forwards their post to their home province or keeps information stored until the potential pilgrim will visit the cultural capital again. This might be the reason why the Dar es Salaam province (Pwani) has such an extraordinary number of *hajjis* compared with the national total. If one takes into account that the percentage of Muslims in Tanga is almost the highest in the country, and their absolute numbers are even compared with Dar es Salaam quite high, it seems strange that so many of the *hajjis* come from Dar. As part of a survey I asked 399 children from six Islamic primary and secondary schools in Tanga if they or their father had been on *hajj*. The first question was unanimously answered in the negative but 26 fathers were reported to have been
on *hajj*. As quite a few of the student’s parents did not live in Tanga (there were a few boarding schools included in the survey) I estimate that less than 5% of the Tanga households can boast of a real *‘Al-hajj*’ or *‘Al-hajja’.*

e. Travel arrangements

The practical organisation of the religious travel to Mecca is in the majority of the cases delegated to one of the *hajj* foundations. These organisations provide air travel as the only mode of transport, but occasionally people (usually men) go on their own by sea or land (Table 9.4).

### Table 9.4

**Number of Tanzanian pilgrims not travelling by air during the years 1968-1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Sex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-1387 H.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1388 H.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1389 H.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1390 H.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1391 H.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1392 H.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1393 H.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1395 H.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 males, 1 female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1396 H.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1397 H.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1398 H.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1399 H.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1400 H.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1401 H.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1402 H.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1403 H.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1404 H.</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1405 H.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1406 H.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1407 H.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Source: Saudi Statistical Yearbook)*
Until 1992 BAKWATA had the monopoly of hajj organisation for Tanzanian pilgrims. In their first constitution published in 1969 the Muslim Council formulated as one of their aims to provide hajj arrangements (kusimamia mipanga ya Hijja). Just as most of BAKWATA’s attempts to represent Islamic interests also their hajj organisations met a lot of complaints. Muslims criticised BAKWATA’s selection of potential pilgrims, protested against their extraordinary prices and even claimed that the Council encouraged people to pay bribes (Chande 1998:157). In 1986 pilgrims launched a court case against BAKWATA in order to get a refund of 11,000 Shilling. Several of them had to be left behind at the airport of Jedda because no accommodation was arranged for them. As described in the last chapter the two imagined communities (nation-state and Islamic umma) easily clash in the discourse on the hajj. It is in this perspective of two rival identities that these protests against the BAKWATA hajj must be read. The same discussions raged on the Zanzibar islands in the early 1990s. In 1994 (when the monopoly of hajj organisation on Zanzibar still rested solely with the state office Kamisheni ya Wakf na Mali ya Amani Zanzibar), a case was launched against the hajj organisation for financial embezzlements. The accusation concerned an attempt to raise the prices of services after the pilgrims arrived in Saudi Arabia. President Salmin Amour tried to silence the problems but finally when the truth came out the government had to formally apologise to the pilgrims.

Since the early 1990s the course in the direction of a more liberal economy, more competition between companies and less influence of the government offered the possibility for private initiatives. Already in 1988 president Hassan Mwinyi indicated the government’s wish to open up possibilities for other agencies beside BAKWATA. Since 1992 the private hajj organisations mushroomed both in Zanzibar and on the mainland. As a result BAKWATA’s contribution to the hajj declined in the last decade (table 9.1). Even before 1992 Saudi based organisations tried to assist Tanzanian pilgrims who were not satisfied with BAKWATA facilities (Chande 1998:157). Since 1987 the BALUKTA organisation assisted the pilgrims in their travel to the holy land. On 21 April 1992 the Minister of Internal Affairs discussed the hajj organisation with BAKWATA, Baraza Kuu and BALUKTA, and finally decided to leave the matter open for private initiatives.

Apart from BAKWATA and the Shi’ite (Twelver and Bohora) pilgrimage organisations, the following Sunni hajj companies are active in Tanzania (three of them operate only on Zanzibar):
Tanzania Muslim Hajj Trust (TMHT) is the largest one at the moment; annually they escort some 300 pilgrims on their journey to Mecca. Former president Hassan Mwinyi is patron of the organisation. Apart from computer courses and Qur’an reciting contests, their main goal is to provide different umra, ziyara and hajj packages. Outside the hajj season many of these institutions offer the Lesser Pilgrimage (umra) often combined with some historical/religious sightseeing (ziyara) especially in Ramadan. A one week umra consist of visits to Mecca (four days), Medina (three days) and Jeddah (one day) while longer tours sometimes include ziyaras to Cairo and Jerusalem. TMHT started this umra service in August 1997 and even offered a fast 24 hours visit for 600 US Dollar! The first flight had some press coverage due to the fact that some well-known Tanzanian Muslims from government and private business were among the first 41 umra pilgrims. In 1997 a normal umra took a week and TMHT offered an arrangement for 875 US Dollar or 560,000 Tanzanian Shilling; in 2002 Ahlul Daawa offered umra packages for USD 950 (two weeks) and USD 900 (one week).

It is common practice for Tanzanian Muslims to combine the umra and the hajj. Islamic Law allows for three different configurations:

1. **Tamattu**: umra (the Lesser Pilgrimage consisting only of rites within the Great Mosque; cf. Figure 2) first and then the hajj only after an unspecified time. Between the two rituals the pilgrim removes his taboo status (ihram) indicated by his special clothes. This form includes an animal sacrifice as compensation (because it is the easiest form of the hajj); in line with mainstream Shafi’i fiqh the tamattu option is preferred by most Tanzanian pilgrims.

2. **Ifrad**: the ‘pure’ hajj, without the umra. However, because the whole umra ritual takes only an hour or so and it yields great spiritual
rewards many pilgrims perform the umra twice: once in the tamattu form (in connection to the hajj) and after the hajj is finished again in its ‘pure form’. Those pilgrims who preferred a ‘pure’ hajj may also decide to perform the umra as well immediately after the hajj. This form does not require a sacrifice.

3. Qiran: hajj and umra together without putting off the special taboo status (ihram) between the two rituals. The qiran is the most difficult hajj (it includes the longest time of uninterrupted keeping the many taboos). Inhabitants of the holy city of Mecca who bring their own animals often perform the hajj in this configuration. If the pilgrim prefers this form of the hajj, then an animal sacrifice is mandatory.

Although organisations offer different packages for the Tanzanian Muslim they always include the tamattu pilgrimage and usually not ifrad or qiran options.

An average hajj arrangement takes about two to three weeks. A two week hajj may contain eleven days in Mecca and a quick three day tour in Medina. In three weeks the pilgrim stays a few days more in Mecca (thirteen days) and at least eight days in Medina. Most organisations offer basically the same: return tickets from Dar es Salaam/Zanzibar to Jedda, travel by bus or plane from Jedda to Medina; airport tax, a special Saudi haji-tax, lodging during the period (hotels in the towns and tents during the hajj), special pilgrim clothes (ihram), visa, a medical practitioner and a Swahili speaking guide. The costs of a passport and the vaccinations are on the hajj candidates themselves. Contacting the agencies outside Dar es Salaam is only possible by representatives by cell phones except for BAKWATA which has appointed special hajj secretaries waiting for customers a few weeks before the pilgrimage. To make their own journey more attractive the different organisations emphasise their distinctive characteristics. BAKWATA has the attraction of a real mufti who annually guides the pilgrims. Some offer air-conditioned buses (yenye vipoza hewa) and hotels equipped with elevators (hoteli yenye lifti) or include all meals instead of just four or five days, whereas others offer a free health check (kupima afya) before departure. Additional attraction is offered by claiming short distances to the mosques (three minutes walking distance in the case of the Khidmat Islamiya). About half of the arrangements include the money to perform the sacrifice but the advertisements do not give any other details such as the species of the sacrificial animal.
Prices differ depending on the number of days and quality of the services. Some indications of the costs in 2002:

- Khidmat Islamiya USD 1760
- Zanzibar Istiqama Hajj & Hajj travelling Agency USD 1700
- Zanzibari Hajj group USD 1700
- Tanzania Muslim Hajj Trust USD 1650
- Ahlul Daawa USD 1550 (USD 1530 for diplomatic passport holders) in 2003, 23 days.
- BAKWATA USD 1420 but the Council changed its price to USD 1300 due to a reduction of the air travel fares
- Muumin Trust USD 1320 for 14 days; USD 1600 for 21 days
- Worldlink Travel and Tours USD 1180

These prices contrast sharply with the Gross National Income of USD 330 per capita (World Bank 2005). Most pilgrims who finally succeeded in going to Mecca mention a long period of steadfast saving. In 1982 Biasi Mnubi and his wife Tatu Bori started to save for the holy journey they finally completed in 2002. A quarter of his monthly salary (20,000 Shilling) was put aside and in 1994 he sold one of his houses. Half of that sum he employed to finish his other house while the other half could be saved for the hajj.

Despite the acknowledgement that the only real preparation of the pilgrims takes place in soul and spirit, the more practical articles on the hajj primarily focus on ‘health’ and ‘payment.’ According to Jabry, the secretary of TMHT, the payments by the potential hajjis frequently provide problems. In advertisements he continually urges them to start saving and paying amounts in advance. Other hajj agencies also insist on regular ‘small small’ payments. This enables the organisations to make arrangements regarding lodging and transport. Often pilgrims have not yet paid the full amount when they arrive in Dar es Salaam to leave for Mecca. Although legal payment for the hajj is a religious obligation it is not necessary that every pilgrim has personally earned the whole sum. Therefore those who are able to do so are urged to sponsor other Muslim to go on hajj, rather than multiply their own hajj titles. The sponsors are offered a double reward (thawabu): one for the pilgrim himself, the other for the donor. Sometimes tickets for hajj and umra are promised for outstanding pupils. As a result of such an arrangement two students from the African Muslim Agency Teachers college Chukwani (Zanzibar) went on hajj in 2003. 25 others obtained umra tickets. A Christian leader
claims that in 1992 the Tanzanian government even got involved in sponsoring Muslim pilgrims in their religious journey for an amount equivalent to USD 1500.\textsuperscript{65}

When everything is done and ready the final event is a farewell party, often in the conference room of the Star Light Hotel, Dar es Salaam. A same kind of meeting is arranged by the TMHT when their pilgrims return.\textsuperscript{64} It must be noted that there is no national arrangement but every organisation has its own farewell and welcome meeting. The major organisations charter complete planes, but others have to share seats. The result is that Tanzanian Muslims leave on at least four or five different days. Schedules for leaving and returning flights of the TMHT are announced in the Islamic newspapers in order that friends and relatives may see them off or welcome them at the airport.\textsuperscript{65}

3. **Formal instruction of the pilgrim**

A good preparation and a flawless performance of the *hajj* are deemed essential for success (*kufaulu*). Lack of knowledge about the *hajj* is a common theme in the Swahili discourse on the Islamic pilgrimage.\textsuperscript{66} In special seminars for women and men the pilgrim candidates are formally prepared by the organisations to prevent their *hajj* from unnecessary errors or from becoming even unacceptable in God’s eyes. These seminars are usually arranged on Sundays because on these days most of the (voluntary) staff members have a day off.\textsuperscript{67} Dates of these seminars and video instruction are widely advertised.\textsuperscript{68} On these occasions pilgrims present their personal stories of “what I learned from the *hajj.*”\textsuperscript{69} However, the bulk of the Swahili *hajj* discourse prepares the Muslims for a laborious endeavour with long lists of prescriptions, supplications and above all potential mistakes.\textsuperscript{70}

Apart from numerous pamphlets, newspaper articles and schoolbooks, the most important Swahili sources for the Tanzanian pilgrim are:\textsuperscript{71}

**Books:**


Tapes:
- Tanzania Muslim Hajj Trust, *Masuala na jawabu za maelezo ya ibada ya Hija na umra* (I & II), audio, 60 minutes.

All of this material is geared towards instruction with a strong focus on text: hardly any image or map is reproduced in these books. Different from the polemical literature we discussed in the last chapters, in the books and tapes used in *hajj* seminars Arabic is functional only when it is recited. Zagar provides long Arabic prayers but next to a transliteration in Latin script he also gives a translation in Swahili. Quotes from *hadith* and Qur’an are in Swahili rather than Arabic. The proper performance and understanding is deemed more important than a convincing defence of a particular point of view.

Swahili as the lingua franca and often the mother tongue of the pilgrims is the medium best equipped for this task. In interviews with Tanzanian pilgrims it is the absence of Swahili that was experienced as strange (‘they don’t speak Swahili on the plane; only Arabic and English!’).

Of minor importance is the explanation of the rituals. No elaborate interpretation, differences between law schools and analyses are provided. The *hajj* as presented in the preparation literature is whole, plain, and uniform. At some points the books connect particular actions with mythical paradigms. The most obvious is the link with the Ibrahimian paradigm: the *hajj* as a re-enactment of Ibrahim’s trial to sacrifice his son. However, the textual foundation of this connection is not constructed or proven as in the polemical discourse on the date of the Idd el-Hajj, but the *hajj* as a scriptural ritual is rather assumed. The proper performance of the ritual is at stake and on the level of the preparation seminars the regulations of the *hajj* are not questioned but reproduced.
4. **The hajj performed**

   a. **The umra (Lesser Pilgrimage)**

   The **umra** or Lesser Pilgrimage can be performed any time of the year (with preference of the month Rajab and with exception of the **hajj** days) but a valid **hajj** is limited to the prescribed days: 8 to 13 Dhu'l-Hijja. As we already discussed often people perform **hajj** and **umra** together and the guides usually include them both, but separate books of the two rituals also exist. Apart from the **hajj** proper and the **umra**, a third element (and often the most time-consuming), is the **ziyara** or historical sightseeing.

   The **umra** is a purely Meccan ritual and takes place in the Great Mosque (Figure 2). It consists of seven acts (only numbers 1, 2 and 4 are obligatory):
   
   1. **ihram** (entrance rite: putting on the special pilgrimage clothes, expressing the intention to perform the **umra** and start the ritual: formulaic chanting *labbayika* ('at your service o Lord'))
   2. **tawaf al-qudum** (circumambulation of the Ka’ba on arrival)
   3. praying two **rak’as** close to the Ka’ba
   4. **sa’y** (running between two hills)
   5. **taqseer or halaq** (cutting nails, hair, beard)
   6. **tawaf al-nisa** (concluding circumambulation of the Ka’ba)
   7. praying two **rak’as**

   Before arriving near the holy places of Mecca the pilgrim should put on his **ihram**: special clothes indicating the new taboo status. Since the airport is no official recognised place to enter **ihram**, pilgrims should put on **ihram** already in

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*Figure 2: Umra and Hajj (freely adapted from Wolfe 1993:150)*

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the plane or before take off. If the pilgrim approaches Mecca over land, then he will meet one of the five hajj stations (miqaat) where he can enter ihram. At these miqaat the pilgrims find mosque's with the facilities for ritual cleansing and changing. After a ritual ablution, clipping nails, and expressing his intention (niya) to perform the umra (and/or the hajj) the pilgrim can don his special ihram clothes. Men are clad in an upper piece of white cloth (rida') and a lower piece (izar) without any headdress. Women are allowed to wear their daily garments but may not cover their faces. Special footwear is required for men and women. After entering the ihram, the pilgrim has to keep several taboos. Most books mention between 5 to 28 acts as forbidden. Taboos include hunting, sexual intercourse and masturbation, wearing socks, closing your nostrils, looking in a mirror and travelling in the shade (e.g. using an umbrella). If any transgressions are made, they must be noted and after the hajj has been completed the total amount of mistakes must be expiated by fasting or food distribution.

After reaching Mecca, the hajji cleanses his body in ritual washing (wudhu) and enters the great mosque of Mecca. Here he will perform the first central umra rite: seven times circulating the Ka'ba (tawaf al-qudum). Visiting the House of God is sometimes phrased as the major motivation to perform the hajj and the first sight of the black, rectangular building often evokes an emotional response. Just like Muhammad's camel the male believer should trot the first three rounds of his tawaf, and complete the final four at normal speed. The pilgrim starts opposite the Black Stone in the Northwest corner and moves to his right in an anti-clockwise movement, leaving the House of God to his left. Because the left is associated with impurity in most Islamic societies including the Swahili coast, this particular rite gives rise to many ingenious explanations. One of them is that the Ka'ba is 'your imam' and just as when you pray the salat with two persons, the imam should stand at your left side. Just like a real imam, the House of God guides the obedient pilgrim through his life.

Each stage of this tawaf is accompanied by precisely prescribed ritual prayers (dua). One may kiss the Black Stone (Jiwe Jeusi) in one of the corners of the cubic building or the pilgrim may point in this direction with his arm or walking stick. Kissing other elements (walls of the Ka'ba or the semi circular hateem) is forbidden. During the tawaf the pilgrim may recite duas he knows by heart, or parts of the Qur'an or the Prophet's Prayer. If possible the hajji should also pray two rak'as at the maqam Ibrahim, the place where the prophet Ibrahim stood when he (re)build the Ka'ba now indicated by a golden marker in the form of a little house (kijijumba). Only during this first tawaf male pilgrims may bare their right shoulder; before and after this ritual both shoulders should be covered. A special prayer near the grave of Ismail, close to the Ka'ba, is mandatory.
After the pilgrim has finished the first leg of the umra (tawaf) he continues to perform the second part: the sa’y: running seven times between two hills: Safa and Marwa. The two knolls are built in the mosque premises and hardly recognisable as such. After climbing Safa he (males only, women should not climb the hill) reiterates his intention (niya) and recites an appropriate dua, facing the direction of the Ka’ba. When he passes a green mark he accelerates his walking (kukimbia matiti) until he reaches a second mark. Women are exempted from this duty and can walk more leisurely. This running reminds the hajji of Ibrahim’s wife Hajar who was frantically looking for water for her son Ismail, after being expelled from Ibrahim’s tent by his first wife Sara. This trajectory is repeated another six times until the pilgrim reaches the Marwa hill.

The final rite of the umra consists of cutting hair or shortening it. Those who perform the umra mufrida (the ‘pure’ umra, unrelated to the hajj), terminate the whole ritual by another tawaf, called tawaf an-nisa. This exit rite makes sexual intercourse lawful again. At this stage these pilgrims may drink Zamzam water in the courtyard of the Great Mosque. Although not required as part of the rituals, the author of Muongozo wa hijja very much encourages drinking from the Zamzam well, which will give water until the last day. He himself was miraculously cured from heart problems. Zamzam water is one of the most common hajj presents distributed among friends and relatives who could not go on hajj.

Those who opted for the tamattu version of the hajj and thus perform the umra as an introduction ritual, must shorten their hair (shaving is forbidden for the tamattu pilgrim in this state) after finishing the sa’y. This latter group can now put off their ihram clothes and the pilgrims are free from most of the restrictions, except sexual intercourse. Now these believers wait for the hajj ritual starting on the 8 Dhuhihi. Until that day they are advised not to miss any prayers at the Mecca mosques because here prayers have 100,000 times more value than performing the salat anywhere else.

### b. The hajj (Greater Pilgrimage)

The hajj consists of four essential acts (without which the whole endeavour becomes null and void), five compulsory rituals (that may be compensated if improperly performed) and a couple of customary practices (table 9.5). Mistakes in the compulsory acts can be expiated by a sheep sacrifice, but sunna practices left behind do not result in any punishments. The similarities between hajj and umra are striking. All essential acts of the umra are included in the hajj as well. The only difference is in fact Arafa. The umra is performed inside the Great Mosque in Mecca, but the essential acts
of the hajj are performed on the way to and from Arafat (figure 2). What also needs clarification is the absence of the animal sacrifice among the ‘pillars’ and the compulsory acts: it is a ‘mere’ sunna practice. Since the only ‘proper’ hajj form is the ‘ifrad’, and the two others (qiran and tamattu) are derivatives it becomes clear that the animal sacrifices are meant to be compensation rather than an essential act of the ritual. In practice, even this compensation can be compensated for by fasting and food distribution (Platti 1994:157).

Table 9.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day of the month Dhulhija</th>
<th>essential (nguzo)</th>
<th>required (wajib)</th>
<th>prophetic custom (sunna)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>taking a bath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Niya (intention)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and donning of ihram</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tawaf al-qudum (first circumambulation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Arafat (ritual standing and contemplation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>stay at Muzdalifa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sacrifice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12 or 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>throwing stones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>shaving or shortening hair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>tawaf al-iladha (second circumambulation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>sa’y (running between Safa and Marwa)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>stay at Mina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 or 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tawaf al-wida’ (final circumambulation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first day: Mina

The first day of the pilgrimage, 8 Dhulhija, is called in Swahili *siku ya Tarwiya* (the ‘day of saturation’ or the ‘day of the dream’). After the pilgrims (re)entered the state of *ihram* and performed their first ritual circulation around the Ka’ba (if not already done as part of the *umra*) they set off for Mina immediately after the morning prayer (*salat al-fajr*). If the pilgrim has already entered the town of Mecca for the *umra* visit it is not necessary to return to one of the *miqat* stations to re-enter the state of *ihram*. *Ihram* for *hajj* includes a ritual bath, clipping nails, a two *rak’a* salat and the pronunciation of the intention (*niya*). From this point onwards the ritual formula *talbiya* (*labbaika Allahuma, labbaika’ Here I am o Lord, here I am*) should be recited frequently. The tent city of Mina is reached before the noon prayer and this salat should be performed within the boundaries of Mina as well as the following afternoon, sunset, evening and morning prayer of the next day. While a normal prayer may consist of up to four ritual cycles (*rak’a* *hajj* prayers are shortened to only two *rak’as* or even two prayers may be combined. Because the stay at Mina is a required part of the *hajj*, the pilgrim must make sure he will remain within the carefully indicated boundaries of the place. 8 Dhulhija is spent in Qur’an recitation, praise and supplication.

The second day: Arafa

Early next morning 9 Dhulhija, all Muslims pray the morning prayer at Mina and after sunrise they leave for Arafa, a half hour drive from Mina. Spending hours at Arafa is the most important part of the *hajj*, emphasise all the guide books. Arafa is the place where the prophet held his final farewell (sermon) *khutba* on a hill, and this sermon is often printed in the *hajj* books as a focus of contemplation. Arafa is also intimately connected with Adam and Eve who recognised each other on this mountain after a 100 year wandering on earth. Here on the Mount of Mercy (*mlima Rahma*) or as close as they can come, all pilgrims will stand and pray. Many pilgrims try to increase the ritual standing (Arabic: *wuqaf*, Swahili: *kisimamo*) by refusing to eat, drink, sit or lie down, but no authoritative text prescribes these aggravating circumstances. The prophet Muhammad used to eat and drink during his Arafa ritual.

The noon prayer is combined with the afternoon salat leaving the whole afternoon free from any interruption. The Namira Mosque, the surrounding plains and the mountain are flocked with Muslims. The Arabic sermon before the noon salat is mostly not understood by Tanzanian pilgrims and often not even mentioned. However, the personal prayers are
enormously important and feature large in eyewitness reports. ‘Standing at Araf’a’ is mentioned as the most emotional part of the hajj, only equalled by the first sight of the Ka’ba. Zagar recommends facing in the direction of the kibla and praying duas while raising hands. Weeping (kulia machazi) is especially recommended.⁹¹ He presents an 80 line prayer (the largest one in the manuals) asking for forgiveness for all Muslims. All books provide many suggestions what to pray in these long hours of humility and submission. Praying in your own words ‘even in Kiswahili if you don’t know Arabic’ is allowed, Zagar adds. However, some East African pilgrim guides prefer recitation of Arabic prayer without understanding rather than a foreign language supplication.⁹² ‘l-Hatimy is in favour of Swahili prayers on Araf’a although in other parts of the hajj he explicitly prescribes Arabic.⁹³

Especially on Araf’a pilgrims experience the vicinity of God and prayers performed here are more likely to be heard than supplications elsewhere. A mirror congregation of angels descends on the Day of Araf’a in the lowest strata of heaven and they take all the prayers of the pilgrims straight to God.⁹⁴ In the discursive practice of including and excluding people form these hajj prayers at Araf’a, the boundaries and frontiers of the moral community become visible. The vicinity of God pilgrims want to share with their friends and loved ones.⁹⁵ A Tanzanian woman called her relatives on hajj to pray for her wayward son.⁹⁶ Potential pilgrims ask when, where, how and in what language they may pray for their children, parents and loved ones.⁹⁷ These prayers are not limited to living members of the community but they include also those who already passed away.⁹⁸ The tsunami victims in Asia were remembered by Tanzanian Muslim pilgrims in 2005. At the same time these prayers also construct the boundaries between who belongs to this moral community and who has no right in there. In a letter to the editor of an-Nuur Ali Juma asks the hajjis not to forget the victims of Mwembechai and Chechnya, and blame their murderers on Araf’a.⁹⁹ Whereas in normal years pilgrims include Tanzanian state officials and important persons in their prayers on Araf’a, they refused to do so during the hajj in 2001 and 2004.¹⁰⁰ To exclude president Mkapa from their Araf’a prayers after the violent Zanzibar elections was a rebellious act that shocked the country. Here again we see the clash between the two imagined communities: Tanzanian nation-state and Islamic world umma.

Just like the other place bound rituals, the Araf’a standing must be within the proper boundaries of the plain; standing outside these borders will nullify the hajj. After sunset all pilgrims leave the Araf’a site for Muzdalifa where they spend the night from 9 to 10 Dhulhija. Leaving before sunset.
requires a compensatory sacrifice, but in practice many hajjis mention early departures. Once they have left Arafa, many pilgrims describe the remainder of the hajj as a prolonged leave, an anticlimax. The evening at Muzdalifa is spent in gathering bean-sized pebbles for the next day’s stoning ritual (ramy). However people should not start this collection before the communal salat in the evening.101

iii The third day: Mina

Stoning

The pilgrims start the 10th Dhulhija on the Muzdalifa plains with the early morning prayer salat al-fajr. Throughout the hajj manuals authors emphasise that the pilgrim should continue to chant the ritual formula talbiya as well as all sorts of other supplications. Immediately after the fajr prayer pilgrims leave for Mina where they will stay in tents for at least another two nights. If not already done on the previous night, now all Muslims on their way to Mina start collecting the pebbles they should throw to three pillars erected in Mina. On the first day only one pillar must be stoned with seven pebbles, and on the next two days (11 and 12 Dhulhija) all three must be lapidated by seven stones. If hajjis would like to do so, they can prolong their pilgrimage another day on which they continue the stone pelting on the 13th, adding another 21 stones (three pillars, seven pebbles each).

At this point most hajj manuals include a little explanation on the significance of this act as expressed in Muslim tradition. During this ritual the Tanzanian pilgrim should remember the deeds of Ibrahim, his son Ismail and his wife Hajar. When Ibrahim got the divine revelation to sacrifice his son, Satan tried to prevent the patriarch from this pious act. The devil first appeared to him as an old man with a white beard. Fortunately the prophet recognised the evil incarnation and used stones to scare the devil. Then Satan appeared to Ismail in another disguise but the son was also able to withstand the temptation. Finally the devil unsuccessfully tried to convince Hajar to prevent her husband from slaughtering her son.102 According to Nassor Abdulla al-Qadiri, the big pillar stands for Ibrahim’s trial by Satan, the middle one represents Ismail’s temptation, and the smallest symbolises Hajar’s test.103 For this reason, Zagar claims, men, women and children should perform this stone throwing rite and slaughter an animal in remembrance of these saints (watakatifu).104 The hajj really is a community ritual and reminds Muslims of the two most holy families: Adam and Eve (Arafa) and Ibrahim, Hajar and Ismail (Mina).105
Swahili guides insert a couple of caveats to be considered here. In the first place a special warning because of the enormous crowds assembled at the place of the three columns. ‘The multitude of pilgrims treading one another, you can almost visualise the scene as that of the Doomsday,’ the Swahili Omani ‘l-Hatimy writes. The danger to be killed here is a real threat, something which often returns in the personal histories of pilgrims.

Because the stone pelting ritual is not an essential part of the hajj, the old, weak, children and children may decide to have this dangerous ritual performed by proxy, many guides emphasise. The ritual annually takes casualties, despite the increasing security measures of the Saudi authorities. One of these measures consists of a schedule providing different times for separate groups: before noon when it is relatively cold women, children and old pilgrims are allowed to perform their religious duty whereas the remainder of the day is meant for the other hajjis.

A second advice concerns potential idolatry: whereas praying a dua at the big pillar (‘Satan’) is strictly forbidden, short supplications at the two other pillars are allowed.

A final warning refers to the common practice of throwing shoes, when pilgrims run out of pebbles. Apparently the ritual evokes strong emotions. A non-Tanzanian hajji reports: “These people have saved for years to come to Hajj so they take the instruction to slay the Devil literally and throw sandals, shoes, umbrellas, almost anything they can get their hands on.”

Sacrifice

There is no authoritative text giving binding prescriptions in which order the pilgrim should perform his 10 Dhulhija rituals: stone throwing, animal sacrifice, hair shaving and circumambulation of the Ka’ba. Most sources recommend the order as described here. A Zanzibari magazine warns the pilgrims: “For the pilgrims who slaughter, be aware of those irresponsible haircutters who jump on you shouting ya hajj, ya hajj! And maybe you find yourself shaved even before your sheep is slaughtered!”

Also Shi’ite manuals emphasise that shaving should be done after sacrifice. Therefore, after pelting pebbles some Muslims go to the slaughter areas to personally supervise the sacrifice in the modern abattoirs, before they start to shave their hair or return to Mecca for the tawaf. Personal, physical contact between sacrificer and animal is encouraged, but most Tanzanians are absent when their own animals are sacrificed.

Sacrifice is one of the least conspicuous rituals in the Tanzanian hajj, in contrast to the Nigerian pilgrimage for example. Many pilgrims opt for the compensation of fasting 10 days: three days during the pilgrimage and
seven days at home, prescribed by Q 2:196. The difficulties concerning this fasting are described in detail, whereas the sacrifice is usually passed over quite quickly. The official Saudi video shown to pilgrims by the Tanzania Muslim Hajj Trust devotes only 58 seconds of the 90 minute playing time to the slaughtering practice. The TMHT secretary Jabry even told me that he discouraged Tanzanians to perform a qiran-hajj (involving a mandatory sacrifice) because first time pilgrims find it difficult to keep all the ihram taboos from the start of the umra to the completion of the hajj. All his tamattu packages exclude the sacrifice.

If Tanzanians do sacrifice an animal, this is mostly consists of symbolically buying a coupon. Zagar describes in his booklet Muongozo wa Hijja this option of slaughtering an animal in just eight lines. After payment the pilgrim receives a number he can use later to check if his animal really has been slaughtered. But killing and the subsequent canning, coldhouse storage and distribution among the poor remains invisible for most hajjis. In 1996 bin Yusuf bought such a coupon at the Islamic Development Bank for 375 Saudi Reals (100 US Dollar).

Tanzanian Twelver Shi'ites are not allowed to buy government coupons for sacrifice and usually slaughter an animal in person. The late Shi'ite missionary Rizvi told me how in his time he used to put his hands on the mutawwif’s (pilgrim’s guide) while the latter slaughtered the animal in Rizvi’s name. He performed his four hajj trips in the time when there were no central abattoir facilities and no cold houses. In his final travel to Mecca he saw how bulldozers shovelled the carcasses in deep ditches to prevent them from polluting the air. Even in that era the exchange of meat between fellow pilgrims and the distribution among the poor was only a token of submission to the Sharia: in fact most of the meat was given to the mutawwif who deposed of the surplus by burying it. As a result, despite the high number of animals slaughtered during the hajj (1,120,000), the visual and olfactory presence of the sacrifice does not dominate the hajj anymore as in the past.

The emotional commitment to the sacrifice likewise has dwindled. Whereas the first sight of the Ka’ba, the standing at Arafa and the stoning of ‘Satan’ very much impress the first time pilgrims, the sacrifice is certainly not on the same level. In fact, some preferred the Idd el-Hajj at home. Bin Yusuf writes on his experiences on the Day of Sacrifice: “…while the rest of the Muslim Ummah celebrates Idd al-Hajj, those performing the actual Hajj do not even realise that it is a day of celebration.” Ibrahim Usman relates: “I missed the Eid festivities back home.” My interviews with Tanzanian pil-
grims corroborate the view that animal slaughter is a relatively unimportant part of the hajj.

iv. The final three days of the hajj

For many pilgrims the 10th Dhulhija is the final ihram day. Immediately after the sacrifice (for most pilgrims after the stoning ritual) they cut or shave their hair, take a bath and put on ordinary clothes. This is called the first relinquishment (tahlil al-awwal) and involves the removal of most of the taboos except the ban on sexual intercourse. The final two hajj rituals (at least for the tamattu pilgrim) are the tawaf al-ifadha (the second circumambulation of the Ka‘ba) and the sa‘y (running between the two hills Safa and Marwa). Both rites take place in the Mecca mosque, preferably on the 10th Dhulhija: ‘For us, the people of Tamattu there is the saayi’, Zagar writes in his Swahili guide for Tanzanians. After having accomplished these town rituals, all restrictions on behaviour are removed and the pilgrim has arrived in the second state of desacralisation (tahlil). Now the pilgrims return to Mina in order to spend the next two days 10 and 11 Dhulhija there. The final stone throwing rites take place either on the 12th or the 13th, depending on how much time the pilgrim wants to spend.

The end of the hajj is not clearly marked. Zager calls the 11th and 12th Dhulhija, ‘Idd pil’i’ and ‘Idd tatu’ (second and third day of the Idd) apparently referring to the 10th Dhulhija as the first Idd, which is common in Tanzania. These days are sometimes called the days of leave in Arabic (ayam al-nafr). A third name of these final days is ayyam al-tashriq (11, 12, 13 Dhulhija). In the past pilgrims used these days to dry their cut meat they had slaughtered on the 10th. After finishing the ritual stoning (the 12th or 13th) the hajjis return to Mecca to perform the tawaf al-wida’, the third and final circumambulation. The primary rites performed at the beginning of the hajj are repeated here: circumambulation, a two rak‘as prayer at the maqam Ibrahim and drinking of the Zamzam spring. Before the pilgrim must have bought al his presents because afterwards no money transactions are allowed, except for fodder (nowadays interpreted as gasoline). After a final prayer for blessings here, during the return journey and finally in the hereafter, the hajji quickly moves out of the sacred city.

c. Ziyarat (visits to historical sites)

Though not part of the hajj proper Tanzanian pilgrims describe the visit to historical sites (ziyara) as emotionally very rewarding. The most common place to visit is Medina but some arrangements also include Jeru-
salem and Cairo where the Tanzanian pilgrim visits ‘maktaba kubwa ya vitabu vya kiislamu’ (great libraries of Islamic books). Some sources describe the essence of the hajj as ‘visiting the grave of the Prophet Muhammad’. Unlike the umra and the hajj, the preparation literature of the pilgrim presents the ziyara as an ambiguous balance between sunna (customary, allowed) and bid’a (illegitimate innovation) practices. Most Tanzanians perform these ziyara visits before the real hajj immediately after their arrival in Jeddah, as Azra Walji from Dar es Salaam describes. After the plane has landed at Jeddah airport, the pilgrim takes either the bus to Medina or board the plane for a one-hour flight. Tanzania Muumin Trust offers a cheap package where Muslims have only three days in Medina, but most other organisations allow for at least eight days in the ‘Luminous City’, and sometimes offer as much as three weeks in Saudi Arabia before the real hajj starts. This presents the opportunity to pray the recommended 40 consecutive prayers at the Prophet’s mosque, described in the following poem:

Arriving at the town of light (mji wa nuru), without its name being mentioned there are continuous prayers, of day and night forty in a cycle (arobaini kwa duru), eight consecutive days all who go on hajj oppose polytheism (ushirikina).

Apart from this spiritual rewarding enterprise the stay in Medina firmly sets the stage for the hajj as a historically embedded ritual. All the sights a Medina visitor will see (ziyara sehemu zote takatifu) refer to particular historical events in the life of Muhammad and Islamic history. The pilgrims not only see the large prophet’s mosque where all the prayers during this week are performed, they also tour several other mosques, former battlefields and cemeteries, such as the graves of martyrs, the prophet’s grave and those of his companions, wives and children (figure 3). Several of these sites have been destroyed by Saudi authorities to prevent any form of idolatry. The Zanzibari hajji Hassan Ali expressed his amazement that at the Masjid al-Qiblatain (mosque of the two kibla’s) the two prayer niches (vibla viwiili) are not longer present. The indication of the old prayer direction to Jerusalem has been removed by the authorities. Only the name of the mosque reminds the Muslims of the historical change of kibla direction from Jerusalem towards Mecca.
Figure 3: Map of the graveyard Janna al-baqi, redrawn from original in Shi'a hajj-guide Umra-e-Mufrida, Dar es Salaam. Courtesy of Maria Florijn

RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS
One of the culminating points of the *ziyara* is the visit of the prophet's grave in Medina. A visit to his tomb is highly recommended (at least by mainstream Muslims) and rewarded as if performed during his lifetime.\(^{136}\) The emotional impact of this grave is often enormous: detailed prescriptions how to greet him are printed in the *hajj* manuals. Apart from the Ka'ba and Araf, here we have another site where Tanzanians deliver special wishes and prayers on behalf of others. However the authors of the several *manasik* guides try to persuade the pilgrims not to attribute any form of (magical) power to the prophet and other dead people: 'you should only pray on behalf of the dead, NOT TO THEM (*kuwaombea tu, SIO KUWAOMBA WAO*; emphasis in original).\(^{137}\) The pilgrim may not kiss the tomb nor take any dust to make medicine (*uganga*).\(^{138}\) An additional safeguard against polytheistic idolatry is the rule to face the graves from the side of the *kibla*, turning one's back towards Mecca.\(^{139}\) Religious police take care that people do not transgress any rule. The physical force of the Saudi upholders of orthodoxy affects practice and meaning of the ritual, as shows the strict protocol surrounding the prophet's grave. A Shi'ite pilgrim comments: “These Wahhabiyya assail the pilgrims with any kind of persecution (*mateso*) and prevent them from praying (*kutaburuku*) and kissing the tomb of the Messenger and you will see time and again they grab their stick and have them ready in their hands to attack every *hajji* who dares to pray or kiss the grave of the Messenger.”\(^{140}\)

5. **Conclusion**

The discourse on the preparation and performance of the *hajj* as presented in this chapter makes clear how in this religious journey the outlines of a specific Tanzanian Muslim moral community are shaped. It is not the overwhelming numbers that turn the Tanzanian *hajj* into an important phenomenon. The *hajj* in Tanzania is an expensive journey only accessible to a religious elite, and dominated by rich men. Both in absolute and relative numbers the *hajj* is not as important as in many other sub Saharan African countries.

The preparation and performance of the *hajj* is certainly not specific for Tanzanian pilgrims. The pilgrimage manuals provide the common information needed to perform a flawless visit to the 'house of God'. The connection between the *hajj* rituals and certain mythical paradigms based on Qur'an or Islamic tradition can be found in all Islamic books. Even the discussions of the *hajj* practices can not be defined as 'Tanzanian'. Within Swahili discourse
one can find debates on the status of the rites (what behaviour invalidates the *hajj*, what can be compensated for etc.), the status of vernacular language in prayer, how and when to shave the hair after the accomplishment of the *hajj* etc. All these questions are almost exclusively dealing with the validity of the *hajj*, rather than with its meaning. This discourse considerably differs from the fierce polemics on the proper date of the Id el-Hajj.

However this chapter also shows how the *hajj* discourse on more than one occasion reveals the fracture lines of the Tanzanian Muslim community itself. It is in contrast to the ideal image of a holy, peaceful, spiritual and united *hajj*-community, that these conflicts are highlighted. Most of the critique on the *hajj* organisation of BAKWATA and its Zanzibari counterpart before the era of liberalisation can be understood as disappointment with the role of the Tanzanian nation-state in religious affairs. The clearest example of how the Tanzanian moral community is constructed through the discourse on the *hajj* is to be found in the Arafah prayers. The 2001 discussion among Muslims in the national press to exclude president Mkapa from the sacred contemplation ritual on the plains of the *hajj* emphasises the connection between the national community and the Islamic world community. To include friends, relatives and loved ones in personal prayers at the most holy site of Islam is a powerful expression of belonging to the same imagined community. To exclude your enemies, oppressors and (in this case) the Tanzanian president is an even more powerful statement of differentiation: our community is not your community!

This description of the *hajj* performance and preparation paves the way for the following two chapters on the significance of the pilgrimage in Tanzanian discourse. Why is it that some rituals are perceived as more meaningful than others? And what is the relationship between *hajj* rituals performed in Mecca and Muslim practices in Tanzania? The answers on these questions will reveal more about the construction of social identities and the nature of the Islamic moral community in Tanzania.
10. **Meaning of the hajj**

1. **Introduction**

   The hajj is in the first place the sacred journey people really prepare for and perform as described in the last chapter. The media of instruction pay few attention to the meaning of the practices because the proper performance has priority. But already the discourse on the performance showed how the significance of certain acts is constructed by Tanzanian writers rather than provided by texts. On the one hand hajj rituals are linked to historical and mythical paradigms (for example Adam, Ibrahim and Muhammad) and on the other hand they are contrasted with the present day social reality in Tanzania. The hajj is imagined as a congregation of fellow believers gathered at a sacred site in a timeless stream from the creation of the world to it's completion on the Day of Judgement. This ideal imagined community is consciously or unconsciously contrasted to the fragmented Islamic community as presented in the Idd el-Hajj. In this chapter we continue to search for the characteristics attributed to the ideal Islamic hajj community assembled near the Sacred City. From that point we start to look backwards from Mecca to Tanzania and look what Tanzanian Muslims would like to see in their own community.

   This chapter deals with that process of signification from two perspectives. One is the hajj as an individual spiritual enterprise. Going there will yield the believer some spiritual rewards like obedience, faithfulness, strength, purity etc. The second perspective focuses on the social result of the hajj. What kind of emotional and spiritual disposition or action is required from the returned pilgrim? Is the hajj a ritual of healing and purification, or leads it to a more activist attitude? Finally we connect these meanings and results to the underlying image of the hajj as a representation of the Islamic moral community itself. The hajj described from this perspective closely resembles the Muslim moral community in Tanzania, thwarted by the Christian insensitive government, threatened by international enemies and internally endangered by Muslim hypocrites.
2. **The hajj as personal edification**

   a. **Awareness of the umma**

   Although the *hajj* rituals are performed by millions of pilgrims each rite is an individual act rather than a group activity (Tayob 2003:104-105). The results of the pilgrimage are therefore primarily described as individual benefits: the *hajj* should increase the personal faith of the believer (*azidishi-we imani*). However the ultimate goal is not only the individual salvation of the Muslim, at least not from the perspective of present day Swahili discourse, but the benefits of the *hajj* should always be interpreted within the framework of the wider Muslim community. The individual and the social gains of the pilgrimage really are two sides of the same coin. Most of the major moral lessons (*mafunzo makubwa*) a Tanzanian *hajji* should learn from his visit to Mecca can be classified in four categories: awareness of the global Muslim community, obedience to God, preparedness for self-sacrifice and continuing remembrance of the final Day of Judgment.

   The *hajj* reminds the Muslim of the fact that he is part of God’s *umma*. In the light of social tensions in a changing society the image of the trans-local, imagined community of the *umma* is becoming more and more emphasised in Tanzanian discourse. The *hajj* as an icon of this equal, ideal community appears as the mirror-image of the present day Tanzanian society divided by centrifugal factors and forces. Just like God is one, the Ka’ba is one, the Black Stone is one also the global community of believers is one. The simple male *ihram* clothes stress the egalitarianism of all believers and they should therefore eradicate all traces of discrimination and jealousy. Walking shoulder to shoulder in performing the *tawaf*, the *sa’y*, standing at Arafa and stoning the Satanic pillars represent the unity, brotherhood and equality (*umoja, udugu, usawa*) of all believers from all corners of the world.

   b. **Exercise in obedience**

   The sole reason to perform the *hajj* is that Allah has ordered it in his Book and that Muslims should obey God (*kumtii Allah*). Therefore probably the most important motivation of Tanzanian pilgrims is obedience in answering the call (*mwito*) of God. The ritual chanting of the *talbiya* (‘at your service O Lord’) is a powerful illustration of this pious submission. Donning the *ihram*, and abstaining from all kinds of normal acts like clipping nails or using an umbrella offer in their apparent triviality an exercise to obey God in all things. Running between Safa and Marwa is not longer a trifling ritual but is a clear demonstration of the believer’s agility in obeying God’s com-
Sacrificing an animal is not because God needs the flesh and blood but only the obedience of the believer as the Qur’an states (Q 22:37). The story of Ibrahim who had to sacrifice his son is explained as teaching obedience to one's parents and ultimately to God.

**c. Self-sacrifice**

The meaning of many of the *hajj* rituals is to demonstrate the pilgrim’s willingness to give up all his worldly possessions and even his life (*kujitaa muhanga*). [The pilgrim] must be ready to give up his soul and to be killed (*kuuawa*) for the Prophet or his teachings. Migration and tourism are well known modes of travel but none of them requires the self sacrifice of the *hajj.* The clearest example of this particular significance is the animal sacrifice. Slaughtering in the name of God is explained in the mental framework of martial obedience and self-sacrifice: the believer is willing to give up everything even his life and the life of his loved ones, just like Ibrahim was prepared to kill his son Ismail. ‘Everyone has his own Ismail’ (*kila mtu ana Ismail wake*). Killing animals is neither a cruel act nor redemption from transgressions. Just like the animal is offered in return for something more valuable, so the sacrificer should be willing to offer his own life for the protection of the truth. But also the stoning ritual is an example of how the Muslim should give up everything in the battle for God. Staying in tents and abstaining from comfort makes the Muslim like a soldier willing to fight and die and suffer for God’s sake. The three days after the Idd (11-13 Dhulhija) are compared with a soldier’s rest after the battle and are actually the summit (*kilele*) of the pilgrimage. The vicinity of death as part of the *hajj* experience is mentioned in Swahili discourse as being one of the hardships one should be willing to offer ‘fi sabili illah’ (in the Path of God) as well as a possibility to quickly enter the gates of paradise. Deaths and epidemics like the cholera occurring during the *hajj* are usually front-page news in the Tanzanian press, sometimes accompanied by a call for special prayers (*swalatul ghaib*). Apart from death and the threat of the masses (*msonga-mano*) Tanzanians often mention the weather (*mabadiiko ya hali ya hewa*) as another hardship the faithful must endure. First-time male pilgrims must be prepared to face the temptation of beautiful women willing to chat with just anybody, Sheikh Suleiman Gorogosi warned his audience during a *hajj* seminar in 2002.
d. Preparation for the end of time

The **hajj** as the end, fulfilment and closure of earthly life is rhetorically linked to death, physical hardships and final Judgement. A salient detail mentioned in the personal report of the **hajjis** is that all the five daily prayers are accompanied by a funeral prayer (**salat al jana’iz**). The frequency of this prayers surprises most pilgrims coming from small mosque congregations in Tanzania. The regularity can be attributed to the high mortality rate of the pilgrims (many old and weak Muslims perform the **hajj** in the hope they will die in Mecca) and the large community of Muslims praying here.

Specific acts within the **hajj** are described in relationship with death and Judgment. Arafa is the most important among them. Standing at Arafa before God’s presence, remembering Him, listening to the **khutba** and praying for the forgiveness of sins is like staying before God’s throne on the Day of Reckoning (**siku ya Hesabu**), or the Day of Payment (**siku ya malipo**), or the Day of Resurrection (**siku ya Kiama**). The diverse assembly all clad in the same clothes resembles the white clothing of newborn children and the shroud of corpses. Also the dangerous practice of stoning ‘Satan’ is compared with the scene of Doomsday.

The **ihram** clothes of pilgrims function in most cases as the pilgrim’s shroud when they will be buried back home. The sprinkling of Zamzam water in funeral rites all over the Islamic world establishes a physical connection with the sacred sites of the **hajj**.

3. The social results of the **hajj**

a. Purification and healing: the **hajj** as a hospital

Going on **hajj** will change the pilgrim for ever. The contact with the numinous or the sacred is reflected in the change of name: the returning pilgrim receives the honorific title ‘Al-hajj’ (cf. Hubert and Mauss 1964:144). This title is proudly mentioned in obituaries, as well as the date of their (first) **hajj**. The new status is imagined as a crown (**taji**). In smaller communities like the Ahmadiyya Muslims in Tanzania, pictures of new **hajjis** appear in the press, including their names. However their new title is not a guarantee that the **hajj** really has had the desired effect. Alhajj Idi Amin Dada, the Uganda dictator defeated by the Tanzanian army under Nyerere, is often mentioned as a gruesome example.

Whereas most Tanzanian Muslims will endorse the view of the returned pilgrim as an obedient member of the world **umma**, willing to sacrifice everything he possesses and always prepared to meet God, when it comes to
the interpretation of the hajj as a blueprint for social action, opinions start to differ. Yet the social effects of the hajj are seen as even more important than the individually achieved moral lessons. Former president Hassan Mwinyi announced on a hajj seminar that Islam is not only a spiritual religion but aims at the social liberation and redemption of mankind (kumkomboa mwanadamu). But to implement this lofty plan Tanzanian groups read the ‘signs of Allah’ (Q 22:32) quite differently. Images of the pilgrimage as a hospital contrast with the hajj as a military training camp.

The first meaning attributed to the hajj in Tanzanian discourse has to do with cleansing, purification and healing. In the Tanzanian Shi’ite guide book the inner meaning of the several hajj rituals are explained as ‘putting off the garment of disobedience, to get rid of hypocrisy, to wash off your sins, abstain from unlawful matters, to seek nearness to God and to cut off the throat of greed by clinging to piety.’ The Swahili expatriate ‘l-Hatimy is also very explicit: the hajj is like a furnace which burns away all the pilgrim’s sins. The clean hajji should return to his mother country where he will display his newly acquired pious behaviour and thus revitalise the moral community there. It is therefore understandable that ‘l-Hatimy concludes his hajj manual with a four page warning to women and girls. It is their behaviour which primarily reproduces the moral community of the next generation.

The discourse on the hajj reflects the perceived and desired characteristics of the Muslim society.

The best example of the hajj as a cure resulting in spiritual effects like love and brotherhood is to be found in the Ahmadiyya discourse. Most of their metaphors they derive from the medical sphere of the hospital for example: ‘Islam is medicine’ (uislamu ndio dawa). The sinful pilgrim goes on hajj as the sick person goes to the hospital. ‘Whoever enters it receives health (Swahili: salama);’ they interpret the Qur’an text Q 3:96:

In it are Signs Manifest; (for example), the Station of Abraham; whoever enters it attains security (Arabic: aminan); Pilgrimage thereto is a duty men owe to Allah,- those who can afford the journey; but if any deny faith, Allah stands not in need of any of His creatures.

Therefore it is necessary for the pilgrim to obey God like a patient obeys the doctors in the hospital. And just like a faithful doctor God will listen to the pilgrim who cries to Him like Hajar and her son Ismail cried to Him in the desert. The Ahmadiyya discourse often recounts the sacrificial myth from the perspective of the victims Ismail and his mother Hajar, rather
than from the perspective of Ibrahim: ‘the hajj is in remembrance of the life of these two blessed ones, Hajar and Ismail.’

The pilgrim returns as a clean and pure creature, like a new born baby, a cured healthy believer. All the sins of the pilgrims have turned the shining gem of the Ka'ba into a black stone. This health must be understood both in terms of spiritual and bodily development (maendeleo ya kimwili na ya kiroho pia). Notions of purity dominate the description of hajj rituals in the Ahmadiyya press. The running between the hills Safa and Marwa should start on Safa, because of its meaning ‘safi’ (cleanliness, Swahili). After his cure (tiba) the pilgrim is required to stay clean and not to return to filth (takataka) and sin (dhambi). Animal sacrifice from the purificatory perspective is explained as killing the animal inside and the animal-like nature (unyama na tabia zao za kinyama).

Apart from a personal state of purity and piety which is in itself a healthy influence in society, the Ahmadiyya newspaper makes only few appeals for concrete social action. Hajjis should turn their wealth into Arabic education and the establishment of good madrasas. Improvement of religious education should enable the students to perform beyond the local religious education which only teaches ‘singing the Qur'an’. The sending of pupils abroad to Arab countries is another task of the rich pilgrims. But overall the Ahmadiyya emphasise spiritual inclination and moral disposition rather than concrete action.

b. Empowerment: the hajj as a military camp

In contrast to the spiritual interpretation of the hajj as a place of moral recovery, Tanzanian discourse also shows more active connotations of the pilgrimage. “The importance of the hajj is not only its value as ritual worship,” Maalim Bassaleh lectured his audience on the Idd el-Hajj 2004. “It is also meant to intimidate the unbelievers,” he claimed. “All hajj rituals performed by the pilgrim must be translated in activities directed towards defending Islam, rights and equality in society,” sheikh Abdallah Kombo explained to a journalist on the Idd el-Hajj 2003. “The objective of the hajj is not the forgiveness of sins but preparation of the believer to become a leader (kiongozi) in establishing God’s law here in this world,” the Amir of the Imam Council wrote in answer to a Dar Leo journalist in 2004. This view contradicts the primarily personal effect of the hajj described above. Apart from the word leader (kiongozi) two other names often appear to signify the active role of the returned pilgrim in society: vicegerent (khalifa) and soldier (askari).
If everything is done according to the letter of the Law and with the true intention then the Muslim hajji really becomes God’s representative on earth (khalifa wa Allah). The pilgrim must recognise when he performs all the hajj rituals that ‘it is not God’s intention to test his servants (waja) with many heavy commandments, but that these are just exercises (mazaoezi) to enable them to become pious (wacha Mungu) and leave behind God’s stewardship (ukhalifa) here in this world.’ The term is derived from the Qur’an where it is used for Adam, Daud and others, but never in the context of the hajj. Montgomery Watt (1983:127) claims that this name is only a fairly recent development in Islamic theology. In Tanzanian discourse it remains unclear what such a khalifa can and must do as plenipotentiary on behalf of God, but his status seems higher than the sick human restored to health in the Ahmadiyya hajj discourse.

More often than ‘leader’ or ‘vicegerent’ the Tanzanian pilgrim is called ‘soldier’ (askari). References to pilgrims as soldiers fighting in the kingdom of God (ufalme wa Allah) are ubiquitous and not limited to the Tanzanian discourse. In most cases this kingdom is a spiritual ruling, and the soldiers in it wage a spiritual war. Praying for this kingdom of God to come here in this world should be an important part of the hajji’s supplications. Believers are ‘soldiers of God in the army of the Mahdi.’ Ahmadiyya missionaries coming to Tanzania are welcomed as soldiers, warriors and leaders of the jihad (shujaa, kaptene, maamiri wa jihadi). They describe the hajj as a defence of Islam against all its spiritual enemies, such as sin and hypocrisy. The hajj empowers the pilgrim to go on with this battle till ‘the day of victory’ (ili siku ya ushindi). The animal sacrifice as part of the Idd el-Hajj is like killing your own animal like spirits, stoning the ‘Satan’ is like stoning your own devilish thoughts.

However, these military metaphors take on a much more tangible content in the IPC discourse represented by their newspaper an-Nuur. Throwing stones at Mina is directed at all enemies of Allah, (and not at someone’s bad habits as Sufi and Ahmadiyya interpretations of the hajj read this ritual). It is like attacking the adversaries of religion to revenge the injustices done to Muslims. The three pillars represent the continuously changing faces of present day enemies of Islam in Tanzania. The image of the soldier, often used in these edifying articles, is meant as a warning to all enemies of Islam. However, at the same time these hajj interpretations try to make the opposite point: real Islam does not use violence, is a religion of peace and Muslims are not terrorists. As an example, the peaceful entry of Mecca in the 6th year after Muhammad’s Hijra is presented. Without weapons, by sheer
force of their unity, and supported by God’s promises the first Muslims performed their umra. Their only weapons were the tahlili (Islamic creed) and takbiri (exclamation Allahu akbar). The enemy was terrified and the Muslims entered the town without shedding one drop of blood. The peacefulness of the ideal Muslim is presented in stark contrast with the aggression of their enemies. The stress on the revivification, erecting and protection of the religion of God, rather than on private piety assumes that inimical forces threaten the Islamic community represented in the hajj.

It is the Muslim’s responsibility (jukumu) to recognise the enemies of their religion, to recognise their plans and the weapons these enemies use in assailing Islam and to be ready to fight them fiercely (kupambana nao vikali) with their possessions and their soul.

While these two mechanisms (the healing, sacerdotal function versus the empowering, royal function) are probably common to most holy places (cf. Smith 1992), the current socio-political situation in Tanzania makes the preference for the second interpretation of the hajj, much more understandable. Behind these metaphors appears the image of a threatened Islamic moral community. The same topic already emerged from the discourse on the proper day of the Idd el-Hajj. The image of the hajj as representation of the ideal, trans-local and timeless Muslim umma is contrasted with the local shortcomings of present day Tanzanian society.

4. The hajj-community endangered

According to many Swahili sources the hajj is the fifth and last pillar of Islam. The number is not arbitrarily chosen but indicates the pilgrimage as the final and most important of all Islamic rituals (hija ndicho kilele cha ibada'). Abu Hanifa is quoted as having said: ‘Yes indeed the hajj is the best of all worship’ (alitangaza kuwa hijja ndio bora kuliko ibada zote). Where the first four obligations (confession, daily prayer, fasting and religious tax) all focus on a single (mostly individual) aspect of religion, the hajj encompasses and emulates them all. While all five pillars express the human goal in life (‘I have only created jinn and men, that they may serve Me’, Q 51:56), this is especially true for the hajj. Every religious ritual has special merits to prepare the believer (kumuandaa muumini) to meet his Creator, but the hajj is the only ibada offering a complete erasure of all one’s sins and a rebirth as a pure baby. It is the apex of one’s whole life and its spiritual fulfillment. More
than other rituals the *hajj* symbolises the Islamic community as a whole.\(^{66}\) Renouncing the *hajj* involves therefore a de facto excommunication from the Islamic moral community. The punishment for indifference towards the *hajj* is equal to apostacy: ‘he who is able to perform the *hajj* but fails to do so, he better die as a Jew or a Christian.’\(^{67}\) From this perspective (the *hajj* as symbolic representation of the Islamic community) it is understandable that attacks on the *hajj* are perceived as serious threats on the community as a whole.

The *hajj* is not (only) the peaceful journey of Muslim saints to a sacred centre but is often rocked by physical violence and political turmoil.\(^{68}\) These oppositional forces are often imagined as originating outside the Muslim community. For example on the other side of the umma one finds the makafiri (unbelievers), washirikina (polytheists), wakristo (Christians), Umoja wa Mataifa (United Nations), Mayahudi (Jews), Marekani (Americans) and the NATO. Having performed the *hajj* together with the oppressed brothers and sisters from Bosnia, Kashmir, Burma, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and Malaysia should teach the Tanzanian *hajji* the willingness to help other members of the global umma.\(^{69}\)

The poem ‘Pilgrims fight polytheism (‘Mahujaji wapinge ushirikina’) by a teacher of Mwenge Islamic Centre describes some of these global enemies.\(^{70}\) In six out of eleven stanzas the Satans of this world are revealed as Americans and Zionists. Both oppress Islam (*dini yetu kuibana*) and the *hajji* is obliged to curse them (*ni wajibu kuwalaani*), and pray for their destruction, just like earlier oppressors like Firaun and Haman were destroyed. Especially the Arafa ritual is a powerful platform to delineate the boundaries of the moral community. It is on the plains of Arafa that Muslims cursed Israel and America.\(^{71}\) It is the same anxiety to guard and defend the Islamic community that is behind the fear of non-Muslim intruders in the *hajj*. To allow the Pope to visit Mecca would be a horrible infringement on the Islamic holy congregation, according to an *an-Nuur* journalist.\(^{72}\) The American president George Bush would have suggested this as an opportunity for East and West to meet each other. The writer explains this outrageous idea as a result of the moral corruption of Saudi Arabia that allowed more than half a million non-Muslim soldiers to be stationed in Saudi Arabia for the Gulf War.

International oppressors are only one part of the forces endangering the *hajj* community. Within the Islamic discourse of marginalisation and oppression non-Muslims are presented as attackers of Islam through its most holy ritual the *hajj*. In this paradigm the *hajj* is presented as a religious duty non-Muslims try to slander, to obstruct and to vilify. In 1997 a daily
newspaper charged the vice president Dr. Omar for giving Muslim leaders the opportunity to use the government plane to go to Mecca on their way to the hajj. The Islamic newspaper an-Nuur immediately responded by comparing this case with one two years earlier of a Christian minister going to a religious leaders conference, without being blamed for spilling the ‘sweat of non-Catholics.’ Instead of focusing attention on the sacred Islamic institution itself, Christian newspapers single out the bad behaviour of some Muslims in order to ‘vilify’ all Muslims, the author assumes.

Many more instances of wrong presentation of hajj rituals are enumerated to show how the non-Islamic press defames (kashf) the Muslim community. A Dar Leo journalist wished that Muslim would live a better live so they wouldn’t need the hajj to get rid of their wrongdoings. A Swahili blogger doubted the sanctity of the ritual stoning if so many pilgrims had to die each year by performing this religious duty. According to a non-Muslim journalist, the white ihram clothes of the pilgrim are designed to ‘better endure the heat of Saudi Arabia’. What aim has this kind of misleading, an-Nuur asks? In schoolbooks hajjis are depicted as hypocrites:

As a good Moslem going to Mecca I can’t take beer with all those fellows looking at me. But at home, you know, I do take pombe and beer, if I can get it. But here, just buy me a cup of coffee.

When the Tanzanian government in 1973 decided to limit hajj travels to only once in a lifetime for adult Muslims, this was because ‘some Christians are hostile to Hajj.’ According to the author of this comment, al-Zinjibari, the reason of their enmity is that the hajj is used for the enhancement of the global Muslim Brotherhood and enrichment of the Islamic education among the pilgrims. And this would threaten the Christian hegemony in Tanzania.

However it is neither the global forces nor the non-Muslim Tanzanians who present the most dangerous threat to the Muslim society. It is rather the Muslims themselves who can not live up to their new status. Here it becomes clear that the hajj discourse is a continuous debate on the nature of the moral community in Tanzania. References to hajjis displaying a profound ignorance and contempt of Islam are plenty. For a pilgrim who continues to be involved in sinful behaviour like riba (usury), waongo (lies), rushwa (corruption) the hajj will not be a crown, but a mere tourist voyage. A pilgrim insulting fellow believers will create turmoil among the sanctified hajj congregation (kufitinisha watu kwa aliyehirimia Hija). And dissension (fitna) in the umma is worse than killing.

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From the perspective of the IPC newspaper *an-Nuur* BAKWATA Muslims are particularly inclined to use the *hajj* only as a pretext to achieve a religious title. Nominal Muslims (but ‘even their names are not Islamic!’), use the *hajj* to display their wealth and earn the prestigious name Al-Hajj. But calling oneself a Muslim or Alhajj, while at the same time acting against the Islamic doctrines, is a clear case of hypocrisy (*unafiki*) and is an example of fearing men more than God (*kuogopa watu zaidi kuliko Mwenyezi Mungu*).

Going on *hajj* only to carve a seal with the title Alhajji is a ‘joke in the eyes of God.’ In a contribution to a debate on mosque properties, a Muslim blames a BAKWATA believer of abusing his *hajj* experience: except for the title “he is not influenced at all by the *hajj* because his actions do not resemble real Islam.”

It is this kind of debates on the moral shortcomings of pilgrims that reflect the tension between the imagined *hajj* community and the real Muslim society in Tanzania. A final example will suffice. On 19 December 1982 34 returning pilgrims from the Kagera region were welcomed with a large festival. This activity was planned to coincide with the *mawlid* celebration. A Muslim attending this festive gathering was shocked by the ‘many commandments of God being broken during this celebration.’ Female and male *hajjis* intermingled freely; two mature girls already past puberty presented clothes to the leader of the pilgrims; *sadaka* presents, pictures of the Ka’ba, Mecca, Medina and mount Arafa were sold in an auction like setting. The opinion of the Muslim observer was clear: the sanctity of the *hajj* as a ritual duty performed for God should not be degraded to a festival where only aim is human praise.

The discourse on the *hajj* as described so far reveals serious concerns with a vulnerable Islamic community endangered by external, global, national and internal antagonists. However the *hajj* interpreted as a military training camp enables the Tanzanian Muslims to address the current predicament in terms of defence and attack. The most impressive ritual of the *hajj* used to illustrate the battle against the oppressors of Islam, is the animal sacrifice performed as part of the *hajj* and also in the local celebration of the Idd el-Hajj. Not surprisingly this particular interpretation of the sacrifice is most visible in the political, activist IPC environment. “Let’s use the philosophy of slaughtering in fighting against the enemies” Ustadh Hashim Lusaganya reminded the Muslims in Dar es Salaam. The real meaning of the sacrifice is to empower Muslims to fight the unbelievers who joke with Islam, he said. According to him many Tanzanian sheikhs are afraid to tell this real meaning to the believers, because they fear to be arrested. The ani-
mal sacrifice reveals the intention and purpose of the hajj: to shed blood on behalf of God. But not only the IPC feels attracted to this notion of sacrificial killing. Whereas the mainstream Ahmadiyya discourse usually attributes only a spiritual meaning to the Idd sacrifice, in the light of the tribulations and oppression in Pakistan during the 1970s and 1980s a more violent interpretation turned up. The editor of *Mapenzi ya Mungu* describes how the commandment to sacrifice in the Qur’an is immediately followed by the instruction to fight for the sanctity of Islam. The religion can only survive if all its members devote their possessions, their time and their blood to this noble goal. Replacing animal sacrifice by a mere monetary *sadaka* donation will harm ‘one of the flanks of the Islamic community’ and thus leaving it unprotected. Although both discourses (IPC and Ahmadiyya) seem to describe the same attitude, the former is more directed to revenge and shedding the blood of the enemy, while the latter is an exponent of the spiritual disposition of self-sacrifice. But it seems likely that in both cases the experience of being oppressed provides an extra stimulus to this particular meaning of sacrifice.

These examples of ritual killing as a preparation for killing human opponents, illustrate the mechanism Bloch (1992) coined as ‘rebounding violence’. Initial violence such as animal sacrifice empowers the perpetrator and enables him to commit violence against others. The two stages involve an expulsion of a natural, vital element (in this case the killing of an animal) and a second stage where participants regain the lost vitality from a non-native, outside source (eating the sacrificial animal). Now the sacrificer becomes the violent actor towards others. Different from Bloch’s description however, in Tanzania it is mainly a discursive strategy. However the link between the two forms of violence is discursively constructed by both Muslim and non-Muslims in Tanzania. Swahili Mwananchi journalists explicitly connected the execution of Daniel Pearl on the eve of the Idd el-Hajj to the Islamic Sacrificial Feast, suggesting that both stood in meaningful relation to each other. In the introduction I already indicated that words for sacrifice and suicide bombing are almost the same in Swahili. A direct relation between them was established at the Baraza la Idd el-Hajj 2004 in Dar es Salaam. Muslim believers from the audience claimed that the ritual violence of the animal sacrifice will turn into real violence towards the enemies of Islam: “Perhaps it is time to sacrifice our selves in Palestinian style.”
5. **Conclusion**

Local Tanzanian discourse describes the *hajj* in the first place as a personal, moral and edifying practice. The pilgrim returns as an obedient member of the Islamic community, willing to sacrifice his possessions and life in the path of God and always prepared to meet his Creator. Apart from this individual level of a moral, responsible believer, there is also a social level. His new status must be employed to the benefit of the Tanzanian society. These social results of the *hajj* are primarily expressed in terms of purification and healing. The purity of the pilgrim will have a positive influence on society as a whole. Concrete actions in this paradigm (which is mainly represented by the Ahmadiyya) are not so much stressed, but rather the right spiritual attitude. However the Idd el-Hajj has also a large potential for politicalisation, due to a more violent discourse linking the pilgrimage to metaphors like soldiers, battle, and fighting. The social results of the *hajj* in that kind of reasoning (mainly represented by the IPC) enable the pilgrim to fight enemies of Islam and protect his religion by all means. The sacrifice appears to be important in this second discourse of the *hajj*. Rather than focusing attention only on the victim as an icon of bad habits, some Tanzanian Muslims turn towards the more active metaphors of slaying and shedding blood of their enemies. A strong feeling of being discriminated against, victimised and thwarted underlies the discussion of the Idd el-Hajj. This discursive connection between sacrifice and the image of an endangered moral community will be the subject of the next chapter.
11. Sacred Sites and Sacrifice

1. Introduction
The meaning and significance attributed to the Meccan pilgrimage as described in the last chapters revealed how the discourse on *hajj* rituals helped Tanzanian Muslims discuss their own moral community. The debates revealed a tension between the ideal, timeless Islamic *umma* as represented in the *hajj* congregation and the experienced reality of a present day Tanzanian Muslim minority feeling threatened by inside and outside forces. This chronotopical quality of the Muslim moral community (the fact that it exists in different places and times) is paramount in this chapter. In the first section three different spatial/historical paradigms are discussed. The site of the Badr victory, the plains of Arafa and the valley of Mina are all linked to *hajj* in different ways. Each of them has grown into a powerful paradigm which is used by Muslims to make sense of their own local reality. The imagined communities evoked by these places are ritually compared with the own realtime/realplace Tanzanian community. The Badr community is a band of brave soldiers and martyrs, Arafa witnessed the Muslim *umma* listening to the prophet’s legacy and in the valley of Mina Islamic civilisation started with primordial sacrifices and the building of the Ka‘ba. The local Idd el-Hajj celebration in Tanzania derives two of its major rituals from these sites: the fasting on 9 Dhulhija is linked to the ritual standing on Arafa and the animal sacrifice of the 10th Dhulhija is explained as being the same sacrifice performed by the pilgrims in the valley of Mina. However the connection between these places and the Tanzanian localities goes beyond a prima facie similarity in ritual practice. Arafa and Mina are situated in a multilayered paradigm stretching from the creation of the world to its final ending. The connection to these places by discourse and ritual practice involves taking part in this rich paradigm. Arafa and Mina but also Badr have their local, Tanzanian ritual counterparts that illustrate how meaning is constructed with the help of spatial/historical paradigms. In the second part we illustrate the
working of these discursive strategies by focusing attention on the shifting role of animal sacrifice in some Islamic traditions. The interpretation of this Idd el-Hajj ritual appears to be much more flexible than authoritative legal texts often assume.

Plate 9: Re-enactment of Islamic historical battles during mawlid celebration in Tanga

2. Sacred Sites

a. Badr

Perhaps the most important historical paradigm within Islamic history is the Badr victory, ‘a guiding representation through which many Muslims approached the world’ (Combs-Schilling 1989:55-56). According to some this victory might have been an important factor in the institutionalisation of the Idd el-Hajj (Rashed 1998:193). Badr is in the first place a reference to a historical military victory. A small minority of 313 Muslims defeated a much larger group of almost 1000 Meccan warriors on Friday 17 March 624. While earlier confrontations between Muhammad’s fighters and his old town turned into tragedies, the Badr victory became a real icon in the Islamic historical paradigm. The Qur’an contains several traces of this historical moment. Only 14 of the 313 Islamic soldiers died. Among the enemies killed
was Muhammad’s greatest opponent Abu Jahl. It was not only a victory of a minority over an overwhelming majority, but it was also the only victorious battle Muhammad participated in.

