The drawing of the mark of Cain: a socio-historical analysis of the growth of Anti-Jewish stereotypes

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Anti-Semitism is an extraordinary historical phenomenon. Over some two thousand years it has manifested itself in different guises, from mild to genocidal, in different places and at different times. Under what conditions do anti-Semitic movements emerge? What evokes large-scale stereotyping? What does it take for people to act upon these stereotypes? And in what way does anti-Semitism differ from other forms of racism?

These are big questions, and in The Drawing of the Mark of Cain they are addressed head-on. The author has devoted his entire career as a distinguished social historian to resolving these and similar problems. He has sought his answers through a highly original, consistently analytical process of historical conjecture and refutation.

The book addresses key episodes taken from the full history of Jew-hatred. It focuses chiefly on the pre-modern period, but pursues its themes as far as Hitler’s rise to power. The author’s ultimate objective is to contribute to the prevention of future outbursts by enhancing our understanding of the societal and ideological circumstances that appear to be their precondition.

Dik van Arkel is Emeritus Professor of Social History at Leiden University (The Netherlands).

This is a fascinating book. It is the result of many years of thorough, wonderfully rich and innovative investigation into a very complex subject. Van Arkel’s methodologically and conceptually stringent – and at the same time factually solid – research has yielded this lucid and fundamental inquiry into the history of anti-Semitism that no student of the subject should ignore.

– Hans Blom, emeritus professor of history at the University of Amsterdam and former director of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD)
THE DRAWING OF THE MARK OF CAIN
The Drawing of the Mark of Cain

A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Growth of Anti-Jewish Stereotypes

Dik van Arkel
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Preface

H. Floris Cohen, Leo A.C.J. Lucassen, Robert J. Ross

This book by the social historian D. van Arkel seeks to explain anti-Semitism as a historical phenomenon. It deals with core issues in the era from early Christianity to the early modern period, so as to show how eventually, by the time of Hitler’s coming to power, vast-scale genocide could come about. It does not claim to provide an exhaustive narrative, which would be elusive in any case. The path taken instead is that of Popperian conjecture and refutation. This consistently hypothetical-deductive, “experimental” and comparative approach is first set forth by means of sophisticated, methodological argument. It then leads to a detailed demonstration that, once distinctively Western anti-Semitism had come into being through clearly analyzable, situational logic, three specific historical variables with an inherent logic of their own provide a set of tools eminently suitable for coming to explanatory grips with:

1. any outburst of anti-Semitism over the period of almost twenty centuries here at issue, with the emphasis very much upon those new forms of anti-Judaism that came up in the medieval and the early modern periods;
2. the distinctive difference between anti-Semitic and other, more common varieties of racism.

Therefore the point is that Jews were never “helots”, like so many of the victims of other varieties – “race” and class never coincided. Anti-Semitism has always been an ideology advocating change, or even the abolishment of the reigning system; on occasion it could even, for all its conservative or reactionary overtones, assume revolutionary features, whereas racism aiming at “helots” has customarily been an ideology defending the status quo. Since in the case of anti-Semitism there was no question of exploiting Jews, these being perceived as the exploiters, there was no economic interest in their preservation, as in the case of the helots. Anti-Semites could “afford” genocide, as racists of other varieties could not.
The author of the present book, a historian with a deep and abiding interest in the social sciences, is a meanwhile 84-year old professor emeritus in social history at Leyden University. After numerous articles on partial issues published in Dutch or English, *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain* crowns the scholarly effort of a life-time to understand anti-Semitism as a distinctive historical phenomenon. Widely read in the vast literature, van Arkel has sought to overcome what he perceives as its explanatory shortcomings by means of the present study.

Accordingly, the book has been long in the making. Around 1980 it reached something close to its present, fully completed state. Some five years later van Arkel published the main ideas on which the book is based in an extensive article “The Growth of the Anti-Jewish Stereotype. An Attempt at a Hypothetical-deductive Method of Historical Research” (in: *International Review of Social History* 30, 1985, p. 270-307). Even so, for all kinds of personal and other reasons publication of the full argument had to wait until now.

The argument of this book, albeit well-written and clear-cut, is also ambitious and complex. Both we and the author himself feel that the reader might benefit from being introduced to its highly original structure and research questions, rather than making the plunge just on his or her own, without any preparation. We are fortunate to have found Dr. G. Chris Quispel willing to provide a brief, fully authorized, introductory essay. Using a hypothetical-deductive method, van Arkel has developed a model which accounts for the rise of anti-Semitism, while also explaining why in other situations anti-Semitism does not arise. He even goes one step further and expects his model to have explanatory value in other cases of racism and comparable situations of stereotyping and persecution. The construction of the model can be found in this book, yet Chris Quispel, who has for the past fifteen years taught classes on the history of anti-Semitism, is well-placed to set forth the main points in the following Introduction. Like two of us (HFC and LACJ), he is among van Arkel’s early Leyden pupils (whereas R JR, not a pupil, has done much work together with van Arkel). Unlike us, Chris Quispel has turned the inspiration that van Arkel’s courses, lectures, and research example so abundantly exuded into the guiding thread of his own career as a historian, which has been focused chiefly on the history of race relations in the USA.

Not only has Chris Quispel served the reader with his introduction; he has also appended to the end of the book a short historiographical essay. Between the completion of *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain* around 1980 and the present day, research has not of course stood still — quite to the contrary. It is important to give the reader an overview of the main findings of the later
literature, and also to find out whether and, if so, to what extent van Arkel’s principal results and research tools, in short, the explanatory model he has in the end come up with, has so far stood up to the test of time. To make such an effort is only in keeping with van Arkel’s own insistence on falsification as the principal motor of scientific and scholarly advance. The reader will find Chris Quispel’s conclusions in this regard to be predictably mixed. On certain factual and interpretative points (notably those concerning the issue of pre-Christian anti-Semitism and the vexed problem of the 1096 Rhineland massacres) the final verdict is still open. Perhaps more importantly, it turns out that the hypothetical-deductive model has overall worked quite well. The principal concepts that have come to make up van Arkel’s explanatory model still have a vast potential as extraordinarily helpful and enlightening tools for future investigations into this endlessly complex, endlessly varied, and (from a present-day point of view) still most timely historical subject.
Introduction

Chris Quispel

To Van Arkel, anti-Semitism is not a given, nor is it something that happens wherever there is a Jewish community. Though it is probably difficult to find a serious historical study that actually takes such a viewpoint, many authors take surprisingly little time to explain the basic question, “why the Jews”? The unspoken assumption seems to be that somehow Jews became the ideal scapegoats. Blaming the Jews could explain a large number of societal evils and consequently led to discrimination and persecution. While there may be a large amount of truth in such a view, some fundamental questions remain unanswered. First of all, in several European countries, anti-Semitism did not occur. In the twentieth century, for instance, there were no strong anti-Semitic political organizations in England, the Netherlands, Sweden, Bulgaria, Greece, or Italy, to name but some of these countries, whereas Germany, France, Austria, Poland, and Russia, among others, did have strong anti-Semitic movements. There is no easy explanation, such as the number of Jews, or the stage of industrialization, or religious differences, and so on. Secondly, although the number of accusations against the Jews is large, they are not simply blamed for everything that’s negative. Most of the accusations used against blacks, for instance, were never used against the Jews. Observations like these have led Van Arkel to the conclusion that the first important research question should address the rise of stereotypes. Apparently, an anti-Jewish stereotype was formulated and developed in some countries and regions, but not in others. Why is that so? This, obviously, is a pre-eminently historical question.

Where, then, to start? Van Arkel does not subscribe to the idea of a pre-Christian anti-Semitism, accepting at most that there may have been forms of anti-Semitism in pre-Christian antiquity, but that these were abortive. There are many examples of anti-Jewish behavior in the Hellenistic and Roman world and even more in Egypt (the Exodus story!). Indeed, there are serious historians who believe that the peculiarities of the Jewish religion, including its monotheism, its behavioral requirements, and the unwillingness
of the Jews to compromise with other religions, led to an abhorrence of Jews and their religion that predated the rise of Christianity. Even so, to Van Arkel it is only with the rise of Christianity that the history of anti-Semitism really begins.¹

Almost from the beginning, Van Arkel argues, Christians and Jews were in conflict. The main cause was a sociological process he has named “secession friction”. Whenever there is a split within an ideologically motivated group, most often religious and/or political, both sides of the split will blame each other in vehement terms. They will accuse the other to be blind to their own truth; to be unfidels who obstinately refuse to acknowledge the most obvious facts. The first Christians must have been Jews; only Jews believed in the coming of the Messiah, and only in a Jewish tradition did a belief in Jesus Christ as the Messiah make sense. In all probability they continued to see themselves as Jews, thus laying the groundwork for manifestations of secession friction. Here we have two conflicting groups within the same religion who disagree about something as fundamental as the question of whether or not Jesus of Nasareth is indeed the Messiah. Already in the New Testament negative remarks are made about the Jews, because they did not believe that he was. Soon the first accusations about the role of the Jews in the crucifixion started to appear. This is where the stereotyping of the Jews began. The accusations made by the early Christians, by evangelists, bishops, and theologians have never disappeared and remain with us till this day. The role of the church is also important in another way. According to Van Arkel, in order for stereotypes to be accepted by large segments of a society they must be legitimized by an institution with a strong moral authority. The condemnation of the Jews by the church is the beginning of the growth of a much more encompassing anti-Jewish stereotype. To follow the development through the ages of a veritable “genealogy of stereotypes”, is the other main theme in Van Arkel’s book.

This is a book about the conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for anti-Semitism and even for racism generally to arise. Obviously, stigmatization is one of the necessary conditions. But is it sufficient on its own? Obviously it is not. The image of the Jew as Christ-killer is well known throughout the Christian world, including those regions that have never developed violent forms of anti-Semitism. Even more importantly, almost 1000 years separate the first Christian accusations of God’s murder from the first persecutions, which took place in 1096 in several cities in the Rhineland.² So Van Arkel has had to look further for additional necessary conditions. But before doing so he had to explain why anti-Jewish sentiments, after the initial con-
flict in the early stages of Christianity, did not disappear. Secession friction generally is not long lasting. There are countless examples in the history of religious and political movements, and several are mentioned in Van Arkel’s text, in which initial hostility began to fade away after a couple of years and certainly after a longer period. Former enemies often came together again or simply ceased to exist anymore. This did not happen with Christians and Jews, but why not? Christians, whose fundamental concepts were so deeply embedded in Jewish tradition, could never deny that the Jews are God’s chosen people. Augustine solved the resulting problem by declaring that the Jews were indeed the chosen people, but that they had forfeited their position. This would compel them to lead a life of misery until they finally realized their terrible mistake and confess their crimes, which would be the beginning of the second coming of Christ. Unlike other religious groups, among them many Christian denominations, the Jews were allowed to hold on to their religion in the Christian world. Theirs was the only religio licita.

There is, however, another reason for the continuing hostility of the Christian church toward the Jews – a reason more closely connected to the growth and dissemination of anti-Jewish stereotypes. For a while, at least during the later years of the Roman Empire and probably also in the early Middle Ages, Jews and Christians were in active competition for the souls of the populace. When the Roman Empire turned Christian, many Roman citizens were not very aware of the precise differences between Judaism and Christianity. A reading of Chrysostom’s virulently anti-Jewish sermons clearly shows his main concern to rest in the apparent fact that many believers went to the synagogue just as easily as to the church. In the early Middle Ages, anxious bishops bitterly denounced the Jews because they were worried about the good personal relations between Jews and Christians. This leads Van Arkel to two important conclusions. First, for a long time, personal relations between Christians and Jews were quite good, or at least good enough to prevent popular uprisings against the latter. Secondly, only after open contacts between Jews and Christians have disappeared can animosity against the Jews become a reason for popular anger and persecution. Here Van Arkel introduces his second necessary condition, social distance. Before the eleventh century social distance between Jews and Christians increased, for reasons that cannot be attributed to prior stigmatization, because stigmatization, if it had been the cause of this social distance, would still be a sufficient condition.

In a process that started around 900, in some places possibly a little earlier, Jewish occupational opportunities in the West began to decline. In agricul-
ture, where the majority of the Jews were living and working, the rise of feudalism spelled doom for the Jews. As feudalism means that all involved have to take a Christian oath of vassalage, Jewish land is very likely to have been allodial. When more and more allodial land was turned into feudal land, Jews were forced to leave unless, as must have happened often, they decided to stay and take a Christian oath, making them effectively Christian. In the cities, the rise of the guilds had a comparable effect. Though originally not Christian organizations, a Christian element became more and more prominent. At the time when the guilds had monopolized the trades, they not only had an important economic function, but they also played a central role in the religious life of European cities. Again Jews had to make a choice, either to remain Jewish, which meant no guild membership and no admission to the trades, or to become Christian. This must have been a turning point in Jewish life in Europe. Undoubtedly their numbers dwindled and those who remained Jewish found themselves in a situation in which opportunities for making a living had become very limited. Outside their own community, functions open to Jews were by now restricted to money lending, pawn broking, and other occupations related to the world of finance; pariah professions not allowed to Christians.

A situation in which stigmatization of the Jewish population went together with a strict segregation existed already in Byzantium where, ever since Justinian, Jews lived in segregated neighborhoods. Stigmatization, in the form of theological accusations about Christ-killing and failing to recognize the Messiah, was strongly developed. Yet no popular persecutions took place. Some acts of violence were perpetrated by the military, but popular initiative was punished as an offense against the emperor. A strong state was able to protect the Jews against persecutions and popular outrage. Jews were cursed, they were treated with contempt and pushed around, but nothing worse happened to them during the many centuries of the Byzantine Empire.

Social distance, then, is certainly a necessary condition to explain anti-Semitism, but together with stigmatization it is still not sufficient. Van Arkel had to introduce a third necessary condition, which is terrorization, i.e., the process due to which well-meaning people are forced to join in discriminatory behavior, or at least to stop resisting persecution and/or helping the victims. This is what happened during the first real persecutions of Jews, which took place in the Rhine region in 1096. Jews were counting on the support of the local bishops, city officials, and other people in authority. Though such help was promised and even given, in the end authorities were unable to resist the persecutors. Terrorization may take place when the authorities lack
strength, but also when they themselves use their power to enforce discriminatory behavior, as, for example, was obviously the case in Nazi Germany. The terrorization mechanism not only makes well-meaning people powerless. It is very possible that once a person is compelled to take part in discriminatory behavior or worse, he or she responds at first by feeling guilty. One effective way then to get rid of such a feeling of guilt is to embrace the negative stereotypes that were the cause of discrimination in the first place.

A meticulous analysis, with all the details, nuances, and historical examples of the way these necessary and sufficient conditions were met, at least in certain European regions, can be found in this book. But why is this so important? According to Van Arkel, anti-Semitic persecutions have taken place solely in those regions and countries where the process occurred that we have just outlined. There the genealogy of stereotypes, which lies at the root of anti-Jewish feelings, could develop. During the years 1000-1300, important new elements were added to the already-existing theological stigma. Closely connected to the specific economic position of the Jews, accusations of usury became part and parcel of anti-Jewish feelings. Charges of ritual murder, blood libel, and desecration of the host, unheard of in earlier times, appeared for the first time in the middle of the twelfth century.\(^3\) Perhaps even more importantly, in the later Middle Ages we begin to find rumors about a supposed Jewish conspiracy to conquer the world. The constant renewal of the anti-Jewish stereotype, called “accusatory innovation” by Van Arkel, makes anti-Semitism unique among the various forms of racism.

These were not just temporary additions to the anti-Jewish stereotype. In Eastern Europe, ritual murder charges and comparable accusations were voiced against Jews until the early twentieth century. At that time economic allegations were among the most important charges leveled by anti-Semites against the Jews. The infamous anti-Semitic forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, in which the existence of a Jewish conspiracy was “proven”, became one of the cornerstones of Nazi propaganda.\(^4\) However, as Van Arkel shows in this book, this process did not take place everywhere in Europe. We have already seen one instance in the Byzantine Empire. There, the theological stigma was as fierce as anywhere and the government enforced strict segregation, yet the very same government was both willing and able to protect the Jews against any attempt by the Christian population to persecute or pester them. No economic specification took place and, unlike in many parts of Western Europe, no new elements were added to the anti-Jewish stereotype. As one consequence, in countries like Bulgaria and Greece, which for a long time remained under the Byzantine influence, no strong anti-Jewish at-
titudes developed.

Italy provides another telling case. No strong anti-Semitic tradition ever developed in Italy. Even in Fascist times, it was only in 1938 that the first anti-Jewish laws were introduced. This happened not because the fascists, or Mussolini himself, hated the Jews, but only in view of strong German pressure after the Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War forced Mussolini into an alliance with Nazi Germany. No process of economic specification ever occurred in Italy. Large parts of the country had remained under Byzantine, and later Saracen, influence. Moreover, in all parts of Italy, Jews have always been able to work in a wide variety of jobs. The result has been theological stigmatization, but no genealogy of stereotypes and no persecutions. There was a level of segregation in some places – the word ghetto originated in Venice – but generally, and especially in Tuscany, Jews enjoyed levels of freedom unknown north of the Alps. The main reason was the exceptional governmental effectiveness in these regions.

Once the process of stereotyping, of economic specification, of social distance, and of the growth of accusations has started, it is very difficult to turn it around. Van Arkel is remarkably gloomy about the possibility of a reversal of the fate of the Jews. Though persecution is of course the exception, and for long times Jews and non-Jews have been able to live together peacefully, there remains an undercurrent of anti-Jewish feelings that, at least until World War II, could easily be mobilized by demagogues, politicians, and religious leaders in many European countries. Why is this so? After the Middle Ages, European society has undergone many incisive transformations, economic, political, cultural and scientific, all of which might have changed the relationship between Jews and non-Jews for the better. Instead they have worsened it, and have even caused new elements to be added to the already-existing stereotype. Van Arkel’s explanation of this state of affairs centers on two distinct concepts, one being the functionality of the anti-Jewish stereotype, and the other being something that he has dubbed “labeled interaction”.

Jews are not of course the only group in history that has suffered from prejudice. In every society with different social groups, there will be prejudices. Some are mean, others innocent; some are shared by large portions of society, others are held only by a small minority, yet few if any survive the ages the way the anti-Jewish stereotype has. Of one reason we are aware already, the combination with social distance and economic specification. But there is another reason, functionality. Anti-Jewish stereotypes have taken forms which enable anti-Semites to give an explanation for the occurrence of a large number of evils that may affect a person or a society. Put in another
way, the anti-Jewish stereotype acquired explanatory value. The importance of such a convergence of stereotype and explanation, which makes the stereotype “functional”, can hardly be overstated. How it works, became painfully clear in the years of the Black Death epidemic. For the European population at that time there simply was no rational explanation for this incomprehensible disaster. Still, to many, there was an obvious cause for the calamity. At that time accusations about well poisoning and desecration of the host, together with rumors about a Jewish world conspiracy, were already well known. The combination resulted in the worst persecutions Europe had known until that day, the size of which would only be surpassed in the twentieth century.

Nineteenth century farmers, shaken by economic problems they could not have foreseen, also found a fitting explanation. It was all a Jewish conspiracy. Those people who blamed technological progress, or the rise of a market economy and international competition, or even lack of business know-how on the part of the farmers, were blind to the real cause, which was simply the powerful and dangerous Jewish conspiracy. Prejudices that lack this kind of explanatory value, like the ill feelings that sometimes exist between inhabitants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam or of Liverpool and Manchester may easily drift away. Functional stereotypes are much more persistent, to the point of arising again even after a long period of absence. Not every inexplicable calamity or economic misfortune will lead inevitably to outbreaks of anti-Semitism. Authorities are important here, especially in whether or not terrorization – the third necessary condition – will come to play a role. Blaming the Jews is the exception. Yet the danger is always there.

So, once a situation in which a functional stereotype has developed in combination with increasing social distance, correction of the stereotype will become very difficult – the combination is virtually irreversible. But one further important reason has not yet been discussed: labeled interaction. It is one of the most interesting ideas and concepts that Van Arkel has developed. In a society in which a minority is the victim of the kind of stereotyping here under discussion, the majority will view this minority as homogeneous. Jews will be seen first and foremost as Jews, with all the negative connotations that go with being Jewish. Differences within the Jewish community, though obvious to the Jews themselves, will be of little or no interest to the prejudiced majority. For them the Jewish doctor is a Jew before anything else, and whatever the function of the Jew may be, his or her Jewishness stands out. This is even more so when, as often happens, the other is met in a situation that fits the prejudiced pattern. A visit to the Jewish pawnbroker or to the Jewish

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banker will do much to confirm and strengthen existing stereotypes, and little to change them. Worse, in situations like these, members of the minority often feel forced, or are actually required, to act in accordance with the stereotype. This can best be shown by looking at the southern states in the United States during the Jim Crow years. Blacks were expected to behave in a “Sambo”-like manner. Refusing to do so even meant immediate physical danger. Most blacks had no other option than to behave in the stereotypical way that whites demanded, and in this way, all personal contacts between blacks and whites did nothing but reinforce white prejudices. Even nowadays, when whites no longer would even dare to expect this conduct from blacks, blacks and whites in the US may still feel uncomfortable in each other’s company. Contacts are still not open but labeled, and they tend to reinforce prejudices rather than combat them.

In a comparable (although probably not quite so extreme) way, Jews were forced into a type of behavior that confirmed existing prejudices, while also being more and more restricted in their contacts with others. Open contacts between Jews and non-Jews became rare. If they existed, these contacts could lift prejudice, but only toward the individual(s) who were involved. “With Jews you must be on your guard, but my neighbor Cohen is a nice guy.” Until the middle of the twentieth century contacts between Jews and non-Jews in many parts of Europe, even in countries without a strong anti-Semitic tradition, were limited and much more likely to enforce prejudices than to diminish them.

The picture Van Arkel paints of the history of anti-Semitism is bleak. Once established, so runs his message, it is very hard to get rid of. On the contrary, several elements work together to strengthen it. Terrorization not only compels well-meaning people to join in discriminatory behavior, but also drives some of them to accept stereotypes so as to relieve their conscience. Contacts between Jews and non-Jews did not disappear, but took place in circumstances that confirmed existing stereotypes. Economic specification played an important role in this process of labeled interaction. This did not change when in the nineteenth century, after emancipation, many functions were opened to Jews. Even though these were not related to stigmas, and also did not fit the few specific professions that were traditionally filled by Jews, open contacts did not result. In the eyes of prejudiced people, Jews simply had no right to fulfill these jobs. A Jewish artisan was an impostor; Jewish artists could not have the emotions and feelings that were the basis of real art.5 Of course functions filled by Jews in trade, industry, and finance fitted in nicely with the hoary stereotypes. In each of these cases Van Arkel’s concept of la-
beled interaction appears to have strong explanatory value.

This, in a nutshell, is the theoretical model that forms the cornerstone of this book. Differences between European countries in regard to the importance and occurrence of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic movements are treated here, not as historical accidents, but rather as the result of often very long-term developments in stigmatization and economic specification. The history of anti-Semitism becomes the history of a “genealogy of stereotypes”. The first part of this process, the theological stage, can be found all over Christian Europe. Later developments, in which new and threatening elements were added to the stereotype, took place only there where growing social distance made the dissemination of these new stigmas possible. Just as important, Van Arkel’s model provides us with central insights in the persistent continuity of anti-Jewish feelings.

Van Arkel has developed his model in the course of an investigation of the history of anti-Semitism, but in his opinion anti-Semitism has many things in common with other forms of persistent racism, such as attitudes in the Western world towards people of African descent and the widespread discrimination against Roma. Each has a history of its own, but the concepts developed by Van Arkel may fruitfully be applied in such cases as well.

This is a book about ideas. It has taken Van Arkel almost a lifetime to develop and refine them. With the appearance of this book, his ideas finally are made available to a large academic audience. Some will use his ideas and concepts to gain insights into other situations of racism and long-lasting ethnic conflict. Others will criticize them, and introduce new facts and interpretations to refute Van Arkel’s ideas. As a firm believer in the growth of knowledge through ongoing falsification, he will enjoy both.

Introduction
The Historiographical Background

The historiographical background

In the early 1930s, when loudmouthed and small-brained Brownshirts began to call Jews names and were beating them up, the world looked on, stunned, perhaps in dismay, but without doing anything; there were no boycotts, nor were other means of pressure applied, until after the Kristallnacht of November 1938, when it was too late. Most Western countries, preoccupied with unemployment and depression at home, only grudgingly granted right of asylum to some of the increasing number of refugees. Appeasement was then the dominating trend in foreign policy. The Soviet Union and the Far East had more than enough problems of their own.

Even during the war, the Allies did not give priority to stopping the Nazi genocide, though they were informed about what was happening. Gas chambers, though located by aerial photography, were never bombed, although there is reason to assume that this was technically not feasible or advisable.¹

When the nightmare was finally over and the full atrocity was disclosed, the world was aghast, but not for long. The few returning survivors were not always given a warm welcome home.² Displaced persons were long left to their fate, when they could not be used as a workforce. There was no eagerness to realize the promised National Home for Jews in the face of Arab sensitivities and Arab oil. Oil production was immensely boosted by the war; in 1955, the Middle East produced 21 percent of the world’s output. Pipelines, the first two of which were built in 1934, could easily be wrecked during anti-Zionist disturbances.³

To what extent were these various forms of looking the other way remnants of a deep-seated hatred of Jews, that had once pervaded almost all Western culture? The Nazi murderers found their willing helpmates all over occupied Europe, and anti-Semitic sentiment was not alien to the world outside it.⁴

There is no reason to assume, however, that this is necessarily the only ex-
planation. The liberal, bourgeois world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had never been able to make up its mind on the issue of anti-Semitism, even while (halfheartedly) condemning it. In fact, the Dreyfus Affair caused an international stir, as did the pogroms of Czarist Russia, but I venture to suggest that in the former case it was indignation about a miscarriage of justice rather than indignation about a miscarriage of justice engineered by anti-Semites. As regards the Russian case, the indignation was one-sided, for the world—except the us—was indifferent to the dire fate of the Romanian Jews, and did nothing about the Romanian refusal to grant them civil rights, which had been demanded unanimously by the powers at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, as a condition for Romania’s recognition as an independent free state.

Today there would be a huge outcry when a socialist of the stature of Jean Jaurès would declare (as he did before the Dreyfus Affair): “Un socialisme nuanced d’antisémitisme n’aurait guère soulevé d’objections chez les esprits libres.” Or when a socialist researcher of Beatrice Webb’s standing would write that “the Jew is deficient in that highest and latest development of human sentiment, social morality.” Nowadays prominent liberal authors could not write unimpededly the articles or books a Goldwin Smith or a Sir Tollemache Sinclair published without serious repercussions. The first mentioned, like some other anti-Tories, gave vent to his loathing of Disraeli’s anti-Russian and pro-Turkish, that is, “Oriental” or “Semitic” foreign policy in generally anti-Jewish terms. Disraeli’s pronounced “Semitism” expressed in some of his novels, such as Coningsby or Tancred, made him an easy target for those who chose to forget that most Jews were no more “Oriental” than most Christians, though the religion of both originated in the Near East. Sir Tollemache Sinclair, a paragon of the liberal party, well liked by Gladstone and an early champion of the anti-Disraeli and pro-Russian policy, was decidedly anti-Semitic. He wrote about Jews as fanatic Christian-hating usurers who charged 100 to 200 percent interest, who had no learning or culture, and had no ethics in their purely formal religion: “(… the cement in the edifice of their fortunes is moistened with the tears of the plundered widow and orphan)”. He minimized the Russian pogroms as persecutions of “some Jewish usurers”. Nowadays a liberal periodical would massively lose subscribers if it had the editorial policy of The Spectator during the 1880s, allowing a series of articles declaring—without a bit of proof—peasant resentment of Jewish exploitation as extenuating circumstances for Hungarian “ritual murder” agitation. If such attitudes were tolerated in the country of the “Mother of Parliaments” or the cradle of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man, of the French revolution, one can easily imagine what it was like elsewhere.

Nevertheless, there is reason to doubt whether such tolerance for the intolerant, for this indifference verging on rejection, is proof of a deep-seated anti-Semitism. Jaurès was the first to recognize his error when anti-Semitism really became a serious issue. Unlike Jules Guesde, the leader of the Marxist wing of the socialist party who argued that the Dreyfus Affair was a bourgeois conflict of no concern to the proletariat, Jaurès was a staunch Dreyfus supporter from the very beginning. The anti-anti-Semites – and there were many of them, particularly where anti-Semites abounded – were often too lenient, because they were too reasonable. There is the example of the too-often forgotten German-Austrian Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus, supported by prominent academics like Rudolf Virchow and Gustav Mommsen. Accepting the anti-Semites’ good faith, assuming them only misinformed, they believed they would be able to combat anti-Semitic ideas with refutation and rational argument, as if anti-Semites, whose hatred was a passion, cared for refutations and arguments. Moreover, members of the Verein were convinced, like most liberals, that the often very recently acquired freedom of the press, and the freedoms of assembly and speech, were sacrosanct. They were arguing – perhaps not incorrectly – that the new wave of anti-Semitism was the “growing pain” of the recent political emancipation of the masses, and therefore a temporary aberration that could be cured by that liberal panacea: education; liberal intellectuals held the view that it would blow over.

Therefore, as long as the civil rights of Jews were protected, as indeed they were before the First World War in the U.S, Europe, and its dependencies anti-Semites were allowed to shout their own meetings and to print their own newspapers and pamphlets. Exceptions were Russia, Romania, and French Algeria. There an extremely violent movement was led by the 21-year-old mayor of Algiers, Max Régis. (Further on in this chapter there will be more information regarding Algeria). There were consequently very few prosecutions for anti-Semitic press infractions in the whole of Europe around the turn of the century; only in such cases, in fact, where the good reputation of individual Jews was at stake. Antisemiteln as some Viennese called the back-biting, was not seen as a real problem, as long as it did not become serious.

To a large extent, leniency was also based on ignorance (of the history) of anti-Semitism. It was conceived of as something that, save for some unsavoury remnants, belonged to the obscurantism of a barbaric past now overcome. Ignorance of anti-Semitism and indifference, occasionally mixed with condescension towards Jews and Judaism, comparable to the self-satisfied in-
difference and condescension towards colonized peoples, resulted in an underestimation of the elemental force of anti-Semitism when it breaks loose.

A mild animosity (which those concerned who, abhorring violence, will not have recognized as anti-Semitism) could permeate civilized society, weakening intellectual defenses against its cruder forms. An erudite but vicious book such as H.S. Chamberlain’s *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, the Bible of the Nazis, was, without becoming authoritative, nevertheless appreciably received by the well educated, not only in Germany, but elsewhere as well. It confirmed the bias of a generation which did not yet know the scientific arguments against prevailing racial doctrines, and which moreover also exonerated a colonialism about which Europe was only just beginning to feel qualms.

Because of this bias and hesitancy the world was ill-prepared for taking a stand against National Socialism. In the English-speaking world it needed Penguin Specials, the caricatures of David Low, and Sinclair Lewis’ *It Can’t Happen Here* to foster an awareness, not necessarily with immediate public results. Elsewhere, these efforts did not meet with much success either. Appeasement policies were inclined to gloss over anti-Semitic excesses, by way of attributing them to “Jewish exaggeration” or by condemning the methods rather than by taking a more principled attitude. James Parkes’ *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue*, an early 1934 effort to put anti-Semitism in the wider perspective of a Christian civilization in order to arrive at that more principled attitude, was to little avail. His work was appreciated in Germany, though, where the *Antisemitische Weltdienst* plotted against his life in 1935.

Perhaps during the 1930s there were still remnants of some currents in European socialism which perceived the Jews as bearers of the capitalist spirit. Perhaps the opportunist, even cynical way in which some socialists used anti-Semitism as a propagandist tool created havoc. Particularly in France, with its large artisan population, some socialists had used anti-Semitism as a lever to raise anti-capitalist awareness in those impoverished petty bourgeois, who, self-employed, saw themselves as victims of the bank and the stock exchange, of “the Jews”, rather than as victims of industrial competition; they could not, and would not, consider themselves proletarians yet. Sooner or later, these socialists argued, the poor artisans would realize the shallowness of anti-Semitic social protest, and turn towards socialism. In Germany, a similar idea was expressed by saying that anti-Semitism was a Vorstufe (harbinger of socialism. (There it was also used by opponents of anti-Semitism who were afraid of socialism). Did German socialist leader Bebel wholly
eliminate the notion that anti-Semites laid the groundwork, when he called anti-Semitism the “socialism of the stupid”? It may have lingered on, as is suggested by the impact that National Socialism later had on segments of the working-class vote. Perhaps there were still traces of that trade-unionist attitude that had perceived poor Jewish immigrants from Russia as mere scabs, or people whose very submissiveness kept the sweatshops going.

All in all there was, in most Western countries, next to downright anti-Semitism, a very complex and very confusing uneasiness vis-à-vis the Jews. There was the widespread notion that “the Jew” was a bit of a smart aleck, not quite honest, or “too clever by half”, which Thorstein Veblen analyzed so beautifully in his brilliant essay *The Intellectual Pre-eminence of Jews in Modern Europe*. He interpreted it as the result of a solely juridical, but socially not quite adequate, emancipation. No longer safely embedded in Judaist tradition, not fully admitted to Gentile society, and not initiated in its taboos, the young Jewish intellectual became “a skeptic by force of circumstances over which he has no control”. He is thereby eminently suited for science in particular. Outside the scientific community, however, this skepticism was often held to be *zersetzend*, undermining traditional values, corrupting. However, a paralyzing uneasiness, different from the post-1945 guilt-ridden variety, was not necessarily always anti-Semitism *in statu nascendi*. It could be an indication of some bewilderment, or it could be an attitude which resembled anti-Semitism “as mist resembles the rain”. The war in occupied Europe, which forced everyone to take a stand, either blew away the mist or condensed it to precipitation.

A lack of vision was not without repercussions. Not only did pluriform embarrassment mean that there was hardly any, and certainly no adequate, reaction to anti-Semitism during the 1930s, mesmerized as depression-ridden European and American democracies were by Nazi brutality. There was also no clear conceptualization as to where anti-Semitism begins, there being understandably not much investigatory tradition in this field.

To be sure, great writers of Jewish history, including H. Graetz or Simon Dubnov, had paid scrupulous attention to the Jew-hatred of the past. One has the impression, however, that they saw it as part and parcel of Jewish history, as did most Gentiles. Inspired by their love of Judaism, they conceived of Jew-hatred perhaps metahistorically as something inherent in being “the chosen”, or more mundanely as something which paradoxically stimulated Jewish genius and fostered chances of survival until emancipation would give Jews a worthy place in society; this idea was negatively expressed by Jules Michelet as: “affranchis par la lettre de change ils sont maîtres – de soufflet en
soufflet, les voilà au trône du monde”.

Their work, presumably written for a Jewish public, was possibly a Jewish version of the then prevailing, largely political and national writing of history, meant to instill awareness and pride.

Anti-Semites frequently used distorted and selective interpretations of these works to “prove” their points. Decent Gentiles were possibly interested in it in the way they seriously took notice of distant cultures, not necessarily as something that concerned themselves. Some Protestants perhaps even used it to confirm their anti-Roman Catholic prejudices, or vice versa. Liberals and socialists perhaps used it to give vent to their anti-religious and their anti-“obscurantist” prejudices, blaming religion for intolerance. All evaded the real problem.

So, all in all, on the eve of the Machtübernahme, apart from such monographs as among others, Bernard Lazare’s *L’antisémitisme, son histoire et ses causes*, there were very few works on the history of anti-Semitism as such, and even fewer that envisaged the anti-Semites rather than the Jews, whose “assimilation” was held as problematic. Bernard Lazare’s book did not really problematize the anti-Semites. He saw Jewish social and religious exclusiveness as the main cause of anti-Semitism – blaming the victim! On the other hand, he also saw the “revolutionary spirit” of Judaism in conjunction with the emerging socialism as a guarantee (on the eve of the Affair) that Jews would be assimilated and that anti-Semitism would disappear. The “Affair” in which he participated at a very early stage by writing *Une erreur judiciaire. La Verité sur l’Affaire Dreyfus in 1897*, was a great disappointment. There was a corresponding uncertainty about which questions to ask.

The historiographical implications of the Shoah and postwar racism

The news about a genocide, so unprecedented that it was not believed while it took place, gradually penetrated into the simultaneously dancing and mourning, ruined and hungry Europe of 1945; it was just one item among many. Consequently there was not that perplexity there would have been in normal times, during that strange year of 1945, when newspapers and broadcasting still functioned badly. There was no indication of that spontaneous generosity normal at times of human catastrophes. Many people still refused to believe, or were confused. *Quisque sibi proximus* people were just too preoccupied with the aftermath of five years of a devastating war to really care. The large-scale indifference which was also experienced by returning sur-
vivors of Japanese camps continued. In the case of the Jews, as noted above, it occasionally verged on anti-Semitism which had been provoked by years of persecution, making many people more “Jew-conscious”, in a pejorative sense. This was true to the extent that in Amsterdam a committee was formed to combat anti-Semitism.

There was shortly after the war a medley of various emotions. Consciences had to be soothed, for even those who were not Nazis had not behaved entirely according to ethical norms during the last years. Some had profited, some had shirked their responsibility, and many had been too afraid to help. Normality had to be restored and the economy reconstructed, which to many meant an irksome “let bygones be bygones”. There were also those who, despairing of mankind, wanted to understand.

For a variety of not always (but mostly) honorable reasons, there was a desire to have the inexplicable explained, the motives ranging from wanting to be able to store unpleasantness away among the facts of history and forget about it, to the need to come to grips with an overwhelming disaster, to get some guidance. Rarely was the motive pure intellectual interest, but whatever the reason for wanting to understand, it was clear to everyone that a crime of such dimensions could not possibly be attributed to some marginal problem, a view hitherto widely held.

In such a situation, which perhaps could be called “public anomie”, any answer was better than no answer. The urgency to explain the reasons for Jew-hatred, created by enhanced Jew-consciousness, a sense of guilt, shame, confusion, or pity, could for reasons mentioned not be met by well-established knowledge. Preoccupation with a nascent “cold war” left people with a nagging uncertainty. Consequently, prewar blankness gave way to a plethora of often very ad hoc solutions, and, often persistent, but widely divergent interpretative trends, born from embarrassment.

Perhaps indicative of both the urgency to understand, and the intellectual confusion of where to look for explanations, could be a bizarre theory launched in those early postwar years. It postulated that due to the overemphasis that authoritarian German society put on tidiness and cleanliness, German children were toilet trained at too early of an age, with the net result that their frustrated anal libido in later years sought an outlet in cruelty. Not all answers were as odd as this one, but many were just as one-sided. Perhaps it is possible to categorize them.

There was a tendency, to this day represented by Nolte, to put the Shoah in perspective by using the also-unexplained Bolshevist massacres, not necessarily by way of exoneration, but perhaps tending to overlook that it pre-
supposes a homegrown preceding anti-Semitic notion that Jews were responsible for them. Some early studies, including French ones, took an almost opposite course by laying the blame squarely on German history and social structure, without even hinting at the Dreyfus Affair, the Limerick riots of 1904 instigated by the religious orders expelled from France, or the pogroms staged by “colons” in Algeria and led by Max Régis, the mayor of Algiers – one of his favorite pastimes was dragging pregnant Jewish women along the cobbles. Resulting stillbirths were mentioned in his anti-Semitic press with glee. His supporters were “colons”, but not Islamic natives. There were similarly serious outbursts of Jew-hatred in non-German Europe west of the Vistula. A branch of the interpretative trend was the “rehearsal for destruction school”, to which I originally belonged myself. Its efforts resulted in a very serious study of political anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany from the perspective of consecutive events. Writers of this school thus sinned – felix culpa? – against the rule that historical events should be interpreted exclusively in the context of time and place, when and where they took place. This “sin” is exemplified by the astonishing ease with which such an obviously nineteenth-century term as “anti-Semitism”, with its implied racialist thinking, was applied to the anti-Jewish phenomena of entirely different conceptualizations of other periods. This type of interpretation is perhaps prone to the conclusion that widespread anti-Semitism will inevitably lead to a Shoah, a notion corrected by Levy, who called attention to the fact that anti-Semitic parties almost vanished in the decennium before the First World War. The major advantage of these studies was that they placed anti-Semitism in a social context.

The one-sidedness was soon corrected by such studies as R. Byrnes’ book on French anti-Semitism, H. Robb’s book on the hatred of Jews by the English working class, and particularly by H. Arendt. Her book on “totalitarianism” long dominating the scene, conceived of the Dreyfus Affair as more of a prelude to National Socialism than the ineffective shouting of vulgarities and bickering of the small each other anathematising German anti-Semitic parties, because she conceived anti-Semitism as being due to totalitarian mob rule. This she saw as the consequence of the – unexplained – breakdown of the eighteenth-century model of state and society, which, in fact, was never realized anywhere; to wit, the government by consent of the governed, who all are members of functional social categories, leaving no room for unstructured mobs. Despite this overly rosy view, her pioneer study was evocative and trendsetting. She explained anti-Semitism as the result of the incomplete emancipation of the Jews, by postulating that it amounted to granting
the privileges of the eighteenth-century “court Jews” to all Jews. Vastly underestimating the economic role of Jewish industrialists and other non-banking entrepreneurs, particularly in Germany, she thus conceived of nineteenth-century Jewry as the financial arm of the state. Whoever was in conflict, for whatever reason, with the state, a fortiori the mob, aimed at its one weakness, its dependence on Jewish financiers. Whatever the merits of this by no means incontestable theory, it remained one-sided in the sense that Arendt did not take the trouble to investigate the origin of the peculiar socioeconomic position of the Jews which led to the emergence of the “court Jews” in early modern times, and was oblivious to the religious issues involved. Her merit was that she had an eye for the continued peculiar socioeconomic position of the Jews, and their consequent vulnerability, that she placed anti-Semitism in the structural problems of post-emancipatory European bourgeois society (as R. Rürup has done very persuasively), and that she depoliticized the Jews by depoliticizing Gentile society.

Modern mob rule, its emotions fed by an irresponsible “yellow journalism”, also played a role in some psychological studies, which saw in anti-Semitism a special aspect of Gustave le Bon’s *psychologie des foules*. These studies depicted it as a loss of reason, a disobedience to the super-ego, in a panic-like reaction of the masses, without adequately explaining why that panic was aimed at the Jews. Other psychological studies, in contrast, equally convincingly emphasized personal prejudice, resulting from individual “psycho-pathologies”, but thereby somewhat lost sight of the collective action of what is so evidently a mass movement, usually of the right, occasionally of the (quasi) socialist left. An older, but in the 1940s and 1950s still immensely influential study, F. Bernstein’s *Der Antisemitismus als Gruppener-"scheinung*, anticipating the “frustration aggression” hypothesis, brilliantly depicted anti-Semitism as due to the Jews always being in a minority position. Bernstein held that all minorities are always victimized by what he called *Randspannung*, fringe friction. Even when the nucleus of the majority group is momentarily at rest, because it has for the moment adequately blown off steam, at its fringes there will always be a remnant of tension and resultant aggression, which will hurt the Jews because as a minority they are “automatically” placed at those fringes. The theory cannot explain which social categories are on the Gentile side of the fringe, and thus loses sight of the evident class character of most movements of political anti-Semitism. It has also difficulty in explaining why some countries are traditionally more anti-Semitic than others.

Although the universally European, not specifically German, character of

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anti-Semitism was gradually realized, the emphasis was still on bourgeois society. This was corrected by medievalists and theologians, who drew attention to the medieval and religious roots, exemplified in the writings of James Parkes, Jules Isaac, Robert Anchel, Marcel Simon, or Joshua Trachtenberg, to name but a few.39

The problem with their exemplary work, however, was the difficulty of linking it up with that of students of the modern period. How are the growing conflicts of the Church and the Synagogue, the medieval burnings of the Talmud, accusations of the desecration of the Host and ritual murder, medieval objections to “Jewish” usury, the late-medieval diabolizing of the Jew, and so forth, related to racial thinking, to the modern newspaper-stimulated mob, to the “Jew” as symbol of modern capitalism, and in the same breath, contradictorily as fomenter of socialist revolution? What light do these ancient or medieval issues throw on later concepts of the “Jew” as a warmonger, or in the same breath as a traitorous pacifist, as promoter of internationalism, feminism, atheism, Freudianism, expressionism, and a host of other “-isms” that were found objectionable by anti-Semites?

Léon Poliakov attempted to answer these questions in his unparalleled immensely courageous and learned Histoire de l’Antisémitisme.40 He was the pioneer of a synthesizing approach, like A. Bein, but precisely because he was a pioneer, because he had to reconnoiter largely uncharted areas, because he had to read the ideologies in many languages, his attempt could not but be a history of ideas, rather than the sociological history this study envisages. The time was not ripe.

Now there is such an overdose of information, in contrast to 1945, we have statistical information about anti-Semitism per country, per person, per social categories, per religious groups, and so forth, based on such a variety of occasionally incompatible research methods and definitions, that we are still far removed from a unified conceptualization. We do not see the wood for the trees.

There are more ambiguities in the posing of the question. My initial interest was not only aroused by the horrific events disclosed in 1945, the wartime experience in the occupied Netherlands, the burning question as to whether as a nation it could and should have done more to save the Jews, but also by contemporary events.

In the late 1940s there was a painful realization among some intellectuals and students – admirers of that early fighter against South African iniquity and injustice, Michael Scott – that apartheid was fully implemented only three years after the detection of the Nazi atrocities.41 Criticism by European
intellectuals was such that in official publications the South African government tried to refute it by arguing that its racial policies had nothing whatever to do with the Nazi ideology of racial inequality. Criticism of South African policies, however, was characterized by a similar embarrassment as had influenced the first investigations of anti-Semitism. There was little reliable knowledge, for European interest in South Africa had during the first decennia of the twentieth century largely been limited to the “white history” of the Boer War and its aftermath.

It was also realized during the 1940s and early 1950s that discrimination against blacks, and violence aimed at them in the US and elsewhere, went on unabated. The American troops liberating some concentration camps were still racially segregated! The same consideration applied in this case too. The American Northern States and Europe had forgotten the blacks after the period of Reconstruction and accepted the Southern “separate but equal” at face value. It was only during the New Deal that interest in the dire fate of the former slaves was aroused again. Ill-treatment of immigrants from former colonies—who had a just claim in: “we are here because you were there”—had its rousing effect. It was realized at the time that in England as well as New York, the immigrants moved into the areas where once the Jews had lived, and met there, despite their rights as citizens, the very same sort of problems poor Russian Jewish immigrants had encountered some fifty years earlier. Elsewhere there were comparable problems related to postwar decolonization. In the Netherlands the settlement of immigrants from Indonesia was not as unproblematic as was often assumed. The Algerian War had its effect on French racism.

There was more awareness of racism during the first decennia after the Second World War than ever before, giving rise to the intuitive, hotly disputed notion that all these varieties were closely related to anti-Semitism. Despite Allport’s classic The Nature of Prejudice of 1954, an overall psychological approach, it was, however, an intuition not easily transformed into insight in other branches of scholarship, because to this day most historical or sociological studies on the other varieties do not pay more than lip service to the study of anti-Semitism and vice versa. This is understandable, but regrettable.

In order to attempt a synthesis of the present-day very extensive but somewhat disparate knowledge of racism and anti-Semitism, some methodological reflection is required. The result is an attempt at social history, or a historical sociology— is there much difference?—in a theoretical framework, rather than “pure” history, theory rather than narration, however evocative.

When sociology maliciously, but perhaps correctly, is defined as “history
with the hard work left out”, and history as “sociology with the brains left out”, there is in sociological history the risk of neither enough brains nor enough effort. A perhaps impossible task should nevertheless be attempted.  

**Preliminary Reflections**

A major argument against the comparability of anti-Semitism with other varieties of racism has always been that none of these ever resulted in systematic genocide. The simultaneous destruction of Gypsies in Nazi death camps suggests that at least one other variety can have as disastrous a fate. Moreover the argument seems to lead to the supposition that either all Jew-hatred inevitably results in attempts at total destruction, or that the Shoah is the inevitable climax of all preceding Jew-hatred, and to the surmising that the will to destroy is inherent in every form of rejection of the Jews. There is not much historical evidence to support such views.

As R. Anchel remarked, medieval society could easily have annihilated its small Jewish minority, but did not do so. Even if some of the wilder “cru-saders”, Pastoureaux and other medieval murderous persecutors of Jews aimed at “total” destruction – the very word has a ring of Goebbelsian anachronism – society as such would not permit it, if only because an age-old Christian anti-Jewish tradition held that Jews should be preserved in a state of misery as witnesses of the truth of the Christian faith. Later secularization did not fundamentally change this attitude. Vital economic interests demanded the continued existence of the despised Jews. The task of the “court Jews” could only be performed by members of a pariah group without rights – their very lack of rights made them docile – so that raisons d’état demanded their preservation. When the “court Jews” gradually became redundant, emancipation, not destruction became the answer. On the Gentile side, emancipation was not inspired by the love of Jews, or shame about past maltreatment, but by late mercantilist considerations. Emancipation of the Jews, like that of peasants, served in Josephinist philosophy the financial interests of the state. Many Gentile emancipators held that Jews could in the future be made into useful citizens, but that they were no good as they were then. The discussion of the emancipation thus initiated a new anti-Semitism, which however did not necessarily aim at destruction.

Robert Melson convincingly argues that the Holocaust was due to a revolutionary situation, which made an existing rejection explosive. Before 1933 the ruling classes, true to the emancipatory tradition, and its inherent am-
bivalences, merely paid lip service to popular anti-Semitism, when this served electoral purposes, without ever being willing to seriously consider taking any measures against the Jews. This would upset the neat order of the civil society they envisaged. This held particularly true for the “Junker”-leaders of the anti-Semitic Bund der Landwirthe, Judenschimpfen, reviling Jews, yes, harming Jews no. The radically anti-Semitic leader of Hessian peasants, Böckel, called it a Windbeutel bund, a windbag, a trap to catch the peasants, and make them harmless.  

Christopher Browning makes clear that the ordinary men of Reserve Battalion 101 could become mass murderers, willing tools of the anti-Semitism of a terrorist regime, without being more ardent anti-Semites than a decade of official indoctrination had made them. It was not so much their Jew-hatred that made them murderers as rather that uncanny mixture of fear and obedience that was reflected in Milgram’s experiments or Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experiment, the game of “wardens” and “prisoners”.

The Nazi leadership could only execute its criminal desires because, having previously conquered the state and its means of control, it was in an exceptional position of power to do so. It was only very partially the hawking of their evil anti-Jewish ideas which lent them that power. The waning of a “monopoly of violence” of the state of the Weimar Republic, due to a growing, violent dichotomy between radical right and left, governmental instability caused by a fear of communism, a lost war, depression, mass unemployment, and the like achieved that. Germany on the eve of the Machtübernahme was in all probability not much more anti-Semitic than Germany under Bismarck – that is, borne by a very vociferous minority – though this is difficult to substantiate. Many Germans voted Nazi without being anti-Semites. In the months before the Machtübernahme in 1933 anti-Semitic propaganda was toned down. The same happened during the Olympic Games of 1936.

Until January 1933, out-and-out Nazis were in the minority and their election results immediately before their seizure of power were actually declining. Von Schleicher’s tactics of “voting them to death” seemed to work, but were hampered by the interference of Hindenburg and von Papen.

At the time of the Dreyfus Affair, French anti-Semites had ideas about rejecting Jews which were as strong as those in the minds of their contemporary congenial Germans. They were just as murderous. The desire expressed by a Roman Catholic priest abbé Cros, of having a bedside mat made of the skin of a Jew, in order to be able to “trample on a Yid” daily, is the exact counterpart of Frau Koch’s lampshade made of a Jew’s skin. French anti-Semitism had its street fighters – the “Vilette butchers” of the Marquis de Morès –
who were as violent as the *Sturmabteilung* (SA). Though in propaganda as active as its German counterpart, French anti-Semitism failed to grasp power, even though numerically it was probably equally strong. French anti-Semites were not able to enter stealthily through a backdoor as the Nazis did, because Waldeck-Rousseau – in his attempt in 1899 at taming the radicals of all color in a cabinet of national “concentration of middle parties” – was more astute than Von Papen when the latter tried to do the same. The Munich Putsch of 1923 was, for the same lack of army cooperation, as miserable a failure as Déroulède’s 1899 anti-Dreyfusard attempt at a coup, (in the fourteenth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [1929], Paul Déroulède’s entry took up more space than Adolf Hitler’s!), 59

The war made all the difference. The butchery on an unprecedented scale, with the inherent diminished respect for human lives, the frontline and *Freikorps* (“Free Corps”) experience had given the Nazis a schooling in ruthlessness their fathers lacked. Postwar cynicism had normalized violence everywhere, a fortiori among the losers, and prepared the way for young Turks, Bolsheviks, Fascists, gangsters, and Nazis. So, if systematic genocide is not the main distinguishing factor, what then makes anti-Semitism different from other varieties of racism?

At first sight there is indeed, a fortiori historically, so much that distinguishes, for example, apartheid or the treatment of blacks in the Americas from persecutions of Jews or Gypsies, that the analogies seem to be based on a mere intellectual and moral abstraction of little practical concern. The former varieties, relatively recent consequences of the European expansion of the early modern period, are characterized by a coincidence of “race” and exploited class, by forceful repression, and a violence of riots and lynchings, which, however atrocious, never assumed the proportions of systematic genocide, because that would ill suit exploitation. 60 These forms of racism have only subsidiarily, if at all, sprouted from religious dissension. Anti-Semitism, on the other hand, originated in religious conflict of some two thousand years’ standing, and as it was rarely contested by Marxists, was never completely characterized by specific class positions of Jews. 61 It was therefore not exploitative in the same sense, and could thus “afford” resulting genocidal persecutions, culminating in an attempt at systematic extermination. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds true for the animosity towards Gypsies. 62

Because of these “semantic” differences, comparative studies of racism were at first limited to those cases which seem to be or are (taxonomically) related, such as the slavery-based racisms of the Caribbean and the South of
the us. Later, the only very partially slavery-based but kindred “helotizing”, or subjugation of the various South African groups, was drawn in, and thereafter those cases where a split-labor market theory was operative. Inequality on the labor market was a major classifying principle and basis for comparison.63

So far, anti-Semitism has only rarely been treated as a specimen of genus racism, and is usually treated as a genus of its own. Although other forms of dissension between religions or between intrareligious sects and their social consequences – one could think of the, in many ways, analogous discrimination against Barakumin64 in Japan – have proved to be of great heuristic significance, comparative methods are perhaps not exploited to the full, and are as a rule limited to the very varieties of Jew-hatred. Indeed, aspects of medieval Jew-hatred have been related to the treatment of heretics and evocative references to the witchcraft delusion have been made, but this was done scantily and not very systematically. Moreover such comparisons cover only one period.

Historians, who by nature and/or by training are splitters rather than lumpers, and more interested in particulars than in generalizing abstractions, have done very little to remedy this situation.

When they argue pragmatically that the study of anti-Semitism, because of its sheer size, evidently is a self-contained field of investigation, they have an entirely estimable point of view. At most one can reproach them with perhaps underrating the heuristic significance of the vast store of information of their results for the study of racism in general.

When they argue, however, that anti-Semitism cannot be compared with (other) racisms, because, as they then have to maintain, it is sui generis, they have to define it accordingly. The required definition would then have to claim a unique position for Jews and Judaism, which could imply that these themselves provoke a negative response;65 an implication with which most anti-Semites would heartily agree. The sui generis assumption therefore is likely to be an a priori, that can only be made plausible by the persistent non sequiturs of comparative reasonings.

To be sure, it is perfectly legitimate to assume (meta-historically) that being hated is inherent in being the “chosen people”,66 for this could imply being detested by all those who reject the ethical principles of Judaism. It is an assumption akin to the Freudian interpretation of anti-Semitism as rebellion of the id to the superego of Jewish-Christian (sexual) ethics; anti-Jewish because it cannot afford open rebellion against the Christian version. It is also perfectly legitimate to surmise that the unprecedented and exceptional
riad of Jewish self-identification – the one and only God, His Law, and the people to whom He gave it – posed a rare problem in a (polytheistic) Gentile world. So, when Jew-hatred is initially determined by objections to Judaism, as the explicit token of that “provocative” triad, the perfectly legitimate hypothesis at the base of concepts arguing the sui generis character of anti-Semitism, it remains nonetheless true that the objections were in the eye of the beholder. Pagan Romans and Greeks, Christians, Muslims, and so forth all attached different meanings to the elements of the triad. Romans feared the (for them) incomprehensible Jewish god, and therefore his servants, who made converts even when militarily defeated. Christians were god-fearing in an entirely different sense, but blamed the Jews for not being true to their own message. Muslims reproached Jews for their unwillingness to recognize Mohammed as the last of the prophets. The Indians and the Chinese had, from the sui generis point of view – somewhat inexplicably – no objections, without, however, recognizing that the Jews were the “chosen”, and without accepting the “Law” as norm for behavior. This observation means that the religious standpoint of the inimical beholder, its social derivatives and appurtenances, and changes therein, are at least codeterminant of attitudes, and this is then precisely what anti-Semitism has in common with various forms of racism.

In more remote periods, a religious point of view was not so very different from a general social position. Because of the public festivities and holidays staged in honor of the deit(y)ies, because of temple or church income, redistributed as alms or for social welfare, because of religious institutions being trendsetting employers, religion set the nonbelievers apart and permeated social life to a much greater extent than is the case in our present-day secularized world. In that sense, anti-Semitism is a “specimen” of a genus racism: it is conceived of as a type of ideology that categorizes both the in-groups and the out-groups, both the Self and the ethnic Other, and allocates social positions on that basis.

Recent developments seem to justify treating anti-Semitism as a specimen of a genus. Postwar forms of anti-Semitism in the West are often intertwined with anti-“allochthonous” racist attitudes. Whereas before the Second World War, Jews shared the dubious privilege of being primary objects of racism in Europe only with Gypsies (there were others, in North Ireland, and among Slavonic minorities in Germany), they now share it with a great many other ethnic groups.
Justifying a social-historical approach

The core of the problem of gaining insight into the long-term development of Jew-hatred seems to be, or is the admissible level of abstraction, the move from the particular to a legitimate generalization. There are by now libraries full of studies of ancient pagan disparagements, early-Christian, medieval, or modern theological rejections of Jews, of socialist or trade-union anti-Semitism, of Islamic or Arab Jew-hatred, of studies per region or country, per period of popular inimical attitudes, or of institutional discrimination, or what have you, all claiming, justifiably so, to throw light on the general problem, but usually leaving that implicit. The insight into the overall development of anti-Semitism, in the process of connecting all these episodes and situations, is like a rabbit pulled from the conjuror’s top hat. Input conjectures, as motives for undertaking the investigation of particular episodes, are as output often virtually unchanged. The dilemma, of course, is that general insight cannot be gained but by abstracting from the particular, which has to be known in order to make abstraction possible. The problem is how to make silk purses out of a sow’s ear.

These aforementioned studies seem to do just that by attempting a now possible, diachronical synthesis, aiming at the long-term development of anti-Semitism. They do so by trying to demonstrate that there is a traceable genealogy of anti-Semitic stereotypes, which are not spontaneously engendered, but are “functional” adaptations of existing ones to changing social, socio-economic, political, religious or other general circumstances. This needs explaining.

Manifest anti-Semitism usually is anti-Semitism in rationalized form. Whatever the in-depth psychological causes, the personal frustrations, or traumatic experiences may be that induce a person to cherish a hatred of Jews as such, from the point of view of social or sociological history, only the rationalizations of such feelings are relevant. The very individual emotions in the raw are likely to yield as many anti-Semitism as there are emotionally disturbed anti-Semites, open only to psychological generalizations.

A numerical reduction to more articulate, socially relevant forms is brought about by all these anti-Semites themselves, due to the fact that keeping these emotions to oneself is not very satisfying. In order to be able to communicate them to like-minded others in order to join forces with them for concerted action against the alleged common enemy, one has to express them in a collectively shared, predetermined terminology, which directs the rationalization.

The Historiographical Background
Rationalization is socialization, irrespective of whether primary prejudices create the need for articulation, or reversely, whether acceptance of some (institutionalized) articulated form fosters the development of prejudices, which then are not necessarily always born of psychopathological conditions, but can also be the adaptive reactions of perfectly “normal” people, forced to comply. Anti-Semitism has the characteristics of a contagious disease.

The investigation of the emotional disorders giving rise to elementary, private, not-very-well-articulated prejudices, the study of the anti-Semitic (racist) and “authoritarian” personality, should be left to the psychologists, since comparative biography of (historical) anti-Semites is a very cumbersome and unrewarding procedure for detecting them. Provided their feelings are of all ages, they are extremely useful for an empathic understanding of individual anti-Semites of the past, whose personalities can no longer be fully studied. Particularly the image of the resentful person, who has not been successful in life, is very suggestive. That person, far from blaming him- or herself, seeks the cause of his/her misfortunes and failures in sinister human agents who supposedly disturb the simple, well-ordered world as it should be and, therefore, in blind obedience, follows a leader who explains how the world ought to be, why it is not so, and who are the disturbers.

Often psychological findings, however informative, are of limited use for the historian’s practical concerns. Usually, when meeting anti-Semitism in the articulate form of collective rationalization and/or institutionalization, his interest is focused on rationalizing material, the ideological content.68

Sustained mob-action or mass movement seems well-nigh inconceivable without some “catalyzing” leader, one who articulates resentment. In the storming of each Bastille, there is always a Camille Desmoulins. The higher the emotional tension, the more charismatic successful leadership tends to be, to the detriment of traditional or rational leadership.

When the leader, either consciously and then calculatingly, or instinctively, rationalizes emotions in front of his followers, he knows intuitively the deindividualizing, collective significance of rationalizations. He knows that he is only effective when he plays upon the collectively shared hatreds, desires, fears, and anxieties of his audience by formulating them according to adapted and updated, but familiar, charges.

This is not only a vindication of the essentially historical character of anti-Semitism (and racism) and the legitimacy of the search for the provenance of these accusations, but also an explanation of why indictments in articulate form are rarely spontaneous. Precisely because individual whims are not nor-
mally easily understood and are therefore less likely to be effective for mass movements or even mob action, they are the exception rather than the rule. Looking for a stick to beat the dog on the spur of the moment, and finding it, is therefore unlikely, though not impossible. For example, even if the charges of poisoning expressed in the face of the sudden calamity of the Black Death were new and instantaneous, they were formulated by using existing ones such as ritual murder and desecration of the Host lending them plausibility. The blood of a murdered child and the wafer were seen as the main ingredients for the poison.

Precisely because such reference to existing notions is likely to have taken place throughout the development of anti-Semitic attitudes since the very beginning, the above suggested “genealogical” relationship between accusations, stereotypes, prejudices, and so forth is assumed. Since indictments have to be explanatory in the actual circumstances to the satisfaction of the audiences; they have to be persistently adapted, updated, or modified in such a manner that they continue to meet the exigencies created by ongoing social change. In this evolutionary process, repeated modifications can create scornful notions which are virtually new, but traceable to preceding ones, much as in the same way that in Darwinian evolution several different species descended from a single one. Virtually all indictments ever pronounced are remembered and used when they can appropriately deal with an actual situation. A nineteenth-century Christian priest, worried about certain secular tendencies dangerous to his faith, and who blames the Jews for them, can and usually will use adapted forms of the old charges of Jewish infidelity allegedly jeopardizing Christianity. An anti-Semitic artisan in distress will use updated traditional accusations of Jewish usury and greed to explain his plight. The two may meet and then amalgamate their views to some sort of anti-Semitic Christian-social ideology, or they may not. Then our artisan can seek refuge in some lay or even anti-Christian (pseudo)-socialist anti-Semitism.

So, at each stage of the development there are one or more stigmata, as clusters of depreciating notions and indictments, that have the character of a spectrum. In the end that spectrum can range from the initial theological rejections to the latest developments of racial speculation, or consist of selected segments of that range. A plurality of choices in the nineteenth century explains the many vehement quarrels anti-Semites had among themselves. In German the invective Auch-antisemiten was used.

There is not only gradual transformation, but there are, also in relation to social change, shifts of emphasis. Some charges, like the older theological re-
jections, are marginalized with ongoing secularization, others, like the cluster of socioeconomic charges, gain in significance as time goes on.

How do adaptations and shifts of emphasis come about? It is submitted that this is determined by “ideological adequacy”. As was suggested above, racism, and hence by implication anti-Semitism is a form of ideology. 69

Ideology aims at either changing an unwanted existing social status quo or, reversely, at preserving a desired social order. In a racist ideology, the more an accusation or stereotype provides a satisfying interpretation of adverse conditions or threatening calamities, the sooner it will be deemed adequate and will be chosen for use in trying to change the status quo; the more an accusation or stereotype provides a satisfactory justification of existing conditions, the more often it will be chosen from the range of available indictments to uphold the social order. Political anti-Semitism, certainly in modern times, is usually a variety of racist ideology aiming at change (which leaves open the possibility of non-ideological, in-depth psychologically interpretable primary Jew-hatred) whereas apartheid, for example, is more of the preserving kind.

Anti-Semites are opposed to the prevailing “system”, in older times consisting of “greedy” princes or “simoniacal” bishops protecting Jews for gain, and in modern times of parliamentarian, party politics, the laws emancipating the Jews, allowing them free enterprise, free trade, industrialism, and so on. They object to free immigration. They want to change the “system” that allegedly gave Jews the liberty to bring about undesirable changes. Adherents of apartheid wanted to maintain the legal system that provides them with opportunities for exploitation; they favor conditional immigration for black workers, and unconditionally welcome “Europeans”. In its desire to change the “system” anti-Semitism can thus assume “revolutionary” characteristics, as it did in the 1930s.

The better the accusations highlight the place of blacks in the desired order, determined by their supposed inferiority in the one case, or the presumed evil role of the Jew in the unwanted social order, in the other case, both in line with accepted tradition, the more “functional” they are. Functional here means being capable of coping with the actual situation, that is, being ideologically adequate. Functionality thus directs the selection, emphasis, and adaptation of traditional stereotyping.

Functionality is group specific, but amalgamations and fusions are quite conceivable. For example, for late-nineteenth-century German and Austrian farmers in distress, the old charge of usury, now named “banking”, provided a “functionally” adapted response to the agrarian depression. Banking to
them meant the issuance of “usurious” spoliative mortgages, ruinous in times of ever falling agrarian prices. The concept of usury and the idea derived from objections to Jewish usurers, court Jews, and peddlers as future millionaires, that those prices were “engineered” by “Jewish” speculation in futures, by “Jewish” manipulation of the money standard, by “Jewish” free trade, by “Jewish” fraudulent bankruptcy, and the like, provided a simpler interpretation of their plight, and a simpler solution, than the contemporary complex economic theory these farmers did not master. They shared their accusations with artisans, who for different reasons, such as rapidly increasing industrial competition, had comparable problems with mortgages and other credit operations. A concept of Jews as “usurious spoliators”, furnished by tradition, is thus for these groups more functional than the also existing weird age-old notion that Jews suffer from skin diseases, or are flat-footed, or have “desert feet”. Racial theorists, however, are likely to be more interested in the latter concepts as a basis for describing an inferior race. Amalgamation is achieved when racial theorists like A. Wahrmund use skin disease and flat-footedness for constructing the notion that the Jew is essentially a nomad from the desert, who cannot but commit spoliative “razzias” on the seszhaft (settled) and truly Aryan society of farmers and artisans. Theirs is “immobile” capital, the nomad only knows “mobile” capital.

Where no such traditional stereotypes existed, as apparently was the case in the US, identical social problems were not followed by outbursts of anti-Semitism. William Jennings Bryan’s agitation against the gold standard was, to my knowledge, not characterized by overt anti-Semitism as was the case in the championing of a true bimetalism in France or in Germany. The mass “liquidations” of farms during the early 1930s in the US did not result in such venomous anti-Semitism as the Güterschlächterei of the 1870s or 1880s in Germany or Austria did. (The mass liquidations of farms (executions in default of payment) was called in anti-Semitic innuendo Güterschächterei. The German verb schächten (shechita) means “Jewish ritual slaughter”).

Moreover, the concepts of the spoliative Jewish banker, the stock exchange jobber, and their bought helpmates all provided a more plausible explanation of the Depression than that of the “thieving” Gypsies, who, in committing their alleged petty larceny, were merely nuisances; in this way, the former were more “functional” scapegoats than the latter.

Not all anti-Semites necessarily completely share these amalgamated representations. Some may have different ones, like the amalgamation infidel-exploiter. It is the “Talmud morality” of the infidel that makes him a blood-sucker, not his race. But by and large the presumed process of functional adap-
tation of old traditions to new circumstances provides the means for interpreting what was at a given moment to most anti-Semites an acceptable and adequate imagery of the “evil Jew” in relation to threatening social change.

The concept of social change itself presumes elements of unalterability, for there must be a stable element whereby it can be defined in the entity that changes. Likewise there must be (through the ages) a hard core in changing anti-Semitism. A unitary scholarly concept of anti-Semitism would be impossible if the Jew-hatred of the beginning of our era had nothing in common with the Jew-hatred of later periods but an indefinite loathing. There would then be two or more virtually distinct phenomena, defeating any attempt at diachronical analysis.

The anti-Semitic imagery, moreover, mirrors its own development at each stage, as it should do according to the genealogical concept. Even the most ferocious anti-Semite is not likely to accuse Jews of being lazy, irresponsible knife-toters – “too cowardly for that” – arsonists, rapists, drunks or dope addicts like blacks are prejudiciously represented, while the latter will not so easily be accused of being seducers, embezzlers, fraudulent bankrupts, poisoners or conspirators. Jews could effectively be called traitorous “November criminals” since 1918 and the alleged treason of the Jew Dreyfus for money and out of hatred of France seemed so plausible, because there was an age-old notion of that type of Jewish treason, symbolized by Judas, and his thirty pieces of silver. (In Latin and German, Judas is almost homonymic to Judaeus and Jude.) In the thirteenth century, native Jews were conceived of as lucratively conspiring with invading Tatars, who were believed to be the “Ten Lost Tribes of Israel” wanting revenge. Stories were told about Jews jeopardizing state and society by being secret sympathizers with “Judaizing” heretics such as Paulicians, Bogomils, Cathars, or Albigenses, and they were seen as a fifth column of conquering Arabs or Turks. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds true for other features of the anti-Semitic stock-in-trade.

An attempt to analyze anti-Semitism as an ideology constructed from a genealogy of “functional” stereotypes in relation to social change is, in other words, a social history of anti-Semitism, both as an end in itself and as a possible auxiliary to the study of racism.

The first problem with such an attempt is finding an explanation for how what began as a purely theological rejection by a literary elite could end up as a highly emotionally charged economically and politically conceived populist social protest that is usually phrased in racial terms. A second problem concerns the question of how an originally intellectual notion belonging to a literate elite was distributed among illiterate masses?
More preliminary reflections

An attempt at social history in the above sense seems to imply an effort at approximating the necessary and sufficient conditions. Although in historical investigation their establishment seems well-nigh unrealizable, it is submitted that they may be approximated on an admissible level of theoretical abstraction, by a methodology as outlined above.

This means that no decisions can be made beforehand about theoretical perspectives. There is no obviously explanatory theory readily at hand.

Given that initially no labor problems were involved and there were no specific class positions, there is no reason to base first conjectures on a split labor market theory or on class conflicts. In the late Roman Empire there was virtually an open situation. Christians, having inherited some of the former charges against the Jews in intensified form – their weird God was not even an ethnic God – bore the brunt of oppression. Nothing much distinguished Jews socially from the common population at large, but for some vague reminiscences perhaps of former quarrels. These had anyhow been limited to some local administrators, to a literary elite near the imperial court, and to some such Hellenistic centers such as Antioch, Alexandria, and Cyrene.

The bulk of the population had never taken much interest in these quarrels, or as proselytism suggests, had even adopted a more positive attitude. The Jewish self-identification and self-definition was largely independent of any outside pressures.\textsuperscript{76}

So, even if it was the rejection of Jews by Christian theology that indeed started a train of events, it is of ever-diminishing interpretative value as time goes on, precisely because the initial rejection cannot explain the ever-increasing significance of indictments of an economic or political nature. Insisting again and again on the Christian contributions once this point has been made is like demonstrating, once a relationship between marshes and malaria is established, that the disease is indeed found near all marshes, instead of investigating whether the causative relation is found in the toxic vapors or miasmata of the marshes, or in the abundance of specific varieties of mosquitoes, anophelinae, carrying the parasites.

The helmman’s art seems to consist of steering between the Scylla of so much detail that no general conceptualization is possible, and the Charybdis of a prioristic theorizing and such abstractions that all sense of reality is lost.

So when I, as a socialist of a kind, not belonging to any Christian or other denomination, find myself in the perhaps somewhat odd position of seemingly playing down the impact of Christianity, or, for that matter, of econom-
ically engendered class conflict, on anti-Semitism, there must be a good reason for this. There is no finger-pointing, no conscious apportioning of blame, but merely explanation. Doubt is emphatically not inspired by a desire to make light of, or to condone, Christian disparagement, or economic conflict, but only by epistemological considerations, the fear of mixing up definition and explanation. When in the initial stage anti-Semitism is defined as “Christian disparagement of Jews”, as could be done with a good deal of plausibility, that same disparagement can no longer serve as “explanation” without running the risk of circular reasoning.

A phenomenon so almost perennial and universal as anti-Semitism is likely to offer possibilities for a synthetic social-historical approach seeking such “laws”. It may be true that most historical “laws” tend to be trivial truisms, but truisms as such have a tendency to be overlooked. I venture to suggest that the early scientific revolution was so successful, partly because researchers anti-high-falutingly had the courage to occupy themselves with seeming truisms or trivialities, with the ordinary phenomena “everybody knew”, and they acquired their information from common people such as blacksmiths, miners, sailors and the like.

A “conjecture and refutation” or, in other words, an “experimental” approach seems justified, despite the full recognition that, from a Freudian or a meta-historical point of view, Jews were possibly hated as the inventors of conscience. The guardians of the “message of salvation” had to establish by introspective soul-searching whether or not they had been up to their divinely imposed task, and so developed the notions of conscience and sin. That arch-rebel against conscience, Adolf Hitler, was well aware of this. He dubbed conscience a Jewish invention. A multiplicity of factors, however, not so easily interpreted in that light, and presumably comparable to some of those shaping other racisms, forces the researcher to treat anti-Semitism as a species of the genus racism: pre-emancipatory Jew-hatred in the wider sense of racism, ethnic conflict post-emancipatory anti-Semitism in a somewhat narrower sense. In both cases, theorizing, which is preferred to description, deals with general social change as a basis for devising interpretative concepts. In that sense, the book is a study on racism, and more in particular on an aspect of it somewhat neglected in the general discussion of racism.
Race and racism

The conceptualization implies that in the modern form of Jew-hatred the existing rejection of Jews is usually, but not always, racialized. This does not mean, as has been contended, that post-emancipatory anti-Semitism should be conceived of as something sui generis. The word “racializing” merely intends to convey that since roughly the middle of the nineteenth century, a then-novel racial terminology was used. The new vehicle for articulating the long-established “functional” adaptation of the stereotype to new circumstances could then continue to be “explanatory”. This point of view does seem to justify a somewhat lengthy, but hopefully not superfluous, digression on “race” and “racism”.

Racial terminology developed with the Enlightenment. The “philosophes” of the French Enlightenment dethroned man from his exalted position as “created in the image of God” and ruler over all creation. Perhaps for reasons of rebellion against Christian orthodoxy, or for reasons of deist conceptions rather than for reasons of biological evidence, they made him into a species among other animal species. Some held that not all men monogenetically descended from Adam, but had “poly-genetically” come into being, and concluded that the species had sub-species, superior and inferior “races”. Voltaire, for one, believed that “Hottentots” (Khoi) were beings in between man and ape. In so far as the Enlightenment is a form of intellectual emancipation of the bourgeoisie, it is itself an aspect of a general process of modernization and secularization, which affected both Jews and Christians, and which, because of new tensions, gave a new impetus to the existing Jew-hatred.

The racists of the “generation of materialism” of an industrialized society inherited the concepts of Enlightenment and gave them a further “naturalistic” and “mechanistic” twist, often in the pseudo-Darwinian form of “social Darwinism”. They worshipped an ever-scarcer wild nature, conceived of by them as symbol of growth, vigor, power, and struggle. They condemned everything “un-natural” as being a failure of nerves. The nation was seen as strong and struggling, but the Jew was seen as nervous, as was the environment in which he flourishes, the detested desertlike and unnatural metropolis. In racist perception it stifles the national vigor of the proletarianized, numbed, laboring masses, and changes art and literature into a mere “Jewish” glitter, mirroring overdressed and over-jewelled Jewesses. The Jew is seen as a swarthy, oriental trafficker, with a nose shaped like the figure 6 and a thick lower lip, an alien in the blond North of peasants, artisans, and crusading
warriors of Wagnerian stature, moreover one who infiltrates and corrupts—and even more so since the emancipation. “He is the ivy that strangles the oak.” It is his alien blood, his rootlessness, that makes him behave as he does. His desert-determined nomadism makes him believe that he has *libre parcours et vain pâturage* ("grazing rights") everywhere, as J. de Biez wrote.78

Once racialized in such non-biological or pseudo-biological terms, and since then (absurdly) called anti-Semitism, Jew-hatred or Judeo-phobia became a variety of racism in a somewhat stricter sense then is used above. It treated the real or imagined somatic features of the Other and the Self as corollaries of the as group (“race”) specifically considered social (mis)behavior and intellectual and moral (in)capacities. Constructed by means of old stereotypes, these were necessary for once more articulating in a new terminology the categorization demanded by ideology and the hoped-for allocation of social position. The cry was that “the Jews had to go back to the Ghetto where they could again become the dirty, diseased Caftan-Jews they basically were”.79

Such racism, closely akin to sexism, is a genus in the class of oppositions subsumed by Elias and Scotson under “the Established and the Outsiders” and/or social prejudices. These can be almost “racist”, as for example in statements like: “the ‘lower classes’ have a hereditary low IQ, and consequently, knowing no restraint, breed like rabbits”. Kropotkin beautifully described the astonishment of Russian ladies when they discovered after the emancipation of serfs that these were human beings after all.80 John Rex rightly emphasized the “racist” content of the Northern Irish conflict.81

Racialism, thus conceived, used as a paradigm for analysis, is ideological in that 1) though occasionally based on a – usually specious – verification of its tenets, it never accepts scientific (biological or other) refutation of them, 2) it makes general statements to reify the figments of their imagination, and 3) it is used for giving meaning to its own and others’ (exploitable) position in society. Though not the case in anti-Semitism, an exploitable position often causes “race” to coincide with class; in the case of anti-Semitism, it is the anti-Semites’ exploitable position that is at issue. The specific, overwhelmingly urban, social position of the Jews west of the Vistula, inherited from the past and immensely distorted and inflated, is usually used to formulate a social protest against a social structure that “wrongly” gives the “inferior Jew” an undue sway over the press, the money market, politics, literature, science, and so forth.

Racism is sometimes confined to an attitude without behavioral consequences. When these are present, they may be spontaneous, as in riots, in
spite of the underlying attitude, or they may be institutionalized, at state level, but also in trade unions, churches, political parties, clubs, and so forth.

Racism can also create intra-black or intra-Jewish (class) conflicts resembling racism or of a racist-inspired formulation; compare with the pre-1933 attitude of some assimilated German Jews, who held that it was the Polish Jews, the “Ost-Juden”, who gave them their bad reputation. Racist arguments were partly taken over.

Finally, racism can induce parts of the minorities to accept and copy racial notions, either positively as a form of self-identification, or negatively as self-hatred. The former is exemplified in “black is beautiful”, or in Disraeli’s extolling of the Jewish “race”, as inter alia in his novel Coningsby. The latter is archetypal in Otto Weininger’s “Geschlecht und Character”, and prevalent, for example, in W. Rathenau, but also in attempts by blacks at “passing”, or, in former days, in efforts to remove the kinkiness of the hair. This self-hatred is grist to the racist mill. (And yet, white women want curly hair and a tan!)

The above is perhaps a rather narrow definition, which does not do justice to the racist-supported, seemingly innocuous, but deeply hurtful conversational disparagements, without grave social consequences, of the (historically largely not detectable) “everyday racism” of slights, name-calling, insulting jokes, and the like, which often, but not necessarily, underlie the more narrowly defined form. The classic example of everyday anti-Semitism without consequences is Major Piquart, who, according to Zola, was anti-Semitically inclined. At great cost to himself, he became through his sheer integrity the Dreyfusard hero. In literature it is Lizzie in Sartre’s La Putain respectueuse. It is also exemplified by Western socialism’s ultimate anti-anti-Semitic stand which by no means prevented “everyday” anti-Semitic attitudes among the rank and file loyal to the anti-anti-Semitic party line. Sometimes, however, it is difficult to detect racism in “everyday racism”.

The behavior of insolent white youths, who do not get up in a bus for an elderly or pregnant black woman, can only be proved to be racist when it can be demonstrated that they would have gotten up for an elderly or pregnant white woman, which their very insolence makes unlikely. Football supporters’ “racism” is not always racism. “Racist” violence is often just violence for violence’s sake. Wise Jewish humor has always known this. The reverse, evident discrimination being denied by the victim, is equally true.

In the above definition lies a difficult, and in a socially and ideologically neutral sense, perhaps rather academic question. Whether or not there are “human races” in a meaningful sense of the word, which is in principle the wholly legitimate concern of physical anthropology, becomes in fact entirely
irrelevant. Not everybody who non-ideologically, rightly or wrongly believes that there are human races, is a racist. Nineteenth-century scientists, in the end unable to interpret evident somatic differences between human beings in environmental terms, without modern genetic insight, had little choice but to accept a racial hypothesis, thus lending, sometimes willingly, sometimes unwillingly, support to the racists.\(^{84}\)

However, the race concept in general is dubious – perhaps there are almost as many races as there are human beings. Identical twins or triplets are “races”. There is definitely no meaningful definition of race, whereby Jews can be categorized as such; all the so-called “Jewish” features are prevalent in some non-Jewish groups as well. This statement is not refuted by the fact that there are situations where Jews were or are “macro-diagnostic”, that is, to a large extent recognizable as Jews by sight, because 1) the frequency of scoring right contains no information about the immeasurable number of times the scorer has not recognized a Jew, 2) there were hundreds of places before mass immigration where the statistical chance of someone of “mediterranean” type being Jewish was virtually one, and 3) recognizability can be of a very subtle sort, whereby say a Dutchman abroad often recognizes fellow countrymen by sight, based on other visible information than physiognomical type (of which the beholder need not be fully aware).

A possible definition of race could be: “a race is a group of people who in homogeneity possess a number of phenotypically distinct and distinguishing visible somatic features, which have to be genetic, and not found elsewhere”, though this definition excludes such in principle legitimate but invisible taxonomic criteria as blood groups or the genetically determined (in)capacity for P.T.C. (phenyl-thio-carbamide) tasting. According to this definition every isolated inbreeding community – and before the age of mass mobility, a large majority of communities all over the world were isolated and inbreeding – could through mutations become a race. The so-called “Nordic” blue-eyed, blond “race” is merely the result of rickets, more frequently occurring in Northern climes, causing a natural selection favoring the less pigmented (absorption of sunlight by the skin to make the protective vitamin D), a reason also why these traits are found more frequently among Ashkenazim than among Sephardim (see appendix). Consequently there may have been, or perhaps still are, numerous “black” black Jews in the US, the Falashas, or the castes of “black” and “brown” Jews in Cochin, a “yellow” Jewish community in China, or “white” Jewish “races”, as there are perhaps countless “black”, “yellow”, or “white” non-Jewish “races”, which in fact are not races but clines. There is not just one Jewish race, provoking “natural, instinctive
antagonism”, as racists contended, because since earliest times (cf. Ruth the Moabite, the great-grandmother of David), the Jewish group was characterized by miscegenation with other groups, if only because of proselytism, and because since earliest times, long before the Roman conquest of Jerusalem in 70 AD, the Diaspora caused Jewish groups to live in physical isolation from each other. The chances that in ancient times a Jew from, for example, Sardes would marry a Jewess from Rome or vice versa, or in medieval or early modern times a Jew from Odessa a Jewess from Toledo, or vice versa, were slight, much slighter than marrying a local convert, then frequently to be found in Sardes or in the second case, a person of Chazar descent; diverse “alien” genes mutate diversely in isolated endogamic groups. The supposition of one “race mentality” is absurd. Anti-Semitic legislators, no more than other legislators, have been able to devise a tight, biologically sound, legal criterium for “race”. The South African legal definitions of “colored” during apartheid were simply ludicrous.

A “colored person” is sometimes defined as “any African or Asiatic native or any other person who is manifestly a colored person”, or a Cape Colored is “any person who in fact is, or is generally accepted as a member of the race or class known as Cape Coloreds”.

“Where for purposes of legal classification, the question arises whether a person is White, Coloured, Negroid or Asiatic, the policeman and the tram conductor, unencumbered by biological lore, can make an assessment with greater conviction, and certainly with fewer reservations, than can the geneticist or anthropologist.” “In the final analysis the legislature is attempting to define the indefinable.”

It would be unscientific to dismiss the notion of race altogether. Races do exist, but rather in great abundance than in very limited numbers. In the past there may have been isolated races, but these are “no more typical of the human species than hermits are of human societies”. What is typical, is that all over the world man, as *Homo erectus* developed his hands, speech organs, and brains, in a specifically correlated manner. As *Homo sapiens* and equally as *Homo faber* and *Homo loquens*, he could adapt himself to prevailing conditions by communication, by making and using tools, and above all by devising tools to make tools, so that he has no “species-specific environment”. (Essential for toolmaking and using the screwdriver or the corkscrew, are rotation of the hands over 180° and opposition of the thumb, the capacity of interpreting his environment, so that he can conceptualize the problem to be solved by instruments, and the capacity to communicate that interpretation). Also typical, as H. Plessner wrote, is that he is capable of making him-
self the object of reflections, so that by a conscious selection of the relevant information in the use of all his senses, he can become an acting subject. In that capacity and as tool-maker and speaker he became (changed himself into) a being whose behavior is determined by culture, always capable of effusion and confluence, as much as, if not more than by specific biological endowments, or perhaps better, whose biological characteristics predestined him to become a being shaped by his culture to such extent that culture-free intelligence tests (claiming to measure differences in biological endowments) become well-nigh impossible.

Consequently statements about group-specific, genetically determined differences in biological endowments of wider purport than pigmentation as protection against radiation, lung capacity at great heights and the like, are extremely questionable.

The racists’ quest for race, however, was not inspired by scholarly considerations. Very few people became racists because they believed to have discovered race, but many came to believe in race, because they were racists. The racist, to use Sartre’s phrase, has the logic of the man who argues: “there must be something wrong with tomatoes, for otherwise I would not dislike them so much”. From the academic discussions he has eclectically chosen that which served his purpose, without bothering about considerations of verification or refutation, which are prevailing in these discussions. Why, if anti-Semitic attitudes were engendered by “natural instincts” as he maintained, should it be necessary to mark the other with a yellow star? Why should some Aryans be more antagonistic than others? Why should “racial awareness” be dependent on political allegiance or religious affiliation? How could “Aryans” be “Judaized”?

Because of their own insecurity in a rapidly changing world, the racists needed “race” as a “super-nationalistic” sense of identity and sense of belonging when older forms of identification had vanished in a process of modernization and ongoing secularization. Jew-haters also needed race precisely because the old theological rejections were increasingly being marginalized. They needed a new rejection categorization now that the old religious one was becoming obsolete, because many Jews no longer entirely observed the Law – these were feared the most – and because they themselves often had relinquished any religious practice. Finally, they needed it to pin down the enemy, who, since the emancipation, was not as “visible” as before. Unfortunately they were being sustained by an independent, largely disinterested scientific discussion of biologists and anatomists and by equally largely disinterested linguists discovering “Indo-European”, “Semitic” and other language fami-
lies, easily confused with “races”. Max Müller, a famous linguist who in his youth dabbed in racial theories, later, sadder and wiser, declared that to speak about a “Semitic” race, was as foolish as to speak about a “dolichocephalic” dictionary, but by then the harm was done.

The race concept implied in racism is “sociological” race, that is, the socially constructed ideological categorization of minorities, the old rejecting stereotypes combined with eclectically chosen elements of a contemporary scientific discussion. When that is so, the “pseudo-biological” rejection of nineteenth-century agitators is not fundamentally different from the “non-biological” rejection of their forebears. It is indeed true that in the latter case Jews could miraculously “be rescued from Jewishness” by conversion to socially accepted religions, whereas in the former there was no such escape. This difference, however horrendous it may have been in its implications, is no obstacle to an overall conceptualization of Judeo-phobia, though, precisely because both were interrelated social constructs. Earlier (as well as post-1945) anti-Semitism is then racism in a wider sense, and modern, pre-1945 anti-Semitism in a narrower sense. Moreover, since a “black race”, or other “races”, for that matter, only “exist” as “sociological races”, the ensuing juxtapositions once more seem to confirm the notion that anti-Semitism is a specimen of a genus, not unique, even though more deeply rooted in age-old religious tradition than most other varieties.

Its not being considered unique does not imply that consequently the Holocaust of Jews and Gypsies was just another massacre on a par with whatever other atrocities of human history. It certainly cannot be exonerated in reference to Bolshevist massacres, as some participants of the Historikerstreit88 would have it, even when these were comparable to the Shoah in the utter dehumanization of the victims, and in the number of people killed, but they were much less so in premeditation.

The premeditated character of the Shoah, requiring a complex industrial preparation, its excesses of sadism, its fiendish system of indirect control by means of usually criminal Kapos, creating mutual antagonism between prisoners, and subjugation by hunger and cold, place it in a rare category, indeed. So does the megalomania of attempting to eliminate not just a “national enemy”, but Jewry as such, as a divinely imposed task. Moreover, as indicated, anti-Semitism is very specific in that, in contradistinction to many other (colonial or postcolonial) varieties of discrimination and prejudice, it is not so clearly related to exploitation and its justification, only secondarily to discrimination in the labor market, and initially related to a much rarer religious conflict; is this why in Marxist studies on racism, anti-Semitism, not so easily construed as due to class conflict, is underrepresented?

The Historiographical Background
Specificity, presumably due to a rare constellation of necessary and sufficient conditions, is neither an “explanans”, nor an “explanandum”. Because that is held to be true, systematic attempts are made to make each step of the presumed explanation a specimen of a genus: the religious conflict a specimen of “secession friction”, social distancing a specimen of the phenomenon we encounter under another name as “apartheid”, “Jim Crow”, or what have you, “terrorization” (in the dual sense of terrorizing the victims into submission) and of “terrorizing” (by means of forcing sanctions upon tolerant or indifferent members of their own group of reference into active exclusivist cooperation) as obtaining in all varieties of racial conflict, perhaps every conflict, vocational specification as related to the general phenomenon of disappearance of *allodia* (estates without acknowledgements to a superior), or the general features of guilds, and so forth. The Multiplication Law of probabilities applies. 

**Two schools of thought**

There seem to be at least two major trends in the historiography of anti-Semitism: one “school” that conceives of the modern postemancipatory form as sui generis, a product of bourgeois, industrial, or modernizing society, and another that emphasizes the initial religious conflict and conceives of it as a whole.

Let us by way of example of a great many who argue like this, analyze the conclusion of an excellent study of that early controversy, John Gager’s *The Origins of Anti-Semitism*. Gager attacks the idea of the sui generis character of post-emancipatory anti-Semitism on the grounds “that the notion of an unbridgeable chasm between the modern world and antiquity or the middle-ages runs against the grain of common sense and sound historiography”. The two worlds were linked by Christianity. Many of the arguments used by modern, racist, anti-Christian anti-Semites, Gager reasons, were borrowed from older Christian concepts, and there were definitely still strands of Christian traditional anti-Semitism during the late nineteenth century. He rejects the idea that modern anti-Semitism was a sort of revived paganism, as has sometimes been argued, a return to the ideals of antiquity; rightly so, I think, since the influence of ancient pagan ideas on modern anti-Semitism are indeed negligible.

All this is very true, but leaves a great many problems unsolved, which can be subsumed under the terms modernization and industrialization. Hannah
Arendt is, according to Gager, the foremost champion of the sui generis character of anti-Semitism, but she is not the last. Rürup also argued that post-emancipatory anti-Semitism is essentially different from earlier forms. In his view, the emancipation, at least in central Europe, far from eliminating the opprobrium, further widened its scope, popularizing, and thereby politicizing, it. It is undeniable, as indicated, that modern anti-Semitism is a function of, or even a consequence of, the kindred political emancipation of the popular masses. Emperor Joseph II’s emancipation of peasants, and first emancipatory measures for Jews, were inspired by the same late-mercantilist motive, the widening of franchise by the same political concepts as emancipation of the Jews.

Moreover, since the emancipation of the Jews had as a consequence for Jewry a continuous apostasy from Jewish orthodoxy ultimately resulting in the birth of the “non-Jewish Jew” and, comparable to a contemporary secularization and relinquishing of churchgoing in the Christian world, it was the modern, assimilated Jew who intellectually, artistically, economically, and politically benefited the most and was feared the most (compare with the role of the modern Jew in liberal and socialist movements). In modern, post-emancipatory anti-Semitism there is a clear shift from the orthodox Jew as object to the religiously reformed, indifferent, or irreligious Jew, who is actually blamed as such for promoting atheism, rationalism, and materialism. Jewish materialist atheism is a far cry indeed from Jewish “deicide”, allegedly committed by Jews who considered Jesus blasphemous, though in a bizarre way, it could be construed as having come full circle, reminiscent as it is of an homonymic pagan charge of Antiquity and the “murdering” of Christi(anity).

The observation of Hannah Arendt cum suis that, despite the emancipation, or rather because of its incompleteness, there remained a marked difference in the occupational structure of the Jewish group compared with that of Gentiles, is incontestable, even though one can disagree with her opinion of what caused that difference.

Modern anti-Semitism was to such an extent a form of a usually, but not necessarily, conservative social protest against the vicissitudes of modern socioeconomic life, against the value systems of a quickly modernizing and industrializing society, that religious motivation for Jew-hatred was increasingly and swiftly marginalized. In the popular mind (whether or not committed to some form of Christianity), the Jew was associated with vile and venal press, with money, with spoliative banking, mortgages, stockjobbing, and interest rates, with dump prices of wheat, and with any other economic
encumbrance. He was conceived of as a parasite, as a symbol of modern capitalist exploitation, but also, contrarily, desirous to attack traditional society from both sides, as fomenter of socialist revolution. He was considered to be too clever by half, and very occasionally he was also held to be a deicide unbeliever. The emphatic statement of an early champion of racial anti-Semitism, Wilhelm Marr,\textsuperscript{93} that he was quite prepared to defend the Jews against the charge of the crucifixion, was by no means an isolated case.

Moreover, the contents of what remained of Christian antagonism drastically changed. It was more often than not an attack on modern politics in the spirit of Pius IX’s \textit{Syllabus Errorum}, an appendix to \textit{Quanta Cura} of 1869. Often it was related to Christian perceptions of the modern “social question”, to Leo XIII’s, \textit{Rerum Novarum}, 1891, and its Protestant equivalents. Capitalism or “Talmud morality” was seen as the epitome of Jewish greed. This conception was unknown to an Augustine or a Chrysostom, and very largely so to an Innocent III.

In the hands of Léon Bloy,\textsuperscript{94} Augustine’s \textit{testimonium veritatis} argument, Jewish fate as proof of Christian truth, and the “\textit{Parousia} argument”, in which Jews prevent the second coming, were given a “gilt” meaning, hinting at banking and the stock exchange, which their author would have failed to grasp. In all of his vitriolic sermons on Jews, Father Deckert, a pastor in the Weinhaus district of Vienna and a paragon of the anti-Semitic Christian Socialist Party, did not once refer to the traditional theological issues, instead only depicting the Jew as the fomenter of the “social question”.\textsuperscript{95} The same holds true for the Protestant minister A. Stoecker in Germany.\textsuperscript{96} There were many Deckerts, judging by the letters French priests wrote when making their donations to the fund for the memorial to Colonel Henry, after the public exposure of his forgeries of the documents serving in Dreyfus trial had induced him to commit suicide.\textsuperscript{97}

The populist anti-Semitism of industrial(izing) society is thus far removed from the ancient forms from which it originated. So far removed, indeed, that the statement that the initial Christian rejection of Judaism is at the origin of modern anti-Semitism is correct in the same way as the statements that the broom is the origin of the vacuum cleaner, or a bow and arrow is the origin of the machine gun, or a flail is the origin of the threshing machine, are correct.

A lot of explaining, therefore, has to be done to attest its correctness. A central issue is that the original conflict as the elitist point of view of a literate community of philosophically trained theologians contains no clue as to how it was disseminated among illiterate and theologically untrained mass-
es. Even more important is the fact that the initial dissension did not show the slightest hint of the cluster of social and economic accusations, which in the end were of such overwhelming significance.

An attempt could perhaps be made to tie those to the gradually developing system of economic ethics of the Latin Church as analyzed by Troeltsch and historians of the theory of economics. Without a doubt there was in the early medieval church, particularly among the regular clergy, a strong anti-mercantile spirit that occasionally associated Jews with the much-detested commerce. The verdict of the early canonists is obvious from: “Qui comparat rem, ut illam ipsum integram et immutatem dando lucretur, ille est mercator, qui de templo Dei ejicitur” (“The merchant steals God’s time”). Alpertus de Metz detesting the Tiel merchants, is a case in point. To what extent these clerics in their secluded life influenced the masses of illiterate commoners, though, remains to be seen. Since the body of doctrines on the economic ethics of the Roman-Catholic Church was only fully elaborated long after popular socioeconomic resentment of Jews had expressed itself, this approach does not seem to be very rewarding. Moreover, there is the danger of circular reasoning as long as it is not ascertained that it was not anti-Semitism that drove Jews into commerce, a most un-Jewish activity in antiquity. The thesis of economic ethics as the source of economic charges is discordant with the classic “envy” hypothesis, for what it may be worth. It states that Jews, culturally predestined for commerce, as Max Weber, among others, propounded, had advantages that were resented. The above thesis also leaves unexplained similar economic charges in the Orthodox world of Russia and Romania, lacking the doctrines of Western scholasticism.

Failure of this course suggests that the best way to detect the explanation is by considering what the other post-emancipatory “school” (whatever it may be called: sociological, socioeconomic, or social protest) has to say about it. Despite the massive evidence it collected and despite its well-argued insights, it fails to explain precisely that specific pre-emancipatory socioeconomic position and occupational structure of the Jewish group, the starting point of its analysis, because it took that for granted.

Particularly in eighteenth century central Europe, that structure was the result of the institutionalized lay anti-Semitism of the ancien régime, maintained by princes, but strongly supported by the intertwined socioeconomic and religious resentment of a populace not yet largely estranged from formal religion. Though the abating of the passions of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation had created some leeway for Jews, popular resentment was
still strong enough, even in tolerant England, – the Pelham naturalization bill of 1753\textsuperscript{100} – to effectively oppose naturalization or emancipation at first, and to vociferously bewail it once it was finally achieved after the French Revolution. That antagonism in turn was steeped in the tumultuous Jew-baiting of the sixteenth century of Luther and kindred minds, and of the late middle-ages of the black death, of increased acrimony of the Friars and their attack on the Talmud, of Endinger Judenspiel and suchlike popular plays, and of ever-repeated accusations of ritual murder and desecration of the Host, always against the background of hatred of Jewish financial operations.\textsuperscript{101} Indeed, the more we go back in time, the stronger the admixture of religious to popular socioeconomic resentment seems to be, or is it the other way around? If so, there is indeed a plea for the above genealogy hypothesis, but still no answer to the question whence then came these economic charges so wholly alien to the world of antiquity, which are supposed to be the origin of the conflict. The most rabid anti-Semite of late antiquity, Chrysostom, did not know of them.

So, the post-emancipatory, largely “socioeconomic” school takes for granted what the other “theological school” fails to explain. The hiatus in the formation of the theory seems to be filled by meticulous description, but not analysis. The “theological school” also has difficulty in explaining why medieval Rome, the spiritual center of Latin Christianity, was an exceptionally rare, be it relative, abode of tolerance towards Jews. It fails to explain why there is no automatic correlation between indoctrination and persecution, as there should have been if the clerical admonishments were fully explanatory. Sometimes, as indicated, the populace paid no heed to them, sometimes it overreacted by resorting to a violence the clergy did not want. “Ecclesia non sitit sanguinem” did sometimes apply. Both popular reactions suggest social motivations independent of clerical warnings, and therefore unexplained. Riots and massacres such as those of 1096 and 1147, for example, often took place against the expressed wishes of the higher secular and regular clergy, who sometimes offered effective resistance. A series of papal bulls (\textit{licet iudaeis}) aimed at physical protection. Doctrine condemned charges of ritual murder and desecration of the Host, born from popular, “magical” religiosity, although it is true that individual members of the (lower) clergy indulged in propagating them, when shrines of the alleged victims attracted pilgrims and their money. The “theological school” also finds it difficult (though not impossible) to explain why the hatred of those outside the Church, the heretics and the members of chiliastic movements, was often more vitriolic than that of others.
Although all this indeed seems to justify a plea for a social-historical approach to the problem, it should nevertheless be stated with the greatest possible emphasis, that the evidence and reasoned conclusions brought together by Gager himself, and by the numerous excellent members of his “school” are such, despite internal discussions, that it would be mere foolishness to deny the ultimate significance of this material for the explanation of the emergence of a Jew-hatred, even though it cannot fully explain its development into fully fledged Judeo-phobia. Both “schools” (or all schools, if over-simplification has reduced them to two) have their great merits and their shortcomings. That is why a generalizing, and perhaps somewhat a-historical, abstracting synthesis of their views, as suggested above, seems a reasonable course of action.

How should it be achieved? I submit by choosing the method of the selective point of view. It is, in conscious one-sidedness, conceived of as an initial reasonable conjecture, the first step in Kuhnian “normal puzzle solving”\textsuperscript{102}. This itself, as well as deductions from it, should be subjected to attempts at every sort of corrective refutation. In that sense the selective point of view is the opposite of a bias, and instrumental in detecting bias, for indeed facts never speak for themselves, but they can contradict.

The methodological advantage is that right from the start one can be explicit about the ordering of the evidence. This is necessary since data can usually be arranged logically in more ways than one. (In principle three in six ways, four in twenty-four, and \(n\) in \(n!\) ways). The selective point of view is a pragmatic shortcut to the problem of reducing the number of possible arrangements by step-by-step exposure to refuting evidence, but in such way that the whole process of reasonable conjecture and refutation is under control. Without a selective point of view, the end result cannot be controlled but by the evidence quoted, and possibly some of the evidence missed. History then remains a “debate without an end”.

**The selective point of view**

In the attempt to devise an “honest” selective point of view, one should try to be as explicit as possible about bias. I hold that the majority of anti-Semites are not evil, but gullible, that a minority are both, and that a very small minority are evil as well as intelligent, with an intelligence capable of manipulating the gullible. The formulating of a selective point of view will, in all probability, reflect this view.

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*The Historiographical Background*
In whatever way anti-Semitism is defined, it is an antagonistic attitude towards Jews as such, that is, towards those rightly or wrongly considered to be Jews, by the persons in question. Someone who dislikes some individuals who happen to be Jewish, is not necessarily an anti-Semite. He is, or becomes one, when he generalizes by attributing the common characteristics he believes to have detected in those particular Jews to all Jews; when, in the psychologist’s phrase, inductive inference becomes deductive inference. The deductive inference can be stimulated and influenced by outside pressures and/or by manipulation.\textsuperscript{103}

This observation, however correct, is not conducive, however, to establishing a selective point of view about the presumed first ancestor in the genealogy of stereotypes, because in the above rule, the initial inductive inference is not specified. The professed reason for dislike can be anything, and the rule may therefore still lead to the conclusion that there are as many anti-Semites as there are anti-Semites. The concept of a genealogy of stereotypes was introduced precisely in order to combat this notion. The key to solving this problem could lie in the manner in which the (manipulated) deductive inference takes place.

A person who hates communism, for example, or what he believes to be communism, and who is convinced that some Jews known to him are in that sense communists will, by inductive inference, dislike these Jews as being communists. According to the above rule he becomes an anti-Semite the moment he deductively infers that all Jews are communists.

Most anti-Semites, however, hate Jews as such, irrespective of whether they are “communists” or not. Since hatred of non-communist Jews cannot possibly be a deductive inference of anti-communism, most anti-Semites must either have known more inductive inferences than one, and/or the deductive inferences must have been the result of outside influences.

This can be argued as follows. The above-mentioned anti-communist Jew-hater does not deductively infer from the fact that there are Gentile communists that all Gentiles are communists. In all likelihood he will solve that discrepancy by saying that these communist Gentiles were duped by the Jews. That means, however, that he has a concept of Jewishness, independent of his hatred of communism, which explains (to himself) why all Jews do what only some Gentiles do, that is, turn communist. He manages to do this by making himself believe that communism is Jewish, indeed with a concept of Jewishness preceding his concept of communism. Even if he does not hold that communism is Jewish, he must believe that there is a specifically Jewish reason for embracing it, for he cannot hold that Jews are duped by Jews. The
same logic applies when “communism” is exchanged for any charge that in
the course of time has been leveled at the Jews. In case of a multiplicity of
opinions (inductive and deductive inferences) the holder must have an inde-
pendent concept of Jewishness that serves as common denominator.

So in whatever way we look at the problem – even for the sake of argument
attributing to anti-Semites logical capacities they are not likely to have or
willing to use – it seems that there is always a general concept of Jewishness
guiding the deductive inferences, though most anti-Semites may not be
aware of this. That guiding is not necessarily only the sole work of specific
manipulative human agents, for it can also be the result of hearsay, tradition,
or education. No one is born an anti-Semite. Every anti-Semite has learned
to be such, but in all likelihood that learning is as much, if not more, exoge-
nous as endogenous. Sometime, somehow, every anti-Semite has swallowed
the notion that there is something specifically the matter with Jews.

The question could be raised whether that something, that factor $x$, has
some basis in reality. When anti-Semitism is scapegoating, why does it per-
sistently choose the Jews as victims? “The Jews are to blame for all our misfor-
tunes,” said the S.A. man to the Jew. “And the cyclists” said the Jew. The S.A.
man: “Why the cyclists?” The Jew: “Why the Jews?” In the quest for an answer
to that question, an attempt is made at formulating a selective point of view.

Numerous people have answered this question either “philo-Semiticly”
or anti-Semiticly by referring to some Jewish trait as an explanation. It is as-
tonishing how often in ordinary conversation, when the question of the rea-
son why of anti-Semitism or racism is raised, people tend to answer: “be-
cause Jews or blacks, etc., are this, that, or the other”, instead of suggesting
some specific determining characteristics of the racists. As in the theories re-
ferred to above, the answer has been Judaism, or Jews as inventors of con-
science. For some modern anti-Semites the answer was race, for others of
previous generations it was deicide. Philo-Semites – often anti-Semites in re-
verse – have often referred to Jewish intellectual endowments, as have anti-
Semites; the former appreciatively, the latter in the sense that Jewish intelli-
gence is always zersetsend (destructive), aiming at undermining sacred truths
and established certainties, aiming at sowing confusion. For those, Th. Ve-
blen has written his brilliant essay: “On the intellectual pre-eminence of
Jews”, arguing that this preeminence is a sociological and not an “innate” fea-
ture, due to social marginality. There is no doubt, however, that 2000 years of
survival have sharpened the Jews’ wits. Numerous other suggestions have
been made of the sort: “Jews are hated because they are $x$”, some of these
more plausible than others. (It is not difficult to prove, when indeed anti-
Semitism is a specific hatred of Jews as such, on the basis of some factor $x$, that all Jews must possess that factor $x$).

There are three possibilities of substitution for $x$:

1. $x$ is tautologically Jewishness. There are numerous anti-Semites who, when cornered, will argue that Jews have a Jewish way of being rich, communist, or whatever.

2. $x$ is a definiens of Jews. Nowadays it is not so easy to define “Jew”, but in pre-emancipatory times, that is, during the period when anti-Jewish attitudes were presumably formed, neither Jew nor Gentile nor Gentile detractor, would have seriously objected to this definition: a Jew is a member of the Jewish people (nation) who, by self-definition, claims a specific relationship with the Divine, except for some renegades whom Jews may have continued to consider as bad Jews, while only some Gentiles did consider them as such, and most Gentiles did not.

In the case of the conflict between the “Jewish” pope Anacletus II (1130-1138) and the anti-pope Innocent II (1130-1143), the Jewish descent was not forgotten. In the Iberian Peninsula, doubt of limpieza de sangre, or purity of blood, implied that one could, with some seeming justification, continue to fleece former Jews. Jewish conversos were often rich, Morisco “new Christians” were not. To the latter, the limpieza de sangre rules were never applied.104

Since Jews cannot be defined, or only during very limited periods, in terms of class, language, status, or race for that matter, and since there is nothing very informative about the term “people”, Jews were in fact defined as adherents of Judaism, or only very rarely as descendants of such. This is because, as indicated earlier, objections to Judaism are in the eye of the beholder (and are very different for ancient pagans, Christians, Muslims, atheists, and others, respectively) and not in that of the beholden. Not even a Freudian interpretation of a loathing of circumcision as fear of castration, nor even dietary laws conceived of as a slight on the “impure” Gentile will do – the proposition that $x$ is a definiens yields no fruitful insight into the explanation of anti-Semitism. It does eliminate, however, the possibility of an explanation of anti-Semitism tainted by anti-Semitism which sees it as a consequence of Jewish behavior. For all those who, despite everything, still hold to the concept that “anti-Semitism is found where Jews abound,” it should perhaps be stated that there is no such clear correlation, as a few illustrations may clarify. No German town where anti-Semitism took root ever had as high a percentage of
Jewish inhabitants as Amsterdam or Thessaloniki where such taking root was hardly the case. In general, the Netherlands and Greece had relatively more Jews than Germany for centuries. Before the First World War, France had about the same percentage of Jewish inhabitants as Italy, with marked differences in anti-Semitic development. New York, or the US in general, counted relatively more Jews than most European towns or countries. The difference in anti-Semitism which existed until 1919 between Hungarian Croatia and nearby independent Serbia cannot be explained in terms of numerical differences. The same holds true for anti-Semitic Romania and non-anti-Semitic Bulgaria, both traditionally Greek Orthodox. In medieval Rome, where there was a continuous Jewish presence for a longer period than anywhere else, where, in other words Jews had the greatest possibility to make their “obnoxious qualities” felt, there was not much of a problem. The Roman ghetto, inspired by the Counter-Reformation and instituted by Paul IV in 1555, dated from the sixteenth century, as did the Venetian one. There were no problems for the Jewish communities in China or India.

So, if the problem is with the beholder, not the beholden, x can only be the Jewish “property” of being prone to having specific characteristics ascribed to them, which seems to imply a specific social position of Jews that renders them vulnerable. That vulnerability cannot be due to the “normal” wartime animosity, as in countless wars Jews have fought with others, on a par with the way other peoples have fought with others in countless wars. (I do object to the treating of the wars Rome fought with some Jews as an indication of anti-Semitism, as many historians do, though later justification of those wars may indeed have been anti-Semitic).

What then comes to mind is the diaspora position.

There have been more “Diasporas” than just the Jewish, with not necessarily always the same disastrous results. What is specific in the case of the Jews, however, is a diaspora of people with a religion that had a specific meaning for the people(s) amongst which they lived. For the Roman elite, as has been indicated and will be elaborated, the fact that a militarily defeated nation, largely enslaved, was able to make converts even among the elite of the victors, was something awe inspiring. Romans felt that the incomprehensible Jewish god, who could not, like all other gods, be included in the Pantheon, but who evidently was capable of wrecking the social fabric of a victorious society must be a powerful and fearsome god, and fearsome therefore were his servants.
There was nothing fearsome about Jews or the Jewish god in China or India or other places, so no problems arose there; a quiet minority, which though religiously different, could be absorbed and integrated in all other respects.

Judaism had a specific meaning, however, for both Christianity and Islam. Both god-fearing in another sense of the word, these two religions stand in a problematic “son-father relationship” to Judaism; both refer to Judaism as the seedbed of their own beliefs. There is consequently truth in the rule formulated by Poliakov, that apart from ancient pagan anti-Semitism—abortive and largely unrelated to later varieties—Jew-hatred is found in countries where these two religions prevail(ed). Since obviously religious dissension is a necessary, but not per se a necessary and sufficient condition, the initial selective point of view deals with the social position which diaspora and dissension created together, that is, the position of the “stranger within the gate”, who with a religion problematic to society, as such is in but not of society. Jew-hatred shares both features with the hatred of Burakumin; it shares the first with all other varieties of racism.

Would a different result have been obtained if the choosing of an initial selective point had begun at the other end, in modern Europe, for example, by the comparison of anti-Semitic with non-anti-Semitic countries?

To call a country anti-Semitic suggests measurability. Although it is impossible to measure anti-Semitism (how should I devise a historically meaningful standard?), there are bound to be all sorts of non-documented opinions. It is possible however to approximate measurements in terms such as:

1. the number and size of the electorate of avowedly anti-Semitic parties.
2. the number and size of the readership of anti-Semitic pamphlets and journals.
3. the number of non-prosecuted cases of defamation or acts of violence.
4. the number of cases of private, officious, or official discrimination against Jews.

and possibly some other criteria. Provided a system of weighing them against each other is devised, it is possible to make a table of anti-Semitic Europe on the eve of the First World War with the emphatic reservation that a categorization of “low” does not signify that there is no anti-Semitic prejudice at all in the respective country or region.
This table actually suggests very little. On both sides there are predominantly Roman Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant countries, and on both sides there are highly industrialized and overwhelmingly agrarian countries; there are countries with a small Jewish population, one percent or less, and countries with a larger Jewish population of over one percent, constitutional monarchies or republics, autocratic states and so forth. In fact, about the only thing that can be deduced from this tentative list is that there may have been coun-

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*only representatives of these countries took part in the “anti-Semitic Congresses” of Dresden in 1882 and Bucharest in 1886.*

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**Table I**

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( ) regions
[ ] very partially substantiated guesses
[[ ] ] no guess attempted
tries where prejudice never found expression, such as presumably Italy, and a number of Balkan countries, parts of the Netherlands and Belgium, or where, in more distant periods, the problem was entirely unknown, or known only from hearsay, such as presumably was the case in Ireland or Scandinavia. There may have been countries where once-virulent prejudices stopped being expressed after a period of absence, as presumably was the case in England, and countries where they continued to be expressed. However, “expressing” or “not expressing” belongs to the beholder, and depends on social structures which made “the stranger within the gate” to be a problem or not, for as yet undetected reasons.

Consequently, the map may seemingly support the impossible hypothesis, uttered by Treitschke, that each country had its own variety of Jews, but it does not suggest either the possibility of another, different, obviously preferable initial selective point of view, nor does it carry any indication that the one chosen (diaspora cum a religion of the nature of a problem to society) is wrong.

A short outline of the argument

It is first argued that ancient pagan Jew-hatred was largely abortive. Thereafter the only way of being true to the attempt at (“specimen-genus”) synthesis in the form of a genealogy of stereotypes, and the initial selective point of view, seems to be to conceptualize the initial quarrel between Jews and Jew-Christians as a specimen of the sociological “law” (law-like statement) of “secession friction”. This states that whenever within a group or institution a minority develops a deviating opinion on one or more points of the common ideology and feels forced to secede on those grounds, it will justify its secession by accusing those who do not follow them of being disloyal to their own, that is, the once common ideology. “They should realize we are right when they honestly reflect about their own creed, but they are stubbornly blind and obstinate.”

Another consequence is that all points of the once common ideology not in dispute remain authoritative for the secessionists; in the case in hand: Jewish scripture, the Torah and Tenach, now called “Old Testament”, particularly the texts of the prophets, remained the “Hebrew truth” (Hebraica Veritas) – Jews were never (in the Christian rejection, in contradiction to that of the Islam) accused of having forged some texts, or having suppressed some pages – even though now interpreted as announcing Jesus Christ. That revealed
truth included the unalterable notion, not disputed by any informed Christian, and hence part and parcel of Christian doctrine, that the Jews were and remained the “chosen people”, only temporarily in divine disfavor, but in the future to be restored to their elect position but then as followers of Jesus Christ.

This had far-reaching consequences, for it meant that Jews could not formally be banished or persecuted, only harassed, could not be ignored, and could not be assimilated. Moreover, because of their misfortunes, the lost war against Rome, the destruction of the temple and the Diaspora, they were seen as a testamentum veritatis – the living witnesses of the truth of the Christian religion, exemplifying what happens to the disobedient, and who as witnesses should be preserved.

However, their mere presence was a perpetual irritant, aggravated when after Constantine the Roman Empire was Christianized. From then on the Jews’ (transcendental) right to title had to be formally recognized, so that Judaism was declared the only legally recognized non-Christian religion, a religio licita. Because of this very legitimacy it could “nefariously” influence the many vacillating Christians who, far from being martyrs, had joined the Church not out of sheer conviction, but for opportunistic reasons, for jobs, or perhaps as a substitute for their true persuasions as followers of the cults of Isis, Osiris, Mithras, and others, whose temples were now closed; and influence them it did, so much so that in most great towns, and presumably not only there, lay masses were “Judaizing” to a degree Church leaders found alarming. By formally becoming Christians these masses were, because of their Jewish heritage of the “Old Testament”, more informed about Jewish traditions than ever before in the days of paganism. In addition to the Christian festival days, they kept the Sabbath and the Jewish feasts. They wore amulets with Hebrew inscriptions, and they believed that only an oath taken in the synagogue was valid, as will be elaborated.

For some men of the Church this was intolerable. The sheep had to be separated from the goats. Chrysostom of Antioch and others made it their task to do so by means of vituperative sermons and occasionally some more effective prodding. The growing acrimony of the attacks by the Church leadership was thus a function of the prevailing lay philo-Semitism, and the invectives, as long as this lasted, and beyond, were systematized into a theologically coherent censure of Jews and Judaism. Thus emerged the stigmatization by people with (moral) authority. It was of so virtually permanent a character that the sign of opprobrium could only be removed with difficulty, if at all; a
characteristic of most other and later varieties of racism. In the case in hand only baptism would do.

But for a long time in the West, until well into the Carolingian era, most lay people refused to pay heed, although sporadic destruction of synagogues – inspired by clergy – did take place. It is submitted that friendly relations lasted as long as in everyday life laymen continued to entertain neighborly and vocational relationships with Jews. Abstract Sunday warnings, if there were any (there is no reason to assume, as will be elaborated, that on the level of the lay masses, that is, the level of the parish church, indoctrination was a regularly returning feature; it seeped through only slowly), were corrected by concrete weekday evidence.

This suggests that acceptance and above all internalizing of the stigma – after all its propagators were men of no mean standing – was dependent on decreasing social interaction, or reversely passively increasing social distancing. Not yet in the sense used by the Bogardus Social Distance Scale,\textsuperscript{109} which ranking ethnic groups according to their prestige in public opinion, and in fact cleverly measures prejudice by gauging to what extent distance is actively kept. To be sure, it will be applicable at the end of the process, for acceptance of the no longer corrected stigma will transform factual distance into keeping at a distance.

There are several ways in which such interaction can be diminished. Segregation can be superimposed by authority, it can be the “Jim Crow”\textsuperscript{110} result of a preceding discrimination of the minority in question, not applicable in this case; or it can be the outcome of the ethnic group in question plying specific (“pariah”) trades, not necessarily imposed by stigmatization. A fortiori this is so in societies where the various trades each have their specific locations (geographical distances).

In Egypt, where, instigated by Cyril of Alexandria, the earliest mass persecution of Jews by Christians took place in 414, a rather specific factual segregation dated back to pre-Christian times.

In the autocratic Byzantine Empire, where the intertwined interests of church and state mutually supported each other, a geographical segregation was superimposed. Jews had to live in separate districts. The empire had the effective means to enforce this because a relatively sophisticated money economy of a “mercantilist” nature, enabled it to maintain an efficient system of taxation to adequately finance an effective bureaucracy and police. Militarily, economically and legally it was for centuries able to stave off “feudal” solutions to its problems.

The distinctive feature of the Byzantine persecutions of the Jews was that
they were always sponsored by the government and executed by the military. The populace had no share in them because autocracy would not tolerate such “democratic” participation and was able to stifle any popular initiatives.

Occupationally, apart from offices, Jews were not overtly distinguished from the non-Jews; there was a slight, but by no means decisive, overrepresentation in bad-smelling trades like silk-dyeing or tannery. These were not necessarily “pariah” occupations. Credit operations, never made a problem of in the “Latin” fashion, were a state monopoly, so that there was no room for the “Jewish money lender”. Consequently, popular resentment, kept in check by the government, was restricted to religious sentiments, and was not exacerbated by that self-exoneration, which by finding excuses for itself, in fact serves as a stimulus for further action. The elsewhere so-typical economic accusations were unknown.

The Christian “indirect successor” states, south of the lower Danube, maintained Byzantine traditions after the very tolerant Turkish interlude. The southern Balkans thus refute the hypothesis that theological stigmatization and a merely geographical, government-imposed and controlled social distancing are necessary and sufficient conditions for a fully fledged Judeophobia, such as later developed in the West. This is all the more remarkable as stigmatization by the Greek Church Fathers, and hence the Orthodox Church, was more severe than that of the Latin Fathers and the Roman Catholic Church. Orthodox liturgy did not have an equivalent of the prayer oremus et pro perfidis judaeis… on Good Friday (perfidus here means faithless, not perfidious).

This greater severity is also curiously illustrated in the formerly Jesuit, Rome-oriented St. Nicholas church in Prague, built between 1703 and 1763. Predominating in this very ornate church are more-than-life-size statues, intriguingly representing four Greek Church Fathers, to wit, Cyril of Alexandria, the instigator of the first great persecution of the Jews (414), Chrysostom of Antioch, of the eight homilies against the Jews, Gregory of Nazianzus, who violently protested against the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem by the emperor Julian the Apostate, and Basil, the founder of Greek monasticism. All four were staunch Athanasians – Nicene victors over Arianism and Novatianism – and may symbolize the Trentine defeat of the new heresies, Hussitism and Protestantism. Also, at least three of them had in common that they were notorious Jew-haters; given the role of monks in the first persecutions of Jews in the East, perhaps all four were.

Since there were authoritative Latin Athanasians in abundance, or anti-Pelagians for that matter, and opponents of other heresies, it seems plausible...
to argue that these forebears of schismatics were placed there as theological vindicators of the 1745 expulsion of the Jews from Prague by the empress Maria Theresa, rather than as defensores fidei. It is then worth noting that Greek Church Fathers were chosen for that purpose.\textsuperscript{111}

Popular resentment in the southern Balkans did not go beyond religious tenets, at the worst expressed in fist cuffs and occasional thunderbolts from a normally blue sky. The story in Western-oriented Roman Catholic Croatia, part of Hungary until 1918, and above all in Romania, is an entirely different one. They follow a Western development pattern, Romania via the long detour of the Polish Ukranian conflagration of the mid-seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{112}

After the final collapse of the Roman Empire there was in the West no effective secular authority capable of imposing segregation. In most successor states a very sluggish circulation of money, and the reverting to an unsophisticated largely rural economy, prevented an efficient system of taxation. Consequently there were no means of financing an effective bureaucracy, military force, or police. The state could not achieve a monopoly\textsuperscript{113} of violence, except in the smallest units. Secular authority, even if it wanted to help, which was by no means always the case, was in no position to succor the churchmen. What it could resort to, as, for example, in Visigoth Spain, was downright robbery, but that by no means met with the approval of the churchmen. It ran against their religio licita principles, although no doubt some unscrupulous bishops will have participated in the spoils.

By and large the Western Church in the early Middle Ages obviously lacked effective means of its own to instill caution against the Jews into the illiterate lay masses, because the notion of the religio licita prevented effective disciplinary measures and because in those largely rural areas, the Church was far from being an effective organization, the village priests being hardly more literate and informed than their parishioners. The general picture of the Merovingian and Carolingian period, is one of remarkably friendly relationships between Jews and Christian laymen, not paying heed to the admonitions of an Agobard or an Amulo, both archbishops of Lyons.

How then can the reversal of popular attitudes since roughly the eleventh century be accounted for? It could be surmised that this was due to gradually increased and more effective ecclesiastical militancy. What comes to mind then is the “discovery” of the Talmud by ecclesiastical authorities, mainly friars, resulting in the by no means generally accepted idea that, because of the authority Jews assigned to these writings, Judaism was not a truly biblical religion, and should therefore no longer be treated as a religio licita. Since, how-
ever, the first outbursts of popular Jew-hatred during the Crusades preceded this new militancy dating from the middle of the thirteenth century, they cannot be explained by it.

A second possibility is the assumption of more or less constant theological rejection of Judaism, in the old style of late antiquity: “biblical but obsolete”; comparable to the Byzantine version, be it somewhat less severe. It could be assumed that growing social distances were a modifying factor, in line with the Byzantine Empire, even though there it was not found to be decisive. Somehow the disappearance of stigmatization correcting daily social intercourse will have to be assumed. A major difference of the Western variety of social distancing as compared with the Eastern might be that it could not be superimposed by the states in Byzantine fashion, for the very reason of their bureaucratic ineffectiveness. Hence it would be uncontrolled. (In parenthesis this uncontrolled character may serve to assuage the arguments of some critics of the social distancing hypothesis. They could argue that in discrimination against women, for example, there is no question of social disparate-ness and point to differences in social roles as explanatory. It could very well be that the reason for diminished social interaction coincided with a change in the social role of Jews, or of both Jews and Gentiles. Moreover the controlled character of social distancing in the Byzantine Empire, not causing great changes in the socioeconomic role of the Jews, could explain why there the hypothesis was not quite satisfactory.)

Social distance, when not superimposed, controlled by neither church nor state, in all likelihood cannot but be the result of changes in the occupational structure, and uncontrolled then has the meaning of: tied up to the vicissitudes of socioeconomic life. There is not much else that can explain it, since possible differences in military roles, for example, are closely connected to socioeconomic positions.

A socioeconomic interpretation of social distance could be as follows: because of their synagogical organization and the resultant social cohesion, their high degree of literacy, and their traditional experience, as Agus so convincingly argued in his studies on early medieval Jewish history, Jews were well equipped to weather the storm of invasions, destruction of town life, war, and so forth which followed the final collapse of the Western Roman Empire—more so than the less coherent, mutually contesting Gentile groups. In the general turmoil Jews were able to find niches for themselves, agrarian as well as others. These can have led them to a social prestige, not yet diminished by religious discord. Suspicion had presumably not yet entered the mind in Merovingian times, since Christianity had not yet deeply taken root

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among the rank and file of the former pagan invaders, and not necessarily
more so among the illiterate servile layers of the former Gallo-Roman popu-
lation. Not paying heed to the sporadic ecclesiastical warnings, which they
perhaps hardly understood, these groups saw no impediments to cooperat-
ing with the Jews, as long as that was advantageous. Thus conceived, the cor-
diality in social relationships during the Merovingian and Carolingian peri-
ods, registered by among others, Blumenkranz,\textsuperscript{115} becomes less enigmatic.
Neither is the beginning of a reversal of attitudes just after the nadir of eco-

The very first stirrings of economic growth, and the restoration of a mon-
ey economy, however limited, implied an increasing division of labor. Spe-
cialized artisanal groups began to emerge, to some extent taking over tasks
that formerly most people had performed for themselves. Hoarded precious
metals began to be minted again, and barter began to give way to exchanges
paid for in money. The result was a growth of new occupational groups, not
entertaining vocational relationships with Jewish counterparts, and out-
numbering the few that still did. Of old there had been Jewish moneyers
(money never wholly disappeared), as well as glassblowers, goldsmiths, and
potters cooperating with Gentiles. The new groups took over.

The reason why Jews could not participate in this division of labor with oc-
cupational groups of their own, was that trades and crafts were increasingly,
almost from the start, organized by monopolizing fraternities, later guilds.
As semi-religious, originally even pagan organizations, they were shunned
by Jews obedient to the Law.

The process implied a continuously increasing specification and limita-
tion of Jewish economic positions, and a continuously increasing prolifera-
tion of Gentile economic positions, with diminishing vocational and neigh-
borly relationships. This implied less daily correction of whatever stigmatiz-
ing indoctrination seeped down to the illiterate population. Social distanc-
ing in the West, inherent to the socioeconomic development of a feudal socie-
ty, is consequently independent of stigmatization, at least initially, and as
such essentially different from the Byzantine version.

When explanation thus focuses on socioeconomic change, this has the ini-
tial advantage of possibly explaining the economic charges which later are so
evident.

Moreover, when antagonism comes to be related to the immediate materi-
al needs on the bread and butter level of human existence, there are height-
ened chances of “terrorization” processes. The “terrorization” hypothesis,
based on comparable phenomena in other forms of racism, postulates that
most – there are always exceptions – benevolent or neutral members of the majority group are forced to comply with the discriminatory acts of others through sheer fear of very probable (violent) retaliation in case of noncooperation or protest. They thereby acquiesce in the prejudices, attitudes and actions of those others, who cannot tolerate the “Jew-friend”, the “Nigger-lover”, or the “Kafferboetie”, and believe that these must be forcibly made to mend their ways. The terrorized who give in, – only the very courageous resist – and who are thereby compelled to hunt with the hounds, afterwards tend to soothe their consciences by rationalizing their attitude or action. The easiest way of doing so is through self-exoneration, fully accepting, internalizing and even elaborating on the existing accusations and stereotypes. (There is, of course, the problem of the *primus movens*, who terrorized the first terrorist? It can be solved as will be shown.)

During the Middle Ages the process was exacerbated by the fact that it neatly solved a hitherto existing disparity between disobedience to the clergy and their authority. What was easier for the terrorized than to say to themselves: “How right the clergy have always been in warning us against these infidels. Why didn’t we pay heed?”

The populace thus began to accept the theological stigma, without necessarily understanding all the theological subtleties advocating a certain restraint. Illiterate people presumably added elements of their own imagination, partly of an economic nature, partly derived from their own magical religiosity, such as the magical belief in ritual murder or desecration of the Host, which though uncanonical, could not be eradicated. Popes might protest, the local (lower) clergy cooperated only too often.

Terrorization explains the contagious character of Jew-hatred, spreading like an oil slick on water. The violent form prevails particularly when an ineffective (feudal) government is incapable of preventing it, because the state has not yet obtained the monopoly of violence, or when the government itself terrorizes; Germany was presumably more anti-Semitic in 1945 than in 1932.

The history of medieval Jew-hatred abounds with examples, so does that of witch hunting. Richard Coeur de Lion, to mention just one case, was not able to punish the malefactors in the “race riot” on his coronation day, 3 September 1189, because of inadequate policing, and, one is inclined to think, thereby paved the way for the massacre in York six months later, which for lack of manpower, he could not avenge either.

Worse happens when governments, while paying lip service to immunity from molestation look the other way when Jews are attacked, in order to
make them more willing afterwards to pay for “protection”. It is the milch-cow system, first developed in England, but imitated almost everywhere else in transalpine Europe.

An effective way of elucidating the hypothesis that growing social distance is due to vocational differentiation, is a mathematical analysis of group interaction, as a form of “non source-based” evidence (appendix), the more necessary since the sources on the socioeconomic aspects of Jewish-Gentile relations during the “Dark Ages” are scanty. The mathematical analysis focuses on growing division of labor, marking a however small economic growth, as explanatory of occupational differentiation. The relationship between social distance and the number of vocational groups involved, turns out to be “exponential”, that is, the rate of growth of the former, is by a specific, continuous factor, greater than that of the latter. (It is of the form $y = a^x$, $y = a^x$). The growth of negative attitudes is accordant.

To sum up: the essence of the argument is that the process took place at a moment when (feudal) government, because of economic underdevelopment, was least capable of either imposing segregation or preventing terrorization and that social distancing and terrorization were independent of possible variations in theological indoctrination. The “model” does explain the unprecedented massacres of 1096. In fact, as will be elaborated (Ch.x1), it explains them better than the traditional “mere religious paroxysm” argument. The perpetrators hardly deserve the name of “crusaders”, whereas the participants of the popular crusades of Peter the Hermit and Walter the Penniless behaved well in Europe; not so in Asia, where after the military disaster at Civetot, which left them de facto leaderless, they degenerated into the dreaded “Taifurs”, extremely violent chiliasts, and murderers of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, perhaps in that order.

The hypothesis can be attested. As a consequence of the gradual disappearance of allodial land (allodium: estate held in absolute ownership, without acknowledgement to a (feudal) superior), land-holding by Jews and by implication Jewish participation in rural life, virtually vanished, not because it was Jewish, but because Jewish land almost by definition was allodial. As a rule, observant Jews could not take the Christian oath, and in that way reacquire their feudal land. If they did, they would probably be lost to Judaism, as they would then be subject to social control.

Commercial undertakings by Jewish “merchant adventurers”, the Radanites – timely sale of land by provident Jews reading the “feudal” signs was perhaps used to provide the necessary capital – after initial successes, succumbed primarily to Italian competition, for a variety of reasons. After the
conversion of the Slavs, the slave trade, a significant item in the Radanites’ activities, dwindled. The costs of overland trade were high. Jews did not have the naval protection against Arab corsairs, which the emerging Italian communities could offer their sea-faring merchants. Jews, moreover lacked these communities’ home industries producing for export. They could maintain themselves somewhat longer in the Rhenish-Danubian trade and the Champagne fairs, but there too in the end they lost out to the merchants organized in “hansae” guilds.

Jewish (self)exclusion from guilds, which in a later stage also implied being excluded from artisanal trades and the sale of non-agrarian products, meant a further reduction of the Jews economic possibilities. At first they did not join, because guilds, long before becoming the monopolizing economic institutions we know, originated in pagan kinship organizations, with long preserved pagan libations, oaths, and ritual drunkenness, abhorrent to observant Jews, and carefully watched over by a suspicious Church, which could not entirely suppress these customs and sometimes tried to “Christianize” them. Because of their religious (originally pagan, but Christianized) background, guilds developed into Christian communities of prayer, of people with a specific, somewhat exceptional standing in an overwhelmingly agrarian society that was organized on commercial lines as well.

Later Jews were indeed excluded from guilds on purpose, with sanctions established by retroactive legislation. The traditional assumption that Jews as infidels have always been excluded from trades and crafts right from the start, is not justified and creates some difficulties of logic.

The consequences of the above process were disastrous. It meant that the economic activity of Jews, as (proto-) urbanites anyhow somewhat suspect in the eyes of rurals, was limited to trafficking in second-hand goods, the pawn business and moneylending related to it, financial administration for great nobles and princes, not necessarily appreciated by commoners – in Marxist terminology transformation of spoils into consumer goods, or in modern terminology “money laundering” – and finally in occupational isolation, the catering for their own Jewish market.

Social marginalization, given the habit of localization of trades and those plying them in specific quarters, as is still found today in (near) eastern towns, – fullers in Fullers Street, basketmakers in Basketmakers’ Alley – implied geographical isolation. The Jewries (Juiveries, Judengassen), where the synagogue and the cemetery were located, were moneylenders’ and pawnbrokers’ streets, later sometimes in retroactive legislation formalized as Ghettos. Jews were as a rule detested for plying these trades. Only the poor occasional-
ly had some appreciation of them, when Jewish pawnbrokers charged less interest than their Gentile competitors, but then these resented the “unfair” competition. Jews were certainly not the only moneylenders. The notion that Christians were not usurers, because the Church forbade usury, is about as right as the statement that there were no adulterers because the Church forbade adultery.

Moreover, Jewish credit operations could victimize commoners not involved in the transactions, because the great borrowers, nobility and (regular) clergy would compensate for the high interest by increased extortion from (servile) dependents. Princes, interested in their share of the profits from Jewish moneylenders, saw to it that the rates of interest were high.

Living apart without much social intercourse, following their strange rites, and reading books in “weird” lettering and language – Hebrew was a sorcerer’s language! – these “usurious”, “blood-sucking” Jews were seen in medieval imagery as sinister, even diabolical. The picture, painted in garish colors, was: how right the clergy had always been in warning against these deci
des, murderers of their own prophets, always rebellious against God, who worshipped the Golden Calf, Baal, and later the pig, the Judensau. As their own text of the Old Testament attested, they were veritable Cains, fully capable of murdering children in their fruitless attempt to use the blood of the recently baptized to cure the (skin) diseases they had as a consequence of their abominable and unpardonable crime of the crucifixion. (The fact that according to essentially Christian concepts “they” were merely instrumental in the fulfilment of a Divine Plan was completely overlooked.) They were seen as fully capable of “crucifying” Christ again and again by means of the desecration of the Host, as if they believed in transubstantiation. They were seen as fully capable of poisoning, and, as the moneygrubbing Judases they were, who betrayed the Saviour for thirty pieces of silver, of conspiring with all other enemies of Church and mankind such as lepers, heretics, pagan Tatars and infidel Muslims. (Although often heretics, and occasionally Muslims held the same views).

In an age steeped in superstition, the uncanonical accusations against the Jews’ malicious magical use of the power of baptism in children’s blood, and of the malicious magical use of the power of the Holy Wafer were then not as strange as they are now. Illiterate people themselves used the Host as a panacea, a fertilizer, an aphrodisiac, an amulet, or even a poison. As Strack demonstrated, few things have all over the world so strongly appealed to the human need for magic as blood.35

Diabolical people like Jews had to be shunned if you could not kill them,
protected as they allegedly were by the venality of avaricious or spendthrift princes and simoniacal bishops, who profited from their usury. Sometimes, however, good princes made wise rules to keep them under control.

The little social interaction that remained, became “labelled interaction”, that is, it was limited to taking care that “inferior and dirty” people perform their inferior and dirty but necessary tasks, which by implication is confirming the prejudice.

**Cisalpine Europe**

And Cisalpine Europe? It is a “refutational area” (i.e., an area where the above theory does not apply) not only the Byzantine world already referred to, but also Italy. The verisimilitude of a theory is no proof of it. A theory is definitely wrong when all supposedly necessary and sufficient conditions are met and yet the phenomenon in question does not appear, or vice versa when none is met and it does occur. Since I cannot think of any concrete (historical) situation meeting these requirements, I have to be content with the next best attempt at refutation. That next best is not a further investigation in the development of the theological rejection. Some critics have reproached me with one-sidedness for emphasizing social factors instead of sufficiently elaborating its medieval varieties. Since such elaboration, according to them can only mean detecting increased and not diminished acrimony of the stigma, they seem to be missing the point. Increased bitterness cannot possibly yield a refutation of the distancing and terrorization hypotheses, when these are held to be operative only on condition that there is a mild or ferocious stigma.

The explanatory significance of the increased acrimony of the stigma can only be gauged when other variables are held constant, or proved to be erroneous.

Regarding acrimony, there is reason to assume that many popes, as heads of the ecclesiastical state, could achieve in their state what they could not in the whole of Christendom, as they lacked there the efficient means of control they had to some degree at home, to wit obedience to the rule of Gregory the Great. It stated: “Jews are allowed everything that is not expressis verbis forbidden to them in law.” The rule implied a degree of tolerance, that did justice to the concept of the religio licita, and seemed the best guarantee for a loving persuasion, when forceful conversion was held to be invalid. Many popes, when their hands were not tied by any of the ever-contesting Roman noble factions, indeed tried to protect Jews against popular onslaughts and to de-
fend them against charges of ritual murder and desecration of the Host. Their attitude may have radiated over the peninsula, making it a “refutational area”.

On the other hand, there is increased acrimony in the measures taken since the fourth Lateran council, such as the Jew-badge and the condemnation of the Talmud. To sum up, had change in stigmatization been a decisive factor, Italy would initially have been less anti-Semitic than the remainder of Europe, or equally anti-Semitic, and after 1215 equally or more. It has been continuously, up to the present, less anti-Semitic than the remainder of Europe, despite the once more increased bitterness of stigmatization of the Counter-Reformation. Measured in number of persecutions and frequency of accusations, in liberality of economic possibilities and so forth, the “underdevelopment” of Italian anti-Semitism not only throws doubt on the effect of increased theological acrimony, but it also lends plausibility to social structures analyzed in the above manner as being elsewhere at the very least codeterminant. Their effect is such that the blame should not squarely and exclusively be put on Christianity, and that by implication possibilities for comparison with other forms of racism are created.

Italy was also different from trans-Alpine Europe in its attitude towards the Jews because of a specifically Italian form of “anticlericalism”, that is, distrust of the Ecclesiastical State. The secular power of Patrimonium Petri constituted a grave problem for peninsular politics. It was seen as not being strong enough to enforce unification, but strong enough to keep dissension going. This distrust tended to create reservations against whatever prescripts emanated from Rome, which were not directly related to matters of doctrine. Among those were prescripts regarding the Jews.

Finally, Italy is a “refutational” area, particularly in the south, because as a consequence of Saracen and Byzantine rule, and because of incomplete “feudalization” or “manoralization”, Jewish occupational specification and the accompanying decrease of interaction did not occur. Moreover there is reason to assume that because of an exceptionally early restoration of a sophisticated money economy in various Italian state organizations, the podestà were better able to protect efficiently the Jews when that served their purpose, and/or to superimpose segregation in Byzantine fashion, than was the case in states organized on communal lines. The above “refuting” characteristics of Italy can be attested.

There are more such areas, for example, southern France before the Albigensian crusade, the early modern Netherlands, or rather the coastal provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen; England after the
“Glorious Revolution” could be an example, and possibly because of its triangular religious connections, the medieval Iberian peninsula.

On the other hand the reason why notoriously anti-Semitic and Orthodox countries like Tsarist Russia and Romania deviated from the milder “Greek” or Byzantine pattern must be sought in their relationship with Roman Catholic Poland. One might say that via Poland they inherited a Western-type of development. The “Jewish Pale” in Russia, the area where Jews lived, was former Polish territory, Russian by the earlier conquest and partition of Poland. Ashkenazi Jews came to Romania after the Polish conflagration of the mid-seventeenth century, the revolt of Khmelnitsky and the war with Sweden.

If in this way an adequate analysis of medieval anti-Jewish stereotyping is achieved, we have gained insight into what was bequeathed to the tumultuous sixteenth century, and later periods, and have thereby vindicated the genealogy concept. It should perhaps be emphasized, that if by thus arranging the evidence, an understanding of the anti-Semitism on the eve of the Machtübernahme is achieved, this cannot possibly be an explanation of the Shoah. That can only be explained, if it can ever be explained, by an analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions making that anti-Semitism “operative”; a by no means identical problem.

**Problems of definition**

Thus far we have left the term anti-Semitism implicit, that neologism of Wilhelm Marr, which gained such astonishingly easy access to all European languages. At this point some reflection about the knotty question how to make it more explicit seems appropriate. Although originally the term implied a certain degree of racial rationalization, common usage now treats it as virtually synonymous with irrational Jew-hatred. In fact, Judeo-phobia would be the better term.

In a joint effort at a recent conference, anti-Semitism was defined as: verbal or active manifestations of antagonism towards the Jewish group as such, irrespective whether they are direct or indirect, intended or not. It is a wide definition, open to question.

“Indirect” is taken to mean that some people passively approve of the anti-Semitic public speaking, writing, or action of others, or indulge in backbiting, without ever seeking a personal confrontation with Jews: auf Juden schimpfen, manger du Juif: is unintended anti-Semitism unconscious anti-
Semitism, or is it something like a “declaration of being Aryan”, as was demanded from higher officials in occupied countries during the Second World War? The signatories did harm the Jews without necessarily meaning to do so; lack of solidarity. Unintended anti-Semitism can also be aggression for aggression’s sake, perhaps aimed at Jews in an (for the above reasons) explosive situation; a lout picking a quarrel with a Jew, say in the early 1930s in Germany, thereby minimally meeting with the passivity of the bystanders, which these would not have shown in the case of another victim, is maximally setting off a chain reaction. In fact a good deal of manifest anti-Semitism may find its effectiveness in not being blocked through the passivity of bystanders; the often-observed passivity of a crowd watching somebody drowning without doing anything about it. It is the first step towards “terrorization”.

The definition does not include an anti-Jewish attitude, a willingness fully to condone backbiting actions, without ever participating in them. Since mere attitude leaves no traces, its non-inclusion in an historically viable definition is justified, despite the fact that its prevalence may turn out to be a condition sine qua non.

By an oversight, the definition contains the possibility of “normal” warfare animosity during the countless wars, Canaanites, Amalekites, Philistines, Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, and so forth have fought against the Jewish people, for reasons of defense or conquest. There is, as was indicated, no reason to assume that for the Roman legionaries the “Jewish” war of 66-70 differed very much from any other Roman war of conquest or from quashing a rebellion. It did not aim at all Jews, but only at the “Judean rebels”, as rebels. Although it thus seems to have had little to do with anti-Semitism itself, a long historiographical tradition treats it as such. The war acquired that special meaning because the later description of it by Tacitus and others, cum (not “sine”!) ira et studio, was colored by consecutive events and perceptions, by fear of proselytism, but mostly because Jewish and Christian tradition lent it a specific transcendental significance. For Christians the conquest of Jerusalem and the destruction of the temple was an essential part of the testimonium veritatis a sign of the divine displeasure Jews incurred by their abominable deed of the crucifixion. It may have continued to have its meta-historical significance, because Flavius Joseph’s account of the war became the second book on the bookshelf, particularly in Protestant Bible-reading families, interested in everything that happened in the Holy Land when Jesus walked on earth. For Jews it implied a further synagogical organization and orientation, with the school of Jabna, derived from Pharisaism, but above all the new spirituality of rabbinical Judaism. Its two main pillars
were the family and the synagogue, the divine Shekina (presence) found in the loving embrace of husband and wife,\textsuperscript{117} and in the gathering in God’s name.

One consequence of the war, the Diaspora, should, as indicated be included in the definition, though in the sense that anti-Semitism conceived of Jews as “strangers within the gate”, in but not of society.

Precisely because of their position “within the gate”, Jews could be conceived of as capable of creating havoc. There have always been fantasies resembling the modern variety of the plotting “international Jew”. Medieval versions were the story of annual get-together at Narbonne to decide by lot the location of that year’s ritual murder, stories about “fifth column” activities on behalf of anti-Christian Muslims, or invading Tatars, or the trans-Alpine charge of the poisoning of the wells during the years of the “Black Death”. Such allegations are only possible when there is a persistent, basically immutable, concept of (enemy) aliens within the gate. It is because of the addition “within”, however, that anti-Semitism cannot simply be equated with xenophobia.

A.N.J. den Hollander has demonstrated in a series of discerning studies of the “stranger outside the gate”, that, although perceptions of him may be at times just as prejudicial and disparaging as those of aliens within, the former have the interesting characteristics, lacking in racist attitudes, of drastic variability. Perceptions can and do change with alterations in the position of the beholder, precisely because they are not part of an ideology allocating the social positions of the Self and the Other within a given society.

In one of these studies, Den Hollander showed how in the course of time the Western conception of Hungarians yo-yoed from condemnation to appreciation and back again in several cycles. From being robbers and murderers in medieval perception, they changed into heroic defenders of Christendom against the “unspeakable Turk”. Then the word “hussar” penetrated into all European languages. The enlightenment did not accept the “Puszta Cavalier”, considering him to be a boorish peasant. In the second half of the nineteenth century these “peasants” became model liberals in the eyes of Western observers, only to deteriorate once more into fascists and oppressors of Slav nations, and end up as anti-communist champions of freedom. If there is any question at all of a genealogy of stereotypes, there are at least two entirely contrary and fluctuating strands of evaluation.\textsuperscript{118}

One wonders whether a Crusader’s concept of Muslims is not of this type, giving way, as it later did to sixteenth century and romantic idolizing of Arabs, and back again – Renan – comparable with the passing phases of Al-
lied imagery of German monstrosity during the First World War. The disparaging is fluctuating to a degree unknown in racism, even though occasionally (irrational) philo-Semitism is anti-Semitism in reverse. Anti-Muslim attitudes could become racist the moment Muslims became numerous strangers within the gate. Before blacks were strangers within the gate, before slavery and colonialism that is, there were alternate positive and negative evaluations, as can be attested by early reported itineraries in South Africa, for example. It should not be forgotten that in medieval iconography, one of the three Wise Men from the East was black.

In the above definition, it is also questionable what is meant by the word “Jew”. Up to the episode of the civil emancipation, Jews in their own perception, and in that of most others, were the Jewish people adhering to Judaism. Religious allegiance posed a problem in the (post-)emancipatory period which witnessed the emergence in great numbers of the reformed or “non-Jewish” Jews. Therefore it seems justified possibly to go somewhat beyond the Jews’ own Halachich and other forms of self-definition by considering the following as primary targets of anti-Semitism: 1) members of the various Israelite orthodox and reformed denominational associations; 2) persons, who, having belonged to such associations, have relinquished religious observance, but who, either negatively (the Jewish “self hate”) or positively acknowledge descent and/or social and cultural ties (the “non-Jewish” Jew); 3) the descendants of such; and 4) somewhat improperly, those who rightly or wrongly are for the reason mentioned above considered to be Jews. Karl Marx and Disraeli would be among those, but also men like Gambetta, F.D. Roosevelt or even Goethe, who sometimes were believed to have had Jewish ancestors. In cases of doubt anti-Semites, of course, never hesitated to dub their other enemies “Judaized” (enjuivé, verjudet), but these, according to them could still be “saved”, when “the source of infection” was eliminated.

This is not the end of the problems, their number indicating the complexity of defining anti-Semitism. Most non-anti-Semitic people will agree that anti-Semitism is largely or entirely based on prejudice, when prejudice is defined as general, unverified, unverifiable, and/or manifestly wrong opinions. In this simple form one covers the bulk of the charges ever made concerning the Jews, and avoids the danger of applying too elitist intellectual standards of rationality and reasonableness for defining prejudice.

Yet defining anti-Semitism as a verbal or active antagonism towards Jews on the basis of prejudice is too shallow. There are opinions or actions which could be called anti-Semitic, or at least as having been a constituent of anti-Semitism, which do not fall under this definition of prejudice.
When Church leaders complained that Jews were “wilfully blind” the innuendo is prejudicial, but the complaint itself is based on a true statement of fact, in so far as confessing Jews as such did not acknowledge Christ, or anything that followed from that acknowledgement. So, when these leaders, from their point of view, consistently argued that Christ’s gracious death had made the Law obsolete, and that consequently the second coming, the Parousia, could not take place before the last member of God’s Chosen People had given up the Law in the light of this truth, the unverifiability of their argument lies in the uncertainty pertaining to the conditions of the Parousia (Acts 1, 7), not in the unverifiable statement about Law-abiding Jews. When they then concluded that Jews not reconciled with God, as “gaolers of Christ” keep this earthly vale of tears going, and are responsible for the postponement of eternal bliss, their argument definitely smacks of anti-Semitism. It sounds very much like the modern concept of the Jew as the only obstacle to perfect social justice, but is not prejudicial in the above sense, as long as they, as indeed occasionally happened, do not ascribe to the Jews an evil intent in their refusal. Given the fact that before the thirteenth-century Judaism was not considered to be a heresy, but was seen as a Biblical religion and therefore religio licita, there is no reason necessarily to assume a Christian belief in Jewish evil intent.

The argument does seem to confirm the above notion of anti-Semitism as antagonism based on ascription. It is then indeed a form of ideologically allocating the social position of the Other and by implication of the Self, and one moreover which is born of difference in the position of power. Only a nearly victorious Church could formulate its resentment of not achieving its final goal in this way. So, only when ascription is synonymous with prejudice can anti-Semitism be defined as prejudice.

This problem could perhaps be solved by distinguishing between “censure” and “prejudice”, adverse judgement of established facts, as opposed to unverifiable or wrong statements. Although the distinction will by no means always be watertight, and prejudicial elements have crept in almost from the beginning, it would mean that the Jew-hatred for the first centuries, as a kind of proto-anti-Semitism was censurable rather than prejudicial, it was anti-Judaism rather than anti-Semitism, but the former a constituent of the latter. There are thus indeed reasons for the disputed distinction between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, as is exemplified by later developments. While many modern anti-Semites – Wilhelm Marr is a case in point – had no objections whatsoever to Judaism, many others, for example Eugen Dühring, objected to Judaism because it was the religion of the Jews, not to the Jews be-

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cause they adhered to Judaism as (early) Christians would have done. Like Gustave Tridon and his group of French anti-Semites, Dühring *cum suis*, as well as many Nazis, also rejected Christianity as Jewish. They held that the evil is in the Jewish “race”, and therefore in the “Jewish” creeds. Many Christians, on the other hand, convinced by their anti-Judaism that Christianity was the “True Israel”, and the “Old Israel” was obsolete, sheltered Jews on very Christian grounds during the 1939-1945 war and on many other occasions, putting their own lives at risk. Many other anti-Judaist Christians held the view, on the basis of Matthew xxvii, 25, that the Jews themselves were to blame for their fate.

The former are not anti-Semites, the latter are because they read the biblical story with the traditional animus towards the Jews. The story is one of the main items of the “anti-Semitic potential”¹²³ of the New Testament, by which is meant the sum total of those texts, which by selective reading and generalization seem to confirm and lend authority to prejudices towards Jews. The biased interpretation is a consequence of prejudices rather than the other way round.

The prejudiced readers generalize by interpreting the alleged opinion of those Jews present at Pilate’s verdict, as being the opinion of all Jews. Without making it the least bit less authoritative, the story can be read in a different way. Certainly not all Jews were there on that historic day, perhaps not even all Jerusalem Jews. Moreover, the “multitude” of the text is not necessarily identical with the sum total of all its members. Did all those present shout “Barrabas”? How many of those present, some perhaps vaguely thinking along lines as later expounded by Gamaliel (Acts v, 24-40), kept silent out of fear? Should they have been more courageous than Peter (Matthew xxvi, 69-75)? How many, avoiding the problem, saw to it that they were not present at the scene? Why should they bother to be present at a session of the (according to Josephus) highly unpopular Pontius Pilate?

This biased reading, moreover, overlooks Luke xxxiii, 34 (Acts vii, 60), where Jesus asks for them to be forgiven. It is oblivious of the fact that according to Christian tradition, the event was foreordained by Divine Will. In the non-anti-Semitic climate of medieval Italy, Dante was well aware of this. He knew the traditional reading (Inferno xxxiii, 123), but he also wrote: *ch’a Dio ed a Giudei piaque una morte* (Paradiso. vii, 47); a view elsewhere usually ignored in the discussion of the Jewish guilt, until it was revived by later protestant theology, emphasizing the merely instrumental character of Jewish and Roman action on that day. The biased reading is ignoring, for example, Jesus’ prayer in Gethsemane (Matthew xxvi, 39-42), Matthew xxvii, 53-
Matthew xxvi, 27-28 and parallel texts in the other gospels, and as such is anti-Semitic. It has the racist characteristics of generalization, omission, and specification.

The distinction between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism has the additional advantage, that by thus making anti-Semitism an attitude towards Jews, indeed Judeo-phobia, it puts the problem of anti-Semitism once more squarely in the realm of “racism”. The blurring, however, has created some confusion. Christians, who are anti-Semitic, will naturally tend to use traditional anti-Judaist disparagements of Jews to substantiate their views, but this does in no way prove that the ideological content of their opinion, their “contagious views” entirely or even remotely originated in these disparagements, though this is not impossible. Despite much overlapping, there is consequently sufficient reason to make the above distinction, so that anti-Judaism (proto-anti-Semitism) becomes a necessary condition for anti-Semitism, but not necessarily identical with it.

A consequence of making the distinction is that a good deal of what traditionally is called institutional anti-Semitism, turns out to be institutional anti-Judaism, measures to prevent “wrong” ideas from spreading and contaminating the insufficiently informed. Maybe therefore the beginning of the history of anti-Semitism should be put forward by several centuries. In parenthesis it should be stated that anti-Judaism thus conceived, is condemnable, also from the point of view of Christian theology, though perhaps not quite as condemnable as anti-Semitism, for it never resulted in genocide. In the words of C.W. Mönnich: “No Christian coming from the Gentiles can have knowledge of God’s peace but through Jewish mediation. That is why a Christian invitation to the Synagogue to convert to Jesus the Messiah is theologically unacceptab le.” Coming from a Christian of non-Jewish descent such an invitation should, according to him, be considered anti-Jewish, but I would hesitate to call it anti-Semitic; no, because it is anti-Judaism, yes, because it is a form of denying the Jew the right to his own identity, which is a form of allocating his social position to him, without consulting him; “You may be one of us, provided you are one of us, and we decide what constitutes ‘one of us’.”

Perhaps the distinction would be a rather academic question, if it were not for the possibility of more succinctly studying prejudice formation, and for facilitating the search for the socioeconomic variables (almost) independent of anti-Judaism. Institutional discrimination of Jews, rules denying them rights granted to Gentiles of comparable status, or in fact the implementation of specifically Jewish social positions, does often but not necessarily reflect popular prejudicial animosity. Initially Church – and governmental –
legislation was introduced in order to prevent Judaizing of lay Christians as a result of too-overtly friendly relations on the popular level. Anti-Jewish legislation can also emanate from people who themselves do not care about anti-Judaist considerations, and/or who have themselves no anti-Semitic inclinations whatsoever. They may do so for pecuniary reasons. Princes often introduced special Jewish poll taxes; they soon realized that the fleecing of a small, defenseless, and hated – but not poor group – is facilitated when that group is wholly dependent for protection on the one who fleeces, made the easier when their unjust measure seemed approved of by “moral” authority.

The classical example of the “not anti-Semitic anti-Semite” is Vienna’s burgomaster Karl Lueger, who merely acted the anti-Semite when that improved the size of his electorate. There are many more examples. A very sinister case could be Heydrich, who was instrumental in provoking anti-Semitism, if indeed his motive was to implicate the whole German nation in anti-Semitic crimes, in order to make it fight better through sheer fear of retaliation.

Opportunist anti-Semitism, where indeed both “censure” and “prejudice” seem to be lacking, only works provided there is enough “real” anti-Semitism to make it worthwhile. It appeals primarily to sociopolitical, that is, ideologically adequate anti-Semitism, although private loathing, “anti-Semitism in the raw”, comes in handy too. The former is historically the more easily traceable form. The latter is only detectable in modern times by means of sociological questionnaires, psychological investigations, and found in newspapers or in otherwise better-preserved ephemeral news items. Most historical analysis consequently labors under the unavoidable one-sidedness of primarily investigating collective anti-Semitism which a historically viable definition should emphasize.

This is suggestive, because seen from that collective perspective, historical anti-Semitism reminds us of the very perceptive and admirably researched study of Svend Ranulf: Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology. Ranulf discovered that “a disinterested tendency to inflict punishment is a distinctive characteristic of the lower-middle class, that is, of a social class living under conditions which force its members to an extraordinary degree of self-restraint, and subject them to much restraint of natural desires.” Classes where this self-restraint was not present were much more lenient. Paraphrasing Ranulf’s thesis – he does not deal with anti-Semitism – it could be said that anti-Semitism is largely the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment on the Jews. Since the Middle Ages Jew-hatred has been a “lower-mid-
dle class” phenomenon in the sense in which Ranulf uses the term, mostly ur-
ban, and in so far as it was rural, overwhelmingly the reaction of owners of
small holdings and day laborers, much more so than the landed gentry, who
only participated when déclassé or for opportunistic reasons.

The term “disinterested” needs some qualification. Undoubtedly every
anti-Semite derives some emotional satisfaction from cherishing his anti-
Jewish feelings. His hatred is disinterested only in the sense that rarely the
run-of-the-mill anti-Semite could hope to gain immediate (material) bene-
fits from his own anti-Semitic action, or from that of others.

It deserves attention that in most cases the persecutions’ plunder was of
very subordinate significance. In 1096, for example, most Jewish survivors to
their astonishment found most of their valuables intact. About the only per-
son who profited from the York massacre of 1190 was Richard Maleysse,
whose debts were cancelled by burning the bonds. It is usually only the ma-
nipulator who profits.

The anti-Semitic disinterested tendency to inflict punishment on the Jews
– one of Ranulf’s “positive instances” is Nazism – is a variety of “moral” indig-
nation, which calls to mind a perception of Bertrand Russell’s. After showing
that Marxism is composed of a series of tenets together forming the common
structure of the Christian confessions, he wrote: “A similar dictionary could
be made for the Nazis, but their conceptions are more purely Old Testa-
ment”; an observation, which despite its horrid implications, need not be
wrong.127 It has been observed before that Nazism or extreme anti-Semitism
is a kind of “Judaism in reverse”, a negation of Jewish values in the vocabulary
of what it negates, a conscious, nay “conscientious” denial of conscience as
opposed to “Nature”. As is formulated in the “German Decalogue” of an Ahn-
herr of Nazism, Theodor Fritsch: “Thou shalt kill the Jew in thine ow n heart”;
“in thine ow n heart” was soon left out.128

If prejudice covers anti-Semitism, it needs a lot of qualifying; not just any
prejudice, not the silly one of Jews having flatfeet, in itself harmless, but a so-
cially and ideologically meaningful prejudice; one that seemingly explains
the social ills of each period, as conceived by the prejudiced of that period. It
is a prejudice born of Christian (Muslim) rejection and in the end anti-Christ-
ian rejection of Judaism, while in a more or less distorted form accepting Ju-
daist values known through Christian (Muslim) mediation. (How often it is
forgotten that “thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself” is from Leviticus
xix, 18). It was the mediator who categorized Jews as “strangers within the
gate”.

This is not the end of the problem. There is the intriguing but confusing
phenomenon of one and the same person being anti-Semitic and anti-anti-Semitic on different occasions. There is Mommsen, writing a courageous reply to Treitschke’s pamphlet, not tolerating a Jew holding the chair of classical studies at his university. There is Bismarck in 1847 voting against emancipation, and later becoming its staunch defender. There is Jaurès before and during the Dreyfus Affair. There is Major Piquart. There is Metternich, opposed to emancipation, opposed to anti-Semitism as an expression of the pernicious idea of popular sovereignty, on very friendly terms with the Rothschilds. Is Pius xi1 Hochhut’s Stellvertreter, or Pinchas Lapidés’ rescuer of Jews? There was an saying in Amsterdam during the crucial war years: “These rotten Maffen (Huns) must keep their dirty claws off our rotten Jews.”

Perhaps this ambiguity is essential. It is symptomatic of both the contradictory anti-Semitic and irrational philo-Semitic aspects of one and the same attitude. Himmler, in his horrifying Poznan speech of 4 October 1943, referred to it by saying: “Every party member says ‘we will liquidate the Jewish race’... but when you try to follow the party line, then your eighty million good German citizens turn up and each one has a decent Jew.”

It would mean that for those incapable of conceiving Jews as ordinary human beings, the problematic difference of the Jews is articulated by a long and pluriform cultural tradition, that contradictorily both rejects and accepts their values. In anti-Semitic perception, the Jew is contradiction personified. That is his diabolism. He is seen as the divinely chosen and the divinely rejected, conceived of as bragging about everything Jewish and hiding under hyphenated names, as wanting racial purity and preaching human equality. He is held to be a capitalist as well as a communist, the nation-undermining pacifist and the warmonger. That could then be a reason why anti-Semitism is so often related to feelings of insecurity, uncertainty, and anxiety (however these may be engendered), and the contradictions and ambivalences underlying them: the Jew as a symbol of what is wrong in a confusing and incomprehensible world, as a target of ideologies which aim at restoring security by change. It is certainly a task of historical investigation to lay bare the ascriptive traditions which have created that symbol value.

Would it have been easier to define anti-Semitism as discrimination, ranging from refusing them some rights granted to Gentiles, to denying them the right to live? Since La Pierre’s experiment in the thirties, corroborated by many later investigations, we know that discrimination and prejudice are not necessarily each other’s corollaries. La Pierre went with a Chinese couple who intentionally emphasized their origin by their dress and mannerisms to many restaurants and hotels on the western coastal states of the US where,
since the late nineteenth century, a strong anti-Chinese sentiment prevailed. Under a different name he made written requests for reservations for a Chinese couple in these same establishments. In a surprisingly large number of cases, statistically relevant, he received a negative reply from those restaurants and hotels where the service had been excellent. There may be prejudice not followed by discrimination, and there may be discrimination without prejudice (or censure). The latter, however, is basically the situation dealt with above, that is, opportunism.

In post-emancipatory Western and Central Europe before World War I there was very little official or officious discrimination at the public level, – Jews were in fact well protected by law – though there was in many cases a strong, prejudicial resentment of Jews, in the form of vociferous anti-Semitic movements. There was indeed some private discrimination in the form of Jews not being admitted to clubs, hotels, certain private schools, or social events, often staged on a Friday evening, but on the whole, late-nineteenth-century anti-Semitism was rather a program than factual discrimination, its ideological content indeed aiming at changing the status quo.

For the pre-emancipatory period, discrimination adequately covers the then-prevailing Jew-hatred, the ideology then aimed at the maintenance of the status quo, in the sense of keeping Jews in an inferior position. Discrimination is then no longer easily defined as independent of prejudice or censure, considering that blaming in Jews what is not blamed in non-Jews, gauging Jews by standards not applied to non-Jews, subjecting them to specific legislation, and so forth, is sustained by prejudice. The same applies to:

1. generalization, ascribing to all Jews attributes allegedly found only in some, (cf. deductive inference),
2. specification, qualifying as Jewish any attributes found among non-Jews as well,
3. omission, not recognizing desirable attributes, and
4. calumny, accusing Jews of crimes or offenses they could not have committed.

A hard-working Jew is thought of as moneygrubbing, and a hard-working Gentile as “serving the economy of his country”. In early Nazi Germany, of the two electrical companies, “Jewish” A.E.G. was abhorred, “Gentile” Siemens praised.

In present-day Western Europe a very apt definition of ethnic discrimination is: judging a person or persons according to criteria which in a situation
of choice, for example, applications for a job, housing, cases of preferment, are irrelevant. It does, however, presume a liberty of choice such as in La Pierre’s experiment. In a medieval or early modern period there usually was very little freedom of choice. Whatever one’s personal feelings, one had to accommodate to a discriminatory and prejudicial situation, once that was articulated in terms of society. One could only protest at one’s own cost. During the early Nazi period the same applied to German businessmen, headmasters of schools, officials, and the like, who were not prepared to pay the price. In cases of having to choose between a Jewish and a Gentile applicant for a job, their preference for the Gentile, even when the Jew was better qualified, was dictated by criteria which in the situation of selection were irrelevant. They had in fact no choice, for anti-Semitism had once more become an attitude of society, forcing their hand. This, too, is a form of terrorization.
CHAPTER 2

Abortive Anti-Semitism?

Jewish-Gentile relations in Pagan antiquity

The main purpose of this chapter is to argue its superfluity. There definitely were various forms of anti-Semitism in pagan antiquity, in the above sense of prejudicial animosity towards a people dispersed among the nations, whose religion and customs were societally unacceptable, as is formulated by the oldest recorded anti-Semite, Haman in Esther 111, 8. Such animosity was aroused by a suspicion aimed at “strangers within the gate”. It was articulated in terms of various societal belief systems, diverse but often syncretized religious concepts, or sheer social contempt.

We will argue, however, that whatever the various pagan articulations of rejection were, none can have strongly influenced the later Christian (and Muslim) stereotyping. We believe this to be so for several reasons.

Firstly, as distinct from the pagan varieties, the later forms of Judeo-phobia in mainstream Christianity and Islam fully accepted the “Hebrew truth”, albeit on their own terms. For example, whereas the Romano-Hellenistic tradition of rejection widely accepted a malevolent version of Exodus, clearly of Egyptian origin – people chased away in shame, as lepers whom the gods punished with the disease for sacrileges committed – later Christian Jew-haters accepted the Jewish version as Gospel-truth. This suggests an entirely different relationship; Jewish values in the reverse.

Secondly, pagan anti-Semitism, most pronounced during the earlier empire, was clearly on the wane long before the Christians took over after Constantine.

Thirdly, pagan anti-Semitism was strongest where later the Christian variety was weakest, and vice versa. Antioch, for example, once a stronghold of Hellenistic anti-Jewish sentiment, at the time hardly paid any attention to Chrysostom’s 4th century vitriolic warnings against the “Judaizing” of its contemporary Christian laity.

This suggests discontinuity, a view not generally accepted. Adherents of
the continuity concept must of necessity accept that all forms of Jew-hatred, whatever the disparities, are somehow interrelated. It could be, that wittingly or unwittingly, these adherents thereby put themselves in a long meta-historical tradition, which holds that all forms of animosity towards the People of the Bible including all “normal” wartime animosities are ipso facto interconnected. They then hold that all wars in which Jews were ever involved, and particularly the war with the Romans in 66-70, have a more transcendental historical meaning, than all the other wars humans ever fought with each other; a view incomprehensible to those who have no knowledge of the Bible and the concept of the “People of God”.

Believers in continuity might feel strengthened in their opinion by the fact that Titus’ triumphal arch suggests that the Romans considered it to be a major war, and even more significant is the fact that there is a special emphasis in the descriptions by both the Jewish Josephus and the pagan Tacitus. The former, conceiving of the war as a totally inadequate reaction of the rabble to procurator Gessius Florus’ misdemeanors, saw God’s hand behind the Roman power.1 His surrender he saw as obedience to God’s will. To him the war was the folly of a people rebellious against God. Josephus has the reputation of being a traitor – he fought like blazes as long as things went reasonably well – but is his basic attitude all that much different from that of the Pharisees, who saw in the war divine punishment for the too eager, but above all too worldly Messianic expectations? Is Josephus’ attitude all that much different from that of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, who had himself smuggled out of Zealot-dominated Jerusalem before it was too late, and who went to see Vespasian, prophesying the imperial purple for him, and asking permission to found the school of Jamnia?2 In so doing he made the Pharisees into the future spokesmen for Judaism, and laid the foundation for the new spiritual development of rabbinical Judaism, without a temple. The difference, of course, is that Josephus primarily wanted to save his own skin, but both saw transcendental meaning in the war, which later Christians did as well.

The venomous description of the causes of the war, indeed *cum ira et studio,*3 by Tacitus, who was a boy of fifteen when it was all over, is indicative of anti-Jewish sentiment, but that sentiment was presumably colored by developments since the war, and does not prove that the war itself was inspired by specific hatred of the Jews. In fact, Tacitus’ description can hardly be called an analysis of the causes, but is rather a justification, and as such “anti-Semitic”. Modern authors add to the confusion by not always distinguishing between real prejudice and “normal”, but passing, wartime animosity.4 This is understandable, given the meta-historical load of the tradition.
In the light of both Christian and Jewish concepts of subsequent history, the wars with Rome, resulting in the Diaspora acquired immense metaphysical significance. For many Christians the wars meant that Jews were meted out their deserved fate. For Jews, however, they signified: that Jewry, dispersed among the Gentiles, had to find in Rabbinical Judaism a new way to honor the name of the Lord, in the spirit of Isaiah, for the ultimate benefit of mankind.

Some branches of Protestant Christianity felt so deep a veneration for the “People of the Old Testament” that they were intensely interested in ancient Jewish history. It is no coincidence that in Protestant Bible-reading families, Flavius Josephus’ account of the war of 66-70 AD was very often found on the bookshelf next to the Books of the Maccabees. Whoever was interested in events which took place when Jesus of Nazareth walked on earth, and interested in the world in which the young Church began to grow, was interested in Josephus’ history, as is evident from its publication record.

It could be argued, however, that meta-historical traditions, so old and venerable that they seem self-evident, divert the attention from the true societal and social causes of pagan Jew-hatred. Did the Jewish war, more than any other war or quenching of rebellion, have a special meaning for the Roman participants, and for an old hand like Vespasian?

The emphasis therefore should be on those justifications that were part of a system of imputations, which may or may not be related to later Christian prejudices, rather than on the military or political events themselves. The cluster of events which took place during the reign of Antiochus IV, the Seleucid king of Syria is another case in point. They could with easy justification be analyzed as just another of those political conflicts: from his point of view, like from that of Vespasian, Trajan, or Hadrian, a mere repression of rebellion. However, since these events, like the wars with Rome, had far-reaching consequences for both religious and secular history, later observers, both Jewish and Gentile attached great significance to them. For Jews, the rebellion of the Maccabees not only meant temporary restoration of an independent Jewish state, it also implied a religious revivalism. It kindled the strong worldly messianic expectation that still played a role in the Roman wars of 66, 115, and 135, until Phariseesism gave it an otherworldly, spiritual twist, in the spirit of the great Prophets and the Talmudic wisdom. Gentiles, in particular Greeks, used these events to further vindicate their imputations, emphasizing the resultant otherness of the Jews.

It is entirely possible that there have been several divergent societal imputations. Egyptian society, and the worshippers of Mithras, or Attis, among
others, may have had objections different from the Romano-Hellenistic ones, if these can be lumped together, although there was a perpetual tendency to syncretism. The purely social imputations, however, need not refer to belief-systems but may be surmised as being part and parcel of a more general “damn the natives” attitude of the elite, and thus do not necessarily imply a specific aversion to Jews; they are then only of very marginal interest for a study of the development of an anti-Jewish stereotype.

It is also possible that the elite, steeped in a highly literate culture, felt the need to express their contempt in as literary and as sophisticated a form as possible. They could demonstrate their learning and refinement, by incorporating the societal prejudices of other peoples in their own opinions. Tacitus or Juvenal could very well be examples of such an attitude. Indeed syncretist views with a greater degree of specificity could then be expected, but these views could then hardly be called functional the way, for example, nineteenth-century German representations were functional in enabling peasants or artisans to (seemingly) understand their plight. In this sense, too, the anti-Semitism of the ancient world could turn out to be of only very marginal interest for later developments.

There is some evidence for such a general “anti-barbarian” attitude. Strabo was disgusted with the Iberians. Julius Caesar, who for political reasons befriended the Jews of Rome, expressed contempt for Gauls and Germans. Cicero, certainly no friend of the Jews, also sneered at Celts as untrustworthy, “trousered” people, mind you, not clad in a decent toga. Cicero’s anti-Jewish and other “ethnic” outbursts may be related to the lawyers’ practice of defaming one’s opponents. Juvenal scoffed at Jews, but attacked Greeks as well. Perhaps fearing them as competitors for the favors of the rich, he held them to be moneygrubbers, and merely interested in their bellies. The Graeculus esuriens, the always hungry little Greek is too clever by half. Tacitus, notorious Jew-hater, somewhat undeservedly has the reputation of being the idealizer of Germanic simplicity. Though he did sometimes extol Germans as being the bons sauvages in order to castigate the morals of his own society, he also shows dislike and contempt for these northerners. There thus seems reason to assume that contempt for and dislike of Jews was indeed part and parcel of a more general derision by the self-satisfied.

Ethnic prejudice “appears simply as a latent and harmless attitude of mind that manifested itself in literary men when they occasionally turned their attention to the peripheries of the Empire”. Elsewhere, however, Sherwin-White writes:
In the case of the northern barbarians, the essential factor of fear was missing. The contrast with the bitter rivalry – under certain conditions – of Romans with the Graeculus esuriens, and of Greeks with Jewish immigrants, all people of recognized culture, is significant. Greek-Jewish conflict may consequently have been based on more than mere contempt of “barbarians”, whereas in the case of the Roman elite, the matter is undecided.  

Roman attitudes could be a matter of despising what they saw as weird people with odd habits; it is also possible that an element of fear was involved, though not fear of competition as in the case of the Greeks. It is after all conceivable that Jews were frightening to Romans. The very fact that they were utterly beaten in the war, yet as exiles refused with some success to adapt themselves to Roman ways, and were occasionally even capable of winning over non-Jews, even Romans of the highest social status to their point of view, was frightening. Exile slaves without a country were able to undermine, as Romans presumably saw it, the Roman family and the Roman social order, and thus Romans must have felt that that strange god of theirs was a very powerful god, or that they themselves had some incomprehensible power. It will have to be decided on the basis of further, but not exhaustive, investigation whether such fear existed and how it interplayed with the presupposed societally formulated prejudices.

The oldest recorded instance of friction between Jews and Gentiles is to be found in the biblical narrative of the events which finally led to the Jewish exodus from Egypt. The Egyptians so much abhorred the idea of sharing a meal with the Hebrews that Joseph ordered separate tables to be laid for his Egyptian and Hebrew guests. Egyptians, according to the story, not only despised Jews but also feared them and consequently sought to enslave them. The story does not prove deep-seated anti-Semitism, however, for the animosity could very well be related to taboos or unpleasant memories of such Asiatic invaders as the Hyksos. Moreover, there were other slaves beside the Jews.

Also somewhat unreliable as proof of a long existing anti-Semitism is another biblical story: the tale of the quarrel of Mordecai and Haman, as told in the book of Esther. The Persian courtier Haman, mortally offended by Mordecai’s refusal to bow to him, sought vengeance by accusing all Jews in the Persian Kingdom. He said to the king:

There is a certain people scattered abroad and dispersed among the people in all the provinces of thy kingdom; and their laws are
diverse from all people; neither keep they the king’s laws; therefore it is not for the king’s profit to suffer them.  

This accusation seemingly follows a perennial pattern, and yet, if the story is authentic at all (its historicity has been contested and it has been alleged that it was written at the time of the Maccabean wars, which would imply that the story in reality referred to Antiochus IV Epiphanes) did Haman represent a large section of the Persian population? Haman’s own motive was not even necessarily hatred of the Jews as such, for he was aware of the fact that Mordecai had done the king a great service by detecting a conspiracy, and thus he knew that he could only incriminate Mordecai by accusing all Jews as such. Not many Persians could have converted to Judaism, as according to the story they did, if there had been a very strong anti-Jewish feeling.

Persian authorities, were in fact far from inimical. Not only did their allowing the Jews to return to Palestine and to rebuild the temple show a benevolent attitude, but so did also their reaction to events in Elephantine in Egypt. The inhabitants of this Jewish colony, partly serving as soldiers, but also engaged in agriculture, were in 410 BC attacked by Egyptian neighbors, probably on account of the slaughter of animals which were sacred to the Egyptians. The Persian authorities immediately came to the rescue of the Jews.

The post-Exilian restoration period under tolerant Persian rule was marked by a strengthening of Jewish inner cohesion on a religious basis. The Babylonian captivity had necessitated a strict religious organization, led by the prophets. The full development of Messianic expectation, of ethics, of universalist monotheism and its message of peace, as phrased for example by the prophet Isaiah, the increasing otherworldliness and the notion of being the elect, all combined to evoke a very strong “in-group” feeling. Although propitious for Jewish spiritual life, it proved to be in the long run a strong impediment to easing the contact with Hellenistic culture, which in a secular sense was just as universalist as Jewish monotheism.

Jewish otherness has doubtlessly been a source of frequent friction in the ancient world, but it may be doubted whether this led to a voluntary seclusion, as for example, Max Weber thought. Cohesion is not identical with seclusion. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine how without inner cohesion so small a nation could have survived against such overwhelming odds as devastation, deportation and repeated conquests. Other small nations like the Lydians, the Phrygians, and Phoenicians have simply disappeared. The price the Jews had to pay for their survival was that they were different. It was a heavy price, as was evident already during the Hellenistic period when with
some seeming justification they were accused of hating all strangers, of being misanthropes.\textsuperscript{15} Such accusations, however, do not prove a voluntary seclusion. The Bible itself bears evidence that throughout their history Jews have considered it their duty to behave humanely towards strangers. “For ye were strangers in the land of Egypt” (Deuteronomy x 19, Leviticus xix 34). “One law and one manner shall be for you and for the stranger that sojourneth with you” (Numbers xv 16).\textsuperscript{16} It is confirmed by a lovely Talmudic story. The moment the children of Israel had safely crossed the Red Sea and the waves closed over the pursuing Egyptians, the angels broke out in a song of jubilation. God reproached them: “How can you sing when my creatures are drowning?”

An interesting example of an attempt to give such behavior a theological basis is found in the “Noachian Commandments” of the Talmud. True to their concept that there is no justice outside Divine Law, the Jews argued that Noah, who lived before Moses and who was obviously a just man, must have known some law.\textsuperscript{17} They formulated this law under the name of “Noachian Commandments” which was a way that philosophic pagans, and later, Muslims and Christians as well, obeyed if they lived according to the precepts of their own ethics.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, proselytism, for which there is biblical evidence as well as evidence from non-Jewish sources, does not suggest disdain for non-Jews.\textsuperscript{19}

Such attempts at amelioration of their relationship with others – no doubt offset by a good deal of alienating fanatical and stubborn dogmatism when provoked – do not seem to have been very effective, for it cannot be denied that there was friction – not necessarily identical with anti-Semitism – between Jews and Gentiles long before the Christian era, to judge by remarks in Greek and Latin literature, by political conflicts and by the many Jewish rebellions. Whether Jews enjoyed the doubtful privilege of being the foremost objects of dislike, as they occasionally did in later periods, remains to be seen.

Perhaps disdainful remarks about Jews in ancient literature do not convey more than a rather scornful, but “au fond” dispassionate amazement at the oddity of this unruly and headstrong nation.\textsuperscript{20} Many authors who wrote in an anti-Jewish vein belonged, after all, to an aristocratic milieu, and their utterances are not necessarily representative of the views of the population of the ancient world at large. Moreover, there is evidence that some Roman measures against the Jews were but part and parcel of ephemeral attempts at curbing the influx of oriental religions. During the reign of Tiberius, for example, both Jewish and “Egyptian” (the cult of Isis) rites were proscribed.\textsuperscript{21} Finally, looking at the list of places inhabited by Jews, as compiled by Juster,\textsuperscript{22}
and realizing that before 70 AD Jews were already scattered all over the Roman Empire, one would expect that outbursts of Jew-hatred would occasionally have flared up in many Roman provinces if there had been overt, violent anti-Semitism. In fact, severe friction seems to have been restricted only to certain periods and only to a limited number of localities such as: Palestine, Rome, Antioch, Cyrene, and above all, Egypt.

The notion of “race” was alien to the ancient world. It is more than doubtful whether Greeks were able purely by sight to distinguish Jews from other Orientals who were by no means victims of their contempt.23

Jews in the Greek and Roman World

In order to understand the nature of strains and conflicts, it is necessary to study the perception of Jews as held by Romans, Greeks, and possibly other Gentiles.

For many a century Greeks seem to have been unaware even of the existence of the Jews. Herodotus, for example, in spite of his scrutinizing curiosity about foreign customs and nations, did not mention them expressis verbis though he did allude to the custom of circumcision which, however, was practiced by other peoples as well. He did not differentiate them from the Syrians in general. It was only towards the Hellenistic period that Greeks began to distinguish Jews from others. At first they had only vague, but by no means unfriendly, ideas about them. Clearchus of Soli, a disciple of Aristotle, for example, wrote that the Jews were descendants of Indian philosophers.24 A similar story is told by Megasthenes, ambassador of Seleucus I to India,25 and Theophrastus.26 It is perhaps justified to presume that these enlightened writers, well-versed in contemporary philosophy, but having only scant information on Judaism, and not really understanding it, have equated the Aristotelian concept of the “Nous”, the self-thinking thought and the unmoved Mover, with the Jews’ only god. Whatever may have been the true meaning of such remarks, it seems unlikely that the word “philosopher” was used as a stigma! Other Greek authors believed to have detected some relationship of the Jews with the Pythagoreans27 or with the Persian Magi.28 Although “magician” may have been a less honorable title than “philosopher”, it need not necessarily have been a term of opprobrium either. Such remarks by no means suggest an almost automatic clash of cultures.

When Greek and Jew came into (politically) closer contact, lofty views occasionally made way for contempt and conflict. A severe clash came about the
year 170 BC when the Seleucid king Antiochus IV Epiphanes wanted to Hellenize his kingdom and saw his attempt thwarted by Jewish orthodoxy. Antiochus was a somewhat unbalanced personality, if the testimony of Livy can be trusted, who wrote: “...ut nec sibi, nec aliis, quinam homo esset, satis constaret” (“that neither to himself, nor to others it was quite clear what sort of a man he was”).29 On the one hand he was a modern Greek, skeptical, perhaps even an unbeliever, on the other hand desirous to be worshipped as a god, as is obvious from his self-styled title Epiphanes (“god manifest”). When meeting resistance from Jews, he was infuriated and lashed out at them. He proscribed orthodoxy, forbade circumcision, and other outward signs of the Jewish cult, profaned the Temple by tearing up the Torah, and had a statue of Zeus erected there. According to the books of the Maccabees, he tried to force pork on some of his opponents. The eating of it he would interpret as submission. Refusal to partake of it, however, would mean torture and death.30

What could have motivated the king to such outrageous behaviour? According to Tacitus, he wanted to improve “this execrable people”, (taeterriman gentem).31 Did this mean an attempt at Hellenization and unification by using the device of conflating Zeus and Yaweh, as had been done with other deities, for example, Zeus-Amon, on other occasions? It has indeed been argued that he merely wanted to give a name to “the god who had no name”, that is, equate the Jewish god with Zeus.32 According to the story as told in the books of the Maccabees, there were many Jews willing to adjust themselves in various degrees to a Greek way of life. Some were assimilated to such an extent that they no longer kept the Law, sacrificed unclean animals, and, – acme of Hellenism – founded a gymnasium in the Holy City of Jerusalem itself. Such behavior naturally was a provocation to the orthodox.33 In the quarrel that ensued the Hellenizing party naturally sought and received support from the king, thereby exacerbating the problem. Matters grew worse when the orthodox rebelled under the leadership of Judas Maccabaeus and other members of the Hasmonaean family at the time when Antiochus was at war with Egypt. Fear lest these rebels should seek support from the Ptolemaeans34 may have given Antiochus an additional motive for persecution. Finally, the high-handed manner in which the Roman Republic, in the person of G. Popilius Laenas, forced him to leave Egypt in 168 BC, in all probability added to his fury.35

The consequences of the conflict have been far-reaching. Not only did the revolt of the Maccabees result in a – temporarily – independent Jewish kingdom that sought and found support in Rome, but, since the most rigorously orthodox party came out victorious, the conflict once more fostered Jewish

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religious cohesion. The revolt can thus be said to have created favourable conditions for later religious development in the Talmudic period, and in so far as Judaism was the seedbed for both Christianity and Islam, for these religions as well. Perhaps, as Bertrand Russell put it, if it had not been for the Maccabees, “neither Christianity nor Islam could have existed in anything like the form they actually took.”

Whatever the great historical significance of this early Graeco-Jewish conflict, it does not in itself shed much light on Greek opinion about the Jews. It could very well be interpreted as primarily a temporary political conflict, comparable to the conflict with the Parthians or even to colonial problems such as the British conflict with the “Mahdi” in the Sudan. Although the events themselves do not allow any definite conclusions about Greek attitudes towards the Jews, later literature relating to the episode, which seems to have appealed to the imagination, does shed some light on a Graeco-Roman body of opinions about them. For a general understanding of these opinions and the attitudes that were derived from them, it is really immaterial to know whether or not the motives imputed to the king by some writers, Tacitus for example, were really his or merely reflected their own biases. Some descriptions of the events were clearly tendentious. Poseidonius of Apameia (135-51 BC), for example relates how councillors of Antiochus v11, referring to the king’s ancestor Antiochus Epiphanes, said that the latter, after vanquishing the Jews, entered the Temple and found there a statue of an ass ridden by a man whom he took to be Moses, the legislator who made such misanthropic and immoral laws, τά µισανθρωπα και παράνοια εθη.

Describing consecutive events, the councillors reflected that the Jews did not want to have anything to do with others – ἀµιξία – and considered everybody to be their enemy. Apion, an Alexandrian Jew-baiter, went even further and inflated the story of Jewish misanthropy into an early version of ritual murder and Jewish cannibalism. In his narrative of the profanation of the Temple by Antiochus iv he described how the Jews each year caught a Greek, fattened him, and after having ritually slaughtered him, ate his flesh, swearing a solemn oath to cherish hatred towards the Greeks. Dio Cassius later also accused the Jews of Cyrenaica of cannibalism and of making belts out of their enemies’ skins during the revolt of 115 AD.

Apion, a contemporary of Caligula and Claudius, seems to have been a rather extreme representative of Graeco-Egyptian Jew-hatred. He himself may have witnessed one of the most serious outbreaks of this hatred in 38 AD and consecutive years. Egypt was indeed the scene of many anti-Jewish outbreaks and the source of many a malevolent story.
Some of the conflicts seem to bear a certain resemblance to conditions that existed in India: violent passions aroused by maltreatment of animals sacred to one particular religious group by adherents of another cult. Tacitus’ remarks “…caeso ariete velut in contumeliam Hammonis; bos quoque im- molatur quoniam Aegyptii Apin colunt” (“the ram is killed as it were in contumely of Ammon; the ox is also slaughtered because the Egyptians worship Apis”) at least seem to point in that direction.\footnote{42}

An often repeated story which in all likelihood originated in Egypt had it that Jews worshipped the ass. Posidonius’ narrative, as quoted above, seems to hint at this idea, but he is not its inventor. Mnaseas of Patras, a disciple of Eratosthenes, the Alexandrian librarian and scholar (176-95 BC) related how a priest of Apollo cunningly penetrated into the innermost part of the Jewish temple and stole the golden head of a statue of an ass.\footnote{43} The aforementioned Apion knew the story\footnote{44} as did many others,\footnote{45} among whom Tacitus\footnote{46} and Plutarch.\footnote{47} They all seem to connect it with the Exodus of which they must have had some notion, for they offer as explanation for this curious cult that wild asses helped Moses to find water when the Jews crossed the desert, an explanation vaguely reminiscent of Exodus \textit{xvii}.\footnote{48} Plutarch adds that Jews are not allowed to eat hare because of the resemblance that animal bears to an ass. It is very strange that he is so meticulously informed yet misrepresents the justification (Lev. \textit{xvi} 6, Deut. \textit{xvi} 7). This suggests animus. Since Tacitus’ version of the story fits into a long diatribe against the Jews, and since Plutarch’s version is found in a treatise on superstition, it seems likely that they too use it in the depreciatory sense it had of old and not merely as an anecdote.

In the Graeco-Roman world proper, the ass was not considered an obnoxious animal – it played a role in the Dionysian cult\footnote{49} – nor even stubborn or stupid, but in Egypt it was often considered a symbol of evil, sacred as it was to Seth, the murderer of Osiris. This is also obvious from Apuleius’ story, \textit{The Golden Ass}, where Apuleius, a priest of the Egyptian gods Isis and Osiris, uses the transformation of his hero Lucius into an ass as an allegory for his wickedness.\footnote{50}

Another Egyptian story that was persistently repeated in an increasingly pejorative sense was the Gentile version of the Exodus that goes back to Hecataeus of Abdera, who lived in Egypt and wrote its history (Hecataeus was a contemporary of Ptolemy I Soter (305-283 BC), and to the Egyptian Manetho who was a contemporary of Ptolemy II and Ptolemy III (246-221 BC)).\footnote{51} Hecataeus, in all probability, was not strongly anti-Jewish – Philo of Byblos later reproached him for pro-Jewish sentiments\footnote{52} – nor was Manetho,
and yet it seems justified to say that in the Egyptian milieu their stories were given a nasty twist. Hecataeus wrote that long ago when Egypt was visited by a severe plague, the Egyptians had come to the conclusion that the gods were angry because they were neglected. Jews, mainly responsible for the neglect, had to be expelled. Led by Moses they settled beyond the Egyptian pale. Hecataeus praised the laws of Moses, but could not refrain from blaming him for the misanthropic way of life he had introduced as a reminder of the Exodus, γαρ τήν ἰδιὰν ἐνηλικίσταιν απανθρωπίαν τινα καί μισόξενον βιον’ ἐσηγήσατι53 (for he introduced the separate, inhospitable, inhuman and xenophobe way of life).

In Manetho’s version Pharaoh Amenophis was ordered by the gods to purge the country of lepers and other “impure” people. These impure people, united under the leadership of a certain Osarsiph, had a law of their own which forbade them to worship Egyptian gods, and which ordered them not to spare animals sacred to the Egyptians, and to have only contact with other conspirators. Hard pressed by the king, they asked help from a remainder of the “herds”, (Hyksos?) chased away by Tethmosis. With their support they again profaned temples, killed sacred animals and committed all sorts of sacrilegious acts. Finally Amenophis managed to expel both the “impure” and the returned “herdsmen”. The leader Osarsiph then assumed the name of Moses. This reference to Moses is about the only indication that Manetho thought of the Jews at all, and it does by no means prove that he thought exclusively and specifically of them. According to a clever modern interpretation of the name, Osarsiph was identical with Joseph – the “Jo” of many Jewish names was, according to this supposition, interpreted by the Egyptians as being the name of the Jewish god and equated with and translated as Osiris (Osar).54 If this is not too far-fetched, it proves at the most that Manetho, who so vaguely understood the Jewish tradition that he mixed up Joseph and Moses, considered the Jews to be one element of the hated foreigners he described. Why should he then not specifically mention them if he had only Jews in mind? It seems therefore more plausible to argue that Manetho’s story reflects a general fear of invaders as well as a fear of diseased persons – natives as well as aliens – whose ailments, according to a widely accepted belief, were indications of the wrath of the gods.55

Manetho’s story has acquired the reputation of being anti-Jewish partly because Flavius Josephus interpreted it as such, and partly because later Gentile writers have given it a decidedly anti-Jewish slant. The notion that Jews descended from a sacrilegious colony of lepers, chased from Egypt in disgrace, and, as a consequence, nourished a deep hatred towards men and gods,
became a popular, firmly ingrained tradition in the ancient pagan world; so much so that it was possible to put forward an – in those days plausible – etymology for the word *sabbath* relating to the Egyptian word *sabbo*, meaning *to boil*. This then could be an example of cultural transfer. Posidonius passed on the story, as did, in inflated form, Apion, the boisterous gutter rhetor, *Cymbalum mundi*, as he was already derisively called in antiquity. Lysimachus of Alexandria, having repeated the stories about Jewish sacrilege, used them to explain the name of the Jewish capital. According to him, the town was originally called “Sacrilege” (Hierosyla) and only later renamed Jerusalem (Hierosolyma). Both he and Appolonius Molon, who taught Cicero and Julius Caesar, called the king who had expelled the Jews Bocchoris. They are therefore likely to have been the sources of Tacitus who also refers to a king of that name, who after the disease had broken out, was ordered by Amon to purge the country of this tribe, as being odious to the gods, “...id genus hominum ut invisum deis...” In Rome the story had been told before Tacitus by Pompeius Trogus (under Augustus), but not in an anti-Jewish sense. Helladius and Rutilius Numantium (fourth century) knew it also.

Handed down to later Christian generations it may have been, though it is not very likely, a source of inspiration for a somewhat similar medieval legend. According to the latter version, Jews suffered from skin diseases as a result of their unfathomable crime and, charged with a most perverse logic, were accused of trying to cure their ailments through the use of Christian blood. The medieval story could not use the Egyptian version of the Exodus since in the Middle Ages the Jewish version, as part of sacred Scripture, had to be accepted, but the ancient combination of sacrilegious acts, enmity towards the rest of mankind, and leprous diseases was still there. In the nineteenth century, the story was used in its ancient form by racists in order to support their contention that both from a moral and biological point of view Jews constituted an inferior race. The French anti-Semites E. Drumont and others, repeatedly referred to Jews as suffering from scrofulous diseases.

If Egyptians were sufficiently informed about Judaism to realize that Jews commemorated the Exodus with Paschal rites, and if they actually interpreted the killing of the Passover lamb as an annually repeated, intended slight upon an Egyptian god, as for example, Tacitus did, then the Passover is likely to have been a constant source of friction between Egyptians and Egyptian Jews, as in fact seems to have been the case. Given that animosity, there is little that is enigmatic about Egypt developing its own malevolent version of the Jewish wanderings.

What does need explaining, however, is its acceptance by Alexandrian

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*Abortive Anti-Semitism?*
Greeks. Why did the latter, who did not necessarily share the convictions of the native Egyptians and who obviously did not resent the killing of cows and sheep, pass on and make additions to stories that originally only fitted in an Egyptian tradition? Apart from mere intellectual interest, the most plausible reason is that in these stories Alexandrian Greeks recognized some of their own preconceived ideas, such as the notion of Jewish godlessness, aloofness, misanthropy, and credulity.

The assumption that such an independent Greek, or at least Alexandrian Greek, anti-Jewish tradition existed, is borne out by the fact that several quarrels with Jews in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt took place in Alexandria itself. There had been difficulties in 88 BC, 38 AD and again in 66 and 118. These conflicts were to a large extent political in nature. The one of 88 BC, for example, was closely linked to the rivalry of two factions at court. Many Jews sided with the faction which opposed the expansionist views of Ptolemy Lathyros who envisaged the conquest of Palestine. Such opposition could easily be interpreted as disloyalty which was punished when in 88 BC the roles were reversed and the formerly expelled Lathyros drove his brother Ptolemy Alexander from the throne. The wars waged by Jews under the leadership of the Hasmonaeans, John Hyrkanius, Aristoboulus and Alexander Jannaeus on the one hand, and revolts of the native Egyptians in that same year 88 BC, on the other hand, may have added to the tension. Subsequently, Alexandrian Jews, having lost Ptolemaic benevolence as a result of continued party strife, were systematically driven to seek support in Rome which did not add to their popularity. Jews were thus increasingly isolated from Greek Alexandrians and gradually the stage was set for the explosion of 38 AD which had a decidedly social and religious character.

The sequence of events was as follows: Herod Agrippa, the future Jewish king (41-44) and favorite of both Caligula and Claudius, stopped over in Alexandria on his way to Palestine. Bearing himself with regal pomp, he was laughed at by Alexandrians who were actually encouraged in this insolent behavior by the Roman governor Avillius Flaccus, already in conflict with Caligula. The latter, afraid of Caligula’s wrath, tried to assuage him by having statues of the emperor erected in Alexandria. The Alexandrian populace thereupon demanded that statues representing the emperor be placed in the synagogues as well. Refusal to allow this would have meant resistance to the imperatorial power, the more so since Caligula fell in with the Alexandrian demand by desiring his effigy to be placed in the temple in Jerusalem.

Flaccus also used the occasion to order the Jews back to their own district which long since had proved too small to hold all the Jews, thereby virtually
inviting people to plunder Jewish houses in the districts they had to leave. Jews were flogged, bereft of their citizenship or given pork to eat, probably in order to establish their identity beyond doubt and also as a kind of immigration inspection to prevent a further influx of Jews.\textsuperscript{74}

When three years later Claudius wanted to put an end to these resumed quarrels after having been approached by Jewish and Gentile embassies from Alexandria, he tried to restore the status quo ante.\textsuperscript{75} As his decree to the Alexandrians proves, he took the matter most seriously. Not being able to declare who was guilty and desirous that both parties live together harmoniously, he restored to the Jews the rights they had of old – since the days of Augustus\textsuperscript{76} – which according to Flavius Joseph, amounted to equal citizenship. (This is not probable, for they paid different taxes.)

He asked the Alexandrian Gentiles not to interfere with or impede the exercise of Jewish religious practices.\textsuperscript{77} Claudius defended religious freedom\textsuperscript{78} and certainly did not favor either his own or Caligula’s deification which the Greek Alexandrians had used as a pretext for their riotous behavior; he referred to his predecessor’s ambition in this respect as utter madness (την πολλην ἀπονοαν και παραφροσυνην).\textsuperscript{79}

He told the Jews not to behave as if they lived in another town by sending separate ambassadors, forbade them to participate in the gymnastic games and ordered them not to invite Egyptian and Syrian Jews to come and live with them. If they did not obey he threatened to punish them with great severity as people who spread misery all over the world.\textsuperscript{80}

Claudius’ decree is in many ways a very revealing document. There is, for example, the intriguing remark about games. Why did he not allow the Jews to participate? There seem to be several possibilities. If apart from being sporting or artistic events, games in Alexandria were religious festivals as well, like the Olympic, Isthmic, and other older games, it would seem logical to bar persons who refused to worship the deities in whose honor the festivals were staged. In that case the exclusion would be related to the often repeated charge of godlessness. If exclusion was not based on religion, and if the Greeks merely desired to shut the Jews out because they felt that the “clannish and aloof” Jews should not play them, then Claudius is not likely to have fallen in with them, for the whole purport of his letter is to urge the two parties to live together harmoniously. It could be related to the problem of citizenship, for the gymnasion was the central institution in determining it. A not very likely psychological interpretation could be Greek loathing of circumcision, which naturally was visible at gymnastic games. It could have been a reason for excluding only the Jews for, though the practice was cus-
tomary among the Egyptians as well, Jews may well have been the only circumcised inhabitants of the town. Circumcision, certainly in the case of proselytes, was indeed a source of difficulties as will be shown. (A Freudian castration complex?)

Claudius’ attitude, on the whole neutral in the Alexandrian conflict was quite consistent with his general policy relating to the Jews. To all his Jewish subjects he gave the same rights as held by Alexandrian Jews, which virtually amounted to freedom of worship, but at the same time, as he had done in the case of the Alexandrian Jews, he told them to keep quiet. If they did not, he punished them as he had told the Alexandrians he would. When Roman Jews and Christians – not yet distinguished from each other by outsiders – quarreled among themselves, he told them all to leave the city. Such at least is Suetonius’ interpretation of the Claudian expulsion – “Judaeos impulsore Chresto assiduo tumultuentes Roma expulit” (“he expelled the Jews, who were continually quarrelling about Christ, from Rome”) – for which there is also biblical evidence. Claudius’ tolerance is one of two solutions of the dilemma Roman emperors had to face when dealing with Jews: persecution or granting of privileges. (It resembles the dilemma of British administrators in India when Muslims and Hindus quarreled.) Either they were of the opinion that no ethnic group should have special privileges (which led to prohibition) and thus persecuted the adherents of Judaism, or they stuck to the Roman principle of religious tolerance. In that case, they would exempt Jews from participation in the official cult and, later, from the worship of emperors; they would allow coins without effigy, they would protect the transportation of money collected throughout the Empire for the Temple, or they would punish a soldier who tore up the Torah. The earlier emperors as a rule chose the latter course, whereas the post-70 emperors occasionally opted for repression.

The very fact, however, that the character of the Jewish religion created such a dilemma is not likely to have made it more appreciated, although the principle was never abrogated and Judaism remained as before a *religio licita*, a recognized religion. This is illustrated by the fact that even Hadrian’s prohibition of circumcision, presumably only for proselytes, imposed after the revolt of Bar Kochba (135) was never seriously enforced.
**Monotheism**

Monotheism in a polytheistic world constitutes a grave problem and it is in this light that the often repeated charge of godlessness and “atheism” must be understood. It is a charge that to modern ears sounds most peculiar, but which is quite understandable from a polytheistic point of view. Moses’ law not only distinguished the Jews from others⁸⁹ – peculiarity in a climate where public life taking place outdoors on the street easily leads to an accusation of misanthropy⁹⁰ – but it was also incomprehensible to most Greeks and Romans who, with the possible exception of philosophers, had an entirely different conception of divinity. Greeks and Romans repeatedly looked in their own Pantheon for gods who resembled the Jewish God as they tried to understand Him. Bacchus was fairly frequently a candidate,⁹¹ but he was unsuitable as Tacitus remarked, for “the rites that go with the worship of Bacchus are gay and happy whereas Jewish customs are absurd and despicable” (“...Quippe Liber festos laetosque ritus posuit, Iudaeorum mos ab surdus sordidus-que”).⁹² (In connection with the identification with Dionysian cult, it is interesting to note that both Greece and Rome knew a certain resistance to the Dionysian cult, it is evident from the mythological stories of Lycurgus and Pentheus). The ass, though not a member of the Pantheon, was often mentioned as the object of Jewish worship. Tacitus, who in total offered four possibilities,⁹⁴ also mentioned Saturnus and based this supposition on two hypotheses. Jews worshipped him either because they were descendants of the “Idaeans” (Mount Ida) of Crete, expelled when Jupiter vanquished Saturnus, or else because Saturnus was the highest of seven (anciently known) planets which rule the life of men. Tacitus uses the latter interpretation as an explanation for the Sabbath and the Sabbatical year: the seventh day and the seventh year in honor of the seventh planet. Juvenalis had still another solution.⁹⁵ He thought that the Jews worshipped heaven while Petronius named the pig as the Jewish god.⁹⁶ Valerius Maximus mentions them together with the adherents of Jupiter Sabazius⁹⁷ which identification was due to the seemingly homonymous resemblance of “Sabazius” and “Sabaoth”, the Lord of Hosts. The cult of Sabazius (Magna Cybele and Attis), characterized by delirious possession and “enthusiasm”, was seen as related to that of Dionysius.⁹⁸ This may explain Tacitus’ equation with the latter.

These efforts show the difficulties pagans had in understanding the Jewish god. They deified either natural powers or abstract concepts like Nike, Amor, Fatum, or Fortuna which they often imagined as anthropomorphic but above all as limited in their potentialities. By means of elaborate rites and sac-
rifices these deities could be controlled to such an extent that if a god failed to do his duty, this was, particularly in Rome, ascribed to some fault in the observance of the proper rite. The ancient concept was so fundamentally polytheistic that in Athens, for example, an altar was placed to the “unknown god” to make sure that no deity was ever forgotten. 99

Because of the very nature of their religion, polytheism prevented the understanding of the spiritual concept of a single god Whose Will was omnipotent and Who was omniscient, omnipresent and invisible. A Talmudic story illustrates these differences well. When a Roman emperor wanted to see the Jewish god, whom he thus implicitly imagined as somehow limited, he was told to look at the sun. The emperor who could not endure that, was told: how can you imagine to see God if you cannot bear to look at one of His mere servants? 100 Such a concept of divinity being alien to them, the pagans may quite logically have deduced from the fact that the Jews worshipped no idols, had no statues, and had no altars after 70 – had, in short, hardly any of the things that they thought were essential to any religion – that the Jews had no gods at all or, at least that what the Jews claimed to be their religion did not deserve the name.

The Jews were a gens religionibus adversa (“a people opposed to religious rites”) wrote Tacitus, 101 who summed up the fundamental opposition between the two worlds of thought as follows: “Everything we hold sacred is profane to them, whereas to them everything is permitted which is forbidden to us” (“profana illic omnia quae apud nos sacra, rursum concessa apud illos quae nobis incest”). 102 Tacitus, who wrote a long diatribe against the Jews, could be expected to have written things like this. Much more revealing for the almost proverbial character of the charge of “atheism”, therefore, is the exclamation of Pliny the Elder who, describing Palestine flora and geography, suddenly inserts a sentence about the Jews and writes “gens contumelia numinum insignis” (“a people notorious for its contumely of the gods”). 103 There are many other examples of this accusation. 104

The Jewish “godlessness” was not only strange and incomprehensible, but it also may have seemed dangerous. Quite consistently with their views, the Greeks and Romans may have felt that not giving the gods their due in the form of rites and sacrifices might unleash the dangerous powers they represented. Ceremonies were public, communal affairs, closely interwoven with politics as is proved by the worship of the goddess Roma and by the deification of kings and emperors. Pagans might with reason fear that nonobservance of religious duties by some of their fellow citizens could evoke the wrath of the gods and thus bring calamity over the whole town or the coun-
try. There was all the more reason to fear this when gods were thought of as located geographically, as bound to one place, as θεοί ἐγχώριοι 105 who in this sense were comparable to the patron saints of medieval towns.

Things would not have been so bad if only the Jewish God could have been incorporated in the Pantheon as gods of other conquered peoples were incorporated to forestall their anger, to prevent them from revenging their original worshippers. But Yaweh, the “jealous” God Who tolerated no other deities, just could not be incorporated although as late as the fourth century Julian the Apostate still tried to do so, allowing Him the position of an “ethnarchic” God, a God who decides the fate of one particular nation. 106

It was by this non-incorporation that tolerance of Judaism was impaired. For, apart from occasional, very temporary exceptions, 107 the Roman state was in all other cases tolerant of foreign religions, not necessarily because it believed in tolerance for its own sake, but because persecution was politically inexpedient and inconsistent with both the polytheist and the incorporating principle of an official religion which permeated political life. The close relation between state and religion was not strongly affected when the cult of some of the autochthonous gods declined to a pure formalism and the emptiness left in the hearts and minds of men was filled by the Dionysian or Orphic mysteries, by the Apollonic oracular cult and by many oriental religions in more or less Hellenized form. 108

When paganism is more than official ritualism, it is then interesting to note that the popular oracles of Didyma, near Miletus, and Claros, throw a curious light on both socially limited boundaries of Jew-hatred in antiquity, and possibly on the growing integration of Jews after the last rebellion of 135. 109 Local cults “owed a debt to the religious language of a local Jewish community,” without accepting Jewish monotheism. Didyma’s Apollo praised the Jews’ respect for law and their worship of the “Creator of all.” Asked whether “reason” or “law” (logos or nomos) was preferable, the oracle “adduced the Jews to support the argument for “law”. “Chaldaeans and “enviable” Hebrews, who worshipped in a pure manner a single God,” were praised. 110

Although this could be an indication of growing popularity, borne out as well by proselytism, it could also be a token of that ambivalence, which so often characterizes anti-Semitic attitudes. Refusal to worship the official gods could thus continue to smack of disloyalty. By refusing to pay homage to the gods of the official Pantheon to which its own God could not belong, monotheism, both in its Jewish and its Christian form jeopardized the politico-religious edifice. As long as the monotheists, however, were not numerous enough to constitute a real threat, monotheism, because of the prevailing tol-
erance, created merely an unpleasant dilemma. “For the Gentile of the Hellenistic period and the Roman Empire, religion was a matter for the individual or an expression of loyalty to the state; he could not understand the unity of a religious-ethical group and an ethnic entity, and frequently feared it.”

Many other charges also expressed a fundamental misunderstanding of Judaism and Jewish customs. Ever since Alexandrian and other Hellenistic writers had accused them of misanthropy, Jews were accused of hating all mankind. This charge was presumably based in part on incomprehension of the Jewish refusal of hospitality on account of dietary laws – Jews themselves were by no means inhospitable, for they had as strong an obligation to open their house to the travelling stranger as Greeks or Romans had – but above all on their aloofness during public festivals. Apollonius Molon repeated the charge in Rome as did Pompeius Trogus: “Caveant ne cum peregrinis conviverent” (“They see to it, that they do not cohabitate with strangers”) and, most bitingly, Juvenal, who wrote that Jews saw “no difference between human flesh and pork, scorned Roman laws, showed the way only to co-religionists and only told the circumcised where to find a well when they were thirsty.” According to Tacitus, who industriously copied all accusations ever made against the Jews, they were full of consideration towards their co-religionists, but cherished a deep hatred towards all others. He thus rationalizes circumcision as a token whereby they could recognize each other: “circumcidere genitalia instituerunt, ut diversitate noscantur.” Philostratus (ca. 180-250), who wrote in the same vein, remarked that Jews keep away from all mankind. “Neither sharing meals nor libations with us, neither prayer nor sacrifices, they are more remote from us than Bactrians and Indians.”

Accusations of laziness, superstition, and credulity were equally based on incomprehension of Judaism and of the sabbath. Seneca, for example, who in his De Brevitate Vitae exhorted people to use their time well, is highly indignant about such a waste of time. These Jews do not work one-seventh of their life! Accordingly he considered the sabbath their worst superstition. Such a view had already been expressed by Agatharchides of Chidos (contemporary of Ptolemy v1, 181-146 BC) who commented that the taking of Jerusalem by Ptolemy on a sabbath proved their credulity. Did he hold that the ancient Spartans who for religious reasons refused to fight at Marathon, were superstitious? Jewish credulity was so proverbial that Horace could write about something wholly unbelievable, “Credat Judaeus Apella” (“The Jew Apella may believe that”). Ovid, Martial, Persius, and many others wrote about Jewish credulity. Occasionally, Jews were accused of being very
dirty and of smelling badly. They were sometimes said to be a nation of slaves, libidinous, given to homosexuality, and to be sorcerers.

**Jewish Proselytism**

Incomprehension of many fundamentals of Judaism and loathing of Jewish customs did not prevent Roman intellectuals from giving way occasionally, however reluctantly – ambivalence! – to a secret admiration for some aspects of Jewish life. Skeptical towards the official religion to which they outwardly conformed, they envied the Jews “monotheistic philosophy” as the early Hellenistic philosophers had done. This held true even for Tacitus who, in the middle of a long diatribe, suddenly commented favorably on the Jews’ combined respect for life and contempt of death. “They consider it a terrible crime to kill newborn children,” he wrote “and they believe that the souls of martyrs and victims in battle are immortal; thus they like to have many children, and do not fear death...”, “hinc generandi amor et moriendi contemptus.” He praised their care of the dead and their philosophic concept of one god (strangely inconsistent with the remark, made only two pages previously, that Jews worshipped the ass), but then proceeded again with his invective.

No such excuses, however, could be made for the converts to Judaism. On them and on the metuentes (God-fearing) the half converts – perhaps sympathizers is the better definition – who frequented Jewish religious services but did not accept all the consequences of the Law, all scorn was heaped. The very first thing they learn, wrote Tacitus, is to despise the gods, to repudiate their country, and to hate their parents, brothers, or children. Much the same feeling was expressed by Juvenal, Martial, and many others. It was one thing to tolerate people born Jewish, but quite another to condone transgression of others into their circle, the less so since for reasons mentioned above, such conversions suggested political disloyalty and treason.

Sheer numbers of Jewish converts added to the fear and the anger. Strabo had already written that Jews had penetrated into all the towns, and complained that there was not a place where they did not dominate. Cicero also feared their numbers, though in his case friendly relations between the Jewish community and Julius Caesar’s party had added to his anger. In a trial instigated by the Popular party he complained, as council for the defense for Lucius Valerius Flaccus who had confiscated money destined for the Jewish temple, about their influence in popular assemblies – “quantum valeat in concionibus” – and about their being incited against the Optimates. If Ci-
Cicero’s utterances were not wholly paranoiac, his remarks clearly show that already in his day a fairly large Jewish community must have existed in Rome. Since Cicero defended Flaccus in 59 BC, four years after Pompey conquered Palestine and the Palestine Jews, who were until then on friendly terms, and since it is unlikely that the slaves brought by Pompey were freed in sufficiently large numbers to make them influential in the popular assemblies, the community must in fact have been much older, and must have consisted of slaves bought elsewhere, freedmen, immigrants and converts.

This supposition would be in keeping with a remark made by Valerius Maximus, a contemporary of Tiberius, who relates that as early as 139 BC “Chaldeans” were expelled from Rome and Italy. This may have been the legitimation for Tiberius’ own measure. In the year 19 AD Jews were expelled from Rome to do service in Sardinia against brigands. Under Claudius, Jews were once more driven from Rome. So either many had by then returned from Sardinia or, more likely, community life had gone on after Tiberius’ measure, which thus can be surmised to have been aimed at proselytes only. It may have been inspired by the conversion of a lady of high rank, Fulvia. A convert in circles socially very near to the emperor may have drawn attention to proselytism. Claudius’ action, likewise, was a police measure, not aimed at all Jews, but only at troublemakers. During the reign of Domitian there was again strong tension.

Tacitus referred to the victims of Tiberius’ measure as “4,000 freedmen infected by this (Jewish) superstition” (“quattuor milia libertini generis ea superstitione infecta”), which does suggest large-scale conversion. The biblical reference to Claudius’ expulsion of the Jews (Acts xvi 11) in conjunction with Dio Cassius’ statement that Jewish assemblies were forbidden suggests that, in this case, the measure was aimed at those who were settled illegally in Rome, but since again infecti were mentioned, these could easily have been proselytes, feared and resented as such. According to Suetonius, they were expelled because they kept quarrelling among themselves about Christ. Neither measure implied “any change in the permanent and universal protection which the Jews normally enjoyed;” the Jews enjoyed protection, but not the Judaizers, for proselytism and the various states of observing Jewish rules, commandments and ethical precepts were a major stumbling block. It was deeply resented, as Sevenster phrased it, because: “Romans who became proselytes were all to be classified as persons who undermined the state religion and disrupted family life, since they endangered the authority of the pater familias by a decisive choice.” Proselytism jeopardized the unity of the state itself.
Fear of proselytism was no doubt enhanced by the Jewish rebellions of 66, 115, and 132-135 AD which, apart from the minor ones, appealed to the imagination of the Romans, to judge by Tacitus’ lengthy comments, by Titus’ triumphal arch, or by Hadrian’s severe measures. Such actions seemed to confirm their suspicions about Jewish disloyalty, though it could be stressed that Jews outside Palestine do not appear to have always participated. Romans not only suspected the Jews of being a notoriously rebellious tribe, but they must also have feared the mysterious power of the Jewish god and his followers, for despite several crushing defeats, the Jews continued to make converts. These fears may to a large extent explain the later prohibitions of circumcision as attempts to prevent the further spreading of Judaism. Hadrian, for example, prohibited the circumcision of neophytes. The rebellion which ensued, this time led by Bar Kochba, resulted in wholesale repression. Money the Jews used to collect throughout the Empire for the restoration of the Temple was then made into a regular tax, the “Fiscus Judaicus”. What remained of the Temple itself was dedicated to Jupiter Capitolinus, and Jerusalem was named Aelia Capitolina. That this measure was political rather than religious is suggested by Hadrian’s indifference to religious matters: “Jews, Christians, and all others have but one God: money,” he wrote, and he referred to priests of whatever religion as charlatans.

Although the prohibition of circumcision was repeatedly reiterated, the measure was never seriously enforced. Judaism thus kept spreading until it was gradually superseded by Christianity. In the light of the politico-religious conflict between paganism and monotheism in both Jewish and Christian form, it is interesting to note that pagan persecution of Jews decreased in proportion to the increase of pagan persecution of Christians. Many charges levelled against the Jews were made against the Christians as well. When the latter became the foremost enemies, Jews were proportionally relieved, the more so, perhaps, because they became in due course potential allies of the pagans against the Christians.

Emphasizing justness, behavior, rather than faith as the way of salvation, it was making proselytes by example, not by preaching and persuasion, even though on the basis of Matthew xxii:15, a certain missionary activity may be surmised. He or she who lives according to the precepts of the Noachian laws is a “proselyte of the gate”. Well known is the story of R. Hillel, who said to a pagan willing to embrace Judaism if Hillel could explain it in the time he could stand on one leg: “Do as you would be done by, the rest is exposition.” Judaism was not a missionary religion in the same sense as Christianity. Even though “conversion by example” presupposes an alert and active proselytiz-
ing zeal, Judaism never resorted to active propaganda. Small wonder that a Roman world, which already resented the passive Jewish form so strongly, lashed out at the so much more active Christians. The more vehemently since Christians could not claim to belong to an ethnic category which, though perhaps not too popular, had to be tolerated and respected as such. Christians were conceived of as pure rabble-rousers.

Another aspect of the conflict between the monotheist religions and the religio-political concept of the state was the refusal to worship the emperor. Under Caligula the Jews were saved only by the sudden death of the emperor. Though the problem was never wholly solved, a modus vivendi was found by the demand, with which the Jews willingly complied, that they say prayers for the emperor, and that they celebrate the emperor’s birthday and other imperial festivals in their own fashion.

Overlooking the areas and sources of conflict, there are certain elements of both a non-prejudicial and a prejudicial character. Among the former may be counted the frequent strife between Jews and Greeks in the Hellenistic towns. Not only Alexandria was the scene of repeated conflicts, but the same held true for Antioch, Cyrene, Sardis, and a number of other towns.

The source of conflict, as was shown in Alexandria, was Greek resentment of the Jews’ tendency, as the Greeks saw it, to have their cake and eat it too. They felt that if Jews desired equal civic rights, they should have equal obligations: military and religious as well as civic. If Jews were, with Roman consent, exempted from a number of these, then they should have the status of resident aliens and not claim equal citizenship. The Greeks of Sardis argued: “If the Jews are to be our fellow citizens, they should worship the Ionian gods.” The difference of opinion occasionally resulted in violent conflict, particularly during the Jewish rebellions of 66, 115, and 132 A.D., when Greeks had less reason to fear Roman retaliation. Yet this civic strife is not without curious complications. In the year 66 A.D., for example, some Greeks of Antioch decided once and for all to put an end to the difficulties by massacring the Jews. Rome was in Judea, engaged in fighting these same Jews. The Antiochians considered that the execution of their plan would present no difficulties whatsoever; “their only fear was of their wives who, with few exceptions, had all become converts to the Jewish religion.” They feared other Judaizers as well. This therefore does not suggest a strong societally formulated prejudice, but rather a severe political or civic conflict, however violent, and however much giving rise to irrational accusations of incendiarism or cannibalism. They are rather reminiscent of the sort of charges hurled at the Germans by the Allies and vice versa during World War I. It is difficult to decide
whether they were based on ingrained prejudice or whether they were the product of imaginations fed by the passions of the moment. Strife and bloodshed do not necessarily mean that during lulls Jews and Gentiles could not live peacefully side by side. There is no reason to assume that everywhere Jews lived in separate quarters as they presumably did in Alexandria.

In Sardis, the greatest Diaspora community under Roman rule, there was no such Jewish quarter. The synagogue (discovered in 1962) in the heart of the town, quite near the Gymnasium, was a “display piece.” No evidence could better demonstrate (than the new archaeological data from Sardis) the intimate and excellent relations which prevailed between Jews of Asia and Greeks. Strife obviously was not perennial.

Tensions could create a certain proneness to accept at face value imputations formulated by and having meaning for other systems of belief. A marked disposition to pass on Egyptian stories as noted above is revealing. (There seems to be no evidence of such stories emanating from other systems of belief). In that sense there was indeed syncretism. An Egyptian accusation of sacrilege fitted well into an Hellenistic or Roman charge of “godlessness.” It could with some difficulty be reconciled with credulity, and with much less difficulty with notions of misanthropy, xenophobia, or “atheism”: haters of men and gods. Syncretist or not, the basic problem was that monotheist Jews did not quite fit into the pagan world, but neither did Christianity, and until Constantine, Christianity was held to be more obnoxious than Judaism. In all likelihood there were never any anti-Christian traditions formulated in reference to specific religions the way an anti-Jewish tradition was formulated in reference to Egyptian religion. Therefore, since Jews and Christians were mostly victimized as adherents to monotheism this shows its significance.

By way of conclusion it must be said that a certain anti-Semitism, in the terms of the above definition did exist in the pre-Christian Graeco-Roman world. It should be noted, however, that it was an anti-Semitism entirely different in its articulation from the forms of Judeo-phobia of later periods, even though to some minor extent elements of the pagan phrasing of rejection may have penetrated into later Christian imagination.

The core of most subsequent anti-Semitic reasoning, the economic charges, was wholly absent, not because the charges did not exist but because they were never applied to the Jews. It is rather the Greeks or Phoenicians who had the reputation of being crafty. Jews were never accused of driving hard bargains, of being usurers, swindlers or exploiters. Jews were not restricted to one or only a few types of economic activity as in later ages, but they belonged overwhelmingly to the lower class artisans and, in the East par-

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particularly, were often engaged in agriculture. 

“Jamais un auteur païen ne les caractérise comme marchands; jamais à l’époque païenne ces deux notions – Juif et marchand – ne vont ensemble de soi-même.”

The one possible indication of economic anti-Semitism that has often been quoted as such by later anti-Semitic historians—a papyrus warning somebody against the Jews—can easily be shown to have a different explanation: it was written in Egypt just after one of the more or less endemic anti-Jewish riots. “From the economic point of view there was no difference between the Jews and the other people among whom they lived, and no single branch of economy constituted a monopoly for Jewish activity.” On the whole, Jews were rather poor.

Another major difference with later Judeo-phobia is that the pagan forms do not appear to have been made perennial by a self-sustained growth, as presumably was the case in later periods; new accusations by way of exoneration of previous ones.

After the storms in the middle of the second century, tension abated and the Jews and Romans found a modus vivendi, made all the easier since Roman interest increasingly focused on Christians.

The controversies of antiquity indeed deserve attention for the formulating of a syntax of a general theory of anti-Semitism and racism in terms of diaspora, and a societally unacceptable religion, but they are of very limited significance for the semantics of a continuously growing European anti-Semitism and for the genealogy of imputations and stereotypes.

Granted, there are similarities with later forms of anti-Semitism. Clanishness and aloofness are charges that repeatedly appear in later accusations as well; naturally, as they are the negative expression of a social distancing, in but not of society, which is held to be a necessary condition for all forms of anti-Semitism, indeed, for all forms of racism. Precisely because these characteristics may be held as valid for any form of racism, they throw little light on a more specific theory of anti-Semitism. The more so because vast areas which in later ages were going to play a major role in medieval anti-Semitism, that is, Iberia, Gaul, Britannia, and Germania, were completely unaffected in Roman days, whereas, as will be a theme of the next chapters, Italy and the southern Balkans played an insignificant role in medieval and modern anti-Semitism of a Christian culture and its derivatives. North African and Asian Islamic Jew-hatred of a much later period was unrelated to ancient anti-Semitism. So, with the possible exception of pre-Islamic Christian Egypt, it holds true that where there was strife in Roman days, there was none in later ages, and vice versa.
Finally, large scale proselytism or semi-proselytism does not suggest strong popular aversion, which was obviously limited to specific social strata. Since many conflicts were related to citizenship and civic duties, it may be surmised that whatever his motive, Caracalla, in his “Constitutio Antoniniana” of 212, which granted Roman citizenship to all free inhabitants, inclusive of the Jews, thereby made Jews eligible for, admittedly burdensome, office. The “constitutio” removed many sources of conflict, much more effectively than the emancipatory legislation 1,600 years later.

The initial ineffectiveness of the vituperations of Christian theologians ranging from Chrysostom to Agobard shows that these provoked the very opposite of animosity. Precisely because Jews had become rather popular, entertaining friendly relations with their neighbors, and because Jews were not or no longer held to be aloof or clannish by the populace at large, theologians had difficulty in making that same somewhat obtuse populace accept all the intricate details of the secessionist and metaphysical condemnation of Jews and Judaism.

They had to harp on the wickedness of the Jews in order to protect their own flock from the contamination of Judaizing. Pagan anti-Semitism is indeed abortive in the sense that the arguments proving such wickedness were not borrowed from a pagan articulation of rejection; but this does not mean that the structure of pagan society did not indirectly contribute to their emergence in the pre-Constantine era.

Both Judaism and Christianity, as small minorities, felt the pressures of an overwhelming pagan world and their respective defensive tactics are therefore likely to have helped in shaping their mutual animosity. For both held true that their “atheism”, their not recognizing the gods, or considering them demons, was as much a social as a political trespass, so much so that the populace heartily approved of punishment, if they did not take the initiative themselves, even though occasionally the populace feared the punishing soldiers more than the Christians.

There was, however, a growing difference between Jewish “atheism” and the Christian variety. The latter was more provocative, not really finding a modus vivendi with imperial authority, ever since Nero’s persecutions and Paul’s condemnation by an imperial tribunal in Rome. Some Christians actually sought martyrdom, were often intransigent, whereas Jewish martyrs belonged to the long bygone period of the Maccabees and the Jewish wars of the early imperial period. Judaism was never officially persecuted, though proselytism occasionally was. It had in pagan eyes, in contradistinction to Christianity at least the merit that it was old and as such venerable, so much so, that

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the oracle at Didyma accepted its wisdom. It had a Law. “The Jews were a people who followed, the Christians a sect who deserted the religion of their fathers, mere rabble-rousers.” The Jewish god was an ethnic god, which ruled the fate of one nation. Jews did not idealize virginity. Jewish religion, though having no statues, was also more respectable in the sense that before the conquest of Jerusalem, it had known “decent” animal sacrifices in a real temple. Synagogues were stately buildings, often in the heart of a town, whereas Christians met in secret in dismal places, or in rooms in private houses. Christians were more frequently and systematically accused of cannibalism and other atrocities. In short, Jews in the end were perhaps somewhat odd, but respectable, Christians were not only despicable, but above all dangerous, much more fundamentally jeopardizing the existing social order. The ultimate Pagan benevolence towards Jews culminated (but too late) in Emperor Julian the Apostate’s (361-363) ephemeral efforts to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem. Christians said that he attempted this in order to spite them. By rebuilding he would undo Jesus’ prophecy of the destruction (Matthew xxiv, 2). The more likely reason is, that the Jewish god, as an “ethnarchic” god, as a demigurge under the Supreme Being, would have his due place in his Neo-Platonist Pantheon. The episode did not contribute to a better Jewish-Christian understanding.

So, if Christians since Emperor Decius (249-251) increasingly bore the brunt of pagan persecutions, and Jews won ever more respect as time went by, it could be surmised that the former felt that the latter had a share in inciting the populace and authorities against them, if only in order to deflect attention from themselves. Were Jews indeed the “fons persecutionum” as Tertullian contended? It is not likely.72

To be sure, as long as Christians wished to stay within Judaism, orthodox Jews of various types could consider them dangerous schismatics; witness the fate of Stephen. The twelfth “beracha” of the “prayer of eighteen parts” demanding divine punishment for schismatics, who brought disunion over Israel, did apply.73 But when, with Paul, Christians went out to meet the nations seeking to convert them, when they considered the Law obsolete, they became part and parcel of the world of the Gentiles, “who do as they do”, their actions of limited concern to Law-abiding Jews. After the last rebellion of 135, however, Jews did find a modus vivendi with that same Gentile world, symbolized in the deal Rabban Yohannan ben Zakkai made with Vespasian.

It could very well be argued that the speech of the Pharisee Gamaliel – it sounds so authentic precisely because it does not really fit into the overall anti-Jewish tenor of the Book of Acts – is representative of the later attitude
of Jews towards Christians. Leave them alone, Gamaliel said, “for if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought: but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it.”

Christians had far more problems with Judaism, than Jews had with Christianity, as long as it was not in a position of power. At worst, they considered it an heretical sect, despicable, with an utterly unbelievable story about a so-called Messiah, who died an ordinary criminal. Some uninformed Jews may have watched the persecution of Christians by pagans, with a bit of Schadenfreude, vastly exaggerated by Christians, who retaliated by calling them murderers of prophets and Christ-killers. Some Jews may occasionally have burned a model of the cross at Purim, but by and large Jews did not really conceive of Christianity as a dangerous sect, but rather as one that, when in distress, could still be won over to true insight. Judaism was indeed a safe haven for lapsed Christians, who rather joined the synagogue than eat “demonic” pagan meat. Only in that sense was the synagogue a “fons persecutionum”.

For non-Marcionite (Marcion rejected the Old Testament) mainstream Christians, Judaism was the seedbed of their own faith, and as the irredeemable frame of reference played an immense role in their own authenticity, whereas the Jews had no need to refer to Christianity. For Christianity, in its self-proclaimed role of the new Verus Israel, it was essential to prove with the aid of Jewish texts that Christians, and no longer the Jews, stood in the divine Grace. This concept leads to the secessionist hypothesis, as was hinted at, and will be elaborated in the next chapter. It is likely, however, that the vehemence, not the contents of the secessionist attitude and its repercussions was co-determined by the increasingly less anti-Jewish and increasingly more anti-Christian attitude of the pagan world at large. Two minorities, harassed in different degrees, had to be permanently on guard, and overall caution implied carefully watching each other.