In the second place refers Badr to a real place, somewhere between Jeddah and Medina. The graves of the Badr martyrs who died in the battle are the physical traces left behind by this historical event. Just like the places Arafah and Mina, Swahili discourse tends to merge the temporal and spatial coordinates of the Badr chronotope. The historical battle of Badr (*vita vya Badr*) and the geographical place Badr can both be indicated by the expression *vivyanja vya Badr* (the fields of Badr). Very few Tanzanian pilgrims bring a *ziyara* (visit) to the Badr graves, so the place remains for most of them imagined rather than experienced.\(^4\)

The Badr victory is closely related to the month of Ramadan when the battle originally took place. The edifying articles and sermons therefore appear mostly in this month.\(^5\) Just like Arafah is thoroughly embedded in the temporal framework of the *hajj*, so is Badr linked to the time of Ramadan.\(^6\) Just like the day of Arafah, also this battle saw a large band of angels coming down from heaven to watch the spectacle.\(^7\) The *khutba* in Dar es Salaam Idd el-Fitr 5 December 2002, Ustadh Musa Kileo referred to the Badr combatants as an example of a good, healthy Islamic community. ‘By cohesion (*shikamano*) and by the grace of God a couple of Muslims defeated more than 1000 unbelievers.’\(^8\) After the Idd *khutba* a special supplication was prayed to protect Muslims against the Tanzanian Anti-Terrorism Act. Another public Ramadan prayer in Dar es Salaam used the Badr paradigm as follows: ‘O God receive our prayers in Ramadan. Give us victory in this month just like you granted victory to Muhammad in this month against the infidels on the field of Badr.’\(^9\) The double process of signification found in the *hajj* discourse (moral purification and militant empowerment) is also visible in the Badr discourse. On the one hand the Badr victory was granted to the Muslims as a reward for their fasting, and on the other hand the memory of this battle enables present day Muslims to fight their own opponents. But if we compare the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj sermons in this respect we find notions of individual piety dominate the former while the battle metaphors can be found more often in the latter.\(^10\)

The many layers of Badr as a historical event, physical place, a particular date connected to Ramadan, and Badr as a powerful image of the ideal Muslim community are locally reflected in several ways. In the first place many parents have chosen Badru as a name for their boys. Apparently the image of heroic, fearless Muslim fighters appeals to many Tanzanians. In the
second place the historical battle of Badr is represented in many Swahili poems, one of the most prominent being *Utenzi wa vita vya Badru*.\(^{11}\) Thirdly Badr is a popular theme to re-enact by *madrasa* students on Islamic holidays like *mawlid* or the Idd el-Fitr (plate 9).\(^{12}\) Finally the reading of “Halibadiri” (the names of the Badr martyrs) in the *Siku ya Mwaka* ritual has been mentioned in chapter 5. Together with the circumambulation of the village, an animal sacrifice and other Islamic (intercession) prayers the recitation of the Halibadiri is performed as a protective ritual.\(^ {13}\) The function is to ward of evil, to protect and cleanse the village community. The Ka’ba like anti-clockwise circumambulation defines the spatiality of the own community and the simultaneous prayers link it to the Badr community.

Reading Halibadiri is one of the strongest forms of witchcraft known to Swahilis.\(^ {14}\) The reading of this prayer in the *Siku ya Mwaka* ritual is mostly seen as a cure but more violent applications are also common.\(^ {15}\) The Badr prayer will achieve its effect only when the cursed is really wrong. Therefore the minister of Interior Affairs, Mohamed Seif Khatib, boldly stated that he was not afraid when this particular supplication was publicly read against the Zanzibar government, because he was in his right.\(^ {16}\) However, when I showed some of the Badr books in my possession to Muslims living in the same house, this caused obvious anxiety and fear. While most of them were of the opinion that I lacked the knowledge to read this prayer successfully, to own a book like that was apparently perceived as dangerous. The effect of the book depends on the intention of the reader but is almost always deadly. The AMYC warns against reading Halibadiri ‘kwa nia ya kumdhuru mwizi ili afe au apate kichaa’ (with the intention to kill a thief or make him insane).\(^ {17}\) During my stay in Tanga, right in the centre of the town (barabara 4), the victim of a bicycle theft took the law in his own hands. He slaughtered a chicken, kindled a fire and cooked some lime fruit and other edibles and started to read the Badr curse over the thief. A pious shop owner quickly called the police before the prayer was ended and the perpetrator was put in custody.\(^ {18}\) Jan Knappert (1988) relates how a Halibadiri reading by an offended sailor resulted in a shipwreck. His conclusion (‘Such is the power of the Arabic language, in particular of the texts relative to the history of the Prophet Muhammad’) is only partly valid for the Badr images evoked in Tanga. I think it is not only Badr as a historical paradigm that makes this Arabic intercession prayer a powerful tool. It is rather the image of the ideal Islamic *umma* in a particular time and place that is evoked by the rituals. The time and space dimensions blur temporarily and the present day Muslim community turns into the Badr com-
munity and vice versa. The prayer enables Muslims to define who belongs to this umma and who must be excluded. Reading the Halibadiri against the CCM government is one of the most public examples of this ritual. It closely resembles the refusal to pray for the CCM on the plains of Arafa, described in the last chapter. 19

The anti-social, aggressive dimension plus the association of reading Halibadiri with blood and killing makes the Badr recitation not suitable for reading inside the mosques, according to many Tanga residents. 20 In 1975 a controversy around this Badr reading occurred in the Tanga region. The opposition was not against the practice as such but rather the place was perceived as unfit. 21 For this reason the Badr recitation is in Tanga not performed inside the mosques but replaced by the more acceptable qunut reading. 22 In reformist circles the complete ritual is condemned as shirk (polytheism). 23 The strong opposition against the rituals makes the Badr recitation unfit for ritual expression of the whole community. 24

However the general discourse on Badr and its spiritual meaning for the Tanzanian Muslims offers the possibility to discuss the same issues as the debates on the proper lld el-Hajj date: moral shortcomings of the Muslim community. 25 The twofold cure for these weaknesses as provided by the Badr paradigm is also similar to the meaning of the hajj: purification and empowerment. Moral pollution (najis, uchafu, uovo) must be eradicated by fasting and praying. The holy Islamic places that are in the dirty hands of the Jews (mikono najisi ya Mayahudi) who killed the prophets of God, must be purified again. 26 The remembrance of the Badr martyrs will induce the desire to fight unbelieving enemies of Islam. The fact that the battle of Badr took place in the fasting month of Ramadan makes clear that jihad is required just like fasting is compulsory for every Muslim. Though answers differ on the question what jihad exactly means, most Tanzanian articles dealing with Badr do not exclude a real violent interpretation. 27 Even the violent World Wars were necessary to defend peace, Bassaleh argues. But the major significance of the Badr battle for modern Tanzanians is self-defence, and only when the religion is threatened, he concludes. 28 Opposite to classical fiqh which describes the Great Jihad as an individual and spiritual battle whereas the Small Jihad is actual warfare, an-Nuur describes the fighting between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria as similar to the great jihad. The Nigerian Muslim victims, who died in the protests around the Miss World elections, were likened to the Badr martyrs. 29 Also the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq after the 9/11 attacks instigated many references to the Badr paradigm in the Tanzanian press. 30
It is the discourse on Badr that provides a framework for dealing with marginalisation and oppression. Local mosque conflicts are phrased in the Badr idiom of Muslims versus unbelievers. These disputes are dominated by references explicitly derived from the Badr paradigm; the enemies of Islam (maadui wa Uislam) and hypocrites (wanafiki) whose aim it is to extinguish the Light of God (kuizima Nuru ya Allah) and the desire for martyrdom (kujitooma muhanga).\(^{31}\) Despite their weakness the Badr Muslims received the victory and so the current trial (imtihani) will become a cooking stove (tanuri la kupikia) in which Tanzanian Muslim will be purified and empowered to fight the enemies.\(^{32}\)

b. Arafa

For many Muslims Arafa is essential as focal point of the imagined community in the Idd el-Hajj, as described in chapter 8. The fasting practice by Tanzanians simultaneous with the hajj rituals on Arafa constructs a powerful imagined community of the umma joined in worship. The ritual standing at Arafa is also an emotional peak in the hajj experience of Muslim pilgrims as described in chapter 9. The Arafa prayers were described as a means to define the boundaries of the Islamic moral community. Friends and loved ones are included while opponents of Islam are excluded from this meaningful site. Here we will turn to the place of Arafa as a historical paradigm, a discursive framework used to make sense of the current socio/political situation in Tanzania.

So many mythical and historical events are attributed to Arafa that the place seems to be imagined as a-historical and timeless. The multiple layers of significance mould past, present and future events into a single, powerful, spatial paradigm.\(^{33}\) The creation of the world as well as its final ending is connected to the plains of Arafa.\(^{34}\) Within this cosmogonic framework at least three formative historical events took place here. Adam and Hawa found each other here after being expelled from the Garden. Secondly prophet Ibrahim and his son Ismail were taught the ancient hajj rituals on this spot.\(^{35}\) The third and most important connotation of Arafa is found in the history of Muhammad. It is on the mountain Arafa that the final prophet of Islam presented his farewell sermon to the Islamic community. During his first and last hajj (hija ya kuaga) on Friday 9th Dhulhija, in the 10th year after his flight from Mecca, God revealed the concluding words of the Qur’an (Q 5:3): “Today I have perfected your religion for you.”\(^{36}\) This address is interpreted by most Muslims as the Prophet’s legacy, and therefore the reference to this sermon as being important is not something specific Tanzanian.\(^{37}\) But
the frequency of citing this speech and its paradigmatic application to interpret current social situations does reveal specific anxieties and concerns of Tanzanian Muslims.38

Different from Badr, the notion of Arafa as a real physical place is powerfully inscribed in the imagination of all Muslim pilgrims and reproduced in Swahili print. Often the importance of Arafa is ‘proved’ by quotations from authoritative Islamic texts.39 One of the prophetic reports for example prescribes a bath for every Friday, Idd el Fitr, Idd el-Hajj and the day of Arafa.40 ‘The hajj is Arafa’ Muhammad proclaimed on another occasion.41 Fasting together with the Arafa ‘standing’ is attributed to a textual prescription: “according to this logic (mantiki) many Muslims fasted on Wednesday April 16),” a newspaper reported.42 This fiqh opinion about the significance of Arafa is corroborated by Muslim experiences as phrased by numerous reports of hajjis.43 The importance of Arafa has lead to the belief that when the day of Arafa coincides with a Friday this will increase its merits, just as the Idd el-Fitr or the Idd el-Hajj.44 Both texts and witness reports are clear about the higher status of Arafa compared to the following day of sacrifice, 10 Dhulhija.

Arafa is, just like Badr, also reflected in the Tanzanian nomenclature: about one percent of the girls is called Arafa.45 Boy’s names are usually spelled Arafati or Araphati and refer primarily to the late Palestinian president (whose name is derived from the hajj site as well), but Arafa for boys is also used.46 Naming is one of the social and cultural tools to inscribe meaning and construct identity, although this influence can never totally define our selfhood. “Culture requires us to think, gives us forms – metaphors, dogmas, names, ‘facts’, - to think with, but does not tell us what to think” Cohen (1995:154) comments on the power of naming. Just like Badr as a boy’s name is used in Tanzania to evoke certain connotations and expectations about the male identity, Arafa for girls denotes ideas about female selfhood and their role in society. Different from what several studies on Islamic naming suggest (e.g. Grandqvist 1950; Goitein 1978) religious names are not limited to boys. A highly religious name like Arafa, pregnant with meaning, is given to girls rather than to boys in Tanzania. Together with the significance of Arafa as a metaphorical representation of the ideal Islamic community, this naming practice suggests that women are perceived as pivotal in the reproduction of this moral community.47

Apart from naming, the Arafa paradigm is employed to construct local rituals. The fasting on the day of Arafa resulting in purification and forgiveness of sins for two complete years has already been described. The
recommended practices on this day are mainly private; fasting, praying ten rak'as before the noon prayer, another four rak'as after the communal salat, the recitation of 50 times Sura Ikhlas (Q 112) and the reading of many supplications available in books and leaflets distributed outside the mosques.\textsuperscript{48} However, Arafa does not only denote individual purification, submission and contemplation. The notion of social empowerment is clearly visible in a national religio/political protest demonstration that took place in 2001. The activity was a joint product of two organisations: the Baraza Kuu and the Islamic Propagation Centre” (IPC). The origin of this demonstration can be traced to a vicious clash between state and Muslims. In 1998 the police and Field Force Units invaded the Mwembechai mosque in Dar es Salaam and in the subsequent riots at least four Muslims died. The victims of this incident were annually remembered on February 13\textsuperscript{th}, the solar date of the incident. The form these remembrance rituals took used to be the normal funeral khitma: a supplication (dua) performed in public.\textsuperscript{49} However this changed when in the wake of the national elections 2000, many more people died in confrontations between political protesters and riot police. A major ‘battle’ between government soldiers and Muslims took place on January 26 and 27 2001. Between 24 and 70 people were killed. This confrontation was the immediate cause to plan a large scale zafa (procession) and andamano (demonstration). The date was carefully chosen: Sunday 4 March 2001, the day of Arafa.

The public demonstration of mourning, fasting and standing in remembrance of the casualties from Mwembechai and January 26, showed a careful orchestration grafted on the well known Arafa practice of the hajj. The reason is to join the pilgrims in spirit and in action (kuunga na kwa vitendo). Both congregations were standing on the plains (viwanja vya Arafa and viwanja vya Jangwani). Their action was described in the same words: kusimama: ‘standing. Both groups listened to high ranked religious, male speakers: on Arafa the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia addressed the pilgrims and in Dar es Salaam the preacher Maalim Ali Bassaleh lectured to the Tanzanian congregation (plate 8). Both groups simultaneously started their ritual activity: in Dar es Salaam the protesters headed for their field around 10 a.m. (saa nne asubuhi) about the time the pilgrims left Mecca in the direction of the Arafa fields. In the same way as the Arafa pilgrims constructed their moral community in prayer (invoking God’s blessings for loved ones and God’s wrath for the enemies), so the Tanzanian mirror congregation told God their complaints and listed all the names of victims killed by hatred and injustice.\textsuperscript{50} Where the pilgrims stood waiting for the signal to leave after
sunset, the Dar es Salaam Muslims already left before the afternoon prayer to perform a procession (zafa) through town to be ended in the Mtambani mosque. Praying together and jointly breaking fast (futari) concluded the Dar es Salaam ritual.

The organisers emphasised the symbolic representation of the Arafa ritual as an icon of the whole Islamic umma and therefore urged women and children to join them. Pictures of the demonstration show mainly women to balance the male overrepresentation in this kind of events. People are asked to come in a state of ritual purity, further stressing the ideal of a pure and sanctified moral community. Just like the hajj which is often sponsored by home communities, Muslims from other provinces collected money in order to send a few of them to the Dar es Salaam ‘Arafa’ demonstration.

In the western part of the country (Mwanza), a similar event took place on the day of Arafa 2001. Already in 2000 Muslims from that part of Tanzania voiced their wish to have a second ritual commemoration of the Mwembechai martyrs on the west side of the country. In 2001 they succeeded. In Mwanza Muslims choose for their remembrance the site of the Aqswah-Buzuruga mosque. On this place the local law and order organisation guards (sungusungu), ‘forced Muslims to worship the sun and beat them with parts of the Qur’an.’ What specifically angered the Islamic community in the aftermath of this incident was the comment of the BAKWATA mufti Sheikh Hemed that it was not the Qur’an but ‘only’ Sura Yasin that was defiled.

All over the country the day of Arafa 4 March 2001 Muslims remembered a string of similar incidents and reproduced the ‘memory of oppression’ as described in the introduction: the abolishment of the EAMWS, the foundation of BAKWATA, the slandering of the Qur’an in Dodoma, the pork riots in Dar es Salaam, the ban on public religious gatherings (mihadhara). The day of Arafa offered a good occasion to remind Muslims on the clear pattern: enemies of Islam continuously attack the Muslim religion, Muslim possessions and Muslim lives. The Arafa paradigm clearly identified in- and out-group of the moral community; one of the banners reads “Mfumo Kristo ndio kiini cha mauaji Mwembechai na Zanzibar” (the Christian system is at the heart of the Mwembechai and Zanzibar killings). Muhammad’s farewell sermon on the plains of Arafa provided important clues to make sense of the social and political predicament perceived by Muslims (appendix III). One of the themes picked up from the prophet’s speech and elaborated in the discourse surrounding the Arafa demo 2001, is the inviolability of human life (utakatifu wa uhai). This sacred-
ness of all living things is linked to the holiness of the day of Arafa, to the month Dhulhija and the town of Mecca. According to the writers, this not only means the sanctity of life but also gives Muslims the responsibility to defend life and possessions against anyone who wants to destroy them. The prophet mentioned that all Muslims are brothers (fahamuni kuwa muislamu ni ndugu wa muislamu, na waislamu wote ni ndugu wamoja), and this is interpreted as an exclusion of non-Muslims from the moral community. The day of Arafa is not primarily a day of mourning but rather a day of requesting revenge. The hajj will not be of any significance for the Muslim if he only stands at Arafa but does not listen to the prophet's words spoken on this plain. Those believers having a grain of faith (chembe ya imani) should listen to the meaning of the day of Arafa and the inviolability of life and feeling touched when fellow Muslims are shot in the head on the Day of Congregation (yaumul Jumua). Is it possible for a Muslim to neglect this important political message when he realises that God Himself was a witness, the key note speaker asked?  

Apparently the Arafa paradigm offers opportunities to make sense of social realities, to perceive the predicament of marginalisation as ultimately meaningful. The ritual setting, its temporal and spatial references to Arafa constructed a powerful image of a united Muslim community. What happened in Mwembechai and in Zanzibar is in fact a serious infringement of ‘the first declaration of Human Rights’ (hilo likawa ndilo tangazo la kwanza la Haki za binadamu), declared by Muhammad in his Arafa speech. The richness of the paradigm allows for many different interpretations. Why Muslims sometimes choose one option and on other occasions prefer different readings is not a matter of change in texts but is shaped by cultural and social circumstances. The attribution of meaning to Arafa and its employment in local rituals can be linked to authoritative texts but can not be reduced to them. Arafa as an important element of the hajj is endorsed by texts, but to re-enact the Arafa standing as happened in Dar es Salaam, is likely to be condemned by Muslims in different contexts. One of the Arafa messages is interpreted by Muslims as individual salvation, purification and healing as expressed in the hadith “There is no other day on which Allah relieves more people from Hell fire then he does on the day of Arafa.” However this dimension is not so much emphasised by present day Tanzanians as is the more militant interpretations of defence, opposition (kupinga), revenge (kulipiza kisasi) and anger. The stress on empowerment instead of piety and purification fits the battle metaphors in the general hajj discourse.
c. Mina, Mecca and the Ka’ba

The third spatial and historical paradigm is equally rich as ‘Badr’ and ‘Arafa’ but more difficult to delineate. The valley of Mina is dominated by the town of Mecca, the Great Mosque and the Ka’ba. Depending on the context Swahili discourse often refers to these spatial elements rather than to the valley as a whole. Because blood spilling in the city of Mecca is not allowed, the animal sacrifice of the *hajj* should take place in Mina. Both places belong to the same sacred valley and their boundaries tend to blur in Swahili discourse. Mina as a historical site is associated with three major events: the building of the Ka’ba, and the near-sacrifices of Muhammad’s ancestors Ismail and Abdullah (see section 10.3.b). Before the time of Ibrahim, Mina used to be a barren place, where only the ruins of the original Ka’ba built by Adam were visible. When Ibrahim sent his son Ismail and wife Hajar into the desert, obeying God’s command, they arrived in this bleak, inhospitable place. After the angel Jibril revealed the well Zamzam to Hajar the valley miraculously turned into a fertile land and this finally lead to the foundation of Mecca and the rebuilding of the Ka’ba. The Ka’ba is presented as the starting point of true worship, the beginning of human civilisation, the aim of all prophets and the place where Muhammad’s revelations were brought to mankind.

All religious revolutions since Adam started from the Ka’ba. The closure of the Ka’ba and its subsequent demolishment will usher in the end of times. The American invasion of Iraq was phrased also in this eschatological idiom of an endangered Ka’ba.

Mina is also the place of two mythical sacrifices. Some Swahili sources attribute Mina’s fertility not only to the Zamzam well or to Ibrahim’s prayer mentioned in the Qur’an but also to the (intended) sacrifice of Ismail that took place here. It is in fact this foundational sacrifice that resulted in the beginning of Islamic civilisation, and is sometimes connected to the creation of the world itself. A second sacrificial event related to Mecca and the valley of Mina is the near-sacrifice of Abdullah bin Abdul Mutallib, Muhammad’s father. This sacrifice (to be described in the next section) was also prevented by God’s intercession. Although these mythical sacrifices are well known among Tanzanian Muslims, they certainly do not dominate the Mina paradigm.

For Muslims in Tanzania Mina is equal to the *hajj*. ‘The Days of Mina’ (*siku za Mina*) refer to the final days of the *hajj* (10-13 Dhulhija) when pilgrims stay in tents. The ‘moon of Mina,’ is meant as synonym for a crescent sighting in the Mecca region of the *hajj*. The *hajj* is the visit to the sacred epicentre of Islam. “In His wisdom Almighty God has chosen this place to be a sacred site (*mahala patukufu*) since He created Heaven and Earth.” Visit-
ing the House of God and all the holy places in and around Mecca bring the *hajji* both in spirit and in action close to God. Majid Hamza expresses this idea in a letter to the pilgrims: ‘*Huko mtaziona alama za Allah zitakazowapa ukaribu zaidi na Mola wenu*’ (There you will see/feel the signs of Allah bringing you closer to your Lord). The Ka’ba is a faithful copy of God’s House in heaven (*bayt al-ma’mur*), the *hajj* rituals mirror similar movements simultaneously performed by 70,000 angels. The Black Stone is the right hand of God, coming straight from Paradise to be grasped by mankind. The Ka’ba is the only place on earth where peace reigns, because God Himself chose this site. The *tawaf* is like circling the house of a loved one and kissing the Black Stone is an expression of one’s affection for God, like a lover kisses the letter of his friend. The seven circles round the Ka’ba, the seven trajectories between the hills and the seven pebbles hurled to Satan in the stoning ritual refer to God’s supreme excellence and the degrees of spiritual perfection. The mythical paradigms associated with the Mina site and historical actors like Adam, Ibrahim and Muhammad will encourage the Muslim to imitate the piety of the prophets.

The Mina paradigm as a structuring device to make sense of current social situations is less visible than Badr and Arafa. Although the Ka’ba (together with the crescent) is one of the most prominent visible representations of Islam, no children are named after the building as far as I know. Nor is the name Mina (or Muna) used for Tanzanian children, despite their inclusion in general Islamic naming books. The only ritual act linking Mina with Tanzanian locales is the animal sacrifice of the Idd el-Hajj. The simultaneous performance of the sacrifice joining two places together like the Arafa rituals discussed above is only seldom emphasised. One example: ‘Let’s join our fellows (*tunajiunga na wenzetu*) who slaughter over there at Mina and show our obedience to God.’ Apparently it is not the place which is the major focus of attention (as in the Arafa paradigm) here, but rather the sacrificial act itself that triggers the discourse.

3. **Sacrifices**

a. **Sacrificial paradigms**

Knowledge embodied in paradigms such as Arafa, Badr or Mina is more associative and different from the discursive elaborations found in historical and theological texts. Preachers invoking these paradigms are not concerned with the specific details; often a vague notion that it is written
‘somewhere’ is sufficient. The practical value, explanatory power and emotional effect of paradigms is much higher than textual accounts. Paradigms are blueprints that are easy to think with. When the Tanga preacher Bakri Abeid Kaluta was attacked on his preaching tour in Mwanza, he interpreted the event as similar to what happened to Prophet Muhammad. Paradigms do not spell out one particular meaning but rather refer to a series of events as a whole (Fernandez 1986). Rituals often make use of polyvalence and attribute multiple meanings derived from more than one paradigm to the same place and event. Through the blurring of time, space and event repetitive ritual occasions can easily shift between earlier mythical, historical paradigms often linked to the same spot. Characteristics of one person or place are easily attributed to other actors and places. The interpretation of animal sacrifice illustrates some of these paradigmatic processes.

The double meaning of many hajj rituals (purification and empowerment) is visible in the perceptions of animal sacrifice as well. The purificatory aspect of the sacrifice is anchored in prophetic reports like the following quote illustrates:

The Messenger (SAW) has very much stressed the importance of slaughtering an animal. He said that the sacrifice will deliver the slaughterer (kutamuokoa mchinjaji) from all evil in this world and the Hereafter.

Other Islamic traditions claim that the Idd animal will be resurrected on the Day of Judgement to testify for its owner’s piety and that every one of it’s hairs will be rewarded as if it had been a good deed. However this spiritual interpretation of the animal sacrifice on the Idd el-Hajj is quite rare in Swahili discourse. More often the redemptive, purificatory meaning of sacrifice is considered to be too close to the Christian theology of Jesus’ death.

As described above, the meaning of empowerment in which slaughtering an animal enables Muslims to fight injustice and political enemies, is more important than individual redemption and purification. This particular dimension is not limited to Mina as a place but rather connected to the spatial paradigms Badr and Arafa. It is the act of slaughtering that discursively connects the three paradigms and presents them as the essentialised image of the real time/place of the Islamic community. The Badr martyrs accomplished and finished the near-sacrifice of Ismail by giving up their lives for the sake of Islam. From Badr to present day politics is only one step:
Indeed the significance [of sacrifice] we have seen in the way how Muslims sacrificed themselves in Badr […] Today you have to meet the B-52, Apache and extremely heavy tanks (mizinga mizito mizito) of the enemies of Islam […] and if we pass this test (mtihani) in obedience God will increase our social status (danaja), as the Qur’an explains in this story of Ibrahim sacrificing his son.86

In the same lengthy article the three fields (Mina, Badr and Arafa) merge into one single eschatological place of congregation (uwanja wa his-abu), a place where the moral community of Islam is tried and tested.

A similar linkage between animal sacrifice and a historical battle paradigm is presented by Barahiyan in his Idd el-Hajj sermon 1997 (appendix IV). One of the prophet’s companions received the call to participate in the battle (Badr is not mentioned), while he and his wife were having sexual intercourse. He immediately obeyed the call to jihad, and was subsequently killed. The very instant he died, angels descended and started to wash his body on the field (uwanja). When the prophet observed this heavenly reward he informed what kind of activity the martyr had interrupted to answer the call of jihad. The companion’s wife told the prophet he had left her even without washing the sexual pollution. Barahiyan presents the story as an explanation of the Arabic name of the Idd el-Hajj (’id al-udhiyya), the day to voluntarily sacrifice yourself (kujitolea muhanga).87

The meaning of sacrifice and the day of the Idd el-Hajj is not intrinsic in the ritual itself, or derived from authoritative texts but rather constructed in the discursive connection with paradigms like Badr and Arafa (Table 11.1). ‘Slaughtering after Arafa’88 is not a neutral expression indicating that 10 Dhul-hija follows 9 Dhulhija, but it connects both days in a single paradigm: one cannot be interpreted without the other. The physical act of animal sacrifice is not emphasised in Swahili discourse. In all the newspapers I only once saw a picture of a sacrifice, whereas photographs of the Muslims praying and standing on Arafa often illustrate articles on the Idd el-Hajj.89 Both the ‘Day of Arafa’ and the ‘Day of Slaughtering’ merge into one single paradigm in many politico/religious meetings in Tanzania. Idd el-Hajj 1999 Muslims showed a videotape of the ‘Mwembechai killings’ to a large audience. The event was interpreted within the idiom of Arafa: “The image of this day is equal to the final hajj of the Prophet [and should] remind the Muslims of the Prophet’s saying on Arafa: your blood and your possessions are sacred.”90 The message was to unselfishly sacrifice (kujitaa muhanga) life and possessions to protect the Islamic community. In 2001 the Shinyanga sermon on the Idd el-Hajj claimed that the significance of Arafa should be derived from the animal sacrifice:
In a prayer on the day of Arafa and yesterday on the day of the Idd in the al-Farouq mosque, the philosophy of slaughtering (falsafa ya kuchinja) on the day of the Idd was explained as urging the believers to be ready to sacrifice themselves in order to protect life (kujitaa mhanga kulinda uhai).\(^9\)

The blurring of boundaries between Arafa and Mina paradigms turn both days into a single holiday, in which several historical actions and rituals are condensed. Some early prophetic reports cement both days together; they claim that although the forgiving of sins is promised on the day of Arafa, the actual atonement is only achieved when the first drop of blood from the Idd sacrifice reaches the ground (Chelhod 1955:202). Other Islamic traditions cite the prophet’s farewell sermon as having taken place on the day of Sacrifice rather than on the Arafa:

Once the Prophet was riding his camel and a man was holding its rein. The Prophet asked, “What is the day today?” We kept quiet, thinking that he might give that day another name. He said, “Isn’t it the day of Nahr (slaughtering of the animals of sacrifice)” We replied, “Yes.” He further asked, “Which month is this?” We again kept quiet, thinking that he might give it another name. Then he said, “Isn’t it the month of Dhulhija?” We replied, “Yes.” He said, “Verily! Your blood, property and honour are sacred to one another (i.e. Muslims) like the sanctity of this day of yours, in this month of yours and in this city of yours. It is incumbent upon those who are present to inform those who are absent because those who are absent might comprehend (what I have said) better than the present audience.”

The final quotation is from the Farewell sermon of the Prophet (appendix III) and is usually attributed to the Day of Arafa. Some versions continue this hadith with the sentence “this is the day of the Greater Pilgrimage” (yaum al-hajj al-akbar). The interpretations of this obscure expression differ. Some say that this is a reference to the hajj proper thus distinguishing it from the Lesser Pilgrimage or the umra. Others indicate that it refers to the day of the Idd el-Hajj, rather than the preceding day of Arafa.\(^9\) The expression “like the sanctity of this day” is used in Swahili discourse as evidence for the significance of the Day of Arafa (‘akikusudia siku hii ya Arafa’),\(^9\) while it could also be attributed to the following Idd el-Hajj. The ambiguous texts leave ample room for both interpretations and some authors use this freedom to claim that the Idd after all is the most important day of the hajj.\(^9\) The blurring between time and places is an
essential feature of ritual. Paradigmatic analysis of animal sacrifice in Tanzania shows that it is not only the re-enactment of Ismail’s sacrifice (Mina) but can just as easily be interpreted as the implementation of Muhammad’s sermon (Arafa) or as a reminder of the first Islamic martyrs (Badr).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11.1 Comparison between historical paradigms and Tanzanian rituals.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Badr</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>historical/cosmogonic event</td>
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<tr>
<td>historical actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hajj ritual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzanian ritual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local time frame</td>
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<td>Nomenclature</td>
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<td>semantic themes</td>
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b. Ibrahim and Muhammad

As mentioned earlier the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice can be connected to several historical sites and paradigms. Each of these paradigms is dominated by one or more historical actors. Attributing important sacrificial narratives to these male protagonists is the rule rather than the exception in monotheistic religions (cf. Jay 1992). Shifts in these paradigms also involve a shifting emphasis from one mythical/historical actor to another. Here the sacrifice attributed to Ibrahim and Muhammad will be presented.

The Idd el-Hajj is intimately linked with the prophet Ibrahim, his life and struggle against polytheism. Ibrahim was a Muslim, performed the *salat* and erected the Ka’ba in which direction Muslims pray. His foot has imprinted the sacred soil when he built the House of God and at this mark (*maqam* Ibrahim) the pilgrims pray after finishing their ritual circulation around the Ka’ba. Ibrahim also founded the *hajj*:

> And remember Ibrahim and Ismail raised the foundations of the House (With this prayer): “Our Lord! Accept (this service) from us: For Thou art the All-Hearing, the All-knowing (Q 2:127).

Ibrahim is the best example to follow, the Father of Faith (*baba wa imani*) and the perfect submissive believer, and Muhammad’s predecessor. In prayers and in sermons on the Idd el-Hajj the association between the animal sacrifice and Ibrahim’s trial is pointed out. A temporal link between Ibrahim and the Islamic lunar calendar is established on the 8th Dhulhija which is called ‘the day of the dream’ (*siku ya ndoto*). On this night Muslims remember the dream in which Ibrahim was commanded to sacrifice his son. However, the *hajj* and its meaning as ascribed above show that there is no syntagmatic ritual chain in which all rituals together re-enact a single Ibrahimian narrative. Rather some rituals are connected with Ibrahim, Hajar and Ismail, but others derive their meaning from the Muhammadan paradigm.

In most of the general, introductory and educational literature the *hajj* rituals are explained with reference to the history of Ibrahim; not surprisingly since the Qur’an itself emphasises Ibrahim’s role in the foundation of the *hajj*. His building of the Ka’ba, the temptation by Satan and the sacrifice of his son are remembered in the pilgrimage. His wife Hajar and his son Ismail are buried near the Ka’ba and their frantic search for water is re-enacted by Muslims in the running between Safa and Marwa. Although Ibrahim and his
family are the focal point and the centre of the hegemonic discourse in the 
*hajj* literature, this by no means excludes other paradigms.  

Islamic discourse increasingly attributes the same characteristics to 
Ibrahim and Muhammad: both destroyed the idols, and restored the mon-
otheistic faith. Both left behind their divine teachings in books (although 
Ibrahim’s book is not longer available as a seperate volume). Both per-
formed a *hijra* out of a pagan idolatrous town, and both are mentioned daily 
in the Muslim *salat*. The *hajj* is a visit to Ibrahim and the *ziyara* to Medina 
is described as the visit to the Prophet Muhammad. The pilgrims who per-
form these visits in one year receive a tremendous reward. The goal of the 
*hajj* is to imitate Ibrahim (*kujipaka rangi ya nabii Ibrahim*) and to follow 
Muhammad. Because of the merging of these two ﬁgures, the meaning of 
several *hajj* rituals can easily switch between different layers of signiﬁcance 

When it comes to the interpretation of the *hajj* in times when the 
local moral community is endangered (the death of Mwembechai Muslims 
in 1998, or the Zanzibar protesters in 2001), the paradigmatic focus shifts 
from Ibrahim to Muhammad. An example is the stone throwing rite on the 
ﬁnal three days of the *hajj*. The common historical explanation mentioned 
above (temptation of Ibrahim, Ismail and Hajar) is sometimes eclipsed by 
writers who stress the link to the Muhammadan historical events. The three 
pillars resemble the army of the elephants threatening to enter and destroy 
the town of Mecca in the year when Muhammad was born. God defeated 
this army by sending birds carrying stones they threw on the assailants. 

One of the reasons behind this shift might be found in the need for 
empowerment which is more clearly reﬂected in the Muhammadan paradigm 
than in the Ibrahimian narrative. Although both Ibrahim and Muhammad 
had to ﬁght against the religious and political establishment (mentioned in 
the Swahili discourse as *serikali*, government!), the oppositional forces in 
Muhammad’s time are better known. The biography of Muhammad offers 
excellent chances to call personal enemies with names from the Prophet’s 
adversaries. For example Abu Jahl (who was killed in the battle of Badr) 
can be likened with the American president Bush. The Tanga AMYC direc-
tor is described by his opponents as ‘Abu Bakr from the outside, Abu Lahab 
within’. The sacriﬁce in Mina reﬂecting Ibrahim’s obedience is interpreted 
within the paradigm of Muhammad’s Arafा sermon and then turns into a call 
for revenge and social justice, as described above. However, there is another 
important aspect of sacriﬁce in the Muhammadan paradigm.
The sermon I recorded when I waited in a Tanga classroom explicitly links the sacrificial stories of Ibrahim and Muhammad. After some ten minutes spent on the well known narrative of Ismail and Ibrahim the boy invited to edify the class devotes about the same time to a similar story attributed to Muhammad’s grandfather. This is based on a prophetic record in which Muhammad claims "I am the son of two sacrifices" and elaborated by Ibn Hisham’s early biography of the Prophet. The first sacrificial victim refers to Ismail and the second to Muhammad’s father Abdullah. One day his grandfather Abdul Mutallib vowed to sacrifice his son Abdullah as a tribute to the pagan idols. Through human intervention he was finally ransomed by 100 camels. Ibrahim first started with a small sacrifice (a bullock) and then increased it to a camel until he understood God’s wish to sacrifice his son (Combs-Schilling 1989:235); Muhammad’s grandfather started with his real son and finally came up with 100 camels as a substitution. The same story is repeated in Ibn Nubata’s sermon, cited annually in the Tanga mosques.

While Delaney (1998:164) describes the story between brackets and thinks that ‘this assertion does not seem to be much elaborated’ my opinion is that the attribution of this narrative to Muhammad’s ancestor is crucial to emphasise the redemptive meaning of sacrifice. God’s favour of the lineage is now bestowed upon Muhammad and a sacrificial narrative containing the elements trial and success is added to prove this.

Swahili sources emphasise God’s saving intercession in these paradigms while at the same time the willing cooperation of the victim is underlined. Saleh Farsy explains in his famous *tafsir*:

The prophet Muhammad is among the generation/offspring (kizazi) of Nabii Ismail who wanted to be sacrificed (alitaka kuchinjwa) and then was saved (aka-okoleta). Likewise his father Abdullah wanted to be sacrificed and then was saved. Therefore the Messenger is called ‘Ibnudh dhabhyhayn’, that is ‘child of the two sacrifices.’

Also the boy-preacher in the classroom stressed the liberation (*ukombozi*) as the guideline in both stories. In religious Swahili narratives it is in the first place God who released the prophets Ismail and Muhammad and through them the whole Islamic community. The narrative techniques of this liberation are similar to those of the Badr victory. In both cases 70,000 angels delivered the saving message and helped to achieve the final outcome of the trial. A 14 year old *madrasa* pupil in his own spelling:
tunachinja kwa sababu ya kumkomboa mtoto wa mtume aitwae Ismail. kwa sababu baba yake alioteshwa na m[wenyezi]/mungu kuwa amchinje mwanawe basi ndipo m/mungu akamkomboa Isimaila kwa kuchinja kondoo ndipo waisilamu wakachinja kila siku ya idihaj

(We slaughter because the saving of the child of the prophet named Ismail. Because his father was tested by A[lmighty]/God to slaughter his son. And then A/God saved Isimaila by slaughtering a sheep and then the Muslims slaughter every day of the Idd el-Hajj)

The boundaries between God as the one who interceded on behalf of his community and Ismail/Muhammad who saved the community by their willingness to be sacrificed are blurring in many discourses. Especially the mawlid speeches in Tanga show many references to Muhammad as the Saviour (mkombozi) who delivered the divine Islamic community from their ignorance. Here we come very close to the concept of kafara described in the context of the akika and the siku ya mwaka rituals. As discussed there the problem of attributing a redeeming and atoning function of the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice, brings the ritual too close to the Christian concept of sacrifice. Perhaps for this reason we find the sacrificial meaning of ‘saving’ (komboa) and ‘rescue’ (okoa) primarily in the marginal Islamic communities (cf. Lazarus-Yafeh 1981:48-57). However it should not surprise us that they are present in current Swahili discourse: the liberating power of Ismail’s and Muhammad’s sacrifice very well fit the Tanzanian paradigms already described. Further evidence is provided by the sacrificial paradigms employed by two other marginal Islamic groups: Shi’ites and Ahmadiyya’s.

c. Shi’a perception of Arafa and sacrifice

Among both Sunnites and Shi’ites the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice is closely related to the Arafa paradigm. It is here that the Shi’ites situate the continuation of the divine spiritual lineage from Muhammad to his son in law Ali and their sons the imams Hassan and Hussayn. Shi’a religious imagination has developed its own rituals connected to Arafa, reflecting mainly the connotation of martyrdom and oppression. The Ummayads used the day of Arafa to curse ‘Ali and all the Shi’a dissenters. The struggle for Muhammad’s spiritual succession is remembered on the plains of Arafa. The day of Arafa in 71 Hijra saw a specific contest between four different groups on the leadership of the Islamic community. Among all the political contesters, only Imam Zainul Abidin spent this day in piety and prayer and thus deserved to
be the rightful heir of the prophet.\textsuperscript{118} Shi‘ite hajjis therefore spend the Arafa day to pray special prayers ascribed to Imam Hussayn and Imam Ali Zayn al Abidin.\textsuperscript{119} Azra Walji from Dar es Salaam tells us:

> the Dua of Arafaat is a lengthy and detailed Du'a from our 3\textsuperscript{rd} Imam which really causes us to ponder deeply on the bounties we enjoy from Him creating us perfecting us and blessing us with guidance an inspiration out of His grace.\textsuperscript{120}

Arafa is not limited to the place in Saudi Arabia, but is also extensively celebrated in Karbala, the shrine where the murder of Hussayn is remembered. A chat forum relates “I did da Arafa this yr alhamdolillah. It was simply out of this world…it was very touching.”\textsuperscript{121} Connotations of one place have thus been translated to another place, cemented together by the notion of sacrifice. Arafa becomes an easy template to model and inscribe different events on. The near-sacrifice of Ismail is mystically connected to the real sacrifice of Hussayn bin Ali. According to the poet Muhammad Iqbal the history of the Ka’ba is defined by these two sacrifices (Ismail and Hussayn). The Shi‘ites see in the latter sacrifice the completion and fulfilment of the first, unfinished sacrifice.\textsuperscript{122}

d. Ahmadiyya perception of Arafa and sacrifice

The same intimate connection between sacrifice and the divine rescue of the community is found among the Ahmadiyya. In the Swahili discourse dealing with the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice the marginalised Ahmadiyya community turns into Ismail and the persecution by other Muslims is part of the trial of Ibrahim.\textsuperscript{123} In an alternative version it is the promised Messiah, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who sacrificed his life in order to save the umma (alipotoa dhabihu maisha yake).\textsuperscript{124}

Different from the Sunni and the Shi‘a discourse this sacrificial analogy is not tied to a specific spatial paradigm such as Arafa or Karbala. The overall Ahmadiyya discourse shows a preference for the Ibrahimian paradigm (Mina, Ka’ba) rather than the Muhammadan paradigm (Arafa, Badr).\textsuperscript{125} Arafa has never been developed in a symbolic marker of the Ahmadiyya imagined community, not even in the era they celebrated the Idd el-Hajj together with Mecca. Apparently the link with Saudi Arabia, the enemy who excluded the Ahmadiyya community from the hajj since the 1970s, prevents them from making Arafa the centre of their own spiritual community.\textsuperscript{126} Instead, “Mecca” stands for oppression, ignorance and rejection of the truth. Bi Salima, an Ahmadiyya believer from Tanga wrote a poem in which the recurring theme
"RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS"

was “Makka sasa yakubali, Isa yuko kaburini” (Mecca acknowledge now, Isa is buried). Mecca is in this context the whole, non-Ahmadiyya Islam, symbolised by Saudi Arabia, who rejects the truth that Jesus really died and is buried, one of the central themes in Ahmadiyya theology. When historical and spatial paradigms are mentioned, they receive only a spiritual meaning: “Arafa is to recognise and to acknowledge [the Islamic truth], Mina means hope and expectations, and slaughtering is destroying your own animal-like lust.” This is the real imitation of the prophet Ibrahim who also sacrificed all his own wishes and desires. Selfsacrifice (kujitaa muhanga) in order to achieve the will and love of God (mapenzi ya Mungu, note the reference to their newspaper!). Instead of focussing attention on Muhammad or Ibrahim, they zoom in on the victim, Ismail and its place of sacrifice Mina.

The Qur’an is silent about which son of Ibrahim was actually ordered to be sacrificed: Isaac or Ismail. Following Judeo/Christian tradition early Islamic historiography favoured Isaac in this role rather than Ismail (Bell 1933; Firestone 1989; Brisebarre 1998:15-17; Rashed 1998:175-179; Abdel-salam 1999; Bonte 1999). In course of time the balance switched and present day Swahili discourse does not even indicate the possibility of Isaac being meant in the sacrificial narrative. Most of the non-Muslim Tanzanian press assume that Isaac is mentioned as the victim in the Qur’an. The debate got a major impetus with the publication of the Christian book Wana wa ibrahimu: wakristo na Waislamu (Children of Ibrahim: Christians and Muslims) by H.P. Anglars. The Muslim reaction Wana wa Ibrahimu katika Biblia (Children of Ibrahim in the Bible) by Kawemba Mohamed Ali and Othman Matata, must be situated against the background of the Deedat inspired da’wa movement.

The Ahmadiyya are the only group who systematically mentions this controversy in their Idd el-Hajj discourse. They focus more on the victim Ismail and the weak Hajar than on the sacrificer Ibrahim. Perhaps their history of oppression and marginalisation plays a role in this. Among others they published a book in reaction to Anglars’ work: Mwana mkuu wa Ibrahimu (The great son of Ibrahim), by Jamil Rafiq, missionary in Tanzania from 1975 till 1980. The Jewish and Christian idea that Isaac was the one to be sacrificed is refuted and Ahmadiyya authors use the Bible to prove that. Isaac was the second son of Ibrahim but the Jewish custom was to sacrifice only first sons. Moreover Genesis 22:1 declares ‘your only son’ and Isaac never was the only son, but Ismail was before Isaac was born. The second argument is that both Christians and Jews abolished the sacrifice, while Muslims, the rightful heirs of Ismail, continued this practice. Ismail was also the son of
the promise, and not Isaac. Ismail was turned into a wakfu that is, separated for the work of God. The role of Ibrahim's dream is greatly stressed, apparently because also the final prophet, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was made aware of his calling by dreams. Finally the circumcision is the proof that Ismail was the chosen one and not Isaac who was not yet born when God entered into a covenant with Ibrahim (Genesis 17:26).

The Bible is used to prove how Ismail is the real son of Ibrahim, through which the pure religion will be preserved. For example Deuteronomy 33: 2

And he said, The LORD came from Sinai, and rose up from Seir unto them; he shined forth from mount Paran, and he came with ten thousands of saints: from his right hand [went] a fiery law for them (King James).

This text, according to the Tanzanian Ahmadiyya author, clearly refers to Muhammad. Paran is Farani in Arabic and refers to the ‘two refugees’ (dual of far’, fugitive), Ismail and his mother Hajar. Mount Paran therefore is Mecca, the only hill in the region used by Ismail to build the town of Mecca, and peacefully occupied by ‘ten thousands of saints’ by the son of Ismail: Muhammad.

Together with pamphlets on the general corruption of Christian feasts and holy scriptures the Isaac/Ismail discourse functions to make a significant distinction between the Christian spiritual lineage and the Islamic genealogy. Towards Christians the line Ibrahim/Ismail/Muhammad must be made clear, while debates with Muslims focus on the continuity of this line towards Ghulam Ahmad. The divinely ordained sacrifice which is remembered in the Idd el-Hajj offers the opportunity to show God’s grace for the Ahmadiyya community. Jamil Rafiq, a Tanzanian missionary, quoted Sayidna Ahmad in his Idd el-Hajj sermon: ‘with my own hand I have planted the tree of Ismail’. In this way he compared himself with Ibrahim, and the Tanzanian Ahmadiyya community with Ismail: ‘Just like the light of Muhammad entered the world through a sacrifice, now the Ahmadiyya community must sacrifice itself in order to let the light return.’

4. Conclusion

The meaning of the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania is constructed by references to the hajj rituals and the historical paradigms associated with them. One of the most dominant explanations of the Idd el-Hajj is in terms of empowerment and defence against an oppressive government. This explanation
skilfully includes some semantic themes of the *hajj* (soldiers, battle, etc) and excludes others or pushes them to a second place (for example purification and healing). The three historical paradigms discussed here (Badr, Araf and Mina) all show surprisingly similar connotations in the IPC discourse: the image of a marginalised Muslim community against an oppressive government. References to events like the battle of Badr or the Ibrahimian sacrificial narrative allow the Muslim to perceive God’s saving intercession towards the Islamic community in different times and places. The Araf paradigm in which Muhammad draw the outlines of the ideal Muslim community, gives the opportunity to interpret the sacrifice in terms of revenge and resistance.

The ambivalent texts, the multiple layers of significance related to the *hajj* sites, the ability to switch between the paradigms allow Muslims to adapt the Idd el-Hajj meaning according to the changing social situation. The preference to interpret the ritual in an Ibrahimian or Muhammadan idiom is often connected with the perception of one’s own moral community. Two marginal groups like the Shi’ites and the Ahmadiyya are both preoccupied with the authoritative lineage after Muhammad. Shi’ites see God’s revelation continue through ’Ali and the subsequent imams while Ahmadiyya extend the link to the 19th century Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Both groups interpret the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice accordingly. Shi’ites connect the festival to the murder of Hussayn at Karbala while Ahmadiyya very much focus on the link between the victim Ismail (in contrast to the Judeo/Christian interpretation of Isaac) and the marginalised, uprooted Ahmadiyya community.

Just like Smith (1992) describes how the development of Christian calendrical festivals connected to sacred sites such as the Holy Sepulchre enabled the ritual to transcend a particular place, the Idd el-Hajj can be seen also as “establishing a hierarchy of significance that focuses the devout attention, chiefly achieved by adding a temporal dimension to the locative experience” (Smith 1992:90-92). In the Christian example this was done by the construction of a fixed sequence of feasts in an annual cycle such as Christmas, Eastern and Pentecost. In the Tanzanian Idd el-Hajj the processes involve the choice of temporal and spatial paradigms which are exported, replicated and reconstructed in different times and places.

While the number of choices may be limited by the availabel textual traditions and the wish to construct behaviour in conformity to the Prophetic example, the freedom in the ‘bricolage’ of the different elements together is still enormous. The final outcome of each choice is the creation of different configurations of temporal and spatial dimensions expressing
the needs of differently perceived moral communities. The metaphorical linkages between a specific chronotopical community (e.g. Badr, Arafa) and the current Tanzanian community, enables the latter to be transformed in the direction of the former, to ‘move in quality space’ as Fernandez (1986) expressed it.
Part IV

CHRONOTOPES
12.

**Praying, preaching and playing:**
the moral community defined

1. **Introduction**

   An important question addressed in the final three chapters of this book is whether the discussions in the first parts have any relevance for local Tanga citizens. What is the relation between ethnographic practice of the Idd el-Hajj and concerns with the present day Islamic moral community as a social group? This chapter describes two of the three rituals of the Idd el-Hajj: the communal prayer (salat) and the sermon (khutba). The third element (animal sacrifice) will be the subject of the final two chapters. In the first section the relationship between prayer, sermon and sacrifice is central: do they belong together, is each of them essential for the Idd el-Hajj? The following two sections deal with the salat and the khutba as rituals that represent and construct the ideal community as it should be. Especially the khutba reveals the tensions between this imagined community and the real time/real place Tanzanian society. Therefore the drawing of the moral boundaries and guarding of this community against pollution and the guidance of its members is a central concern in several of the Tanga sermons. The final part describes some other meetings on the day of the Idd el-Hajj: the national Baraza la Idd, broadcast on television and radio, and all kind of social and sports events.

2. **Prayer, sermon and sacrifice**

   The most conspicuous, visible and important ritual on the Idd el-Hajj is the prayer (salat). Idd celebration is almost always indicated by the Swahili words ‘kusala Idd’ (praying the Idd). The discussion why it is important to celebrate the Idd el-Hajj together with other Muslims is dominated by examples taken from the salat (‘why don’t we pray on the same day?’) rather
than the sacrifice, as we described above. To participate in the communal festive prayer on the morning of the Idd is perceived as the most important religious act of the holiday. 80% of the girls (n = 100) and 90% of the boys (n = 273) indicated that they joined one of the Idd prayers on the Idd el-Hajj in 2002. Even if this number might be exaggerated, it emphasis the social importance attached to the practice. People who prayed almost certainly listened to the subsequent sermon (khutba) as well. Only very few Muslims walk away after the Idd prayers.

The AMYC Muslims often celebrate the Idd el-Hajj one or more days ahead of the majority, because of their opinion that the holiday should be celebrated together with the hajj at Mecca. In order to get an impression how many students in 2001 actually participated in this early AMYC salat I asked three questions immediately after the holiday (appendix I): “When did you celebrate the first day of the Idd el-Hajj?” (question 2.1); “If anyone in your house has performed a sacrifice, on which day did they slaughter the animal?” (question 2.4); “When did you pray the Idd salat?” (question 2.22). The three questions make a difference between ‘celebration’, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘salat’. According to the answers of 399 students the day of celebration and the day of the Idd prayer were perceived as the same. Some 14% prayed together with the AMYC on Monday 5 March 2001 while 82% celebrated the first day of the Idd el-Hajj one day later with the majority of the traditional Tanga mosques on Tuesday. The percentages on the first and the third question did not show any significant difference. However the question on the day of sacrifice revealed a slightly different picture: 21% indicated the day of sacrifice as being the previous Monday (i.e. the day AMYC prayed and sacrificed) while 78% of the households sacrificed on the next day. This percentage of the Monday sacrifices is much higher than expected. Apparently a substantial group sacrifices one day earlier than they pray.

After analysis of each case a couple of reasons for separating sacrifice and prayer can be presented. In some instances it is clear that the student lives in a house where the sacrificer belongs to the AMYC minority. The respondent however prefers to stay within the local tradition and prays together with the majority. The preference for the salat on Tuesday instead of Monday might be attributed to their social background: a substantial majority of this group belongs to the autochthonous Digo and is connected to one of the traditional Maawa-l Islam schools (madrasa and secondary school). To justify this behaviour the student refers to the difference between the sacrifice and the salat. The former has a counterpart in the hajj-sacrifice in Mina and therefore both should be performed simultaneously or at least on the
same day. The salat however is a particular local practice, without any hajj equivalent and this should be performed according to the local calendar. A second, and more mundane, explanation is that quite a few people slaughter one day earlier in order to have the Idd meal ready early next day. Just like Rashed (1998:199) described for the Egyptian Idd el-Hajj, this unexciting rationalisation is commonplace in Tanzania.

During the Idd el-Hajj 2001 and 2002 none of my neighbours and members of the communal household I lived in, sacrificed an animal. About five houses down the street there was an Arab who slaughtered a goat, but people in the house could not mention any other case in the neighbourhood. The Indian widow who owned the house and lived a couple of blocks down town had a goat slaughtered in 2002. The survey among students and madrasa pupils confirms this relative lack of interest in animal sacrifice. In 2000 217 out of 368 (59%) households actually slaughtered an animal. In 2001 only 192 out of 351 (54.7%), reported a sacrifice during the Idd el-Hajj. According to Islamic texts available in Tanzania only sheep, goats, cows and camels count as ‘real’ Idd sacrifices. The percentage after subtracting the chickens and fowl drops to 43% of all the households. Even this percentage is biased, because some pupils describe a case well known to them, but not in their own house as the question explicitly stipulated. All things considered, the actual percentage of Tanga households having animals slaughtered as understood in Islamic authoritative texts might be well under 40%. Rural figures are considerably lower.

The Tanga ‘disinterest’ in animal sacrifice, which seems to be representative for other Tanzanian cities as well, provokes some complaints from preachers across all denominations. Not sacrificing according to God’s command reveals the fact that the Muslim community has lost its bearings. The AMYC mention the lack of interest in sacrifice among the most lamentable innovations in Tanga. In one of the sermons, their preacher urged Muslims to look at their West African brethren who are much more active on the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice. In Barahiyan’s sermon (appendix IV) he interprets the sacrifice as something to express the obedience of the believer. He explains the philosophy of the sacrifice with the Islamic narrative of someone who slaughtered a fly for the idols and went to hell and a believer who refused to do so and received the eternal reward of Paradise. According to him sacrifice has the same religious status as the salat, because the Qur’an mentions both in the same sentence ‘to thy Lord turn in prayer and sacrifice’ (Q 108:2).

Despite the uncertainty if this text really refers to the Idd el-Hajj, it is the only citation invoked to underscore the importance of the sacrifice.
In the famous collection of Swahili sermons Lassenga cites the verse in the following way:

Follow the Sunna of the prophet and don’t follow Shaytan. He is whispering in your ear you shouldn't sacrifice. But Fear Almighty God, ye Muslims! Sacrifice and you will prosper/ pass the test (chinjeni ili mpate kufaulu). That is what God us commanded to do: “We have given you the fount of abundance (al-kawthar), therefore turn to thy Lord in prayer and sacrifice” (Q 108:2).  

The Ahmadiyya community likewise criticises the Tanzanian attitude to downplay the importance of animal sacrifice. Not sacrificing situates the Muslim outside the community. They quote the hadith: ‘He who is able to sacrifice a sadaka [on the Idd el-Hajj] but does not do so, he should not come near our mosques.’ The imam of the al-Nisa mosque in Tanga mentioned in his Idd el-Hajj sermon (23 February 2002) he could not believe that people could not save 15,000 Shilling (USD 15) in a whole year in order to accomplish this divine commandment of sacrifice. He ascribes this attitude to a ‘roho mbaya’ (bad spirit), the moral bankruptcy of the Tanzanian community. At the same time he mentions the mediating role of the prophet Muhammad in his sacrificial practice. When he celebrated the Idd el-Hajj in Medina he sacrificed two rams: one was his personal sacrifice and the second he slaughtered on behalf of his community. Also the well known Islamic hadith mentioning the return of the sacrificial animal on the Day of Resurrection together with its horns, its hairs and its hooves to witness the faith of his slayer, is never mentioned in Swahili sermons.

What becomes clear from these sermon fragments is that authoritative texts concerning the legal status of the Idd el-Hajj rituals are inadequate as a sole explanation for the perceived difference between prayers and sacrifice. The Shafi’i tradition prescribes the sacrifice as a ‘sunna mu’akkida’ (well established, confirmed prophetic custom) and a communal obligation instead of a personal one. But the salat has the same status: most of the Swahili scholars perceive it as a ‘sunna iliyosisitizwa’ or ‘sunna iliyotiliwa mkazo sana’ (a translation of the Arabic ‘sunna mu’akkida’). This is in contrast to the salat on Friday which has a higher legal status and is required for every free, male town citizen. However several Muslim scholars outside the Shafi’i tradition perceive the ritual as wajib (required). Their reasoning is twofold: the Prophet never missed a single Idd prayer in his life and secondly God wrote in his Word ‘pray and sacrifice’ (Q 108:2).
The low figures (compared to other Muslim communities) of actual sacrificial practice should not seduce us to rash conclusions about the superficial state of Islamisation in general or the irrelevance of Islamic calendrical rituals in particular. Earlier chapters showed that Islamic discourses on the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania are very much concerned with the moral quality of the religious society and the protection of the marginalised community against a secular/Christian government. Animal sacrifice in the Idd el-Hajj is clearly not seen as the most important tool to express religious identity. However, the particular way different groups in Tanga perform, neglect and discuss the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice offers the opportunity to discover more about the intricacies of identity and ritual.

3. **Salat: the ideal imagined community**

   **a. Performance**

   The Idd *salat* represents the ideal Islamic community more than the daily *salat* and the Idd el-Hajj *salat* even more than the Idd el-Fitr prayer. In all cases the congregation worships one God, in one language and as one body. What makes the Idd *salat* different from the daily prayers is its visibility and the inclusion of women and children. The imagined connection with the pilgrims in Mecca makes the Idd el-Hajj distinct from the Idd el-Fitr. This image is especially strong when the congregation prays outside in the open as is the case with the AMYC and the Ahmadiyya communities. Because of this representative function of the *salat* among these two groups we find special admonitions for women and children to be present. Even if women have their monthly periods they are urged to witness the ritual ‘in the margin of the prayer field’ (watasubiri kando ya mahala pa kusali). The mosque communities do not invite women for their Idd prayers and sometimes even forbid them to participate. But on the prayer fields women and children are necessary symbols to represent the complete Islamic umma. On the fields women and children pray in the last ranks, leaving a large space between them and the ranks of the men. They number about one fifth of the whole group.

   Discussions on the *salat* are geared towards disciplining the moral community and streamlining the representation of the community into a harmonious ideal united in spirit and in worship. Just like the discourse on the proper Idd date revealed, in matters concerning the *salat* it is more important to show the same movement (e.g. raising your hands or folding
them after the takbir) than performing the correct gesture. The neat rows during the salat must be maintained till the sermon is finished, according to an Ahmadiyya writer, because the community is an organic structure (nisha-mu) and not a collection of ‘unruly sheep’. Here the Idd el-Hajj salat is taken as a model of and a model for the ideal society.

The Idd day is lifted out of the normal temporal flow and emphasised as different in many aspects. The preparation of the believer before the Idd el-Hajj prayer consists of washing, donning beautiful clothes and refraining from any food. Most Muslims come on foot (which is recommended by authoritative texts) but also quite a few cars arrive at the prayer areas. Texts prescribe Muslims to return through a different way than they arrived at the Idd salat. Men are encouraged to put on perfume (forbidden for women) and also a dress code is provided: a red shawl or neckerchief (kashida). Many men in Tanga do actually wear a Palestinian like ‘keffiya’ either black and white or red and white chequered. Their kanzu (robes) are in the majority of cases white or lightly coloured, but also black, blue and green are well represented. Sameja agrees that all colours of Idd clothing are acceptable ‘even if they are not white’. On the Idd day food and drinks should be better prepared and more luxurious than on normal days and even the sacrificial animal should be bigger than usual animals. Different from the normal Friday ritual where the salat follows the sermon, the Idd prayer is performed before the khutba. Nor has the Idd salat any formal call to prayer (adhan or iqama). Further differences are the brevity (only two rak’as) and the religious status: while Friday prayers must be performed communally, the Idd prayer can be done individually. Just like the Idd is extra-temporal, so the activities should be beyond the normal.

The festival prayer is the first public event on the Idd el-Hajj. The prescribed time of the Idd salat is somewhere between sunrise and noon, ‘when the sun has risen and moved through the sky as high as the length of one spear above the horizon.’ In practice the most common time in Tanga is between 7 and 9 am. It is recommendable to pray earlier on the Idd el-Hajj than on the Idd el-Fitr, because breakfast precedes the salat in the latter case while on the Idd el-Hajj people fast till the prayers are finished. Only the Ahmadiyya movement really tries to establish the custom of different times for Idd prayers (8 or 8.30 a.m. for Idd el-Fitr, 7.30 a.m. Idd el-Hajj), although these attempts usually fail. The prayers I witnessed in 2001 and 2002 at the AMYC were performed at 7.30 am (both Idd el-Hajj and Idd el-Fitr) although announcements were made in 2002 that Idd el-Hajj prayers would be held at 7 am. The mosque al-Nisa started prayers at 7.45 am (23 February 2002),
and the BAKWATA Idd prayer in Dar es Salaam started 7.30 am, according to the local press.  

In all cases people flocked to the prayer areas and mosques much earlier, loudly chanting the *takbir* in Arabic: “Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar, la illaha illallah, allahu akbar, allahu akbar, wa lillahi l-hamd…” (God is great, God is great, there is no god but Allah; God is great, God is great and all praise be to God…”). The tradition is justified by the Qur’anic verse 2: 185 ('He wants you to glorify Him') and Q 2: 203 ('Celebrate the praises of Allah during the appointed days.') Though the *takbir* is recommendable on many occasions Muslims perceive the formula as something characteristic for the Idd el-Hajj.  

A Tanga sheikh told me: ‘On this day, even if you see a living goat, you should say a *takbir*.” Both Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj *salat* contain 12 additional *takbirs* (7 in the first *rak’a* and 5 in the second) but the period of *takbir* chanting on the Idd el-Fitr is much shorter than on the Idd el-Hajj. On the former occasion it starts with the crescent sighting and ends a few hours later immediately after the *khutba*. During the Idd el-Hajj *takbir* recitation starts on the day of Arafa (9 Dhulhija and continues throughout the *hajj* days until 13 Dhulhija; it reaches a crescendo just before the communal *salat*.

The *takbir* on the Idd el-Hajj is the audible representation of the Muslim community in public space. It is in the first place a sound of the Islamic umma that celebrates the praise of God but several other connotations are also present. The *takbir* can express consent at different occasions such as during sermons, when passing by the bodies of killed Palestinian collaborators, or the announcement of the new Islamic university in Morogoro. *Takbir* is also weapon because it contains the powerful name of God; it is perceived as an aggressive means to claim the public space. The ban on female *takbir* chanting is telling in this respect: it does not physically deny women access to the public space, but it mutes their voices. Shouting ‘Allahu akbar’ during government speeches in 1968 was a powerful ritual of stifling human speech by the name of God. The announcement of a protest demonstration with the words ‘today the Mnazi Moja field will roar with *takbir*’, reveals the uncompromising attitude of religion against secular infringements.

A few Qur’an parts are recommended for public recitation by the imam as part of the Idd *salat* (for example Q 87 and 88 in the first *rak’a* and Q 50 and 54 in the second *rak’a*). Lists with other suras to include in the *salat* at different occasions (such as the *tarawih* prayers in Ramadan) circulate among Muslims. Several of the mainstream Sunni mosques in Tanga follow these traditional recommendations, but AMYC preachers make their own choices. Idd el-Hajj 2000 they appropriately recited Sura al-Hajj (Q 22:23-32
in the first rak’a and Q 22:34-40 in the second rak’a). In most of the cases the parts chosen for public recitation illustrated the image of the ideal Muslim community (Q 62 ‘the Congregation’) and the reward they will receive for pious behaviour (Q 71 ‘Noah’).

The salat as an icon of the ideal imagined community is more important than any diacritic meaning (cf. Bowen 1989). Across all denominations the salat performance is quite similar and takes up between nine and eleven minutes, depending on the length of the Qur’an parts recited. Some diacritic, socially distinguishing, elements can be mentioned here, although it must be emphasised also that in every salat the representatives of different opinions can (and do) participate in a joint prayer. The use of paraphernalia like prayer beads and prayer mats is discussed, contested and defended among several Tanzanian groups. After every takbir Muslims either raise their hands or fold them on their chest. The Ahmadiyya do not really stress the point but recommend that the congregation chooses one of the two positions in order to show the unity of the assembly. Among the Shafi’i followers hands are raised after every takbir and they also respond with ‘amin’ every time (Cf. Topan 2000:101). The AMYC-Muslims show more diversity in practice: the majority raises hands like the Shafi’ites but they respond with ‘amin’ only once after the first takbir. The exact pronunciation of the ‘amin’ is subject of further linguistically exercises. A common practice among the Qadiriyya and others in East Africa is to lengthen both syllables of ‘amin’. On the basis of tajwid (rules of pronunciation) the Ahmadiyya missionary declared that the way the Sunnis pronounced it made the word into something else: instead of the short form (amin) meaning ‘o God receive our prayers’, it turned into ‘aaamin’ with the meaning ‘resorting to’ as it is used in Q 5:2.

Slightly more important differences between the AMYC and other groups in Tanga concern the posture of the hands during the standing position and the fingers when standing up after the second rak’a. Mainstream Muslims put the hands on the stomach and AMYC on their chest. A Tanga author of Islamic books showed me a quotation from Albani on this salat posture: “When the person offering prayer gets up from the second Rak’ah, both fists must be placed on the ground as done in kneading dough. This is an essential act of prayer.” The discussion between the Tanga groups on this point is often far from elevated. The Shamsiyya madrasa attacked the AMYC opinion by publishing the book Kukunja ngumi katika sala (kneading dough in the salat). On June 30th 1990 Muhammad bin Ayyub, director of the
Shamsiyya, explained that the AMYC-Muslims fold their hands on their chest ‘because of the shit (mavi) in their bellies’.

Apart from these issues concerning the form of the ritual, the temporal and spatial aspects (when and where to pray the Idd el-Hajj salat) take on distinctive local meanings beyond the mere historical mode of the public discourse. In chapter 8 we discussed the way how different methods of crescent sighting constructed different temporal imagined communities. Here we will introduce the spatial dimensions of the Idd salat. The local Tanga mosques gather together inside their own mosques whereas the AMYC held a joint celebration with all their affiliated mosques on the Tangamano field.

b. Idd salat inside the mosque

Most festival prayers in Tanga take place in one of the mosques in town. The transition from the urban, profane street life and the sacred mosque space is sudden, not mediated by courtyards or open spaces. The obligatory ritual cleansing (wudhu) before the communal prayer usually takes place not near the mosque but at home. The mosques in Tanga usually have only one tap (or a water barrel) in an area next to the mosque. After washing people have to go to street again and enter the mosque from the street side. Three to six unvarnished steps lead to the building that can be recognised as a mosque only by the paint and the arcs. Green, white and yellow are the most common colours for mosques. The concrete mosque steps have a profane function as well: during the rainy season Tanga streets become rivers of mud that often erode the stone walls of the buildings. These steps are based on a concrete foundation and help to protect the superstructure. It also gives the mosque just that extra kind of elevated stature that makes it a spiritual place. This is strengthened by the text often written on these steps: ‘vua viatu’ (remove shoes); not only a simple reminder but also a direct quotation from the Qur’an (20:12). Minarets and domes are present on top of the expensive donor financed buildings but the communal mosques usually don’t have any or only a very small one. Minarets prevent the addition of another storey which is a very common wish, and usually the only possibility of enlargement.

Except from these steps, no formal boundaries between the street and the mosque exist. The Shamsiyya mosque in Tanga does have an iron fence because it is situated on the campus of the madrasa, but the mosque itself is situated in an open space. During Friday and Idd prayers the believers spill over the place and the mosque takes over the profane space. This is facilitated by the rigid German town plan: the North/South orientation
of the mosques situates them perfectly in line with the other street buildings. Ropes tied across the streets symbolically mark the new prayer area and block the traffic. Janvis (plaited floor mats) on verandas of adjacent houses seamlessly join the mosque space. No permanent markers define these prayer places near houses. The baraza is the most common place to pray, but apart from the prayer times this is normal ‘profane’ space.

The choice to perform the Idd prayers in or near the mosque and not on the prayer field (as the AMYC does) illustrates the local, mosque-centred character of the community. Often Tanga mosques are flanked by one or more graves where illustrious scholars or founders of the mosque are buried. It is through this dead sheikh and the genealogy of scholars he embodies that the living Muslims are connected to the Prophet himself. Rich Muslims often have their body transported to the burial place of a famous sharif. The intimate connection between a place of worship, a grave and a madrasa rooted in a particular religious (and often ethnic) tradition makes each mosque community recognisable as having a distinct Muslim identity. This distinguishing characteristic can be observed in the ritual procession (zafa) of the major madrasas in Tanga. This takes usually place once a year and consists of a circular movement through town, a visit to other important graves and the return to the mosque. The movement through space and time (towards a deceased ancestor) clearly shows the inclusion of the dead lineages in the living community exemplified by the mosque. This meaning of the zafa makes the ritual an excellent tool for demonstration: the mosque community enters public space with a specific message for non-Muslims. The Arafa demonstration described in chapter 11 was also concluded with a zafa and ended in the mosque. Almost all political protest marches are labelled as zafa and carefully includes mosques as their starting point and finish. On the occasion of the annual Mwembechai commemoration an-NNuur journalist commented: “Zafa is a religious march (matembezi ya kidini) founded on Islamic teachings that builds a feeling of togetherness (mshikaman) among believers of this religion.”

However, these zafa processions are not part of the Idd el-Hajj and grave visiting of local scholars often takes place in the first 10 days of Dhulhija, immediately preceding the Idd el-Hajj. In other words the Idd salat in the mosque remains a relatively unmarked event. After salat and khutba when the loudspeakers are silent the mosque immediately turns into the inconspicuous building it was before. It is rather the mawlid that creates the platform for publicly asserting the social identity of the local mosque and madrasa. However, on the Idd proper, the rituals in the local mosques are far
less charged with meaning than those of for example the AMYC. The latter condemn local practices and deny the local roots of their religion. Not the rooting in a specific geographical place marked by a physical building or a grave but the translocal umma is the symbol of the ideal Islamic community. In one of his classes AMYC director Barahiyan condemned the transport of the deceased BAKWATA sheikh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy to his birthplace, the town of Tanga. A Muslim body should not be moved but buried on the spot, he argued. To spend money on the moving of a dead body is nothing less than waste (israfu) and belongs to local traditions (mila na desturi). 50

c. The Idd salat on the prayer field

The place of congregation on the Idd el-Hajj is especially relevant to the identity of the AMYC in Tanga. Although most Tanga citizens mention that the best place for the Idd prayers is a field (uwanja) if the weather allows for that, none of the mainstream mosques actually organised open air Idd prayers. 51 In 1997 the AMYC started to perform their Idd ceremonies on the Tangamano fields, next to the main approach road in the centre of Tanga. Apart from their different Idd date (usually one or two days earlier than the other Tanga mosques) the venue also underlines their distinctive social and religious identity. Although this practice is defended by references to authoritative texts, the social and political significance of praying outside should not be underestimated. In Tanga these open air meetings are even more sensitive than in other parts of Tanzania. In the early 1990s the government tried to enforce a national ban on the so-called mihadhara (open space gatherings on ‘comparative religion’ where Muslims and Christians discussed each others beliefs in order to prove the superiority of their own creed). 52 Similar state interference triggered riots when two Kigoma missionaries were expelled from Tanga in March 1985 (Chande 1998:153-156). Although the prohibition on religious meetings outside the mosque has never been successful the threats of the state to limit religious worship and missionary activities to mosques still reverberate in the Swahili discourse. As a response the JUMIKI was established, an organisation meant to rekindle the mihadharas. The 15 November 2002 public prayers listing all Muslim laments also included this mihadhara point. Believers asked: “Almighty God, we want the freedom to let Your name be mentioned and spread in every corner.” 53 Muslims felt betrayed when political parties based on religion were not allowed to enter the political arena. If political parties were not religious, then they could only belong to the kafirs and thus “Islam was denied all space in this society.” 54 The liberty to defend the public space
as a space for Muslims, recalls the other important fields in the Idd discourse: Badr, Arafa and Mina. In 2002 IPC newspaper an-Nuur proudly announced on how many fields (instead of mosques) Idd prayers were conducted in Dar es Salaam. Although there is little affinity between IPC and the AMYC related groups, both share the opinion that public prayers outside the mosque is a symbol of the Islam as a visible social force.