It may be true that initially there was not just one Jewish-Christian controversy, both pre-70 Judaism and early Christianity being divided into many factions and sects, all cherishing in various ways Messianic expectations, despite, or perhaps better because Roman power was then at its Zenith. Judas’ treason could be seen as resulting from the disappointment with the other-worldly turn taken by Jesus’ messianism. Rebelliousness, the hope of repeating the Maccabean miracle, was another form of messianism. After 70, when most Jewish factions and sects vanished, when mainstream Christianity found its shape, not yet overly disturbed by internal quarrels as in the fourth century, controversies grew into one conflict between mainstream

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Christianity and a rejuvenated rabbinical Judaism of Pharisee origin. The year 70 was the watershed. The terms of the new portentous conflict were dictated by the fatidical events of the four decennia between 30 and 70, in all of which the Roman Empire played a decisive role: the Crucifixion, the violent death of Peter and Paul in Rome, Nero’s persecution of Christians on the occasion of the great fire, the conquest of Jerusalem and destruction of the temple by Titus, and the ensuing new Diaspora.

So, when defensive strategies of a pagan world against threatening monotheism first articulated in their anti-Jewish form codetermined the later development of Jewish-Christian conflict, this chapter, after all, is not entirely superfluous.
The secession friction hypothesis

Because the first Christians were Jews who developed a deviating conviction about messianism, which for some implied a temporary sectarianism within, but for others secession from Judaism, we may surmise that the law of “secession friction”, mentioned in the previous chapter is applicable. Moral indignation about the unfaithfulness to the once common ideology could result in Ranulf’s “disinterested tendency to inflict punishment”, particularly when the secessionists belong to the “middle class” in the sense he uses it. Considering the social layers in which Christianity first spread, this could in this case explain much of the animus of the New Testament.

The (future) secessionists always accuse those who do not join them of malevolent blindness and obstinacy, because to them their deviating conviction is so clearly the forgone conclusion of the once common belief system, that, according to them, doubters cannot be but inspired by evil motives.

In all cases of this type of secessionism of whatever social category, the process of conflict and withdrawal shows a specific pattern. At first the innovators try hard to convince the others of the correctness of their views, and only when they fail to do so they decide to secede. Then “because of a decent respect for the opinions of mankind”, because they want to avert unwelcome censure by (powerful) outsiders, or in order to strengthen internal secessionist conviction and cohesion, and encourage the wavering, they appeal to outsiders and seek to make them into umpires of a kind. In accordance with the ideological nature of their conviction they will however not accept a possibly contrary verdict of these umpires, for they will hold that a ruling against their opinion cannot but be inspired by evil motives, fear, partiality, or bribes.

Thirdly, all elements of the once common ideology not in dispute remain authoritative for the secessionists. These elements remain a framework of reference for them, albeit that they tend to be radicalized or given new meaning in the light of the issue in dispute. Fourthly, the secessionists usually de-
velop a strong missionary zeal, they want to win over others, preferably even nonmembers of the original unit. Finally, very often but not necessarily, the hard core of the non-secessionists feel forced, in defense, to reformulate their point of view, thereby occasionally starting – unwillingly and/or unwittingly – a process of innovation, that further sharpens the conflict; they start a counter-reformation, because they too feel the need to win over the wavering and the neutrals, as well as newcomers.

As the reader can easily ascertain for himself, all these elements do obtain in this type of secessionist conflicts in all sorts of social categories. There is the example of the American colonies seceding from the British Empire, asking the “decent” unbiased “opinion of mankind” to be the umpire – “let the facts be submitted to a candid world” – and retaining British parliamentarianism and Common Law in the Articles of Confederation in a radicalized form. There is the Bolshevik secession of 1904. There are Tito’s and Mao’s different secessions from the Russian-dominated Cominform. Mao freely and massively distributed *The Little Red Book* all over the world, in order to expose “Krushchov’s [sic] Phoney Communism” and convince the world that Communism can be realized immediately. There is the example of the Church of England, headed by the holder of the papal title *fidei defensor*, seceding from the Church of Rome, protestantising somewhat beyond the issue in dispute, and at Thomas Cranmer’s suggestion referring that issue to European theological faculties to act as umpires. After the Great Depression provoked a conflict over industrial unions versus craft unions, the Congress of Industrial Organization seceded from the American Federation of Labor and sought official recognition in order to fare better in litigation over labor disputes. It radicalized tactics in the form of sit-down strikes. And so forth.

The pattern to the process of conflict and withdrawal is indeed so regular that it has heuristic possibilities for investigating the problem in question: that is, Jewish-Christian controversy. One problem to be solved then is the reason why, unlike in many cases mentioned above, and in a host of others, sooner or later a *modus vivendi* was not found and the hatchet buried.

As indicated, the anomaly could perhaps in part be explained by its being a conflict between two monotheistic religions, both, though in different degrees, harassed by an overwhelmingly pagan world. It could also be surmised that, when the initial dissension had a messianic, or perhaps even chiliastic nature, the metaphysical dimension gave the conflict a more lasting effect. It could finally be hypothesized that the ardor of the missionary zeal, closely related to messianism, the combat over the final and total conversion of all the wavering, prolonged the conflict, or even made it self-sustained. In all three
cases, however, whether in combination or not, it would be a problem expli-
cable in terms of comparative social science.

Such a comparative approach may have advantages, for it could suggest a
ideal-typical solution for the analysis of all the intricacies of merely one con-
flict. It could perhaps better be done so, than by the careful weighing of the
known, but often merely plausible data of only the one conflict in question,
with all the methodological dangers involved in such a procedure; the risk of
the same tautological reasoning as, for example, exists in explaining the caus-
es of the First World War treating the latter as a single issue. It could anyhow
be helpful for removing in some measure the possible religious, meta-histori-
cal biases of such a tradition- and sentiment-laden problem. It could more-
over serve as a check on the so far best case analysis of John Gager’s.4

Chiliastic movements show a certain resemblance to general secessionist
movements; they are as it were a “condensed” form, in that they formulate
radical deviations from parts of existing traditions, break away from them,
and condemn the loyalists, while at the same time preserving core elements
of the tradition as frameworks of reference, the more so when that tradition
has messianic traits.

In the abundant literature on this subject the element of total renewal is
usually emphasized, rather than that of preservation. This is understandab-
le, as the outstanding characteristics of all chiliastic movements is the concept
of the immediate realization of the “new earth and heaven”,5 the “Kingdom of
God” on earth, here and now, the period of eternal bliss that is imminent,
when history as the ongoing contradiction between what is and what ought
to be, comes to an end. The chiliastic expectation, not necessarily, but often
related to messianic expectation, can be described as a new “symbolic uni-
verse”, conceived of as the matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively
real meanings; the entire historic society and the entire biography of the indi-
vidual are seen as events taking place within this universe; however, “the
meaningful totality that explains” is not created ex nihilo.6 Almost always, al-
beit in varying degrees, it knows a certain syncretism, and thereby a formulat-
on in reference to what has been, even though that is declared obsolete, and
even though the new dispensation finds its very justification in declaring the
old one obsolete. During the Vailala Rage of 1919 in Papua New Guinea, at
one of the cargo cults along the shores of the Coral Sea, the Papuan men
made a point of opening the men’s houses to the women, and showing the
hidden secret objects to the women, who since time immemorial had never
been allowed to see those objects. They saw this conscious sacrilege as one
step in the process of purification necessary for the destruction of a now-

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white-dominated society. That first step would initiate the period of eternal bliss. The wholesale destruction would remove all impediments which lay in the way of the ancestors’ return, but then in the possession of the white man’s cargo, which he himself would no longer enjoy. Even so, the new cult shared with the old one the worshipping of ancestors. The same holds true for the Melapi movement among the Toradjas of Celebes.

Such chiliastic movements are not limited to the non-Christian world of colonial oppression and consequent cultural disintegration, for they abound as well in the Islamic world. Here, too, in announcing the coming millennium, the restoration of paradise on earth, the popular prophets branded the existing order as wicked and diabolical, one which had to be destroyed. In many a millenial movement of the Middle Ages, the Pope was considered to be the Antichrist, the clergy unworthy simoniacs, and the secular rulers, the Jews and the rich their mammonist helpers. Popular prophets announced that in a tremendous conflagration, a holocaust, the wicked would be destroyed by the poor, as vessels of grace, led by the last emperor, or another messianic leader. The chosen, the poor and the meek would inherit the earth.

Such fantasies, often inspired by Revelations and other apocalyptic literature, again and again moved popular masses to such a frenzy that perhaps these movements better serve as measuring rods for medieval popular religiosity than orthodoxy. In so far as they express social protest, they resemble later anarchist or early socialist movements, which also held that from the shattered capitalist order, the “new society” based on the “new man” would rise like a phoenix.

Chiliastic movements take place in periods of great social upheaval, when in an anomic reaction, the “disoriented poor” want new hope, the promise of imminent future bliss, often falling back into resignation and apathy when this is not realized, but in such a way that at any moment the flame can be rekindled. Precisely because the tradition provides no adequate or satisfactory answer to the acute stress, the populace eagerly listens to the prophets from among their midst, who denounce the establishment; but when the tradition contains messianic elements, denial of the tradition often assumes the character of putting a purified version in its place, thereby keeping elements of the shattered tradition as a significant framework for reference.

In all messianic or chiliastic movements there seem to have been alternate phases of strong eschatological expectations and phases whereby for institutional reasons eschatological hopes are restrained. The chiliastic symbolic universe, is so to speak frozen, and becomes the creed of a new establishment. As an institution (which like every institution sought to make secure the rea-
sons for its own existence), the medieval Church could not possibly accept the popular prophets of the chiliastic movements who proclaimed without any authority the coming of the millennium to be at that very instant,12 instead of somewhere in the future. (The Church could justify its position on the basis of Acts 1:7: “it is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in his power”). Acceptance of the prophets would have implied the admission of its own superfluosness, but non-acceptance would imply a certain resignation to the world as it is, an adaptation to the social status quo. The position of the Church was then very much the same as that of the Bolshevist party vis-à-vis leftist deviationists or Maoists, proclaiming the immediate realization of communism.

In general it may be said, that the coexistence of two or more “symbolic universes” inevitably engenders conflict. The one poses a threat to the other, “because its very existence demonstrates empirically that one’s own universe is less than inevitable”.13

Likewise, heresy poses another threat, as it often is a primary “impetus for the systematic theoretical conceptualization of symbolic universes”. The very occurrence of heresies, necessitating an ever greater precision in the articulation of the creed, may consequently have contributed to the harshness of the rejection of alternative universes. In the case in question, heresy may have forced the young Church to an ever more elaborate Christology, which by implication continuously widened the gap that separated Christianity from Judaism.

This whole array of interrelated general social phenomena, inclusive of the suggested dichotomies could explain the conditions, and their aftermath, at the beginning of the common era in what was then the Roman province of Palestine.

Ever since the days of Antiochus Epiphanes the country had been plagued by civil strife, war and devastation. The members of the Hasmonaean dynasty degenerated into tyrants who persecuted opponents; it came to such mutual conflict, that Pompey saw the chance to interfere. From then on things went from bad to worse, first with the tyranny of the Idumaeans, forcefully converted by Hasmonaeans and protected by Rome, among them Herod and his descendant.14 Then came the full subjection to Rome, with a series of thieving and oppressing procurators.

Flaccus, defended by Cicero, had set the tone, by sequestering temple money. Pontius Pilate was about the worst, using sacred money for secular purposes and cruelly suppressing protests, but he had almost his equal in Gessius Florus, whose malversations to enrich himself actually provoked the great re-
bellion. People derided him by starting a public collection of small coins, for the “poor Florus”. The others were not much better, as even Tacitus admitted, although Antonius Felix, in Acts xx1v, 15 Paul’s trial, has the reputation of being pro-Jewish, because he was married to a Jewess, Drusilla. According to Tacitus, she was the granddaughter of Mark Antony and Cleopatra. An indication of the anti-Jewish bias of the Acts?

If Drusilla was Jewish, she was presumably a member of that Romanized establishment, like Flavius(!) Josephus, the princes of the ruling house, Philo of Alexandria and some of the Sadducees. In all situations as outlined above, there is always a part of the establishment that profits by making a deal with the oppressors or the colonizers. The worse the oppression and collaboration, the higher the pluriform messianic expectations of the populace.

**Secessionism**

Early Christianity had many features in common with the later popular movements, though it lacked the violence of some. It was in origin a messianic movement of the poor. The Sermon on the Mount was not delivered to members of the more or less Hellenized establishment. It long remained a religion of the modest and the downtrodden. It is suggestive that whereas 78 percent of the 2,489 saints of the Church were of upper-class background, 17 percent were born in the middle class and only 5 percent were of lower-class origin. (The criteria for ranking in such different societies as are encompassed by almost two thousand years of varied historical development may not be quite watertight). Half of the saints of lower-class origin lived during the first five centuries, whereas virtually all the saints from the fifth to the sixteenth century were of upper class origin. The majority of the 22 percent “lower-class saints” were thus saints who lived during the first centuries.16

Nascent Christianity kindled the hope, against disorienting oppression, that the Kingdom of God was at hand, a total renewal, even though referring to the esteemed elements of the old tradition, it was said: “till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled” (Matthew v:18). There are also chiliasm features in Jesus’ prophesy of the destruction of the Temple, his regular transgressions of traditional precepts, of the sabbath, of dietary laws, and his social relations with outcasts, like the publicans, the prostitutes, the Samaritans, the Gadarenes, and the un-circumcised (Matthew xxiv:2 – John x:14,15,16 – Acts x:15). There is nothing enigmatic in the fact that the movement came from the periphery of a some-
what backward and poor Galilee – though, of course, doubters asked: “Shall Christ come out of Galilee?” (John v 11:41) – as such movements often start in the periphery where the pressure is greatest. The Ghost Dance of the proud Sioux began among the poor Paviotso. Evara, the prophet of the Vailala Rage, came from a remote village.17

Many, like Judas, who expected the messiah to liberate Israel from foreign domination, will have been disappointed by the preaching of Jesus. There were others, however, who anticipated the messianic age to be one of peace, more in the spirit of the prophets Isaiah, Hosea, Micah or Zechariah: Isaiah 11:4 “… and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more,” or x:1-6: “And there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse (...) and the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord (...) but with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and reprove with equity for the meek of the earth (...) the wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid...,” or Isaiah lxv:17: “For, behold, I create new heavens and a new earth,” or Zechariah 1x, Micah iv:3, and Hosea 11:18.

Many of those who had such expectations, mindful of Deuteronomy xxi:23: “for he that is hanged is accursed of God” will, however, have turned away in the end: executed like a common criminal, he could not have been the messiah.18 The Romans were still in power, there were no miracles, there was no evidence of “the new heavens and a new earth” or of the gathering of “all nations and tongues”, no evidence for creating “Jerusalem a rejoicing” any more than any other sign as foretold by the prophets.19

But when prophecy fails there are always those hardcore followers who maintain that the prophecy is still true but must be differently understood.20 To an interested outsider this would seem to have happened: the disciples found the new interpretation in the resurrection: the tomb was empty. (The possibility that the body had been removed by the Roman authorities, perhaps in order to prevent undesirable mass gatherings, was the solution offered by the “Toldoth Jeshu”, an account of Jesus’ life, produced in the Middle Ages by the Jews, oppressed by Christians.)21 It was maintained that some disciples had seen him, that Thomas had actually seen the wounds (John xx:27) and that at Emmaus disciples had eaten with him (Luke xxv:30).

This meant to them that the Law was fulfilled, that the rod had come forth “out of the stem of Jesse”22 and that Micah v:1-2 had come true, for the savior was born in Bethlehem. It meant that the reign of God had only been post-
poned to the (very near) future. (Early Christianity expected an almost immediate Parousia ("Second Coming"). This in turn implied that as the “Kingdom of God” was at hand, many elements of the Law had lost their function, just as the sacred masks in the Papuan men’s houses had lost their function and meaning after Evara had spoken. Most followers of Jesus held that the old faith had become obsolete, as the destruction of the Temple, shortly afterwards, seemed to prove. They considered those who refused to realize this to be willfully blind, and that they persecuted the disciples out of mere spite rather than because these brought disunity over Israel. Such is the theme of many of the Epistles.

But dissension and dispute were not yet schism and secession. The disciples at first tried to convince their fellow Jews of the correctness of their views. Stephen did his utmost best to win them over, but his tone was so vehement, that his efforts were to little avail; he was stoned. When defending himself before the high priest, he declared that the Temple was superfluous, al-luding to Jesus’ prophecy of its destruction, and then said that the Jews had never kept the Law anyway, and had persecuted the Prophets, as they had now murdered the Redeemer. It is somewhat curious to read that the charge against Stephen was lodged by the “synagogue of the Libertines” (Libyans? Or “freedmen” from Rome, descendants of Jews enslaved by Pompey?), and Cyrians and Alexandrians, and of them of Silicia and Asia; were they the Jews of the Diaspora, who, as they were exposed to strong Hellenistic influences of alternative symbolic universes, needed certainty and could thus ill afford any attack on orthodoxy? The position of the above-mentioned “alienation”?

Also indicative of an originally merely inter-Jewish dissension is Matthew x:15-19. The disciples, “sheep in the midst of wolves”, shall not go to the Gentiles or the Samaritans, but only “to the lost sheep of the house of Israel”. They have to be “wise as serpents and harmless as doves” for they will be “delivered up to the councils” and “scourged in their synagogues”.

Was it a reaction to Stephen’s radicalism, which under the leadership of James the righteous, the brother of Jesus, led to the formation of the group of “they that were of the circumcision”? They held that nobody who was not circumcised could be saved, and they reproached Peter with eating with the uncircumcised in the house of the centurion of the “Italian band”, Cornelius. Peter justified his position by evoking his vision of the unclean animals, which he had been ordered to eat by Divine command; in itself a token of both his moving away from Judaism, and his hesitancy to do so. When protesting “nothing common or unclean hath at any time entered into my
mouth”, Peter heard a heavenly voice saying: “What God hath cleansed, that call not thou common.” Peter thus held a middle position between James’ circumcision party and that of the radicals Paul, Silas, Barnabas, and the followers of Stephen, which — not without dissension among themselves — ended up converting the Gentiles to belief in the Christian message, not in Judaism. Peter, according to Paul, leaned towards the conservatives.

The compromise of the Council of Apostles between the conservatives and the Petrine Church — also indicative of a hesitancy to secede — declared that converts from the Gentiles should at least “abstain from pollution of idols, and from fornication, and from things strangled, and from blood”. In 1 Corinthians viii, Paul makes it very clear that he is only willing to accept even this mild concession to Jewish orthodoxy as not abstaining from forbidden meat might hurt the delicate consciences of weaker brethren who do not have superior wisdom, thereby giving to understand that there is no real objection.

Nevertheless, during the first decennia of Christianity the question of abstention from food forbidden by Mosaic Law still had deep religious significance, as much as the abstention from meat, and the eating of fish on Fridays had during Lent in Medieval Europe. (Transgression was still a criminal offence in Elizabethan England.) It is curious to note that the question was still discussed in the eighth century. Paul’s unwillingness to abide by the compromise of the Council of Apostles is also noticeable in his rendering of the proceedings of the Council: “Only they would that we should remember the poor.” He was absolutely silent about forbidden food. His secessionist position clearly was: “If righteousness come by the Law, then Christ is dead in vain.”

Despite Gamaliel’s wisdom, tension continued to grow as long as the first disciples tried to win over the Jews. James, the brother of John, was executed by order of Herod Agrippa II, who also arrested Peter; the latter, however, was miraculously saved. (Acts xi.) Agrippa met divine punishment. The twelfth Beracha of the “Shemoneh Esreh” (Amidah, Telia), “the prayer of eighteen parts” cursing the schismatics who endanger Israel, was applied to the Jewish Christians. It was applicable as long as Christians wanted to stay within Judaism, but the more the rift widened, the less the Jews cared, and the more the Christians felt the urge to show that they were different from the Jews who were none too popular with the Romano-Hellenistic elite. On these grounds did the early Christian communities in Palestine declare their neutrality during the great rebellion. Their members could not possibly conceive of the messianic age which had indeed arrived, according to them, as
merely purporting to restore the kingdom of David, as the Zealots thought. They had no interest in the rebellion — a view they shared with the Pharisees — and thus they were once more conditioned to trying to appease the Romans. They feared the Roman state, and had no reason to pick a quarrel with it. Consequently they attempted to convince the Roman authorities, as “umpires”, that they were loyal and peaceful subjects, and not rebellious Jews, as is evident, for example from Luke xx:25 “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s” or Romans xi:1-7 “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers (...) Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due....”

Vindicatory persuasion of third parties, as umpires — in this case Rome — a noted characteristic of all secessionist movements, or those about to become such, is also manifest in the way the Gospels, the Acts and the Epistles seek to minimize Roman responsibility for the Crucifixion and later persecutions, putting all the blame squarely on the Jews. A neutral onlooker, a modern reporter, would have noticed that Jesus was formally condemned on the charge of sedition by a wavering Roman administrator, who tried to play safe by hastily making peace with the tetrach of Galilee, Herod Antipas, a prince of the royal family. He could assume that the tetrach, the royal family being none too popular, had every reason to fear a Galilean revolutionary. Pontius Pilate was not certain what to do, however, when Antipas did not react. Pilate was then in the position of, say, a later colonial administrator who, confronted with messianic movements, and discussing the matter with colleagues over a drink in the club, would ask himself: “Is the fellow a mere harmless fool, or does he provoke sedition?” Once more he played safe by giving in to what he saw as the establishment.

Roman soldiers performed the execution and these knew full well what was at issue when they mockingly crowned Jesus, dressed him in purple, and nailed a sign over his head saying “INRI” (“Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews”). Roman responsibility cannot be denied, despite Pontius Pilate’s washing of his hands. Did Pontius Pilate, who showed so little respect for Judaism, really perform this act, which seems utterly alien to Roman custom, but which fits into a Jewish tradition? (Deuteronomy xxv:6 prescribes it in case of manslaughter when the killer is unknown, as a declaration of innocence, in which sense it is also used in Psalm xxv:6). Did he share his wife’s qualms?

Pilate was indeed no friend of the Jews. He tried to coerce them into accepting statues of the emperor in Jerusalem, even to the point of using violence. He used sacred funds for the construction of an aqueduct, silencing the protests by having the obstreperous cudgelled by his soldiers dressed as
civilians, and he most cruelly suppressed an insurrection by having the blood of the Galileans “mingled with sacrifices”, that is, presumably having massacred them while they were sacrificing. He is not likely to have had qualms about executing a possible insurrectionist, and a Galilaean at that.

Tacitus was well aware of Pilate’s responsibility, and approved of it: the man who gave his name to this movement, Christ, was executed by Pontius Pilate during the reign of Tiberius. The thus momentarily repressed pernicious superstition broke out again, not only in Judaea, the origin of this evil, but also in Rome, where it so happens that all imaginable horrors and outrages get together and find acceptance. Thus opined the Roman establishment.

Eusebius of Caesarea was well aware of Pilate’s responsibility, though he equally blamed the Jews. Commenting upon Pilate’s later misfortunes, which drove him to commit suicide, he writes: “Divine justice, it seems, was not slow to overtake him.”

The early Christians, as people under suspicion of preaching sedition, had every reason to fear Roman wrath, as is evident in Acts xxiv sometimes on a par with Jews, with whom they were initially confused, “Ob Chresto tumultuantes”. Paul’s condemnation, Peter’s death in Rome, and Nero’s persecution of Christians in 64 AD confirmed their suspicion of Rome. Paul, just before his death in 62 AD (possibly 66) may have felt the tension that exploded in 64 AD; Nero well knew which scapegoats to choose for the great fire of Rome. (Therefore, in order to put an end to the rumor that he himself was the arsonist, Nero blamed and punished with carefully chosen punishments those whom the populace called Christians, hated for their flagitious behavior.) The flagitia Christians were accused of were ritual cannibalism and sexual promiscuity.

As the Gospels were written after the Epistles, Nero’s persecution may have been well known by then. There was thus every reason to try to appease the Romans. The Acts are strangely silent about the violent deaths of Paul and Peter in Rome. Odd, too, is what is related in Acts xxiv-xxvii, because it seems utterly inconsistent with Roman legal procedure. If Agrippa and Festus were convinced of Paul’s innocence, they were certainly in a position to set him free. They had full authority to do so, for they could act in the name of the emperor. Only if they had been convinced of Paul’s guilt, would they have been forced to send him to Rome to be tried there as a Roman citizen. Festus’ words: “Hast thou appealed unto Caesar? Unto Caesar shalt thou go” and Agrippa’s remark “This man might have been set at liberty, if he had not appealed unto Caesar”, deny that authority. It is most implausible, however, that a Roman procurator would have hesitated to set a Roman citizen free.
when he was convinced of his innocence and when some mere “natives” accused him. Would a British official in India have hesitated to set at liberty a Scot, a fellow Briton, who was charged with having insulted a sacred cow, once he had convinced himself that the man was innocent of the charge?

Luke, the author of Acts, however, obfuscated the issue in his desire to minimize Roman responsibility. According to him, Festus’ predecessor, Felix, was really to blame. His procrastination had made the case more difficult, and the reasons why he did not act as he ought to have acted, were that he was corrupt, that he was married to a “Jewess”, Drusilla, and wanted to please the Jews. In the final analysis, according to Luke, the Jews were to blame. 52

Secession was allegedly completed with the former Pharisee Paul, who, considering that circumcision was redundant, – only the “circumcision of the heart” counted – and holding that the Law was obsolete, even an impediment to salvation, the Temple superfluous, completely renounced Judaism.

A major problem for the future was that Judaism refused to be obsolete. Far from being the ritualistic, hairsplitting religion of empty forms which Christian tradition made of it, Judaism vigorously found an answer to the challenges put out by the Roman conquest, the destruction of the Temple and the Diaspora. It not only survived these catastrophes but it found so much new inspiration there that it remained, as has been shown, a vigorously proselytizing religion, in constant competition with Christianity.

Ironically, it was the Pharisees, the New Testament byword for hypocrisy, faithless ritualism and literalism, as founders of rabbinical Judaism, who accomplished this major achievement. It was precisely as the main competitors of Christianity, and paradoxically because their views were in many ways so akin to Christian teachings that they earned their bad reputation.

Descendants of Maccabean orthodoxy, indeed abided strictly by the Law, yet they spiritualized it. Obedience implied foremost the conservation of a message of universal salvation, and hence the preparation for it. In so doing the Pharisees spiritualized and individualized the message, so that, as has been noted above, the righteous pagan could be saved, so that Rabbi Hillel could write that the Law was neighborly love and all the rest mere exposition. 53 Thus Pharisaism could survive the loss of the Temple, great as the loss might be, whereas the other sects, the Essenes, the Sadducees, and the Zealots, vanished. 54 Rosemary Ruether writes:

Pharisaism also emancipated the Jews from the need for priestly mediatorship and for historical vindication, whereas the Church continued to be tied to the latter through its Messianic heritage,
and redeveloped the former in a revived priesthood and vicarious sacrificial system. The Pharisaic Jew needed no priest, for he was his own high priest, making acceptable offerings to God through prayer, penitence and deeds of loving kindness.  

After the destruction of the Temple, the Pharisees held that the divine “Shechinah” (“presence”) was in the schools of learning and in the husband embracing his wife, thereby making the synagogue and the family the pillars of Jewish life. They thus prepared the way for the Talmud and Rabbinical Judaism.

But, as Leo Baeck wrote, what also lent Judaism its tremendous vitality, was the fact that more often than not, it has the character of a philosophy of religion, a permanent discussion, which requires permanent study, so that it did not really know dogma. Consequently, it was not plagued, as the Christian Church was almost from the beginning, by vehement quarrels over dogmatic questions, and ensuing heresies and schisms.

If the Pharisees rejected Jesus, they did so not because they fundamentally objected to his teaching, but because they feared excessive messianism. They also rejected the messianism of the Zealots during the great rebellion. They felt that Israel should not stake its life on too-eager messianic expectations, which could only provoke the Romans, and preferred the normalizing phase of postponement of ultimate salvation to some unknown future, as Christianity did later by postponing the Parousia to some distant future.

The two movements were in entirely different, opposed phases, ecstatic milleniarism, which had to declare the old dispensation obsolete, but which formulated its expectation in reference to that same dispensation, and a “normalizing” conceptualization of temporary resignation, which for the time being accepted the social status quo. To the latter, as always in chiliast situations, the former seemed to be in the grip of some raving, and perhaps dangerous madness, a rage.

The antagonism left its mark on the oldest Christian writings, which explains what has been called the “anti-Semitic potential” of the New Testament, in the sense that over the centuries, people cherishing hatred towards Jews, have found in these writings rationalizations and justifications. As the very term “potential” suggests, and as was argued above, and will be elaborated, there is no immediate causal relation between that and later anti-Semitism, although occasionally some people may have formed their negative opinion about Jews on the basis of these writings.

The Acts and the Epistles are most directly informative about the attitudes
of the first Christians, unlike the Gospels, written several decennia after the events they describe. The Gospel of John mentions the Jews far more often in a pejorative sense than the synoptic gospels – 71 times as against 16 times – but it also contains the passage, significant for the secessionist hypothesis: “Salvation is of the Jews.” Even so, it should be remembered that in the Old Testament there is also “anti-Semitic potential”, eagerly used by Jew-hating exegetists. When John in chapter VIII, for example, though not as a verbatim report, fairly renders what Jesus said, his are the words of a Jew among Jews, castigating them in that self-critical style that has always been characteristic of the prophets. Are these words more critical of Jews than Isaiah v, or xxvi-i, Jeremiah iv:22, Ezekiel ix, Amos ii:4-10, v:26, or Micah vii, some examples at random?

Perhaps John, the most ecstatic of all, whose Revelation inspired all later chiliiasts made them more condemning than they were meant to be, as throughout the book he depicts the Jews as being possessed by hatred, and unlike the other evangelists, hardly differentiates between the various groups of Jews. He describes them, in an almost Manichaean dualism, as personifying evil. But dualism is a major characteristic of messianism or chiliasm. It has to be, since the only way to preach “a new heaven and a new earth” is to deny the existing ones, cf. Rev. 11:9, 11:9. Those who have one foot or more in the old order, cannot have the necessary faith in the new dispensation, and are thereby judged and condemned (John xii:43).

As indicated, mainstream Christianity inherited the secessionist rejection of Judaism, because the constant threat of heresy forced it to an ever more precise formulation of its “symbolic universe”, which it claimed was the “verus Israel”, the Jewish heritage, Jews having forfeited it. Judaism, once good, is no longer good, and its message has only meaning in a Christian context. This view can be attested by patristic writings, as can be exemplified.

**Patristic inheritance**

“Codicem portat Judaeus, unde credat Christianus. Librarii nostri facti sunt, quomodo solent servi post dominos codices ferre, ut illi portando deficiant illi legendo proficiant”, wrote Augustine. “Jews are merely library servants who hand over the texts. They are burdened by the weight of the Book, which only for the Christian is the solid foundation of his faith and the source of his spiritual welfare.” Augustine thereby summarily dismissed all claims of the Jews to their own sacred writings. There is no hope for them. In Augustine’s
opinion, Christians were the sole inheritors of the promise once given to the Jews, who in the era that began with the birth of Christ would have but one function: having fortified their claims, they would by their misery bear witness to the eternal truth of the Christian message: they would be a testimonium veritatis.

Similar ideas were often expressed by men of the Church of the fourth century; in fact, Justin Martyr had already said as much in the second century, when in the discussion with the Jew Trypho he remarked: “Your scripture, or rather not yours, but ours.”63 Jerome, thinking of Romans xi:16-25, wrote more kindly than Augustine: “Nos in radicem ipsam inserti sumus; nos rami sumus, illi radix. Non debere maledicere radicibus, sed debemus orare pro radicibus nostris” (“We are grafted onto the root. We are the branches. They are the root. We must not curse our roots, but we must pray for our roots”).64 The idea of the Christian inheriting the favored position of the Jew was expressed in yet another way by the author, who stated that, although the Jews were undeniably descendants of Sarah after the flesh, in spirit it was the Christians who belonged to Sarah’s line and the Jews to Hagar’s. (“Haec certe doctrina apostolica atque catholica satis evidenter indicat nobis secundum originem carnis ad Saram Judaeos, id est Israelitas, ad Agar vero Ismaelitas pertinere; secundum autem mysterium spiritus, ad Saram Christianos, ad Agar Judeos”).65

It was said that Jews had forfeited the promise once made to them, not only because they had murdered Christ, but also because this abominable crime was seen as the culmination of one continuous series of disobediences and trespasses, which began with the adoration of the Golden Calf in the Sinai desert. God, in His compassion and unending love, had again and again forgiven the Jews, until they committed the crime for which there is no forgiveness. That final felony was far from being a mere incident, for Jewish contravention of the Law was systematic. They perpetually sinned, repeatedly worshipped idols, and persecuted the Prophets when these rightly condemned them. Being deaf to the Prophets—who are thus systematically invoked as witnesses against them—the Jews failed to hear that these announced Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah. As the Chosen People, to whom the Message and the promise were first given, they ought to have known better, but since their hearts were hardened—since they were willfully deaf and blind—they failed to realize what they should have realized. That is why all Jews are guilty of the Crucifixion, and not just those who were present and answered “Barabbas”, when Pontius Pilate asked the pertinent question: “Whom will you that I release unto you? Barabbas or Jesus which is called Christ?”66 By staying in Ju-
daism, it was argued, Jews made it clear that they acknowledged the verdict of the multitude as just, and consequently they were collectively guilty. Collectively they had to answer for the curse they had brought upon themselves by exclaiming: “His blood be on us, and on our children.”

In so far as Jews kept the Law at all, some Christians argued, they did it in a literal, formal sense: without faith, and comprehending its true meaning.

Many texts of the “Old Testament”, as the Christians now called the Jewish scriptures, thereby indicating that the “Old Covenant” was obsolete, were quoted in patristic writings to prove these conditions. The Jewish texts and the Hebraica veritas (“Hebrew truth”) they contained were held to be authentic, (there were no accusations of forgeries as later in Islam) but the Jewish interpretation of them definitely was not. This notion became so ingrained that it was transformed into a ceremony in medieval Rome. At the consecration of each new Pope the Jewish community of Rome solemnly offered a scroll with the sacred texts to the new ruler of Rome, who condescendingly accepted the gift by saying that he respected the writings, but condemned the Jewish interpretation of them.

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In many early Christian writings the Jewish guilt was emphasized to such an extent, that not only Roman responsibility was systematically played down, but that rarely, if ever, the crucial events were depicted as inevitable, as Dante did later, when in an for his days unusual perception, in fact a denial of the charge of deicide, he wrote “ch’a Dio e a Giudei piaque una morta.” Neither the Jews nor the Roman administration were seen as being merely instrumental in the fulfillment of the divine will, despite the fact that the redemption through Christ’s blood is an essential feature of the Christian faith. The inevitable was announced when Jesus said: “For this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins”, or John xvi:7-8. In Gethsemane Jesus prayed: “O my Father, if this cup may not pass from me, except I drink it, Thy will be done.” The Jewish guilt was emphasized despite this divinely established inevitability, as if Jewish demeanor left God no choice but this cruel form of redemption.

The road to Damascus

It was primarily the former Pharisee Saul who, after his sudden conversion on the road to Damascus, and with the psychologically understandable vehemence of the neophyte, then as Paul, formulated the issues, in a manner
which deeply influenced later patristic literature. He confessed to being a pupil of that wise Jew, Gamaliel, to whose teaching, however, he paid little heed. The persecutor in Paul’s former self made him want to be persecuted in his new role: it is the same obsession.\textsuperscript{75} He boasted about his many sufferings.\textsuperscript{76}

Paul, perhaps more than any other apostle, gave shape to the nascent Christian theology and by implication to the articulation of a Christian rejection of the Jews collectively. His concept of faith as the exclusive way to salvation remained a central issue of Christian beliefs after Augustine, in particular, revitalized and reformulated it. The latter’s doctrine of justification by faith, inspired by the Epistles of Paul, not only served to condemn as heretical the Pelagian view that man can be saved by his own moral effort – in its emphasis on righteousness it could be called “Jewish” – but was also the hard core of the theological debate during the Reformation many centuries later. We want to submit that the notion that only faith in Jesus Christ – acquired by the mercy of his sacrifice, by grace – could lead to salvation, was the main secessionist issue, because it was the intellectual means of declaring Judaism a dead end. This does not mean to convey that the alleged guilt of the Jews in regard to the Crucifixion did not play an enormous role in the emerging animosity, but rather that Pauline doctrine made that event part and parcel of a more systematic rejection. Even so, it is interesting to note that Paul only once directly referred to the Crucifixion as committed by the Jews.\textsuperscript{77}

Systematic rejection needs some qualification. Gager’s excellent summary of extensive modern exegesis, makes it very clear that Paul’s Epistles can be read in a different way. It is then as if to all the utterances should be added: “for the Gentiles”, so that circumcision is redundant for the Gentiles coming to Christ, the Law obsolete for the Gentiles, and so forth.\textsuperscript{78} Such a reading, indeed, greatly helps modern Bible readers concerned about the “anti-Semitic potential” of the Epistles. For the faithful, Jewish guilt is then greatly reduced, rejection not absolute, the way to a better Jewish-Christian understanding opened. The question, however, is whether centuries ago, in the Middle Ages, the Epistles were ever read in this spirit. The traditional reading was in all likelihood the prevalent one, and as such essential for the understanding of the traditional Christian rejection of Jews and Judaism, and by implication for the understanding of anti-Semitism.

Paul was the enemy of the Judaizers and the hero of the Marcionites and Gnostics,\textsuperscript{79} who altogether rejected the Old Testament. As Gager remarks, he could only be rescued for mainstream Christianity, and be canonized, by the later condemnation of these heresies in anti-Judaistic terms.\textsuperscript{80}
The whole Pauline argument in relation to the Jewish failure is most extensively elaborated in the Epistle to the Romans, but also in Galatians and elsewhere, as well as in Hebrews, the letter to Jewish Christians, not written by Paul, but in its argumentation very much akin to Pauline thought.

To summarize, the argument runs that when faith paves the way to salvation, circumcision, as an outward sign, is to no avail, and therefore superfluous. It is the circumcision of the heart that counts. After all, Abraham was not circumcised, but through his faith became a patriarch. All great circumcised Jews were great, not because they were circumcised, but because they had faith, the circumcision of the heart. More or less the same holds true about the Law. Man can be righteous when he keeps the Law, naturally, for God’s Law is good, but only when he keeps it by faith. He may outwardly keep it, and yet be a sinner and a hypocrite. There is justification without the Law through faith in the redemptive act of Christ as the Law itself and the prophets testified. Righteousness is for the Jews, who keep the Law and have faith in Jesus and for the Gentiles, who do not have the Law, yet have faith through the grace that is in Jesus. The Law therefore is redundant. Grace is more than the Law: “Now grace is the ruling factor with righteousness as its purpose.” The Law has lost its claim. It is good, but cannot make man good.

This whole argument, as developed in Romans 11-11, is at the same time used as an indictment against the Jews. It is far more than a mere argument stating that with Christ a new dispensation has come. Jews are reproached with not keeping the Law at all. “Thou that makest thy boast of the Law, through breaking the Law dishonorest thou God? For the name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles through you, as it is written.” The Jews always were sinners, Paul argued, quoting the Psalms.

In Romans 11-11, Paul once more stresses the rejection of the Jews, a temporary rejection, for in Christ they will be ultimately saved – and also the obsoleteness of Judaism. “The elder shall serve the younger,” he argues, by quoting: “Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.” The Jews, the “chosen”, have miserably failed, but though they are at present enemies, which is to the advantage of Christians, they may yet be grafted onto the olive tree again. Christians ought to be grateful and compassionate, for they “have now obtained mercy through their [the Jews’] unbelief.”

The theme of the obsoleteness of Judaism is also found in the second letter to the Corinthians, phrased in a different manner. In it is related how after Moses had received the Law – which is the “ministration of death”, “for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life” – written on the stone tablets, his
countenance was so radiant with heavenly splendor that the children of Is-
rael could not bear to look him in the face. In veiling his face Moses, in fact,
blinded their minds: “for until this day remained the same veil untaken away
in the reading of the Old Testament; “…ut Deus Dominus noster auferat ve-
lamen de cordibus eorum…”93 in the prayer on Good Friday (that Our Lord
may lift the veil from their hearts).94

A most curious argument is the one Paul used to refute the implications of
the words “cursed is everyone that hangeth on a tree”,95 by turning it upside
down. Starting from the point that “cursed is everyone that continueth not in
all things which are written in the book of the Law to do them,”96 he argues
that as it is impossible to do all things, justification is only by faith so that the
Law becomes a curse (of alienation from God).97 Perhaps this dark passage
wants to convey that in a sort of dialectics avant la lettre Christ is cursed by
the Law that has become a curse so that – minus times minus equals plus –
consequently his act of redemption in abolishing the Law creates the mercy
of faith whereby “the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles.”98 It
reads then as if the promise made to Abraham: “In thee shall all nations be
blessed”,99 could only be realized by the rejection of Judaism.100 It had served
its time. Paul, therefore, in the end totally rejected circumcision. Circumci-
sion implies subjecting oneself to the Law101 and that amounts to renouncing
Christ, for “then is the offence of the cross ceased”.102 Paul repeatedly refers to
his own spiritual death and his rebirth on the road to Damascus as a testimo-
ny of these truths.103

In many ways the letter to Jewish Christians harps on the same theme,
though there the emphasis is not so much on the obsoleteness of the Law, but
rather on the redundancy of the Temple, and in this sense perhaps more anti-
Sadducean than anti-Pharisaic.104 It is similar to Paul’s writings in that it
equally emphasizes faith as the only way to salvation. All the heroes of the
Old Testament were heroes because they had faith. Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abra-
ham, Sarah, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Rahab, and many others.105 The Epistle to
the Hebrews, however, declares the old order obsolete on the grounds that
Christ’s sacrifice is perfect, vastly superior to the old customs. “For it is not
possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins, but the
blood of Christ does.”106 “The blood of the new covenant” makes superfluous
the blood of the old covenant.107 That is why the Levitical priesthood is now
superseded by the priesthood of Melchizedek, the King of Salem,108 who
blessed Abram, not yet renamed Abraham of the Covenant, and gave him
bread and wine, a forecast, whereupon Abram paid him tribute.109

In this articulate form secessionism was justified. The arguments were be-
queathed to later generations, but motivated the actions of the first disciples. The more both Jewish and Christian positions were articulated, the more manifest the dichotomy;\textsuperscript{110} the less room there was for the middle parties, for the Petrine Church, and in the end for the Jewish Christians. Hence there was less room for the tolerance they represented, much in the same way as there was no room for the moderates in the growing conflict between Reformation and Counter-Reformation. The Christian-Jewish controversy does seem explicable in general sociological terms, and is not necessarily due to the personal animus of the protagonists, Paul and others, as is often contended. Both are examples of the very secessionist positions analyzed above.

Repercussions of the heretical views

Although the Pauline views became the orthodox kernel of mainstream Christianity, it took some time before the victory was complete,\textsuperscript{111} for Judaism continued to be attractive, as is evident from the sects of the Ebionites and Nazarenes of the middle of the second century.\textsuperscript{112} The former even denied the virgin birth, and both rejected Paul’s writings and held that the Law had to be kept, including circumcision. They probably survived because the young church was not in a position to exert great pressure on Jewish Christians. This was due to the fact that the Jewish dispersion was so complete after the defeat of Simon Bar Cocheba by Hadrian in 135, and to the fact that Jews (and by implication Jewish-Christians) were not allowed to enter Jerusalem renamed Aelia Capitolina.\textsuperscript{113} The Church, therefore, continuously had to be on its guard in order to prevent backsliding and Judaizing among some Christians, and so the above quoted fifth century utterances are fully understandable.

Other heresies, like that of the Marcionites, completely rejected Judaism. The latter held that the Creation was the work of a just but wrathful “demiurge”, who gave the Law which nobody could keep. This was the god of the Old Testament. A higher god, manifest in Jesus Christ, resolved to rescue mankind from the curse of not being able to keep the law. The demiurge, angry with “God the Son”, had him crucified, but in doing so he infringed on his own Law, for which he was punished by having to give up all the souls from the underworld to be redeemed. To gain the living, Christ created Paul, who alone understood the difference between the just and the good god. His words were however falsified by the Jewish-Christians, who gained the upper hand. Salvation, in Marcionite thought, could only be achieved by accepting
exclusively the purified Gospel of Luke, and the expurgated Epistles of Paul: a task Marcion took upon himself. In assuming the existence of two gods and in teaching that only the spirit could be saved and that the body should be left to the demiurge, Marcionism paved the way for those Gnostic movements of Manichaeanism, with which it later fused, and which held that the Creator was the evil principle and the Creation was evil. Salvation consisted of the pure spiritualism that could only be achieved by the undoing of Creation. In such a view, the “chosen” as the “chosen people of the evil spirit” were of necessity an evil people which particularly in Egypt conformed to age-old traditions.

The outspoken anti-Judaistic tenor of Marcion’s teaching did not prevent Tertullian from contesting them in an equally anti-Judaistic manner, arguing that one God, both just and loving, could not but give a harsh Law because of the hard-heartedness of the Jews. The Law itself foretold its own finiteness, and its final consummation by Christ.

So, heresies not only directly stimulated an ever-more precise articulation of the “symbolic universe” of mainstream Christianity and by implication its anti-Judaistic and/or its anti-Jewish tenor, they also indirectly strengthened particularly its anti-Semitic animus, Marcionism, some varieties of Gnosticism and also the more Christianized western variety of Manichaeanism which denied the uniqueness of the God of Israel, by giving him a lower place in a dualistic order. Precisely in order to salvage a true monotheism from the heretical views, and in order to emphasize the obsolescence of the Law caused by Jesus’ redemptive act, Tertullian, Justin Martyr, Origin, and others were forced to blame the Jews for not keeping it and for not understanding its foretelling of Christ. Their hard-heartedness, their inclination to disobedience ever since the Golden Calf, prevented that.

Intellectual defense against heresy therefore stimulated the leadership of the Church into making the secessionist accusation of disloyalty of the Jews everlasting, but this, as will be discussed did not necessarily hold true for the laity. The more the Church grew in size, in wealth, and in power, however, and the more the leadership was thereby removed from the social layers of the first disciples and apostles, the greater grew the disparity between a literate leadership and a largely illiterate laity, and the greater was the need for the leadership to instill its rejection of the Jews into that same laity, so often under the influence of diametrically opposed, strongly Judaizing heresies.
CHAPTER 4

Stigmatization, Nascent Hostility, and Social Distance

The Church and the state in East and West

However much the Church may have grown after Constantine’s conversion, this did not mean that its position was henceforth secure and uncontested. Julian the Apostate did pose a threat, and so did the remnants of traditional paganism, the heretical Germanic invaders and the pagan Huns. Although the Council of Nicaea in 325 had condemned Arianism, and its doctrine that Christ was of different substance from God (heterousios) and accepted Athanasian consubstantiality (homo-ousios), Constantine and his immediate successors still tried to swing the Church towards Arianism. As long as the Church was thus in a state of turmoil, the Judaizing tendencies of a large section of the laity also constituted a menace, but perhaps one that seemingly could more easily be dealt with than all the others. A militant attitude was adopted.

The emphasis on the temporary displacement of Jews by Christians in the Divine plan, the frequent attacks on the Jews by many Church Fathers – deicides, worshippers of the devil, murderers of the prophets, enemies of such men as John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Eusebius of Caesarea, Origen, and many others – and the lengthy argumentation and elaborate theological reasoning they used to prove their contentions, all suggest that the Church of the fourth and fifth centuries still took the Jews seriously and feared them. Otherwise it would not have taken so much trouble to refute the Jews’ claim to full possession of the truth; it would not have harped on the wicked blindness of the Jews, their stubbornness, and their inexorable crime. A really victorious Church, backed by the political power of the Roman Empire, would have treated its former rivals, the Jews, as nonentities, would have ignored them altogether, might even have tried to annihilate Judaism, the way it annihilated paganism and many heresies, had it not been forced of necessity to pay heed to the Jews and their traditions. These traditions had so much authority that the easy way out of all difficulty by accusing the Jews of having
forged the texts, was never chosen – Justin Martyr seems to have been the exception⁴ – for Dorotheus of Antioch and many theologians, including Jerome, were only too eager to learn from the Rabbis.⁵ The *Hebraica veritas* of the text was never doubted,⁶ only the Jewish interpretation of it was strongly denied. That had to be refuted and its pernicious influence had to be broken, which is perhaps the reason why Jerome wrote: “We must hate the Jews, who every day in their synagogues insult Jesus Christ.”⁷ Fear of Judaizing tendencies indeed forced the Church to be constantly on its guard,⁸ precisely because it needed some essential features of the Judaist tradition to legitimize its own creed, and for the vindication of its own authenticity.

During the late fourth and fifth centuries there were several reasons why the Church in general continued to adopt a militant attitude, particularly towards the Jews. The gradually increasing political chaos in the western half of the empire necessitated an independent attitude towards the emperors. The Western Church, not sure that it could always find support at the imperial court, had to rely on its own strength. It did this so successfully that occasionally it could turn its power even against the emperors, as it did in the case of Theodosius the Great, whom bishop Ambrose of Milan forced to do penance for the massacre in Thessalonica in 390, which was committed in revenge for an insurrection. Ambrose thereby strongly emphasized the independence of the Church, and precluded the “caesaropapist” organization which was gradually unfolding in the East. Such a solution would have been impossible anyway because of the disappearance of imperial power in the West.

After the death of Theodosius (395) the turmoil increased. Alaric sacked Rome in 410, Attila ravaged Italy, and Africa was conquered by Vandals. Sheer self-preservation forced the Church to fill the political vacuum. It became a political force of prime significance. The popes Damasus 1 and Leo 1 were temporal lords as well as spiritual leaders. Claims of the Donation of Constantine already began to be made.

The price the Church had to pay was greater vulnerability to external influences: the Germanic invasions not only jeopardized the religious authority of the Church, but also its political influence.

Although the situation was different in the East, this did not necessarily mean that the position of the Eastern Church was more secure. Subject to rigorous imperial control, it often became involved in political conflicts, which could not but hamper it. Not only was the traditional divinity of the emperor maintained in the semi-sacral form of the *proscynesis* court ritual – such a divinity not being possible in a Christian Empire – but also, ever since Constantine, and certainly since Justinian, the emperor had a controlling influence in
Church matters; *Sacerdotium* and *imperium* were united in the person of the monarch, though not always uncontested. The emperor virtually controlled the nomination of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and although the latter had the power to excommunicate an emperor, he seldom wielded this weapon. Imperial influence was not limited to Church administration, but extended to theological disputes as well. Emperors interfered very frequently. The theological foundation of this exalted position of the emperor was formulated by Eusebius of Caesarea, who saw in Constantine the image of the Logos, the Great Emperor, who ushered in the age of salvation, an idea related to the concept of Augustus as the creator of the *oecumene* in which the savior was born.9

Because of this “caesaropapist” nexus between Church and crown, political conflicts often tended to assume a religious character and vice versa, as is proved by the history of many heresies, in particular by the behavior of Nestorians and Monophysites, who in the end actually welcomed the Muslim invasion. In the East, too, there were various disruptive forces, which demanded great vigilance on the part of the established Church.

Under these circumstances Judaism was a perpetual irritant. Eschatologists could regard it as the major impediment to an otherwise imminent *Parousia*.10 The idea was that Jewish disbelief prevented the Second Coming, that would take place when final peace was established between God and “His people”, then converted to belief in Jesus. Jews are to be blamed for the continuation of this vale of tears. The more practically minded had to pay special attention to Jewry because of its peculiar relation to Christianity and because it was the only recognized religion outside Christianity in the Roman realm;11 compare this with the *Codex Theodosii*: “*Judaeorum sectam nulla lege prohibitam satis constat*”12 (“that the sect of the Jews is prohibited is by no Law sufficiently established”). It was of old a *religio licita*, so that before Constantine was converted, Christians could use it as a safe haven in times of persecution; they could hide “*sub umbraculo insignissimae religionis certe licitae*” (“under the umbrella of the most notorious religion, which however is definitely allowed”).13

Within the framework of a not yet wholly established Christian community, Judaism constituted an alien element, which was hampered by restrictive measures but would not, and could not, be absorbed. Because of its secessionist relation to Judaism, the Church could not incorporate it as it incorporated many obdurate paganism by giving them a Christian varnish (25 December is Mithras Day!); on the contrary, the Church had to be perpetually on its guard against possible Judaizing tendencies. Legally protected, Ju-
daism could not be blotted out with violence, since its continued existence was, from the Christian point of view, a theological necessity; the Jews being the “chosen of God” having paramount significance in Christian theology as well. The expressis verbis-formulated legality in itself is a token of this peculiar relationship between Judaism and Christianity, for it is indeed only on theological considerations that Judaism did not share the fate of so many other oriental religions. It was not a heresy, nor a paganism, nor could it be considered as such for theological reasons. It had a position of its own, in theology as well as in secular law. When Theodosius the Great opted for Athanasianism against Arianism and proscribed both paganism and heresy in severe decrees, Jews were merely hampered: no new synagogues could be built, intermarriage with Christians was forbidden, proselytism was made an offense; harsh enough measures, indeed, but far removed from the fate of pagans and heretics.

During the reign of Theodosius 1 the statue of Victoria was definitely removed from the Senate House a short while after a senatorial deputation, led by Symmachus, had pleaded for its restoration, Eleusinian mysteries and Olympic games were celebrated for the last time, and the cult of Mithras, Osiris, Serapis, and all the other competing cults silently stole away. Pagan art and culture were neglected or fanatically destroyed, as Gibbon so eloquently bewailed. In fact, the proscription of paganism seemed so effective that the Theodosian code, 42 years after the death of Theodosius 1, could state: “Paganos, qui supersunt, quamquam iam nulos credamus...” (“The pagans who remain, although we believe that there are not any left...”). Christianity, which in the decisive year of the battle of the Milvian Bridge (312) was still only a small minority, seemed to have been completely victorious. The victory, however, was perhaps not as complete as it appeared, for it was only a short while before that Julian, who supported the Jews, restored the Temple and gave new heart to the remaining pagans, so conveniently died from the wound inflicted by a Persian arrow. The army, composed of peasants and barbarians, could acclaim tomorrow another Julian, another Valens, even another Diocletian.

There was, however, not only danger to the Church from the outside, but from the inside as well, for although, no doubt, many new Christians were true, convinced converts, a greater number, merely afraid of sanctions, were not so sincere and only outwardly conformed. The sack of Rome by Alaric, only shortly before the publication of the Codex, had given rise to such widespread feelings of doubt as to whether this calamity was not due to the neglect of the ancient rites and gods, that it induced Augustine to refute them by writing “De Civitate Dei”.}

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The proscription of heresy was probably less effective than that of paganism. Arianism, eradicated perhaps within the realm, was rampant among the invaders, whereas apart from the 47 other minor or major heresies which Eusebius of Caesarea mentioned in his History of the Church, Nestorian and Monophysite teachings began to take shape during this period. Yet, however great the need for militancy, the existing synagogues were officially, and mostly also in practice, left undisturbed.

If the Church could neither eradicate Judaism nor absorb the Jews, it could not ignore them either. This is evident, for example from the ritual on Good Friday, “oremus et pro perfidis Judaeis”. Judaism and Christianity were so inextricably intertwined by common background and by the use of the same sacred books that theological discussions were bound to ensue; disputes which, in fact lasted until well into the Middle Ages. The Church, however, could not afford to meet the challenge openly, for it could not allow the Jews to score points and leave the onlookers a free choice; the Jews had to be proved wrong on all points. That is why all Jewish texts had to be fully appropriated. That is also why so many tracts were written in the form of a dialogue. It was a form ideally suited to refute all the possible Jewish arguments, whether actually used by Jews, or not.

Often the rendering of these disputes were miracle tales rather than philosophical discussions. For example, in the Discussion of St. Silvester with the Jews of Rome, the author, for fear that the Christian argument would not be fully convincing, has one of the Jewish disputants, Zambri, propose to decide the issue by working some miracles. Both parties agreed, and thereupon Zambri killed a ferocious bull by whispering the holy and unpronounceable name of God into the animal’s ear. It was revived, however, by St. Silvester, in the name of Jesus Christ, in such a manner that, though healthy, it had lost its ferociousness. Judaism kills, Christianity restores to higher life!

By systematically refuting the Jews’ position, the Church primarily aimed at preventing Christians from backsliding or being Judaized. There were those who were still impressed by the Biblical authority the Jews enjoyed, and those who were baptized for opportunist reasons, such as jobs or office, or because they did not care one way or the other. The continued separate existence of the Jews, who by their misery could serve as a testimonium veritatis (“witness of the truth”) of the Christian faith, was only advantageous to the Church provided they were actually miserable and in no way influenced the Christians. Consequently, as long as there was even the smallest degree of Jewish proselytizing or Judaizing among Christians, the Church could only try to sever relations.
There seems to be no reason to doubt that Jewish proselytism persisted long after Constantine. Judaism continued to be attractive even for those who had become Christians, as is evident from the fulminations of John Chrysostom. As late as 1092 it was deemed necessary to forbid Jewish proselytism in Spain.\(^{23}\)

Perhaps the very spreading of the Gospel resulted in more people coming into contact with Jewish traditions than ever before. This could have been as much to the advantage of Judaism as of Christianity. The Jews could still profit from Christian anti-polytheist groundwork,\(^{24}\) as had been the case in previous centuries.

There was a persistence of Jewish ideas and Judaizing tendencies among the Christian fold, despite Romans 11 and 111, where the relation to the old Law is most succinctly described. The tendency to adhere to the dietary laws, to keep the sabbath, to attend Jewish sermons and to consume unleavened bread persisted. To “sabattize” and to “Judaize” became bywords for any tendency towards presumed unorthodoxy. This was notably the case with the iconoclasts.\(^{25}\) Despite his anti-Jewish measures Leo 111 the Isaurian was accused of Judaizing by the Iconodulists, (i.e., image worshipping) understandably since the worship of images always played so great a role in the dialogues with the Jews.\(^{26}\) (The Brazen Serpent, erected by Moses in the Sinai Desert to ward off the plague of poisonous snakes (Numbers xx1:9) was always invoked by Christians to justify their transgression of the Second Commandment!).\(^{27}\) Even so, in 782 Pope Adrian 1 threatened to excommunicate those who ate blood, pork, or strangled animals; Gregory 111 (731-741) forbade the eating of carrion, or animals killed by other animals. There are more examples of the preservation of Mosaic law, which all contributed to the confusion,\(^{28}\) and hence to the ever existing necessity of the Church to be on the alert, the margin for true orthodoxy being narrow.

It could use theological argumentation; it could also, by exerting pressure on the imperial government, bring about measures in secular law which aimed at preventing the Jews from successfully spreading their teaching, or it could, in the West at least, do so on its own authority. The aim was as great a severance as possible.

In the Codex Theodosii it was already made an offense to try to make converts to Judaism or to try to restrain Jews from becoming Christians. (Later, it became a capital offense to circumcise a Christian child, which, of course, could imply that if someone baptised a Jewish child, its parents committed a capital offense if they reared it in their own religion.\(^{29}\) Marriages between Jews and Gentiles were forbidden, and in fact, treated as adultery. Jews could
not own Christian slaves and were not admitted to public office, unless these were burdensome. The building of new synagogues was not permitted officially, the repair of old ones hampered as much as possible. In this respect, however, the West, or at least Italy was slightly more tolerant than the East. In Africa under Byzantine rule, for example, the formalistic attitude was adopted that the rebuilding of a synagogue which was destroyed by an earthquake, was building from scratch and therefore not allowed, whereas repairs were permitted in Italy both under Gothic and pontifical rule.

Much of this Roman segregationist legislation was later introduced formally, if not effectively, in some of the Germanic successor states, notably in Spain, under Alaric I, and increasingly so after Recared gave up Arianism in 589. Naturally it served as the basis for Byzantine legislation concerning the Jews, and was greatly elaborated by Justinian and his immediate successors.

The champions of the Church also occasionally borrowed from earlier pagan writers whenever it served their purpose. The ancient charge of Jewish superstition, for example, was used, now to mean clinging to wrong perceptions.

With these weapons men of the Church of the fourth and fifth centuries and their allies set out to render the Jews hateful in the eyes of the common laymen – Simon speaks of a système d'avilissement – they were carried by their secessionist convictions that the Jews constituted a real danger as well as a theological necessity. Perhaps by wrath over the persecution they, rightly or wrongly, believed to have suffered at the hands of the Jews in a recent past. Eusebius’ The History of the Church is full of such accusations.

When the Church Fathers were really inspired by fear of the weight Jewish arguments carried with the laity, this suggests that their attitude was far from representative of the attitude of the population at large. Popular lay philo-Judaism could then be the true explanation of clerical anti-Semitism.

**John Chrysostom of Antioch**

One of the main testifiers, of course, is Chrysostom of Antioch, who in his eight Homilies against the Jews attacked them precisely in order to prevent so many members of his own flock from heading to the wrong stable. Was Antioch, of old a place of intense Jewish-Gentile symbiosis, though not always a friendly one, a case apart? As has been shown, it knew tensions between Greek and Jew, which were to some extent offset by Jewish proselytism. Antioch, due to the efforts of Paul and primarily Barnabas, was also the primary
early Christian community among the Gentiles, so much so that it was there that the name “Christians” was used for the first time.⁴⁷ According to Meeks, this means that pagans in Antioch realized the difference between Jews and Christians sooner than those of other places,⁴⁸ which tallies with the fact that it was the centre of the anti-Judaizing, anti-Jacobean party. The remark also shows the relatively social significance of both groups. A Greek majority would not bother to differentiate between such “barbarian” groups if they were utterly insignificant.

There is therefore reason to assume that later there was a tripartite power-game between the traditional pagan Greek aristocracy, the Jewish community, which gradually became respectable, and the Christian community of mixed Greek-Jewish descent. The traditional aristocracy was the losing partner. It lost much of its former prestige because of heavy taxation and economic decline and could not maintain the relative autonomy it had enjoyed of old, like most other Greek centers. A new elite of (former) officials and military commanders, the honorati, took its place. This elite gravitated towards Rome, as the Christian elite did after Constantine, so that presumably these groups fused. Jews who had often clashed with the autochthonous Greek elitist group in pagan days had always sought support in Rome after the great rebellions, and even more in the later pagan period with the realization that rebellion was fruitless, and that their faith was increasingly being recognized as an authentic “ethnic” religion, in contradistinction with Christianity. This alliance between the Jews and Rome was reversed when the Empire became Christian, so that the Jewish community and the remnants of the (formerly) pagan Greek aristocracy, former enemies, became natural allies; the forging of this alliance was presumably reinforced by both groups being favored by the Emperor Julian’s short-lived attempts at reviving paganism and restoring the Jewish Temple.⁴⁹

Political strife between a Jewish-Greek faction and a Christian elite does not necessarily mean, however, that all Christians participated in it. Assuming a downward social mobility for large parts of the population, there may have been social cleavages.⁵⁰ A downward social mobility of a large section of the Christian population could perhaps explain a decreased animosity towards the oppositional faction. It was said at the time that the underprivileged —women and the poorer, uneducated classes — were particularly prone to Judaizing, though, as Meeks warns, this could be merely a manner of speech.⁵¹

Antioch may have been the stronghold of the radical Christian party as long as Paul was there, but the quarrel between Paul and Barnabas may have
rather changed that. The quarrel was more than a private affair: Barnabas (and his followers?) leaned towards the Petrine point of view. In view of such a “semi-Judaizing” party, it may be significant that Paul never returned to Antioch. Perhaps the Judaizing tendencies were too strong for him. Whatever the cause of such (restored) intimacy between segments of the Jewish and Christian groups, it was so strong that conversions from Christianity to Judaism could actually take place. It may have been reinforced by a certain degree of indifference on the Christian side as a result of opportunistic conversions. Since, moreover, ancient Judaism and Jewish scripture enjoyed prestige in all versions of Christianity, a degree of Judaizing was almost inevitable.

There is no reason to assume that Antioch was exceptional in this respect. Although information about other towns is scarce, there is every reason to assume that conditions in these smaller towns were basically the same, the only difference being that they did not have a Chrysostom, to highlight them. There had been the same conflict in other towns over the citizenship of Jews. There the Greek aristocracy is likely to have lost much of its prestige for the same reasons, and for the same reasons a Christian elite, after Constantine, basked in the favour of central authority. Thus a similar reversal of alliances is likely to have taken place, with identical results. In Daphne, for example, as is evident from Chrysostom’s invectives, the situation was identical. Only Alexandria may have been an exception, since of old it had a strong social segregation, reinforced by local Egyptian religious traditions. There the existing social distance may have been so great as to prevent a renversement des alliances.

However provocative the mere Jewish presence was in his eyes, Chrysostom’s ambition was not the extirpation of Judaism. His “aim in these homilies is to deter Christians from participating in Jewish rites. Far from representing a popular hostility towards Judaism among Christians in Antioch, Chrysostom’s imprecations reveal the exact opposite: a widespread Christian infatuation with Judaism.” This infatuation took many forms, such as celebrating Easter on the day of the Passover (against the ruling of the Council of Nicaea), practicing circumcision as well as baptism, observing the sabbath as well as the Sunday and celebrating the Jewish feasts as well as the Christian festivals. It also took the form of consulting Jewish healers and exorcists. Women wore amulets with Hebrew signs. Yet another form was the firm belief that in cases of civil litigation an oath was only valid when taken in the synagogue, presumably on the grounds that the Church did not allow the taking of an oath. (Matthew v:34-38, James v:12).

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Though in principle not approving of such practices for non-observants, the Rabbis perhaps condoned them, considering them as permissible for the “proselytes of the Gate”, the followers of the “Noachian Laws”.50

Chrysostom and many other Church Fathers could not possibly condone them. For them recognition that the observance of any element of the Law was valid was equal to the total denial that redemption was through faith in Jesus Christ alone. What was perhaps once permissible for the first disciples who were born Jewish, was now by no means permissible any longer, and certainly not for Christians coming from the Gentiles. Augustine and Jerome too, though disagreeing on the former point, are equally emphatic about the latter.51

With all his oratorical skill Chrysostom set out to “heal the sick”, the sickness being the practice of many “who belong to us and say that they believe in our teaching” of attending the festivals of the Jews, “even (sharing) in their celebrations and (joining) in their feasts”.52 In his opinion the need for this cure was so urgent that the Sermons against the Arians – their impiety in his eyes being anyhow akin to that of the Jews – had to be temporarily suspended.53

His technique seems to be applying literally to the Jews’ terms taken from biblical metaphors. Quoting Jeremiah 11:3 and Jeremiah 7:11 he calls the synagogue a house of prostitution or a den of wild animals, a hideout for thieves.54 Their fast is a drunken party of the crowds at the theaters.55 The synagogue is not made more holy because the Holy Scripture is there, any more than a tavern full of robbers is made respectable by the presence of a virtuous man. It is a place full of demons, the place where the Christ-killers gather – Chrysostom is one of the first to use this term unreservedly for his own Jewish contemporaries56 – and thus the place “where the Cross is ridiculed, God blasphemed, the Father unacknowledged, the Son insulted, and the Grace of the Spirit rejected”.57 But because the holy books are there, the simple and the foolish are taken in and fall into the Jews’ snares.58 So he goes on and on, harping on the Jewish wickedness, their basenessness, or their obstinacy: not fasting when God demanded it,59 fasting when God no longer desired it. It is one long repetitious and tedious harangue.60 The vehemence, nay the coarseness of his invectives, stands in a strange contrast with the loving kindness he later showed to a fallen enemy, the pagan consul Eutropius, whose right of asylum in the Church he defended, even though that had been the very source of their conflict.61 Lack of triumph in this case highlights the significance he attached to the denouncing of his other enemies, the Jews, not yet beaten.

In the light of later accusations, it is most interesting to note that in calling Jews drunks, gluttons, robbers, sorcerers,62 licentious and so forth, Chrysos-
tom used epithets wholly alien to later epochs. He never calls them profiteers, moneygrubbers, exploiters of the work of others, conspirators, or similar medieval or modern designations. This once more suggests that (early) Christian indoctrination is perhaps a necessary, but certainly not a necessary and sufficient condition for Judeo-phobia.

The Latin Fathers

In the West similar conditions may have obtained, though it seems more difficult to prove. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Council of Elvira in Spain (ca. 300) found it necessary to forbid the blessing of the crops of Christian landowners by Jews suggests that Jewish rites were highly esteemed. Likewise, the ruling about Christians sharing a meal with Jews (and by implication not objecting to dietary laws) suggests close social relations, as do rulings about intermarriage or illegitimate relations with a Jewish woman, which were more severely punished than inter-Christian adultery. Moreover, the very fact that in Carolingian times the Church still had to deal with similar problems suggests that Jewish-Christian friendship on the lay level persisted, despite the measures of Church leaders.

It seems therefore justified to presume that the Latin Church Fathers were largely inspired by the same fear that inspired Chrysostom. Even though their expression of concern consisted less of vulgar name-calling, their rejection of Judaism was just as total.

As has been shown, Tertullian (150-225), in his attack on Marcion, defended the God of the Old Testament in a most anti-Jewish fashion. The Law given by a wise and loving God was harsh, he argued, because hard-hearted people called for strict rules. Dietary laws were imposed to combat Jewish gluttony (cf. Chrysostom). The rule “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” was imposed because this restive nation was too impatient to wait for divine justice. The destruction of the Temple and of Jerusalem, the Diaspora, and all of the Jews’ other misfortunes were God’s punishment for their implacable crime. This point of view is also held by Origen, thereby anticipating both Augustine’s “testimonialum veritatis fidei nostrae” (“witness of the truth of our faith”), and its implied self-fulfilling prophecy.

Augustine applied his formidable intellectual powers to the rejection of the Jews. His intellectual standing, his enormous influence on later generations, and his pre-eminence over the other Fathers of the Church made his judgment a standard for later generations.
Preoccupied with sin, entirely rejecting the notion of free will, basing his predestinarian views on the most extreme form of the Pauline concept of justification by faith alone, he could not but rigorously reject any form of Judaizing and of declaring allegiance to the Law. His notion that God is a loving and just God, who seemingly quite arbitrarily condemns most and saves some, lends a sort of finality to the condemnation of the Jews. Nobody merits being saved, for we are all sinners, but by God’s free grace some are chosen, having received the faith as token of that grace. 69 “ Damnation proves God’s justice; salvation His mercy. Both equally display His goodness.” 70 Augustine hopes for the salvation of the Jews, by conversion to Christianity that is, but does not seem to believe in it, at least not in his day. Some of his anti-Jewish feelings may have been a relic from his Manichaeist youth.

On the eve of his baptism, he was told by Ambrose of Milan to read Isaiah. As an explanation why only that book was chosen, Augustine later wrote that Isaiah more clearly than others foretold the perdition of Israel, 71 referring to Isaiah vi:9, rendered in the Gospels: “By hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand” (Matthew xi:14, Mark iv:12, Luke viii:10, John xii:40). 72

In the City of God he seldom refers to the Jews, but when he does it is always in that same tone of finality. He constantly refers to their fate as irrevocable, except at the very end of the book where he expresses the view that when the prophet Elijah returns, shortly before the day of judgment, he will expound the Law to the Jews, will make them see the light, and bring them to Christ. 73 Only then will they cease to interpret the Law in a material sense (cf. Malachi. iv:5). 74 The irrevocablity is most clearly expressed in his statement that the division of the kingdom of Israel prefigures the division into an Israel which is the enemy of Christ and an Israel which attaches itself to Christ, that is, the Israel connected with the maidservant Agar and the Israel connected with the freewoman Sarah (cf. Galatians. iv:21-31). 75 The implied perdition of the former Israel was foreseen, for he continues: “The Lord will not go back on His word, nor will He change His mind.” 76 Indeed, all is part of the divine plan “For what is the ‘Old Testament’ but a concealed form of the New Testament? And what is the ‘New Testament’ but the revelation of the Old Testament”; 77 the Jews killed Jesus when the New Testament revealed what was veiled in the Old Testament. 78 Jews have never understood the Law and the Prophets. 79 The true priesthood is that of Melchizedek, and not that of the line of Aaron, which was abolished when the events prefigured by Melchizedek came to the light of day, with Christ. 80

The themes of Augustine’s Sermons on the Jews are very much in the same vein. Admonishing the faithful to be steadfast, he uses the fate of the Jews as
an example of what happens to those who waver. Even though the cut-off branches of the olive tree may yet be regrafted (Rom. xi:18), there is “weeping and gnashing of teeth” (Matthew VIII:12) for the unbelievers. Augustine despair s of the Jews’ willingness to accept the faith as long as they say to Christians: “What use is it to read the Law, if you do not keep it”, forgetting that they themselves cannot keep it since they do not understand it. In substantiation of this statement he uses all the well-known arguments, as well as some of his own invention.

The Law is not abolished but fulfilled in Jesus. Psalm 69, among others, is adduced as proof, in particular verse 22, and therefore, Augustine continues, Jews themselves have become “as bitter as gall and as sour as vinegar”. God refuses their sacrifices (Psalm L: 7-15, Malachi 1:10). Moreover they can no longer lawfully sacrifice, for the only place, according to the law, where sacrifices could take place is lost by their guilt. He uses the arguments of the rejected cornerstone (Psalm cxi:22, Isaiah xxviii:16), the older shall serve the younger, the priesthood of Melchizedek, and the argument that the superiority of the new dispensation is proved by its stemming from Jerusalem, whereas the old Law came from the Sinai – (Isaiah 11:3), to prove that Jews are no longer “the Chosen”. In the “Tractatus adversus Judaeos” he uses many pejorative epithets such as criminals, murderers, voluptuous, godless, wolves, and so on, and compares Jews in the synagogue with cattle, but like Chrysostom he too uses none of the later typical socioeconomic or political charges. So, both Greek and Latin Church Fathers, in utter condemnation stigmatized the Jews as the obstinate adherents of a wrong, even pernicious, belief. Are they then exclusively responsible for maintaining the articulation of rejection, after Marcionism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism were more or less driven underground?

Many of those who accepted such a point of view could and did look for arguments to support their thesis in the history of Arianism, which is said – among others by Montesquieu – to have been more tolerant towards the Jews than orthodoxy. Early Visigoth Spain – after the Visigothic kings became Roman Catholic, they were amongst the more intolerant, like Sisibut ordering mass conversion in 613 – and Ostrogothic Italy of Theodoric the Great are usually cited as proof of this contention.

Jews, indeed, showed their gratitude towards Theodoric by actively helping him to defend Naples against Belisarius in 536, but does this prove more than that the Jews had worse to fear from Byzantine rule? It does prove a greater measure of tolerance on the side of the Gothic King as king, not as Arian, for the treatment the Jews received at the hands his co-religionist Alaric
11, who introduced some of the harsher measures of the Theodosian code in Spain, was not very different from that of Catholic rulers.\textsuperscript{94}

The argument rests on the assumption that Arianism was less alienated from Judaism and consequently more tolerant because it conceived of Christ’s nature as being different from God’s and because it did not accept the Trinity.\textsuperscript{95} The argument is invalidated by two considerations. On the one hand, even granted that Arians would less easily accuse the Jews of deicide, – a notion which even in orthodox Athanasianism smacked of the Sabellian heresy (the Son is identical with the Father)\textsuperscript{96} – there was enough left for them to distance themselves theologically from the Jews. There is no reason to assume that Arians would be less inclined than the orthodox to blame the Jews for their willful stubbornness and blindness, or that they would consider the “crime” of the Jews less abominable because they had a different concept about the victim. One of the few extant Arian anti-Jewish tracts, the “contra Judaeos” of the Arian bishop of Hippo, Maximinus, is there to prove it.\textsuperscript{97}

On the other hand, given the widespread philo-Judaism of the lay population at large and the abstract character of the anti-Jewish argumentation, there is little that is enigmatic in Theodoric’s treatment of the Jews relating to practical affairs, the less so since he was equally tolerant with Catholics in his kingdom. His attitude, in fact, closely resembled that of Gregory the Great, the administrator, who differed greatly from Gregory the Great, the theologian. As administrator he ruled that Jews should be met with kindliness, whereas as theologian he would be polemical.\textsuperscript{98} In both roles, however, he ruled that violence should never be used, and condemned forced conversions or any other form of coercion. His position was that Jews are permitted everything that is not \textit{expressis verbis} forbidden them in law.

Within the limitations of the anti-proselytist legislation many emperors also treated the Jews with fairness. There is just no reason to assume that abstract controversy automatically found practical application.

The question has therefore to be raised how these highly literate theological abstractions were translated into official discrimination or more in particular into popular hatred and mob violence, of illiterate masses.

The situation was actually very complex, for there is reason to surmise that despite still fairly generally prevailing goodwill, some sections of the population had already begun to draw conclusions, which led to mob violence and to destruction of synagogues, as early as the fourth century, although this may have been primarily the work of monks. It is also true that such actions often went unpunished. Bishop Ambrose of Milan, for example, by refusing...
communion in 388, compelled Theodosius the Great, against the latter’s better judgment, to condone the destruction of a synagogue, in Callinicum in Mesopotamia.99 Two years later Ambrose adopted a similar attitude, with much more moral justification, towards the emperor as rebuke for the latter’s massacre of the Thessalonians,100 which strikingly illustrates how much Ambrose valued the case of the arsonists. His attitude, however, was completely in accordance with the contemporary theological standpoint, as was the emperor’s for that matter.

The latter would have argued, rightly, that as Judaism was a religio licita, it was against the law to burn down a synagogue. It was, therefore, an offense against his “imperium”, and should be punished as such. Ambrose argued that no Christian money should be spent on supporting pernicious unbelief. He may have claimed that the rule of law also implied that no new construction of synagogues was allowed, and that certainly no Christian should be forced to pay for such an unlawful building. He does not say that the arsonists were right in doing what they did; regrettably he does not condemn them either. He merely held that the cause of religion is more important than the cause of secular discipline. On the basis of this incident it cannot be construed that the Church as such – not identical with individual churchmen – began to stimulate anti-Semitism beyond the limits it had set itself.101

There are more cases like that of Callinicum. When relics of Stephen, the first Christian martyr, were carried to Minorca in 418, it led to violence. In Gibbon’s cynical phrase: “At Minorca, the relics of St. Stephen converted in eight days 540 Jews; with the help, indeed, of some wholesome severities, such as burning the synagogues, driving the obstinate infidels to starve among the rocks(...).”102 Why relics had this effect on Minorca, and nowhere else,103 is far from clear, but seems to indicate its rather exceptional character. Even though there are a few more cases – the destruction of the synagogue in Dertona in northern Italy by bishop Innocent, for example, or the killing of Jews weeping at the Wailing Wall in 413 by a group of monks led by one Barsama104 – there is a good deal of evidence to show that Christian laymen and Jews lived peacefully together in the West for centuries to come. The ruling of the Council of Elvira in 310, forbidding Christians on penalty of excommunication to dine with Jews or to have similar intimate social relations with them, had to be reiterated as late as 538 or 581.105 Friendly relations in Merovingian and Carolingian times will be dealt with separately.
Nascent hostility in the East

Even in the East, where Christianity was so much older, this seems to have been the case during this period, to such an extent that it was not at all considered incongruous when Jews meddled in Christian controversies. If they chose sides too openly, however, they were likely to meet the wrath of the antagonistic party. In Daphne near Antioch, for example, the Jews seem to have sympathized too ostentatiously with the anti-Monophysite party, which in 507 led to retaliatory actions on the part of the “Green” faction – parties were named after the contestants in the hippodromes – but they were victimized as “Blues” and not as Jews.106

The so-called “ritual murder” case in Antioch during the early fifth century107 cannot really be adduced as proof of an increased lay animosity towards the Jews. It was not even an “authentic” ritual murder charge at all, since the notion of premeditated malice was lacking. Drunken Jews, according to Socrates’, ridiculed Christ and Christians, and giving substance to their mockery, tied a child to a cross. When the quarrel grew worse, they began to beat the child, with unintended fatal consequences. Indignant though he is, the author nowhere suggests that the Jews had the intention to kill from the start, or that they needed the blood for ritual purposes.108

In fact, the story seems to prove the very opposite of the notion of Jews being in a cornered position, since it suggests a liberty of action ill harmonizing with the attitude of people who have to fear severe retaliation. The story, if true, evokes the picture of a group with firm social standing and is similar to the story told by Gregory of Tours, many centuries later, about Jews publicly pouring rancid oil over a former Jewish catechumen walking in the procession,109 on his way to baptism; proud of their high social standing, they felt that they could afford such an act.

The majority of the population probably paid no attention at all to the Jews. What then made the scales tip?

It has often been argued that if a set of accusations is but repeated with authority, it will in the end be accepted by the population at large, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, or rather the evidence will then be interpreted as, in fact, proving the thesis: once the Jew is conceived of as a diabolical villain, every act of friendliness on his side can easily be interpreted as an effort to mask some hideous devilry. As long as people believe the evidence of their own eyes, however, clerical accusations will have little consequences in everyday life. The two attitudes may exist side by side for some time, but in the end one is likely to prevail over the other. “The reality of the experience of
ordinary men is shown to be that attacks upon the Jews did not become endemic in Christendom until the twelfth century (...)” wrote Parkes. In other words it would have taken six to seven centuries before the inimical view had finally displaced a more benevolent attitude. The question is: everywhere, or only in the West?

When there were marked differences in the way common people reacted to the theologians’ backbiting, this could either be due to nuances in the theological conceptualization or to differences in the social structures of the lay masses. For reasons which had nothing to do with the theological views in themselves, some groups may have been more prone than others to accept these.

Nuances in conceptualization could possibly be related to the great theological debates of the fourth and fifth centuries. But, just as there is no reason to suppose that Arianism was less anti-Jewish than Athanasianism, there is no reason why Nestorianism or Monophysitism would be markedly different in their concept of Jews. Why would the various groups who, however ferociously they debated about the human and divine nature of Christ and about the relation of the Son to the Father, have markedly different opinions on what they all saw as the murderers of the key figure of their debates, Jesus Christ? The wickedness of the Jews was presumably the one thing they were all agreed on.

Nuances in conceptualization may certainly be expected in the various heretical or schismatic groups. Ebionites or Nazarenes have had vastly different concepts from those of Marcionites or Manicheists as has been shown. In order to make these differences explicative for the variations in attitude of the various regions, it has to be surmised that proportionally they were unevenly distributed over these regions. This may have been the case, though Manichaeism – witness Augustine – had deeply penetrated into the Latin world – as had the Donatists or the Circumcellions. But even if the Greek or Semite East showed a greater proclivity towards heresy, sectarianism or schism than the West, simply because Christianity had been rooted there longer, this does not help. Such a proclivity would only explain a greater variety of lay attitudes, there being strongly Judaizing and strongly anti-Judaizing sects, not a greater willingness to accept the anti-Jewish views per se. All in all, looking for nuances in Christology or in soteriology does not seem a very rewarding approach to explain the unequal diffusion of anti-Jewish concepts over the lay masses and the penetration of these notions into their hearts and minds, at unequal depths.

The sociological approach seems to be more rewarding. Precisely because
clerical Jew-hatred, based on fear of backsliding, was a function of popular
and lay liking of Jews, a liking based on frequent interaction in everyday life,
it stands to reason that a diminishing of the frequency of such interaction,
however it may be explained, paved the way for an ever less reluctant accept-
ance of inimical notions. It is surmised that as long as daily social intercourse
corrected the stigma attached to the Jews, and as long as a certain indifference
in religious matters prevailed, people paid no heed to clerical admonitions.
However, the moment the stigma was no longer corrected by daily social in-
tercourse, attitudes changed, the more so because the very moral authority of
the clerics made non-acceptance of some of their views painful. Humans as a
rule strive for unity in their beliefs and try as much as possible to avoid dis-
crepancies when they are aware of them. As soon as there is no longer a dis-
crepancy between belief system and daily experience, they hasten to amend
their inattention to what the clerics teach, the more readily when such a
change of mind requires little effort. It is easier to accept the clerical warnings
against the Jews when you no longer socialize with them than to accept the
clerical warnings against all those forbidden fruits that seem to make life so
much more pleasant. So you hasten to follow suit at least in this respect. This
cynicism seems to lead to the conclusion that the greater the sinner, rather
than the more faithful the son of the church, the greater the Jew-baiter – a
premium on hypocrisy. Moreover, as experiments of “social dynamics” have
made abundantly clear, people tend to conform to majority opinions. The
key to the problem would then be: diminished interaction, or reversely, in-
creased social distance.

The social distance and “labelled interaction” hypothesis

There are several varieties of collective social distance. It can be limited to
mere geographical distance, groups living in separate quarters, with limited
contacts. It can be related to occupational differentiation, which implies no
meeting in the workshops, and limited and rather singular and one-sided
economic, and by implication social relations. It can, of course, also mean a
wide disparity in social prestige and social status, and finally it can be a com-
bination of all these varieties.

A peculiar characteristic of racist situations is that belonging to the group
at a distance, almost a caste, or about to become one, is independent of any of
the above criteria, even though all of them, of course, can obtain as well, be-
cause the group in question is not defined in any of these terms. Some of its
members may formally belong to a certain socioeconomic prestige group or class and yet not fully share open interaction with the other members of that prestige group or class.

The criterion for the ideologically determined allocation of social position is the characteristic which prevents open interaction, or one which can be used for that purpose: skin color, a “societally” problematic religion, a nomadic lifestyle, and the like. It is only “racist” up to a degree, for as noted before, some problems of social inequality, such as status at birth, not encompassed in “sociological race,” can in fact acquire “racist” characteristics; this is John Rex’s conception of the problem in Northern Ireland, also elaborated by Greenberg. It is the criterion which defines the underlying group in question, which the dominant group considers to be in, but not in any worthwhile degree of society; it is akin to the criterion whereby in the ancien régime, for instance, peasants were not considered to be part of the nation. It is a specific form of asymmetric interaction, with unequal positions of power, as for example exists between the policeman and the presumed offender.

Social distance is not equal to no interaction. The essential feature is, that whatever the social intercourse, it takes place within the pattern of predetermined social roles. In the “old South” of the us everyday relations between masters and slaves, and somewhat later between sharecropping blacks, or those performing other “fitting” tasks, and whites could be frequent and friendly, up to the one-sided intimacy of sexual relations – offspring belonging to the underlying caste – but only on the conditions that blacks played a “Sambo” role, that they were not “uppity” and “knew their place”, that they were submissive, and pretended to accept their inferior position.

Interaction of this type, even when friendly, is of a special nature, and could be called “labelled interaction”. It is the interaction of a discriminatory and prejudicial situation. Discrimination and prejudice lead to an interaction based on the standard perception of the minority group by the dominant group, mostly based on categorization and generalization. That perception, when activated, not only strictly limits the liberty of action of the members of the underlying group, but also determines the code of behavior of the oppressors vis-à-vis the oppressed. The action allowed to the underlying group are all true to type, and have therefore the character of self-fulfilling prophecies. The ensuing interaction may be termed “labelled” because it is limited to relations fitting like a label onto the dual code of behavior. Dominating and subjected groups never meet except in ways determined by that label. As such, the interaction of necessity always confirms prejudice, and never corrects stigma. The greater the social control within the dominant group,
the less chances there are for its individual members to entertain open, humane interaction with members of the other group, although there always have been such “sinners”. Social control within the respective groups makes the type of relationship continuous, despite the fact that imposing the role can be disadvantageous for the one who imposes. As Booker T. Washington remarked: “If you want to keep the Black man in the gutter, you have to sit yourself right next to that gutter.” It is largely “disinterested” behavior, in the way Ranulf uses this term.

An example might be the interaction between employers or white foremen and black laborers, who excluded from skilled labor by trade unions and/or employers, thereby not only “prove” that they are only suited for unskilled work, but are also forced to accept this argument as valid, or at least pretend to do so. It may very well be the “moral authority of suffering” which causes them to do that. Another typical example is the role of the black nanny, who develops intimate relations with the small white children entrusted to her care, but who is not allowed to sit next to them when they are in their teens. The many menial tasks involved befit her low status, the ensuing human relationship does not.

An additional factor in the continuity is the fact that the minority often performs tasks that the majority is not willing or unable to undertake but needs to have done. “Kafir-work”, the dirty work of the untouchables, Barakumin (Eta), in Japan, such as scavenging, or removing carcasses of animals. The task justifies the label, and vice versa: dirty people do dirty jobs.

In the case of medieval Jews, it could be surmised that when Jewish economic activity in the Gentile world was largely limited to “usury”, this indispensable but despised task, abhorred by the people, condemned by the Church, but advantageous to princes, fitted the anti-Jewish label. It was seen as a task by which the murderers of Christ, one of which had sold the messiah for thirty pieces of silver, could further soil their already unclean hands.

Beyond labelled interaction there is almost absolute social distance. This is, as the terms “Jim Crow”, segregation, apartheid, ghetto, and so forth suggest typical of situations of discrimination and prejudice. This is true to the extent that there is room for a sneaking suspicion that a tautology is at play, discrimination and distance being both forms of differentiation. There is a tautology when “social distance” means “keeping at a distance”, but not necessarily when it has the mere passive meaning of being at a distance, when, in other words, social distance is indirectly dependent or independent of the stigmatization before this is popularly accepted.

When the issue is the reversal of the attitude of a formerly strongly Judaiz-
ing laity as a consequence of the theological rejection no longer being corrected by open, everyday interaction, it is really immaterial what causes that passive social distance. It can be: A) shaped by stigmatizing preceding conditions (independent); B) superimposed against the popular will by the segregationist legislation of an autocratic government on stigmatizing “caesaro papist” grounds (indirectly dependent); or C) the consequence of an occupational differentiation independent of the stigmatization, the diminished chances of meeting in socio-economic relations.

If, as may be surmised, social distance in Egypt was to a large extent determined by social conditions preceding Christianity, as analyzed above, Egypt could be an example of A, the Byzantine Empire could be an example of B, and the Greek-Orthodox world could be an example of either B or C. If in the West, particularly the trans-Alpine West, social distance was the result of a feudal, or perhaps manorial specification, of Jewish occupational positions independent from stigmatization, it could be an example of C. In that case, it needs to be explained why, presumably because of bureaucratic ineffectiveness, neither the Church nor the state was capable of imposing segregationist legislation in Byzantine fashion.

Where feudalization and manorialization in the West were less marked, and specification of Jewish occupational positions therefore did not obtain, as presumably was the case in the Italian peninsula and in southern France before the Albigensian Crusade, anti-Semitism will be “underdeveloped”. Where social distance in the West was somehow mitigated by tripartite religious relations, as in the Iberian Peninsula (or Sicily), Judeo-phobia could be held to have been blocked as long as the tripartite situation lasted, but would grow worse when it was over. It was not hazardous that expulsion of the Moors and of the Jews occurred at the same time.
CHAPTER 5

Jewish-Gentile Relations in Eastern Christendom and the Permissiveness-cum-Terrorization Hypothesis

The Alexandrian massacre of 414

Early Christian Egypt represents an instance of a situation where social distance preceded Christian stigmatization. Quarrels with native Jews had been endemic since the days of the Persian occupation.¹

Even though the beliefs constituting the source of the difficulties had entirely disappeared in the late fourth and early fifth centuries, and the old conflicts had thus lost all meaning, and even though Egyptians had imbibed Jewish traditions with the acceptance of the new faith, there is no reason to assume that this would result in a sharp increase in interaction. On the contrary, severed from the Jews who lived in separate districts, Egyptians, or at least Alexandrians, were conditioned to accept the anti-Judaistic tenets of early Christianity sooner than many others did.

This tendency was perhaps reinforced by the fairly frequent occurrence of Gnostic sects in Egypt, which held, as did the Manichaeans and Marcionites, that everything created is evil, as is also the Creator, who at best is a lower, imperfect spirit,² at worst a decidedly evil, if not the “Evil Spirit”. Is it sheer coincidence that they made use of the old Egyptian tradition of pointing to Exodus 11:36: “and the Lord gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they lent unto them such things as they required. And they spoiled the Egyptians”, in order to prove that the Jewish God was a god of robbers and thieves?

According to the social distance hypothesis, Egypt is thus likely to show one of the earliest examples of Jew-baiting on a massive scale. Such Jew-baiting would have been sparked off under identical theological circumstances as prevailed in the West, where no such outbursts had as yet taken place, as Egypt was staunchly Athanasian until the days of Monophysitism, like the non-Germanic West and unlike the remainder of the East, where, until Theodosius the Great, even many emperors had Arian inclinations, and where later Athanasianism took the form of Nestorianism. Furthermore, economic
antagonism not coming into play, there is little reason to expect that these assumed outbursts were based on charges of a partially economic nature.

To some extent the hypothesis can be corroborated. A series of riots and quarrels culminated in 414 in the—wholly illegal—total expulsion of all Jews—40,000, according to Gibbon— from Alexandria, where Jews had had a right of settlement for about 700 years. It does seem to be an event which in fanaticism, violence and numbers involved, surpassed anything like Minorca or Callinicum.

The instigator of these excesses was Cyril, who since 412 occupied the episcopal see of Alexandria, an ambitious and fanatical zealot. Charity was not his greatest virtue, and in all his actions he could count on the support of the Alexandrian mob. As the Council of Ephesus in 431, over which he presided, was later to prove, he was indeed in full agreement with the West in condemning the views of Nestorius, who objected to addressing the Virgin Mary as “Mother of God”, since the divine nature of Christ had no mother—even though he himself may have had views which were later condemned as heretical monophysitism. Since this conflict came into the open only after his death, there was as yet nothing to distinguish him from those with a Western point of view.

He began his career by attacking the Novatians, at the time still in full accord with Nestorius; their churches were plundered and closed. Two years later the full blast of his angry zeal was directed at the Jews. An accidental quarrel leading to some bloodshed was the pretext for inciting the masses against them. The response was such that the town prefect, Orestes, was not only powerless to prevent the onslaught, but also, by his mere attempt at legitimate protection, so incurred the wrath of the populace that he himself was almost stoned and his friend, the distinguished philosopher and mathematician, Hypatia, was cruelly murdered. The savagery of her murder—her flesh was scraped from her bones with shells—has the flavor of the excesses of a lynching party: white-hot mob hatred knowing no bounds. After this, Bertrand Russell remarks, “Alexandria was no longer troubled by philosophers.”

The plunder, murder, or expulsion of the Jews, and the fact that the secular authorities were powerless to prevent this, an indication of the brute force of the masses, would seem to prove a deep-seated hatred of the Jews. Yet the evidence is not conclusive. Was Hypatia’s murder an example of derived hatred analogous with the hatred met by “niggerlovers”, Jew-friends or does her case together with that of the Novatians prove instead that anybody who was not a Cyrilian orthodox in one way or another could be victimized? Was it general fanaticism or specific Jew-hatred? Since such in Alexandria general, but for
Alexandria specific, fanaticism is not so easy to explain, the supposition “Jew-hatred” seems to provide the better answer, the more so since one has the impression that Cyril’s Christian opponents were not treated with the same harshness.

After these events little is heard of Jews in Egypt. Did some stay behind, or did they only return after the Arab conquest of 640-43? Whichever it may be, for the further analysis of the growth of anti-Jewish stereotypes in a Christian setting, Egypt is of little interest, as subsequent Muslim rule completely changed the social structure. Both Jews and Christians were henceforth placed in the position of the Dhimmis, (“People of the Book”) who had to pay special taxes as unbelievers. The fact that only in the Abyssinian Church, or perhaps also in the Coptic Church, “innocent” Pontius Pilate was canonized (25 June), by implication putting the blame for the Crucifixion entirely on the Jews, could perhaps be a remnant of Cyrillian anti-Jewish fanaticism.

The theological and economic foundations of Byzantine autocracy

The Byzantine Empire or Constantinople, since most Jews lived there, could be an example of superimposed collective social distance, the independent variable in this case being a sufficiently effective bureaucratic organization, capable of actually enforcing segregation. This is surmised by considering that the Byzantine Empire somehow weathered the storm which blew away the western half of the empire, and that “caesaropapist” forms of church and state relationships pertained. The link between those two observations could be something like: a more effective central government implied the precedence of imperium over sacerdotium, or at least their intertwining, whereas in the West sacerdotium, lacking the effective support of imperium, had to rely on its own strength as best it could.

The western view initiated by Ambrose culminated in Augustine’s grandiose concept of the succession of the four empires, of which Rome is the last. According to Augustine, Christian Rome can at best try to undo some of the injustice inherent in the civitas terrena – “Quid sunt regna sine justitia nisi magna latrocinia?” (“What are kingdoms without justice but big dens of robbers”) – by supporting the Church and being submissive to it. It really amounts to indifference to things political. The sack of Rome by Alaric inspired Augustine to write: “De Civitate Dei” but not to take measures to prevent future barbaric invasions. He preferred leaving the unjust civitas terrena to its own well-deserved fate.
The East opted for, or used as rationalization, the Eusebian point of view of the messianic Emperor. Embedded in an age-old Oriental tradition of the divinity of the emperor, this concept, in fact, served to legitimize unlimited imperial power. In order to explain why social distance could be superimposed on the Jews, the source of that power has to be analyzed.

A number of factors have contributed to save the Byzantine Empire from the fate of the West. The disasters here were not fatal, so that after overcoming tremendous crises the Byzantine Empire was able to recuperate, and to attain new vigor.

The worst blows of the earlier invasions fell in the West after skillful diplomacy diverted the invaders from the Eastern areas, as, for instance, happened in the case of the Ostrogoths, Constantinople inciting them against Odoacer. Depopulation was not as disastrous in the East as in the West, which is probably one reason why the former could follow the diverting policy. It also meant that the growth of the great latifundia which exploited the labor of coloni (comparable to the future serfs of the West), was not as marked in the East. There were however adscripti glebae (a “free peasantry”) who survived to such a degree that there was a basis for its further growth after the reforms of Heraclius, whereas in the West the very opposite was true.

Moreover, the East was much more urbanized, the larger part of nonagrarian production having been in the eastern half since the formation of the empire. Trade, commerce and, hence sea power did not decline to the same degree as in the West where town life virtually disappeared. In fact, Constantinople surmounted the difficulties caused by the revolution in warfare – the shift of emphasis from infantry to cavalry due to the spread of the use of that Chinese invention, the stirrups, making man and horse into one firm assault unit – because it ruled the waves during the critical period, which gave it a greater measure of tactical mobility and logistic versatility.

Many of these combined factors enabled Byzantium to maintain a money economy with a very stable currency based on gold – the famous bezant – and, consequently, a (sometimes very oppressive) system of taxation to finance a very meddlesome bureaucracy, which in the long run was perhaps stifling but initially helped to overcome the difficulties.

What even Justinian was unable to do: check the growth of the landed estates, was brought about by the military and administrative reforms of Heraclius. Perhaps because so much territory had been lost, which made the remainder more easy to administrate, or because many areas which were devastated by war had to be resettled, his reorganization in “themes” was a lasting success enabling the empire to defend itself against further attacks. The mili-
tary settlements within the “themes” swelled the ranks of the free peasantry, there being no social difference between soldier-peasant and the usually closely related (younger son or brother) taxpaying free peasant. Newly settled devastated areas of Asia Minor became recruiting grounds for the new soldiery and prevented a “feudal” solution, since the fully armed cavalry soldier was not himself responsible for his outfit and therefore did not belong to a knightly class of landed gentry.

Central government and peasantry had mutual interests. The Farmers’ Law, probably issued under Justinian (685-695), strengthened the position of small freeholders. The members of the community – there was communal pastureland – were made jointly responsible for the payment of taxes, later designated as the system of mutual warranty.

In relation to the general economic conditions, it is interesting to note not only that rents were mostly paid in money but also that right from the beginning the peasantry entertained close relations with the urban communities, buying town-made goods at fairs or markets in exchange for highly specialized agrarian products. In this way, during the first centuries, peasantry contributed to the maintenance of urban communities and a money economy. As Ostrogorsky remarked: “(...) both its (i.e., the state’s) financial and its military strength depended on the existence of the small freehold peasant property.” Although the “allelengyon” system of taxation in the long run forced the peasants to sell out to the big landowners, it helped to postpone the downfall of the Byzantine Empire by many centuries.

A bureaucratic apparatus based upon a sound money economy could also be maintained because of the commercial and industrial developments. The commercial significance of Constantinople during the early Middle Ages – it is supposed to have numbered at least 100,000 inhabitants at the zenith of its development – and of the lesser towns is a key to the understanding of Byzantine stability. Because of its wealth and industry the empire could maintain in crucial periods, if not supremacy at sea, at least a sufficiently large navy to avert invasion and to foster logistic versatility, cavalry units being transported overseas to threatened places.

As a result of its geographical position, Constantinople, the city of Europe, was for ages the pivot of the most important trade routes. Most important was the trade with the Far East, and with China in particular. Persians acted as mediators in Simhala-Dvipa (present day Sri Lanka), where Chinese merchants brought their wares, as is attested by the finding of Byzantine coins there and in South India. Attempts to develop an independent trade route via the Red Sea never met with success. To some extent this was due to Jew-
ish-Christian controversy, since it was the largely Jewish Himyatite kingdom, situated approximately in present-day Yemen, which initially caused the impediments. In 518 King Dhu Nuwas put an embargo on imperial trade through the Red Sea in retaliation for the slights meted out to Jews in the empire. After the loss of Egypt and Syria, good use was made of the control over the Black Sea and the trade routes through Russia and Samarkand were developed via the Crimea and Trebizond. Relations were maintained with the West and North via Durazzo, the Danube or Amalfi, and later via Kiev and Novgorod. Here, too, it may perhaps be said that the Arab conquests were a blessing in disguise. Even though it is a debatable point exactly how large this commerce has been in terms of money or quantity of goods, it explains the flow to Byzantium of precious metals which were the lifeblood of a society of a far greater complexity than the West then knew.22

On a par with the commercial development there was industry, of which the most important branch was, of course, the silk trade. Other important trades were the metallurgical industries, tin being imported from England,23 the making of enamel and ivory wares, and the manufacturing of arms and Greek fire; (a highly incendiary product used in warfare) the latter two, like the silk industry, were organized as jealously watched state monopolies, which frequently used slave labor.24 Silkworms, smuggled from China, were introduced into the Byzantine Empire during the reign of Justinian I (527-565).25 The production of silk, which actually took place in a wing of the imperial palace – the mulberry trees being grown in imperial gardens – provided the emperors with a tremendous income and, as such, with an instrument of power. Processing and marketing were closely inspected by imperial officials, no other competition being allowed than that of aristocratic concessionaires in the provinces.26

These state industries are tokens of the “mercantilistic” character of the Byzantine economy, which is manifest in many other features as well. “Guild” organizations, which were found producing for the local market, in only the minor industries, were not autonomous “oligopolistic” bodies for the regulation of production and sale, as later in the West, but were state organizations for controlling the economy and for the levying of taxes, as the Book of the Eparch at the time of Leo VI clearly shows. Rules were made by imperial legislation. Membership was not a matter of choice but an ascribed position one could not legally leave. Originally control went so far that members of the bakers’ guild, for example, could only marry daughters of fellow-members. Prices, wages, profit, the amount of interest paid on loans, the amount of goods, and the place and time of the sale of each product, were minutely regu-
lated and the amount of taxation established accordingly. The branches of the economy were regulated to such an extent that private saving and reinvesting were virtually impossible. Imports and exports were controlled by numerous officers in the various ports, the export of precious metals being absolutely prohibited.27

One feature of Byzantine economic life should be strongly emphasized because it had an immediate bearing on the possible role of the Jews in economic life, as compared with the West: since the moral problem of usury and interest was somehow never raised, credit operations were perfectly straightforward procedures. Facilitated, of course, by the relatively large quantity of money available, rates of interest were fixed at between 4% and 8% and controlled by the government, which frequently took a hand in moneylending itself. Under Nicephorus I (802-811) it even became a government monopoly. Obviously, no opprobrium was attached to such activities, which consequently were not reserved for a pariah group.28

The emperors after Justinian I followed the tradition of his predecessors Zeno and Anastasius of concentrating on the East. Justinian’s western policy and his squandering of the great savings made by Anastasius brought the empire almost to financial and administrative ruin from which it was saved largely by Heraclius.29 Even so, the very fact that thousands of workers could be employed for five years in the building of the Hagia Sofia is proof of an organizational and economic versatility and complexity absolutely unknown in the West at that time.30 By comparison, Charlemagne’s dome in Aix la Chapelle, of some 200 years later, looks small.

Finally, the complete equality of all Christian subjects before the law, calling to mind much later European developments, greatly helped the exercise of centralized power based on bureaucracy. The Byzantine Empire, in fact, almost realized a “monopoly of violence”.

For at least seven centuries, until the disappearance of the independent peasantry and the loss of commercial priority to the Italians, there was a continuous imperial authority which, relying on an efficient bureaucratic apparatus, was therefore not wholly dependent on the personality and talents or whims of each separate ruler. It was an autocracy which could survive an occasional palace revolution or a bad emperor. Such continuous, more or less impersonal authority, was fully able to enforce anti-Jewish legislation. (The poetess Kasia confirmed the “caesaropapist” notion once more in the ninth century by writing that the emperor was the successor of both Augustus and Christ. Not only Constantine, but also Augustus had soteriological importance because with the Pax Augusta he prepared the inhabited earth, the oikumene, for the coming of Christ.31
The effective means of imposing segregation were there, as well as the political and religious volition. There was no impediment of an economic nature, such as financial dependency, or at least not in the same degree as it bound the hands of later western kings. Thus, according to the social distance hypothesis, the socio-economic, political and legal structure – a uniform code of law, based on the Codex Justiniani and the Novellae – created conditions favorable for the continuous development of popular anti-Jewish sentiment and for the vanishing of stigma-correcting interaction. It is often presumed to have been a deep-seated hatred, which as Poliakov writes, is held to have had an immediate bearing on the anti-Jewish attitude of early Tsarist Russia and some Orthodox Balkan countries. It should be borne in mind, however, that Tsarist Russia inherited at a later stage, not only Polish Jews, but also a good measure of Polish, that is, a variety of the Western, “Roman Catholic” type of anti-Semitism, the “Jewish Pale” being former Polish territory.

Byzantine Jew-hatred is, however, expected to differ from the Western variety in derived charges, because severance was effected in a different way. These secondary anti-Jewish charges are expected to be either of a wholly noneconomic character or else to be related to entirely different economic positions, money-lending and monetary or financial operations in Byzantine not being a specifically Jewish activity. Perhaps there were other “pariah” occupations, however, which could then influence the creation of the anti-Jewish image. On the whole, the charges are likely to have preserved their more specifically anti-Judaist character.

Moreover, the Byzantine branch of anti-Semitism is expected to be of a “controlled” character. Autocracy would not suffer independent mass action of whatever nature, as that could be detrimental to state interests. It resembles in that respect the autocracy of the Italian podestà, or many centuries later, of Metternich who would not tolerate anti-Semitic mob action either, the latter considering it de facto an expression of the pernicious idea of popular sovereignty. Control implies that there was less room for proliferation of accusations by that uncanny self-sustaining process of charges in exoneration of previous demeanor.

To what extent are these expectations borne out by the evidence?
The Byzantine State, the populace, and the Jews

Since the fifth century, isolation of the Jews in the eastern part of the empire was brought about by a persistent increase in restrictive measures. Since Theodosius I (379-395) the eastern emperors each added their bit to a fast growing body of anti-Jewish legislation, and thereby created and increased a social distance between their Jewish and Gentile subjects, which Chrysostom had desired but not achieved.

In the transitional period, during the reign of Zeno (474-491), the first blast of nascent hatred, which had smoldered since the days of Theodosius II (408-450) and which he had controlled only with difficulty, hit the Jewish community of Antioch in 486. With the connivance of the emperor this outburst was repeated under his successor Anastasius (491-518), but, it is difficult to establish to what extent the Jews were victimized as “Blues” or as “Jews”. That the Jews, as a community, felt compelled to identify so consistently with one faction, would seem to be a token of nascent hostility, but it could also mean that the Jews realized that what they had to fear most was imperial power, and were merely on the side of that faction which happened to be in opposition to the emperor. (Oddly enough as a rule “Blues” were on the side of the authorities.) If that was the case, it was fear of official hostility rather than popular hatred that motivated them. This in turn could mean that anti-Jewish feelings were still largely undeveloped. Zeno, who commented that the “Greens” would have done better to kill the Jews themselves than to burn their synagogues and exhume the bones of Jewish cemeteries, was certainly their enemy. Since events were limited to Antioch, his wrath could very well have been directed at Jews who had the impudence to be “Blues”, than at Jews tout court, whereas “Green” deeds might indicate a specific anti-Jewish angle, for would the bones of Christian “Blues” be exhumed? Yet the very fact that Jews could participate in these factional quarrels does suggests there was no general violent animosity.

Another feature persistently fostering anti-Jewish sentiment during this period was the war against the Samaritans, whom contemporaries did not clearly distinguish from Jews.

A decisive step was taken by Justinian I (527-565), who not only tried to convert African Jews by force after North Africa was conquered by Belisarius— a policy copied on a much larger scale by his successors, notably Phocas (602-610), who also set a pattern of expulsion, expropriation or execution of the unwilling— but who actually meddled in internal Jewish affairs. He forbade Jews to celebrate the Passover before Easter and he meddled in the usage
of language in their services, wishing to promote the vernacular.\textsuperscript{36} (During this period Hebrew was beginning to oust the hitherto customary Latin or Greek in synagogical inscriptions,\textsuperscript{37} which might indicate a decrease in proselytizing and a growing Jewish “in-group” feeling.) Justinian also forced the Jews to live in separate quarters, the \textit{Chalkopratia}. Although he excluded them from all salaried offices – a Jew could not have authority over a Christian – he forced them to accept the position of town councillors, “decurions”, with all the financial consequences (private payment of taxes they failed to collect) so that, as he said, they “sint in turpitudine fortunae in qua et animam volunt esse” (“So that their fortunes are in that same state of array they wish their souls to be”).\textsuperscript{38}

The position of the Jews greatly deteriorated from the fourth to the sixth century, as can be gauged from differences between the \textit{Codex Theodosii} and the \textit{Codex Justiniani}; it deteriorated so much that when centuries later the Justinian code and the \textit{Novellae} came to be known in the West, which had always based its legislation on the \textit{Codex Theodosii}, it badly affected the condition of Western Jewry.\textsuperscript{39} The Jews knew who their enemy was when they so staunchly supported Theodoric the Great and fought for him!

The theme set by Justinian, Phocas, and Heraclius was harped on by a great many of their successors. Every once in a while mass conversions were ordered, and the unwilling were threatened with expulsion or violence and to a large extent actually victimized. Leo 111 the Isaurian (717-741), Basil 1 (867-886), temporarily Leo vi (886-912) and Romanus 1 (919-944) attempted to force the Jews to be baptized by means of harsh persecution. Particularly Basil seems to have been exceedingly cruel, using severe tortures such as causing the most steadfast to be crushed in olive presses. It should, however, be emphasized that persecutions were not directed exclusively at the Jews, but at heterodox Christians as well. Particularly the Paulicians, often – perhaps wrongly – described as a semi-Manichaean or Marcionite sect, most unlikely to be in league with the Jews, were heavily persecuted.

The somewhat ambiguous character of these persecutions – alternating between leniency and harshness – is borne out by a contemporary Jewish apocalyptic text called the “Vision of Daniel”: “The sign of his name will be two B’s (Basileus, who is Basil 1). He will begin by rebuilding the synagogue which the tribe before him had scorned. He will enrich his kingdom with great riches; he will conquer nations and bring peoples under his sway. Then he will become surfeited with his goodness and turn his forces against the holy ones of the Most High. He will baptize them by force against their will, and with much woe, and then he will sell them for slaves and for serving
maids. And he will die in his bed in great agony. And he will pass his scepter into his son’s hands as an inheritance, whose name will be the sign of royalty for beasts – Leo. He will make a release and give freedom to the holy nation of the Most High, and the Lord of Lords will increase his kingdom.”

In the final analysis these efforts represent attempts at creating a unified, harmonious empire without inner dissensions, which could better sustain the many-sided attacks from outside. Sectarians and Jews had in the past not always proved to be loyal subjects; they had every reason not to be.

Somehow many Jews weathered the onslaughts for, when in the eleventh century the Spanish Jewish traveller Benjamin of Tudela visited the Byzantine empire, there were still 2,000 Rabbanite Jews in the capital and a great many smaller communities in the provinces. It is not quite clear why such efforts were desisted, and why Jews, in contravention of the law which threatened a Christian who became Jewish with confiscation of his property, were allowed after the death of a persecuting emperor like Basil to return to their former faith, as “dogs to their vomit” as one chronicler put it. (Words literally repeated about 300 years later by Ekkehard describing a similar situation after the first crusade: “sicut canes ad vomitum”.) The most plausible explanation is that such enforced mass conversions were not considered to be altogether beneficial; the Eastern prelates shared with the papacy serious objections to the number of wholly insincere converts such actions entailed.

The Second Council of Nicaea in 787 objected to false converts who pretended to be Christians yet mocked Christ and denied him, and prescribed therefore that Jews should live openly according to the prescripts of their own religion, and that only the sincere should be accepted in the fold. Occasionally a famous monk or bishop took the initiative instead of the emperor, for example, the monk Nikon who, no doubt with the help of the inhabitants, chased the Jews from Sparta as a remedy against an epidemic in 985, but in such cases expulsion, and not conversion was the aim.

When Jews were not actually persecuted, they were tolerated on the most humiliating terms; the Rabbanites were perhaps more harshly treated than the Karaites. There is at least some slight evidence that when the two quarrelled, the authorities were willing to listen to the latter somewhat more readily. It is curious to note that centuries later such a favored position was granted to the Karaites of the Crimea by Tsarist Russia: they were not considered to be Jews. Such a slightly favored position could perhaps be explained by the Karaite rejection of all Talmudic and rabbinical writings as non-authoritative. These writings were perhaps not quite as obnoxious to the Byzantine clergy as to their later western colleagues. There is, at least, no evi-
dence of burning of Talmudic writings – but they must have been suspect since post-biblical literature was proscribed according to the laws concerning the Jews as codified in the “Basilics”.

According to the laws as codified in the “Basilics”, Jews were definitely reduced to an inferior social position. They could have no military or civil office, no position of honor. They could not testify in cases between orthodox Christians, and marriage with a Christian was subject to the same penalty as adultery. The building of new synagogues was forbidden. Circumcision of a Christian was punished by expulsion or death. Jews could not own Christian slaves, and if the slave of a Jew became a Christian, he was to be set free. Scripture was to be read in synagogues in the vernacular, Septuagint version. This was necessary because officials, who did not understand Hebrew, controlled the services, having to see to it that no remark vilifying Christ or Christianity was ever made. A Christian who turned Jewish would have all his property confiscated; if this was detected after his death, his will was invalidated. According to an earlier law, arguing against the Christian faith was punished by death.

However, the “Basilics” knew some protective measures as well, such as the rulings that synagogues could not be used for quartering soldiers, that non-Jews could not be overseers over Jews, that Jews could not be required by officials to desecrate the Sabbath, and that violence to Jews or their synagogues was forbidden.

Very revealing are the rules concerning the Jews of the Trullan Council in 692 (Quinisectum). Although this Council as a whole was never recognized in the West, the articles concerning the Jews were incorporated in the Corpus Iuris Canonici. In all probability they were more readily enforced in the East where they had full authority, than in the West. They ruled that no Christian, layman or priest, should partake of unleavened bread, associate with Jews, accept medical treatment from them, or bathe with them, on penalty of excommunication. Even though the penultimate article was infringed upon, as the number of Jewish physicians suggests, the limitation on free association was more readily enforced. These rulings mark a definite social degradation for which there is other evidence. Benjamin of Tudela, the Jewish traveler from Spain, relates that no Jew was allowed to ride on horseback, which probably had about the same significance as later in the West: social and legal inferiority. There is some evidence that the occupation most frequently exercised by Jews, tanning and dyeing, were considered “pariah” occupations. (Expressions like: “who makes up Jewish deception is immersed in tannery, or reference to Jews as: leather-gnawing dogs (...) tanners and dy-
ers of old clothes” seem to suggest that). It should be noted that in the fifth century, purple dyeing was convict labor, because of the unbearable stench of urine and decayed shellfish which were the raw materials.

That any deviationist was automatically called a Jew was another hallmark of opprobrium. This was particularly true for the iconoclasts, who were accused of Judaizing despite the fact that emperor Leo, the first iconoclast, was also a persecutor of the Jews. As happened later in the West, the messiah the Jews expected was sometimes equated with the Antichrist, and as also happened in the West, such an interpretation was occasionally accompanied by accusations of witchcraft and sorcery. The stories very often fitted into a general belief in magic which was shared by the Jews themselves. Although the story that Photius, the very learned patriarch of Constantinople at the time of Michael (842–867) and responsible for the first schism of 867 had, like an early Faust, acquired all his learning and wealth by means of Jewish magic in exchange for a denial of Christ, was told by an enemy and is definitely malicious in intent. It is aimed at Photius more than at the Jews, and seems to be rather an exception.

These somewhat rare indications do not seem, however, to prove a deep-seated popular hatred. Even though without a doubt, enmity existed, Jews shared this with all other heterodox people, who perhaps bore the brunt of popular hostility.

Apart from the doubtful question of the “pariah” occupations, which anyhow were not legally imposed, there were no restrictions whatsoever on Jewish economic activities, other than the general “mercantilistic” ones described above. Jews could own real estate and were frequently engaged in farming. Benjamin of Tudela mentions a community of 200 Jewish farmers in Krissa. Jews could ply any craft they wished. Frequently they are mentioned as weavers, finishers, glassblowers, merchants, physicians, and the like. Some were men of great opulence, though the majority probably belonged to the lower strata. No economic charges of swindle, usury, exploitation or greed are ever made against them.

The anti-Jewish concept remains overwhelmingly theological. The stories also found in the West, of Jews maltreating images of Christ, detected by the miraculous spurring of blood, fit within the context of a purely religious prejudice. Stories about the desecration of the Host seem to be unknown – understandably so, as the underlying Roman doctrine of transubstantiation (1215) was not declared until long after the schism of 1054. The ritual murder story seems to have been virtually unknown in the East. The Jews, infidels on a par with heretics, occupied an inferior and separate position, which was
expressed and enforced by law, but which, safe in times of crisis, also guaranteed a certain measure of security and protection.

Violent persecutions, including massacre, did take place, but they were always undertaken by the military and bore an official character. They always seem to take place for *raisons d’état*. In quiet times the old Roman rule that Judaism was a *religio licita* was kept. Whatever was not explicitly forbidden by the law was allowed to the Jews. A semi-theocracy like the Byzantine Empire could, for identical reasons — *testimonium veritatis* and the necessary preservation of Jews till the day of judgment — no more abolish this rule than the popes could.

This survey of Byzantine Gentile-Jewish relations does not wholly confirm the social distance hypothesis. All that can be established with certainty is that there was a hostile indifference among the population at large, which either did not lead to a more active hatred, or lead to one which was not allowed to express itself in hostile deeds, beyond fisticuffs.

A survey of Jewish-Gentile relations in the modern Orthodox world

The evidence being as yet inconclusive, it raises new questions. In a Greek Orthodox setting, or one derived from Greek Orthodoxy, are there any instances of an autochthonous anti-Semitism, engendered by the populace, one which is akin to, but independent of the later western varieties? This should then be an example of a popular Judeo-phobia complete with some sort of socio-economic charges and secular political and ideological aspects. The question implies that henceforth stigmatization, social distance, combined with governmental permissiveness ranging from an ineffectiveness of the bureaucracy and policing, resulting in an incapacity to prevent excesses, to the government taking the lead – Nazism – are held to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for a fully developed Judeo-phobia.

As possible areas of preliminary and orientating investigation one could take the European part of the Ottoman Empire, the nineteenth century successor states in the Balkans, notably Romania, and Tsarist Russia. Russia and Romania were indeed notoriously anti-Semitic countries in the nineteenth century. The former may however, as indicated, have inherited not only its Jews but also its anti-Semitism from Roman-Catholic Poland. It would then be a derivative of the Western variety. After all, the Jewish “Pale”, the area where Jews were allowed to live in dismal conditions in Tsarist Russia, was
largely former Polish territory acquired by the consecutive partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century, and to some minor extent former Turkish territory.

The sad story of Russian anti-Semitism may be said to have begun with the wars of the 1650s in Poland and the Ukraine. The Cossack rebels, under the leadership of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, opted for Russia and massacred the Jews because they saw them as an instrument of the oppression they suffered from their Polish masters. Perhaps nascent Polish anti-Semitism placed the Jews in the marginal position of middlemen between the Polish landlords and the Ukrainian serfs. That position can also have been the replica of a similar position in the feudal West, where the administration of estates of great nobles by Jews led to anti-Semitism. The massacres committed by the Ukrainian invaders, though perhaps justified or rationalized by an Orthodox theological stigma, cannot possibly thereby be explained. They were more inspired by social conflicts of a partly Western connotation, Jewish-Gentile relations in Roman-Catholic Poland being shaped by forces immanent in the world of Latin Christendom.

The massacres committed by the Poles were rationalized by the belief that the Jews had supported the Swedish invaders of 1655, who in their turn treated the Jews rather harshly, though less so than they did all the others. All in all, three forms of Christianity were involved in the tragedy (or four non-Jewish religions if Turkish buyers of Jewish slaves are counted in) as well as very complicated social and economic issues: so complex, in fact, that all that can safely be said in a survey is that the Jews were the common underdogs in this four-way contest. It spelled the doom of the hitherto fairly free Jewish communities in Poland and marked the reversal of the Jewish migratory movement from an eastern to a western direction, which lasted till well into the twentieth century. The conflagration initiated the tragedy of Russian Jewry for centuries to come! It did all that and is therefore a major episode in the history of Russian anti-Semitism, but it cannot be said to have been the outcome of an inherited Byzantine tradition, even when before 1650 Russian fear of the Jews was inspired by Constantinople. Muscovy had known no Jews, and before the conquest of large Polish and Turkish areas, Russia had therefore only a few Jewish inhabitants. As had happened in the late Roman Empire, first contacts resulted in some strongly Judaizing sects, which forced the Tsars to isolate the Jews.

Something similar may hold true for Romania. The Jewish population of Romania was largely of Ashkenazi descent and Yiddish speaking, whereas the Jews of the southern Balkans were overwhelmingly Sephardic, mixed with...
the remnants of the Greek-speaking autochthonous pre-Ottoman Jewish groups. There the Jewish *lingua franca* was Ladino, their own Romance language derived from Spanish. This division suggests that Romania, though Orthodox, in terms of the social conditions giving shape to its anti-Semitism, belonged more to northeastern Europe than to the Balkans. Like Russia, though in a more complex manner, it may have inherited its anti-Semitism from the Polish discomfiture. Romanian linguistic and economic ties with Habsburg Transylvania even suggest a more direct link with Western developments. Proper areas of precursory investigation of autochthonous Orthodox anti-Semitism are, therefore, the Ottoman Empire and its nineteenth-century successor states, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and possibly Montenegro. Romania should be glanced at by way of comparison.

The Turks treated the Jews fairly well; they tended to deal with all *zimmi* alike, organizing as the true nomads they once were, their “human cattle” in such way as to exploit all talents to the full, and applying Muslim law with regard to the infidels in a very lenient fashion. The Ottoman Empire gave a very warm welcome to the Sephardic Jews, whom their Spanish enemies had been so unwise as to expel in 1492. Under Turkish protection these Sephardim, mixed with the original oriental Jewry founded a great many communities throughout the Ottoman realm, which flourished economically and were religiously active, as for example Thessaloniki where Jews actually formed the majority of the population.

Here Jews were found in all walks of life, including, unusually, that of dock-labourers. (Until World War II no ship cargo could be handled on Saturday in Thessaloniki’s port). Istanbul remained an important center of Jewish life. Even more significant perhaps was the new community of Safed in northern Galilee as center of the new Jewish universalist school of mysticism founded by Isaac Luria and a center of Talmudic studies, which culminated in Joseph Karo’s *Shulhan Aruch*. The rather wretched North African refugee communities saw their condition somewhat improved after the area was conquered by the Turks.

Many Sephardic immigrants, who could use their trade relations with, and their information on, the world they had left, became prosperous merchants and financiers, often rendering diplomatic services to the Porte. They were a significant element of a very cosmopolitan urban class, which further consisted of Greeks, Armenians, Levantines, Ragusans, Italians, and possibly other ethnic categories of the vast Ottoman Empire and its trading partners. Jews thus do not seem to have had group-specific occupations or monopolies, though at periods they were preponderant in the textile industries and in
printing. Sephardic refugees introduced printing techniques in Turkey, using Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and later also Arabic characters on their presses.

The textile industry on the shores of Galilee, consisting of mostly woollens, was due to the initiative of a *Marrano*, a “new Christian”, Joseph Nasi, a nephew of the international banker Francisco Mendes, whose daughter he married. Together with his wealthy mother-in-law, Donia Gracia Nasi, he settled in Istanbul, where the family reverted to Judaism. Due to their extensive information on European courts, he became adviser to Suleiman and Selim II. In 1566 he was made duke of Naxos, governor of Cyclades, and Tiberias was given to him as a place of Jewish settlement. His influence at court was such that, when Henry II of France refused to pay him a debt, French ships in Turkish ports were seized. The textile industry he founded in Palestine bloomed till the early seventeenth century when Dutch and English competition became too strong.\(^{78}\)

Nasi was not the only Jew who became personal adviser to the Sultan, and the careers of these men demonstrate the practical Turkish policy vis-à-vis “infidels” and the good use that could be made of the enemies of the Christian enemies of the Sultan, though Greeks, the Phanariots, and Armenians could also achieve high positions. The position of the Jews was to some extent comparable with that of the later “court Jews” at Central European courts. These “court Jews” were practical and informed businessmen, who had neither citizenship nor any rights, and who could consequently be mercilessly dropped or executed when their services were no longer needed or when popular resentment became too strong. One does not have the impression though that there were many such as Jud Süß (the Württemberg Hofjude who in the end was executed)\(^{79}\) among the advisers of the Porte. This could be due to the fact that popular resentment against the “infidels” was less pronounced. They were not recruited from an outcast and hated minority of moneylenders as in Central Europe.

Treated on a par with other “infidels”, each group having its own color of turban and presumably not enjoying special privileges, the Jews as a group played their not too conspicuous part in this medley of ethnicities and religions. They could do this all the more easily since neither the autochthonous Jews nor the immigrant Sephardim traditionally knew of such an occupational specification as prevailed in trans-Alpine medieval or early modern Europe. It is true that the latter differentiated themselves by continuing to speak Ladino. This could not have constituted a grave problem, however, since most groups in this linguist’s paradise were polyglot.

The conditions of all groups concerned may have deteriorated somewhat
when the Ottoman Empire was no longer on the offensive. Turkish policy would lash out at minorities if that would soothe the offended feelings of the now stronger opponent. The notorious ritual murder case of Damascus in 1840 is an example. When a Capuchin monk, Père Thomas, suddenly disappeared, the French consul, Ratti Menton, demanded an investigation.

At that time France claimed to be the protector of Roman-Catholic Syrian Christians and the Turkish authorities were presumably only too willing to oblige lest France strengthen her support of the rebellious Mehemet Ali. When the rumor spread that Père Thomas had last been seen in the Jewish quarters, the authorities arrested a number of Jews, who by means of severe torture were made to confess not only that they had committed the murder, but that they had carefully preserved the blood. A Muslim servant of one of the accused, Murad el Fallat, who was also heavily tortured, was responsible for this charge. Only when the other great powers began to interfere, Great Britain inspired by Palmerston, Austria by its consul Merlato – all opponents of the French in their policy towards Mehemet Ali and supporters of the Sultan – did things improve. It turned out that the confessions under torture contained so many contradictions that, in fact, there was not a shred of evidence. 80

Though this may seem to indicate an anti-Jewish attitude, Turkish policy could just as well lash out at Christians, as is evident from the massacre of Chios in 1822 or the “Bulgarian atrocities” of 1876, (which induced Gladstone to attempt a reversal of the traditionally pro-Turkish British policy) 81 and the later Armenian massacres in the realm. It may be true that the stronger the possible helpers of Christians became, the greater was the temptation for the Turks to take it out on the defenseless Jews, so that there is certainly no reason to suppose the Jews had a favored position.

Everything considered, there is little reason to expect a further growth of an Orthodox Christian anti-Jewish stereotype during the Turkish epoch with the possible exception of the rural areas in the former Byzantine territories. Notions of Jews as “Christ-killers”, as obstinate infidels, may have persisted among some Christians, though this could not be said too openly since Christians themselves were now in the position of “infidels”. There is no basis for the assumption that general charges of a more secular, socioeconomic nature were made; there may, of course have been private quarrels. Consequently there is reason to assume that these same areas, when they finally freed themselves from Turkish suzerainty, inherited social structures which were not particularly prone to develop a strong secular anti-Semitism, though an emerging nationalist feeling could do this to some extent. Greece, Bulgaria,
possibly Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro are therefore probably areas where there may occasionally have been religious conflicts – presumably particularly at Easter time – but where there was neither room for organized political anti-Semitism nor for anti-Semitism as a form of social protest. It may be surmised that in these areas, Jew and Gentile have on the whole lived peacefully together.

It is no easy matter to confirm or refute this conjecture for the simple reason that the nineteenth-century Jewish history of the southern Balkans seems to be a more or less unexplored area or at least inaccessible for one who does not have at his disposal an exceptional linguistic ability, who in short does not easily read the original material in Serbo-Croat, Macedonian, Bulgarian or New Greek. Some insight, however, can be gained from the general literature.

During the Greek War of Independence (1821-1828) Jews were persecuted by the “Armatoles”, a Christian militia the Turks recruited from brigands, the “klephts” they were supposed to combat (and therefore occasionally hardly distinguishable from them). When the Armatoles chose the side of the rebels against their Turkish masters, they may have wanted to punish neutral Jews, or Jews loyal to the old regime, or they may simply have continued their banditry.\(^82\)

There were more incidents, however. On Easter day 1821, in retaliation for Greek rebellion, Janissaries stormed the cathedral of Istanbul and killed the Patriarch, Gregory. His body was dragged through the streets to the sea. Since some Jews were forced to take part in this procession, the rumor spread that the Jews had participated in the murder. Greeks all over the peninsula retaliated by massacring Jews.\(^83\)

This form of revenge suggests bad feeling, although the incidents do not seem to have had further consequences. Was the animosity based on a hatred of “traitors”, a hatred of Jews, or a hatred of Jews thought of as perennial traitors? Is the Greek aspect of the Don Pacifico Affair proof of Jew-hatred? When in 1847 a Rothschild visited Athens to negotiate a loan, the Greek government in the person of Minister Coletti, desirous to propitiate the banker, asked the Athens populace to abstain from the customary burning of a Judas Iscariot effigy at Easter. It led to a riot, as a consequence of which the house of the Portuguese consul, Don Pacifico, a Jew from Gibraltar, and as such a British subject, was damaged. Don Pacifico asked indemnities which the Greek government, unable or unwilling to pay, refused to satisfy. It was then that Lord Palmerston, considering the rights of all British subjects everywhere should be protected by the mighty arm of the British military potential, ordered a
naval blockade of the Piraeus. He defended his attitude in parliament with the famous *Civis Romanus Sum* speech, which gave the whole affair notoriety.

Is the affair a manifestation of Greek Jew-hatred? The burning of an effigy of Judas does not offer more proof of Greek anti-Semitism than the occasional burning of an Haman effigy during the festival of Purim proves a Jewish hatred of Persians. The subsequent riot, however, may be proof of a certain anti-Semitism or, if Pacifico indeed was a moneylender, it may indicate a hatred of moneylenders and bankers, irrespective of whether they were Jewish, Armenian, Greek, or what have you.84

Because anti-Semitism often assumes the form of hatred of financiers, the reverse is not necessarily true, even in parts of the world where moneylending is not traditionally a specifically Jewish activity. Even in nineteenth-century Britain, with its well-developed credit system there was such widespread feeling and public agitation against the small-scale usurer, bloodsucker of the poor, that a parliamentary enquiry was deemed necessary, but this agitation had no anti-Semitic connotation.85

It does not seem justified to claim that modern Greece was entirely immune to the new wave of European anti-Semitism that began in the eighteen eighties. In 1891 on the Island of Corfu there was even a ritual murder case. It was a rather peculiar case though, since the victim was a Jewish girl. Rabina Sarda, the daughter of a Jewish tailor, was murdered by Greeks, who afterwards claimed that the victim was a Christian girl murdered by Jews. There was sufficient popular readiness to give credence to such a story to cause the populace to besiege the Jewish Quarter for several days. After the siege was raised, violence continued to such an extent that many Jews fled to Italy or Turkey, returning only after it had abated.86 None the less the affair is not proof of an autochthonous Orthodox traditional belief in ritual murder. Nine years earlier, the notorious Tisza Eszlar affair in Hungary had been widely discussed in the entire European press, and had become the starting point of a vigorous international anti-Semitic propaganda. A portrait of the alleged victim, Esther Solymoszi, adorned a wall of the congress hall of the first international anti-Semitic congress of 1882 in Dresden. There was a second international congress in Bucharest in 1886.87 The notion of ritual murder may thus easily have penetrated into Greece. The Corfu murder is not the only example of a murderer’s attempt to remain at large by trying to lay the blame on the Jews.88 Cutting the throat of his victim in the manner of ritual slaughter was in those days a criminal’s method of framing the Jews.89 However, the episode does suggest continued (religious) animosity.

Increased nationalist feelings did create something of a breeding ground...
for the modern variety of Jew-hatred. During the war with Turkey, in 1897, when the Turks temporarily reoccupied Thessaly, the very large Jewish community of Larissa was accused of having collaborated with them. It led to some bad feeling.\(^9\) A portent of disaster took place during the interbellum. The incorporation of Thessaloniki, conquered by the Greeks in the war of 1912, with its Ladino speaking, very large Jewish community – about half the population was at that time Jewish – and the integration of the masses of refugees from Anatolia after the disastrous Greek war with Turkey in 1920 proved to be a combination too hard to swallow. Jews were victimized. There was plundering and violence until the government intervened, afraid that Thessaloniki Jews would opt for Bulgaria, which also laid claims on the town.\(^9\)

Incorporation into Greece and Greek economy robbed Thessaloniki of its traditional hinterland and thus adversely affected its economy. The Jewish community, which socially had all the characteristics of a modern class structure – the dock laborers! – was victimized. Imposition of an enforced Sunday observance, naturally never imposed under Turkish rule, added to the decline of Jewish prosperity. Many Jews emigrated – in 1940 the Jewish population of Thessaloniki was reduced to 20 percent; the wealthier groups presumably left sooner than the poorer ones so that the working class element grew relatively larger. Under the adverse circumstances the latter turned increasingly to the political left. In 1926, 39 percent of the Jewish vote went to the communists (ΚΚΕ). From the very beginning Jews had been active in the socialist movement. In 1909 Jews had founded the Federacion Socialista Laboradera, which had a great impact on Greek and Balkan socialism and communism.

Most Jewish groups in Thessaloniki (now called Salonika), and presumably also in other towns recently acquired by Greece, having tasted a certain measure of autonomy for so long, had difficulty in accepting Greek bourgeois nationalism, whether of Venizelist or other inspiration. The Jewish bourgeoisie became increasingly Zionist. (In Thessaloniki in 1926 and 1936, respectively 46 and 70 percent of the Jewish vote went to the Zionists). Jews, speaking a language of their own, and being Zionists or left-wing internationalists, were thus suspected of disloyalty to Greece. That suspicion was no doubt reinforced by the talk about “Jewish Bolshevism” customary in right-wing Europe in those years.

Antagonism grew worse as a result of the massive influx of the Anatolian refugees after the disaster of 1922. Most refugees settled in the North. They were poverty-stricken and discontented, understandably so, as the Greek
economy was unable to cope with such massive immigration (1,200,000 refugees per 5,000,000 autochthonous). Mostly of peasant stock, religious, and anti-socialist, they turned to the right-wing groups, notably to the “National Union Greece” known as the EEE, Ethnike Evosis Hellas. This resulted in an anti-Semitic campaign and even some rioting, in which the northern groups of the Venizelist Liberals participated and which Venizelos could not stop, even less so because he too felt bitter about the Jewish “disloyalty”.

The agitation abated with the Metaxas military dictatorship of 1936, not least because by then the partition of land from which the refugees also profited was completed. It is difficult to ascertain how deeply entrenched the anti-Semitism was. Traditionally, Jewish-Gentile relations in Thessaloniki were reasonably good. Recent bitterness can perhaps to some extent explain why the Nazis, several years later, were able to completely destroy the Thessaloniki Jewish community; yet one has the impression that this earlier anti-Semitism was a temporary explosion limited to the recently acquired areas. In “old” Greece, that is, the regions that were already Greek before the Balkan wars, there were never any problems: complete equality before the law was maintained, uncontested. Jews could go to the universities unimpededly and participate freely in economic life. In contradistinction to Poland, for example, where the resistance was almost as anti-Semitic as the Nazi oppressors, in the Greek resistance movement, Jews took part on an equal footing. It is interesting to note that archbishop Damaskinos gave instructions to all monasteries and convents to shelter Jewish fugitives.

Serbia and Bulgaria are reputed to have been remarkably free from Jew-hatred. The great Russian-Jewish historian, Simon Dubnov, rather representative of what has been called the “lachrymose interpretation of Jewish history”, that is, more inclined to indictment than to praise, finds very little to criticize. Though in these countries, as in Greece, Jews were occasionally suspected of being pro-Turkish during the wars of liberation, this had no serious repercussions. Both countries abided by the ruling of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, which stated that all citizens should have equal rights, regardless of creed. Though Ladino continued to be used among Serbian Jews, there was a marked tendency towards linguistic assimilation, which may have implied social integration. Bulgaria seems to present an identical picture. Friendly relations existed even at the lowest social levels. Jews who had joined the gangs of bandits thus participated in “social banditry”. The one attempt at creating a case of ritual murder in 1891 was abortive.

When Bulgaria joined the Axis in 1941, the Bulgarian population protested
so effectively against the persecution of Jews, that the fascist government gave in. Jews were only persecuted in the Greek and Yugoslav areas occupied by Bulgarian troops where the Nazis were given a free hand, not in Bulgaria proper. On 7 June 1943, the German ambassador to Sofia, Beckerle, reported: “But they (the Bulgarian government) are forced to take into account the mentality of the Bulgarian people, who lack the ideological conceptions we have. Having grown up among Turks, Jews, Armenians, the Bulgarian people have not observed in the Jews faults which would warrant these special measures against them (...).”

As in Greece, Jews participated in the resistance movement side by side with the Bulgarians.

The Romanian development is quite the opposite. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the principalities Wallachia and Moldavia were still inhabited by pagan Wallachians – who were said by Benjamin of Tudela to favor the Jews above the Greeks – and Cumans, as well as the harassed remainder of the original Dacian, romanized population. The area was probably Christianized from Constantinople or Bulgaria, and is up to the present still overwhelmingly Greek Orthodox. This remote area, cut off from the West by the Carpathian Mountains and from the Black Sea by Bessarabia and Dobruja, became under Turkish rule an area of settlement, at first for the refugees from the Polish-Ukrainian Jewish catastrophe, and later for fugitives from Russian persecution. Together with Greeks and Armenians, the Jews fulfilled the very modest middle-class functions of that primitive, overwhelmingly agrarian, society.

When the principalities gradually acquired autonomy and full independence under Russian protection and were united into the kingdom of Romania in 1856, a very strong anti-Jewish feeling emerged, which was shared by the government. Peasant indebtedness was certainly a factor in this aversion but cannot be the full explanation, since Greek and Armenian creditors were much less victimized. Previous stigmatization must therefore have been rampant.

This growth of tension occurred at a time when a liberal view prevailed in the remainder of Europe, and Jewish-Gentile relations outwardly seemed to have improved to such an extent that anti-Semitism seemed a thing of the past.

Romanian-Jewish history of the nineteenth century is indeed one long, sad story of popular persecutions, official discrimination with full consent of the electorate, and deprivations. Under Russian inspiration it began with the “Regulamentul Organic” (“Organic Statute”) of Kisselew in 1832, when the
two principalities were occupied by the Russians after the treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Jews could neither own nor lease land; they could not acquire citizenship. If they did not have a useful occupation, they could be expelled as vagabond strangers. Jews thus became craftsmen and small traders, occupationally isolated from the peasant population. Wallachia and Moldavia, united after the Crimean War into an autonomous principedom under Turkish suzerainty, became modernized in the sense of agrarian reform and parliamentary government, but not in regard to the Jews. The Western powers, under moral pressure from the “Alliance Israélite Universelle” insisted on equal citizenship for the Jews in the Treaty of Paris in 1856. It was to no avail. When a Jewish naturalization bill was under discussion in 1866, a Bucharest mob, in destroying the synagogues and committing other violent acts, effectively prevented its passing. Prime Minister Bratianu completely shared the feelings of the mob. When Jewish “vagabonds” in Galati were put across the Danube in 1867, and the Turks on the other side refused them, Romanian officials let them drown. Bratianu was responsible for the law prohibiting Jewish peddling, whereby the poorest were robbed of some meager income. To prevent litigation Jews were excluded from the legal profession: they could not even become clerks in the offices of solicitors or barristers. Bratianu cynically justified his policy with a fable: “A hungry fox entered a vineyard through a hole in the fence and ate so much that the hole was too small to allow him to go back. The only way for the proprietor to get rid of him was to starve him till he could slide through the hole again.”

Pogroms were the order of the day. To mention but a few: Galati in 1868, Jassy in 1867, in 1870-73 Tecuci, Ismail, Kaful, and Bacau, 1897 in Galati again, and 1899 in Jassy. Students were active participants. In 1895 an anti-Semitic league was founded, the avowed aim of which was to make life unbearable for the Jews and to realize “Romania for the Romanians.” The league succeeded in making the country into such a hell for the Jews that mass emigration, often under very difficult circumstances – the fussgeyer (“emigrants on foot”) – followed. About a third of the Jewish population had emigrated by 1914.

Neither strenuous efforts by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, nor the nomination of Benjamin Franklin Peixoto, a Sephardic Jew, as consul of the United States, with the avowed purpose of alleviating the fate of his co-religionists, nor international indignation, expressed in newspapers and questions in parliaments, were to any avail. It was indeed remarkable – even more then than it would be now – how through sheer procrastination, obfuscation of the issues and general ill-will, a small country could defy the concerted will –
even Russia complied – of the Great Powers.\textsuperscript{114} Article 44\textsuperscript{115} of the treaty resulting from the Congress of Berlin in 1878, declaring legal equality for all religious persuasions a condition sine qua non for recognition as an independent kingdom, was unanimously accepted. One by one the Great Powers, tired of the whole issue, defected, and the Romanians had their way.\textsuperscript{116} The failure of the Great Powers to impose their will was indeed a portent of future evil; sixty years later the Axis applied the Romanian tactics of defiance on a grand scale and Romania eagerly followed their lead.

To what extent was Romanian anti-Semitism really autochthonous? The later form might have been molded by Romanian students who had been infected abroad. To what extent was it influenced by the anti-Semitism of neighboring countries via Transylvania or – the Kishinev pogroms– Bessarabia? The strong Romanian delegation at the first international Anti-Jewish Congress in Dresden in 1882,\textsuperscript{117} and that of the next meeting in Bucharest itself in 1886, suggests close relations with French and German anti-Semites.\textsuperscript{118} Romania also leaned heavily on Russia. In 1876 Bratianu declared: “Russia alone is able to ensure the Romanian nationality against an absorption that threatens it from the side of the Germans of whom the numerous Jews who invade this country would only be the precursors.”\textsuperscript{119} At the time of the Dreyfus Affair, French anti-Semites, the Latin brothers, loudly acclaiming the Franco-Russian alliance with truly anti-Semitic Russia against the German-Jewish conspiracy, voiced the same opinion.\textsuperscript{120} Bratianu’s remark was no doubt inspired by the conflict with Germany over the Romanian payments to German investors in Romanian railways. The Jewish banker, Bleichröder, who was very close to Bismarck, led the negotiations. Bratianu may have shared the views of German anti-Semites, who held that Bismarck, in the pay of the Jews, was their willing tool.\textsuperscript{121} To serve Jewish interests, it was said, he abolished bimetallism in 1879 and thereby artificially boosted the price of gold, to the detriment of the agrarian classes. High prices of gold allegedly so lowered the prices of agrarian products that indebted German farmers went bankrupt, and the Romanians could no longer advantageously export their grain.\textsuperscript{122}

Romanian anti-Semitism is either a direct or an indirect offshoot of “Western” developments, or showing affinity with Western and Russian concepts, it is an autochthonous development of a not yet analyzed “western” pattern.
The permissiveness-cum-terrorization hypothesis

This bird’s-eye view of “borrowed” varieties of anti-Semitism as well as the occasional very conspicuous nondevelopment of it in parts of the Orthodox world does not prove to be very indicative of autochthonous developments. This is all the more remarkable since traditionally Greek Christianity is more anti-Judaistic than the Latin version. Nationalism clearly does not provide a clear-cut answer, for in Serbia, Bulgaria, “old” Greece, nationalism was as strong as anywhere else where anti-Semitism did take root. All over Europe anti-Semites were nationalists, but not all nationalists were anti-Semitic.

Economic problems provide no clear answer, even though it is true that the difficulties in northern Greece could have triggered off an anti-Semitic movement, if the Metaxas dictatorship had not nipped that in the bud. There is no reason to assume that the economy of Romania was essentially different from that of the other countries mentioned, though there were marked differences in the attitudes towards Jews.

Yet the analysis so far, does seem to contain essential information. The mob action in Alexandria in 414, reminiscent of a true “race riot”, could only have disastrous results, because at the time the government did not have the factual means, military or other, to prevent it. The same holds true for sixth-century developments in Antioch and Syria. The autocracy of the Byzantine Empire in its hey-day, however, could effectively prevent any popular initiative, as in fact the Metaxas dictatorship did. Turkish autocracy did not tolerate internecine conflicts between its 

Yet the analysis so far, does seem to contain essential information. The mob action in Alexandria in 414, reminiscent of a true “race riot”, could only have disastrous results, because at the time the government did not have the factual means, military or other, to prevent it. The same holds true for sixth-century developments in Antioch and Syria. The autocracy of the Byzantine Empire in its hey-day, however, could effectively prevent any popular initiative, as in fact the Metaxas dictatorship did. Turkish autocracy did not tolerate internecine conflicts between its dhimmis. The “millet-system” with its various autonomies of the different religious groups, may have preserved a merely geographical distance, but can easily, as was suggested, have increased stigmatization-correcting socioeconomic relations, between the various dhimmis groups, if only because they all had to pay the cyzia, the tax for infidels. So, in the Balkans, south of the lower Danube, perhaps not even the condition “distance” was met after independence, and antagonism was limited to purely religious issues, particularly manifest at Easter time. In Romania, in contradiction, there was not only social distance from the onset, but aggression was actually condoned by the government, and even promoted. The same applies to nineteenth-century Tsarist Russia, where the “Black Hundreds” were given a free hand, and little more was done by the government to prevent the numerous pogroms than paying lip-service. Jew-hatred came in handy too as a red herring.

This is suggestive. Whenever the government, incapable of stopping riots or massacres, condones them, or actually promotes them, violence, because
of the accusatory consequences of self-exoneration and justification, makes antagonism grow into fully fledged anti-Semitism. Wherever the government realizes a (near) “monopoly of violence”, and does not for whatever reasons tolerate anti-Semitic excesses, anti-Semitism remains ideologically or in effect “underdeveloped”. When, however, as in the case of Nazism, the government uses its “monopoly of violence” actually to lash out at the Jews, orders the population to do the same, and severely punishes any friendliness towards Jews as trespasses against the law, anti-Semitism grows into the immeasurable dimension of the Endlösung.

Governmental condoning of racist violence reminds one of the “Old South” of the US, where state or local governments actually connived in lynchings, race riots, and other maltreatment, and where the federal government, respecting state rights, did not interfere until very late in the day.

Such condoning opens the door for the “terrorization hypothesis”, which says that in such a situation of governmental permissiveness, fanatics, or people who stood to gain by threatening them, force others who are wavering or who are more benevolently disposed into an active cooperation, into “hunting with the hounds”. To be a “nigger-lover” is almost as dangerous as being a “nigger”. The somewhat-naïve young man from, say, Oregon, who, as such, does not know Southern mores, does not cherish hatred towards blacks, and who inherits a lunch counter or barbershop somewhere in the Deep South, will tend to serve whites and blacks on the same footing. Local hooligans come to tell him that if he continues to do so, his shop will be destroyed. Coming down a peg or two, he has to rationalize his now-conformist behavior, and is terrorized into an anti-black attitude. The same applies to the man who, at a lynching party, though convinced of the innocence of the victim keeps silent out of sheer fear, has to rationalize his behavior in self-exoneration, of necessity in an anti-black sense. He, too, is terrorized.

The phenomenon occurred in South Africa, where to be, or believed to be, a “Kaffir boetie”, resulted in ostracism or worse, sanctions only the very courageous dared to incur.

The same holds true for the witchcraft delusion. Wherever the government gave the witch hunters a free hand, fear of witches and persecution grew to immense proportions. After some women had been arrested, and their confessions obtained (by torture), an initially skeptical and uncooperative population was made to believe, and “terrorization” processes then caused new accusations to pour in, which prevented all but the very courageous to come out in defense of the accused. The otherwise so eminent Jean Bodin, the man who explained the sixteenth-century price rise in terms of
massive imports of gold, from the Americas, started witch trials in France with the full weight of his judicial authority when he argued that the humane procedure he championed in ordinary criminal cases was not applicable to witches, who would then be able to escape. Where, by some freak of fate the government did not cooperate, as for example in the province of Holland, where the ordeal by water was declared illegal in 1594, and weighing took place honestly in Oudewater, persecution abated, in fact vanished, though not necessarily the delusion, as the fate of Balthasar Bekker proves. This minister of the Church in 1691 published a book entitled, *The World Bewitched*, an attack on the witchcraft delusion. On account of this book he was expelled from the Dutch Reformed Church, but the Amsterdam town government continued to pay him a stipend.

When it is thus surmised that “terrorization” is a necessary condition, next to social distance and stigmatization, and dependent on both, but that the constituting governmental “permissiveness” is an independent factor, one could ask whether there is a *primus movens* problem at issue. Who terrorized the first terrorists? The self-exoneration of an initial riot could do that, as “self-terrorization”. A quarrel about some minor issue gone out of hand, drawing in some bystanders, can assume riotous proportions, as was the case in the Chicago race riots of July 1919, started when a little black boy accidentally swam in “white” water. The Alexandria massacre of 414 is also a case in point. As will be shown, the London riot of 3 September 1198 that was started by a trivial quarrel (and after which the rioters went unpunished) was the sign for the York massacre six months later (which also was equally unpunished, as will be elaborated). In both cases, all participants but one were “disinterested”.

The permissiveness-*cum*-terrorization hypothesis opens many perspectives, and indeed allows for the unhindered expression of Ranulf’s “disinterested tendency to inflict punishment”. It is often the untutored or half-tutored popular leaders (monks or lower clergy, for example), who articulate the resentment, and whose followers, by activating it, force the waverers and the benevolent to comply; it is the oil slick. Terrorization helps to explain why and how illiterate masses begin to accept, on their own terms, the stigmatization formulated by a literate elite. Because their actions reflect the fears and worries of the day, terrorization mechanisms help to explain the aforementioned “evolutionary” growth of a genealogy of stereotypes in relation to social change, and thereby their potential ideological adequacy, the “functionality”, the ideological allocation of social positions, and the self-fulfilling prophecy character of the allegations. The labelled interaction, always con-
firming prejudice, lends a degree of stability and permanence. In short, the hypothesis opens perspectives for explaining the, in the end overwhelmingly secular, Judeo-phobic ideology of mass movements.

Table 1 contains the eight combinations of the three variables deemed necessary and sufficient conditions, 1) stigmatization, 11) social distance and labelled interaction, and 111) permissiveness-cum terrorization. The symbol / means does not occur and + means does occur.

Lines 2 and 6 have no real meaning, for it is difficult to imagine how terrorization can operate when open interaction prevails. Lines 1 and 3 are virtually identical, for there social distance cannot mean much more than a harmless amazement about these people; this is the situation in China, India, ancient Persia, the larger part of the pagan Roman Empire, and so forth. The only example of 4, the combination / + +, that comes to mind is the attitude of the Japanese military during World War II, in those occupied colonies where Jews can be expected to have played some role. In what was then called the Dutch East Indies, there were, in the civilian camps, many Jews who were separated from the other prisoners and treated more harshly.128 Nothing in their culture and history suggests a reason for the Japanese to hold any special concept about the Jews. The explanation for treating the Jews differently can therefore only have been the racist concepts and pressure of their German allies, or perhaps some indoctrination by prisoners of war during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Line 5 is the situation of lay philo-Semitism of the early period of the post-Constantine Church, which Chrysostom and other Church leaders tried to amend, but it could also characterize the position of

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**Table 1**

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the southern Balkan-Christian states after they obtained independence from Turkey; this would result in possibly in a middle position between 5 and 7.

Line 5, or a combination of 5 and 7, could, it is surmised, characterize the larger part of the medieval and modern Italian peninsula, Merovingian or Carolingian trans-Alpine Europe, England after the seventeenth century, Holland (the province, not the Netherlands) after the seventeenth century, Bohemia at the time of Charles IV, Belgium, modern Scandinavia and so forth. These were in fact the non-anti-Semitic countries of the table in chapter 1, in which Judeo-phobia was not wholly absent and a certain condescension and “social anti-Semitism” could prevail, but in a way that was politically ineffective. Finally, 8 marks widespread, politically effective, fully fledged Judeophobian.

The gradual transformation of friendly relations into deeply rooted popular hatred in feudal trans-Alpine Europe and its derivations provides possibilities for checking the hypothesis.
CHAPTER 6

A Dead Reckoning: The Growth of an Anti Jewish Stereotype in Western Europe

The selective point of view

Where, in Merovingian and Carolingian times, as will be demonstrated below, social relations between Jews and Christians were remarkably friendly, a reversal of the attitude of popularity to hatred took place roughly at the time of the first Crusade, and it is a baffling problem to interpret the change in relatively so short a period. It is so complex a problem indeed, that it seems appropriate to conduct the investigation by making a first dead reckoning on the basis of the reasoning so far and a general socioeconomic and broader history than that of Jewish-Gentile relations. A minimal reference to these is, however, unavoidable. The aim is first to investigate how general social change can have affected these relations, and later weigh up the conclusions against possible refuting evidence. Such a dead reckoning is a “reasonable conjecture”, a selective point of view. It is the auxiliary for ordering the evidence, and serves as a fixed point of reference.

Popular religiosity?

It is odd to see that a society as savage as that of the “Dark Ages” is reputed to have been, almost never aimed its violence at its Jewish minority. This is all the more astonishing when it is realized that the one institution aiming at mitigating the violent mores of the age, the Church, traditionally bore Judaism and its adherents no goodwill. It does seem reasonable to expect that the populace, interpreting clerical rejection of Judaism as somewhat condoning the inflicting of pain on them, must have felt that in that particular case violence was more excusable than in all other cases. Friendly social intercourse is therefore rather unexpected.

It could then firstly be assumed that popular religiosity was such that it failed to perceive the severity of the doctrinal rejection of Judaism, or per-
haps even that it still knew some degree of Judaizing. The former could certainly be expected from fairly recently converted Germanic groups, much paganism still being alive, and Christian tenets not having deeply penetrated despite former Arianism. The latter, given the persistence of a Judaizing tendency among the lay population in the West as well as in the East – the uncertainty about dietary laws or the ruling of the Council of Elvira that Jews should not be asked to bless the crops are some indications among many – could certainly be assumed for the Romano-Gallic population. Moreover the theological training of the vast mass of the lower clergy in that overwhelmingly illiterate age presumably left much to be desired, so that doctrine was inadequately inculcated. “Le clergé paroissial était dans son ensemble intellectuellement comme moralement inférieur à sa tâche.”

The finer points of the doctrinal indictments of Judaism by learned, literate theologians presumably seeped down very slowly to the levels of the parishes. An Agobard or an Amulo, archbishops of Lyons in Carolingian times, detractors of Judaism – Agobard wrote De Insolentia Judaeorum – were not listened to, not even by the emperors.

Yet it seems very unlikely that elementary notions of Jews as “Christ-killers”, deserted by God, deeply in error, were entirely unknown to the lay population, but as in Chrysostom’s days in Antioch, they were probably outweighed by some vague awareness of Jews being the Chosen People, and of Judaism being a religio licita.

For ill-instructed people, if they cared at all, this must have been a very disturbing thought. Why, if Jews allegedly, as adherents of Judaism, had committed the unpardonable crime of the Crucifixion, did that same religion have that lofty position? A reason to approach it with respect and wonder. What made the scales tip? Popular religious concepts? A change in popular religiosity, in relatively so short a period, so drastic as to explain the massacres of 1096 is not likely in a stagnant society, when there was chaos in Rome, “pornocracy”, and when theological learning until the Cluniac revival was at a low ebb. Was it then the Crusades themselves, inflaming religious fervor and fanaticism? Nothing untoward happened when the masses of the popular Crusade, followers of Peter the Hermit and Walter sans Avoir marched through the valleys of the Rhine and the Danube. The massacres came somewhat later in the year, committed by people who never reached the Holy Land. Or was it the Cluniac reform itself and particularly the crisis caused by the ensuing quarrel between pope and emperor about the investiture of bishops, and its aftermath? A Church in distress against its own religio licita intentions, inciting the populace against the Jews as protégés and finan-
cial supporters of its adversary? Nothing untoward happened to the Jews during the seventies of the eleventh century, the years of the Saxon rebellion, or during the years of the emperor’s excommunication – only temporarily suspended by the penance of Canossa in 1077 – absolving the emperor’s subjects from allegiance. There was enough excuse and opportunity before 1096, when indeed such inciting did take place.

**An initial reasonable conjecture**

Widening the pivotal period somewhat to the tenth century, another assumption based on the sociology of religion could be that the Viking, Magyar and Muslim invasions explain a change of attitude towards the Jews. If the pagan invaders systematically robbed and burned churches and other places of worship meaning to attack the god of the enemy and rob him of his strength, this could perhaps explain among Christians a heightened awareness of their religion. Such increased consciousness, a gradual process of deepening of Christian faith, could by implication result in an increased awareness of non-Christians, and thus of the Jews. However, increased consciousness did not necessarily guarantee greater doctrinal certainty among the laity regarding Judaism. This supposition moreover automatically implies that the most exposed areas would be the first to turn anti-Jewish; there does not seem to be much evidence to support this.

A new form of popular religious experience, greater doctrinal certainty, is not a likely explanation. What could be explanatory, is the three variables – hypothesis as developed in the previous chapters, clerical stigmatization seeping down, and the independent variables, social distance cum increasing labelled interaction and permissiveness cum terrorization. None of these by itself is a necessary and sufficient condition.

In the East, where for reasons of “Caesaropapism” social distance was not a truly independent variable, the hypothesis was neither confirmed nor refuted, as argued earlier, because the element of “terrorization” was lacking.

There superimposed segregation presumably ended all Judaizing tendencies among the lay population, but it did not result in a deeply ingrained popular Jew-hatred. An almost entirely opposite of the situation in the East obtained in the West. Instead of the controlled, government-staged persecutions as executed by the military in the East, in the West these were almost always uncontrolled mob actions, rarely with the connivance of the authorities, who in fact, as a rule tried to offer – not very effective – and by no means
disinterested, protection. Persecution was almost never staged by the government. In the East, Jews could participate in almost all economic activities, prejudice having no bearing on their economic role, whereas in the West, the Jewish economic role was in the end restricted to interrelated money lending, money changing, pawnbroking, trafficking in second-hand goods, and financial administration for—oppressive—lords. In contrast to the East, where popular resentment was limited to the religious issues in dispute, there was in the end in the West a deeply ingrained popular hatred that went far beyond the original religious issues, bearing charges of an economic nature, and perceptions of the Jew as a completely dehumanized diabolical being, sorcerer, poisoner, murderer of children, traitor, and more, as will be discussed below.

A partially explanatory conjecture would initially look as follows: A money economy with a degree of sophistication as existed in the East, could not be maintained in the West. (To what extent and when it lost its significance in the West is a matter of controversy.) Trade and commerce had sunk to such a low level, while agriculture was approaching a mere subsistence level, that no form of taxation could provide sufficient means to keep a highly literate bureaucracy in existence. This resulted in governmental ineffectiveness, including that regarding the Jews, on any other than the small-scale regional level, and perhaps even present there. Combined with an initial plurality of legal systems, shortly after the Germanic invasions, such regionalized government gave scope to a tremendous variety of policies, even though there was to some extent a common religious denominator. Since moreover, as stated earlier, the conception of church and state was somewhat different in Latin Christendom—the Western Church traditionally claiming a greater measure of independence—the Roman church probably formed a less coherent working unit with the various kingdoms than its eastern counterpart. All in all there is every reason to assume that even if the Latin Church insisted on the segregation of the Jews, for identical reasons as its (Orthodox) Greek counterpart, there were far less effective means of enforcing this on the one hand, and far fewer means of preventing terrorization and mob action on the other hand, once social distance came into being in any other than a politically enforced way. Government ineffectiveness, the very reason why segregation could not be imposed, is also the reason why terrorization could not be prevented. Thus there would be ample opportunity for persecution by the mob, for massacres perpetrated by the populace, which in all likelihood would later seek recourse for the justification of its misdemeanors in ever more fantastic stories and charges. The more that happened, the more the Church would be forced, without for a moment changing its segregationist policies and its
condemnation of Judaism, to emphasize the other aspects of its own teachings, to wit the theological necessity of the continued existence of the Jews, the idea that God awaits their conversion, and the rule that sincere converts can only be made by prayer, charity, persuasion or miracles, but not by violent coercion. It would consequently be forced to make – presumably not very effective – attempts at protecting the Jews.

The preliminary conjectural description would further predict that before isolation of the Jews was somehow brought about, the clerical stigmatization would fail to take effect, since it would be overruled by day to day corrective interaction with Jews, who were indistinguishable in every respect but religion; their legal, social, and economic position being unspecific.

The key to the problem is then an explanation of a social distance, not imposed by any authority – perforce a truly independent variable – in all likelihood attributable to a general process of social change differently affecting Jews and lay Christians.

The reason for assuming this is that, as the as yet unproven friendly social intercourse suggests, there must have been a whole array of patterns of interaction, largely of a socioeconomic nature. If Jews and Christians had primarily met as members of two religious communities, that which divided them would in all probability have dominated the encounter. When they met in a great variety of roles, however, the religious issues could be somewhat obfuscated. Precisely because that was so, laymen confused anyway, as mentioned, could develop Judaizing tendencies, just as in the Antioch of Chrysostom’s days, or could at least be indifferent to whatever clerical warnings were seeping down.

If, as will be argued, it may with reason be assumed that in Merovingian and Carolingian times, Jews were indistinct in every aspect but religion, there was in the daily life of the workaday world ample opportunity for neighborly contact, for all sorts of economic, social and military cooperation, for the hustle and bustle of daily life, for taking part in the hue and cry when the alarm was raised and perhaps even in a common place of work, in short for all the human relationships of ordinary life. The evidence before people’s own eyes, stimulating their confusion, would undo the effect of clerical admonishment. Perhaps ordinary laymen even failed to identify the Jews they actually met with the Jews who allegedly had crucified Christ, as Matthew xxvii, 25, had not yet been loaded with meaning.

Such friendly intercourse in a situation of open, overall interaction is in keeping with the psychologist’s “inductive and deductive inferences” (people form opinions on some members of another group on the basis of some posi-
tive or negative experiences and tend to generalize and apply them to the whole group as such).\textsuperscript{11}

It can only have disappeared when, with no segregation being imposed by the authorities, there were, in daily life diminished chances of meeting, and this in turn obtains only when there were drastic changes in the occupational positions (and their social derivates) of Jews and Christians. The search therefore is for a socioeconomic process, that brought about a change from a situation of Jewish indistinctness, where Jews were found in all walks of life, to a situation of very specific Jewish socioeconomic functions, the above mentioned interrelated roles, with all the legal and social encumbrances such specification entailed. Geographic distance, due to the medieval custom of each vocational group living in its own street, would be one of them, the origin of Jewries, or even ghettos.

Jews catering to their own Jewish market in various occupational activities, for example, kosher butchering, did not result in contact with comparable Gentile groups. Social distance further increases when in the Gentile world there is at the same time a proliferation of vocational positions, expliable in terms of the same process.

The reasonable conjecture therefore assumes a socioeconomic development wherein Jews could not fully participate, because it involved activities and attitudes at variance with Jewish orthodoxy, so that participation by Jews could only take place at the price of concessions jeopardizing Judaism. In agriculture one could think of those aspects of feudalism, where the title to land involved the taking of a Christian oath. In other cases one could think of the trade monopolies of “oligopolistic” guilds, which apart from being economic organizations, were also Christian communities of prayer, and as will be seen, preserving semi-pagan rituals contrary to essential tenets of Judaism.

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to emphasize that this reasoning, which has to be elaborated, implies that specification of Jewish vocational positions was primarily due to Jewish religious scruples, resulting in self-exclusion, rather than being due to the traditionally assumed exclusion of infidels. This is in keeping with social distance as an independent variable, and holds true, however much, at a later stage, after the reversal of attitudes, the status quo was rationalized and ratified as a well-deserved exclusion of “those infidels”. It holds true, even though undoubtedly some less strict Jews were quite willing to make some concessions. These then, considering the amount of social control demanded for conformity in the face-to-face relationships of those early times, could probably not maintain themselves as
Jews. At a time when all parties concerned held that a Jew was an adherent of Judaism, they will have apostatized and disappeared in the Gentile world.

It is perhaps also appropriate to emphasize that an economic interpretation of social distance is not identical with an economic interpretation of Jew-hatred. It deals with only one of the presumed necessary, but not necessary and sufficient conditions. It has the advantage, however, of opening perspectives of the later very evident economic charges, not so easily explained by a purely religious interpretation.

In order to clarify this it is perhaps useful to look at an admittedly somewhat extreme form of a purely economic interpretation of Marxist inspiration. It is the study by A. Léon, a former Zionist turned Trotskyist, murdered by the Nazis. His book, hardly noticed when it was posthumously published in 1946, was rediscovered in the 1970s, when it played a role in left-wing anti-Zionism. Léon, wholly in the spirit of Marx’s Zur Judenfrage, denounced Zionism as a bourgeois reaction, a false track, since it overlooked that anti-Semitism, being a form of class war, could only be ended by a social revolution.

In the war of 66-70, according to Léon, Jewish merchants sided with Rome, betraying their compatriots, who inter alia, sided with Christianity and its denunciation of riches, (Matthew xix, 24) by formulating a revolutionary ideology. These merchants, thereby reinforcing their privileged position, fully became a class, during the colonate period of the Roman Empire, foreshadowing feudalism. The coloni, formerly free peasants heavily indebted to rich landowners, were already adscripti glebae. Christianity, in a revisionist process bereft of its revolutionary fervor, having become a religion to comfort the masses, was ideally suited to become the class ideology of the landed ruling classes. Judaism likewise became the class ideology of a commercial class, their social function the result of the conversion into other values of the plus value which landowners extracted from their serfs. As long as a “natural economy” lasted, with production mainly for local consumption and not for exchange in a market, Jews were a privileged class. They were victimized by the onset of a capitalist production for a market of the nascent bourgeoisie in the new developing towns. Jews, now restricted to mere usury, were exposed to the wrath of the exploited. Persecutions of the Jews in the later Middle Ages…were medieval forms of what now would be called social revolution. It is by no means clear from Léon’s reasoning, why such a situation should have persisted. The sprinkling of baptismal water would for many have created an opening to this new bourgeois world, would have ended their problems. Why, if that class ideology was no longer functional, did they stick to it? Jews stuck to their religion, precisely because it was not a class-

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ideology, and much more of an independent variable than Léon is prepared
to admit.

Nevertheless some of Léon’s observations stand. Jews did play a role as ad-
ministrators of great landed estates; persecutions of Jews began the moment
they had, as urbanites, a very limited range of economic activities, as they did
not participate in the production for a market, and Judaism, in rabbinical ex-
egesis had perforce to find some justification for economic activities that
were not strictly “kosher”; usury was in fact forbidden by Jewish law. Léon’s
observations fit into somewhat more complicated social structures.

The significance of social structures and the changes in them

Three Christian societies with almost identical theological concepts about
Jews and Judaism, but with remarkably different social structures, had three
entirely different ways of treating their Jews. Nothing better highlights the
significance of social structures and the changes in them.

In one case there was governmental persecution, controlled, without sig-
nificant participation of the populace that consequently knew little preju-
dice. In the second case there was friendly social intercourse between Jews
and the lay population, with sporadic, unofficial destruction of synagogues—
perpetrated by monks? — the third, roughly since the twelfth century, was a
persecuting society, with violence usually in the form of uncontrolled mob
action, rarely staged by government, with popular prejudices much beyond
the original theological issues.

In the first case, as shown, there was an urbanized, sea-oriented, com-
mercial society, with a free, tax-paying and integrated rural community. A “mer-
cantilistic” government owed its effectiveness to a salaried bureaucracy, and
perhaps equally to a uniform codified law, which effectively made the inhabi-
tants into subjects.

In the third case, there was once more a society with a money-economy, its
trade, shipping, and commerce flourishing and highly urbanized. Towns
were rather autonomous units, however, as state formation had only just be-
gun. Peasantry was only partly integrated, when in the vicinity of towns there
was greater intensity of agriculture. Taxation and therefore bureaucracy and
policing was ineffective north of the Alps, and there was not yet any question
of one uniform law, valid for all, but rather a whole array of privileges. These
two cases seem to highlight the significance of the nascent state both as an—
effectively — protecting or a persecuting institution.13

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Early medieval society is the second case deviating from both the others. Overwhelmingly agrarian, landlocked, it had a very slow circulation of money, “trop atrophié pour permettre un fonctionnariat salarié”\textsuperscript{14}.

There was no uniform code of law, but all the various groups were subject to a whole plethora of different laws, with as their main characteristic “l’attache du subordonné à un chef tout proche”.\textsuperscript{15}

It approached what could be called a natural economy. After the invasions many towns were in a shambles, though devastation was perhaps not as complete as traditionally assumed. In many former civitates, now sees of bishops, diocesan administration preserved some vestiges of urban life. Money did not altogether disappear, and was used to buy eastern luxuries such as spices and silk. Slaves, furs, high quality swords etc. were exported, but the balance of trade was negative, and for a long time the scarce precious metals, mined on a very modest scale, tended to flow to the east. Some commercial relations over short distances existed in the northern coastal lands, with trading in palia fresonica ("Frisian cloth") and earthen- and glassware, but they were not linked up with the great commercial systems of the east.\textsuperscript{16} Often barter was the ordinary means of exchange.

Taking Postan’s warning to heart that the terms “rise” or “decline” of a money economy should be used in relation to the total number of transactions paid in money,\textsuperscript{17} rather than in relation to the quantity of money, the economy which prevailed during several centuries before the eleventh century might, if this is not taken too literally, be called “natural”.

The overwhelming majority of the population was engaged in agriculture with extremely low yield-ratios, on acres insufficiently fertilized, with insufficient manpower to allow extension by forest clearing or opening up of wastelands. No taxation of any significance could be imposed on such a peasantry, who, consuming locally what was produced, made, and endlessly repaired their own clothing, and household articles. In such a situation kings could easily acquire, the perhaps somewhat undeserved qualification of fainéants, statehood naturally being at so low an ebb. The administration of justice was accusatory, not inquisitorial, with the burden of proof laid on the accused through trial by ordeal, battles, or judgment of God.

What, in such a society, is the likely place of the Jews? The usual answer is: commerce. Pirenne, when he launched his famous theory about feudalism being the result of the traditional Mediterranean commercial system having been cut in two by Islamic conquest, characteristically made an exception for Jews; they were the only merchants.\textsuperscript{18} Gregory of Tours mentions Jews as purveyors to the courts of Merovingian kings, but also mentions them as physicians, moneyers, shipowners and in other roles.\textsuperscript{19}
In Carolingian times, there were the famous “Rhadanites”, Jewish “merchant adventurers”, travelling to and from Gaul to Baghdad, via co-religionists in both worlds. They stemmed from Rhadan in Iraq, but their proverbial linguistic ability, and their excellent connections at the courts, show that they must have been quite at home in the Christian world. Were they, as Iraqi, non-Christians, and merchants in a rural society, the threefold aliens, suspected and disliked, as Cohen assumes? Were Jews exclusively merchants? If so, that would have been a fairly recent development, for in the ancient world Jews were not predominant as merchants. Juster commented: “Jamais un auteur païen ne les caractérise comme marchands; jamais à l’époque païenne ces deux notions – Juif et marchand – ne vont ensemble comme de soi-même.”

More recent research by, among others, Tcherikover has demonstrated that even in Egypt that was the case. Moreover, how could a rather exceptional commerce of aliens, serving only the upper fringes of society, have sustained groups, sizeable enough to allow the Jewish community life, demanded by synagogueal organization; a community life that very soon was to be attested all over Gaul and western Germania, and must have had deeper roots. Archaeological evidence, as well as chance remarks, prove that already in the fourth century Jews inhabited these areas. Christianity may have spread, like everywhere else, via Jewish communities. Migration, being sold as slaves, later manumitted, and proselytism, can explain Jewish residence in other roles than those of merchants. They were recognized as coloni and later on as landowners.

How did they obtain the land? Some may have bought a plot after long years of residence, some, after having served as soldiers in the Roman army, may have acquired land in the neighborhood of their former garrison. According to one story, former non-Jewish soldiers were sometimes not only given pieces of land, but Jewish female slaves as well. Not minding their offspring being reared in the Jewish faith by their mothers, they may have thus given rise to a group of Jewish smallholders. There may have been landowning converts. There were wealthy Jewish landowners, perhaps particularly those who catered to a specific Jewish market as viticulturists (wine was considered to be unclean if even one drop of it was used for pagan sacrifices, and perhaps also if used as wine for Mass). The only kosher wine was that made of grapes gleaned by Jews. These may have maintained themselves longer, that is, especially if they lived near a town where there was a synagogue and opportunity for study. Up to the period of the Crusades, Jews are mentioned as viticulturists, prominent in the general wine trade.

Coloni were already adscripti glebae, who later fused with slaves who had
risen socially. When Rome was forced to fight defensive wars, which yielded fewer prisoners than offensive wars, slaves became scarcer and consequently more expensive. The greater the investment made in a slave, the greater the loss when he died, or when he was made unproductive by disease. This would result in better care being taken of the slaves. Slaves consequently acquired more rights and became less alienable property. They could marry, raise families, build cottages on the estates of their masters, and might even have a plot of their own for the upkeep of their families. Gradually the differences between *coloni*, clients (if any), and slaves became more and more blurred. Together with their dependent manumitted slaves they were fused by the German invaders into one category; they were still called *servi* but they had already become the group called “serfs”, with perhaps all the shades of dependence or freedom that for ages remained characteristic of this group.

Were Jews members of this group? Some former Jewish *coloni* or slaves initially may have been. But even if some Jews were found among the groups which were gradually transformed into the classes of serfs and villeins, it is not likely that they would have been able to maintain themselves. When Jews were scattered as very small minorities in small isolated villages and belonged to the lowest class of society, sheer isolation would have made it impossible to sustain the required degree of literacy; they would have been illiterate members of the most illiterate class of a most illiterate age. The above-mentioned social control in these small rural settlements would have done the rest. Free Jewish landowners could perhaps through commendation have sunk to the lower villein classes. This is unlikely, however, since commendation required a Christian oath, with all the aforementioned consequences.

As the oath of fealty created the same difficulties, Jews cannot have belonged to the nobility either, unless they paid for it by complete assimilation. People of Jewish descent, like the Pierleonis in Rome, could certainly belong to the noble classes, but not as professing Jews.

Jewish landed property, if any, therefore consisted of *allodii*, or hereditary estates, which were, to use a nice late-medieval phrase, a “fief of the sun.” The owners recognized no human seigneur, which indicates to what extent they were an alien element in feudal society.

There is yet another argument for presuming that Jews belonged to the neither very poor, nor very rich, stable “middle classes” of that early medieval society. As a literate group in a very illiterate age, with strong cohesion because of their religious ties, they were somehow better equipped to weather the storm of invasion and devastation than other groups who had no such links. But as Agus argued, such strengthening inner cohesion only held true

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for strict Jews. For the wavering, as mentioned, there was no place. So Jews emerged as a religious, strongly coherent, studious, and literate group of merchants, well-to-do landowners, viticulturists, physicians, craftsmen, but were not found in oppressive power-positions. Legally they belonged to the Romano-Gallic population, where Roman law was used; socially they were indistinguishable from people in comparable positions, as will be shown.

As long as lay Christians were still somewhat confused about religious differences, nothing prevented Jews from being a status group, free, respected, with some prestige, rarely hated, and not the objects of particular envy. Even many members of the clergy, as of old desirous to learn from them, to use their vast expertise in matters of Old Testament lore, entertained friendly relations. Friendly social intercourse with large sections of the population, employees, customers, neighbors, and colleagues, is indeed the appropriate term. The first threat to their comfortable position came with the waning of allodial land.

**Feudalism, communalism, urbanism**

The more demonetized the economy became, the greater the general poverty, and the more land became the standard for measuring wealth and status. Lack of money and the necessity to raise mounted armies to fight the invaders, necessitated furnishing the warriors with the means to obtain the obligatory outfit; necessitated, in other words, compensation for services rendered or to be rendered in the form of grants of land.

As long as the king or emperor had enough land at his disposal to distribute among his vassals – and that was precisely the reason why Charles Martel also sequestered the land owned by the Church – as long as there were strong external pressures and danger, and as long as the king as supreme warlord was able to meet these threats successfully, he could rely on followers. When the king was unable to make vast conquests, when his vassals needed his protection less, or when they could handle the local threats by themselves, centrifugal forces began to make themselves felt. Logistics being what they were in this period, with its level of technology and its level of economic development, local commanders only too frequently had to deal with the local situation and with local threats as they saw fit. The king, in order to enable them to do so, in fact not merely handed out land, but in practice also the regalities belonging to it; even when he was unwilling to invest his vassals with these powers he did not have the factual means to prevent their usurpation. He thus
gave away, or was forced to give away “chunks of sovereignty”. He could only punish the disobedient by relying on other vassals. Duly compensated, these in turn sufficiently strengthened their positions of power to allow them to play the same game. Even conquest offered no absolute guarantee, for if the overlord overextended his grip, the same problem of logistics made it virtually impossible for him to control the vassals in the border regions of newly conquered areas. The king thus found himself sooner or later to be only a primus inter pares among a nobility which had made itself virtually independent – sooner in France, landlocked by the Empire, Muslim Spain and the sea, and a little later in Germany, where it was somewhat postponed by the possibilities of a successful conquest in an easterly direction.

The centrifugal forces, however, set their own limits. Since land was the basis of status and power, each member of the warrior class who had achieved virtual independence had to keep what he possessed. This, in fact, implies that he had to make constant efforts to extend his holding, either by marriage or by conquest, for the slightest change in the equilibrium could jeopardize his position. If neighbors or a coalition of neighbors could muster more men than he, they could wipe him out. Thus he was forced to take precautions by strengthening his position. If he became too powerful, he would automatically draw the inimical attention of a coalition of weaker ones. Since the system implied that each player primarily had to serve his own interest whatever the obligation proclaimed by oath of loyalty to the overlord might say to the contrary, an unstable equilibrium resulted, one regularly disturbed by an almost perennial warfare, in which the weakest were eliminated. In this manner, as N. Elias explains so well in his grandiose ideal-type description of the “socio-genesis” of feudalism, “monopoly” positions were gradually built up, in much the same way as many centuries later free competition led to the elimination of small firms and the rise of corporations. In fact, the unit that turned out to be the most successful in this power game was the princedom roughly the size of Flanders.

This process adequately explains the “atomization” of power and authority, as presumed above, that is, the unlimited plurality of policies regarding the Jews. No general isolating legislation could be achieved in this way; if some local potentates refused to co-operate for reasons of their own, there was no way of forcing them. Conversely, these small princedoms were unable to prevent, even if they wished to do so, the furor of fanaticized mobs, terrorized by their own members. Jews were thus increasingly subject to princely whims, to the arbitrariness of a class they were dependent on, for Jews were increasingly forced to seek a livelihood as administrators of the landed es-

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tates of that same class,\textsuperscript{32} and to put it mildly, not necessarily earning the gratitude of the servile dependents of these estates. This was by no means the end of their problems.

As N. Elias also shows, it was only with the slow re-emergence of a money economy, i.e. with the gradual coming into being of (proto-)urban groups, the gradual development of trades and commerce over greater distances, that princes, overlords as well as vassals and sub-vassals, could hope to restore or consolidate their power positions. By favoring the urbanites who made the money, they could obtain some money income, thus bringing about a “division of labor” in their realities – by separating military, legal, administrative, judicial and other salaried tasks – and were consequently no longer forced to give away whole “chunks” of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{33}

All the various officials were now in the same abstract way dependent on the prince, no one being any longer in a position to make himself independent. As a spider in his web the prince could control them all, provided he had enough of the \textit{nervus rerum} money.

The new classes, desiring safety and security as well as the right to manage their own affairs as they saw fit, were willing to pay a certain price for adequate protection, and for the punishment of the meddlesome local potentate who did not serve their interests; in cities, the new commercial and trading groups did support the emperor against over-exacting bishops, for example, but depending on the circumstances, they could also favor the local potentate when his protection was adequate against the demands of some far-away overlord.

The whole development, however, was ominous for the Jews. When in the process of their formation, the new classes somehow lost the easy interaction with Jews of former days, because there were less chances of meeting “on the shop-floor”, when social distance grew, clerical stigmatization was less easily corrected, and more readily accepted. The growing elbow-room of the new classes, their increased autonomy and positions of power provided the means of giving full expression to their changed mood. That angry mood was not improved when growing social distance had occupational consequences for Jews, allegedly or really having an averse effect on the well-being of these same new classes. Jews were then once more victimized but, as is rather unusual, by economic growth rather than by depression.

In the tenth or eleventh century Western Europe began to wake up from its torpor. Possibly due to a change in climate, agrarian yields improved,\textsuperscript{34} causing an as yet very minor demographic change. But when somewhat more labor was available for clearing forests and wastelands, the effect was doubled.

Increased agrarian production created the \textit{Subsistenz-mittelfonds}, as
Böhm-Bawerk called it, that little bit extra that enabled man to direct his energies to other goals; the proverbial extra bit of fish that sets some people free to make the nets so that the whole hitherto spearfishing population could catch more fish; in short, the principle of savings and investments. An ever growing part of the population was free to specialize in the production of other consumption goods than food, and, what is more, in the production of capital goods. The concentration of all sorts of toolmakers, weavers, carpenters and hosts of other artisans in towns, as well as merchants, and growing trade relations of these nascent urban centers with the country as well as with each other, necessitated a general means of exchange: money. Hoarded gold and silver was again minted. Urban development in turn stimulated agriculture, for highly urbanized areas were often at the same time Intensitäts-Inseln, areas of greater agrarian productivity. Widening commercial relations fostered the demand for industrial products, and so on. In terms of these mutual interdependent factors, an ideal type description of the development of the medieval economy can be made: though hampered by chronic shortage of precious metals, it had such characteristic features as technological development, a certain degree of mechanization (watermills), increasing division of labor, rationalization of financial transactions by the use of the bill of exchange, and so forth.

The technology was, according to Lynn White, an aspect of that feature characteristic of Western society ever since the early Middle Ages, which he described as the persistent “labor to end all labors”, a feature itself deeply embedded in Judaeo-Christian labor ethics. (One may wonder to what extent this common background has later aggravated the situation.)

As will be elaborated below, in the Judaeo-Christian tradition labor was seen as emancipating man from his immediate bodily wants, staving off discomfort, hunger, cold, ferocious animals and so on, so that he had spare time for reflecting on his obligations towards the Creator, for prayer, for meditating on sin, faith, and the way of salvation; labor as the means to the means of redemption. The less drudgery, the more spare time for a spiritual way of life. That explains the continuous search for labor-saving devices; let nature, animals, wind, water, and so on do the drudgery. Man, as the ruler over all other creation, Genesis 11, 28, could and should use the earth and all it contained as instruments for creating the conditions for his spiritual well-being, but only for that purpose. In Jewish ethics, the beating of an ass is allowed when one uses the animal for work, in all other situations it is a transgression of the respect one owes to a divinely created being. The more Jewish sages were manual workers, the more they were respected. The glass-polishing Spinoza fits
into an age-old Jewish tradition, far removed from Greek philosophical traditions, which saw labor as degrading, fit for the unenlightened.\footnote{It could be surmised, however, that despite the Jewish origin of Christian labor-ethics, Jews were seen as no longer belonging to an ethical community, when by some quirk of circumstances they were no longer engaged in “emancipating” work. Perhaps it contributed to their being, in the end, popularly conceived of as reprobate infidels, a further step towards degradation.}

One aspect of that quirk of circumstances was the not necessarily exclusivist medieval communalism, an outcome of rural development. Although the basic socioeconomic unit was the family, mutual aid and protection made people usually prefer the village with the houses close together. The very number of animals required for plowing, which necessitated pooling, as well as the number of men needed to do the work, the strong effort involved in reclaiming land, the joint warding off of external dangers, strange men and ferocious animals, all created a mutual dependence and the indispensibility of cooperation, which also found expression in communal ownership of the wastes, the commons.

The basic units were the \textit{mansi} (English \textit{hide}, French \textit{manse}, German \textit{Hufe}) grouped around the \textit{mansus indominicus}, the demesnes, which indeed reflects the changed feudal dependence relations, but they remained single-family units in a communal system. Climatic conditions favored it. No vast centralized “hydraulic” arrangement as in the old river cultures was required, and therefore no “Oriental despotism” to quote Wittfogel,\footnote{Communalism, however, certainly when it is permeated with the above labor ethics, and particularly in its urban form, is a disaster for the outsiders, which is what Jews are likely to have become ever since their removal from rural areas. From the perspective of this study, communal autonomy also means another aspect of that “atomization” of authority, which helps to explain a certain amount of “permissiveness”, the condition for “terrorization”.} in order to keep the system going. The European plains did not have to face the problem of so many tropical and subtropical regions, the alternation of semi-annual rainfall with very dry periods, and the resulting exigency of irrigation or storage of water, which in turn demanded a tribal or other political organization over a wider area. Small-scale communalism as it originated in the rural areas, in fact set the course of future development: “When the increase of agricultural surplus enabled more peasants to move to the cities, they carried with them a habit of communal autonomy far more vivid than anything known under the Roman Empire.”\footnote{The drawing of the Mark of Cain_BW 27-11-09 09:35 Pagina 208}
Communalism also helps to explain why a “proto-urban” population of the Western type, which is supposed to have so deeply influenced the Jewish position, could come into being at all. When the yield in agriculture increased, the community no longer needed practically all available labor to raise enough food, so that some members could begin to specialize in the production of non-agrarian goods. Due to the communal organization this could happen even when the increase was only slight. If over a long period of time it averaged say five percent, one family of five could not set a person free but a community of twenty could. It is the (proto)urban development that now demands attention.

In the former civitates, now episcopal sees, or cities, some remnants of urbanity were preserved. The many administrative activities needed, the large retinue this required, the many monks attracted by the various clerical functions as well as the many pilgrimages to the sepulchers or relics of famous saints, such as those of Saint Martin in Tours, kept some cities thriving, small and ruined though they might be. Because of all these clerical and administrative functions cities together with the monasteries remained pockets of literacy in an illiterate world. So influential, in fact, were the clergy in these cities that, more often than not the bishop and his staff in fact usurped government, and maintained secular as well as canonical law and order. Since the Church was a landowner and some surplus from clerical estates as well as some part of the tithes must have come to them, these centers, requiring transport, storage and so on, could not have been without some economic significance as well, providing a livelihood for however small a lay population. Thus preserved, many old Roman cities became the nucleus of new growth. They attracted the people driven from the land by the diminishing demand for labor in the rural areas; vagabonds who perhaps never had a plot of their own, seeking new opportunities, as well as Jews and other former owners of alodial lands.

As these cities were from the outset so much dominated by the clergy, one may well wonder whether this very fact would not make clerical stigmatization more effective. Concentrated clerical influence on the secular level could, one may surmise, effectively isolate the Jews from the other newcomers, and in this respect urbanization could very well have been a major step towards the growth of an anti-Jewish stereotype. This possible effect would no doubt be somewhat offset by the fact that the church was not interested in a violent persecution of the Jews, and had little reason to deny them entrance to the various new economic activities, which anyhow it largely condemned as Mammonism, and willingly left to the infidels.

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Moreover, clerical influence would also to some extent be limited because
the new lay inhabitants tended to rebel against the somewhat autocratic rule
of the bishops, and objected to the taxes and economic restrictions imposed
by episcopal rule.⁴⁶

There were other towns, however, where clerical supremacy did not neces-
sarily obtain. If indeed the cities, as episcopal sees were slightly more preju-
diced, these other towns could have been favored by the Jews.

Major factors in urban revival appear to have been the opening of so many
new trade-routes, the discovery of new lands, and the development of seafar-
ing and shipbuilding techniques by the Vikings, which perhaps made their
raids a blessing in disguise. Particularly stimulating for economic growth in
the north and west of Europe, it seems, was the Byzantine gold introduced in
the Baltic area via the Russian trade route.⁴⁷ Even if that has been rather exag-
gerated, the very fact that the Scandinavian world was brought into the orbit
of Latin Christendom certainly contributed to the development of commer-
cial relations, and hence to the foundation of new towns, particularly in
North Germany, and in the Baltic and North Sea areas. To what extent new
towns immediately owe their existence to the Vikings is a matter open to de-
bate. It has been argued that often when the name of a town ends in -which, -
vic, -wijk, -weich, or something similar, it could be derived from the Norwe-
gian word vik, meaning bay, or sheltered water;⁴⁸ such names thus betray a
Scandinavian origin. Vikings would have sold their loot in such sheltered
places, and this would be the beginning of commercial undertakings of a
more permanent nature. In Holland, Wijk bij Duurstede, the vik near the de-
stroyed Dorestad, would then be a classical example. Others maintain that
vik or wik is a word of common Germanic stock, found in all Germanic lan-
guages and still to be found in the German word Weich-bild, formerly mean-
ing urban tenure, now more generally urban precincts. Wik, whatever its ori-
gin may be, is “the district where the merchants live”.⁴⁹

On the outskirts of the old civitates such new districts also emerged. Mer-
chants on their way to or from the many fairs in Europe where the annual
buying and selling took place – for a long time the Champagne fairs were the
most important, but certainly not the only ones – often sought the hospitali-
ty of the great monasteries, or the protection of the strong castles or burghs.⁵⁰
In time, temporary settlements of these merchants became permanent and
gradually new towns would emerge. St. Gallen and Munich are typical exam-
pies of the first type; Bruges, literally meaning the settlement near the bridge
of the castle, according to the charming description of Jean Long in the four-
teenth century,⁵¹ would be an example of the type of town that began as a
faubourg: a group of settlements, when finally walled, fused together with the original castle, frequently preserving a memory of its origin in its name. Finally a new type of town would emerge at the crossings of rivers and land routes, near fords, bridges, or ferries, or near dams such as Amsterdam or Rotterdam.

The Church had every reason to be suspicious. From its point of view, they all seemed to fall under the ruling: “Qui comparat rem ut illam ipsam integram et immutatem dando lucretur, ille est mercator qui de templo Dei ejiciitur” (“He who buys a commodity so that he may make a profit by selling that same commodity in its original form and unchanged, is a merchant who must be expelled from the temple of God”).52 Pursuit of gain without effort is sinful. It amounts to the stealing of God’s time. Only honest labor should be compensated, a notion fitting in with the above-mentioned labor ethics.53

Clerical criticism may have drawn attention to Jews as conspicuous members of the reprobate group, who thus were conceived of as doubly hardened in sin, but this does not explain increasing acrimony among the Gentile members of this outcast group.

Were these merchants as hardened in sin as some clerics would have us believe? There is evidence that many merchants were aware of a conflict of roles. There is the famous story of Godric of Finchale, whose career is representative of so many of his group: the son of very poor Saxon peasants from the Lincolnshire coast, he started out as a beachcomber, became a shipowner and a very wealthy merchant, and, when middle-aged, gave all his earthly goods to the poor and became a hermit.54 There were many others like him.

The inconsistency of their two value systems must have burdened their conscience, which they quite likely tried to soothe by making large donations to the Church. How else were the many parish churches in the new faubourgs, the new commercial quarters, financed?

Merchants were often founders of monastic houses, hospitals, and almshouses. In fact these gifts for the building of large cathedrals, churches, and other ecclesiastic buildings were so substantial, that at a later stage they jeopardized investment in trade and industry. It has even been argued that the commercial crisis of the fourteenth century was partly due to overinvestment in the building of churches.55 It could be surmised, that, when there was such an inconsistency in norms and values, the soothing of consciences could lead to an attempt to externalize the conflict as much as possible. This could best be achieved by putting the onus for the worst aspects of the totality of commercial activity, the most “usurious” transactions, on a subcategory which for other reasons was already “expelled from the temple of God”.

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would mean in practice that there was a tendency to reserve the seamier side of commercial activity, money lending, to the infidels, the Jews, as was later formally established by the fourth Lateran Council in 1215. Nobody then or later realized, or was willing to realize that the canonists’ prohibition was largely based on Old Testament texts. *Hebraei*, it presumably was argued, could not be usurers but *Judaei* could; forced by circumstances rabbinical rulings had to be made accordingly. In their dealings with Gentiles the rabbis gave Jews more liberty of action than strict orthodoxy allowed.

**The occupational specification of Jews and occupational differentiation of Gentiles**

When, for the time being, apart from viticulture, Jews were ousted from agriculture, which were their likely outlets? If in commerce, were there any specific advantages for Jews? In the Arab world Jews were heavily engaged in the caravan trade, perhaps also after having been ousted from agriculture, in this case by desiccation. So Ashkenasic Jews may easily have developed commercial relations with co-religionists. They had freedom of movement in a world extending from Spain to Baghdad and beyond, but the advantages need not have been specifically Jewish, for Christians also had co-religionists in the world of Islam.

More specific Jewish advantages were that they had a language in common with their co-religionists, whereas the Christians had not, and what is more, a language closely akin to the lingua franca of that vast area — the Arab writer Ibn Khardâdhbeh (circa 847), describing Jewish commercial activities, emphasizes their linguistic ability; they also had a high degree of literacy, and as Max Weber noted, a certain predilection for occupations which left time for study.

Some Jews, reading the signs of nascent feudalism, may have sold out, thereby having some initial capital. Jews, though by no means the only merchants (there were the “Frisians” in Dorestad), because they had a foot in both camps, presumably specialized in the Oriental trade and became the main providers of Oriental luxuries. This would explain the pre-eminent position Jews presumably had at the Merovingian and Carolingian courts. So advantageous might their commercial position, in fact, have been that it drew immigrants from the Byzantine area, where Jews were already more harassed than in the West.

This preeminent position, however, could not last. Italians (Amalfians
first, Pisans, Venetians and others somewhat later) counter-attacked the Muslims and reconquered a number of Mediterranean islands. Thus gradually achieving supremacy at sea, the Italians were soon better qualified than the Jews for monopolizing the Oriental trade. The latter lacked both naval support, and export industries at home.

Those Arab corsairs, who were still around after the Italian counter-attack, would sooner have attacked ships owned by Jews, if there were any, than Pisan or Genoese ships, since in the latter case they would have feared retaliation. To what extent was Jewish mercantile enterprise based on shipping? Though the sources do mention Jewish-owned and Jewish-manned ships in Carolingian times, one is left with the impression that Jewish merchants often travelled by land, using the Spanish route, not having adequate ports at their disposal on the north coast of the Mediterranean. Here, too, the Italians had advantages which enabled them to monopolize the Oriental trade.

The Jews did not only have to face Italian competition, but that of the newly emerging western commercial groups as well. Only by means of a certain specialization could they hope to hold their own.

It is not difficult to imagine how such specialization was forced upon the Jews. Ever since their reemergence in the tenth century, the itinerant adventurous peddlers had formed associations, guilds, hansas, charités, for mutual protection and cooperation – the career of the above-mentioned Godric really took off when he joined such an association – They travelled with their merchandise in large caravans, under the leadership of a Hansgraf or Doyen. Personal credit depended largely on the credit enjoyed by the group of which one was a member. Security in those unsafe days was only obtained by sticking together. By means of cornering tactics such associations could easily reserve for themselves the juicier bits, as they had to do anyhow, and leave the less digestible bits for the Jews to pick up. In this way a more specific position for the Jews can certainly be explained; this explanation, however, does presume that from the outset a certain, however vague, distinction existed between the Jewish and the new merchants. Such distinction is by no means implausible.

Indeed, if these new merchants were the boisterous, raucous drunkards Alpertus depicted – and their hazardous life may easily have made them so – there is reason to believe that pious Jews shied away from them.

Moreover, it does not seem altogether wrong to suppose that, sociologically speaking, there were differences between these Gentile merchants and the Jewish merchants, or at least the influential Jewish commercial elite.

Indeed if, as Pirenne emphasized, and as seems to be generally accepted,
most merchants of that troubled age, the tenth century, began their career as vagabonds hardly distinguishable from highway men – once more Godric could be cited as an example – and worked themselves up to not yet wholly respectable, but rather wealthy merchants, there may have been social distinctions. In fact, the very name of the English “Court of Piepoudre”, which dealt with legal matters of the fairs and markets, preserved until late in history, reminiscences of the original merchants, the peddlers, the “dust feet” (*pieds poudreux, pedes pulverosi*). Jews with some initial capital, and specializing in Oriental trade, were as such an elitist group; they were the *mercatores imperatoris* (merchants of the emperor-purveyors to the court), who, by special privilege, were given imperial protection.

Jews were at first able to maintain their elite position. Privileges like those given by the Carolingian emperors were also given by the Saxon emperors. A typical Magdenburg diploma of 965, issued by Emperor Otto 1, mentions “Judaïci, vel ceteri ibi manentes negotiators” (“Jews, or other merchants living there”). Latouche concludes from the wording a certain Jewish preponderance. That is indeed suggested by the fact that the *ceteri* in the previous quote remained unspecified. However, in 973 Otto 11 gave to the same town a privilege with the wording: *negotiares, vel Judaei ibi habitantes* (“merchants, or Jews living there”). In Saxon times, according to Planitz, privileges were given to the mercantile groups of the various *wiks* as a whole, and no longer to specific groups of merchants or to individual merchants as before. Equal standing, however, does not exclude either an economic preponderance or a certain degree of specialization, both having sociological consequences. One form of specialization would be the slave trade, in which for a long time Jews, probably due to their Oriental trade, seem to have had a leading position, though by no means a monopoly. It lasted until the conversion of the Slavs. There is therefore reason to assume that right from the beginning of the new mercantile development Jews held a somewhat special position in the merchants’ group, which is not attributable to anti-Jewish prejudice among their Gentile fellow merchants. The trend was likely to have been furthered by the continued growth of guild organization, which could mean that a similar specification existed within the artisan group.

Were Jews excluded from trade monopolizing craft guilds, and thereby from non-agrarian production and its commercial outlets, or did they not join them because membership would interfere with prescripts of Judaism? Jewish nonparticipation in (non-)agrarian production has always been a matter of controversy. Marxists like Léon explain it as the result of their economic action from the outset having been purely financial and commercial;
the same holds true for Marx in *Zur Judenfrage*. Racists like Wahrmundt explain it as being the result of the biologically determined spoliative and unproductive character of nomads. The very fact that in antiquity in the Byzantine Empire, the Islamic lands and former Byzantine or Muslim areas like southern Italy or Sardinia, in the Balkans and eastern Europe, Jews were frequently engaged as craftsmen in a variety of occupations, shows that the Jewish nonparticipation in Trans-Alpine western and central Europe, with the possible exception of Iberia and southern France, was an anomaly. Even in that area, it did not hold true for some branches of production, for example, glassblowing, glazing – still practiced in Cologne in the sixteenth century, and the gold- and silversmith’s craft, using unredeemed pawns as raw material. Jews were also engaged in crafts made for the Jewish market, such as tailoring, and cobbling. They were sometimes mentioned in Merovingian times as moneyers. However, outside Italy they were neither engaged in the cloth trade, leather business, processing and the major industries, like candlemaking, nor in building.

According to some older theories, craftsmen initially were recruited from the servile classes, and as Jews did not belong to them, this would allegedly explain their later non-participation.

As is generally agreed, corporative organizations of the crafts in the form of guilds with recognized status, which controlled prices and organized production, do not appear in great numbers (with the possible exception of Italy, where they may have been related to the older Byzantine institutions), much before the thirteenth century; that is long after the presumed change in Jewish-Gentile relations. If this means that craft guilds only then came into being, that simple fact would make the assumption about the specification of economic positions being the cause rather than the result of Jew-baiting rather illusory. Indeed, then it would be far more plausible to argue, that since Jews were already outcasts, they were for this reason excluded from honorable positions, the more so since these monopolizing organizations had a charitable function of an exclusively Christian character, and were fellowships of prayer.

This last qualification, however, raises the question whether or not a problem of conceptualization is at issue. Guilds and related organizations have, quite naturally, primarily been studied by economic historians whose interest consequently was focused on their economic function and behavior.

A clear case in point is Mickwitz’ famous study of the guilds conceived of as *Kartell* organizations whose main function was regulatory: price setting and control over the quality and the quantity of production and the number
of producers, were the mechanisms by means of which they tried to guarantee a satisfactory sustenance to all their members. As Max Weber so aptly formulated: Zunftpolitik ist Nahrungspolitik. The fact that in the heyday of their development these organizations could be described as such, by no means implies that an attempt at monopolization was the original motive of their foundation. That would assume a level of sophistication among those craftsmen in the Dark Ages, an insight into price mechanisms and the functioning of the market which is not very plausible. It would, moreover, presume a Weberian degree of modern rationality, a tendency to attempt the realization of a conscious set of goals with the greatest economy of means.

Because that type of calculating rationality seems implicitly to conceive of human society as a human artefact, its presupposition in the early Middle Ages seems anachronistic. Such rationality is inconsistent with a belief system which naturally accepted “thaumaturgic kings” – the anointed who use their divinely bestowed power to heal the diseased; it is utterly incompatible with a world which believed in the transcendental nature of justice which had to be “found”, and which can be found by means of water and fire ordeals or by trial by battle; a justice, moreover, which is “found” in different ways for different social categories, which are thereby transcendentally sanctioned. These judicial procedures were so alien to the belief system of a contemporary Arab traveller, Qazwini, that he, utterly amazed, described them in great detail. Furthermore, rationality seems inconsistent with a “symbolic universe”, which accepts in theory, though not necessarily in practice, the allocation of power positions as divinely ordained, and thereby legitimized. A beautiful example is the theorem of the “two swords” worked out after the coronation of Charlemagne by theologians at his court, that is, the notion that pope and emperor, at the top of the spiritual and secular hierarchy, each received his power directly from God. Modern Western time-conscious rationality does not fit well into a society which was hardly capable of measuring the time, even though it would become so time-conscious within a few centuries that it would feel the need for most intricate time pieces. Such rationality seems incompatible with the belief in magic and naturalistic rites which Keith Thomas analyzed so well, a belief which in contradistinction to modern times was the rule rather than the exception.

The description by the above-mentioned Arab traveller, Qazwini, resembles the uncomprehending observations European travellers made at a much later date about the behavior of whatever “natives” they happened to meet. In a still later age, anthropologists, by showing the interconnection of all the various elements of the different “patterns of culture”, made these
comportments perspicuous. Reversely it seems preferable to conceive of the culture of early medieval society as forming such a pattern. It was a more or less consistently non-rational (in the above sense) belief system or rather one that was not explicitly rational, and by no means illogical. The Weberian theory of conscious rationality increasingly determining the various aspects of modern life does not imply that previous times did not act rationally within the matrix of their belief system. He who firmly believes that a Holy Wafer guarantees a better harvest acts rationally when he buries one when plowing. The “symbolic universe” is such a matrix. Symbolic universes are bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different areas of concern and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality; they are “matrix(ices)” of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings, and are only understandable historically.

Such ordering of the universe and all it contains, materially and immaterially, and the consequent explanation and legitimization of the way things are, from the point of view of philosophical anthropology, as developed by H. Plessner and others, are a result of the “unfinished state” of man. Man, unlike most animals, not wholly adapted to his environment, is forced to develop criteria for himself, because of a surfeit of information, and to interpret the totality of information of his whole environment. Since behavior of others is part of the totality of information, these frames of interpretation, which also function as norms for action and legitimization of action, have to be socialized within certain cultural groups. Otherwise, the behavior of other members would still remain incomprehensible, or at least a continuous interpretandum; symbolic universes in fact determine the pattern of culture. These frames are all-encompassing, they have to be as consistent as possible and, since any change will have an effect on all the constituting elements, might be dangerous; they tend to be conservative. Inadequacies, inconsistencies or clashes between belief systems tend, unless syncretist solutions are possible, to create “anomie”, the state of normlessness, which was found to be strongly correlated to a suicidal situation, and therefore need to be somehow solved.

It could be surmised that, despite friendly relations in Merovingian and Carolingian times, Jews had increasing difficulty in adapting themselves to an alien “symbolic universe”, the moment such problem solving lends it aspects of some greater socioeconomic significance. That would be the case if guilds initially were semi-sacral organizations, with rites incompatible with Judaistic ethics and precepts, which at a later stage became the economic organizations we know.

It is likely that the guild organizations were rooted in social categories
compatible with an early medieval “symbolic universe”. One could imagine that guilds initially resembled semi-sacral, partly paganistic associations, closely related to kinship systems, more than organizations which are of a rationality comparable with nineteenth- and twentieth-century trade unions, or employers organizations.²⁹⁸

Such a supposition is borne out by the evidence. It is interesting to note that Sylvia Thrupp, an authority on the history of the guilds, when writing about guilds as an economic historian, for example, in her contribution to the Cambridge Economic History and elsewhere,²⁹⁹ describes them as economic organizations, with the corresponding conceptualization, whereas in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, she emphasizes the social aspects and makes comparisons with non-European cultures, thereby focusing on kinship systems as the origin of guild organizations.³⁰⁰

This line of thought should be elaborated a little further. Etymologically the word “guild” is related to Dutch and German geld and similar forms in other Germanic languages derived from the same root, meaning “money” only to be found in English in the word wergeld or Danegeld. In Gothic it means “tribute”, and in old Swedish there is the additional meaning “reward” and “sacrifice”. This latter meaning is also found in the Dutch and German verbs gelden, gelten, vergelden, vergelten, and various other forms, which apart from meaning to pay, to remunerate, to be worth, also originally meant “to sacrifice”. The Oxford Dictionary gives as meaning for guild: “Association of persons contributing money for some common object” and as the root also means to “sacrifice”, to “worship”, some have supposed that guilds were so called, as being “associations for religious purposes, heathen or Christian”. The latter meaning is accepted by De Vries: “Pagan sacrificial communities, which contribute payments for sacrificial meals.” Coornaert writes “sacrifice, repas sacrificiel, réunion de fête, société”, and “libation religieuse”.³⁰¹ This has more the ring of “kinship” organizations than of economic organizations. Planitz in this connection speaks about guilds as organizations assuming the functions of the Sippe³⁰² – a word heavily discredited by National Socialism, but in its true meaning the German equivalent of “kinship”, clan or “extended kinship” – so that the family appears as the archetype of guilds,³⁰³ a sworn fraternity complete with libations for dead brothers.³⁰⁴

The Church tried, not always successfully, either to Christianize these semi-pagan organizations with their suspicious customs, or to prohibit them. “Ritual” drunkenness can be found in many religions; our word enthusiasm, literally “the state of being possessed by a god”, still contains traces of ancient bacchanalia and orgies.³⁰⁵
Gregory the Great explicitly ordered St. Augustine and other missionaries to England not to try to suppress these Anglo-Saxon institutions, but rather to change their ceremonies into the pious habits of a truly Christian flock.106 Guilds then assumed the form of protective societies which had as an important function the raising of the amount of wergeld to be paid when members were guilty of violent attack, manslaughter, or the murdering of outsiders: collective security.

This is typically the function of a kinship organization in a society which still accepts the vendetta as a normal procedure for settling disputes. Guilds did thus indeed assume the functions of gradually disappearing kinship organizations. Quite naturally they became fraternities for mutual assistance in case of theft, fire, or shipwreck, and for repressing violence and retaliation, as well as being funeral associations and societies for mutual help in other matters.107

The communal link remained as before religious, now Christian, in the form of common masses and the joint burning of votive candles,108 which were also used for taking the oath: “omnes qui entrant gildam jurent super candelam” (“all who become members of a guild must take an oath over a candle”). Remains of the pagan past remained in the form of common meals, the joint libations, and the solemn funerals.109 The wholly pagan variety was described by an Arab traveller in the ninth century, who witnessed some of the ceremonies in Hedeby (Schleswig). The same form of mutual protection and creation of greater legal security, in combination with joint meals, drinking bouts, and religious ceremonies, are found in the “universities” of early medieval students. Universitas, next to fraternitas or confraternitas is the Latin word for these fraternities, from which our word university is derived. Standing outside the protection of the law in the city of temporary settlement, these students created an artificial citizenship in the form of such “kinship” organizations, complete with the traditional solemn toasts.111 The Doelen, citizen guards in Dutch and Flemish towns, are late reminiscences of the military aspects of such organizations.

The Church, had every reason to be suspicious of these semi-pagan organizations. Alcuin denounced them with these words: “illa conventicula, in quibus deceptus est populus, ecclesias relinquentes et montana petentes loca, ibi non orationibus, sed ebrietatibus servientes”112 (“these gatherings, where the people are deceived, because avoiding churches and seeking mountains, they dedicate themselves not to prayers but to drunkenness”). Hincmar, archbishop of Reims, complained about “gravedines, et indebitae exactiones, et turpes ac inanes laetitiae et rixae, saepe etiam (...) usque ad...
homicidia et dissensiones” (the oppression and unwarranted exactions, and obscenities and the vanities of frolic and quarrel, which often may go… as far as dissensions and homicide). Anselm too, was indignant: “In gilda aut in conventu eorum qui ad inebriandum solum conveniunt bibere audeat...”

(“let them dare to drink in a guild, that is to say in the gathering of those who only get together in order to get drunk”).

As these were (semi-pagan) organizations which had inherited morals and customs which from the point of view of orthodoxy were dubious to say the least, repeated efforts were made not only to improve them, but also to suppress them: in vain, as it turned out. In Carolingian times they were repeatedly forbidden, even when they had in truly Christian fashion a patron saint as protector. In the capitularies of Charlemagne there is for example the text: “de conjuratione bibendi. Omnino prohibitum est omnibus ebrietatis malum, et istas conjurationes quas faciunt per sanctum Stephanum aut per filios nostros prohibemus” (“Concerning the conjuration of drinking. Entirely forbidden for all is this evil of habitual drunkenness, and we forbid those conjurations they make in the name of St. Stephen, or in the name of our sons”), or “De sacramentis per gildonia invicem coniurantibus ut nemo facere praesumat. Alio modo de illorum elemosinis aut de incendio aut de naufragio quamvis convenentias faciant, nemo in hoc jurare praesumat”

(“Concerning the oaths which guilds use to swear between themselves, that nobody should dare to do so. On the other hand although they make agreements concerning their alms and concerning fire and shipwreck, let nobody dare to swear an oath in these matters”). The motive was not only to eradicate paganism, but also, as Bloch pointed out, the notion that the very fact that they had assumed or inherited legal functions – punishment of violence, theft, or murder – clashed with the prerogative of the nascent state. They were condemned as conjurations which then and later were incompatible with a hierarchical society. These were the first prohibitions, which were to be reiterated again and again throughout the whole history of these institutions!

Gradually these institutions adopted a more outspoken economic character and became self-help organizations of merchants and later of craftsmen who at a still later period began to form organizations of their own.

When Alpertus of Metz complains about the drunkenness of the merchants of Tiel he seems to refer to such “libations”: “potus certis temporibus in anno cernunt in celebrioribus festis quasi solemniter ebrietati inserviunt”

(“at stated periods of the year they decide on drinking bouts, and on the more celebrated festal days they do, so to speak, solemnly devote them-
selves to drunkenness”). They use some of their gains to these ends: “Pecuni-
ami simul conferunt et hanc partitam singulis ad lucra distribuunt, et ex his
quoscumque potus certis temporibus in anno cernunt” (“They bring togeth-
er money and according to each member’s share in the gains, they decide at
certain periods of the year to organize drinking bouts”). They have been giv-
en certain rights by the emperor: “Judicia non secundum legem sed secun-
dum voluntatem decernentes, et hoc ab imperatore karta traditum et confir-
matum dicunt” (”They judge not according to the law, but as they see fit,
and they say that they do this on the basis of a charter that is given and con-
ferred by the emperor”). (In exchange for these liberties, they pay a special
tribute to the emperor.)

This is certainly the beginning of that peculiar relationship between
prince and town, urban autonomy in exchange for payments, which Max We-
ber rightly emphasized as being uniquely characteristic of Europe. Urban
autonomy, closely akin to or sometimes even derived from the communal-
ism of early Western European society, is of the greatest significance for the
proper understanding of Jewish-Gentile relations, once the Jews had becom-
ea typical urban group.

The above-mentioned merchant guilds are found in northern France, the
Low Lands, Germany, England and Scandinavia, in other words in most Ger-
manic or Germanized parts of Europe, north of the Seine. Free artisans,
before they had organizations of their own, were members of the merchant
guilds.

In later periods the old customs and the religious aspects were preserved
in the dual sense of Christianized paganism without the members being nec-
essarily aware of their original pagan character. The craft guilds had the same
solemn funerals, the candela processions with the votive candles, also used
for swearing in new members, the same morning speeches, morgensspråken,
as the assemblies were called, preceded by a solemn mass, and followed by the
traditional carousals. They carefully preserved the original characteristics
of the “kinship” organization, of the Sippe: internal charity, mutual help and
protection. They formed the nucleus of later urban autonomy, that is, the cit-
izenship as a coniuratio. The communal movement in its revolt against the
bishop followed the same pattern.

Even though the artisans initially may not have belonged to these associa-
tions, being under feudal obligation or subject to obligations under the prin-
ciple “Stadtluft macht eigen”, it was the urban community as a fraternity, as a
coniuratio, which emancipated the craftsmen. Though economically de-
pendent on the merchants, the artisans as newly admitted members of the

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community, the *coniuratio*, helped finally to establish the principle “Stadtluft macht frei” during the period of the communal revolts against the bishops: in Cambrai in 895, in Cologne in 1074, in Worms and Mayence in 1077 and so on.\(^{127}\) In other words, they knew too well the advantage of such organizations not to have joined or formed them as soon as they saw an opportunity to do so.

Thus, even though it is true that most craft guilds do not seem to have had charters before the thirteenth century and that they only then begin to be more influential politically and socially, the organizational structure presumably goes back to more ancient times. Apart from Tiel, the existence of such organizations was attested to in the eleventh century for Valenciennes, St. Omer, Paris, Rouen, fairly frequently for England, and also for Worms and Mayence, sometimes already as specific artisans’ organizations.\(^{128}\) The fact that there are no charters extant does not prove that elsewhere artisans, in so far as they were not members of merchant guilds, did not have ties binding them together, did not also pursue a *Nahrungspolitik*.

Wijffels has demonstrated that guilds in Flemish and Brabant towns were considered to be religious, charitable organizations and were clearly distinguished by contemporaries from the *ambachten*, corporations which were organizations of a more pronounced “public law character”.\(^{129}\)

This is no doubt correct, but as Wijffels himself indicates, it does not necessarily follow that such a distinction was made everywhere. If guilds were merely innocent charitable organizations, why was it forbidden “to eat and drink as guilds”, as happened in Leyden, for example, as late as 1312?\(^{130}\) Moreover, such a distinction is a legal distinction, not a sociological one, which makes it highly plausible that if the group was unacceptable to Jews for one reason or another, or vice versa, it would have been so in both respects.

Is it likely that Jews joined such semi-pagan, and later decidedly Christian, organizations with their abhorrent libations, their solemn masses, and their patron saints? They must have shied away from them, but this implied missing opportunities, when these organizations gradually assumed their “oligopolistic” character, their *Nahrungspolitik*. Perhaps some less strict Jews did make efforts to join, but these, as indicated, would because of social control presumably be lost to Judaism. They will have been converts.

The Cologne patrician name Jude, if it is not derived from some homonym, does seem to suggest that such conversions actually took place, and that when they took place no obstacle whatsoever prevented the elevation of converted Jews to the highest patrician and ruling circles.\(^{131}\)

Could not Jews have attempted to preserve some productive capacity as
freelance non-members of the guild? When indeed non-agrarian production or the specialization in it, began to be a side line of the communal economy, when higher yields in agriculture no longer required the almost total available labor force for the production of food, Jews were anyhow at a disadvantage. Not joining the merchant guilds, from which the later craft-guilds sprang, they were from the outset very isolated, having to face growing organized competition. So the remnant of the few Jewish craftsmen of Carolingian times must have dwindled in number. Excluded in various ways, Jews had to be content with the activities that remained, and their economic position was thereby once more made specific. Prejudice, co-engendered in this way, did at a later stage what Jewish scruples originally did, it kept them out, rationalizing and justifying non-inclusion, as being the well-merited exclusion of obstinate infidels. Jewish productive capacity was from now on limited to catering for the Jewish market.

The competitive position of the Jews in many branches of production was no doubt also unfavorably affected by the structure of supply and demand in medieval society. As the majority of the population lived in rural areas, where it was customary to wear clothes made of homespun yarn and handwoven cloth, as well as homemade shoes and the like, and where most articles of clothing were seldom renewed but as a rule repaired again and again, peasant demand for articles of clothing was low. The same holds true for household utensils and certainly for luxury goods. Towns may have been centers of innovation, but on the level of general demand it is likely that influences of a more common order outweighed those of an exclusively urban character.

There was one group, the clergy, which created a relatively strong demand, particularly for town-made goods and urban labor, and which as such had a decisive influence on production. Not only because it was on the whole a major, if not the largest, unproductive group, did the clergy influence, as a consumer group, the structure of supply and demand, but also because it controlled the largest chunks of public demand. Probably no social category gave more commissions for all sorts of building operations, decorations, embroideries, arts, and so on, either for their own use or in the name of the public at large, than the clergy did. The number of people engaged as glaziers, stonemasons, carpenters, plumbers, blacksmiths, mortar mixers for the building of churches, cathedrals, monasteries, hospitals, almshouses, and the like must have been quite considerable. This is particularly true when one bears in mind that before the thirteenth century the number of public buildings of clerical or semi-clerical character may well have surpassed the number of public buildings of a purely secular character. Most town halls, cloth
halls, and the like belong to a later period. In the private sector only the nobility could compete with the clergy, as most ordinary houses during the period were made of timber with thatched roofs\(^{135}\), although Tiel is referred to by Alpertus as “a new town, made of brick”\(^{136}\). Secular buildings requiring labor were therefore castles, town defences and stone bridges, of which there cannot have been too many.

Building is not the only way in which the clergy affected public demand. Quite a considerable part of the public demand in the form of purchases on behalf of numerous charitable organizations, that is, clothing, food, and so on for the poor and disabled, was controlled by members of the clergy, as was, for example, the demand for such an important article in medieval life as the candle\(^{137}\).

If so large a section of the public and private demand was directly or indirectly influenced by the clergy, it stands to reason that the same clergy had some control over the way the demand was satisfied: Jews are less likely to have been among the workforce engaged by these employers, even though the Church had no doctrinal reason for denying Jews manual work. Jews, moreover, may have had scruples about taking part in the building of churches or monasteries.

In contrast with the limitation of Jewish occupational opportunities, is the proliferation of the Gentile ones, the consequence of an ever increasing division of labor. A wider variety of Gentile economic activities makes the one-sidedness of the Jewish ones more conspicuous. The more so, when those Jewish activities acquire a bad reputation.

Division of labor took place both in the wider sense of an ever greater assortment of goods being produced by increasingly specialized labor, and in the stricter, truer sense, of certain steps in the production of one article being delegated to different people, which took place in the cloth trade at an early date.

It is an indication of economic growth, in the sense of a growing demand for an ever greater variety of products, such as new types of woolens. This results in a greater demand for special tools, and new, or more, raw materials, in new marketing techniques, and growing needs for transport. When there are more weavers at work, more looms are needed, which requires more carpenters to make them; this creates a demand for saws, chisels, planes, and so forth. More goods also require more ships, cranes, and so on. As a phenomenon of economic growth, diversification is a process which probably had its most palpable effect in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries.

Economic growth, however limited, affected Jews, who could not partici-
pate directly or indirectly, because of the inherent growing need for credit. It forced them further in the direction of their financial specialization, in which the business of money changing, also an indication of general economic activity, became increasingly significant.

It presupposes great quantities of ready cash, a condition Jews could perhaps more easily meet than many others. The fact that the Church condemned these activities as Mammonism, giving them a bad reputation, did not mean that there were no Christian competitors. There were the “Lombards”, the great Italian banking houses, spawning in Dutch the word *lommerd* for pawnshop. There were the Caorsins (*Cauwersinen* in Dutch, *Kaverschen* in German texts). The notion that there were no Christian money lenders because the Church forbade money lending is as correct as the notion that there were no adulterers because the Church forbade adultery. The difference between Jewish and Christian money lenders, of course, was that the former were conceived of as doubly hardened in sin. Even though there is reason to suppose that Jewish money lenders were less exacting – with foresight? – than their Christian competitors, which made them not overly appreciated by these, the almost always existing adverse relations between debtor and creditor, combined with their growing reputation as avaricious and murderous infidels, did not add to their popularity. Therefore the ordinary Gentile, if he met with Jews at all, would only see the Jewish money changer, the Jewish usurer, the Jewish peddler, and the Jewish pawnbroker. He would thus be more inclined to conceive of the Jews as such, as a group apart, in a pejorative sense. The “inductive and deductive inferences” became negative, with disastrous consequences.

The start of persecutions, moreover, once more forced the Jews in the same direction. It would allegedly have resulted in a tendency among Jews to “mobilize” their property so as to be able to carry it away as soon as necessary. This is occasionally adduced as an explanation for the Jewish specialization in the money-lending business.\(^{138}\) Although it does not seem to be a sufficient argument for the explanation of the whole phenomenon, if only because it reverses “cause and effect”, it could very well have been an additional factor.

Finally, there is the role of royalty and princes. They, as mentioned, trying to strengthen their position by bringing about a division of labor in governmental tasks, were constantly in need of money. One way of obtaining it was to claim possessory rights over Jews, who, ill-defended and increasingly unprotected by law, could do very little to prevent themselves from being used in this way. As is well known, kings and great nobles began to claim possessory-
ry rights (of a special nature, which did not make Jews serfs) from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. With many variations, as will be demonstrated below, their game was roughly as follows: they did not allow “their” Jews to adopt any other profession but the money-lending business, the keeping of pawnshops, and such like, and promised them their royal or noble protection for which they charged a heavy price. During the reign of Henry II, for example, an estimated £3000, or one-seventh of the total revenue, was in this way extracted from the Jewish community in England. It was exacted in the form of special taxes, and fines for mostly imaginary trespasses. It is self-evident that these mighty monarchs and princes could invent all sorts of possible and impossible pretexts such as “ritual murder” or desecration of the Host, for withdrawing their protection or for extorting as much as they wished from the Jewish earnings. Jews, in fact, ended up being only an instrument for the levying of illegal indirect taxes from the Gentile population. It was not a situation likely to enhance the popularity of the Jews. Increasingly helpless, depending on the dubious goodwill of the monarchs but not effectively protected by them, Jews were increasingly driven into an isolated position, and became the object of scorn and hatred by the population at large.

Economic specification in a medieval town, where each occupation had its specific locality, also implied geographic isolation, creating the “Jewries” (Juiveries, Judengassen), later occasionally formalized as ghettos. This is where the synagogues were located, and the Jewish cemeteries. Strengthened by a tendency to flock together for reasons of mutual support, and by religious considerations – the limited distance a Jew was allowed to walk on the Sabbath – the isolation of the Jewry implied the end of all normal neighborly relations, even though churches were still referred to as “intra Judaeos”. It finalized the medieval equivalent of “little apartheid” or “Jim Crow”.

It could even be surmised that the segregation was sociologically speaking more responsible for antagonistic attitudes, than the economic specification itself. Conceived of as weird people, with strange customs, reading books with incomprehensible lettering – sorcerer’s language – exacting and dangerous, Jews had become a detested out-group of obstinate and malevolent infidels, protected by simoniacal bishops and avaricious princes, who sometimes, however, set wise rules for controlling them. As the ritual murder charges, the accusations of desecrating the Holy Wafer, of poisoning, of treasonable relations with other Christendom-hating infidels like Muslims, suggest, the ensuing hatred was “religious” as much as fed by resentment of “usury”.

The instigators of persecutions and the victims of usury were by no means
necessarily identical. For who were the people most likely to borrow from the Jews? Apart from small-scale pawnng, they were not the poor peasants, the serfs, or the members of the poorest urban classes, who presumably were the main perpetrators of the violent persecutions during the first crusades. Some of them may, as indicated, have felt the pinch indirectly. However, their motive does not always seem to have been plain robbery, for the Jewish chronicles of those days contain many stories of Jews, who on coming back to their homes after the storm had blown over, found their property intact and their valuables untouched. Many a bishop and burgher known to have been debtors did their utmost to protect the Jews against the onslaught. Debtors would have been the first to make good use of violence seemingly justified by noble religious motives, if resentment of usury were really the main motive. This is not gainsaid by the fact that debtors occasionally capitalized on popular resentment in order to get rid of their debts. Riots were excellent means for destroying bonds, as is proved among others, by the York massacre of 1190.

When growing social distance is instrumental in stereotyped thinking, and hate-fostering, it is at this stage perhaps appropriate to emphasize that the process is irreversible.

Private relationships of a friendly nature between individual blacks, Jews, and others, and individual whites, Gentiles and others, have not achieved much in the way of improving race relations once these were bad.

When, at a later stage, there was once more Jewish occupational diversification with ensuing social intercourse on the shop-floor, this, as a rule did not result in a decrease of existing anti-Semitism, unless, as in seventeenth-century Holland, the preceding prejudice had been extremely weak. There were no Jews there in the Middle Ages. The argument that renewed segmented social intercourse improves relations, in general overlooks the fact that social distance is held to be a necessary condition, but not a necessary and sufficient condition. It is not easily conceivable how new forms of partial cooperation could undo the effects of the other conditions once prejudice was well-established. Cooperation between Jews and some Gentiles does not affect the attitudes of those Gentiles who do not cooperate. Moreover, cooperation with Jews in a trade union, for example, may imply that the Gentile workers involved, changed their attitude towards their Jewish fellow workers, but not necessarily towards the Jew as such, as an abstraction. They may conceive of them as exceptions to the rule. Early socialism in France and elsewhere, not only that of the Utopians, was susceptible to anti-Semitism, precisely because solidarity with some Jewish workers did not always outweigh the cher-
ished hatred for the Jewish capitalist. Marx’s *Zur Judenfrage* reinforced this tendency, until leaders like Bebel taught the workers differently by reminding them that they should hate the Jewish capitalists as capitalists, and not as Jews.

**Social distance reconsidered**

Is the social distance cum terrorization hypothesis really necessary? Could not indoctrination have been achieved the direct way by hearing sermons about the Jews? Would not the authority of learning in the end have paid off? After all, all Christian groups which at some stage entertained relations with Jews, and those which did not, all had relations with some members of the clergy, if only the village priest.

Such an argument raises a few questions. Firstly, what determines nonacceptance and acceptance? Secondly, relations with the clergy were of a different order. Social intercourse with Jews, apart from Judaizing tendencies, had to do directly with the cares of everyday life, whereas relations with the clergy were one step removed, on the transcendental, “Sunday” aspect of life. Certainly, magical popular religiosity was closely related to the cares and toils of everyday life, giving them meaning. But there is no reason to assume that a religious interpretation of them would outweigh direct experience, if it proves to be contradictory. Comfort in cases of accident, disease, or death did not involve dealing with Jews. As long as similar conditions prevailed, Antiochians had not paid heed to Chrysostom’s severe admonitions, and later Greek Christians had only listened to his successors, when a superimposed segregation had broken off relations. Thirdly, if repeated inculcation by authority were sufficient to convince people of the divine rejection of the Jews, why then was the final acceptance of it accompanied by so many uncanonical views due to popular imagination, such as “ritual murder”, desecration of the Host, or the *Judensau*, Jews worshipping (Satan in the form of) a pig? These made the Church look almost like a “sorcerer’s apprentice”, provoking reactions it had not foreseen, and emphatically did not want, but could not effectively combat. This suggests psychosociological processes as influential as the authority of the Church. Moreover, how was that authority conveyed to the lower echelons of lay society? Not by ritual.

Hearing Mass, the Holy Communion, and the Sacraments, however meaningful to the parishioners, do not in themselves assume an indoctrinating character in an anti-Jewish sense. There is only one exception to the rule
that ritual never does this, to wit, the procedure introduced in the tenth century, that is, in the presumably pivotal period, that the faithful do not kneel on Good Friday when the prayer “et oremus pro perfidis Judaeis...” is said, in contradistinction to all the other special prayers of that day.\textsuperscript{146}

Acceptance of priestly functions, moreover, does not necessarily imply acceptance of and obedience to all priestly teachings. There would be no sin if it were so. There may be great inconsistencies in the secular and religious convictions of one and the same person. One example from later days may suffice to clarify this. During the French revolution a high regard for priestly functions was held by many to be by no means inconsistent with adherence to the most contrary ideologies. After the “Constitution civile du clergé” was adopted revolutionary ideology was very much at odds with the Church’s teaching. It did not prevent women, who had participated in bread riots and consecutively in other revolutionary activities, and who with their husbands accepted revolutionary goals, and showed revolutionary fervor, from literally whipping unsworn priests to the church from their hiding places, and forcing them to say mass. Inconsistency in ideologies was no problem.\textsuperscript{147} If this holds true for eighteenth-century France, after centuries of Christianity, it holds a fortiori true for early medieval France and trans-Alpine Europe, when Christianity was still young and not deeply rooted.

It could be objected that relations between laymen and clergy were not necessarily limited to the field of worship and liturgy. It could have been more complex for the simple reason that churchgoing not only has a manifest function, namely worship, but has latent functions as well.\textsuperscript{148} Churchgoing is a very intense secular social activity and in previous centuries it was perhaps more so than now. The parish really meets face-to-face on Sunday mornings. That is the moment to talk things over at one’s leisure, the moment to discuss the cares of the day.\textsuperscript{149} Under the aegis of the Church, might not the intensity of such a gathering of all the social groups of the community, save the Jewish groups, work in favor of stigmatization?