In Tanga the Shafi’i tradition that prescribes to pray the Idd salat in the mosques (cf. Juynboll 1930:110) is still dominant. Their opponents (who pray on the field) emphasise this behaviour as ‘parochial’ and traditional, but also as a deliberate choice based on Shafi’i texts. Those who pray inside their mosques usually emphasise their willingness to pray together with the whole town, but in order to actually realise such communal prayers many objections must be overcome. Not the least of these barriers is the continuing madrasa friction between the different factions. The Tanga scholar Ali Hemed Al Buhriy, who became a Tanga kadhi, was able to cement the different groups and at least once performed the Idd prayer together on a field (Chande 1998:104). On other occasions such as rain prayers and especially the mawlid Tanga mosques are able to perform a public, joint worship. The congregation on the Tangamano fields, the communal devotional worship, the moral boundaries emphasised in the speech and the recording on audio and video make the mawlid celebration a mirror image of the AMYC Idd.

The major difference between the mosque salat and the field prayers is the overt presence of the state in the latter case. The AMYC has to apply for a licence before every Idd prayer. In theory the municipality can refuse this as sometimes happen with other public religious events. In Zanzibar the government tried to prohibit open air Idd prayers in 2000. On other occasions the state limits certain practices like the sale of juice and ice-cream on the field in fear of cholera contamination. The prayer field Uwanja wa Tangamano (Union field) where the AMYC prays is not ‘sacred’ as such, at least not in the Durkheimian sense of the word. Neither is it specially reserved for praying practices as is the case in Morocco (Hammoudi 1993:50). Far from a neutral place, the fields are thickly covered with meaning. On the east side the field is marked out by the Taifa road, lined with trees where bicycle repairers find some shade. Two multi storey hotels and the busy Ngamian bus station indicate the business centre to the south east. Prominently visible on the south side of the roughly rectangular field is a bar. At the back of this building some government offices and NGO’s are located. On the north and west side the railway track, some scattered trees and premises of the Tanzania Railway Company provide an artificial border of the field which is
used for informal football matches, political rallies, Christian ‘crusades’ and the weekly market in second hand clothes. Twice a year this field is transformed in a religious arena flooded with white robed men and women in black. Long rows of prayer mats are brought by Toyota Hiaces and pickups, a water barrel for the cleansing (wudhu) is put behind a makeshift ‘bathroom’ made from wheat bags, two video cameras fixed on tripods are set up on different sides and audio equipment to amplify the sound is connected.

What makes the place special is the purifying effect of the prayer. AMYC director Barahiyan sometimes mentions a hadith in his lessons in which the prophet stated that it would be better to hit someone who is passing in front of a praying Muslim, than to continue the salat. Sometimes ritual space was physically marked by an umbrella planted in front of the imam, leaving him just enough space to perform the prostrations. Although I could not confirm this, it seems to be a prophetic custom as well. Bukhari writes on a similar practice:

Whenever Allah’s Apostle came out on Idd day, he used to order that a Harba (a short spear) to be planted in front of him (as a Sutra for his prayer) and then he used to pray facing it with the people behind him and used to do the same while on a journey. After the Prophet, this practice was adopted by the Muslim rulers (who followed his traditions).

Another hadith explains this practice as a protection against invalidating and polluting influences like the passing of donkeys and women. Apparently an umbrella can serve this purpose as well. Given the contested status of public space, the presence of the non-Islamic state, the distinctiveness of the AMYC community, and its preoccupation with moral purity, it will not surprise us that the AMYC khutba is dominated by the theme of boundaries and borders of the moral community.

4. Khutba: defining the moral community

Just like the salat, the Idd sermon also has diacritic and iconic functions. But different from the salat that is bounded by textual prescriptions leaving little room for meaningful social distinguishing practice, the Idd el-Hajj sermon is important to differentiate and underline the social identity. The sermon is used to situate the Islamic community within the temporal and spatial discourse discussed in parts II and III of this book. References to the proper date of the Idd and to spatial paradigms connect the audi-
ence to imagined communities in different times and places. The choice of the mosque or prayer field to perform Idd prayers further influences the construction of meaning. Through actions (discourse and practice) as well as structures (place and time) the congregation transcends temporal and spatial boundaries and turns into an icon of the ideal Muslim community. At the same time the Idd el-Hajj sermon may indicate the boundaries of the moral community, the distinctions between the in- and out-group.

**a. The diacritic meaning of the khutba**

In all denominations the Idd el-Hajj khutba is delivered immediately after the *salat* and the audience remains seated.\(^6\) After a formal address in Arabic, the Swahili sermon starts after the words ‘ama ba’d.’\(^6\) During the sermon there is hardly any interaction between preacher and audience, except for a few takbirs as consent. Sometimes the audience answers a rhetorical question by shouting ‘amin!’ Afterwards people quickly leave the mosque or the prayer field on their way to breakfast. Apart from these similarities between the Tanga sermons, the way these sermons construct imagined communities or diacritically distinguish one group from another, is quite diverse and also the genre of the sermon is varied. The most noticeable distinctions are between the mosque sermons and the field sermons. Traditional, local mosques recite Arabic sermons from printed collections, whereas translocal organisations like the AMYC and the Ahmadiyya prepare their own sermons in Swahili. The differences between them reflect a deeper differentiation based on their perceptions of the moral community, its situation in time and place and the nature of the religious authority.

Sermons can be transmitted in almost any format from impromptu oral performance via tape recorded mosque speeches to silent reading of a centuries old fossilised text. Very basic *madrasa* texts such as the *Kifaya al-mubtadi* taught in the first years of the religious school, already contain short written sermons. Not only refer the oral sermons to the most important Islamic written texts but form and content of the homily are mostly prepared as a written text. The image of a textually transmitted truth is visible in the mosques where the sermon is recited from a book. In the period of fieldwork I gathered the following written sermon collections:

*Khutab al-jum’ah*, Arabic, published by the sultanate of Oman. An average sermon is between 9 and 13 pages. Each volume contains four sermons. I collected the sermons Jumada I 1421, Muharram 1420, Dhulkaada 1418, Ramadan 1415, Jumada II 1415, Rajab 1414. The bookseller in...
Shinyanga (plate 5) had personally acquired these volumes during a visit to the Arab countries. Because it is unclear if and how these sermons are used in Tanzania, I don’t include them in my analysis.

*Diwan al-khutab*, by Ibn Nubata in Arabic; 120 pages; printed in India. The author is a well-known Shafi’i scholar who died in 984 (see also Gaffney 1994:121; Hallden 2005; Jones 2005; Rashed 1988:81-82). Every month contains either four or five sermons (depending on the number of Fridays in that month), with additional sermons for the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj. The book has also a special *khutba* for leaving pilgrims. The style is highly polished and rhetorical, and the author makes use of rhyme. The sermon is chanted (like the Qur’an) in stead of the more common recitation techniques used for instructive texts.  

*Uqud al-jawhariyya fi al-khutab al-minbariya*, by Muhammad Sa’d bin Abdallah al-Ribatabi al-Maliki al-Tahani; Arabic, 199 pp. Published in 1959. The same set up as the ‘Diwan’, four or five sermons per month, starting with Muharram until Dhulhija. Every sermon in the ‘Uqud has a distinctive title (e.g. ‘the benefits of the Friday sermon,’ ‘Muhammad’s umma,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘the Night Journey’), not just a number as in the ‘Diwan’. In contrast to the popular ‘Diwan’ I have no hard proof of the ‘Uqud actually being used in any Tanga mosque but its availability in almost all Islamic bookshop all over the country, does suggest it has a real function in the liturgical community.

*Khutab al-irshadiyya*, by Muhammad Ayyub and published by the Tanga madrasa ‘Shamsiyya’. 141 pp, mostly Arabic but parts are Swahili in Arabic script. Handwritten, photocopied and widely used in and outside Tanga.  

*Khutba za ijumaa kwa lugha ya kiswahili* by Alhaj Yussuf H.Lassenga, 1988. 135 pp, printed in India. Language is Swahili in Latin script but Qur’an, *hadith* and introduction/praise is written in Arabic neither translated nor transcribed. The book is published in a normal soft cover but often booksellers rebind them in a more luxurious hard cover. This suggests that it is actually used in a public setting, until now only one print has been realised. The author published at least two other books: *Dhikri ndani ya Qur’an* and *Mafundisho ya Mume na mashairi ya hekima*. He lives in Moshi.
The use of Arabic sermons read from printed collections is limited to the more traditional mosques, such as al-Nisa. Only a few of them have started to address the audience in Swahili. Even a modern collection like the *Khutab al-Irshadiya* written by the director of the Tanga madrasa Shamsiyaa sticks to this Arabic tradition. Most of the traditional al-Nisa Idd el-Hajj service (which is shorter than the AMYC Idd ritual and takes about an hour) is dedicated to Arabic recitation. Up to half an hour before the *salat* the imam starts reciting devotional poems very similar to the *mawlid* celebrations. Next comes the ten-minute *salat*, followed by the recitation of the Idd sermon from the *Diwan al-khutab* (27 minutes). It contains practical details on the *hajj*, (for examples the differences between *hajj* and *umra*), conditions of the sacrificial animal and other functional details. Functional at least for an audience that understands Arabic which is often not the case in Tanga. Perhaps the majority of the listeners only recognise the references to Qur’an verses, the prayers for the four rightly guided *khalifas*, and the narrative of the Ibrahimian sacrifice. The preacher concludes his sermon in Arabic “*as-salam ‘alaykum wa rahmatullah wa-barakatuhu, al-hamdulillah, al-hamdulllah; Qawli ama ba’d*” (peace be with you and the grace and blessing of God, praise to God, praise to God; My speech is as follows).

At this point he switches to Swahili and delivers his own sermon (9 minutes). It is clear that the Arabic part is not meant as medium of instruction, although the preacher assumes full comprehension as shown in his Swahili comment referring to the just finished Arabic sermon: “On the day of the Idd el-Hajj and its goals (*makusudi*) I have already talked in the *khutba*, and that’s enough, OK?” The Swahili sequel is used to transmit ethical guidelines, rather than information gleaned from scriptural sources. Hospitality, gift giving, the exhortation to obey God and proper education of children are among the most important. The image of the ideal community presented here is primarily local, with close interpersonal bonds:

Today, search for a guest wherever you can. Go to Ngamiani market and look for a guest. Bring him home and give him your food even before you start eating yourself. God gives you everyday sustenance (*riziki*) why do you refuse to give someone only food for one day? Now we will pray Sura al-Ikhlas for some people with problems. (Tanga, 6 March 2001)

Sometimes after a Friday *khutba* the al-Nisa preachers presented a recent convert to the congregation with the question to accept him.
Although the mosque cannot contain all the believers and therefore part of the streets around the mosque are also filled with people praying and listening to the Idd sermon, the focus of the ceremony remains on the physical building. The community is mainly represented by males (women pray at the back and remain invisible). Both the living men of the congregation and the dead scholars buried next to the mosque opposite the qibla are part of the worship. In the Arabic sermon this devotional community is extended over times and includes among others the four rightly guided caliphs, and of course Muhammad himself. Religious authority is transmitted through these genealogies and finally invested in the local preacher. After the imam has finished the salat, the preacher is led to the minbar (pulpit) in a solemn procession. Under his guidance the community come to God in order to ask His forgiveness.

Today is the day of the hajj. Hajj is written with two letters: ha and jim. Ha means ‘hilmika’ (Arabic: your clemency) and jim means ‘jirmi’ (Arabic: my sin). The pilgrim arrives at Mecca and he tells Almighty God: “Here I am o Lord, today I arrived with my sins and I ask Thy forgiveness to pardon my sins. That is the meaning of the Idd el-Hajj. (23 February 2002)

Here Mecca is presented as the centre of the hajj, but not necessarily the centre of the Islamic community present at the al-Nisa mosque. Not a single reference is made to the preceding Arafat day or to the particular hajj ceremonies. Mecca is rather the place chosen by God and only relevant for pilgrims as the place of the Ibrahimian myth:

Even as an old man, he still has his sexual lust (tamaa). God promises him a son. He was a good father and nursed his son in Islam. And we? How do we treat our children? Is our child a son of the devil, or a son of the promise? Then comes the divine dream: sacrifice your child. Ibrahim travels with his son toward the valley of Mina. Then the devil comes toward him in the appearance of an old man. But Ibrahim recognises him and throws stones towards him. Then Satan comes to Ismail, but fortunately also Ismail recognises the devil. The father explains to his son: I am going to sacrifice you. Ismail answers: do what you want. We have to follow the Sunna of Ibrahim: a goat or a sheep if you are able. The angels ask God: please have mercy on Ibrahim. And then 70,000 angels descend with a huge sheep as substitute for Ismail. Just like Ibrahim we have to obey God. (6 March 2001)
The difference between this local mosque community and the one constructed in the field sermons of the AMYC, is striking. An AMYC sermon (the actual address in Swahili without the Arabic ritual recitations) takes between 45 minutes to over an hour. The time before the salat is filled with takbir chanting. After the ten-minute prayer the sermon is introduced and concluded with a few Arabic sentences (less than two minutes). Different from the al-Nisa speech, the AMYC director only occasionally uses functional Arabic such as in quotes, but never without Swahili translation. The only similarities with other sermons are formal: Arabic must be used for the following five compulsory elements of the Idd khutba: to praise God (alhamdu); to praise prophet Muhammad, to exhort the believers to fear God (al-wasiya bi-taqwa Allah), to recite some Qur’anic verses, and to pray for Muslim men and women.

The following hadith recited before any religious AMYC speech is also not rendered in Swahili and neatly summarises the intention of the Idd el-Hajj sermon:

\[
\text{kullu muhdath bid'a, wa kullu bid'a dhalala, wa kullu dhalala fi nar (every newly invented matter is an innovation (bid'a) and every innovation is misguidance, and every misguidance is in the Fire)}
\]

Most of the prayers at the end of the sermon are bilingual. The Arabic quotations and the many loanwords give Barahiyan’s sermons an air of thorough, Arabic text-based knowledge. His educational background just as those of his fellow AMYC staff members (many years in Saudi Arabia, some in Pakistan as well), shows a deeper command of Arabic than that of his colleagues at the local mainstream madrasas.

The Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre has the explicit aim to renew the religion of Islam, and the Idd el-Hajj sermons must be made subservient to this major goal. A continuous stream of ‘lessons’ (at least three evenings a week), and Friday sermons are poured out over the town of Tanga. A clear monotheistic image of God, founded on authoritative texts and a firm rejection of all compromises is characteristic of this group. Apart from these oral speeches the organisation’s research and PR department Idara ya Da-wa, Habari, Utafiti, Tahariri na Uandishi (Department of Mission, Information, Research, Publication and Writing) is also meant to provide information and publications in order to really change people’s behaviour.

It stands to reason that the AMYC Idd sermon is delivered in Swahili. This focus on the vernacular they share with the Ahmadiyya, the group who
not only delivered the first Islamic Swahili translation of the Qur’an but also is a strong defender of the vernacular in the Friday services.\textsuperscript{76} Both groups have a new message and strongly depend on comprehension of their audience. The AMYC emphasised oral means of knowledge transmission while the Ahmadiyya also use their elaborate printing press to expand their ideas in books and a magazine, in addition to tapes.\textsuperscript{77} Both have a high estimation of Arabic as the most important language of Islamic sources and both groups strongly advocate a \textit{jihad} against blameworthy innovations.\textsuperscript{78} The aim of the \textit{khutba} according to the Ahmadiyya and the AMYC is admonition (\textit{waadhi}), guidance (\textit{uongozi}) and education (\textit{mafunzo}), and that can be best accomplished by the vernacular. Both groups attack the local standpoint of the Shafi’i mosques who continue to preach in Arabic, and do not change their subject and exclude ‘topics relevant for our modern society.’\textsuperscript{79} But the major difference with the traditional mosques is to be found in the representational, iconic meaning constructed during the Idd el-Hajj service.

b. Iconic meaning of the \textit{khutba}

The most conspicuous element in all Idd el-Hajj sermons is of course the story of Ibrahim’s trial to sacrifice his son. In the sermons the congregation is equated with the patriarchal protagonist in time and space. I quote from Lassenga’s Idd el-Hajj sermons in Swahili:

Ye Muslims, on this day (\textit{siku kama hii ya leo}) the prophet Ibrahim was commanded by his Lord in a dream to slaughter his son, the prophet Ismail. […] When Ismail was laid there in Mina, orientated towards Mecca, Almighty God sent his angels to bring a sheep to be slaughtered in the place of the Prophet Ismail, because He was satisfied with the faith of those two.\textsuperscript{80}

The temporal alignment is clear: today is like the day of Ibrahim’s sacrifice. The basic outlines of this mythical foundation of the Idd are well known and often rehearsed in school books and newspapers. Almost all sermons explain the significance of the Idd el-Hajj with reference to this historic event, based on the Qur’an suras Q 37:102-109 and Q 22:34-37. Most sermons make it clear that the Tanzanian congregation can join the holy assembly ‘over there’:

\textit{We join our brothers who slaughter over there at Mina in showing obedience to Allah […] in thanking for His grace, we follow the custom of Ibrahim (tunafuata mila ya Ibrahim), […] even if we have to kill or be killed.}\textsuperscript{81}
However, behind this figure looms the final Prophet, Muhammad, the one whose exemplary behaviour should be followed, and the one on whose mediation we can hope.82 'Today is a day of joy for all who follow Muhammad,' Lassenga writes in his Idd sermon.83 The Idd el-Hajj is ‘following the practice of the Prophet Ibrahim, his son Ismail and his grandson Prophet Muhammad.’84 By emphasising the dedication for Muhammad, the local mosques present themselves as primarily a devotional community, with a particular religious hierarchy. Idd el-Hajj sermons in traditional mosques are not polemical because the boundaries of the community are not contested in this ritual. For this reason there is no particular significance attached to the date and the place of the Idd el-Hajj.85

The AMYC sermon connects the listening audience to other congregations of active, committed and obedient believers. The choice of a different date, a different place, the involvement of women and children draws the attention to the boundaries of the moral community. A large part of Barahiyan’s speech in 1997 (Appendix IV) contains quotations of Muhammad’s farewell sermon, linking the Tanga preacher to its two predecessors. The Tangamano field than easily turns into the Arafa field: ‘We Muslims of Tanga’ have joined ‘our brothers at Arafa.’ The description of Muhammad’s gestures and the simultaneous re-enactment of them by Barahiyan, easily blurs the boundaries between them. ‘Thereupon Allah’s Messenger (SAW) lifted his fore-finger towards the sky and then pointing towards the people said: “O Lord: Bear Thou witness unto it! The sermons actually create a chronotope of a timeless, Islamic, community. Rather than references to local places to be found in the traditional mosques (‘go to Ngamiani market and look for a guest’) the AMYC khutbas refer to the Islamic umma wherever it is: Muslim brothers in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Palestine, Bosnia and Sudan.86 The preacher quotes Muhammad’s warning against tribalism to dub BAKWATA as a danger for the Islamic community. He repeats the Islamists idea that the pre-Islamic time of Ignorance, the ‘Jahiliyya’ has returned: ‘Brothers, today the Muslims have returned to factionalism and tribalism. They separate from the fold.’87 This attitude has resulted in Muslims who are not really Muslims. Salim Barahiyan describes how the popular exhilaration when Muslims entered the Parliament (Bunge) turned into sadness when those Muslims publicly declared that Islam was left at the roadside by secular modernity. And he quotes Muhammad who said in his farewell sermon “all things of the Jahiliyya are now under my feet.”
Women as gatekeepers

If the Idd el-Hajj sermon is to be interpreted as a discursive construction of the ideal imagined, moral community, then the question arises what the role of genders in this community is. Here we will look into the role of women in the mythical hajj-narratives and other historical paradigms and in the second place we will discuss some references to women in the Idd-el-Hajj sermons. As many authors already have stated, Ibrahim's wife Hajar is absent from the Qur'anic story of the sacrifice, and her role in the tradition is passive and small (Cf. Combs-Schilling 1989; Jay 1992; Delaney 1998). However as we saw in the Swahili hajj discourses references to Hajar are presented as examples for female pilgrims. The sa' y (running between Safa and Marwa) reminds the pilgrim of Hajar's frantically looking for water when she was sent away by Ibrahim. Hajar is left behind in the barren desert together with her son; it is her obedience as well as Ibrahim's prayer and subsequent sacrifice that finally turns the valley of Mina into fertile soil. The stoning ritual is described as the remembrance of the devil's temptation of a sacred family, rather than the testing of Ibrahim alone. The great, middle and small pillars stand for Ibrahim's, Ismail's and Hajar's trial. Female pilgrims often mention their emotional linkage with Hajar, when they perform these hajj rituals (Jeenah 2000; Nomani 2005).

However the overall picture is one of female marginalisation. Swahili recapitulations of the Idd el-Hajj founding myth often continue to obscure Hajar's existence as an autonomous human being and prolong her invisibility. The Idd el-Hajj is a remembrance of the 'two prophets who were willing to act upon the word of God,' the rituals of two male prophets Ibrahim and Ismail, without mentioning Hajar. The two sermons I listened to in 2001 and 2002 in the mosque al-Nisa, both omitted Hajar's role in the Swahili part (though her name appeared in the Arabic reciting). In the AMYC sermons the omission seems to be more structural, obviously because the content of the khutba is much more closely linked to the Qur'anic text and the focus is more on edification than on the retelling of stories. It is Ibrahim who gets the child 'with Hajar' (kwa bi Hajar, Nabii Ibrahim alipata mtoto wa kiiume). Hajar is important only in relation to male protagonists: she is either the mother of Ismail (mamake Ismail) or Ibrahim's spouse. Other Swahili sources describe her royal descent as Pharaoh's daughter which is fitting for the founding mother of the Islamic lineage; at the same time however she is passively given away as a compensatory gift (zawadi) to Ibrahim's first wife Sara. She is perceived as one of the few legitimate female vessels of God's revelation (aliwua akipata ufunuo kutoka kwa Mungu).
Sometimes she does receive a voice and on these occasions the author describes her strong faith (imani iliyothibiti), obedience (utiifu) and submissive heart (moyo uliosalimu amri) as equal to Ibrahim's steadfastness. In Khiyar Islam's retelling of the story Banati wa Shuaib/Hajar, Sara receives a voice whereas Hajar remains dumb. Ibrahim succumbs to Sara's wish and marries Hajar, she gets pregnant and delivers Ismail. Sara changes into a jealous co-wife and as a result Ibrahim 'does not get have any rest at all' (note the male perspective!). He starts to pray the salat al-istikhara, God answers Ibrahim and tells him to send Hajar and Ismail to Mecca. Hajar is not troubled by the idea that she has little food and water when she understands that this is the instruction of Ibrahim's God ('ni amri ya Mwenyezi Mungu kwake Ibrahim'). The same picture of a passive, mute, obedient woman is presented in other Swahili articles. Hajar does not complain about Sara's behaviour but interprets the whole chain of events as the result of God's omnipotence. Most sources underline Hajar's submissiveness 'because the commandment came from Almighty God'.

When Hajar is sent away into the desert with her son and is standing on the hill of Safa, she sees water at a little distance, at Marwa. But when she starts running, it turns out to be just an illusion. This happens seven times. Islam Khiyar Islam explains between brackets that this is the reason why pilgrims perform the running ritual during the hajj. Finally when she returns to Ismail water is welling from the ground. Hajar thanks God who did not leave her in times of distress. The well is called Zamzam. Some time later Ibrahim visits Hajar and Ismail in Mecca. At that time the place was completely dry, but now it is a lovely garden. This as a direct result from Ibrahim's prayer (Q 14:37):

O our Lord! I have made some of my offspring to dwell in a valley without cultivation, by Thy Sacred House; in order, O our Lord, that they may establish regular Prayer: so fill the hearts of some among men with love towards them, and feed them with fruits: so that they may give thanks.

Some authors attempt to attribute this prayer also to Hajar. As evidence they point towards the sudden change from singular to plural in the next verse Q 14:38:

O our Lord! truly Thou dost know what we conceal and what we reveal: for nothing whatever is hidden from Allah, whether on earth or in heaven.
The plural (we instead of I) shows that Hajar joins Ibrahim in his prayer ("and here she joins her husband in the carrying out (of God's command-
ment) and later in the prayers...").[97] God answers this prayer and turns the
barren desert in a fertile valley. The ethnic group Bani Jurhum came to live
there, and Ismail married one of their women. One year after Ismail married,
Hajar died and was buried near the Ka'ba.[98]

Khiyar Islam excludes the sacrificial story from Hajar's biography. But
tradition has given her sometimes a (small) voice in this cosmogonic drama.
Lassenga writes in his sermon:

Also he (Ismail) asked him (his father Ibrahim) to explain his mother Bibi Hajar
the story, and then instruct her to exercise patience (kusubiri) in order that all
should get the blessing of their Lord (radhi za Mola wao).[99]

On instigation of her male child Hajar is given here her own road to
salvation. Both Ibrahim and Ismail are the main actors and after they have
shown obedience they will be "among those who practice patience and con-
stancy" (miongoni mwa wenye kusubiri) according to Q 37:102. Although it
remains unclear from the Qur'anic story whether Hajar knew about Ibrahim's
intention to kill their son, Islamic tradition has emphasised that Hajar was
informed. It is only because Hajar had heard about the coming disaster that
the devil could tempt her and she could resist him. This characteristic (being
patient and obedient) is presented as a virtue for women, reflected in the

Delaney (1998) remarks that the Qur'anic text does not question
the notion of a child being owned by his father rather than by his mother.
Indeed most sermons talk about Ibrahim's son rather than Hajar's child.[100]
However in the tradition mentioned by Ibn Nubata, Satan explicitly tells
Hajar "Behold, Ibrahim wants to slaughter your son Ismail according to a
dream". She responds with the proper reaction of a Muslim woman: "If it is
God's command, to do so, he must obey His Lord". Whereas Ismail explicit-
ly is asked about his opinion, Hajar is only interrogated by Satan. Ali Bauri
describes Hajar's anxiety in the episode when Ibrahim is about to leave her
and her son in the desert: 'Is it really almighty God who ordered you to do
so?' When Ibrahim responds affirmatively, she immediately agrees.[101] Usu-
ally only Ismail and Ibrahim are mentioned as the ones being tested and
who succeed in obedience (utiifu) and submissiveness (unyenyekevu), with
very few exceptions.[102] So apart from some weak attempts to give Hajar a
voice in the Idd el-Hajj story, her role remains obscure. As Ebrahim Moosa
(2003:291-292) concludes for countries where a revivalist movement has become hegemonic (and he includes Tanzania among them) the 'politics of identity have trumped the politics of gender equality'.

Interestingly it is not Hajar who appears as the most influential role model for Swahili women in public sermons but rather other, more active women. The public prayers organised by IPC-related groups on 15 November 2002 in order to protest against the Tanzanian government asked God to shape women’s behaviour in conformity to two female models: Asia and Sumaiyya (the latter is also known as Ummu Ruumaan). Both women fought against oppressors, Asia against her husband Firaun (Pharaoh), Sumayya against the infidels of Mecca. Sumayya was the first female martyr in Islamic history. Asia is among four excellent women who have earned a place in paradise. Swahili commentator Farsy describes her as the ‘wife of Allah’s biggest enemy who remained faithful and did not choose the (easy) way of Firaun’s devotees’. In AMYC discourse Khadija, Muhammad’s first wife, is often presented as the ideal of the active, supportive woman and mother. Khadija was willing to sacrifice her time to the noble cause of Islam, in contrast to Tanga women who complain if their husbands have been to an evening mosque class. Together with other exemplary female models (notably Fatima and the prophet’s spouses), the basic role of women is to give birth to children who are willing to be killed for their (Muslim) rights.

Apparent the shift away from the passive role of Hajar towards more active identification models is the same as the change from Ibrahim towards Muhammad as witnessed in the hajj-paradigms. Not surprisingly this is most clearly visible in the rituals performed in public space, such as the Idd el-Hajj or the IPC supplication just mentioned.

In the second place these public rituals present women as important metonyms of the Tanzanian Islamic community: they represent the whole community. The female role of reproduction and education is especially relevant in this image. In the IPC prayer performed in many Tanzanian mosques Muslims asked: “Our Lord, unite the hearts of Muslim women, give them a good delivery of children that will inherit their points of view.” Any attack on Muslim women is perceived as a direct challenge of the Islamic community. A significant part of the public prayers dealt with the harassment of Muslim women in the 1998 Mwembechai incident. Muslims asked God to be a witness of their predicament. Interference of the government with Islamic affairs is phrased in the same words as having sexual access to women: ‘Ni kwanini waislamu wanaingiliwa na serikali ...’ (Why are Muslims penetrat-
ed by the government...”). Not surprisingly in the Arafa demonstration of 4 March 2001, in which the Islamic moral community was presented as endangered by outside forces, the rape of Islamic women in Kosovo featured prominently. When in 2002 police forces blocked the Mwembechai mosque to Muslim worshipers in order to prevent the commemoration of the 1998 victims on this spot, Islamic press published a photograph of women and children being hauled to prison. Women and houses should therefore be guarded and protected as icons of the Islamic umma. A woman is only allowed to go out of her mother's womb, out of her father's place, and out of her husbands' house on the shoulders of the coffin bearers. Women strolling 'naked' on the streets is one of the terrible signs of the coming Judgment day and shows the moral bankruptcy of the community.

It is from this perspective we must interpret the references to women in the Idd el-Hajj sermons. The visible presence of women is essential in order to represent the Islamic community. The AMYC Idd el-Hajj sermon 1997 (appendix IV) focuses on the identity of the Islamic community and includes a stern warning for men not to leave their houses open when their womenfolk is there. Even men not being kin (mahram) are forbidden to enter the houses. Failing to obey these guidelines should be punished by beating. The paragraph on women and the protection of houses is linked to the Prophet's farewell hajj and his comment 'Fear Allah concerning women.' This passage is often used in treatises on the Idd el-Hajj. The Kenyan schoolbook gravely warns children to behave properly on the Idd el-Hajj because '[i]t was the practice of the Holy Prophet [...] to address the girls and the women separately…'

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ii. "Idd time": vain joy, heavenly reward or painful punishment?

The Idd sermons describe the Islamic community chronotope as being extra temporal, not limited to this particular time or space. The most distinctive characteristic of this time should be the outstanding moral behaviour of Muslims. After the fasting (either the Ramadan fasting or the Arafa fasting) the believer is free from all sins, and this moral and ethical purity must be reflected in exemplary behaviour. Therefore the Idd is something like the first day of one's life. Just like Islamic history shows a continuous cycle of moral corruption and renewal (cf. Grandin 1978:95) the Idd punctuates the year in the same way. It is a safe haven from everyday life, and it annually recurs. The final reference point is the day of Judgement. Idd sermons have a pretty clear message: a good Idd celebration points toward eternal joy, but returning to your former life will result in a terrible punishment.
‘Transgressing divine rules on the day of the Idd is like sinning on the Day of Judgement’, preachers continually quote the Prophet.

As already discussed the Idd is seen as a test after a trial (imtihan). The joy of the Idd is the first shahada (testimony), and finally the test is completed at the Judgment Day. The idea that God looks on to check the believer’s faithfulness is more visible in the Ramadan sermons than in the hajj speeches. The ‘trial’ in the latter case is more associated with Ibrahim and the Mecca pilgrims than with the local festivities in Tanzania. Joy after fasting in Ramadan seems to be natural and does not require extensive explanation. Joy on the Idd el-Hajj must be explained and is often interpreted as ‘being glad for our brothers the pilgrims’. Because the local Idd el-Hajj is not preceded by a ‘real’ trial like the Ramadan fasting, the label is often applied to the moral behaviour of the Muslim on the Idd itself. In this sense the Idd el-Hajj is no longer the reward (as in the case of the Idd el-Fitr) but rather the trial.

Obedience ranks high as the major characteristic of a Muslim’s behaviour on the Idd el-Hajj. It is ‘the heart of faith’, indeed it makes the distinction between Satan and the true believer; the former disobeyed God when He asked him to bow down before the human creature, while the latter follows Ibrahim and obeys God. Spiritual lessons learned from the Ramadan and the hajj should be continually put in practice after the Idd, although preachers express their doubts this will actually happen. Those who only pray on the Idd and forsake the salat on normal days are a clear indication that ‘yaum al-qiyama’ is nigh.

A common denominator of Idd sermons is the stress on the proper boundaries of a joyous holiday celebrations (kuchunga mipaka ya sherehe). The greeting ‘blessed Idd’ (Idd mubarak) has an equivalent in ‘good joy’ (furaha njema). To be happy is a divine commandment and happiness (mchangamfu) is created by God. The Idd is a day of pleasure expressed by preachers in words like uhondo (entertainment), farh (gladness), sa’id (happy), a day full of surur (joy). The gladness on the annual Idd day (furaha mara kwa mara) reflects the joy a pious believer will receive in the afterlife when God will say: “I am really close to you’, or ‘Well done, my servant.” Therefore the description of the Final Day and the following luxuries are partly applicable to the day of the Idd: “My devotees! no fear shall be on you that Day, nor shall ye grieve” (Q 43:68). But not joy is the major topic of Idd sermons, but fear. As we have seen in the chapter on moon sighting, this link between the Day of Judgement and the Idd is quite common (corroborated with a hadith) and used to inspire fear of God and his commandments. Essential elements in the Idd khutba are ‘thanking God, praying for the
Prophet, and inducing fear of God; especially the last aspect dominates many sermons. Both the classical (Arabic) models and the modern (Swahili) speeches elaborate on the final day of wrath. Muhammad bin Ayyub quotes in his *Khutab al-Irshadiyya* Q 4:48-52:

One day the earth will be changed to a different earth, and so will be the heavens, and (men) will be marshalled forth, before Allah, the One, the Irresistible; And thou wilt see the sinners that day bound together in fetters; Their garments of liquid pitch, and their faces covered with Fire. That Allah may requite each soul according to its deserts; and verily Allah is swift in calling to account. Here is a Message for mankind: Let them take warning therefrom, and let them know that He is (no other than) One Allah. Let men of understanding take heed."

The Idd time is part of linear history closed by the day of Judgment preceded by the ‘period of Ignorance’, the Jahiliyya. Rhetorically preachers often distinguish between the divine joy and the sinful happiness, which occurred before the coming of Islam. The discourse on how to behave on the day of the Idd is overloaded with sharp warnings. Preachers are afraid that proper behaviour like *sherehe* (celebration), *ibada* (worship), eating, drinking and mentioning God gives way to more unruly conduct. The climax of the Idd in Islam is not drumming, or eating and drinking, but remembering God with many. Visiting ‘dirty places’ like beer halls and cinemas; using stimulating drinks like alcohol, and drugs (*marungi*), are used as contrasting examples. By doing so Muslims will not only deserve individual punishment but because they perform these offences on the Idd they will remove the essential differences between the Muslim festivals and those of other religions and thus harm the whole Islamic community. While other religions allow their believers extravagance, attend concerts, dances, wine parties and discotheques, Muslims see the Idd as an occasion for prayer, and social meetings. The joy of the Jahiliyya is beer, dancings, strolling naked, adultery, cinemas, playing cards, dirty songs, fornications and other western cultural habits summarised with the expression ‘mambo ya laghwi’ (foolish things). ‘This will greatly please our enemies’. The writers collective Warsha ya Waandishi explains that the ‘Idd is not a day to revel in rebellion’ and ‘we are free from God’s commands and prohibitions’ (this is orthographically emphasised with the final words *Sivyo. SIVYO HIVYO KABISA!* (Not at all!). Dancing, beer, playing cards, and squandering are all *haram*, especially on the Idd el-Hajj which is a preparation for the ‘siku ya kiyama’ (Day of Resurrection).
To sin on the holy day of the Idd el-Hajj is a real shame (aibu) and people should refrain from upuuzi (gossip), maasi (disobedience) and madhambi (sin). “On this holy day you shouldn’t indulge in your own desires, but the fear of God and the coming Day of Sorrow and Anger (siku ya majuto na hasira) should lead you to piety and righteousness,” a letter writer from Maswa expresses his ideas. He regrets that people who call themselves Muslims are using the Idd to brew and drink beer; that men dress up like women and the other way round. They will end up as inhabitants of the Fire. Perhaps the best way to spend the Idd el-Hajj is as a day for kutubu (repentance) and returning to God. While quite a few space is reserved for all the wrong practices, the positive formulations take up just a tiny proportion. A Kenian schoolbook summarises “The rest of the feast day is spent in piety and good deeds.”

Apart from the tendency to emphasise the special importance of the Idd el-Hajj time, also the opposite can be observed: proper behaviour shown in Ramadan or on the day of Arafa should be continued throughout the year. AMYC Idd sermons for example are not very different from any other Friday sermon: they are directed to inscribe the proper religion in the hearts and heads of the audience. The 1997 Idd el-Hajj theme ‘entering Islam whole-heartedly’ (Q 2:208) would not have been misplaced in other sermons. What makes the Idd el-Hajj sermon special in the case of AMYC is the additional emphasis on the translocality of the moral community. But the major factors playing a role here are the time and the place of the sermon rather than its content.

5. The Idd baraza

Apart from the salat and the khutba, many mosques and madrasas organise religious meetings of a different nature in the afternoon of the Idd. For example on the Idd el-Hajj 1996 the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre in Tanga invited Sayyid Rico from the outreach organisation al-Mallid to show on the base of Bible texts how Jews and Jesus actually prayed like Muslims. Sometimes these gatherings are called with the generic name mihadhara (from the Arabic mahdar, assembly) but a more common indication is baraza. Often the boundaries between khutba and the Idd baraza are blurred in the popular language, because the topics treated in both speeches are very similar. Distinction must be made between ordinary barazas and the National Baraza organised by BAKWATA. The major madrasas in Tanga all have their own Baraza la Idd three times a year (Idd el-Fitr, Idd
el-Hajj, and mawlid). Usually between the afternoon and sunset prayers or between sunset and night prayers the pupils of the madrasa perform poem recitations for over an hour. Speeches are relatively short (10 to 15 minutes) showing the same emphasis on devotion rather than discursive preaching and explanation as discussed in the Idd el-Hajj khutba. These meetings take place on the madrasa premises; Idd barazas are often scheduled simultaneously on the first day of the Idd so visitors have to decide which baraza they would like to attend. The National Idd el-Hajj Baraza of BAKWATA is usually on the first day about one hour after finishing the khutba. That makes the national Idd el-Hajj celebration a tight ritual unity starting with the salat and the khutba, a one hour interlude for the sacrificial meal and finally concluded by the baraza. The Idd el-Fitr baraza however is always on the second Idd day, due to the uncertainty of the date.

The National Idd Baraza pretends to represent the Muslim Tanzanian community: it is therefore essential that only one baraza is held on behalf of the whole country. In 1968 the performance of two national Idd barazas (instead of one) sent a shockwave through the young independent nation-state. The venue of the Idd baraza is usually on neutral ground such as a conference hall or a cinema. It is the most visible part of the Idd el-Hajj because of its nationwide broadcasting on television and radio. Here we see again that the two imagined communities nation-state and Islamic umma come together. Idd barazas on the national level invite government officials, which sometimes starts hefty debates. But in general the national barazas tend to show conformity to the ideal of a united Muslim community living peaceful under a neutral government. Critique towards the state is mildly phrased, or absent. In contrast, on the local Idd baraza often social tensions start to emerge in public; the 1998 Mwembechai incident for example had its roots on the Idd el-Fitr Baraza in the Mwembechai mosque (Dar es Salaam).

On the National Baraza the careful equilibrium between politics and religion must be protected according to many Muslims. However according to an an-Nuur writer the ‘only subject of the Idd baraza should be Mwembechai, and the only official guest Allah.’ Because Islam is a way of life (mfumo wa maisha) politics should be discussed by Muslims, including the killings of Mwembechai, Said Ramadhani said on one of the Idd el-Hajj barazas in Morogoro. Therefore important political messages and declarations are put forward on the baraza such as the ‘Tungi declaration’ and the ‘Aziz-letter’ to president Mkapa as well as the official announcement that Muslim students were allowed to wear ‘hijab’ in schools. Statements on one of the Idd barazas are expected to be answered by the following baraza.
This iconic meaning of the Idd baraza lends special weight to the ritual meeting. Emphasis is put on the baraza as a mechanism to improve national Muslim solidarity and tackle common problems. When the opposition party CUF in 2002 for the first time participated in the national Idd el-Hajj baraza, this was favourably received by the Swahili press. A familiar theme of these gatherings is the Qur’an text 3:103 (hold fast onto the rope of God). The image of these Idd barazas is extremely important. A picture of one of the Idd barazas shows how Islamic leaders join hands behind a table showing cohesion (mshikamano). Another front page picture of the Idd el-Hajj in South Africa shows Nelson Mandela, a Muslim male and a small veiled girl between them. The caption reveals one of the desires of present day Tanzanian Muslims: “These are the [real] leaders of the people” (Hawa ndio viongozi wa wananchi). Often these Idd barazas are summarised with texts like “Part of the Islamic umma listened to their leaders.”

27 December 2000 I witnessed the National Baraza la Idd in Tanga. The venue was a large hall open for everyone willing to pay the rent. From 3 p.m. the guests were welcomed with Islamic poems (kaswida) in Swahili sung by pupils from two small Tanga madrasas: Ta’lim and al-Nisa. At 4 o’clock all guests participated in the communal afternoon prayer outside the hall. After the official reception of the mufti and the vice president, the meeting started by a communal supplication (Sura al-Fatiha and Sura al-Ikhlas) and a Qur’an recital (tilawa) by a representative of the Zahrau madrasa. After two other welcome speeches by the chairman of the regional BAKWATA office and the secretary of the BAKWATA national headquarters, Mufti Hemed bin Jumaa talked for half an hour. Finally the official guest, the vice president Dr. Omar Ali Juma (1941-2001) delivered his keynote speech from 5.30 to 6 p.m. He had arrived by plane on Tanga airport and was then transported by convoy to the hall. His speech focused on development of Muslims and education. The meeting was closed with another supplication and afterwards soft drinks were distributed. The whole event showed an extraordinary tight orchestration and a hierarchical display of power. Speakers were visible in the distance on a huge stage and inaccessible to the audience. The vice-president entered the building only to deliver his speech and left Tanga immediately after the closing dua. Whereas the setting was local with representatives of local madrasas, the baraza itself was meant to show the good cooperation of Muslims and government to enhance the development of the country.
6. **Competitive activities on the Idd**

Qur’an reciting on the day of the Idd has a long tradition in the region of Tanga. “After the salat the children come together and with their teacher they go around the town to read the Qur’an and other praise poems of their religion,” a colonial administrator wrote in 1958. Nowadays only the AMYC organises Qur’an reciting contests on the afternoon of the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj. On these occasions the street before the mosque is blocked to traffic and in the middle of the road a small desk and microphone is installed. One of the AMYC staff members mentions the first few words of a Qur’an verse and then the child should recognise the locus and continue the recitation. After a mistake the girl or boy is immediately corrected by loud knocking on the microphone. The audience sit and stand quietly around the desk and often quietly join the recitation. The complete ceremony is recorded on videotape.

Before these Qur’an reciting contests several other AMYC organised sport activities take place throughout the town. Major areas are the Tangamano fields, the Arafa premises and the mosque at the 19th street. The AMYC has a remarkably lenient view on sports not mentioned by Qur’an and hadith. Because ‘the Prophet was a sportsman’ everything which is not explicitly forbidden or involves haram activities like wearing shorts, mixing women and men or sorcery, is allowed. Physical exercise is like divine worship because ‘Muslims with bellies can not be good Muslims’. Especially meritorious are ‘war training activities’ like karate, wrestling matches, target shooting, running etc. All these activities that have a certain usefulness are allowed and belong to the realm of the ibada (worship), the sole aim for which both the jinn and the human beings are created. Among the events bicycle races, swimming contests and acrobatic shows (sarakasi) are practiced. Since the mid 1990s the AMYC celebrate the Idd with ‘brave and skilful games’ (michezo ya kishujaa na ukakamavu) in order to edify the Tanga Muslim. This renewal (kujadidi, kuamsha) of a tradition Muslims had forgotten is an example of their general view of religion: Islam should permeate all daily activities including leisure. Political Islamic groups advocate these plays as preparation for real, physical battle. Training individual bodies (miili) of believers prepares the Islamic congregation for jihad.

Not only the AMYC but also the Ahmadiyya community celebrate the Idd with outdoor events and sports competitions. The Ahmadiyya usually celebrate the Idd sport events on the second day of the Idd. In the same way as the AMYC this celebration is linked to the Sunna of the Prophet, because once he watched particular military practices from Ethiopian soldiers and
even Aisha saw them from the door of her house (she stood behind the Prophet). Just like the AMYC, the Ahmadiyya also announced this practice as a return to a sound Islamic tradition, while at the same time ‘we are going with the times’ (mwendo na wakati). 165 Although they explicitly state that all men, women and children participate, they are careful to preserve the decent separation between the sexes. Women should remain in a large tent and perform their games inside, although the tent is on the field of the mosque, or behind a curtain. Carry-eggs-on-spoons-race, rope pulling, handball and a tug of war are among the games mentioned. 166

Not all Muslims share the same opinion regarding these sports. A group associated with Muhammad Nassor Abdalla al-Qadiri vehemently attacked BAKWATA who organised a football match to raise funds for religious activities. 167 They find the following hadith appropriate to condemn football:

Every game of amusement is haram for a Muslim except the following three: learning to shoot, breaking a horse, and playing with his wife.

Because football is not mentioned, the author concludes that this play is forbidden. It is used as further evidence of BAKWATA being the Great Enemy, wanting to destroy the real Islam.

7. Conclusion

The social practices of communal prayer (salat), preaching (khutba and baraza la Idd) and playing construct the chronotopes of the Muslim moral community. It is not longer only an imagined community, such as described in the theoretical discourses above. But the ritual actually constructs the boundaries of the moral community and therefore must be explicit in mentioning the ethical and moral choices. And just like all processes of discursive and ritual constructing of communities, it involves both inclusion and exclusion. Therefore the Idd sermon is not only used to connect the local community and the world umma by emphasising the common Ibrahimian myth, but most of the speech is devoted to ethics of the society. Women are especially ‘good to think with’ as the gatekeepers of the moral community. After Bowen (1989) I have made a distinction between iconic and diacritic meanings of the social and ritual Idd el-Hajj practices. Iconic meaning focuses on the rituals as reflecting social and religious features of the Islamic moral community whereas the diacritic meaning of the ritual is based on the
distinction it makes between social groups. The Idd el-Hajj shows that both meanings are often intimately intertwined.

The choice for a particular Idd el-Hajj date as described above is primarily a diacritic aspect of the Idd el-Hajj: it neatly separates different Islamic groups. However at the same time the iconic meaning of this choice must not be neglected. Choosing local moon sighting often illustrates a pattern of similar choices: local saint veneration, local madrasa conflicts and the expression of social solidarity alongside ethnic lines for example. One more example discussed in this chapter is the distinction between field prayers and mosque prayers. Different from the temporal aspects of the Idd el-Hajj the place of congregation is not highlighted in discussions and seems to attract hardly any attention. However, when taken together the choices reveal particular patterns, indicating how these groups think about social issues and how they perceive Islam in a modern society.

Two major groups of iconic/diacritic social identities might be distinguished. On the one hand the local Tanga mosques and madrasas and on the other hand the translocal AMYC and Ahmadiyya groups. The mosque and madrasa networks each stay in their own local, Shafi’i tradition. Not so much instructing believers is the main crux of the short Swahili sermon, but their Idd celebration primarily expresses devotion to the prophet Muhammad and adherence to well tested Arabic traditions. The local mosque is the focal point of salat and khutba and reverence to living and dead religious leaders is important. The Idd date is in line with local crescent sighting. The absence of polemics in the sermon of the Shafi’i mosques indicates that the Idd is not very important with regard to social identity. This is surprisingly different from the mawlid celebration which contains a longer Swahili speech, is often highly polemical and shows a particular concern with social identity.

For AMYC and Ahmadiyya the Idd el-Hajj is much more important. Both groups have a new message (rekindling the original Islam) and their Swahili sermons are witness of their major task: instructing believers into an absolute submission to the only true God and His messenger. Both show a particular linkage with translocal communities expressed in their Idd date and the venue. They follow either instructions from the London headquarters (Ahmadiyya) or focus on the date of Arafa (AMYC). The place of congregation (outside the mosques) is indicative of their ideas on the place of Islam in Tanzanian society: not linked to a local madrasa or mosque but transcendent and visible in public space. Both see the Idd as excellent opportunity to teach their message, to claim absolute adherence to the Prophetic
Sunna and both groups have successfully reinvented the tradition of playing games on the Idd. It is telling in this respect that both groups neglect the mawlid celebration (AMYC) or profoundly alter the festival (Ahmadiyya), thus leaving the two Idds as the major ritual channel to express social identity vis-a-vis other Muslim groups.
13. The Idd el-Hajj sacrifice in Tanga: places and persons

1. Introduction

In this chapter I turn to the third element of the Idd el-Hajj celebration: the animal sacrifice. I describe three different places where Tanga Muslims usually perform this rite: the private home, the prayer field and the government abattoir. Although on the one hand the performance of the sacrifice does not appear to be very much different from those in other Muslim countries, on the other hand the different places and persons involved highlight different aspects of the central theme under discussion here: how different groups ritually construct identity. The description of three distinctive sacrificial places allows us to make comparisons between the different players in the social arena: the local ethnically divided madrasas, the fast growing reformist Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre and the government.

Plate 10: Domestic sacrifice in Tanga, 2002
2. **Sacrifice and Place**

It is important to stress again that both the rituals and the discourses described in this book are primarily urban. The difference between urban and rural rituals must not be overestimated but neither should it be neglected (Parkin 1975). “Town” and “country” are continuously reconstructed in the performance and textual prescriptions of Islamic ritual. For most of the Tanga citizens the village is important as a source of cheap animals, a place where life cycle rituals are performed among kin and extended family and the location where one would like to return some day to enjoy the benefits of an own *shamba* (field, garden). However crude and distorting the stereotype might be, the town is mainly the place for ‘Islamic ritual’, and the village is for ‘pagan ceremonies’. The New Years/crisis ritual *siku ya mwaka* and the birth/funeral ceremony *akika* described in chapter 5 are usually performed outside the major urban centres. Idd el-Hajj and Idd el-Fitr are mostly celebrated in town. *mawlid* festivals are important both in villages and in urban centres but often the town *madrasas* attract more country residents for the *mawlid* celebrations than the other way round. Not only ritual practices but also prescriptions show distinctions between country and urban dwellers. For example Ramadan fasting is only compulsory for those living in town (Q 2:185) and villagers are not under any obligation to attend the festive Idd el-Fitr or Idd el-Hajj *salat*. Differences in town and country rituals suggest that the relationship between religious ceremony and place is constructed. By performing particular kinds of rituals in particular places these places like “town” and “country” continue to be seen as having a particular meaning such as “Islamic” or “traditional”.

What pertains to the ritual construction of differences between urban and rural places may also be valid for the differences between sacrificial places within the town of Tanga. When, where and by whom animals are immolated on the Idd el-Hajj influences to a large extent the experienced value of the sacrifice. Changes in these parameters directly change the meaning of the holiday as studies on Muslim migration communities in Western Europe show. The change from home sacrifice to slaughterhouse meat processing devaluates the Idd day for many European Muslims (Brisebarre 1998; Van Nieuwkerk 2005). The private house, the public prayer ground, and the government slaughter area function as lenses, amplifying particular aspects of the social fabric. Far from being neutral, each place constitutes a different sacrifice and highlights other elements as important.

By far the most popular place for the sacrifice is the home: 163 out of 203 survey households killed an animal at their home in Tanga. 31 did so
in a village, which was mostly the place where they also lived, and might be better described as peri urban rather than a remote rural area. Taken together more than 95% of those sacrificing animals on the Idd day did so at home. Only nine people performed the sacrifice either near the mosque or on the prayer field, most of them did so as part of the AMYC religious service. This is a more laborious practice since it involves the transport to and from the place of worship. Finally the government slaughterhouse functioned as the place for cattle slaughter and occasionally a private citizen offered his animal for killing, flaying and inspection. This was the cleanest, but also the most expensive option (transport, taxes, abattoir fee etc.).

a. Private house

The preference for the house as the place of sacrifice does not automatically determine the Idd el-Hajj as an exclusive home or family ritual. 'At home' can be translated in Swahili as *nyumbani* (at the house) or *kwetu, kwangu* (with us, with me) but it is difficult to conceptualise the relationship between neutral space (house) and experienced place (home).7 'Home' is not always one clearly defined spot but people can easily move and have several places where they stay. Sometimes people (proudly?) told me they or their father had built this or that particular house but personal details like photographs of parents or foundation stones I never saw.5 Sometimes the 'tombstone' of a deceased child is an intimate reminder of the people who made a house into their home. However this stone is seldom visible in urban settings. The lack of space in towns favours a more spiritual *akika*-ritual and often people decide to perform the ceremony in the village, thus creating the image the 'real' family house is rooted in a rural area. Technical words for houses in different sises indicated with their own Bantu prefixes range from very large (*jumba*) via normal sise (*nyumba*) to small dwellings (*kijumba*) and rooms within a house (*chumba*).7 Instead of saving money in a bank account people prefer to buy a plot and start building their own house any time they can spare the money.

The linguistic muddle often led to a Babylonic language confusion when I asked about the sacrificial practice 'in the house where you lived in last year' (appendix I, question 2.2). From the answers I got, I finally understood that my respondents usually understood 'nyumba' in the sense of the place where they were born, where their parents lived, their home place. Many students who did not live with their parents said they could not answer this question because they were not 'at home' during the festival."8 The questionnaires also revealed that the practice of everybody returning
'RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS' to their families before the Idd el-Hajj as known from other ethnographies (for example in Egypt according to Rashed 1998 and Schielke 2006: 84-86), is not always the rule in Tanga. Many boarding school students who enrolled in the technical course in Tanga School did not feel any need to return to their parents to celebrate the Idd el-Hajj, although they preferred to be there during the Idd el-Fitr.

House or home, the physical space most Tanga sacrifice takes place in is usually invisible, private, and clearly marked by boundaries not to be overstepped by anyone without a specific purpose. Before entering the courtyard, house or room any guest announces his presence by ‘hodi’, and does not enter without the answer ‘karibu.’ In Tanga not the traditional ‘Swahili house’ as described by De Vere Allen (1979) and Middleton (1992:54-68) is omnipresent but rather another type of urban dwelling place. The major distinction between the two is the closed courtyard (ua). Here most social activities take place, women cook and children play, bicycles are parked during lunchtime and visitors wait to be admitted.

The ua is usually described as female in opposition to the male veranda (baraza). During my fieldwork I never experienced the courtyard as specifically female, although women were most of the time present, and dominated it during the early morning (the earliest women got the washing lines for them selves) and dinner preparing time. Especially after sunset when the cooking fires had died and the dishes were washed both men and women inhabited the ua. One of the occupants, a traditional healer (mganga), smoked outside his house, another solitary living man did his washing, and a young father raced his daughter on his bicycle around the courtyard. Other renters (such as two teenage boys selling peanuts and a senior Pemba fisherman) were never seen doing anything else in the courtyard except crossing it to the bathroom or their bedroom. One of the boys told me he disliked the courtyard because of the women, and one of them in particular because she was ‘dangerous’ (he hinted at her supposed sexual indecency which was clear to him because her sister died form AIDS).

Just as the ua is not a secluded place for women only and changes it function during the day, so is the veranda (baraza) in front of the house not a purely male place. After sunset the old fisherman could be seen sitting here listening to his radio or talking to friends. At the far corner of the baraza an elderly woman who sold porridge on the market was sitting or lying. Also the space between the houses where the communal tap was located did not show a gender specific use. The two sons of the traditional healer were often sitting there on a masonry protrusion of the neighbour house. Some-
times they were joined by their sister. In the afternoon when the neighbour had finished his client’s washing and ironing, they would sit together and circulate newspapers and discussing them. If anything, the space between the houses was female since the only running water tap for three houses was situated here and mostly women came to fetch the water. Rather than an over generalised genderedness of places I think that both day time (and the position of the sun) and personal character play more important roles in the use of space.

However in discourse the house is often associated with women. Polygamous men usually live with their youngest wife while his first spouse continues to inhabit the original dwelling place. These female headed households with a husband often living far away are more common in the villages than in towns. But even when a couple lives together, the house is perceived as more female than male. In his 1997 Idd el-Hajj sermon Barahiyan emphasised the purity of Islam as illustrated by the protection of women and the guarding of the house. Matters concerning for example sexual intercourse and virginity are called unyumba (house affairs). A mistress in Swahili is a small house (nyumba ndogo). The lessons of AMYC director Barahiyan on animal slaughtering contained a large digression concerning the contaminating effects of dogs, alcohol and prostitutes on the house. Women (as well as dogs) are highly ambiguous as both protectors and potential polluters of the house.

Almost every courtyard is centred round the karo, a dump place of dirt and foul water. This is the place where potties are emptied, people brush their teeth and the waste bins are stationed until they are collected. Originally a cavity, after some time it usually takes the form of a small hump, sometimes overgrown with weeds. The karo is not a real impure place but neither is it completely clean; children are discouraged to play in/on the karo. The daily sweeping of the courtyard (only done by women) reveals that ‘normal’ dirt like fowl’s feathers, dust and leaves are swept into the karo, but exceptional and smelling dirt like fish leftovers are put into the bins. The karo is the place where animals are slaughtered.

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i. Ngamiani, 28 December 2000 (Idd el-Fitr), 5.00 a.m.

In the collective house I came to live in November 2000, families were from different ethnic (Sambaa, Pare, Digo, Bondei) and religious groups (Roman Catholic, Assemblies of God, Sunni Muslim). Because Christmas and Idd el-Fitr almost coincided that year I decided to buy a goat for the whole house. A young Christian Sambaa businessmen from Lushoto, married with
one child, took care of the purchase and succeeded to get a goat for 12,000 Shilling (12 US Dollar). Two days later a Digo bicycle repairer working in the same street and regular visitor of the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre complained to him: if only he had known we were looking for a goat, he could have offered us a larger animal (kept his hands near his hips) for only 9,000 Shilling (9 US Dollar) because he was forced to sell it anyhow due to financial problems. On the eve of the Idd, late at night on December 27 someone knocked on my door with an urgent question: three male representatives of the households wanted to slaughter the goat that night in order to have the meal ready early morning. The reason of the three men was that they wanted to participate in the Idd prayer next morning. A Christian renter countered that since they did not pray during the whole year this was not a valid argument according to him. He preferred to have the slaughtering done in the morning with everyone present to safeguard a fair distribution of meat.

I left it to the household members to appoint a slaughterer. The most logical option was sheikh Bakari, a small elderly man who recently had married his second wife but still renting one of the rooms. He is known as Sheikh Tumbo (Belly) because of his shape caused by neglected elephantiasis. His father was born on the island of Pemba while his mother was originally from a Southern Kenyan ethnic group (Taita). He was working for 'mean' Indians as a 'house boy' but had difficulty in doing the heavy jobs like washing because of his back aches. Occasionally he asked me small favours and in return he sometimes invited me to attend one of his prayer sessions. On these occasions he prayed for the sick and the needy for a little money (usually 500 Shilling, about half a US Dollar). He also taught Arabic on a very basic level. His skills in reading Arabic and the treasure of a few books earned him just that much to survive but he was still living at one of the lowest levels of the urban population. In one and a half year I got to know him as a nervous man but well adapted to the hard circumstances of town life. As a real entrepreneur he was successful to arrange almost everything while he still was able not to overburden a relationship by too many demands. He occasionally lied about his relationship with me, presenting me as one of his Muslim students, but also got me books and sold them me for only a little profit.

Around five o'clock a.m. from every household at least one member was around. The sheikh was late because he took his time to dress properly. Finally he appeared in a white flowing kanzu over his trousers, a clean grey jacket and an Arab red and white chequered keffiyeh substituted his daily kofia. The mganga and one of his sons immobilise the goat, pressing it down on a couple of banana leaves. Before and after the throat cut Bakari takes his
time for a couple of inaudible prayers. Later that day we reconstructed this moment as follows: first he starts with “Bismillah ar-rahman ar-rahim”. Then follows the cut which is for abattoir standards quite slow and amateurish. At the moment the blood starts to gush, he recites four times “Allahu akbar” (God is great) and seven times the Prayer for the Prophet: “Waswala lahu ‘ala [sayyiduna] Muhammadi wa-‘ala aalihi waswahabihi wasallim” (May God grant our lord Muhammad and his house and the Companions mercy and peace).

The blood is collected in a yellow oil bin and removed as normal waste. After the killing Bakari withdrew and left the scene for those who were proficient in dressing the animal. From this moment on Stephen the Sambaa businessman took the lead. Before he had settled in Tanga he used to buy and prepare cow heads and hooves for soup near the major slaughterhouse in Dar es Salaam. The division of labour between the Islamic slaying and professional dressing is visible at all the Tanga slaughter scenes both public and private. The religious act of killing is not necessarily done by the most proficient Muslims available but rather by the most learned.

The meat distribution is in the hands of all the men who helped dressing the animal but elderly men like the mganga clearly have a lot of influence. In the background all women are present and cautiously contribute in the decision making of the men. Although Stephen is usually not very much involved in general affairs concerning the house (collecting rent, paying for water and electricity, repairs) he is prominently present as the one who bought the goat. In general families get more than individuals. Those who did not get a share because they did not cook for themselves (I was among them), are invited to a more or less communal meal cooked by the porridge vendor and another woman. Surprisingly absent was the Pemba fisherman; he mentioned to Stephen he did not want to have any portion.

ii. Kwaminchi, 6 March 2001 (Idd el-Hajj), 9.00 a.m.

A few months later I witness an Idd el-Hajj domestic sacrifice in the Tanga urban area Kwaminchi. Together with sheikh Asmani Ahmed from the al-Nisa mosque and madrasa I enter the house which had invited him to perform the sacrifice. After the festival prayers and the khutba the sheikh had broken his fast together with other madrasa teachers in the buildings of the Irshadul Muslimin School, a few blocks to the south of Ngamiani. The house where the sacrifice is to take place does not have a karo and the whole courtyard consists of a flat concrete floor. The goat is taken to a small alley next to the main house, but still in the courtyard, just between the house and the
surrounding wall. The owner, a middle aged Arab, holds the animal with the help of his two sons. When the sheikh enters he receives a knife and tests the sharpness of the blade on his thumb. He subsequently removes his sandals and his watch. Silently he starts the procedure by pronouncing three times the takbir “Allahu akbar,” followed by the prayer of the prophet:

Allahuma salli ‘ala Muhammadin wa ‘ala ali Muhammadin kama salayta ‘ala Ibrahim wa ‘ala ali Ibrahim innaka hamidun madjid. Allahuma barik ‘ala Muhammadin, wa ‘ala ali Muhammdin kama barakta ‘ala Ibrahim wa ‘ala ali Ibrahim. Innaka hamidun madjid.

(O God pray for Muhammad and for the house of Muhammad just as you prayed for Ibrahim and for the house of Ibrahim. Indeed you are to be praised and the Glorious. O God give peace for Muhammad and for the house of Muhammad just as You gave peace for Ibrahim and the house of Ibrahim. Indeed you are to be praised and the Glorious.)

He continues with the basmallah: Bismillahi ar-rahman ar-rahim, followed by a final allahu akbar when the blood starts to spurt. Nobody collects the blood but most of it drips in a shallow cavity, prepared for this occasion. The sheikh drops his knife and asks for water. When he has washed his hands, and put on his watch and slippers he starts a final prayer from the Qur’an (2:201):

Rabbana atina fi dunya hasana wa fi al-akhira hasana waqina ‘adhaba nar

Our Lord! grant us good in this world and good in the hereafter, and save us from the chastisement of the fire

The men being present answer ‘Amin’. The two boys continue flaying the animal while the owner of the house asks us to sit down in the corridor between the main entrance and the bedrooms. A jamvi (mat), incense and a burner are waiting for the next ritual: the prayers for the ancestors. The owner of the house brings a school cahier and shows two pages with more than 30 names he wants the sheikh to pray for. He recites the Arabic text from the khitma ritual by heart and does not refer any particular book. Time and again he drops the white pieces of ubani (incense) in the burner. When he has finished, the sheikh puts the remainder of the incense in his pocket.
The Arab tells me he always sacrifices at the Idd but this time he was quite late to buy the animal, so he had to pay 20,000 Shilling (USD 20) in the village the day before the Idd el-Hajj. Apart from the fact that he was under pressure to buy an animal because of the approaching feast, he also preferred a billy goat, which also substantially increased the price (sheep and female animals are cheaper than goats and male animals). Distribution of the meat was taken care of according to the Sharia rules he said; neighbours and poor (masikini) got parts while he and his family ate the rest. He always consumed the liver of the animal because he liked the meat.

Plate 11: Public Idd el-Hajj sacrifice by AMYC, Tanga

iii. Ngamiani, 23 February 2002 (Idd el-Hajj), 9.45 a.m.

One year later I observe an Idd el-Hajj sacrifice in Ngamiani, downtown Tanga. Immediately after the khutba in the al-Nisa mosque, Salehe Uthman takes me to a house two streets behind the mosque. Salehe is an advances madrasa student of al-Nisa and is in his early twenties. His father, a madrasa mwalimu, received three requests to perform the sacrifice this morning, and Salehe is doing this one on behalf of his father. When we enter the house Abdi Juma, a middle aged man and related to the family, wearing only a pair of trousers is there. He grinds a pair of knives on the concrete
'RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS'

floor. In one of the corners of the courtyard a white/brown he-goat is tethered with a pink sisal rope to a water pipe, behind a rusty iron bathtub. A bucket with clean water and some green leaves are within reach of the goat. Several unusual architectural details (like concrete chairs in the courtyard) show that this house is privately owned and not inhabited by renters.

One side of the courtyard is occupied with a couple of concrete stalls with sloping floors towards a shallow gutter, apparently construction work in progress. This place is chosen for the killing. Abdi fetches the goat and takes hold of its rear end while Salehe carefully tucks away his kanzu, revealing a traditional male khanga underneat. As most Muslims he also wears an embroidered cap (kofia). He removes his sandals and steps on the raised floor near the drain. His left foot slightly presses the goat's neck while the animal is lying on his left side facing north towards Mecca. A very brief "Bismillah" before the swift throat cut and a final "Allahu akbar" when the blood comes forth, is the only formula used here. After the slaughtering Salehe washes his hands and bare feet, and unfolds his dress. Abdi heaves up the animal to one of the ridge beams and attaches its left hind leg to the corrugated iron roof.

The flaying by Abdi is rather rough but the skin is not damaged as happened sometimes. Salehe hangs around, waiting for a share in the meat; he never gets any money, just some charity gift (sadaka tu). Before starting to cut up the animal Abdi went to the elderly woman who lives in the house together with her husband, to ask for specific instruction for the distribution. She didn't have any special wishes so he started to cut everything in small pieces. The final distribution was done by the woman: she took seven different dishes outside and started to contemplate on the allocation. One portion for the old man next door, one for mzee wangu ('my husband'), one portion for Abdi the dresser: head, legs, stomach, half of the entrails and part of the front leg. Her son, living in the well-to-do Raskazone area got a big portion, containing quite a lot of plain meat (legs). Most of the tasty meat like heart, liver, kidneys and lungs she kept for her own household. Her father got a normal portion, equally taken from different animal parts. The girl next door came and got a little bit of the entrails. Finally the mwalimu, Saleh's father received also a significant portion in acknowledgment of a long relationship between him and this particular family. At 10.10 a.m. the whole ceremony is finished and Abdi cleans his knives. The woman comes and removes the twigs Abdi used as surface to cut the meat.
b. Public field

As of 1997, as described in the last chapter, the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre in Tanga started to celebrate their Idd festivals on the Tangamano field, right in the middle of Tanga’s business centre. The videos I watched from 1995 and 1996 showed that the Idd el-Hajj prayers were conducted inside the mosque on the 19th street. Both videos did not show any trace of a sacrifice. The announcements in 1996 addressed women to wait after the official part was over, so they could hear how they could receive their part of the sacrificial meat. Just like other mosques in Tanga the AMYC building lacks a suitable place to sacrifice animals, although other mosques sometimes do sacrifice on their premises. The new venue in the centre of Tanga offered the logistic facilities to introduce this new element as part of the worship.

i. Tangamano, 17 April 1997, 8.35 a.m.

After the communal prayers (7.30-7.41 a.m.) and the *khutba* (7.42-8.34 a.m.) on the Tangamano field, the video tape shows a three minute sacrifice by two men, one of which is the AMYC director Salim Barahiyan. Because it is the first time the congregation will sacrifice as part of the religious service, Barahiyan extensively introduces the slaughtering. He explicitly refers to the prophetic customs of first slaughtering his own animals in public permitting other believers to sacrifice at home. The new practice is embedded in the authoritative genealogy of the Prophet and his Companions, the best credentials one can imagine:

*My brothers, we have some important announcements, so please listen. I think the custom to distribute coupons (*kugawa kuponi*) with regard to the sacrificial *sadaka* is one thing you are used to. Another thing is the accomplishment of the Sunna of the Prophet (SAW), yes we will slaughter today here some animals, in order to allow (*ili iwe ndiyo ruksa*) the other Muslims to go home and slaughter an animal in their own homes (*mayumbani kwao*). The *salat* [...] the sacrificial ceremony is done immediately after the *khutba* and therefore today we will accomplish [that] here [and now]. Some animals will be slaughtered here and that is a *sunna* received from the Prophet when he was in Medina; he used to slaughter some animals on the prayer field (*uwanja wa sala*). Afterwards he let the Muslims go home to slaughter in their own homes. Therefore today some animals are brought here in order to finish this ceremony successfully. And [according] to this ceremony my Muslim brothers, it is required that those who are able and have animals, let them slaughter, eat, and distribute among their brothers in Islam.*
Barahiyan (white flowing garment, white embroidered cap) starts to sacrifice a single white goat with black head. Several men have taken hold of the bleating animal, while the camera man continuously repeats ‘Allahu akbar’. When Barahiyan carefully cuts the nerves in the spinal cord, his papers containing the notes of his speech drop into the spurting blood. Two or three persons (from the more than 20 standing behind him), try to grasp them.

ii. Tangamano, 27 March 1999, 8.31 a.m.

The khutba this year is directed to the congregation by another AMYC staff member and not by the director Barahiyan. After the sermon, Barahiyan adds his own announcements (matangazo). He comments upon diverse issues like the moon sighting issue, Arafa, terrorism, bicycle races, and the relationship between Islam as a religion of peace and the popular image of Muslims as killers. Finally he shortly announces the sacrifice: “na hivi sasa tutafanya ibada ya kuchinja hapa” (and now we perform the sacrificial ceremony here).