The question surmises that the latent function of the gathering, exchange of news and opinions, was overruled by the manifest function, worship, which in this case is unlikely. The hearing of Mass in no way influences the way people discuss the weather, harvest prospects, prices, diseases, work, division of work, payment of tithes and feudal dues, and similar topics. Only a sermon anticipating these discussions can do that, and such anticipation in an anti-Jewish vein is difficult to conceive of in a period when a secular stereotype did not yet exist. One could only harp on the wickedness of Jews in relation to the everyday problems of the community, providing there was a
concept of Jews related to those problems, but the as yet purely theological concept of Jewish wickedness seems very remote from them indeed. This is a fortiori so, when there is still some Judaizing confusion.

Could economic dependence not favor stigmatization? Relations between the laity and the clergy were not limited to the more transcendental aspects of human existence, but were more down to earth, indeed related to production and consumption. Servile peasants working in the fields belonging to abbeys, free peasants paying tithes, artisans engaged in the building of churches, hospitals or almshouses: all had group-specific economic relations with clerical groups. Although this is true, it does not necessarily mean that having such relations was more conducive to acceptance of theological stigmatization than not having such relations. Were the servile or semi-servile peasants of St. Giulia or St. Germain, or of the innumerable other abbeys, forced by their dependence on the regular clergy to accept their opinions, or did their being exploited, their working with little compensation, make them more rebellious and as such far from eager to hold the same opinions as their masters? The peasant Bodo, who belonged to the abbey of St. Germain, may not have thought in these terms, but he did have his feelings of bitterness, as well as his lapses into paganism, his belief in ancient rituals, and his use of magic potions, which he had to confess. His way of making merry on Christian holy days with ribald pagan songs suggests that he did not much care for the opinions of his masters, the monks. Profanity combined with being exploited was not conducive to blind obedience for Bodo and his ilk, and therefore did not necessarily result in a more ready acceptance of anti-Jewish indoctrination.\textsuperscript{150}

Masons, carpenters, and all the other artisans working for the Church, and thereby contributing to Jewish economic specification, need not, as a consequence of that dependence have been more prone to accept all clerical teachings. The freedom of the \textit{coniurationes}, the new communal structures, often had to be conquered through hard struggle with episcopal rule. Conflict was not conducive to blind obedience.

There is no other obvious reason why the population at large should have paid more heed to the clergy in matters of anti-Jewish indoctrination than in matters of paganism, magic, the weakness of the flesh, manslaughter, or the other violent habits of that somewhat uncouth age. Bible teaching and iconic indoctrination may have had some effect, since the Biblical story in those ages was largely told by means of images. There may have been representations of \textit{Ecclesia et Synagoga} in the parish church, illustrating that \textit{Synagoga} had lost her claim and that \textit{Ecclesia} ruled supremely, thereby conveying that
Christianity was the new Israel.\textsuperscript{152} There cannot have been very many of those images in such a poor age, the more so as there were also iconoclastic tendencies in the West. Moreover, these images represented the theological doctrines the people heard anyway, which presumably bore no relation to their everyday experience of Jews. Finally, a scant glance at the earliest examples of such images suggests that iconographically the theme was not fully elaborated before the eleventh century. Examples from the Carolingian or Saxon period, vastly different from later specimens, show Synagoga more in complete juxtaposition with Ecclesia, though standing on the left, the “sinister” side of the Cross, rather than in a position of inferiority. This juxtaposition added to the confusion. Iconography seems to suggest that these representations followed rather than led the trend.

Everything considered, there is not much plausibility for direct indoctrination, which indeed makes the social-distance hypothesis necessary. After segregation, stigmatization, and with additional popular imagination, the Jewish group as such was reduced to one outwardly homogeneous subgroup of society at large, a true “out-group” which for the onlooker, irrespective of his religious, economic, legal, domiciliary, or even linguistic point of view, always consisted of the same members, the very discriminatory situation described by the psychologist Lewin.\textsuperscript{152}

This does not mean there were no differences between Jews. As before, there will have been within the Jewish groups, the artisans catering for the Jewish market, the kosher butchers, there will have been the Torah scribes, the shames (synagogue sextons), the gabbaim, the parnassim (treasurers and wardens), the cantors, the mohelms, Jews dependent on the rich Jews as clerks or servants, or the schnorrers and all the schlemiels and schlimazels and other characters of the rich Jewish folklore, there will have been the respected Talmud students, the rabbis, the judiciary, and so forth; as varied a human society as any.\textsuperscript{153}

To phrase it differently, reduction to one social category means that the members of the out-group, in what psychologists call the process of categorization,\textsuperscript{154} are always perceived as being exactly alike. Distinctions between Jews, in the eyes of Gentiles, were blurred because by now they had but one role in Gentile society, that of the miscreant purveyor of sordid money, the unproductive exploiter of human labor, who, in his uncanny, inaccessible separate districts of the town followed his weird customs and abided by his own incomprehensible law, which would have been far from innocuous, had Christian rulers not wisely set some limits. It is possible that the majority of the population was not aware of the last-mentioned legal distinction which,
as Kish has shown, knew the difference between Jewish law (*Jüdisches Recht*), the legal system regulating dealings Jews have with each other, based on traditional Jewish law and on case law, for example formulated in the comments of the Geonim or other rabbinical schools, which adapted Jewish law to non-Jewish surroundings, and Jewry law (*Judenrecht*), the body of rulings and privileges regulating the legal intercourse between Jew and Gentile, the rules regulating the traffic of money, the punishing of trespasses, the administration of the oath *More Judaico*, — the Jewish litigant forced to stand on a pigskin — and such like. Both the legal intercourse and the other sparse relations, determined by unformalized, but by now well established social norms, presumably took the form of labelled interaction, as outlined above.

Apart from the examples quoted, one could mention the “negro”, who by enforced compliance with the white-formulated expectation to act like “Sambo”, has to be happy-go-lucky, laughing, irresponsible, childlike, but intemperate and lazy. It shows how much differences in power positions are at play, power here in the sense of the capacity to restrict the alternatives of behavior of others. The dominated group has to conform to the expectations, as long as it does not have effective means of protest, and in so doing it sustains and confirms the articulated prejudice of the label. As long as the task, justified by the label, was performed, as long as blacks behaved in accordance with the label, white-black relations within these terms could be quite cordial, particularly in the case of domestic servants, as in the old South of the US, but not so when blacks become uppity. According to the Southern myth, the black slave under tight control was sweet, friendly, happily singing; emancipated, he became a beastly savage.

There was not much room for such cordiality in the case of medieval Jews, because of the “sordid” nature of their task, not involving menial duties which promote normal friendliness, or talks about the work to be done. This was partly because of the great geographical isolation, but mainly because the label in that case had a transcendental dimension. Economically labelled interaction was limited to seeing that Jews performed the indispensable but despised and loathed usurious and financial function, lucrative for princes, but condemned by the Church. Because of that clerical censure the label could easily be attached to the existing theological rejection. The populace did that in its own way, when there was no longer correcting open interaction. They would do so more readily the more the prestige of the belief-system-formulating authorities — power! — made previous non-acceptance more painful for the believers. Now that the pain of the inconsistency in the belief system was no longer counterbalanced by the pain of inconsistency of
stigma and experience, there was every reason for hastily accepting the stigma. Inductive and deductive inferences now became negative, the prejudice self-enhancing. Mammonism, to phrase it in the style of the day, came naturally to these “Christ killers”, who having sold the Messiah for thirty pieces of silver (Judas and Judaism, like Cain, were often one in anti-Semitic folklore) could now further soil their already unclean hands.

In a situation of labelled interaction the victim group is in but not of society, a stranger within the gate. The “within” lends permanency to the situation of labelled interaction, because it restrains both parties. This is the major difference with the attitude towards the “stranger outside the gate”. This can be just as prejudicial, but because the alien here has no specific role or task in the observers’ society, perception of him can be altered; this once more highlights the significance of social structures in creating “racist” situations. One of Den Hollander’s examples is the varying European judgments on Hungarians,159 which in their simplification, categorization, and generalization, are definitely stereotypes of a frequently negative character, a “racist” one. Originally perceived as robbers and murderers, in the sixteenth century Hungarians were seen as heroes fighting the “unspeakable Turk” – their military organization, as the word hussar proves, was admiringly imitated – and thus as romantic Puszta cavaliers, with whom enlightened “French philosophers”, however, had very little sympathy since they considered them barbarians. One could go on and find that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, after having been seen as model liberals, the stereotype of Hungarians once more changed to oppressors of Slavonic nations and Hitler-worshipping fascists, only to end up as noble anti-communists or, for another observer, as good communists. It is, of course, the perception that changes rather than the Hungarians themselves, and it is the alterations in the situation of the observer that cause the change.173

In the perception of Jews there is no such variability, as long as the mutually interdependent labelled interaction and social function last. This lends it its perpetuity. Social reintegration can only take place, when this nexus disappears, which was very imperfectly achieved by the emancipation.

A peculiarity of the Jewish position, however, arguably due to the transcendental dimension of the perception, is that Jews outside Europe were never seen as “strangers outside the gate”. Typically in the thirteenth century, Tatars were seen as the Ten Lost Tribes, coming to the aid of their brothers against the Christians. “Christendom-hating Jews” of Islamic countries were always conceived of as in conspiratorial league with the infidel Arab or Turk. Judas is also the archetype of the Jewish traitor, which stereotype helps to ex-

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159

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plain the accusation against Dreyfus and against the “November criminals” of 1918 and their “stab in the back”\textsuperscript{160}

How can labelled interaction enforce the “fitting” behavior of the victim group? The minority, when it lacks effective means of resistance, reacts by invoking what Barrington-Moore Jr. so aptly called the “moral authority of suffering and injustice”.\textsuperscript{161} He argues very convincingly that people adjust to a situation they cannot control by making suffering part of an internalized moral order, thus turning acceptance into a form of moral self-aggrandizement. Giving a moral value to the state of oppression could happen all the more easily when the culture of the oppressed interpreted suffering as a form of expiation for sins committed.

Medieval Jews could and presumably did feel that they hallowed the name of the Lord God by preferring martyrdom to life-saving unfaithfulness. The many stories of Jewish mass suicide or of Jews who preferred being butchered to being baptized during the Crusades, or during the persecutions in York in 1190, the Black Death in 1349, and at other times, strongly suggests this.\textsuperscript{162} However, in suffering the intolerable, Jews seemingly confirmed the hard kernel of all later stereotypes; the image of the malevolently obstinate Jew, as well as that of the cringing Jew, both inviting violence.

Since such a moral order also had significance for Christians, but in reverse, it did not take great qualms in this respect to be seemingly obedient to the Church, going far beyond its strictures, so that the not astonishing rule seems to follow: the greater the sinner, the greater the Jew-hater.

Labelled interaction has development retarding consequences. Maintaining the oppression consumes a great deal of energy that could have been more fruitfully applied elsewhere. It fosters social structures which are in fact obsolete or obstacles to progress. The desire to inflict punishment may be disinterested, in Ranulf’s terms; it does not serve economic or other interests. The racist not only harms his victims, but also himself.

It is no coincidence, as Rürup and others have demonstrated, that on the Gentile side the emancipation discussions in the eighteenth century were largely inspired by economic considerations of a “mercantilistic” nature, rather than by feelings of guilt or shame.\textsuperscript{163}

The Emperor Joseph 11, reigning with “enlightened absolutism”, perceived that the interests of the state were better served by making full use of the economic potential of the Jewish minority, and that of the peasants for that matter, than by maintaining the oppressive system, and its peculiar form of credit operation, via the “court Jews”, a legacy from the Middle Ages. There is similarity in the Austrian emancipation of Jews and peasants, even though that of
the latter was more lasting than that of the former. There was a comparable discussion in other Central European States. Dohm’s book, *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden* contained much the same views. It was an attempt at finding a way of modernizing states lacking the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of the “Atlantic States”, in order to keep up with them.\(^{164}\)

Labelled interaction thus forces the hand of the majority group, not always to its advantage. As indicated, group terror means that one can only deviate from the group norm at a price, even when that group norm is contrary to one’s own experience and conviction. It results in ostracism or worse.

The whole concept is confirmed by psychological experiments. Most group members “tend to converge towards a group norm as they interact and become aware of another’s judgement”\(^{165}\) or “These experiments show that individuals asked to make judgements severally in a group (about the apparent movement of a spot of light or the relative length of fairly equal lines) tend to agree with the judgement of the others in the group, whether or not they are objectively right. The group consensus may provide a standard or frame of reference for the individual judgements”.\(^{166}\) “Group-centred structure can thus be said to have more power to alter the perception of individuals in the direction of a common norm, than is the case with a leader-centred structure”.\(^{167}\) The two may coincide when the leader articulates the group norm.

The Milgram experiment had shown to what lengths people are willing to go in a situation of intensified group interaction in order to conform to an authoritative norm. A study of people in a simulated teacher-pupil relationship showed that they were willing to apply high-voltage shocks (unknown to them, simulated) to “unwilling pupils”, not knowing that these were in fact staff members, because “Science”, personified by respectable researchers in white coats, demanded it. These were people who under normal circumstances would not dream of using violence. Similar results were obtained by Philip Zimbardos Stanford prison experiment.\(^{168}\)

As R. Merton formulated it: “Moreover, in the course of daily interaction, whenever he, the group member, conforms in his actions or expressions of opinion to the values of his associates, these others are likely to approve and reward; and when he fails to conform, they may disapprove, bringing negative sanctions to bear. Hence he often conforms in order to win approval or (in Veblen’s telling irony) to ‘gain an increment of good repute’.”\(^{169}\) The terrorizing effect of the group norm, its sanctions, inherent in the labelled interaction, and confirming the “terrorization hypothesis” – the refuting evidence is always the civil courage of the “disobedient” with strong consciences obeying another norm – is historically proven by C. Browning’s *Ordinary Men*.\(^{170}\)
This gives a harrowing description of indeed ordinary men, elderly and as such exempt from ordinary military service during World War II. Not convinced Nazis, not party members, not even strongly anti-Semitic, they served as a police battalion in Poland. Developing group norms, partly derived from fear of the general terror of the Third Reich, partly from misguided patriotism and solidarity, after some hesitation, they became, by a combination of sanctions and rewards, an “efficient” unit of mass murderers and executioners of Jews.

Such psycho-sociological processes, once there are conditions favoring them, go a long way to explain the emergence of virulent popular Jew-hatred.

**Theology reconsidered**

The psychosociological approach so adequately explains Jew-hatred, that the true significance of the theological indoctrination may be questioned. It is clear that it was a necessary condition, since the Christian rejection of Judaism drew the mark of Cain, but then the norm of the above “disobedient” is just as Christian. The washerwoman who alone, with her bare hands, in the face of a howling mob saved a Jewish woman during the persecutions in Würzburg in 1174, acted on her Christian conscience. So did the nameless many who helped Jewish “U-boats” (as those in hiding were called) in Nazi Germany.

There is no doubt that in papal bulls, encyclicals, and other writings in learned theological treatises, the fine points of the age-old Christian rejection were repeated, if not greatly elaborated. New terms were added. Perhaps after Agobard, insolence—in German *frecher Jude* (insolent Jew) began to be used in anti-Semitic folklore at that time—was added to the lot of disparagements and abuses. The attack on the Talmud from the middle of the thirteenth century was a medieval contribution. Indeed, large segments of the regular and secular clergy fostered popular anti-Jewish sentiment. So did the priests who guarded the shrines of innocent children allegedly murdered by the Jews, attracting pilgrims and their money. Popular plays, like the *Endinger Judenspiel* about ritual murder will not have been performed without a clerical *nihil obstat*. There were priests, like the Dominican Berthold from Regensburg, inciting the populace against the Jews. Very often they were members of the mendicant orders. These founded the *monte di pietà*— aiming at robbing the Jews of a livelihood?—in competition with Jewish pawnshops. They played a role in the burnings of the Talmud, and declared that
since Jews lend authority to these rabbinical writings, Judaism was not a truly Biblical religion relying only on God’s word, and therefore ought no longer to be considered a *religio licita*, a point of view by no means generally accepted. These were the fanatics, but what about the better theologians, like a Bernard of Clervaux, or an Aquinas who, though strongly anti-Judaistic in their writings, also occasionally protected the Jews?

Even if the late-medieval Church was more harsh in its rejection of Judaism than the Church of late Antiquity, what impact did that have on popular beliefs? Those were – to insist once more – uncanonical. The whole notion of a *Judensau*, of which there were later many popular prints – the idea that Jews worshipped (Satan in the form of) a pig, is an indication of the poor biblical knowledge of the lay population. Its knowledge of doctrine was not much better. The magical power of the blood of recently baptized children, in which Jews allegedly believed as strongly as the Christians themselves – for how else could they deem a Jewish concoction of it an effective poison? – was a far cry from the doctrine of ablation of original sin. Not only did people believe that Jews accepted the doctrine of transubstantiation, for how else could they attempt to “murder Christ again”, but they also credited Jews with the same belief in the magical power of the Host as they themselves held, when they used it as a fertilizer, an aphrodisiac, or a poison. It looks as if medieval popular religious knowledge was *gesunkenes Kulturgut*, deformed information, half-truths, scaled down, though the essentials, such as Jews the infidels, “Christ killers”, Cains, worshippers of the Golden Calf, and others, were well known. Even so, the greatest medieval innovations having a negative effect on Jewish-Gentile popular relations, the transubstantiation dogma, the Jew badge, the condemnation of usury, and perhaps others, did not spring from theological speculation on the relation between the “new and the old Israel”. The condemnation of the Talmud did, but how much did that affect popular sentiments? Perhaps the notion was that Jews were evil sorcerers, and their books were magicians’ prescripts.

The introduction of the Jew badge, the consequence of a measure in intent more anti-Muslim than anti-Jewish, was perhaps an afterthought with, however, disastrous consequences. Transubstantiation obviously was not part of any Jewish-Christian discussion, and the condemnation of usury was part and parcel of a whole system of labor and economic ethics, centered round the *pretium justum*, the just price. When the scholastics allowed “interest”, as compensation for the income somebody could have earned by making use of the loan he made, and condemned “usury” as *contra naturam*, because gold cannot bear gold, based on Old Testament texts, there is no reason
to assume that they particularly thought of Jews. The whole system of socio-
economic prescripts was a belated reaction to the explosion of commercial de-
development, which the Church had not foreseen when it initially condemned
commerce as the “stealing of God’s time”.

So, from the point of view of economy of research, there is no obvious rea-
son to enter into the one-sided theological medieval debate between Christi-
nity and Judaism, however much the rejection of Judaism was harped upon
in innumerable writings.

Paradoxically, there is reason to enter into it for a better understanding of
the – vain – efforts the Church made, in an attempt at being true to its own re-
ligio licita principle, to stem the popular reaction it had itself provoked.

The full social impact of medieval anti-Judaistic theology came presum-
ably with the increase in literacy, when people could read the various tracts,
as well as the Bible itself; that is, strange as it may sound, most strongly felt at
the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, when private Bible reading be-
came customary for the laity, because of new translations in the vernacular,
now available in print.

Erasmus, Luther, Zwingli, Pfefferkorn and all other participants in the de-
bate, stood in a medieval tradition in their rejection of Judaism, and added
little of themselves. There is theologically no real discrepancy between
Luther’s early so-called philo-Semitic writings, such as Dasz Christus ein
geborner Jude sei and his later anti-Semitic writings, such as Von den Juden
und ihren Lügen; both sprang from essentially the same conceptualization,
the former expressing hope of conversion, the latter disappointment. In the
case of Luther, as in that of many others, the innovation was partly the harsh
language he used, but mainly that he expressed himself in the vernacular. The
invention of the printing press brought his tracts and his translation of the
Bible, with its anti-Semitic potential in the hands of an increasingly literate
lay readership. German racist anti-Semites like Georg von Schönerer, among
others, as well as the Nazis, who reedited his anti-Jewish works, claiming him
as a forerunner, expressing völkish sentiment, did him an injustice, but so
did their enemies, who tended exclusively to blame Luther for nascent mod-
ern anti-Semitism. He was no worse than many of the Counter-Reforma-
tionists. The dismal ghetto and its enforced sermons in Rome, where Jews
during the Middle Ages had known such a high degree of liberty of con-
science, and even freedom, was of Counter-Reformatory inspiration.

After the “Decline of Magic”, the modernizing age gave anti-Semitism a
new vicious impetus. The sixteenth century was a watershed, not only be-
because it gave reactionary theology a much wider public basis, but also, (and
not coincidentally) because the repercussion of early developing capitalism, particularly in Central Europe, where unlike in the Atlantic States, there was no bourgeoisie willing and capable of taking risks, was to force princes, in order to keep up with the Western powers, to give the enforced financial expertise of the Jews a new lease of life, in the form of Hof Judenthum, the “court Jews”. There the state-forming processes thus further aggravated the Jew’s one-sided socioeconomic position, and considering the “cuius regio, eius religio” principle, and state interference with religion, it also affected their religious position. The early modern world thereby created the conditions for the modern – often racist – anti-Semitism of the bourgeois world, which were only very partially undone by the emancipation.

**The chiliastic response**

Economic development, as the cause of both social distance and popular stigmatization, explains the attitude, not necessarily the persecutions. The group of “passive” racists, or anti-Semites, indulging in mere Jew-baiting, Juden schimpfen, is always much larger than that of the activists, who are given to violence, but their attitude is supportive or condoning. Only a minority of people in the South of the US actively participated in lynchings and race riots, but these outrages are unimaginable without a broad anti-black consensus. Once the combustive materials are properly mixed, the spark can be anything, ranging from inciting sermons, like those of 414 in Alexandria, to all sorts of calamities like famines, fires, earthquakes, epidemics, and the rest. There has to be, however, as a rule, some seeming connection, however trivial, between the calamity and the focus on the Jews. In the case of the massacres at the time of the Black Death, there was presumably such a seeming correspondence through the fact that there were fewer Jewish victims of the disease; this could perhaps have been due to the hygienic effect of regular washing, fewer chances of contamination through their geographic isolation, fewer rats, or because of different dietary habits.

Scapegoating is a little easier to understand, when either large sections of the population felt, or were, the victims of Jewish specification, or when the economic development affecting the Jews was also detrimental to large sections of the population, in a manner seemingly corresponding to the conceptualization.

In the first case, an aftereffect of Jewish usury springs to mind. It can easily be imagined how the great debtors, the clergy and nobility, in order to be able
to pay their debts, put the screw on their dependents by increasing their exactions. These dependents, fully realizing just where the fault lay, but unable to defy their overlords, would retaliate by lashing out at the Jews. This seemingly plausible explanation has two weaknesses. On the one hand it would make the persecution of the Jews mostly a rural rather than an urban occurrence, presupposing large bands of rustics, something difficult to conceive, and it would imply that the persecutions began the moment Jewish usury was institutionalized and not before. Jewish usury can only explain urban Jew-hatred, when the urbanites themselves were borrowers. To what extent was the organization of eleventh-century business dependent on credit? The credit system based on the bill of exchange, in which the Jews are supposed to have played a strong role—Sombart, among others, contended that the Jews were the inventors of the bill of exchange—\(^{184}\) is of a later date. Small-scale lending in the form of pawnning did occur, but does that explain massacres? Perhaps, and perhaps not. The same holds true for money changing.

There is another possibility. The process of economic growth may have had a very unsettling effect. Uprooted from traditional and familiar relationships, which provided a sense of security, finding themselves in new and unfamiliar surroundings, many of the vagabonds, who according to Pirenne, constituted a large part of the urban population, must have experienced a sense of insecurity. Not all could equally profit. The growth in population and the migration to towns where there was not always sufficient work, created a shiftless, poor population of day laborers, loafers, beggars, and petty thieves, leading a hand-to-mouth existence, and who were not necessarily members of the new “communal structures”. These underdogs took part in the conflict when the conjurations through hard struggles had to conquer their liberties from or defend them against the “simoniacal” bishops of Cambrai, Cologne, Worms, Mayence and a host of other cities. As underdogs, however, they did not share in the economic advantages; they did not reap the fruits of the victory, since the victory itself produced class divisions. Yet resistance against the bishop could imply that the authority of the religious leaders was thrown into doubt the very moment their teaching regarding the Jews had finally penetrated.

The situation suggests a great deal of uncertainty, normlessness, or anomie.\(^{185}\) An only partially, or hardly accepted interpretative framework does not help man fully to master a bewildering environment. In other words, a degree of doubt throws him back into his “unfinished state”, needing, but lacking such an interpretative scheme. The terror of the situation creates pathological and suicidal reactions reminiscent of delirium, or aphasia.
The “social construction of reality” with the aid of interpretative symbolic universes, the explanatory and legitimizing belief systems usually provide sufficient guarantees against such mental states. When, however, the symbolic universe no longer functions because it refers to a reality that is no longer recognized, and when a situation arises where there is no adequate interpretation of the reason why the world is as it is, because a series of shocking experiences has undermined belief, anomie will prevail, leading either to apathy, and perhaps suicide, or to some seemingly delirious behavior and violence. The uncertainty results in a craving for a new legitimating interpretation of the world.

Inadequacies of belief systems in explaining sudden and uprooting changes may indeed provoke a chiliastic reaction: the spontaneous creation of a symbolic universe out of known, but never before so urgently needed, eschatological traditions, in a syncretist fashion. What takes place then is basically the replacement of the old symbolic universe by a wholly new one, normative for a new type of action, which to the adherents of the old system will appear as hysteric or even madness.

There are innumerable examples of such reactions referred to above, both in the Western and the non-Western world. In the West, as Norman Cohn and many others have shown, they ranged from the Circumcellionesi via such movements as the Anabaptists and the Ranters, to anarchist revolts. They abound in the eleventh and twelfth century related perhaps to the fear of the impending “millennial” doom but just as much to the drastic social change which fuelled that fear. It gave also shape to a new sexual morality.

In Europe the chiliastic movements took place in periods of tremendous social upheaval – the Ranters during the civil war in England – or when specific social categories were put under great strain by an odd combination of factors. Cohn speaks of the “disoriented poor”.

Building materials for the European syncretist “symbolic universes” were usually traditions derived from the Hellenistic-Jewish eschatological literature, such as the Sibylline Books of prophecy, in which the Tiburtina, Daniel’s Dream and the Book of Revelation were particularly important, as well as traditions fed by the fantasy and imagination of preceding movements.

All the chiliastic movements that were still more or less in the Christian fold (later chiliastic movements were of more secular inspiration), that is those of a period ranging from the tenth to the seventeenth centuries, had a number of elements in common. Insistence on apostolic poverty and com-
munal ownership is an almost constant recurrent aspect of the various medieval chiliastic movements. Frequently invoked were the scriptures Matthew xix 24: “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God” and Acts iv 32: “And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul: neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own; but had all things common,” and the Pseudo-Isodoric Decretals, particularly the five epistles of Pope Clement. The latter contain a passage where it is said that communal ownership includes the spouses, a passage that created some difficulties for the official Church which accepted the Decretals as authentic until the sixteenth century.

In parenthesis: this shows that even at the apogee of the papacy in the thirteenth century, the Church was less of a monolith than has been assumed. This could explain some doubt as to what was canonical and what was not.

Another characteristic is the idea of a “Last Emperor”, the anointed ruler who will usher in the millennium, prepare the world for the Parousia which is at hand, and smite the peoples of Gog and Magog and the hosts of the Antichrist. Frederic Barbarossa, Frederic 11, Baldwin of Flanders, and many other great princes have played this role in the popular imagination.

These movements persistently show the same pattern, not only because of a common tradition but also because they are responses to very similar situations and social conditions. They all held that the poor, the underprivileged of this world were the “Elect”.

Yet another belief they all share is the perhaps unconscious but inherent conviction that all history, inclusive of the future – not strange in a Christian society – is not only decreed but known, because in its essentials, it has been revealed. The prophet “claimed to be in charge with the unique mission of bringing history to its preordained consummation”. If the Church, if only for institutional reasons, objected to the activities of these unlearned, untrained self-styled prophets who claimed to possess the full truth, and declared them heretical, so much the worse for the Church; it was immediately depicted as a den of iniquity, the evil Babylon, filled with unworthy, wealthy prelates and headed by the Antichrist in the shape of the Pope. Clerical fulminations did not prevent the populace from following the new prophets. Their charisma was too overwhelming; they formulated too well the desires and anxieties of their followers. Anticipating the fears of their potential adherents, giving shape to their hardly conscious worries, expressing vaguely known hopes, and making distinct promises about immediate salvation, not in heaven, but on earth, the messianistic leaders fulfilled a craving need: they
offered the common people a new symbolic universe that, as antidote to the 
terror of their anomic situation interpreted more satisfactorily than the pre-
vailing one, the way the world was, the reason why it was so, and how it ought 
to be. (There is a reminiscent of people high on Adorno’s “F-Scale”!)

It was the self-imposed task of the Elect to purify the earth, to prepare it 
for the earthly millennium that was at hand, to cleanse it from unworthy 
priests and infidels. Who were more likely to be their victims than these 
newly detected “Christ-killers”, these mammonists, these secretive bloodsuckers, 
the Jews, who had such shady dealings with their oppressors, the princes, the 
clergy, the nobility and the wealthy bourgeois. In the Middle Ages, and not 
for the last time, Jew-hatred had all the characteristics of a social revolu-
tion.²⁰⁰

As an institution, the medieval Church – and for that matter – the Bolshe-
vist party, had to seek its own continuation for the simple reason of legitimiz-
ing its existence. Both had to put their promise of salvation sometime in the 
future, but not today, nor tomorrow, for such an admission would imply 
their own ultimate redundancy.

Such a conflict between popular beliefs and orthodoxy can be very illum i-
nating, for the former need not always have assumed the form of an heretical 
mass movement which openly defied the authority of the Church. Even 
when formally staying in the fold, people may have held unorthodox views 
going against priestly counsel. As has been indicated, in their anxiety, fear, insecurity, and sorrow, they occasionally used Christian prayers and Christian 
symbols in a most un-Christian fashion, employing the host as an amulet or 
as a fertiliser, even as a magical poison to kill enemies and using prayers as in-
cantations. When the Holy Wafer can be used as a poison, why should not the 
Jews, those enemies of Christ, use it in that way? When the sacrament of bap-
tism has a magical power,²⁰¹ why should not the Jews use that in a perverted 
form? Why should their refusal to eat pork not indicate that they worshipped 
the pig?

However, the margin between being in the fold or outside it, was small. It 
was in the Rhine Valley, northwestern France, Flanders, and Brabant, the 
densely populated, even-over-populated areas, where mass poverty was en-
demic despite economic expansion, that the chiliastic movements were firm-
ly rooted, and where also most persecutions of Jews were staged.²⁰²

At the very time that the first large-scale massacre of the Jews took place, 
during the first Crusade, an early messianistic revolution with a mass follow-
ing took place in the Low Countries. It was then that Tanchelm began his ca-
reer as heretical prophet and savior, whose bathwater was preserved as a relic,
who betrothed himself under popular acclaim to the Virgin Mary. It was also during the first Crusade, that the Tafurs, remnant of the first popular Crusade, believing themselves to be the Elect, marched to the Heavenly Jerusalem in the expectation of the immediate millennium, and combined a life of apostolic poverty with the most violent outrages – they even practiced cannibalism – against all the "unrighteous": Jews, Muslims, and "unworthy priests". The bloodbaths among the Jews in the valleys of the Rhine and the Danube, and in Jerusalem at the time of the Crusades were presumably instigated by *pauperes* with or without the connivance of sections of the social elite. The socioeconomic background explains why such chiliastic behaviour was accompanied by charges of economic misdemeanor.

Since it was a socioeconomic process, rather than the Church itself which satisfied the clerical desire for segregation, the Church lost control over the limits set to stigmatization, and became the sorcerer’s apprentice. The (proto) chiliastic or magical beliefs gave new content and meaning to the limited indoctrination the Church intended, a meaning it had not foreseen, and did not want, but could not stop, try as it might. Official theology never condoned the ritual murder story or the accusation of desecration, which by implication held the theologically impossible view that Jews believed in transubstantiation; on many occasions it courageously and forcefully condemned it, but in vain. Sometimes, after having long contested the accusations, the Church yielded to popular pressure, as was, for example, the case with the Trent ritual murder case; sometimes it yielded for very mercenary reasons, as, for example when the shrine of a “ritually murdered” child attracted many credulous pilgrims who could easily be mulcted; and sometimes, particularly among the lower echelons, members of the clergy shared the superstitions of the social layers from which they themselves had sprung.

Mercenary motives, blind hatred or cowardice may have moved some clerics to condone or even stimulate the persecutions of Jews, but presumably also the assumption that too strong a resistance could provoke heretical movements, which could turn against them, accusing them, not always without reason, of mammonism and simony.

In the statement that *pauperes* had a hand in the persecutions there is no attempt at exculpating the authorities. Clerical authority had after all taken the initiative, and secular authority was by no means always averse to persecution. It depended on what seemed at the moment financially more advantageous, or on the acuteness of monetary needs. So secular authority itself occasionally had a hand in it, as Philip Augustus of France did, when he badly needed money, or as did John Lackland; or it resisted it, when persecution im-
plied a diminished income, as in the case of Richard-coeur-de-Lion. In the “Milch-cow” system secular authority promised protection against payment, which was often withheld when Jews allegedly committed their crimes, for which they were then punished with “tallages” or other means of extortion. Then persecution became remunerative, but the bonds of Jewish lending operations on which the royal claims to a large share of the income were based, were not to be destroyed. Richard was furious when that happened in York in 1190.

In so far as the persecutions were rewarding, they are a facet of the emergence of state formation, which was far from being complete. Richard was not yet able to punish the perpetrators. Money as the remuneration for the literati, the new officials, was the means to bring about that “division of labor” in the regalities, as referred to above. Thus money acquired without the parliamentary consent of the governed, apart from the regular taxation, was eminently suited to extend royal or state power, even though in the final analysis, it was the debtors of the Jews who paid it. Moreover, if one did not stage the persecutions oneself, one could always use the stratagem of persecuting the persecutors as heretics, as a menace to the social order, and in that way once more foster state power; one could have one’s cake and eat it.

For these reasons there is less of a discrepancy between the above and the views of R.T. Moore as developed in “The Formation of a Persecuting Society”, which holds that, from the twelfth century, all persecutions of heretics, lepers, Jews, and eventually homosexuals and witches, are the outcome of a power game of the new class of literati in the nascent states. It is therefore very likely that competition with some influential Jewish managers of large estates, with Jewish administrators, was an additional motive. Likewise, as it could do without transgressing its own religio licita teaching, the Church had every interest in holding full sway by introducing the Jew badge, by condemning the Talmud, by harping upon Jewish obstinate infidelity, or on the Jewish original crime, by forbidding them to hold office, or by trying to prevent Christians from consulting Jewish physicians. It could also exercise control by condoning, within limits popular uncanonical beliefs, even against its own principles.

It looks, however, as if persecution as a means of holding sway, were teething problems. The fully grown, established modern state, like first of all the Italian podesta as mentioned before, effectively protected its Jewish minority, because state-interests were no longer served by oppression, unless the persecutors themselves conquered modern statepower, as in Nazi Germany. These modern persecutors, however, were perhaps more the heirs of
medieval *pauperes* than of *literati*, when anti-Semitism once more became largely an ideology of reactionary social protest against the bourgeois society of capitalism and modernization, and when the original religious issues were increasingly marginalized, or adapted to the new needs of dealing with “the social question”. Norman Cohn has a fascinating chapter, where he puts forward the thesis that National Socialism, as well as Bolshevism, fits into the European chiliastic tradition.
CHAPTER 7

Refutations and Predictions

On the basis of the dead reckoning as a reasonable conjecture, a number of predictions could and should be made. Ideally some of these should be refutable, because exposure of the conjecture to contrary evidence could result in corrections, and generate new hypotheses and insights, determining the further course of the investigation.

A most desirable, truly Popperian refutation would be evidence of a situation where all conditions so far deemed necessary and sufficient were met, and where yet no manifest and popular hostility towards Jews occurred. This would of necessity be a situation where inimical indoctrination is largely accepted, but results in a mere attitude or perhaps some backbiting, but not in action, where there are no chances, or not many, of entertaining friendly social relations with Jews on any other than a somewhat coincidental individual level, but where terrorization as an activating force is ineffective. This is presumably the case when the terrorists lack the effective means of moving the potentially terrorized, because of the latter’s sheer inertia and number; when even means such as blacklisting, ostracism, or defamation, more easily applied than violence, are ineffective.

Such a situation would perhaps arise when as a result of the fast growth of the urban population, and changed social circumstances of the town, the vast majority of the inhabitants have become strangers to each other. When guilds and comparable corporations have disappeared, and new institutions have not taken over their latent function, when there are many newcomers with different social backgrounds, when firms have grown to such a size that many employees no longer know each other, and when the spread of a town far exceeds walking distances, the urban community is characterized by an ever-greater anonymity, and loose social cohesion.

Hannah Arendt has argued that precisely this situation is a prerequisite for totalitarianism. Her main thesis was that with the gradual disappearance
of a structure of interlocked, cohesive, and articulate interest groups as the social basis of the eighteenth-century model of representative government, an amorphous mass that could easily spawn mob rule was born. From that mass the individual could be taken away in a night arrest without any significant social repercussions. That was the terrorism implemented in dictatorial power, based on that very mob, in which the individual counted for nothing. “Du bist nichts, dein Volk ist alles.” The dictator represents, in ultra-Rousseauan fashion, the volonté générale, as opposed to the volonté de tous, the individual will.

Medieval towns certainly had their mobs once in a while, but their small size, and the fact that in most sections, social as well as geographical, people knew each other by sight or otherwise, prevented anonymity. Then terrorization could be effective, because name calling was.

The refutational supposition that an inert mass of the anonymous robs terrorization of its effectiveness, is seemingly at variance with Hannah Arendt’s thesis. Seemingly, because at any time during a crisis, jingoism, and a terrorizing mob can emerge. Mobs, however, come and go, the less well people know each other, the sooner dissolved, the sooner the constitutive panic or delirium evaporates. There is reason to assume that indeed sustained, not governmentally imposed racist attitudes, continuous hate-formation are more pronounced, as more primary groups of people who know and control each other are involved, and the greater the governmental “permissiveness” is. It is the typical case of lynchings and race-riots in semi-urban or urbanizing situations with easy transport. Another example: in Martha Gellhorn’s eyewitness account of a lynching party she attended involuntarily, the participants, arriving by car, were saying “So long, Jake. Hi there, Billy. See you tomorrow, Sam”. They knew – and disliked – the woman who pretended to have been raped, but they also knew that authorities would not interfere.

When hate formation can be tempered by mass inertia, there is obviously a question of scale at issue, which could imply that there has to be a corresponding enlargement of scale in terrorization to make the trance more effective, and longer lasting? There is, in effect a larger scale when the terrorizing groups, shedding their somewhat haphazard mob-character, and organizing themselves in, for example, militant parties, or act on a semi-military basis as the S.A., are then able to conquer the state and with it all the means of power pertaining to the maintenance of its monopoly of violence.

Then the state itself terrorizes, as in the cases of Nazi Germany; South Africa during apartheid, with its persecution of white opponents as “kafferboetie” communists; some southern States of the US before the civil rights
movement that ostracized “nigger-lovers”; or the Ottoman Empire during the regime of the “Young Turks”, punishing those who objected to the massacre of the Armenians.⁵

Then many formerly passive individuals, afraid of sanctions, feel forced to hunt with the hounds, and in turn may force others to do the same. A racist ideology, bent on disabling or persecuting the “inferiors”, is superimposed as law, maintained by the ordinary police and judiciary, but above all by new institutions of organized street-fighters, “People’s Courts” and secret police outside the judiciary. A social isolation of the (future) victims of persecution by the state and its (terrorized) helpers is likewise formalized or superimposed as law, see, for example: the Nuremberg laws in Germany, townships; “homelands” in South Africa; removal of Armenians from the “millet”-system in the Ottoman Empire;⁶ and “Jim Crow” in the US.

There is a paralyzing risk in not abiding by the new state ideology. A horrid new feature of the enhanced terrorizing effectiveness is its deliberate arbitrariness. There is no knowing what will be punished and how. An army officer disobeying orders, not in any way related to the prevailing ideology, not denounced to the Gestapo, may get away with it, or may have to face normal disciplinary measures from his superior commanders. A secretary in a Berlin office can be arrested by the Gestapo, denounced by colleagues, for saying “Good morning”, instead of “Heil Hitler”? There just was not that freedom of speech or action in Nazi Germany which Goldhagen so wrongly assumed was the case, partly on the basis of the doings of the said officer. That assumption is possibly based on the incomprehension for somebody reared in a society of free speech, of what is the quality of civil life under a totalitarian dictatorship, with anonymous denunciations rampant. He may well be acquainted with the fate of the hunted, but may easily forget that the hunted have no clear perception of dissensions among the hunters. It is the terrifying effect of this arbitrariness that was overlooked by Goldhagen.

Another characteristic is the arresting of wives, husbands, or other relations as hostages. Safety could only be acquired by cooperation, by a non-committal attitude, at the price of losing one’s moral integrity, or by surreptitious behavior; otherwise one had to take unknown risks. Most people accepted the benefits of the new regime – full employment, social security, government-sponsored outings and concerts, motorways, and gratification of national feelings, so grievously wounded during the preceding decades – and turned a blind eye to the less-desirable aspects, thereby leaving themselves open to terrorization. Anti-Semitism was not necessarily the main motive in voting for Hitler for the one-third of the population who elected him, but
once he was in power, one had somehow to live with it, or take risks not many were prepared to take. In her meticulously researched study, Sarah Gordon emphasizes that only a minority of the Germans was virulently anti-Semitic, whereas the majority was indifferent or actually helped the Jews. This held true for Party members or even members of the S.S. Only in Vienna did the Kristallnacht on 9 November 1938 meet with general popular support. Gordon’s analyses throw doubt on Goldhagen’s thesis of an all pervading eliminationist anti-Semitism in Germany. If it had not been for Waldeck-Rousseau, France in the Dreyfus Affair could have gone the same way.

To sum up: to Hannah Arendt’s analysis is added the element of organized, and thereby enhanced, terrorization to make it come true. As long as that did not prevail or was adequately prevented, large-scale modern urbanity was paradoxically not characterized by sustained anti-Semitism.

There is a caveat, however. The argument so far assumes that early modern metropolises like, say, sixteenth-century Antwerp and the large towns (over 50,000 inhabitants) and metropolises of the nineteenth century are more easily policed and administered, and are more governable than either their medieval or twentieth-century counterparts. This calls for an immense exploration of urban sociology, far beyond the scope of this study.

To substantiate the above view, a somewhat impressionistic exploration and circumstantial evidence will have to suffice for verifying the assertions made; football violence for one, could be seen as an indication of governmental ineffectiveness of modern super-towns, as could traffic congestion, and the complexities of social welfare legislation.

As was noted before despite the emergence of vociferous, new anti-Semitic ideologies and parties, life, limb, and property of Jews were reasonably well protected in most European countries outside Russia and Romania, during the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth centuries, though social discrimination in jobs and admittance to clubs or societies did occur.

The derived, “refutational” hypothesis can be corroborated somewhat further than that, for there are arguments to sustain the notion that mature urban societies tend to be less anti-Semitic than urbanizing ones (measured in terms of the approximation of chapter 1). This tallies with the above argument that the fully grown modern state, presupposing economically viable towns, which mainly provide the money for taxes, is better equipped to control terrorization if, not conquered by terrorists, it is for its own ends willing to do so.

Nineteenth-century verbal anti-Semitism in “non-terrorizing states” was
presumably rooted in the smaller or economically backward towns, and in the rural areas. The latter were now “urbanizing”, that is, being reluctantly but inexorably drawn into the town-dominated economy of industrial development for market-production, increasingly exposed to the thereby generated vicissitudes of agrarian prices – late-nineteenth-century agriculture became a gamble. The rural areas were also urbanizing in the sense of developing urban lifestyles, reading town-produced newspapers, having the same type of schools, medical services, insurances, buying more town-made goods, or having articles of clothing, furniture, household utensils and the like, made by specialists, sold in the village shops. These were no longer made on the farms themselves. All this was facilitated by easier transport that ended rural isolation. The rural areas were opened up for the urban-developed systems of credit (for example, mortgages) of the “Jewish” banks, counterbalanced by cooperative banking (the Raiffeisen Banks); just as in the nascent towns, usury was countervailed by the *monte di pietà*.

Political-ideologically explicit anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany and Austria demonstrably found the bulk of its electorate in the rural areas and the small towns such as Marburg or Eisenach,¹⁰ which were as yet only marginally affected by modern industry. It was a social protest against destabilizing modernization and industrialization. Indicative of a predominantly rural disposition of modern anti-Semitism, in contradistinction to the largely urban character of its medieval form could be the frequent protests of the anti-Semitic propaganda literature of the late nineteenth century against the gold standard. (It deserves attention because it illustrates a difference in development: in the US the “silver-men”, followers of W.J. Bryan after his “Cross of Gold” speech, were not anti-Semitic.) Anti-Semitic innuendo had it that agrarians were particularly affected by its alleged price-lowering effect, because of production inelasticity. Heavily indebted during the good years by loans to finance better drainage and other improvements to their holdings, agrarians ruined by the depression allegedly became the helpless victims of expropriating Jewish mortgage bankers, who had cunningly planned it this way. In Germany it was said that Bismarck did not have the means to prevent the introduction of the gold standard, because he was in the clutches of his Jewish banker Bleichroeder, (in actual fact a protagonist of bimetallism¹¹).

Another indication of rural anti-Semitic resentment is the attack on modern inheritance law. The charges had it that because of the non-entail clauses of the modern law, via the French Code Civil inherited from non-Germanic, alien Roman law, younger brothers and sisters had inheritance rights equal to that of the oldest son. If the holding was not divided these younger mem-

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bers of the family were entitled to financial compensation. They thus enhanced the indebtedness of the holding, allegedly to the sole advantage of expropriating Jewish bankers, who in this way could acquire landed property in former days denied to them. Recently emancipated Jewish lawyers allegedly saw to that.

In Austria the campaign resulted in a demand for a “Heimstätten-Gesetz” in imitation of the American “Homestead Act” of 1862, with an execution-free minimum for agrarian holdings. It was strongly promoted by Georg von Schönerer, hero of Adolf Hitler, whose electoral support was mainly rural.

Finally, anti-Semitic protests against “British-Jewish Manchesterism” had clear agrarian connotations, for protectionist demands mainly came from agrarian groups.

As suggested, the new anti-Semitism also took root in small towns, not yet affected by modern industry, but where artisans, increasingly facing industrial competition, had financial problems comparable to those of the agrarians, because of the technical improvements heavily indebted to “Jewish” banks.

More or less the same holds true for small shopkeepers, facing the competition of the chain stores and the large department stores.

Berlin never was a focus of the movement, and neither were the new industrial agglomerations or the great commercial centers like Hamburg. It is no coincidence that the Völkisch writers, unanimously declared, anticipating Blut und Boden, that the pure, “not Judaized”, soul of the German nation was found in the small towns or villages. The metropolises in their eyes were the stone deserts where the “Bedouin” Jew felt at home. They were according to them inhabited by an uprooted, denationalized, soulless proletariat and a “Judaized” bourgeoisie, both dancing to the piping of the Jews, so that art and literature in them were debased to a mere false “Jewish glitter, brilliant, but without much emotion or spiritual depth”. Berlin was until 1933 a bulwark against Nazism, “Berlin bleibt Rot”, as the saying went.

Another very interesting example is Budapest. It witnessed an explosive growth from 11,000 inhabitants in 1720 to 933,000 in 1913, with about 20 percent of the population Jewish. Judeo-phobia was by no means alien to the Hungarian rural areas (for example, the notorious Tisza-Eszlar ritual murder affair in 1882, which even required interference by the military to prevent riots), but the capital was different. Presumably the strongly “Magyarized” Jewish population met with very little animosity and could fully develop its talents.

It is perhaps not without significance that Austrian anti-Semites always talked of “Juda-Pest”. There was a change for the worst during the first quarter of the twentieth century, due to official or “officious” “ter-
rorization” after 1918, after the Bela Kun episode, when the Arrow Cross Movement, akin to Nazism, began to gain ground.  

French mob anti-Semitism during the Dreyfus Affair was indeed based in Paris, but most activists and most impulses came from the provinces. The worst excesses took place in Algeria, under the leadership of the “Colon”-elected burgomaster of Algiers, Max Régis. Moreover, Paris, like Vienna, was at the time economically somewhat backward, living so to speak at the expense of the country. Both towns had primarily developed as royal residences and administrative and financial centers, lacking large industries, trade, or port activity, their merely consumptive industries, such as breweries, mainly catering to the needs of the town. (Present-day Paris industry dates mainly from the so-called second industrial revolution, and is largely of twentieth-century origin.)

In both cases anti-Semitism was mainly a reaction of their large artisan population. The economic center of gravity of the Austrian part of the dual monarchy was not Vienna, but Bohemia or Silesia, – the textile industries, the Vitkovitz and other steelworks, Bata – Viennese anti-Semitism was indeed strong enough to achieve the election of the purely opportunist anti-Semite, Karl Lueger, as burgomaster. He always acted the anti-Semite at election time. Anti-Semitism was mainly verbal, and Jews were well protected. The truly vicious and “pan-German” ideological variety of anti-Semitism propagated by Schönerer, precursor of the Nazis, never got a foothold in Vienna outside of student circles, and found its main support in the rural areas east of Tyrol, and in the small towns, particularly those of western Bohemia and Silesia, like Eger or Troppau, the Sudeten-Land of the 1938 crisis. Rural Czech Bohemia and Moravia were presumably more anti-Jewish than Kafka’s Prague, though Jews there were victimized by German-Czech conflict.

So when the refutational evidence suggests that anti-Semitism is typically a feature of transition or crisis, a case could perhaps be made for arguing that the first European areas to approach urban maturity, sustained by a highly rationalized, modern, market-oriented agriculture and dairy farming, not yet exposed to overseas competition as was the case in German nineteenth-century agriculture, these could be relatively free of anti-Semitism. Jews in such areas were presumably not as “dangerous” as they seemingly had been in the nascent towns. There finance and the giving of credit were no longer exclusively “Jewish” business.

Such a supposition could highlight the relative tolerance of England since the seventeenth century, after a turbulent medieval past, or perhaps also its developing ideologically deviant varieties of Jew-hatred in the nineteenth
century, aiming at the poor Jewish Russian or Polish immigrants of the sweatshops, not at the Jewish “capitalists”. Reversedly it could also highlight, via the “court Jews” the continued medieval traditions in economically retarded eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Central Europe, where there was for a long time no bourgeoisie willing and capable of taking the risks of early capitalist finance, commerce and industry. It explains the relative calm before World War I in most countries where Jews had been emancipated, amid noisy but inefficient anti-Semitism.

However, it cannot explain a seeming refutation of the dead reckoning, to wit, the discrepancy between the statement made above, that manifest medieval and early modern anti-Semitism was primarily an urban phenomenon, and the fact that the two most urbanized regions of late medieval and early modern Europe, northern Italy and the Low Countries, were also the areas where Jew-hatred was the least pronounced, if not conspicuously absent (e.g., in Tuscany). In these areas too, a transitional period has to be assumed, unless for some reason or other, none or not all of the presumed necessary conditions were met.

From this perspective the case of the Low Countries is somewhat deceptive. In the late Middle Ages, the higher ground of the northeastern Low Countries, agriculturally poor because of largely sandy soils, showed (exceptionally for Europe) the urban agglomerations of the IJssel and Rhine towns, members of or affiliated to the Hanseatic League: Kampen, Zwolle, Deventer, Zutphen, Arnhem, Nijmegen, and so forth. In all these towns there were severe persecutions of Jews, particularly during the years of the Black Death. The same holds true for the Meuse towns. Flanders was not strongly affected, because for some reason or other, neither in Ghent, nor presumably in the other industrial centers were there many Jews, although Brabant had some. This is evident, for example, from the Brussels case (in 1370) of a “desecration of the Host”, or from the worried letter the Regent Duchess Aleidis wrote to Aquinas, asking advice about the “Jewish question”, the usury that had so vexed her late husband, Henry II. In fact, the answer she received epitomizes Italian reasonableness and tolerance in secular matters. Jews in Italy were not usurers because they could find work in other branches of the economy.

So, although it is perfectly legitimate to surmise that the high degree of mature urbanization is responsible for Belgian tolerance in the nineteenth century, manifest in, for example, the decision not to commemorate the Brussels miraculous event of 500 years earlier, it does not really presuppose the late medieval or early modern benevolence, though it does perhaps for
sixteenth-century Antwerp. A final analysis shows that the relative tolerance in the Low Countries at an early date, was restricted to the maritime provinces of the Dutch Republic, where there was an exceptional degree of urbanization, not of great centers, but of a vast agglomeration of towns; the envy of states aiming at mercantilism. Their economic versatility went hand-in-hand with a highly developed, specialized- and market oriented agriculture – flax, madder, and dairy farming. These were at an early date de-feudalized, and monetized, due to the fertility of the land reclaimed from water. Since the late Middle Ages, this form of land reclamation had resulted in forms of landownership and tenancy, which were very unusual for contemporary Europe.\footnote{31}

These areas had not known Jewish inhabitants during the Middle Ages. At that time there was for Jews no way of eking out even the most precarious livelihood, in what were then small centers of fisheries, and bulk-carrying trades. Consequently, religious indoctrination regarding the Jews was either nonexistent or a matter of mere hearsay. The early Reformation did not change that. Due to severe Habsburg repression, the early-sixteenth-century Reformation in the Netherlands had great difficulty in finding organizational forms. It long remained a movement from below, not from above, as elsewhere, no “cuius regio, eius religio”, nor was it the equivalent of an Anglican state-church, and it therefore acquired the characteristics of the politiques, people opposed to any form of religious oppression. It was spiritual, emphasizing religious experience, undogmatic and Erasmian, and in a way initiated by the “Modern Devotion” movement. The ensuing tolerance, later superseded by more intolerant forms of Calvinism, remained a strong undercurrent. It facilitated the coming of the Iberian New Christians, who obviously had comparable Nicodemist dissimulationist\footnote{32} problems with their outward Catholicism, as did many adherent to the early Reformation. It could be argued that Calvinists, because of their great veneration for the Old Testament, for the “Chosen”, occasionally went along with the undercurrent in this respect, although they too presumably distinguished between Hebraei and Judaei.

The (mostly Portuguese) New Christians were also welcome because their expertise in overseas trade fitted well into the early capitalism of the new burgeoning trade centers of the new commerce, originating from bulk carrying and fisheries. Jews, having shed their Roman-Catholic pretences, though, as of old, excluded from the guilds, could freely participate in commerce, and in all the new, non-guild-organized processing industries derived from overseas and colonial trades, such as the tobacco, sugar, dye, and diamond trades,
There was consequently no conspicuous specification of Jewish economic positions, and hence sharply diminished social distance. Adequate urban bureaucracy and policing, as a rule, prevented terrorization.

For entirely different reasons, partly based on Islamic and Byzantine policies, Jews in most parts of Italy could also freely participate in almost all crafts, with consequent diminished social distance. Noteworthy is their activity in the textile-trades. The various podestà, their power based on a money-economy could likewise adequately prevent terrorization.

A specifically Italian form of anti-clericalism, the Patrimonium Petri constituting a grave problem in peninsular politics, took away some of the bite of the theological indoctrination, as did moreover Papal policy itself. It usually abided by the rule formulated by Gregory the Great, that to Jews everything is allowed that is not specifically forbidden in (Roman) law. It implied taking seriously the religio licita principle. Although able to carry out this policy locally, the Papacy lacked the means of enforcing it north of the Alps.

The long and the short of all this is, that Italy and the Netherlands were exceptions to the dead reckoning, but not refutations, for some of the presumed necessary conditions were lacking. Like the comparable case in the south of France, before the Albigensian Crusade, these should be elaborated.

Another prediction following from the dead reckoning, which has to be checked, is that in Transalpine Europe, north of the Pyrenees, there was a delay in hate-formation from West to East, and, less pronounced, from South to North. It is surmised that there is a certain incubation period, after first contacts, shortened when Jews migrating to the East took with them their specific economic position, imposed elsewhere. Rhenish anti-Semitism is supposed to be somewhat later developed than French, eastern German anti-Semitism later than Rhenish, and so forth. It does help to explain a Jewish migration to the east. That there is hardly any such migration to the north, to Scandinavia, remains unexplained. There is one example of a westernly migration to England, for (as yet) inexpllicable reasons, presumably not continued towards Ireland or Scotland. The dead reckoning would make England a case apart. Jews arrived there for the first time with the Norman conquest, when in Normandy and elsewhere in France they had gone through a process of specification of economic positions. They thus arrived in England as threefold aliens: they were French speakers like the nobility, adherents of a suspect religion, and moneylending urbanites. Medieval English Jew-hatred was therefore likely to be almost instantaneous and almost immediately subsequent to the Norman conquest. Given the somewhat better control of the Norman and Angevin kings over their vassals, preventing independence,
English Jews were therefore presumably more directly dependent on the crown, than anywhere else. The kings of England could use that to their advantage. This could explain specific forms of royal extortions, which Jews somehow had to recoup, their exactions probably making them none too popular.

The dead reckoning does not contain an adequate premise for any conclusion concerning the Iberian Peninsula, since conditions there were heavily influenced by tripartite religious affiliations. Islamic policy is likely to have prevented economic specification. As in Sicily, the effects may have radiated over the Christian parts, so that for Spain and Portugal social positions may be assumed, deviant from the remainder of Transalpine Europe. The fate of the Jews in Christian parts is likely to have been closely linked to the vicissitudes of the “Reconquista”, the more successful the latter was, the more this fate deteriorated, culminating in the expulsion in 1492 after the fall of Cadiz. The Russian and Romanian cases have been dealt with separately.

**A logical objection to terrorization**

There is a possible refutation of another kind: a logical objection to the dead reckoning. It could be argued that in the terrorization hypothesis there is a *primus movens* problem: “Who terrorized the first terrorists?” It can be answered that this happened in a process of “auto-terrorization”. It can easily be imagined that when Jewish popularity had sharply diminished as a result of social distance cum indoctrination, disputes over some financial or other matters between some Jews and some Gentiles got out of hand and resulted in fisticuffs, or worse. When other Jews were aware of this, they may have wanted to succor their co-religionist, perhaps still in the conviction that their social standing was such that they could afford this and get away with it, as they once had got away with pouring rancid oil over a former Jewish catechumen participating in a procession.\(^34\) Christian bystanders either spontaneously or with some pressure invited by the first antagonists, may have joined in. A regular brawl, or even a minor race riot may have evolved which did not go unnoticed. There may have been many such conflicts in many places, thereby forming a pattern.

Each of the participants had to justify his behavior to himself, which in the case of the Gentiles involved, could easily result in an attitude of: “serves them right,” their self-exoneration adding to their existing antagonism, and making them more prone, not only to use violence the next time, but also to
force others to do likewise, by naming the unwilling “Jew-friend” (cf. nigger-lovers, kaffir-boetie). Then terrorization can be said to have begun. The whole process is naturally aggravated when the perpetrators are not punished for their misdemeanor through lack of adequate policing.

For the Jews it had repercussions as well. Likely to be in a minority position, cowed, they will have developed an attitude of hesitancy and caution. The “cringing Jew” was born, who by his very submissiveness and helplessness, makes himself an easy prey, and so to speak invites people to violence. This is a fortiori so, when due to their diminished social standing, Jews were no longer allowed to carry arms and lost the ability of handling them in self-defense. They could no longer fight it out the way they could in Merovingian times. In the various “Truces of God”, Jews had the defenseless status of women, clerics, and monks, the latter to their honor, the former to their ignominy, as it was phrased.35

There is historical evidence to substantiate such “auto-terrorization”, in the events on the coronation day of Richard Coeur de Lion, 3 September 1189, extensively described below, here reported only in the essentials. The Jewish communities all over England, wishing to honor their new king, sent delegates with presents to London. Richard, arguing that “his” Jews had bought these presents with money that was really his, refused them audience. The small group of Jews, standing hesitantly at the gate of the castle, where the king was holding his banquet, were hard-handedly told by some guards to go away. Their disobedience – they tried to argue their case – was for a number of bystanders a sign to take matters into their own hands. The town was thronged, not only because of the festivities, but many sick and disabled and their relatives must have come to London, hoping for a cure from the hands of the newly anointed “thaumaturgic” king, who could freely dispense healing by the grace of the holy oils. Emotions ran high and no doubt many had abundantly drunk to the new king’s health. What began perhaps as a drunken brawl soon evolved into a regular race riot. The Jewish delegates, fleeing to the houses of their London co-religionists, were pursued by the mob. The houses were set on fire, and caused neighboring houses to catch fire. There was a danger that a good deal of London would be reduced to ashes. Richard was furious, but was unable to punish the guilty. Six months later, at Easter time, always a period of heightened tension, there were riots all over England, culminating in the York massacre in 1190, where “permissiveness” and terrorizing definitely were at play.

The timing of the York massacre was presumably not by chance. There was at the time in York no authority to prevent the onslaught. The sheriff
happened to be absent and there was a vacancy in the episcopal see. Richard, about to leave on crusade to the Holy Land, was once more unable to punish the guilty. Richard Malebysse, a local nobleman, heavily indebted to the Jews, who wanted to get rid of his debt the easy way by burning the bonds, was the main instigator. The mob, incited by him, first stormed the cathedral where the (royal) copies of the bonds were kept for the exchequer. Malebysse went scot free. In the following year, there was highly increased Jew-hatred all over England, no doubt aggravated by discontent over the extra taxes levied to pay the huge ransom to liberate Richard from captivity at the hands of Emperor Henry VI. The reign of Richard’s successor, John Lackland showed a further deterioration of Jewish-Gentile relations.36

A word of caution, however, should be added. The narration of the incidents of coronation day and subsequent events does not purport to claim that they were the beginning of manifest Jew-hatred in England. The Norwich ritual murder case is there to belie this. What is suggestive, is how a spontaneous outburst of violence can in effect cause a chain reaction. It may, however, also be assumed that the events were a kind of watershed, in the sense that perhaps previously popular antagonism was a mere attitude, or merely verbal, protected as Jews were by the crown, for its own ends. The events of the coronation day showed how ineffective that protection actually was.37

What is achieved by constructing the dead reckoning, its predictions and its refutational and other deviations, will form the agenda for the continuation of this study. The various elements have to be checked.

The procedure of testing independent variables

The above prediction of the dead reckoning, as well as the constituting variables themselves, should be tested. In the case of the theological indoctrination and stigmatization, there is a problem. Going by the book, the three variables should be independent of each other, for otherwise there is no sure way of gauging their effect. Conceptually, if the original indoctrination is held to be basically limited to the rejecting consensus of the Fathers, they are inherited from late antiquity, and as such preceding the other two.

Difficulties emerge when popular religion, developed under the impact of the social conditions shaping the other variables, had a stigmatizing effect of its own. Then stigmatization is no longer independent. Methodological correctness can be rescued, when there is plausibility, preferably certainty, that
the canonical views, generating the noncanonical, are themselves, unaffected by the social conditions, that gave shape to their popular interpretation or elaboration. It seems highly unlikely that over several centuries in a changing society there would be no doctrinal innovations whatever, regarding the Jews, unless these are demonstrably conceptions not primarily dealing with Jews, but in their anti-Jewish consequences well fitting into the corpus of rejections inherited from the Fathers. The concept of the infidel as usurer, the introduction of the Jew badge, the condemnation and burnings of the Talmud, inter alia, would have been of that type.

These considerations not only raise the question as to who or what decided what is canonical and what is not, before the foundation of the Congregation of the Curia, but also whether there were innovations, derived from the original rejection in the medieval condemnations of the Jews, which could stand the test of orthodoxy, and were acceptable to the highest authority. It would be a very cumbersome procedure to read the whole *adversus Judaeos* literature, and from that be able to distill the, in that sense, greatest common denominator.

There are examples of anti-Jewish concepts that were not contrary to orthodoxy and yet were not so to speak put on the statute book. An example could be the writings of Agobard, “De insolentia Judaeorum”. Given the as yet unproven excellent Jewish-Gentile relations in the Carolingian period, it is not likely that his views were widely accepted in his day, but they may have been later on. His idea that Jews spoil the wine of Christians may or may not be at the origin of accusing the Jews of being poisoners. His works presumably were such, that they received the *nihil obstat* (they are included in the *Patrologia Latina*), but the idea that Jews are poisoners were sanctioned thereby.

A more interesting example elaborated below is the thesis defended largely by the mendicant orders – the urban orders – that since Jews lend authority to the Talmud, Judaism cannot be considered to be a purely biblical religion, and can therefore not be a *religio licta*. If this view had been accepted by the Vatican and the post-mid-thirteenth-century councils, Judaism and the Jews would have been completely outlawed, and presumably annihilated at the time. Whether or not the common people accepted this somewhat esoteric point of view, is immaterial, for by that time popular Jew-hatred was sufficiently developed not to need additional doctrinal incentives. It should, however, be emphasized that the mendicant orders played a decisive role in inciting the populace against the Jews, on both sides of the Alps in the fourteenth and fifteenth century. Even when, in Counter-Reformation days, the Papacy adopted a much harder stance than it did in the Middle Ages – the Roman
ghetto! – the concept of the religio licita, and the derived rule of Gregory the Great, that to Jews everything is allowed that is not expressis verbis forbidden in law, was never abolished, even though the legal encumbrances were then much more strictly interpreted than was traditionally the case. Jews maintained their position of “witnesses of the truth”.

If the friars had had their way, Judaism could have been declared a heresy, in the sense of willfully deviating from the revealed truth. The interesting point is, that Judaism was never denounced as a heresy. Never having belonged to the faithful, Jews could not possibly consciously and willfully fall away from Christian orthodoxy, and could therefore not be considered to be heretics. Jews had the right to live, – as witnesses -, heretics had not; as Aquinas wrote: “Jews are subject to perpetual servitude, and their goods are at the disposal of the ruler; only he must not take away from them so much that they are deprived of the means of life”, thereby emphatically recognizing their right to live, whereas heretics had forfeited this, as the counterfeiters they were.38

The idea of Jewish servitude as the basis of the Reichskammer-Knechtschaft, servi camerae imperatoris,39 comparable forms of utter dependence of Jews upon the rulers in other countries, justifying exploitation, certainly came to full vicious bloom during the Middle Ages, but it was not a medieval innovation, for the idea was known to Augustine, for one.

Were there then specifically medieval concepts regarding the Jews, that could qualify as canonical, that were innovative, and that were not more or less coincidental applications to Jews of rulings that in intent were not primarily aimed at the Jews; that came in handy, so to speak, for further blackening them? This raises once more the question as to who or what decides what is canonical.

By its own definition the medieval Church was the Corpus Christi, the “Body of Christ”, the sacred community of all the truly faithful. It was ruled as a monarchy with, as its divinely appointed supreme ruler, the successor of St. Peter, and keeper of his relics – the most precious and prestigious in an age that, so to speak, lived by relics.40 The vast majority of the faithful, inextricably bound by baptism, were the subjects, who had no say in the matter of government, and left it willingly or unwillingly, but presumably willingly to the Pope and his assistants, the clergy, organised almost as a guild.41 Like every autocratic government, it had its palace revolutions and anti-Popes, but whatever the sometimes sordid intrigues, nobody but the heretics contested the authority of the office, before the sixteenth century, when the system broke down, like in the Byzantine Empire, where whatever the intrigues, no
one contested the office of the emperor, or in the West, the office of the second in command, the Holy Roman emperor.

The Church was on principle coercive, leaving its subjects no free choice, even though the means of coercion were limited, consisting mostly of a not always effective excommunication, unless it could have its inquisitorial policing executed by a loyal, or at least interested, secular ruler, as in the case of the Albigensian Crusade. It lacked a police force of its own, apart from mercenaries, “the soldiers of the keys”; for some reason or other it never used the military orders of the knights for that purpose.

It was particularly the regular clergy, opposed to the occasionally too-meddlesom e bishops, which upheld the principle of Papal supremacy. It was the emporium of theological learning. So, supported by most of the intelligentsia, by a very well-administered, well-founded legality, and the concomitant, clerical jurisdiction of canon law, the Pope-led medieval church, in its hey-day was, in the words of R.W. Southern, the fullest development of the Roman Empire, “with Innocent iv playing Caesar to Frederick ii’s Pompey”. It preserved a unity that drew its strength from the ancient world. “During the whole medieval period there was in Rome a single spiritual and temporal authority exercising powers, which in the end exceeded those that had ever lain within the grasp of the Roman Emperor.” With that accumulated authority and coercion, it seems safe to say that the Vatican Curia was the repository of the truly canonical view, the decisive power.

The growth of Papal ascendency, at first in unison, later in somewhat growing dissension with the ecumenical councils, was contemporaneous with the first stirrings and the full development of the urban economy. This is no coincidence. The Church contributed massively by reinvesting its enormous hoarded treasures in all sorts of building operations and the like, to the remonetization of the economy. It provided also in this way a spiritual haven for the rather alienated new urban upper classes, not the “disoriented poor”, often in conflict with the bishops, and dissatisfied by their “rural” outlook. The Merovingian and perhaps also Carolingian bishops were largely recruited from the landed classes, the remnant of the old landowning senatorial families, independent after the fall of the Roman Empire, and finding in the Church and Church administration a fruitful compensation for their original social role. They did not as a rule excel in theological learning. It was only at the end of the medieval period, that urban classes, in a process of emancipation, seeking a new spirituality, began to draw away, thereby initiating a new epoch. The “lower classes”, as indicated, had always shown signs of rebelliousness; both developments victimized the Jews.
Thus, if the attainment of Papal ascendancy ever since the eleventh century coincided with the reversal of a popular attitude towards the Jews, it seems probable that the Papacy had a hand in it.

Lea Dasberg has, with a wealth of arguments, attempted to prove that, indeed, in the growing conflict with the Emperor, the Popes have incited the populace against the Jews, as being the financial agents of the Emperor. It may have been true in the initial stages, but very soon the Popes must have realized, that in so doing they acted like the apprentice sorcerer; such incitement ran against their basic principle of the *religio licita*, of Jews as witnesses of Christian faith, and ill suited their notion of the role of the Jews in the ultimate realization of the “divine plan”, the *Parousia*. It may also be surmised that it ran against their own financial interests. Jews, after all, were bankers to the Holy See.

Growing ascendancy and the concomitant greater articulateness of the clergy certainly made indoctrination more effective, but does not suggest anything about the nature of that indoctrination. The above outlined roots in antiquity, could imply that it was indeed limited to the teaching of the Fathers, but the very sense of victoriousness could have made it innovative: now the time was right to teach these infidels a lesson. In the latter case indoctrination could still be in part a variable dependent of that socio-economic development, that had contributed so much to the realization of the ascendancy.

There is a roundabout way of solving the problem of whether there was innovation or not, by investigating which of the great issues directly or indirectly concerned the Jews. A hopefully limited list would be:

1. The adoration of the Virgin.
2. The schism of 1054, and by implication, because the Eastern Church refused to accept the *filioque*, the Trinity.
3. The defense of Papal ascendancy in the face of imperial aspirations; or the theory of “the two swords”.
4. The development of a system of economic ethics and the problem of usury.
5. The crusades and the final defeat of the Muslims.
6. The combating of heresy.
7. The constitution of the mendicant orders, or the problem of “Apostolic poverty”, and the final condemnation of the *spirituali* or *fraticelli*.

*Refutations and Predictions*
9 The *Patrimonium Petri*.

10 Tithes.

11 The introduction of the “Jew badge”.

12 The problem of the Talmud.

(1) Mariolatry no doubt engendered many miracle stories in which the Jews played an evil role, but it in no way affected the conceptualization of the position of the Jews in a transcendental cosmic order. (2) The position of the Jews was also not affected by the thorny question, surreptitiously entered in the Western Creed, of whether the Holy Spirit comes from the Father and the Son (*Filioque*) or only from the Father, as the Greek Church held. (3) As stated, at the most, initially this question adversely affected the Jews. (4) A systematic treatment of a code of behavior in economic life is a more difficult matter. Even though the Church gained advantage from the economic situation, it was taken by surprise by its development. It had previously condemned commerce as mammonism, as the “stealing of God’s time”, a view fitting in with the early medieval rural outlook of the Church in an overwhelmingly agrarian world. As alluded to above, it extolled manual labor in its early labor-ethics as the means of emancipating man from the tyranny of his immediate bodily wants, creating time for devotion and reflection about the relation between man and his Creator. *Ora et Labora!* It was essential to reconsider the position, while maintaining the main concept, when economic conditions changed, thereby making the compensation of labor – in modern terms the real wages – the central issue. “The laborer is worthy of his reward.” (Matthew x, 10, Luke x, 7, 1 Tim. v, 18). Therefore the question hinged on the “just price”, *pretium justum*. Every form of artificially raising prices by means of speculation, was sinful. Forestalling, preemption, inclusive of the habit of towns to buy the as yet-unharvested crops in order to guarantee food for their inhabitants and hoarding, were forbidden. The realities of commerce and the inherent problems of credit could not, however, be denied; losses had to be considered. It is not correct to conceive of the distinction the schoolmen made between “interest” and “usury” as a hypocritical way to harm the Jews and save the Christians. The prohibition of usury, frequently circumvented, was on the one hand based mostly on Old Testament texts, and on the other hand on the Aristotelian concept, that gold and silver were barren, so that money cannot bear money. It is *contra naturam*. Interest dealt with losses and their compensation. This is allowed in the case of *damnnum emergens*, when the loss sustained would have been more tolerable, if the loser had not lent money to another, who therefore has to pay compensation. Interest is
also permitted in the case of *lucrum cessans*, the profits made by one’s own labor, which one could have made with the loan. The “silent” partner in the *commenda* partnership, who financed the undertaking, was entitled to part of the profits, payments on top of the principal. The next time, he could be the loser!47

There is no doubt that Jews were victimized because of their usury, enforced by circumstances, but it should be remembered that the worst objectors to Jewish usury were the Christian usurers, the Caorsins and others. The Church never forbade it, gladly leaving this sordid business to the infidels, the more gladly since Jewish usury added another blemish. It was not until the later Middle Ages that the friars founded the *monte di pietà* in competition with Jewish pawnbrokers.

(5) The popes, even if they believed that Jews were conspiring with the Muslims, never aimed the crusades at the Jews, with the possible exception of the Albigensian “Crusade” in which Jews were also victimized. The populace did draw conclusions the Church did not want and strongly opposed, notably in the person of Bernard of Clairvaux, no friend of the Jews. (6) Perhaps there was a suspicion that the Cathars were “Judaizers”, but as shown, most heretical movements were not, far from it. Most chiliastic movements denounced the Jews, and most of the dualistic heresies, Manichean from the Paulicians and Bogomils onwards, had the notion, also held by Gnostics, that the Creator, as the evil principle, was identical with the Jewish god.

(7) When the Vatican in the end distanced itself from the problem of Apostolic Poverty by condemning Franciscan radicals, the *Fraticelli*, thereby possibly indicating that it – resignedly – accepted an existing social order, it did not have the Jews in mind. Neither did it in the question of payments to the Vatican, though tithes had to be paid on land Jews had bought from Christians, or in the justification of the Ecclesiastical State, (7) (9) (10). (8) It could be that canon law influenced the codification of secular law in the God’s truces, such as in the *Schwaben Spiegel* or the *Meissener Rechtsbuch*, or the swearing of the oath *More Judaica*, with a very insulting and humiliating procedure, the litigant standing on a pigskin. Jews were not allowed to testify against a Christian. These were forms of *Judenrecht*, secular law, mirroring popular sentiment, at most with clerical connivance, but not essential deviations from traditional existing Roman law, and its constrictions.

(11) A more complicated issue is the Jew badge, *la rouelle*, *rotella*, the badge of shame, or the pointed Jew hat. It was spawned by hostility, and in its whole history, up to the Nazi use of it, it is the visible sign of Jew-hatred, the marking of the enemy, utterly humiliating. Yet, at the time of its introduction, the
fourth Lateran Council in 1215, it was aimed equally at Muslims. There is even reason to assume that this measure was in fact primarily meant for the latter.

It may be doubted whether the Saracens were conceived of as exclusively external enemies of no concern to the internal organization of a Christian society. A contemporary change of circumstances may have caused them all of a sudden to appear as an internal threat, as a dangerous fifth column. Saracens of southern Italy and particularly Sicily, kept in check by the Norman kings, were not dangerous as long as it was in the interest of these proud rulers to be loyal vassals and defenders of the Papal see. Sicilian Muslims became a potential threat to the Ecclesiastical State and Papacy, however, the moment the inimical and feared Hohenstaufen came to power in Sicily, as the result of the marriage of the Norman heiress Constance and Emperor Henry VI. Innocent III, as the clever and astute politician he was, realized the new danger full well, and developed a scheme to detach Sicily from the Empire, when he became Pope, and Henry’s sudden death in 1197 gave him the opportunity. In the turmoil of the succession, he supported Otto IV of Brunswick, the Welf. Innocent’s plan miscarried, however, because Otto did not keep his promises. Contrary to the Pope’s intentions he interfered in Sicilian affairs and intrigued with the German barons of Henry’s retinue. At the time the Lateran Council met in 1215, Stupor Mundi (“the wonder of the world”), Frederic II, the son of Henry and Constance, born in 1194 and heir of Sicily, was king of the Germans as well, and had imperial aspirations. He was crowned King of the Romans in 1212 and Emperor in 1220. This incomparable youth did in the end achieve exactly what Innocent feared the most: the wedging in of the Ecclesiastical State between two centers of formidable Hohenstaufen power. A major source of Sicilian military strength, apart from the islands wealth, was the fact that Frederic, by granting his Muslim subjects liberty of conscience and religion, on condition that they fight for him, was able to organize a powerful standing army devoted to him. Admittedly he only fully achieved this in 1222, that is after the Council, but it was entirely foreseeable that he would do something of the kind.

Such a policy was the logical outcome of a Norman practice of long standing. Norman rulers had treated local Saracen rulers of the Sicilian interior, which had never been subjected, alternatively as enemies or allies, as it suited them. Since the days of Roger II, Norman kings of Sicily called themselves “Kings of Africa”, with some justification, for not only Sicilian Arabs, but also princes from Morocco to Tripoli paid tribute to them. So did the Almohads, to buy off an attack on the Baleares. If need be these Norman princes could...
find Muslim allies and could muster a considerable Saracen strength. In the hands of their Hohenstaufen inheritor this potential might effectively be used against the Pope, as in fact Otto had done.\textsuperscript{51} Frederic, who spoke fluent Arabic himself, was on much better terms with many rulers in the Islamic world than the Church liked. Thus this potential reemergence of Arab valor and military ability must have seemed to Innocent III, since 1211 threatened from the north and the south by a Hohenstaufen power that was certainly as strong as that of Henry IV in the days of Gregory VII, a possible danger of no mean significance. The Battle of Bouvines in 1214, where Frederic’s ally the king of France, Philip II August beat Otto’s English and other allies, aggravated the problem.\textsuperscript{52}

Innocent III was the great loser, but dauntless he fought back with all the spiritual means at his disposal. The Lateran Council was indeed a formidable weapon he could wield, and he was not slow in using it. Ostracism of the once more dangerous Muslims was one of the strategies he could use, and there is therefore reason to assume that inclusion of the Saracens in the ruling about special clothing was not a mere afterthought, and perhaps even the foremost reason to introduce distinctions in clothing. A crusading and renovating spirit which seems to have motivated Innocent in all his actions – a crusade was actually proclaimed at the Council – may also have been of some consequence. The Muslim infidels in all the areas to be conquered should be marked; Muslims should be fought with their own weapons, and it could thus even be submitted that Jews were included only as a matter of consistency, as an afterthought. After all it should not be forgotten that the introduction of such distinction in clothing was an imitation of Islamic practice.\textsuperscript{53}

Another argument that this measure could be interpreted as primarily aimed at Muslims, is that if it were first and foremost aimed at Jews, there is no satisfactory explanation why it was not introduced much earlier, social and sexual intercourse being forbidden since the fifth century. Of course, it is a measure entirely consistent with the isolating policy fiercely anti-Judaist theologians had demanded, and tried to practice for centuries. Hence there was absolutely no reason for a zealous, perhaps fanatical, anti-Judaist like Innocent not to apply it to Jews, once it was conceived. Yet it may have been the Muslims who, in a dual sense, were the original source of inspiration.

It is indeed remarkable how leniently the measure was enforced in Rome itself after the Sicilian menace was staved off with the final defeat of the Hohenstaufen, and after the sixth and seventh Crusades failed to achieve anything spectacular, the Crusading idealism being compromised by the fourth Crusade with the conquest and sack of Christian Constantinople in 1204.

\textit{Refutations and Predictions}
Postponements of the obligation to wear a badge were frequently permitted by the Popes themselves, who explicitly made specific exceptions for their Jewish physicians. The literal text of the decree is as follows:

In nonnullis provinciis a Christianis Judaeos seu Saracenos habitus distinguuit diversitas, sed in quibusdam sic quaedam inolevit confusio, ut nulla differentia discernatur. Unde contingit interdum, quod per errorem Christiani Judaeorum seu Saracenorum et Judaei seu Saraceni Christianorum mullieribus commisceantur. Ne igitur tam damnatae commíxtonis excessus per velamentum erroris hujus modi excusationis in omni Christianorum provincia et omni tempore qualitate habitus publice ab aliis populis distinguantur, cum etiam per Mosen hoc ipsum legisser eis injunctum.

(In many provinces Jews and Saracens are distinguished from Christians by a difference in clothing, but in a few such confusion prevails, that no difference can be discerned. Therefore it happens once in a while, that by mistake, Christians have intercourse with Jewish or Saracen women, and Jews and Saracens with Christian women. Lest therefore excesses of such criminal mingling be executed under the cloak of error they (Jews and Saracens) must in each province forever be distinguished in clothing from the other people as Moses himself also commanded them.)

The text requires some comment. In the Latin text the reference to nonnullis provinciis effectively means only Alais in the Languedoc and Arragon. For a very short time also in Paris, but there soon forgotten. Chazan explicitly mentions the introduction of the Jew badge as taking place in France only about 1260. England was about the first country to enforce this measure. So the nonnullis could in fact have been limited to Alais and Arragon, where in the age-old fusion of Muslim and Christian culture such a custom could be expected, as it was in fact borrowed from the Muslims. In 1215 Muslims were mentioned for the first time in relation to illegitimate sexual intercourse with Christians, at a moment that is, when Muslim influence in Europe had been on the wane for at least two centuries. Why should such measures be taken at a moment when such intercourse was less and less likely to take place outside Iberia? Unless one assumes that the measure was also intended for those Muslim countries which were expected to be conquered in the new Crusade, and unless one assumes that a shrewd man like Innocent 111 had anticipated the pro-Muslim policy of Frederic 11, the question remains unanswerable.
A second interesting feature is the fact that extramarital sexual intercourse with infidels or pagans apparently is a worse sin than extramarital relations with co-religionists. This sounds very much like a pretext. In all probability the aim was to put a mark on the – as yet unconverted – infidels in the final victorious onslaught Innocent expected to take place soon. The early thirteenth century, after all, was a period in which expectations of an immediate *Parousia* were very much alive again. Finally, the interesting final justifying allusions to Mosaic Law needs some comment. It is clearly a reference to the *tsitsit*, blue tassels in the fringes on the borders of garments “that ye may look upon it and remember all the commandments of the Lord, and do them”. It can only be based on Numbers xv:37–41 and Deuteronomy xxii:12.

This need not necessarily be interpreted as proof that the measure was primarily aimed at Jews, though it fits into the anti-Judaistic tradition: every Old Testament text justifies Christian action. According to that same tradition, there is a difference, however, between Jews and Muslims. The latter are pure impostors, whereas the former are the malevolently blind, who in the end, however, shall be saved. At the end of time – and that was considered to be at hand – when Jews would come into their own again, the badge of the Jews, in this view, would become a badge of honor, whereas in the case of the Muslim usurpers who have to be crushed, it marks the victim.

It serves the purposes of stigmatization wondrously well. The very fact that God Himself had commanded the wearing of such an outward sign proves once again that everything goes according to the “divine plan” that was revealed in the priesthood of Melchizedek, who anticipated Christ. Moreover, it is an excellent way to visualize the *testimonium veritatis*: a badge of shame for the unconverted, a Mosaic badge of honor for the true believers, for that is what the chosen Jews still were when God commanded the wearing of it, and what they will be at the end of Time, than as followers of Jesus. Marking the infidel sufficiently explains the later sad history of the Jew badge, but does not deny that in origin the measure was aimed at the Muslims.

In the light of an original divine commandment of the badge, it is interesting to note, that after 1215, Old Testament heroes, Moses, Aaron, the prophets, and so forth were in medieval manuscripts frequently depicted as wearing the Jew hat. In their case, it was obviously not a mark of opprobrium, but it could reflect popular sentiment.

In many ways 1215 marked a watershed in the medieval Jewish-Gentile relations, or at least in the formal conditions meant to regulate them; it marked in more ways than one the deterioration of the Jewish position. The Jew
badge and its fatal consequences is but one aspect. Innocent III, in his purifying zeal, manifest in the Albigensian Crusade, changed the wording of the “Sicut Juaeis” bull of Calixtus II (1119-1124). This document aimed at protection of the Jews, highly necessary after the first crusade. Like Jews should not have the freedom to do in their synagogues more than the (Roman?) Law allows them, so should they suffer no impediments in all that the law permits. Particularly forced baptism are strictly forbidden. “Veram quippe Christianitatis fidei habere non creditor, qui ad Christianorum baptismum non spontaneus, sed invitus cognoscitur pervenire” (“Because he who is known to come to Christian baptism not of his free will, but by force, cannot be considered to have the true faith of a Christian”). 61

Innocent III slightly changed the wording, by adding that only those Jews would be protected, “qui nihil machinari praesumpserint in subversionem fidei Christianae”. 62 Because in his version punishment for Christian offenders against the ruling is somewhat milder than in that of his predecessors, there is a slight but unmistakable deterioration of the Jewish position foreshadowing the Counter-Reformation.

Indicative of a changed sentiment is also the admonishment to princes, the greatest profiteers of Jewish loans, to treat Christian debtors not too harshly. “Princibus autem injungimus, ut propter hoc non sint Christianis infesti, sed potius a tanto gravamine Judaeos student cohibere” (“The princes, however, we emphatically demand that they do not treat the Christians harshly on account of these loans, and that they rather seek to restrain the Jews from such exaction”).

Also indicative of a changed mood, of deterioration of relations, is perhaps the article concerning the better control of neophytes, referring to Leviticus xix 19, presumably inspired by fear of backsliding. 64

Far worse, however, were the unforeseen consequences of the adoption of the transubstantiation dogma by the fourth Lateran Council. Nobody at the time could predict that this dogma in relatively a short time would result in the popular accusation of desecration by Jews of the Host, and by implication in the notion of the magical poisoning of Christians by Jews.

Popular imagination, absurdly assuming that Jews believed in this dogma, held that Jews, by piercing the wafer, wanted to murder Christ again and again. A Host desecrated in this way was allegededly a main ingredient, next to the blood of a recently baptized child, in the preparation of the poison that caused the Black Death.

Finally, there is the question of the condemnation of the Talmud and other rabbinical writings, and its complex repercussions. In the West, the Paris
trial of 1240, when a Jewish renegade, Nicholas Donin, acted as a witness for the prosecution, started a chain of events that lasted till the Nazi-period, increasingly moving from anti-Judaism to anti-Semitism. In the course of time a great many copies of these writings were burned, held to be blasphemous, but another Christian tradition held that they should not be destroyed, for a distorted reading provided excellent means for slander. In the nineteenth century, those who for dogmatic reasons did not accept the then prevailing racial theories, found in the allegedly pernicious “Talmud morality”, means as effective as “race” to blame the Jews for all the social and economic ills of the time. On that basis the various “Christian Socialists” and the racists, holding it to epitomize race mentality, found a basis for cooperation.

That tradition really began with Raymond Martini’s “Pugio Fidei” (the “Dagger of Faith”) of 1278; Martini argued that Jews used the Talmud to falsely interpret all the Old Testament texts that announce Jesus as the messiah. It is the great obstacle to the conversion of the Jews. It was, however, only in the sixteenth century, after the invention of the printing press and after the Renaissance revival of Hebrew studies among non-Jews like Reuchlin, that the anti-Talmudic tradition acquired momentum. Outstanding in the series of compilations was Johannes Eisenmenger’s Entdecktes Judenthum of 1711, that served as an example for Augustus Rohling’s Der Talmud Jude. Eisenmenger’s book started the revival in Central and Western Europe of the ritual murder story, beginning with the notorious Tisza-Eszlar affair of 1882, the alleged “murder” of a 14-year-old girl, Esther Solymossi. Rohling had offered himself as witness for the prosecution, being prepared to declare on oath that the Talmud commanded the use of “Christian blood”. The book continued to play a nefarious role; the leading anti-Semite, E. Drumont, for one, knew and used it, despite the fact that Rohling was exposed as a perjurer, and was made a laughingstock; having lost his chair as professor of Hebrew Antiquities at the Karl Ferdinand University of Prague, he ended up somewhere obscure in Latin America. The poison stayed, responsible for a series of ritual murder accusations, inter alia the Hilsner case, Konitz, Xanthen, and for attacks in that vein in Der Stürmer.

It could be surmised that the origin of this slanderous tradition, was the anti-Talmudic campaign of some friars, who indeed were directly responsible for the notorious Trent ritual murder case of 1475, the Franciscan Bernardino da Feltre inciting the people. It was the first instance of a ritual murder affair, where after long hesitation, the Curia gave in to popular pressure. After almost a century Gregory xiii, at the height of Counter-Reformational reaction, and even then reluctantly, canonized Simon of Trent. (The canonization was revoked in 1961).
Was this the beginning of a new tradition? At this junction it is appropriate to discuss the fascinating thesis of Jeremy Cohen, on the attack on the religio licita concept by the mendicant orders. His main concept is, that beginning with the Fourth Lateran Council and the attack on heresies, a new spirit pervaded Catholic theology, the gist of which was an exclusivist spirit of Christian unity, Corpus Christi, which came to imply that the religion of the Jews then living was a heresy and a seedbed for heresies. He holds the mendicant orders, Dominicans and Franciscans, urbanite and intellectual, social reformers and inquisitors, mainly responsible for this new spirit. In his view the older theology never did enter into discussion with actual living Jews – these did take place – but conceived of Jews in the Augustinian tradition as the people who, having failed in their duty, obstinately clung to the obsolete but nevertheless Divine Law. They were punished with the Diaspora, yet had, as Chosen People a rightful existence in Christendom. Their religion was a religio licita. With the attack on the Talmud in 1240 in Paris, initiated by the convert Donin, or perhaps earlier, the idea arose that Jews by no means adhered to an obsolete but legitimate religion, but that their religion based on the Talmud was essentially unbiblical, and therefore, as willful deviation from revealed truth, heretical. Consequently it was held that the Jews no longer had a legitimate right to exist as Jews, and that the Church had the right, nay the duty, to interfere in their affairs, as it did in the debate on Maimonides. Cohen interprets Innocent’s changing of the wording of the Sicut Judaeis – protection, provided they do not try subversive acts against the Christian faith – in this light. He emphasizes the activities of a certain Bernard Gui who continued to attack Judaism, in order totally to eradicate it, even when there were no Jews left in the France he knew. He quotes Berthold von Regensburg as saying that Jews are in league with the Devil, and “It is bad that they live”. The founding of monti di pietà was in his view just as much an attempt to eradicate Judaism by economic means as a sincere effort to help the poor.

Cohen very cleverly uses the contemporary resistance of the secular clergy against these very Friars to substantiate his thesis. He shows how the main objection was that the Friars were guilty of innovatio, or in others words that their basic tenets were not scriptural, and concludes thereby that thirteenth-century religious sentiment obviously rejected everything that was not scriptural, and thus by implication the Talmud and its adherents. He concludes:

The intellectual and spiritual climate of thirteenth-century Europe, ingrained with the notion of Christian unity, made the time
ripe for a new exclusionist attitude towards the Jews. The monarchic Papacy assumed the right of intervention in the internal doctrinal affairs of the Jewish community. Canonists began to claim direct ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Jews. And as R.W. Southern has noted, the general religious enthusiasm of the time gave “specious justification” for the people of Europe to inflict violence upon the Jews.  

This penetrating analysis worked wherever the soil was already plowed for the sowing of this new clerical hatred, but not in Italy, as will be shown in its proper context. It is no coincidence that Trachtenberg’s evidence for demonstrating the late medieval diabolizing of the Jews, stems mostly from Transalpine, particularly German, regions: German because that was the area where the new propaganda had full force, Jews having been, or about to be expelled from the other areas before it came to full development. In this, Italy is not only the geographical region, but includes the Vatican. It may be true that the 4th Lateran Council, at the zenith of papal ascendency, introduced a new severity. There is an unmistakable difference in tone, resulting in an unmistakable deterioration of the Jewish position. But that severity was not innovative, but rather due to the fact that the Council so to speak codified all the existing rules. Apart from the Jew badge, it passed several other measures interfering with the life of the Jews. To a large extent, however, they were reiterations of older canons. The rule that tithes had to be paid on formerly Christian owned land, “ut sic ecclesias conserventur indemnes” (“so that the Church suffers no harm”) – implicitly acknowledging that Jews could have legal title to immovable property – dated back to 1068. Prohibition of offices was already promulgated in the *Codex Theodosii* and repeated ever since; the text refers to the Third Council of Toledo in 589. The rule that Jews should stay indoors during Holy Week was also of very old standing, promulgated for the first time in 538. New perhaps were the rulings about immoderate interest which were, however, by no means a prohibition of usury for Jews. Princes, who were the greatest profiteers of Jewish loans, rather than Jews, were admonished: “From princes, however, we emphatically demand that they do not treat the Christians harshly on account of these (loans) and that they rather seek to restrain the Jews from severe exactions.” The ruling that Crusaders were entitled to remittance of usurious interest was affecting Jews. Perhaps indicative of harsher times is the article concerning the better control of neophytes, referring to Leviticus xix 19, fear of backsliding or of Judaizing:  

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Indicative, as signs of foreboding evil, were also the obligation to listen to conversionist sermons, introduced by Nicholas I (1277-1280), but later more severely enforced, and the obligation to contribute to the upkeep of the houses of catechumens.

Severity there was, but no condoning of the campaign of the friars. Paul II intervened on behalf of the Jews, at their request. He ordered the governments to respect the Jews: “Usque at prefinitum tempus suorum capitalorum” (“until the ordained time, when they shall come into their own again”). 86 Typical is the Papal admonition: “Predicatores admonete ut peccata regarduant et exterminent, Judaeos autem permittant suo more vivere, qui etiam secundum leges nostras tollerantur inter Christianos” (“Admonish preachers to consider and exterminate sins, but to let Jews live according to their customs, Jews who, also in accordance with our laws, should be tolerated among Christians”). 87

A curious Jewish comment on Papal policy is the legend of Pope Elhanan, the son of a Mainz rabbi who, kidnapped in early youth, was reared in the Christian faith and was elected Pope because of his great talents. Having become aware of his Jewish descent, and desirous of seeing his father, he ordered all the bishops throughout Christendom to prohibit all manifestations of the Jewish religion, reasoning that Mainz Jews would send his father to Rome to plead for them. So it happened. When father and son were alone, the Pope told the truth, and asked his father’s forgiveness, for having been so long in error. It was gladly given, the son abrogated his decree, and then reverted to the faith of his ancestors. 88

The story is revealing. On the one hand it is a clear manifestation of a certain wishful thinking on the part of the oppressed German Jews having for once the upper hand over vexatious Christianity; on the other hand it shows how in times of distress it was natural for the Jews to appeal to the Pope. “Lacrimabilem Judaeorum Alemaniae recipimus questionem” was the phrase used. 89 In the story, Roman Jews express their utter amazement over the Pope’s decree, saying that it was probably an invention of the bishop of Mainz, and thus the legend seems to convey the idea that the bishop of Rome is unlike other bishops.

It may well be that the friars, wedded to poverty as they were, resented the new economic development, and its usurious aspects. The monte di pietà were therefore presumably not only attempts to help the poor, a social reform, but just as much, as J. Cohen argues, an attempt to eliminate the Jews. The attack on the Talmud was then an excellent argument to deny the legality of the Jews’ existence, it came in very handy. If that is so, the action of the
mendicant orders, as well as its not being taken over by the highest authorities, is in itself a confirmation of the Dead Reckoning, rather than a refutation: noncanonical innovation inspired by economic development.

It is in fact not very likely that the Talmud was only detected in 1240, after Donin’s denunciation. The Vatican, before 1054, and certainly before the coronation of Charlemagne in 800, was looking to the East, many earlier popes being Greeks. From 654 to 752 only five out of seventeen popes were of Roman origin. It must therefore have known about the Talmud, “Deuteronomy”, as rabbinical writings were called in Constantinople. There it was expressis verbis stipulated that Jewish neophytes had to forswear it. In the Byzantine Empire, moreover, Karaites, a Jewish sect that did not recognize the Talmud as authoritative, were given a privileged position, a tradition maintained in Tsarist Russia: the Karaites of the Crimea were legally not Jews, discriminatory legislation did not apply to them. In Constantinople knowledge about the Talmud was, however, never used to declare Judaism “unbiblical” – religio licita was not under attack.

This hopefully exhaustive overview of the main problems besetting the medieval Roman Catholic Church, clarifies that, when it formulated canonical concepts specifically dealing with Jews and Judaism, it did not go beyond the consensus established by the early Church, and used that as a standard for weighing pronouncements on the unforeseen innovations necessitated by changing circumstances. This, in fact, justifies the assumption that it was an independent variable, the primary force that sets everything else in motion. Christian theology, in its anti-Judaism, drew the sign of Cain on the forehead of the Jews.

In fact, identification of the Jew with Cain was a medieval literary motif, as is evident, for example from the rhymed Bible by the Flemish poet Jacob van Maerlandt, According to him, circumcision was the mark of Cain of the Jews.

The causative rejection is a mixture of censure and prejudice. That those who shouted “Barrabas” in answer to Pilate’s pertinent question, are identical to all Jews, is gainsaid by Mark xiv, 2 and Luke xxiii, 27. The argument was that, by adhering to Judaism, Jews signified that they accepted as just the verdict of those who wanted Jesus crucified. It is curious to note that it was hardly ever admitted (Dante was an exception), that Jews and Romans, according to the very essence of Christian teaching, were merely instrumental in fulfilling the divine will; it is the same as blaming the stick when somebody hits you. There were prejudicial statements: the self-fulfilling notion that Jewish misery was a testimonium veritatis fidei Christianae, the idea of Jewish

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slavery, and the conviction that Jews had lost the rights to their own sacred writings, were willfully blind, and so forth. The censorious element, a precisely articulated set of doctrines on the relation between God and His people, who were the Chosen, and would again be recognized as such in the future, implemented a certain restraint.

Whereas prejudice is usually a self-sustaining and even self-enhancing process because of the need of increasing rationalization of ensuing behavior, this was as little (or less) the case in the Latin Church as in Greek Orthodoxy.

It is precisely this restraint, which caused the primary rejection to be a variable, despite its constancy, for, depending on the circumstances it could be exhortative, or even inciting against Jews, but just as well protective by combating noncanonical views; to the ones mentioned could be added the feotor Judaicus, the Jewish stench, the belief that the Antichrist would be born of a Jewish prostitute, Jews conspiring with Muslims, Tatars, lepers, and witches, Jews as sorcerers and poisoners and so forth.

As long as social relations between Jews and Christian laymen were good, Churchmen, afraid of Judaizing, would seek to isolate them by blackening them as Chrysostom had done. Popes would write letters, complaining of the fact that Jews and Christians together worked the fields, keeping the sabbath and violating the Christian sunday. There were warnings against consulting Jewish physicians. There would be prohibitions of intermarriage, of course, but also of cohabitation and commensalism; if Jews reject the food of Christians, these should reject the drink and food of Jews. Jews were ordered to stay indoors during Holy Week, and the faithful were told not to kneel on Good Friday when the prayer “Et oremus per perfidis Judaeis” was said, in contradistinction to all other special prayers of that day, so as fully to inculcate the Jewish abomination commemorated that day. But when the populace independently began to draw wrong conclusions from those warnings, there was a volte-face. The Church not only never condoned them, but even did its utmost best to combat them. It presumably failed to do so effectively precisely because there were the sociological feedback processes from the other variables over which the Church had no control; even though by censoriously drawing attention to the Jews, it provided conditions favoring the development of those processes.

Substantiation of this notion however, is hampered by a complicating feature: the indissoluble intertwining of “pure” Church policy and the more secular Ecclesiastical State policy, part and parcel of the intricacies of medieval Italian political life. Political or financial considerations often interfered with
purely canonical ones, as well as, of course, ordinary incompetence or malevolence of individual, only too human Popes. Bishops all over Europe, either as secular princes or as officials invested with secular powers, being administrators, had to pay heed to other than purely theological considerations.

The attacking and protecting principles are already evident in the famous ruling of Gregory the Great (590–604): Just as license must not be granted to the Jews to presume to do in their synagogues more than the law allows them, so they should not suffer curtailments in that which has been conceded to them as adherents of a *religio licita*. The principle was repeated in almost the same wording after the horror of the massacres of the Crusades, by Calixtus III in 1120 in the *Constitutio pro Judaeis* and in the frequently reissued bull “Sicut Judaeis”96 reiterated whenever a massacre or other form of persecution took place. While defending the Jews, these papal bulls and letters were not a whit less censorious.97

“Sicut Judaeis” is, indeed, a very good example. The oldest known version is that of Alexander III (1119–1124). The preamble leaves no doubt:

Sicut Judaeis non debet esse licentia, ultra quam permissum est lege in synagogis suis resumere, ita in eis, quae concessa sunt, nullum debent praecipuum sustener. Nos ergo, cum in sua magis velint duritia permanere, quam prophetarum verba arcana cognoscere atque Christianae fidei et salutatis notitiam habere, quia tamen defensionem et auxilium nostrum postulant, ex Christianae pietatis (...) ipsorum petitiones admittimus eisque protectionis nostrae clypeum indulgimus.

(Just as licence must not be granted to the Jews to do in their synagogues more than the law permits, so they should not suffer curtailments in that which is conceded to them. Although they persist in their obstinacy rather than acknowledge the arcane words of the prophets and to obtain insight into the Christian faith and its message of salvation, and yet demand to be defended and protected by us, we therefore, out of Christian charity grant their requests and allow them the shield of our protection.)

He then continues by prohibiting forced baptisms, threats to life, limb, and property, disturbance of Jewish ceremonies, and desecration of Jewish cemeteries. This was the model, as has been indicated, for a great many almost identical documents for the next four hundred years.98

The *testimonium veritatis* argument is frequently used in the protective

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letters in a censorious sense. So, for example in a letter by Martin v in 1429 defending the Jews against incitations by the mendicant orders: “Quamquam Judaei, quos in diversis mundis partibus constitutos sacrosancta tolerat ecclesia in testimonium Jesu Christi, in sua magis velint duritia et caecitate perdurare, quam prophetarum verba et sanctarum scripturam arcana cognoscere...” (“Although the Jews, whom the Holy Church allows to settle in various parts of the world as witnesses of Jesus Christ, persist in their obstinacy and blindness, rather than to acknowledge the words of the prophets and the Holy Scripture...”). (Only Christians correctly interpret the Old Testament texts!) and yet, as Innocent iv, like so many others formulated in 1247: “Nolentes igitur, prefatos Judaeis injuste vexari, quorum conversionem dominus miseratus expectat...” (“We do not want these Jews, whose conversion our merciful Lord awaits, to be wrongly vexed”).

When, however, by way of exception, there was no particular need for protection and when the Jews behaved “uppity”, in the eyes of some high ecclesiastical dignitary, he would lash out at them. Nicholas v, for example, disturbed in Italy by the “arrogance” of Jews and Saracens, detrimental to the Christian faith, revoked in 1450 all the privileges given to the Jews (“in maximum Christianae vilipendium (...) animarum iacturam.”) The letter reads, seemingly anachronistically, as if it were a fifth or sixth century document, rather than one of the fifteenth century, in its emphasis that Christians should have no social intercourse with Jews, and should not pay any service to them. Jews were not allowed to build new synagogues, a measure not enforced for centuries, for how else could there have been synagogues in England, Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and so on. No Christian should accept medicine from Jews, contrary to a traditional policy that Jewish physicians were given special privileges and even were exempt from wearing the Jewish badge in the Ecclesiastical State, and emphatically allowed to treat Christian patients. The more or less forgotten rule that Jews should stay indoors during Holy Week was reinforced. Christians were forbidden to light fires for Jews on the sabbath or bake bread for them: a ruling sharply contradictory to papal admonishments of that period to the mendicant orders not to incite people against the Jews, and not to prevent them from precisely those activities. The whole epistle is completely deviant from the bull Sicut Judaeis of Calixtus ii in 1119, reissued dozens of times ever since in almost the same wording. It is contrary to traditional papal policy. Perhaps the letter merely reflects the antiquarian interests of the former librarian of Cosimo de Medici, and the founder of the Vatican Library. In the second half of the fifteenth century, apart from Granada, Muslim influence in Europe had dwin-
The doctrine, whether offensively or protectively used, was sufficiently hostile to allow laymen, not well versed in theological subtleties, to draw their own conclusions.

The censorious attitude is obvious in the reply, standardized since Innocent I (1130-1143), to the offering of a Torah scroll by the Jewish community at the consecration ceremony of a newly elected Pope:

“We praise and revere the holy Law, for that it was given to your fathers by almighty God through Moses. Your religious practices, however, and your worthless explanations we condemn. For the redeemer for whom you wait in vain has long since come, according to the teachings of our apostolic faith: our Lord Jesus Christ, who dwells with the Father and the Holy Ghost and reigns as God, from generation to generation.”

The new Pope then promised protection, but did not mind the Roman population having its “fun” with the Jews, sack cloth races at Carnival time. It cost lives! Given the doctrinal aspect, there is every reason to suppose that either the Cluniac reform or the emergence of the mendicant orders, or any other form of religious revivalism, up to the Reformation, has contributed to widen the rift between Jews and Christians.

A consistent development of doctrine is not falsified by the somewhat peculiar and exceptional events in Gothic Spain. The reason why the Gothic kings, in contradistinction to other Germanic rulers, fairly systematically attempted persecution of Jews after Reccared’s renunciation of Arianism and conversion to Catholicism in 587, is difficult to explain. In 613 Sisebut, against the strong opposition of Isidore of Seville, ordered mass conversion or expulsion, with expropriation probably as his main motive. Despite the fact that the fourth Council of Toledo in 633 and the sixth Council of Toledo expressis verbis forbade compulsory conversion, Recesswinth, after a milder interlude during the reigns of Swinthila and Chindaswinth (641-649), was again very intolerant, only accepting the rules of the councils pro forma but in fact harassing the Jews as much as he possibly could by prohibiting circumcision, the celebration of the feasts, the keeping of the sabbath, and so on. Erwig returned once more to a policy of forced conversion, once more against the express wishes of Church authorities. Royal policy, moreover, often met with failure because Jews could easily bribe nobles and clergy. And so, in 693, Egica adopted the policy of forcing the Jews of the realm to sell their land and other immovables at a fixed price.

The series of events in Gothic Spain is indeed one long, sad story of violence and persecution, foreshadowing events which would take place some eight centuries later, complete with the suspicion of forced converts and a
well-developed spying system, which even called for fining the person who failed to report when he had detected persons secretly practicing Jewish rites. The *Breviarum Alerici*, in contradistinction to the *Codex Theodosii*, did not allow proselytes to return to Judaism, which elsewhere only became rule in a much later period. In Spain Jews could not testify against Christians. Nothing of the kind existed in contemporary Gaul or Italy, as will be shown.

The question why conditions in Spain were so different (not necessarily with the consent of the subjected lay masses) is interesting enough, would require a good deal of further research into the economic and social conditions of Gothic Spain (greed presumably being the main motive of these none too powerful kings), but from the point of view of economy of research there is no reason, within the purpose of this book, to enter into that matter. With the Muslim conquest by the Berber Tariq ibn Ziyad in the year 711, who was without a doubt helped by Jews wherever and whenever they could, conditions changed so drastically that the Spanish scene has become irrelevant for the understanding of the growth of anti-Jewish stereotypes in Latin Christendom. This is true even if one allows for the possibility that Visigothic legislation somehow influenced the policy of Spanish kings many centuries later; when one assumes, in other words, that there was legislative continuity in the scattered remains of the former Gothic Christian kingdom, and in the kingdoms of the Reconquista. That may or may not be so, but whatever the answer, it was not the Church which was directly responsible for the events in seventh-century Spain. Consequently, these events, do not argue against ecclesiastical consistency.

The objection seems valid, but apparently it is not. In so far as they were obedient children of the Church, laymen must have been able to distinguish between the person and his office, grace working through unworthy vessels. And even when they were not fully obedient, this did not prevent them from hating the Jews; as noted above, the greater the sinner, the greater the Jew-hater.

Apart from ordinary sin, there is indeed reason to assume that popular religiosity deviated from a dogmatically pure Christian “symbolic universe”. There were the many heresies and chiliastic movements, often protests against wealth and splendor, and ill-gotten riches, but as indicated, these were as a rule not a whit less anti-Jewish than the official religion, presumably even more so. Jews were denounced as the mammonist helpers of greedy bishops, abbots and princes.

There were in popular religion all sorts of substrata of paganism, but that did not help the Jews either. It could perhaps even be argued that a semi-pa-
gan outlook objecting to a strict Jewish monotheism, added fuel to the fire. Be that as it may, there is absolutely no reason to assume that a “pagan” devotion had a mitigating effect. An older theory, which interpreted persecution of witches as in fact being an out-and-out war against subterranean paganism, could have led to the assumption of some sort of victim solidarity. There is no evidence for such an assumption, even though there is a definite link between the witchcraft delusion, and the full diabolizing of the Jews in the latter Middle Ages. That link and the persecutions will have to be differently interpreted, as outcomes of the “persecuting society”, however that is interpreted. The witchcraft delusion was to a large extent a consequence of the campaign against heresy, as was the Friars’ denunciation of the Jews.

If in this way, in the daily experience of the common people, the teachings of the Church were far removed from the ethical values they were intended to be, but yet somehow penetrated in the end, then the evil life of some clergymen, not diminishing their magical propensities, was no reason not to accept them, the way they understood them. Condemnation of clerical abuses, was more a form of anticlericalism, less subtle than that of Dante, than a rejection of the articles of faith.

Obviously, the magical view of uneducated people was not the only concept; they could be massively moved by a Peter the Hermit, by a Francis of Assisi, by a Savonarola, but such religious enthusiasm as these preachers evoked, was out of the ordinary, not part of their daily, drab existence.

All this goes to surmise the very relativity of theological indoctrination. It did presumably not matter all that much in what precise and reserved terms the Church articulated its rejection of Jews, which the illiterate great majority of the people could not read anyhow, as long as people understood it in their own way, under the impact of the changing conditions of their lives. It had not always been like that. In 306 the Council of Elvira forbade Christians to have their crops blessed by Jews. The blessing too, was presumably thought to be magic. At that time, there being no social distance as yet, the “magician” had not yet developed into the enemy-magician. As Langmuir wrote: “The existence of the doctrine is a very insufficient explanation for the treatment of the Jews”, but it was a necessary condition, to set the other aspects in motion.

Langmuir later elaborated this view in his History, Religion and Anti-Semitism, a very comprehensive study of the diverse relations between religion and religiosity when they foster anti-Semitic attitudes. Since it raises the question whether there are discrepancies between his views and the ideas developed in this chapter, which could prove fatal for the latter, it is worthwhile...
examining the ideas a little further. Langmuir’s study made me realize that I
had possibly evaded the thorny question of religion in relation to the emer-
gence of anti-Semitism, by using the – in principle – religiously neutral con-
cepts of secession friction, stigmatization, social distance, labelled interac-
tion, and terrorization. Even though the phraseology of the originating
stigmatization as a necessary condition was purely religious, the structure of
the ensuing conflict was rightly or wrongly depicted as social, rather than reli-
gious, meaning that, had the originating issues been ethnic, political, nation-
alist, socialist, or of any other ideological nature, there could have been com-
parable secession friction, with the secessionists accusing the remainder of
being willfully unfaithful to their own creed, and with an identical lending of
authority to all the elements of the once common ideology or creed not in
dispute. There would have been a comparable stigmatization. Is then the reli-
gious nature of the originating conflict accidental? A specifically religious ex-
ample of a “covering law” of a secessionist type of conflict?

It is not accidental, when historically it is plausible or even certain, that the
originating conflict could not but be religious. Since Jewry conceived of its
ethnicity in religious terms – that is, encompassing all those who belonged to
the people of the Covenant – a secessionist conflict could not but be articulat-
ed in religious terms. Such articulation, however, deals rather with doctrine
than with the way illiterate common people accepted doctrine in a rather dis-
torted way. Here Langmuir’s distinction between religion and religiosity is
useful.

One of Langmuir’s aims is to remove from the discussion of the religious
roots of anti-Semitism, the self-exonerating or reversedly self-accusing bias
of believers, Jews and Christians alike. He has particularly in mind the self-ac-
cusatory tendencies of Christian authors after 1945, wrestling with the prob-
lem of the responsibility of Christianity as such, for Auschwitz. It should be
noted that such confessions of guilt sometimes produce such a good feeling
that it can lend them a rather hollow ring. Attempts at exoneration can have
the same effect. Langmuir’s attempt at limiting the discussion to rational em-
piricism is therefore entirely justified.

In order to achieve this he makes a distinction between religion and reli-
giosity, defining religion as “those elements of religiosity that are explicitly
prescribed by people exercising authority over other people.”109 He defines
religiosity as “the salient patterns or structures according to which the indi-
vidual human organism consciously correlates all the diverse processes oc-
curring within the organism with those that surround and impinge on it in
order to develop, maintain, and ensure the coherence and continuity of the
distinctive elements of its identity”. If I understand him rightly, religiosity is the non-rational way in which the individual comes to terms with total reality as he perceives it, apart from the rational way he comes to terms with part of that reality. This could imply that the believer does not accept all the tenets of his religion, without his being aware of the discrepancy. There is so much that he does accept, that one or two deviances do not cause him to withhold his sincere allegiance. Matters become problematic the moment the formal adherent is painfully aware of the discrepancies, and not willing to abnegate for social or other reasons. In the Middle Ages it was virtually impossible to leave the Church, if one did not want to run the risk of being accused of heresy. In such a situation one can only opt for irrational ways to solve the problem, that is, ways contrary to rational empiricism. Langmuir has the fascinating idea of explaining why Jews were accused of desecration of the Host, with the intention of “killing” Jesus again, by suggesting that Church members doubted the truth of the transubstantiation dogma. But when even Jews evidently accept it, there is no reason not to accept it. I am not sure whether this is necessarily the only explanation, for, as mentioned earlier, a magical interpretation of transubstantiation, of the Host as an amulet, or as the means of magical powers to make unlikely things come true, can imply that the enemy magician uses it for his own evil ends, irrespective of whether it is likely that this enemy believes in transubstantiation. Both interpretations, however, share the irrational.