A large banner is quickly unfolded, specifically made for this occasion. It reads in Arabic (plate 1):

Al-Muntada al-Islami
Sacrificial project for the year 1419 Hijrah
Financing/ Muhammad and Abdallah Collective Enterprise
Realisation/ Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre
Place/ Country of Tanzania

The Saudi funded charity al-Muntada al-Islami primarily works in Africa, and some of the AMYC books are published by their Nairobi based Trust.15 The video fragment showing the banner of the sponsor is pasted a couple of times in the tape to artificially increase its visibility. Salim Barahiyan wears a long white shirt over a white pair of trousers well above his ankles, a Palestinian like keffiyeh around his shoulders and a white, plain kofia on his head. For the occasion he has tucked his long shirt around his waist, and removed his sandals. Five goats are slaughtered all by Barahiyan alone (no one helps him in immobilizing the animals. He puts his right bare foot on the wriggling body while cutting the throat. He carefully severs the nerves between the vertebrae or breaks the animal’s neck after the throat cut. Just like other AMYC sacrifices no particular care is taken to remove the slaughtering from the sight of the living goats, different from for example the Ahmadiyya who
use a prophetic custom forbidding that. Only a few people watch the scene, most of them young boys. When Barahiyan has finished his job, both his trousers and sandals are covered with blood.

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iii. Tangamano, 22 February 2002, 8.20 a.m.

After the salat 7.30-7.39 a.m. and the khutba (7.40-8.15 a.m.) delivered by an AMYC staff member, Salim Barahiyan, the director of the AMYC walks towards the trees on the west side of the Tangamano field where boys are waiting with seven goats. Two men from the organisation unfold the Muntada al-Islami banner (the same as in 1999, except for the indication of the year). Under this banner Barahiyan (more experienced than in earlier years) killed the first goat without making any amendments to his white clothes. After the throat cut, he drops his knife and joins the other leaving Muslims. The sacrifice is not the focus of attention, it is not necessary to witness the ritual in order to participate in it (as in the salat). However this is not the same as saying the ritual sacrifice is marginal or unimportant as we will see below. Only some boys and a few men wait for the other six goats to be slaughtered. This is quickly done by a young man with dirty clothes, bare legs and plastic slippers. Instead of the Muntada al-Islami organisation, now a Muslim Aid welfare banner is displayed in English. This London based NGO, founded in 1984 by the converted pop star Cat Stevens/Yusuf Islam16, has spent in 2002 more than 35,000 British pounds on welfare in Tanzania (730,000 for the whole continent).17 Qurbani aid is only one of their projects. They also financed new classrooms and equipment for the Twayyibat Islamic Secondary School in Dar es Salaam. Muslim Aid is also active in Tanga with so-called ‘eye camps’ where free ophthalmic care, small surgical services and screening for eye diseases are offered. The banners of the different sponsors have been visible only for a very short period when the camera records the actual killing and are probably only meant for the donors. The bodies of the goats are unceremoniously dropped in a waiting pickup to be flayed and distributed elsewhere. During the khutba token slips (kuponi) have been distributed among listeners. At a later moment this day they can change these vouchers for meat (between two and three kilo) at the AMYC centre.

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c. Government abattoir

i. Blood, danger and sacrifice

The state is absent in the home sacrifice, marginal on the public prayer field (permission of the local authorities is necessary) but dominant in the final sacrificial place under consideration here: the abattoir. Although
only a few (wealthy) private persons bring their cows and smaller animals
to the government owned slaughter facilities, the abattoir is the major site
where welfare organisations like the AMYC slaughter their Idd el-Hajj ani-
mal[s]. Commercial, nocturnal slaughtering for public consumption and the
Idd el-Hajj sacrifices performed in the abattoir are very similar. Pragmatic
considerations and secular law rather than religious rules influence the sig-
nificance of sacrifice performed here.

The location of slaughter slabs and abattoirs is usually near a river
or near the sea as in Tanga, because the need of running water is essential,
especially in times when the normal water supply fails.18 The Tanga abattoir
is based in Sahare, a semi-rural area perceived as lagging behind develop-
ment (cf. Askew 2002:150,228-230). It is also a dangerous place according
to the urban population living in central Tanga. On an early morning when I
left for the abattoir I was warned by a neighbour not to use my bicycle in any
place except for a few of the major Tanga roads, especially not in the Sahare
area where the slaughterhouse is located. Several cyclists were murdered
by thieves, using a rope stretched over the road in order to let the victim
fall. Even local employees don't use a cycle to get there but rather hire a
taxi (sharing the price with six or seven passengers). Some places in Dar es
Salaam were even so dangerous that the skinners and dressers employed
in the abattoir preferred to sleep there rather than travelling in the midst of
the night.

Animal activists in the colonial period were not very pleased with the
situation in the Tanga abattoir:

A howling mass of untrained natives get into a pen with a few poor little skinny
cattle, brandish sticks and drag the animals around, beat them up, break their
tails and often legs, until they get them down on the ground for the knife, the
animals are in a state of sheer terror, and they are killed in the sight of each
other. It is a common sight to see living and dead animals all in a heap and this
is civilisation.19

Although this animal rights discourse has been marginalised now,
the scientific and health arguments still continue to label slaughter-
houses as dirty and inadequate places for food processing.20 The colonial
discourse presenting ‘the African’ as unable to handle matters of health
without the proper guidance of Europeans, continues in a disguised form
substituting ‘Muslims’ for ‘Africans’, and ‘government health officers’ for
‘Europeans’.

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Apart from markers like ‘backward,’ ‘dangerous’ and ‘dirty,’ the Sahare slaughterhouse is also the place where ‘foreigners’ are located. Both in the major Dar es Salaam abattoir (Vingunguti) and in Tanga, the labourers are dominated by Gogo, an ethnic group from the central Dodoma region. A small survey among abattoir employees in Tanga yielded the following numbers: ten Gogo, three Sambaa, two Buguru, one Sukuma and one Chagga. Gogo are described by members of other ethnic groups as fierce, troublesome and ease to pick a fight with. Fact is that the abattoir sphere is often filled with laughter, jokes and only occasionally disturbed by a small fist fight. In Tanga I never witnessed the use of knives on these occasion; older workers and the government employed meat inspector intervened verbally. In Vingunguti however one worker was almost murdered in a quarrel over a bicycle pedal.

On the moral and spiritual level, slaughter areas are perceived as bad places because of the excessive presence of blood and spirits (roho). Dealing with blood will eventually result in craziness due to the ‘curse of the cow’ (laana la ng’ombe). This can be prevented by regularly (‘at least every year’) slaughtering a goat or sheep and distribute its meat as charity (sadaka) without eating from the meat. This expiatory sacrifice can also be substituted by money, according to some abattoir professionals. The amount varies but slaughterers mentioned to me between 25 and 100 Shilling (USD 0.025 – 0.10) a cow, which is a substantial amount compared with their salary. A Kimara slaughterer (Dar es Salaam) offered 10 percent of his salary to the mosque for this reason; a Kigoma butcher mentioned one goat per 100 cows. This is also the explanation some people put forward why they don’t like working in the abattoir. They complained to me that at the end of the day, you are left with no money at all. They also mentioned that ‘the Arabs’ (here used in the meaning of butchers and cattle owners) fear the blood too much (waarabu wanaogopa damu sana), and therefore prefer to pay for the dirty work.

Although the AMYC are very explicit about the proper date of the Idd el-Hajj (simultaneous with 10 Dhulhija in Saudi Arabia, i.e. 5 March 2001) they accommodated to the main stream Tanga Muslim population and slaughtered animals on the next day too. (On that day I witnessed a heated debate on the correct Idd day between an abattoir client and some AMYC representatives.) When the first AMYC pickup arrives, most of the workers have already left after finishing their work in the early hours (4.30 a.m. on 5
March, and 2.10 a.m. on 6 March). The women selling tea and *chapati* in the shed just outside the fence are joined by a crowd of more than 80 people on Tuesday the 6th. All of them hope to get some cheap meat. When the AMYC representative and the labourers have agreed on the salary (4,000 Shilling/USD 4) per cow and a quarter cow among them all), they start to fetch the animals from the railage, around 8.40 a.m. One of the employees flings a rope round a hind leg while another attaches a cord round its neck. When the cow decides to walk in the right direction this is fine, but usually the time pressure is quite high so the cow is already thrown on the floor before it reaches the indicated slaughter area. This putting down on the concrete slab causes huge bruises. In Tanga town I never saw the meat inspector remove these contusions, although one of his colleagues in the Tanga region did.

Under the eye of the AMYC supervisor each of the 16 cows is immobilised in one of the ‘chambers’ normally occupied by butchers. Each butcher has his own designated area. Athmani the watchman/slaughteerer performs all the slaughtering on these holidays. He is clad in normal trousers, a shirt and an embroidered *kofia*. He carries his own knife and a bucket with water used for washing his knife after he has cleaned it provisionally on the skin of the dying animal. When the skinners who fetched the cows have to wait too long they call him ‘Athmani, wewe!’ a not very respectful vocative. Most of the blood is collected by a couple of boys. After boiling the liquid in large barrels until it solidifies, they sell it to the municipality for 500 Shilling (0.5 US Dollar) per 20 litre. The municipality sells it to an animal fodder company. The government employed cleaner walks on and off with buckets of water. When the hide is halfway removed, the carcass is hoisted from the floor and not, as in other slabs, left on the concrete. After the skin is taken off completely and the entrails removed from the body, the carcass is cut in four parts. The heavy, wet hide is transported to a separate area where some self employed labourers remove the remains of the flesh (*malapa*) and carefully store it according to the government skin and hide regulations. The stomach and entrails are washed in a different place and then hung inside of the carcasses. The meat inspectors make incisions in head, liver, heart and lungs and then release the body marked with a government seal.

The body parts are loaded in the trucks and removed to another place where they will be cut and packed in smaller packages. The final distribution takes place mostly in villages around Tanga and Pangani. An AMYC representative remarks that quite a few of the receivers sell their meat. Private clients bringing small animals like goats and sheep, usually prefer to take the freshly flayed animal home as a whole, but request only the entrails to be
cleaned with a hose. Just like the other users of the abattoir they contribute taxes to the tax collector and pay separately for the killing and skinning.

Even on normal days the abattoir is a busy place, a site where several economic exchanges between money, meat and services take place. Taxi drivers bringing me to the abattoir at night took their time before they left: they washed their cars with the hosepipes, and bought some cheap meat. Outside the dilapidated fences, once used to separate the place from the surroundings, market women gather to buy meat for their *mama ntilie* cooking business. Male skinners and flayers employed by butchers, trade with the women while complaining and haggling about the prices. The meat dressers sell the women the meat they get as a salary in natura. Higher quality meat like the spleen which the Muslim slaughtermen in Tanga receive as their salary is sold to one dealer but sometimes also a woman tries to get a share. Every morning a shabby old man cleans the gutters and looks for tiny little bits of fat and meat. When I ask for his motives the meat inspector quickly interrupts and tells me this is ‘only for dog food’ to be sold to pet owners. On later occasions the man refuses to talk to me.

On the morning of the Idd el-Hajj the place is even more crowded and many persons try to get their share of the enormous amounts of meat being processed. The meat inspector gets away with a large portion. Athmani the main Muslim slaughterer this year does a good business because today he kills his own cow and sells its meat slightly below the market value (which is still considerably higher than the price outside the festival seasons). He supervises the cutting and flaying and completes the monetary transactions in person. At this stage the women have entered the actual abattoir site and surround the carcass, pointing out the parts they want to buy.

People come to oversee their animal sacrifice only when the *salat* is finished and most of them even after they have listened to the *khutba*, sometime between 8.30 a.m. and 900 a.m. By that time the first batch of cows destined for the common market and butcher shops has already been processed. A second difference concerns the payment of the workers; instead of the normal, fixed remunerations, on the Idd el-Hajj a select number of abattoir employees picked by the meat inspector offer their services to the representatives of the welfare organisations who decide how much they get for their efforts. But more conspicuous are the similarities: just like ‘normal’ food processing, the Idd sacrifice is firmly controlled by the government, embedded in a market driven exchange system and performed by migration workers. Whereas the normal killing is done in the dark with no witnesses, now the distinction between sacrificer (who performs the sacrifice) and sac-
rifiers (on whose behalf the animal is killed) becomes clear. The separation between on the one hand local, religious, white robed, immaculate owners of expensive cars, and on the other hand the wildly shouting, dirty clad, poor foreign labourers never becomes clearer than on the morning of the Idd el-Hajj. The urban elite who can afford the abattoir expenses waits at a safe distance till the work is done before they return in their four wheel drives, their servants carrying the carcasses, leaving the blood and the danger behind.

3. Sacrifice and sacrificer

a. Text and conflicts

Textual rules on the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice are generally perceived as clear and unambiguous in Swahili discourse. In contrast to the lack of Qur’anic guidelines on the Idd celebration, one can find quite detailed prescriptions on food, meat and animal slaughtering. The most relevant Qur’anic parts concerning the method of slaughtering and the acceptability of the sacrificer come from Sura 5 (‘The Table’) immediately after the regulations pertaining to the hajj sacrifices (hady) described in chapter 2.

Q 5:3: Forbidden to you (for food) are: dead meat, blood, the flesh of swine, and that on which hath been invoked the name of other than Allah, that which hath been killed by strangling, or by a violent blow, or by a headlong fall, or by being gored to death; that which hath been (partly) eaten by a wild animal; unless ye are able to slaughter it (in due form); that which is sacrificed on stone (altars); (forbidden) also is the division (of meat) by raffling with arrows: that is impiety. […]

Q 5:5: This day are (all) things good and pure made lawful unto you. The food of the People of the Book is lawful unto you and yours is lawful unto them.

The same rules concerning the killing for consumption are also applicable to sacrifices on the Idd el-Hajj. Swahili discourse on this topic accentuates two essential conditions: the sacrificer’s belief in one God and the pronunciation of God’s name when slaughtering the animal.24 Even Jews and Christians, in the madrasa literature known as kitabi (belonging to the People of the Book, derived from Q 5:5) are legitimate sacrificers. Arabic legal texts only exclude a majus (Magi) and a wathani (idolater) from the group
of valid sacrificers. These basic conditions are further explained by commentators: the sacrificer should have reached puberty (baligh), be rational (mumayyiz) and skilled (yati`u-l dhabh). Invalid is only the slaughtering by a mentally deranged person (majnun); sacrifices by drunkards and blind people are just makruh (reprehensible). In addition to these texts on normal animal slaughtering, commentaries and glosses provide further clarifications for the Idd el-Hajj. In Tanzania it is believed to be a sunna to kill your own Idd animal if you are able to do so, but if otherwise you can appoint someone else. Sometimes (but not very often) this assignment of a representative is ritually emphasised by handing over the knife or touching the knife when someone sacrifices on your behalf.

Outside Tanzania many cases of Muslims complaining about Western commercial meat processing concern the way of slaughtering and the person who slaughters. Many Muslims perceive the method of electrical stunning employed in most modern abattoirs inadequate and according to them the meat from these abattoirs is carrion and thus forbidden according to Q 5:3. Within Tanzania this discussion surfaced during the colonial times, when the large scale meat processing plant Tanganyika Packers Limited (TPL) introduced the method in the 1950s. In the 1960s Abdullah Saleh Farsy followed the line of earlier modernists like the Egyptian Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) who allowed the meat of the People of the Book ‘killed by any method. Although Farsy’s opinion as a Chief Kadhi is held in high esteem, on this particular point most Tanzanian Muslims did not agree with him. Although in 1968 several Kenyan sheikhs supported Farsy’s view and reported that they witnessed the Saudi’s employing the very same method of stunning for all hajj sacrifices, nowadays very few Muslims perceive this way of killing as valid. However the discussion has lost most of its social relevance because in Tanzania no large scale meat processing or import exists any more.

Apart from the method of slaughtering, a second objection in these modern debates on animal slaughtering concerns the exact definition of the ahl al-kitab (People of the Book) mentioned in Q 5:5. This theme is for example picked up by the AMYC director Barahiyan in 1997. The discussion deals with the question what the underlying reason (‘illa) is why the meat slaughtered by Jews and Christians is lawful for Muslims; is it their faith or their particular method of slaughtering? If it is their beliefs, than what to do with a Christian who strangles an animal (forbidden in Q 5:3); but if it is their particular practice, than what is the status of a meat explicitly dedicated to Jesus or to a divine trinity, Barahiyan asks? The solution some Muslims pro-
pose is to limit the label *ahl al-Kitab* to only those Christians living during the time of the Prophet, who killed according to Islamic rules and did not believe in three gods. The condition underlying the permission to eat meat from the *ahl al-kitab* is that the practice of slaughtering does not contradict Qur’anic regulations. Therefore, all those Christians living now cannot claim the status of People of the Book.

However, just as all the conflicts described in this book, also the debates on the sacrificer are not so much concerned with the proper application of particular textually transmitted rules, but rather with social identity and trust: who belongs to the moral Islamic community and who does not? Who is responsible and able to guard the boundaries of the religious society? Accepting or not accepting someone’s butchering as valid, is a mechanism of inclusion or exclusion from the moral community. The Tanga sheikh and founder of the Shamsiyya *madrasa* Muhammad bin Ayyub Khamis illustrated this social device in his book “Protect your Islam.” A Muslim who has placed himself outside the Islamic *umma* by his behaviour or beliefs, cannot marry legally, cannot inherit from a Muslim, his body may not be washed, shrouded, or prayed over in the mosque but it should be devoured by the dogs. Among these social repercussions also the condemnation of any meat slaughtered by him, is mentioned. It is therefore on the frontiers of Islam and in religious plural societies (rather than on the Muslim dominated Swahili coast) that we find these discussions on trust and social identity cloaked in debates on slaughtering. Muslim minorities protesting against a Christian butcher in the town of Moshi; Ahmadiyya believers complaining about exclusion from the meat business in Taveta and Yala (Kenya); Uganda Muslims killed for refusing to eat the king’s meat and Uganda Christians challenging the Muslim monopoly on commercial animal slaughtering are just a few examples.

The same as in the discussions on the moral community emerging in the debates on the proper date of the Idd and on the significance of the *hajj*, the slaughtering controversies focus attention on authority: who is entitled to define the boundaries and how are Muslims to protect them? Practical problems dealing with the exact practice of slaughtering (orthopraxy) are always secondary to these larger themes of the community’s wellbeing. The National Muslim Council BAKWATA claims to be a grassroots organisation and admits responsibility for correct local slaughtering of livestock for human consumption. In July 1999 the organisation discharged a slaughterer from Ilala (Dar es Salaam) after Muslims expressed serious doubts about his functioning (*kutokuo muadilifu kwa wakati wa kuchinja*). Earlier problems
arose in Ukonga, in September 1992, where cows were killed by ‘stabbing’ instead of the proper throat cut. During the subsequent meeting on 7 October 1992 in the CCM building of Ukonga, government officials, veterinary inspectors and representatives from the local Muslim community decided that all the slaughterers should be chosen by BAKWATA. Furthermore they should regularly pray and abstain from alcohol (limepita Azimio kua wachinjaji waote wateuliwe na Bakwata wasali na waache kulewa). If a cattle owner was in need to perform an emergency slaughtering and no skilled Muslim was available he should go to the mosque or madrasa to ask someone to perform this task.44

The way these problems are dealt with concords with the general observation in abattoirs: state officers as representatives from the government have the highest authority but try to delegate as much power to BAKWATA as possible in case of religious problems. Authoritative knowledge, the knowledge that really counts and is acted upon belongs to health officers in charge of the meat processing. Their knowledge system is constructed by modern, western notions of ‘proper,’ ‘humane,’ and ‘hygienic’ food production. The problems they indicated are different from those of the slaughterers. Meat inspectors complained to me about the absence of incinerators (they had to use pits to burn condemned offal), absence or poor quality of the tackles, too much floor contact of the meat, etc. Muslim slaughterers deal with other problems. In the just mentioned Ukonga case, the local BAKWATA sheikh persuaded a retired airport civil servant (born 1935) to take over the work of some of the discharged employees. The personal bond between the religious sheikh and this particular man is essential. The latter was chosen because he was known to be trustworthy and doing all his work conscientiously. Only after being selected for this job, he got the basic training necessary for animal slaughtering.45 Faithfulness and reliability can not be guaranteed by a letter of recognition many people told me, but only by personal trust.46 Only a good Muslim can resist the social pressure someone exerts on you, several slaughterers related. A case mentioned to me involved the question to ‘kill’ a goat that had already died on arrival because it was transported with five others in a basket on a bicycle.

The official letters from BAKWATA function as a token from the state to prove that a neutral government does its utmost to ensure that Islamic Law is applied properly. Commercial enterprises likewise approach BAKWATA to provide their employees with credentials in order to safeguard their right of entry on the national meat market. Although these letters (often framed and attached to the wall) are compulsory from a bureaucratic point...
of view, Muslims are eager to point out how ineffective these BAKWATA signatures are compared with the government: “If you don’t have a licence from the government you go to jail, if you don’t have a BAKWATA letter nothing happens […] Although we don’t like BAKWATA we do what the government wants.”

Although some of those who offer their sacrificial animals for slaughtering to the government abattoir have serious doubts about the integrity of the state and BAKWATA (for example the AMYC) they do trust the power of the state to enforce halal slaughtering. This is perhaps most visible in the idea Muslims have that the killing of animals in the public food sector by a Muslim, is imposed by Tanzanian written law. In the same way people believe that Islamic rituals can be found somewhere in a written sharia (Islamic religious law), they also refer to Tanzanian sheria (secular law) as the code which prescribes the slaughtering by Muslims. In a literal sense, such a law does not exist. Although it is compulsory for all butchers to make use of the official slaughter slabs and abattoirs, the method or even religion of the slaughterer is not prescribed by law. The adage “Do not mix religion with politics” is explained by government officials as prohibiting to ask a Muslim to perform a particular task. Every one should be selected according to his/her capacities, not because his or her religion. Therefore most Muslims do not feel the need to make inquiries about the religiosity or particular skills of the abattoir slaughterers. They act according to the often quoted statement attributed to Islamic fiqh: “if you doubt, you better not ask.” And: “if you doubt you say ‘bismillah’ before eating.” The government is very careful not to betray this public trust. One of the meat inspectors, who wished to remain anonymous, declared he had once condemned a whole carcass slaughtered by someone else who was not appointed as a recognised Muslim slaughterer. Despite the fact that this killing might have been lawful according to Islamic Law, he used his authority to make a clear statement: Tanzanian law makes sure that all meat produced for public consumption is coming from properly slaughtered animals. He phrased his condemnation in spatial terms: “killing outside the proper designated area makes the slaughtering illegal and the meat unfit for public consumption.”

b. Text and gender

Not textually mandated but rather culturally inscribed is the image of the male sacrificer. Almost all Tanzanian Muslims I spoke to admit that women and children (mentioned usually together as opposed to Muslim men) may slaughter both for consumption and for ritual sacrifice. This idea
is corroborated by many authoritative texts. However most of these reports portray ambiguous women performing the sacrifice in extraordinary situations. For example the following hadith transmitted by Bukhari and often quoted in Swahili discourse does not explicitly refer to women performing sacrifices as a regular job, but to a woman on the margin of the social system, who acted in an emergency situation:

A slave girl belonging to Ka'b used to graze some sheep at Sl'a (mountain). Once one of her sheep was dying. She reached it (before it died) and slaughtered it with a stone. The Prophet was asked, and he said, “Eat it.”

The following report states that even women having their periods are allowed to sacrifice their animals on the Idd el-Hajj, whereas at the same time Muhammad is described as the one who sacrifices on behalf of women:

Abu Musa ordered his daughters to sacrifice with their own hands.

It is related that 'A'isha said, “The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, came to her at Sarif when I was weeping. He asked, ‘What is the matter? Have you started your period?’ ‘Yes,’ she replied. He said, “This is something that Allah has decreed for the daughters of Adam, so do everything that someone on hajj does [including the sacrifice, GCvdB] but do not do tawaf of the House.” The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, sacrificed some cows on behalf of his wives.

The very same ambiguity and fuzziness surrounding women in sacrificial or slaughtering roles is visible in Tanga. Actual slaughtering by women as part of commercial meat processing is rare. I know of only one case where a Tanga hotel employs a woman for killing their chickens. This Christian woman asked to remain anonymous, although she performed her work in a semi-public area near her house. She mentioned the fact that she was a woman, rather than a Christian, that might be the stumble block for Muslim customers to buy the meat. Idd el-Hajj slaughtering by women also takes place on a small scale. Two girls from Jumuiya and Maawal secondary school confirmed that they sacrificed the Idd el-Hajj animal at home. Both girls are circumcised.

Male circumcision is seen among Muslims as a laudable practice based on the Sunna of Ibrahim and Muhammad. The operation is performed sometime before puberty, individual or as part of a jando (initiation) ritual.
Circumcision for male slaughterers is perceived as a condition sine qua non in Tanzania. One of the letters of recognition abattoir personnel showed me, states that the slaughterer “is recognised (anatambuliwa) by the BAKWATA council, circumcised (ametahiniwa), sic) by the Sheikh of the district council and has succeeded in the test (amefu zu mtihani).” The idea that ritual purity derived from circumcision (tohara) is necessary for any act of sacrifice and slaughtering is widespread in Tanga. Although uncircumcised men are not allowed to perform some hajj rituals, educated madrasa teachers indicate that there is no textual authority for the idea that circumcision is essential for valid sacrifices. The Swahili scholar Mazrui in his influential textbook Hidayat al-atfal explains: “Over here all knowledge based on intellect has ceased because some people claim that a sacrifice by a woman, or a child, or an uncircumcised is invalid.”

Against this background it is striking that both female respondents who acted as a sacrificer in the 2002 Idd el-Hajj, belonged to the minority of girls who indicated they had undergone a circumcision (table 13.1). The high non response also suggests that these seven girls are not alone in the Tanga region. These data imply that women in the private sphere are allowed to perform religious sacrifices only on the condition that they are ‘purified’ by circumcision. While Islamic Law does not object to female sacrificers apparently more locally defined views on gender and religion feed this idea of circumcision as a condition for male and female sacrificers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Circumcised</th>
<th>Not circumcised</th>
<th>Non response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boys (n = 273)</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls (n = 100)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. **Locality, authority and the significance of sacrifice**

a. **The domestic sacrificer: personal bond**

In the private setting the majority of Idd el-Hajj sacrificers are male relatives or madrasa teachers (table 13.2). However, if we look at the other answers the number of students who personally performed the sacrifice and the category of ‘others’ is substantial. It is a further illustration of the fact that the Idd el-Hajj is, within particular textual and cultural parameters, primarily a contingent and pluriform ritual.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sacrificer</th>
<th>Percentage (and frequency)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>male relative (father, maternal uncle, brother)</td>
<td>39.7% (83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious expert (mwalimu, sheikh)</td>
<td>26.3% (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone else</td>
<td>17.7% (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent him/herself</td>
<td>16.3% (34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All cases of religious sacrifices I witnessed, showed the personal bond between the sacrificer and the sacrificers, the family on whose behalf the animal was killed. Before the Idd in December 2000 I asked Bakari to kill ‘my’ goat but initially he refused. He preferred invite a ‘real’ learned person in order to give me the opportunity to learn as much as possible. Later he admitted his attempts had failed and he decided to do it himself. One of the reasons why he couldn’t find a sacrificer was Bakari’s social network. As a relatively recent migrant from upcountry his network was unconnected with the local madrasas, and he had very few family members living in Tanga.

The ideal sacrificer is the Qur’an teacher from the local madrasa. Most of the teachers I interviewed indicated that they did slaughter Idd el-Hajj animals on invitation.63 As elsewhere (cf. Tayob 1999:30,72) the Swahili waliimu perform ritual tasks such as religious performances during birth, marriage and death. According to Chande “these ritual actions are important since they reinforce social and communal values and thereby confirm the religious leaders’ ritual power” (Chande 1998:208). Often the waliimu
performs more than one of these ritual functions when he visits the house to sacrifice an Idd animal. Praying for deceased family members is the most common among them. In exchange of these services he gets meat and later the skin of the animal is sent to the madrasa.

The mwalimu’s authority is partly derived from his textual knowledge, but just as important is his connection to religious institutions like mosques, madrasas and mystical brotherhoods. Knowledge and skills outside these socially recognised channels are difficult to imagine. My neighbour, a bicycle repairer, can serve as an example. Just like Bakari, he comes from upcountry; however his migration was not driven by economic motivations but rather religious ones: he chose Tanga for its excellent reputation as a town of Islamic learning and wanted to study here. After he had finished the whole religious curriculum (a rare fact) he did not continue as a teacher at one of the madrasas. His knowledge of Islam and texts is extensive, but missing the link with an authoritative institution, it remains isolated. Consequently a madrasa student with much less knowledge, can and will perform a task like ritual slaughtering due to his contact with authority and his personal bonds with higher level teachers, while my neighbour will not receive an invitation for such ritual tasks. Sometimes a madrasa student will ‘inherit’ a family where his teacher used to provide ritual services: not because of his ‘real’ knowledge but because of his personal relation to a mwalimu.

b. The AMYC sheikh: emblematic figure

As described in the introduction, the AMYC window on the world is emphatically translocal, anti-parochial, and focused on the worldwide umma which they wish to restore to its former glory.64 They transcend the ethnic and madhhab (Islamic Law school)65 divisions and fight the hierarchical local madrasas. Their many connections abroad generate income, and ensure a steady stream of guest speakers from the Congo, Kenya, Uganda and the Arabic heart lands. The AMYC program of moral reform, returning to Qur’an and Sunna, and fighting against innovations (bid’a), is carried out by an intensive education programme. Their English/Arabic medium schools teach both secular and religious subjects within a state approved curriculum; together with the Africa Muslim Agency they run a girls and boys Islamic school; a separate Public Relations department is involved in raising awareness and teaching Muslims to follow the straight path, and religious lessons and sermons are broadcast from several Tanga mosques.
A central figure in this ambitious reform movement is Salim Barahiyan. His public exposure three times a week in the mosque classes, his conspicuous car, his personal involvement in running the welfare institutions for orphans, his announcements after prayers has made him a symbolic representation of the Ansaa movement itself. His long black beard, Middle Eastern features, the shortened, loose flowing dress, and his posture make him easily recognisable in town. Although he is supported by a group of like minded Saudi/Pakistani educated Tanzanians, the AMYC movement only gained momentum under Salim Barahiyan’s leadership. It is significant that in 1997, the first time the Idd el-Hajj was publicly performed at the Tangamano fields, Barahiyan delivered the khatiba. Whereas on the occasion of the Idd el-Hajj the roles of imam (prayer leader) and khatib (preacher) are occupied by different AMYC staff members, the function of sacrificer is always performed by their mudir (director): Salim Barahiyan.

To grasp some of the significances attributed to the public sacrifice, we should look how the personal authority of Barahiyan as sacrificer is constructed. In his 1997 sermon, the ideas and program of AMYC were presented within the paradigm of Arafa and Muhammad’s farewell sermon delivered there (cf. appendix IV). The major lesson to be learned is that it is not personal or ethnic bonds that matter, but only the divine blessing derived from meticulously following the prophet’s example, especially his behaviour during his stay in Medina. For example the AMYC mosque at the 19th street blocked their prayer niche (Arabic: mihrab, Swahili: kibla) in order to further enhance the resemblance between the Tanga building and the original state of the prophet’s house in Medina.

It is within this historical paradigm, transcending spatial and temporal limitations, that the meaning of the Idd el-Hajj as a chronotope (a “time/place”) was constructed. The congregation gathered on the Tangamano field was identified as Ansaar, the group of Medina people who helped the prophet when he migrated from the godless town of Mecca. In later years Barahiyan referred to the dichotomy between two groups (makundi wawili). On a local level this meant the distinction between those who follow the Saudi moon sighting and those who follow a local crescent sighting to determine the date of the Idd el-Hajj. Within the Arafa paradigm however, it turned out to be Meccan pagans against the Medina Ansaar.

Not surprisingly the sacrifice in 1997 was introduced as an imitation of Muhammad’s ritual performed in Medina (see paragraph 2.2 above). The Arafa paradigm of the sermon, the many literal prophetic quotes, the col-
our of the animal (black and white) and Barahiyans’s explicit reference to Muhammad’s model, make both sacrifices almost identical:

The Prophet slaughtered two rams, black and white in colour (as sacrifices), and I saw him putting his foot on their sides and mentioning Allah’s name and takbir (Allahu Akbar). Then he slaughtered them with his own hands.

Whereas the Idd el-Hajj in 1997 provided perhaps the best example how public Islamic sacrifice functions as a metaphorical action, the Idd el-Hajj in other years showed the same pattern. The public space, the creation of a paradigmatic framework during the khutba, and the sacrifice by the director moved the AMYC as a social group beyond time and space and imagined the congregation as a different chronotope. Where the domestic sacrifice and the abattoir slaughtering have severed the link between myth (salat, khutba) and ritual, the AMYC have succeeded in reconnecting prayer, sermon and sacrifice. Their social and religious agenda (Islam as a way of life, an imitation of Muhammad, the most perfect example) is iconically represented by public sacrifice and embodied in a powerful male leader.

Plate 12: Self employed hide-dresser, abattoir Tanga
c. The abattoir employee: anonymous expert

Sacrifice in the majority of Tanzanian abattoirs shows the same division of labour as domestic and public sacrifice: the Muslim slaughterer is different from the flayers and butchers. This is a typical urban phenomenon. The large quantity of cows slaughtered every day creates special jobs (cleaning, killing, flaying, preparing hides), and by this division the available resources can be shared by as many persons as possible. In the villages where I witnessed animal slaughtering for consumption, the butcher usually performed also the role of killer and flayer. Because he only kills one or two cows a week, a division of labour doesn’t make sense here.

In those places where slaughtering remains small scale (mostly villages) sometimes a particular relation between Islamic knowledge and butchering can be witnessed. In one of the rural slaughter slabs I met a local madrasa teacher who earned his living as a slaughterer. Here the connection with Arabic texts and religious institutions clearly provides the authority and status necessary to perform a religious task like animal slaughter. However, this is more often the exception than the rule and this should not lead to the conclusion that in Tanzania butchers are among the most influential persons (as Levtzion [1968:101] claims for all Muslim communities). In urban and commercial contexts (like the Tanganyika Packers meat plant in Dar es Salaam for example) status and salary of the slaughterer are equal to those of the other manual labourers.

Abattoir personnel including the Muslims who slaughter the livestock are squarely under control of the state and the state acknowledged Muslim supreme council of BAKWATA. The status of the slaughterer is not very high. Whereas the meat inspector is politely addressed (“bwana”) to attract the attention of the slaughterer people shout “wewe!” (“you!”), just like a disobedient child. Rarely the vocative “mwalamu” (“teacher”) is employed. Not religious knowledge is pivotal in their career but luck and personal connections with state employees provide them with the job of mchinjaji (slaughterer). Transmission of Islamic knowledge concerning the way of slaughtering is not textual, but oral and practical. Usually a local BAKWATA sheikh who knows the person who applies for an authorisation repeats a few conditions and then asks the candidate to kill a chicken. When the sheikh accepts the chicken he sometimes publicly eats its meat and this ritual is like the passing of the examination.

Muslim slaughterers are envied by many: their work is perceived as easy (‘everybody knows how to slaughter’) and well paid, in distinction to the other workers. Except for butchers (who sometimes own herds of more
than 50 cattle and exploit several meat shops) most Tanga citizens in the meat business (meat shop renters, skinners, flayers and the abattoir caretakers) are quite poor. Compared with their co-employees slaughterers are relatively well off in Tanga where they receive the spleen of each cow. They sell these spleens between 200 and 400 Shilling (USD 0.2-0.4) each. Among the highly valued cattle organs the spleen is seldom discarded by the inspector in contrast to the liver, lungs and hearts for example. Therefore it makes a relatively stable asset. This arrangement in Tanga is much more profitable than the salary slaughterers receive in other (mostly private) abattoirs. Monetary rewards almost never reach the 40,000 Shilling (USD 40) per month, slightly above the minimum salary of 30,000 Shilling (USD 30). More common is a much lower fee, for example 50 Shilling (USD 0.05) per head, for 10 to 15 cows a night, which is inadequate for a living. Archival material suggests that the remuneration in Tanga always has been quite good:

I am not sure that the fee of Shs. 5 would be an imposition because my recollection is that these official Mohammedan slaughterers make a very good business at the abattoirs and get a substantial rake-off

Compared with for example a livestock officer’s salary (70,000 Shilling) a month and a teacher’s salary (100,000 Shilling) this remains meagre.

In Tanga the religious part of the slaughtering for public consumption is performed by three men. (All abattoir employees are men though meat inspection is also performed by women). All three had only economic reasons to apply for this particular job. Salimu was born in Kondoa district, Dodoma region. He estimates his age between 70 and 75. Before independence, in 1955, he moved to Tanga. Under Nyerere’s rule he started his work in the meat processing business in Tanga. Only after several failed attempts in all kinds of jobs he started his current work in the abattoir somewhere in 1978. Salimu has had no formal education and hardly any madrasa instruction. Only after he had begun to regularly slaughter himself, he followed a course and got his permit from BAKWATA.

Athmani is a second generation migration worker. Both his parents are Wanyamwezi, and he is 40 years old. He first got his job as a watchman at the Sahare abattoir because he happened to know his predecessor Alifa. He followed two years madrasa education and visited primary school till standard 7. Just like Salimu he also has a formal letter of acknowledgement from BAKWATA. In his house near the abattoir that goes with the job of watchman, he repairs radios. Salimu and Athumani each slaughter in turn, two weeks a month.
When Salimu and Athumani have overslept or in cases of emergency, Salim Hemed will do the killing. The youngest of the three, he moved from Lushoto region (Salim Hemed is born from Sambaa parents in 1964) to Tanga in 1980. His formal education reaches to standard 7 of primary school and he also followed madrasa teaching for three years. His father worked also as a slaughterer. Currently he is doing all kind of jobs in the abattoir: cleaning hides and helping to immobilise the animals.

It becomes clear that the abattoir is a state dominated place where mainly economic transactions are performed. Individuals who bring their Idd el-Hajj animal to the Tanga abattoir often belong to the wealthy urban elite. The reason to have their goat or sheep sacrificed here is purely pragmatic: clean, efficient and quick. Many of them leave the animal’s skin behind and sometimes even the intestines. Perceived as inferior meat they might be given to the slaughterer. Intestines represent a value of about 500 – 700 Shilling a kilo (0.5-0.7 US Dollar). While these parts may be handed over to the workers as a salary, the meat inspection and abattoir tax should be paid in cash.

5. Conclusion

Public debates on issues related to animal sacrifice proper are relatively rare in Tanga. Most of the textual transmitted regulations are taken for granted. If we look at the most common, domestic, sacrifice, it appears that Muslims do not perceive the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice as a carrier for important religious and social messages. However, if we look at the three different places where Idd el-Hajj sacrifices are performed in Tanga, they show remarkable different rituals, despite their evident similarities.

Sacrifice in or near the homestead is mostly a confirmation and construction of personal ties and relationships. The private home sacrifice is usually performed by a male relative or neighbour, and hardly ever by a woman, despite a widespread awareness that no Islamic texts disapproves of a female sacrificer. In other cases the sacrifice is taken care of by an invited mwalimu of a nearby madrasa, or a religious person known by the family. The killing and meat distribution is done behind the walls of the courtyard, out of sight. Often nobody is present except the mwalimu and the persons immediately involved in the subsequent flaying. Domestic sacrifice is part of a ritual exchange: religious services (not only killing the animal and praying for deceased family members, but also educating children and performing marriage ceremonies) are exchanged against meat. Absence of most of the
family members, invisibility of the ritual and lack of religious identity markers (except clothes) makes the home ritual a private activity between two parties: the madrasa and the house.

The public sacrifice performed by the AMYC since 1997 on a central field in Tanga, is a completely different phenomenon. Temporarily the fields are turned into Islamic places fit for worship. The direction of prayer and sacrifice, the references to an imagined global community all underline the transformation of public space into Islamic place. The public prayer field performance is typical for the AMYC and marks their particular view of Islam: open, transparent, visible, and different from the local hierarchic and ethnically divided madrasas. The explicit link made to the sacrifices by the Prophet Muhammad, the importance of his words and deeds and the context of the whole discourse makes it difficult not to see the director Barahiyan as a prophetical figure and his sacrifice as a ritual re-enactment of Muhammad’s offering. The banners in Arabic and English (and not in Swahili) are witness of a larger transnational network, their links with the umma, just as the date of their ritual refers to the field of Arafa where the imagined umma congregates. The AMYC sacrifice is a powerful illustration how time, place and ritual co-operate and enable a metaphorical movement and transformation into other chronotopes.

The abattoir is fully controlled by the state. The Muslim visiting this place on the Idd el-Hajj only comes here to perform a modern transaction: he pays his taxes and the state supervises a clean, hygienic killing. The white robed Muslims coming straight from their prayers seem out of place in the dirty bloody slaughter slabs. The sacrificer is not primarily a religious authority like the madrasa teacher but his status is almost on the same level as other migration labourers and government employed abattoir personnel. His work is dirty but well paid, perhaps because it is generally understood that the shedding of blood can make a human being crazy. The wealthy Muslim clients remain respectfully aside and quickly return with the meat to their homes. Despite many complaints about the state and its attitude towards Muslims it is striking that the same Muslims show confidence in the state when it comes to the supervision of a proper Islamic slaughtering. In the slaughter area the hegemony of the state is not longer contested: even the AMYC pay their inspection fee and participate on the conditions of a secular body they do not recognise.
Plates 13 & 14: Throatcut and heart piercing by Muslim slaughterer, Dar es Salaam 2000
14. **Sacrificial animals and social meals**

1. **Introduction**

   In some societies Islamic sacrifice shows a clear pattern across different social strata. The species of the animal, its colour and sex, the way it is sacrificed and prepared, followed by the careful distribution of meat and skin seem to be based on a cultural consensus (cf. Combs-Schilling 1989). In Tanzania we don’t find a similar homogeneous choice and treatment of the sacrificial Idd el-Hajj animal. Pragmatic considerations and contingencies considerably influence the sacrificial transformation from animal to meal. This chapter describes the selection of the Idd el-Hajj animal, the act of immolation and the distribution of its body. The final paragraph focuses on ritual meals and the way they can be transformed from ordinary friendly sessions to highly politicised statements.

2. **The animal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>frequency</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sheep (kondoo)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cow (ng'ombe)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chicken (kuku)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goat (mbuzi)</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A significant majority of the Tanga households sacrificed a goat (table 14.1). Prices for goats before the holidays rose to 16,250 Shilling (equivalent to USD 16), but very few people decided to buy the cheaper sheep (around 12,200 Shilling). According to the returned questionnaires, cows were purchased around 56,000 Shilling, which is an extremely small amount.1 Most of these animals were bought from acquaintances in a village. The most surprising outcome of this survey is the enormous popularity of fowl and chickens. The strong link between poultry and traditional expiatory (kafara) sacrifices (especially related to witchcraft)1 does not seem to be a barrier for killing fowl on the Sacrificial Feast.

Ethnographic studies on sacrifice mention the special relationship between the sacrificial animal and the sacrifier (Combs-Schilling 1989; Bloch 1992:65; Brisebarre 1998:24-25). Some Islamic authoritative texts highlight the importance of building a personal relationship with the animal.2 However this intimate relation between animal and family is absent in Tanga. The general trend is to buy the animal at short notice, one day before the Idd el-Hajj (52.8%) or even on the day itself (9.1%). Most of the animals come from the villages (52.1%) or the local town market (34.5%). Even if the animal is already in the possession of the family, it is no playmate for children or specially taken care of like the sheep in Morocco. In Tanga Idd goats most likely spend their final night bleating at the roadside or under a makeshift shelter in the courtyard.

a. Fowl and chickens

One day when I visited a small Digo madrasa, just outside the town of Tanga, I found myself in an awkward situation. My purpose was a small survey of Islamic educational institutions, syllabi and their affiliation to larger Tanga schools. Due to my companion’s introduction focusing attention on my interest in Islamic knowledge it turned into an inspection tour evoking all kind of learned demonstrations. On this particular occasion not only the sheikh, but also most of the teachers and their most brilliant students gathered together and started to show off their skills in memorizing the Qur’an and reciting texts. After listening for a while I tried to find a polite way out of this. Perhaps I could ask a few questions on the Idd el-Hajj? Sure, the sheikh would answer any issue concerning this subject. After elaborating on all Shafi’i aspects of the sacrifice, and the way cows and camels should be killed I asked him whether he had slaughtered any animal and if so, what he had sacrificed the previous Idd. The silence following this question embarrassed both of us. Finally he answered: “a chick-
en" (kuku). In the deafening silence followed by this remark, one of the boys giggled behind his sleeve. Today I think the embarrassment of that particular incident was primarily caused by the acutely felt cleft between the grandiloquent description of cattle and camels in Arabic texts and the mundane reality of rural poverty. Perhaps it also indicated the shame to fall short of the required limit and the wish to be able to slaughter a larger animal and being a better Muslim.

Generally speaking Islamic fiqh values bigger animals as better sacrifices, although differences exist between schools of law (Sidi Maamar 1998). So within the range of permitted sacrifices taken from the category of grazing livestock and four legged herd animals, Shafi’i scholars prefer camels, cows, goats and sheep in that order. Despite their status as halal food, chickens do not qualify as a proper Idd el-Hajj animal. However as a dependable, self-sufficient animal the chicken is in Tanzania the most common domestic animal. In my survey 59 respondents out of 222 (26.6%) said to have slaughtered a chicken on the Idd el-Hajj 2001 (appendix I, question 2.5). Probably the real number of Idd chickens is much higher than this percentage suggests. After an initial negation ('no animal sacrificed') it often appeared in the course of the conversation that the interviewee actually had slaughtered a chicken. Their original answer was based on the assumption that a ‘real’ sacrifice was meant. Another common phenomenon is that Muslims slaughtered chickens in addition to a goat or sheep. The main reason to do so is that chickens can be slaughtered before the salat (and sacrificial animals only after prayer). This considerably lightened the work load for women who had more time to prepare the festive breakfast. The day before the Idd it is a common sight seeing both women and men buying chickens near the bus market at Ngamiani. The (Muslim) traders also act as slaughterer in exchange for a small fee (100 Shilling/0.10 US Dollar).

The two Idd holidays in Tanzania are closely connected to the luxury of eating meat. A slight preference to kill an animal on the Idd el-Hajj (rather than obtaining meat from the butchers) seems to induce many families to kill a chicken. One of the women running a family with two children and living in the same compound as me purchased a large cock for 2,000 Shilling on the occasion of the Idd el-Hajj. On the Idd el-Fitr she got her meat for the Idd meals from the market. Another Muslim family chose to buy four chickens rather than one goat, though the price would have been almost the same (average price for chickens before holidays used to be 2,280 Shilling).
b. Goats and sheep

In most parts of the Islamic world there is a general association between Islamic sacrifice and sheep, because most Muslims believe Ibrahim’s son was redeemed by a sheep (cf. Combs-Schilling 1989; Brisebarre 1998; Rashed 1998). Despite the fact the Qur’an is silent about the species most Swahili reproductions of the sacrificial foundational myth also mention a sheep.9 Because the Idd el-Hajj is perceived as a ritual remembrance of Ibrahim’s trial, it seems remarkable that the Tanzanian practice clearly shows a preference for goats. In all domestic and public sacrifices I observed, goats were involved rather than sheep. According to the survey this picture is representative for Tanga as a whole: 109 (49.1%) out of 222 animals are goats. People are quite consistent in their answers to explain their clear predilection: goat’s meat is much tastier than that of sheep, and does not contain so much fat. Butchers confirmed this idea: ‘people here don’t like mutton’. The smell and the fat of sheep make mutton difficult to sell, although processed sheep meat is offered in supermarkets. Swindle in meat often involves the substitution of the cheaper mutton for goat meat.10 Abattoir slaughtering shows the same preference in favour of goats.11

Most sacrificial systems construct a meaningful difference between goats and sheep (cf. De Vaux 1964; De Heusch 1985:199-215; Werbner 1989:120. In order to answer the question whether a similar cultural construction of differences between goats and sheep exist in the Islamic sacrificial systems, we first turn to the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet. The Qur’an never refers to a meaningful cultural or religious distinction between goats and sheep. In fact it strongly defends the equality of all animals provided by God as proper food as in Q 6: 143-146. Because of their obstinacy God punished the Jews with a more strict dietary system which forbade them for example the fat of sheep (da’in) and goats (ma’z). Both these words occur only once in the Qur’an. A single ewe (na’jata) plays a role in the Qur’anic parable told in Q 38:23-24, while the collective ghanam (both goats and sheep) appears once in Q 21:78. All these instances are directly linked with Jewish texts and practices. The most relevant episode for the Idd el-Hajj (Q 37) does not mention any species. Ibrahim’s trial is finally solved by the provision of a great ‘sacrificial animal’ (dhibh), and it remains unclear what kind of animal that is. The Swahili translation by Farsy renders the verse 37:107 without reference to a species: “We ransomed him by (substituting) a sacred animal sacrifice (mnyama wa kuchinjwa mtukufu).” In general the Qur’an reflects the idea that the pre-Islamic animal sacrifices were not required but merely permitted, as Foltz (2006:11-13) rightly states.
Any particular significance attributed to the species of the sacrificial victim would endanger the truth of Q 22:37 “It is not their meat nor their blood that reaches Allah; it is your piety that reaches Him.”

The prophetic Sunna as reflected in hadith literature is much more outspoken about sheep and goats, but here also the similarities are clearer than the distinctions. On most instances hadith reports refer to both species with a single word: either *dajinu* (domestic animal whose milk may be used) or *ghanam* (small cattle, goats and sheep, herded together). Some cases in which sheep and goats are differentiated: a she-kid (‘anaq) was killed, cooked and eaten by the prophet in one of his battles; Muhammad allowed Muslims to use the skin of a dead, not properly killed goat (‘anz). Sheep (shat) may be milked, can be used to prepare a wedding meal (walima), and were refused by Muhammad as a ransom for adultery. Specific descriptions of the annual Idd sacrifice (udhiyya) mention both sheep and goats as lawful victims, and use the collective noun *ghanam/ghanima*, or completely avoid the species by using the ancient word *nusuk* (sacrificial animal). Even a young kid (‘atud), left over after the Prophet distributed animals among his Companions for sacrifice, was a lawful udhiyya for Uqba bin Amir. Several hadith appear to express doubts about the legal status of (she)goats as sacrifices. One of the varieties of the above mentioned traditions contains a warning: “Sacrifice a she-goat (djaza’) from the goats (ma’az) but don’t distribute anything from it.” Further evidence for (she)goats as second choice animals is found in the following hadith:

Abu Burda slaughtered (the sacrifice) before the (Idd) prayer whereupon the Prophet said to him, “Slaughter another sacrifice instead of that.” Abu Burda said, “I have nothing except a djaza’ (she-goat).” (Shu’ba said: Perhaps Abu Burda also said that djaza’ was better than an old sheep in his opinion.) The Prophet said, “(Never mind), slaughter it to make up for the other one, but it will not be sufficient for anyone else after you.”

These discussions on the permission to sacrifice goats must be interpreted against the background of a dominant Arab tradition of sheep sacrifices on the Idd el-Hajj. Several descriptions of Muhammad’s Idd sacrifices describe how he slaughtered two rams (kabshay), some traditions adding details such as that they were horned, castrated and with white and black markings on hooves and eyes. In the 9th century seven-volume Kitab al-hayawan (Book of animals), the Iraqi author Abu ‘Uthman al-Jahiz (776-869) describes the sheep as far more blessed than goats. The former animal has
‘RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS’


Tanzanian discourse does not provide us with clear answers on the cultural significance of sheep (kondoo) and goats (mbuzi), except for a tendency to associate positive strong characteristics of the goats with men and the negative, week qualities of sheep with women. Goats are together with cows the most common meat providers, and in many instances both species are interchangeable or even identical. Several sayings express that a poor man does not know any fortune: his dhow will not sail fast, his cane does not have any strength and his goat does not bear kids (mbuzi wa maskini hazai). Together with rice, goats and cows are often given as presents during holidays such as the mawlid celebration. The destructive powers of goats are well known and the wooden stool with steel blade used by women for shredding coconut is aptly called mbuzi (goat).

A he-goat (beberu) is a strong male, in the first place a sexually potent man. Both beberu (he-goats) and buzzi (goats) are used for men who have relations with younger women providing them with material possessions in return of sexual favours. The negative side of the strong, sexually potent male is reflected in cruelty and dominance; a beberu is also a metaphor of a cruel man (mwanaume mkatili).

Sheep are represented in Swahili discourse as positive (docile, meek, and submissive) animals but also negative (unruly, hypocritical). In general sheep are more often associated with women than with men. A leopard or wolf can use a sheepskin to mask himself as a peaceful animal. A letter writer from Arafa primary school in Tanga urges Muslims not to behave like submissive, silent sheep looking how fellow Muslims are butchered by the government. Often sheep function as a Christian/Jewish symbol in Islamic discourse. For example sheep in the garden of a mission school are described as Christian idols, Jesus is a Muslim prophet sent to the ‘sheep of Israel’, not as a universal Saviour. Jesus as the Lamb of God is false interpretation of the Paschal Lamb ritual. Sheep are also metaphors for hypocrites: pretending to be something else is like a sheep wearing his tail like a goat. A hypocrite (mnafiki) is a ewe (note the sex of the animal!) pretending to belong to two folds. Ahmadiyya believers are warned not to behave like the ‘wandering sheep’ of the Christian and Jewish religions.

In most cases when sheep and goats are contrasted to each other gender issues are involved. When women exhibit improper sexual behaviour, this is often phrased as sheep behaving like goats. Sometimes a sexually indecently clad woman is referred to as little goat (kibuzi) as in the khanga.
There she is, silly goat, look how she moves her body (anavyojitingisha). The most obvious difference between goats and sheep is their tail. The standing, short tail of the goat is contrasted to the longer, hanging tail of a sheep. The sexual active connotations associated with goats and men are not appreciated in women. Girls wearing miniskirts are compared with ‘naked’ goats which not cover their body decently.

These (girls) I compare with goats which have very short tails, but instead of letting them cover (their genitals) they stand erect, and therefore they leave the goat completely naked without any modesty (stara) like a sheep has.

Apart from Islamic texts and Swahili popular discourse, also the sacrificial practice reveals a different attitude towards goats and sheep. Among the inhabitants of the Swahili coast, (male) goats and cattle are the most common animals used for sacrificial purposes (cf. Parkin 1991:122). In Tanga goats and bulls are sacrificed on the occasion of funerals but almost never sheep. “The goat of the funeral sacrifice” (mbuzi wa kitima) is a common expression and denotes a person who is looking miserable. For the protective, circumambulation ritual Siku ya Mwaka described in chapter 5 almost always sheep or cows are slaughtered. Sacrificial goats and cows are usually interchangeable (el-Zein 1974:290; Ahmed 2002:193). Goats are also slaughtered and their blood consumed in spirit possession rituals while during this time the patient should not eat any mutton. Finally the launching of new ships is accompanied by the sacrifice of a goat rather than a sheep (Hock 1987:109).

Sheep on the other hand have in most parts of East Africa a special function, different from the practical attitude towards goats and cattle. Black sheep are used in rainmaking and purification rituals like the ones to cleanse a homestead after homicide or incest (Parkin 1991:146-151). As a joke someone proposed to start sacrificing black sheep at the most dangerous road junctions in Dar es Salaam to try to reduce the number of traffic victims. Several authors note the anomalous function of sheep in East African folk tales and rituals, making them ideal mediators between binary oppositions like life/death, male/female, domestic place and wild space etc (De Wolf 1983; Parkin 1991:146-151). We find many taboos for the eating of mutton (especially in relation to women) and hardly any for goat meat. It is this ambiguous character of the sheep that makes the species very attractive as a sacrificial animal in the akika ritual among the Digo described earlier. The akika animal transforms parents and deceased child, moving both...
parties in opposite directions. The sheep brings the child to Paradise where he/she will intercede between God and parents. At the same time the sheep restores sexual productivity in women, symbolised among others by the roasted fat tail.

It is from this difference between the plain goat and the ambiguous sheep that we might be able to understand the emphasis of Swahili scholars on goats as proper sacrificial animals in both *akika* and Idd el-Hajj sacrifices. In opposition to authoritative texts which prefer sheep, most Swahili books and articles state: “the *akika* is a goat.” The same trend we can witness in text on the Idd el-Hajj: “And if it is difficult for you (to get an animal) you can just kill goats which are easy to come by.” Some sources even obscure the possibility to sacrifice sheep on the occasion of the Idd, and mention only camels, cows and goats. One of the most important prophetic reports on the Idd sacrifice shows a sheep in the role of victim: “The prophet ordered a sheep and he slaughtered it saying: in the name of God, O my Lord, receive this *sadaka* on behalf of Muhammad and his kin and his *umma*.” However when I listened to the Idd el-Hajj *khutba* in 2002 this very same *hadith* was quoted but the animal had changed into a goat! Apparently the ambiguous character of sheep as illustrated in local discourse and sacrificial practice seems to endanger the spiritual character of ‘real’ Islamic sacrifice.

However this development does not show a clear, uniform and dominant pattern. Although on a very small scale we can also witness the preference of sheep. And here we do find a conscious effort to match text and ritual. The international mission organisation Jumuiya ya Da’awah ya Kimataifa distributes live sheep (not goats) among poor Tanzanian Muslims in order to enable them to slaughter an Idd animal. From the 27 sheep which, according to the survey (table 14.1), were sacrificed on the Idd el-Hajj 2002, as many as 22 were slaughtered by families from the Digo dominated Maawa l-Islam madrasa. Maawa was the only Qur’an school in the survey and the significant ‘sheep’ contribution seems to have a link with the religious character of the school. In Swahili discourse the Ibrahim story is always told with sheep in the primary role, not goats. *Madrasa* pupils from very age wrote on their survey lists that the Idd el-Hajj involves a sheep sacrifice in remembrance of the animal substituted for Ibrahim’s son. Although this is not hard proof that they actually sacrificed sheep, it certainly implies that pupils were aware of the idea that the Idd animal should have been a sheep, despite the local preferences.

It is precisely these two seemingly contradicting trends (goat sacrifice in contrast to local sheep sacrifices or sheep sacrifice in agreement with text-
tual preferences) that appear to cloud the meaning attributed to the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice. However, both choices are influenced by the wish to perform a ‘proper’ Islamic sacrifice. Goat sacrifice reflects a desire to get rid of any unwanted side effect, carefully avoiding the attribution of any significance to the species. Sacrificing a goat on the Idd el-Hajj stresses the spiritual nature of the ritual as reflected in the Qur’anic statement: “their flesh and their blood does not reach Allah” (Q 22:37). A sheep sacrifice is textual in a more narrow sense of the word: it attempts to reflect the Ibrahimian sacrifice and re-enact the prophetic practice. In contrast to sacrificial practices in for example Morocco (Combs-Schilling 1989) and Egypt (Rashed 1998) where the choice of the animal seems to be derived in a more direct way from Islamic scripture, in Tanzania the selection of the species is subjected to a wider array of cultural foci.

C. Cattle and camels

As described above, cows and goats are often interchangeable in East African sacrificial practice (cf. Blanchy 1996; Ahmed 2002). Cattle function as the most economical providers of meat. For example at large scale gatherings like mawlid celebrations two or more cows are slaughtered near the madrasa to provide the beef for the traditional pilau dishes. Al-Nisa mosque sacrificed a single cow on the occasion of the Idd el-Hajj 2000 and distributed the meat among their believers. Cattle are the main species for all the welfare organisations active in Tanzania.

The annual slaughter of a real camel by the Qadiriya zawiya in Dar es Salaam, as part of the khitma rituals for their deceased leader, is remarkable for its difference. The advertisements announcing the arrival of the camel, and the subsequent procession of the Sufi order in which the huge animal is shown emphasises the importance of the ritual. The difference between the exceptional, very visible animal of this Sufi ritual and the unremarkable, almost invisible goats of the Idd el-Hajj reflects a difference between publicly marked identity and more privately experienced piety.

3. The slaying

Discussions dealing with the way of immolation are rare and if they occur at all these debates are hardly dealing with technical aspects but rather reflect personal distrust or contest religious authority as described in the last chapter. Discourses on drunken sacrificers, ‘piercing’ instead of the proper throat cut, or slaughtering outside the government assigned areas never
reach the same level of intensity as for example debates on the proper date of the 1ldd el-Hajj. Islamic texts circulating in the Tanzanian mosques, madrasas and bookshops are clear about the basic ways how to slaughter the 1ldd animal. The following five things are *mustahhab* ( recommendable), but not essential: 1) *tasmiya* (formula 'in the name of God'), 2) *salat `ala nabbi* (prayer for the Prophet), 3) *qibla* (prayer direction), 4) *takbir* ( formula 'Allahu akbar') and 5) the *du’a al-qubul* ( prayer for reception of the sacrifice). Sometimes authors add conditions like a sharp knife, a Muslim slaughterer, expression of the spiritual intention (*niya*), or laying the animal on its left side.  

Not mentioning Allah’s name during the sacrifice does not necessarily imply the invalidity of the sacrifice, but referring to any other name than God’s makes the sacrifice *haram*. The *tasmiya* expression is the most common way to ‘Islamise’ a particular action: God’s name is written on the blackboard first thing in the morning when the teacher enters the classroom, it is on top of any written or printed text, it is supposed to be said when men ejaculate their semen, when they shoot an arrow or bullet while hunting and it should be the final thing a dying human being hears, according to a popular devotional manual. Some Swahili internet forums automatically generate the *tasmiya* whenever you reply on a certain topic. However, God’s name can never legalise sinful behaviour; the Tanga *madrasa* Shamsiyya warns against reciting *bismillah* before drinking Tembo (a brand of beer) or while fornicating. Many independent sources claimed that the meat processing plant Tanganyika Packers Ltd (TPL) used electric slaughter equipment bearing the Arabic formula *Bismillahi ar-rahman ar-rahim*. By writing it on the knife it could carry out *halal* slaughterings without any human intervention. Interviews at the (now defunct) TPL premises revealed that a huge knife used for dividing carcasses might be the source for these rumours; However, TPL always employed a Muslim who carried out the slaughtering by a manual throat cut.

Most sacrificers indicated that they limit the sacrificial formula to the basic *bismillah* when putting the knife on the animal’s throat and a final *Allahu akbar* when the blood starts to gush. Several others preferred to include the longer formula *Bismillahi ar-rahman ar-rahim*. When asked about the differences they referred to the second phrase as more complete but not necessarily better. This closely resembles the Shafi’i discourse in Tanzania stating that:

The slaughterer should say *Bismillahi* and the more complete (*akmal*) expression is *Bismillahi ar-rahman ar-rahim* but if he does not mention the name [of God] that still makes the animal *halal*.
Nobody referred to the Islamic scholarly discussions on the question whether mentioning God’s compassionate qualities (rahman and rahim) is appropriate in the context of killing an animal.60

Apart from the tasmiya, also the prayer for the Prophet Muhammad (tasliya) should be pronounced when sacrificing the Idd el-Hajj animal.61 All sacrificers I witnessed in the domestic setting included this Prophetic prayer in their address; even Muslims who were not involved in regular slaughtering often mentioned this part of the Idd prayer as important.62 The salat 'ala nabi is widely known because it is part of the daily salat.63 However, instead of a single fixed, textually transmitted form, in practice varieties of the tasliya “are an endless, intricate embroidery on the short basic phrase, ever seeking greater intensity, greater inclusiveness, greater duration” (Padwick 1997:163). Not so much its content but rather its place immediately juxtaposed behind the name of God, is potentially problematic according to some Muslims. The Shafi’i scholars therefore make clear that the formula “in the name of God and Muhammad” (adjacent to each other) before the sacrifice makes the animal inedible, but the prayer for the Prophet after the throat cut is allowed, because in the latter case Muhammad appears in a subordinated position.64

The third characteristic of sacrifice is the orientation of victim and sacrificer towards Mecca, the prayer direction (qibla) of the daily salat. Although some schools of law do not acknowledge the qibla as a necessary condition of valid sacrifice, it is usually adhered to in Tanzania.65 Among the dominantly Christian Haya (North West Tanzania) facing Mecca is recognised as a salient feature of Islamic sacrifice: “to perform qibla” is identical to Muslim slaughtering.66

The fourth condition of sacrifice is the takbir (‘Allahu akbar’) and is also regularly performed. Mittwoch (1971) mentions a threefold takbir before and after the tasmiya, but in Tanzania this practice shows great variation and is heavily influenced by personal preferences. The function of the public takbir chanting on the Idd el-Hajj has been described above.

Finally the du’a bi-qubul, is the prayer for the acceptation of the sacrifice should be pronounced: “Allahuma minka wa laka, allahuma takkabal minni” (O Allah, it is from You and belongs to You, O Allah, accept this from me.)67 In interviews this fifth condition of ritual sacrifice was only mentioned by educated Muslims but mostly ignored by the lower, professional slaughterers. The same process of elaboration and variation is visible in this prayer. The most common addition is mentioned by the director of the Tanga madrasa al-Munawwara: “fa takkabal minni udhiyyati kama takabaita
'RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS'

'ala [sic] *Ibrahim khali lika wa nabika*68 (and accept my sacrifice just as you accepted Ibrahim your friend and your prophet). This extension is clearly crafted on the common Prophetic prayer (note the grammatical error!).

The similarities between the five conditions of sacrifice and the daily *salat* are certainly not accidental. The conscious effort of early Islam to attribute only spiritual significance to animal sacrifice remains visible until today. The following Qur’an verses which are sometimes structured into a supplication recited before the Idd el-Hajj animal is killed, join the two ritual practices into a single meaningful framework:

> I have turned my face sincerely towards the Being who created the heavens and the earth, and I am not from among the idolatrous people (Q 6:79). My *salat* and my sacrifices and my life and my death are all for Allah, the Lord of the Universe, Who has no partner with His. This is what I have been enjoined and I am the first to surrender to Him (Q 6:162-163).69

Just like most of the textual expressions in the *salat*, these sacrificial formulas are mostly mute: it is the spiritual disposition rather than the oral-aural transmission of speech that is important. A colonial visitor of the Tanga abattoir commented on this inaudible ritual: “If it is to satisfy Mahomedan prejudice, it should be accompanied by a prayer over the animal […] I heard no prayer and saw no reference. I suggest the cruelty remains and the prayer is omitted.”70

Different from what many Tanzanians believe, Islamic legal sources do not require the shedding of blood as a conditio sine qua non for a *halal* slaughtering. It is rather the movement of one of the victim’s limbs on the moment of the throat cut which determines whether the sacrifice is to be accepted as valid or not.71 The law schools differ on the exact number of channels to be cut when the throat is slit.72 The Shafi’i school insists on all four: the *hulqum* (windpipe) transporting the incoming and outgoing breath (*nafs*), the *mari’* (gullet) and both jugular veins. Failing to cut any of them turns the meat into carrion.73 However, most slaughterers mention only three or indicate that they don’t know the exact number.74

The modern discourse on animal rights and the perceived cruelty of the Islamic method of slaughtering is all but absent in the Tanzanian public sphere. Not surprisingly it is mainly in colonial archives and in English texts produced outside Tanzania where we find traces of these debates.75 However, real concern with animal welfare is certainly not lacking among Muslim sacrificers. The AMYC director Barahiyan referred to the image of cruel
Muslim butchers in one of his Idd el-Hajj sermons when he claimed that "Muslims sacrifice animals but they are not slaughterers." In all his public sacrifices, Barahiyan meticulously cut the nerves between the spinal vertebrae. In the same way ordinary abattoir employees emphasised their attempts to reduce pain by cutting spinal nerves as soon as possible. By doing so the animal looses its consciousness (fahamu) and stops feeling pain. While the act as such is not derived from Islamic Law in any direct way, the motivation is explained as reflecting Islamic tenets on compassion and mercy towards God’s creatures.

A final illustration of the way how Islamic text might influence actual sacrificial behaviour I witnessed on a video tape produced by the Tanga Ahmadiyya missionary. The video shows several goats waiting together, while preparations are made for the sacrifice. Suddenly the missionary interrupts the process and instructs the boys watching the scene to move all the goats except one around the corner of the next house. He quotes the prophetic hadith “do not slaughter an animal while another animal is watching it...” However when I got the copy of the tape this correction of ‘improper behaviour’ was cut from the video. This might be illustrative of the way how ritual performance is put into conformity with authoritative texts in a single, individual case. It might also be an illustration of the way ritual knowledge is transmitted outside public arenas like schools and mosques.

4. Distribution of animal parts

a. Blood and bones

In various parts of the Islamic world the blood of the Idd el-Hajj animal’s extraordinary status is employed for the healing of wounds, divining future events and protection from evil. Different from these cases in Tanzanian urban areas blood of the domestic Idd el-Hajj sacrifice is never used for anything, unlike the normal abattoir blood which is processed and sold as animal fodder. In rural areas the case might be different: an Ahmadiyya video showed a village boy carefully collecting the blood coming from the slaughtered goat. Hooves and head of cattle and goats killed in commercial processing of meat are used for a fat soup (supu) and popular for breakfast. Mostly bones of the Idd el-Hajj victims are given to dogs, chicken or just ‘thrown away’. One respondent wrote that he used the grinded bones as mortar (vyombo vya dongo).
b. Hides and skins

Table 14.2

Destination of the Idd el-Hajj skin (N = 132, appendix I, question 2.17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of the skin</th>
<th>frequency</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>madrasa drums</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>destruction</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadaka</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pragmatical use (misc.)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hides and skins of sacrificial animals are good to think with. In Morocco the sheepskin is used in an elaborate masquerade, if not given “to the State as a gesture of solidarity with national or Arab causes” (Hammoudi 1993:55; Carter 2003:108). Enveloping new born children in the animal’s skin is witnessed in North Africa and North African immigrant communities (Brisebarre 1998:71; Virolle 1999:184). In some Muslim societies the collection and sale of hides and skins is a large, state controlled business (Gokalp 1998; Rashed 1998:163; Spuler-Stegemann 1998). In many Tanzanian sacrificial rituals, both Islamic and non Islamic, the use of the victim’s skin is highly charged with symbolic meanings. The local rituals described in chapter 5 illustrate some of the ritual connotations attributed to the animals’ skin in Tanzania (cf. Lienhardt 1966:379-381).

More than half of the Tanga citizens (71 out of 132) who sacrificed an animal on the Idd el-Hajj, indicated that they donated the skin to the mosque or madrasa for the purpose of making or repairing a drum (Table 14.2). The real number is likely to be even higher, because 19 respondents mentioned not the destination of the skin but just marked it as ‘sadaka’ or ‘gift.’ A substantial number of people (28 out of 132) decided not to use the skin at all (haikutumiwa), to throw it away (ilitupwa), or to bury it (ilizikwa). Twelve people used the Idd el-Hajj skin for pragmatical goals like repairing clothes and shoes, sleeping mats or household attributes. Finally two respondents said they sold the hides.

The pattern of skin distribution corroborates earlier conclusions: the domestic Idd el-Hajj sacrifice in Tanga is characterised by social and religious networks in which madrasas play an important role. The goat skin
drums described in the answers were called *ngoma*, *dufu* or *twari*. Whereas *ngoma* is associated with spirit possession, *dufu* and *twari* instruments are almost exclusively used in *mawlid* celebrations and *zaafa/ziyara* processions of the madrasas.\(^8^4\) Several times during these processions the boys playing drums have to tune the instruments by heating the goat skins over quickly ignited fires of cardboard boxes and newspapers. A skin donation to the madrasa establishes therefore a link to the ritual veneration of the Prophet as expressed in *mawlid* celebrations. The animals’ skins are part of the same reciprocal system between madrasa and Tanga Muslims: ritual services are exchanged for gifts.