Continuing his argument, Langmuir states that religiosity and the corresponding religion itself can be irrational, when the latter is a kind of formalization of the former, constructed against all evidence to the contrary, without paying heed to rational deliberation. An example of this is the National Socialist “pseudo-religious” faith in Aryan superiority, which creates a chimical “Jewishness” or “Gypsyism”, contrary to all normal observation of the normal humanity of Jews and Gypsies, justifying their being killed. As an aside, it could be stated that, as Karen Armstrong emphasizes, this can be a characteristic of all monotheistic religions. All had a marked tendency to eliminate the nonbelievers, though Judaism perhaps to a lesser degree by its acceptance of the metuentes, and its “Noachidian” Laws. “Nulla salus extra Ecclesiam” occasionally justified the persecution of heretics, and a deserved death for unconvertible pagans and Muslims. Conversion by fire or the sword. In Islam, “Kaffirs” deserve death.

However capably Langmuir is fitting in Nazi “pseudo-religion” in his concept of religiosiy and religion, I am not entirely convinced. One objection could be that in this way everything becomes “religious”; the murder of the
Kulakki, an outcome of the “pseudo-religion” of Stalinist communism; ethnic purification, the outcome of the “pseudo-religion” of nationalism, and so forth, making “religion” a cover-all term, covering both Christianity and violent anti-Christianity. Secondly, I am not certain whether all the worst Nazi criminals believed in the “divinity” of the Aryan race; as people who normally do not read much, most had presumably never heard of it. A long tradition of secular post-emancipatory anti-Semitism may have caused them to believe in the Jew as the embodiment of all social evil. A Nazi religiosity, not accepting the whole creed, may have made them outwardly conform to the “religion” of the leadership, without fully accepting it. A now socially acceptable ordinary criminality may have been at play. When, in the us, according to the Southern myth, black slaves were sweet, friendly, docile creatures, who after emancipation, lacking white guidance, became savage beasts, there does not seem to be any pseudo-religious concept of “blacks” at play, just elementary hatred and fear.

After all, the race concept in the nineteenth century had become a convenient way of singling out the enemy, when after the emancipation it was no longer clear who was a Jew and who was not; the assimilated Jew, the “Reform Jew”, the “non-Jewish Jew” and their descendants, who often had hardly any ties with Judaism, even less than the ties which a baptized Disraeli or Heine still had. This happened at a time when, in the pre-Mendelian confusion of materialism, many serious scientists, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, without being “racist” believed in “race” and the somatic determination of human behavior; among them Darwin, Renan, Lombroso, Gumpolowitz, and a host of others. Whoever denied the “Adamic” concept of human descent – Man created in the image of God – ran the risk of falling into the trap of race distinction, before modern genetics proved the untenability of such a view. “Race” was in!

Finally, it should perhaps be mentioned, that even to the most vicious anti-Semites of Imperial Germany, Marr, Dühring, Fritsch, the “Aryan” concept was unknown. They acted according to another canon!

Surveying the whole issue, hopefully having done justice to Langmuir’s rich, profound, but difficult book, may I state that I do not see any great discrepancies. Langmuir has probably a better explanation for the medieval transition from anti-Judaism to anti-Semitism, which he places somewhere in the thirteenth century, although the concept “magical” religion seems to correspond largely with “irrational religiosity”; but my preference for using the somewhat-evasive “Jew-hatred” to a point obfuscates the issue. One wonders, however, where “Judeophobia”, the term preferred by Poliakov, begins.
It seems to be present in what I called the originating stigmatization, with prejudicial and censorious elements mixed.

It seems that Langmuir wants to avoid the use of the term prejudice, for which in another article he gives his reasons—certain intellectual standards of rationality not generally applicable—but “unverified, unverifiable, or manifestly wrong opinions (see above) are not far removed from irrationally refusing to accept evidence”. Could there be any discrepancies in other aspects of the problem? Considering that Langmuir explicitly and implicitly recognizes that social change and social conditions are explanatory factors for irrationality, becoming mass phenomena, there do not seem to be any such discrepancies there. The two approaches supplement each other. After all, social distance and labelled interaction, making corrective evidence inoperative, will foster irrationality. The same goes for the fear that the violence of terrorizing fanatics instill in the more neutral, forcing them to think up irrational justifications and exonerations for their action of now hunting with the hounds. These rationalizations can very well be conceived of as elements of their religiosity, because their permanent character determines future behavior.

In conclusion it may be surmised that Langmuir’s interpretation is totally encompassed in the interpretative scheme developed in this chapter, and is not to be contested. There do not seem to be contradictions, but I venture to suggest that the scheme of the dead reckoning is a theory of a somewhat wider range, which for that reason should not be dismissed. On the contrary, when two theories are able to explain a certain range of events, in the sense of prediction, but one of them has the bonus of an explanatory capacity for other events as well, the latter, as a theory of wider range, should be preferred. A theory of a “genealogy of stereotypes”, arriving at an almost identical interpretation of medieval anti-Semitism, has a rather better chance of explaining modern, and in particular nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments.

One could think for example of the decidedly anti-Christian varieties of anti-Semitism, a tradition which began with Voltaire, but is manifest in the social protest of say Gustave Tridon, Eugen Dühring, of the Nazis for that matter, or in the neo-paganism of a Georg von Schönerer. They all had this in common (along with Hitler, when he declared that conscience was a Jewish invention): they considered Christianity to be the utterly condemnable offshoot of a pernicious Jewish mentality, conceived of and described in terms of stereotypes developed in the past. They all shared with their spiritual ancestors the notion of an utter rejection of Jews and Judaism, even to their
physical elimination, from as early as 1096, to be a way of formulating an ideology aimed at changing the existing social order; in all cases an ideology irrationally at odds with observable reality. Medieval, early modern, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century anti-Semites all seem to share Ranulf’s “disinterested tendency to inflict punishment” on newly created “middle classes”, as Ranulf sees them.\(^{119}\) Full acceptance of Langmuir’s views does not seem to provide an obstacle to further proceeding down the road chosen in this chapter.
The writing of a survey of Anglo-Jewish history, in particular a survey of Jewish-Gentile relations in medieval England, is made difficult by the relative abundance of information, rather than by the absence thereof, as is frequently the case in other areas. There is a good deal of excellent literature on the subject, but much of it is written from the point of view of medievalists’ interests in a particular period of English history and English political institutions, for example, money as a source of royal power, or the role money lending played in the redistribution of land rather than as a mere step in the unfolding of a 2000-year-old drama.

In the beginning, Jewish-Gentile relations were either not very spectacular or information about them has been lost. It is not likely, however, that Jews were immediately very much in the public eye, as at first there were only a few Jews permanently settled in England and most of them continued to operate from Normandy. Free exchange and travel between England and Normandy was lost. What does, however, seem to be firmly established is that right from the beginning Jews were primarily engaged as moneylenders, although throughout Anglo-Jewish history before the expulsion there were a few exceptions, such as physicians, cheesemongers, fishmongers, silversmiths and goldsmiths, and wool merchants.

Their being engaged as moneylenders does not mean to say that every single Jew was a private banker. Many, or most, Jews, of poor or modest means, acted as agents for a few wealthy lenders operating on a large scale, though there may have been, of course, a number of small lenders, who made small advances to poor people in a desperate situation. There were, indeed, some Jews who acquired immense fortunes, as, for example, the well-known Aaron of Lincoln, depicted in a contemporary popular drawing as filius Diaboli. The property of this Aaron, escheated to the Crown after his death as scaccarium Aaronis, constituted a separate but considerable branch of the royal treasury. Wealthy Jews – for extra protection? – were, apart from the nobility, the earliest known owners of stone houses, some of which have survived.
A peculiarity of the medieval Jewish community in England and at the same time an indication of their separateness, of the sui generis character of their social, legal, and economic position, is the fact that Jewish women were much more “emancipated” than their Christian sisters. Whereas the latter were completely subjected to male domination in a very masculine world, the sources frequently mention Jewish women in business, either as independent entrepreneurs or as the heirs of their husband’s business. There is no direct evidence of outspoken animosity towards Jews during the first decennia after the Norman conquest. Persecution in Rouen in 1066 and the fateful year 1096 did not have any repercussions in England. Royal exactions were not too heavy at first. King William Rufus greatly promoted the Jews, realizing fully where his own advantage lay. His indifference to religious or theological disputes is indicated by the fact that he is reported to have said in jest that if the Jews could convince him of the truth of their religion, he would embrace Judaism, and, more significantly, that he allowed, against the explicit rulings of canonical law, the remorseful-coerced?-converts to Christianity to return to their old faith. Conversion by means of violence during this period is mere conjecture since there is no evidence to substantiate it; there is no need to assume that it was necessarily through violence that converts were made, but neither is there any reason to exclude that possibility, even though the higher clergy was certainly not promoting it, in compliance with the well established principles of the Church. The learned Anselm, at least, archbishop of Canterbury, Italian by birth, if he may be held to be representative, disputed with Jews in a most friendly manner. “He often came to me as a friend”, he writes about a certain Jew, or “his objections were consequent and logical”. One of these friends was converted and became a monk. But then what does it mean when he admonishes the faithful to be as kind and helpful as possible to a converted Jew? Was this mere Christian charity, or was he inspired to this action because there were already dark suspicions among the populace about the wickedness of the Jews. This might be concluded from Philip de Thaun’s Bestiary (1120) where the Jews are owls: “They deserted God, and this they did inversely as the owl flies inversely, that bird of the night which for bodes evil.”

The evidence for the first fifty years is not conclusive as far as a widespread animosity towards Jews is concerned, but about their separate position there can be no doubt. The Jews’ legal status was determined in a charter of Henry I (itself lost, but frequently referred to and quoted in later documents). It gave them complete liberty of movement, relief from ordinary tolls, protection against misuse – why was this clause held to be necessary? – free recourse to
royal justice and responsibility to no other authority, and permission to retain land in pledge. These privileges, which made Jews completely dependent on royal favor, were repeatedly renewed, but at an even higher price! They illustrate the Jews’ dependence on royal power which could at will be used against them, and the hazardousness of their position.

The boundaries of royal power always worked against the Jews for the simple reason that if the king was unpopular, dislike of him was quite likely to spread to the Jews as his instrument of oppression, and if the king did not have the effective means to prevent that, Jews would be victimized. The net effect of this situation was that powerlessness of the Crown, for example, in King John’s reign, could be just as detrimental as very effective royal power when it was ill-disposed to Jews, as was frequently the case in the thirteenth century. It made Jewish life very much of a gamble, until when the lemon was squeezed completely dry and the Jews were no longer of any use to royal financiers, they were finally expelled.

The popular animosity, counterbalanced to some extent by unmistakable evidence of friendly relations, was not necessarily a direct function of the lender-borrower relationship, as has been frequently assumed. That is too facile. The majority of the borrowers was not the common people, although, as mentioned above, there may have been some small fry among them, but mostly the nobility, the gentry, the secular and, particularly the regular clergy.

It may, however, be true that the commoners felt the pinch indirectly, in so far as the noble and clerical debtors are quite likely to have tried to raise their exactions, their feudal dues, as much as they could in order to be able to pay off their debts. It is not unlikely that for these and other reasons large sections of these common masses could at all times be mobilized. Since debtors’ interests clashed with royal interests, the Crown being the greatest profiteer from Jewish money lending, it may be taken for granted that a general theme throughout English medieval Jewish-Gentile relations is that any form of rebellion, any form of opposition to royal power was accompanied by anti-Jewish actions. The events at Runnymede, for example, and the tenth and eleventh clauses of the Magna Carta, later abolished, are a clear illustration of that theme.

Even though protection was effective and a good livelihood guaranteed throughout the reign of Henry I, which drew many immigrants, ominous signs began to appear. In 1130 a London riot started because of the rumor that Jews had caused the death of a sick man, in very much the same way as happened in Würzburg in 1147. In a theological dispute a Jew asked “if the Law should be kept, why do you treat those who keep it like dogs?” which
seems to indicate a growing animosity, as does the fact that it became customary during the twelfth century for Jews to betroth their daughters while still minors, against the rulings of the Talmud. The excuse was: “Because persecutions wax more frequently every day, and if a man can afford to give his daughter a dowry today, tomorrow he may not be able to do it.”

Far worse than anything preceding it was what happened in Norwich in 1144. Then and there started the myth which played havoc in Europe till the days of the Stürmer, the ritual murder charge. It originated in England; the first continental case was that of Blois in 1171 (not counting the Apion story).

In fact, this figment of the medieval popular imagination was in the late nineteenth century still strong enough to serve as detonator of the new nineteenth-century anti-Semitic movements, as is proved by the notorious Tisza-Eszlar Affair in Hungary and the repercussions it had in the Habsburg Empire, Germany, and France. It is this aspect which lends weight to this particular absurd charge, and which, therefore, needs further investigation.

In itself the charge, in its initial stages, is by no means very enigmatic. In many countries, in many diverse cultures, various groups were accused of such misdeemans. Christian missionaries were accused of such crimes in China, the French were accused of this abomination in Madagascar. There are many similar examples. In many cultures the idea that blood is thicker than water, a sort of identification of blood with life itself, has played havoc. One has only to think of the “blood brotherhood” as is found in many cultures—the drinking of each others’ blood to establish a relationship which is perhaps stronger than family ties. One has only to think of the Aztec sacrifices of human bodies to the Sun God, as a guarantee of life itself, and to similar, though to a lesser extent, human sacrifices among the Incas, where the heart blood of the victims was needed to appease the gods. All sorts of magical beliefs were attached to blood.

Carlo Levi relates in his book Christo si ferma a Eboli how in that small village in the south of Italy, where he was confined by the Fascist government, women in the 1930s still used menstrual blood to make love potions. Menstrual blood was until the eighteenth century considered to be an excellent medicine against all sorts of diseases. To quote a story which is very much akin to the ritual murder story is the legend that Emperor Constantine the Great was advised to bathe himself in children’s blood to cure himself of leprosy.

That Constantine had the reputation of being a leper is obvious from Dante. Margaret Murray frequently refers to blood sacrifices and to docu-
ments signed with blood in what she calls the “witch cult”. It is an open question whether, as her school claims, blood and bloody rites played such a tremendous role in the cult or whether that was so only in the imagination of the persecutors, but in both cases it illustrates the significance attached to blood.

Our common parlance, unscientific as it may be, about “blood relations”, “blue blood”, and “royal blood” are other indications how much significance is attached to blood as being something mysterious, as a symbol of life. Christianity itself, of course, is full of it. Man can be saved by Christ’s blood; in the Eucharist, whenever Mass is celebrated, the priest drinks Christ’s blood in the form of wine in memory of the Last Supper; and Christ’s words: “For this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins” indicate the same. Christian liturgy resembles very much an incorporate rite, found in many religions, as the famous anthropologist Frazer did not fail to notice in his well-known book *The Golden Bough*. Small wonder then that if blood rites and ceremonies played a role in so many ways, simple common people attributed something of a similar kind to the Jews, and invented the story that each year a gathering of Jews in Narbonne decided by lot which country had to yield that year’s victim. There is furthermore no reason for amazement that it should be England where this belief in the Jewish crime first appeared. There is after all only a 27-year-long lapse between the first English blood accusation and the Blois case, which is not necessarily related to the Norwich case. It only proves that in the year 1144 the English Jewish community was already sufficiently isolated from the rest of the population to allow common people to give credence to such a wild accusation. It was going to be followed by a great many other cases (not in the least because a church where such martyrs were buried had decidedly financial advantages on account of the many pilgrims it attracted). Moreover, in this case, as so often happened later, for instance in the Pfefferkorn affair on the Talmud or in the case of the Tisza-Eszlar Affair, credibility was reinforced by an evil Jewish renegade who did not hesitate to slander his former co-religionists. In the Norwich case the renegade in question invented the above-mentioned Narbonne story.

According to the contemporary account, the child William was brought by the Jews, tortured, and “on Good Friday (they) hanged him on a rod in hatred of our Lord”. As was to be expected his body worked miracles and for years to come attracted many pilgrims to Norwich. The Norwich case was soon followed by several others. There is Harold of Gloucester in 1168, St. Robert of Edmondbury of 1181, a case in Bristol in 1183, and in 1255 per-
haps the most well-known case, Little Hugh of Lincoln, familiar to readers of Chaucer. The Prioress’ Tale (in a slightly modernized version) refers to it as follows:

O yonge Hugh of Lincoln; slayn also With cursed Jews as is notable, For it nis but a litel whyle ago; Preye eek for us, we sinful folk unstable, That of his mercy God so merciable On us his grete mercy multiplye, For reverence of his moder Marye. Amen.41

No ritual murder case has more appealed to the popular imagination than “Little St. Hugh of Lincoln”, perhaps because it was supposed to have taken place shortly before the expulsion. The memory was kept alive in the form of popular ballads, as, for example, in the ballad “Hugh of Lincoln and the Jew’s daughter” of much later date. It would have been a very beautiful ballad had the subject not been so gruesome:

And first came out the thick, thick blood, And syne came out the thin, And syne came out the bonny heart’s blood There was no more within …. When the bells were rung, and mass was sung And a’ the bairns came hame, Then every lady had hame her son, But Lady Helen had none …. (The mother’s name was Beatrice and not Helen).42

And a’ the bells o’ merry Lincoln Without men’s hands were rung; And a’ the books o’merry Lincoln Were read without man’stongue; And never was such a burial Sin’ Adam’s day begun.43

As a consequence of this affair, eighteen Jews were hanged and nineteen imprisoned in London.44 It was often alleged that the clergy had a hand in these affairs, because since the victims always worked miracles, they attracted pilgrims and thereby provided the particular church or monastery in question with an extra source of income.45 In this general form the allegation is hardly creditable. Where as it is certainly possible that unscrupulous local clerics saw possibilities of gain, and whereas it is certainly highly plausible that some did not hesitate to use these, the Church as such most certainly did not condone such action. Popes, not always successfully, have systematically opposed the belief in the ritual murder charge. In the notorious case of Simon of Trent, the Pope and the papal legate did their utmost to save the accused
Jews, who confessed only after terrible torture. Under tremendous popular pressure they finally gave in, and Simon was later beatified.\textsuperscript{46}

Official theology has never accepted the ritual murder charge. It was popular superstition that sustained the myth; when a Grey Friar pleaded moderation in the case of Little Hugh, his efforts only resulted in making the order of the Franciscan less popular than it perhaps already was because of its extortionist tendencies: people always tried to ignore a Friar when they saw one. During the trial of the accused Jews people openly refused to give alms.\textsuperscript{47}

From a sociological or psychological point of view, the myth of ritual murder is of a very similar nature as the prejudicial view that blacks always try to rape white women, the cause of so many hundreds of lynchings.\textsuperscript{48} It is social distance, social isolation and the fear of conspiracy and sedition that create the conditions for the sustenance of such beliefs. Wherever such conditions were met the myth was accepted; it wreaked havoc until the days of the \textit{Stürmer}. The fact that it should be England where the myth emerged for the first time only seems to prove that conditions were ripe in England, nothing more and nothing less. It is exceedingly difficult to prove or disprove that the Blois case was related to the Norwich case. Did the Norwich case start a general European tradition, or was there spontaneous generation, after certain conditions were met, in all the various parts of Europe, in much the same way as completely independently in South Africa and in the southern part of the \textit{vs}, Africans were accused of being the “sons of Ham” on the most flimsy biblical evidence?\textsuperscript{49} It should be emphasized, however, that the other major charge leveled against the Jews elsewhere, desecration of the Holy Waf er and the related charge of using it as the basis for preparing the poisons which caused Christians to fall ill or to die – related to the acceptance of the dogma of the transubstantiation – apparently played no role whatsoever in England, even though England was the first country to put the rulings of the fourth Lateran council concerning the Jew badge into practice.\textsuperscript{50}

Equally indicative of increasingly strained relations as the nascent ritual murder charge were the events of the years 1189 and 1190, entailing the coronation of King Richard I, his preparation for the Crusade, and his ensuing absence from the country. The coronation ceremony took place on 3 September 1189. According to a curious, ancient pagan tradition, for reasons that are not quite clear, 3 September was called an “Egyptian” (i.e., an unlucky) day.\textsuperscript{51}

A contemporary chronicler, William of Newburgh (1136–1201) probably had that expression in mind when he wrote: “England, where they (the Jews) had been happy and renowned, was suddenly by God’s judgement changed into an Egypt, where their fathers suffered hard things.”\textsuperscript{52} One should like to
know whether that late summer day was a particularly hot one, for the lively description almost reads like a page by Faulkner depicting similar events in a hot Mississippi town or like any description of a lynching party or, to pick an example at random, like the report of the race riots in Chicago on 27 July 1919 (38 dead and 537 injured), which started as a common brawl on the beach.53 Williams’s description of the events tallies very well with contemporary Jewish accounts,54 even though, as is obvious from the above quotation, he had a strong anti-Jewish bias himself. This bias, however, did not prevent him from spurning some of his co-religionists and their violent actions.

Not only the London mob was afoot to see a glimpse of the ceremony or of the new king, moving in great pomp from the church to his palace, but many great nobles had come with their retinue from all over England to attend the banquet. Commoners from other places also came over to partake in the festivities. There must have been immense crowds in London on that particular day. Among them were also many Jews, who had come to London from afar with the hope of obtaining royal favors. Because Richard had apparently been antagonistic to some of his father’s policies, the Anglo-Jewish community may have felt the need to appease him, or at least to humor and propitiate him.55 They thus brought rich presents. Richard, however, refused to admit them or their delegates. According to Matthew Paris, another chronicler, Jews and women were not admitted to the coronation ceremony lest they exercise a magical influence;56 this remark perhaps reflects more the biases of a later generation than that of the late twelfth century, though the time span is not very large. (Matthew Paris died in 1259, 60 years after these events.) Even so, one wonders to what extent contemporaries believed that the presence of Jewish infidels might harm the thaumaturgical effect of the anointing.57 How many visitors might not have come hoping to have their health restored? If that is so, it betrays something about the idea the average twelfth-century Englishman might have had of Jews, as somehow sinister and evil, even though there were still a great many exceptions.

The description of the coronation events by Robert of Gloucester about a century later, at the time of the expulsion, (here rendered in slightly modernized form), reflects more the biases of that period than those of Richard’s age.

The wretched wicked Jews, they weened well to do, And a rich present they presented with great pride, and sent it to the noble king, but small thinks them betide! For the king was somewhat vexed, and took it for great shame That from such unclean things as them, any meat to him came … .58
Richard certainly did not hesitate to accept their “meat” in the form of tallages or otherwise; in all likelihood he refused to commit himself by accepting presents bought with money he considered to be his anyhow. The rational and the irrational argument combined explain his refusal well enough. In his eyes the offer must have been unpardonable arrogance, and he refused the Jewish delegates entrance. As the masses thronged near the gate, and very probably lavishly drank to the new king’s health, some common brawl began for unknown reasons. In the ensuing confusion, some Jews who were still loitering there indecisively got inside the gate of the palace. One of them was hit in the face by a Christian (probably a doorkeeper, though the chronicler does not say so) reminding them of the king’s order that no Jews should be admitted. (One wonders how they were recognized as Jews since these events took place before the introduction of the Jew badge; it is likely that the man hit was a publicly known, important member of the Jewish community.)

This was the signal for a general attack on the group of Jews still standing near the gate. According to a contemporary Jewish version of these events it was rumored that the new king had ordered the conversion of all Jews in England. (This is a most unlikely story as this would have robbed him of a considerable income). It reflects more the mood of the populace at large than that of the Crown, but it could account for the attack. At first the victims were only attacked with fists, but soon the mob began to use sticks and to throw stones. The Jews fled to the stone houses of their wealthier London co-religionists. One prominent Jew, the rich Benedict of York, was forcibly baptized as a result of the royal Decree. The next day he relapsed. An archbishop is reputed to have said, quite uncanonically: “If he does not want to be a Christian, let him be a Devil’s man.” According to a chronicler, when he died shortly afterwards, poor Benedict could not be buried in the Jewish cemetery because of his baptism. According to Adler, this is highly unlikely.

The fury of the mob reached such a feverish pitch that all began to pursue the fleeing Jews setting fire to the thatched roofs of the houses where they sought protection, thereby burning neighboring Christian houses as well. Many Jews were burned alive; those who escaped the fire were butchered by the masses. Only then, as William of Newburgh phrased it: “avarice got the better of cruelty”, and the murderers began to loot, quarrelling among themselves in rivalry of covetousness. The number of Jewish victims was given as thirty, but a great many Jewish women and dependents must have died as well.

The King knew nothing about all this: according to the Jewish version, he was intentionally misinformed by a doorkeeper, who said that the noise was
only due to men making merry. This doorkeeper was afterwards sentenced to death. When Richard heard what had actually happened he was furious, thereby indicating how much he valued “his” Jews. The number of people involved, however, was so large that he felt incapable of punishing all the guilty. Only three men who had looted Christian houses were hanged. The fact that the rioters got away with it unscathed was an ill omen indeed!

The story, if it is reliable, and the realistic, somewhat cynical tone seems to justify that assumption, contains a great many points of interest which should be emphasized. In the first place there is the hint of feared evil Jewish magic on par with that of women, but that story dates from a later time when belief in witchcraft, closely related to Jew-hatred, may have begun to spread. Even so, belief in magical evil powers is not essentially different from belief in ritual murder, so there may have been a kernel of truth in the story, which would then reveal how alien, how at a distance indeed, the Jews were from the population at large already at that time. With such an abysmal gap, and so little corrective interaction, any evil story will find credence, not only in England. Stories of that kind, which began to find credence on the continent at roughly the same time, as is obvious, for example, from the writings of Caesarius of Heisterbach, reflect the wild accusations, which are basically not different from accusing blacks of rapism. They are characteristic of every discriminatory situation, reflecting the fears of the discriminator rather than the behavior of those they discriminate against. At the end of the medieval period the belief that Jews were evil sorcerers who, with the aid of “their God” (i.e., Satan), were capable of wreaking havoc among the Christians, was widespread.

The Jews stood almost on an equal footing with witches, who used lepers as their aids. There is a close affinity between the fear of Jews and the fear of witches as the word “witches’ Sabbath”, which was always supposed to take place on a Saturday, suggests. The Jews were supposed to have caused the Black Death: according to a folktale, a woman who cheated a Jewish money-lender who had demanded the blood of a recently baptized child as extra “interest” (One of the main ingredients of their poison was the sacred blood of a baptized child, which in a Jew’s hand became diabolical) by giving him pig’s blood thereby unwittingly caused an epidemic among the pigs. Such was the logic of a medieval superstition, which, like the ritual murder story, could have arisen in England sooner than elsewhere, according to the dead reckoning. A second point that needs attention is the fact that as the rioters in all probability did not belong to the debtor class – the great borrowers, nobility and clergy, were probably more heavily represented among those who at-
tended the banquet— they can have felt the pinch of Jewish usury only indirectly, and it is therefore highly implausible that the riots can be interpreted as an attempt to get rid of outstanding debts. The chronicler does not describe any attempts to destroy Jewish bonds, whereas he does when describing the tragic events in York six months later.

Given the fury of Richard when he heard the news, there is no ground for a “red herring” interpretation. The king was in fact the greatest profiteer from Jewish usury, and his main interest was to leave them undisturbed. The Crown had no interest in persecuting the Jews, unless some fictitious or real misdemeanor provided it with an excuse for imposing an extra tallage or other form of exaction, which apparently was not the case in that particular year. The violence was certainly not government sponsored to dislocate popular resentment, as was the case in the nineteenth-century pogroms in Russia, which were instigated by the semi-official “Black Hundreds”. At face value it was, therefore, most akin to a race riot, a release of pent-up aggression without a particular motive.

The source of this aggression is more difficult to locate. Envy? There is a logical flaw in the frequently used jealousy argument. If merchants A, B, C, D, and so on envy the success of merchants A*, B*, C*, D*, and so on, why should that only be true when * means “Jewish”, and why should they not envy, or at least not give expression to their jealousy, of successful merchants E, F, and G, who are not Jewish? Envy of Jewish mercantile or financial success can only take place after an anti-Jewish stereotype has already been formed, and cannot be its explanation; it is a result rather than cause of Jewish hatred, as Shakespeare was already well aware of.

There is no indication of a particularly fanatic priest who incited the masses, as was explicitly the case in York six months later, according to the same author; neither is there any reference to people who had taken the Cross and were preparing for the Crusade, as was the case in York. Looting came only as an afterthought, and was certainly not the primary motive. William is quite explicit about that, and he is on the whole remarkably precise in pointing out the difference between the two series of events.

What does have explanatory value is the fact that the Jewish group as such was an instrument of royal and/or baronial oppression; as such they were mere pawns in a complicated class struggle: peasants and commoners against nobility and clergy, nobility against the Crown. They were hated, defenseless and despised, totally dependent on royal favor and completely alienated from all layers of society at large except for a form of “labelled interaction”, even though on a purely individual basis there might have been friend-
ly relations. There are indeed stories of Jews attending Christian wedding parties and vice versa, or tales of Jews and Christians drinking together, but such stories have only relative meaning (compare the saying in Nazi Germany: “There is no anti-Semitism in Germany, for every German has a Jewish friend”, which was to some extent literally true). 

Yet another point that needs emphasizing is the fact that Jews and Christians apparently lived side by side in medieval London and in other towns? - for how else could Christian houses catch on fire? Was there no tendency to form a juiverie or a Judengasse, the proto-ghetto: Shul (Synagogue), cemetery, businesses and houses all in the same quarter? Does this fact argue against the hypothesis of social distance? It is a thorny question, firstly because until 1177 the London cemetery was the only Jewish cemetery in the whole of England, which led to distasteful scenes of dogs barking at the decomposing corpses of the deceased transported from afar to London. The fire in London confirms nor denies the existence of a Jewish quarter in other towns; this would argue against the Judengasse, on the other hand, there are indications of the existence in some English towns of a jewynstreet - the Germanic plural ending should be noted!- for it contains evidence that such Jewish streets of French speaking Jews existed at the time the commoner still spoke a more Germanic variety of English. The plural ending could therefore be an indication of social distance. The fire itself proves nothing. Sparks may have flown to neighboring non-Jewish streets after all.

The events of 3 September 1189, more or less predictable by the dead reckoning, though not to the precise moment, initiated a whole series of troubles. What may, however, have influenced the moment, apart from the fact that a coronation is certainly a very emotional event was the assize of Arms of only eight years before, whereby Jews were even forbidden to own “mail or hau-berk”. The prohibition of offensive or defensive weapons certainly marked a further downgrading. The coming Crusade may have incited religious fervor, as well as other passions; it resulted in any case in the formation of heavily armed bands, whose motives certainly were not only devotion. Preparation for the Crusade also explained the absence of the king in the eventful year 1189–1190, and that may contain the key to the problem of English Jew-hatred throughout the Middle Ages, terrorization not being prevented.

London was certainly not the only place where riots took place. Massacres took place in the year 1190 mostly during the Lent season in Norwich, Stamford, York, and Edmonds bury (Bury St. Edmunds), whence Jews were expelled by Abbot Samson, and in Kings Lynn. In the latter city, Jewish revenge on a apostate, who sought refuge in a church, set off the riot. A Jewish physi-
cian, highly respected even by Christians, was killed. The inhabitants, fearing the King’s wrath, pleaded innocence, pretending that noncitizens had committed the crime. In Lincoln similar attempts at riots were made, but Jews, knowing what was afoot by now, had sought refuge in the fortified part of the town.

William of Newburgh explicitly mentions the king’s absence as explanation of the rioting all over the country, since, as he says, after the London riots, the king had issued a decree for the protection of the Jews which by his absence was ineffective. It was confirmed by King John in 1201, although apparently without much success, for 15 years after the fateful events of the year 1189-1190, there was still so much bad feeling that in 1204 special measures to protect the Jews had to be taken again. Town officials were incapable of dealing with the situation. Altogether this is a clear indication how strained relations had become, and how much room there was for terrorization: as soon as the relatively effective protection of the Crown was momentarily taken away, hatred burst out. The series of massacres culminated in the tragic events of York, a short literary rendering of which has been made by André Schwartz-Bart (with the date wrong) in his novel *Le Dernier des Justes*. An excellent modern description based on meticulous research is found in R.B. Dobson’s booklet.

Clifford’s Tower, the location of the saddest event in medieval Anglo-Jewish history, was the nadir of Jewish victimization. Why it should be York is still open to question. Was it because it was so far off, high up in the north, far away from direct control? Or because the ringleader was a nobleman, Richard Malebysse, the “Evil Beast” (cf. *Mala Bestia*, French *Male Biche*), who, highly in debt, went with other debtors to burn the bonds at the church where they were kept for safety’s sake? Or because there happened to be a fairly large concentration of crusaders en route to France? Or because of the coincidental (?) absence of the sheriff? Or because the masses were incited by a fanatical monk of the Premonstratensian order? (Ironically he was the only Christian victim in the riot, accidentally killed by a stone thrown by one of the siege engines used by his own followers. His death may have contributed to the frenzy.)

After the mob had destroyed the stone house of one of the rich Jews, Josce, the whole Jewish community fled in panic to a nearby royal castle, Clifford’s Tower. The warden had gone away and the Jews could thus obtain free access to the tower, refusing to admit the warden when he came back. With the permission of the sheriff – which shows his dubious role – the mob then started a real siege, which, since the Jews had no arms, was bound to succeed. The
drama ended by the Jews setting fire to the building and committing mass suicide. The few survivors who asked for clemency and declared themselves willing to be baptized were given parole, but were treacherously butchered to the last man on coming out.83

Richard, once more furious, sent William of Longchamp, the bishop of Ely (the archbishopric of York was vacant at the time) to investigate.84 Fifty burgheers were fined, but no other measures were taken. Even Richard Malebysse, who had temporarily flown to Scotland, could soon return, and get away with it unpunished. Persecutions did not take place everywhere. Winchester was such an exception, as was Lincoln, where the bishop behaved so exemplarily that the Jewish community was present at his funeral several years later.85-86 In Canterbury, nothing took place and relations between Jews and Christians seem to have been very good at that time (to the extent that Jews even became involved in Christian internal quarrels), even though the Godeliva story seems to deny this. Godeliva, reputed to have some “medical expertise” in the form of incantations, went to the house of a Jewish woman with a bucketful of water blessed by St. Thomas to treat the Jewish woman’s bad foot. As soon as Godeliva entered the house, the bucket flew to pieces and she fled in panic.87 never to return. Though this story may be an indication of popular hostility and belief in the diabolical qualities of the Jews, it nevertheless remains true that in the three bishoprics where the clergy did its duty, where, in other words, there was no crisis of authority, nothing happened: a repetition, on a small scale, of the Italo-Byzantine conditions.88

The whole episode of 1189-1190, however, made the Anglo-Jewish community more dependent on the Crown, to the exclusive advantage of the latter. King John was not slow to capitalize on the opportunity, protecting the Jews not for the love of Jews but for the love of money so as to finance his hopeless policies in France, particularly after Bouvines in 1214. He imposed an exceedingly heavy tallage and used torture to exact payment – he had the teeth pulled out of some hostages for every unpaid amount of money – and his policy was followed by his successors to such an extent that Jews became the royal “milch cow” which was all the more serious when, after 1206, the French connection was lost and Jews were not allowed to leave the realm without royal permission. Jews, the personal property of the King in much the same way as in Germany where they became servi cameræ imperatoris,89 became a source of basically illegal royal income at the expense of his other subjects, and as such a helpless instrument of royal oppression, resented by clergy, nobility, and the populace at large.

As indicated above, the events at Runnymede provide clear evidence of
this situation, for in the later-abolished tenth and eleventh clauses of the Magna Carta, it was confirmed that no interest should be paid during the minority of the heir of a deceased debtor, and that if debts fall into the King’s hand (e.g., if the creditor died), only the principal and not the interest should be exacted; this is a clear indication of how much the nobility as debtor class valued the abolishment of the high rates of interest, which could rise to 40 percent or over, and also how that same nobility realized in what way the Crown profited from that practice to the detriment of their own powerful position. Jews had become instruments of royal despotism in much the same way as many centuries later they actually became, as court Jews, the instrument of the not-too-enlightened despotism of many German princes. Awareness of the potential for abusing Jews as instruments of royal oppression was also manifest in the civil war of 1258-1265 led by Simon de Montfort, son of the Albigensian Crusader, who did not spare the Jews either. Wherever the oppositional party was temporarily successful (and it should be emphasized how much they were supported by the commoners), wherever they gained a firm foothold, massacres of Jews took place, as most notably was the case in London in 1261 and in Canterbury where, two generations earlier, the relations had been relatively friendly. It need not necessarily have been a crisis of authority that provoked such reactions, for we hear about students in Oxford attacking the Jews in 1244, but on the whole that seems to be the established pattern. Cecil Roth quite rightly emphasized the role of the Jews as involuntary instruments of possible royal despotism by pointing out that the expulsion of 1290, at a time when the Jewish purse was emptied by repeated tallages and other exactions, when Jews were driven to coinage clipping in order to survive, in a sense paved the way for the development of parliamentary institutions and proceedings:

It was not without its importance in the development of the English constitution that this uncontrolled and uncontrollable source of royal revenue was finally removed. From this date the detailed regulation of finance by the representatives of the people became possible. It was thus not without significance (…) that the Model Parliament of Edward I assembled and the English constitution received its shape four years after the expulsion of the Jews.

Admittedly Flemish, and, above all, Italian bankers like the houses of Bardi and Peruzzi were only too willing to take over, but it may have been easier to control their operations as they were not royal property the way the Jews had
been. It is, however, too far-fetched to argue, as G.M. Trevelyan seems to do, that by generalized responsibility for public finance conditions were created whereby the relation of the Jews to the English was renewed under happier auspices because the English had developed “the habit of managing their own affairs”. It seems more appropriate to attribute the relatively exceptionally favorable conditions of English Jewry in the modern period to democratic institutions made possible, as Barrington Moore has pointed out, by the early elimination of the English peasantry. The peasantry, backbone of nineteenth-century anti-Semitism almost everywhere in continental Europe, was then lacking in England.

On the whole the expulsion seems to have been a very popularly acclaimed measure. Jews were indeed feared as instruments of royal oppression and hated as a completely alien and sinister, if not diabolical, group, a notion that could be easily rationalized because they were evil, willfully blind infidels and Christ-killers.

Medieval England has a bad reputation in Jewish tradition, which Cecil Roth seeks to mollify somewhat, though not altogether successfully. It is true that the Jews shared many beliefs, prejudices, and credulities of their Christian contemporaries, such as the idea that Barnacle geese (Branta leucopsis) grew on trees. It should be mentioned that some priests saw in the rabbinical ruling that Barnacle geese might be eaten if properly ritually slaughtered a splendid opportunity to try to convince Jews of the Virgin Birth, as being indeed a much smaller miracle than the changing of plants into animals. Such common beliefs, however, do not disprove social distance and lack of interaction, in the same way as acceptance of many features of the “American way of life” by American blacks does not disprove an abysmal gap; an even more telling example is the sharing of elements of Afrikaner culture by the so-called “Cape coloured”, who yet are denied entrance to white Afrikaner society.

It is true that, much to the distress of some rabbis, Jews and Christians drank together up to the thirteenth century, but then the rabbis added, “but perhaps, as there would be great animosity if they were to refrain from this one, so must not be too severe on them” – the age-old accusation of aloofness!

It is true that Jews were not exclusively moneylenders. It has even been argued that no community, however small, can survive on money lending alone, an argument which, given the amount of administration and paperwork which provides work for a great number of dependents, does not sound altogether convincing. King John employed a Jewish goldsmith, but, as has
been argued above, this craft was often developed in the pawnshop. Occasionally a Jewish cheesemonger of fishmonger is mentioned, or Jews engaged in the wool trade.\textsuperscript{105} To what extent, however, particularly in the latter case, where the wool was given as pawn, were these activities related to credit operation, as was certainly the case in the corn trade, where harvests from land were given as pawn for loans?

Neither these few exceptions nor the occasional conversion of monks\textsuperscript{106} to Judaism provide an argument against an almost total isolation, linguistically, socially, economically and religiously, from the population at large. Regarding the conversion of monks to Judaism, the sources mention no Jewish influences in disputes, not even a love affair; they give “madness” and the burden of monkish life as explanation. It could very well be that Bible reading and theological studies made them doubt whether the messiah had actually come, as had happened before and would happen again, particularly during the Reformation, but also among some Waldesians and Anabaptists in search of the truth.\textsuperscript{107} The stir caused by the presumed marriage of the Jew Jurnet with Miryld, daughter of Ralf de Hauteville, a love affair which reduced them to utter poverty (at least temporarily, for later Jurnet’s daughter is mentioned as being in business again) proves the extraordinary character of such an event.\textsuperscript{108}

There are many other indications of hostility. Many towns, apart from Edmundsbury, had expelled the Jews long before 1290. So, for example, Newcastle on Tyne and Derby, respectively, in 1234 and 1260.\textsuperscript{109} Another indication is the fact that England was the first country to put the ruling concerning the Jew badge of the fourth Lateran Council into effect. It was reinforced in the “Statutum de Judaismo” which also vainly tried to abolish Jewish usury. It was a failure because guild regulations had by then excluded Jews from practically all crafts.\textsuperscript{110}

It is difficult to gauge how representative of the general mood was the action of a ship’s captain who, in the year of the expulsion, promised to take—for a price—a group of Jews to France. At low tide he grounded his ship on a mud bank and told his passengers to go for a walk. When the tide came in, he refused to let them back on board, shouting at them to “repeat the miracle of the Red Sea”;—letting them drown. Did he really hope for such a miracle or was he motivated by mere spite?\textsuperscript{111}

The above story does seem to be a symbolic ending of an, on the whole, very unhappy relationship between the Jews and Gentiles in medieval England, a relationship which, given stigmatization from the outset and almost total isolation, and given the fact that massacres almost always took place.
during a crisis of authority, when “permissiveness” was highest and possibilities of terrorization greatest, seems to fit in the general hypothesis.
CHAPTER 9

A Survey of Jewish-Gentile Relations in Italy

Introductory remarks

According to the argument of chapter vi, “dead reckoning”, medieval Italian attitude towards the Jews would be very different from that of medieval England. There is every reason to believe that the speculations of the “dead reckoning” can be verified. Cecil Roth, an eminent scholar in the field of Italo-Jewish history, has claimed that Italy is the only country in Europe which has never witnessed mass persecutions of Jews. The exaggeration lies in the word “only”, for as far as Italy is concerned his claim seems to be largely justifiable. There is at first sight precious little evidence indeed of a deep-seated animosity. There are very few indications of accusations of the desecration of the Holy Wafer and where there are any, they do not seem to have caused massacres on the same scale as elsewhere.

There is nothing comparable to the Rindfleisch massacre of 1298, for example, where on the basis of one accusation of desecration of the Holy Wafer in Röttingen, Jews were massacred in 65 places in central Germany during the course of several months. There is presumably no indication of the belief in the Judensau, the absurd belief that Jews worshipped a pig. Even the ritual murder story does not seem to have penetrated as deeply into the Italian mind as elsewhere, even though the accusation was not completely unknown. There is, of course, the notorious Trent case of 1475.

It may be questioned, however, to what extent this ritual murder affair belonged to the Italian sphere. After all, Trent had belonged to the Austrian realm for centuries. To this day there is a more Austrian than Italian character to its older architecture. It may easily have received its impulses from the north rather than from the south. The name of the alleged victim, Simon Unverdorben, does not sound very Italian. (Even had that name been given to him and his family afterwards, Unverdorben meaning “innocent”, why should it be rendered in German?) In so far as Italians proper, the Pope and the papal legate, were involved in the case, they were on the side of the ac-
cused Jews, and tried in vain to save their lives.\(^4\) Only at the height of the Counter-Reformation (curiously enough also associated with Trent), long after the event, and long after the publication of the bull Cum nimis absurdum, which so drastically changed the conditions of the Jews in Rome,\(^5\) did Gregory xiii (1572–1585) reluctantly give in to tremendous local popular pressure and canonize Simon of Trent (the canonization was undone in 1961\(^6\)).

The accusation was not entirely unknown in Italy, as in fact would be most unlikely. Not only was the ritual murder story known all over Europe but, as has been indicated, such fantasies are often applied to feared alien or esoteric groups, or groups conceived as esoteric. As indicated, Christians were once also accused of this crime. Witches were always supposed to feast on – unsalted! – roasted babies. Frenchmen were accused of this crime in Madagascar, and so forth.\(^7\) Why should there be no credulous Italians? Even so it is interesting to note that this horrible story began to circulate in Italy rather late.

The oldest recorded instance, about which little is known, is that of Trani of 1290, a century and a half after Norwich. There is the Messina case of 1347 and the Milan case of 1443, which was settled with a fine. Parma of 1479 was an abortive case, persecution being quenched by Gian Galeazzo Maria Sforza. All other Italian cases took place after Trent had lent the accusation some apparent reliability.\(^8\) They were, however, as Milano emphasizes, rarely – if ever – accompanied by the elsewhere customary bloodbaths.

Whether this was due to more effective combating by the Papacy, as he holds, to the more efficient policing of the secular governments, or simply to the fact that the belief was not as deeply rooted remains to be seen. It cannot be denied that as a rule the Popes systematically opposed this obvious slander, as is evident e.g. from the strongly worded letter by Innocent iv of 1247. Attention, however, should be paid to the fact that the letter was sent to the German bishops and archbishops in relation to a complaint from Germany—“Lacrimabilem Judaeorum Alemaniae recipimus questionem ……” (“We have received the tearful question of the German Jews …”)\(^9\) – as if the problem did not exist in Italy.

There is no reason to assume that twelfth-, thirteenth-, or fourteenth-century Italy was less inclined to violence than other countries. On the contrary. The constant wars between various towns, and the party strife and family feuds within the towns, such as the one existing between Shakespeare’s Capulets and Montagues, families often entrenched in mighty fortified towers, which in San Gimignano are preserved to this day, tell a different story.
Bands of soldiers of fortune, sometimes in the service of warring towns, but changing allegiance as it served them, sometimes jobless, but under any circumstance hardly distinguishable from ordinary bandits, ravaged the country. They were the precursors of the later condottieri, men like Giovanni Acuto (John Hawkwood), Guarnieri, nicknamed “Enemy of God, faith and charity” (“Nimico di Dio, di pietà e di misericordia”), “Corrado Lupo, nomen est omen, and above all’fra’ Monreale, e tutti quanti” (“Foreigners indeed, most of them, but all finding Italy a most profitable area for their covetous violence and violent covetousness”). If that were not enough, there was the constant party strife and the conflicts between factions of the parties, as took place in Florence where the Guelphs were divided into the Bianchi and the Neri. Dante is a most famous example of a man who happened to belong to the wrong wing, and who therefore was banished from his native town. Banishment was almost like death, for as the formula said: “We declare your wife a widow, your children orphans, your possessions property of the town; your body is given to the ferocious animals of the forest, to the birds of the heavens, to the fishes of the waters. The four quarters of the wind will be your desmesne. Where everybody will find peace and rest, you will lack them.”

Party strife often took the form of class warfare, which in Florence is evident from the episode of the Ciompi, the revolt led by Michele di Lando of the poorest weavers, spinners, dyers, and other craftsmen, beautifully described by Machiavelli in his distant but condemning style. It led to excesses of cruelty, such as the cutting up of the body of the most-hated former ruler, so that only one leg was left on the gallows. On other occasions the flesh of a beaten enemy was sold on the market. If most of the examples cited to re-voke the sphere of passions, hatred, and cruelty, offset no doubt by such deep and sincere religiosity as that of Francis of Assisi and Joachim da Fiore and some of their followers, are chosen from Florentine history, this finds its justification in the fact that the situation was not very different elsewhere. The Renaissance Bravi had their precursors in the Middle Ages, and the rural areas were no less tumultuous than the towns. How telling is the story of the young shepherd who contritely confessed that he had accidentally drunk a drop of milk during Lent, but did not bother to confess a couple of murders committed in his capacity as highway robber, because that was so much part and parcel of his daily existence that he did not even trouble to think about them.

This society, so full of uncontrolled passions, cruelties, and violence compensated by excesses of contrition, this intensity of life which makes Italian history so fascinating apparently almost never lashed out at the Jews. There is a remarkable similarity to the general violence of the Merovingian period.
and its benevolent attitude towards the Jews. According to Boccaccio’s description of the Black Death of 1348, it was not accompanied by large-scale massacres of the Jews, as was the case in Germany where they were accused of having poisoned the wells with the aid of lepers.

Italy was certainly not less severely hit by the terrible disease than other countries, but knew only one example of an accusation of well poisoning by Jews. Such a story caused some sanguinary riots in Parma, negligible indeed when compared to the thousands of Jewish victims of the fear-inspired massacres in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, or Spain. Genoese sailors, who were infected in Caffe (now Feodosia) in the Crimea, and other sailors brought the disease to Italian ports, from which the epidemic spread over large areas of Europe, sparing neither distant England nor Scandinavia. Italy, however, was hit when the disease was most virulent. (If, however, as has been argued, the colossal mortality was due to general malnutrition, and particularly to scurvy, which caused a very low degree of resistance to any infection whatsoever, Italy, having easy access to citrus fruits, may have been somewhat less severely hit than otherwise might have been the case.)

Admittedly, there were few, if any, Jews in the Florence of Boccaccio’s days, but he would certainly have mentioned in his tales such events if they were supposed to have taken place elsewhere in Italy. How, in fact, could he have told this story, when the two main ingredients of the “Jewish” poison, the desecrated Host and the blood of Christian children, were lacking in the Italian imagination? Here, in fact, it is submitted that in the Italian mind of the Middle Ages the Jew was not that symbol of diabolical evil he had become in the trans-Alpine world.

A first glance already seems to confirm this. Boccaccio’s story of the just and honest Jew who became a Christian because of the very depravity of the clergy, arguing that if Christianity spread, when served by such unworthy ministers, the Holy Ghost must in fact be effective and therefore believable, is a clear indication. In a strongly anti-Semitic climate nobody would dare to oppose an honest and just Jew to ministers of grace, however licentious. The very fact that Boccaccio believed that he could afford to tell such a story tells something about the social climate.

Boccaccio’s third tale, the story of the three rings, is equally indicative. Centuries later, Lessing would use this motif for his Nathan der Weise, borrowing that name from another Boccaccio story. (In Boccaccio’s version of the story of the three rings, the name of the hero is Melchizedek.) Nathan der Weise, for whom Moses Mendelsohn stood portrait, was made by Lessing into one of the great early monuments of Jewish civil emancipation. (He was taken to
task for that by Eugen Dühring, the Ahnherr of modern racist anti-Semitism.) The Parable of the Three Rings, purporting to claim the equality of the three religions virtually denying the truth of “nulla salus extra ecclesiam”, (“there is no salvation outside the Church”) and by implication indicative of a feeble anti-Judaic mood, seems to have become part and parcel of Italian folklore, to judge by the fact that not only did a Venetian goldsmith and the Friulian miller Menocchio know the story, but believed in its truth. Why should Boccaccio, who with such relish aimed the arrows of his mockery and wit at all people and groups, blameless or not, have made an exception for the Jews, had they really been so much in the public eye? Why does Machiavelli, in the first part of the Storie Fiorentine, where he describes the whole Italian scene and all its ethnic components, not trouble to mention them?

An argumentum ex silentio, like the previous ones, is always dangerous to use as proof. Even so, it might be worthwhile to use yet another one. It is noteworthy that Dante, that universal mind of for his day colossal erudition and learnedness, who did not hesitate to criticize everything he found worthy of his criticism in his contemporary world did not trouble to send the Jews into the dock. He even passed judgment on Boniface VIII, the living pope of his own day, whom he did not hesitate to condemn to hell. Had the Jews deserved a slashing in his mind he would certainly have been severe on them. However, Dante hardly ever mentions the Jews in his magnum opus in which he refers to almost everything he found noteworthy, and which therefore is such a rich source for medieval Italian history.

The reference to the Jews in his condemnation of Boniface VIII cannot be interpreted as an indication of great animosity: “Lo principe de’novi Farisei” (“The prince of the new Pharisees”), “avendo guerra presso a Laterano”, (“who started war near Lateran”), “e non con Saracín nè Giudei” (“but not with Jew or Saracen”), “ché ciascun suo nimico era Cristiano” (“since all his enemies were Christians”).

Guerra in reference to the Jews should not be taken literally, as since the days of Gregory the Great, as Dante no doubt knew, that had never been papal policy. The verse: “ch’a Dio ed a’ Giudei piaque una morte….” merely states what everyone then believed, to wit, that Christ’s death was necessary for ultimate human salvation, and that Jews perpetrated the act. In fact, the implicit statement that Jews were instruments of Divine Will is highly unusual for that period, receiving full attention only in (Protestant) theology of a much later day. He once refers to the Jews as “la gente ingrata, mobile e retrosa…” (“the ingrateful, restless, and contrary people”) which is part and parcel of common
lore. Far more interesting is the fact that he did not meet any Jews in the inferno, neither as obstinate infidels who had sinned against Divine Will nor among the usurers.\textsuperscript{27} The first is merely strange because he so meticulously describes all of Hell’s denizens, but the latter suggests that in thirteenth-century Italy, “Jew” and “usurer” were not as inseparable notions as elsewhere in Europe, or as they were later for Luther,\textsuperscript{28} for example. That this connection was not self-evident is all the more plausible since we do have massive evidence of large-scale non-Jewish Italian credit operations. One has only to think of the ill effects on the economy when the houses of the Bardis and Peruzzis went bankrupt because their main debtor, the king of England, turned out to be insolvent, or how Italians were involved in the English wool trade, because wool was frequently used as security for loans.\textsuperscript{29} Here, too, Boccaccio is a testimony.\textsuperscript{30} Only in the fifteenth century is there evidence of Jewish small-scale lending to the poor in pawnshops with full connivance and approval of the higher clergy: “...pauperum Christianorum commoditate” (“to the benefit of poor Christians”). After the Counter-Reformation, that same clergy tried to stop it; in vain, because the monte di pieta (pawnshops organized by the clergy) turned out to be ineffective in helping the poor.\textsuperscript{31}

So far there is only very circumstantial evidence for the lack of expressed animosity. This absence of inimical feelings, however, can be substantiated more positively. The greater part of medieval Italian Jewry lived for a long time in the southern part of the peninsula. Benjamin of Tudela states in his detailed late twelfth-century itinerario, that there were hardly any Jews in Genoa or Pisa, a few in Lucca, none in Florence, but a large and flourishing community in Rome, and a great many south of Rome.\textsuperscript{32} Roth, however, mentions a number of Jews in Pavia and Verona who were “on conspicuously friendly terms with their neighbours and engaged in all branches of commerce without opposition.”\textsuperscript{33} He also emphatically states that the majority of the Italian Jews lived in the southern part of Italy during most of the medieval period. It should be emphasized, however, that there were no legal encumbrances against Jewish residence in most northern communities.

This relative scarcity of Jews in northern Italy, as compared to earlier and later periods\textsuperscript{34} – relative because there is still evidence of Jewish landed property, for example, in 967 in Ravenna, or in 1025 in Modena\textsuperscript{35} – deserves some explanation. There seem to be two possibilities. One is more or less a repetition of what happened in Visigoth Spain. King Aripert of the Lombards abjured Arianism, and for his son Pectarit (661), this could have been a pretext for forced baptism, spoliation in all likelihood being the true motive.\textsuperscript{36} As in Spain, Lombard policy never wholly succeeded, and some Jews must have re-
mained till the time the Lombard kingdom was conquered by the more congenial Franks. Many Jews, however, are likely to have moved to either the more hospitable Frankish territory, or to the Byzantine or Saracen held south and east. The evidence is very meager.

Another possibility, not inconsistent with the first explanation is the application of the Leon thesis in its general form. As soon as Gentile mercantile communities came into being, and in Italy this took place at an early date, long before anything like it existed north of the Alps, there was no room for Jews, who thus would have left. Against this view would argue the fact that Jews are still mentioned as landowners, and secondly that the first stirrings of Italian economic enterprise started in the south, in Amalfi for example. An argument in favor of this view would be the fate of the originally Italian Kalonymus family – one of its members saved the life of Otto I – which later settled in Germany, where they had better opportunities.

The not wholly satisfactorily explained phenomenon that there were few Jews north of Rome (a complete reversal took place after 1492 because of refugees from Spain) contains a key to the explanation of why a severe animosity did not develop in Italy during the Middle Ages, and why there was little antecedent stereotyping for the development of anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century.

It is submitted that there are four major considerations in explaining a kinder disposition towards Jews in Italy. They are succinctly indicated here, and will be elaborated and tested separately as far as possible.

1) Because of Byzantine and Saracen legislation and social structure southern Italy knew no Jewish occupational specification. Consequently there was, according to the suppositions of the “dead reckoning”, ample room for all sorts of cooperation, little social distance, and hence varied relations, all corrective of whatever stigmatization there was.

2) Because all Italian society during the Middle Ages was structured in a manner very different from the trans-Alpine world, Jews were able to maintain their vocational unspecificity when they gradually moved to the north, with like consequences.

3) Because of a very early restoration of a money economy, state formation took place much earlier than anywhere else in Europe. A consequential early monopolization of violence by the state, to use the terminology of N. Elias, effectively prevented “terrorization”, when that was not in the interest of the various podestà.

4) For comparable reasons – the flow of tithes often, though not always, allowed them an efficient administration – medieval popes could as a rule
achieve in their own ecclesiastical state what they could not achieve elsewhere lacking the means of law enforcement. There they could see to it that anti-Jewish legislation and stigmatization were kept within the bounds formulated by Gregory the Great. This implied that everything that was not explicitly forbidden to the Jews by (Roman) law was permitted, and secondly that the testimonium veritatis argument was taken seriously. Consequently most popes held that the place in Roman society allotted to the Jews was theirs by right. Their religion was a religio licita. They had freedom of worship, and since God awaited their conversion, which could only be achieved by loving persuasion, they were not molested, and their property was respected. This does not mean to convey that there were no vexations of one kind or another, or that there were no negative nuances of interpretation as time went on. It does mean, however, that there were very decided limits to harassing, and that no form of violence was accepted.

Cordial relations in southern Italy

Southern Italy, like Ravenna, remained for a long time under Byzantine control, so much so that it can be said that it was at the time more Greek than Latin in character. In Tarente, and even the whole “heel” of Italy, perhaps even in Bari, a kind of Greek rather than a Romance language, was spoken. In the Sicily of Frederic II’s day, decrees were issued in Greek, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin. The same conditions which prevailed in Byzantine proper prevailed in these Italian outposts, as is obvious from Starr’s collection quoted above. For identical reasons therefore no popular anti-Jewish attitude could express itself; there was no need for justifying rationalizations, and hence no need for an explicitly articulated stereotype, beyond that of infidels. For exactly the same reasons as in Byzantium itself, there was no economic and therefore no social specification, and Jews were found in all walks of life.

The temporary occupation by Saracens of some parts of southern Italy may have had basically the same results; this holds true particularly for Sicily and perhaps for Sardinia as well. Though Muslim occupation of that part of the world did not last as long as it did in Spain, its traces can nevertheless be seen to the present day. The church of Giovanni degli Eremiti and other churches in Palermo, built for Christian use from the outset, but designed by Moorish architects, are interesting examples. They show a strong resemblance to North African architecture. The interior decoration of many Sicilian churches and monasteries of the Norman period in Palermo, Monreale,
Cefalù and elsewhere has, apart from the mosaics which were made by Greek artists – with inscriptions in Greek! – a definite Moorish touch. The exquisite polychromous, nonfigurative decoration of the pillars and walls below the mosaics have a strong resemblance to the arabesques of Spanish Moorish architecture. Another indication of a vaguely remembered Muslim past is the curious fact that in Sicilian dialect a synagogue is called a *moscheta*, or *muskiti*. It is interesting to note that Antonio Labriola, the first Italian Marxist, referred to the Italian South as belonging to the Byzantino-Islamic world, as an explanation for its specific social and economic problems.

It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze Arab-Jewish relations in detail. There can be no doubt that they were occasionally strained to say the least. Muhammad himself began his career by killing a great many Jews, angry, as is well known, that the Jews would not recognize him as a prophet. Massacres did occasionally take place – notorious were those instigated by the Almohads in North Africa – though never on quite the same scale as later in the world of Latin Christianity. Jews, honored as the “People of the Book”, perhaps more so than Christians, were nevertheless treated as not true believers, and were therefore in a decidedly inferior position to Muslims. Neither Jews nor Christians were allowed to ride on horseback. From the eighth century onward, as indicated above, long before a similar measure was introduced in Latin Christendom, both groups were forced to wear distinctive marks on their clothing to separate them from the “true believers”. Both groups had to pay a special poll tax for non-“true believers”, the *jizya*, which sometimes could be very oppressive. Perhaps, as Goitein insists, nineteenth-century Jewish historians, preoccupied with the sad history of European Jewry, have by way of contrast painted medieval Arabo-Jewish relations in very bright colors.

Perhaps the differences were not so great. Islam may not have had a clear *testimonium veritatis* argument, which determined the right of Jewish continued existence within Christendom, but it had something very much akin. As B. Lewis phrased it:

For both Christianity and Islam, and therefore for both
Christians and Muslims, the Jews have a certain cosmic stature.
They are known; they have a place, and indeed an important
place, in both the theological and historical scheme of things.
For good or for evil, they are seen as significant.

Islam, too, may have had its “secession-friction”. On the whole, however, the
position of Jews seems to have been somewhat better than that of Christians, since Muhammed rejected Christianity much more vigorously than Judaism. 51 "Nevertheless," to quote Goitein, “when the known facts are weighed, I believe it is correct to say that as a whole the position of non-Muslims under Arab Islam was far better than that of the Jews in Medieval Christian Europe". 52 Jews, as will be shown in the case of the Radanites, 53 had great freedom of movement in the Muslim world; 54 they participated in Muslim culture, not only in Spain, and they could occasionally reach positions of honor and influence. The honors bestowed upon the Bustanai family of Persia by Umar, who gave Bustanai the daughter of the defeated Persian king Chosru in marriage, is one among many examples. 55 Perhaps it is better to say that when Jews held high positions, these were based on tolerance, not on right, and comparable to those of the later court Jews in Germany. 56

If indeed *1001 Nights* can be held to be representative for popular medieval Arab feeling and folklore, it is fairly obvious that neither Jews nor Christians played a very evil role in popular imagination, in contradistinction to the Negro slave, who is frequently depicted as deceitful, evil, lazy and depraved, and accordingly as having sinful relations with evil women. (The sexual component is remarkable.) The *Tale of the Hunchback* and *The Fisherman and the Jinnee* are clear indications of a friendly medley of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, even though, of course, the latter were held in higher esteem. One has the impression that Jews were slightly more respected than Christians. 57 It is submitted here— but cannot be elaborated— that the further deterioration of Arab-Jewish relations (which cannot be doubted after reading Memmi’s 58 book) dates back to the Napoleonic period. The argument put forward is that the great powers of the nineteenth century who decided the fate of the world, England, France and to some extent Russia, robbed the Arabs or Muslims in general of the possibility of lashing out against Christians, which made Jews the only available scapegoats. Even the Turks could not afford to attack Christians in the end. Thus Jews were victimized as the Damascus ritual murder affair clearly demonstrates. 59

It may be true that in principle there is reason to assume a comparable stigmatization of Jews in Islam as in Christianity. 60 Nevertheless there were differences. Islam never incorporated Jewish tradition as integrally for the verification of its own truth as did Christianity, with all the ensuing problems analyzed above. In many ways, however, not only in circumcision or in the prohibition of pork or graven images, but above all in its strict monotheism, it is very much akin to Judaism. Obviously the Crucifixion could, in Muslim imagination, never play the role it played in Christianity: it was certainly no
reason to accuse the Jews of deicide. Although on the basis of the hypotheses of the “model” a special variety of Jew-hatred in the Arab or Muslim world should in fact be expected, there is all in all reason to expect that the Muslim variety implied contempt rather than hatred based on fear. Jews were sometimes despised, humiliated, spoliated and even massacred, but they were not conceived of as worshippers of Satan, doing Satan’s work, as they finally were in the late medieval popular imagination of the greater part of Latin Christendom.

There is thus reason to assume that Jews in Muslim Italy were not strongly affected in their daily life, and certainly not occupationally, by Muslim antagonism. Since Muslim authorities would not allow their Christian subjects to express their animosity in a violent way, the Muslim south of Italy, and particularly Sicily, was during the Norman and Hohenstaufen period as free from the anti-Jewish contagion, as was the Byzantine south, so that the Italian south and particularly Sicily was remarkably free from the anti-Jewish contagion.

As long as Jews and Christians paid the special toll tax there were, apart from public office, no occupational limitations. There is no evidence of the existence of a ghetto, although Jews tended to live in specific districts of the towns. Consequently there is little reason to assume a specific social distance in the Sicily the Normans took over. Because in many ways they maintained the existing policies, overall cordial relations continued for some time.

A recollection of friendly cohabitation of all ethnic groups is curiously illustrated in the letter of Pope Nicholas V of 1450, quoted earlier (vii p.188), complaining about the good relations between Jews, Saracens, and Christians in Italy, to the detriment of the Christian faith. Perhaps that letter merely reflects the antiquarian interests of the former librarian of Cosimo de Medici, and of the founder of the Vatican library. In the second half of the fifteenth century apart from a remnant in Granada, Muslim influence in Europe had dwindled completely. So the letter probably refers to conditions of two-and-a-half centuries earlier.

It is curious to note that the first prince to introduce the Lateran Council’s ruling in regard to the special clothing was Frederic II whose power may have been the causa materialis of this regulation. There is no inconsistency.

In the first place he had no reason to quarrel with the Pope over such an issue, there being enough other combustible materials, and secondly, it fits into his plans for regimentation of all his subjects which made him the first “modern” prince, precursor of the absolute monarchs, model of Renaissance princes, and admired by Machiavelli. Semi-Arab that he was, he imitat-
ed in this very regimentation Muslim practices. One of his most far-reaching borrowings was a system of control over incoming and outgoing commodities for the payment of custom duties. The benches, *diwans*, made for that purpose are the origin of the word *douane* (customs) in many European languages.\(^66\) The word *tariff* is also borrowed from Arabic.

For a prince who found so much inspiration for the organization of his kingdom in the Arab world, the introduction of outward signs of religious affiliation was a perfectly natural thing to do.\(^67\) The favors he bestowed on the Jews, however, for instance granting them the silk monopoly,\(^68\) and the role he allowed Jewish intellectuals to play at his court\(^60\) do not suggest a deep-seated hatred of Jews. Milano speaks about Frederic's rule as a *periodo completamente fausto*\(^70\) ("a completely happy period") for Jews. The man who mercilessly persecuted heretics as alien to his concepts of regimentation of subjects\(^71\) for the benefit of the state was as emperor absolutely fair in the Fulda ritual murder case of 1235.\(^72\)

An additional indication of cordial relations between the various religious groups may be illustrated by another specifically southern Italian set of conditions. Nowhere else in Europe, with the possible exception of Spain, was there such a free exchange of ideas of various different cultures as in Italy, still the axis of a Mediterranean world.\(^73\) The famous medical school of Salerno, situated in the realm of Frederick II, is an interesting example. In that layman’s school, wholly beyond ecclesiastical control, Jews, Muslims and Christians, mingled freely, both as teachers and students: no mean threat to whatever orthodoxy. Faraj ben Salim of Salerno translated Arab medical literature into Latin. Moses ben Salomon taught there.\(^74\)

How friendly the interaction was, and how open to the exchange of ideas—a feature often mentioned in the literature—is open to question. Muslim physicians after all were willing to allow a certain amount of astrology in their diagnoses, that is, humors influenced by the stars; to Jews, given their abhorrence of the Akum, worshippers of the stars, such an approach was in all likelihood unacceptable. Even so, though there thus may be assumed certain methodological differences, these need not have diminished a friendly relationship. There may have been an agreement to disagree in matters of speculation.

Moreover, acceptance of Aristotelian ideas from Arab philosophers in Spain as well as at the court of Frederick II, who knew Maimonides,\(^75\) ideas inconsistent with Jewish orthodoxy,\(^76\) proves that in the Mediterranean world exchange of and adaptation to new ideas was by no means impossible. As this held true for Christians as well, a champion of orthodoxy and archen-
emy of all heretical ideas, not only Albigensian, like Innocence III must have been greatly worried. Shrewd politician and administrator as he was, rather than philosopher and theologian, he sought to fight the threat with political and administrative means rather than with philosophical or theological arguments. In so doing he did not hesitate to lash out at the Jews, the most defenseless group. In this, he and his immediate successors were helped by the newly founded mendicant orders, which at this time began their offensive. It remains to be seen whether they were successful.

No social distance: Conditions fostering open interaction

Of great significance for the understanding of Gentile-Jewish relations in Italy is the peninsula’s entirely different socioeconomic structure, especially when compared with the trans-Alpine world.

It never knew the manorial organization and feudalism to the same extent as in the north. What there was in the way of nobility was much sooner urbanized and fused with the bourgeois patricians than anywhere else. It probably never knew the same slothful movement of money as prevailed in the north during the earlier Dark Ages, and even if it had, very early mercantile development and urbanization created conditions in the early Middle Ages which existed in the north and west of Europe at a much later period. It is submitted that this situation favored the Jew. A relative abundancy of money, tithes, and other ecclesiastical dues – and a relative amleness of credit – did not create that specific need that Jews north of the Alps fulfilled to their detriment. In Italy, moreover, the guild organization – in so far as it is at all comparable to similar organizations in the north – does not seem to have originated in extended kinship systems, but seems to show a greater affinity to comparable state organized institutions in the Byzantine Empire. Like these, Italian guilds were possibly of Roman origin.77 The organisational form was inherited either directly or indirectly via Byzantium. This would mean that such processes of Jewish self-exclusion as were assumed for the north did not necessarily obtain in Italy, or at least not in the southern part of Italy. As originally legal or administrative institutions, organized from above for reasons of control and tax gathering, they need not have had that semi-sacral character that prevailed north of the Loire. This in turn would mean that in the social structure of the peninsula, and certainly in the from our point of view most interesting southern part, there is less reason to assume such absolute socio-economic specification as prevailed in the north. There is manifold evidence
for this assertion.

Although in other countries Jews are occasionally mentioned as physicians, often distrusted as poisoners, Jewish medical practice was nowhere as highly developed as in Italy. Honors were bestowed upon Jewish practitioners, who were frequently personal physicians to Popes, cardinals and other clergymen, and who, despite occasional and then usually abortive attempts at exclusion, as has been indicated, were allowed to freely ply their trade in the *Patrimonium Petri* as well as elsewhere. Frequently they were exempted from paying taxes and – more significantly – not obliged to wear the Jew badge, not even in Rome itself. Their expertise included dentistry.\(^7\)\(^8\) Jewish traditional medical knowledge – to some extent based on practical deductions from dietary habits and hygienic prescriptions of a religious nature – was of decided influence on the medical schools of Renaissance Italy. Vesalius, for example, was familiar with Jewish treatises on medicine. The Salerno tradition was indeed to some extent continued.\(^7\)\(^9\)

Another indication of the high esteem Jewish physicians enjoyed was the fact that in Florence, once Jews began to settle there, Jewish practitioners could become members of the *Arte dei medici e speziali* (the guild of physicians and chemists) an indication that they were not only not automatically excluded from the guilds but, on the contrary, had entrance to the most prestigious ones.\(^8\)\(^0\) It was a Jewish physician, Lazzaro da Pavia, who attended to Lorenzo il Magnifico during his last illness. Shemuel Zaphati cured Giuliano de’ Medici, and many other members of the Medici family had Jewish doctors.\(^8\)\(^1\) The seedbed for this happy situation during Renaissance was the medieval development.

What holds true for medicine holds true for other spheres of intellectual interest as well. More than in other countries was the tradition of free exchange of ideas, as noted above, continued in late medieval and Renaissance Italy. Early revived interest in Hebrew and the original text of the Old Testament led to an intellectual cooperation much sooner than anywhere else, and even there – Reuchlin is the famous exception – was it much more sporadic. Pico della Mirandola is among the many famous humanists who collaborated with learned Jews, who participated in Latin and Greek studies, and in the neo-Latin literary movement. During the Renaissance there was a diffusion of much-appreciated Jewish knowledge about the ancient world and antiquity, which Jews had preserved in their own traditions. The channel of diffusion was close cooperation based on a medieval tradition that was not limited to Sicily.\(^8\)\(^2\)

Another indication of a happy integration into Italian life, in the remain-
der of Europe not found before the nineteenth century, is Jewish participation in musical life (for obvious reasons less so in the pictorial and plastic arts, although Jews indeed passively participated as ardent customers and admirers). Many Jews enjoyed a reputation as professional composers, performers, ballet masters, dancers and the like. Here, too, the foundations were laid in the Middle Ages. The German minstrel Süskind is about the only northern counterpart one can think of. Sociologically comparable is perhaps the reputation Jews enjoyed in eighteenth-century England, where they excelled in boxing.

Such integration could indeed not have culminated in the Renaissance period had there been very strained relations during the preceding periods. Not only because an admittedly sometimes somewhat condescending tolerance was actually practiced in Italy, with local and temporal variations, but also because the Jews never had a very specific economic function – or only locally as for instance in Brindisi where in the earlier Middle Ages the Jewish community consisted almost exclusively of dyers – could they not as easily become a pariah group as elsewhere in Europe.

Throughout the Middle Ages Jews were found in all walks of life, particularly in the south, and rarely – Venice perhaps is among the exceptions – were there any legal encumbrances on economic activities. As Cassuto remarks, the sole reason why in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Florence Jews were not very preponderant in the various crafts is only due to the fact that crafts there had been well developed long before the Jews began to settle in that town. There just was not enough room for them.

In the rural areas Jews were so largely represented (specializing in dairy farming, viticulture, and the growing of olives) and the amount of land held by them so large (bought, and not obtained as pledges for unpaid loans, for as will be shown that kind of large-scale Jewish money lending did not exist, Gentile competition being too great) that the Fourth Lateran Council found it worth its while to discuss whether tithes should be paid on formerly Christian-owned estates, “ut sic ecclesiae conserventur indemnes” (“so that the Church suffers no harm”). Though, of course, this does not mean that all land under discussion was Italian, it must have been so to a considerable extent, the more so if as so many historians have maintained, Jewish landownership elsewhere did not exist, or only on a very temporary basis. It was decided in the affirmative.

Jewish horticultural skill and experience was such that Frederick II gave the supervision over the state-owned plantations of henna, indigo, and the Sicilian palm groves to Jews. In the Papal State during the thirteenth centu-
ry Jews not only occupied a preponderant position in the textile trade, but were also landowners on a large scale, employing servants without impediments.  

In Sicily, Bari, Brindisi, Sardinia and many other southern places, Jews were so largely represented in the arts of weaving, spinning, and particularly dyeing, that *tintoria* was almost synonymous with “Jewish” craft.  

The tradition of plying these trades went back to Byzantine and Saracen days. Benjamin of Tudela mentions those Jewish craftsmen explicitly in the description of his journeys. The Jewish versatility in handling silk, inherited from Byzantium, was such that Frederick II gave the monopoly of the import of raw materials and the production and handling of silk to the Jews of Sicily, a position they were able to maintain for a long time. These were, however, not the only crafts Jews specialized in, for as late as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries they are mentioned as tanners, cobblers, harness makers, blacksmiths, plowmakers, carpenters, porters, stevedores, dockers, and the like: industrious, but on the whole, far from rich. Of old, Jews were occasionally employed as mint masters, and as such (and not as a derivate of the pawnshop) they seem to have been able to develop their activities and skills as gold- and silversmiths. In Rome they seem to have had such a special reputation as makers of cheap saltpeter of high quality, and as such as producers of gunpowder, that it led to an early “mercantilistic” Florentine scheme of seducing some of these specialists to settle in Florence. Other activities mentioned were making playing cards, printing, and related crafts.

As merchants in Florence, in that quality too admitted to the prestigious *Arte dei medici e speziali*, they met with very few impediments, and not infrequently enter into a commercial partnership with Christian merchants. Their favored position in Florence seems to have been based on their prevalence in the Levantine trade. In a period when new clothes were only for the rich, they played a particularly important commercial role in the towns as ragmen and dealers in secondhand clothing, *strazzaiuoli*, often in combination with tailoring. (Apart from the last-mentioned this is, of course, not specifically Italian.) As such they had to have special permission, the *condotta*, which they also had to have as pawnbrokers, serving the needs of the poor, or at least the small fry.

It was mostly in this context that Jewish credit operations were of any significance in Italy. Consequently the identification Jew usurer was by no means as self-evident in Italy as elsewhere, as has been noted above. Even Aquinas, no friend of the Jews, and enemy of their usurious practices in other parts of the world, is indulgent on this point, stating that Italian Jews offered
no grounds for complaint on the score of usury, earning their livelihood in other ways. The pawnbroking business was a rather late development, coming to full bloom in the later Middle Ages and Renaissance. Even Venice was obliged to issue *condotte* in 1298 in order to help out the poor. This is the general picture, which preferably should be corroborated more in detail.

It is impossible, however, within the scope of this study to analyze in sufficient detail all Italian communities in their Jewish minorities. In order to demonstrate that later Jewish resettlement in central and northern Italy had the anticipated effect, i.e. a continuation of an originally southern pattern of interaction, a representative sample of non-southern communities with a longer history of settlement than, for instance, Florence had should be analyzed. A study of the Jewish community in Assisi, with information on nearby Perugia – perhaps not quite a sample, but held to be representative by the author – may serve this purpose. The chances are indeed slight that these two towns, that provide information which tallies with other data, are exceptions to the rule. Consequently a cautious generalization seems warranted.

Jews were settled in Assisi since the early fourteenth century, when it became a flourishing business community, and where politically the landed aristocracy was ousted by the new entrepreneurial classes. Jewish bankers, from whom the clergy also borrowed, could play a role fulfilling the constant demand for credit, which these classes could not always provide themselves, but Jews were neither the only bankers nor were all Jews bankers, being engaged in other branches of commerce and crafts – the almond trade – as well. “The fact that Jews and Christians worked side by side, sometimes in the same business, once more emphasises the dynamic realism of medieval Italian communal life, whose progressive spirit left no place for intolerance or religious discrimination.” Neither in Perugia nor in Assisi were Jews accused of having caused the Black Death. More positive indication of full acceptance is the fact that some Jews were allowed to carry arms, or that the Priori of Perugia ordered a pompous funeral when a prominent Jew, Matassia di Sabbatuccio, died in 1383. Also indicative of civil equality is the fact that in jurisdiction there was neither a special “Jewry” law, nor the Jewish autonomy of the “Jewish” law. There were no *giudeccas* in Umbrian towns. Jews could freely buy and own immovable property, and were in fact engaged in various branches of agriculture. Jewish physicians were general practitioners who treated Jews and Christians alike. One of them, Sabbatuccio di Manuela, made a special effect during an epidemic of 1363 to cure the very Franciscans who later would start their anti-Jewish agitation, but with whom he then entertained the most cordial relations.

Summing up, since professional diversification was so large, without ap-
parently the existence of ghettos (with the one sixteenth-century exception of Venice), there was throughout the Middle Ages ample opportunity for a more open interaction with large sections of the Italian population. It is submitted that it was sufficiently large to correct some vicious indoctrination, that undeniably took place.

Ineffective Stigmatization: Friars; Counter-Reformation and Ghettos

Italian sunshine casts its shadows. There is little reason to assume that in the very heart of Latin Christianity the Jewish-Christian controversy would have no effect. There was strife. The above-mentioned anti-Jewish campaign by the Franciscans of the fifteenth century was not an isolated series of incidents, and yet it seems to be true that the controversy in Italy had a different tone. The harshness of the quarrel was mitigated somewhat by the fact that the rules set down by Gregory the Great were maintained until the Counter-Reformation. The only city in the Western world in which the Jewish settlement has remained uninterrupted from antiquity down to the present day, where Jews could worship unimpeded and where, as a rule, their life and property were protected, was that for the rule of which the Popes were themselves responsible: Rome.

Given the stigma-correcting social structures discussed above, tolerant papal policy may easily have radiated over the peninsula. In their quality as secular princes of the Ecclesiastical State Popes could see to it that the rules they established as pontiffs were put into effect, provided the feuding noble families of Rome would let them. Occasionally the Orsinis, Collonas, the Vitelleschis, Frangipanis, or members of other families, separately or in constantly changing combinations, were able to achieve factual control of the state, as was the case, for example during the “Babylonian Captivity” of the Popes in Avignon, (1305-1378). Perhaps these families harassed Jews more than was normally the case, which would explain why Roman Jews gave their – hesitant – support to the “popular tribune” Cola di Rienzi, dreaming of the restoration of the ancient Roman Republic. Jews were punished for their support by having to perform the as shameful considered burning of the corpse of Cola after his final fall from power. Moreover, families of Jewish descent occasionally participated in these factional quarrels. The descendants of the convert Baruch (Benedictus), calling themselves Pierleoni after a grandson of Baruch, Petrus Leonis, pushed the candidature of a member of the family:
Anacletus II (1130-1138) who therefore was called the “Jewish Pope”. His election was answered by the election of an anti-Pope, Innocent II. The episode may have given rise to the beautiful legend of the “Pope Elhanan”, purporting that the bishop of Rome is unlike other bishops who though condemning Judaism, yet protected the Jews. That does not hold quite true for Innocent II, who not only introduced the Jew badge, but also, in his purifying zeal, manifest in in the Albigensian crusade, changed the wording of the Sicut Judaeis, of Calixtus II. In 1199 he reissued the bull, but added, that only those Jews would be protected “qui nihil machinari praeumpserint in subversionem fidei Christianae” (“who will not be impudent enough to try subversive acts against the Christian faith”). Because, since his days, punishment for Christian offenders against the ruling is somewhat lighter in his version than in that of his predecessors, there is a slight, but unmistakable, deterioration of the Jewish position, coming to full force again during the Counter-Reformation. Indicative of a changed sentiment is also the admonishment to princes, the greatest profiteers of Jewish loans, not to treat the Christian debtors of Jewish creditors too harshly. “Princibibus autem injungimus, ut propter hoc non sint Christianis infesti, sed potius a tanto gravame Judaeos studeant cohibere” (“The princes, however, we emphatically demand that they do not treat the Christians harshly on account of this (loans), and that they rather seek to restrain the Jews from such exaction”).

In 1215, at the Fourth Lateran Council, there was an unmistakable difference in tone, if only because of the codifying character of the rulings of the Council, reissuing all older ruling concerning Jews and Judaism. Indicative perhaps is also the article concerning better control of neophytes referring to Leviticus xix:19.

There were more shadows. One shadow in Rome itself was the carnival festivities to which the Jews had to make large financial contributions, certainly since the fourteenth century. Whether as premeditated humiliation in remembrance of the Passion of the Lord, or merely as a form of rough, popular amusement, Roman Jews were forced to perform the notorious footraces. Exposed to blows either as exhortations, or else in revenge of Christ, and pushed on by soldiers on horseback, not infrequently some of the participants died of sheer exhaustion. This vulgar custom was abolished only in 1668.

Far worse was the above-mentioned animosity of the mendicant orders, particularly the Franciscans, who systematically tried to incite the lower layers of society against the Jews. Giovanni da Capistrano O.F.M. (1386-1456), and his disciple Bernardino da Feltre were quite successful at this game
and had a certain influence on Nicholas v. They added a new element—foreboding the evils of the Counter-Reformatory period—in launching a campaign for the founding of monti di pietà to oust the Jews from the pawn-brokering business. That was perhaps not their primary object, as they asked the wealthy to contribute to their fundraising without demanding interest, in order to be able to lower the rates of interest on loans given on pledges. Savonarola tried to achieve the same in Florence. Although the campaign did not meet everywhere with success and, as has been shown, Jews were given permission as before to continue their activities “to help out the poor”, but even so a great many Jews were ruined as a consequence. The effects were less noticeable in the more absolutist states, which presumably had a stake in the business, condotte (permits) probably being dearly paid.

Other signs of foreboding evil were the obligation to listen to conversionist sermons, introduced by Nicholas III (1277-1280), but later more severely enforced, and the obligation to contribute to the upkeep of the house of the catechumens, as well as the beginning attacks in Rome itself on the Talmud during the first half of the sixteenth century.

It could be argued, as will in fact be done below, that the agitation of the Grey Friars against the Jews was a result of the watering down of the strict canonical principles concerning the taking of interest. Wedded to poverty as they were, the Friars could not but condemn the new mammonism of a growing economy. Since anti-mammonism cannot by itself explain the ritual murder campaign by Bernardino da Feltre and others resulting in the Trente affair of 1475, it is more likely that this was an unfortunate by-product of the attempt, of the Friars, discussed above, to have Judaism declared heretical. Given that conditions in Italy so strongly deviated from those considered necessary and sufficient in the “dead reckoning”, it is interesting to note that these attempts did not meet with success, not even in the birthplace of St. Francis, Assisi.

This is also suggested by the fact that the popes, however hesitantly, continued the Sicut Judaeis tradition. Not only were there throughout the fourteenth century very cordial relations between Jews and Franciscans in Assisi, but the first anti-Jewish sermons of Bernardino di Siena in 1425 were met with indifference. The one attempt to molest a Jewish banker was severely punished. More or less the same held true for the sermons of Cherubino da Spoleto in 1452 insisting on the Jew badge. As soon as Cherubino had left the town the rule fell into disuse. When some elements of the population took practical consequences from the sermons, high fines were imposed. The Priori assured the Jews that they would not fall under ecclesiastical juris-
diction, “non siano soctoposti ad alcuna persona secolare e ecclesiastica cioè ad alcuno predicatore, inquisitore et spirituale”112 (“they are not subject to any secular or ecclesiastical person, that is to say to any preacher, inquisitor or spiritual (Friar)”), and would remain as before “propri et veri ciptadini della Cipta de Assisi”113 (“actual and true citizens of the city of Assisi”).

As was the case elsewhere, only when a monte di piate was actually found did the mood change somewhat. It is true that an effective anti-Jewish mood could develop only when institutions (such as the monte di piate) had been devised to provide credit still cheaper than any Jew could offer.114 This was no doubt also a consequence of the relative economic decline of Assisi. Even so, when things became more difficult, and the town government lost heart, afraid of the preachers, Paul II (1464-1471) interfered on behalf of the Jews at their request. He ordered the government to respect the Jews: “Usque ad prefinitum tempus suorum capitulorum”115 (“until the ordained time of their surrender”), thereby proving that many popes hesitated to give in to the Friars, continuing their traditional protective policy. That attitude is also found in the papal admonition: “Predicatores admonete ut peccata regardant et exterminent, Judeos autem permittant suo more vivere, qui etiam secundum leges nostras tollerantur inter Christianos”116 (“Admonish preachers to consider and exterminate sins but to let Jews live according to their customs, Jews who also in accordance with our laws should be tolerated among Christians”).

The Friars wanted “schifare la multa pratica, conversazione et compagnia et familiarità con gli giudei… .la qual caso hoggi vedemo in tutta quasi la Ytalia cresciuta et abonda tanto, che non pare ce sia prohibitione alcuna”117 (“to shun the frequent conversation, keeping company and familiarity with Jews, which nowadays we perceive in almost all Italy to be so intensified and abundant, that there seem to be no prohibitions whatever”). This last part of the sentence adequately describes the true state of affairs in fourteenth century Italy. It thus seems safe to assume that Cohen’s penetrating analysis discussed above works wherever the soil was already plowed for the sowing of this new clerical hatred, but not in Italy. It is no coincidence that Trachtenberg’s materials for demonstrating the diabolizing of the Jew stem mostly from trans-Alpine, particularly German, regions:118 German because that was the area where the new propaganda had full force, Jews having been or about to be expelled from other areas before it came to full development.

Italy, despite its religiosity, or better perhaps, precisely because of its religiosity, and also because of the vicinity of the Ecclesiastical State, which was a perennial problem in Italian politics, may have tended to be somewhat
more “anticlerical” than most other European countries, and therefore perhaps less inclined to obey clerical dictums which had no immediate bearing on private spiritual life. Bigotry seems somewhat alien to the medieval Italian mind. The mood deploiring the state of Rome and the resulting indignity is evident in Dante and Boccaccio as has been shown, and is in its final form most clearly expressed by Machiavelli.

To quote another few examples lamenting the state of Italy and Rome, Dante wrote:

Ahi serva Italia, di dolore ostello,
    nave sanza nocchieri in gran tempesta
non donna di provincie, ma bordello\textsuperscript{119}  
(O slave girl Italy, inn of sorrow, ship without pilot
in a great storm, not queen of many provinces, but brothel)

Machiavelli is even more explicit: Abbiamo con la chiesa e coi preti noi Italiani questo primo obbligo, d’essere diventati senza religione e cattivi (We Italians owe it to the Church and the priests to have become people without religion and wicked).

His arguments are telling Arguing from the premise that religion is good for the commonwealth, engendering virtù and serving the public spirit, he continues by saying that the Church of Rome in this respect has miserably failed. The court of Rome gave a bad example: it kept Italy divided, unlike France or Spain. The temporal power of the Church is too great to allow unification by outsiders, since it plays successfully one power against the other, and not great enough to achieve unification itself. Thus Italy is in the hands of barbarous potentates. The Church and nothing but the Church, according to Machiavelli, is to blame for this state of affairs.\textsuperscript{120}

Rome was a problem for the Italians, who obviously at a fairly early stage in their history were aware that they were Italians, and it is the Church as a political factor of prime significance in Italy which created the problem. That would be a sufficiently strong reason not to automatically accept everything of a more socio-political nature emanating from Rome. This could be reason to share its – limited – novel preoccupation with the Jews to a lesser extent than elsewhere. If Rome itself was a major financial centre, doing business in a very businesslike way, why shouldn’t one do business in the same manner with the Jews if it served one’s purpose, whatever the Friars might say to the contrary? And even if the populo minuto were impressed by the sermons of the Friars, the rulers would stand no nonsense. The Viscontis, Montefeltros,

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Gonzagas, Medici, *e tutti quanti* effectively protected the Jews when that served their purposes.\textsuperscript{121}

In general, it may be said that, in the more “democratic” states, life for Jews was more precarious than in the absolutist states. In Florence, for example, the ups and downs of the Jewish community are closely associated with those of the Medici family. The Viscontis had a realistic and tolerant policy, as had even the Doges in Venice, who, although watching them carefully, left the Jews in peace until they established the ghetto in the sixteenth century,\textsuperscript{122} and Venice became perhaps one of the most anti-Jewish towns in the peninsula. This phenomenon seems to validate somewhat the “terrorisation” hypothesis, as does, of course, the frequently mentioned Frederic II model for all later princes, who, to use Burckhardt’s phrase, wanted to make their states into “works of art”.\textsuperscript{123} In Sicily were the first stirrings of the modern (absolutist) state, which left no room for anarchic permissiveness and terrorization from below.

At the beginning of the modern age a long shadow cast by the Italian sunshine fell with the publication of the bull *Nimis Absurdum*, issued by Paul IV in 1555, wholly contrary to traditional papal policy. It marked not only the beginning of an obscurantism which lasted till 1870 and beyond, but it jeopardized the very existence of the Jewish community in Rome because of the ruling that Jews had to sell all their immobile property – at an immense loss! – in the Ecclesiastical State.\textsuperscript{124} The preamble is worth quoting:

\begin{quote}
Forasmuch as it is unreasonable and unseemly that the Jews, whom God has condemned to eternal slavery because of their guilt, should, under the pretence that Christian love cherishes them and endures their dwelling in our midst, show such ingratitude to the Christians, as to render them insult for their grace and presume to mastery instead of subjection which beseem them; and forasmuch as it has come to our notice that in Rome and in other cities their shamelessness is carried so far that they not only make bold to dwell among Christians, even near their churches, and without any distinction in their dress, but even rent houses in the distinguished streets and squares of these cities, villages and localities, acquire and possess landed property, keep Christian nurses, maids and other servants, and do much else that is *(sic)* a disgrace to the Christian name; therefore do we perceive ourselves constrained to issue the following ordinance.
\end{quote}
The regulations contained the following elements: Jews had to live in a single area of the town – within months there was a walled-in ghetto – where they may have one synagogue; all the others have to be destroyed. Yellow hat and veil have to be worn. Christian servants are prohibited, and Jewish physicians may no longer treat Christian patients. There was strict control over the pawnshops, with the obligation to do the bookkeeping in Italian with Latin characters. Acme of humiliation: no Jew must allow himself to be addressed as “sir” by a Christian.125

Nothing in these regulations, as will be evident from the foregoing, is new. To some extent the bull resembles the cum sit nimis absurdum section of the Fourth Lateran Council, and all other clauses are repetitions of previous rulings.126 New was the – temporary – harshness and severity of the execution, and its effectiveness allowed by modern means. Soon afterwards the once flourishing Roman community was reduced to utter poverty. The main occupation of the inhabitants of the ghetto became the making of bedding and mattresses, in the narrow and overcrowded streets a very unhealthy occupation, since dust caused serious lung diseases. So dismal became the conditions that many in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries emigrated to more hospitable countries like Holland and England. The Disraelis and Montefioris are distinguished English examples of descendants of such émigrés.127 There was also the trade in rags sewed over and over again by countless seamstresses, which F. Gregorovius, an eyewitness, described so vividly. Like Massimo d’Azeglio, he also described the squalor, the stench, the overcrowding and above all the poverty of the ghetto, often flooded by the Tiber.128

To crown the intolerance, the sacred Talmud was burned whenever copies were detected,129 the enforced attendance of conversionist sermons was reintroduced, and the House of Catechumens was reopened at the cost of the Jew.130 Intolerance had decided economic limits, however, for the rich Jewish community of Ancona, essential for the Papal treasury, was left undisturbed.131 Till 1870 the fate of the Roman Jews was dependent on the mood of the successive popes. Some, like Sixtus V (1585-1590), who rescinded all the measures of his immediate predecessors and restored all the ancient liberties,132 were kind – in his own interest? Others were harsh, but by and large obscurantism prevailed. The Jews, now an easy bait, were regularly molested by the inhabitants of the poor neighboring districts, the Trasteverini.133 It is strange that the town which throughout the Middle Ages was a bulwark of a more enlightened spirit in re the Jews, should in modern times become a centre of obscurantism. The ghetto continued to exist under the most dismal cir-
cumstances until the unification of Italy in 1870. Even then the nefarious influence continued to exist. Ultramontane spirit, resenting the loss of the Patrimonium Petri, occasionally put the blame for the unhappy course of events, for those elements of modern life summed up in Pius IX’s (1846-1878) Syllabus Errorum of 1864, on the Jews. The Voce della verità saw the Jews as the driving force behind the detested liberalism. The Civiltà Cattolica published in the 1870s a series of articles on this theme in a clearly anti-Semitic vein, which directly influenced such ultramontane reactionaries as Gouguenot des Mousseaux in France or Sebastian Brunner in Austria and which indirectly inspired the first stirrings of the nascent nineteenth-century secular and even racist anti-Semitic movements, the anti-liberal clue being taken up in Germany by the conservative Kreuzzeitung. They did not have many repercussions in Italy itself.

Far from the madding crowd of the modern tourist industry is the Venetian ghetto, a living memory of the Jewish past. The solitary walker recognizes it immediately as soon as he is in the vicinity, since the houses on that island are much higher than the houses on the neighboring islands. One enters the ghetto through a gateway. Right in the middle of it there is a small square, with in its centre a beautiful synagogue. In the Venetian ghetto – the name is possibly derived from a gun foundry (getare means to found), there is no evidence of humiliating or derogatory inscriptions over the gateway as was, for example, the case in Frankfurt.

Perhaps the Venetian ghetto is different. It was established in 1516, to propitiate Divine wrath that was evident from the fact that the war of the League of Cambrai (1509-1517) went very badly for Venice. A curious fact is that a proposal at segregation was made the year before, but was dropped because Divine displeasure could be attributable to the fact that one of the inciting Friars committed the indiscretion of wanting to take a relic to his home town. This suggests ritualism rather than a violent Jew-hatred. The next year the proposal was accepted after another military defeat, when Jews had been about town at Easter time. The defeat was again attributed to Divine displeasure about the fact that Jews were not in their proper place: a kind of ritualism indeed. Of course, it was a ritualism to the detriment of the Jews, by twentieth-century standards abominable discrimination, but by sixteenth-century standards rather mild. No violence was tolerated, no interference with religion. Providing they did not live in the ghetto, Gentiles could be freely employed by Jews.

A peculiarly Venetian ritual seems to illustrate the relative mildness of the animosity: after Pesach Gentile bakers would bring bread to the ghetto. They
were greeted by children crying: “pan, pan”, who were allowed by custom to throw stones and mud at the bakers while the adults looked on; once a year the roles were reversed, as in the ancient Roman Saturnalia. How different from the Prague ghetto, where the accidental hitting with sand of a procession carrying the Host by children at play, resulted in thousands being killed. Segregation was (therefore) a vital condition of toleration,” writes B. Pullan, neatly summarizing the nature of Venetian discrimination. There should be added, however, “because effective autocratic government prevented terrorization and mob action”.

Summarizing, it may be said that medieval and early modern Italy was certainly not totally immune to anti-Jewish prejudice – there was, for example, persecution in Ferrara in 1581 – but it was not as systematic or as deeply ingrained as almost everywhere else in Christendom. It is a question of scale, and on a sort of medieval “F-scale” Italians scored very low. Sunshine and shadows naturally continued to exist. Next to Roman obscurantism and the intolerance of the Spanish dominated areas, and the relatively mild discrimination of the Veneto, there is Tuscany, and particularly Livorno. Nowhere in eighteenth-century Europe, not even in Amsterdam or London, did Jews enjoy a liberty of movement and action as in that town. It is a moot question whether Livorno (Leghorn) or Naples is the more typical for the Italian attitude, although the fact that the former is a place without outside interference would give it perhaps the palm of victory.

The Failure of Terrorization: Liberal and Fascist Italy

The civil emancipation which elsewhere resulted in cantankerous debates, and, as Rürup has demonstrated, prepared the soil for the coming of modern racist anti-Semitism, by raising the social issues, that in later debates played so nefarious a role, was in Italy relatively unproblematic. To be sure, the first phase during the French Revolution and Napoleonic epoch was accompanied by some violence, and the Restoration implied the status quo ante in the Ecclesiastical State, Bourbon-held Italy, Modena, and temporarily Piedmonte, but in the Lombardo-Veneto region the Patent of Toleration of Joseph II was applied. In Parma, and above all in Tuscany, of old conditions were extremely good, amounting to factual equality.

The kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont) followed suit, once it had assumed the role of Italy’s unifier under the leadership of Cavour, who was a foremost champion of Jewish rights like all leaders of the Risorgimento wherein
Jews actively participated. He promoted everywhere the cause of liberalism and freedom, which was achieved with the final unification. In the new Kingdom of Italy, after some legalistic quibbling, full equality was unreservedly accepted without any of the social repercussions as took place elsewhere.

There was no anti-Semitic movement in late nineteenth-century Italy. This is all the more remarkable, because, as has been noted before, Italy had its share of the socioeconomic problems that elsewhere stimulated the new hatred. The presupposed conditions for the growth of a functional stereotype were never met to a sufficient degree. (The difficulty, of course, is how to establish what is a sufficient degree.) Terrorization seems to be lacking entirely and social distance, expressed in the formula of the appendix, was never anywhere near infinity. Two elements of the “dead reckoning” are lacking.

Had there existed in Italy a functional stereotype, which, somehow inexplicably, was not able to express itself during the liberal period, one would then expect political anti-Semitism to have emerged during the Fascist period, for if ever there was a period when Italy was a hotbed of potential anti-Semitism, it was then. To a very large extent the constituent factors of Italian fascism were comparable to those creating the modern anti-Semitic ideologies in France, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere. Italy was sufficiently industrialized to channel the discontent of the workers into a mighty socialist movement which threatened the established order, and yet sufficiently traditional to develop a petty bourgeois radicalism. There was the resentment of the old crafts being jeopardized by modern industry and commerce, so typical of the trans-Alpine anti-Semitic movements. Italy knew the uprooting effects of very rapid urbanization, which elsewhere fostered anti-Semitism, perhaps more than any other country in so far as particularly in the South, such towns as Naples, Palermo, and Catania grew into vast agglomerations, which without commensurate means of employment of the immigrants became pockets of mass poverty. Italy had had its share of agrarian distress due to export difficulties of fruit, olives, and wine – the disastrous loss of the French market for cheap wines due to French retaliation when Italy formed the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria is an example. Such agrarian distress resulted in that very mass indebtedness, that large number of executions of farm and rural poverty which gave impetus to the anti-Semitic movements north of the Alps.

The Italian fascist social protest shared with the rekindled anti-Semitic movements elsewhere the frustration of postwar difficulties, the resentment of unemployment, the fear of Bolshevism, and the aversion to liberal policies. It had the same propensity to violence. In ruthlessness of street fighting
and beating up of socialists, communists or other opponents, the *fasci di combattimento* and the *squadre d’azione* were the equals of the Nazi brownshirts, and more than a match for the *camelots du Roi* of the Action Française, or similar organizations.\(^{150}\) Italian fascism knew the same characteristic contempt for or hatred of women and the feminist movement\(^ {151}\) – almost always a corollary of racist attitudes – as its anti-Semitic counterparts in Germany and Austria, which before World War I were already characterized by a detestation of the feminist movement. It knew the same nationalist frenzy, the same militarism, the same inherent mass emotionalism which was as carefully staged and orchestrated as in Nazi Germany. It was as much the enemy of independent working class organization as National Socialism. It shared this with the Dolfusz-led inheritants of Lueger’s anti-Semitic Christian Social movement in Austria, who violently destroyed all working class organization in Austria in 1934.\(^ {152}\) It was perhaps even racist in its subjugation of the Arabs in Libya, finally achieved in 1930 by Badoglio.\(^ {153}\) Poison gas was used. There were concentration camps. Hostages were taken and towns starved into submission. This is not gainsaid by Mussolini in 1937, in order to spite the English, beginning to pursue a pro-Arab policy. He had himself proclaimed “Protector of Islam”.\(^ {154}\) Fascism was racist in its justification of using poison gas against the Ethiopians and in its ruthless suppression of resistance, ending with the execution of Ras Desta Demtu\(^ {155}\) and its “apartheid” policies. In short, while it knew most of the constituent elements of what elsewhere became violently anti-Semitic movements, it was itself never really anti-Semitic before 1938, even though early attempts to introduce anti-Semitic doctrines were made.

An Italian version of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion was published in 1921 by an ex-priest, Giovanni Preziosi. It had virtually no repercussions until 1938, when a not very consistent racially anti-Semitic policy was finally adopted. Preziosi played a minor role in the German-controlled Fascist republic after 1943. In 1944 Mussolini made him against his will “Inspector of Race”. He only did this because Preziosi blackmailed him by sending a copy of a letter complaining about Mussolini’s slackness in combating the “Judaico-Masonic” plot to Hitler.\(^ {156}\)

The strongest impetus towards anti-Semitic tenets traditionally came from sections of the Roman Catholic press. For a short while in the years 1870-1880, *La Voce della Verità* and *Civiltà Cattolica*, wholly in the spirit of the Syllabus Errorum, blamed all the evils of the modern age on the Jews, but their articles had more repercussions in Germany where, inspiring the anti-Bismarck “Germania” articles written during the *Kulturkampf* and later the
Kreuzzeitling. La Voce launched an anti-Semitic campaign. Likewise the Jesuit-edited Civiltà Cattolica, disseminating since 1884 a more or less traditional, that is, non-racist, but violently anti-liberal, and anti-Masonic anti-Semitism, inspired by Roman Catholic anti-Semitism from France and Austria, had more repercussions in these countries than in Italy itself. There may have been some other abortive attempts before 1938 when Paolo Orsino, at Mussolini’s suggestion, published his anti-Semitic Gli ebrei in Italia. This book does indeed create the impression of being made to order. It contains all the clichés, such as Jews being sponsors of Marxism and anarchism, always subversive, promoters of Freemasonry, positivism, who are however totally uncreative, but guided by a sense of superiority. The book was well received by the Gleichgeschaltet Italian press. It clearly was the opening move of the anti-Semitic campaign which started that same year: 1938.

Mussolini himself had never cherished strongly anti-Semitic feelings, although he was furious when daughter Edda wanted to marry a Jew. Jews, and particularly Jewish women like Angelica Balakoff and Margaritha G. Sarfatti, his biographer, who had a great influence on him in his Marxist as well as in his Fascist days, belonged to his intimates. As late as 1932 a somewhat opportunistic Jew, Guido Jung, became Minister of Finance – the argument was that Jews know how to handle money – the year he declared his opposition of anti-Semitism when interviewed by Emil Ludwig. At the Fiera de Levante on 7 September 1934, he referred with scorn to anti-Semitic ideas as doctrines upheld by the descendants of those trans-Alpine people who could not yet write at the time Rome saw Caesar, Vergil, and August. In a conversation with Nathan Goldman on 22 November 1934, he called Hitler a Dummkopf and Schwätzer. This was, of course, just after the abortive Nazi coup in Vienna when German-Italian relations were strained.

The Concordate of 1929, which made Roman Catholicism the religion of the Italian state, did not prevent a declaration of full liberty of conscience and religion for all non-Catholics, in which Jews were explicitly included. In 1933 Jewish-German refugees were given right of asylum, an example many democratic countries did not follow a couple of years later.

Right from the start there were good relations with a substantial part of the Jewish community. Five Jews participated in the founding of the first fascia of Milan in March 1919, 230 participated in the “March on Rome”, Jews were member of the PNF (Partito Nazionale Fascista) and admitted to the Gran Consiglio del Fascismo. Mussolini founded a nautical school for Jews in Civitavecchia (the basis for the present-day Israel navy). Though there were thus on the one hand strong indications of lack of anti-Semitism in the
Fascist movement, on the other hand Bolshevism from the outset was described as Jewish, and Mussolini prophesied that it would lead to a mass pogrom. Fascism was on the whole strongly anti-Zionist – Italian Jews who wanted to be Italians had nothing to seek there – except when typically opportunist support of Zionism served an anti-English policy.\textsuperscript{167} Indicative of a naive belief in Jewish financial power verging on anti-Semitism, to put it mildly, was Mussolini’s sincere indignation when, as he saw it, Jewish international organizations were unwilling to achieve the abolishment of the League of Nations’ sanctions against Italy. He interpreted that as ungratefulness, for they could easily have done so, had they wanted to.\textsuperscript{168}

This on the whole friendly but wavering attitude changed rather suddenly into its opposite. A well-prepared anti-Semitic agitation was set afoot, followed by discriminatory legislation. How can this sudden reversal be accounted for? The easiest answer is German pressure after the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and closer alliance with Germany. Yet there is no evidence of official German pressure, and the matter was not discussed during the earlier Hitler-Mussolini talks. There was indirect pressure, however, exerted by German institutions in Italy.\textsuperscript{169} Very often, even by Mussolini himself, it has been argued that the Ethiopian war had made the Fascists more race-conscious. Mussolini was worried about fraternization and miscegenation – no Italian could stay in Ethiopia longer than six months without a wife. ("Per pensare dall’inizio i terribili e non lontani affetti del meticismo disponga che nessun Italiano – militare o civile – può restare piu di sei mesi nel vicereame senza moglie") ("In order to pay attention to the terrible and not distant effects of racial interbreeding right from the start it (the Council) decrees that no Italian – military or civilian – may stay in the vice-kingdom (Abessinia) longer than six months without a wife"). There may have been a link with more specific anti-Jewish racism in the fact that in Ethiopia Italians had to deal with the Falashas, since times immemorial – according to the tradition dating back to the queen of Sheba – native adherents of Judaism. Mussolini spoke about “il contegno pessimo da parte dei nazionale civili e militari nei riguardi delle donne indigene” (the extremely bad demeanor of military or civil members of the nation in the eyes of indigenous women). Demographic concern, the – for the white race – catastrophic decrease of the birthrate, which resulted in premiums for the births, may have played a role,\textsuperscript{170} but most important was the isolation of Italy after the Ethiopian war due to the League of Nations sanctions, and after the intervention in Spain. This all resulted in Italy becoming more closely tied up to Germany;\textsuperscript{171} anti-Semitism could thus be conceived of as means to better cement the alliance.
Roberto Farinacci, Secretary-General of the P.N.F., opportunistically favored such anti-Semitism per rendere totalitaria l’alleanza con la Germania (in order to make that alliance with Germany truly totalitarian).\textsuperscript{172} His opportunism is illustrated by the fact that in the very year 1938, Mussolini had to reprimand him for continuing to employ a Jewish secretary. Ciano wrote in his diary: “Il Duce se la prende con Farinacci che, capo della corrente antisemita, ha una segretaria ebrea: Jole Foà. Gli stranieri possono in un fatto simili riconoscere una prova della poca serietà di carattere di molti Italiani” ("The Duce is angry with Farinacci, who, though leader of the anti-Semitic movement, has a Jewish secretary: Jole Foà. Foreigners can in such a fact see a proof of the frivolous character of many Italians").\textsuperscript{173} Ciano himself, though champion of the German alliance, opposed the anti-Semitic campaign. He is quite explicit about there being no direct German pressure: “Gli ebrei mi caricano di anonime ingiuriose, accusando mi di aver promesso a Hitler la loro persecuzione. Mai i tedeschi ci hanno parlato di questo argomento” (“The Jews anonymously abuse me, accusing me to have promised Hitler to persecute them. Wrong. The Germans have never spoken to us about this problem”). Racist legislation, according to him, was the consequence of pledges made to Germany.\textsuperscript{174}

However this may be, whether through direct or indirect pressure, or keeping up with the Joneses, the reversal came rather suddenly, and the Italian public had to be prepared. Apart from the preparations already mentioned, and a new edition of the Protocols,\textsuperscript{175} the selling of anti-Semitism fell to Telesio Interlandi, who in his journal La difesa della Razza (Defence of the Race) used all the stock-in-trade of internationally developed anti-Semitic catchwords.\textsuperscript{176} Thereafter the Manifesto degli scientiati razzisti (Manifesto of Racist Scientists)\textsuperscript{177} about racism and anti-Semitic legislation was forced through the Gran Consiglio on 6-7 October 1938.

The general preamble has an interesting imperialist touch, as if to underline the autochthonous Italian, un-German character of the legislation:

Il Gran Consiglio del Fascismo, in seguito alla conquista dell’Impero, dichiara l’attualità urgente dei problemi razziali e la necessità di una coscienza razziale. Ricorda che il Fascismo ha svolto da sedici anni e svolge un’attività positiva, diretta al miglioramento quantitativo (the demographic aspect) e qualitativo della razza italiana, miglioramento che potrebbe essere gravemente compromesso, con conseguenze politiche incalcolabili, da incroci e imbastardimenti.

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Il problema ebraico non è che l’aspetto metropolitano di
un problema di carattere generale
(The great council of Fascism, following upon the conquest of
Empire, emphasizes the pressing actuality of racial problems and
the necessity of a racial consciousness. It calls to mind that Fas-
cism has since sixteen years developed and still develops positive
activity aiming at the quantitative and qualitative improvement
of the Italian race; an improvement which could be seriously im-
paired, with incalculable political consequences, by cross-breeding
and bastardization The Jewish problem is but the metropoli-
tan aspect of a problem of more general character). 178

These are the considerations of a racist turned anti-Semitic, and not of an
anti-Semite who uses racist arguments. It could very well be argued that a
colonial Racism – the atrocities in Ethiopia, the factual apartheid – implied
that in 1938 (Munich!) it was virtually impossible to resist Nazi pressure.

Here there is a similarity with the Dutch National Socialist Mussert, as was
shown, who openly opted for anti-Semitism after his journey to Indonesia.
His interpretation of a colonial society made him racist. Once racist he could
no longer resist the anti-Semitic wing of his own party. Even so the measures
were stringent. Marriages of Italians and members of the razza camita, that is,
Ethiopians, and the Semitic and other non-Aryan races were forbidden. Mar-
riages with foreigners were restricted, and white supremacy was introduced
in the colonies: “Dovranno essere rafforzate le misure contro chi attenta al
prestigio della razza nei territori dell’Impero” (“Stronger measures shall
have to be taken against those who discredit the racial prestige in the territo-
ries of the Empire”). 179 The new law charged world Jewry (ebraismo) of being
the hotbed of antifascism, that is, the same Jewry that in Spain stemmed
from Barcelona Bolshevists. It held therefore that entrance of foreign Jews
should be forbidden and that expulsion of undesirables was essential, with
exception of those who were over 65, or were married to Italians. Members of
the Jewish race were considered to be either those who had two Jewish par-
ents, those who had a Jewish father and a foreign mother, or those who of
mixed descent professed the Jewish religion, but not those of mixed descent
who before the first of October 1938 professed another religion than
Judaism. 180 This is, of course, a strange way of legally defining a race, but then
it should be realized that Nazis did not do much better, nor did the South
African authorities. 181 No racist – naturally! – has ever been able to design
consistent race criteria for legislation.
Very strange for self-confessed racists, who by implication accepted racial determinism, were the exceptions made for the families of those killed in action in the Libyan war and in the Ethiopian or Spanish war. The families of volunteers or of the decorated of these wars, the families of those fallen for the Fascist cause, or mutilated fighting for that cause, the families of Party members inscribed between 1919 and 1922 and those of the second half of 1924 and the families of exceptional merit were all excepted. In this respect, of course, the Nazis were far more consistent. Italian citizens of Jewish extraction could henceforward no longer be inscribed as members of the P.N.F., could not own or direct an enterprise employing more than one hundred people, could not own more than 50 hectares of land, and were excluded from military service.\textsuperscript{182} This general law was followed by a great many supporting laws whereby Jews could not hold any public office, and were forbidden to teach at or attend Italian schools. Textbooks written by Jews were outlawed, music composed by Jews could no longer be performed, Jews could not go to hotels, and their telephones were cut off. Jews were robbed of their citizenship by subsidiary laws; Jews of recent naturalization were sent to a concentration camp in Ferramonti, a malarious area near Cosenza.\textsuperscript{183}

Fascists showed themselves to be good pupils of the Nazis, and yet their anti-Semitism continued to have the hollow ring it had from the outset, as is obvious from the provision of the maximal number of employees, or amount of land, a proviso utterly unthinkable in Germany. Sometimes it was downright farcical. Any sincere racist must have laughed at a “racist” legislation which knew a legal procedure of \textit{Arianizzazione} (Aryanization), not of businesses as in Germany, but of persons. This naturally fostered corruption, as did other \textit{discriminazioni} (exemptions).\textsuperscript{184} Despite its ruthlessness, which forced many Italians to emigrate, Italian anti-Semitism had these farcical qualities because it was highly unpopular.

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There are many instances to prove this unpopularity. Many former fascists protested, those lower in the social scale protested the most, but prominent ones like Marinetti, Enzio Garibaldi, and Italo Balbo, Air Marshal and governor of Libya, who protested in the Gran Consiglio and openly sabotaged the anti-Semitic measures in Libya, also complained. In a letter dated 19 January 1939 to Mussolini, Balbo asked him to authorize the government of Libya to apply the racial laws in a manner that suited local conditions. The fascist press with tell-tale frequency complained about the pietisti who could not understand the new measures, referring to them as intelletualoidi and animule temerelle (miserable intellectual lot). Police and Party reports revealed the anti-anti-Semitic mentality, notably from Trieste, the most “Jewish” town, where since Austrian days an anti-Semitic tradition might be expected. There it is written: “Non avendo molti triestini dimenticato la proficua opera svolta dagli ebrei in difesa dell’italianità di Trieste” (“Most people from Trieste have not forgotten the useful work the Jews have done to defend the Italian character of Trieste”). Ciano noted in his diary how popular sentiment was opposed to the anti-Semitic measures; he quotes Borelli, director of the Corriere della Sera, Italy’s most influential and best-informed newspaper: Mi dica che a Milano c’è un’atmosfera pesante. I provvedimenti hanno colpito troppe persone per essere popolari (“He tells me that in Milan there is a somber mood. The measures have hurt too many people to be popular”).