Most Islamic schools of law prefer to keep all the parts of the sacrificial animal out of the commercial circuit unless the money is finally used to give away as *sadaka*.\(^8^5\) Most Qur’anschool teachers mention the importance of not selling anything from the animal, in accordance to mainstream Shafi’i points of view. Even personal use of the skin is discouraged by the Ahmadiyya movement. If the believers do not know any worthy recipient, than they should sent it to the headquarters, the editor of Mapenzi ya Mungu writes.\(^8^6\) However the Hanbaliyya are more relaxed about this topic: selling a hide or making a prayer mat out of a skin is not *haram* according to them.\(^8^7\) Swahili sources mention the importance of the skin as *sadaka* for both the *akika* and the Idd el-Hajj animal but the topic is hardly stressed.\(^8^8\) In Tanzania selling skins for a reasonable price would be difficult anyway. Despite enormous efforts, still over 90% of the skins (goats and sheep) and hides (cattle) are exported as raw material, rather than processed in Tanzania.\(^8^9\) In the period under discussion here, a good sheep skin would not yield more than 300 Shilling (USD 0.30) while in Tanga cowhides were sold to export firms sometimes as low as 2,000 Shilling (USD 2).\(^9^0\)

c. Meat

Just as other festivals the Idd el-Hajj is a day of meat consumption. Even if people don’t slaughter or buy a whole animal, often they do purchase meat at the butcher. Meat consumption in Tanzania is quite low and many of the poor only eat meat on holidays.\(^9^1\) Meat distribution is part of the official Idd discourse in books, newspapers and sermons.\(^9^2\) In Tanga most Muslim know about the partition in three shares (*mafungu matatu*), although the practice is less straightforward. Some mention one part personal use, one part neighbours, one part for the poor, which is close to the Tanzania madrasa textbook and bestseller *Hidayatul atfal*.\(^9^3\) The category of the poor is sometimes further divided in *mafakiri* and *maskini*: whereas the
former group does not have anything at all (for example beggars) the latter has at least work but wages are insufficient to live on. A daily income of 3,000 Shilling (USD 3) is mentioned as the limit of being poor, according to a madrassa teacher. Others just talk about their own family, neighbours and friends as the three categories, excluding the poor. A division in two parts (neighbours and own family) is explained by the fact that everyone is poor. Also the eight classes of zakat recipients sometime emerge as deserving to receive the Idd el-Hajj sadaka. State discourse often reduces the meaning of both Ids as a Muslim ‘celebration of generosity.’

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i. Giving sadaka

Those students whose family distributed sadaka did so in a highly random pattern. One of the more common elements was a preference of the liver to be consumed within the nuclear family. Paja (thigh) is often mentioned and is, after the liver, one of the most appreciated parts of the goat. Most pupils who responded to the question on the allocation of meat mentioned diverse parts like kichwa (head), figo (kidney), shingo (neck), steki (steak), mchanganyiko (mixed), mguu (hind leg), moyo (heart), sehemu ya ubavuni (part of the flank), kifu (breast), mkono (front leg), mapafu (lungs), utumbo (entrails), kiuno (buttocks), kiwiliwili (body). Among the recipients close family relations rank highest: kaka, dada, shangazi, mjomba, jamaa zangu (elder brother, sister, father’s sister, mother’s brother, family) immediately followed by neighbours (majirani).

The suggestion that the distribution is primarily a domestic and family affair is corroborated by the survey. Ethnicity and religion of donors and recipients are significantly correlated. However, none of the interviewees suggested that non-Muslims should not receive part of the sacrificial animal, but only that poor Muslims should benefit in the first place. The general feeling is that poor Christians are legitimate beneficiaries of the Idd el-Hajj meat. The idea that eating the Idd el-Hajj animal implies membership of the Muslim moral community is marginally present in some discourses. Without explicitly excluding others AMYC director Barahiyan said in his 1997 sermon ‘let them distribute [the meat] among their brothers in Islam (ndugu za Islam).’ Nuh Ha Mim Keller glossed the original addition of Naqib al-Misri’s text on the Idd el-Hajj as follows: “it is unlawful to give any of [the meat] to non-Muslims.” A Shia hajj manual also unequivocally excludes non Shi’ite believers from the sacrificial meat. However, just as it is the case elsewhere in pluralist societies, in Tanga sharing of food among members of different religious groups is also common (cf. Kanafani-Zahar 1999).
The classroom evidently offers possibilities to transcend ethnic and religious barriers. An 18 year old girl from a rich household, attending school at the BAKWATA owned Jumuiya, provides an example. She has lived in Tanga 14 years and her parents are of mixed ethnic origin (Mgunya and Arab). Her father has a job at one of the government institutions in Tanga. Both in 2000 and 2001 they slaughtered animals during the Idd el-Hajj. Her mother does not have a paid job (mama wa nyumbani). Apparently well off (her father went on hajj) the family was able to sacrifice two goats on the occasion of the Idd el-Hajj in 2001. Among the nine people who received meat from these animals, five girlfriends were included. All of them were Muslims but from different ethnic groups.

ii. Receiving sadaka

Those who received sadaka in 2001 usually got their meat from parents and friends: 40.5 %. Perhaps in the rest category ‘other people’ (9.8%) also the informal social networks must be included. That suggests that the total of all meat donations takes place within the close environment of the intimate social network. The local mosque is the second important distributor of meat: 13.1%. The larger religious organisations provided most of the other sadaka: Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre 11.8 %, African Muslim Agency 11.5 %, and Haramayn 9.5 %. The National Muslim council BAKWATA was only mentioned by four people (1.4%) as donor. Most people who offered sadaka also received meat (almost 75%), a phenomenon coined by Robert K. Merton in 1968 as the Matthew effect. 31% of the respondents did not receive any meat at all during the holidays.

The distribution of Idd meat by mosques and welfare organisations is efficient and formal. The AMYC hands out vouchers after the Idd el-Hajj khutba but does not exclude Muslims from other denominations. The African Muslim Agency (AMA) annually slaughters more than 100 cows in their six centres Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Iringa, Morogoro, Moshi and Tanga. Financially this is made possible by support from the Kuwait headquarters, instituted in 1987. The slaughter is supervised by AMA personnel, but local butchers and skinners perform the manual labour. Each sadaka package is wrapped in plastic and contains about two kilos.

Receiving meat from religious institutions does not necessarily imply the sharing of their points of view. Many Tanga citizens received food from AMYC or AMA who prayed one day earlier than most of the other Muslims. Since the slaughtering took place on at least two consecutive days this difference did not cause any problems: everybody could have his meat on
his or her own preferred day. An important aspect of Swahili culture is to maintain a proper respectful distance (*heshima*) in gift giving and to prevent shame when you give *sadaka*. For this reason some Swahili authors prescribed to cook the meat before sending it, because the poor recipient might not be able to buy firewood.\(^{107}\)

The same reason (preventing shame) is reflected in the custom that meat is more often sent (preferably by small children) than that people are invited for a meal (35% were invited, others received their meat). Sending food instead of inviting people for a common meal can function as a way to express solidarity while at the same time a certain distance is preserved. Ritual commensality is much more charged with meaning than gift giving, and the former is therefore a potential source of conflict as the next paragraph will illustrate. Whereas the traditional *akika* ritual (after the death of a young child) involves commensality, in the more textual *akika* (after birth) the meat is distributed as a ‘mere’ charity.\(^{108}\) When the ritual is seen as performative and sacrificial details really matter, the meat is shared and commensality becomes important. Muslims who classify the *akika* as a *sadaka*, send the meat to friends and neighbours rather than inviting them.

5. **Eating the community**

Discussions on differences between gift giving and sharing food reflect the different ways of constructing moral communities, by integrating or differentiating donors and recipients in different patterns. The two basic sacrificial processes described in chapter 2 communion and expiation, joining and separation, *sadaka* and *kafara* are visible in the patterns of meat distribution and commensality. In the process of giving and eating, the boundaries of the moral community are constructed. Islamic literature and ethnographic accounts from various times and places show the continuing preoccupation with the sharing of meat from the Idd sacrifice. Questions whether Christian personnel or Jewish midwives may benefit from religious offerings or what to do if there are no poor in a (western) country, find their way into newspapers and discussion platforms.\(^{109}\) Commensality often turns into a carrier of other social issues like the nature of the moral community and the questions who belongs to it.

Belonging to the same group can be expressed through commensality: sharing food highlights a common social and religious identity. Celebrating a holiday is often phrased as ‘eating the Idd’ (*kula Iddi*).\(^{110}\) This social identity is certainly not restricted to living people only. The Idd el-Hajj animal in East
Africa is therefore often shared with deceased family members and ancestors (wazee). On both Idd el-Fitr and Idd el-Hajj the presence of the ancestors is strongly felt. In East Africa the first ten days of Dhulhija are devoted to the Islamic ancestors who have become an object of veneration rather than oblation (Middleton 1992:163). The common Bantu perception of the bond between living and dead (in which charity is more stressed than revenge) seems to have been imported into the Islamic belief system (1982:25). The differences and similarities between the two types of ancestor veneration are freely discussed among Tanzanian Muslims and non-Muslims (Lienhardt 1980:298). On the days preceding the Idd el-Hajj, the so called siku za vijungu (days of the dishes), the ancestors were supposed to eat together with the living. In the opinion of many Muslims the sacrifice, the concomitant prayer and the common meal, were essential elements in constructing a moral community. The rituals would really benefit the deceased and served as a fidia ya dhambi za wafu (substitute, redemption for the sins of the dead) as well as those of the living.  

Although this commensality between living and dead members of the moral community is still practiced, many Muslims have replaced them with the more spiritual supplications prayed by an invited mwalimu and accompanied by the burning of incense (ubani). Those rituals I witnessed usually took place before 10 a.m. immediately after the salat. Although prayers of the dead are not restricted to the Idd el-Hajj (other auspicious days are the weekly Friday and the Idd el-Fitr) the former is perceived as the feast of community par excellence by many.  

The same celebration of the timeless moral community can be witnessed in the collective mawlid festivities in Tanga; here the common meal and prayers on behalf of the dead are strictly segregated in time. The recitation of wazifa (repetition of religious phrases) includes all the founding fathers of the local Sufi branches. Often the funeral text khitma is read while incense is burned before the chanting starts.  

But even the incense burning as the expression of an intergenerational connection is discarded by some Muslims and substituted for a more spiritual bond. Among the adversaries of commensality and incense burning in relation to ancestral prayers are the modernist Muhammad Saleh Farsy, the Ahmadiyya and the reformist AMYC. Most of the discussions about these practices do not concern the question whether dead people belong to the Muslim umma, but rather how the living community members should express this bond. Typical question are: does a khitma really benefit the deceased person? Is it useful to perform an akika for a deceased child or has God already decided over his or her fate? Is it allowed to perform a
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...procession to an ancestor’s grave and read the Qur’an at his tomb? Most of the Tanga Muslims in Tanga answer these questions affirmatively. Dhikr recitations for example can be performed on behalf of the dead ‘just like you also can deposit money on someone else’s account.’ Another metaphor employed to illustrate the connection between living and dead is derived from radio broadcasting: nobody can see the actual waves, but if you have the right transmitter and receiver set you will be able to hear the message.

Debates on the distribution of the Idd el-Hajj animal indirectly deal with the nature of the social and moral community. Changes in these communities also change the significance attributed to sacrifice and the division of the animal. The akika and siku ya mwaka rituals described in chapter 5 illustrated the importance of particular lineages and kin groups as ritual units not only highlighted but actually constructed by sacrifice and the subsequent meat distribution. The Idd el-Hajj however substitutes all these kinship terms with the undifferentiated ‘ndugu’ (brothers and sisters), thus emphasising the membership of the translocal umma. At the same time the meticulous meat division within the Islamic moral community becomes irrelevant. Rejection of traditional commensality and meat distribution seems to mark the Idd el-Hajj as a ‘real’ Islamic ritual. Often the distribution of the Idd el-Hajj animal is therefore significantly and consciously differentiated from the sharing of other sacrificial animals. For example on the Comoros, meat distribution during ‘local’ marriage and funeral rituals strictly takes place alongside lines of class and gender but the Idd el-Hajj as a more ‘global’ ritual uses a ballot system to divide the animals (Blanchy 1996; Ahmed 2002)! This method should safeguard the equality of all Muslim members of the umma. One of the new Ahmadiyya believers described his conversion from the ‘Sunnis’ to ‘true Islam’ in terms of a liberation from the hierarchical and ungodly system of meat distribution: “I told [my former friends] to join us in the Ahmadiyya community which has a healthy Islamic leadership (mwongozo safi wa kiislamu) without sheikhs and teachers who ask us for goat skulls (kichwa cha mbuzi) and rice bowls.”

Discussions on the division of animals do not concern questions whether one should get part of the liver or a leg but rather deals with moral issues like equality, unity and brotherhood. Sharing of food among members of the worldwide Islamic community can be a powerful tool to establish a common religious identity. Meat from the hajj sacrifices in Mecca is especially valued in this respect. As described above, the image of the hajj as the focal point of the Muslim chronotope is important in defining the character-
istics of the moral community. Annually the Islamic Development Bank ships 4800 to 6000 sheep and goat carcasses sacrificed during the pilgrimage. They usually arrive in the port of Dar es Salaam about three months after the hajj. BAKWATA is generally known as the recipient and distributor of the deep-frozen meat shipped from the factories in Mecca. Most of my informants expressed doubts towards the justice and efficiency of this organisation especially with respect to this meat distribution.

This donation is the most visible gift from the Islamic umma towards Tanzanian Muslims. Abuse of this symbolical gift is therefore seen as another threat to the Muslim community. Some people even state that the meat distribution of BAKWATA is a ‘government plot to dominate the body of the people (miili ya watu) in order to dominate the hearts of the people (nyoyo za watu).’

As might be expected, the boundaries of the moral community as constructed by ritual meals are severely contested. Apart from defining who belongs to the community, the Idd sacrifice and eating together also excludes partners and differentiates the Muslim moral community from others. The most powerful image of these integrating and differentiating forces is perhaps the hajj. The hajj community, powerfully imagined as gathered together during the Arafa and Mecca rituals, often clashes with the daily social life of the returned pilgrims. This ‘deterioration’ of the moral purity is sometimes defined in terms of commensality:

[During the hajj] you see Muslims trampling on each other, hurting each other and even killing each other competing for space to lapidate the satans but when they return they will live with these [very same] satans and eat with them! A satan is anyone (among the jinns or the human beings) who persuades [a Muslim] to leave God’s commandments.

Sharing a meal is an expression of sharing the ideas and deeds of your commensal partner. Therefore eating with rich Christians or members of the government is highly detestable. Eating with the rich and leaving alone the poor is indeed an act of betrayal basic Islamic tenets: it is the worst of all meals (mbaya kuliko zote). Funeral meals (sadaka ya maiti) are not allowed for the Qur’an teachers or other high officials but only for the low and the poor. Participating in the wrong meals, such as some ritual food served on funeral days, will have serious consequences. Also when a Muslim eats together with Christians on ‘their Sacrificial Feast’ (i.e. Good Friday and Easter) he will implicitly approve their views on the divinity of Jesus and his redemptive sacrifice. It is therefore in discussions on the participation...
in non-Islamic festivals and the consumption of food, that ideas about the
to the nature of the Muslim community emerge. This might be summarised with
the words of Lulu A. Kitoi who started a discussion thread on a Swahili forum
titled Manaswara (Christians):

In a pluralist society (jamii mchanganyiko) like ours here in Tanzania, Muslims
have brothers (ndugu), men/women, children, parents, friends, neighbours
who are non-Muslims. How can a Muslim live with these people without cross-
ing God’s boundaries (mipaka ya Allah). 128

6. The community eaten

The construction of the Islamic umma transcending temporal and
spatial boundaries is a theme we witnessed in all rituals of the Idd el-Hajj:
the salat, khutba, sacrifice and the concluding meal. However, despite the
fact that prayer and sermon also show a conscious process of differentiating
between those who belong and those who don’t, it is especially sacrifice and
commensality that employs the powerful symbols of killing and being eaten.
These latter metaphors express the recurrent subject of the marginalised,
oppressed and threatened Muslim community in present day Tanzania.

In a climate of political turmoil and social marginalisation many Tanza-
nian Muslims believe that the Islamic community is endangered, oppressed
and discriminated. The association between the sacrificial Idd el-Hajj victim
and the Tanzanian community as a living body is a pervasive metaphor in
Swahili discourse. The Christian church and the Christian state have a long
history of ‘killing and flaying their Muslim opponents like goats’. 129 From this
perspective the Idd el-Hajj is perhaps more the celebration of God’s saving
intercession of the Tanzanian Muslim community, rather than a symbol of
obedient surrender. The communal prayers in November 2002 were con-
cluded with a request for salvation: “Give us protection for our eyes, guard
our skin (ngozi) that our blood may be safe, and our bones may not be dam-
aged.” 130 It is this victim orientated perspective that dominates much of the
Idd el-Hajj discourse.

Symbolism of food and eating are often important in expressing ideas
on the moral community (Caplan forthcoming). 131 One of the internet sites
where Christians and Muslims discuss the problems on the proper Idd date
in Tanzania is headed ‘CCM [ruling party] eats human flesh’ (CCM wame-
kula nyama ya mtu). 132 This aggressive meaning of consuming and destroy-
ing something is clearly present in a couple of pictures printed in an-Nuur,
showing the American president Bush while he is eating and preparing food. Two pictures next to each other (one of Muslim prisoners on Guantanamo bay, one of President Bush eating a birthday cake), are accompanied by the text: ‘Careful Mr Bush, don’t get into difficulties again.’ The second picture shows the president cutting a turkey on the occasion of Thanksgiving and bears the caption ‘after killing Muslims, they congratulate each other.’

These ideas about the threatened Muslim community as being eaten by non-Muslim political entities are most visible in the ritualised fast breaking meals (futari). Although these futari are usually associated with Ramadan, the first meal after the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice is also called futari. These meals mark the end of a period of fasting: the month of Ramadan in one case, or the 9 fasting days preceding the Idd el-Hajj in the other case. The first meal (eaten before the salat on the Idd el-Fitr but after the salat and khutba on the Idd el-Hajj) is a prophetic sunna. The social and religious significance of these meals is often equated with ibada (religious observance). The following case will illustrate some of the connections between commensality and social identity in Tanzania.

During the month of Ramadan, on 21 October 2004 the American ambassador Michael Owen invited Tanzanian Muslim leaders to break their fast together with him on the embassy in Dar es Salaam. This annual tradition is meant to underline the good relationship between the United States and the Muslim community in Tanzania. The White House valuates Ramadan as a good opportunity to strengthen ties with Muslim groups worldwide. Social values like feeding the poor, distributing clothes and money and the communal eating between different groups are highly appreciated. According to their Ramadan message in Swahili: “Muslims invite people from other religions for meals, called futari, in order to show a tolerant religion (iman ya ustahmilivu).”

When most of the Muslims responded to the invitation and attended the diner, many others were upset. IPC newspaper an-Nuur opened the next issue with a large heading: “Disaster! They eat meat while their brothers are being eaten.” The reference is to Muslims killed by American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. By phrasing it this way the Muslims who went to this futari were accused of the same atrocities as the Americans and even the suggestion of cannibalism is present. On two pages an-Nuur prints full colour illustrations of the war on the left side flanked by cosy pictures of the futari on the right page. The speech of Ambassador Michael Owen is printed as well. The next issue continues the story and includes several opinions of Muslims defending or attacking the futari attendance. The international
Islamic community is represented by 18 Muslim leaders including Yusuf al-Qaradawi opposing a statement from BAKWATA Mufti Sheikh Simba claiming that there is nothing bad in accepting an invitation.

Ally Bassaleh explains his point of view; according to him good neighbourhood is indeed essential in Islam, but not when these neighbours wage war against innocent citizens as in Fallujah (Iraq). Bassaleh mentions a couple of reasons why Muslims are not allowed to eat their Idd meals with Americans: the invasion of Iraq is a religiously motivated crusade (vita vya msalaba) and a horrible injustice (udhalimu); America’s support of the Israel nation which systematically kills Muslim Palestinians and destroys their dwelling places. Until the Americans stop their enmity towards Muslims, the latter cannot participate in their meals. According to the Qur’an “Satan is your enemy” (Q 35:6) and Muslims cannot fight this demonic evil (uovu) when both are sitting at the same table. Although many politicians participated, that does not make it any more halal. Politicians should use their own platforms, holidays and meals to express their friendship (ushoga) but not abuse a holy Islamic feast for this purpose.141

In the same issue Khalid Mtwangi supports Bassaleh and he refers to the Qur’anic text ‘hold fast unto the rope of God’ (Q 3:103).142 According to the author practicing communitas with all Muslims in the world is a divine commandment and eating with those who kill Muslims is disobedience to the Word of God. The final contribution to the discussion is by A.S. Chachika who decides that Qur’an 3:118-120 is a good advice for Muslims who want to participate in American futaris:

118. O ye who believe! Take not into your intimacy those outside your ranks: They will not fail to corrupt you. They only desire your ruin; Rank hatred has already appeared from their mouths; What their hearts conceal is far worse. We have made plain to you the Signs, if ye have wisdom.

119. Ah! ye are those who love them, but they love you not,- though ye believe in the whole of the Book. When they meet you, they say, "We believe": But when they are alone, they bite off the very tips of their fingers at you in their rage. Say: “Perish in your rage; Allah knoweth well all the secrets of the heart.”

120. If aught that is good befalls you, it grieves them; but if some misfortune overtakes you, they rejoice at it. But if ye are constant and do right, not the least harm will their cunning do to you; for Allah Compasseth round about all that they do.143
The differences between a normal meal (in which both Muslims and non-Muslims may participate) and the politicised futari as described here are fuzzy. Immediately before and after the futari incident an-Nuur wrote positively about inviting non-Muslims for a similar Ramadan meal as an excellent occasion to practice da’wa.\textsuperscript{144} Apparently when social identity is threatened, the community must be ritually guarded against inimical forces, and boundaries between communities are stressed. In those cases the integrating and joining qualities of ritual give way to differentiating and separating movements.

The discourses on the Idd el-Hajj provide many illustrations of these contrasting processes. For example the National Baraza la Idd symbolises the unity of government and Tanzanian Muslims but at the same time the ruling party CCM is accused of abusing these Islamic feasts as stages for its own ideas.\textsuperscript{145} The Ahmadiyya community emphasises the Islamic character of the foundational Ibrahimic sacrifice by clearly distinguishing the ‘real’ history (with Ismail as the son who was nearly sacrificed) from the ‘corrupted’ one having Isaac in the leading role. The foundational myth is discursively differentiated from Jewish and Christian traditions.\textsuperscript{146} The same mechanism was at work when Pakistani Sunni Muslim prevented the Ahmadiyya believers to participate in the Idd el-Hajj or even to sacrifice animals because they were not considered to be Muslims.\textsuperscript{147} Apparently social identity constructed in the Idd el-Hajj is just as dependent on participation in rituals, as on the exclusion of others. Ritual provides the metaphors and symbolism to (re)construct the moral community and to differentiate if from other communities.

7. \textbf{Conclusion}

Just like many other sacrificial rituals the Idd el-Hajj constructs a moral community through the process of sacrificing, meat distribution and commensality. However, the nature of this community is different from the local rituals like for example the akika and the siku ya mwaka. Consequently the process from Idd el-Hajj animal to social meal significantly differs from the sacrificial transformation in the former rituals.

More than 75% of all the animals slaughtered in Tanga are chickens and goats. The most salient detail is the preference for goats to be sacrificed on the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania whereas most Islamic societies prefer sheep sacrifices. The reason might be found in the ambiguous role sheep play in purification and life-cycle rituals. A general anxiety not to attribute any spe-
specific significance to the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice apart from its spiritual meaning of obedience to God and charity to the poor, might be one of the reasons to slaughter goats. This animal choice is different from the stories about Ibrahim's trial in which a sheep was substituted for his son.

Immolation of the animal shows many similarities with the daily salat and both ritual obligations are often equated: prayer direction towards the ritual gravity centre Mecca, the inclusion of the prayer to the prophet Muhammad, and emphasis on God's unity. All of these features identify the sacrificial community as followers of the only true God, its final Messenger Muhammad, and focussed on the Ka'ba as the geographical heart of Islam. The sacrifice of an animal is one of the many reminders of that the Idd el-Hajj is intimately connected with the hajj, the celebration of the Muslim umma.

This connection with the translocal community rather than with locally defined kin groups or descent systems is further emphasised in the apparently randomised distribution of animal parts. The meat is divided according to pragmatic rules rather than showing particular culturally influenced considerations or textual prescriptions. Instead of the meticulous divisions according to age, gender or place in a kinship system shown in some local sacrifices, the Idd el-Hajj animal is often distributed in completely equal portions, showing the equality of all Muslims. Welfare organisations distribute vouchers among poor Muslims which can be exchanged for meat, regardless the social position of the recipients. Unsurprisingly the distribution of domestic sacrifices is shaped by factors like reciprocity, domestic relations and family membership. The majority of the skins are donated to the Qur'an schools, with the explicitly stated goal to use them for the ritual drums played in the mawlid celebrations. This gift as part of a wider ritual exchange system, symbolically connects Tanga Muslims with one of the major players in urban religious life: the madrasa.

Commensality appears to be a powerful metaphoric action to construct a moral community. Eating from Idd el-Hajj sacrifice cements the community together whereas exclusion from ritual meals marks the boundaries between social entities. The Idd el-Hajj celebrates the transgenerational links between the dead and the living by common meals. However Muslims increasingly substitute prayers and incense burning for these practices. The differentiating power of ritual commensality is shown by a futari incident on the American embassy in October 2004. Influenced by global events (such as the invasion of Iraq), several Tanzanian Muslims claimed that eating together with the U.S. ambassador would imply complicity in the oppression of fellow Muslim in Iraq and Afghanistan.
15.

**Texts, Rituals and Identities**

This study has explored some of the ways in which groups of Muslims in Tanzania construct their identities through ritual practices and discourses related to the Idd el-Hajj. Special emphasis has been put on the connections between texts, rituals and social identities. By using a literary model, notably Fernandez’s (1986:23) notion of ritual as “the acting out of metaphoric predications upon inchoate pronouns which are in need of movement,” the different ritual performances can be understood as expressing different ‘movements’ of ‘inchoate pronouns’. While the interactions between the three elements (text, ritual and identity) certainly change, these changes occur within the parameters of a loosely defined Islamic social identity: firstly, the belief in one, unique God (*tawhid*) and secondly, immediately connected to the first element, the belief in one, worldwide community of believers (*ummah*). In the only two Islamic annual festivals, the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj, these common denominators provide the basic grid for a social identity. And it is especially the Idd el-Hajj, the celebration of the annual pilgrimage to the sacred heart of Islam, that vividly portrays the image of a united community believing in one God. The concepts of *tawhid* and *ummah* transcend time and space, and offer possibilities as both a model of, and a model for, one’s own social community bounded by temporal and spatial constraints. Arabic texts, the *hajj*, and sacrificial paradigms offer essential metaphors with which to imagine one’s own position in relation to God and the *ummah*. Tension between belonging to the local, ordinary context of a plural modern society and the exalted, true religious transcendental community of believers is clearly illustrated in the different ways the Idd el-Hajj is discussed and performed in Tanzania.
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'a Raise Your Voices and Kill Your Animals'

a. **Texts**

This book has not only corroborated the importance of authoritative texts in transmitting awareness of "standard Islamic practice" but has distinguished also several other functions of texts in the ritual context of the Idd el-Hajj. In the following section I will repeat some of them: 1) formulaic use of Arabic texts, 2) the role of written texts as channels to the past, 3) texts as carriers of ritual rules, 4) texts as means to create hermeneutical paradigms and, finally, 5) texts as constitutive elements of textual communities.

**Speech acts**

The formulaic usage of Arabic texts is present in the performance of the daily salat, the takbir chanting during the days of the Idd el-Hajj, in the preacher's literal quotations of the Qur'an during his sermons, and finally as part of the animal sacrifice. The translation of these Arabic phrases is not demanded for the ritual to be effective: they are 'speech acts'. Just like wedding and naming ceremonies, these speech acts are performative utterances: they do not transmit information but they achieve something rather than saying something. None of these Arabic expressions are exclusively linked to the Idd el-Hajj activities, but invoking these words identifies the practice as Islamic. The Arabic formulae connect diverse practices and label them as belonging to the domain of 'Islam': the domain of one God and one community.

In traditional madrasa rituals, the use of Arabic as a 'sacred' language dominates the Idd el-Hajj. The same Arabic sermons are recited year after year, accompanied by laudatory poems praising the Prophet. Arabic texts do not function as a mere container of ritual rules, but the memorising, reproduction and performance of these texts distinguishes the Idd el-Hajj as Islamic. In modernist and reformist groups this use of Arabic is marginalised and Arabic quotations are almost always immediately translated in vernacular languages. It is not the speech act, but rather the understanding which is central. Discussions regarding the language (Arabic or Swahili) of the Friday khutba and the prayers of the pilgrims must be seen in the same light.

**Objects**

In the second place, written texts are important channels through which reality can be approached and handled. Islamic history is taught as a subject in madrasas and in the religious curriculum of government schools. It is only through texts that Muslims have access to the ideal living practice of the Prophet Muhammad, whose precedent is the embodiment of correct ritual. Texts create a reified collective memory of events and hence are
perceived as a reliable source for justifying current practices or contesting them. This historical dimension is present in every discussion on the Idd el-Hajj rituals. Proving that a particular form of ritual is correct always involves references to authoritative textual precedents. It is partly through the existence of this corpus of texts that the 'ideal' ritual is felt to exist, outside any real practice and actors. This aspect of literacy creates, according to Walter Ong (1988), a different mentality in literate people. Written words are 'thing-like', reified, perceived as outside actors and events. Amongst other implications, this literary or textual objectification can become a barrier to adaptation to changing circumstances: the 'unchangeable' text remains there, ensuring the continuation of the particular form of the ritual. As long as the authority of texts is reproduced, it is much more difficult for changes in the ritual to be enacted or realised. In a setting where a ritual's rules are orally transmitted, on the other hand, change is often easier (cf. Barnes 1999:263).

However, as Brian Street (1984,1993) has shown in his 'ideological model' of literacy, both oral and scriptural texts are continually reworked, although each new version is fixed and perceived by followers as being based on a continuous tradition. It is through this model that we can understand the 'new' AMYC practice of celebrating the Idd el-Hajj in the open air. Although this started only in the mid-1990s in Tanga, the textual precedents evoked to justify this practice date from the formative period of Islam. It is not these texts that are the intrinsic reason or cause of the ritual practice; it is rather the actors who read and interpret these texts who are the driving force behind change. In this sense, texts often obscure the flexibility of real life, by suggesting unchanged practices while in reality these key texts are read, forgotten, reread and continuously interpreted. Indeed, all of the conditions facilitating the (re)reading and interpretation of texts, or the factors obstructing the implementation of certain textual prescription, must be taken into account. In the case of the AMYC rituals, we must understand them in relation to the multiple contested public demonstrations of religiousness which arose after the public domain was opened to religion in the beginning of the 1990s. The presence of texts describing the Prophet's practice offered the symbolic idiom through which the AMYC could express their message of reform and their claim of the public space.

Rules

A third function of texts as the carrier of rules, must be treated with care. On a superficial level this is the least problematic of all. Several studies show that when the circulation of authoritative texts increases, ritual
practices tend towards conformity (cf. Stock 1983). A practice like the hajj is
difficult to imagine without a consensus of shared, written texts describing
the rules. The Idd salat, the sermon, animal sacrifice and the distribution of
food all show a considerable awareness of standard Islam across many social
strata in the town of Tanga. Minor differences in all of these practices are sel-
dom emphasised; for example, within a single congregation it is possible to
witness different bodily postures or small variations in the Arabic formulae.
These differences do not threaten the overall image of a united community
submitted to God and following the example of the Prophet Muhammad.

Although the Idd el-Hajj is not described in the Qur’an, its acceptance
by the Muslim community in an early stage of the formative period contin-
ues to the present day. However, texts never provide all of the answers to
ritual questions. Whereas the preparation of pilgrimage candidates is domi-
nated by an ample selection of detailed texts and explicit rules, the local
counterpart, the Idd el-Hajj, is more open to variation and interpretation.
The lack of clear-cut prescriptions regarding the correct Idd el-Hajj date
continually triggers readers to re-interpret existing rules in order to deduce
rules for contemporary life. Discussion of the rules is based on a limited
number of texts describing the Prophet Muhammad’s practice and that of
his Companions and Successors. Several attitudes towards these rules must
be distinguished.

People can be directly inspired by the reading of literal texts and
change their behaviour accordingly. Some Islamic groups, for example,
attempt to schedule the Idd el-Hajj prayers half an hour earlier than the Idd
el-Fitr prayers (although both are completed after sunrise, according to the
letter of Islamic law. I witnessed a similar moulding of practice according
to textual prescription when a sacrificer removed some animals from the
site where another goat was killed. In all of these cases the sincere motiva-
tion of acting as closely as possible to the imagined example of the Prophet
Muhammad as described in written texts should not be doubted.

Often people do not exactly apply a textual rule but demonstrate an
awareness of scriptural authorities through their behaviour. For example,
while many Muslims slaughter poultry on the Idd el-Hajj, they are well aware
of the Arabic texts which state that chickens are not allowed as a valid sac-
ifice on that day. Nonetheless, they act according to the spirit of the law
which says that every lawful animal which does not belong to the species
of Idd el-Hajj animals is ‘just a sadaka’. Since this is exactly the significance
of the festival meal, they decide to kill the cheaper animal. An additional
advantage is that by choosing the chicken, the specific rules relating to the
treatment of the Idd animal no longer have to be considered and they can therefore start preparing the meal even before the salat has finished.

In some cases where texts and practice are in obvious conflict with each other, these texts can be de-legitimated: the text is accepted but considered as not being applicable to the current situation. A clear case is the ‘Kuraib-hadith’ in which a Companion of the Prophet describes how his community in Medina does not accept the Idd el-Fitr date based on a crescent-sighting in Syria. Modern groups in Tanzania who advocate a single global Idd holiday based on one authoritative moon-sighting anywhere in the world, de-legitimate this text as not binding for modern practice because of jurisprudential subtleties.

A textual norm can also be neglected in favour of a higher norm or value. For example, the textual evidence for celebrating the Idd according to local crescent-sighting is often discarded by Muslims who confess that they prefer to pray according to a world-wide moon-sighting in order to express the virtue of a united umma: the authority of the text as well as its applicability to the current situation is accepted, but other compelling reasons motivate the individual to act otherwise.

Many other cases have been mentioned in which texts only indirectly influence people’s or groups’ behaviour or in which the driving force behind ritual practice is completely extra-textual. For example, meat distribution is influenced by important values to ensure that shame is prevented and respect towards the recipient is preserved. The almost total absence of women among the group of sacrificers is not endorsed by any Islamic textual consensus, but is rather a result of cultural ideas. The orientation of the animal and sacrificer towards the qibla is not essential for sacrifice (unlike the salat) but it is obviously perceived as being essential and is seldom left behind in Tanzanian cases. On the other hand, a perfectly ‘orthodox’ meaning like the possibility of intercession (shafa’a) in the akika ritual is denied by Muslims who have some knowledge of Islamic texts, while others lacking this literacy find it perfectly acceptable. In all of these cases, the notion that Islamic ritual is embodied in a textual legacy is present but the relationship between the two is more complex than that of cause and effect.

Paradigms

In the fourth place, texts are extremely helpful in the construction of hermeneutical paradigms through which the world and social reality are approached and imagined. For example, a place name like ‘Arafa’ becomes exemplary for a host of other events, concepts and ideas. Arafa is the place
where the Prophet Muhammad addressed his community for the last time, leaving them with the “Book of Allah and my Sunna.” Apart from being a place name it also became an indication of a specific day, the Day of Arafa, indicating the time when the pilgrims visited the plains of Arafa as part of the hajj. The Prophet’s explanation that “the hajj is Arafa” is found to be true by many pilgrims who claim that this day is by far the most emotional and most edifying part of their journey to the Sacred City of Mecca. A cosmogonical and eschatological dimension is added to the place by stories about the first human couple who mated here and about the expectation that the assembly of Arafa mirrors those at the Day of Judgement. All of these dimensions are continually repeated in written texts in classrooms, sermons, books and newspapers. The detailed narration of these events and their dissemination is facilitated by scriptural media. The highly charged symbol of ‘Arafa’ can create the scenario for new events like the protest meeting in Dar es Salaam (2001). The simultaneous orchestration of the meeting together with the ritual ‘standing’ of the pilgrims on Arafa resulted in a powerful merging of both places. The Tanzanian protesters became the pilgrims (and did not just act as if they were), and their complaints about the victims of state/Muslim clashes in the preceding weeks were likewise carried over to the sacred plains of the hajj and received by the angels gathered there. But these metaphorical ‘predications’ on ‘inchoate pronouns’ could only function this way precisely because the basic features of the Arafa paradigm were shared among Muslims.

The popular idea is that historical events or religious actors can be approached through written texts. According to this idea every Muslim prophet left behind his own book: not only Musa (“Tawrat”), Dawud (“Zabur”) and Isa (“Injil”) but also Ibrahim. Because subsequent generations continued to corrupt their written legacies, we do not have their messages in the original form but incorporated in the Qur’anic revelation. But also the ‘Badr-martyrs’ for example, are physically accessible through their names written in the book “Ahl al-Badr.” The abovementioned Arafa paradigm can be evoked through quotations from the Prophet’s Arafa sermon. Hajj organisations offer visits to Islamic libraries in Jerusalem and Cairo, thus bringing the pilgrim in contact with ‘Islam.’ But not only is the religious domain accessible through Arabic texts, but also secular paradigms are represented by certain key texts. The hegemonic discourse of the suppression and marginalisation of Muslims in the Tanzanian nation-state by a Christian government is reproduced by quotes from written texts and references to printed books. Almost every Muslim in Tanzania has some idea of what these references to texts
and authors (like the “Tungi declaration”, the “Aziz letter”, or “Sivalon”) stand for; they are used to prove that Muslims do not have an equal status in the Tanzanian nation-state.

Textual communities

A fifth and final function of texts is that of the creation of a textual community consisting of literate language users. The two most important communities described in this book (the Islamic umma, and the Tanzanian nation-state) are both textual communities. Being Tanzanian, whatever your ethnic background, means being a user of Swahili as your lingua franca and, since the introduction of Universal Primary Education, a literate Swahili speaker as well. Being a Muslim, despite your ethnic background, equally implies some knowledge of the Arabic script. Both communities share many characteristics (for example, the emphasis put on unity) even to the extent that Tanzanian citizenship resembles a ‘civil religion’ (cf. Becker 2006: 589). The right of membership in these communities is emotionally discussed in the press using similar expressions.

The belief that texts contain the absolute truth about rituals is the common denominator of many (if not all) Islamic groups participating in the Tanzanian discourses. However, similar ideas regarding the influence of texts on practice are expressed with regard to the presence of the secular law that safeguards the halal-slaughtering. Even the words ‘Sharia’ (Islamic Law) and its secular equivalent ‘sheria’ (law) are similar. Obeying the “she-ria which is not from God,” is a common reference to national secularism. Both communities are mainly urban phenomena and access to the media requiring literacy such as books, newspapers, and the Internet is limited to the urban population, thus reinforcing the urban/rural distinction (cf. Goody 1987: 141). That the revival of literacy among youth in the 1990s coincided with the development of the Islamic press within the international framework of the increasing influence of scripturalist Islam, might be significantly correlated.

Both textual communities are dominated by the ‘sacred language’ of Arabic for the umma, and Swahili for the nation-state. From the early 1990s onwards, attempts to create a socialist egalitarian state were officially abandoned, and the transition to capitalism and social adjustment was made. However, traces of the civil religion, the national community with its own ‘sacred’ language Swahili, are still present in all kinds of discourses (cf. Blommaert 1999). One of the main successes of Ujamaa politics was developing Swahili as a key factor cementing the state, whereas the hegemony of the
state to dominate the meaning and significance of the language failed. At the same time, the Islamic press and the publication of books in Swahili started to grow considerably. Despite the state’s efforts to enforce a uniform spelling in Swahili, the Muslim/Swahili textual community developed its own spelling in order to represent specific Arabic letters. The two ‘sacred’ communities (umma and nation-state) both demanded their own forms of loyalty from believers and citizens. Speaking Arabic and Swahili symbolised belonging to two different worlds, and, increasingly, being a Tanzanian citizen and a Muslim caused tensions. Anderson (2002) describes how the erosion of the sacred religious imagined community was essential to enable the emergence of the new imagined community of the nation-state dominated by a vernacular language. However, with the rise of the nation-state, the religious textual communities did not simply vanish, but rather both communities continued to live side by side.

The two textual communities (nation-state and umma) are often portrayed as rivals. The Arabic script, once very common for Islamic Swahili publications, rapidly gives way to the Latin alphabet. New forms of scriptural authority are more often associated with English, Latin script and modernity rather than with classical Arabic. The Islamic scholarly class as described by Farsy in his hagiographic account Baadhi ya wanavyuoni wa kishafi wa mashariki wa Afrika, is leaving the scene. Pupils in traditional madrasas often describe their particular educational career as the result of not having been selected to attend secular secondary school. Most madrasa leaders nowadays have had at least four years of secondary education in state schools. Religious leadership tended to be embedded in the shurafa families, claiming direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad and often coming from the Hadramaut. With the coming arrival of the colonial powers in the last quarter of the 19th century, the introduction of another educational system, national independence in 1961, and the emergence of the multiparty system in 1992, new forms of religious authority were increasingly established. The establishment of the National Muslim Council BAKWATA (1968), backed by the secular state, is an example. The council publishes in Swahili, and their knowledge of Arabic and Islamic fiqh is contested. Several initiatives to combine the two worlds have been undertaken. In the last decade, new institutions emerged on the mainland: the Bait ul Mal, an Islamic University, and Muslim ‘seminaries’ catering only for Muslims and offering both secular and religious knowledge. These are initiatives developed by Tanzanian Muslims, citizens who express their wish to participate in two communities.
Despite the abundant literature on the Swahili language, its genesis, development and usage, very little research has focused on the ethnography of Swahili Islamic literature. Religion is more often than not excluded from socio-linguistic studies. In her excellent study of Tanzanian nationalism, Kelly Askew (2002) emphasises the significance of musical performance rather than newspapers and print press in this development. Further, studies on the religious media in Africa usually leave out the role of Muslim newspapers, pamphlets and other written literature (including the Internet). By making these choices, the Muslim communities’ input in national debates is seriously underestimated. It is primarily through the media of written texts that Tanzanian Muslims discuss, contest and criticise the nation-state, revealing social tensions between two predicates: ‘Muslim’ and ‘Tanzanian.’ Similar tensions are powerfully enacted in the Idd el-Hajj rituals.

b. Rituals

Symbols and significance

The Idd el-Hajj rituals consist of elaborate performative metaphors, both constrained and enabled by textually influenced discourse. To one extent (an awareness of) authoritative sources limits the choice of actors, but on a different level these texts offer more possibilities to conceptualise Muslim identity. In particular, the use of Islamic historical paradigms centring on specific places (Arafa, Mina) or persons (Ibrahim, the Prophet Muhammad) creates new scenarios to interpret current situations. In this book, ritual as a movement of social groups between different domains is central. The thesis is that it is through ritual practices and discourses that social groups are identified, boundaries are drawn and distinctions between groups are enforced. Discursive practice and performative discourse are two sides of the same coin. In this section we will review the ways in which the symbolic elements of the Idd el-Hajj (prayer, sermon and sacrifice) relate to their meaning.

Many examples presented throughout this thesis demonstrate that the rather static Peircian tripartite division of conventional (‘symbol’), existential (‘index’) and iconical signs does not adequately describe what is occurring in the Idd el-Hajj. On a superficial level, the Idd el-Hajj rituals are merely conventional symbols. The meaning of these activities is not self evident but rather only becomes clear in the divine revelation. Many Tanga Muslims perform the ritual activities during the Idd el-Hajj as an expression of their...
obedience to the ‘Book of God’ and in imitation of the Prophetic example transmitted in a limited body of authoritative texts. On this level (ritual as rule-governed behaviour) there is an almost perfect match between texts and the three Idd el-Hajj practices (communal prayer, sermon and animal sacrifice). However, a more existential relation between signifier and signified also exists. For example, the prayer direction towards Mecca is a clear index: it ‘indicates’ the Muslim community. Further, the sharing of the meat sacrificed during the hajj creates an existential connection between the pilgrims and the recipients. Commensality in general and sharing festival meals (kula Iddi) in particular are important indices of social organisations. Finally, the whole ritual is imagined as an icon of the ideal Muslim umma. The salat in particular shows the desired characteristics of the Islamic community: neatly organised, bowed down in worship, equal to God and with the genders separated.

The three relations (symbolical, indexical and iconical) are not to be separated, and often interfere with each other as the many different meanings of animal sacrifice illustrate. Sacrifice as a symbol of total surrender is dominant in the Ahmadiyya discourse. Based on specific cultural conventions, the meaning of animal sacrifice is constructed as the giving up of personal vices and sinful customs. The difference between goats and sheep in the Idd el-Hajj sacrifice is symbolically connected to different domains. Most Muslims prefer a goat for pragmatic reasons: because they dislike mutton. However, the minority who sacrifices sheep does so with the popular Ibrahimi sacrificial myth in mind, in which the prophet offered a ram in substitution for his son. Sheep thus become an essential element in the symbolic re-enactment of a historical/mythical event. However, other sacrificial rituals show that sheep are connected to the domains of expiation and purification, often in clearly non-Islamic contexts. Muslims choosing a goat probably feel the need to distinguish their sacrifice as clearly being Islamic. The important Qur’anic warning “their flesh and their blood does not reach Allah” (Q 22:37), prevents the attribution of any transformative function to the animal sacrifice; a plain goat perfectly fits this meaning. Within the social and political predicament of Tanzanian Muslims, the killing of animals on the Idd el-Hajj is sometimes iconically connected with Islamic martyrdom and the perceived violence of the state towards Muslim citizens. Especially in 2001 and 2002, when the violent clashes at Mwembechai and after the elections in 2000 were remembered in the days before the Idd, the notions of victimhood and revenge were influenced by the meaning of the hajj rituals. The killing of an animal was sometimes referred to as spurring Muslims to defend their reli-
gion, to show their willingness in martyrdom, and to revitalise the ‘body’ of the Muslim community. All of these meanings can co-exist in a single ritual, and shifts in emphasising one or more semantic elements are the rule rather than exception.

Place and time
The conceptualisation of Muslim identity in Tanzania has strong spatial and temporal elements. The symbolic building-blocks of rituals transform the praying and sacrificing community and connect the participants to the Islamic umma, the Muslim community of all times and places. Beyond any doubt, the most important spatial image of the umma is the hajj. The significance of Idd el-Hajj rituals is influenced by ideas held by Muslims regarding the hajj rituals. Whereas the actual number of pilgrims is quite limited, knowledge of the basic hajj rites is transmitted in all kind of media. Discourse is not concerned with the meaning of the hajj-symbols as such: most people agree on the basic significance of the hajj as an expression of the ideal Muslim community, obedient to God, willing to submit oneself completely, and always prepared to meet God. Differentiation in the performance of the hajj is difficult: procedures are critically protected by the Saudi military police apparatus. Rather than the actual performance of the pilgrimage, it is discussions about the hajj and the umma that reflect the current problems of Muslim identity in Tanzania. The heartland of Islam and the republic of Tanzania are connected by pilgrims going back and forth between the two places. By contrasting the ideal image of the umma as portrayed in the hajj-rituals on the one hand with the marginalised Muslim community in the Tanzanian nation-state on the other, the hajj becomes a metaphor to speak about the social identity of Tanzanian Muslims.

The question about the social significance of the hajj for Tanzanian society is answered in two different ways. The first response is represented by the Ahmadiyya and restricts religion to the personal sphere. In their vision, the hajj is a hospital and the individual believer is healed and returns as a newborn baby to his own country. His purified personality will certainly have a positive effect on his environment but the pilgrim will not become a driving force of moral change in his own society. This attitude is different from groups who advocate a more military, jihadist attitude as the social significance of the hajj. According to this group, the hajj rituals signify the way in which they can defend the threatened Muslim community and prepare the returning pilgrim to identify their enemies. The real believer should be willing to kill and be killed just like he has killed his hajj-animal.
The temporal aspects of Muslim identity are the shared history and the common Islamic calendar. As it is presented in Islamic sermons, history is perceived as a continuous chain of crises followed by God’s saving intercession on behalf of faithful individuals and communities and the punishment of corrupted sinners. Sacrifice plays an important role in this pattern. The Ibrahimian paradigm shows how the prophet is tested, his son is saved and the apical ancestor of the Islamic community survives. A similar divine benevolence towards the umma is presented in the near sacrifice of the Prophet Muhammad’s father. It is therefore essential for the Muslim community to “grasp the rope of God” (Q 3:103) in difficult times. The two calendrical Idds are taken as touchstones of the Islamic moral community, taken from the normal stream of daily life and having a different quality. This aspect is further underlined by the preceding period of fasting in Ramadan and the first 9 days of the hajj month. While the social and psychological significance of the Idd el-Fitr is more like a New Year’s day, the connotations of the Idd el-Hajj are often linked to the final day of Judgment and are therefore more solemn. Within this discourse, fasting or feasting at the wrong time is a real threat to the moral order, as ordained by God.

Perceived or real threats from outside of the Islamic community often lead to attempts to reinforce unifying rituals such as the salat and the Idd el-Hajj (cf. Parkin 1994:180). Therefore, in the current socio-political climate the idea of unity is stressed. Even more than the Idd el-Fitr, the Idd el-Hajj should show a united umma. The existence of one God, one hajj, one language and one Prophet is often expressed as the meaning of being a Muslim community. Praying the Idd el-Hajj on different days is a painful, very visible reflection of internal fracture lines within the umma. While all Islamic groups in Tanzania adhere to the Islamic lunar calendar, their different Idd dates show their different conceptualisations of Muslim identity.

By using scientific methods to determine the day of the Idd, the Ahmadiyya community proudly express their wish to be modern and rational Muslims. Their connection to the Islamic umma is a tenuous one because they are banned from the hajj and were labelled heretics in the 1970s. The loss of their founding place was partly compensated by the introduction of a new modern solar Hijra calendar. The names of the twelve months were derived from Islamic history and provided access to the community’s Islamic roots. A second answer to the problem of communal fission is given by groups who advocate a single national Idd. These Muslims stress the fact that Islamic citizens should show their unity on a national level. Not surprisingly, it is among these Muslims that we find broad support for active participation in the Tan-
Tanzanian nation-state. A third solution is provided by reformist youth movements like the AMYC. They take the Day of Arafat as the God-given solidifier of the umma-sentiment: the Idd el-Hajj is determined by the days that the real hajj takes place. Among these groups it is not national unity that matters but rather Islam, that is by definition trans-local, and disconnected from ‘parochial’ social structures. Finally, a few madrasas in Tanga follow a specific Shafi’i method in which the exact geographical position of the community determines when the Idd should be celebrated.

Movement and metaphors

The rituals and discourses described in this thesis illustrate how Islamic groups are able to express their Muslim identity within the structural limits of texts and conventional symbols, alongside temporal and spatial axes. Events do not unfold in a neutral duration of time or in an undefined place, but are acted out in socially constructed temporal systems and value-laden spaces. In written and oral discourses the connection to different temporal and spatial domains is established through metaphors and metonyms. The result is the construction of different chronotopical communities which occupy a unique time/space. For example, when the AMYC community in Tanga started to conduct their Idd prayers in the open air, this was a literal process of ‘coming out’. They claimed public space, showed their visible orientation towards Saudi Arabia, and separated their community from others Muslims who prayed one day later in their mosques. Like a map or a diagram, the time and place of worship exhibit the roots in the local society or in the global community. While at a superficial level both rituals seem to be identical, their meaning changes when performed in a different temporal or spatial setting.

The metaphorical connection between the ritual acts as performed now and those by earlier prophets (notably Ibrahim and Muhammad) is emphasised by simultaneity. By stressing that the performance takes place at exactly the right time, coinciding with the hajj rituals in Mecca (and especially Arafat), the metaphor turns into metonymy. Not just a mere similarity, but rather the relationship is that of a part to the whole: a real metonym. Because the hajj is perceived as an icon of the whole Islamic community, all of the individual believers gathering together on a particular field in Tanga are demonstrated as being part of the same chosen community. What occurs, to quote Gaffney, is “imitating the Sunna of the Prophet without passing through an intervening historical heritage” (1994:239).
More 'moderate' or 'spiritual' sermons' metaphorical images also dominate: certain ideas and values from the early age of Islam are applied to the modern context. Madrasa sermons, for example, link the Arabic letters of the word hajj to spiritual values of forgiveness. However, in 'radical' or 'literal' sermons we find more metonyms, as the boundaries between the signifier and the signified are blurred. The AMYC Idd el-Hajj is not just an obedient application of textual rules; it is more like a re-enactment of Medinian society. “We Ansaar” is not simply an indication of the Tanga believers listening to the sermon, but actually refers to the 'real' Ansaar, the Prophet Muhammad's helpers in Medina. The Idd el-Hajj sermons make it very clear that the ritual practice performed in Tanga is intimately connected to the Prophet's action in Medina. It is through actual mimesis, exactly re-enacting Muhammad's sacrifice, rather than a more abstract ibrahimian imitation, that the AMYC director achieves his authority.

A similar mechanism was shown in the Arafa demonstration in March 2001, one day before the Idd el-Hajj. The ritual was a simultaneous (according to clock time) re-enactment of the Arafa rituals performed as part of the hajj. In the same way as the Arafa pilgrims constructed their moral community in prayer (invoking God's blessings for loved ones and God's wrath for the enemies), so the Tanzanian mirror congregation told God their complaints and listed all the names of victims killed by hatred and injustice. The organising bodies of this demonstration were not connected to the AMYC in any way, but through the metonymical connection between two places, the protest meeting and the hajj community merged into one.

c. Identities

The Idd el-Hajj rituals move between the parameters of textual consensus and the basic requirement of a social identity. The variations and similarities in ritual practice reflect different ideas about the position of Islam in the modern Tanzanian society but also a strong sense of common Muslim identity. How can communal identity be achieved whilst both conforming with strict textual norms and simultaneously satisfying the need to be distinct from others? How do actors move between structures and events, strategically changing their position in 'quality space'? How are these social communities indexed, identified, symbolised or iconically represented in the Idd al Hajj rituals? To answer these questions we look at four different social units: 1) the family, 2) the madrasa, 3) the nation-state and 4) the global imagined community. All of these communities face the major problem...
of how to define their social self as a continuous self while at the same time the members of the community are constantly changing.

Family
On the day of the Idd, family members often eat together and visit other members of the family. Not only the living but also the dead are remembered in prayers accompanied by incense-burning or visits to the cemetery. The majority of those who sacrifice an animal do so in the restricted area of the house and courtyard. On this level, it is justified to call the Idd el-Hajj a domestic and family ritual.

However, it is difficult to claim that the Idd el-Hajj identifies or maintains family organisation as, for example, Combs-Schilling (1989) claimed in relation to the festival in Morocco or several other sacrificial rituals in Jay (1992). Several of the ritual elements of the Idd el-Hajj take place outside the house. The salat is primarily a male activity and the audience of the Idd sermon consists almost exclusively of men. The community that gathers in the mosque or on the prayerfield is not linked by common descent although the members are referred to by the spiritual kinship term ndugu (brothers). Many boarding students do not return to their family’s residence during the feast. Sacrifice and eating as described in this book are not essential to cement the family together or to create descent systems (as it is in the akika ritual). In line with other studies on the role of Islamisation, I found that the role of kinship was diminishing in the Idd el-Hajj rituals. No clearcut dictum prescribes who has to carry out the sacrifice (only in a minority of cases did the pater familias perform the act). Neither the sharing of food nor the distribution of meat showed clear, meaningful patterns: neighbours, friends, classmates as well as cognatic and agnatic family members were among the recipients. Rural practices of ‘eating with the ancestors’ (siku za vijungu) during the days preceding the Idd el-Hajj, is uncommon in urban contexts.

Madrasa
The Tanga madrasas are a focus of ethnic identity, they reproduce the canonical rules of Islam and Islamic ritual and provide an education to students who failed to qualify for secondary school. Some madrasas, like the Shamsiya, use a special method to determine the proper day of the Idd el-Hajj, thus creating at times a difference with the other Islamic communities in Tanga. The Friday and Idd khutbas are conducted in Arabic and are dominated by the praise to the Prophet and the formal repetition of rules and regulations regarding the hajj and the Idd el-Hajj. The Swahili part is
relatively small. Sacrifice in urban Idd el-Hajj celebrations by madrasas is absent or invisible. However, after the salat, staff members come together and jointly break their fast in one of the buildings. Participation in this meal, as well as in the salat and khutba is usually restricted to men. Every major madrasa organises a baraza on the afternoon of the Idd el-Hajj. Here, as well as in the sermon, the non-discursive and performative elements dominate the ceremony. Poetry, musical performance and a short speech in Swahili emphasise the identity of the madrasa as a pious, ‘Muhammadan,’ male community. The connection to the Islamic umma is not metonymically stressed by simultaneity, but rather metaphorically (the community is similar, but not identical to the first Muslim community). The madrasa is connected to the wider community through the local, pious, ancestor buried near the madrasa or mosque. This founder, often buried right behind the prayer niche, is connected to his teachers in a genealogical chain going all the way to Muhammad. This genealogy is sometimes printed in the traditional madrasa literature.

All of these ritual elements are more clearly pronounced in the mawlid ceremonies, by far the most important madrasa ritual. Through communal meals, music, poetry, speeches and the joyous procession to and from the grave of the madrasa founder, these multiple day events represent the Islamic community more directly than the Idd el-Hajj does. Not only men, but also women and children participate in the mawlid. Apart from a joint mawlid celebration, every major madrasa has its own rituals in which distinction and identity is stressed. Just as some groups’ Idd el-Hajj sermons use military language in order to defend their own identity, the mawlid shows military enactments of historical battles, the carrying of machetes during the procession and sometimes stone throwing when rival madrasas are passed. On a personal level, urban Muslims may express their connection to a madrasa by sending their children there for a basic Qur’anic education, inviting one of their leaders/students to perform a domestic sacrifice or other religious life-cycle ceremonies and by returning the Idd el-Hajj skin to the madrasa as material for their mawlid drums.

Nation-state

More visible than the family and madrasa communities, the nation-state is present in the Idd el-Hajj rituals. The state is perceived to be an actor involved in deciding the date of the festival. Officially, the BAKWATA state organ has a monopoly in deciding when the Idd el-hajj as a national holiday has to be celebrated. Although, in practice, the performance of the Idd
on other days is not opposed (as it is in Zanzibar), the awkward position of the (secular) state in meddling with religious festivals causes tensions. As indicated by Zerubavel, “gaining control over the calendar has always been essential for attaining social control in general” (1981:45). However, state control is always limited. Even the mufti himself once decided to have his personal Idd one day later than decided by BAKWATA. The disregard of national Idd holidays by the state is taken by Muslims as being indicative of their marginalised, inferior status within the nation-state. The weekly Friday services, the Idd el-Fitr and the Idd el-Hajj are perceived as representing the dual loyalties of Muslims: as believers and as citizens. Tanzanian national history is presented in Muslim discourse as a continuous series of incidents starting with a pork-raising project by the Germans in the early 20th century, to the killing of Muslim protesters in 2001. Consequently, the national Idd celebration is both an important showcase of the successful connection of umma and nation-state as well as a site of potential conflict. Both the television and the radio broadcast the national Idd baraza that usually deals with the problem of Tanzanian Muslim development and the importance of education. Conflicts between the state and the Muslim community are also addressed in the Idd barazas. Many Muslims try to reconcile their double identity as a Muslim and a Tanzanian by striving for a single, national Idd holiday. The image of one united community which is strong enough to fight their enemies in the national realm, is attractive for many Muslims. Just as is the case at the family and madrasa levels, at the level of the nation-state sacrifice is also almost invisible or absent. Commensality as an expression of social cohesion can be witnessed in the form of food-donations by state officials, usually in the context of hospitals. But no significant link with the hajj sacrifice is established.

Umma

Finally, all Muslims who celebrate their Idd el-Hajj do so as members of the worldwide Islamic community. ‘Praying the Idd’ (kusali Iddi) is the symbolic manifestation of a global umma directed towards the sacred centre of the Ka’ba. Just like daily prayers are the touchstone of being a true Muslim, Idd prayers are the symbol of a sound community. It is the salat, the humble prostration before the Creator that is the essence of the Idd el-Hajj; “Pray to your Lord and Sacrifice”. (Q 108:2). Rather than an individual act of piety, Idd prayers have to be performed as a community. The awareness of not praying simultaneously is a painful sign of separation and fissure. The exclusion of president Mkapa from the pilgrim’s supplications during the hajj in 2001...
and 2004 was a powerful sign of the clash between the nation-state and umma. In the khutba, the connection between the hajj, where the umma is gathered together, and the local community is established, especially in the AMYC sermons. Often an Idd el-Hajj sermon starts with the sentence: “Yesterday was the day when the pilgrims were assembled on the plains of Arafa...”. The sacrificial animals are frequently bought with financial gifts from Muslims abroad, indicated by the banners written in Arabic and English. An alimentary gift from the umma is the annual donation of 6000 carcasses, sacrificed and frozen in Mecca.

To sum up...

In conclusion let us return to the original research question: “how do Muslim groups construct identity through ritual practices and discourses related to the Idd el-Hajj in Tanzania”. Not surprisingly a first and most important answer is by adherence to a textually transmitted legacy of authoritative sources. It is the basic idea that (ritual) truth is revealed in written codices like the Qur’an and the hadith that draws the outlines of the moral community of Islamic believers. This textual core is faithfully kept and taught in Islamic schools among all the different denominations, and has hardly changed over the period in which we have detailed data. The Idd el-Hajj is intimately connected to the hajj, the icon par excellence of the Muslim community and as one of the major public rituals in Islam is particular apt to express the shared identity of a religious textual community.

In the second place this book shows how Muslim groups construct social identity by controversies, debates and critiques of Idd el-Hajj practices, their proper time and place of performance. This is not in contradiction to the emphasis on a common identity but rather the result of it. Because of the importance of the original texts as part of the Muslim identity the contradictory readings of the ritual show the internal fracture lines of a supposed unified community. And elements of these shared texts fuel the discussions and ultimately function as the building blocks of distinctive identities. Contrary to what some studies suggest, it is often the publicly expressed differences on the Idd el-Hajj that are seen as more disruptive than similar discussions on other major Muslim holidays. A high rate of literacy in the national lingua franca Swahili has enormously increased the accessibility to these discussions.

In the third place this process of identity construction is played out in the ongoing discursive tradition on local and global levels. The study of the Idd el-Hajj as both a local and a global phenomenon is clearly misun-
understood in many studies. Both the neglect of the ritual as belonging to a
global ‘standard Islamic practice’ or the overemphasising of particular ‘local
aspects’ is not borne out by the facts. The Idd el-Hajj rituals show different
ways of expressing and renewing Muslim identity, both through connection
and disjunction. The major ritual elements of the Idd el-Hajj (prayer, sermon
and sacrifice) can express a connection to a particular moral community
(notably the worldwide Muslim umma), but they can also be employed to
differentiate the practitioner’s community from other Muslim groups. Where-
as ritual symbols to a large extent are captured in a textually transmitted
global canon, the idea that Arabic texts reduce Islamic ritual to a mere for-
mality is certainly not true. The practices and discourses of Idd el-Hajj rituals
are potential means of transforming the community and connecting it to
an outside source of vitality, while at the same time the ritual differences
reveal the different practitioner’s views on religious society. They can not
be explained by a simple reference to monolithic textual models, they are
rather historically generated practices influenced by many actors with dif-
f erent agendas and opposing interests.

Two of the most interesting questions raised by these results are
the relation between state and Muslim identity in Tanzania and the social
dynamics of Islamic text production and consumption. The role played by
the state in, for example, Kenya, Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland in the
Idd el-Hajj debates and other public Muslim holidays, is quite different and
deserves more attention. Furthermore it is striking that the study of Islamic
deracunar texts in East Africa has been neglected. As this study shows the
amount of papers, pamphlets and books is enormous, but unfortunately we
know very little about the social dynamics of writing, publishing, distribu-
tion and reading of this material.
APPENDICES
1 Questionnaire Kuchinja wanyama na sadaka mjini Tanga

399 students returned the list (273 boys, 100 girls, 26 missing values for sex). In the final analysis (processed by SPSS 10.1) I left out one as too unreliable. One madrasa (Maawa-l Islam) participated with 109 (27.32%) students. The other five secondary schools returned the following numbers: Tanga School 91 (22.81%), Maawa-l Islam Secondary 78 (19.55%); Jumuiya 52 (13.03%); Usagara 44 (11.03%); Galanos 25 (6.27%).

Lengo: kufahama maendeleo ya mawazo kuhusu kuchinja ya kidini na kimila katika mazingira ya mji
Mtafiti: Gerard van de Bruinhorst, Barabara 20 (nyumba 432, karibu na Taifa Road), S.L.P. 5264, Tanga


1. General

1. Jina (si lazima kutaja jina!!) ................................................................................................................................................
2. Tarehe za kuzaliwa ...........................................................................................................................................................
3. Ulizaliwa wapi? .............................................................................................................................................................
4. Sasa unaishi wapi? ...........................................................................................................................................................
5. Umeishi Tanga kwa muda gani? ......................................................................................................................................

6. Umehamia Tanga kwa sababu gani? (weka alama □ ambapo ni sahihi)
   □ elimu ya kidini
   □ elimu ya kawaida
   □ shughuli
   □ sababu nyingine ..........................................................................................................................................................
7. Unaishi (weka alama □ ambapo ni sahihi):
   □ pamoja na wazazi wangu
   □ peke yangu
   □ pamoja na rafiki zangu
   □ pamoja na familia yangu
   □ pamoja na watu wengine

8. Jinsia □ Mwanamke □ mwanaume

9. Umeoa/umeolewa?
   □ Ndio
   □ Hapana (endelea swali 13)

10. Umeoa wanawake wangapi? .................................................................

11. Mke/ mume wako anaishi wapi? ............................................................

12. Una watoto?
   □ Ndio. Wangapi? .........................................................................................
   □ Hapana

13. Ulisoma shule gani? (weka alama □ ambapo ni sahihi, hata kama ni zaidi ya moja)
   □ shule ya msingi
   □ shule ya sekondari (mpaka kidato ..................................................)
   □ madrasa kidato cha ibtida'i (miaka mingapi? .....................................)
   □ madrasa kidato cha mutawassit (miaka mingapi ..............................)
   □ madrasa kidato cha thanawi (miaka mingapi .....................................)
   □ elimu nyingine ......................................................................................

14. Sasa unasoma:
   □ Madrasa Maawal Islam
   □ Maawal Secondary School
   □ mbili zote
   □ kozi nyingine

442
15. Shuguli za baba (weka alama □ kwa kila shughuli anyoifanya)
   □ elimu (ya serikali)
   □ elimu (ya dini)
   □ biashara ndogo ndogo
   □ kazi za nyumbani/ walinzi nk
   □ serikalini
   □ shirika binafsi
   □ kilimo/ shamba
   □ vibarua
   □ biashara binafsi
   □ zingine

16. Shuguli za mama

17. Kabila ya baba mzazi

18. Kabila ya mama mzazi

19. Kabila ya mume au mke wako

20. Nani hulipa ada za shule?
   □ najalipa mimi mwenyewe
   □ wazazi wangu
   □ mtu mwingine

21. Kwa kawaida unasali
   □ mara 5 kwa siku
   □ kati ya mara 1 na mara 4 kwa siku
   □ mara chache kwa wiki
   □ mara chache kwa mwaka
   □ sisali kabisa

22. Uakisali, unasali wapi?
   □ nyumbani
   □ misikitini (jina ..........................................................)

23. Unatembelea vikao vya tarika, kwa mfano Kadiriya au Shadhiliya?
   □ Hapana
   □ Ndio
   □ Mara chache

443
2. **Idd el-Hajj**

1. Ulisheherekea siku ya kwanza ya idi-l hajj siku gani?
   - □ Jumatatu
   - □ Jumanne
   - □ siku nyingine

2. Nyumbani ulipoishi mwaka uliopita, kuna mnyama aliyechinjwa wakati wa idi-l hajj mwaka 2000?
   - □ Ndio       □ Hapana

3. Nyumbani unapoishi mwaka huu (2001), kuna mnyama aliyechinjwa wakati wa idi-l haj?
   - □ Ndio       □ Hapana (endelea swali 20)

4. Mnyama alichinjwa siku gani?
   - □ Juma tatu
   - □ Jumanne
   - □ siku nyingine

5. Mnyama gani alichinjwa?
   - □ Kuku       □ Mbuzi     □ Kondoo    □ Ng’ombe

6. Shilingi ngapi? Tsh

7. Wanyama wangapi walichinjwa?

8. Mnyama alinunuliwa wapi?
   - □ Sokoni mjini
   - □ Kijijini
   - □ kwa rafiki
   - □ Barabarani
   - □ mahali pengine

9. Mnyama alinunuliwa lini?
   - □ Siku ya idi
   - □ Siku moja kabla ya idi
   - □ wiki moja kabla ya idi
   - □ kabla ya siku
10. Nani alijechinja?
   - mwalimu
   - mimi mwenyewe
   - baba mzazi
   - mtu mwingine

11. Alichinjia wapi?
   - Tanga, nyumbani
   - Tanga, misikitini au uwanjani wa sala
   - Kijijini

12. Mtu aliyechinja mnyama idi-l hajj iliopita, aligawa nyama kama sadaka nje ya nyumbani?
   - Ndio
   - Hapana

13. Watu wangapi walipata nyama?


   Mnyama aliyechinja wakati wa idi-l hajj, iligawanywa kwa jinsi inafuatavyo:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mwenye kupokea nyama. (kwa mfano: rafiki yangu)</th>
<th>Kabila ya mwenye kupokea nyama</th>
<th>Dini ya mwenye kupokea nyama</th>
<th>Sehemu ya nyama aliypokea (kwa mfano: mguu, moyo)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

15. Nyama ilipelekwa au watu walilikwa?

16. Damu ya mnyama ilitumiwa?
   - Hapana
   - Ndio, kwa dawa
   - Ndio, kwa chakula cha wanyama
   - Ndio, kwa chakula cha watu
   - nyingine
17. Ngozi ya mnyama ilitumiwa kwa namna gani? (kwa mfano matwari)

18. Mifupa ya mnyama ilitumiwa kwa namna gani?

19. Nyama ya mnyama iliisha
   - baada ya siku 1
   - baada ya siku 2
   - zaidi ya siku 2

20. Idi-l hajj iliyopita, ulipata nyama kama sadaka?
   - Ndio, nyama iliitoka (onyesha mahali panapohusika hati kama ni zaidi ya moja)
   - msikitì (jina)
   - African Muslim Agency,
   - al Haramayn
   - Bakwata
   - Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre
   - rafiki yangu
   - wazazi wangu
   - wanafunzi wangu
   - watu wengine
   - Hapana

21. Ulisali sala ya idi mwaka 2000?
   - Ndio
   - Hapana

22. Ulisali sala ya idi mwaka 2001?
   - Ndio,
   - Jumatatu
   - Jumanne
   - siku nyingine
   - Hapana

23. Ulishakwenda hajj? 

24. Baba yako alichakwenda hajj? 

446
3. **Hakiki, (yaani kuchinja mnyama baada ya kuzaliwa au kifo cha mtoto)**

1. Je, wazazi wako walifanya hakiki kwa ajili yako baada ya kuzaliwa kwako?
   - □ Ndio
   - □ Hapana
   - □ Sijui

2. Je, ulishatahiriwa?
   - □ Ndio, (siku ya ______________________________ baada ya kuzaliwa kwangu)
   - □ Hapana

3. Wazazi wako walinyoa nywele yako mara ya kwanza lini?
   - □ siku 7 baada ya kuzaliwa kwangu
   - □ siku 40 baada ya kuzaliwa kwangu
   - □ siku ______________________________

4. Ulipata jina lini?
   - □ siku 1 baada ya kuzaliwa
   - □ siku ______________________________

5. Je, katika familia au jamaa yako, hakiki inafanywa baada ya kifo cha mtoto au baada ya kuzaliwa kwa mtoto?
   - □ Baada ya kifo
   - □ baada ya kuzaliwa
   - □ baada ya kifo na baada ya kuzaliwa
   - □ haifanyi wakati wo wote

6. Je, ulishaona hakiki kwa macho yako mara nyingapi?
   - □ Niliona hakiki baada ya kuzaliwa mtoto mara ______________________________
   - □ Niliona hakiki baada ya kifo cha mtoto mara ______________________________

7. Mara ya mwisho ulipona hakiki, ilikuwa lini?
   - □ Mwaka ______________________________
   - □ Mwezi ______________________________
   - □ Mahali ______________________________
8. Andika kwa ufupi tofauti baina ya hakiki ya kidini na hakiki ya kimila

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9. Maana ya hakiki ni nini? (chagua majibu yaliyo sahihi, lakini si zaidi ya 3)

- kinga
- mtoto anaweza kuwaombea kwa Mungu wazazi
- kumshukuru Mungu
- kutoa sadaka na kwa hiyo kupata thawabu
- kutii amri ya Mungu
- kafara
- kufuatilia mfano wa nabii Ibrahim

4. Mila ya kuchinja

1. Unafikiri wakazi wa Tanga wanaochinja katika utaratibu wa mila ni

- wengi
- wachache
- hakuna

2. Je, tendo gani la mila linafanywa mara nyingi sana? (chagua majibu 2)

- ngoma
- tambiko
- kafara
- sadaka la mizimu
- kafara la mji/kijiji
- kuchinja mahali pa kaburi
- jando ya kidini
- jando ya kimila
- mila nyingine

3. Sema jinsi mila zifuatazo zinavyofanywa katika sehemu zilizonyeshwa katika jwdwali hili. (tumia “hamna”, “sana” au “kidogo”)
4. Je, hapa Tanga, ni kabila gani liinalofanya tendo la kuchinja la kimila mara nyingi?

5. Kwa sababu gani watu wanafanya tendo la kuchinja la kimila? (chagua jibu tatu)
   - [ ] kazi
   - [ ] mtihani
   - [ ] mapenzi
   - [ ] kuzaa
   - [ ] siasa
   - [ ] kinga
   - [ ] afya
   - [ ] sababu nyingine

6. Nani wanakwenda kwa waganga wa jadi zaidi, wanaume au wanawake?
   - [ ] wanaume
   - [ ] wanawake

7. Kwa sababu gani?

8. Akikuamuru mganga kuchinja nyama ya kimila, utaifanya?
   - [ ] Hapana
   - [ ] Ndio
   - [ ] Labda
9. Ukiwa na matatizo, utafanya nini? (Chagua jibu moja au zaidi)
   □ Kutoa sadaka
   □ Kufunga
   □ Kuomba
   □ Somea dua (pamoja na ubani n.k.)
   □ Kwenda kwa mwalimu
   □ Kwenda kwa mganga
   □ kitu kingine

10. Ulishatembelea mganga?
    □ Mara moja □ mara nyingi □ sijafanya kabisa
    Kwa sababu gani?

11. Ulishafanya tendo la kuchinja la kimila, kwa mfano kafara?
    □ Mara moja □ mara nyingi □ sijafanya kabisa
    Kwa sababu gani?

12. Ulishaona tendo la kuchinja la kimila?
    □ Hapana
    □ Ndio, (taja jina la mila, mahali na mwaka)
### II  Number of public holidays for Muslim feasts in the period 1961-1994

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Idd el-Fitr</th>
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<sup>1</sup> = NO DATA AVAILABLE; 0 = NO PUBLIC HOLIDAY

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Bruinhorst - CS2 - revisie.indd 451
Bruinhorst - CS2 - revisie.indd 451 26-7-2007 17:28:10
"RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS"

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III Farewell sermon by the prophet Muhammad, Arafa 9 Dhulhija 10 H./632

(Source: www.buzylife.com/farewel/holy_sermon1.htm, accessed 8 February 2005)

“Verily the Satan is disappointed at never being worshipped in this land of yours, but if obedience is anything (short of worship is expected, that is): he will be pleased in matters you may be disposed to think insignificant, so beware of him in your matters of religion.

All praises is due to Allah, so we praise Him, and seek His pardon and we turn to Him. We seek refuge with Allah from the evils of ourselves and from the evil consequences of our deeds. Whom Allah guides aright, there is none to lead him astray; and there is none to guide Him aright, whom Allah leads astray. I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, the One, having no partner with Him. His is the sovereignty and to Him is due all praise. He grants life and causes death and is Powerful over everything. There is no god but Allah, the One; He fulfilled His promise and granted victory to His bondsman, and He, alone, routed the confederates (of the enemies of Islam).

“O people, listen to my words, for I do not know whether we shall ever meet again and perform Hajj after this year. O ye people, Allah says: O people! We created you from one male and one female and made you into tribes and nations, so as to be known to one another. Verily in the sight of Allah, the most honored amongst you is the one who is most God-fearing. There is no superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab and for a non-Arab over an Arab, nor for the white over the black nor for the black over the white, except in God-consciousness.

“All mankind is the progeny of Adam, and Adam was fashioned out of clay. Behold! Every claim of privilege, whether that of blood or property, is under my heels, except that of the custody of the Ka’ba, and supplying of water to the pilgrims.

“O people of Quraish, don’t appear (on the Day of Judgment) with the burden of this world around your necks, whereas other people may appear (before the Lord) with the rewards of the Hereafter. In that case I shall avail you naught against Allah.

“Behold! All practices of the days of ignorance are now under my feet. The blood revenges of the days of ignorance are remitted. The first claim on blood I abolish is that of Ibn Rabi’ah b. Harith who was nursed in the tribe of Sa’ad and whom the Hudyayls killed. All interest and usurious dues accruing from the time of ignorance stand wiped out. And the first amount of interest that I
remit is that which Abbas b. Abd-al-Muttalib had to receive. Verily it is remitted entirely.

“O people, verily your blood, your property and your honor are sacred and inviolable until you appear before your Lord, as the sacred inviolability of this day of yours, this month of yours and this very town (of yours). Verily, you will soon meet your Lord and you will be held answerable for your actions.

“O people, verily you have got certain rights over your women and your women have certain rights over you. It is right upon them to honor their conjugal rights, and not to commit acts of impropriety, which, if they do, you are authorised by Allah to separate them from your beds and chastise them, but not severely, and if they refrain, then clothe and feed them properly.

“Behold! It is not permissible for a woman to give anything from the wealth of her husband to anyone but with his consent.

“Treat the women kindly, since they are your helpers and are not is a position to manage their affairs themselves. Fear Allah concerning women, for verily you have taken them on the security of Allah and have made their persons lawful unto you by words of Allah.

“O people, Allah, the Mighty and Exalted, has ordained to every one his due share (of inheritance). Hence there is no need (of special) testament for an heir (departing from the rules laid down by the Sharia.

“The child belongs to the marriage-bed and the violator of wedlock shall be stoned. And reckoning of their (deeds) rests with Allah.

“He who attributes his ancestry to other than his father or claims his client ship to other than his master, the curse of Allah is upon him.

“All debts must be repaid, all borrowed property must be returned, gifts should be reciprocated and a surety must make good the loss to the assured.

“Beware, no one committing a crime is responsible for it but himself. Neither the child is responsible for the crime of his father, nor the father is responsible for the crime of his child.

“Nothing of his brother is lawful for a Muslim except what he himself gives willingly. So do not wrong yourselves.

“O people, every Muslim is the brother of the other Muslim, and all the Muslims form one brotherhood. And your slaves! See that you feed them with such food as you eat yourselves, and clothe them with the same clothes that you, yourselves wear.

“Take heed not to go astray after me, the strike one another’s necks. He who (amongst you) has any trust with him, he must return it to its owner.
“O people! Listen and obey, though a mangled Abyssinian slave is appointed as your Amir, provided he executes (the Ordinance of) the Book of Allah among you.

“O people! No prophet would be raised after me and no new Umma (would be formed) after you.

“Verily I have left amongst you that which will never lead you astray, the Book of Allah, which, if you hold fast, you shall never go astray.

“And beware of transgressing the limits set in the matters of religion, for it is transgression of (the proper bounds) religion, that brought destruction to (many people) before you.

“Behold! Worship your Lord; offer prayers five times a day; observe fast in the month of Ramadan; pay readily the Zakat (poor-due) on your property; and perform pilgrimage to the House of God and obey your rulers, and you will be admitted to the Paradise of your Lord.

“Let him that is present, convey it unto him who is absent. For many people to whom the message is conveyed, may be more mindful of it than the audience.

“And if you were asked about me, what would you say?

“They answered: We bear witness that you have conveyed the trust (of religion) and discharged your ministry of Apostle hood and looked to our welfare.”

Thereupon Allah's Messenger (SAW) lifted his fore-finger towards the sky and then pointing towards the people said:

“O Lord: Bear Thou witness unto it! "O Lord: Bear Thou witness unto it!”
IV Idd el-Hajj sermon by Salim Barahiyan,
Tanga 10 Dhulhija 1417 H./1997

Introduction in Arabic

[Sura al-Fatiha; supplication for forgiveness; Islamic creed: “All praises is due to Allah, so we praise Him, and seek His pardon and we turn to Him. We seek refuge with Allah from the evils of ourselves and from the evil consequences of our deeds. Whom Allah guides aright, there is none to lead him astray; and there is none to guide Him aright, whom Allah leads astray. I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, the One, having no partner with Him”; Arabic quotations from: Q 33:70-71, Q 3:102 and Q 22:1-2; no translations; Arabic quotation from hadith: “Every newly invented matter (muhdath) is an innovation (bid’a) and every innovation is a going astray (dhalala) and every going astray is in hell fire.”]

Main part in Swahili

Ndugu zangu katika uislam. Leo tuko katika kusheherekea sikukuu ya id al-adha. Na Mwenyezi Mungu amejalia kwamba leo ni siku ambayo mahujaji wana- fanya ibada ya kuchinja. Na leo ndugu zangu katika uislam […] kujimweka […] katika kutekeleza ibadi hii ya kuchinja ambayo Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) ametuamrisha katika Kitabu chake:

[Arabic quotation from Q 108: 2: “Therefore to thy Lord turn in Prayer and Sacrifice.”]

Sali kwa ajili Mola wenu na chinjeni kwa ajili Mola wenu. Ndugu zangu ya Islam, ninakuuisieni mcha Mungu kama vile […] nafsi yangu […] Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) katika Kitabu chake:

[Arabic quotation from Q 33:70-71: “O ye who believe! Fear Allah, and (always) say a word directed to the Right: That He may make your conduct whole and sound and forgive you your sins: He that obeys Allah and His Messenger, has already attained the highest achievement.”]

Enyi mcheni Mwenyezi Mungu kikwelikweli na semeni maneno yaliokuwa sawa na Mwenyezi Mungu atatengenezee mambo yenu […] madhambi yenu […]
basi hawa wanafunzi watashinda […] shindi kubwa. Kisha Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) [anasema]

[Arabic quotation from Q 3:102: O ye who believe! Fear Allah as He should be feared, and die not except in a state of Islam”]

Mcheni Mwenyezi Mungu […] kucha kweli kweli na wala msife ndugu katika dini ya kiislam. Kisha Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) […] wanadamu wote:

Arabic quotation from Q 22:1-2: “O mankind! fear your Lord! for the convulsion of the Hour (of Judgment) will be a thing terrible! The Day ye shall see it, every mother giving suck shall forget her suckling-babe, and every pregnant female shall drop her load (unformed): thou shalt see mankind as in a drunken riot, yet not drunk: but dreadful will be the Wrath of Allah.”


Ndugu zangu ya uislamu nawauisienu Mwenyezi Mungu katika matendo yenu na katika kauli zenu kwa mcha Mungu ni yule ambaye […] amepokuja.

Religious status of the hajj

Ndugu zangu waislamu: kama nikutangulia kusema leo tuko katika kusherekea sikukuu ya Idd. Na Mwenyezi Mungu amejalia leo […] ulimwengu nzima watu wanasherekea sikukuu hii ya id al-adha, siku ya iddi ya kuchinja. Ndugu waislamu: hii shughuli ambayo leo tunafanya ni katika jumla ya yaale wanaalekezwa Mweneyezi Mungu (SWT) kwa waumini wote:

[Arabic quotation from Q 3:97: “Pilgrimage thereto is a duty men owe to Allah,- those who can afford the journey]

Hijja, kuhiji nyumba ya Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) huyu mwenye uwezo na atekeleze ibada hii. Vilevile katika aya nyingine Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT):

[Arabic quotation from Q 2:196: “and complete the hajj or umra in the service of Allah”]

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‘RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS’

Na timizeni hijja pamoja na umra kwa ajili ya Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT). Kwa hiyo ndugu zangu waislamu leo ndugu zetu ambayo wenyewe uwezo wapo katika viwanja vya hijja huko Makka wa Mtume Muhammad (SAW) amebainishwa katika sahaba Umar (RA):

[Arabic quotation from hadith: “Allah’s Apostle said: Islam is based on (the following) five (principles): 1) To testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and Muhammad is Allah’s Apostle. 2) To offer the (compulsory congregational) prayers dutifully and perfectly. 3) To pay Zakat (i.e. obligatory charity). 4) To perform Hajj 5) To observe fast during the month of Ramadan.”]

Kwa hiyo leo ndugu zangu waislamu ya maana ndugu zetu ambao wamesafiri […] katika nchi Makka wapo katika kutekeleza na wapo katika kuzitumia karibu kilele katika shughuli hivi za hijja. Kwani leo ni tarehe kumi ya mwezi wa Dhulhija. Leo ndipo mahujaji wanajikusanya katika viwanja vya Mina na kwenda kupiga kamarat kubra au shetani kubwa. Baada ya hapo mahujaji wataondoka katika ya kwamba […] zao […] Na kwenda kuchinja […] sehemu ya ibada waliamrisha Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT).

The Day of Arafa and the importance of fasting

Ndugu zangu waislamu. Kama mnavyojua kwamba jana ilikuwa siku ya Arafa, siku ambayo mahujaji wote walikuwa wamekusanya katika viwanja vimoja, katika viwanja vitukufu viliyoko huku Makka: Arafa. Na sisi katika jumla ya Mtume wetu Muhammad (SAW) ametuwausia tufunge katika kushirikiana na ndugu zetu walikuwa siku hii tukufu ya Arafa ambayo Mtume (s.w.s) alisema:

[Arabic quotation from hadith: “the hajj is Arafa”]

Hijja ni Arafa. Kwa hiyo jana waliilahi hamd: sisi Waislamu wa Tanga pamoja na Waislamu wenzetu popote pale ambao hawakuhijji jumuahatika wa lillahi hamd kufunga saumu hii tukufu ya Arafa ambaye Mtume (SAW) amesema kwamba: “Kwamba inamsamehe mtu madhambi yake iliyopita mwaka moja na madhambi ambayo angeweza kuyafanya katika kipindi ambacho […] mwaka itapokuja.” Mwenyezi Mungu atakukabalia saumu zetu na ajalie katika hawa ambao amesamehewa […] madhambi yetu.
Farewell hajj of Muhammad: your blood is sacred

Ndugu zangu waislamu khutba hii ya leo, ni kuwakumbusha baadhi ya maudhia ambazo walizitwa Mtume wetu wa Muhammad (SAW) wakati akifanya hijja ambayo imeitwa katika Uislamu hijjatul widaa, ni hijja ya kuwagana. Kwani Mtume (SAW) alikuwa mara kwa mara akiwaambia mahujaji:

[Arabic quotation from Muhammad's sermon: "maybe I won't see you again after this year"]

Sionani nani tena baada mwaka huu. Kwa hiyo kila aliokuwa kilizungumza alikuwa kilizungumza kwa maana ya kwamba naangana na waislamu. Katika jumla ya waadhia ambaya aliyotoa Mtume Muhammad (SAW) mambo ni mengi aliyosema Mtume Muhammad (SAW) ni pale ambapo walikusanya mahujaji karibu 130,000 [...] walikuwa masahaba kutoka sehemu mbalimbali na mwaka wakati kikusanya jua yake. Ndugu zangu waislamu, batukufu natoa maneno aliyosema Mtume Muhammad (SAW) na pale ambapo walikusanya mahujaji karibu 130,000 [...] walikuwa masahaba kutoka sehemu mbalimbali na mwaka wakati kikusanya jua yake. Mtume (SAW) siku ya Arafa katika jumla aliyezungumza na waislamu katika kiwanja cha Arafa ni yale maneno aliyowasema waliyopokewa na masahaba watukufu waliwaambiwa waislamu:

[Arabic quotation from Muhammad's sermon: "verily your blood and your possessions are sacred like this day and this month and this town is sacred"].

Hakika damu zenu, na mali zenu zimepewa heshima baina yenu kama vile ilizopewa heshima siku hii ya leo (akikusudia siku hii ya Arafa), na mali iliyovewa heshima mwezi mkuu wao na mali zenu zimepewa heshima mwezi Dhulhija. Na vile vile damu zenu na mali zenu zimepewa heshima kama uliyopewa heshima mji. Mtume (SAW) anapata kuwakumbusha baadhi ya mahujaji ya kamsatia, kama vile maadudia ambayo alikuwa ambayo aliyotoa maneno aliyosema.

Usury

Ndugu zangu waislamu, maneno hayo wa Mtume Muhammad (SAW) anataka kuwabainisha waislamu kwamba mali zao na damu zao, zoomheshimiwa katika dini ya Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT). Kwa hiyo si ruhusa kumua mtu yoyote katika wanadamu, kumwaga damu ya ndugu wake wa kislamu, kwa sababu damu ya ndugu waislamu imepewa heshima na Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT). Au kuchukua mali ya ndugu wake mwislamu kwani kuchukua mali bila riba yake ni katika kuvunja heshima ya ndugu
'RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS'

yako mwislamu katika mali […] iliwyeweza. Vile vile katika jumla iliyosemwa Mtume Muhammad (SAW) ilikuwa alisema:

[Arabic quotation from Muhammad's sermon: “All practices of the days of Ignorance are now under my feet”]

Jueni ndugu waislamu kwamba jambo lolote lilikuwepo zama za Ufahamu na Ujahiliya leo limedhalilishwa na kuwekwa chini ya miguu yangu hii. Mtume(SAW) akibainisha haya ni kwamba kuanzia leo yale matendo mlokuwa mkiwafanya zama za Ujahiliya basi leo ndio ya komeke yale ndio mwisho.

Na katika jumla yale ambayo yametaja Mtume (SAW) ni matendo ya riba wal- iokuwa kiyafanya waarabu katika zama kabla ya ujia wa Mtume Muhammad (SAW) basi baadhi vilevile akakumbusha katika kuanzia kuwaasia mwislamu na kuwaeleza kwamba ye ye ni wa mwanzo katika kuyaondo maambao hayo ni baadhi ya kutangaza kwamba riba ni […] ikifanywa. Na ammi yake ambaye aliwua Ibn Abbas kwamba kuanzia leo tena [hayasabiri?] Kuwa ni shughuli ya biashara ya kisheria. Ilkuwa Ibn Abbas ya kufanya mu'amala wa riba na ni jamaa yake Mtume (SAW) akawaambia: “kuanzia leo hata hii riba iliyokukifanywa na ‘ammi yangu Abbas, basi haimo mizani katika sheria ya kisheria”.

Women

Kisha nyingine, ndugu zangu waislamu, ambalo awaliousia waislamu siku ya Arafat, ni pale aliposema:

[Arabic quotation from Muhammad’s sermon: “Fear God concerning women, for verily you have taken them on the security of Allah and have made their persons lawful unto you by words of Allah; you have rights over your women and your women have rights over you. Your right over them is that they do not allow into your bed those you dislike.”]

Mcheni mola wenu kwa wanawake. Mcheni Mwenyezi Mungu katika kuwatembea wanawake. Kwani mwachukuwa kwa amana wa Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) na mtahalisha mkalalishwa ndugu zenu bi kalimatillah, kwa ajili ya Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT). Basi ni juu yenu, msije mke waachie wake. Yule ambaye mwachukia kuwingia majumbani yenu; kuwingia majumba ambayo wake zenu hii ndio tafsiri aliilotolewa na wanachuoni, kwamba kuwingia katika matanda yenu, maksudi yake kuwingia majumbani yenu. Msibaruhusu watu ambayo sio jamaa zenu sio ambao ni watu ambao ni mahram wake zenu, kuwingia majumba yenu na wanawake watataka watu na majumbani yenu basi Mtume (SAW) wanasema wapigeni bakora isipokuwa kupigwa

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The perfect guide: Qur’an and Sunna

Kisha baada ya maneno haya Mtume M. (SAW) akawausia wasilamu jambo lingine, pale aliposema :

[Arabic quotation from Muhammad's sermon: “Verily I have left amongst you that which will never lead you astray, the Book of Allah and my Sunna.”]


[Arabic quotation from Muhammad's sermon: “And if you were asked about me, what would you say?” They answered: “We bear witness that you have conveyed the trust (of religion) and discharged your ministry of Apostle hood and looked to our welfare.” Thereupon Allah's Messenger (SAW) lifted his fore-finger towards the sky and then pointing towards the people said: “O Lord: Bear Thou witness unto it! "O Lord: Bear Thou witness unto it!”]

Ninyi mnauliza na mnauliza habari zangu na nyinyi mnasema nini? Tunashuhudia ewe Mtume wa Mwenyezi Mungu kwamba umefikishwa ujumbe na umefikishwa amana ya Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) na hakika umetoa nasaha katika kipindi cha utume wote uliokuja. Kisha Mtume (SAW) akasema maneno yafuatayo wakati akasharia kidole mbinguni nakwasheria kwa watu. Akasema: “Ewe Mwenyezi Mungu shuhudia.” Yaani shuhudia kama nimefikisha ujumbe. Shuhudia Mmwenyezi Mungu na ama sahaba wanatamka mbele yako Allah (SWT), kwamba nimefikisha ujumbe na nimefiki-
 sha amana na nimetoo nasaha kwa ummati wangu. […] pale Mwenezi Mungu (SWT) katika uwanja mtukufu Arafa, alipoteremsha aya ya Mwenezi Mungu ambaye imehesabiwa katika aya za mwisho aliposema Alla (SWT):

[Arabic quotation from Q 5:3 (slightly adapted): “Today I have completed my religion and I have completed my blessing upon you and I have approved Islam for my religion”]

Hakika Mwenezi Mungu anasema: “Leo nimekamilisha dini yangu na nimetimiza neema yangu na nimeridhia Islamu dini yangu.” Maneno haya ndugu yangu waislamu yalikuwa na sheria kwanza kumikushwa kwa ujumbe wa Muhammad (SAW). Kwamba tayari dini nimekamilika na Mwenezi Mungu (SWT) ameshari-dhiya […] dini yake kuwa ndio dini ya kubwa.

The end of revelation?

Islamic brotherhood: rejection of tribalism and nationalism
Ndugu zangu wasalamu, nawausieni ucha Mungu kama unaonyosia nafsi yangu. Ndugu zangu wasalamu katika jumla ambayo Mtume (SAW) aliwausia siku inafuatia ambayo iliikuwa ni tarehe kumi na mbili ya hijja alisema maneno yafuatayo kama ninasaha kwa umma wa uislam. Akasema:

[Arabic quotation from Muhammad’s sermon: “O people, your Lord is One, and your father is one, i.e. all of you are from Adam and therefore an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab,
also a white has no superiority over black nor a black has any superiority over white except by piety and good action.”

Enyi watu wa ujumla hakika mola wenu ni moja, na baba yenu ni moja yaani Adam (AS) kwa hiyo hakuna ubora juu ya Mwarabu au juu ya sio Mwarabu ubora kuliko Mwarabu wala hakuna ubora nyekundu juu ya mweusi wala hakuna ubora juu ya nyekundu isipokuwa katika ucha wa Mungu.”

Ndugu zangi waslamu hii ni msingi ambaye Mtume wetu Muhammad (SAW) anatuweke waslamu msingi ya udugu. Kwamba msingi ya utaifa, msingi ya rangi, msingi ya ukabila ni katika ya mambo ya ambaye amemafiwa kwamba ni katika ya matendo ya kijahiliya. Kwani Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) ametubainishia katika kitabu chake tukufu pale aliposema:

[Arabic quotation from Q 49:13 (translation according to Arthur J. Arberry): “O mankind, we have created you male and female, and appointed you races and tribes that you may know one another. Surely the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most godfearing of you


Na ni maarufu ndugu zangi waslamu kwamba ucha uislamu wao na uwanda ya ambaye yameletwa na Mwenyezi Mungu na kuletwa na Mtume wetu Muhammad (SAW), na kuyepusha yote tuliwaamrisha […] Nayo na Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) na kuwahatarishwa naye na Mtume wetu Muhammad (SAW). Kwa hiyo ndugu waslamu, hakuna uislamu unayeitwa uislamu wa makabila wala hakuna uislamu unayeitwa uislamu wa mataifa. Waislamu wote wana […] taifa moja. Waislamu wote wana kabila moja. Ndio pale mwanza moja anasema:

[Arabic quotation from hadith:”My father is Islam and I have no father but Islam whenever thy are proud of Qays and Tamim”]

“Baba yangu ni uislamu, sina baba mwingine zaidi uislamu. Hata fakharisha Qays na Tamim kwamba makabila makubwa kubwa, mimi kabila yangu ni Uislamu.”

Kwa nini mtu huyu anasema haya? Kwa sababu huu Uislamu umekuta Ujahiliyya uliyewapita […] ambao watu walikuwa watafakharisha nayo zama za Ujahiliyya. Ndugu waslamu, leo waslamu wamerudia katika utaifa na ukabila. Leo ibada zao wamez-
ambayo Mweneze Mungu (SWT) ametutaka waislamu kuisheherekea kwa njia ya kuchinja wanyama ikiwa ni sehemu ya ibada katika ibada zilizo [...] Mtume wetu Muhammad (SAW). Kama liliivyotangulia kusema. Mweneze Mungu (SWT) anasema:

[Arabic quotation from Q 108: 2: “Therefore to thy Lord turn in Prayer and Sacrifice”].


Meaning of sacrifice: the prophetic examples of Ibrahim and Muhammad

Kwani Mweneze Mungu (SWT) alimwaamrisha Mtume wake (SAW) [bis] Ibrahim (AS) asema maneno yafuatayo:

[Arabic quotation from Q 6:79 (Barahiyan adds the word muslim which is not in this original text, but the combination occurs in other places like Q 3:67): “For me, I have set my face, firmly and truly, towards Him Who created the heavens and the earth, and never shall I give partners to Allah.”

Q 6:162: “Say: “Truly, my prayer and my service of sacrifice, my life and my death, are (all) for Allah, the Cherisher of the Worlds”]


Kwa hiyo hapo tunamwona Mweneze Mungu (SWT) amelihesabu tendo la kuchinja kama alivyoamrisha pamoja na tendo la sala. Kwa hiyo tendo la kuchinja katika Uislamu limehesabiwa kwamba ni sehemu ya ibada ambayo mtu anatakiwa atatekeleze kwa ajili ya Mola wake. Ndipo pale Mtume yote Muhammad (SAW). Katika sikukuu tukufu kama hii alipofanya ibada ya hijja alichinja ngamia 100: 63 aliwachinja kwa mkono wake mwenyewe na waliowabaki […] ndugu yake ambaye ni sayyidi Ali (RA) achinje kwa niaba yake. Kwa hiyo, hii naasheria ndugu zangu waislamu kwamba

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hakika hii ni siku ya kuchinja. Kwani Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) alimwoamrisha Mtume wake (SAW) afanye ibada hii.

Sacrifice is a religious observance: the case of the fly


[Arabic quotation from hadith: “and he entered Hell-fire”]


[Arabic quotation from hadith: “and he entered the Garden”]

ni haramu kwa sababu ni ibada ambaye imetekelezwa kwa ajili ya asio kuwa Allah (SWT) wakata Mwenyezi Mungu anasema:

[Arabic quotation from Q 108: 2: “Therefore to thy Lord turn in Prayer and Sacrifice”].

“Sali kwa ajili ya Mola wako na chinji kwa ajili ya Mola wako”.

*The sacrificial history of Ibrahim and Ismail*

Ndugu zangu wasilamu nawausieni mcha Mungu kama ninavyousia nafsi yangu. Ndugu wasilamu leo ni siku ya kuchinja katika kuwa lile alishindwa na Mungu kama ninavyousia nafsi yangu. Ndiyo, wakata Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) anasema: (Arabic quotation from Q 37:102-109 “Then, when (the son) reached (the age of) (serious) work with him, he said: “O my son! I see in vision that I offer thee in sacrifice: Now see what is thy view!” (The son) said: “O my father! Do as thou art commanded: thou will find me, if Allah so wills one practising Patience and Constancy!” So when they had both submitted their wills (to Allah), and he had laid him prostrate on his forehead (for sacrifice) We called out to him “O Abraham! Thou hast already fulfilled the vision!” - thus indeed do We reward those who do right. For this was obviously a trial- And We ransomed him with a momentous sacrifice: And We left (this blessing) for him among generations (to come) in later times: “Peace and salutation to Abraham!”]


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tuliypotesha? Kwa hiyo tutapolipa kwa yale mema uliyofanya kama vile wemo waliyo-
fanya mambo mema.' Hakika Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) anasema: Huu ulikiuwa mtihani
kubwa kwa Ibrahim

[Arabic quotation from Q 37:106 "For this was obviously a trial"]

"ulikuwa mtihani mawazi" kwani mtu kuartishwa kumchinja mwanawe si
jambo ndogo ndugu zangu wa Islamu. Linataka moyo na kwamba wewe umejitalimi-
sha kwa Mola wako kikwetu, kwa sababu umeamrithwa kumchinja yule ambaye
unampenda mwanawe? Kwa hiyo iliikuwa ni mtihani kwake Ibrahimu (AS) na mtihani
kwake nabii Ismail (AS) ambaye ni mwana wa Ibrahim. Lakini kwa sababu wote waw-
ili Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) walijitalimisha kwa Mola wao, nilikuwa nyepesi kwao,
Mwenyezi Mungu akakubusha kwa mtihani huu kwa hiyo akasema

[Arabic quotation from Q 37:107 "And We ransomed him with a momentous
sacrifice"]

"tukawapa mnyama mwingine ya chinje badala ya huyu mwanawe." Mwenye-
zi Mungu akateremsha kwa njia ya malaika wake akakalewa mnyama Ibrahimu (AS)
akamchinja badala ya yule mwanawe.

Moral lessons from the sacrifice: obedience and jihad

Kwa ikawa hii ni sunna ya Ibrahim (AS) ya kuchinja wanyama kwa ajili ya
Mola, ndiyo hii Iddi akaitwa 'Idul udhiyya', yaani Iddi ya kujitolea muhanga. Kwamba
watu wanatakiwa si mas'ala ya kuchinja na kula wanyama tu. La! Watu wanatakiwa
watafakari na wazingatia […] Ni nini kilichokusudwa katika ibada hii? Katika jumla
ambaye tunajifunza ndugu zangu Waislamu katika mambo yanayapatikana katika
ibada hii kwamba Muslamu anatakiwa amti Mwenyezi Mungu na ajialimisha katika
dini yake kikamilifu. Kwani Allah (SWT) anasema:

[Arabic quotation from Q. 2:208 “Enter into Islam whole-heartedly”]

“Ingieni katika Usalamu kikamilifu,” yale yote ambayo imeamrishwa na
Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) na yale yote ambayo imeamrishwa na Mtume wake Muhammad
(SAW) mujialimishwa nayo hata kama […] ndani yake na madhara yake binafsi.
Kwani ndiyo pale masahaba mara kwa kusikia mnadi wa Mtume (SAW) akiwata kwa
ajili ya jihad walikuwa wakitekeleza mara moja jihadi hili ambaye iliyewa na Mtume
Muhammad (SAW) kwa sababu wanaujaa Mtume wetu Muhammad (SAW): hamwaam-
rishie isipokuwa ni jambo kutoka kwa Mola wake (SWT). Hata sahaba moja inasimuli-

Obedience or heavy punishment

Ndugu Waislamu Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) anawaambia mwaomini sifanya amini kweli ni ipi? Anasema:

[Arabic quotation from Q 33:36 a “It is not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by Allah and His Messenger to have any option about their decision”]

“Haiwi kwa muumini mwanaume wala mu’mini mwanamke Mwenyezi Mungu na Mtume wake wanapoamrisha jambo basi wawe na khiari katika ya kulifuata. Wawe naati ati […] katika kulifuata.” Kwani anasema:

[Arabic quotation from Q 33:36 b: “If any one disobeys Allah and His Messenger, he is indeed on a clearly wrong Path.”]

“Kwani yule ambaye atamwaasi Mwenyezi Mungu na Mtume wake basi huyu atakuwa amepoata upotevu uliokuwa wazi kabisa.” Kisha Mwenyezi Mungu aka-watayarisha Waislamu juu ya tendo la kuchukua baadhdi ya mambo aliokuwa nayo Mwenyezi Mungu na Mtume wake. Na kuyaacha mambo mengine akakutegiza hasara ambazo zitawafika watu katika kuchukua baadhdi ya mambo na kuacha. Mwenyezi Mungu anasema:

[Arabic quotation from Q 2:85 b “Then is it only a part of the Book that ye believe in, and do ye reject the rest? But what is the reward for those among you who behave like this but disgrace in this life? And on the Day of Judgment they shall
be consigned to the most grievous penalty”)


Kwa hiyo ndugu Waislamu yote kwa ujumla na mimi nausiano na nafsi yangu. Kujiingiza katika Uislam kikamilifu. Hakuna Uislamu kuuchukuliwe na mengine hajachukuliwe kutoka kama makafiri. Uislamu ni dini ambaye ni mkamiliki. Tujiyalimishwe kwa Mola wetu kweli kama vile tunavyopewa […] mfano ndugu yetu Ibrahimu (AS) na vile tunavyopewa mfano na ndugu yetu ambayo ni mtoto wa Ibrahim (AS) nabii Ismail. Lakini basi, pamoja na kuwa watanakwawa kijisalimishe kwa wazazi wa ni sehenu ya ta’a ya Mwenyezi Mungu. Lakini Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT) anakusaidia isipokuwa wanaweza na ujumla, na ndugu yetu ambayo na kuwa watana wazazi wana mwisho hili anasema:

[Arabic quotation from Q 29:8 b: “But if they (either of them) strive (to force) thee to join with Me (in worship) anything of which thou hast no knowledge, obey them not.”]


[Arabic quotation from hadith: “Don’t obey a creature if that involves disobedience to Allah”]

Hakuna kumtii kiwango yote katika kumuasi Mwenyezi Mungu (SWT).

Current religious problems in Tanzania: disregard for God’s laws


[Arabic quotation from Q 2:85 “Then is it only a part of the Book that ye believe in, and do ye reject the rest?”]

Jel! Mnamini baadhi na mnakufuru baadhi?. Mkifanya hivi basi mjue mtapata madhila duniani na huko akhera mtapelekwa katika adhabu inayoumiza sana.

The case of marriage law

Only remedy is to return to the Book of God and His Messenger


Conclusion in Arabic and Swahili

[Arabic quotation from Q 33:56 b followed by the prayer for the Prophet; both are not translated in Swahili. Than Barahiyan quotes six conventional Arabic supplications, inserting Swahili translations after every one. Prayers include a request of help for Islam, Muslims, Islamic leaders, every one who helps the religion, forgiveness of sins for the dead and the living. A final plea is made in Swahili with no Arabic counterpart, concerning the victims killed the day before in Mecca]:


[As always Salim Barahiyan concludes his speeches with the same sentence in Arabic: “Aqulu qauli hadha wa billahi tawfiq wastaghfirullah walakum wa huwa ghafurul rahim wa huwa barul karim”].
Notes

Notes Chapter 1

1 Maryamu is a pseudonym; I have changed as many personal details as necessary to safeguard her anonymity.

2 For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the sale of these t-shirts see “Picha cha Usamah zazua jambo Dar,” an-Nuur 428, 26 March 2002, p. 3; an-Nuur 5 February 2002, p. 12; Already before 9/11 an-Nuur paid quite a few attention to bin Laden (cf. “Mjue Usama bin Ladin,” an-Nuur 185, 22 January 1999, p. 5.


5 These two dimensions of ritual roughly coincide with ritual as rule-governed behaviour and performance with or without meaning (cf. Staal 1979) and the expressive, self-representative or communicative meaning traditionally seen as the most important characteristic of rituals (cf. Platvoet and Van der Toorn 1995:30; Lightstone 1995:30).


10 “Kanzu za kiislamu zaleta balaa kwenye mkutano wa injili,” (Nyakati 22 December 2002, p. 1) describes Christian preachers claiming their cultural identity as Swahili by wearing a kanzu during an open air meeting on the day of the Idd el-Fitr.


15 Their point of view is represented in Christian magazines and newspapers like Biblia ni Jibu, Msema Kweli, Njia and Nyakati.

16 Funded by the Advanced Masters Programme of the CNWS Leiden.

17 From September 2000 until November 2004 I was funded by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), Leiden. Research was conducted under research permit 2000-344-NA-2000-104 issued by the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH).

18 This might be the same reason for performing the akika after death, according to a student who wrote me: “Hakika ya kimila hufanywa baada ya mtoto kufa kwa sababu wanafikiri ukifanya hakiki baada ya kuzaliwa eti una mchimba mtoto” (questionnaire 399).
'RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS'

19 In January 2006, Roman Loimeier and Hassan Mwakimako started a study on time conception and conflicts in Tanzania and Kenya (Plurale Konzeptionen von Zeit in (trans)lokalen Kontexten) in which they address several of the topics I raise in this thesis.

20 Michael Lambek put me on this track through my reading of his book *Knowledge and practice in Mayotte*. In this book, he emphasises the importance of conversation rather than ritual (1993:116,434).


22 Free after Claude Lévi-Strauss. Cf. the role of the bear among bear hunters in Siberia, the camel in the Arabian deserts (Wheeler 2006), the cattle complex of the Nuer and the pig complex of Melanesia.

Notes Chapter 2


3 Among the Druse, the Idd el-Hajj is still celebrated in memory of Habib’s sacrifice (Mit-twoch 1971).


7 Lazarus-Yafeh (1981:20) claims: “Actually this is not a sacrifice at all, but rather a family offering, of which at least one third is devoted to charity.”

8 Bawa Muhiyaddeen, *A Sufi Cookbook*.


10 Originally a formula for the *hajj* sacrifice, but Islamic sources also allow for its use on the occasion of the *’aqiqa*-ritual (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Tuhfat al-mawlud*, p. 39; Suyuti, *Nuzha al-muta’ammil*, p. 99).


12 She derives her colour theory from Berlin and Kay’s theory, which is criticised by Schadeberg (2000) as being inapplicable to Swahili colour categories.

Notes Chapter 3

1 This paragraph is based on Worldbank reports, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (issued by the U.S. Department of State), Kussendrager 1996; Lapidus 2002.


4 See, for example, the debates held in The Guardian, Rai and other newspapers after a three-day conference held on this topic (23 March 2002).


6 I limit this paragraph to outlining Tanzania’s modern history after the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), when Africa was distributed among the colonial powers. This period is most relevant to the current Islamic discourse. See for further historical and political information see Chande 1998; Askew 2002; Lapidus 2002.

7 For the US intelligence agency’s warning regarding this development see CIA (1965).

8 Zinjibari, Nyerere against Islam.


11 For general information on Tanga see the introductions in Chande (1998) and Askew (2002). The most complete and thorough study on the development of Tanga as a city in early colonial times is Becher (1997).

12 “NGO ya Nungwi mfano wa kuigwa kwa kuilinda maadili,” Maarifa (7), 12 May 2002, pp. 1, 4, 16.

13 Most Tanzanian cities now have a part called ‘Uswahilini’, which is used as a general indication for the poorer quarters of a town rather than a real name.


16 Baraza Kuu (“Maazimio na tamako la kongamano,” an-Nuur 405, 4 January 2002, p. 11) criticises the claim that Christians constitute the largest population of the state (45%, against 35% Muslims). At the time of independence the ratio Muslims, Christians and others was 45%, 30%, 25% according to the article “Waislamu wa Tanzania ni jamii inayokandamizwa,” (Mizani 45, 18 March 1994, p. 12). The state-owned paper Daily News carefully writes: “...close to half of this country’s population is Muslim” (editorial 12 February 2002, p. 1) whereas an-Nuur boldly claims that Muslims constitute “zaidi ya nusu ya Watanzania” (419, 22 February 2002, p. 11). AMYC director Barahiyan also believes the Muslims are in the majority (64% against 36% Christians and no ‘traditionalists’; interview 15 January 2001). In popular non-Muslim sources often the Christian percentage of the population is emphasised: “One half of the population are Christians, one third are Muslims and the rest other denominations” (www.poni.com accessed 29 January 2003). For other numbers see Omari 1984; Drønen 1995.

17 For a short history of the Ismaili community in Tanga see www.ismaili.net.

18 For major conflicts and differences among them see Nimtz (1980) and Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Vishubaka/Vyumba vyana wawakwako na mapazia ni misikitini haramu.

19 For their self-presentation see the videotape Barahiyan, Ni nani Ahlul Sunna.

20 See for some of his sermons www.qssea.net; www.tawhiyd.co.uk; Barahiyan is personally involved in some of the Swahili discussion sites such as http://groups.yahoo.com/group/jfunzeislamu/messages/701?viscount=100 (message posted 17 June 2006).


22 Tape Barahiyan, Hukmu ya kuishi miji ya makafiri (2 vols).


24 Cf. Appendix IV; Barahiyan, Mwanamke katika Usalam, p. 4.
RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS

25 See the official Qadiani website www.alislam.org. As far as I know the Lahore variety is not represented in Tanzania. But see their site www.aaiil.org.

26 See A Lively Discussion Between Sunni and Ahmadi Muslims, 1967. After almost four decades the book is still widely available all over Tanzania and Kenya.

27 Sheikh Kaluta Amri Abedi was Minister of Community Development and National Culture. He died in Germany (Tanganyika Standard 16 and 17 October 1964).


30 An-Nuur 467, 4 October 2002, p. 11.

31 See, for example, their discourse on the pagan origin of Christmas: "Yesu Kristo hayuko mbinguni," Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1963.

32 Interview Kombo, Tanga.


34 Mapenzi ya Mungu, June 1986. For the same letters from Nyerere see Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1975.


37 See "Taarifa ya mauaji ya waislamu chini," an-Nuur 328; an-Nuur 374, 11 September 2001; an-Nuur 430, 2 April 2002; As of July 2002 BAKWATA also owns a radio station (The Quran Voice Radio). Radio Kheri has had a licence since 1998, and started immediately to collect their hardware ("Radio Kheri broadcasting station," an-Nuur 182 1 January 1999, p. 10) and, according to an-Nuur 591, 26 November 2004 p. 12 ("Radio Kheri sasa yaja"), broadcasting started in early 2005; some regions have local stations like Radio Imaan in Morogoro.


41 "Matatizo ya waislamu ni historia ya kanisa kuishinikiza serikali," an-Nuur 237.

42 For a comparison of pork-breeding and genocide see "Kosovo kuzu kuzuka Tabata," an-Nuur 235; In popular discourse pigs are "catholic goats" (mbuzi katoliki) and fried pork is referred to as the "hot chair" (kiti moto). After the Arusha Declaration (1967), the Tanzanian government tried to 'build the nation' via the sale of pork. In March 1969, the provincial officer in Tanga expressed his surprise that sales in Tanga were only slowly increasing, despite the many mahotelis (restaurants) in town. Over the subsequent months many letters were sent in which the project and its benefits were explained to all civil servants. Finally, in May 1969, the secretary proposed not to stress the issue too much "because don't forget we have many Muslims here in Tanga." Tanga Archives, Acc. 5, File V1/10 "Veterinary: bacon, ham etc. supplies".

43 "Dua ya Kumshitakia Allah (s.w)," an-Nuur 483, 6 December 2002, p. 7.

44 BAKWATA Mufti Ali bin Hemed only had a traditional Islamic madrasa education and some sources suggest this is insufficient (Mwananchi 18 April 2002, p. 4). "If you want a divorce, go to BAKWATA and pay 12,000 Shilling and you get one" Barahiyan claimed in one of his classes (26 April 2002).


There is not just one single cause for the incident. Njozi (2000, 2003) mentions important preceding events: Mkapa’s speech of 4 January 1998 condemning the insulting religious speeches; three weeks later a moon-sighting conflict occurred regarding the particular date to start fasting; and on 29 January the Idd Baraza took place at Mwembechai in which the preacher increased the already existing tensions. The Christian priest's broadcast on the perceived slander took place on 8 February and provided the final spark.

This verdict was later annulled. Cf. “Dua ya Kumshitakia Allah (s.w),” an-Nuur 483, 6 December 2002, p. 6.


“Dua ya Kumshitakia Allah (s.w),” an-Nuur 483, 6 December 2002, p. 7.

TNA, File 26164.

Cf. “Tusikubali Kubaguliwa Kielimu,” an-Nuur 562, 14 May 2004, p.6. For a critical review of an EAMWS dance performance in the Aga Khan Club in March 1967 see “Je, Ngoma zitaaunina Uislamu?” Mapenzi ya Mungu, June 1967, p. 6. See, for example, the reaction to the US attack after these bombings as published on the “Islam in Tanzania” website: www.islamtz.org. An abstract monument to commemorate the victims was erected in the National Museum’s backyard, invisible from the streets.


The non-Muslim press blames Muslims for abusing the mosque for political benefits, thereby endangering this dinisiasa balance. A vulgar expression used in one of the tabloids reflects this accusation: “the mosque is for worship and the toilet is for shit” (Fukuto 6 May 2002).

In Tanga I was proudly shown the house of the (now former) Digo Public Safety and Security Minister Bakari Mwapachu.

“CCM na demokrasia ya vyama vingi,” an-Nuur 248, 7 April 2000.


“Vyanzo vya migogoro na ujenzi wa demokrasia Tanzania,” an-Nuur, 4 October 2002.

See the critical piece “Umoja,umoja, Mapenzi ya Mungu,” November 1978.


Cf. al-Haq 15,19,20; an-Nuur 16 April 2002.


For these themes see i.a. Nasaha 178, 181, an-Nuur 388; “Umoja miongoni mwa Waislamu!” al-Huda 133, 20 April 2006, p. 6; Mwinyi 1988.
‘RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS’

The quote is attributed to Benjamin Franklin. Apart from his nationality (American), the author was also a deist, so his worldview was apparently different from that of mainstream Tanzanian Muslims.


Ibid.

Notes Chapter 4

1 My original intention to write an ethnography of Muslim Tanzanian book production has changed. Unfortunately, the current book does not allow me to treat this rich field the way it deserves.

2 Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari, Desturi za Waswahili, p. 34.

3 For historical information on Tanga madrasas see Chande (1998); Cf. TNA archival records in File 19/10 Acc. no. 14. “Education Koranic Schools”. The on-Nuur newspaper presents regular historical essays on local madrasas in Tanzania.


5 An example of a Shia syllabus is the Al-Minhaj al-Dirasi ahl Bayt.


7 Interview Bel Hassan, 7 March 2001; Madrasa Ta’lim 5 December 2000; Madrasa Nujum 6 December 2000. Madrasa Shams al Ma’arif (Mabokweni branch) has 113 pupils who are enrolled in the first four grades: 60 girls and 53 boys (interview, 10 January 2001); Ramadan bin Issa (interview, 7 December 2000) claims that there are more boys than girls.


9 Officially it is a 12-grade course (cf. Chande 1998), but estimations of the real time spent on the full course range from 10 to 18 years, depending on the individual pupil. (Cf. interview, Hariri, 6 January 2001 who mentioned that common durations are 5 years for ibtida’i, 3 years for mutawassit and 2 years for thanawi). Another sheikh finished the first part between the ages of 10 and 17. Later, he returned to school and completed the mutawassit level in two years when he was 26 (finishing aged 28) and finally went to Lamu (Kenya) to finish his education under an Alawi Sheikh from the ages of 40 to 45 (interview, Salim Zubeiry, 16 January 2001).

10 Interview Sheikh Zubeir Ally, 11 December 2000; Chande (1998:126-127) interviewed Tanga students in Saudi Arabia. In general, Tanzanians complain about the perceived racism of the ‘Arabs’ and the sheer impossibility to study something other then religion or Arabic.

11 This process of fragmentation continues. See for example the madrasa Munawwara from sheik Bel Hassan. He himself graduated from Zahrau and got most of his diploma’s (ijaza) there. He started in 1998 his own school and is now the head of six other branches in the region founded by his graduates.

12 al-Fikrul Islami (49).

13 al-Fikrul Islami (42), Jumadi Thani 1414 H, p.1.
Often the Shi’ites are subjected to their wrath. Any claim that an Imam, a Tanga sharif or the Prophet Jesus transcends the ordinary status of a human being is, according to the AMYC, the ultimate heresy, (Darsa Barahiyan, 21 May 2002).

Eating in the mosque (kulisha chakula msikitini) is highly contested however; Cf. “Fatawa,” Sauti ya Haki, November 1973, p. 5.

Shorter excerpts from this Arabic work in Swahili are sold or distributed for free, for example Tawhidi khalisi and Kitabu cha Tawhid.

For example, the article entitled ‘Tobba’ (al-Haq 22 June 2001, p. 6) closely followed the oral session in the mosque.

Cf. tape Msabaha, Suluhisho, vol. 1 p. 6 of transcript. We find another queer usage of page numbers in references to authoritative texts in Farsy, Bid-a sehemu ya kwanzu. Only page numbers and titles are mentioned, but without a bibliography it becomes almost impossible to find the proper edition.

“The Leo tunes hadith number 386 today we read together hadith number 386). The significance of this number is not to make reading more convenient for the audience because, firstly, most of the listeners usually do not possess a copy, and secondly, the most commonly printed copy of this book (Umda al-ahkam) has another numbering (478 for this hadith).

See the tape from Nassor Bachu Hijja, side B, which refers to Sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunna, vol l, p.451.

See his tapes Hijja and Fiqquh Sunnah kuh. Istikhara.

One example is the opinion article from the Jabal Hira Islamic Centre in Morogoro “Waislamu wautazame upya mfumo wao wa elimu, ” an-Nuur 177, 27 November 1998, p. 15.

For more examples see the advertisements in an-Nuur, including nr. 388.

Some Islamic primary schools claim that their standard VII pupils master at least one-third of the Qur’an (10 juzuu) when they leave (“Wazazi Wakrisot waitaka Alfurqan,” an-Nuur 575, 6 August 2004, p. 1,3).

The Shamsiyya madrasa offers evening classes for students who are enrolled in secular day tuition (interview 8 December 2000). Ally Hassani from the Madrasa al-Jami’a Islamiya also offers afternoon education for primary school students, starting at 14.00 p.m (interview 20 December 2000).

Maawa-l Islam secondary school and the madrasa make use of the same premises but the former starts 15 minutes earlier than the latter. While the head of the madrasa is often found in the secondary school buildings, the Maawa-l Islam secondary school headmaster usually stays in his own (secular) place.

Interview, Shaaban Mapeyo, 1 November 2000.

A similar preference for integrated education (secular and religious subjects) is described for Kenya in Kahumbi 1995.

Locally produced coursebooks for Arabic are very rare, but the Kenian Institute of Education announced a plan to print them in Kenya (”Kenya kuchapisha Kiarabu mashuleni,” Nasaha 384, 14 June 2006, p. 5).

Becker published a list in 1911. Martin (1968) edited and translated this bibliography, and Nimtz (1973) published an update. Nimtz omitted the local Muslim religious literature in his annotated bibliography. He refers to an unpublished list by W.F. Schildknecht but I was unable to consult the latter. However, Nimtz’s section, “sources in Arabic and

NOTES
Swahili, contains interesting material. St. Paul-Hilaire (n.d.) compiled a list of 63 law books in his study on Tanga, but it is unclear if all of these works were actually available.

Most of the additional information on titles and authors comes from Van Bruinessen (1990), a very detailed article on books in Arabic script used in the Pesantren milieu in Indonesia. His collection is very similar to the Tanzanian one since both countries are dominated by the Shafi'i school of law.


De Vere Allen (1981:20) mentions this title as a popular work.

For many quotations from both commentaries see the works by Farsy and Saidi Musa.

Mentioned by St. Paul Hilaire, but not found by Becker (1968) and Martin (1971).


In Indonesia the book is perceived as "one of the texts that are little known elsewhere" (Van Bruinessen 1990:249). In Tanga the title is ranked among the top four most quoted books in the madrasa environment.


This tradition is continued in modern publications like that by Muhammad Nassor Abdulla who, in his introduction of *Masajid al-nisa' buyutihinna* explicitly identifies his work as Shafi'i: "al-Shafi'i madhhaban."


Interview, Sheikh Muslih Ali Hama, 6 December 2000; Machano Makame is a well-known religious leader who led the mufti's funeral in Tanga during my fieldwork. For further information on Swahili translations of the Qur'an see Lacunza Balda 1989.


Many of the Islamic teachers who allowed me to see their libraries preferred to remain anonymous and seemed to be a little embarrassed to talk about magical practices.

In the same category the popular book *Jewish Conspiracy and the Muslim World* by Misbahul Islam Faruqi (Karachi, 1967) must be mentioned.

Becker (1968) mentions that due to the Arab-Israeli war and the closing of the Suez Canal, the importation route shifted from Egypt to Singapore and Indonesia. Recently, the Indian Ocean has come more into the picture as a locus of research. See Parkin & Headly (2000).

The *basmallah* is one of the few Arabic formulas that can be replaced by their Swahili translation "Kwa jina la Allah mwingi wa rehema Mwenye kurehemu."

The copy of *Mtanzia* was actually shown to the audience, 14 May 2002.
NOTES

52 Mapenzi ya Mungu, August 1965.
53 Cf. Saidi Musa, Maisha ya al-Imam Sheikh Abdulla Saleh Farsy katika Ulimwengu wa Kiislamu; and his regular “Fatawa” in the Mombasa magazine Sauti ya Hakiki.
55 Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1981.
56 “Mama wa lugha zote,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1977.
57 Mapenzi ya Mungu, June 2001, p.1; Arabic polemic books by Tanga madrasas: at-To’in mas’ala al-qiyam ka-‘I Ajin’ (bilingual); ‘al-Sa’iqa al-muhriqat ‘ala al-firqa al-Mariqa’; al-Muhadara.
58 But see the report on a Catholic CCM member surprising all participants (jambo lililowachacha midomo wazi) by reciting Arabic supplications at a memorial service of the murdered Zanzibar president Abeid Amani Karume: “Padri amwaga Kiarabu ‘akimrehemu’ Karume,” an-Nuur 504, 11 April 2003, p. 1,11.
60 Interview, Rizvi, 29 October 2000.
61 TNA File 41286/3.
63 Interview Ally Seif, Tanga, March 2002. It is telling, however, that questions appear in the religious newspapers regarding whether it is haram to conduct a Friday prayer in Swahili.
64 Tape, Tanzanian Muslim Hajj Trust, Masuala na jawabu, tape II, side B.
65 Cf. Juma al-Mazrui, Mwezi muandamo.
66 Cf. www.uislamu.org. In one of the classes from the AMYC, a man referred to a polemical debate which he had experienced with a Shi’a believer who tried to convince him with a book title and a page number. In the reading group he wanted to have a clarification from the speaker (Salim Barahiyan) but the latter responded that he needed the exact quotation rather than the locus of the text.
67 See the apologetic statements in Warsha, Hajj: Nguzo ya Tano ya Uislam, p. X; and Mubar-ak Ahmad, Zawadi ya mawlidi.
68 The best example is the ‘guided tour’ which I received in the Shams al-Ma’arif madrasa from 18 until 20 May 2002. I ‘participated’ in 12 groups and in every class the same topic (hajj, sacrifice and animal slaughter) was read from different texts. The impression I got from this approach is that all of these texts provide an absolute, homogeneous truth.
69 Cf. Becker 2006 and the notion of civic religion mentioned by her. Muslim discourse on the role of the state is permeated by references to texts. Like scholarly debates on the transmission of hadith we also find glosses, interpretations, “typographical erros and editorial infelicities” (Njozi, Muslims and the state in Tanzania, p. 154).
70 http://www.bcestimes.com/discussions/viewtopic.php?t=189&postdays=364&postorder=asc&start=30 (accessed 29 March 2006); Note the usage of upper and lower case in elimu/Elimu.
71 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislamu (II), p. 86.
72 The recorded and transcribed sermon in Appendix IV shows how the speech follows the textual transmitted prophetic sermon of Muhammad. Although orally performed, the logic and composition betrays a highly literate mindset.
Notes Chapter 5

1 “Siku ya Ijumaa kuu kwa hakika ni siku ya Idi kubwa kwao,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, April 1965.
6 Bowen (1992:660) suggests that the Gayo (Indonesia) also have a similar name for the ritual: reraya haji (pilgrimage holiday). In Egypt, the expression mausim al-hajj (season of the hajj) establishes the same link between local festivity and the trans-local pilgrimage (Rashed, 1998:15). Launay (1992:198) argues that the Tabaski festival in Côte d’Ivoire is a celebration of the Islamic community and the hajj rather than a commemoration of Ibrahim’s sacrifice.
7 Brisebarre’s informants also never used the word ‘sacrifice’ spontaneously when they talked about the Sheep Festival in France. Instead, they chose technical words indicating the act of killing (such as ‘couper le mouton,’ or ‘égorger le mouton’) (1998:43).
10 “Wanyama wa muhanga wachinjwao mwezi 10 Dhul Hijjah,” at www.jifunzeuislamu/message 446; “Wahanga wa mauaji Pemba, ” an-Nuur 426, 19 March 2002, p. 1; ‘victims,’ both ritually killed animals and people who have died in accidents, are also called wahanga.
12 “Zingatieni lengo la hija,” an-Nuur 191; Mapenzi ya Mungu, October 1974.
14 Innocent, personal communication; Central Tanganyika Press, Ushirikiano kati ya Wakristo na Waislamu, p. 46 passim.
15 “[Sadaka] will set you free from your evil acts (maovu) by the means of God who knows who performed it” (i.e. the sadaka) “Kutoa sadaka kwa siri,” an-Nuur 177, 27 November 1998, p. 2. For the notion of sadaka in the labeling of Islamic and ‘pagan’ sacrifices in Côte d’Ivoire see Launay (1992:196-219). Surprisingly, most of the notions which Swahili Muslims ascribe to kafara are labeled by Launay’s West African Muslims as sadaka.
17 Lassenga (Khutba za ijumaa kwa lugha ya kiswahili, p. 110) translates the Arabic word kafara in a hadith into the Swahili word kinga (protection).
19 Interview, Bel Hassan, 7 March 2001; Digo sheikh 2 January 2001; Imam Zuberi Ally also mentioned kafara as the fulfillment of a vow (Swahili: kuapa), 11 December 2000.
22 “Mdahalo kati ya Waislamu na Wakristo ni mgumu,” an-Nuur 177, 27 November 1998, p. 9. The Ahmadiyya movement announced a book on the death of Jesus entitled Kafara ya Yesu. The refutation of Jesus Christ’s redemptive death (kafara) is also covered in the Ahmadiyya books Silaha za mahubiri (p. 53-54 written by Sheikh Muzaffar Durrani) and Mirza Tahir Ahmad Ukristo Safari kutoka hakika kuelekea kwenye ubunifu (p. 19-55, chapter 2 Dhambi na kafara). Shia polemics against the Christian tenet of atonement employs the word kafara extensively but also makes use of fidya (substitution); Cf. Kundi la Waandishi katika Njia ya Haki, Uhakika wa Ukristo, p. 69.
24 The best exception I know of outside of East Africa is Bowen's book on the Gayo (1993). He extensively analyses the Sumatran counterparts of both the akika and the Idd el-Hajj in their local context and meaning.
25 The Persian connection which is believed to be historically true according to Gray (1955), is also contested (Glassmann 1995:171-172). See the references in Frankl (2000:6). However, Swahili polemical literature still links the two, probably to underline its pagan nature (cf. Farsi Bid-a I, p. 33). Dammann (1940:336,n2) explains: “In Lamu wird das Neros-Fest Anfang August gefeiert. Es ist das Zeichen, dass die Seeschiffahrt, die während des scharf wehenden Südwindes (kusi) geruht hat, nach Abflauen dieses Windes wieder aufgenommen wird.”
26 Hock (1987:105) interprets the whole ritual as ‘eine komplexe Regenzeremonie.”
27 For example in 1846 the festival occurred on August 29th, in 1969 on July 30th and in 1992 the mwaka took place on July 24th (Landberg 1977:414; Frankl 2000:9).
29 Mazrui, Hidayatul atfal, p. 44. According to Landberg (1977:413), the two rituals must be distinguished, although informants emphasised the similarities between the two (ibid.: 416).
30 Frankl (2000:5) assumes that the ritual’s ‘revival’ can be attributed to an increased awareness that Mombasa’s “cultural heritage is under threat as never before.”
31 If the quite major temporal, geographical and methodological differences underlying the reports are taken into account, I think the cases can be fruitfully compared to each other. Needless to say that the current situation in most places might be different. I exclude shorter descriptions like Caplan (1997:66-67, and plate 9) on the Mafia performance, Hirschberg (1974) based on older literature, and several accounts in Gray (1955b), Wenban-Smith (1955) and Trimingham (1964:89).
32 The reconstruction of this ritual in Tanga is based on 50 interviews. All of the interviewees are male, and most of them belong to the Digo ethnic group. The general characteristics of the group members are as follows: they have a few years of madrasa study, as well as some secular education, and they currently earn a living from a small shamba (farm). All of them are married and most of them have some children. In addition, I talked to three Digo Muslim walimu: Sheikh Ramadani Mabruki (7 February 2002), madrasa teacher Salimu Hassan (8 February 2001) and Mzee Ruwa (13 June 2002), and one Sambaa mwalimu (Saidi Nawawi, 6 February 2001). The only written source for
Tanga is Landberg (1977:413-417) who writes about the *siku ya mwaka* in the village of Kigombe, on 30 July 1969.

Town *mji* refers to settlement rather than city or urban centre. As far as I know, the *sadayaka la mji* occurs only in the peri-urban Tanga regions and not in the centre itself. This was corroborated by the questionnaire (Appendix I).

Cf. Dammann (1940:336, n.2) "Die Digo feiern Anfang August ein Erntefest, das sie mwaka nennen." Frankl's account (2000:26) possibly also suggests a link between the ritual and the harvest: "One or two months before Siksu ya Mwaka, when the crops are about to ripen…"

At Kwale island, near Tanga, the animal (ox or goat) is killed on the beach and the meat is carried in a procession around the village (Gray 1955b: 69). At another village on the same island, the sacrificial goat took part in the procession before being slaughtered (ibid.: 70).

*Milango* are generally linked to males rather than females (Landberg 1977:88) and several men declared that the only participants in the ritual should be men, rather than women, although the latter should fast. Also el-Zein (1974:304) mentions the nominal inclusion of all but the de facto exclusion of significant parts of society; this seems to be a common characteristic of the ritual.

However, it can also convey the ritual expression of the village as a unity of kinsmen: 'we are all brothers,' as Landberg mentions in the same context of the *siku ya mwaka* (1977:408-409).

Frankl (2000:15) mentions the seven basic grains for Mombasa as *mahindi, maharagwe, k'unde, mbazi, p'ojo, mtama* and *dengu*; the mixture is called *t'angalizi*. Ash is a common element in all the *mwaka* narratives and is the continuing element connecting old and new temporal cycles (cf. Lambek 1992:418, n.18).

Many collections of useful supplications exist (cf. Padwick 1997), but the most common local publication (in many different editions) is *al-Adhkar wa al-awrad* by Muhyiddin ibn Abdal Rahman ibn Muhammed al-Zinjibari. 'Kusoma Nabahani' refers to reading the *Tawassul lil-Sheikh Yusuf bin Isma'il al-Nabahani* (pp. 13-16 in the above mentioned collection).

Interview, Mzee Ruwa, 13 June 2002.

According to Frankl (1993:127) and Lloyd Swantz (1990:18,73) the book *Majmu’a sa’a al-khabar* is used in Mombasa and Dar es Salaam respectively. In January 2000 I bought a cheap Indian print of this 80-page book in Dar es Salaam. I also copied a personal notebook based on this text from a friendly astrologer in Tanga who used this to find out which days of the week were favorable for particular activities which his clients had planned, like making love, business, finding work or reconciliation.

Note that in Tanga this function would label the ritual as *kafara*.

I will further describe the significance of the Badr paradigm in Tanzanian rituals in chapter 11.

Such as Muhammad bin Ayyub Khamis, *Ulinde uislamu wako*; and the AMYC *bid'a* lists in *al-Fikrul Islami* nr. 37-38; the latter mention "sacrifices for jinn or shaitan" in general and "slaughtering on the occasion of the New Years festival" in particular.

Interview sheikh Ramadhan Mabruki, Tanga, 7 February 2002.


Farsy, *Bid-a, sehemu ya kwanza*, p. 33. In his Qur’anic commentary on Q 5:3, Farsy mentions this mwaka animal among the six forbidden sacrifices for Muslims.
50 I used the Cairo edition from 1894, p. 181.
52 “Maswali na Majibu ya Kiislam,” Maarifa 004, 15 February 2002, p. 14; I am not sure if my translation is correct. Almost similar expression (kwa ajili ya mpango) is used by Salim Barahiyan in the same context of sacrificing to spirits (appendix IV).
53 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislam (II), p. 97.
54 This can be witnessed in some of the Arabic treatises on the ‘aqiqa rituals. Some authors claim, for example, that shaving and sacrifice should follow the same order as in the hajj ritual.
55 Cf. Mtaita (1996: 20-23); Harries (1965:3). The Indonesian Gayo also perform the “kika” (sic) after death, according to Bowen (1992:662); Snouck Hurgronje (1889 vol II:136-143) mentions the performance of akika after death in the Arabian Peninsula. Popular etymology sometimes derives the word from the Arabic haqiqya (reality). In Swahili, both words can be spelt and pronounced the same (hakiki or hakika); cf. Swantz (1986:100). Although the association between the two terms is also found in Malaysia (cf. Zwemer 1916:245) none of my informants came up with the link. Akika, akiki and hakiki are common variant spellings of the ritual (cf. the Shamsiya pamphlet by the Tanga author Muhammad Ayyub Swala ya Mayit na Talqini ya Mayit na Maaelezo ya hakiki kwa ufupi; non vidi, Landberg 1977:605, n.9). In conversations, I employed the Tanga pronunciation (hakiki) and the reader will also find this in the questionnaire. In the English text I chose the more common akika (which is the standard Swahili spelling).
56 A mwalimu from the Boraska madrasa participated more than twenty times in post mortem akika rituals and ‘almost never’ in post natal akikas (interview Ally Zuberi, Tanga, 11 December 2000). Although condemned by scholars as un-Islamic, the practice has not received as much attention in Swahili discourse as other more public rituals do. Cf. Saleh Farsy, Qurani Takatifu, commentary on Q 6:141 (on extravagance and immoderateness): Farsy mentions the akika because Muslims spend an excessive amount of money on this occasion just like in jando and ukumbi initiation rites, marrying a second wife, spirit-possision rituals, khitma, tahilil and mawlid readings, ziyaras, going on hajj several times and karamu (ritual meals for social occasions). The same reference is also quoted in Mapenzi ya Mungu, March 1970, p. 4.
57 The tahilil ritual consists of chanting the creed “la illaha illa-allah” (There is no god but God) 10.000 times, and usually starts immediately after the sunrise prayer. Interview, Salimini, 16 February 2001. Farsy condemns most funeral rites including tahilil practices, (cf. his book Bid-a).
59 Interview, Abi Bakar Mengere 10 January 2001.
60 Interview, Jumaa Mwasabu, 12 June 2002.
62 The focus on parents and their reproductive functions in this ritual may explain why the akika can only be performed when the parents are married, as an anonymous Digo woman emphasised (interview 3 April 2002); cf. the advice of a Swahili scholar about the akika when the child is born out of wedlock (Mzee bin Ali Muhammad, Umuri, p. 60).
63 Or, alternatively, as a camel, as heard by Landberg (1977:385). In other Islamic societies it is not the akika animal but the ‘id al-adha sacrificial victim that is attributed the role of
guide to the hereafter. In Mombasa, the cow slaughtered at a Muslim’s funeral (khitma) will change into a horse in paradise ("Fatawa," Sauti ya Haki, February 1974, p. 6).

64 Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari, Desturi za Waswahili, p. 168.
65 Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari, Desturi za Waswahili, p. 12.
66 Parkin (1991:146-151) mentions that among the Masai sheep are seen as more feminine than goats. Both authors mention a special relationship between the (male) sheep and the hyena (fisi); In Tanga sometimes the word nyang'au (hyena) is used for the wild counterpart of the sheep. An interesting parallel can be found in Islamic fiqh: if a pilgrim unintentionally kills a hyena (dab) while wearing his ihram clothes, he can compensate his error only by killing a ram (kabsh). Other animals (camels, cows, ewes and especially goats) are listed as compensation for all other animals (Sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunna, volume I, p. 487). In Lamu the sheep is linked to the wild gazelle (el-Zein 1974:291).

67 The shaving of the child’s hair 40 days after birth is also closely linked with sexual reproduction. Imam Mengere mentioned the house as the best place to bury the child’s hair in order to “have more progeny” (Interview, 10 January 2001). Van Pelt mentions hair shaving among the Pogoro as a sign of renewed sexual relations between partners (Pelt 1982:154), as well as a symbol of mourning (ibid.: 233). The Zaramo (Bagamoyo area) sometimes buried the child’s hair together with the placenta, umbilical cord, nails and first excreta outside the house and planted a tree on top (Swantz 1973:272). The function of the akika ritual as marking the renewed sexual relation between the parents is implicitly attacked by Mzee bin Ali in his book Umuri Swalat. He states that the responsibility for the akika is not on the parents but on the religious functionary (walii) and that in case of a child born out of adultery the mother must perform the ritual.

69 The religious part of the child’s funeral is now strictly the men’s burden, while in the past the women probably used to have a large say and buried the child inside the house. Cf. the riots on this topic among the Pokomo in Kenya in 1945, as described by Bunger (1972:92,110-11). Van Pelt mentions that the common burial place for young children is inside the house (Pelt 1982:232).

70 See my MA thesis on the ‘aqiqa among the North Ghanese Dagomba, where the ritual is closely linked with the Damba festival (the Prophet’s birthday) and the outdoing of the newborn.

71 A basic published Tanga madrasa text dealing with the ritual is Masa’il muntakhiba (vol 1), p. 21-22; More classical works include: Abu Shuja’ al-Isfahani, al-Ghaya wa al-taqrib, p. 43; Muhammad Hasaballah, al-riyad al-badi’, p. 45-47; Farsy, al-Bid-a’; Farsy, Maisha ya sayyidnal Hassan, p. 5-7 (identical piece in Farsy, Maisha ya sayyidnal Husseyn); Some Swahili sources include: Muhammad Masoud Hilal al Barwani, Adabu zai Muislamu kwa wato wake, pp. 135-141; Mzee bin Ali, Umuri Swalat. “Maswali na Majibu ya Kiislam,” Maarifa 4, 15 February 2002, p.6; for the most classical source on the ‘aqiqa outside East Africa one should start with Ibn Qayyim, Tuhat al-mawdud; a recent Islamic source is Dawud’s thesis, al-‘aqiqa; For a general overview of Islamic (sacrificial) birth rituals including the ‘aqiqa see Aubaille-Sallenave (1999).

72 al-Fikrul Islami 38, Dhulkaada 1411, p.6; The Ahmadiyya merely state that performing the ritual after death is “not necessary” ("Akika ifanywe lini?" Mapenzi ya Mungu, June 1979, p. 3.).
73 Landberg (1977:385, 389); but contrast ‘aqiqiyah – ni mbuzi’ (akika is a goat) at www.al-iman.co.uk/fatima_ra.htm (accessed 15 September 2005); Interview, Abi Bakar Mengere, 10 January 2001.