There was even sabotage. Preziosi complained that libraries had either not ordered his books or had hidden them. Many libraries, among them the National Library, did not lend the officially sponsored Difesa della Razza and other books, since they were “lost”. Germans complained about Italian sloppiness.

From a German point of view, things became worse during the war. In the departments of France occupied by the Italian army, Vichy police officials were denied authority. Italian authorities would not allow arrests of Jews. Carabinieri sometimes even arrested too-eager Vichy policemen. Knocher, an S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst) official reported that “Jews and Italians live in the best of harmony”. SS Commander Roethke complained about the Italian Army and police who did their utmost to protect the Jews. He called the Côte d’Azur the “Promised Land”. It was a safe haven, until 1943. Four thousand Jews were saved in Nice. The same held true for Albania. In Athens Italian guards protected the synagogue against Nazi sympathizers. In Thessaloniki the Italian ambassador gave persecuted Jews Italian nationality, as Eichmann angrily noted. The Italian occupied zones of Yugoslavia were safe havens.
Giovanni Palatucci, chief of public security in Fiume, had to pay with his life in Dachau after 1943 for the official protection he had extended to Yugoslav Jewish refugees. In March 1943 Zeitscher, a major of the SS, complained that a great many Jews still served in the Italian army.\textsuperscript{195}

As De Felice remarked, such general sabotage by military and civil officials cannot be explained as individual deeds of generosity. There was no secrecy about it at all. It can only be explained in terms of general ill will of the Italian population.\textsuperscript{196} War-weariness and resistance to the Germans by themselves do not explain an anti-anti-Semitic attitude, as the Polish case sadly illustrates. In combination with a lack of a traditional stereotype they do.

Things grew worse when Germany ruled the Fascist Republic after the Italian capitulation of 1943. Mussolini was a mere puppet in Hitler’s hands and the persecution of the Jews was executed by the German “experts” of the SS. But Jews were helped by the Italian population all over occupied Italy so that at the Eichmann trial a survivor could declare: “Ciascuno di noi ebrei italiani che abbe potuti salvarsi in seguito, deve la sua vita alla popolazione italiana” (“Each one of us Italian Jews who has been able to save himself, owes his life to the Italian people”).\textsuperscript{197} The worst razzia, after 50 kilograms of gold was extorted under pretense that this would buy off deportation, took place on 16 October 1943 in Rome.\textsuperscript{198} The area where most Jews lived was completely cut off by SS troops. Although 1,259 Jews were arrested, (according to Milano 1,024, and to Lapide 1,007) many more (between around 8,500-9,000) escaped because Pius xii ordered all monasteries and convents to harbor as many Jews as they possibly could, and because many citizens gave shelter to the persecuted. Many hospitals took in large numbers of Jewish “patients”.\textsuperscript{199} Many citizens helped Jews to cross over to Switzerland. Figures prove the Italian incapacity to understand racist doctrines: of the roughly 45,000 Italian Jews and 9,000 foreign Jews residing in Italy in 1938 when it all began, 7,495 were deported, of which 610 returned, approximately 5,000 Jews emigrated, and 200 converted to another religion.\textsuperscript{200} Obviously the persecution was against the desires of the majority of the Italian people. Their tolerance accounts for the relatively very low number of victims when compared to other countries (as compared to the Dutch figures, for example); it is gruesome to have to call 7,000 murdered a “relatively low number”. A monument of that tolerance, and a monument of joint Gentile-Jewish suffering, is found in Le Fosse Ordeatine near Rome, where on 24 March 1944, 262 Christians and 73 Jews were killed by the Germans.\textsuperscript{201}

Without in the least trying to minimize this exemplary tolerance, it might yet be asked why it was so much more pronounced in Italy than elsewhere.
cannot be explained with the intrinsically anti-Semitic argument that there were so few Jews in Italy (how many there were before the anti-Semitic measures necessitated a counting is difficult to establish, because due to Risorgimento principles Italian statistics never knew a denomination census). As has been indicated, there is no immediate correlation between the number of Jews and the “amount” (anti-Semitism cannot really be measured) of anti-Semitism, when approximated in the above-mentioned way.  

The vocational structure of Italian Jewry: 22 percent engaged in industry, of which 27 percent as workers, 43 percent in commerce, of which 48 percent *al minuto*; of the roughly 45,000 Jews counted in 1938, very much resembles the occupational structure of Germany or Prussia at the beginning of the century. That therefore cannot be the explanation. Italian Jews were overwhelmingly concentrated in a few towns as they were in other countries: the relative figures show this order: Trieste, Leghorn (Livorno) – of old a very liberal center – Rome, Milan, Venice, Turin, Ancona, Florence, Genova, and Ferrara. By far the greatest number lived in Rome, which in the end did so much to save them.

France, which at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, before and after was strongly anti-Semitic, had about the same number of Jews as Italy: 0.15% of the population, and only slightly more at the time of the Vichy government, which of its own accord instigated anti-Semitic measures.

The only possible solution seems to be that, as in Holland, but for different reasons, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the growth of a functional anti-Jewish stereotype in Italy were never met. Longstanding friendliness – which was evident from the exceptional great number of mixed marriages and a low degree of social distance – prevented even an official fascist terrorization of having that effect. Perhaps it did not last long enough, but it may also have failed because the terrorization was somewhat inconsistent, and sometimes downright farcical. It primarily failed because of the attitude of the Italian population.

**Conclusion**

Human decency existed everywhere. It is not the prerogative of the Italians. Even in Nazi Germany there were people who risked everything to save a Jew. It is known that at the time when Jews were still allowed to use the Berlin underground people would surreptitiously slip an egg or some comparable treasure into the pocket of the proscribed. There were people like Anton
Schmid, a sergeant in the German army who smuggled food, medicines, and even weapons into the Vilna ghetto. He was caught and executed. His wife was harassed by neighbors as the “wife of a traitor”. In Berlin, despite the efforts of Gauleiter Goebbels, 5,000 Jews could survive because they were helped by a multiple of decent Gentiles, risking their own lives, but these were individuals, representative only of themselves.

Perhaps it was more dangerous in Germany to behave decently, and yet it may be doubted whether a difference of scale in the reaction can be reduced to German efficiency and Italian “sloppiness”. Both totalitarian regimes enjoyed mass support.

If anti-Semitic social control was more effective in Nazi Germany, it was because anti-Semitic feeling was over a long period of history less deeply ingrained in Italy. Even though it is true that in a free election Hitler never got more than a third of the votes, that third of the population effectively terrorized the other two-thirds. In Italy where the Party and the Party organizations themselves were wavering, the number of fanatics and the tools at their disposal were too small to terrorize the vast majority. It was so small because for historical and sociological reasons, Jew-hatred had no roots in Italy, since the conditions for its development were never fulfilled.

In all those cases where anti-Jewish traditions were traditionally ingrained, as in the case of Hungary, Romania, and perhaps Croatia, movements analogous to or inspired by Italian fascism took a violently anti-Semitic form. Bulgaria, however, member of the Axis powers, which for reasons analyzed in chapter vi, can with good reason be surmised to have known no strong anti-Semitic tradition, did not follow that pattern. Initially Italian fascism itself rejected racialism on ideological grounds. Perhaps it is justified to say that the sociological conditions presumably required were not met in Italy. Stigmatization for reasons described was confined to very precise limits, social distance, because of the unspecific character of Jewish economic enterprise, was less developed, and permissiveness and popular terrorization, because of the very early development of effective modern states, was given less of a chance. In short, Italians could be more decent because their history made them so, but their attitude being engendered by “objective”, “impersonal” factors, is no reason not to admire them for it.
In 496 a battle against the Alemanni turned the pagan Frankish warlord Clovis into another Constantine. His conversion had effects as lasting as those of his predecessor. His option for orthodoxy spelled doom for the Western Arianism of the Burgondian and Visigoth enemies, and gave new heart to Gallo-Roman Athanasianism, not perturbed by Monophysite or Nestorian quarrels. It therefore fostered the ethnic integration of the realm. Finally, it laid the foundation for that portentous alliance of the growing Frankish kingdom with the Holy See, which in the end would result in the “Latin” religious unity of the whole Transalpine world west of the Tisza.

It was a unity that by implication gave rise to a virtually uniform Jew-hatred, with only marginal local variations and few exceptions. As was submitted earlier, the Greek variety of Christianity was only indirectly to be blamed for this, despite its earlier and more vehement rejection of Jews and Judaism. Russian and Romanian anti-Semitism were, as argued, socially offshoots of the “Latin”, in this case Polish, variety, however much it was stimulated by (Greek) Orthodox rejection.

However, the development of that anti-Semitism was still a long way off by the end of the fifth century. Cordial relations prevailed for a long time to come, and probably only came to an end through the social changes described in the previous chapter.

The Christianity of the newly converted was presumably not more than a thin veneer, imbued with paganism, and hardly affecting their violent habits. It amounted to the exchange of one tribal and martial religion for another: Woden for the Lord of Hosts. It long remained a religion of warriors. “Soldier saints … figured more than God in their piety and in practice differed little from pagan deities.” Possibly because of this martial spirit, Merovingian and Carolingian Christianity had an unmistakable, though selective, Old Testament flavor, manifest in the occasional use of Hebrew biblical names. This was not only inspired by those books in the Bible, glorifying the wars of “God’s People”, but also by the concept of kingship. This was unknown in the
Roman tradition ever since the faraway days of the founding of the Roman republic, but reference to the biblical kings sanctioned their perhaps more sacral than legal authority.\textsuperscript{2,3}

Aniconism, whether or not conceived of as “Judaizing”, hampered indoctrination by visual means, and may thus have contributed to the popular indifference towards Judaism, as it existed in the confusion noted above, similar to the one that once prevailed in Antioch, but still less easily combated because of lack of urban sophistication. It took intricate reasoning to explain to the uninstructed illiterates why the Chosen were not really the Chosen, but would be so again at the end of time, why “Christ-killers” had the special privilege of having their persuasion recognized as the only legitimate non-Christian religion, why what the prophets said, was not what the prophets meant. Intricate reasoning was not the strongest point of Gaul in the Dark Ages.

Intellectual life in the West during the early Middle Ages was at a low ebb, so that it lacked the urban sophistication, engendering the theological bickering which so shook the East, and was not propitious for the Jews. As Le Goff argued, the “Carolingian Renaissance”, innovative indeed from an artistic point of view, could hardly be called intellectual, despite having men like Alcuin. Scrupulous copying was a form of penance, and the elaborate calligraphy, making books scarce and costly, is rather an indication of lack of intellectualism, than proof of it. These beautiful, laboriously produced books, which Charlemagne could not read, were cherished as treasures, on a par with relics, but not for their content.\textsuperscript{4} Intellectual revival, learning, complete with fallacies, sophisms, dogmatism, and by implication the spreading of a theologically rearticulated rejection of Judaism, would not take place before the restoration of urbanity in the vigorous new towns, opened up by commerce for ideas and knowledge of faraway countries and cultures. In that sense too, anti-Semitism is a phenomenon of early town life.

Lack of sophistication in early Medieval Gaul had its precedence. Even during the heyday of the Roman Empire it was sparsely urbanized. Apart from the southernmost part, Narbonensis, it was neither agriculturally – due to inexperience of a non-mediterranean climate – nor in manufacturing strongly developed, though cheap, course Gallic cloth seems to have been competitive on the Roman market.\textsuperscript{5} It was virtually a subsistence economy, and only marginally involved in the Mediterranean commercial system. What there was in the way of towns, were usually small, mostly administrative and military centers. Juvenal scoffed at their attempts to acquire learning.

The devastation of the fifth century, the plunders of Attila and other invaders were not propitious for maintaining what there was in the way of
town life, for the upkeep of philosophical and literary traditions. Gregory of Tours complained bitterly about his lack of education, about his incapacity to write grammatically correct Latin. Under these circumstances what can one expect from the clergy? Certainly not Chrysostom’s rhetoric even in his own day ineffective.

Bishops, as noted, were largely recruited from the Gallo-Roman landowning elite. In fact service in the Church was a way of maintaining their social position, which made them perhaps able administrators, pious, but far from experts in theology. Gregory of Tours is a clear example. Georgus Florentinus – his real name – was a member of an old senatorial family, and not only his grammar, but also his knowledge of doctrine, left much to be desired. It was his piety, his devotion to St. Martin, that caused him to be elected bishop of Tours, not his knowledge. This rustic clergy of doctrinal simplicity maintained the anticommercial labor ethics of the early Church, described above. This had further implications.

It could be surmised that in an overwhelmingly agrarian society, one of the attractions of Christianity was its frequent allusion, in parables and otherwise, to a rural way of life. Since Jews were still to a large extent a landowning group, this meant not only that they were not distinct, but also that it lent them some prestige; possibly a remnant of the prestige evident in the ruling of the Council of Elvira prohibiting the faithful to ask Jews to bless the crops. Such a ruling may have been trespassed upon, like so many other rulings of councils were systematically disobeyed. Therefore, if, as Agus argued, Jews were well organized, were about the only ethnic group that as such was literate, had status, their alleged guilt, (if Matthew xxv 11, 25 at all applied) must have resulted in mitigated, mild, ambivalence. Occasional anger is likely to have been aimed more at Judaic symbols than at Jews, more at – very rare! – destruction of synagogues than at persecution. In later times this was usually coincidental.

What is more curious, however, is that this mild ambivalence was not limited to the lay population, but affected the Merovingian and Carolingian clergy as well. This attitude could be related to the dilemma, disproportionally enlarged by circumstances, of rejection of Judaism and yet realization that “salvation is of the Jews” (John iv, 22). The enormous expansion of Christianity, witnessed by this clergy who were perhaps pious, but unsophisticated and not given to doctrinal quibbling, must have signified to them that the millennium was at hand, which could be brought nearer by the conversion of the Jews.

Expansion was enormous from the late fifth century onwards. The British
Isles were brought within the orbit, reunion with the Irish Church achieved, and Germany converted by English missionaries. After king Recared gave up Arianism, the Iberian peninsula was temporarily won over. The Lombards were converted, the Slavonic world, not yet split by the schism of 1054, joined the *oeicumene*, and so did the Scandinavian world at the end of this period. Admittedly, this expanding Christendom was going to be suffering badly under Muslim attacks as well as Avar, Magyar, and Viking invasions, but to what extent were these invaders conceived of as the “peoples of Gog and Magog” of the Revelation (Rev. xx, 7-10)? Satan’s last vain efforts, part of the troubles of the year 1000, about which Raoul Glaber wrote11 (without blaming the Jews, however).

Under such good augury, with paganism formally wiped out, the conversion of the Jews, the final step to ushering in eternal bliss about to be taken, implied that these people should be approached with respect, in a friendly manner. The rejection of Judaism, however, implied that Jews should not approach the common lay people to spread their wrong interpretations. The aim seems in effect to have been a kind of “semi-permeability”, a qualified segregation resulting in an “osmotic” pressure on behalf of the Church. The greater respect Jews popularly enjoyed, the greater was both the need for stigmatization, and conversely, clerical amiability. The clerical ambivalence thus mirrored the ambivalence of the lay population, and in effect fostered it. For this period an observation by Anchel holds particularly true: “Le Moyen-Age, exclusif dans ses croyances religieuses, a toléré les Juifs. Les autorités ecclésiastiques ou laïques possédaient alors plus de force qu’il ne fallait pour détruire complètement, si elles l’eussent voulu, ces mécréants qui n’étaient ni en nombre, ni en situation de résister.”12

This qualified tolerance, mirroring ambivalence, was presumably based on the idea that “the Chosen”, now reprobates, but at the end of time coming into their own again, ought to be preserved as witnesses of the truth of the Christian faith, was an idea which, according to Baron, was taken much more seriously in the Western Church, since Augustine formulated it, than in that of the East.13

Given the ambivalence, these friendly relations between individual Jews and individual ecclesiastical dignitaries, cannot by themselves be adduced as positive proof of a happy integration, but they do highlight the absence of a persecuting spirit, radiating over the whole population.

The period of happy integration ended when for socio-economic reasons, the lay population, of its own accord, began to take issue with the Jews, and when an intellectually far more advanced clergy had to deal with a situation
in which naïve hopes of the imminent Parousia faded behind the complexities of urban life.

Sidonius Apollinaris (430-88) is a typical early example of the above ambivalence. Frequently using befriended Jews as messengers, he always seems to need an excuse: “one should not condemn this man, for as long as he lives, there is hope”, and “He is a forthright and delightful person”, or “He would be a person very dear to me if he were not a member of the despised sect”. He expresses sincere joy about the conversion of a Jewish friend.¹⁴

Venantius Fortunatus (530-609) praises Hilary of Poitiers (d. 366) in his hagiography for never having had any social intercourse with Jews, not even having greeted them, but adds “quod inter mortals valde videtur difficile” (“What between mortals seems very difficult”).¹⁵ This remark does not only strongly suggest normal social relations in Venantius Fortunatus’ day but also shows his own ambivalence.¹⁶ St. Ferreolus, bishop of Uzès during the years 553-581, is another example. He was on very friendly terms with Jews, eating and drinking with them – forbidden since the Council of Elvira! – in order to win them over. Accused of treason because of his transgression (the hagiographer has somewhat mixed up the dates as he has him eating with Jews and Saracens) he is imprisoned by King Childebert. Liberated after a miracle, he returned to Uzès, and when reinstated, assembled the Jews and told them to choose between baptism or expulsion.¹⁷

Gilbert Crispin and Sigebert of Gembloux won the friendship of Jews because they consulted them on Hebrew texts, as did Rabanus Maurus, abbot of Fulda and bishop of Mainz, in an earlier period. The latter, however, felt obliged to defend himself against the possible accusations that he accepted the Jewish interpretation of the books Chronicles and Kings.¹⁸

Since early times Jews took part in the funerals of bishops with whom they must have been on friendly terms, and who must have treated them fairly and honestly.¹⁹ An early example is Jewish participation in the exequies of Hilary of Arles in 449. They were present in great numbers: “I remember to have heard Hebrew sung at the funeral”, wrote an eye-witness. The reference to the Hebrew language must allude to special honorary prayers.²⁰ Gregory of Tours relates how in the year 551 Jewish mourners with lit torches followed the bier during the funeral procession of Gallus of Clermont.²¹ Gregory sincerely believed that it was a bishop’s duty to care about the salvation of Jews, for he reprimanded bishop Cautinus of Clermont for being on good terms with the Jews: “…not for the sake of (their) salvation, as should have been the anxious concern of a priest…” but to buy costly spices. Because they flattered him, he allegedly paid higher prices than was necessary. There is no mention,
however, of Jews taking part in Cautinus’ funeral procession. Gregory himself tried to convert a distinguished Jewish courtier, Priscus, whom he befriended.

Later examples of Jewish participation in obsequies of church dignitaries are the funerals of Walthard of Magdeburg (1012), of bishop Adalbero II of Metz, of Bardo of Mainz and that of Anno of Cologne (1075), for whom, according to the Christian authors, prayers were actually said in the synagogues. In describing these events, the authors always expressed some malevolent astonishment. The *Vita Annonis*, for example, described how prayers were said in the synagogues of these very enemies of Christ. Constantine, the biographer of Adalbero II of Metz (984-1004) writes that Adalbero was mourned even by these Jewish enemies of our religion; the ambivalence is always there, but is resigned, and never inciting.

There is no reason to assume that only business associates of these ecclesiastical dignitaries took part in these funerals. Although it is true, as Agus demonstrated, that Jews frequently acted as financial advisers and administrators, and in this quality often developed true friendships with their clients, there cannot have been too many of these associates.

Internal Jewish legislation, as Agus has also demonstrated on the basis of *Responsa* literature (answers given by learned Jews on problems of Jewish internal life) ruled that such positions were considered monopolies. According to the law of Maarifa (Roth spells it Maarffiya) or the “law of the exclusive customer”, a Jew had no right to enter into negotiations with the customer of another Jew. Once the community had recognized such a business relationship, it had a duty to see to it that the law was kept, for example, by refusing a newcomer right of settlement. He should try his luck elsewhere; medieval *Nahrungspolitik*. If business associates alone had been involved in mourning bishops, there would have been very few participants. Participation in greater numbers therefore suggests another type of relationship, one based on mutual respect. In the case of Anno, who shortly before he died ordered his administrators to see to it that all his debts to both Christians and Jews were paid, Jews had no business interests to justify their presence at his funeral. Real friendship is also indicated by a letter of Salomo II of Constance to Wilgar of Augsburg, in which he wrote that the Jews loved him.

Friendliness was not the only attitude. In fact the whole situation is very opaque. Friendliness mixed with rejection, alternates with passing, somewhat incoherent anger, and vehement bellicosity, to which no heed was paid.

A rather enigmatic story, told by Gregory of Tours and Venantius Fortunatus, is indicative of some bad feeling. In 576 bishop Avitus of Clermont had fi-
inally succeeded in winning over one Jew, who as catechumen, took part in the Easter procession. An angry Jew poured rancid oil over the renegade—he obviously believed that he would get away with it. Angry bystanders made to throw stones at him, but the bishop prevented them. However, on Ascension Day, the populace destroyed the synagogue, upon which the bishop expelled to Marseilles all the Jews not prepared to be converted. It was said that five hundred Jews were then baptized.

It is far from clear why it should take some six weeks before popular wrath exploded. Perhaps there was no connection at all. Perhaps, the whole event being rather exceptional, it was due to a specific tension in Clermont related to Avitus’ predecessor Cautinus squandering so much money. Bishop Avitus obviously did not condone persecution, but he may have read the destruction as a sign; a sign of what? Divine intervention? The inadvisability for Jews to stay in Clermont? Who were the perpetrators? Monks, as in Callinicum, and in other places, such as Dertona in northern Italy, in the fourth century, where there were no repercussions?

There is another example of a synagogue being destroyed during the Merovingian period. About the circumstances leading to its destruction, nothing is known. It is mentioned in Gregory of Tours’ description of a visit by king Guntram to Orleans in 585. He was greeted by the population in their various languages, and Jews also participated in the general laudation. But Guntram was angry with them. He accused them of hypocrisy, saying that they only praised him in order to obtain public means for the rebuilding of their synagogue, which had some time previous been destroyed by Christians. That was the issue, not the restoration itself, though it was formally forbidden in the Codex Theodosii. Another interesting feature is the fact that Jews seemingly had easy access to the king, for the above remark was made at a common meal.

Both episodes do not argue against relative social integration, but confirm—an as yet only marginally effective—stigmatization.

If on an individual level church dignitaries adopted a wavering attitude towards the Jews, with cordial personal relations perhaps a little on the sly, this did by no means imply that the Church as an institution hesitated. The justifications and self-vindications prove that friendly clerics were acutely aware of, and feared a contrary opinion, and that to some extent they subjected themselves to its control. When in 937 Archbishop Frederic of Mainz hesitatingly asked Leo vii for advice, the Pope answered that it was perfectly legitimate to expel Jews when they refused baptism. However, when Agobard and Amulo began their theologically consistent attacks, these fell on deaf ears.
Ecclesia et Synagoga

The opaqueness, the confused medley of sometimes contrary opinions and policies, both secular and ecclesiastical, can be partly explained by the difficulty of propagating a coherent body of rejectionist beliefs, sanctioned by authority. A fortiori, an impervious, doctrinally uninstructed lay population, was difficult to reach, certainly when the clergy were not united, and many wavered. “Jamais la théologie ne se confondit moins avec la religion véritablement sentie et vécue.”

How could doctrine be taught to illiterates? Not through the Mass, but by the spoken word, by sermons and by pictorial means. As regards the spoken word, it is obvious that in an overwhelmingly rural society of small parishes, manned by a hardly literate lower clergy, it was far more difficult to reach vast masses than in Chrysostom’s time of urban concentration, or in that of the later Middle Ages. As regards the pictorial means, it is hardly conceivable that in the many isolated small parish churches of such a poor society, there were little more than the most elementary paintings and sculptures, before the heyday of Romanesque art in the twelfth century, after economic revival had set in. Pictorial narration, moreover was hampered by the above-mentioned aniconic tendencies.

Moreover, a peculiarity of the few items of Merovingian, Carolingian, or Ottonian church art related to Judaism, is that they hardly seem to be indoctrinating. The artefacts, often executed in costly materials such as ivory, have the characteristic of treasures, like relics, only beneficial by inference. “Ecclesia et Synagoga” representations of this period are markedly different from those of the twelfth century and later, which were highly indoctrinating and easily accessible to the public. In those later ages Ecclesia was depicted as a beaming, crowned princess, bearing the chalice to receive Christ’s blood. Synagoga was rendered as a blindfolded woman, with bent head, clutching the broken Stone Tablets, her crown falling from her head, and her staff broken. Often, in order to make the message quite clear, Ecclesia is depicted as being gently impelled forward by the Archangel Gabriel, while Synagoga is led away by the Devil, or shot in the eye. An alternative has the Snake coiled round her neck and covering her eyes. Another topic is Synagoga attacking the Lamb, but with her spear splintered in the effort. Similar ideas are expressed by depicting Synagoga as the half-blind Leah (Gen.xxix,17).

Nothing of the kind is found in earlier art. There, Ecclesia and Synagoga are usually portrayed as two women almost equal in appearance, standing in almost complete symmetry right and left of the cross. Only there is no full
equality because Christ is looking to the right and “Luna”, the weak light, is
over Synagoga, while “Sol” the full brightness of truth, is over Ecclesia. It may
be assumed that “left” still had the connotation of “sinister”; a biblical foun-
dation for this could be Matthew xxv, 31 and following.

Nevertheless the inequalities are so subdued that a casual observer might
easily be deceived into thinking that the artefacts in fact depicted “Concordia
Veteris et Novi Testamenti”, as the intention seems to have been. They might
even be expressing the hope for final unification. This would tally with the
Old Testament flavor mentioned above, and the heightened dilemma of re-
jection and salvation.

In later ages there would have been no question of such confusion, in the
abundant, accessible, and varied works of art; the various indoctrinating
themes are highly distinguishable, but Concordia and Conversion are con-
spicuously absent. An exception is the retable of of the Lamb of God by Jan
van Eyck, in the St. Bavo church in Ghent. L. Dequequer has convincingly ar-
gued that this is not a Concordia, but that it depicts living Judaism, about
to accept Jesus as the Messiah. The end of the Great Schism (1378-1417) raised
high hopes, not only of the reunion of all Christianity, but also of the conver-
sion of the Jews. The donor was a converted Jew. However, the very fact that
Jan van Eyck, in the Fountain of Life (Prado, Madrid), conventionally depicts
the Jews as the condemned, shows that he knew his iconography.39

Why did the Ghent ecclesiastical authorities accept such a piece, which in
its lettering, shows an intimate knowledge of Judaism, and even Cabbalism?
The answer given, is that there were no Jews in Ghent at that time. Why
would the painting have been banned, if there had been Jews? Fear that they,
stubbornly spreading their pernicious interpretations, would have prevent-
ed the dream from coming true? Given that in general at the time Jewish-
Gentile relations were extremely bad, the chances of Judaizing were negli-
gible. According to that reasoning, one would have expected representations of
the harsher kind in the earlier period, when chances of Judaizing were very
real.

Another possible explanation is that ecclesiastical authorities were bend-
ing over backwards to follow the mood of the faithful in order to avoid too-
great discrepancies. In that case, Ghent could afford a “conversion” piece,
provided Jews had not been recently expelled, whereas Strasbourg cathedral,
to mention one example, would have a very explicit Ecclesia and Synagoga in
its portal frieze. Yet another possibility is that in the early Middle Ages, the au-
thorities were more concerned about remnants of paganism – the drunken
bouts of the “guilds” and Bodo’s way of making merry – than about Jewish in-

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fluences. Paganism could be best combated by showing the whole unfolding of the Divine Plan, and then Concordia’s with Ecclesia et Synagoga elements, or the other way round, were appropriate.

Moreover, this tallies with the fact that before the first crusade, there were no attempts at caricature, no efforts to develop a specifically Jewish physiognomy, as in later periods. Since presumably this was a liberty which the artists had within the strict ecclesiastical control of the theological correctness of the works of art, it seems justified to argue that artists, in so far as they depicted Jews at all, depicted the social status quo, just as they did in later ages, when they depicted accepted heroes of the Old Testament, and prophets, wearing the Jew hat or rouelle. It is submitted that in the former case that status quo was one of near integration.40

Merovingian and Carolingian society could easily absorb Jews: they had a loose social structure, their economy was not widely diversified, they were ethnically and legally pluriform, each group had its own law, and they were not heavily religiously indoctrinated. Despite the not very articulate religious ambivalence, this absorption amounted to such overall social integration as was seldom achieved before and rarely ever since. The Dark Age Frankish realm thus provides an excellent starting point – a near “zero” situation – for gauging the growth of prejudice and stereotyping under the impact of a social change as surmised above, and ever-more articulated ecclesiastical stigmatization.

**What is meant by integration?**

A group can be considered to be integrated in society when neither its members nor the members of other groups of that society inappropriately attach meaning to its group-specific and group-determining characteristics, and when jointly with others are forming yet other groups with as diversified social roles and functions as the state of development of society permits, resulting in maximally diversified but frequent interaction. There is an inappropriate attaching of meaning when said characteristics, in no way related to the ends, functions, and norms of the joint groups are nevertheless taken into consideration. In the discussion of medical problems among the staff of a hospital, it is immaterial whether some of the participating members of staff are Jewish, black, or whatever. In the case of less than full integration it is important.
Conceived in this way, integration can be more than tolerance, since this can mean giving no effect to distinctions which are considered to be meaningful. Tolerance need not necessarily imply maximal open interaction. Integration is the reverse of a discriminating situation. There real or assumed characteristics are always, whatever the situation, considered to be meaningful, both by the members of the minority group and their antagonists. The former, more often than not, react or, as the case may be, feel forced to behave as members of that group, even when in the given situation, this is inappropriate. They rarely forget, or are allowed to forget that they are members of a spurned group. Even when not under pressure their insecurity forces their hand. Their behavior assumes for example the form of cringing, or an over-compensating form of self-assertiveness, both often expressed by their hardly conscious body language: seeming shiftiness or smart aleck behavior, which reinforces the prejudice in the antagonists. In such a case, the Jewish or black physician in the above-mentioned staff meeting, is not allowed to forget that he is Jewish or black.

Evidence for substantiating early medieval integration is found in clerical complaints of this situation, and in more direct sources. An example of the former is the complaint of Julian of Toledo in 673. Because of the prevalent friendly relations between Jews and Christians, he called the kingdom of the Franks “a brothel of blaspheming Jews”. Equally telling is an angry letter to the Archbishop of Narbonne by Pope Stephen II (768-772), complaining about the fact that with the consent of the Frankish kings these rebellious Jews have the right to hereditary ownership of lands – *allodia* – which are scattered between the lands of the Christians – quasi *incolae Christianorum* – and that these Christians even work these lands for the Jews. (In the light of the above suppositions concerning Jewish land tenure, it should perhaps be emphasized that the Pope uses the Germanic word *allodia.*) This mingling of Jews and Christians is nefarious, he writes, for Christians cohabiting with these Jews, and failing in their duty, are day and night stained by the blasphemous words of these Jews.

Finally, there are the complaints of the Archbishops of Lyons, Agobard (774-840) and his successor Amulo, exceptions to the ambivalence alluded to above. With bellicose vehemence they wage a crusade against the ungodliness of contemporary society, manifest in the cordial relations between Jews and Christians, even up to the imperial court, and in the positions of honor, influence and power that Jews enjoy. Their overall indictment thus evokes a picture of happy Jewish-Christian symbiosis, of de facto integration.

Agobard was in many ways an enlightened spirit, objecting to trial by or-
deal of water and fire, opposing magic, and rejecting the belief in witchcraft. The supremacy of the Church and strict obedience to its rules was of paramount interest. Courageous, he was not afraid of picking a quarrel with the Emperor, when the interest of the Church as he saw it, demanded it.

It started with Agobard’s attempt to try and convert Jewish children, and Jewish-owned pagan slaves – baptism entailed an automatic loss of slaves – methods unacceptable to Emperor Louis. The conflict escalated when Agobard participated in a rebellion of 833: he was divested of his office, but later reinstated.43

In many writings, he defended his position.44 In one of them he harped on the fact that the Prophets and John the Baptist had called Jews names and that Jesus himself spoke of them as a brood of vipers. Therefore he resented what he saw as imperial laxity and its Judaizing result. In his opinion, Jews ought to lead a humble existence, separated from Christians. But no, they intermingle, and drink and eat together, which is forbidden by the Church. In a typical comment on 1 John 11,22, he writes that Jews are the Antichrist, and then continues, “But who can dine with the Antichrist, and yet assert to be following Christ?”45 Their nefarious influence goes so far, that wine grown by Jews and defiled by them on purpose, is used for the Holy Eucharist. (The “defiling” is probably based on a misunderstanding of the Jewish prescript that even the choicest wine is no longer kosher when touched by a non-Jew; the prescript is related to fear of pagan libations). The charge was repeated by Amulo. They sell improper meat from cattle reared by themselves. (He probably did not realize that Jewish communities were as a rule too small to consume a whole ox or a cow before the meat spoiled, and that they therefore had to sell kosher meat to the Gentiles, presumably at reduced prices. In later ages such meat had to be sold in the area of the market where meat of diseased animals was sold at very low prices.46 The bishops complain about Christians who work for Jews in their houses, as well as in their fields.47 “These Christians”, both bishops assert, “are so much under the influence of Jews, that they maintain that rabbis read a better sermon than Christian preachers, and hence they keep the sabbath but work with them on Sundays”. The bishops accuse Jews of using their – illegal – position as tax collectors to lure poor Christians into apostasy by remittance of debt.48 “These Jews,” they write, “receive against prevailing laws permission to build new synagogues. The emperors, because of the Patriarchs, are so much under their influence, that Jews have all sorts of privileges. Some wives of Jews wear costly garments, presents from ladies at the court.49 Their insolence knows no bounds.” Agobard wrote “De insolentia Judaeorum”.50 Did he coin the phrase “Jewish inso-
lence”? “Frech” was the most common epithet in German anti-Semitic literature. Amulo tried – in vain – to enforce segregation in his own diocese.51

Is the resentment of Jewish wealth and well-being a harbinger of future economic charges, as has been suggested? This can be doubted. The bishops did not accuse the Jews of usury. Their verdict contains no element of social protest. It was not the way some Jews had obtained their wealth that was so obnoxious to them. The hurt was caused by the fact that these infidel Jews undeservedly had it all at their disposal. Their representation of Jewish riches – landed wealth! – always is such that it does not have the liquid assets necessary for money-lending. That same wealth in Christian hands would have raised no objections.

Are these complaints exaggerations and fantasies from two sulking old men who picked a quarrel with the emperor and lost, or do they describe an actual state of affairs? The picture the bishops evoke, the very opposite of outcasts, can be corroborated by direct evidence.

**Jews ethnically identical**

The concept of integration belies the notion that Jews were a recently immigrated, alien group. In actual fact they were a fully autochthonous, familiar group, which, due to former and still ongoing miscegenation and proselytism, had various family ties with other groups, encouraging interaction. From at least the first century, the southern parts of Gaul were inhabited by Jews. Nothing definite is known about it, but in all probability the first settlers were manumitted slaves, soldiers in Roman service and migrants from northern Italy or Spain.52 There is also some evidence for the existence of a Jewish community in Roman Trier and other places along the German frontier, also known as the “limes”.53

According to tradition, Jewish slave girls were given to soldiers of the “limes”, who did not object to their offspring being reared in the Jewish faith.54 Their communities, which in these regions like everywhere else in the Roman Empire were probably the first nuclei of Christianity, must have grown through proselytism.55 If bishops in the fourth century were still being recruited from the local Christian communities, the fact that a former Jew was consecrated seventh bishop of Metz in 350 AD could indeed only be an indication of long-standing Jewish residence.56 More certain positive evidence is contained in the letters of the Emperor Constantine in 321 and 331 to the “decurions” of Cologne, whereby the hitherto valid exception of all Jews to be
nominated to the “honorary” office of “decurion” was rescinded. This implied that Jews were now also held responsible for the collecting of taxes and hence were expected to pay out of their own pockets the taxes they failed to collect. An exception was made only for the leaders of the community. A similar measure was enforced in 383: Jews could no longer claim exemption from the office of decurion. If those emperors were motivated by the same considerations as the Emperor Justinian was later in the East, these rulings contain a certain indication, not only of the prosperity of the Jewish community, based on the possession of land, since the amount of land owned was the criterion for nomination, but also of long-standing residence.

Because of miscegenation, Jews were genetically indistinguishable from the other pre-invasion population. They were also indistinguishable in speech. As old residents they spoke the vernacular. This is an argument for integration not invalidated by the consideration that in nineteenth-century Europe, after centuries of hate formation, the fact that Jews spoke the lingua franca of the diverse countries did not prevent anti-Semitism. Jews did not only use the vernacular for daily communication, but also in religious gatherings, so that there was nothing secretive about them. How else could uneducated lay Christians have listened to their sermons, as the bishops alleged they did, if these were read in an incomprehensible language? Even if the allegations of the bishops were unfounded, the very fact that they thought it possible, leads to the same conclusion. Apparently Hebrew, the later “sorcerer’s language”, was initially used little in the West. In contradistinction with the East, where Hebrew inscriptions began to oust Latin and Greek ones in synagogues as early as the sixth century, the West long maintained the tradition of using the vernacular, as had begun with the Septuagint.

Even Hebrew scholars used French glosses to make the sacred texts more understandable for their contemporaries. Revival of Hebrew and Talmudic scholarship with the famous schools of Troyes and Mainz did not begin much before the tenth or eleventh century. In earlier times there was so little alien about the Jews, who so often had the same Gallo-Roman, Germanic, or Latinized names as Gentiles, that specification was needed to indicate where a Jew was in question. Names like Amantus, Lullus, Priscus, Salpingus, Sigeric, Theodorus, and many others were common to both Jew and Christian, who both also used Old Testament names like Jacob, Jonathan, Judith and so forth, as would centuries later only be customary in Puritan, Protestant countries. From the eleventh century onwards Jews would increasingly use names of Hebrew origin, whereas Christians would only use biblical names of specifically Christian significance, like Paul, Joseph, Martha, or Magdalene.
Legal status

In modern times, full integration requires a minimum absence of any legal limitations for Jews, or full emancipation, which seems a necessary condition, but no guarantee for full integration, even though it could be argued that restriction of civil liberties for Jews, imposed by the government, but not approved by the population at large, does not prevent social integration. This apparently was the case in Fascist Italy, and the Roman Empire after Constantine, when restrictions of the Codex Theodosii began to be imposed; an integration attacked by Chrysotom.

The equivalent of an “emancipation” situation in a society with a pluralistic legal system based on privilege and ethnically specific legislation (Franks having a law different from Gallo-Romans), would be the absence anywhere within the system of any restrictions specifically for Jews, and not applicable to non-Jews. Restrictions which some Jews share with some non-Jews, matter no more than some Jews having privileges which some non-Jews did not have.

Obviously, such a situation did not occur, for there was legislation exclusively aimed at Jews. However, it could be argued that when such legislation was not enforced, there was de facto “emancipation”, or that if enforced to some extent, an unwilling and uncooperative population at large, could yet create a factual social integration. A badly equipped administration, lacking the means of control, could hardly prevent this.

Ever since Caracalla’s edict, Jews, as former Roman citizens on a par with all free residents of the pre-invasion provinces of the Empire, west of the “limes” belonged to the group where Roman law held sway. In Carolingian times, though, the rule began to be established that for litigation among themselves the Rabbinical courts of Mosaic law were to be considered competent.65

The Codex Theodosii, as being codification of Roman law, contained a number of special laws pertaining to Jews. So did the initial Canon Law in the form of rulings for councils and synods. There were undoubtedly de jure a great many restrictions for Jews, but law enforcement fell short of their aims. Jews held office, new synagogues were built, proselytism did continue, often unimpeded, marriages did take place, Jews had the right to bear arms, Germanic law vendettas were fought, involving Jews. Though not mentioned in the wergild regulations, in cases of manslaughter, Jews were paid the wergild for Romans, that is, for those subject to Roman Law.66
A great many rulings of councils and synods regarding the Jews in matters such as commensality, and the prohibition to be outdoors during Holy Week, had to be re-iterated again and again, presumably because they were regularly, if not systematically ignored. All the various elements mentioned are found in the famous Priscus story, as related by Gregory of Tours. The Jew Priscus was purveyor of spices to the court of Chilperic I (561-584), and as such, on very good terms with the king. He was also mint master in Chalons-sur-Saône. On a certain day he met the king and Gregory of Tours in Nogens sur Marne. The purpose of the visit is not mentioned. Was it social? The king ordered Gregory to baptize Priscus, who, however, refused to be baptized. There ensued a theological discussion with no other result than that each participant became more firmly entrenched in his own convictions. The king seemed to accept that for the time being. However, a year later, he once more ordered the baptism of a group of Jews. He himself acted as godfather to a number of them, without however caring too much about their progress, for many relapsed into the old faith. Priscus was among those the king ordered to be baptized. He refused for the second time. Upon being incarcerated by the irate king, he asked for postponement, which was granted. Once freed, he became involved in a violent quarrel with a convert, Phatir, one of the godsons of King Chilperic, “quia iam regis filius erat ex lavacro”, who killed Priscus and his companions on their way to say prayers. Phatir was able to do the murder, Gregory said, because Priscus was on his way to the synagogue – “orario praecinctus,” that is, dressed in a stole, by which he must have meant the tallith – and was thus unarmed (“nullum in manu fere ns ferramentum…”). Gregory thereby indicated that it was only on account of religious prescripts that Priscus went unarmed, and that Phatir knew full well that Priscus would have been armed under any other circumstances. In the scuffle which followed, Phatir and his servants sought asylum in the Basilica of St. Julien le Pauvre. Phatir, though granted amnesty by the king, fled to Burgundy, where he was killed while fighting it out in the style of the day, with Priscus’ relatives. One of the servants, condemned to death by the king, was lynched by the Paris mob on leaving the church.

This story tells us something about the social standing of Jews. The king is not likely to have been godfather to Jews who were far beneath him socially, and the “lynching” of the murderer of a Jew by a Parisian mob does not suggest a very strong anti-Jewish feeling. The story is not about an isolated event, for all elements in it are found elsewhere as well.
Right to bear arms and be mounted

The right to bear arms is a good indication of social standing in a society which measures a man’s position in terms of military rank.

Jewish aid in the defense of Naples against Belisarius is not the only example of Jewish warlike activity, for they also fought against the Lombards and participated in local wars throughout the period leading up to the Crusades. Narbonne Jews were given special privileges because of their substantial help in the war against the Muslims. Jews participated in the war of Otto 11 against the Greeks and Saracens in Calabria in 982. One of the participating Jews, a certain Kalonymus – a forebear of the famous Mainz family of that name – is reputed to have saved the emperor, to whom he was very close, by lending him a horse, thereby enabling him to reach the ship that brought him to safety. (This proves that Jews were still mounted, in itself a proof of social standing – a privilege, by the way, denied to their brethren in the Byzantine Empire, according to the testimony of the twelfth-century Jewish traveller Benjam on of Tudela – Jews in Worms fought together with the other citizens of the town on the side of Emperor Henry IV against the Saxon rebels.) The emperor showed his gratitude in 1074 by remitting both Gentile and Jewish citizens of a tribute they were accustomed to pay.

In 1084, military service is emphasized in the privilege granted by bishop Rüdiger, nicknamed Huozman, to the Jews of Speyer, (“Vigilias, tuiciones, municiones, circa suum tantum modo exhibeant ambitum, tuiciones vero communiter cum servientibus”) They must keep watches, erect defenses around their area, and maintain the upkeep of the walls, together with (labor) serfs. In Worms Jews were given rabbinical dispensation from the rule not to carry anything on the sabbath, to allow them to carry arms when the siege of 1201 necessitated it. In Cologne one of the towers was called “propugnaculum Judaerorum”. Of course, it could be argued that, there being references in Cologne and Speyer indicative of a Judengasse, the propugnaculum should be interpreted as a mere geographical location, i.e. the one nearest to the Jewish quarter, (later it was in the “Laurenzpfarre”), but this does not necessarily imply that it was not manned by Jews.

Hebrew chronicles about the persecutions during the first Crusade relate how the Jews in Mainz and other places, heavily armed and dressed in armor, defended themselves against the Crusaders; they would not have been so well placed had it not been their right to possess arms.

Even long after the first Crusade, when Jews as “homines minus potentes” (“men of lesser standing”) no longer bore arms and were no longer consid-
ered wholly free men, legal textbooks contain reminiscences of the greater Jewish liberty of a bygone age. The various compilations of customary law in the thirteenth century, such as the *Sachsenspiegel*, the *Schwabenspiegel*, the *Meissener Rechtsbuch*, and many others, as well as their glossaries, are full of direct or indirect references to these former Jewish privileges, which together give a reasonably accurate picture of the gradual decrease in the social Status of the Jews, and the high prestige they must once have enjoyed.

The group with the right to bear arms was itself subdivided into five categories representing a sliding scale of honor: 1) those who were entitled to bear arms at all times, even in peace time and in a court of justice; 2) those who had the right and duty to do military service, the *Heerfolge*; 3) those who in a feud were legally entitled to defend themselves (a serf who defended himself committed a felony); 4) those who were entitled to combat in a legal procedure; and 5) those who participated in the *Gerichtsfolge*, the pursuit of peace breakers, thieves, and murderers, after the alarm was raised. In the *Sachsenspiegel* from the early thirteenth century, Jews were still mentioned under the fifth category, which means that they had approximately the status of free peasants. These legal compilations were written at a time when Jewish rights in this respect were greatly waning: ever since 1103, after the first persecution, Jews were regularly mentioned in the King’s peace, which is an indication of their greatly diminished social status. The actual situation influenced the wording and the interpretation of the older rules at the moment of compilation. Jews were then put on the same footing as women, peasants, and all others who did not bear arms, like priests and monks. Even so it should be noted that in the *Sachsenspiegel* of 1224, the oldest compilation of all, it is written that Jews are forbidden to bear arms because they were mentioned in the King’s peace, whereas in the later *Schwabenspiegel* (1275) it is argued that Jews are mentioned in the King’s peace because they do not bear arms: “wende sie ne solen wappen vüren, die mit des koniges dageliks vrede begrepen sin” (“they shall not carry arms who are included in the King’s peace”) and “die liude, die hier vor genennet sint (‘the protected groups’), die sint darumbe sunderlich genenent, daz se selbe niht se sulne han; da von suln si alle steten fried haben” (“the people mentioned above, are particularly mentioned, because they shall not defend themselves. Therefore they will have permanent peace”), such are the respective texts.

The *Sachsenspiegel*, which was compiled relatively soon after the beginning of the persecutions, clearly reflects the older situation of the Middle Ages, when Jews were still fully entitled to bear arms. In the fifty years which elapsed between the writing of the *Sachsenspiegel* and the *Schwabenspiegel*,
conditions had considerably worsened. That Jews were mentioned on the same footing with priests and monks in the thirteenth century does not mean that they had equal status. On the contrary, monks and priests were mentioned in the various issues of the King’s peace and in the legal textbooks on the ground that Canon Law forbade them to carry arms, whereas in the case of the Jews, it was a dishonor. Later glossators leave no doubt about that: “wafen vorbydet men hir den presteren… tu eren, and vorbydet yt den juden tu schanden” (“Priests are forbidden to bear arms to their honor, Jews are forbidden to bear arms to their disgrace”).

Royal favorites

Narbonne Jews, having effectively assisted the Franks in the wars against the Muslim invaders, gained royal favor, in the form of special privileges, and a certain autonomy, which gave rise to the notion of a Jewish principedom of Septimania in the Carolingian period. It was not only as loyal soldiers that Jews gained access to the courts, but also as merchants, with specific, Oriental expertise. The aforementioned Priscus was not the only one who basked in royal favor, though it was temporarily rescinded. There was also Isaac, a Jewish merchant familiar with the near East. He was a member of the mission Charlemagne sent to Caliph Harun al-Rashid. As the only surviving emissary to return, he handed the Caliph’s presents to Charlemagne. According to a charming story told by a monk of St. Gallen, Charlemagne used another of these merchants to punish the spendthrift bishop Richulf of Mainz. The Jew, with the Emperor’s connivance, sold him a perfumed mouse as something very precious from the Holy Land. The bishop was later exposed by the Emperor for squandering in this way the money of the poor. A Jew used to punish a bishop!

The standing of the Jews at court and their privileges were unlike those of the later “court Jews,” mercilessly thrown aside – Jud Süß – when their services were no longer needed. The royal protection contributed to the general security and prosperity of the Jews. Agobard seems to have been right! Jews were the cream of the merchant class.

Jews enjoying prestige and social standing in the sense of easy access to princes, and were protected by special privileges. This definitely contributed to their security. In these privileges it was stated that their real estate was explicitly protected. Like other merchants they were exempt from toll and service money. The were even entitled to hire Christian labor – later forbidden –
and to own and import slaves, as long as they loyally served the emperor. It is an indication of their indispensableness, which, as mentioned above, they shared with other merchants. The “Praeceptum negotiatorum” of Louis the Pious in 825, contains these provisions. It should be noted though, as the words “sicut Judaeis” suggest, (“they have the right, like the Jews to be purveyors”) that Jewry law, so to speak, had precedence over merchant law. There were many other merchants beside Jews, as is evident from such expressions as “mercatores, id est Judaei et ceteri mercatores” (“merchants, that is to say, Jewish and other merchants”), “Judaei vel ceteri ibi manentes negotiatores” (“Jewish or other merchants”), and so on. These expressions highlight the Jews’ status.

Cohabitation, intermarriage, and commensality

Cohabitation is another mark of integration, and social intercourse. Before the eleventh century there is no evidence of Jews living in separate quarters; given the low degree of urbanization, this was improbable anyhow. The great many place names which suggest habitation by Jews, suggest that Jews lived scattered all over the land in small groups, often consisting of only a few families. The misgivings of Pope Stephen and the archbishops of Lyons seem therefore well grounded, for such cohabitation seems to warrant the presence of normal neighborly relations, indeed even the conviviality of attending each others feasts such as weddings, and the intimacy of joint mourning.

The apogee of intimacy was of course intermarriage, which in those days had greater social consequences than in modern times. The Church naturally did not object to mixed marriages wherein the Jewish partner became Christian, but objected all the more to the reverse. It was considered adultery, punishable by excommunication. It is questionable whether in an age of incomplete Christianization, this was a sufficient deterrent. In eleventh-century Germany, mixed marriages still took place. (It was forbidden in the Codex Theodosii and by the Council of Elvira, and regularly reiterated since – because it was ignored?) (Elvira apparently accepted Christian husband and Jewish wife.)

Almost equally indicative of integration is the keeping of open house. Commensality was forbidden by the Councils of Elvira and Vannes in 465, but then only for members of the clergy. Later the prohibition was extended to the lay population. The Council of Vannes argued that since Jews hold the food of Christians to be unclean, it would be humiliating and sacrilegious to
accept theirs.\textsuperscript{96} The prohibition was regularly reiterated, because it was systematically contravened. Elvira (306), Laodicea (367), Vannes (465), Agde (506), Metz (838), Trier 1227), Vienna (1267), and Breslau (1267).\textsuperscript{97}

Jewish dietary prescripts were vexatious to the clergy, because the superiority of the Christian religion was at stake. It could be surmised that for the layman a cause of resentment could be that he was being held in low esteem. It is a seeming source of irritation for a lay Christian, that a fly in the wine did not make it unclean, but that his touching it before it was offered to him made it unfit for Jewish consumption. However, he may have accepted this as an interesting oddity, once the Jew had explained to him over a glass of choice wine, that the seemingly odd behavior was a consequence of the strict rule that a Jew should only drink wine vinted by a Jew, and touched by nobody but a Jew, because that was the only guarantee that it had never been used for an abominable (pagan) libation.\textsuperscript{98} The Christian will the sooner have accepted this explanation, if his Jewish host, while serving the wine, continued to explain that water handed him by a Christian, even if defiled on purpose, was by no means “unclean”, and could be drunk without objection. From the Christian’s own monotheistic point of view, he might even begin to appreciate the Jew’s strictness. The wine Jesus drank at the Last Supper was kosher wine! Did that make Jewish wine especially appropriate for use at Mass, as Agobard so bitterly bewailed?

The rulings against commensality were regularly disobeyed. King Guntram shared a meal with Jews, and so did Ferroleus of Uzés, as mentioned.\textsuperscript{99} Venantius Fortunatus praised as one of the exceptional virtues of Hilary of Poitiers, that he never had a meal with Jews.\textsuperscript{100} Gregory of Tours relates, without comment on the joint eating, as if it were the most normal thing in the world, how the Jewish tax collector Armentarius was murdered by his debtor “Iniuriosus” (a nick name) after having served him a meal.\textsuperscript{101} Gregory does not relate whether, and if so how, dietary laws were observed.

\textbf{Proselytism}

All these forms of friendly social intercourse, at all social levels, including those with servants in the Jew’s house, will indeed, as Agobard feared, have resulted in a certain degree of “Judaizing”, varying from friendly discussions on religious matters to downright apostasy. Jewish proselytism in fact continued. It can indeed only persist on condition that there is social intercourse of more than a passing character, even though reciprocally, a certain amount of coercion may have been at play; debts to Jewish tax collectors!

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Pagans – if any – and Christians were converted to Judaism and Jews were converted to Christianity. Conversion to the wrong religion was evidently considered to be a real threat. In 508 bishop Caesarius of Arles spent a lot of money ransoming prisoners of war, in order to prevent their becoming Arians or Jews, saying “that it is not proper that a reasonable man, saved by the blood of Christ should, on losing his status as a free man, come under pressure to become a Jew or an Arian.” According to Julian of Toledo, relations between Jews and Christians were so friendly in Gallia Narbonensis at the time of the joint rebellion against the Visigoth king Wamba, that many Christians converted to Judaism.

In the time of Agobard, there was the famous case of the conversion of Bodo, which event partly inspired him to go on the warpath. Bodo, a man of learning, well versed in theology, and dean at the court of Louis the Pious, rejected Christ in 839. He assumed the name of Eleazar and went to Saragossa, where he married a Jewish woman and humbly accepted the wearing of the Jewish belt, imposed by the Muslims. The case caused a tremendous stir, as is evident from Florence of Wevelingenhoven’s account of the event as late as the fourteenth century. Florence could not bear the idea of such a high dignitary turning Jewish, and in the account made him regret his rash action and return to the fold.

Bodo first openly declared himself Jewish during a journey to Rome with presents from Louis the Pious. Paulus Alvarus, after trying in vain to dissuade him, ended up by indignantly calling him “a thief of God’s chalices” which somehow seems incongruous. Amulo, who naturally also commented on this event, was not slow in pointing out that this was the result of very friendly relations. In about 1012 there was in Mainz the similar case of Wenzelin, who as a clergyman at the court of duke Conrad, “seduced by devilish illusions”, accepted Jewish error. King Henri 11 was so indignant about this event, that he is reputed to have – temporarily – expelled the Jews from Mainz in 1012. Eighty years later Alpertus of Metz was still so shocked that he shuddered and his hair stood on end when relating it. Wenzelin had had the audacity to write a booklet to win others over to the Jewish faith.

There is another example of such dignitaries of the Church converting to Judaism in the archbishop of Bari. It may have been the very theological learning of the Jews and the weight of Jewish arguments that made them give the palm of victory to Judaism, the ultimate consequence of “osmosis”. However, they were not the only proselytes, simpler minds were won over as well. Agobard and Amulo seem to have been right once more. The Jewish martyrologies of the first Crusade commemorate with pride and admiration the
proselytes who were steadfast in the hour of danger. In these books a whole community of twenty proselytes is mentioned. There is no reason to assume that proselytism among laymen was less fervent in the ninth century than in the eleventh.

Even though lay proselytes are not mentioned in Christian sources, there is an indirect fear of its occurrence in the form of the prohibition of religious discussions for laymen, a point of view still adopted by St. Louis. It was apparently only too obvious that in such cases the usually better instructed Jew was likely to win the argument. In England, apart from one case, a love match, we do not hear about Christians becoming Jews, until the sixteenth century.

Because of their social standing, Jews could also afford a certain ostentation, even defiance, not only by participating in rebellions against episcopal and princely rule, but also in daily life. The pouring of rancid oil over a catechumen is an example of an expression of disdain. More revealing is the motive for introducing the rule that Jews have to stay indoors during Holy Week – never successfully applied – “They have the cheek to enter churches on Good Friday, festively dressed, and they dare laugh at Christians, who on this day of mourning show signs of sorrow.” The Council of Mâcon in 581 decided that only virtuous, elderly men had the right of entrance into nunneries, “in particular Jews shall not enter, and under the pretext of some business secretly converse with the young women – puellae – who have dedicated themselves to God, and they shall not have too-friendly relations with them, or wile away the time there”, as apparently was so usual, that the council felt impelled to take action. That is not the behavior of outcasts!

In 587 a Bordeaux Jew could afford to ridicule the priest Lupus because the latter, suffering from quintan fever, sought remedy for his ills by praying to St. Martin. According to Gregory of Tours, the Jew himself was shortly afterwards afflicted by the same disease. Although suffering badly, he refused to be baptized. Later ages would certainly not have left the punishment of such a transgression to celestial justice.

The blind archdeacon of Bourges, Leonantis, “who was miraculously healed by St. Martin”, nevertheless consulted a Jewish doctor, who pretended to know better. Naturally Leonantis’ lack of faith was punished by recurring blindness. No accusations of evil sorcery were aimed at the Jewish doctor, as certainly would have been the case several centuries later. The Jewish custom of burying their dead while singing psalms was considered a provocation. The Council of Narbonne felt forced to take measures in 589: it was decreed, that Jews shall not bury their deceased while singing psalms, but they shall carry away the body and put it into the grave (in silence) as of old was their custom. No such new ostentation!
Economic integration

The social integration as suggested above is rather meaningless when it is not sustained by complete socioeconomic integration. There were definitely forms of widespread Jewish integration in some social classes of nineteenth-century European society. However, the very one-sidedness of Jewish socioeconomic positions, legacies of the discrimination of preceding centuries, prevented this from being the case in all social layers, and thereby left room for ongoing anti-Semitism. It was particularly virulent in the rural and artisan classes as well as in the nobility, and not absent from the industrial working class, where for understandable reasons – there were exceptions, as for example in Holland and Greece – where Jews were scarcely represented, if at all.

Therefore, in order to make the integration thesis meaningful, it has to be proven, as far as the scarcity of source-material allows, that within the confines of the socio-economic development existing at the time, there was no such one-sidedness of Jewish economic position in pre-eleventh century western and central European society.

Trade and shipping

In the year 404 a pagan writer, Synesius, sailed on a Jewish-owned and Jewish-manned ship. He would probably never have mentioned the fact, if the coincidence of a heavy storm on the sabbath, obliging the skipper to read the Torah rather then attend to the navigation, had not made the journey a most memorable one. There was apparently nothing strange about ships being manned or owned by Jews in late Antiquity, which in the late Middle Ages or early modern times seems impossible. In Merovingian and Carolingian times Jews were still engaged in shipping, not only as owners, but as sailors as well. A miracle story by Gregory of Tours illustrates this. It tells the story of a nameless monk who wanted to bring a handful of earth from the grave of St. Hospicius to Lérins Abbey, near Cannes. He boarded a ship in Nice, on its way to Marseilles. When he realized that she was owned by Jews, he kept silent about his treasure, and did not ask the crew to land in Lérins. The supernatural power of the earth, however, made the ship stand still in mid-sea the moment she passed the abbey, even though there was no calm. Once informed about the cause of this strange event, the Jews quickly brought their passenger to Lérins.

The purpose of a miracle tale is to convince, prove, or further illustrate the
existence of a divine power which is able to interfere with the natural order of things. To be really persuasive, all the circumstances of the story, save the miraculous event itself should consequently be within that natural order, and should be of a generally accepted probability. From this follows that to both author and public of this late sixth-century tale, it seemed perfectly natural that ships were manned by Jews. Interesting in this respect is also a letter by Gregory the Great referring to a Jew who had pawned his ships, and who would receive his due after having paid his debts.

From the ninth century there is evidence of Jewish shipping, for in a St. Gallen chronicle a story is told about unknown ships off the coast of Narbonne, which the populace, apart from other possibilities, held to be Jewish ships. The emperor, who knew better, told them these were Viking ships. Although the story seems somewhat apocryphal, as there were probably no Vikings in the Mediterranean at such an early date, it does seem to prove that ships owned and manned by Jews were by no means uncommon. Jews were indeed still active in the shipping business, as is confirmed by other references.\textsuperscript{117}

The description by the postmaster Ibn Kordebah of the famous Rada-nites,\textsuperscript{118} with whom he presumably had to deal professionally, leaves no doubt about Jewish shipping. These Jewish merchants, based in the Rhône Valley, travelled from France by sea and land to Baghdad and beyond, sometimes as far as India and China. It is most unlikely that they did all this travelling as passengers on Muslim ships. From the eleventh century onwards these Jewish “merchant adventurers” were ousted from the Mediterranean trade by the Italians. The entrepreneurs of Amalfi, Bari, and Gaeta came first, and later those from Genoa and Venice. The Italians had the advantage of being (sometimes) backed by the Byzantine Empire and the advantage of location, communal organization, and last but not least export industries, and a naval force to fight Arab corsairs. For some time to come Jews plied the overland routes to the East, more costly and hence less competitive.\textsuperscript{119} They were not so much ousted by discrimination, as competition. Much later, Benjamin of Tudela still moved about unimpededly.\textsuperscript{120,121} The letter addressed to emperor Henry I and the bishop of Mainz by the Venetian doge, Petrus, showed animus, though. On account of Jewish misdemeanors in the church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, the doge urged the clergy to baptize the Jews, or at least see to it that they did not handle with their “polluted” hands commodities, woolens, or metals, adorned with the sign of the cross.\textsuperscript{122} The letter, inspired by mercantile rivalry, remained without effect. However, a connection between Mainz Jews and oriental trade is suggestive. Commerce, therefore,
need not have been limited to the Mediterranean, for the Mainz Jews may have used the overland or Danubian routes, beyond the reach of the Venetians. In Gaonitic (response) literature of the eleventh century, there are references to shipping activities, presumably down the Rhine and the Danube.¹²³

Jewish merchants, though basking in royal favor, particularly those engaged in overseas trade, had, as was argued, a special legal status of their own, on a par with the Gentile merchants, so that merchant law was, so to speak, akin to Jewry law.¹²⁴ The clergy were suspicious of merchants as a group, accusing them of mammonism. Alpertus of Metz called the Gentile merchants *Judaeorum sequaces*, fellow travelers, and bitterly complained about their behavior.¹²⁵ As a curious illustration of that suspicion one could mention the fact that a certain Ernald is ordered to search the houses of both Jewish and Gentile merchants for outlaws sheltered there.¹²⁶ The two sections of this group having common interests during this early period, cooperated closely, even though Jews will not have participated in the Gentiles’ drinking bouts. They both wanted an autonomous freedom of action, and protested jointly when episcopal rule became too strict for their liking.¹²⁷ Even if the laity, in contradistinction to the princes, by and large shared the feelings of the clergy, Jewish merchants were disliked qua merchants, not qua Jews, and that will have strengthened the true friendship that existed between the two sections. Such friendship could be illustrated by the very name, Juden, of a truly patrician Cologne family, and more certainly by the intriguing fact that in the fateful year 1096, townspeople everywhere tried to protect the Jews.¹²⁸ Common interest initially outweighed the dissension which in the end would drive the two sections apart, with the decline of the Jewish shipping business, and the further development of a “guild” mentality among the Gentiles.

Commercial expertise, combined with an exceptionally high degree of literacy on religious grounds can explain their – unlawful – position as officials, mintmasters and publicans. The latter position was sometimes combined with that of judge. In Hungary Jews were still employed in this way in the thirteenth century.¹²⁹ That their literacy, though coming in useful for commerce, was nurtured by their religion, is attested to by a student of Abelard, who wrote: “the Jews, out of zeal for God and love of the law, put as many sons as they have to letters, that they may understand God’s law, – not for gain as Christians do.”¹³⁰ But these Christian *literati* were instrumental in creating the “persecuting society”, as G. Moore argued.¹³¹
Crafts

Jews are also mentioned as traders, bakers, millers, and tailors. The traveler Ibrahim ibn Jakub, ambassador for the Caliph of Cordoba to Otto I, referred to Jewish salters on the Saale, an affluent of the Elbe.\textsuperscript{132} Perhaps Jews were engaged as glassblowers. Gregory of Tours and some of his contemporaries knew the story of the Jewish glassblower who threw his little baptized son into his oven and to his dismay found that the child emerged from the furnace unhurt. The story seems to prove that it was by no means uncommon for a Jew to be a glassblower.\textsuperscript{133} In the thirteenth-century version of the same tale written by Caesarius of Heisterbach the Jew was no longer engaged in glassblowing. It is interesting to note that by way of exception to the general exclusion from trades, the \textit{Judenordnung}, (Jewry Ordinance) of Cologne in 1599 allowed the Jews to be glassblowers merely because they had up to that time plied this one trade.\textsuperscript{134} Perhaps since the early Middle Ages?

There are also rather vague indications that Jews were goldsmiths, blacksmiths and farriers, furriers, saddlers, tanners, and so on.\textsuperscript{135} They were sometimes engaged in such crafts in a semi-official or even wholly official capacity, for there is evidence that Jews in the early Middle Ages were occasionally employed not only as moneyers, but also as mint masters.\textsuperscript{136} The scarcity of evidence does not really argue against Jews being artisans, since specialized crafts in this period were very underdeveloped, most people making their own utensils, clothing etc. at home. With specialization and “guild” organization, Jews were ousted. There is overwhelming evidence for guild animosity.

Physicians

No profession is more likely to improve human relations and create a climate of open social interaction than that of physician. Jews are mentioned in this capacity ever since the sixth century, and not only in Italy, where they played a major role in the medical school of Salerno, or the Muslim world where Maimonides is, of course, a famous example. Jewish physicians were often consulted by Gentiles, – popes and cardinals had their Jewish physicians! – as long as the Church did not prohibit this, or the buying of their medicines, and as long as their success and their relative invulnerability (due to better hygiene) was not interpreted as being due to evil magic. No such stigma was attached to them in the early Middle Ages to judge by the story of Leonastis,
told above. In the charters of Henry IV for the Jews of Speyer and Worms the right to practice medicine and to sell medicine to Christians was *expressis verbis* established.\(^{37}\)

**Agriculture and Viticulture**

The occupation most frequently mentioned in the sources of the early Middle Ages, however, is the tilling of the soil, according to modern concepts a most “un-Jewish” occupation. Very often the Jews are referred to as owners of land, which they work alone, or with the help of Christians. This has often been denied.\(^{38}\)

Statistics will have to prove the value of the evidence. In a presumably representative collection of documents covering the period 500-1000 and roughly the area of Charlemagne’s empire minus Italy, the number of references in one way or another to Jews involved in either mercantile operations or landownship, was counted.\(^{39}\) (The statistically odd chance that the sources, not included in Aronius’ collection will decidedly change the evidence, seems slight.) For the period and area in question, the ratio of references of Jewish husbandry to Jewish commerce was 9 to 11.

After researching the local charter books of France of this period, Blumenkranz has compiled a very impressive list of the lands which belonged to Jews, and of the Jews resident in villages and hamlets, where in all likelihood they can only have been engaged in agriculture, horticulture, viniculture, or dairy farming.\(^{40}\)

Apart from cadastral data there are other indications of Jewish agrarian proclivity during this period. As was expected, the documents usually refer to bigger landowners, but this by no means precludes the probability that many Jews were involved in agriculture in a more modest way. The lesser people are not usually considered worthy of a mention in official documents. Alongside the big Jewish landowners who, like all the other big proprietors, had the soil tilled by dependants or slaves, there may have been smaller landowners who worked the land themselves, or with the help of Christian neighbors, as the letter of Pope Stephen II suggests.\(^{41}\)

It is not the only instance of a reference to Christians working the lands of Jews. In 809 Charlemagne ruled that no Jew could ask a Christian to work for him on Sundays. If he did, he would be fined and the Christian would be punished as well, “*ita ut alii die dominica opus servile agere non audeant*”\(^{42}\) (“so that others do not dare to work on Sundays”). It is evident that work on other
days was quite normal, and it may be assumed that this implied agricultural work, not just menial services. In the Formulae Imperiales it is indeed explicitly stated that Jews have the right to hire Christian labor; provided “rebus” in the sentence “… nec de rebus eorum proprisi … aliguid abstrahere aut minuare … audeat” may be translated with landed property, they specifically refer to agricultural labor. There is reason to translate it this way since this expression is used in the privilege for Abraham of Saragossa as distinct from “negotium” (“… de rebus suis proprisi vel negotio…”) and since in the charter of Louis the Pious for the Jew Gaudiocus and his sons “rebus quibusdam” refers to the landed property in question, about which there is dispute.

There are other indications of Jewish-owned land outside the Mediterranean area. In 945 a document mentions among the properties of an abbey near Metz “vinea quam habuit David Judaeus” (“a vineyard that belonged to the Jew David”) and in the charters of Henry IV for the Jews of Speyer and Worms, vineyards and lands are explicitly mentioned as well as the right to work these with the help of Christian labor or slaves. Jewish victims who were at work in their vineyards near Mainz when they were killed, are mentioned in the Hebrew chronicles of the persecutions of the second Crusade. Agus has claimed that Jews played an important role in the wine trade because they had exquisite, ritually clean wines at their disposal.

It is probably for that reason that Jewish viticulture is still mentioned long after Jews cease to be mentioned as agriculturists; selling other lands, and keeping vineyards suggests a certain liberty of action. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that Abelard, describing conditions as they prevailed in France in the twelfth century, has the Jew in his “Dialogus inter Philosophum Judaeum et Christianum” saying:

We can possess neither fields nor vines nor any land, since nothing can guarantee them against covert or overt attack. Therefore our sole resort is usury. It is only by practicing usury with non-Jews that we can maintain our miserable livelihood. Yet through this we provoke bitter hatred on the part of those who consider themselves greatly burdened.

It suggests, as was anticipated, that occupational specification and isolation in Western Europe coincided with general economic growth. The process of specification is illustrated by a most interesting rabbinical response in a case of Jewish litigation about taxation, in the early eleventh century. It rules that for communal (i.e., internal Jewish) taxation, a piece of land of a certain
price would not be considered the equivalent of that amount of money in
species, since liquid assets were more remunerative than that same capital in-
vested in land. It was a response typical of a stage of transition. Taxable in-
come was earned in commerce and lending.\footnote{151}

Before the tenth century, usury, if practiced at all, was extremely rare. It
was forbidden by Jewish law, and it took a great deal of casuistry on the part
of the rabbis to make allowances when they were forced by circumstances.
When loans and debts are mentioned at all, there is never a reference to in-
terest. The above mentioned Armentarius tried to collect a taxation debt. A re-
ference to Dodona, the widow of Bernard of Toulouse, who borrowed from
both Christians and Jews, cannot possibly be interpreted as proof of specific
Jewish money lending or as an usurious undertaking.\footnote{152} Bishop Anno of
Cologne was indebted to Jews, but nothing is stated about interest.\footnote{153}

A golden chalice, belonging to the church of Speyer, which Jews had given
to archbishop Ruthard as a present, and which was found in his possession af-
after 1096, could indeed be an indication of Jewish pawning business in the
eleventh century,\footnote{154} even though by then pawning of sacred objects was for-
bidden. The \textit{Capitulare de Judaeis} contains an article forbidding Jews to ac-
cept ecclesiastical objects as pawn, but in all probability this document be-
longs to a much later period and was wrongly antedated as stemming from
the period of Charlemagne.\footnote{155}

\textbf{First rumbles}

At the end of the Carolingian and Ottonian period when Europe was slowly
awakening from its torpor, minor winds of change began to blow without as
yet affecting overall integration. As such may be mentioned, according to
A\^{\text{d}}e\text{b}ard de Chabannes, the boxing of the ears of a member of the Jewish
community on Good Friday in Toulouse, and perhaps some other places,
with fatal consequences. Toulouse tradition had it, that this resulted from an
attempt to betray the city to Saracens. The day of commemorative punish-
ment was not arbitrarily chosen, as it was the day of Judas’ treason.

Holy Week, in later periods always a time of heightened tension, was the
most effective time for implementing stigmatization. This particularly holds
true for the liturgy on Good Friday when the prayer “Oremus et pro perfidis
Judaeis” was offered, “that God may take away the veil from their hearts”.
Even though \textit{perfidus} must presumably be translated by “infidel”, and not by
“perfidious”, simple believers of Romance speech must have thought of the
latter meaning. (This was the reason why the word *perfidis* was deleted by Pope John xxiii). It was as if the liturgy underlined this by stipulating since the early ninth century that the faithful should not kneel when that prayer was said, “...pro Judaeis non flectant”, whereas they should do so with all the other special prayers.

The oldest known explanation of this habit is found in a marginal note in the missal of Saint Vaast-en-Corbie (“ob populi noxam ac partier rabiem”). The word *noxa* (also meaning “trespass”, or “crime”) suggests that *populus* means the Jewish people, and *rabies* their raging against Christ. The Salzburg decrees of 799 state that not kneeling is a Roman custom,¹⁵⁶ which could mean that theological considerations inspired the ruling, that is, it is all right to pray in a spirit of abstract forgiveness that Jews may soon see the light, but particularly on this day of the Jews’ crime, the faithful should not kneel, to remind themselves of the deed for which they implore God’s forgiveness. It was an intended slight, suitable to inculcate in the popular mind the awareness of the Jews’ presumed abomination.

Other first rumblings include the – minor? – persecution which Adémars de Chabannes and Raoul Glaber referred to, related to the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher by Caliph Al-Hakim in 1096.¹⁵⁷ According to rumor, the ruining was instigated by Jews of Orléans, as if the “mad Caliph” had not lashed out at both Jews and Christians.

The first stirrings of a more persecuting mood were found in France, presumably because economic specification was more advanced in the most feudal country, and because stigmatization, however limiting, was of longer standing. There was indeed, as surmised, a “West-East” delay; conditions prevailing in Carolingian France or western Germany were still found to exist in eastern Germany, Hungary, or Poland, at the time they had long ceased to exist in the West. In this respect the council of Breslau in 1267 is very revealing. In a peroration the comment was made: “It is also decreed, because Poland is only a new garden in Christendom, in order that the Christian folk are not infected by Jewish superstitions and bad morals, that...

Another indication of the East-West retardation, is that conditions prevailing in Eastern Europe in the thirteenth century resembled the situation of several centuries earlier in the West. Among the properties of a monastery in Breslau in 1203, land recently bought from Jews is mentioned, at a time when Jewish landowning had long ceased in the West. Retardation tallies with the privileges given to Jews by Casimir the Great of Poland as late as 1364, which put them on an equal footing with nobles, and tallies with other comparable privileges. Since Jewish-Gentile relations were begun much later,
open interaction would have lasted longer, and the reversal of conditions would be of a later date. The openness was certainly expressed by social intercourse in the form of joint meals and mutual hospitality, even dancing together. The proceedings in the Breslau council read like a French council of some 600 years earlier.\textsuperscript{158}

Such a retardation seems to be a significant corroboration of the main hypothesis. Not only was stigmatization of later date, but so were also economic development and (proto-) urbanization. It should be noted, however, that in the East, there were less chances of family ties, and secondly that Jews migrating to the East, carried their newly gained economic propensities with them, as they did in Romania in the nineteenth century. Once begun, negative developments are therefore likely to have been faster.

Retardation explains why the carnage of 1096 in Western Germany was wholly unexpected, a thunderbolt from a blue sky, committed by outsiders. It was, moreover, not in proportion to the first rumblings, so that this very enigmatic event, ending the halcyon days of happy integration, deserves special and separate attention.
C H A P T E R  1 1

The Crusades

The massacre of Jews in the year of the first crusade is a watershed between a period of largely friendly Jewish-Gentile relations, or at least of not overt antagonism, and a period of increasing popular hostility. The events were portentous, not because there was a justified distrust among the members of the victim-group, resulting in retaliation – Jews as a small minority were not in a position even to consider it. They could only hope and pray for improvements – but because of that sinister process whereby exoneration of crimes committed results in new accusations. It is the victims who are blamed, because guilt often breeds hatred.

Although nobody contests this fated aspect, there is no consensus about the explanation of such sudden carnages. They are indeed enigmatic in view of the preceding, and on-going integration at the time.

Interpretations have varied from one of simple greed, via resentment of usury, to one of bewildering religious paroxism. In the latter case it was held that the violence was engendered by the unexpected popular response to Urbanus’ summons to arms at the council of Clermont Ferrand. The pope had only envisaged an army of professional, noble warriors.

In the case of a paroxysmal interpretation, it has been argued that most crusaders agreed with Guibert de Nogent, who at the time reasoned: “if we have to fight the enemies of Christ in distant lands, which are only reached with much hardship, why should we leave the enemies of Christ in peace at home”? Although Guibert was undoubtedly not alone in his views, as an explanation his notion is unfounded. Many, if not most crusaders were aware of the doctrinal distinction between Jews and Muslims, as is evident from the sincere but often futile attempts made by the Rhenish bishops to protect the Jews, and also from the fact, hinted at and elaborated below, that in 1096 neither the followers of Peter the Hermit, during the popular crusade, nor the regular armies of the south, ever indulged in the killing of Jews, although in 1099, after the conquest, many participated in the massacre of Jews and Muslims in Jerusalem.
The murderers of 1096 were perhaps not even true Crusaders. The sequence of the persecutions suggests that, at least at first, they marched in a direction almost opposite to that of the route to the Holy Land, which in fact, none of the perpetrators ever reached.

Robbery, seemingly justified, will certainly have played a role in attracting the purely criminal elements. Yet the Hebrew chronicles narrating these events relate how, after the storm had blown over, survivors found their valuables intact, as these had been well protected by friendly neighbors; robbery was not operative.²

Resentment of usury, objection to have to borrow money from the enemies of Christ, in order to fight the enemies of Christ, is in fact a most unlikely interpretation. Jewish money lending was only just beginning to develop. It is therefore highly unlikely that crusaders borrowed money on any significant scale in order to finance their outfit. In 1096 Jews were simply not yet in a position to provide the required amount of ready cash. It could moreover be argued that money-lending was to some extent a consequence of the massacres. It provided ready cash, one could easily take along in case of another persecution, using it as a safeguard.

A crisis of authority after the tumultuous years of the quarrel between Pope and Emperor over investiture, and the Saxon rebellion, with the emperor moreover being absent in Italy, can explain why most excesses took place in the German Empire. The authority of the local bishops to fight the masses intent on murder was ineffective, as was the help of neighbors, for they lacked the manpower. Moreover, as will be demonstrated, terrorization as a consequence of ineffective rule did play a role, when former helpers of the Jews, at a later stage often betrayed them when they themselves were threatened. A crisis of authority cannot, however, be the full explanation, since the massacres began in Rouen, where there was no such crisis. All things considered, the explanation must be sought in the special mental state of some specific groups.

Langmuir argues very convincingly that a change in religiosity under the impact of social change, which for some made traditional authority no longer acceptable and resulted in a sense of insecurity, is a sufficient explanation, thereby making a form of Christianity, rather than Christianity itself, responsible. Using the Weberian distinction between forms of authority, he bases his argument on the consideration that Christianity, both in the legal-rational authority of late antiquity, and in that of the Germanic traditional authority knew certain restraints, and had adequate means of religious conflict control, which for some categories broke down during the crisis of the
late eleventh century, due to sudden social change. Since Langmuir’s interpretation is, as argued above, totally encompassed in the interpretative scheme developed in the Dead Reckoning, I have absolutely no reason to contest it.  

As one tending to emphasize rather more the significance of social change, of nascent urbanization, and thereby the role of the “disoriented poor”, I am inclined to lend more weight to Norman Cohn’s chiliastic interpretation, than Langmuir is apparently prepared to do; the more so since the masses, who could not fully profit from economic growth, however slight, had Ranulf’s characteristics of a “disinterested desire to inflict punishment”. Tanchelm’s popular movement in the Low Countries, shortly before 1096, is a proof of the existence of such “disoriented poor” in the more densely populated areas of north-west Europe.

The fact that the bloodbaths took place in the Rhenish-Danubian region, cannot be attributed to local conditions. There is no evidence of a widespread Jew-hatred in these areas, no proof of a perennial German anti-Semitism. On the contrary, Jews were still fully integrated, as they would be according to the retardation hypothesis. Judging by the then recent episcopal and imperial privileges referred to, by perhaps sporadic intermarriage, by proselytism, by Jewish participation in the Rhenish-Danubian trade, and continuing viticultural activities – some Jews as mentioned, were slaughtered when at work in their vineyards – one may assume that there was an open society with friendly social intercourse.

The carnage was therefore unexpected, a thunderbolt out of the blue. When they were warned by their co-religionists in France who had already met with some violence, the sages of Mainz, completely misunderstanding the warning, replied on behalf of all the Rhenish communities: “All communities have ordered a fast… for we are afraid on your behalf. We have nothing to fear. We have heard nothing, not even a rumor of a sword over our heads.”

This honest surprise seems to show that an animosity which may have begun to develop in France, was in the Jewish perception not yet in existence in the Rhenish areas. Either the Jews were completely blind to the situation, which is unlikely, or else their attitude implies that the massacre was wholly the work of outsiders. This tallies with the fact that, when the storm came, most better-class citizens in the towns involved did try to help the Jews, either by hiding them, or in some other way; it does not tally with the fact that the gates in Mainz were opened from the inside.

However, since there is no evidence about the number of people implicated in this treason, (it may have been the work of just one, or only a very few accomplices) it does not argue
against the assumption of generally good relations, even though there was a growing class of outcasts – Pirenne’s shiftless vagabonds – as a result of the overpopulation accompanying the nascent economic development and urbanization. As has been mentioned, this class was prone to revolutionary chiliastic sentiment that could as easily turn against the Jews as against “unworthy simoniacal” priests, the rich, and all other “Mammonist” enemies of the Elect: the poor. The existence of such a group must be surmised. Why else would bishop Rüdiger of Speyer in 1084 find it necessary to surround the Jewish quarter with a wall to protect them against the rabble “et ne a pecoris turbe insolentia facile turbarentur muro eos circumdedi” (“pecus” can mean “rabble”).

These dissatisfied, “disoriented”, autochthonous elements, by themselves not numerous enough to stage the massacres, were presumably over-awed, “terrorized” by outsiders or willingly joined them, which suggest that indeed the majority of perpetrators came from elsewhere; from northern France, where Peter the Hermit did his preaching, as well as from Flanders, Lorraine, and other adjacent areas. Why did these men not avenge Christ in their native area; why should they go to the Rhine Valley?

Firstly, it could be argued that there was less opportunity in France. In fact some persecutions did take place there; the warning of the French Jewish community was not wholly imaginary. Guibert of Nogent described the massacre in Rouen, and there may have been others. Yet it cannot be doubted that nothing on the same scale as in the Rhenish area ever took place in France. The Jewish chronicles which later were so explicit about events in York, or about the ritual murder case in Blois in 1171 and about the second Crusade, would certainly have contained them, had they taken place. This restraint could be due to better local policing. The very fact that owing to the weakness of the kings, local lords had usurped all the power, creating smaller units which could efficiently be governed with the means of the day, allowed them to take stringent measures. They could effectively prevent violence when it was in their interest to do so.

In Germany, by contrast, as Elias has so well analyzed, the strong imperial authority of the successful overlord had prevented feudal lords from usurping power to the same extent, but had left them enough to prevent the spiritual lords from being invested with too much of it, though these may have been pillars of imperial strength. Even if, on this measure, Pope and Emperor agreed in principle, imperial pressure on the bishops had nevertheless provoked the quarrel with the Cluniac Pope over investiture some twenty years earlier. Since that conflict remained unsolved, there was a temporary
power vacuum. Moreover, as a result of the quarrel, many of the bishops were accused of being tainted with simony. Bishop Ruthard of Mainz in particular had a bad reputation. He was accused of being bribed by the Jews. He later changed allegiance and went over to the papal party. In principle all the bishops loyal to Henry could be suspected, and were therefore not in a position to exert sufficient spiritual authority to restrain the chiliastically inclined pauperes, the enemies of unworthy rich bishops. Though this construction is slightly different from that of Lea Dasberg, full credit must be given to her for having for the first time so brilliantly and inspiring drawn attention to a possible link between the massacres and the quarrel over the investiture.

The bishops of Worms, Speyer, Trier, Mainz, and Cologne, did lack sufficient military power to keep the vast masses under control when these came to their respective towns. Another explanation for the temporary power vacuum was that Emperor Henry was in Italy at the time. Concerted action might have worked, but there was no opportunity to organize it, when the trickles of potential murderers, prevented from doing damage on home ground, gathered together, to become a devastating flood.

However, sheer mass does not fully explain why the carnage took place in the Rhenish area. The larger part of the hordes who followed Peter were blameless. Peter and his helpers, whether or not aware of the theological necessity to spare the Jews till the end of time, had effectively restrained the hordes from violence, as long as they were in their immediate vicinity. This in itself would make the murderous intent of the perpetrators the result of being without a more or less doctrinal spiritual guidance, rather than being inspired by it, which tallies with Langmuir’s views.

The restraint can be substantiated. A large party of the popular crusaders—presumably French, but possibly of other origin—moved through the Rhine Valley, demanding provisions from the Jews, but otherwise leaving them in peace. A first group, led by Walter-sans-Avoir, was already in Hungary in May at the time the killing began. Peter himself and many of his followers left Cologne about April, that is long before the massacre. These groups did not do anything untoward during their journey. Yet, after the battle of Cive-tot (Cibotus) at the sea of Marmora—an easy Turkish victory on October 21—which ended the People’s Crusade— it must have been from the remainder of these groups that the “Tafurs” were recruited, bloodthirsty murderers who joined the general massacre of Jews and Muslims after the fall of Jerusalem. Before the battle Peter’s authority had begun to wane; his followers had become increasingly unruly, and he had quarreled with the Byzantine authorities, none too happy with this kind of “helpers.” All sorts of atrocities had al-

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ready been committed. The Tafurs were a group of *pauperes*, the poor who saw themselves living in apostolic poverty, as vessels of true grace about to gain the new earthly paradise in Jerusalem. In their “revolutionary” chiliastic zeal they were perfectly willing to commit the most atrocious crimes, just as their brethren in Germany did in May, June, and July.\(^2\) There does then seem to be an argument for averring that opportunity creates the crimes where there is no restraining spiritual leadership from men like Peter or Walter, who was killed at Civetot. It tallies with the events of the second Crusade, when massacres took place wherever there was no effective restraining influence of men like Bernard of Clairvaux, and even he only succeeded with great difficulty.\(^2\)

However, it is inconceivable that even Peter would have been able to keep these unruly hordes in check at all times. It was the personal charisma of this austere mortifier of the flesh, clad in rags, barefooted riding on a donkey, that had such popular appeal. Whenever people were not in his immediate vicinity the appeal waned, and his authority diminished. So stragglers growing disobedient, or falling under the influence of other disobedient characters terrorized all the discontented as they met them. These groups too, were easily convinced that they were the Elect, by their poverty the vessels of grace, who had to cleanse the earth of all evil to inherit it when *prophetae*, self-appointed leaders would tell them. Salvation of the poor by the poor!

These were only too willing to follow the ferocious, merciless, blood-thirsty leadership of an impoverished Emicho of Leiningen, who declared that God had revealed to him that he was the chosen leader who was to inaugurate the new age. He claimed that, as a token of his election, a celestial messenger had branded the Sign of the Cross between his shoulder blades.\(^3\) He may be said to have been an instrument of “terrorization of the discriminators” “du dum tyrannica conversatione nimis infamis, tunc vero velut alterus Saulus revelationibus, ut fatebatur, divinis in huius modi religionem advocatus” (“once only very ill-reputed for his tyrannical behavior, now like another Saul, as they say, by divine revelation called to religion in this fashion”), as Ekkehard described him in scathing sarcasm.\(^4\)

This is not the end of the problem. It is unlikely, even improbable, that all the massacres were committed by one and the same group under Emicho’s leadership. His exploits seem to have inspired others, for often while he raged in the West, followers of Gottschalk and Volkmar, unruly disciples of Peter the Hermit, massacred the Jews of Ratisbon and Prague despite bishop Cosmas’ attempts to prevent this.\(^5\)

Moreover, the dates of the various massacres seem to preclude the possi-
bility that they were all committed by one and the same group. Perhaps the
slaughter in Metz was also the work of the followers of Volkmar.28

In Speyer an attempt at massacre was made on 3 May. It was prevented by
the energetic action of Bishop John. On May 18, it was the turn of Worms,
and on 27 May the Mainz community was victimized. The Jews of Cologne
were effectively protected by their Christian fellow citizens until 3 June. Trier
was also victimized in June (suggesting a north-ward movement).29 At that
time Emicho was already in Hungary.30 There can, therefore, be no other con-
clusion than that the bloodshed was the work of several groups, similar in
spirit, and from this it follows that the massacre was a more general phenom-
enon, perpetrated by people deprived of orthodox religious leadership and
not inspired by one and the same paroxysm. This suggests a nascent hatred
conditioned by changing social and economic circumstances and triggered
off by vehement, more chiliastically inspired, heretical religious sentiments
of social protest against the well to do and the rich. Langmuir’s changed reli-
giosity.

However, not everything fits into this social revolutionary explanation. In
1095 Godfrey of Bouillon swore to avenge Christ with the blood of the Jews.
Only when the Emperor, informed by Rabbi Kalonymus of Mainz, urged
him and other princes to leave the Jews in peace, did he withdraw his oath.
But by then the Cologne Jewish community had already presented him with
500 marks in silver. Was Godfrey’s attitude mistaken religious sentiment
which he later cleverly exploited, or downright astutely planned blackmail
and extortion?31 Whence came that noncanonical notion that the killing of a
Jew brought remission of sins, which made a certain count Dithmar say that
he would not go before he had killed at least one Jew?32 Misguided religious
sentiment, or greed and ferocity under the cloak of piety? It is definitely true
that many, if not most crusaders, both in the Crusade of the nobles and the
popular crusade, were inspired by truly secular motives, adventure, hope of
gain, a way out of indissoluble problems at home, and so forth.

One of the strangest episodes, perhaps suggesting misguided but not neces-
ecessarily insincere religious sentiment, was the killing of a well-known and
generally loved Jewish woman, Minna. Inhabitants of Worms who had
joined the crusaders knew her. When her hiding place was detected, these
people implored her to allow herself to be baptized. They even knelt before
her. When she refused, she was killed.33 This certainly does not suggest cool,
indiscriminate Jew-hatred among some inhabitants of Worms, but rather an
ambivalence, psychologically fostering hatred. It reminds one of some Nazi
females in the camps who, while loving a Jewish child, yet did their “duty”
and hated the Jews more as a consequence. This psychological set-up was used in the training of S.S. men. They were given a dog which they themselves had to look after. The moment there was a genuine mutual attachment between man and animal, the former was ordered to kill it with his own hands. Another possible interpretation of this episode is that the killing was done by outsiders, and that these inhabitants of Worms were more or less forced to cooperate. In that sense it is then part of a general pattern, indeed suggestive of what has been termed terrorization of the potential discriminator (see above).

The clearest evidence of this phenomenon is found in Trier. Archbishop Egilbert promised to protect the Jews and actually gave them shelter in his fortified palace. On Whit Sunday, when the church was full of Crusaders and local people, he preached abstention from violence in the spirit of the events of Pentecost (Acts 11) and demanded that Jews be left in peace. This was not at all to the liking of his congregation: some tried to hit him and the multitude behaved so menacingly that the bishop fled to a vestry where he remained hidden for a full week. Crusaders, having failed to take the episcopal palace, decided to return to the church, and once more threatened to kill the bishop if he did not give in. He then ordered the Jews to accept baptism. When they refused, he sent a number of them to the crusaders, intending by the example of their most certain death to convince the others of the hopelessness of their situation.34 Nothing of the kind happened when Peter the Hermit was in Trier.35

Elsewhere events show basically the same pattern, with the one and only exception of Speyer where the bishop effectively protected the Jews, if no more than ten victims may be called effective protection. According to Christian sources, the murderers were punished by Bishop John.36

The very opposite obtained in Worms where, even though help was promised, bishops and citizens were so intimidated (terrorized) that nothing came of it.37

The situation in Mainz was more complicated. At first the archbishop and the viscount, both bribed, did, with the citizens, give effective help. When the gate was opened from within with Emicho’s 12,000 men before the town, the situation changed drastically. The archbishop fled, and his soldiers refused to fight, perhaps because Christians did not want to fight Christians on behalf of Jews. Archbishop Ruthard summoned Rabbi Kalonymus to his village Rüdesheim with a number of Jews who had been overlooked by the slaughterers. He tried to persuade them to accept baptism. Kalonymus, furious at his betrayal, snatched a knife and attempted to kill the bishop. This was pre-
vented; he was arrested, and he and his comrades led away to a certain death.38

In Cologne, bishop and citizens at first gave effective protection but then the bishop made his ill-fated mistake. Archbishop Hermann unfortunately decided to distribute his Jewish subjects over seven villages within his territory, believing them to be safe there. Contrary to his expectations, they were found and slaughtered during late June and July. In Mörts the now familiar pattern was repeated. The count promised help and ended up by handing over the Jews to their murderers.39

In all several thousand Jews were killed, sometimes dying by their own hand – in Mainz alone roughly a thousand – at the instigation of this man, Emicho.

His end somehow does seem to fit into this timeless story. Because of a mere rumor that the Hungarian king was about to punish them for pillaging the country, this mass murderer and his ilk ignominiously fled, “fuga nemine persecutente” (fleeing while nobody persecuted him), as Ekkehard wrote. Ekkehard, a cleric who regretted that many of the forcibly baptized returned to their former faith, “sicut canes at vomitum” (11 Peter: 22), nevertheless voiced with his rather condescending condemnations the uneasiness felt by many Christians.40 A more directly concerned eyewitness wrote: “It was sad to see the many great piles of Jewish bodies being removed from Mainz in open carts.”41 It has a horribly familiar ring.

The second Crusade threatened to become a repetition of the first. This time it was a Cistercian monk Radulf who incited the population against the Jews. According to Otto of Freising, he was immensely popular, and many Jews both in France and Germany were killed as the result of his activity.32 However, a general massacre on the same scale as in 1096 was avoided, because this time King Conrad could effectively protect the Jews, and largely because Bernard of Clairvaux with his immense prestige intervened on their behalf.

The Jews and the archbishop of Cologne did not repeat the mistake of fifty years before. This time Cologne Jews found a safe haven in the strong episcopal castle Wolkenburg.43 Many others found refuge in Muremberg, in the immediate presence of King Conrad. Only the relatively young Jewish community of Würzburg, not having had the experience of 1096, and relying on the good relations with both bishop and citizens, hence failed to take any special measures, and was heavily punished for this negligence. When, after the body of a drowned Christian began to work miracles, the many strangers in the town began to attack, the Jews were helpless; a massacre followed on 24 Feb-

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ruary 1147. This was long after Bernard had intervened. It shows how little was needed for passions once more to flare up.

Then, as almost 800 years later, there were noble courageous people who defied mass hysteria and terrorization. In the Hebrew chronicles, a Christian washerwoman is mentioned with love and admiration for having saved a Jewish woman in the face of a howling mob. She should be commemorated with a statue.44

Radulf, of whom Otto of Freising said that he was “litterarum notitia so-brie imbutus” (sparsely imbued with a knowledge of letters), was characterized by Bernard as follows: “Homo est magnus in oculis suis, plenus spiritu arrogantiae. Verba et opera eius praetendunt, quod conatur sibi facere nomen iuxta nomen magnorum qui sunt in terris: sed non habet sumptus at perficiendum” (“The man is great in his own eyes, full of arrogance. His words and deeds give one to understand that he tries to make his mark in the world next to the great of the earth: but he has not the capacity to see matters through”). Was there ever a more succinct description of a racist?45

In his own letters, Bernard most intriguingly opened a new perspective, using the argument that there was no reason to kill the Jews, as Christians usurers were worse (“taceo quod sicubi desunt, peius judaizare dolemus christianos feneratores, si tamen Christianos et non magis baptizatos Judaeos convenit appelari” (I am silent about the fact that where they are absent we suffer far more from the “Judaizing” of Christian usurers, if these could be called Christians indeed, and if it would not be better to call them baptized Jews). He argued that Jews should not be killed, but that it was perfectly reasonable, as the Pope had ordered, to demand of them remission of all debts for those who had taken the Cross.46 Ephraim bar Jacob, referring to a similar order issued by Louis VII, states that French Jews then lent money without interest, so that the royal order implied a severe loss for them.47 Bernard’s novel use of the word judaizare suggests how much Jewish money lending had progressed. This tallies with the above-quoted lawsuit before the rabbinical court, where a piece of land of a certain value was held to be less remunerative than its money equivalent, which could be put to lending, or with Abelard’s remark. This novel and frequent discussion of usury is most illuminating for it throws light on the economic specification hypothesis.

There is thus on the one hand a good deal of evidence for assuming that in mid twelfth-century France Jewish economic specification had already progressed so much (though not on a scale to finance the Crusade), and was already so restricted to the pawning business and money lending as to entail a considerable lessening of social interaction.48 This is also borne out by many
cases in the responses of, for instance, Rabbi Rashi of Troyes in the early eleventh century. These dealt with problems of inter-Jewish economic relations arising from the pawning and lending business, and involved disputes between Jews resulting from having dealings with one and the same insolvent creditor, or from unforeseen consequences of partnerships.  

On the other hand, it is also perfectly reasonable to assume that in the Rhineland, the Rhine being a major emporium, Jews still had greater opportunities in ordinary commerce than they had in northern France. They could participate in the buying and selling of commodities shipped along the Rhine and its tributaries, such as the Main, and along the Danube. Such an increased possibility of commercial activity, as is suggested by the above quoted letter of the Venetians, is plausible for a variety of reasons. In the German Danubian area there were possibilities of trade with the downstream Byzantine areas (in 1096 the Danube was the northern border of the Byzantine Empire), where, as has been shown, there were no economic impediments for Jews. The Danubian trade system was closely linked to the Rhenish system overland by, for example, such towns as Ulm and Ratisbon, and via the Neckar. The Rhenish trade system, which was overland and via tributaries such as the Main closely linked to the Elbe system and its tributaries, such as the Saale, had a vast, newly developed hinterland in central and eastern Germany and the Slav lands beyond. This vast hinterland, in the tenth century either not yet fully Christianized or only very recently so, created no more economic impediments for the Jews than the West had done earlier. Trading possibilities in these areas during the late Carolingian and Ottonian period attest to the Jewish share in the slave trade. At the time, in the ninth and tenth century, the not yet converted Slavonic captives gave—unwittingly—their name to this activity, that is, of increasing pressure and expansion of the Germans in an easterly direction. Slaves and furs from this area were among the most important commodities trans-alpine Europe had to offer the (Muslim) Mediterranean world in exchange for spices and other oriental products. Even though the slave trade may have disappeared by the eleventh century, there must have been enough left of the vast trade to allow Jews a fair share of it. The same holds true for trade down the Rhine. Bishops and kings were well aware of this, as is evident from the various privileges discussed above. As has been shown, Rhineland Jews at that time were still engaged in shipping.  

The specific greater commercial possibilities of the Rhine towns are likely to have postponed the Jewish economic specification and to have entailed a lower degree of social distance, illustrating once more a general West-Eastde-
lay. This tallies with the markedly friendly Jewish-Gentile relationships mentioned above, which were more or less restored once the storm had blown over. Jewish survivors returning to their homes found their valuables intact. Friendly neighbors had preserved them, which illustrates how little the massacres had been inspired by a desire for robbery and how little professional jealousy was involved. Competing Christian neighbors would have welcomed the persecution had they indeed been envious of the Jews. Among the property-owning classes the attitude may also have been inspired by a holy fear of the “revolutionaries”.

The argument of low social distance as a consequence of diversified economic activity is based on the assumption that there is an inverse relation between commercial opportunity and economic specification. This can perhaps be defended as follows: the greater the number of commercial transactions, the smaller the overall risk of non-payment or postponed payment. Conversely, the greater the risk involved, the greater the need for demanding security. As it is reasonable to assume that the pawning business was to some extent an outcome of the demanding of security, and the pure lending business the outcome of the pawning business, the less opportunity there was for commercial enterprise, the greater the tendency to achieve capital growth in this way. As there were no legal or, in the end no religious encumbrances for Jews — it should not be forgotten that the Christian prohibition of usury was largely based on texts from the Old Testament, and that it took the Rabbis a lot of ingenuity to find a way out — it is only logical that they would seek this compensation. In a paradoxical way it increased exposure to animosity and yet, because of the very need of credit, it gave them a position of relative autonomy and relative unassailability, an admittedly somewhat dubious protection when there were no particular upheavals.

The long and the short of this digression into economic speculation is its sociological meaning in terms of the variables of the explanatory model. If indeed, as is also suggested by Pounds,\footnote{North-western France showed a relative degree of commercial stagnation, social distance in that area would increase. There would, therefore, be decreased “correction of stigmatization” and hence increased possibilities of animosity, but for reasons mentioned above (better policing), fewer chances of regional terrorization.} north-western France showed a relative degree of commercial stagnation, social distance in that area would increase. There would, therefore, be decreased “correction of stigmatization” and hence increased possibilities of animosity, but for reasons mentioned above (better policing), fewer chances of regional terrorization.

Greater specification in France seems perhaps inconsistent with the commercial possibilities of the nascent fairs of Champagne. There seems to be little evidence, however, that Jews participated on a large scale, though of course the Jews of Troyes itself may have joined in. Like Italians, Jews apparently had to pay safe conduct charges.\footnote{As was argued above, the organiz-}
tion of overland trade in larger companies – Hanses – probably somewhat weakened the Jewish competitive position. By and large it seems safe to say that Jewish economic specification was more advanced in the north of France and consequently, that there the social distance was greater, so that people in that area were more prone to accept stigmatization, in particular “chiliastic”, self-perpetuating forms of popular stigmatization, which was then the case in the Rhenish region.

It is indeed inconceivable that all those following Emicho and the other massacring leaders were recruited locally. Many of them were French, as is evident from members of the French nobility among the leadership, as for example Drogo of Nesle, Clarambald of Vendeuil, Thomas of la Fèvre, and above all William, Viscount of Melun, nicknamed the Carpenter, an adventurer without a conscience, who would betray the cause if it profited him.

From this it seems to follow that all the presumed conditions of the explanatory scheme were met, at least for a substantial part of the murderers of the first two Crusades. Once they were on the move, there was sufficient social distance to prevent any correction of stigmatization, which in their case began to assume the form of a self-perpetuating, popular variety. The mob effect of lowered individual responsibility (a collective super-ego supplanting individual ones) had a terrorizing effect in that it kept the waverers at their murderous task by means of violence. The greater the mob and the more violent its methods of social control, the lesser the chance of individual opposition, though there have always been individuals with sufficient moral courage to do so. Terrorization has been shown to be effective in the massacres of 1096 and, though less so, in the carnage of 1147. It seems safe to argue that it has the effect of further stigmatization by a now noncanonical popular religiosity. Self-exoneration in the case of guilt by implication, usually takes the form of accusation of the victims. Such accusation is, psychologically, a most effective way of rationalizing guilt feelings into their opposite. The process can be observed in classical descriptions of American race riots and lynchings.

To sum up a somewhat complex argument by way of conclusion: The events of the crusades seem to corroborate the prognosis of the dead reckoning. Social distance, in all likelihood, played a part in the behavior of the perpetrators from outside. For reasons mentioned, this was not the case for the inhabitants of the river valleys themselves, who consequently were remarkably not involved in the carnage that took place on their own territory. However, some elements of the autochthonous populo minuto, although not being ini-
tigators, may, by being susceptible to terrorization, have participated, after others had started the massacres.

Since stigma was less and less corrected by daily interaction, it will have induced the murderers to increasingly accept the stigma in a distorted form. The noncanonical character of their motivation can easily be gauged from the spurning of the various prelates, from the sarcasm of the various ecclesiastical commentators, and above all from the protective “Sicut Judaeis” bulls, issued shortly afterwards. The chiliastic nature of the murderers’ conceptualization is suggested by their being pauperes under the charismatic leadership of self-styled prophetae, desirous to cleanse the world from unrepentant, obdurate Jews, against the express wishes of what they saw as “mammonist” and “simoniacl” prelates. Such cleansing can easily be conceived of as step towards the realization of an earthly paradise.

Finally, terrorization played a part in the events in Trier, Mainz, Mörs, and other places, as was shown.

Potential murderers, mostly outsiders, by adequate policing prevented from doing evil on home ground, were massed together in the Rhine valley, because that was the route to the Holy Land, although in their murderous frenzy they may at times have diverted from this course. A crisis of authority related to the quarrel between Emperor and Pope, together with mob formation, are the optimal conditions for terrorization, when the individual super-ego is superseded by mass hysteria, and there is no adequate policing to keep the mob in check.

Deviating religiosity of a chiliastic nature was more marked in the areas west of the Rhine, because of endemic mass poverty, so that as a result of greater specification of Jewish economic positions, and hence of increased social distance, existing stigmatization was given a popular turn. Chiliastic frenzy was aiming at all the Mammonists, the rich, and the infidel Jewish “Christ-killers”, protected by “simonist” bishops and greedy princes.

The better-class citizens of the Rhenish towns were not at all involved. Because of Jews still having a variety of economic possibilities in this trade emporium, social distance had not yet developed, and traditional friendly social intercourse was continued. A second reason for their benevolent attitude was possibly that the “revolutionary” vehemence of those crusaders inspired a holy fear among them. Professional envy obviously was not at issue, for otherwise their attitude would have been more cooperative, and they would not have helped the Jews, protecting their property.

Finally, explanatory is also the fact that, because of better economic opportunities in the Rhenish area there was a large concentration of Jewish
communities, so to say facilitating the bloody handiwork. Many Jews had recently migrated to these areas; they were often still French speakers.

The interpretative scheme, having thus stood a major test, is by no means proved. In the concluding chapters, some possible flaws will be discussed as well as prospects for further elaboration.
CHAPTER 12

Accusatory Innovation

Accusatory innovation distinguishes Jew-hatred from other variations of racism

Léon Poliakov called the events of the first two crusades fatidiques (“bearing foreboding”), announcing worse to come, thereby implying that the carnage was not an isolated event, but had an impact on the further development of anti-Semitism into modern times.¹

If this is correct – and if it is not, each episode requires its own explanation – one may ask what the nature of the impact was. Did the massacres “merely” break down the barriers of moral restraint, facilitating future persecution, or did they have directly or indirectly an innovative and repeatable effect on the concept of the “evil Jew” and the “Jewish evil”? It is submitted that, if true, such a – persistent? – innovation would be a characteristic that distinguishes anti-Semitism from most other varieties of racism. Moreover it would presumably be related to another distinguishing feature, to wit, persistent genocide not prevailing in other racisms, however violent. This needs comment.²

All politically relevant racism is a form of ideology, aiming at assigning ethnic minorities their “proper” place in society or denying them a place.³ However, the ideology concept has a dual nature. It is either a set of ideas, desires and notions that aim at preserving the status quo by justifying it, or it seeks to change the status quo of the moment by condemning it. Since in the latter case the status quo is a transitory stage in an ongoing process of social change, the unsettling vicissitudes of it provide a virtually inexhaustible supply of possibilities to formulate the condemnation and to conceptualize the desired change. Since former “solutions” of problems are rarely lost from consciousness, and become terms of reference for the more stable elements of the changing but rejected system, there is indeed a “genealogy of stereotypes” (Theoretically social change, when it undermines a once established “proper” position of ethnic minorities, can transform a “justifying” ideology
into a “condemning” ideology with a comparable innovation in conceptualizing the rejected minority, and vice-versa). This has to be substantiated.

The source of an ideological innovation presumably has to be the fantasies exonerating committed persecutions, changing them by instantaneously imagined rationalization into “well-deserved” punishments. However, it is not easily conceived how violence itself generates such fantasies. Rationalization is more likely to be engendered by the other variables of the process of stereotyping, variations on the theme of a stigmatization not corrected by open interaction. In 1096 the concept of Jewish wickedness was “underdeveloped” in comparison with later forms; yet it sufficed to impel the masses to resort to the ultimate means of retribution, wholesale massacre or forcing people into mass suicide. The question could then be raised why that conceptualization was changed at all. The answer could be that at first as a consequence of the massacres the perception of the Jews was exculpatory changed in a twofold way. In the first place it could be surmised that the murderers of the first crusades may have felt that they had not achieved their aims, if they had any aims at all. They may have felt that the death of Christ should be revenged on those Jews who refused to be baptized. They may have believed that baptized Jews, touched by Divine Grace, making good their error, no longer guilty by implication, could no longer be held responsible for the abominable crime committed by their forebears. The others, however, by obstinately continuing to adhere to Judaism, and thereby of their own free choice guilty by proxy, acknowledging the crime of their ancestors as entirely justified, were probably considered as more hardened in sin, more objectionable, than the Jewish group as a whole was before they were given the choice. Increased evil obstinacy is indeed a change in perception.

There is more, however. The massacring crusaders may have felt that by failing to entirely eliminate Judaism, they failed to remove the main obstacle to the second coming and, by implication, the coming of the millennium. They must have heard sermons on the Last Judgment, and may have had an inkling of the view propounded by influential theologians that this would coincide with the Parousia. That could only take place, in these views, the moment there was the final reconciliation between God and “His people”. These would then once more be the “chosen”, for they were now adherents of Jesus of Nazareth, Christus iudex. The unlearned, disoriented poor possibly interpreted the coming of the “eternal bliss” as the coming of the earthly paradise, the reign of justice, the end of toil and poverty. The concomitant extirpation of the Muslim, pagan enemies of Christ, and Christians would seal the happy turn of events.
None of these chiliastic dreams, reminiscent of later Nazi ones, came true. On the contrary, by changing social circumstances as outlined above, “these evil miscreants” at roughly the same time, became allegedly profiteering usurers, supported and protected by venal popes, simoniaclal bishops, and a plundering nobility. Jerusalem was reconquered by those same pagans, who continued to be a threat.

Henceforward, each evil turn of circumstances, new poverty, famines, or diseases could be blamed on these enemies of mankind. In accordance with their own magical beliefs, the common people attributed the use of magic and sorcery to the enemy. So innovative accusations corresponded again and again to new calamities.

A.N.J. den Hollander has convincingly argued that changes in the condition of the observer, rather than in those of the observed, are causative of alterations in the perception of the others. The more alien these others became, the greater the innovated accusations; social protest in relation to social change, a process continuing to the present day, in no small way due to the criminality of the nazi's, indirectly responsible for the Palestine-Israeli conflict and its aftermaths. Here, too, is an explanatory difference with other forms of racism, where, despite labelled interaction, there was, given the economic conditions and the inherent regulation of tasks, more room for normal human relationships, with the beloved black nanny, the black cook, the Chinese butler, and so forth.

Illuminating for the possible significance of baptism as sketched above could be an event which Bar Ephraim relates in his general account of the persecutions of Würzburg in 1147. He describes how some inhabitants of the town, who occasionally did cooperate with the murderous “crusaders”, implored a local Jewess, much loved and respected by Gentiles, actually begging her on their knees, to accept baptism. Did they merely want to save this much-loved woman’s life in this way (not as practical as the washerwoman who shielded her) or did they feel that her baptism would solve the problem of inflicting a death they did not want? Whatever learned clerics may have told them to the contrary, they themselves held perhaps the death to be unavoidable, because it seemed to them a divinely established necessity, should she refuse.

The persecutors did, quite remarkably, offer the choice of baptism or death. The baptized were left in peace, unless they returned to their former faith. This makes the atrocities still markedly different from the twentieth-century form of extermination, and, however gruesome, not yet genocide proper. It is perhaps meaningful that in York, about a century later, the baptized were killed as well.
The desire to eliminate remained – dormant at times, but not dead. Thereby a perhaps not very articulate, but all the same real, ideology was created. It possibly envisaged the changing of a social order that kept all sorts of iniquities going. Jews were allegedly protected, and made to pay for protection, by the venality and mammonism of the high and mighty, who were also the oppressors of the poor. All later forms of anti-Semitism were likewise characterized by such social protest, condemning a social order that granted the Jew his “undue” place.

In general there does not seem to be much evidence to warrant the conclusion that racist violence persistently generates novel assertions about the wickedness of the victims when rationalization to exculpate violence is needed. Its existing form usually sufficed for blaming the victim, being adequately functional in the sense of justifying punishments of deviations from the social order that is deemed desirable by most members of the dominant group. Even the lowest layers of the white society in the former American South, the poor whites, though they could feel themselves victimized by the plantation system, had little interest in improving the fate of the blacks, since that would not have helped them. Moreover they had the satisfaction of looking down upon them as even lower than themselves socially. By and large, the Southern ideology relating to rationalization was the kind that preserved and justified the status quo. This is exemplified, to quote one example, in the book written by George Fitzhugh: Sociology for the South, or the Failure of Free Society, of 1854. He contrasts the slaveholding Southern society with the capitalist North, or capitalist England. Whereas the one takes loving care of the blacks from birth to death, providing for these docile (but dangerous when unguided) beings for their own good, the others are harsh, without pity for the deserving poor, the unemployed, the sick, who are mercilessly evicted when they cannot pay their rent.

The remarkable constancy of the conceptualization of blacks in the southern US before and after emancipation indeed does not suggest accusatory innovation. For a long time blacks were ideologically conceived of as friendly, childlike, happy go lucky creatures when under strict control, “Sambos”, but as savage beasts when they were not. Violence in South Africa, once “adequate” stereotypes were formulated, aimed at keeping Africans and colored in their “proper” – that is, white-formulated – social positions without many newly formulated assertions. In the US, once a kind of standard rejection of the Chinese was formulated, branding them as drug criminals and only fit for “female” menial tasks – which, in fact, enabled the Chinese virtually to
monopolize the laundry business— not many new charges were added, for a long period. Persecution of the Gypsies did presumably not imply persistent-ly novel assertions about their badness, as violent, thieving nomads, a pest in a well-ordered sedate society.

Why then was there persistent innovation in the conceptualization of the “Jewish evil”? Ever since the crusades, accusations of ritual murder and blood libel, desecration of the Host, Jewish poison, satirical stench, mass treason, usury and swindling, perjury, corruption, exploiting capitalism, fomenting worldwide revolution, founding and controlling freemasonry, and so forth were added to the originating theological rejections, to such an extent that these were largely marginalized in the social protest of a more secular age. Two examples: Father Deckert, a parish priest in the Weinhaus district of Vienna, as well as an anti-Semitic agitator and bright light of the Christian Social party, never in all of his anti-Semitic sermons referred to theological issues, but merely to the “social question”: Adolf Stoecker’s following was increased when he spoke about the “social question” in anti-Semitic terms. There was little popular interest when he spoke about the traditional Christian values.

The explanation must presumably be sought in the peculiar social position of Jews in an inimical society. It was markedly different from that of those other victims of racism, who as a rule were “helots”, or former slaves turned into “helots” after emancipation, or those who had social positions derived from helotism. The helot often performed the same type of unfree labor as the slave, (initially mostly agricultural), without being any longer technically a slave, in the sense of alienable property. In the US it was typically the landless black sharecropper, irretrievably caught in the system, who performed the tasks formerly done by slaves.