74 A good example is Mzee Bisani, who explained that the akika after death was “nothing,” that it was “only a sadaka” and that you should therefore take a goat. When you performed an akika after birth, then the child would profit and the animal should be a sheep. The child should drink something from its gravy (supu) to receive the protection (Interview, 1 January 2001).

75 Interview Adamu 27 December 2000; Shia Sheikh Mabokweni 10 January 2001. Both were adamant in their opinion that this happened with sheep, rather than with goats. Cf. the same practice with goats as part of an adult funeral (Parkin 1991:146).

76 Interview, Mzee Bisani, 1 January 2001.

77 One interview (Salimini Abdallah, 15 February 2001) was interrupted when an old man (born in 1918) stated that an akika was always a sheep while his son was sure a goat was better. Subsequent questions on the function of the sacrifice made it clear that their choice also had consequences for other ritual details. Note that, although the son had more ‘textual knowledge,’ his ideas could not be directly derived from any authoritative text. Omar Saidi (born in 1941) had performed the akika for his living children and explicitly mentioned the sacrifice as kafara because its effect was the protection and wellbeing of his child. He chose a sheep because Ismail’s substitute was a sheep, he said (Interview, Muheza, 21 December 2000).

78 Interview, Muhammad Hairi, 6 January 2001; Interview, Shia sheikh, Mabokweni, 10 January 2001.

79 Mzee bin Ali, Umuri swalat; “Akika ifanywe lini?” Mapenzi ya Mungu, June 1979, p. 2; Farsy, al-Bida; Fary, Maisha ya sayydinal Hassan, p. 6; Even where the Arabic texts unequivocally mention a sheep, the Swahili authors often feel the need to translate ‘goat’ as in ‘Sura ya kumi na moja: Aqiyqah, khitani, vyakula na vinywaji’ at http://www.uslamu.org/fiqh/fiqh135.htm (accessed 20 March 2006).

80 Interview, Shia sheikh, Mabokweni 10 January 2001. Most people agree that the age of the child must be below puberty, but some say that even after four years of age the akika should not be performed (Interview, Mzee Bisani 1 January 2001).

81 This is what el-Zein (1974:253) assumes. Landberg (1977:386) also witnessed a boy’s akika.


83 Interview, Mabruki 7 February 2002.

84 The only Swahili source I could find is Bawazir, Hoki ya mtoto mchanga katika Uislam. See the editor’s note in Suyuti, Nuqhat al-muta’ammil, p.98,n 2 ‘ma’nahu an abahu yuhaaramu shafa’ata waaladihi idha lam yu’aqqa ‘anhu’. (Suyuti is a classical Shaafi’i author [1445-1505] with over 140 printed works to his name.) Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Tuhaft al-mawdud, p. 22,41; ‘Abdallah Nasih ‘Ulwan (Tarbiya al-awlad, vol I, p. 78) mentions this intercession but apparently Maryam Dawud had some difficulties with this opinion and she strategically leaves out these words when she quotes ‘Ulwan (Dawud, al-‘aqiqa, p. 40-41); Ghazzali (d. 1111), in his major work Ihya ‘ulum al-din also mentions the intercession of children who die very young (Gil’adi 1995:48-49); Sayyid Sabiq (Fiqh al-sunna, vol II, p. 32) omits the shafa’ar in his treatise on the ‘aqiqa.
"RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS"

85 28 year-old secondary school teacher at Maawa-1 Islam; her standpoint as an outsider (she belongs to the ethnic group of the Wangoni, from south west Tanzania) might have influenced her views of this particular Swahili ritual.

86 Hasbullah, Riyad al-badi`, p. 45.

87 Menk, Social Conduct of a Muslim, p. 7; cf. Adamek 1968:129; classical Arabic sources often mention the similarities between the ritual acts of the ‘aqiqa and the hajj (cf. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Tuhfat al-mawdud, p 58), but in Tanzania the links between the two ceremonies are limited to their status as Ibrahimian customs.


89 al-Barwani, Adabu za Muislamu, p. 137; al-Fikrul Islami (38), Dhulkaada 1411, p. 7.


Notes Chapter 6

1 Cf. Niazi ‘Azzal-Din, Ma huwa al-nasi?.

2 In Tanzania, the AMYC and like-minded Ansaari Sunna followers condemn the use of the crescent for its pagan origin. However, many other Islamic institutions adopted the symbol, for example, the student organisation MSAUD. For a critique of the symbol, see “Alama ya mwezi katika misikiti” at http://www.alhidaaya.com/swahili/iframe/Maswali%20na%20Majibu/Maswali%20Mchanganyiko/Alama%20Ya%20Mwezi%20Katika%20Misikiti.html (accessed 20 March 2006).

3 Kadir Sudi, Hidaya, p. 24; “God is supreme. O God! Let this new moon appear on us with peace and faith, with safety and Islam and strength for (doing) that which Thou lovest and which Thou art pleased with. Our Lord and thy Lord (o moon) is Allah”; Ibn al-Qayyim, Handbook, p. 99; al-Muntasser, Rules, p. 40.


5 Cf. Lech (1979) for a subtle analysis of the Ramadan and its coming into being.


11 Cuperus (1973:53) mentions one of the translated prayers pronounced on the occasion of the Idd el-Hajj “Plaise a Dieu qu’il nou garde jusqu’a l’annee prochaine.”

12 According to Middleton (1992:165), the word refers to the “releasing of the spirits that were fastened up or imprisoned during Ramadan,” but the reference to –funguo is also common, as ‘breaking the fast’. Mfunguo is often spelled as mfungo and in Tanga is always pronounced as such.

13 Both lunar calendars are intimately connected, but their differences are nevertheless important because they are emphasised by Swahili Muslims. Cf. “Majina ya miezi ya kal-
enda ya kiislam,” *an-Nuur* 27, October 1993, p. 13. Instead of Rajabu, the names *Mfungo kumi* or *Mrisho* are sometimes used.

14 The BAKWATA secretary of Tanga wrote on his official letter of invitation for the national *Idd el-Fitr* baraza the equivalent of the date 27 December 2000 AD as 1.1.1446 A.H. [sic]. The editor of a large non-Islamic Swahili daily wrote: “The celebration of the *Idd el-Fitr* … depends on the appearance of the new moon that signals the start of the Islamic new year,” (*Nipashe*, 24 October 2006).


16 Most sources date this battle in March 625 and not in April.


18 Most sources date this battle in March 625 and not in April.

19 The *siku ya mwaka* celebration in Mombasa moved to the Sunday (Frankl 2000:12).

20 The only Qur’anic verse which includes the word ‘*id*’ (Q 5:114) does not refer to any of these three holidays. Alilly S. Kilima, *Siku za Mungu*, *an-Nuur* 95, 25 April 1997, p. 6.

21 “Neno IDD ni lenye asili ya lugha ya Kiarabu lenye maana kila siku ambayo wanausanyika” (*al-Haq* 18, 22 February 2002, p. 3); “…id neno ambalo lina maana ya furaha ya mara kwa mara” (*Mapenzi ya Mungu*, October 1974).

22 Bachu (*Ufafanuzi*, p. 108) regrets that “we Swahili have mixed up the names of the week.”


25 For a fascinating idea on the link between fasting and (sacrificial) feasting in funeral rites see Spencer (in Carter 2003:45). Commemoration days for the dead usually precede the joyful celebration of national liberty. Cf. Zerubavel (1981:46). On Zanzibar, voluntary fasting during the six Shawwal days is concluded by another festive holiday.

26 Pious Muslims also fast on Mondays remembering the birth and demise of Muhammad.

27 Pilgrims are not allowed to fast on the 9th *Dhulhija* (the Day of Arafa) but many of them do so or compensate their non-fasting by other hardships, like standing bareheaded in the sunshine (Jeenah 2000).


30 Bachu, *Ufafanuzi*, p. 3.


32 The belief that the Last Day will arrive on a Friday (Bunger 1972:200) suggests further similarities between the two days.

33 Dumila, *Siku ya Ararat*, pp. 1, 14; the Islamic concept *bala’ wa al-bara’a* (trial and exemption) is in Swahili texts often explained as the necessity of being tested before freedom is granted.

34 “Ramadan is really heavy” (*Ramadhani ni zito kweli;* interview Adamu, Tanga 19 May 2002).

35 Sheik Hariri explained that the actual comparison is between Ramadan fasting and the performance of the *hajj* proper. Both of these are important pillars of the religion and
both practices are very hard (ngumu). But the Idd el-Hajj lacks its real meaning if not preceded by the hajj and its physical hardships (interview 6 January 2001).

36 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafa, p. 47.
37 Cf. ethnographies of Islamic sacrifice in chapter 2. In the Kenyan school-book Islamic Religious Education (form I, p. 46) the ayyam al-tashriq are presented as a separate festival. For the different value attached to each day of the ayyam al-tashriq in Morocco, see Mahdi (1998).
38 “Kuna soma katika kuchinja,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, February 2002; Ebrahim Kazim, Essays on Islamic Topics, p. 120-21.
40 Lassenga, Khatuba za ijumaa kwa lugha ya kiwahili, p. 124.
44 Glassman is very subtle in his analysis of the role of the Idd el-Hajj in the Pangani revolt (1888), but he also assumes that “Idd al-Hajj, known as the “major feast” perhaps had more solemn religious observances” (1995:171).
45 In contrast, the Griottes in Eastern Gambia value the Tobaski (Idd el-Hajj) higher than the Koritee (Idd el-Fitr) because they earn more money on the former holiday (Janson 2002:172).
48 Interview Waziri, Tanga, 5 March 2001.
49 www.uslamu.org/nasaha/idd1.htm (eid kubwa for the Idd el-Fitr and eid ndogo for Idd el-Hajj). I will not mention the many instances in which anthropologists mix up the two names, such as in Skinner (1980:185-186).
52 See also Anonymous, “Short introduction to the History of mawlid Festivals/ ceremonies in Lamu.” I am grateful to the librarian of the Lamu Museum who provided me with a copy.
53 The most common reference to the mawlid is sikukuu ya mfungo sita (holiday of the sixth month), but it is sometimes even called an Idd (cf. Quraishy, Textbook of Islam, vol.2, p. 205).
54 Sometimes, this mawlid in Tanga is delayed (‘mawlid Tanga hatimae yafana.” an-Nuur 111, 22 August 1997, p. 12.)
55 “Taarifa ya mawlid, Nasaha 101, 24 May 2001, p. 4
56 The Finnish NGO 4H is active in raising environmental awareness among school children and donates trees to schools. The project coordinator in Tanga laments that Islamic schools are usually careless in nursing the young plants when the mawlid is over.
57 Apart from the many Arabic books on this topic (Padwick 1997) see also the Swahili publications such as Farsy, Tafsiri ya mawlid, neno kwa neno; Ayyub Bin Khamis, Iaanatul twaalibil mustafsiri li mawiliki Sayyid Jaafar (Tanga); Kheri bin Shahib, maulidi barzanji
A selection from local available texts include: Farsy, Qurani takatifu (commentary on Q 5:3) describes the sacrifices at the mawlid celebrations as un-Islamic and actually haram; Saidi Musa, Majadiliano juu ya mawlidi; Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki, Kusherehek-ea mawlid ya mtume; Ibn Baz, Indispensable implication of sunnah and caution against innovation; Sayyid Hassan A. Badawy, Siku ya kuzaliwa Mtume (SAW) ni lazima ikumbukwe; Ustadh Suleiman Hemed, "Maoni kuhusu sherehe za mawlidi," Maarifa (7), 12 May 2002, p.10.

Tapes mawlid celebration Tanga, 23 May 2002.

Islamic Religious Education, form 1, p. 50.

Cf. articles in Mzalendo 26 May 2002, p. 2; Msema Kweli, 2 June 2002.

Cf. the speech of Sheikh Mafuta, on the evening of 27 April 2002, condemning the practice together with the tarawih prayers, the salat ‘ala nabi every Thursday and the dhikr (tape in possession); al-Haq (15) p. 2; al-Haq (19), p.6. al-Fikrul Islami (26) mentions several reasons against the festival, one being the “aping of the unbelievers” (a reference to Christmas).

IPC, Maarifa ya Uislamu, (2), p. 104. There is no certainty about Muhammad’s day of birth and even the year is doubted. Ramadan is sometimes mentioned as Islam’s ‘birthday’ since the Qur’an was revealed then. Cf. ”Mwezi Mtukufu wa Ramadan wa jana, ” Maenzi ya Mungu, June 1983, p. 2. Monday is also presented as the day of Muhammad’s birth, demise and first revelation (al-Haddad, The Book of Assistance, p 139, n.59).


"Sherehe Kizimkazi zapigwa marufuku," Maarifa (3), 14 February 2002, p. 1,4. Knowledge and practice of Shawwal fasting is widespread in Tanzania and in the town of Tanga. Cf. the pamphlet “Saumu za sunna,” sold outside the Mtoro mosque in Dar Es Salaam, 2001; Ustadh Jabiri Deen, “Miongoni mwa mema hayo ni kufunga suna ya sita, ” an-Nuur 404, 28 December 2001, p. 2; In the same copy of an-Nuur, the shairi by Zabibu I. Ng’onda Sitat shawal mentions the following as benefits: forgiveness of sins, plentiful sustenance, clothes for Paradise and the book in your right hand on the Day of Judgment. The same author published a poem with the same title in an-Nuur 592, 3 December 2004, p. 5.

"Waismu wanataka kuona vitendo tujiepushe na mazushi," Maenzi ya Mungu, December 1966, p. 3.


73 The government forbade a meeting of the Yanga football club because it was scheduled to take place on a public holiday (www.kiongozi.tripod.com/michesomei2.html accessed 30 January 2003).

74 See the Press Release on 21 December 2001 at www.tanzania.go.tz/masasi2.htm where it is stated that on the occasion of Christmas, President Mkapa handed over rice, goats and money to several institutions dealing with disabled people and orphans. An additional gift was offered to buy tools.

75 The event is listed among other Muslim grievances ("Mufti wenu chagueni," editorial an-Nuur 467, 4 October 2002, p. 2).

76 Many Tanzanian restaurants and clubs have a dress code forbidding slippers and khangas.

77 Tanganyika was the first in the East African region to do so: the Kenyan government announced the Idd el-Fitr as a public holiday as late as 1972 (al-Islam 1 (4/5), December 1977, p. 10) and never recognised the Idd el-Hajj as a national holiday despite many complaints (cf. "Muslims mark Idd Ul Hajj," East African Standard, 2 February 2004.)

78 This was the case in 1961. Tanga archives, Acc. 13, File C1/2.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid. It is noteworthy that these letters of complaints pertain only to the two Idds, not to the mawlid or other Muslim religious events.

82 Tanga Archives, Acc. 1, File 55; Muslim Association of Moshi & District to Education Secretary, 9 June 1956.

83 Ibid, 8 May 1958.

84 For example: Day of the International Workers (1 May 1962); the Queen’s Day (8 October 1962); Days of mourning (President of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio, 15 January 1963; Kennedy, 23 November 1963); Day of the Union (28 April 1964); see the respective dates of the Tanganyika Gazette.

85 Tanga Archives, Acc. 13, File C1/2.

86 See the mawlid invitations in the Tanga archives (for example, Acc. 13, File A6/8/II, Handeni 1970, starts at 17.00 p.m., in the morning only the reception of guests is scheduled; ibid., nr. 132, Handeni, 1971, starts at 16.00 p.m.; ibid., nr. 13, Chanika, Handeni 1976, starts at 16.00 p.m.). For recent examples, see the advertisements in the Muslim press (e.g. an-Nuur 25 May 2001, starts after alasiri prayer; an-Nuur 1 June 2001, starts at 15.00 p.m.).

87 The AMYC takes this assumption as another reason to reject the mawlid as an imitation of Christmas (cf. al-Fikrul Islami, 26).


89 Cf. the German proposal to introduce Islamic national holidays ("Grüne fordern gesetzliche Islam-Feiertag," Die Welt, 16 November 2004); the American Evangelical preacher Jerry Falwell and his "Friend or Foe Christmas Campaign" in 2005; and the recent Iraqi protests attempting to introduce the Friday as a national day off.

90 "Lengo la propaganda," Nasaha 60.

91 Maalim Bassaleh, "Kwani nchi hii ya Wakristo pekee?" an-Nuur 208, 2 July 1999, p. 13; "Sherehe za mwaka mpya si za waislam;" editorial Maanfa (3), 14 February 2002, p. 2. BAKWATA proposed to open an Islamic University in 2000, and called it Millennium University. According to a letter-writer (an-Nuur 237, 21 January 2000), this is embarrassing because the ‘millennium’ is only based on the Christian calendar, which “we Muslims oppose with all our strength” ("…Kalenda ya Wakristo sisi Waislamu tunapinga kalenda hiyo kwa nguvu zetu zote").
96 www.youngafrican.com/forum/topic.asp?topic_ID=4113. It must be noted that the student ‘Tototundu’ is talking about Tuesday 11 February 2003, a day which the Tanzanian government did not recognise as the ‘real’ Idd.
100 “Salamu za Edd-El-Fitr kutoka DAMUSA,” *an-Nuur* 185, 22 January 1999, p. 5.
103 “Udini ni Muislamu kupata haki yake,” *an-Nuur* 235, 7 January 2000, p. 5; a letter to the editor on the topic of the Friday *salat* for students clarifies that Muslims do not ask for the right to pray because ‘that is a divine commandment’ but they ask for a change in the tuition schedule (“Ratiba ya Shule isimame kuanzia saa sita siku ya Ijumaa,” *an-Nuur* toleo maalum, 3 August 1999, p. 5.
104 See Tanga Archives, Acc. 13, File V10/10.
105 Tanga Archives, Acc 13 File V 1, 48.
106 Tanga Archives, Acc. 13 File V 10/10, 27, 15 June 1971. For other discussions on the same topic see Acc. 8 V10/6 File 164 and 166.
108 Every year, the school holidays are negotiated with the Ministry of Education. The results are sometimes remarkable. The Islamic Maawa-l Islam was closed on the Christian Good Friday 29 March 2002 but no additional holidays were given on the Idd el-Hajj because the feast was celebrated on Saturday and Sunday.
118 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, *Kitabu Arafa*, p.70.
120 Ibid.
122 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, *Kitabu Arafa*, p. 3.
123 Cf. Ismail Sameja, *Twahara*.
125 “Hakuna siku maalum za kuabudu,” *an-Nuur* 401, 14 December 2001, p. 3.
131 At the Shams al-Ma’arif madrasa class, activities went on as usual during the *adhan*. Qur’anic reading can have similar effects as the *adhan* call. For example, interruption of Qur’anic recitation is strictly forbidden (Muhammad bin Ayyub Khamis, *Ulinde Uislamu wako*).
134 Nadel (1954: 217, 239) condemns the Nupe believers for celebrating the *mawlid*, the *Idd el-Fitr* and the *Idd el-Hajj* according to their own calendar, rather than to the ‘proper’ lunar calendar. This is a case of a modern author working with the concept of real time.
136 “Kwa Mwislamu, kuswali ni wajibu na si kuswali kwa nyakati atakapojisikia” (For the Muslim, praying the *salat* is a religious command, not praying at the time he/she feels like it). Ramadan Kinyonya, *Majira* 5 November 2004; Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, *Kitabu Arafa*, p. 35.
137 Tanga, Friday sermon 14 June 2001. The preacher also mentioned the importance of praying in the first rank (*safa ya kwanza*).
139 Hamisi, *Adhabu za mwenye kuacha swala*, collected 2003. Another copy was read in a Tanga school by a young schoolboy, behind his teacher’s back.
140 See for example Mwinyi H. Mzale, *Wito wa Waislamu*.
142 Saleh Farsy, *Quarani Takatifu*, commentary on Q62:9,10;“Maswali yenu,”*Mapenzi ya Mungu* June 1978. Cf. the different attitude of Jews who “have been particularly meticulous in their efforts to determine the temporal boundaries of the Sabbath in the most precise manner” (Zerubavel 1981: 126).
144 The Shi’ite page www.al-shia.com/html/swa/bio.htm, mentions *mwezi mtukufu wa Shaban*; Cf. Buitelaar (1991:138): “Shaban and Ramadan are distinguished from the other months as the two “most blessed months” of the year.”


Lassenga, *Khutba za ijumaa kwa lugha ya kiswahili*, p. 117.

Table 6.1

i On Good Friday 2002, Muslims organised a protest demonstration but it was not connected to the Christian holiday (“Maandamano Aprili 12,” *an-Nuur* 428, 26 March 2002).

ii Easter and Christmas are extensively discussed in the Islamic press, especially in Ahmadiyya sources (cf. Sulley S. Sulley, *Historia ya kveli ya Christ Mas*).

iii “Tanzania ni nchi ya kikristo?,” *an-Nuur* 21, April 1993.

iv Its first celebration was in 1973 according to *Gazeti* (vol liv, no. 5 taarifa nr. 115): “Wote wanafahamishwa kwamba Serikali imeanzwa kuifanya tarehe 5 Februari siku ambayo chama cha Afro-Shirazi Party kilizaliwa kuna siku ya kupumzika (Public Holiday). Siku hio itasherehekewa kila mwaka.” In 1977, the union between the Afro Shirazi Party and the Tanganyika National Union resulted in the birth of the CCM. Its 25th anniversary was celebrated on 5 February 2002, both on the mainland and on Zanzibar (Zanzibar Leo, 5 February 2002). For an Islamic reaction to the birth of CCM see “Chama cha Mapinduzi,” *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, February 1977, p. 2. In 2003, *an-Nuur* wrote that the celebration in Dar Es Salaam did not attract as many visitors as the remembrance of the January 27 killings one week earlier (”Wakereketwa wadai CCM kutoondosha a kura,” *an-Nuur* 7 February 2003, p. 13).


vi This used to be a celebration held by TANU (Tanganyika African National Union). When the constitution changed in 1992, the July 7 (Saba Saba) celebration changed into August 8 (Nane Nane) honouring the farmers, but there is still confusion about the sta-
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tus of each holiday (cf. Askew 2002:29). Many towns, including Tanga, still have special Saba Saba grounds, used for the one week celebrations. The Ahmadiyya used these holidays for missionary activities (cf. Mapenzi ya Mungu, October 1968, p. 1). During my fieldwork, both dates were national holidays but their social significance in Tanga was marginal. I thank Eileen Moyer, Harvey Glickman and Richard Mshomba who responded to my question concerning the Saba Saba and Nane Nane holidays posted on the H-Africa forum.

A major activity is a speech by the Minister of Agriculture (cf. www.pmo.go.tz/bajetilowass.htm).


The first celebration took place on 1 May 1962 (Tanganyika Gazette vol xlii, n. 20 general notice no. 990); “Sherewe za Mei mosi: Lipumba kuhutubia wafanyakazi Starlight,” an-Nuur 251, 28 April 2000.

Notes Chapter 7

1 It is not my task here to explore the Islamic fiqh discussions outside Tanzania on this point, but see the 2001 reprint Ahkam al-ikhtilaf fi ru’ya al-hilal Dhulhija by Ibn Rajab, a 8th century Hijra discussion precisely on the Idd el-Hajj moon-sighting.

2 He kindly sent me his book through the Bilal Muslim Mission Mombasa and added some 14 photocopies corroborating his arguments.


6 This CD-ROM is for sale on the internet for 50 British pounds.

7 Cf. the Saudi newspaper al-Watan, 20 January 2005, for an interview with the two moon-sighters.


9 “Islam does not contradict the natural constitution (maumbile) in its law, nor is it against scientific knowledge” (Darani, Uzushi, p. 7).


11 Cf. www.moonsighting.com (based on Khalid Shaukat’s calculations; www.hilal-sighting.com; Islamic Crescents’ Observation Project (www.icoproject.org) has several observers in Kenya, Tanzania and Zanzibar. The Arab Union for Astronomy and Space Sciences developed a Universal Hejric Calender (UHC) which divides the word in three different time zones, thus limiting the number of different Idd days. Mohammad Ilyas (Malaysia) established scientific criteria for the first visibility of the moon, used by Monzur Ahmed to develop the software Mooncalculator.


13 Bahasaniy, Rai za wanazuoni, p. 119.

14 Independent from the moon-sighting many people in Tanzania prefer to start Ramadan one day early to increase blessing (kwa kujiongezea baraka). This practice is condemned as disobedience to the Prophet: “… kumbe wanaasi amri ya Mtume. Wema hasa ni...
kutii amri iliyohusikana na hali iliyopo. Pamoja na kujitaabisha, jamaa hao wanapata dhambi” (Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1966, p. 3). Another reason for fasting 30 days instead of 29 might be the reading of a 30th part (juz’) of the Qur’an every Ramadan day, as is the case in Indonesia (pers. comm. Martin van Bruinessen).

15 If the moon is seen earlier, civil servants have to run to their offices as happened on July 22, 1982 (Mapenzi ya Mungu September 1982). The editor claims that this inconvenience could be solved if all Muslims were to follow the scientific method of the Ahmadiyya (“Tarehe ya Idil-Fitri,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, July 1985).


17 For a critical reaction to this interpretation see Bachu, Ufafanuzi, p. 91-92.


19 Bahasaniy, Rai za wanazuoni, p. 118; same arguments in Shafi, The question of sighting the moon and the use of scientific instruments, p. 28.

20 Bahasaniy, Rai za wanazuoni, p. 130; Shafi, The question of sighting the moon, p. 20.

21 Bahasaniy, Rai za wanazuoni, p. 32; IPC, Maarifa, p. 67; Shafi, The question of sighting the moon, p. 33.


23 Darani, Uzushi, p. ii.

24 Darani, Uzushi p. 7-9; Anonymous pamphlet, Saudia yapinga Qur’an 2:189 na Sunna.


26 This point is known in Arabic as ‘ittihad al-matali’. Cf. al-Fikrul Islami (52) p.8; Lemu, Tawhid, p. 141; Fadel, Validity of Ijtihad.

27 Fadel, Validity of Ijtihad; Saleem, Concerning the Dates for Eid-ul-Adha and Hajj.

28 al-Fikrul Islami (50); Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafata p. 56.


30 This is the Shafi’i point of view. The number of witnesses for valid moon-sightings in other schools differs. Cf. ‘Mambo wanayokubaliana wanachuoni kuhusu mas-ala ya mwezi wa kufunga na kufungua,” al-Fikrul Islami (50), p. 1-2; Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani, Bulughul Maram, p. 137, n.3.


33 Mujlisul Ulama port Elizabeth, A discussion of the rules of the Shariah pertaining to the sighting of the hilaal.


36 TNA, File C 1/2 “Public Holidays” (27), 18 March1961.


38 Interview, Haruna Rajabu Muheme, 16 December 2000.

40 Bahasaniy, *Rai za wanazuoni*, pp. 123-125. For another miraculous communication see Knappert (1967:191-194), where the poet describes how Muhammad’s voice is carried across the desert at the time of the Battle of Tabuk.

41 In 1990, some Muslims in Tanga celebrated the Idd el-Fitr one day after the national Idd to protest against late delivery of the crescent-sighting (*Daily News*, 17 April 1991). The Twelver Shi’ites suddenly broke their fast on 19 June 1985 at 10.30 a.m. after they had received the news of the moon-sighting. They even prayed the Idd *salat* at noon ("Tarehe ya Idil-Fitri, " *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, July 1985, p. 2); announcements of Dhulhija crescent sightings on the internet at www.alhidaaya.com and http://groups.yahoo.com/group/jifunzeuislam/message/810 (accessed 12 February 2007).


43 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, *Kitabu Arafa*, p. 29,36, 62, passim. See also Barahiyan, Appendix IV

44 A reference to Q 3:103 "and hold fast, all of you together to the cable of Allah and do not separate" (translation is from Pickthall); the text is often cited in articles on unity and Idd celebration, e.g. "Umoja miongoni mwa Waislamu!, " *al-Huda* 133, 20 April 2006, p. 6.


46 The Christian missionary Dale: "na mtu miongoni mwenu aliyehudhuria mwezi huo na afunge"; al-Amin bin Aly: "basi mwenye kuwamo katika mwezi huu naaufunge"; al-Kindy: "utakayemfikia mwezi (huu wa Ramadani) naye yuko mjini basi afunge". www.uismu.org/nasaha/nasaha27.htm "...atakayekuwa katika mji katika huu mwezi (wa Ramadani) afunge...."
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56 Bukhari, *Sahih*, nr. 1900.
64 Bahasanini, *Rai za wanazuoni*, p. 38-42.
66 Bachu inserts two pages of the Shawkani’s Arabic text as an appendix (pp. 164-165). Muhammad ibn al-Shawkani (d. 1250 H/1834) is a popular author among the so-called neo-Salafi’s, probably because he denied the consensus of the companions like Ibn Abbas. The Tanga AMYC frequently quotes Shawkani in their magazines *al-Fikrul Islami* and *al-Haq* (cf. nrs. 49-51 dealing with the moon-sighting controversy in Tanzania).
67 The Ahmadiyya reject this argument in favor of their local moon-sighting perspective. They claim that for the Ramadan moon, only one witness is necessary and not two as Bachu claims. Furthermore, the sentence “and the people saw it” implies that more than one witness was available. Also the ‘Bedouin hadith’ mentioned above shows that only one witness who is able to confess the *shahada* is necessary (“Kuandama kwa mwezi,” *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, April 1988).
73 The same *hadith* plays a role in the argumentation of local moon-sghters (see Tape Anonymous, *Mawaidha ya hitilifu za mwezi wa Ramadani kuonekana au kufungua*).
74 The same opinion on the value of *ijtihad* independent of its truth can be found in the article “Do different times of moonrise matter?” at http://www.islam-qa.com/index.php?QR=1248&ln=eng (accessed 11 August 2006): “…the one who has the correct opinion will have two rewards, one for being right and one for making *ijtihad*; the
one whose opinion is wrong will still be rewarded for his ijtihaad. This point of view is disputed (cf. Fadel, *Validity of Ijtihad*).

77 Dumila, *Siku ya Arafat*, p. 3.
80 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, *Kitabu Arafa*, p. 68.
82 Bachu, *Ufafanuzi*, passim.
88 Interview, Muhamed Seleman, 30 November 2000.
89 Interview, IPC teacher, 31 October 2000.
92 Interview Adamu, Tanga, 19 May 2002; according to Adamu Ramadan is ‘just very heavy’, and on the Idd el-Hajj the social aspects of the community are central: rembermbering the dead, the prisoners and the afflicted.
95 Badawi, *Siynam*, p. 6. Knappert (1970) takes the *umma* as a basic concept of Islamic belief in East Africa. The *hajj* in his opinion is an effort to achieve this unity on earth.
98 The text of Q 21:92 “This is your Umma. It is one Umma: and I am your Lord,” is also popular. Cf. al-Fikrul Islami (49); Nyello, “Kwanini tusisali Idd siku moja (jibu),” *an-Nuur* 198.
99 “Nifanyeje?” *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, May 1988; The ‘lost sheep’ is a reference to the Bible (Matthew 15:24).
102 “Jambo hili la kufungua siku ya Iddi ni baya sana hata Mtume (SAW) akasema ya kuwa anayefungu siku ya Iddi basi amekuwa shetani” (Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 2000).
Notes Chapter 8

1 Abu Kisha (“Sheikh Salum Msabaha una agenda gani na WaIslamu?” an-Nuur 196, 9 April 1999, p. 5) phrased this process as follows: “…nikiwa kambi ya kitaifa niliweza kuvutwa na hoja zake mpaka nikashawishika na hoja zake na kurudi kwenye kambi yake”; The Zanzibar born bin Yusuf: “In March 1999, due to being disgruntled with the local leadership, my wife and I decided to move from Local (or Regional) Sighting to following Global Sighting” at www.swahilionline.com (accessed 4 January 2006).

2 This section only deals with the Qadiani ideas on the Idd date which are different from the Lahore branch. For example, the UK Ahmadiyya Lahore community follows the Idd date predetermined by astronomers since 1978. Aziz, Moon-sighting confusion again, p. 2; In a personal letter, Dr. Aziz explained that the Lahore branch does not have an official point of view, but local communities are free to decide their own (18 December 2005). This makes them clearly different from the more centralised Qadiani community.


5 Mapenzi ya Mungu, April 1971.

6 Mapenzi ya Mungu, November 1982, p. 4.

7 “Je, tufuate mwezi wa nchi gani?” Mapenzi ya Mungu, January 2001.


9 Ibid.

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15 According to their website www.aaiil.org.
17 Idd el-Fitr sermon 14 November 2002, Zahid Aziz.
18 This text functions in Ahmadiyya discourse to condemn all improper actions, cf. “Ingieni majumbani kutoka milangoni,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1982.
21 In 1978, the Lahore branch also implemented a new scientific method of Idd calculation. The connection between this new system and the excommunication from the Islamic community seems likely.
22 “Sherehekeeni Idi kubwa sawa na tarehe ya Makka, ” Mapenzi ya Mungu, April 1972.
26 “Umoja, umoja, umoja!” Mapenzi ya Mungu, November 1978.
27 But see the expression “Idil-haji” in Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1984.
30 “We don’t have bishops or monks we just have the Qur’an and the Sunna as our leaders,” an-Nuur 467, 4 October 2002, p. 3.
32 Khamis Abdurrahman, Mwezi Ko-ongo, p.1.
34 An-Nuur, 17 September 1999, p. 5-6; Idd el-Hajj 2004 the issue was raised again in Dar es Salaam (“Bakwata msipotoshe suala la Kadhi,” an-Nuur 549, 20 February 2004, p. 10).
35 Abu Bakar, “Tatizo la mwezi,” al-Ma’arif (2), September 2001, pp. 14-15. The author proposes a Syear experiment in which everyone should follow the kadh’s decision, even if he does not agree with it. “Only in this way we will be able to protect our unity (kuhifadhhi umoja wetu) in these two religious Islamic duties: fasting and Idd celebration.”
36 The khitma-rituals took place at the BAKWATA-owned Jumuiya school, Tanga, Sunday 28 April 2002; BAKWATA’s ambition to unite Muslims under a muti is evident in the name of one of their institutions: “Mfuko wa Tahfidh Qur’an chini ya Mutfi wa Tanzania,” an-Nuur 182, 1 January 1999, p. 11.
38 Al-Haq (19), April 2002.
See, for example “Mufti buried at his Tanga home,” *The Guardian*, 10 April 2002, pp. 1, 4, 5.

For AMYC discourse on BAKWATA see Tapes, Barahiyan, *BAKWATA mkono wa kanisa* (vol I, III); *BAKWATA dhidi ya Ansaar*; also, their mosque classes occasionally functioned as a platform to criticise BAKWATA practices (Barahiyan reacted to the funeral during the class of 26 April 2002).


“It, kuna mkono wa Marekani?” *an-Nuur* 600, 28 January 2005.

Rashid Juma Othman, “Jenerali on Monday imualike Mufti Hemed,” *an-Nuur* 414, 5 February 2002, p. 5; Many books and articles have been written on and against BAKWATA. See for example Magora, *Bakwata ni adui mkubwa wa Uislamu*, (1981); Ahmadh, *Bakwata and the administration of Islamic Law*. For more titles see Chande (1998).


The relationship between state and religion on Zanzibar is different from the mainland. Friday prayers on Zanzibar include prayers for the President (Topan 2000). Becker (1968:43) mentions that a reference to the Sultan was included in the Friday *khutba* in Dar es Salaam at the beginning of the 20th century.


Mwalimu Kai Mwalimu (“Kufunga siku za Iddi,” *an-Nuur* 603, 18 February 2005, p. 9) asks the reader: where is the field of Arafa? Is it in Kwerekwe, Jangwani, Malindi (places on Zanziber) or perhaps near Mecca?


Also in the Tanzanian press, this Arafa connection is put forward as their most salient characteristic (cf. “Waislamu wa Answar Sunna kufunga Arafa kesho,” *Alasiri* 30 January 2004).

Cf. *an-Nuur* 79, October 1996, *an-Nuur* 232; “Manispaa waichachamilia Shule ya Kiislamu Ubungo,” *an-Nuur* 560, 30 April 2004; *an-Nuur* 607, 18 March 2005; Riyadh is probably not a reference to the Saudi capital but to the famous Lamu mosque Riyadh al-Salihin (Sacred Meadows). Both refer, of course, to the notion of ‘garden’ as synonymous to ‘paradise’.

At first glance the name Imamu Shafii for one of the Ansaar schools in Tanga seems odd. However the piety of the Islamic law school founders is not contested, but rather the blind following of a single school.

*Al-Haq* 18, 22 February 2002.

61 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafu, p. 57. This interpretation is contested by Dumila, Siku ya Arafat, p. 13.
62 Cf. Saleh Farsy, Qurani Takatifu, Sura 89.
64 Note the reference to time according to the Western calendar to prevent any misunderstanding.
65 Khamis Abdurrahman, Mwezi ko-ongo, p. 21; Mtawazi, Pambo la waja wema, pp. 18-20.
66 The Fiqh council of North America: “… requests all Muslims in the United States and Canada to celebrate the Eid with the hajjis on the same day that they stand in prayer in the masjid al Heef at Mina, celebrating the praises of Allah for the bounty that he has granted them. In this way our prayers may include them and their prayers may include us” (“Element of place is dominant in eid al Adha,” at: http://www.ummah.net/moon-sighting/fatawah/isna.htm (accessed 11 August 2006).
67 Bahasaniy, Rai za wanazuoni, p. 125-126 (between square brackets his added interpretation of this hadith towards local moon-sighting); Dumila, Siku ya Arafat, p. 11.
68 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafu, pp. 24-25.
69 Mtawazi, Pambo la waja wema, pp. 18-20.
70 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafu, p.75.
71 Interview, Saidi Musa, Dar es Salaam, 27 October 2000; perhaps it is due to this standpoint that a Shia bookseller in Moshi described Saidi Musa as a Wahhabi (interview 25 January 2000).
73 Tape, Suluhisho, III, side B, transcript p. 17.
74 “Saud Arabia mfano wa kuigwa,” an-Nuur 336, 12 March 2001, p. 11.
76 The four pictures appeared on the front page of an-Nuur 600, 28 January 2005.
79 Tape, Anonymous, Mawaidha ya hitilafu za mwezi wa Ramadani kuonekana au kufungua, transcript p 8.
80 Cf. “Fitina za Jarida,” al-Ma’arif (1), June 2001, p. 16; his Sharh usul al-iman is often quoted (cf. Muhammad Abdallah Riday, Tawhid: msingi wa dini ya uislam) and his hajj manual How to perform the rituals of hajj and Umra is sold in the English edition. Some of his works like Tahara na Salah and Athari za maasi kwa mtu binafsii na kwa jamii are translated into Swahili. Publishers of all these works usually have some connection with the Arabic heartlands (e.g. Africa Muslim Agency, al-Muntada al-Islami Trust, al-Haramain Foundation).
82 Interview, Seleman, Tanga, 30 November 2000.
83 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafu, p. 64; Bahasaniy, Rai za wanazuoni, p. 35,48.
84 Darani, Uzushi, pp. 19-20.
85 Mapenzi ya Mungu, March 2002; Darani, Uzushi; Darani, Bid’ ya Arafah (pamphlet).
87 Darani, Uzushi, p. ii, passim.
89 Bahasaniy, Rai za wanazuoni, p.118.
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90 Cf. Saleem, “Concerning the dates for Eid-ul-adha and hajj.”
91 Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1984; March 2002.
93 Eyewitness reports mention that quite a few pilgrims fast on the Day of Arafa (cf. Jeenah 2000).
94 Saleem, “Concerning the dates for Eid-ul-adha and hajj.”
95 Cf. Tayob (2003); Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabo Arafa, p. 27.
96 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabo Arafa, pp 26-27.
97 Dumila, Siku ya Arafat, p. 1, 11.
98 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabo Arafa, p. 73.
99 Cf. “Kiswahili kitumike,” Nasaha 42, 5 April 2000, p. 7; “Kiswahili lugha yangu,” Nasaha 42, 5 April 2000, p. 7; “Kasumba inakwamisha Kiswahili kuwa lugha ya kufundisha,” an-Nuur 246, 24 March 2000, p. 7; it is the Islamic University in Morogoro that advocates the role of Swahili on an international level (“Chuo Kikuu cha Kiislam Moro chakivalia njuga Kiswahili,” Nasaha 376, 3 May 2006, p. 4); on Swahili and state ideology see Blommaert 1999; the author does not pay any attention to the role of religion in his study.
100 The slogan “umoja ni fardhi” (unity is obligatory) is often used. See, for example, the advertisement for a political rally in 1999 in an-Nuur 193, p. 4. The khitma in remembrance of Hajat Bii Aziza Bint Omar was announced in an-Nuur 404. Every Muslim was invited for this exalted duty in order to show unity and tenacity (“Waislamu wote kwa jumla mnatakiwa kujitokeza kwa wingi leo [… ] katika shughuli hii adhimu ya kuonyesho usoja na mshikamano wetu”).
106 The late BAKWATA mufti sheikh Hemed warned against the system, according to al-Haq (19), April 2002.
107 Mapenzi ya Mungu, April 1965.
111 Ponda, Mauaji ya wananchi Mwembechai p. 9; on the relation between the Mwembechai incident and the Idd controversy see also Njozi, Mwembechai killings.
114 Moses, “Swala la Idd el-Hajj kufanyika kesho,” Majira 11 Februari 2003; “FFU wapiga waislamu wakiswali iddi,” Majira, 12 February 2003; FFU was represented in Mzalendo (26 May 2002) as Fanyu Fujo Uone (causes disturbance, be aware); “FFU wmawaga risasi,” Nipashe, 22 February 2003; The Guardian, 22 February 2003; Nipashe Jumapili, 23 February 2003; On Zanzibar, the mufti has the legal power to allow religious meetings or to forbid them according to sheria nr. 9, 2001.
115 Idd prayers were performed from 24 to 26 November. Mpoki Bukuku, “Ansvar Sunna wadawida kuswali kabila,” Majira 25 November 2003; I have the impression that state interference in the Idd el-Hajj occurs more frequently than in the Idd el-Fitr.
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119 See his tape Hukmu za Kuishi katika Miji ya Makafiri.
123 See Appendix IV. In his mosque classes he also used the word quite often, e.g. 3 May 2003. Ustadh Hashimu Mbonde went to jail for 9 months; he was accused of calling the government “kafir” (“serikali ni ya kikafiri,” an-Nuur 374, p.1). By following the taghut laws (“sheria za kitwaghuti”) in deciding the Idd dates, the BAKWATA mufti leads the umma astray (Mwalimu Kai Mwalimu, “Kufunga siku za Iddi,” an-Nuur 603, 18 February 2005, p. 9). The Anti-Terrorism Bill 2002 was another attempt of the taghut powers to suppress Islam (“Dhana ya ugaidi kwa jicho la Uislamu,” Nasaha 175, 30 October 2002, p. 10).
124 Bachu, Ufatanuzi, pp. 78-81. In defense of national unity the LM respond that also the boundaries of Medina and Sham (Syria) were drawn by unbelievers (Juma al-Mazrui, Mwezi muandamo, 10).
127 This paragraph is a summary of his article “Kwanini tusisali Idd siku moja (jibu),” an-Nuur 198, 23 April 1999, p. 12.
128 The same argument of unity to be found at the tape, Anonymous, Mawaidha ya hitilafu za mwezi wa Ramadani kuonekana au kufungua, transcript p. 12.
129 This paragraph is a summary of his article “Umoja wa Kiislamu katika swala ya Iddi,” an-Nuur 200, 7 May 1999, p. 12.
130 Ahmad Abdallah Al-Amoudi (Tanga) explains how BAKWATA’s restricted geographical opinion of the umma resulted in the negligence of Muslim martyrs in Sudan, Bosnia and Kossovo. In a reductio ad absurdum argument he claims that the BAKWATA attitude leads to the valuation of the hajj as ultimately unimportant because Mecca ‘is outside the borders of East Africa’ (“Kama Bakwata ndio hii mimi pia siitaki!” an-Nuur 182, 1 January 1999, p. 12.
132 Ponda, Mauaji ya wananchi, p. 9; Rayhana, “Kutokusali Idi siku moja sio tatizo,” an-Nuur 202, 21 May 1999 p. 12; al-Huda (11), 18 December 2003; a Christian contributor to a Swahili internet discussion: “Now you Muslims on this board, please inform the govern-ment how to deal with this announcement of seeing the moon so we don’t get another Mwembechai,” (“sasa nyinyi wasilamu wa humu bodini naomba muishauri serikali jinsi ya kulishughulika hii tamko la kuandama kwa mwezi ili kusitokee mwembechai nyingine”) at http://www.bcstimes.com/discussions/viewtopic.php?p=2540&sid=1890c20db60ca10ab599951b8e73342 (accessed 28 March 2006).
133 “Kuwa Muislamu Tanzania ni kuwa mhalifu,” an-Nuur 558, 23 April 2004, p. 8; a similar emphasis on Muslims as citizens (wananchi) of a secular state with civic rights (instead of believers) can be witnessed in many an-Nuur articles for example “Mwananchi ana-posema afadhali ya kufa kuliko kunyanyaswa,” an-Nuur toleo maalum, 3 August 1999, p. 4.
134 al-Fikrul Islami (49).
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2 This paragraph is based on the 165 documents in file 29144, TNA from 29 October 1940 until 12 October 1948.

3 The picture in Taifa Weekly (15 December 1973) shows only Asians.

4 Michael Wolfe (1993:155) writes "I had not expected to see so many women..."

5 One of the few eyewitness reports of this period mentions how a Dar es Salaam family managed to send almost all their male members on hajj, except for the wife who was represented by someone else (hajji badal); “Dr. Dar amehiji Makka,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, May 1970, pp. 1,6.


7 Cf. Tape, Nassor Bachu, Hijja, side B. The preacher elaborates on the differences between male and female pilgrims whereas the original text of the book he comments on does not provide an immediately occasion to do so; Shabani Kaifta, Hijja na maamrihsa yake.

8 Tape, TMHT, Masuala na jawabu, (II).

9 Kermalli, umra, p. 18; “Umuhimu na nafasi ya Ibada ya Hija katika Uislamu-3,” an-Nuur 195, 2 April 1999, p. 13. Elaborate discussions exist on the use of anti-conceptive pills to

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stop menstruation in order to perform the hajj. Cf. 'Hatimy, The Rites, p. 22-23; Manji, Performing Hajj-e-Tamattu, p. 31; Swahili fora like "Maswali na majibu," at: www.uiismu.org.

10 Cf. advertisement "Khidmat Islamiya," an-Nuur 483, 6 December 2002, p. 5; whereas men receive the white garments of the afterlife, women must wear national dress!

11 Apart from sermons this comparison between Tanzania and Nigeria can be found in "Mahujaji waondoka," an-Nuur 243, 3 March 2000; "Dr Dar amehiji Makka," Mapenzi ya Mungu, May 1970.


15 The estimated number of pilgrims in these periods is based on applications and is often higher than the actual numbers of the hajjis who really got a visa. Reports often mention problems in 'getting foreign valuta' (TafISA Weekly, 15 December 1973).


17 Although occasionally the rich pilgrims are encouraged to sponsor the sacred journey for the poor instead of going on hajj more than once (Kiongozi, 26 January 2002, p. 3).


19 In 1986 hajjis complained about the organisation: everyone had to take care of himself ('karibu kila mtu na lake') Mapenzi ya Mungu, October 1986, pp.1,2,4.

20 "Wasihitaki Bakwata?" Mapenzi ya Mungu, October 1986.


22 Mwinyi, Mwito kwa waislam kuimarisha umoja wao, p. 39.

23 The hajj secretary in Tanga told me only 12 candidates from Tanga region registered in 2000.

24 Mwinyi, Mwito kwa waislam kuimarisha umoja wao, p. 39; BALUKTA stands for Baraza la Uendelezaji Koran Tanzania (association for the spread of the Qur'an in Tanzania). Some of its leaders were behind the 1993 pork riots (cf. Lodhi and Westerlund 1997). This was one of the reasons for the government to abolish the organisation on 27 April 1993 (Mtanzania 27 April 2002, p. 10).


26 Shi'ites also publish their own preparatory material in English and Gujarati (seldom in Swahili). See Kermalli, umra; Manji, Performing Hajj-e-tamattu.


32 "Zanzibar Hajj Group, an-Nuur 399, 7 December 2001.

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36 The number of 300 is their own logistic limit, but in the future they plan an increase to 350 -400 (interview Jabry, Dar es Salaam 19 June 2002; “Hajj Trust yaongeza huduma kwa mahujaji,” Nasaha 82, 10 January 2001, p. 4); TMHT warns against illegal, unregistered hajj companies which ‘make your hajj invalid’ (Nasaha 181, 11 December 2002).
40 Cf. Warsha, Nguzo, p. 53-54. For the benefits of each see tape TMHT, Masuala na jawabu, side A.
41 Sayid Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunna (I), p. 466; Muhammad Salim Zagar, Muongozo wa Hijja, p. 9; ‘l-Hatimy, Rites, p.37. Bin Yusuf, The Hajj Experience & A Visit to the City of the Prophet (SAW), p. 5; Hajj-tamattu is described as the most profitable form for those coming from far: ‘at-Tamatu ndio aina bora zaidi na yenye nafuu kubwa kwa wale wanaotoka mbali’ (“Umuhimu na nafasi ya Ibada ya Hija katika Uislamu-3,” an-Nuur 195, 2 April 1999, p. 13); “Ibada ya hijja,” al’Istiqama, January 2002, p. 25. All Tanzanians I have spoken to and who have lived for some time in Saudi Arabia used to perform the hajj in the ifrad modus: Zahrau principal Suleiman Mbwana (interview Tanga, 4 December 2000); Zubeir Ally performed an ifrad hajj when living in Saudi Arabia, but the tamattu after his return to Tanzania (Interview Tanga 11 December 2000); Mbwana Malau (Interview Tanga, 29 November 2000). Some Tanzanians even claim that the hajj-tamattu is required for all those living at least 16 farsakh from Mecca and beyond (Manji, Performing Hajj-e-Tamattu, p. 1; Muhammad Jawad al-Mughniyya, al-Kashif II, s.v Q 2:196).
42 Kermalli, umra-e-Mufrida, p. 2. Scholars differ on the opinion if this is allowed. See for some of the opinions ‘l-Hatimy, Rites, p. 36.
43 “Umuhimu na nafasi ya ibada ya hijja katika uislamu-3,” an-Nuur 195, 2 April 1999, p. 13. Some sources claim that the qiran option has been abrogated (www.allaahuakbar.net/eid/sharing_in_udhiyah.htm) accessed 20 February 2003.
45 On the importance of the vaccinations Nasaha reports in “Hajj Trust yaeleza umuhimu wa chanjo kwa Mahujaji,” Nasaha 87, 14 February 2001, p. 4.
48 In less than a decade hajj-prices more than doubled. For 1999 the average price was somewhere around 700,000 Shilling or 1000 US Dollar (IPC, Elimu ya Dini ya Kiislam, III}


52 an-Nuur 399, 7 December 2001.


54 Apparently also other agencies profitted from the same price reduction. Tanzania Muslim Hajj Trust mentioned USD 1480 in December 2001, and changed its price in January 2002 to USD 1300 (an-Nuur 402, 21 December 2001).


57 an-Nuur 220, 24 September 1999.


60 Mwinyi, Mwito, p. 38-39.


63 Islamic Watch, August 1992, p. 3.


66 Mwinyi, Mwito p. 31.


69 "Nilivyojifunza katika hijja," contribution on a seminar on 23-24 September 2000 by Mwalimu Musa Omar, Dar es Salaam (Mafenzi ya Mungu, September 2000, p. 5). Personal hajj experiences and eyewitness reports are hardly printed but have started to appear on the Swahili internet.

70 See for example al’istiqama (January 2002, pp. 28-29) describing two pages of ‘makosa katika ihram, makosa katika tawafu, makosa katika kupunguza nywele kwa hija au umra, makosa yatokezaayo kwenye kisimamo cha Arafah, makoso kwenye kiwanja cha Muz-dalifa; makosa wakati wa kulenga jamrati’ and so on.

Among the many Arabic and a few English books I have purchased in Tanzania I can mention here: Anonymous Ghursa al-sawab (Ruwi, Oman n.d., 42 pp.); Abbas Abdallah Fida’, Manasik al-hajj wa al-umara wa ziyara al-madina al-munawwara (Mecca, 1395 H., 80 pp.); Banoo, Duas for Hajj and Umrah (Delhi, 1992, 74 pp.); Kamal, Everyman’s Guide to hajj and umra (Delhi, 1997, 115 pp.).
A good example is the TMHT tape Masuala na jawabu. Apart from the pilgrimage supplications the first Arabic quotation is mentioned at the end of the tape dealing with the polemical issue of the visit to the graves.


Cf. Lazarus Yafeh (1981:106, n.56); “Ibada ya hijja,” (al’istiqama, January 2002, p. 28) warns the pilgrim for putting on the ihram too late, when the plane already has arrived in Jeddah; this should be compensated by a sacrifice. Some sources condemn donning ihram in the plane because then one of the ihram taboos is broken by travelling under shade (Kermalli, umra-e-Mufrida, p. 5). Muhammad bin Yusuf first put on his ihram clothes but expressed his intention when he arrived at one of the miqaat (The Hajj Experience, p. 4).

Others allow the umbrella (‘I-Hatimy, Rites, p. 15).

People easily lose track of the number of completed circles. A Swahili pilgrim asks on the internet whether it would be problematic to have more than seven rounds completed (www.uslamu.org/q&a/index5.html).

The Muhammad bin Yusuf writes: “It has been on my mind for so many years to visit the Ka’bah, not necessarily to perform hajj” (The Hajj Experience, p. 1).

‘I-Hatimy, Rites, p. 22.

“Sikukuu ya Idil-Haj,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1984. al-Wansharisi (Mi’yar, vol. I, pp. 442-43) mentions the explanation that a human hart is at the left side of the body and this noble part should be as close as possible to the Ka’ba. Another explanation found in South Africa: the movement of the tawaf starts towards the right, and that is the auspicious direction for Muslims (Abdelkader Tayob, pers. comm.). On two different occasions I witnessed how children were beaten and kicked as a punishment for using the left hand in social interactions (for example receiving a sheet of paper or offering coffee).


Most people do not know this, ‘I-Hatimy (Rites of hadj and umra, pp. 12-13) assumes.


Cf. al-Habshy, Tafsiri ya Risalatul Jamia, pp. 6-7; al-Mazrui, Hidayatul attaf, p. 123; Lemu, Tawhid, p. 164. Some Shafi’ites include a 6th pillar (performing all 5 pillars in the right order) and another compulsory act (abstaining from forbidden things in ihram state): Mazrui, Hidayatul attaf, 57. For only three nguzo (ihram, Arafa, tawaf ya ifadha), see www.uslamu.net. Donning ihram is included in two categories (both as a pillar and as a compulsory act) in Abdul Jabbar, Misingi ya kitiqhi, p. 34 and al-Mazrui, Hidayatul attaf, p. 123.

Mazrui, Hidayatul attaf, p. 57.


IPC, Maarifa ya uslam, III, p. 72; The ancient word tarwiya might refer to a water cult, or to the fact that Muslim pilgrims provide themselves with water for their journey (Lazarus Yafeh 1981:22), or to the dream of Ibrahim in which God showed him to sacrifice his son (Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafa, p. 61).
Secondary sources sometimes interpret the Arafa ritual as a ‘manifest trial. The pilgrims must stand from high noon to sunset seeking repentance for themselves and others. The sun shines hot and they must neither eat nor drink, nor shield their heads...’ (Combs-Schilling 1989:74); Jeenah (2000) witnessed an ailing woman who insisted on fasting the day of Arafa. In general these reports do not match Tanzanian discourse of Arafa which emphasises that eating, drinking and almost all other actions are allowed during the 9th Dhulhija.


Shabani Kaifta (Hijja na maamrisha yake) does not translate the Arabic Arafa prayers in his manual.

Rites, p. 18, 22, passim.

‘I-Hatimiy, Rites, p. 46.

For this reason Michael Wolfe (1993:121) recorded his friend’s prayers on tape to play them during the hajj. Lambek (1993:106) reports that on Mayotte people even pay pilgrims to ensure their prayers are brought to the right spot.


In Tanzanian reports these prayers for the deceased loved ones are often present: ‘...na waliyo fika huko, kina baba warehemu, ya Rabli Mola Karimu, wanusuru Mahujaji’ poem “Wanusuru mahujaji,” an-Nuur 246, 24 March 2000.


The author of the tape Masuala na jawabu (TMHT, tape II, side A) inserts this warning because he witnessed many Tanzanian hajjis doing this.

For accounts of the trial see Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafa, pp. 46-47.

Ibid., p. 46.

This makes the hajj a family event. More than any other Islamic ritual the hajj represents the total community. Women and children are explicitly drawn into the orbit of religious sacrificial practices in Kazim (Essays on Islamic topics, p. 118).

Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafa, p. 44.

‘I-Hatimiy, Rites, p. 58.


Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafa, p. 43.


www.channel4.com/life/microsites/H/haji/gend_three_sacrif.html (accessed 26 August 2005); Other eyewitnesses: Ibrahim Usman observed pilgrims hurling slippers and umbrella’s (‘Journey of faith,” at: http://news.biafranigeria.com/archive/2003/mar/22/0193.html; sandal traders are doing a very good business near the three pillars
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114 ‘l-Hatimy, Rites, p. 63.
117 Tape TMHT, Masuala na jawabu, II.
118 Saudi authorities feel obliged to allow individual sacrifices outside the abattoirs because of the prophetic statement: “I slaughtered (nahartu) here, but the whole of Mina is the place of slaughtering (manhari);” cf. Miyanji, Righteous Pilgrimage, p. 24.
119 The Hajj Experience.
121 Interview Saeed Akhtar Rizvi, Dar es Salaam 26 October 2000.
123 Bin Yusuf, The Hajj Experience.
126 “Dr Dar Amehiji Makka,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, May 1970; Bin Yusuf, The Hajj Experience & A Visit to the City of the Prophet.
127 Taifa Weekly, 15 December 1973. The 18th century Hadramaut scholar Abdalla Ibn Alawi al-Haddad whose works are widely available in Tanzania and Kenya comments: “It is churlish to go to the House of God for Hajj and then neglect to visit God’s Beloved for no overwhelming reason,” (The book of Assistance, p. 75).
128 One quarter of the TMHT audio tapes Masuala na jawabu deals with this issue.
130 Bin Yusuf, The Hajj Experience.
136 Keller, The Reliance of the Traveller, p. 357.
137 Zagar, Muongozo wa Hijja, p. 7.
138 Shabani Kaifita, Hijja na maamrisho yoke.
139 Bin Yusuf, The Hajj Experience.
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Table 9.1

i ‘Foreign pilgrims’ only refers to non-residents. Usually the total number of pilgrims (including the Saudi residents) is at least twice the number of foreign pilgrims. For example in 1977 55% of the hajjis were living in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

ii 1488 according to Taifa Weekly, 15 December 1973. This source claims that several Tanzanians took this occasion to stay behind in order to earn money as illegal workers.

iii 8 Dhulhija 1393 H. corresponds with 1 January 1974 and therefore the hajj 1394 H. took place in the same Gregorian year 1974. Rush (1993) has some mistakes in the corresponding Gregorian calendar.


v 636 from the mainland (Constantin 1998).

vi 656 from the mainland (Constantin 1998).

vii 550 from the mainland (Constantin 1998).

viii 660 from the mainland (Constantin 1998).


x From 1988 onwards the Saudi Statistical Yearbook only mentions total number of foreign pilgrims.


xii For the years 1413 H. to 1415 Fouad al-Farsy (2004:28) gives the much lower numbers 905 thousand, 918 thousand and 982 thousand.


xvi “900 kwenda Hija mwaka huu,” an-Nuur 414, 5 February 2002, p. 16 (the author excludes the 80 Twelver Shi’ites and 45 Bohora Muslims).


Table 9.5

i To include the shaving among the pillars is characteristic for Shafi’ite practice (Nassor Khamis Abdurrahman, Mwezi ko-ongo, p. 20); although some Shafi’ites exclude it (Rippin and Knappert 1986/92).

Notes Chapter 10


2 Cf. tape Kilemile, Nafasi za Umma.

3 “Sikukuu la Idil hajj,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1984. I only consider here the symbolic value of the hajj in Tanzanian discourse and not the experience of the hajjis them-
selves. In reality the pilgrimage often emphasises the local identities and the national differences rather than their unity (Tayob 200:108-111; Delaney 1990).


7 Cf. the Swahili poem ‘Chuo cha Herekali’ where Ali answers the Prophet’s call when the latter cries out in the desert at a time of great distress. Ali responded ‘labbaika labbaika samiatu’ (Knappert 1967:193).

8 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislam III, p. 70.

9 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislam III, p. 136. See also the story of Michael Jansen who relates how she overcame her tender heartedness towards animals and decided to strictly adhere to Qur’anic and sunna precepts concerning the sacrifice (Aramco world magazine, The hajj, pp. 30-39).

10 Sermon Barahiyan, 1997, appendix IV; Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafa, p. 48).

11 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislam III, p. 66.

12 Mwinyi, Mwito, p. 32; ‘the great lesson we learn from the sacrifice is that a Muslim must obey God in all situations even if it involves killing or being killed’ (’Idd Mubarak Waislamu wote,” an-Nuur 94, 17 April 1997, p. 14).

13 “Umuhimu wa Hijja,” an-Nuur 243, 3 March 2000; Note that some hajj organisations also operate as normal travel agencies.


18 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislam III, pp. 73-74; IPC, Elimu ya dini III, p. 137.


23 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislam III, p. 68.


25 ‘l-Hatimy, Rites, p. 58.


27 Mapenzi ya Mungu, June 1972.

"I-Hatimy, Rites, pp. 82-86; the article on the significance of the hajj ("Ibada ya Tawaf kwa Mahujaji"); an-Nuur 243, 2 March 2001, pp 6-7) is illustrated by a picture of young girls, all heavily veiled. The caption reads: 'It is good to prepare the young in the Islamic rules so they may build a better society (jamii bora).


34 Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1975; Mapenzi ya Mungu August 1978.


38 "Jiwe jeusi," Mapenzi ya Mungu, August 1983.


45 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislamu III, p. 68; makhalifa as a synonym for mahujaji is also found in the poem "Nendeni salama mahujaji," (Nasaha 36, 23 February 2000, p. 7); 'kwa muhtasari lengo la Ibada ya Hijja ni kumuandaa mja kuwa Khalifa wa Mwenyezi Mungu (s.w.) hapa ulimwenguni' (IPC, Elimu ya dini III, p. 126).


48 Grunebaum (1951:32) wrote about the hajj as a martial operation accompanied by military music, shouting and gunfire.


51 Cf. Mapenzi ya Mungu, April 1971; March 1975; March 1996.


55 "Ibada ya hijja ni dihirisho la utukufu wa Allah," Mapenzi ya Mungu, March 2001. The Ahmadiyya consequently translate jihad as spiritual warfare and effort rather than physical fighting (cf. their translation of an-Nawawi, Bustani za watawa, p. 309). The AMYC director Barahiyan occasionally contests this interpretation in his sermons and classes, pointing towards the other meaning of jihad as real violence.

56 'Kupiga kwenu mawe jamarati kuwape mori (animal like ferocity) na dhamira ya kuja kupambana na madhalimu wa Waislamu' an-Nuur 243, 3 March 2000; The same

58 "Vazi la ithram," an-Nuur 331, 27 February 2001, p.7; 'askari wa Allah' and 'mwanajeshi wa Kislamu': 'Ibada ya Tawaf kwa Mahujaji,' an-Nuur 332, 2 March 2000, pp. 6-7; "Umuhimu wa Hijja," an-Nuur 243, 3 March 2000, pp. 9,14; Ihram clothes as soldier's uniform, hajjis as 'army of the King' (jeshi la Mfalme) in: "Ujumbe kwa mahujaji," an-Nuur 243, 3 March 2000; for more 'battle metaphors' and the comparison between the hajj and jihad see IPC, Elimu ya Dini III, p. 125, passim (kuipigania dini ya M/Mungu). On the topic of obedience in ritual matters compared with martial obedience see Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1966 (fasting on the day of the Idd is like a disobedient soldier who refuses to rest).

59 "Vazi la ithram," an-Nuur 331, 27 February 2001; this article bears a striking resemblance with IPC, Elimu ya dini III, pp 129.
62 Sometimes referred to as the third pillar (Mapenzi ya Mungu, October 1974) or the fourth pillar ("Mahujaji warejea nyumbani, IPP media, 30 January 2006); "Introduction to hajj" at: http://groups.msn.com/stonetownZanzibar/general.msnw?action=get_message&view=0&ID_Message=1270&LastModified=4675516599223346343 (accessed 25 April 2006).
65 IPC, Elimu ya dini III, p. 126.
68 Violent disruption of the hajj is mentioned in "Idul haji Agosti 5," Mapenzi ya Mungu, August 1987, p. 1.; See also Haarmann (1975); Van Leeuwen (1991).
71 "Mahujaji wailaani Marekani, Israeli," an-Nuur 144, 10 April 1998.
76 Adam Esmail, "Upotoshaji huu una lengo gani?", an-Nuur 17 April 1998, p. 5.
77 Wizara yaidhinisha kutukanwa Uislamu, an-Nuur 580, 10 September 2004, p. 3.
79 "Hajui Islam" (Mapenzi ya Mungu, November 1987, p. 2).
82 For a long time an-Nuur carried as a motto 'Fitna ni mbaya kuliko kuua. ' The government as the instigator of inter-Muslim fitna: "Serikali iache hadaa na fitna," an-Nuur 144, 10 April 1998, pp. 1-2.
Notes Chapter 11

2 Alternative date is 17th Ramadan 2 H. corresponding with 13 March 624.
3 See especially Sura 8 and the introduction by Saleh Farsy, Qurani Takatifu. pp 230-236.
4 Kermalli, Umr-o-Mufrida, p. 25.
6 References to Badr in the hajj discourse are rare but see Juma al-Mazrui, Mwezi muan-damo (10).
9 “Dua ya kumshitakia Allah (s.w.),” an-Nuur 483, 6 December 2002, pp. 6-7.
10 But see the exception of the rule in “Tuyazingatie haya,” (an-Nuur 586, 22 October 2004).
12 In Tanga the Madrasatul Shamsiyya played out the Badr victory on 29 June 1971, apparently on their annual ‘Tamta day’. See the page length (critical) description in Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1971; In Oujda (Morocco) an Islamist group commemorates the Battle of Badr in Ramadan (Van Nieuwkerk 2005:389).
13 The most common books available in Tanga are: Anonymous, Asma’ ahl badr (Mom-basa, 95 pp); Mustapha Rushdi Ibn Isma’il al-Dimishqi, Jabr al qasr fi nazm asma’ ahl al-badr; Cf. Becker 1968:55.
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15 For this double aspect (cure and curse) see the interesting cases in Swantz (1986:136,143 passim).


17 al-Fikrul Islami (37) p. 6; ibid. numbers 21 and 42. Abdalla Saleh Farsy condemned the cursing practice also but allowed the use of the Halbadiri and the ‘Tayyib al-asma’ as intercession prayers (tawassul) (“Fatawa,” Sauti ya Haki, May 1973, p. 5-6).


20 Cf. the opinion of some villagers in Mayotte that the Badr dua cannot be performed ‘dry’, without a sacrifice (Lambek 1993:123).

21 Protests started after reading the Badr in the new mosque of Chanika (Handeni), 5 May 1975. See Tanga Archives File A.6/8/I nr. 220.


23 Warsha, Shahada: Nguzo ya kwanza ya Uislam pp. 29-42.


27 Cf. Baghoza, Jihaad, Jel ia nendeela au imekufa?


33 Khamis Abdurahman, Mwezi ko-ongo, p. 20.

34 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafa, pp. 18-19.

35 See for different etymological explanations of the name Arafa “Historia na falsafa ya Hijja,” Maarifa (3), 16 January 2002, p. 6; Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafa, p. 20. Most sources play with the linguistic root of the name (‘r-f- : to know, recognise). At this place the angel Jibril asked prophet Ibrahim ‘arafta manasik hijjat” do you know the hajj rituals? The Arafa prayers connect to this semantic core (‘l-Hatimy, Rites, p. 46). Wheeler (2006:57) mentions some sources indicating that Adam and Eve had sexual intercourse on Arafa.

36 See appendix III. At least three different versions of this speech exist. See Ibn Hisham, Sirat al-nabbawiyya, reprint M. Khalil Hiras, Cairo, vol. 4, p. 251.

37 See for example Ahmad Kamal, ar-rihatul muqaddas, p. 78-80; Brisebarre (1998:94) relates how this sermon is annually read on the Idd el-Hajj in France.

RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS

43 Ebrahim Kazim, Essays on Islamic topics, p. 111; Ahmad Suvi, “Poleni kwa safari Mahujaji, an-Nuur 249, 14 April 2000 (‘Siku ililo muhimu, ni siku ile mwezi tisa / sisi huku kuhijimu, twafungu siku ya tisa / Kwenu ‘Arafa’ adhimu, hiyo siku ya kutisha’).
44 “Inatarajiwa Arafa kuangukia Ijumaa ya aani ‘Hajjul-akbar'” is advertised by the Sameja Hajj group (an-Nuur 185, 22 January 1999, p. 3); the same idea can be found on the coincidence of the Idd with a Friday. For a refutation see the chapter ‘ma huwa al-hajj al-akbar’ in: ‘Azzal-Din, Ma huwa al-Nasi, pp. 168-173.
45 I found evidence of 13 girls called Arafa from Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam and Moshi. Perhaps the best known Arafa is the director f the CUF Women Wing on Zanzibar, Arafa Shauri.
46 I came across five different men bearing this name from Tanga and Moshi. ‘Arafat (in the plural) is mentioned as a boys name in Arabic books like the Qamus al-asma’al-‘arabiyya wa-l maghribiyya wa tafsir ma’aniha by Dr. Hinna Nasr al-Matti. None of the eleven Islamic naming books I consulted listed Arafa among the girl’s names.
47 The Tanzanian discourse on naming and naming rituals is oral rather than written. I only found one Swahili naming manual (Uthman M. Ali, Majina ya kiislam), meant as a guideline for parents and only a few lines on naming in Bawazir (Haki ya mtoto mchanga katika Uislam). An English book by the Africa Muslim Agency briefly covers the subject (Menk, Social Conduct of a Muslim, p 7). Asking your name is like asking your religion (cf. tape Barahiyana, Kuchinja, transcript, p. 28). Names are changed after conversion. See also Middleton (1992:214,n.33).
50 “Mwanza wahimiza jihad,” an-Nuur 333, 6 March 2001, p. 3.
52 “Mwanza tunataka siku yetu ya mashahidi kanda ya Ziwa,” an-Nuur 238, 28 January 2000, p. 5.
53 “Mwanza wahimiza Jihad; Dar wasema kisasi ni haki,” an-Nuur 333, 6 March 2001, p.1,3. In class the incident was discussed as part of the lesson Arabic, standard VI, 17 April 2002. For a more detailed and contextualised description of the affair see Chande (1998:151-152).
54 “Bado mtu ataraji ku waelimisha wanaodhulumu kwa makusudi?,” Nasaha 90, 7 March 2001, p. 2.
55 “Maandamanmo yafana,” Nasaha 90, 7 March 2001, p. 3.
60 See ‘Bida Haji’; (at:www.admin.muslimsonline.com/~bern/hajjbidat2.html (accessed 15 February 2005) condemning the ‘imitation of the people of Arafah.” See also Hizmet...
Books, *Endless Bliss* (at www.hizmetbooks.org) “*it is makruh* for those who are not on Arafat to assemble at some place and do as the hajjis do on Arafah day.”

62 "*Mwanza wahimiza Jihad,*" *an-Nuur* 333, 6 March 2001, p. 3.
63 See for example Bachu, *Ufafanuzi*, pp. 97-98.
65 "*Upeo wa mwisho wa husuda,*" *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, May 1975, p. 2.
66 "*Historia ya Ka’ba Makkah hatarini,*" *an-Nuur* 504, 18 April 2003. The event that triggered this description was the looting of the Historical Museum in Baghdad.
69 For the link between the hajj sacrifice and the murder of Abel the son of Adam, see Brisebarre (1998:18) and references there. The world was created on the 10th DhulHijja, the Day of Sacrifice (Platti 1994:166). For the complex mythology of the Jewish temple and the spatial and temporal correlations between sacrifice and sacred sites see Smith (1982:84-85).
70 Interview madrasa Hudda, Tanga 7 December 2000.
72 Majid Hamza, “*Dua zenu yaa Hujaj,*” *an-Nuur* 243, 3 March 2000, p. 5.
78 “*Ibada ya Tawaf kwa Mahujaji,*” *an-Nuur* 332, 2 March 2001, pp. 6-7.
80 “*Sikukuu ya Iddil Haji,*” *an-Nuur* 328, 16 February 2001, p. 7; “*leo ni siku ya kuwa minna*” (Lassenga, *Khatuba za ijumaa kwa lugha ya kiswahili*, p. 124).
81 I use the word ‘paradigm’ as a loose equivalent to ‘cultural pattern’. A paradigm in the way I employ the term is close to Clifford Geertz’s use of ‘model’. A paradigm can be used to symbolically express a structural congruence between social realities, events or processes, either to improve our understanding of reality (a building can be reduced to an architectural plan; the plan is a ‘model’ of the actual building) or to model reality according to the blueprint provided by the paradigm (the architectural plan can be used to build a house; the plan has become a ‘model for’ the physical structure). More creative than a model, a paradigm is an elaborate performative metaphor, linking different domains together by contiguity or similarity (cf. Fernandez 1986:44-45). This definition must be distinguished from paradigm as “a cluster of conceptual and methodological presuppositions embodied in an exemplary body of scientific work” (Barbour 1990:33; cf. Kuhn 1973:10-11).
82 Popular Islamic paradigms in Tanzania are: Pharao and the Jews ("*Msitishike na siasa kongwe za Firauni,*" *an-Nuur* 251, 28 April 2000), the Holocaust ("*Tuondokane na maisha ya Sobibor,*" *an-Nuur* 252, 5 May 2000), Muhammad and the Jews ("*Mandela kuikoa Zanzibar,*" *an-Nuur* 575, 6 August 2004). On the importance of Islamic historical paradigms
to cope with current problems see “Umuhimu kuchanganya dini na historia,” Nasaha 177 & 178, 14 & 20 November 2002.
84 Anonymous, Swala ya sunna siku ya Arafa.
85 “Kuna soma katika kuchinja,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, February 2002. In non-Tanzanian hajj reports this redemptive and purificatory dimension of the sacrifice is visible, for example in Sangster (The torn veil) in which a Pakistani girl goes on hajj in order to be cured from her paralysis.
92 Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Ghafor ‘Atar, Qamus al-hajj wa-l ‘umra, p. 260-261 for both interpretations; See also the common tafsirs on Q 9:3 with the same expression.
97 Salim Hassan, Nabii Ibrahim wa kizazi chake, Mombasa 1972 (non vidi).
98 To be found in almost all articles on the hajj, but see ”Ibada ya Tawaf kwa Mahujaji,” an-Nuur 332, 2 March 2001, pp. 6-7.
99 Cf. Bonte (1999:21-27) emphasising the Ibrahimian model; Grandin (1978) and Graham (1983:68) claim that the hajj is actually a-mythical, only loosely connected to a ‘civilizing hero’. Schoneveld (1976) gives excellent examples how the Ibrahimian sacrificial story in Israeli literature is interpreted in various ways fitting different social and political agendas.
100 Ebrahim Kazim, Essays on Islamic topics pp. 112-116.
101 ‘l-Hatimy, Rites, p. 73; Tape TMHT, Masuala na jawabu.
103 “Umuhimu wa Hijja,” an-Nuur 243, 3 March 2000. Delaney (1998:180) mentions another variant: ‘…the three pillars represent the three pre-Islamic goddesses; These goddesses mentioned in the Qur’an function in the so-called satanic verses and are also linked with Satan and his attempt to deflect Muhammad from his mission.
NOTES

108 Recorded 25 February 2002, Maawa-l Islam, form III.
111 Muhammad’s first and only hajj-sacrifice also consisted of 100 camels; he killed 63 with his own hands ‘one for each year of his life’ while the remaining 37 were sacrificed by his closest blood relative ‘Ali (their fathers ‘Abdallah and Abu Talib were full brothers). On behalf of all his wives Muhammad sacrificed a single cow. Cf. Miyanji, Righteous Pilgrim-age, p. 24; Idd el-Hajj sermon Barahiyan, Appendix IV.

112 Qurani Takatifu, 37:103-107.
113 Cf. the sermon recorded in Tanga 6 March 2001 and Knappert (1971:35). The number of angels is not derived from the Qur’an that mentions only 3.000 and 5.000 angels as allied forces (Q 3:123-125). The same number of 70.000 angels appear in the hajj rituals as circling in the lowest heavens right above the Ka’ba.
114 Written on one of my questionnaires distributed at the madrasa Maawa-l Islam, March 2001.
115 See for an elaborate example the Shamsiyya Friday sermon of 17 May 2002.
116 Selfsacrifice, redemption and martyrdom are connected in the report on the death of the Palestinians Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdul Aziz Rantissi who are hailed as ‘wakombozi wa Waislamu’ (‘Sheikh Twalib ataka Waislamu wafuata nyayo za Sheikh Yassin,’ an-Nuur 560, 30 April 2004 p. 1,3).
117 The place Ghadir Khum between Mecca and Madina is taken by most Shi’ites as the place where Muhammad appointed ‘Ali as his rightful heir on his return from the Farewell Pilgrimage. 18 Dhulhija this event is celebrated. However some narrators situate this at Arafat. Material on this topic collected in Tanzania: Abu ‘Aziz al-Khatti, al-Tansib yawm al-Ghadir fi haq al-amir, Bahrayn: Dar irshad al-’ama; Sauti ya Bilal 26 (5); Nassir Makarim Shirazi, Tujuue Uimamu (4); Omar Jumaa Mayunga, Tarekh ya kiislam; Sauti ya Umma (76); Yusuf N. Lialjee, Ghadir E Khum.
118 ‘The political situation in which the imam (as.) lived and his martyrdom’ at: http://home.swipnet.se/islam/imams/4th_imam/chapter8.htm (accessed 12 April 2005).
119 See Dua Arafa (Arafa Supplication) and Dua arafa of Imam ali husayn bin Ali (Qom 2004).
120 The Hajj, the Ultimate Journey; cf. also Manji, Performing Hajj-e-Tamattu, p. 17.
122 The local commemorative events of Karbala as I witnessed them in Dar es Salaam en Tanga suggest that there are many similarities between the ways how religious communities ritually construct meaning with the help of historical paradigms. Processions, flags and banners, re-enactments and speeches occur both in the Sunni Arafa and Shi’a Karbala rituals. Cf. “Kila siku ni siku ya Ashura na kila ardhi ni ardhi ya Karbela,” Mwanchi 24 March 2002, p. 2.
125 Note the absence of Badr in the Ahmadiyya calendar. Other battles like Uhud (which was lost) and the confrontation at Tabuk and Dhat al-riqa (where no physical fighting took place) lend their names to Ahmadiyya months.
"Raie your voices and kill your animals".

126 "Upeo wa mwisho wa husuda," *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, May 1975. King Faisal was subsequently murdered by one of his family members as *Mapenzi ya Mungu* (September 1979, p. 4) mentions in the same context.

127 *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, December 1965; a similar interpretation of "Mecca" as equal to religious and social opponents in "Mbinu za Makafiri wa Makka katika kipindi cha Makka zu huilikisha Uislamu," *an-Nuur* toleo maalum, 3 August 1999, p. 9.


132 Cf. Chesworth (2000); Kawembwa Mohammed and Matata were among the founders of the preacher movement Umoja wa Wahubiri wa Kiislamu wa Mlingano wa Dini (UWAMD), using comparative religion as a missionary tool. For Deedat see Westerlund 2003.


134 *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, April 1965; On the link between sacrifice and circumcision in this narrative see Abdelsalam (1999:365).

135 The same two arguments repeated in *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, March 1970.


Notes Chapter 12

1 About 15 at the al-Nisa mosque, 2002. Between the khutba and the concluding announcements (which can take up a considerable time) many more people leave.


3 Interviews June 2002 in Bwagamacho, Matopeni, Sigaya (villages to the North of Tanga). Cf. also the situation in Mafia, where sacrifice on the Idd is rare (pers. comm. Pat Caplan, April 2005). On the other hand Rashed (1998:159-60) observed a higher sacrificial rate in Egyptian rural area's compared to cities.

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The same explanation evoked on the eve of the Idd el-Hajj 21 February 2002.

Lassenga, Khutba za ijumaa kwa lugha ya kiswahili, p. 124; Farsy, (Qurani Takatifu) translates: "Hakika tumekupa kheri nyingi. Basi Sali kwa ajili ya Mola wako na uchinje (kwa ajili ya Mola wako)."

"Faida ya kuchinja wanyama," Mapenzi ya Mungu, April 1965.


al-Ghazzi, Fath al qarib, p. 62; Keller, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 357. Only the school of Abu Hanifa requires the sacrifice to be performed (wajib) for every one who has the financial means (Ibn Nubata, Khuttab).


The Idd prayer is among the acts of worship that should be performed in public ("Kutoka Sadaka kwa siri," an-Nuur 177, 27 November 1998, p. 2).


Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Vishubaka/ vyumba vya wanawake.

Ibid. 15

Ibid.

Sameja, Twahara, Swala an mambo yanayomkhusu maiti, p. 38.

IPC, Maarifa ya Uislamu (II) p. 96.


Rizvi, Your questions answered (I), Q 69.


Twelver Shi’as prayer their 1985 Idd el-Fitr salat at noon, due to a late reception of the Shawwal crescent sighting ("Tarehe ya Iddi Fitri," Mapenzi ya Mungu, July 1985, p. 2).


See for their attempts Mapenzi ya Mungu, November 1975, November 1981; August 1983; Mapenzi ya Mungu. September 1982 gives as the time for the Idd el-Fitr celebration 8.30 am.


Interview sheikh Rajab, Tanga, 6 March 2001.

Sameja, Twahara, Swala an mambo yanayomkhusu maiti, p. 38.

30 “Takbir zapigwa kushangilia,” *an-Nuur* 430, 2 April 2002, p. 1; “Kivumo cha Takbiir, kime-wafunga midoma mahasidi,” *an-Nuur* 566, 4 June 2004, p. 1; The expression ‘nderemo za takbir’ (cheerfulness of the takbir) is also used.

31 *an-Nuur* 331, 27 February 2001; The Egyptian government banned the takbir-processions before and after the Festival prayers since 1993 (Rashed 1998:75).

32 Silent mumbling is allowed (Sameja, *Twahara, Swala an mambo yanayomkhusu maiti*, p. 38).


34 *an-Nuur* 580. For a controversy on the audible expressions like supplications, the salutations of the Prophet and the takbir on Idd days in South Africa see Tayob (1999:72). Cf. the poem “Takibiir Mbukuzi,” by Idi Kikong’ona (*an-Nuur* 233, 24 December 1999, p. 6); takbir as protest against Russian invasion (“Mtazamo wa maadui wa Uislamu juu ya Uislamu,” *Nasaha* 36, 23 February 2000, p. 10).


37 On the differences between diacritic and iconic modes of public discourse on ritual see the definition given by Bowen (1989:612): “In a diacritic bestowal of meaning Muslims take differences in the performance of the ritual as signs of social distinctions, without the ritual differences themselves taking on a semantic or representational value. Members of such categories or groups also may impute an iconic meaning to an as aspect of worship, in which they take the form of the ritual to model or diagram features of society.”

38 For more differences between the Sunni Swahili and the Shi’a Isma’ili prayers see Topan (2000). Cf. all contributions in Parkin & Headley (2000); (Lambek 1993:180); Launay (1992:123).

39 See the discussion on a particular mosque mat (*busati*) in *al-Fikrul Islami* (37); Use of the rosary (*tasbih*) I witnessed on the older video’s of AMYC but seems to be extinct now. The tasbih is condemned by Farsy (*Bid’a*, I p.13); Shi’a Muslims put their head on something natural (*mohr*) during prayer (interview Rizvi, 26 October 2000). This practice is forbidden by the Saudi’s when Shia’s perform the *hajj* but fortunately the Mecca mosques are paved with marble and limestone and these materials are also appropriate (Kermalli, *Umra-e-mufrida: guidance book*, p. 21).

40 The exact level of the hands during prayer is a complex issue. See the different positions in *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, November 1970.


42 Cf. videotape *Idd el-Hajj* 1996; another practice observed in Shafi’i mosques but almost never in the AMYC congregations is wiping hands over the face at the end of the *salat*.


45 I thank Yusufu Mgaza for drawing my attention to this source. Noteworthy is that the original source of this quotation is available in Tanzania (*Abridged Translation of Sifatu Salaatin Nabee*) but only in English and abridged. Yusuf got his quote from the internet because in the Tanzanian version the ‘kneading dough position’ is left out. Albani is perceived by the AMYC as ‘mwanachuoni mkubwa wa hadithi katika zama zetu’ (a great scholar of hadith in our time), *al-Fikrul Islami* (37). Together with Ibn Baz and Salim Barahiyan Albani’s religious writings dominate the Swahili Salafi website www.qsssea.net.
Letter reproduced in *al-Fikrul Islami* (18); Muhammad Nassor Abdulla (*Kitabu cha tarawe-he*, p. 25) probably condemns the same practice of ‘stretching hands like a sleeping dog.’

The Maawa-I Islam community has its founder buried right in front of the prayer niche, a common practice in Tanga according to *al-Fikrul Islami* (38), p. 6.

*Cf. al-Fikrul Islami* (38), p. 5.


1 May 2002; his comments were part of a digression triggered by the Arabic words ‘ida’at al-mal’ (*Dalil al-falihin*, vol 2, p. 187).

“Saumu, Swala ya Idd na zakaatul-Fitr,” *an-Nuur* 587, 29 October 2004; “Sikuku ya Iddil hajj,” *an-Nuur* 328, 16 February 2001; *Islamic Religious Education* (I), p. 48; sometimes the choice for the field in favour of the mosques is justified by the rationale of space, such as in *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, December 1975.


“Dua ya Kumshitakia Allah (s.w.),” *an-Nuur* 483, 6 December 2002, p. 7.


“Msimtii yeyote kinyume na Mwenyezi Mungu,” *an-Nuur* 483, 6 December 2002, p. 3.

Interview Barahiyan, Tanga, 23 November 2000.

Interview Saeed Akhtar Rizvi, Dar es Salaam, 26 October 2000.

See the picture in *an-Nuur* 545, 23 January 2004, p. 5.


Other Ansaa Sunna preachers also elaborate on this popular theme (*cf. Tape, Nassor Bachu, Uharamu wa kupita mbele ya mwenye kusali.*)


*Ibid.,* nr. 495: instead of ‘harba’ here the word ‘anza’ is used with the same meaning.

This section is based on the observation of five Idd el-Hajj sermons in 2001 and 2002 (two from the traditional Shafi’i al-Nisa mosque (18th street Tanga), two from the AMYC centre (19th street Tanga) and one during a Maawa-I Islam classroom session when the form III pupils invited a boy to improvise a sermon on the Idd el-Hajj, which he did. In addition I analysed the AMYC Idd el-Hajj sermons taped in 1995, 1997 (transcribed in appendix IV) and 1999. References to other sermons are derived from newspaper sources and written collections.

In contrast to for example Morocco where Muslims stand while listening to the Idd sermon (Hammoudi 1993:51).

The Idd sermon should consists of these two separate parts according to Islamic texts, but in Tanga the distinction between the two is not stressed. *Cf. Keller, The Reliance of the Traveller*, p. 357.

*al-Nisa mosque, 6 March 2001; Ibn Nubata, *Diwan al-khutab*, p. 107. The hadith from the same sermon was read in a normal voice, clearly distinct from the preceding part. The hadith narrates the story of the Prophet Muhammad slaughtering two rams, comforting the poor who cannot slaughter, and the exhortation of the rich to sacrifice and share, and the returning of the sacrificial animal on the Day of Resurrection.

*For example in the madrasa Qadiriyya, 13th street* (interview mwalimu Sulayman, 6 December 2000).

In contrast to Topan’s observation of Swahili Friday prayers (2000:102), political and polemical remarks are almost absent in the Idd el-Hajj sermons of traditional Tanga mosques. Also the Egyptian sermon attached to Rashed’s book (1998:207-214) is
strikeingly different in its political relevance and detailed admonitions. These two examples resemble the AMYC and the Ahmadiyya Idd sermons rather than the khutba in the local Tanga mosques during my fieldwork.


70 According to the AMYC this imitation of ‘church liturgy’ must be condemned (al-Fikrul Islami, 37, p. 5).

71 AMYC videotape Idd el-Hajj 1997 (52 minutes); Ahmadiyya sermons are also delivered on a prayerfield, spoken in Swahili and last about the same time (Cf. Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1982).

72 Mapenzi ya Mungu, January 1978, p. 3; Sameja, Twahara, Swala anambo yanayokhusu maiti, pp 34-35; Mazrui, Hidayatul attal, p. 32; Matn safinatu naja, p. 15; Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1975. On the formal requirements in Shafi'i school see: Tafsiri ya risalatul jamia, p. 5; I never witnessed the practice of preaching the khutba in two parts marked by the imam’s sitting down for a short while, as described by other researchers (Rashed 1998:79; cf. Sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh al-sunna [I], p. 240).

73 Like ritual expressions such as ‘wallillahi l-hamd’, wahyi (revelation), ‘dukhuli’ (sexual intercourse), ta’a (obedience).

74 For example the Zahrau director had to pick up his Arabic from a radio course offered by Egyptians (Interview Tanga, 5 December 2000).

75 Interview Salim Awadh, Tanga, 4 December 2000.

76 Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1963; this article by Tanga resident Rashidi Kihaule uses a remarkably similar discourse compared to the current AMYC homilies.

77 Cf. their advertisements e.g. Mapenzi ya Mungu, January 1986.

78 For Ahmadiyya against bid’a see Mapenzi ya Mungu, January 1978.

79 al-Fikrul Islami 37, Shawwal 1411, p. 5.

80 Lassenga, Khutba za ijumaa kwa lugha ya kiswahili, p. 124.

81 *Sikukuu ya Iddil Hajj, an-Nuur 328, 16 February 2001, p. 7.

82 Mtawazi, Pambo la waja wema, p. 17.

83 Lassenga, Khutba za ijumaa kwa lugha ya kiswahili, p. 124.

84 Mapenzi ya Mungu, April 1965.

85 In contrast to the non-polemical character of the Idd khutba in local mosques is the highly polemical tone of the joint mawlid celebration of the Tanga mosques, apparent because here the religious identity is at stake.

86 Video AMYC Idd el-Hajj 1995.


88 Muhammad Nassor Abdulla, Kitabu Arafa, pp. 16-17.


91 Ismail, Ibrahimu, and Muhammad are mentioned, but Hajar not. Cf. appendix IV and video Idd el-Hajj 1996.


93 In line with most of the Arabic classical texts that call Hajar Umm Ismail (Ismail’s mother). Cf. “Historia ya Makkah,” al-Ma’arif 4, April 2002, pp 18-20. See also Islam Khiyar Islam,

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But most secondary sources stick to the Biblical narrative of Hajar as a handmaid (Delauney 1998:174) or as ‘la servante noire d’Ibrahim’ (Abdelsalam 1999:365).


97 Ibid.

98 Abdelsalam (1999:365) mentions that Hajar was buried inside the Ka’ba, but most Muslim sources claim the *hijr*, the ‘area of special sanctity defined by a low semicircular wall’ as the burial place of Ismail and Hajar (cf. Peters 1994:15). Excluding the graves of Ismail from the circumambulation is forbidden, Manji, Performing Hajj-e-Tamattu, p. 8.

99 Lassenga, Khutba za ijmua kwa lugha ya kiswahili, p. 124.

100 For example Ibn Nubata, Khutab, p. 103.


102 Warsha, Hajj, p. 49. An exception is “Sikukuu ya idil-hajji,” Mapenzi ya Mungu September 1984, which mentions three actors: ‘sacrifice performed by the Prophet Ibrahim, Ismaili, and Bi Hajira.’

103 “Dua ya Kumshitakia Allah (s.w.),” an-Nuur 483, 6 December 2002 p. 6. For Shi’ite female models see “Mwanamke mshirika katika maisha” at: http://www.al-shia.com/html/swa/maktaba/akhlaq/mwanamke/m02.htm (accessed 4 October 2006); Bayile, Umuhimu kwa wanawake, p. 3.


105 Qurani Takatifu, commentary on Sura al-Tahrim.

106 AMYC darsa, 17 May 2002.


108 “Dua ya Kumshitakia Allah (s.w.),” an-Nuur 483, 6 December 2002 p. 6. The poem “Tuji-heshimu wanawake,” (an-Nuur 177, 27 November 1998, 6) connects the themes ‘decent clothes’ ‘women as custodians of the nation’ and ‘imitation of Europe customs’ thus representing women as playing a leading role in the reproduction of culture (utamaduni). ‘Building of the community’ (ujenzi wa jamii) and ‘developing the umma’ is the duty of Tanzanian women: “Wajibu wa mwanamke katika maendeleo ya uumma kwa kiswahili,” an-Nuur 243, 3 March 2000, p. 13.


110 “Ubakaji wafananiwa na ule wa wanajeshi wa Serbia kwa akina mama Waislamu wa Kosovo,” Nasaha 90, p. 1,3.


113 Tape Ismail Bayile, Qiyama (II), side A.

114 Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1975.

115 Cf. other Swahili rituals that focus on the protection of women/houses (Middleton 1992:159).


117 Lassenga, Khutba za ijmua kwa lugha ya kiswahili, p. 124.

118 Mapenzi ya Mungu, June 1986; Mapenzi ya Mungu, August 1978.

119 Cf. videotape Idd el fitr, AMYC 1995. The theme of trial and reward is also common in Egyptian khutba’s (Rashed 1998:84-85).
120 The word ‘imtihani’ is used in Farsy’s Swahili translation of Q 37: 106 between brackets, in the main text the less well known word ‘jaribio.’ See among the many oral accounts of the event: interview, Suleiman Kasim Misiora, Tanga, 25 December 2001.
121 “Utii, utii, utii, ” Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1982.
123 Tape Abdalla Juma Hassan, Dalili ya Qiyama, side A transcript, p. 4.
125 See advertisements in Mapenzi ya Mungu, September 1977.
126 Mapenzi ya Mungu, December 1975.
129 See Risalatul jam’a, p. 5; Sameja, Twahara, Swala an mambo yanayomkhusu maiti, p. 35; Barahyan’s sermon, Appendix IV, passim.
130 “Utukufu wa Iddi,” al-Ma’arif (3) p. 30.
131 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislamu (II) p. 22.
133 Ahsan, Islam: faith and practice.
137 Idd videotape AMYC, 2 February 1995; al-Fikrul Islami (37).
139 Lassenga, Khatuba za ijumaa kwa lugha ya kiswahili, p. 124.
140 Quraisy, Textbook of Islam II, p. 205.
141 Idd videotape AMYC, 2 February 1995.
142 Idd el-Hajj videotape AMYC 1996.
143 On the many different interpretations of the word baraza see Loimeier 2005.
147 For example when the prime minister Frederick Sumaye was invited (“Ni kosa kubwa kabisa,” an-Nuur 208, 2 July 1999); Joining the OIC was discussed at the Baraza la Idd el-Fitr 19 January 1999 (“Mtazamo wa maadui wa Uislamu juu ya Uislamu,” Nasaha 36, 23 February 2000, p. 10).
148 In Kenya the national baraza by the Muslim Association in 1977 showed the same conformism, and appeared almost sycophantic (al-islam 1 [4/5], p. 10).
149 Cf. discussion on Swahili forum identifying the moon sighting issue at the Idd el-Fitr 1998 as one of the causes of the Mwembechai problems at: www.bcstimes.com/discussions (accessed 28 March 2006).
150 CCM accused of turning an Islamic holiday into a podium to promote their own agenda (an-Nuur 210); “mawili Usangi yageuka jukwa la majungu,” an-Nuur 27, October 1993, p. 3.
151 “Mauaji ya Mwembechai mada Baraza la Idd,” an-Nuur 235, 7 January 2000, p. 5.
152 “WaIslamu Moro watangi kuzungumzia siasa,” an-Nuur 246, 24 March 2000, p. 16.
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156 “Viongozi wa kiislamu wakionesha mshikamano katika baraza la Eid el Fitr ilofanyika Diamond Jubilee hivi karibuni,” *an-Nuur* 237, 21 January 2000, p. 1. Same picture in “Umoja miongoni mwa Waislamu ni muhimu,” *an-Nuur* 552, 12 March 2004, p. 6. Vice-President Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein told his audience on the National Idd el-Fitr Baraza in 2002: “…believers are Tanzanians and this is the country of all [believers];” real piety, he continued, is shown by cooperation, kindness and willingness to “build a peaceful nation” (*kujenga taifa lenye upendo*); “Mufti kuwakusanya Waislamu,” *Mwananchi* 7 December 2002, p. 3.


158 Provincial education officer Tanga to D.C. Handeni, 8 May 1958 (baada ya hapo watoto hukusanyika kwa Mwalimu wao wa dini ili kuzunguka mijini mwao kwa shangwe la kusoma Kur-ani na sifa nyingine za dini yao).

159 See videotape AMYC, 27 March 1999 on the link between the Prophet’s horseriding and Muslim’s bicycle racing.


161 *al-Haq* 19, April 2002 (the quote is taken from Q 51:56).


163 *Al-Haq* 18, 22 February 2002; also simple entertaining games like blind man’s buff are played by the AMYC staff.


165 Expression used by Barahiyan on the eve of the Idd el-Hajj, 21 February 2002, to defend the change in practice from running in the time of the Prophet to bicycle racing nowadays.


Notes Chapter 13

1 Interview, Salum Nikindo, 7 May 2002.

2 Cf. the etymology for pagan (from the Latin *paganu(m)*, for “someone who is not from the city, rather from the country”).


4 Interview Shaaban S. Mapeyo, director Mwenge Islamic centre, 1 November 2000.

5 See for example Smith 1987.

6 If any pictures at all they are usually the colored reprints with idyllic English mansions in a green landscape, religious representations of the Ka’ba, or pictures from president Nyerere or Mwinyi.
7 The words are derived from the verb –umba (create, give form to, shape) and is almost exclusively used for God's creativity. This cosmological dimension of houses is explored in several contributions to Carsten & Hugh-Jones 1996.

8 'Sijui, kwa sababu nilikuwa shule' I don't know because I was at school (questionnaire 224).

9 "Baadhi ya bid-a ambazo zimeenea sana katika miji yetu na anataka muislamu ajitahadhari nazo," al-Fikrul Islami (38), Dhulkaada 1411, p. 5.

10 Tape Barahiiyan, ‘Kuchinja’; physical building of bars and brothels can only be purified by fire; the dog’s pollution can be washed away by seven consecutive ritual cleansings.

11 The most frequent supplication of the Prophet Muhammad according to a hadith (cf. Bukhari, Sahih, vol. 1, p. 288; Bukhari, Sahih, vol. 6, p. 592).

12 Khitma actually refers to a ritual performed when a Qur’an recital has been completed. On the Swahili coast it is used to indicate the reciting of a few short Qur’an suras (among others 108, 112, 114) and praying for the deceased (Cf. the common devotional manual Kifaya khatm al-Qur’an; Farsy condemns the practice in his book Tunda la Qur’an).

13 See the picture of the sacrifice near the Masjid Majengo in Dodoma, an-Nuur 246, 24 March 2000, p. 16.

14 For example “and we returned home and we slaughtered,” (Bukhari, Sahih, vol. 1, p. 288; Bukhari, Sahih, vol. 6, p. 592).

15 For example Barahiiyan, Mwanamke katika Uislamu. I also collected 10 copies of their English/Swahili magazine The Advice/Nasiha published in 1995/1996. In 2003 the Kenyan government closed Muntada al-Islami for suspicion of supporting terrorism.


17 Their contribution to Tanzania in the last years in British pounds: 2001 (16.000); 2003 (48.000); 2004 (29.104); 2005 (52.152); annual reviews at www.muslimaid.org (accessed 16 November 2006).

18 See for the discussion on the location of the slaughterhouse in Mombasa (Lushoto district) near the river TNA, acc. 14, 64/4, 30 July 1938 to 5 October 1955 and the comments of administrators ("slaughterhouse is now in use but not known whether the water supply had been connected as yet").

19 Isobel Slater from the Tanganyika Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (TSPCA) in a letter dated 28 November 1947 to Sir Peter Macdonald, MP. Mrs. Slater apparently got on the nerves of several colonial bureaucrats, as can be seen in the marginal notes scribbled on the archival documents: ‘she is a fanatic with one idea only’; ‘she may ultimately get into trouble over it. She deserves it.’ “She has been nothing but a nuisance”. Although her efforts did not result in any lasting improvements in the Tanga abattoir, she finally won herself the Albert Schweizer medal of the Animal Welfare Institute in 1960. See also her book ‘Answering the cry: the R.S.P.C.A. at work in Tanganyika’, p. 18.

20 Tazama, March 1994, p. 3.

21 Completely different from the ethnicity of meatshop employees: In Tanga I found 19 Sambaa, 3 Chagga, 2 Gogo, and 1 Mburu butcher. In both branches the major ethnic groups Digo and Segeju were absent in accordance to Chande's remark: “In terms of business activities, the Sambaa are doing much better than the Digo and Segeju” (Chande 1998:89).

22 The connection between Gogo ethnicity and fighting in slaughter slabs and abattoirs is common, as one of my Tanga friends who worked at the Vingunguti premises pointed out.
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24 Interview with one of the Tanga slaughterers, 14 December 2001. When asked to comment on these beliefs, Maalim Bassaleh quoted an hadith stating that ‘working with blood is bad’ (interview 2 April 2002).
25 Many interviewees were adamant about their identification of the ritual as sadaka, although it shares many characteristics with kafara rites as described in chapter 2.
26 Interview 16 November 2000; Interview Salimu Athumani, Tanga, 6 March 2001. Note that this concept of paying a certain amount to a religious institution or to the poor is distinct from the zakat, the religious tax, which is only 2.5%.
27 This reason for not performing the actual killing himself, was also put forward by the Muslim owner of Mollel’s Modern Butchery in Kigoma (interview Kigoma, 19 March 2002). The fear of blood and killing often returns in the interviews with madrasa teachers (cf. interview Mudir madrasa al-Hudda, Tanga 7 December 2000; madrasa al-Nisa 4 January 2001).
30 Ibid.
32 Interview Amrani Mohammed Kilulu, 12 June 2002.
34 Cf. TNA, file 31356 “Methods of slaughtering animals for human consumption;” I thank Mr. Heddy who allowed me to read the minutes of the TPL Board Meetings on this subject. TPL died an untimely death by not being able to implement stricter conditions of the European and Arabian export markets. 15 May 1952 Tanga Sheikh Ali bin Hemedi El Buhuri visited the TPL branch in Arusha and announced that because of Muslim doubts that the “Spark” actually killed the animal, TPL had decided to abandon stunning. Until recently special luxuries like tenderised meat were imported from South Africa, but nowadays this process is also performed by Tanzanian firms like Coast Zone Meat Masters and Kinondoni Meat Masters who deliver mainly to beach hotels in Pangani, Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam. Stunning is apparently used without any discussion (interview Goodluck Moshi, Tanga, 19 December 2000). While stunning has been used in the Dar es Salaam abattoir Vingungutini since its opening in 1961 (the electrical equipment is still present), this has been abandoned sometime around 1976 due to technical failure and poor maintenance rather than Islamic scruples (interview meat inspector, Dar es Salaam, 7 November 2000).
37 Saidi Musa, Maisha ya al-Imam sheikh Abdulla Saleh Farsy katika ulimwengu wa kiislamu, p. 70.
38 Tape Barahiyan, Kuchinja.
39 Sophisticated distinctions are made between Christians who follow Musa, Isa and all other prophets adhering to the dietary laws as described in Leviticus and Christians who follow Paul (“I’m fully convinced that no food is unclean in itself” Romans 14:14); “Kuleni vya halali na vizuri,” an-Nuur 561, 4 May 2004, p. 6.
41 Muhammad bin Ayyub Khamis, *Ulinde Uislamu Wako*, p. 11.
43 BAKWATA to Mganga Mkuu, 12 July 1999.
44 Mufti Sheikh Mkuu to Sheikh wa Kata Ukonga, 9 October 1992. Among the criticised methods was the ‘killing by piercing’ (*uchinjaji wa kutoboa*). Despite BAKWATA’s condemning this piercing of the heart after the throat cut to accelerate bleeding, in 2001 most of the Dar es Salaam private slabs and the government owned Vingunguti abattoir still practised it (plate 13 and 14). The large skin fold characteristic of the local Short Horn Zebu race has to be cut before to facilitate the piercing. It is kept apart to keep count of the total number of animals processed.
45 This procedure (high status Muslim addresses personal acquaintance to become slaughterer) I also met in Korogwe, where the slaughterer was introduced by the (Muslim) meat inspector. Interview Korogwe, 8 January 2001.
46 “Kuleni vya halali na vizuri,” *an-Nuur* 561, 7 May 2004, p. 6; *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, March 1993, p. 6; a different attitude can be found in a recently published response on a popular Swahili website. A concerned Muslim asked if he still could eat the meat from his own butcher who ‘does not pray, does not fast, wears gold and cheats with the scales’. The answer was that all these personal issues do not really matter: as long as the butcher is a Muslim, Jew or Christian, any customer can safely assume that the meat is halal (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/jifunzeislamu/message/811 accessed 12 February 2007).
47 Interview Ustadh Hashim Lusaganya, Dar es Salaam 8 November 2000; Ustadh Hashim directed the prayers at the Araf demonstration in 2001. He teaches at Ridhwa seminary Dar es Salaam and some of his speeches are published on the internet (e.g. at www.alhidaaya.com); Interview Mapeyo, 1 November 2000.
49 See for example Mtendaji Mkuu to Mkurugenzi wa kilimo, 26 March 1971. Before independence many towns had two slaughter facilities: one for Christians and one for Muslims (Veterinary Services Mpapwa to Member of Agriculture Dar es Salaam, 19 June 1951, TNA 31356, f. 247 A).
50 The most recent jurisdiction on this aspect is the Food (Control of Quality) Act, 1978, act 10: “No regulation made under this section relating to any slaughterhouse shall be so framed or construed as to deny to any religious community reasonable facility for obtaining as food the flesh of animals or birds slaughtered by the method specially required by their religion.” According to the Islamic Law (Restatement) Act, 1964 the minister can make religious regulation into national law according to Shafi’i, Hanafi and Shi’ite schools. Cf. Interview Dr. Rashidi, Morogoro 19 March 2002.
51 Interview Mr. Mkumbo, 15 November 2000.
52 Interview Dr. Rashidi, 19 March 2002.
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53 Vingunguti 7 November 2000.
54 Mazrui, *Hidayat al-atfal*, p. 62; Interview Shaaban Mapeyo, director of Mwenge Islamic Centre, 2 November 2000. Bakry Abeer Kaluta, 21 November 2000; Sheikh Abdi Hariri 6 January 2001; mudir Madrasat al-Hudda, 7 December 2000. Bel Hassan, 7 March 2001; Ironically the only one who emphatically stated that women could not slaughter under Islamic Law was the BAKWATA secretary Rajab Kundya (interview 20 November 2001). Bowen (1992: 667) mentions an example from an Indonesian scholar defending the possibility for women to sacrifice. Brisebarre (1998:20,71) states that the sacrifice is a strictly masculine affair. Bousquet (1971) describes a case of women who place a phallic symbol between their thighs if circumstances force them to perform a sacrifice. Nancy Jay (1992) presents an intriguing theory on the common exclusion of childbearing women from sacrifice, but hardly pays any attention to Islamic sacrificial practices.
57 BAKWATA to Afisa Mfawidhi, 19 November 1996. Note that circumcision is not included among the conditions for a slaughterer as is correctly stated in *Mapenzi ya Mungu*, 1976, March, p. 3.
58 Interview Omar Saidi 21 December 2000.
61 Cf. Leila Sheikh Hashim, “Unyago traditional family life education among the muslim Digo Segeju, Bondel, Sambaa and Zigua of Tanga Region” unpublished paper 1989; www.afrol.com/Categories/Women/profiles/tanzania_women.htm (accessed 24 June 2005); Sara Mwai popo “The law and practice relating to FGM in Tanzania” (MA thesis); these sources contrast to Lodhi and Westerlund (1997) who claim "female circumcision does not exist among Tanzanian Moslems other than those of Somali origin…”
62 The relationship between circumcision, purity, sacrifice and ideas on gender and sexuality in early Islam needs to be explored. The notion that Muhammad was born circumcised, as well as without a direct connection to his mother (maqtu’ al-surra) indicates his purity from the female domain. Also the traditions that Hajar was circumcised and had her earlobes pierced before the near-sacrifice of her son seems to be significant. Cf. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Tuhfat al mawdud*, p. 163; Kister 1994.
64 See for example Barahiyan's two tapes "Sababu za udhaifu wa umma wa ki-islamu" (the reasons for the weakness of the Islamic umma).
65 See for example Barahiyan's video tape 'Je, Muislam ana wajibu wa kufuata dhehebu?' (Is it necessary for a Muslim to follow a particular school of law?).
66 In 1999 Barahiyan for the first time sacrificed his goats single handed and with his foot on their flank.
68 Often the professional sacrificers in religious centres like the Jewish temple of YHWH were a class of inferior laborers as Robertson Smith explains (in Carter 2003:71).
70 See Mtenga e.a. (1998:14); “Ripoti ya mwezi /ukaguzi wa nyama (meat hygiene),” July 1973, Tanga Archives, acc. 14, file V10/9, 78 (condemnation in 1 month: 19 livers, 7 lungs, 4 kidneys, 2 intestines and only one spleen).
Complaints about salary occurred in Dar es Salaam in the 1990s. Then BAKWATA asked to increase the price of 50 Shilling a head to 300. See Shekh wa Kata Ukonga to Mufti sheik mkuu, 9 October 1992.


Interview Kyatwa Slab 10 November 2000.

File 24419. vol II, anonymous remark ad file nr. 99 on the introduction of licenses for butchers and flayers, 1947. Ugandan Muslims employed as slaughterers used to get the equivalent of 5 US Dollar a cow or 5 kilograms of meat, which is enormous (“Christians, Muslims clash over slaughterhouses,” *Asian Political News*, 28 January 2003).


Interview Mrs. Habiba, 10 November 2000.

Informal discussions and interview Tanga, 6 March 2001.


Notes Chapter 14

1 Average prices in Tanzanian Shilling paid at the Korogwe market in November 2000 (steers 105,000, bulls 107,000, cows 90,000, heifers 70,000); General fluctuation is between 95,000 and 120,000 (Interview livestock officer Shembilu, Tanga 13 December 2000). The holding ground manager at Pugu market (catering for the city of Dar es Salaam) mentioned an average price of 140,000 Shilling as usual (17 November 2000). At the Kimara slaughter slab a butcher mentioned prices between 180,000 and 200,000 Shilling (Interview 15 November 2000).


3 Shafi, History of Qurbani, pp.48-49.


6 Early hadith show how birds slowly disappeared among the category of sacrificial animals, maybe because of the popularity among other Semitic groups in the region (cf. Henninger 1946).

7 27 million chickens, 15.6 million cattle, 10.7 million goats and 3.5 million sheep according to the livestock subsector annual performance report 1999/2000.

8 Interview chicken vendor Tanga, 26 December 2000.


Livestock subsector annual report 1999/2000. Also most of the veterinary meat inspection reports of the last three decades show more goats then sheep. However compared with the quantity of beef, both goat meat and mutton remains significant less. See for example TNA, file V10/9, February 1973, Tanga, 647 cows, 691 goats and 260 sheep. The Tanganyika Packers who slaughtered primarily for export, processed 21,000 goats, 8,700 cattle and 250 pigs in 1949 (file 35749).


Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-maghazi, p. 55.

Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-dhaba’ih, p. 585.


Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-adahi, p. 591.

Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-adahi, p. 593.

Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-‘idayn, p. 289. Many similar questions in which Muslims asked Muhammad whether a she goat (‘which is dearer to me than the meat of two sheep’) is allowed as an Idd sacrifice appear in the same section.

See among others Bukhari, Sahih, kitab al-dahaya, p. 591. Basic madrasa primer ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Maqdisi al-Jamma’li, Matn umda al-ahkam, p. 119 mentions a variant on this report as the only hadith in the chapter on sacrifices: “and the Prophet sacrificed two black and white horned rams, with his own hand and he said bismillah and the takbir and put his foot on their flanks.”

In the book Majina ya nyama (names of animals) by Sheikh al-Amin bin Ali al-Mazrui the words for mbuzi and kondoo are translated from the Arabic ma’z and kabsh. For interesting parallels between the strong, powerful male sheep (kabsh) and the meek, docile female sheep (kharuf) in Egyptian Idd discourse, see Rashed (1998:182).


The man is not necessarily the most powerful in this relationship. Women are sometimes portrayed as the ones who ‘flay the goat’ (chuna mbuzi). For some examples see the tabloid Hamu 4 June 2002, p. 3.


Something inadequate like a salary is ‘like a goat tail’ (mkia wa mbuzi). A Swahili proverb: ‘the tail of a goat is short, therefore clean the place where it sleeps.’


Goats and bulls mentioned by Landberg (1977:383,398) for halili/khitma practices.

Interviews Kamassan, 5 June 2002; Massakaria Bakari, 5 June 2002; Cf. el-Zein (1974: 281-321; Landberg (1977) mentions a sheep sacrifice on this occasion.
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34 Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari, Desturi za waswahili, pp. 100-106; Goats and cows slaughtered in the healing and initiation ritual pungwa (Topan 2005).


36 Ibid.


38 Goats and cows slaughtered in the healing and initiation ritual pungwa (Topan 2005).


40 Ibid.


42 Two of the other five were Somali’s. One got the sheep as a gift, so perhaps the family’s choice might have been different.

43 See for example the tape Msabaha, Suluhisho (II) side B.

44 Even if goats are sacrificed people may follow the Muhammadan practice of sacrificing a male, white animal as in the case of the public AMYC sacrifices; Islamic fiqh prefers white animals, followed by tawny colored, black and white and finally a completely black one (Keller, The Reliance of the Traveller, p. 358).

45 In some parts of Morocco a preference for castrated goats due to the scarcity of sheep is described by Hammoudi (1993:110). In Mtwapa (Kenya) the Idd el-Hajj animals were also goats (Parkin 1994:181).

46 For similar discussions on the topic of sheep and goats on the Idd el-Hajj in Indonesia see Bowen (1992:669). Muslims from the Comoros favor goats for the Idd el-Hajj (Brisebarre 1998: pp. 23,47,114). In some parts of Morocco a preference for castrated goats due to the scarcity of sheep is described by Hammoudi (1993:110). In Mtwapa (Kenya) the Idd el-Hajj animals were also goats (Parkin 1994:181).


48 Interview Salehe, 6 March 2001.


52 "Maoni ya Masheikh wa Zaire," Mapenzi ya Mungu, January 1978, p. 3.

53 Qahtani, Hisn al-Muslim min adhkar, nr. 75; Tape Barahiyan, Kuchinja side A.

54 Muhammad bin Ayyub Khamis, Ulinde Uislamu wako, Ulidhe Uislamu wako, p. 7.


56 Interview chicken vendor, 26 December 2000; TMHT, Musawala na jawabu, tape 2.


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62 Interview Abi Bakar Mengere, 10 January 2001; mzee Bizani, 25 May 2002.
65 Interview Bakry Abeid Kaluta, 21 November 2000.
66 Interview Mutembei, January 2000.
67 Qahtani, Hisn al-Muslim, nr. 135. The author of "Historia ya Makkah," (al-Ma'arif 4, April 2002, p. 19) mentions an addition: "allahuma hadha 'an fulan" (O God this is on behalf of so-and-so).
68 Interview Bel Hassan, Tanga, 7 March 2001. Cf. the Kenyan Textbook of Islam (II), p. 205 "O God accept this sacrifice as thou did of thy friends Muhammad and Ibrahim."
69 Except for some minor changes the translation is from Siddiqi, Animal Sacrifice in Islam, pp. 36-37. Rizvi, Your Questions Answered (II), p. 51.
70 Tanganika Standard 21 June 1949.
71 Cf. Benkheira 1999:69; al-Zamzami, Ahkam al-dhabh; but see the tape Barahiyan, Kuchinja, side B stressing the importance of ‘sharp weapons penetrating the body and shedding blood’.
76 Interviews 15 and 16 November 2000, Kimara abattoir.
77 Animal rights are included in the general treaties on human rights and precede the western debates by several centuries. See for example the Swahili translation of the Risala al-huquq by the fourth Imam Ali bin Hussain Zainul Abidin (658-713), chapter 13 ‘haki ya mnyama wa kafara’ (note that the Arabic original [Risala al-huquq, 1997, p. 12] only speaks about the hajj sacrifice ‘wa amma haqq al-hady…’) translated in English by Saeed Akhtar Rizvi (The charter of rights, 1998, p. 9-10) as ‘it is the right of the sacrificial animal’. A modern Moroccan booklet on the legal status of imported meat also has a separate chapter on compassion towards slaughter animals (al-Zamzami, ahkam al-dhabh, p. 20-23); Cf. Foltz (2006) for a more extensive treatment of the subject.
78 Tirmidhi, al-ilsan bi tartib sahih, vol. 1, p. 344.
80 Interviews Sahare, Tanga, 2 December 2000; Star Butcher Slab, Dar es Salaam 10 November 2000.
81 Goat hooves (makongoro ya miguu ya mbuzi) are lowly valued. See for example "Karamu ilio mbaya kuliko zote," Mapenzi ya Mungu, November 1977, p. 2.
82 Interview Mwarabu, Kwaminchi, 6 March 2001.
83 Among the Chagga the skin is used as a shroud (Interview Mlemba, Tanga, 9 December 2000).
84 See Mohammed Kassim Mazrui’s mocking description of people who try to justify the use of twari as religious while condemning other drums ("Khitilafu ya Twari na ngoma nyengine," Sauti ya Haki, May 1976, p. 8).
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87 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Tuhfat al-mawdud, chapter 20.
88 Nurudin Hussein, Ufafanuzi wa bida. Akika skin may be sold according to some (Interview Mengere, 10 January 2001).
89 See on these efforts TNA I 244 I “Storage of hides in towns”; Daily News 24 April 2002, p. 5.
93 al-Mazrui, Hidayatul atfal, p. 128.
94 Interview Rashidi Bakari, Tanga, 18 May 2002.
96 Interview Shia madrasa Mabokweni 10 January 2001.
97 Interview Hariri, 6 January 2001. He refers to Qur’an 9:60 “Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer the (funds); for those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (to Truth); for those in bondage and in debt; in the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer: (thus is it) ordained by Allah, and Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom.” For further explanation of these categories see IPC, Maarifa ya Usilamu (II), pp. 42-47); “Fatawa,” Sauti ya Haki, October 1975, p. 5.
98 “Idd el Haji: Sikukuu ya Sadaka,” Habari Leo, 31 December 2006.
99 But see the Arabic Shafi’i manual by ‘Alwi ibn Ahmad al-Saqqaf, Tarshih al-mustafidin, p. 177 (‘the best thing is to devote the whole animal as sadaka except a morsel from the liver that will yield special blessing (baraka) if you eat it’) and the Swahili newspaper article “Sunna za Eid el-Hajj,” Maarifa (4), 15 February 2002, p. 2.
100 Interview AMYC representative on the Idd el-Hajj 5 March 2001; cf. Abdul Aziz (Studies in Islam [VI], p. 92) who writes: “One [portion of the animal] is kept for the family, the other is given to relatives, neighbours, friends, and the third to the poor and the needy, not necessarily Muslims.”
101 Reliance of the Traveler, p. 357.
103 Closed by the government as a result of the Anti Terrorism Act.
104 The text in Matthew 25: 29 “For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath” also appears in the gospels according to Luke (8:18) and Mark (4:25).
105 Interview Mbwana, director of Theology Department, 30 October 2000.
107 Farsy, Maisha ya sayyidnal Hassan, p. 6; Nurudin Hussayn, Ufafanuzi Bida. On the general concept of respect (heshima) and shame (aibu) in social relations see Pelt (1982:115); el-Zein (1974:82-68, passim); Swartz 1991.
108 Comparing these numbers with the akika practice again we see an important difference. When people talk about the ‘proper’ akika (i.e. after birth) than almost everyone agrees that sending meat is better than inviting people, but actual practice (i.e. after death of a child) makes clear that the meal is consumed in and next to the house of the

109 See for example the twelve volume fatwa collection al-Mi’yar by al-Wansharisi and several contributions in Brisebarre 1998.

110 www.youngafrican.com/forum/topic.asp?topic_ID=4113 (accessed 20 February 2003); “Answar Sunna wala Idd yao leo,” Alasiri 10 January 2006; a religious textbook offers as an assignment for the Idd el-Hajj: “Name the people you share your things with” (The Young Muslim, II).

111 “Sadaka ya Mfungo tatu,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, June 1971, p. 2-3; The author of the article “Idd el-Hajj: Sikukuu ya Sadaka” (HabariLeo, 31 December 2006) mentions this idea as a cleansing from sins (kuisafisha kwa dhambi); Trimmingham 1968:167,134; on Mayotte this ritual is called ‘kuitimia’ and ‘a Ramadan for the dead’ (Lambek 1993:108).

112 Interview Salehe Uthman, 23 February 2002; Bibi Uji, 23 February 2002.

113 As witnessed on the Tangamano fields 24 May 2002.


116 “Talkini na Radio,” Sauti ya Haki, November 1972, p. 8. The counterargument put forward is not to deny God’s ability to perform miracles, but to emphasise the human limitations. God told Muhammad “you cannot make those to hear who are buried in graves” (Q 35:22) and if someone claims that a Swahili mwali could perform something that even Muhammad could not, is a clear sign of hubris.

117 In a similar way after the period of seclusion of women in case of divorce or their husband’s death, the finishing meal (karamu) defines the boundaries of the kin group (Middleton 1992:160).

118 “Sadaka ya m fungo tatu,” Mapenzi ya Mungu, June 1971, pp. 2-3.

119 See the IDB website www.isdb.org. The meat conveniently arrives usually just before the mawlid celebration and is distributed in that context as a festival gift.

120 Interview Suleiman Mbwana, 5 December 2000.


128 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/jifunzeuislamu/message/225 accessed 5 October 2005; in the same thread explicit reference is made to the problem of distributing Idd al-Hajj meat (“Hsuswan siku ya idd kubwa ya mfungo tatu…”).

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130 “Dua ya Kumshitakia Allah (s.w.),” an-Nuur 483, 6 December 2002, pp 6-7; for the Islamic community as a body see also the Egyptian sermon mentioned in Rashed (1998:89).


134 “Baada ya kuwaua Waislamu, wanapongezana,” an-Nuur 395, 23 November 2001, p. 1; another picture connects the theme of eating the Idd meal and the oppression of Muslims slightly different: a picture of an Israeli soldier and a small Palestinian boy has the editorial message: “When you eat your pilau today remember this child” (an-Nuur 483, 6 December 2002, p. 1).

135 IPC, Maarifa ya Uislamu (II) p. 94.


139 An unrelated story in the same copy also employs these metaphors: “Makafiri wachinja moto wa kisilamu,” an-Nuur 587, 29 October 2004, p. 3.

140 The colour of American Coca Cola is compared to the colour of Palestinian blood (“Mwaka mpya wa Kisiisi 1427,” Nasaha 363, 8 February 2006, p. 8.


143 “Haya ya salamaleko hatuyataki,” an-Nuur 594, 17 December 2005, p. 2,7; on a Swahili forum (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/jifunzeuislamu/message/217, accessed 12 February 2007) a distinction is made between ‘normal’ relationships with non-Muslims concerning everyday matters like eating together or lending money and participation in religious rituals. For the latter category the Qur’an informs: “It is not for the Prophet and the believers to ask pardon for the idolaters, even though they be near kinsmen,” (Q 9:113, translation from Arberry).


Notes Appendix 2

1 *The Tanganyika Gazette*, vol xlii, no. 25.
2 *The Tanganyika Gazette*, vol. xliv, no. 67.
3 *The Tanganyika Gazette*, vol. xlv, no. 74.
4 *The Tanganyika Gazette*, vol xlvi, no. 37; Tanga Archives Acc. 13, file 10/1.
5 *Gazette Extraordinary of the United Republic of Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, 21st March 1966; Note that Saturday 2 April and Monday 4 April are public festivals for the Idd el-Hajj, so Sunday is excluded.
6 *The Tanganyika Gazette*, vol xlvi, no. 50.
7 The moon sighting for this day has been made public in the Gazette (vol xlvii no. 26, general notice 1303).
8 In case of a moon sighting on the 11th of January 1967, the first day of the Idd el-Hajj would coincide with the Zanzibar Revolution Day on the 12th. In that case there has been only 11 public holidays that year. See *Gazette extraordinary*, vol xlvii, no. 2, general notice no. 68.
9 See *Gazette*, vol xliv, no. 9, general notice no. 348. The annual announcement of the public holidays has been published in no. 54 of 18 December 1967. This issue I have not been able to find.
10 Tanga Archives, Acc. 13, file C10/1.
11 *Gazette*, vol xliv, no. 23.
12 Tanga Archives, Acc. 13, file C 10/1.
13 *The Gazette*, vol L, no. 2130;
14 *Gazeti la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (Gazetti)*, vol LI no 45. Note: as of volume LI, nr. 33 this newsbulletin is published in Swahili.
15 *Gazeti*, vol lii, taarifa na. 1962. Only ten public holidays because the Sikukuu ya Muunga-no (26 April) coincides with the *mawlid* day. Tanga Archives, Acc. 13, file C10/1.
16 *Gazeti* vol liii no 35, taarifa na. 1253.
17 *Gazeti* vol lv, no 43, taarifa na. 1249.
18 *Gazeti*, vol lvi, no. 42, taarifa na. 1290.
20 *Gazeti*, 2 December 1977, taarifa na. 1408.
21 *Gazeti*, vol. lx, no. 43, taarifa na. 1174.
22 *Gazeti* vol lxi, no. 36, taarifa na. 824.

Notes Appendix 4

1 Technical term for overt ignorance, stubborn clinging to a false idea about essential doctrines.
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands

In deze studie heb ik de relatie onderzocht tussen tekst, ritueel en sociale identiteit in de jaarlijkse Idd el-Hajj zoals deze uitgevoerd wordt in Tanzania. De Idd el-Hajj is een van de twee grote feesten van de Islamitische kalender en toont grote gelijkenis met het Offerfeest (‘id al-adha) in andere delen van de Islamitische wereld. De drie belangrijkste onderdelen, het feestgebed (salat), de preek (khutba) en het dieroffer, worden geënte door een klassieke canon van Arabische gezaghebbende teksten. Het achterliggende verhaal dat ten grondslag ligt aan dit feest is dat van Ibrahim's beproeving. In een droom werd deze profeet getoond hoe hij zijn zoon moest offeren. Toen hij dit in gehoorzaamheid aan God wilde doen, werd dit op het laatste moment verhinderd en mocht hij een ram in plaats van zijn kind slaan.


Dit proefschrift toont aan dat de relatie tussen gezaghebbende teksten en de rituele praktijk niet vanzelf spreekt: de interpretatieve ruimte biedt de gelegenheid om rituelen op een creatieve wijze aan te passen aan de behoeften van Moslims in een snel veranderende Tanzaniëse maatschappij. Het is de Idd el-Hajj die Moslims de gelegenheid biedt om hun Islamitische identiteit vorm te geven binnen een context van competitieve groepen en botsende belangen. Dit onderzoek naar de Idd el-Hajj laat zien dat rituele praktijk, symbolische verbeelding en beleving weliswaar gebruik maken van teksten maar zeker niet gedetermineerd worden door deze klassieke erfenis.

Dit boek valt in vier delen uiteen: na een uitgebreide inleiding worden telkens drie hoofdstukken gewijd aan respectievelijk de thema's tijd, plaats en chronologie (tijd/plaats). In de inleidende hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 5 wordt een introductie gegeven op het boek, de literatuur van het offer in het algemeen en van het Islamitische offerfeest in het bijzonder, de sociaal/politieke context van Tanzania, de rol van teksten in het Islamitische onderwijs en tenslotte worden een tweetal offer rituelen (akika en de siku ya mwaka) vergeleken met de Idd el-Hajj.
Het tweede deel handelt over het concept tijd. In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een aantal kalenders beschreven die in gebruik zijn in Tanzania. De Islamitische kalender, de nationale kalender en de ‘sacrale’ kalender, kennen elk een eigen manier van tijdrekening met eigen hoogtijden. De islamitische kalender begint met de vlucht van Muhammad in het jaar 622 en kent 12 maanmaanden in een jaar. De Idd el-hajj wordt op de meeste plekken in de islamitische wereld gevierd op de 10e van de twaalfde maand Dhulhija. In Tanzania echter is deze hajj-maand niet de twaalfde van het jaar maar de derde omdat Swahili sprekers het Islamitische jaar laten beginnen met de Idd el-Fitr, na de vastenmaand Ramadan. De Idd el-Hajj heeft in de nationale kalender van Tanzania de status van nationale vrije dag, maar in de ogen van veel moslims zijn Islamitische feestdagen sterk ondergeëerd ten opzichte van Christelijke feestdagen. De hajj en zijn afgeleide, de Idd el-Hajj vormen binnen het Islamitische tijdsconceptie de kroon op het leven van de mens. Zoals de vrijdag en afsluit, doet de Ramadan dit voor het jaar en de hajj voor het hele leven. In het licht van deze tijdsovertrekking heeft de Idd el-Hajj een connectie met dood en wederopstanding. Het belang van goed gedrag is daarom essentieel.

Hoofdstuk 7 gaat over de datumbepaling van de Idd el-Hajj. Hoewel alle groeperingen zich houden aan de Islamitische maankalender en volgens deze tijdrekening het feest dateren op de tiende van de Dhulhija, verschillen zij onderling in de methode om het begin van elke maanmaand vast te stellen. Volgens tekst en traditie gebeurt dit middels een waarneming van de maansikkel met het blote oog waarna de volgende dag gerekend wordt als de eerste van de nieuwe maand. De vraag is echter of een dergelijke waarneming bindend is voor alle moslims of slechts voor een beperkt aantal van hen. De gegevens van de Islamitische gezaghebbende teksten hebben vooral betrekking op de Idd el-Fitr en niet op de Idd el-Hajj. De ruimte die de teksten (Qur'an en hadith) bieden wordt aangegrepen om verschillende antwoorden te verdedigen. Globaal zijn er twee opties: een maan observatie is bindend voor de gehele wereld of elke regio moet zelf de nieuwe maan waargenomen hebben. De achter deze discussies liggende gedachte is opvallend gelijk bij al de groepen die hieraan deelnemen: de Islamitische gemeenschap wordt ernstig bedreigd in haar eenheid. Het vieren van feestdagen op verschillende data toont de morele zwakte van de gemeenschap. Dit is des te pijnlijker omdat de Idd el-Hajj wordt geacht het feest van de gehele, wereldwijde Islamitische umma te zijn, en niet slechts dat van de plaatselijke moskee.

In hoofdstuk 8 wordt verder ingegaan op de consequenties die de keuze voor een bepaalde feestdag met zich meebrengt, en de dieper liggende sociale pijnpunten die hiermee verwoord worden. Er worden vier verschillende dateringsmethoden besproken die elk een belangrijke Islamitische waarde vertegenwoordigen. Allereerst de Ahmadiyya gemeenschap die prat gaat geloof in geopenbaarde waarheid
en astronomische inzichten te kunnen combineren. Het is vooral het centraal leiderschap van de gemeenschap dat trots toont aan de verscheurde facties rondom hen. De Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) en de andere salafistische organisaties waarmee zij zich hebben verbonden, nemen de hajj, en dan vooral de rituelen die op de dag van Arafà voltrokken worden, als het ijkpunt voor de Idd el-Hajj overal elders ter wereld. Omdat de moslimgemeenschap slechts een God erkent en een profeet, is er ook maar een hajj en een Idd el-Hajj denkbaar. Hoewel deze redenering ook ingang vindt bij notoire tegenstanders van de AMYC zijn brede lagen van de Tanzaniaanse moslims er het niet mee eens. Het is vooral de vermeende arrogantie van Saudi Arabië die een blokkade vormt om de plaatselijk feestdagen te synchroniseren met de dubieuze Saudische tijdrekening. In de derde plaats is er een aanzienlijke groep in Tanzania die er prijs op stelt de moslimgemeenschap op nationaal niveau te verenigen middels een (nationale) Idd el-Hajj. Op deze wijze zou men een duidelijk signaal af kunnen geven tegenover de regering dat de moslims een groep zijn waar rekening mee gehouden dient te worden. De opposanten van dit standpunt beweren dat moslims zich dienen te richten op Gods wil en niet die van een niet-islamitische overheid gestoeld op niet-islamitische principes. Een kleine minderheid ontzet de natie-staat zelfs elke vorm van legitimiteit. Een vierde oplossing van het datum conflict wenst binnen de traditie van de klassieke rechtsschool van Imam Shafi'i te blijven. Volgens hen heeft een maan observatie geldigheid tot 8 graden in de omtrek. Het is daarom van belang om de exacte locatie van de woonplaats te weten om zo te kunnen bepalen of een waarneming geldig is of niet. Tegenstanders van deze manier vinden de basering op slechts een enkele rechtsschool te bekrompen.

In deel III, dat de hoofdstukken 9 tot en met 11 omvat, staat de hajj centraal. In hoofdstuk 9 gaat het om de voorbereiding en de uitvoering van de jaarlijkse vijf of zesdaagse pelgrimage naar Mecca. Over de laatste veertig jaren is het aantal Tanzaniaanse pelgrims meer dan verdubbeld, maar in vergelijking met andere landen met een grote populatie moslims blijft het percentage hajj reizigers relatief klein (totaal aantal buitenlandse pelgrims is in die periode meer dan verviervoudigd). De hajj zelf is een strak georganiseerde reeks handelingen, ingestudeerd met behulp van instructieboekjes en video's en geleid door Saudische gidsen. Het welslagen van de hajj is afhankelijk van de intentie van de gelovige maar vooral ook van het correct uitvoeren van de verschillende rituelen.

Hoofdstuk 10 laat zien hoe de betekenisgeving van de hajj niet primair gedefinieerd wordt door teksten. Een aantal steeds terugkerende ‘lessen’ die pelgrims kunnen leren van de hajj zijn: het belang van de umma, oefening in zelfdiscipline en gehoorzaamheid, opofferingsbereidheid, en voorbereiding op de dood en het hiernamaals. Het is in de vertaling van deze lessen naar de sociale werkelijkheid dat een opvallend verschil naar voren komt. Enerzijds is er een sterke nadruk op spiritu-
‘RAISE YOUR VOICES AND KILL YOUR ANIMALS’

ele reiniging en genezing zonder dat de pelgrim actief moet ingrijpen in de maatschappelijke structuren. De belangrijkste metaforen in dit discours zijn ontleend aan de medische sfeer: de Islam is een geneesmiddel, de hajj is een ziekenhuis, God is een arts. Deze houding is sterk vertegenwoordigd in de Ahmadiyya en overheidsorganen zoals de Nationale Moslim Raad BAKWATA. Deze groepen zijn sterk consensus gericht en zien religie als primair betrekking hebbend op het persoonlijke leven. Anderzijds is er een tendens te bespeuren die de hajj gebruikt als model om de samenleving daadwerkelijk te hervormen. Dit vertoog maakt gebruik van metaforen ontleend aan strijd en oorlogvoering: de Islam is een wapen, de hajj is een militair trainingscamp en God is een legeraanvoerder. Een dergelijke houding is aan te treffen in salafistische organisaties als het AMYC maar ook in politiek activistische bewegingen die hameren op meer rechten voor Tanzaniërs moslims. Geen van beide metaforen zijn exclusief voor een bepaalde groep maar er is wel een significante relatie tussen gebruikte beeldspraak en de rol die een islamitische groep ziet treffen in salafistische organisaties als het AMYC maar ook in politiek activistische bewegingen die hameren op meer rechten voor Tanzaniërs moslims. Geen van beide metaforen zijn exclusief voor een bepaalde groep maar er is wel een significante relatie tussen gebruikte beeldspraak en de rol die een islamitische groep ziet weergegeven voor de Islam in de Tanzaniërs maatschappij. Net als bij de discussies over de juiste dag van de Idd el-Hajj zien we ook bij de vertogen over de betekenis van de hajj, dat de islamitische gemeenschap in Tanzania zich in toenemende mate bedreigd voelt.

Hoofdstuk 11 toont hoe rituelen gebruik maken van bepaalde historische paradigma’s, modellen die de huidige sociale werkelijkheid inzichtelijk maken in het licht van wat de islamitische gemeenschap in vroeger tijden overkomen is. Deze paradigma’s zijn oorspronkelijk gebaseerd op een historische of mythische gebeurtenis in een bepaalde plaats en in een bepaalde tijd. Maar het voortdurend reproduceeren van deze gebeurtenissen en het incorporen in een rituele context maakt ze tot metaforen van de Islamitische gemeenschap waar mee de wereld beter begrepen kan worden. De slag bij Badr waar de jonge moslimmaatschappij voor het eerst een grote overwinning boekt op een ongelovige overmacht wordt vooral in de maand Ramadan herdacht. De dag van Arafa is verbonden met de hajj en laat de Islamitische gemeenschap zien die luistert naar de afscheidswoorden van de profeet Mohammed. De vallei van Mina, de stad Mecca en het vierkante cultusgebouw de Ka’ba zijn verbonden met de schepping van de aarde, het begin van de beschaving en met de twee grootste Islamitische profeten: Ibrahim en Mohammed. Binnen bepaalde rituelen worden verwijzingen naar deze paradigma’s gebruikt om de huidige moslimgemeenschap in Tanzania te verbinden met deze oergemeenschap. Zo wordt bijvoorbeeld tijdens mawlid vieringen de Badr overwinning nagespeeld door studenten van madrasas. In 2001 werd tijdens de dag van Arafa een protestbijeenkomst zodanig vormgeven dat deze grote gelijkenis vertoond met de gebeurtenissen op de gelijkmarge plaats tijdens de hajj. Met behulp van deze plaats paradigma’s kunnen
Islamitische groepen zowel aansluiten bij een gemeenschappelijke erfenis als zich onder scheiden van andere moslimgemeenschappen.

Deel IV bevat de hoofdstukken 12 tot en met 14 en illustreert hoe moslims in Tanga hun sociale identiteit vormgeven in de viering van de Idd el-Hajj. In hoofdstuk 12 staat het gebed en de preek centraal. Het gebed (salat) sluit nauw aan bij een wereldwijde praktijk en wordt nauwelijks gebruikt om zich te onderscheiden van anderen. Het is juist belangrijk om het gemeenschappelijke en samenbindende te benadrukken. Het onderscheidende element is te vinden in de tijd en plaats van uitvoering. De AMYC zijn begonnen met het buiten bidden van het feestgebed en samen met hun opvatting dat de Idd el-Hajj gelijktijdig met de hajj behoort gevierd te worden, zorgt dit voor een afwijkende praktijk ten opzichte van de traditionele Tanga moskeeën die een dag later binnen bidden. Dit verschil in tijd en plaats kan zeker niet gereduceerd worden tot alleen maar een verschillende interpretatie van teksten, maar weerspiegelt een fundamenteel andere opvatting over aard en functie van de Islam in een moderne maatschappij. Waar de ‘binnenbidders’ hun eigen groep vooral plaatselijk duiden (binnen een locale traditie, rond het graf van een plaatselijke madrasastichter) zijn het de ‘buitenbidders’ die veel letterlijker en zichtbaarder zich richten op wat er in Saudi Arabie gebeurt. Ook in de preek komen verschillen aan het licht. Vooral de AMYC richten zich sterk op het belang van de morele zuiverheid van de gemeenschap terwijl de plaatselijke madrasa’s de feestpreek gebruiken voor lof aan de profeet Mohammed.

Hoofdstuk 13 beschrijft de drie verschillende plaatsen waar het Idd offer geslacht kan worden en de samenhangende betekenisvelden. Het huis is veruit de meest gebruikelijke plek, gevolgd door het publieke gebedsveld en het staatsabattoir. Het offer binnen de sfeer van het privé huis wordt meestal door een mannelijke verwant gedaan, en iets minder vaak door een religieus expert. Aanwezigheid bij het slachten is tamelijk onbelangrijk. Het publiekelijk slachten van dieren na het gemeenschappelijk gebed vindt plaats bij de AMYC. Sinds zij hier mee begonnen zijn (midden jaren 90 van de vorige eeuw), wordt dit uitgevoerd door de directeur Salim Barahiyan. Het slachthuis laat een efficiënte en hygiënische wijze van vleesverwerking zien, meer dan een religieus offer. Degene die de slacht uitvoert heeft hooguit enkele jaren madrasa onderwijs genoten en is vooral een werknemer.

Hoofdstuk 14 zoomt in op de rol van het offerdier en de vleesverdeling. Opvallend is dat er relatief weinig aandacht is voor het ‘correct’ offeren van een dier, maar dat de betekenis van het ritueel vooral ligt in het sociale karakter van het feest. Daarom worden er vaak kippen geslacht, ondanks dat deze dieren niet gelden als ‘echte’ offers volgens Islamitische bronnen. Van de vieroetigen die geofferd wordt op de Idd el-Hajj zijn vooral de geiten erg populair. De minderheid die een schaap slacht doet dit in het bewustzijn hiermee dichter bij de oorspronkelijke offerver-
haal van Ibrahim te staan. De vleesverdeling laat nauwelijks een cultureel bepaald patroon zien: het zijn vooral vrienden en verwanten die vlees krijgen en dit gebeurt op een tamelijk willekeurige wijze. De huid wordt overwegend aan de madrasa gegeven die dit aanwendt voor het maken van trommels die ingezet worden bij de populaire mawlid vieringen.

Concluderend kan gesteld worden dat in het laatste decennium van sociale en politieke verandering de Tanzaniaanse moslimgemeenschap in de volle breedte zich in toenemende mate gemarginaliseerd en zich in haar bestaan bedreigd voelt. De Idd el-Hajj rituelen laten verschillende manieren zien waarop deze bedreigde moslim identiteit voortdurend opnieuw wordt vormgegeven in een proces van zich verbinden met en zich onderscheiden van andere groepen. Het gegeven dat dit ‘orthodoxe’ ritueel zo’n lange traditie kent, ingebed is in een corpus van gezaghebbende teksten en wereldwijd gevierd wordt, maakt het erg geschikt om juist het transcendentie karakter van de Islamitische gemeenschap tot uitdrukking te brengen. Tegelijkertijd vormen deze teksten het materiaal waarmee bepaalde deelaspecten van die identiteit benadrukt kunnen worden. Het is niet alleen de praktijk van het ritueel, maar vooral de context en de vertogen ertussen die de betekenis van de Idd el-Hajj verduidelijken. In de wijze waarop de datum van de Idd el-Hajj bepaald wordt, de visie op de hajj en de sociale relevantie van de bedevaart, en de plaats van handeling tonen zowel de loyaliteit aan een gedeelde erfens als de behoefte om zich te onderscheiden.
Curriculum Vitae

1973 born in Apeldoorn, 14 December
1986-1992 VWO (Gymnasium Alpha stream) van Lodenstein College Amersfoort
1992-1999 Social Anthropology University Utrecht (MA)
Arabic Language and Culture University Utrecht (MA)
1994 Summerschool Coloquial Arabic in Cairo
1997-1998 6 months fieldwork Tamale, Northern Ghana
1999 Thesis: “Beschouwingen over de ontwikkeling van het ‘aqiqa-ritueel in de formatieve periode van de islam”
1999-2000 Advanced Masters Programme CNWS (with distinction)
2000 Inventarisation and acquisition Islamic books in Tanzania
2001-2002 13 months fieldwork Tanga, Tanzania