In South Africa one could think of the badly paid black workers in mines and on farms, forced into this work by being denied independent economic activity, and by being robbed of their own means of existence. Positions derived from helotism are very unequal in the labor market, with virtually no free bargaining position, as trade unions are restricted or forbidden. It takes a long uphill struggle to escape from this situation. The Chinese in the US, excluded from competition in the labor market after having worked in railway construction, were in a similar position.

Writers of Marxist inspiration, usually interpreting racism as the ultimate form of capitalist exploitation, and in fact all those who approach the problem of racism from a socioeconomic or labor market point of view, always had some difficulty with anti-Semitism and related forms of discrimination,
like the position of the Barakumin\textsuperscript{14} in Japan, who performed the “unclean” tasks which members of the majority group were unwilling or by public disavowal unable to take on, or the persecution of heretics, “witches”, homosexuals, and so forth. If they spared it a thought at all, they thought of anti-Semitism as an aspect of the class struggle, either by thinking of the Jews as capitalists, as Marx himself did in \textit{Zur Judenfrage}, or as Léon and like-minded authors did,\textsuperscript{15} by conceiving of Jews as being within the ruling class, but a manipulated minority that got all the beatings. This is suggestive. Anti-Semitism can clearly not so easily be interpreted as a form of exculpation for exploitation. Further comparison may elucidate the problem.

Much non-anti-Semitic racist violence, that of the helot-suppressing kind, is a consequence of the European expansion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Cipolla described in his book \textit{European Culture and Overseas Expansion}. During this period of Vasco de Gama, as he calls it, technological superiority in shipbuilding and the application of ordnance in ships developed such an effective instrument of ocean-resistant naval warfare, that the Atlantic states of Europe could establish their sway over the coastal regions as well as over inland regions overseas, where native technology was very underdeveloped, as in the Americas.\textsuperscript{16} All the while on land, Europe still had great difficulty in staving off conquerors like the Turks. Europeans could not penetrate into the much more developed Asian interior until at a much later date. The newly conquered areas were often abundantly rich in raw materials, or in vast areas of profitably usable land, but exploitation was initially hampered by shortage of capital, and above all by labor shortage. Slavery, changed into helotism after the emancipation, provided the solution.

In South Africa, helotism resulted in the existence of a low-paid black working class, with a very privileged “bounded” white working class on top.\textsuperscript{17} Police violence, as in Sharpeville in 1960,\textsuperscript{18} was needed to keep the helots in the position desired by white ideology. The maintenance of the system was political in nature. Through exercising monopsony, the South African government saw to it that the competing demands for labor in industry and agriculture did not raise black wages, and thereby create better bargaining positions. It did so by putting a legal ceiling on African wages. It could do this because whatever other conflicts there were, within the exclusively white electorate, there was virtual consensus about helotism. After the failure of populism in the American South, and of Tom Watson’s initial attempts at ameliorating black and white relations at the lower levels, there was a comparable white consensus, politically maintained. In both situations, helotizing, resulting in a coincidence of class and “race” was characterized by such caste phenomena as “Jim Crow” or “small apartheid” regulations.
Helotizing was certainly at first justified by the common run of white oppressors, who may not have heard of the Platonic and Aristotelian arguments, as part and parcel of a divinely established order. Both in the US and South Africa, Genesis ix, 25-27 was invoked to sanction oppression. Because of the curse on Canaan, his descendants were condemned to perpetual servitude. Later it was justified by a plethora of “white man’s burden” type of arguments, but always in such a way that colored people had a specific low-wage and dependent position in a white-dominated society.

In post-pagan times, as argued above, Jews have rarely, if at all, been in the position of “helots”, or in one derived from helotism. Although there was Jewish mass poverty at times, this was rarely an indigence generated by inequality on the labor market, since Jews, however poor, as a rule had to be economically independent for reasons of religious self-defense and were, so to speak, self-excluded from the labor market. The poor had to lead, until modern times, a hand-to-mouth existence, as Schmarotzer. The very desire to change them into useful citizens, lay at the basis of the earliest, Josephinist considerations of emancipation, in the Habsburg area.  

In the early medieval period during which prejudice took shape, Jews, as a result of circumstances analyzed above, ousted from agriculture and crafts (with early exceptions in Italy, southern France and Iberia, and later to some extent eastern Europe) could not participate in any productive process, other than catering to the Jewish market. They could not even be day laborers or journeymen. Even if they had been admitted to these jobs, they would have found it difficult to maintain themselves as Jews vis-à-vis Christian employers. Social control would have forced them to give in. The general rule applied, that economic independence from others than fellow Jews, was a condition sine qua non for being true to their persuasion.

In the Middle Ages, Jews were indeed employed by the nobility as administrators, but given the scarcity of expertise, the employers would think twice before they maltreated them. In later periods Jews were occasionally employees, for example in the sweatshops of London and elsewhere, in the diamond trade or typography in the Netherlands, or docking in Greece. Characteristically, this applies to countries where anti-Semitism was less virulent. However, by and large, Jews were independent, or in the service of other Jews, even though more often than not they were eking out a very poor existence as peddlers, cattle dealers, rag-and-bone men, small innkeepers and the like, poor but independent, and never helots; “race” (ethnicity) and class did not coincide. Another peculiarity of the position of the Jews is that protective ethnic niches, such as the American Chinese, for example, developed in the laundry
business, or recently the Koreans in the delicatessen business, or Africans in South Africa, in the “black taxi” business, worked, against them. Money lending and financial expertise—once a protective niche—became part of the anti-Jewish stereotype because of the resentment it caused among the people.

An ideological justification for the bad treatment of Jews could not possibly be that they had to be kept in a God-ordained social position, for their actual place in society was regarded as being the very opposite of divine intention.

Instead of being, as they certainly were initially, relatively well-to-do and independent people, landowners, artisans, merchants and later money lenders, protected by mighty lords, bishops and kings, they should lead the humble existence of punished people, with just enough means, earned by the sweat of their brow, to be able to survive, as the Church Fathers had argued, and was again and again repeated by men like Agobard, Aquinas, or Luther. They should be slaves or serfs, as they were only formally in the Holy Roman Empire, Reichskammerknechte, servi camerae imperatoris. In practice they were not like that at all, certainly not in the popular perception, where their social status was seen as an anomaly. Their disobedience and obstinacy had prevented the true divinely intended order to be realized, they prevented the Parousia, and they not only got away with it, but they actually profited by it. So, chiliastically inclined or ignorant commoners, misunderstanding the finer points of theology, in their understanding anyhow propounded by venal popes and simoniaclal bishops, felt that presenting the Jews with the choice of baptism or death would end the anomaly, and bring about that true and intended divine order, or even an earthly paradise, whatever these mammonist clerics might say to the contrary. They wanted to change the existing order of things, as later anti-Semites would, who also held that the alien, “Bedouin” Jew with his “mobile capital”, symbolic of capitalist exploitation, ought not to have a place in society, and certainly not one by which he profited. They too wanted radically to change the “system”. These commoners could not accept the view possibly held by some clergy, and expressed by the thirteenth-century Flemish poet Jacob van Maerlant, that the Jews, like Cain, should not be slain, despite their crime. (Genesis 1v, 14-16). In the Rijmbijbel he wrote that Jews and Jesus were brothers as Cain and Abel were. Like Cain, they were angry with, and jealous of, their brother’s virtue, and slew him. Like Cain, Jews had a mark, in their case circumcision, whereby they could be recognized, so that they could not be killed. Van Maerlant does not refer to massacres, perhaps because he himself did not witness any.

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It may be assumed that the type of social protest mentioned above is the key to understanding accusatory innovation. When large sections of the population are steeped in magical religiosity, the social order is presumably conceived by them as part and parcel of a larger cosmic order, in an almost mythical way. In a mythical belief system based on analogies, human, social, and societal relations mirror cosmic forces and vice versa, so that iniquities of the social order are on a par with natural catastrophes. In such a point of view, unjust feudal exaction, devastation by war, the practice of forestalling, “causing” famines, hurt people the way epidemics do, or floods, or drought, all forces of an evil fate. It is the case of the small southern Italian village Carlo Levi describes: for its inhabitants, “Rome” and “fate” were synonymous, equally calamitous.\(^5\) When baptism is popularly conceived of as a de facto pagan rite, necessary to guarantee the newborn’s life, it is unjust that the Jew lives well without it. The unbaptized have no right to live.\(^6\) This evil state of affairs in popular religious concept will end when the last obstacle to the coming of the millennium, Jewish disbelief, is removed.

Those who held such views may easily have concluded that the causes of evil are therefore epitomized by the privileged position unrighteous Jews have in the prevailing order, protected as they are by the equally unrighteous mammonists and plunderers, the mighty of this world. But the social order that leaves room for iniquity is itself subject to change and therefore as a phenomenon not always constant, so that also the evil contained in it, can change its appearance. This means that there is in such a conceptualization a virtually inexhaustible supply of reasons to explain the wickedness of the world, and by implication to envisage the wickedness of the Jews who keep it going in this imperfect state, because they are not in their “proper” position. Since there is no basic difference between the iniquities caused by man and those of nature, the latter are also in part attributable to “evil” Jews, as they are to wicked witches. Both can provoke epidemics, though there does not seem to be much evidence that Jews were accused of provoking earthquakes, hailstorms, drought, and the like.

Such a view is not essentially different from the more secularized modern variety. Though bereft of its medieval magic, which was replaced by modern forms of occultism, as will be elaborated elsewhere, it has an analogous concept of an evil permeating the social order, that allows the Jew to create havoc, as he is not in the proper place that befits miscreant aliens. Liberals and all those who stood to gain from reform and industrialism, from modern ways of fleecing the poor, allegedly protected the Jew. In anti-Semitic innuendo, modern, liberal-inspired legislation gave the emancipated Jew the chance to

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Accusatory Innovation
ruin all the truly productive classes, peasants and artisans, with “his” free trade, Manchesterism, and the gold standard, to rob people of their savings with “his” stock exchange, to bemuse people by “his” deceptive journalism, to jeopardize what there is left of the safeguards of life, limb, and property by “his” fomenting of a socialist revolution, to undermine morality by “his” founding and controlling Freemasonry. The Jewish doctors, masters of disease, can use their power at will. Jews so dominate art and literature that these degenerate to no more than “Jewish glitter”, brilliance without emotion or spirituality. The Jew, by instigating feminism, disturbs the proper relationship between man and woman, and thereby undermines social morality to his advantage. The Jew who is not in his “proper” place, that is, the ghetto that befits the alien, robbing nomad, can hope to establish a Pax Judaica, prepared by the “Elders of Zion”, a Jewish world government, and the enslavement of all Gentiles. He rules by “divide and conquer”.

The modern anti-Semitic social protest, ideologically condemning the existing social order, betrays the same obsession as the medieval one. The two are clearly interconnected via a “genealogy of stereotypes”. Social protest cum social change does indeed explain accusatory innovation, but what is more, the propensity for uncontrolled violence.

The exploiting oppressors of the helots, for reasons of economic self-interest, could not afford to kill indiscriminately, or allow others to kill their (potential) low-wage labor force, so that there were effective, but not necessarily moral, restraints on violence, and never any attempt at systematic genocide.

If economic considerations played a role at all in the carnage of the Crusades and subsequent persecutions, the disoriented poor had no such economic inhibitions. Rather, they considered themselves to be the exploited. Once people became aware, after a period of friendly relations, of what they saw as an anomaly, violence was uncontrolled, without the restraint that characterized violence aimed at helots.

The uncontrolled violence aimed at Jews was perhaps triggered by a desire to establish at last the natural order of things, hitherto never realized. There is a difference in ideological exculpation, also since the latter much more so than the former could be an instance of a “disinterested desire to inflict punishment”. This then could be answers to the baffling question why Jew-hatred could result in genocide, whereas most other older varieties of racism did not. The hypothesis could be put forward that genocide takes place when the perpetrators of violence consider their victims to be representing a social order that should not be. It sees Australian Aborigines or Native Americans as pagan, useless impediments, in the way of the “Manifest Destiny”, of
the onward march of “civilization”. One could mention Khoi-San, Bushmen, victims of the “Boer Commando’s”, nomadic Gypsies, formerly just called “pagans”, superfluous old women, who consume without producing, heretics, and many more. In the case of the Jews, the particular social order they allegedly represented was ever more conceived of as of Satan, the great disturber.

However, there is a caveat to this reasoning. This line of thought could easily lead to the conclusion that Auschwitz was the chance outcome of the Jew-hatred of the past, and not the more or less accidental result, however disastrous, of a peculiar constellation of factors, as among others, Melson argued, seeing it as the result of a revolutionary situation that gave the mob a chance – a hotly disputed issue.

The above conclusion presumes that the excesses of the mob represent the convictions of the oppressing group as such. However, not everyone who accepts as natural and rightful the inferior position of blacks in society is also prepared to participate in lynching, or even to condone it. Likewise, not everyone who holds that Jews have too much influence, are dangerous, and should be limited in their rights, necessarily resorts to massacre and extermination of them as the only solution. However, they do create a climate of opinion that paves the way for excesses the moment a social crisis results in mob formation, and in so doing they make themselves vulnerable to terrorization.

In 1096 the uncontrolled character was due to the peculiar circumstances of the mob formation, to wit, the socially unsettling effect of the preaching of the crusade. Although seemingly promising escape, it infringed on a settled way of life, and by implication amplified the inherent insecurity of that, as a rule, rather dismal way of life, resulting in normlessness. This was furthered by the removal of local controls, through geographical dislocation and by a certain amount of (“auto”) terrorization. Similar conditions prevailed in the case of later massacres.

According to the observations of Gustave le Bon and his modern psychological exegesis, mob sentiment, akin to panic, implies a lowering of rational control in the individual personality, in diminishing super-ego functions. The results of such diminished rationality are the more dangerous, the greater the mob, the greater its emotional tensions, and the more it acquires an army-like character, remote from other influences, stuck together day and night, officered by like-minded leaders; the more it acquires an “S.A. character”.

However, the mob is, almost by definition, usually not stable or perma-
nent, not even when it assumes an army-like character, as the strange dissolution of Emicho’s hordes in Hungary clearly suggests. When the constituting circumstances have disappeared, there is a “back to normal”, that is to say, a falling back on attitude instead of action. There is no permanent violence, though it can be whipped up at any time, when a new crisis creates new mobs. Up to the time of Nazism (when terrorization became permanent because the monopoly of violence of the state then fell into the hands of the terrorizing mob, which thereby acquired some sort of permanence), “normal” anti-Semitic attitude is limited to backbiting, Judenschimpfen, manger du juif, condoning or supporting measures restricting Jewish liberty of action, and in modern times voting for anti-Semitic parties, attending meetings, and reading or writing anti-Semitic brochures, journals and the like. It is mostly verbal apart from occasional fisticuffs.

The discrepancy between attitude and behavior detected by La Piere’s experiment, repeated\(^3\) and corroborated many times since, has to be taken into consideration. However, this state of inactivity does not mean that all attitudes were alike. There are anti-Semites and anti-Semites, with great differences in the vehemence of their opinion, not all of them accepting all rejectionist tenets. If there had been ideological conformity, there would not have been so much bickering and quarrelling between the various anti-Semitic parties in the nineteenth century. In Austria there were conflicts between Lueger’s Christian Socials and the Schönererists including the various secessionists from Schönererism, who quarrelled among themselves. Schönerer and others resented the lack of radicalism and nationalism of the Christian Socials, and their Austrian loyalty. The latter naturally resented Schönerer’s “Los von Rom”, the attempt at persuading Austrians to go over to the more truly “German”, more truly “anti-Jewish” Lutheran Church. – “Ohne Juda, ohne Rom, wird gebaut Germaniens Dom”. What they resented, in fact, was his anti-Christian racial “philosophy”, resulting in overt Germanic paganism and pagan festivals and also his use of a Germanic chronology that began to count with the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutons.\(^4\) Schönererists resented the clericalism of the Luegerites, and particularly their educational program. The murder of Dolfuss in 1934 by Austrian Nazis is the culmination of the conflict between the two wings.

In France, there was the conflict between Drumont, posing as a Roman Catholic when it suited him, and the more radical followers of the Marquis de Morès, like Jules Guérin, (Guérin rightly accused Drumont of profiteering and of pseudo-anti-Semitism, by accepting large advertisements of Jewish firms in his Libre Parole, and leaving out the Jewish names)\(^4\) or those who
like Gustave Tridon, conceived of Christianity as being thoroughly Jewish, and as such condemnable. In Germany such views were expressed by proto-Nazis like Eugen Dühring, Arthur Dinter, Theodore Fritsch, and a host of others, essentially different from Adolf Stoecker’s conservative “Christian” anti-Semitism. There was a whole array of contesting anti-Semitic parties, noted by Kurt Wawrzinek as early as 1927. A standard term for anti-Semites condemning other anti-Semites was “Auch-anti-Semiten”. There is no reason not to assume conceptual variability in earlier anti-Semitism as well, the greater the more accusatory innovation.

This could theoretically be measured on a “scale of intensity” in anti-Semitic attitudes. It is conceivable to devise a questionnaire with opinions ranging from, say, “Jews are odd people”, via a number of intermediate opinions to the extreme “every single person born a Jew is evil personified and must be eliminated”. If used, it would probably yield at first an asymmetrical curve, with the top on the axis nearer the mild extreme expression, certainly after an untroubled period. It is also entirely conceivable that the majority opinion would gradually move towards the other extreme, an ongoing demonizing of the Jew, when exoneration and exculpation of crimes committed necessitated it. This would particularly hold true for all those who, without initially being involved, were implicated in the course of events, and like the bishops of Mainz and Trier became indirectly involved by terrorization. Precisely because there were no built-in restraints, as in the case of helots, the need for exculpation was ever more pressing.

However, there is more. Each excess so to speak heightened the Jewish “evil stature”. Hatred logically tends to aggrandize its object, for it cannot bear it to be something insignificant. As time goes on, and majority opinion gradually moves up the “intensity scale”, the alleged Jewish danger assumes ever greater proportions. From being obstinate infidels Jews evolved in popular perception to an evil power, that could cause the Black Death, and worse. Hitler’s megalomaniac hatred forced him to believe in the colossal power of the Jews to do evil. Quite characteristically, he occasionally in informal discussions gave vent to a kind of negative admiration for the Jews, as Joachim Fest noted: “Their racial exclusiveness and purity seemed to him no less admirable than their sense of being a chosen people, their implacability and their intelligence.” Basically he regarded them as something akin to “negative supermen”, creating an either/or situation, a conflict that could only end by extermination.

Some sixty years earlier, Wilhelm Marr had written about a race war of thousands of years, won by the superior race: *Finis Germaniae*. Michelet
said about the Jews, who in his view were “people of darkness”\textsuperscript{49}; “de soufflets en soufflets, les voilà au trône du monde”.\textsuperscript{50} The persecutions during the Crusades, where the evil was still seen as limited to the unbaptized, may perhaps be said to have initiated the growth of a Jewish evil stature, from a mere nuisance to a cosmic threat; the first step in the construction of an ideology aiming at change. Such a statement is difficult to substantiate.

A possible indication of a changed mood very soon after the events, is what happened in Mainz in 1098. Emperor Henry IV ordered an investigation into the whereabouts of the property of Jews killed there. Some relatives of bishop Ruthard were accused of having seized substantial parts of the fortune. They were defended by the bishop, who thereupon was himself accused of having done the same. Angry, Ruthard, who had once promised to protect the jeopardized Jews, went over to the enemies of the emperor. Two years later, many of the Mainz Jews returning from Speyer still felt menaced in Mainz.\textsuperscript{51} In Bohemia Duke Bratislav sequestered all the properties of the Jews, who having been baptized by force, in 1098 returned to their old faith. He thereby in effect sanctioned the forced baptisms and the persecutions.\textsuperscript{52} The novel use of the word \textit{judaizare}, in the sense of money lending, by Bernard of Clairvaux in 1147 is also revealing.\textsuperscript{53} The events of Würzburg in that same year are equally revealing. There the pattern of 1096 was repeated despite the vigorous action of Bernard, of the emperor and others, to prevent a repetition. According to Bar Ephraim, the Jews felt safe in Würzburg, just as in 1096 in the Rhenish towns – West-East retardation? – and did not seek refuge in the castle.\textsuperscript{54} When the crusaders were assembled, the body of a Christian, Theodoric, was found in the river Main. Immediately the rumor spread that he was murdered by the Jews. This was the sign for a general attack. Men, women, and children were killed. While the carnage took place, all sorts of miracles, not specified by Bar Ephraim, were alleged to have taken place near the body of Theodoric. The populace proclaimed him to be a saint, but the bishop refused canonization. The story is interesting because it has all the makings of a blood libel so shortly after the first ritual murder case ever, in far away Norwich, in 1144. Had the Würzburg commoners heard about the Norwich case, or was their action spontaneously born out of popular wrath, which according to Otto of Freising, even the saintliness of Bernard could hardly keep in check elsewhere?\textsuperscript{55} Perhaps there is no need to assume their being informed about events in Norwich, which moreover only became generally known after Thomas of Monmouth’s largely concocted account of it several years after the death of
the “victim” William. In 1147 Würzburg commoners cannot have known the story of Theobald of Cambridge, a convert who, like so many renegades, in hatred of the community he had left, told Thomas that Jewish sages annually got together in Narbonne to decide by lot which town should provide the next victim for Jewish murder.⁵⁶

Perhaps an independent spontaneous generation of this twelfth-century myth, in several places, is not so enigmatic. It was, so to speak, in the air. Although it is highly unlikely that twelfth-century commoners were informed about Purim,⁵⁷ they may have had some vague notion of an annual effigy “killing”, and not knowing about Haman,⁵⁸ having no inkling about the book of Esther, they may have thought of a regularly repeated murder, that had religious significance, in the form of ritually repeating again and again their great crime of over a thousand years ago. Perhaps it even suffices to assume that murder is justified by an accusation of murder, and that being killed by Jews lends the victim an odor of sanctity, particularly when the alleged crime takes place about Easter. Würzburg was late February.

Recent analyses of the English ritual murder cases, notably Norwich and Lincoln, and the Fulda case of 1236, have demonstrated that a distinction should be made between the ritual murder proper, and the blood libel.⁵⁹ In ritual murder the form of the killing has ritual significance. Crucifixion allegedly was the form of the older ritual murder. It is curious to note that clerics would condone that accusation, lured as they were by the chance of enhancing the prestige of their church by having relics of a saint – martyrs of the pagan period were scarce in England – and thereby attracting pilgrims and their money. The Church has always been opposed to the blood libel, the idea that the Jews needed Christian blood for the unleavened Passover bread, or for medical and magical purposes, with the exception of the case of Simon of Trent, where the Vatican gave way.

Perhaps, as Strack argued,⁶⁰ the blood libel is just an example of a belief in the magical propensities of blood which is found all over the world, in many cultures and religions. This is most plausible indeed, but does not really explain why the story emerged in 1236 and not earlier. Langmuir relates it to the immediately preceding persecution of heretics, who were accused of practicing blood rituals, whereby popular imagination was fed;⁶¹ but why were they accused of it? At the time, the learned Suffragan bishop Thomas of Cantimpré, in a comment on a blood libel in 1267 in Pforzheim, related the alleged Jewish usage of Christian blood to Matthew xxvii, 25. He knew the story of Theobald of Cambridge. As a result of their great crime, he argued, the Jews suffered from diseases that could only be cured by Christ’s blood, that is, by
becoming Christians. Maliciously misunderstanding the message, they believed that they needed the blood of Christians.  

Be this as it may, ritual murder charges in both forms served wondrously well as means of exculpation and justification for killing Jews. The story once propagated, spread like wildfire. As early as 1171 there was a case in Blois, where there was not even a victim. A groom watering a horse in the Loire, saw a Jew who, peradventure, dropped a leather parcel he carried on his breast, into the water. Seeing the horse being frightened, made the groom report to his master that the Jew had thrown the body of a murdered child into the water. The count, angry with the Jews because of a love affair with a Jewess gone wrong, was only too eager to punish them. He ordered a trial by ordeal. The groom had to go into the water with a pot of holy water. He would sink if he had not spoken the truth. He swam freely. The accused was thus found guilty and fifty Jews were executed on 26 May. In that same year, Jews in Carentan and Cologne were accused of putting forged money into circulation.

In 1190, the year of the York massacre, instigated by Richard Malebysse, but with eager participation of the populace, there was an event in Bray sur Seine which clearly illuminates the growing hatred. The Christian murderer of a Jew, a King’s man, was executed by order of the Count de Champagne. Rumor had it that after the execution, Jews put a thorny crown on the head, in derision of Christ. This was for King Philip Augustus a pretext for asserting his royal rights in Champagne. The Jewish quarter was besieged and a hundred Jews executed. Even though it could here be argued that this was royal policy, and not necessarily popular sentiment – but who spread the rumor? – this was not the case in Fulda.

Emperor Frederic II, princes and clergy cleared the Jews of the accusation, but it was to no avail. It stuck. At that moment, the emperor introduced the Reichskammerknechtschaft, as was said in the law books, in his role as successor of Titus. Jews in those law books were either slaves of the Emperor, because Titus conquered Jerusalem, or there was a special relation because Josephus cured Titus of the gout. At first meant as a protective measure, it later developed, in the Milch-cow fashion, into an instrument of oppression and extortion, later emperors paying their debts in Jews, who could be squeezed dry.

The blood libel is paramount among the medieval fantasies that were bequeathed to later periods. It was depicted in paintings, sculptures, prints, and was the theme of Chaucer’s “Priores’ Tale”, of ballads, bestiaries, and of popular plays like the Endinger Judenspiel.
Never having disappeared from popular consciousness, as is evident for example from Eisenmenger’s *Entdecktes Judenthum*, it was in the nineteenth century revived by such cases as the notorious Père Thomas affair of Damascus, in 1840, which caused quite a stir and was the object of international diplomatic negotiations, France and Russia acting as protectors of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The affair ended as the result of vigorous action by a deputation headed by Alphonse Crémieux and Sir Moses Montefiore. The accusation was without foundation, the body of Père Thomas was never found. Accident? Murder? It was never proven, but medieval memories were revived.70

Worse than the Damascus case was the alleged Tisza-Eszlar “ritual murder” of 1882 in Hungary. It gave rise to a whole new series of accusations, among them the Hilsner case in the Habsburg Empire. Hilsner was defended by Thomas Masaryk; it resulted in his, fortunately temporarily, almost total isolation.71 In Russia there were new accusations, in Germany it led to the Xanthen (1893) and Konitz (1901) affairs. Ritual murder became once more a main topic in anti-Semitic propaganda literature, up to the days of *der Stürmer*.72

The first international anti-Jewish congress – an anti-Semitic international! – of 1882 in Dresden, bewailed the “murder” of Esther Solymossi, the alleged victim of Tisza-Eszlar, who in all probability drowned. Her portrait hung in the congress hall.73

The case achieved such worldwide notoriety because of the action of Augustus Rohling, a fanatical priest, who, as a supposed expert (at the instigation of some high Church dignitary, he was appointed professor of Hebrew Antiquities at the Karl Ferdinand University of Prague, without being in the least qualified), wrote during the affair that he was prepared to declare under oath that the Talmud prescribed the use of Christian blood.

Rohling was attacked by a Polish rabbi, J. Bloch who, in a famous article “Angebot des Meineides” published in a leading Viennese newspaper, accused him of willingly and wittingly committing perjury. The trial that followed, Bloch being accused of libel, ended farcically. Rohling withdrew his charge, and thereby admitted that Bloch was right. Rohling became the laughingstock of Vienna, lost his chair at the university, and disappeared from the scene. Not so the venom he distributed. It was said that as the trial did not take place, nothing was proven or unproven. Propaganda went on, unabated. E. Drumont wrote an introduction to the French edition of Rohling’s notorious book *Der Talmudjude*. Henri Desportes also propagated the idea in France.74
A significant feature of the modern version of the ritual murder story, as was to be expected, considering the above argument, is that, it was now completely embedded in an ideology of social protest. In meetings of the Reformverein, an organization of artisans in distress, (the nucleus of Karl Lueger's later Christian Social party), the ritual murder charge played a role. Considering themselves victims of Jewish capitalism, since the emancipation of Jews in 1867, the artisans eagerly listened to ritual murder propaganda at the time of the Tisza-Eszlar affair, with Rohling often being quoted. It proved to them what bloodsuckers Jews were, in a literal as well as figurative sense. The London liberal Spectator wrote articles in which it was stated that such accusations were to be expected, even though they were without foundation, when Hungarian peasants were mercilessly exploited by Jewish mortgage banks. In Germany, in the Antisemitisches Jahrbuch, articles about Konitz appeared side by side with articles on the policy of the thoroughly anti-Semitic Bund der Landwirte, by the radical Hessian peasant leader Böckel, claiming that it did not go far enough. Indeed, the anti-Semitism of the Bund was often no more than paying lip service, as the Junker leadership did not want to upset the social order, which radical anti-Semitism would have entailed. Up to the days of Julius Streicher, ritual murder was part of that radical anti-Semitism.

The medieval story of the desecration of the Host, the desire to kill the Savior again and again, had presumably no such direct impact on the later formation of an ideology, as was the case with the blood libel.

In the Europe of the Reformation, when communion in the form of bread lost its significance as a sacrament, the charge in its literal form naturally vanished. Elsewhere, the decline of magic, and a greater literacy achieved the same. Was that the reason why in 1886 the Belgian clergy wisely abstained from commemorating the Brussels case of 1386? Officially Christian dogma had always denounced this accusation as unfounded malicious credulity, as for example formulated by Pope Martin v. but that did not prevent the common people from ardently believing in it. The story had such immense appeal because people themselves, as noted, used the Host for magical purposes, as a fertilizer, an aphrodisiac, or even a poison. The absurdity of the charge, to wit, the idea that Jews believed in transubstantiation, was obviously for commoners outdone by a desire to exculpate and justify violence, as punishment for the counter-magician. Perhaps they saw the belief of the Jews in the dogma as proof of its veracity. Religious sentiment of the thirteenth century put a strong emphasis on Corpus Christi, the institution of the Eucharist. From 1246 onwards the festival of Corpus Christi spread from
Liège, and was made official in 1264 by Pope Urban IV. Given the related idea that the Church, as the spiritual community of all the faithful, is the “body” of Christ, simpler minds could easily come to the conclusion that the satanic raging of Jews against Christ, in the form of the desecration of the Host, implied the intent to rage against all Christians. In the sense that Jews thus became the enemies of humankind, it indirectly greatly influenced later ideology up to the time of the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”. From passive malevolent outsiders, who had prevented the “divine order” from coming true, they had now become active destroyers, doing Satan’s work, as befitted unbelievers who in a strange way were also believers. The notion signified that “Salvation is of the Jews” (John 1:22), is not held to be true, but rather the very opposite, destruction and calamity. They were made manifest in the popular imagination, when it held that Christian blood, obtained by ritual murder, and the desecrated Host were the main ingredients of the Jewish poison that caused epidemics like the Black Death.

Perhaps the allegation was seemingly substantiated by the peculiarity that *micrococcus prodigiosus* in larger cultures colors moist, starchy products blood-red, as it did to the bread of the soldiers when Alexander the Great besieged Tyre. Ferdinand Cohn, one of the founders of modern bacteriology, discovered this in 1850.80

Belief in magic explains the tremendous stir, the heavy persecutions that followed the “detection” of a case. Persecutions culminated in the Rindfleisch massacre of 1298, when terrorization held full sway, because the effectiveness of the government was weakened by the conflict between Adolf of Nassau and Albrecht of Habsburg, both pretenders. A butcher in Röttingen on the Tauber proclaimed himself to be celestially appointed to avenge the piercing and “bleeding” of the Host. It resulted in a kind of popular crusade through Franconia and Bavaria in which an estimated 5000 Jews were murdered. It is worth noting that repeatedly new accusations of desecration were promulgated after the massacre had taken place. Jews were collectively held responsible.

The murderous doings of Rindfleisch were repeated in 1336 by “King Armeleder” the impoverished Ritter Arnold von Uissigheim, in Franconia, Swabia, and Austria. Another group, under the leadership of an innkeeper named Johann Zimberli, was active in Alsace. In Diggendorf in Bavaria a “blood” Host was kept as a relic, attracting many pilgrims.81

The scene was set for the calamity of the Black Death by the contribution of the Pastoureaux. In 1320 peasant rebelliousness in France turned against the Jews, who had been readmitted after the expulsion of 1306. The Pas-
toureaux were massed together in bands, made possible through the growth of the population, so that peasants were less isolated than in earlier periods. They felt victimized by ever-growing feudal exaction “caused by Jews” and did their bloody handiwork all over France, usually with the help of the urban poor. The movement clearly had chiliastic features, in that it often turned against the clergy as well, even though some friars joined it. It prepared the way for the massacre of the Black Death, in that for the first time it accused that other group of outcasts, the lepers, of being accomplices of the Jews. They were accused of spreading the Jewish poison to contaminate the wells. The association was rationalized – some learned cleric must have informed them – by the story of Elisha’s servant Gehazi, who lied about the gifts he had received from Naaman, which Elisha had refused because Naaman’s recovery from leprosy was God’s work. Gehazi and his “seed” were punished with the disease of Naämân (2 Kings v, 1-27). Perhaps Jews themselves were held to be lepers of a kind, suffering from skin diseases as punishment for their abominable crime.

It does not seem a coincidence that French anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century still regularly referred to Jews as suffering from scrofulous diseases.

The story of the Jewish poison was repeated during the years of the plague, later named the Black Death after the dark spots caused by subcutaneous hemorrhages. This combined bubonic and lung plague originated in Asia, where it was perhaps endemic. Desperately ill Genoese sailors brought the contagion to Sicily from Caffa (present-day Theodosia) on the Black Sea. Messina was badly hit. Other sailors infected other places. The epidemic spread northward, hitting Florence very badly, crossed the Alps into France and England, another strain penetrated into Germany and eastern Europe. Scandinavia was infected from England. The disease followed the trade routes.

Very densely inhabited towns, dirty, infested with rats and fleas, were heavily affected, the villages a little less. These were not always spared, since there was also respiratory infection. Attempts to escape by seeking the rural areas, as Bocaccio’s storytellers did, were not always successful. In Norway a whole community of refugees from Bergen died, save one girl, who as a consequence became a rich heiress.

Malnutrition and famine had made people less resistant. The years before the outbreak in 1348 had seen several poor harvests, causing the price of grain to rise sharply. The death rate varied; in some regions up to two-thirds of the population died, but an overall one-third seems to be a reliable estimate.
It was a stupendously terrifying experience. Bocaccio’s story about the pigs dropping dead after sniffing at the rags of a deceased beggar highlights the supernatural character people attributed to this calamity. Many explained it as a scourge sent by God. Everywhere people did penance, the most extreme performed by the flagellants, who in the end were condemned as heretics for professing the belief that they were the elect, disobedient to the authority of the Church. Others, however, indulged in excesses of merrymaking and drinking bouts, arguing that since the next day one could be dead, one should enjoy life as long as it lasted. It resulted in loose morality, which may easily have contributed to lessen the restraint on the killing of Jews.

If it was a scourge sent by God, why did He so indiscriminately kill saints and sinners? Abbeys and monasteries where people lived closely together, were particularly affected. Or were these, as the heretical flagellants contended, dens of iniquity?84

The contentions of the Pastoureaux provided another answer: Jews had poisoned the wells. Mass killings began in Savoy, where torture had made the Jews confess, and via Switzerland, this became a regular pattern in the Holy Roman Empire. There was no massacre in England and France, simply because there were no Jews to be killed. In Italy for reasons mentioned, the story of Jews poisoning the wells was not generally accepted. The role of lepers was minimized. There is no evidence of the massive killing of lepers, as there was in 1320-1321; is this because the killing of lepers was not as remunerative as the killing of Jews?85

In the Empire, killings took place in a total of 454 towns and villages, that is, in 78 percent of all places where there were Jews.86 About a hundred communities were entirely wiped out, while some Jews escaped to rural areas. Bohemia was not affected, either because somehow it suffered less from the epidemic, or else because in his personal domain Charles 1v had the effective means of preventing the carnage. It was not necessarily for love of the Jews that he protected them. As emperor he demanded his share of the spoils of murdered Jews, arguing that the possessions of his *servi camerae imperatoris* fell to him after their death. He actually made these claims beforehand, stipulating that if Jews were killed, their property belonged to him. This sounds like an invitation to murder!87 Jews being spared in Bohemia is no evidence of there being no Jew-hatred there. In 1389, under the weak, dipsomaniac successor Wenceslas, one of the worst pogroms of the later Middle Ages took place in Prague. A minor incident, Jewish children at play, allegedly mocking a priest, perhaps throwing a stone, was the sign for the attack; an estimated 3000 Jews were killed. A pure race riot.88
The whole episode requires some comment. As lepers were not being killed, Jews were obviously the main enemies, though people using their common sense did not believe the story. The historiographer Konrad of Megenberg (1309-1374), for example, pointed out that Jews were victimized as well, particularly for example, in Vienna, and that many people died where there were no Jews. Pope Clement VI defended the Jews with similar arguments, but to no avail.89

However, it is possible, but in general not very probable, that by better hygiene, dietary habits, and isolation, Jews occasionally stood a better chance of survival, and this did not remain unnoticed.90

The general picture though, is that people with responsibility, the Pope, bishops, princes, and town councillors, did not believe the story and tried to protect the Jews, to no avail. There were exceptions, like Frederic of Thuringia, and the margrave of Brandenburg, who actually promoted the killings. Of Duke John I of Brabant, it was said “Die hertoghe Jan zonder waen / dede die Joden alle vaen”. (Duke John, without hesitation, had all Jews carcered) In Freiburg, all Jews were arrested. They confessed after torture. The synagogue was turned into a brewery.91 There were more exceptions, but the skeptical mood was very well expressed in the letter the councillors of Cologne wrote to their colleagues in Strasbourg and elsewhere.92 Expressing their fear of further revolutionary action by the “common folk” intent on killing the Jews, they exhorted them to protect the Jews. The established order was endangered, but when the killings nevertheless took place, the same councillors were not slow in claiming their share of the spoils.

Spoliation was a strong motive. Impoverished and indebted nobles joined the guilds in Strasbourg, when they were protesting against the initial policy of the town council. It gave in, and according to contemporary reports, likely to be exaggerated, 16,000 Jews were killed, and some of the spoils were handed over to the killers. The motive was so clearly spoliation, that the Strasbourg chronicler Fritsche Closener could write in 1362: “Money was the poison that killed the Jews.”93 Some have argued that the whole episode was an aspect of the conflict between patricians and guilds. There cannot be any doubt that the flagellants had all the characteristics of a chiliastically inclined revolutionary movement of the poor. Their behavior in Frankfurt and Brussels, to name but two places, with mass killings of the Jews, had the full support of the common people.94

So, although it cannot be denied that grave socioeconomic problems played a part, indicative of social unrest and protest fostered by the high cost of living, and above all indicative of the resentment of Jewish usury, and of
those who stood to profit from it, it cannot be maintained that the killings were a mere social revolution. The argument that often baptized Jews, or those expressing willingness to be baptized, were killed all the same, is no proof against a “religious” motivation. In York, Jews prepared to be baptized in Clifford’s Tower in 1190, were also killed. So 1349 is no different from 1190. There is no reason to assume that the murderers of the Rindfleisch and Armleder movements, allegedly “punishing” desecration of the Host, did not likewise resent Jewish usury, and were not motivated by this.

Recognition that the massacre of 1349 and consecutive years markedly had social revolutionary aspects is by no means at odds with the statement that the justifying stereotype was part and parcel of popular religiosity, a conceptualization of evil. Why is there no discrepancy? When the concept is that the Jew is a diabolical being, eternally conspiring, bent on destroying Christendom or humankind, why should he not also want to do that by economic means? A disinterested desire to inflict punishment on poisoners does not preclude a desire to get rid of usurers. Both may be true, for the notindebted masses of the poor, who were not likely to profit from the spoils in any way, would nevertheless participate in the murders. What it all amounts to is that new justifying and rationalizing items were added to the hypothetical scale of intensity, so that majority opinion thereby once more moved toward the extreme act of extermination.

Demonizing was an ongoing process, contributing to an evil stature of the Jews. Like other victims of racism, Jews were supposed to smell, but their stench, the *faetor judaicus* had a satanic odor—was it sulphurous?—An abbot dreamt that while debating with faithless Jews, they exhaled a horrible stench that remained after he woke up. The abbot smelled it again whenever he saw a Jew. Caesarius of Heisterbach, specializing in anti-Jewish miracle tales, relates how a Jewish girl converted to Christianity could smell her unconverted father from a distance. Was it the odor of disbelief, or was it an olfactory perception of the alleged skin-disease, the divine punishment? A Jewess was automatically considered to be a witch, and a Jew an evil sorcerer. Hebrew was a sorcerer’s language. The Faust figures of the sixteenth century used Hebrew signs and Hebrew incantations. It was generally held in popular lore that Jews worshipped Satan, in the form of a goat, but particularly in the form of the *Judensau*. The adoration of the pig, by Jews amorously caressing it, was a popular theme. Luther referred to a representa-
tion of it in Wittenberg. People had scant knowledge of the Old Testament, but Jewish abstention from pork fascinated them. That is why it was interpreted as some sort of veneration. That same misunderstanding was at the basis of the oath *More Judaico*. When a Jew had to clear himself by oath, he had to swear on the five books of Moses, standing barefoot on a pigskin. Deliberate insult, or guarantee that he would speak the truth?

Judas haunted the medieval mind, so that all Jews were considered to be traitors, in conspiratorial league with all the enemies of Christendom. At the time of the invasion of the Tatars, it was immediately assumed, according to Matthew Paris, that these were the “Ten Lost Tribes” coming to the aid of their brethren. Resident Jews were accused of providing them with weapons, smuggled in wine cases. They were a fifth column for Arabs and Turks. Dreyfus and the “stab in the back” of 1918 fits into a long tradition.

A peculiarity of the process of stereotyping, dreaming up weird fantasies, was the nefast role of some converts. Either to prove their sincerity to further their advancement in Christian society, or because of the psychological strain of leaving one belief system and entering another, some were willing to slander their former co-religionists. Spite could have been a motive, or fanaticism of the neophyte, or anything else. As former Jews, who therefore had “inside” information, they were easily believed. Theobald of Cambridge’s story caused havoc. So did Nicholas Donin’s slandering of the Talmud in 1240. Some of the Spanish inquisitors were converts. Pfefferkorn was the antagonist of Reuchlin and other humanists who defended the Talmud in the affair of 1509, when once more it was attacked. Antonius Margherita wrote about the secret teachings of the Jews, and accused them of systematically cursing Jesus. A. Rohling had two converts helping him to write his *Talmudjude*.

It is possible that in the Middle Ages this phenomenon was related to a conflict between princes and the Church. The former, arguing that one could not in good conscience fleece a Christian in the way one could plunder a Jew, held that a conversion costs money. The convert had, according to them, to prove his sincerity by handing over the possessions he had earned while still a Jew. Since there was, so to speak, a tax on conversion, a neophyte had to make good in another way.

In the process of continuous innovation of stereotypes, Jews had been turned from a respected group with a fairly high status, into a spurned and hated group of outcasts. However, the very fact that the extremists did not achieve their aim, namely extermination, shows clearly that some restraints of moral, theological, or economic nature continued to be effective, but in a lesser and lesser way. When Jews were not persecuted or expelled, they were
insulted. A typical form of harmful insult, was the obligation for Jews to sell meat they could not consume in time, at a loss in the corner of the market, where cheap meat of diseased animals was sold. (Gentiles consume kosher meat at their risk!) In towns north of the Alps, if Jews continued to live there at all, they were marked by the badge of shame and had their dwellings in separate quarters of the town, which more and more acquired the character of dismal, unsanitary ghettos, with curfews, and insulting inscriptions over the entrance gate, as in Frankfurt, where even the most elderly Jew had to make way for any little Gentile urchin who happened to pass by, and who in so doing could poke fun at him.

Perhaps nothing contributed so much to firmly establishing stereotypes as the fact that “the Jew” became a stage figure, topic of various “bestiaries”, moralizing animal stories, and was the theme of popular ballads and literary works. The various renderings in fiction mirror the development of thought about the Jews. In Philip de Thaün’s twelfth-century bestiaire, the Jew is the night bird of ill omen, the owl, that vole envers, flies backwards, obstinately refusing to follow the natural course of events, or the ass, who obstinately never deviates from his wrong path. Other tales which are still mythical in the sense of highlighting the evil of the world in a mythical sense are, for example, the Endinger Judenspiel, or Chaucer’s “Priores’ Tale” about ritual murder. A peculiarity of many of these works, illustrating how the “Jewish evil” had become an abstraction, a fixation, is that they were written long after the expulsion, when “the Jews” were no longer a social reality, and were nothing but a memory. Chaucer, Marlowe, and Shakespeare had no direct knowledge of Jews. Another peculiarity is that the elaboration of the theme is, as it were, secularized, as was to be expected on the basis of the foregoing, and as will be elaborated below. From the Jew of Malta, and the Merchant of Venice, up to Gustav Freytag’s Soll und Haben and beyond, the elaboration of the theme moves from the mythical aspects, like ritual murder, to the Jew as the alien outsider, speaking a broken language, and being primarily the Geldmensch, the swindler and usurer as is evident, for example, from Sheridan’s plays. The plays of the emancipatory interlude of the eighteenth century, such as Cumberland’s, and above all Lessing’s, form the great exception to this observation.

As mentioned above, continuously growing stereotyping, in terms of popular belief in magic, and derived from the originating theological stigmatization, is nowhere at odds with accusations of a more economic nature. The one can be thought of as the rationalization of the other, and vice versa. Murderers will be plunderers, and plunderers will be murderers.
However, what does need explaining, is why economic accusations systematically grew in significance, so that in the course of time, what in origin was a rejection of Jews in religious, or from religion-derived, terms, could in the process of stereotype formation acquire increasingly the character of social protest, whereby in the end it could become a secular ideology, with marginalized religious arguments. The question put the other way, is why, as noted in the case of ritual murder, accusations originally argued on religious grounds, increasingly acquired an economic connotation.

There can be no doubt that from the beginning resentment about Jewish money lending played a part, but it was not always very explicit, though for example the letter of the Duchess Aleidis of Brabant to Aquinas, as well as his reply, emphasizing that in Italy Jews were not money lenders, expressed great concern about Jewish and Caorsin money lending. From the fourteenth century onwards, the economic issues are more noticeable. It was shown how in the excesses during the years of the Black Death economic motives so clearly played a role, that it was difficult to decide whether the killings were the result of social protest, under the cloak of a religiously inspired accusation, or vice versa.

The consequences of the murders reinforced tendencies that were already present. Ever since the beginning of the commercial revolution of the thirteenth century, the socioeconomic position of the Jews deteriorated in England and in France, resulting in expulsion when they were no longer of any use. With the expansion of commerce and increasing risks being taken, there was a slackening in the maintaining of the canonical prohibition of “usury”, in so far as this had been applied at all. There always were loopholes, but the growing need for credit further prevented strict application. Evasion was particularly fostered by the increase in the usage of the bill of exchange, with its speculative character, and its “hidden” forms of paying or demanding interest. Since the paying of low interest became normal, and since by the vast increase of money in circulation, greater facilities for cheap credit were opened, Jews were no longer as relatively indispensable for the raising of loans as they had once been. The Italian bankers, and later the Fuggers and others took over, to the extent that Jewish money-lending was more and more restricted to the lesser people, to those who were not fully worthy of credit, which made lending less remunerative and more risky.

After the Black Death, many Jews, expelled from most towns, (though sometimes readmitted later) were driven to (semi-) rural areas. Excluded from crafts and agriculture, they had to eke out a hand-to-mouth existence as peddlers, small money lenders, keepers of small pawnshops, as dealers in
secondhand clothing, and rag and bone men. It is true that some, as (future) court Jews, were men of great wealth. They owed their position to the fact that in central Europe, after the devastation caused by the Thirty Years’ War, credit facilities and public finance were less well developed than in the remainder of Europe, as there was no bourgeoisie willing to take risks. It is true that Poland, whither many Jews migrated, offered a temporary respite. However, by and large, the majority of Jews sank to the level of small pawnbrokers, if not of a Lumpen proletariat, which, by the way Marx, when he wrote Zur Judenfrage, refused to see.

Jews, occasionally shrewd and sharp traffickers, with the usually unfounded reputation of being cheaters (they could not afford swindle), were now dealing with the lesser people, the peasants, wage earners, and poor casual laborers. The net result of this development was that they were, in their economic role, more noticed by the populace at large. But for that populace, these alien Jews, “who do not work with their hands as we do” were now stigmatized by a host of weird accusations, and dealing with them did not result in diminished social distance, or more friendly interaction. On the contrary the labelled interaction was clearly marked and apt to confirm prejudice. More than ever the Jew was seen as the Judas, the Christ killer, who allegedly wanted his thirty pieces of silver. With a gradual decline of magic since the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, due to greater literacy, and later with increasing secularization, the charge of being a moneygrubber remained, and became relatively more prevalent, to the extent of creating a secular ideology. This transformation of originally religious accusations into economic charges, needs some further elaboration by discussing the workings of “usury”.

Such an analysis seems necessary in order to close the gap between the ideology of the “intellectuals” and that of the common people, those without much education. It is hardly conceivable that the average S.A. man read and understood the books of Eugen Dühring or Houston Chamberlain, for example, with their allusions to Schopenhauer and Kant, and their learned quotations in foreign languages. It is hardly conceivable that the mob participating in the riots of the Dreyfus Affair, knew Voltaire’s work, or that of the other philosophers, or that of men like Gobineau. The learned Jew-haters no doubt had their popularizers, like medieval learned theologians had their priests or itinerant preachers. The agitators no doubt spoke a language common men could understand. Yet it seems unlikely that the latter grasped the sometimes abstruse notions, imbued the sometimes abstract rejections, when these ex-
periences did not tally with the day by day findings of their own existence, on the bread-and-butter level and when the interpretation of those supposed experiences was not rooted in the same tradition, was so to speak not the gesunkenes Kulturgut (in so far as this is Kultur) of the former “intellectuals”. Only in this way would an anti-Semitic mass movement have been understandable. Up to now, research has rightly emphasized the development of anti-Semitic ideas, the superstructure, but so far has rather neglected the substructure, of social protest and resentment, that not only made people receptive to the “superstructure”, but also, what is more, made anti-Semitism into a mass movement. It was noted above, that Adolf Stoecker, for example, had a much larger following when he spoke about the socioeconomic sins of the Jews, than when he spoke about theological issues.

Usury and secular ideology

One may wonder, however, whether it is at all necessary to assume that illiterates somehow imbued the rejections of the learned. When in the perception of common unlearned people Jews were poisoners, bloodsuckers of the poor, evil sorcerers, murderers of children, there is no human reason not to completely ostracize these reprobates. There is evidently every reason to assign them the lowest place in society, when you do not rightfully kill them. What further arguments were necessary?

And yet there was once more accusatory innovation to judge by the post-medieval rejections, and there is reason to assume that it was once more related to vast social change giving existing rejections a new twist; the Reformation? The economic consequences of overseas expansion? State formation processes? Modern warfare? Wars of religion? Growing literacy?

According to the suppositions made above, it should be secular, far removed from the originating religious conflicts. Although modern nineteenth-century political anti-Semitism showed many variations, as the discussion of the “scale of intensity” made clear, it seems yet possible to devise some sort of common denominator. This would describe political anti-Semitism as the articulation of a rejecting ideology, that on the one hand protests against a social order that allegedly, for morally questionable reasons of its own, allows Jews and their associates to rob peasants, artisans, the honest workers, from their existence and their vocational pride, the gullible from their savings, and on the other hand conceives of the prevailing social life as soulless, as one in which all spiritual, artistic, literary, and scientific values are for sale.
It sees as its main problem the Jews’ capacity for applying and spreading their “usurious” rationalist materialism, the “Manchesterism” that leaves no room for mythos, the nonrational creative myth, the vision of the crusading spirit, of inspiring nostalgia and selfless aspiration, ridiculed by that same Jewish alien, who is in, but not of, society, and who as the nomad, without fixed abode, lives by a calculating rationality without any sense for the organic, the historically grown, without respect for the nationalist sentiment, and therefore opts for both international finance and revolution, when either the one or the other serves his ends of dominating the world, as allegedly was promised him by the “desert god.” In the terms of Ferdinand Tönnies’ well-known Community and Association one could conceive of a conflict between an allegedly Jewish or Judaized Gesellschaft (association) as opposed to a Christian or national Gemeinschaft (community).

According to this ideology, the Jew is capable of playing this pernicious role because he is protected by Gentile bourgeois liberals and other powers. These, believing in that same calculating rationality, or failing to see its harm, allegedly dance to the Jew’s tune, because they are either duped or bought.

This may seem a far cry from medieval dissatisfaction, but it is less so when “usury” is given a wider meaning, in the sense of being almost synonymous with the monetary and financial aspect of modern capitalism after the ancien régime. This argument is justified in so far as any of those who tended to be anti-Semitic, from say A. Toussenel in France or Glagau in Germany onwards (both of these were laudatoris temporis acti), formulated their resentment of bourgeois society in terms of denouncing manipulations of the currency, banking, company mergers, stock gambling, the cost of notary deeds, mortgages, etc. and rarely or at all in terms that were remotely religious. Gustave Tridon denounced Christianity as oppressing the workers, because it was Jewish, as did E. Dühring in Germany. However all those who in (proto)-Marxist fashion saw the root of social evil primarily in the control over the means of production, and the derived capacity to create plus-value, as a rule were not anti-Semitic. In the eyes of their antagonists, theirs was the wrong “Jewish” theory which enabled the Jews to control the socialist movement.

Initially the two concepts were sufficiently blurred to taint early socialism with anti-Semitism, as will be elaborated, and as was the theme of studies like E. Silberner’s “Sozialisten zur Judenfrage”. Marx’s essay “Zur Judenfrage” was largely responsible for the confusion.

The roots of modern social protest, modified by accusatory innovation, lay in the medieval condemnation of “usury”, which was more than a mere condemnation of immoderate interests, and which was embedded in a sys-
tem of labor ethics, which in a distorted form was still operative in the modern period. Since, as will have to be further investigated, this system was based upon, in fact inherited from Judaist concepts of labor ethics, the development of anti-Semitic social protest amounts to a rejection of Jews on the grounds of essentially, be it distorted, Jewish thought; another instance of rejection articulated in a terminology derived from the value-system of the rejected, of a “son–father antagonism”.

There is indeed a close parallel in accusing the Jews of being untrue to social norms that were Jewish in origin, and the statement that Jews were unfaithful to their own religious teachings; Jews as the permanent disobedient. Not surprisingly, the worshipping of the Golden Calf (Exodus xxxi, 9) was an ever-returning theme in later anti-Semitic propaganda. The parallel may help to understand the secularization of the originating purely theological rejection, embedded as it remained in notions derived from religious sentiment. It facilitates the understanding of a genealogy of stereotypes.

How can accusatory innovation in a secular sense be accounted for? The key may be that the above surmising of a relation between accusatory innovation and social change was based on the consideration that the latter forces anti-Jewish malcontents continuously to re-articulate their rejection of a social ordering, that, in whichever way, whatever the changes in it, perseveres in granting “the Jew” an “illicit” position, irrespective of their rationalization of that “illegitimacy”. This can be religious, nationalist, or racial, or a combination of any of them. For example, the Burschenschafts, German nationalist duelling student corporations, in the nineteenth century, the most vociferous anti-Metternich champions of nationalist sentiment, held that a Bursche, as a true Christian and a true German, could not assent to Jews being given a place in a truly German Christian society.

But societies continue to do precisely that, allegedly for the benefit of the ruling classes, until the Jewish lemon is so completely squeezed dry that there are no more advantages in keeping them, and they can be expelled. Social climbers, knowing which way their bread is buttered, will easily fall into the Jew’s snares, which explains in anti-Semitic jargon the ongoing “Judaization” (Verjudung, enjuivement) of society. It is contaminating. Characteristically, Theodor Fritsch (died 1933), precursor of the Nazis, who as a redundant watermill technician resented the new industrialism, author of the very influential Handbuch der Judenfrage, champion of a Christianity that would do away with the Old Testament altogether, had as the first commandment of the “German Decalogue” – “Thou shalt kill the Jew in thine own heart”.

The rearticulations, functional in the sense that they seem to explain any
social ills – Fritsch’s redundancy, artisans in distress due to industrialization, peasants in distress owing to liberal free trade, nobles losing status, are building blocks for a rejectionist ideology.\textsuperscript{35}

The problem then, is finding the reason why such articulations tend ever more to use arguments related to the more mundane aspects of life, and are secularised into a social protest ideology, in the narrow sense of the word, with the originating religious rejection of the Jews and Judaism ever more marginalized, even within the so-called Christian Social parties; a social protest against “Judaic” capitalist society, as Toussenel, Glagau, Wahrmund, and others perceived it to be. This suggests that, as indeed it did in a modernizing world, social change is increasingly present in that more mundane sphere.

As long as commoners felt the pinch of usury only indirectly, if at all – heightened feudal exaction – the articulation of any dissatisfaction, the disinterested desire to inflict punishment, will mostly be in terms of popular religiosity, its stigma being the only known form of articulating rejection. These terms will largely be transcendental, even magical, dealing with the supernatural, and are as such explanatory for the ongoing demonization of the Jew, as sketched above. At first, a still very relative secularization will take place, when seemingly or really, Jewish financial activities directly affect the economic position of these commoners, for example, when as mentioned before, they themselves increasingly became small borrowers, or because, in an increased monetized society, they felt the pain of rising prices, allegedly attributable to the “plundering” Jew.

It is submitted that what is historically for convenience considered to be the beginning of the modern age, namely the vast and fast social change of the sixteenth century, was the first step in creating conditions for a secular articulation. It could of course be objected that the major aspect of the social change of the period was the earthquake of the Reformation, which by its desire to go back to the origins, could easily have rekindled the fundamental rejection of Judaism by the Church Fathers.

This is undoubtedly true, but it is also true that the passions it provoked were most pronounced in inter-Christian conflict, and thereby temporarily distracted attention from the Jews, although these continued to be between the devil and the deep blue sea. The Reformation knew phases of a more friendly attitude towards the Jews, as was the case with the young Luther, Osiander, and others. Renewed interest in the study of Hebrew and the Old Testament, the discussion about the need to burn the Talmud in the Pfefferkorn affair, resulted in lay and clerical intellectuals such as Melanchton, Osiander,
and Capito combating the ritual murder charge.\textsuperscript{116} The Reformation had little reason for pursuing the accusation of the desecration of the Host. So, in what Keith Thomas called the “Decline of Magic”,\textsuperscript{117} the Reformation took away some of the more demonic aspects of the rejection of the Jews, while all the same maintaining that Judaism was a dead end, that Christianity was the \textit{Verus Israel}, and that, because of their crime, there was little hope for the Jews, as indeed the Church Fathers had taught. This remained the prevailing view, even though, Calvinism in particular, by its close unification of the Old and New Testament, did kindle a renewed admiration for the “People of the Covenant”, not necessarily identical with contemporary Jews! Everything considered, contrary to expectation, the tremendous social upheaval of the Reformation was ill-suited to bring about accusatory innovation, to rearticulate the rejection, except in its, not generally accepted, mainly Lutheran attack on “usury” and all it implied.

Apart from the Reformation, there were other forms of drastic social change, giving the sixteenth century its reputation of bringing in modernization, almost all completely related to the secular sphere, and only marginally to religious issues. A fairly haphazard enumeration looks as follows: There was the vast increase in popular literacy, providing access to information facilitated by, and promoting the newly invented art of book printing. It could have its adverse effects. In Nürnberg, for example, in 1510, shortly after the event, a popular account was published about the desecration of the Host affair in Berlin.\textsuperscript{118} But Luther’s earlier works, and denials of ritual murder written by Osiander, Melanchton, and others, were presumably also read. Increased literacy probably worked both ways, in much the same way as it later spread knowledge and fostered the yellow press. A further penetration of Roman law into the legal system certainly had an effect on the Jewish legal position, until then based on privilege. Among jurists a notion began to prevail (how effective this was, is another matter), namely that according to a principle of Roman law, Jews were \textit{cives} on a par with others. Therefore, they could not be expelled, nor could their possessions be confiscated without a due process of law. These principles could be maintained by princes, whose financial interests were served by Jews.

In the state-formation processes, when there was a tendency towards absolutism, the inclination often was towards making religious principles subordinate to state interests, unless they coincided. There was also the attitude of the many \textit{politiques} (temporizers) who in diverse ways sought to rescue political interests from internecine religious conflicts, or who, in Nicodemist fashion, did not show their true colors (John 11:1). Such secularization could
benefit those Jews who served the financial needs of the states, but at the price of growing popular resentment when their dealings, however beneficial for the state, were considered harmful by the populace. Army contracting and lending, resulting in higher taxation, introducing new levies, the lowering of the silver content of the coinage, the very tasks of the “court Jews”, were not likely to enhance their popularity.

In general, social changes in the economic sphere were far-reaching, as they had an impact on the state-formation processes. The fast development of trade with the newly discovered overseas territories, took place at the detriment of all those towns which had flourished with the traditional trans-Alpine trade. Overseas conquest and colonization also resulted in the massive import of precious metals, which caused inflation, as Jean Bodin (1530-1596) already noticed at the time. These imports also resulted in an accelerated monetization of all human transactions down to the rural areas, with price increases due to greater dependency on the market and higher taxation, easily attributed by the less well informed to the spoliation of Jews in the service of spendthrift kings. This would particularly hold true for those non-Atlantic areas where princes had no immediate access to the new nervus rerum, and needed the services of Jews to obtain it. Due to commercial decline, there was no bourgeoisie willing or capable of performing this task.

Immoderate spending by princes, who all wanted their little Versailles, could certainly be said to have been exacerbated by the revolutionary developments in Renaissance and Baroque art, architecture, and garden design. Princes were only too glad to act as Maecenas, as the new art contributed to their status and prestige. They had their court painters and sculptors, sometimes lured away from other princes by higher salaries. The cost of this benevolence towards the artists, paid for by borrowing, in the end had to be borne by their subjects.

Finally, there was in the military sphere an increase in the use of firearms, with consequent higher logistics and greater use of infantry consisting of mercenary soldiers, which made wars more costly. Much of this financing was done by Jewish middlemen who prospered from it.

All this either overlapping or interrelated social change, likely to have a negative effect on some layers of society, was so mundane in character that it presumably caused the social protest that was provoked by these changes to be less concerned with the transcendental or the supernatural.

This is borne out by the curious coincidence – if it is a coincidence – that supernatural evil, at the time, was mostly ascribed to those other worshipers of Satan, the witches and sorcerers, the “offspring” of Medieval heretics.

Accusatory Innovation
(Many of the factors contributing to anti-Jewish prejudice were also present in the forming of the witchcraft delusion.)

Even though for some time to come popular imagination continued to attribute to the Jews powers for working magical havoc in the form of ritual murder and desecration of the Host, as those beliefs only gradually disappeared, it was mainly “witches” who were accused of doing evil in a supernatural way. They were believed to cause hailstorms, diseases in cows, drought, floods, stillbirths, murder at a distance, and other calamities. Ever since the late fifteenth century, and even more so in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is a curious division of labor in evil-doing between sorcerers and Jews in the imagination of frightened people – Faust and Shylock. By implication Jewish misdeemeanor was thought to be more secular. (However, it should be emphasized that the occult never wholly vanished from the anti-Semitic belief system. A representative number of anti-Semitic leaders, and certainly their followers up to the twentieth century, indulged in spiritualism, “natural” quack medicine, astrology, and a host of other occult beliefs.)

This division of labor presumably has to do with the opposition of town and country. The articulation of who or what is a witch was more functional in the above sense of the word in the (semi-) rural areas, where in fact the witch-craze largely originated. According to one interpretation (there are others) this was partly due to the further inclusion of the village in the monetary system, by increasing production for the market. It disturbed the old community life of the village, and made solitary old women redundant, and therefore allegedly vengeful when support was begrudged them.19

If this reasoning concerning secularization is correct, it is implicitly assumed that it is an elaboration of a medieval condemnation that was embedded in religion or religiosity. That is why a survey of medieval economic ethics – inherited from the Jews! – is appropriate, as well as that of the role of the Reformation in this respect, and that of the emergence of the “court Jews”, and the effect, mostly negative, this had on the process of emancipation. The thesis will be defended that this secularization enormously contributed to the shaping of a modern anti-Semitic ideology.
CHAPTER 13

Usury and Labour Ethics

In the 1870s and 1880s, the Viennese rabbi Dr. Bloch—who would later be the talk of all Vienna for exposing Prof. A. Rohling, the promoter of the ritual murder charge for the swindler and calumniator he was—was lecturing to the workers of Floridsdorff, a working class district. His avowed aim in doing so was to prevent the workers from falling into the snares of the emerging anti-Semitic agitators. As a result of some serious setbacks, Austrian socialism was weak at the time, the leaders imprisoned and the workers without guidance. The danger that in their distress they would be prepared to listen to an anti-Semitic form of protest was far from imaginary, and so Bloch decided to counterbalance the evil influence, by lecturing on Jewish labor ethics, thereby highlighting the historical relativity of “Jewish money-mindedness”. As far as the laborers were concerned, (not the small independent artisans) he was eminently successful, in the sense that they did not join the nascent anti-Semitic parties. (This does not mean that at a later date, Austrian socialism did not show the same anti-Semitic traits as there were everywhere else.)

Bloch convinced his audience that workers had nothing to fear from the Jews as such, despite seeming evidence to the contrary. He pointed out that, in contradistinction to the much-admired Greek philosophy, which abhorred manual work as befitting unworthy people and slaves, thereby justifying slavery, Judaism honored labor. While Platonic and Aristotelian arguments were used to defend slavery in the new world, Jews manumitted their slaves. Bloch could not have chosen his subject any better. The rejection of usury and of capitalist exploitation as derived from usury, is to a large extent based on a system of labor ethics first developed in Judaism. By a quirk of circumstances, Jews stand condemned as usurers on the basis of a Jewish value system.

The notion that there is worthiness, even moral exaltation in manual work, is an essentially Jewish concept. Not only were the most respected sages, such as, for example, Hillel, manual laborers as well as teachers, the esteem they enjoyed being based as much on their dexterity as on their sagacity, but Judaism also regarded labor as essential for ultimate salvation. Al-
though labor “in the sweat of your brow”, is a result of the “Fall”, it is also a means of ultimate reconciliation. In order to prepare himself for that final bliss, man has to keep the Law, and study it. Labor enables him to do that, for, to a certain extent, labor emancipates him from everyday bodily exigencies, by the long-term satisfaction of his immediate needs. It protects him against heat, cold and ferocious animals by providing shelter, it clothes him, and it liberates him from the otherwise daily search for food, by creating a store of victuals. By effectively providing man with the essentials, labor frees him from much care, and thus provides him with time and leisure to think about God’s will and act accordingly. As long as it is not drudgery, labor spiritualizes him. It is not only a means to a means to serve God, but it is also a way to be true to a man’s essential, divinely created humanity.\(^5\)

The fruits of his labor of six days allowed him not to work on the seventh day, when the Lord rested from His labor.

The Greek view was somewhat different. Though labor is indeed a form of foresight that distinguishes rational man from non-rational beings, it changes man himself, his back, his skin, and therefore it belongs to this sublunary imperfect world of change. Ever since Parmenides raised the question of the logical impossibility of change, Greek thought found change perturbing.\(^6\) The workman’s intelligence, Seneca wrote, is directed towards the earth, whereas that of the philosopher, concerned with the immovable, eternal self-thinking thought, the “Nous”, focused on the changeless sublime. To this the philosopher owes his exalted position in society.\(^7\)

The story Aristotle relates about Thales, in order to prove superiority of the philosopher seems unthinkable in Jewish tradition. Once upon a time, Aristotle tells us, Thales knew with his superior knowledge and foresight that there would be a very good harvest of olives, when nobody else expected it. He therefore hired all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios at a very low price, long before harvest time, when nobody bid against him. When harvest time came, he sublet to the highest bidders, thereby making a handsome profit. The philosopher can be rich, Aristotle argues, but wealth is not his main concern.\(^8\) However, in Jewish and Christian eyes, Thales’ action is the very process of forestalling and creating monopolies, which Judaism and (early) Christianity condemned as wicked, but which the modern world thinks perfectly normal.

Jewish social wisdom differed in its perception from Greek elitism. In Judaism everybody is a “philosopher” for all the people of the Covenant are called to be aware of God’s will, and to reflect about the Law, and all are told to wear the *tsitsit* while at work, to remind them of the need for that reflection
(Numbers xv, 40). To be God’s people involved being your brother’s keeper and therefore having a certain responsibility for each other: nobody should be prevented from keeping the Law due to material want. Every third year the tithe of one year shall be given “to the Levite (a priestly caste) and to the stranger, the fatherless and the widow”; and every seventh year, the sabbatical year, there shall be a release of all debts “save when there shall be no poor among you”, and the poor shall be well provided for. There is no indentured labor. Charity is a foremost Jewish duty, as is neighborly love. Since nobody should be deprived of the benefits of labor, property being considered to be an instrument of labor, the poor and the needy should be helped. Nobody should ever be robbed of the fruits of his labor, nor of the means of existence. That is why it was later ruled that nobody should ever (by stealthy means) infringe upon the clientele of another man (Law of Ma‘ārifa) and why usury was forbidden.

Even the alien slave had his rights, for he had to be manumitted when wounded, (Exodus xx1, 26-27); for in principle all men are equal, (Job xxx1, 13-15) as all are created in the image of God. The slave was not just alienable property, but a possession one could temporarily use. The owner was obliged to give his slave religious instruction, and when he was fully learned, to manumit him, as happened with black slaves in the Caribbean, which in part gave rise to black Jewish communities in the us.

Much of the socio-economic law-giving is to be found in Exodus xx1, xx11, and Leviticus xxv. In the year of the jubilee everything shall be set right what has gone wrong. “Ye shall not therefore oppress one another, but thou shalt fear thy God: for I am the Lord your God.” “The land shall not be sold for ever, for the land in mine” (Leviticus.xxv, 17).

Perhaps the Jewish social concepts, the norms, can be summarized by quoting Proverbs: “Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways and be wise.” Early Christianity naturally inherited this tradition from its Jewish origins. Moreover, it befitted its original “plebeian” character. As a salvationist religion that did not exact the price for initiation that characterized so many other esoteric religions of the Roman world, it strongly appealed to the downtrodden poorer classes, which also must have felt comforted by seeing their despised labor thus elevated to a means of salvation. Early Christianity had the same respect for the honest worker, for “the workman is worthy of his hire”. As the saying about the camel and the eye of the needle indicates, it was suspicious of (ill-gotten) wealth; it praised charity and forbade usury. Attachment to wealth that is not shared with the poor, property not used as an instrument for labor, was condemned as avarice.

Usury and Labour Ethics
Indicative perhaps of the detestation early Christianity felt for the sin of avarice, is the story of Ananias and his wife Sapphira. They were among the multitude of believers who set great store by common ownership (Acts iv, 32-37), but they had not handed over all the proceeds from the sale of their property. They both separately lied about it to Peter and died instantly (Acts v, 1-17).

It is true that in its emphasis on other-worldliness, it had a greater appreciation of the contemplative than of the active laboring life, but it was far from spurning it, as the Greco-Roman philosophic tradition did. Mary may have chosen the better part, but Martha “who was careful and troubled about many things” should not be despised (Head-nurses in medieval hospitals were often called Martha). The Benedictine rule that monks should do manual work as well as pray was not inspired by contempt of labor: Ora et labora. The idea that labor is more than mere rational foresight, more than merely sensible, but is a means of gaining leisure to serve God, and in itself a way of worship, a vocation, is closely related to the essential time consciousness of Jewish and Christian cultures.

In their perception, sacred history, whether or not dissociated from secular history, is linear and finite, moving from the “Fall” to ultimate salvation, and the events of everyday life are part of that flow. The meaning of history is the tension between what is and what ought to be, between sin and redemption. The ultimate victory of good over evil is the theodicy of history.

For Christianity, it was Augustine who once more emphasized the meaning of time by using his concept of it as a means of rescuing the idea of creation out of nothing, against pagan philosophical attack, that held such creation to be an absurdity. Using the notion of time as being subjective, he held that awareness of time, consisting of past, present, and future, that is, of observation of things remembered, of things seen, and of things expected, is consequently always a form of observation. From that he concluded that before the creation of time there is no observation, and then goes on to reason that, when matter is not observable, there is no way of arguing that it exists. Observable reality is thus created with the creation of time.

In this ideology, sacred time as the axis of grace and salvation, is so essential an aspect of the divine plan, that it should not be wasted. The saving of time, as virtually a religious obligation, could in the workaday world of the Middle Ages, be achieved in two ways. Working hours could be institutionally set, as the guilds did, not only to prevent unfair competition and achieve equal sharing, but its regulation is ideologically also justified as time saving. Time well used and saved, rescued people from the two mortal sins of laziness and covetousness.
One could use nature to do the work, and save time, even though the concepts of sanctity of labor and saving time could be mutually exclusive, for example when fulling mills are depriving fullers of work. Animals in treadmills, wind or water! could do the work as is illustrated by the astonishing number of multi-purpose watermills, and later windmills, or by the locks, so greatly facilitating river navigation in the thirteenth century. The spinning wheel is another form of labor-saving device. Using the forces of nature was a solution that greatly helped by that Judeo-Christian notion that man is master of the whole of creation (Genesis 1, 28).

Secularization is based on the anti-magical attitude held by Christianity – formally, even if not in popular religion. This, as Max Weber emphasized, is inherited from Judaism. In neither Judaism nor Christianity are mountains, rivers, trees, animals, holy in themselves. Places can only be made holy by an act of God, or by an act of human faith. The whole world, and all it contains is to be used as a means for work, but it should be respected by good stewardship. In the Talmud it is written that one may beat an unwilling donkey, when used for work, but at other times the beating of an animal is maltreating a divinely created being, and as such reprehensible. Judaism of old, respected animals. (Deuteronomy). xxii, 4,10; xxv, 4).

The desire to save time in combination with the – presumably rather theoretical! – notion that no fellow human being should be exploited, and that there is a right use of nature, could very well be at the basis of that medieval effort to design labor-saving devices by means of trial and error. Lynn White characterized this as the effort to end all effort. In the end the search resulted in a technical orientation, a pleasure in machinery for its own sake, that expressed itself most clearly in the making of very intricate clocks, which every town wanted to have. However, these still had as main function the regulation of working and praying hours. A relation with the notion of the divine origin of time is shown, for example in such cases where the twelve apostles appear on the stroke of noon.

Although the nobility disagreed, work remained honorable, despite the fact that it resulted from the “Fall”. In the Christian view, not essentially different from its Jewish origin, it is a form of ascesis, and as a reminder of the “Fall”, it teaches humbleness. As Troeltsch formulated it: it is a punishment and a means of salvation at one and the same time, remedium peccati.

The system of labor ethics which Christianity inherited from Judaism, implicitly abhorring usury, was later used to blame the Jews. In this case, however, the rejection was not merely another instance of the charge that the Jew is untrue to his own values. There was more to it. The growing intricacies pro-
voked by the system itself, forced the canonists to elaborate on it. In their elaborated form these ethics were likely to have a strong ideological appeal to those “truest sons of the Church”, the laboring townsmen. They were less dependent on the vicissitudes of nature than the peasants steeped in magic and paganism. Their working hours needed a more abstract notion of time, not regulated by the sequence of daily chores on the farm, as determined by nature. Their work was, apart from daylight to work by, independent of the seasonal changes. However little dependent on the vicissitudes of nature they may have been, though, they had to face the more abstract vicissitudes of the market. There was always the risk of slumps, shortages of raw material, due to the vagaries of war, rising costs of food and the like, for which they had to prepare as well as they could. It is this more abstract insecurity enforcing certain restraints, it is their very industriousness and thrift, which made the urbanite workers prone to develop precisely that middle-class morality, Ranulf had in mind. The townsmen were consequently a little more inclined to have a “disinterested desire to inflict punishment” on top of a resentment caused by usurious practices, that affected them directly or indirectly. This held a fortiori true for the great mass of urban poor in their hand-to-mouth existence. Labor ethics enabled them to articulate their resentment.

At first there were no great problems. The Church of late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages had no great difficulty in accepting the traditional labor ethics in an overwhelmingly agrarian society, despite the perhaps doubtful Christianity of many of the workers. Accepted as norm in a truly Christian society, labor ethics served to utterly condemn the merchant who enriches himself by stealing God’s time, selling an unchanged commodity at a higher price after some lapse of time. “Qui comparat rem ut illam ipsam integram et immutatem dando lucretur, ille est mercator qui de templo Dei ejicitur”;

The labor ethics did not raise great intellectual problems for the canonists, as long as the labor-saving devices, of which they may have stimulated the use and of which they approved, were limited to the improvement of agricultural implements and techniques, where it all began. The first step, as noted, was the change over to horse plowing, made possible by the invention of the horseshoe, the bit, better harnessing, and the like. When due to such improvements, the economy began to grow, as a result of greater agricultural productivity, emerging inconsistencies created dilemmas. The laboring townsmen, when he no longer worked to order, was forced to sell his product in a market. It was much more a problem for him than for
the largely self-providing peasant. The increasing complexity, variability and quantity of production and transport over long distances, implied that he could do the selling less easily by himself, and needed middlemen more and more. This implied that the merchant was no longer as directly condemnable, as the early churchmen – at least in theory – had believed.

The honest artisan could in effect only be “worthy of his hire”, and the “just wage” could only be guaranteed when the products of his hands were sold. In the doctrine of the “just price” and its corollary, the “just wage”, the canonists tried to be true to their former principles. It seemed a way of guaranteeing everybody his fair share. Monopolies, forestalling practices, and usury were forbidden on the grounds that they had an “unnatural” effect on the just price, in whatever way it was established.35 Did the canonists conceive of it as determined by the cost of labor needed for its production? Was it based on free bargaining, or had “nature” somehow fixed it? The just price was indeed the “natural” price, and its discussion opened the door for natural law concepts, partly based on Roman law and the ius gentium – the greatest common denominator of the laws of all peoples is natural law – and partly based on Aristotelian philosophy, which also found its application in the discussion on usury.36,37 This was to be expected since usury was seen as an unnatural infringement on the proper functioning of money. The prohibition of usury was, certainly in the case of Aquinas, increasingly based on the Aristotelian concept that money was barren, and usura consequently contra naturam, even though the Old Testament texts prohibiting usury remained authoritative.38

A more Aristotelian basis for the Christian point of view, implied that it moved away from the original Jewish heritage. As such, it was another step in the ongoing Jewish-Christian alienation. It also implied, and this was perhaps more serious, that the usurer, whether Christian or Jewish, sinned against nature, as well as against divine law, like the one who practices bestiality did. Sins against nature were perhaps the worst.

But what exactly was usura? With the economy growing, however slowly, that is, with transport over greater distances and hence growing risks, and thereby a greater need for credit – the bill of exchange is essentially a risk-avoiding operation (of which the clergy approved, because of the lesser risk incurred, failing or unwilling to see its hidden “usurious” character) – the question became urgent, the more so since the Vatican itself was involved in credit operations.39 If usura was any payment above the principal, as for example Gregory 1x (1227-1241) ruled,40 commerce over long distances was well-nigh impossible. The canonists found a solution in the form of interest.
Irrespective of the question whether the “just price”, apart from its “natural” worth, is determined solely by the cost of labor (to be established how?), or by a free equilibrium between offer and demand, that is, not impeded by forestalling practices or monopolies, a raising of the prices of a commodity is not unnatural, should even be welcomed. Certainly, “pecunia pecuniam parere non potest” (“money cannot beget money”), but “cum hominis accessione potest” (“but with the help of man”). The cost of transport, for example, was such an added labor cost. It seemed therefore perfectly plausible to argue that if A., instead of working with some commodities and increasing their value by his added (manual) labor, gives the monetary worth to B., in order to let him (B.) do that, he denies himself the privilege of “natural” gain. He is thus entitled to ask that part back from B. This, it seems is the underlying idea for the *lucrum cessans* as justification for interest. Moreover, A. takes a risk in giving his money to B., who might sell at a loss, or who might, for example lose the whole principal in a shipwreck, in which case A. is entitled to some compensation, the *damnnum emergens* or *periculum sortis* argument.

The difference between *usura* and interest is not mere hypocrisy, as Parkes contended, not another stick to beat the dog. Nor is it a compromise between idealism and economic reality; rather is it the outcome of emerging inconsistencies between various offshoots of one and the same idealism. The difference (interest, in theory at least, involved potential labor – in principle it is only payable after the transaction of the borrower’s affairs, and not at the moment of lending) was very real, in particular in all *commendas*. The sleeping partner in that relationship was entitled to “interest”, to a share in the profit, and it is hardly conceivable how the product of honest labor could have been sold at a price guaranteeing just wages, had that risk-spreading partnership not been allowed, or had the oldest form of insurance, that is, ship-owning partnership (common ownership diminished the individual risk), or the *societas maris* not been permitted, whatever Gregory IX may have said to the contrary. The Church had its hand forced by economic ethics, so that indeed a cynic might say that it resulted in rates of interest far more oppressive than Jewish “usury” had ever been. People could cry out “Rendez-nous nos Juifs, si bons et si débonnaires”, when it was too late. The average layman involved presumably cared very little about the subtleties of canon law, since on the one hand he raised protest against outrageous interest, and on the other hand often himself indulged in de facto usurious practices, as did the Curia itself.

The tragedy of the whole situation was that pawnbroking could not be construed as a form of interest, since no labor was involved, and thus re-
mained usury. Likewise, any form of lending where no lucrum cessans or periculum sortis was involved, remained usury. The long and the short of it is that Jews became sinful usurers the moment they were excluded from the production of goods, and the sale of goods in markets other than the Jewish market, as were “Caorsins” and Lombards, likewise hated for their sins. The sins of the Lombards who often worked with capital provided by the Curia, were somewhat mitigated, upon the consideration, that if they did it for the benefit of the Church it was not quite so bad. However, in the case of the Jews, it was from the Christian perspective, a sin which could be added to a long list of already existing sins, avaricious usury was simply part and parcel of their sinful, rebellious nature. This could all the more easily be maintained since not all Lombards were sinners, nor every citizen of Cahors, but all Jews were, because they all directly or indirectly lived of the wages of sin the moment the Jewish community was excluded from any productive capacity. Stigmatization ceased to be an independent variable, and became an essential part of a social protest. Since usury was, so to speak, a pars pro toto of the whole financial, indeed the whole economic system, it encompasses the whole socio-economic order. It was therefore predictable that early protests against these initial forms of capitalism would have a decidedly anti-Jewish overtone. This is so when more and more urban classes, involved in a money economy, and not in any way self-providing, were forced to raise money in times of distress by pawning. It helps to explain why anti-Semitism became increasingly an urban phenomenon. It was therefore also predictable that the urban mendicant orders, “wedded” as they were to apostolic poverty, were primarily aiming at the Jews in their outcry against “mammonism”.

Friars were foremost in the anti-Semitic agitation of the later Middle Ages. It was Franciscan agitation that led to the Trent murder case. Berthold of Regensburg, virtually inciting to murder, exclaimed: “It is bad that they live.” They would have done more harm than they actually did, had the Popes, who knew the world, not kept them in check. However, it is bitterly ironic to realize that the monte di pietà, intended by the Franciscans to break the Jewish monopoly in small-scale pawnbroking and their “exploiting the misery of the poor”, charged 6 percent interest for “costs”.

The tragedy assumes even more gigantic proportions when it is realized that the Jews themselves were fully aware that their lending operations were transgressing their own moral code. For although Deuteronomy xxii.20 contains the phrase “unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury”, Talmudic sages had ruled against that—whether on practical grounds or on ethical considerations, is irrelevant—and consequently casuistry was needed to sal-
vage the situation. The Talmudic ruling was later rejected with the argument that there was no choice, as there were no other sources of income. Even so, the Book of the Pious of the thirteenth century deplored Jewish credit operations, considering them as having an evil influence. That an uneasy conscience remained, is very evident from the fact that the rabbis were very strict about coin clipping, a sort of usury in reverse.

Internally, the Jews maintained the old code of economic ethics. The taking of interest from Jews was still strictly forbidden. “The Law of Maärifa” can be conceived of as the outcome of the old principle that no man should be robbed of the means of existence. According to this law, no Jew had the right to do business with the non-Jewish customers of another Jew. Moreover, this law offered some general protection, for an archbishop or nobleman who had entrusted the management of his affairs to a Jew, realized that no other Jew could take over in the case of a quarrel. Thus, as long as he was dependent on Jews for the administration of his affairs, he had to be careful and treat his manager with fairness. A typical feudal lord of this period (eleventh and twelfth centuries) was unlettered, brutal and violent. To deal with such a man, a manager of an estate needed great strength of position. The fact that he was indispensable, since he could not be supplanted by another, gave him that strength and greatly increased his security.

To make sure that these rules were maintained, to prevent the butter from being spread too thinly, a Jewish community could even deny a Jew the right of settlement by means of the Herem hay-Yishubh. This form of legal monopoly, in contrast with forbidden monopolies, where the price is raised at the detriment of the community, provided a measure of security in a most insecure age for the whole community.

Perhaps this internal solidarity and the fact that no interest was paid on internal loans, infuriated some Christians. (There was one exception, which some, but not all rabbis accepted it: If A. borrowed from B. in order to lend to a Gentile, as a possible consequence of the Maärifa ruling, B. was entitled to a share of the resulting interest.) It could be seen as an indication that Jews had far less esteem for Christians than for fellow Jews. In that sense it once again may have aggravated the problem, although the majority of Christians are not likely to have known much about the dealings Jews had among themselves.

Precisely because the development of the concept of “usury” was imbedded in Church policy and theology, it added a morally loaded economic argument to the existing body of stigmatisations. Conversely, because that economic aspect was so susceptible to social change, and hence prone to accusa-
tory innovation, the ensuing social protest was given a veneer of (seeming) morality and religiosity. It was in that sense portentous for the development of a basically secular ideology that could thus link the old theological notions of Jewish wickedness and contrariness to the mundane aspects of life. It could even pave the way for the later racist varieties of an ideology which held that because their contrariness was inborn, Jews always act contra naturam, in fact have no human nature, but are only menschen-ähnlich. One could even formulate an anti-Christian anti-Semitic ideology based on originally Christian concepts.

In how far was Martin Luther responsible for passing on the rejection of usury?

The argument condemning “usury” often became a little specious. It lost persuasiveness because the canonists’ rulings regarding usury, credit and mercantile operations were already in the later Middle Ages systematically trespassed upon. There were all kinds of subterfuges, more often than not, as in the case of commendas, or bills of exchange, condoned by the casuistry of the canonists themselves. Because of the hollow ring to it, and the untenable nature of the prohibition, many Reformers, notably Calvin, who trained as a jurist, took a lenient view of the matter. Puritans of Calvinist or kindred persuasion could, according to the well-known Weber thesis, solve the problem of labor ethics and economic reality by means of an innerweltliche Askese, an intra-mundane ascesis, which in effect fostered a capitalist mentality. Due to a labor ethos of hard work this allegedly amounted to plowing the excess profits back into the business. In an anti-mammonist spirit, these could not be spent on luxurious or conspicuous consumer goods. It could be ventured that in countries where this mentality prevailed, as for example in the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the U.S., the capitalist spirit obviously not being Jewish (whatever Werner Sombart may say to the contrary), political anti-Semitism was less noticeable than in countries where it did not prevail. Whatever the merits or demerits of this much discussed thesis – cause or effect? – the fact is, that the German Reformation adopted a far from lenient stance.

This conservatism was presumably related to the great social tensions of the time and the place. The great shift of commerce from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic states, due to the great discoveries of new sea-routes, and of new worlds, adversely affected the (South)-German and Swiss towns hither-
to prospering on the trans-Alpine (spice) trade. To some extent this decline was masked by the activities of the great mining magnates and bankers like the Fuggers. Their commercial enterprises in non-ferrous metals marked a shift to investments in capital goods, and as bankers they—therefore?—took a lenient view on the matter of “usury”. Since they were the financiers of the Counter-Reformation, resentment on the part of the Protestants may have been induced in these a more conservative point of view. The great peasant war of 1525, was provoked by the increased monetization of feudal dues. This seemed an instance of “mammonism”, though in fact it was likewise an effect of the inflation caused by the great discoveries. Because of the system of land tenure, only the East Elbian “Junkers” were able to make good by producing for the market. Their land was worked by hired labor. The other nobles dependent on feudal dues, needed a relatively greater income of money to preserve their status. The peasants, often looking to the Reformation as a vehicle for expressing their grievances, with some turning to the anarchism of the apocalyptic visions of someone like Thomas Münzer,—abolition of tithes and dues to abbeys also came into play—may well have seen in Luther another champion of their cause. Although Luther condemned any form of rebellion against God-given secular authority, the expectations of the disappointed peasants may not have been wholly unfounded. Luther himself was of peasant stock and the anti-mammonism of their protest could have appealed to the man who, wanting to go back to the origins, is likely, as in the very early Church, to have seen in a rural society a truly Christian community, where Mammon was not worshipped.

It is nevertheless faintly odd to see such a conservative stance in economic matters taken by the son of a man, who had relinquished peasant life, and who towards the end of his life became a rather prosperous mining master, who was “modern”. Conflict with the father, who wanted a legal career for his son? The secluded life in the monastery? Abhorrence of the mammonism inherent in Tetzel’s sale of indulgences for the benefit of the “Antichrist” in Rome? Someone, who made Scripture the sole foundation of his faith, and had not the worldly experience of Calvin, could not but take seriously the Old and New Testament injunctions on usury.

The curious thing, though, is that in his earlier treatises on the subject “Von Kaufhandlung und Wucher” (1524) and in the “Sermon von dem Wucher”, repeating all the arguments against forestalling practices, monopolies, interest and so forth, Luther did not mention the Jews. At that time, 1524, he still expected to win over the Jews to his purified Christianity. He expressed this hope in his tract of 1523 “Dasz Christus ein geborener Jude sei.”

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Jews are definitely on the wrong track, but they will not come to Christ if you maltreat them and accuse them of all sorts of misdeeds and crimes, “geben yhn Schuld, sie mussen Christen blut haben, das sie nicht stincken, und weys nicht was des narren wercks mehr is” (“denial of blood libel, fetor, and desecration of the Host”). “Wil man yhn helsen, so mus man nicht des Papsts, son- der Christliche gesetz an yhn üben.” His verdict is mild: “Ob echtliche halsstarrig sind was ligt dran? Sind wyr doch auch nicht alle gutte Christen?”

Things changed when he gave free rein to his disappointment, and to his fear that true Christianity was under threat from all sides, from Jews, Turks, “Papists” and heretics.

In 1540 he published a tract to admonish priests to preach against usury, in the most traditional way, as any payment above the principal. In it he argues that monthly loans, “mond-wucher oder centisima” prove that Jews invented usury, for they base their calendar on the month. A new Nehemia is needed – the tract is based on Nehemia v,2 – for otherwise everyone, from prince downwards, will be enslaved. The usurer is as great a criminal as the murderer or the robber. A true Christian can never be such a worshipper of the devil as the usurer in fact is.

The severest invectives were written in 1543, in his Von den Juden und ihren Lügen (“Concerning the Jews and their lies”), abusive, rambling and repeti- tive, rubbing it in. Luther stumbles over his own words. Usury figures large among the other accusations, although it is not the main motive for his invectives. He now repeatedly insinuates that Jews need Christian blood, and are sorcerers and poisoners. The main theme is a general attack on their wrong pretensions, on circumcision as a token – without faith it is of no value – on their being the Chosen, which 1500 years of dispersion refute, on their belief in world-dominion, and on their wrong belief in the Messiah to come.

The tone is vehement. Luther calls Jews the most greedy, bloodthirsty na- tion in the world. In the days of Solomon, when they were not usurers, they were not as well off as now that they rob us, and live well without ever working, while we toil. He wishes “blushing” (Schamrot) was for sale somewhere, he would buy pounds of it, to smear it on their cheeks. Princes do nothing to prevent their usury, getting heavily paid by them form the money stolen from us. Here Luther hints at the real problem, the involuntary role of the Jews in state-formation processes.

Luther recommends that their synagogues be burned, their houses demol- ished, for there too they insult our Lord. The books written by the rabbis should be taken from them, and these should no longer be allowed to teach. Jews should no longer be protected on the roads, when they do their totally
unnecessary travelling. They have no business to be in the rural areas. Their usury ought to be forbidden, and when princes refuse to do anything about that, people should form their own mounted police to enforce the prohibition. Thus speaks the man who in 1525 refused to lift a finger to help the peasants, because he was so strongly opposed to any form of rebelliousness. Their stolen treasures must be taken from them, and from the fund thus created, the truly and honestly converted should be given an allowance. Jews must be forced to earn their living in the sweat of their brow, as it was commanded (Genesis 11:19). Why should these blasphemers be protected any longer? It would perhaps be better to expel them altogether, as happened in Spain and France and the Electorate of Saxony. He ends by admonishing Christians to beware of Jews, as if they were the Devil incarnate. Many of the arguments are also found in "Von Schemhamphoras und vom Geschlecht Christi", an earlier anti-Jewish treatise, that is less explicit about usury.

How does Luther’s work fit into the literary output of the age? It is erroneous to think that Humanism necessarily opted for a greater tolerance of the Jews, or that the Enlightenment did, for that matter, to judge by the attacks of Voltaire and many other philosophes.

Humanist Biblical and Hebrew studies, though indeed refuting ritual murder charges, and in that sense, de-demonizing the Jews, re-invigorated the originating “Pauline” rejection, by once more rejecting the Jews’ “false pretensions”.

The Reuchlin affair cannot be adduced as an argument for greater toleration. Reuchlin, the foremost German Hebraist opposed the burning of the Talmud as was advocated by the renegade Pfefferkorn and the Cologne Dominicans who protected him. In the consequent quarrel, neither Reuchlin nor his partisans, attacking the viri obscuri could possibly be called “Jew-friends”. Reuchlin’s avowed aim in studying Hebrew writings, was to vindicate the Christian truth. In the quarrel, “freedom of research” was the issue, rather than furthering the cause of the Jews.68

Erasmus was no friend of the Jews either, approaching an almost “Jud bleibt Jud” standpoint. He distrusted converts and as such disliked Pfefferkorn. He was ill at ease with Hebrew studies, fearing that they had a contaminating effect. For that reason he was not entirely on Reuchlin’s side, but he did not wish to be identified with the scholastics of the opposing party either. “Si Christianum est odisse Judeos, hic abunde Christiani sumus omnes”, was apparently not ironically meant. He detested merchants, thereby showing an economic conservatism akin to that of Luther.69

Likewise Luther’s prime concern was to protect the Divine Word as the ba-
sis of true faith, as the only way to redemption, against all those who jeopardized it, destructive Turkish Islamic “pagans”, Jewish legalists, Roman sacramentalists and heretics, who distorted its meaning. They are all manifestations of the Anti-Christ of the last days, which were about to come.

Like Luther, the Strasbourg reformer Martin Bucer also recommended that Jews should be forced to do the lowliest kind of work, like chimney sweeping, lavatory cleaning, woodcutting and the like.70 Luther fits into a general pattern. What is exceptional is his vehemence, as well as the fact that unlike most others he did not write in the Latin of the learned, but in the vernacular, in a folksy, not to mention vulgar tone. When the newly invented printing press cheaply divulged his works, he could easily be read by common people with no more education than mere literacy. Without using learned phrases he referred to Jews as “farting after copious meals paid for with their stolen money”. (The folksy tone he adopted is no reason to acclaim Luther as the father of German anti-Semitism, which the Nazis did, as well as their enemies. The Nazis republished his works with glee. These were almost forgotten at the time. Purposefully overlooking the fact that Luther’s concern was wholly theological, they made him into a national hero, whose German sentiment expressed the “gesundenes Volksempfinden”).

Luther’s vehemence was no doubt inspired by some Moravians (Hussites?) becoming Jews. He attacked them in his tract “Wider die Sabbather”, in an unrestrained way expressing the same fear of contamination as Erasmus did.71 The behavior of these Moravians was a first manifestation of a phenomenon found all over Europe of the Reformation. Some people in their reformed zeal went as far as to discard Christ altogether and – look at the state the world is in – proclaimed that the Messiah had not yet come. One famous example among many: Nicholas Antoine, a French pastor, burned at the stake in Geneva in 1632.72 In the Netherlands a number of Anabaptists converted to Judaism, in Italy a number of Waldensians, perhaps some Socinians. In the peasant movement of 1524 there were “Judaizing” tendencies in the form of a desire to re-introduce the Jubilee year. These conversions and Judaizing tendencies, though extremely small in number, must have caused something like near panic by their sheer novelty.

However, it could be argued, that panic or not, Luther, by reprimanding the princes for their laxity in curtailing Jewish usury73 has, perhaps against his own intentions, given his purely theological concern a twist that was food for social protest against a “mammonist” social order, and as such stimulated the development of a more secular ideology.

For by emphasizing the “usurious” role of Jews in state-finances, Luther
seemingly was the originator of modern German anti-Semitism, that blamed the Jews for exploiting public finance. As indicated the inhabitants of non-Atlantic states could less easily profit from commerce with the newly discovered overseas territories, that contributed so much to the decline of the traditional Alpine traderoutes, and of the towns profiting from it. These central states could therefore not as easily develop as the others a bourgeoisie prepared to bear risks and as such willing to invest in public finance. In times of inflation, in the sixteenth century caused by the massive import of precious metals from the Americas, these somewhat underdeveloped states had to raise the required greater amounts of money in the traditional way. One cannot blame Luther and kindred minds for this development, that fostered the financial role of the later “court Jews” – primarily a central European phenomenon – and the social protest it provoked. Nevertheless it is true that this protest anticipates nineteenth-century anti-Semitism, that as Hannah Arendt observed had conflicts with the state on its allegedly Jewish financiers. German nineteenth-century anti-Semites held that Bismarck, hand in glove with the Jewish banker Bleichröder, introduced the gold standard in 1879, to the detriment of peasants and artisans, in order to please the Jews. Its price-lowering effect affecting incomes allegedly ruined farmers and artisans, their property heavily mortgaged. According to the protest literature expropriating Jewish bankers had foreseen this. In France, E. Drumont wrote when he first heard about the arrest of Dreyfus that since the traitor was a Jew the Jewish and Judaized “Panamists” in power would hush up the treason.

Luther was by no means alone in giving his rejection of Judaism an economic connotation. After all, in the other camp Roman Jews were, in the newly created ghettos, reduced to very much the same kind of work Luther and Bucer had in mind. It later resulted in the very insalubrious conditions in mattress making.

Calvinism too, was far from blameless when conditions for economic growth were not propitious. On a par with many South German towns, Lausanne and Geneva had expelled the Jews. They were not readmitted after the Reformation. The Calvinist Palatinate drove out the Jews as did the Lutheran Saxon Electorate.

It may therefore safely be assumed that policy regarding the Jews was denomination invariant, but all the more dependent on social structure and statecraft. This can to some extent be extrapolated. For, even though nineteenth-century German anti-Semitism at first sight appeared to come from traditionally Protestant areas, or to have been instigated by Protestants like Adolf
Stoecker, this is a little misleading. After the “Kulturkampf” Roman Catholics hesitated to participate all-too openly in what could be deemed a religious conflict, even when it was not. There was no comfort in racists like Wilhelm Marr telling them that religion had nothing to do with the problem, because so many of these racist anti-Semites like Eugen Dühring, Theodor Fritsch, Arthur Dinter or H.S. Chamberlain, and a great many others, if they did not take an outright anti-Christian stance, denouncing Christianity as “Jewish”, were in any case violently anti-Roman Catholic, because they held that the Roman variety of Christianity was the product of the racial mishmash following the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, making it more prone to accept contaminating Judaic admixtures. The truly “Aryan” message – numerous were the efforts to prove that Christ was Aryan, even Teutonic –, was allegedly obfuscated.

Nevertheless Roman Catholic anti-Semites could equally effectively formulate their resentment of modern capitalist economy in attacks on what they called “Talmud Morality”. Moreover, the vicious anti-Semitism of thoroughly Roman Catholic Austria in the nineteenth century – nowhere else did anti-Semites have such a large electoral success as that of Karl Lueger’s Christian Socials – once more suggests that anti-Semitic ideology is denomination invariant. The Austrian wing of Georg von Schönerer and his followers, though it started the “Los von Rom” movement propagating Lutheranism, as the truly German and anti-Jewish religion – Schönerer himself preferred Teutonic paganism! – was not of Protestant origin, but largely, via the Burschenschaften deeply rooted in the 1848 (anti-Habsburg) radically nationalist tradition, as was German racism to some extent. French anti-Semitism, with an identical social protest against banks, Stock Exchange, mortgages, against “high finance”, was likewise either of Roman Catholic inspiration, or rooted in the revolutionary tradition. Gustave Tridon, for example, author of the Le Molochisme Juif, denouncing Christianity as utterly Jewish, and as such co-responsible for capitalist exploitation, called himself an Hébertiste, after the Cordelier Jacques Hébert, the inspiration behind the “Worship of Reason” movement during the Revolution.

Many of the early socialists, with strong, racist anti-Semitic sentiments, notably some of the Blanquists, came from the revolutionary tradition of Gracchus Babeuf.

Finally it should perhaps be emphasized that Luther’s invectives did not negatively affect the Lutheran Scandinavian world, that had little or no medieval anti-Jewish tradition.

Therefore, what seems decisive in the formation of the substructure of the

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ideology from the early modern period onwards, apart from general economic developments, is in particular the socioeconomic aspect of state-formation processes; their growing complexity is highly susceptible to social change.

**Crown, Jews, and populace**

This thesis surmises that there is an evolution or further specification of the relation between Jews and the Crown, that had its roots in medieval structure. At the risk of tedious repetition, it is perhaps worthwhile to return to the complexities and intricacies of the tripartite relationship between the Crown, Jews, and commoners of different allegiances.

According to the assumption of the dead reckoning, Jewish vocational specification resulted in diminished social intercourse corrective of stigmatization, and consequently provoked growing popular hatred. To princes, both vocational specification and popular hatred could be advantageous, the one providing them with an income derived from Jewish money lending, that would be the greater the more the other could be used as a lever for extortion under the guise of payment for “protection”. Both would be processes mutually reinforcing, in such a way that princely policy was aimed at trying to see to it that popular hatred never got out of hand, for as long as the goose laid the golden eggs, it should not be killed. The Crown lost interest when this was no longer the case, so that then, as a sop to the populace, it could resort to expulsion. This is not in contradiction with the “permissiveness” hypothesis, with terrorization as a consequence of governmental ineffectiveness, since it takes far less organized state power to effectively fleece a defenseless and threatened minority, than to effectively protect that same minority against mob violence. The less developed the monopoly of violence of the state, the greater are the chances of inarticulate popular hatred violently expressed, the better developed the monopoly of violence, the less chances there are for a continuously better articulated resentment expressing itself in violent form, and the more a not democratically controlled government will resort to arbitrariness as it sees fit: sops to the populace in the form of general restrictions for the Jews, or “punishments” in accordance with Church policy or not as it suits the government, and privileges for Jewish money-men needed to help financing the running of the state.

According to Rabbinowitz’ classical study, a seeming refutation of the above pattern is not only medieval southern France, as shown above, but
northern France as well. Basing his findings on a meticulous analysis of contemporary rabbinical writings, of the so-called Tosafists, Rabbinowitz argued that, in northern France, up to the late thirteenth century, in contradistinction with England and later Germany, Jews were by no means in an isolated social position. Through continued pluriformity of vocational positions, they allegedly showed an open interaction and friendly relations with their Gentile neighbors.

It is possible that the rabbis, in the psychologically well-known inclination of those who are about to be persecuted to belittle the severity of the threat, described in fact a status quo ante. Like their descendants in France at the beginning of the Dreyfus Affair, and some of their co-religionists in the early days of National Socialism, they may have felt that animosity was a temporary aberration from normal, happier conditions, and would therefore blow over. The rabbinical writings, describing that normal situation then become defective source material.

The massacre of Rouen in 1096, the Blois and Bray-sur-Seine incidents mentioned by Rabbinowitz, the violence aimed at Jews during the Albigensian Crusade, and particularly the persecutions by the Pastoureaux, which he does not mention, tell a rather different story.

It may also be true that northern France in fact was different, because there the feudal disintegration took place earlier than anywhere else. The kingdom of the Franks fell apart into a great many small counties and dukedoms, more easily policed, so that terrorization could be prevented. It is possible, though this will have to be investigated, that because of that early splitting up, the process of manorialization (development of the rules of the Manorhouse) was slowed down to the extent of preserving some Jew-held alodial lands. There is evidence of continued Jewish agricultural and particularly viticultural activity in France as well as Germany, where it is related how the “crusaders” of 1096 attacked Jews, while at work in their vineyards.86

However, the trend was for increased concentration on money-lending, as is proved by an interesting law-suit of the transition period (twelfth century). The proprietor of a vineyard complained before the rabbinical court that she was too highly assessed for local taxation. The return on her property in cash would be higher by money lending, so that she should pay less than those who had that amount in cash.87 Rabbinowitz points out that his sources mention journeymen and day laborers, but he does not specify whether they worked for Jewish or Gentile employers. Perhaps the feudal overlords used the same type of extortion for alleged trespasses, as for example John Lackland did, but given the Ma‘arifa and Herem- hay-Yishubh regulations, which

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rather tied their hands, they are not likely to have practiced it on the same scale. So all in all, a continued friendly relationship of Jews with their neighbors is by no means implausible. However, it should not be forgotten that friendly neighborly relations can coexist with widespread animosity, as Germany, on the eve of the Machtsübernahme clearly proves. Numerous Gentiles had friendly relations with their Jewish neighbors, before it became too dangerous to cherish these. Onomastic assimilation, for the same reasons, is not incompatible with social distance.

Although Rabbinowitz’ account can indeed, within certain limitations, constitute a refutation of the dead reckoning and further reflection is needed on the methodological consequences, the fact is, that with the growth of the power of the Crown, France increasingly ceased to be an exception, when French kings systematically began to impose the above structure of tripartite relationships based on Jewish usury. Rabbinowitz himself insists that when widespread habitation over large areas (evident from Gros’ “Gallia Judaica”) gave way to ghetto-like concentration in a limited number of towns, Jews had every reason to fear concentration of power in the Crown. After repeated expulsions (1306) and readmissions on less advantageous conditions (1320-25), Jews were finally driven from France in 1397 – only to reappear, due to the later conquest of Alsace Lorraine, the settlement of Marranos in Bordeaux and Bayonne, and the reincorporation of Papal Avignon during the Revolution.

Philip Augustus’ expulsion of Jews from the royal domain in 1182 was clearly an act of extortion, and subjection to royal arbitrariness, even though, the domain then being small, it was of little consequence, Jews could escape to nearby counties and dukedoms, and in that way it was sooner over. In analogy with the non-detention rules which French kings and vassals made for their serfs, hôtes and other unfree subjects to control the movement of manpower (they promised not to acquire each other’s serfs), these were also made for their respective Jews, even though Jews were technically never serfs. It was the first step towards complete subjection to the Crown. For Jews, whose opinion had not been asked, the deal between king and vassals implied that, once subject to the Crown, a Jew remained subject to a spoliating and arbitrary king. He could no longer escape and seek a lord who treated him better. Readmitance to the royal domain in 1198 had already resulted in a competition to acquire, retain, and control Jews. The crown therefore drew most benefits.

“The statute of 1230 (making the principle of non-detention law valid for the whole kingdom) imposed on all Jews a restriction which was motivated by the desire to control and exploit Jewish lending and thereby implied that
all Jews were conceived of as a group which specialized in an occupation that was illegal when exercised by Christians.” The stronger the Jew exploiting monarchy, the more sharply defined and worse the Jewish status became, and the greater the popular resentment because of the repercussions royal policy regarding the Jews had on the common people.93 (This statement is not contradictory to the terrorization hypothesis, because this assumes a non-spoliating strong government.)

The reason why France finally fell into line, and could expel the Jews when the lemon was squeezed dry, did not apply to Germany or Central Europe because there feudal disintegration increased rather than slowed down. The Reichskammerknechtschaft deteriorated into an imperial pawn of Jews. Princes could act as they saw fit, and this meant that in the sixteenth century, as monetization progressed, princes, despite the wrath of Luther and others, continued to use their Jews when it was to their advantage.

Moreover the role of autonomous towns in the policy towards Jews had always been more pronounced in Germany, due to that same disintegration of the feudal system. In Luther’s day, these, like for example Regensburg, in 1519, were more inclined to expel Jews than were the princes, who had different financial needs for the building up of their states, for their growing bureaucracies, for their armies, and had much less reason to fear the guilds.94 The Protestant Elector of Brandenburg for example, in 1545 re-admitted Jews who after the desecration of the Host affair in Berlin had been expelled in 1510.95 He thereby incurred the wrath of Luther, who was particularly angry at the “unbecoming” conspicuous lifestyle of what might be called one of the first “court Jews”, Michael of Derenburg.96

At the time, the trend was against autonomous towns, as the territorial states grew in power, and there was a concomitant growth in capital cities. They were, moreover, ever more vulnerable to princely coercion, as their medieval walls were no protection against modern artillery.97

The dwindling of the old autonomous towns, and the growth in the number of towns under princely control is likely to have had a number of consequences for Jewish-Gentile social relations, some beneficial, others harmful. Beneficial, presumably was the growth in capital cities and other new towns vital for the new economic development, granting liberties to the Jews, with Livorno of course as a prime example. The Danish Glückstadt, founded to compete with Hamburg is another interesting example of a town where Jews enjoyed great freedom, and could even engage in modern crafts, even though some complained that there was neither Glück nor Stadt. Hamburg itself, being rather exceptional as a seaport, opened its gates to Sephardic Jews.98
As argued above, the growth of urban agglomerations diminishes the number of face to face relationships, and hence the chances of terrorization. The early modern period would therefore be characterized by a diminished frequency of popular massacres, which were also prevented by better policing.

However, better protection of life and limb for the Jews by no means implied diminishment of prejudice or “normal” verbal anti-Semitism. So the process of accusatory innovation, articulation of social protest against princely policies would go on unabated, and could become explosive when in some way control lessened. This happened in the period of absolute princely rule, as late as 1819, during the so-called “Hep-Hep” movement, or even in 1848.

In fact the last old-fashioned guild-staged persecution of Jews took place in Frankfurt and Worms in 1614. In the former town, decline in the autochthonous textile industries, fostered anger with resentment towards the town council and the Jews importing Dutch and English cloth. It led to a revolt under the leadership of the baker Vincent Fettmilch. Luther’s writings were widely distributed to the protesting participants, and yet did not result in massacre, only in robbery and expulsion; clear indication of economic protest gaining the upper hand over the “demonic” aspect. Also, quite characteristically, the revolt was quenched by the princely interference of the Emperor, the Elector of Mainz and the Margrave of Hesse. Fettmilch was executed.

Another earlier indication of the loss of significance of town politics and the increased emphasis on growing princely politics, is possibly the remarkable career of Josel of Rosheim, the first – and in effect last – “gemeiner Jüdischait bevelhaber in Teutschland”, as his not uncontested title was, the spokesman for the Jews, the Schadlan. It marks a certain aggrandizement of scale in Jewish-princely relations.

This Alsatian Rabbi (1478-1554) made deals, among others, with the dukes of Bavaria and Württemberg, defended the Jews of Colmar, about to be expelled, and had particularly good relations with Emperor Charles V, who despite his half-Spanish descent – the expulsion of 1492! – in various Diets bestowed favors on the Jews, upon Josel’s intercession. The emperor, by no means entirely disinterested, wanted to restore the traditional relations between Jews and Empire in a protective sense, that is, the emperor having jurisdiction, and receiving Schützgeld, the money the Jews had to pay for protection. In a meeting of the Diet, Josel thus succeeded in exposing Antonius Margeritha, a renegade and author of the slanderous “Der Gantz Jüdisch Glaub” for the swindler he was. With the emperor’s consent the latter was

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banished from Augsburg. One Count Pöing, who in order to get rid of his
depts, had kidnapped a child, and spread the rumor of it being ritually mur-
dered, was duly punished, owing to Josel’s intervention. He prevented other
expulsions and persecutions, except in the case of the electorate of Saxony.
Luther, whom Josel had asked to intercede on behalf of the Jews, on the
ground of Luther’s earlier writings, refused to receive him.101

In order to further reconciliation, Josel admonished the Jewish money-
lenders to try to lower their rates of interest. He also tried to abolish the
“Hehler privileg” (fence privilege) by trying to establish the rule that a Jew,
who had in good faith accepted a stolen object as pawn, should, against pre-
vailing custom, return the pawn to the rightful owner without compensa-
tion; both were attempts to mitigate popular resentment when dealing with
the high and mighty.102

Josel entertained very close relations with the reformers Capito (1478-
1541) and Osiander (1498-1552). The former denied that Jews blasphemed
Christ, the latter, an independent spirit, wrote a treatise against the ritual
murder charge and severely criticized Luther’s anti-Jewish writings. Yet on
the whole, Josel and with him the Jewish community sided with the Roman-
Catholic party – trying to refute the charge that Protestantism was a form of
“Judaizing” – because they feared a Protestant attack. During the war of the
Schmalkaldic League, they not only prayed for the Imperial armies, but actu-
ally financially supported the Imperial cause. This eminent man Josel, whose
religiousness may have been inspired by the humbleness of the “modern de-
voon” and the “Brethren of the Common life”, was himself a transitional fig-
ure, modern in his organizational efforts and the way he dealt with princes;
yet, because he opted for the imperial side, his cause was negatively affected
by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which by its “cuius region, eius et religio”
stipulation, greatly furthered the development of territorial states. He had no
successor as Schadlan, and his efforts to mitigate resentment may have come
to nought.103

**Mercantilism and state formation**

The development of virtually independent sovereign states, aiming at abso-
lutism and a monopoly of violence, which began in the early sixteenth centu-
ry, was confirmed by the Peace of Augsburg, and more emphatically by the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It extended the old tripartite relationship –
Crown, Jews, and commoners – on a much more sophisticated footing of
mercantilistic and “politique” attitudes.

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The assumption that there lay the basis for a further articulation of popular resentment, as it provided fuel for accusatory innovation, is in no way at odds with the thesis of Jonathan Israel\textsuperscript{104} that the very “mercantilistic age” from the point of view of cultural and religious history represented a high point in Jewish development. A newly articulated popular resentment, engendered by economic policies, but less able to continuously express itself in a spontaneous way, because of noncommittal better policing, does in no way argue against the flowering of a Jewish culture, due to the same development. However, it could be argued that this intellectual development in a later phase may have added fuel to the resentment and the vehemence in the discussion of emancipation, by making Jews and Judaism more conspicuous. On the Gentile side, emancipatory ideas were as much inspired by the mercantilistic or Josephinist principles of “Enlightened Despotism”,\textsuperscript{105} as the creation of the “court Jews” had been. They were its logical outcome, as soon as the more mature state could afford it.

Further attention should be given to mercantilism, as it was held to be explanatory for the emergence of the court Jews, as a new form of traditional relationship between Crown and Jews, and for the resulting emancipation discussion, as well as for the resentment that it provoked. The discussion on mercantilism has widened the meaning of this term to the extent that the notion is now far removed from Adam Smith’s concept of amassing precious metal within the state by an artificially maintained positive balance of trade, or pure Colbertism, which he so eloquently bewailed as harmful to public welfare.\textsuperscript{106}

Ever since Schmoller raised that issue, and certainly since Hekscher’s influential contribution to the field, its role in state formation has entered the discussion. Mercantilistic policies not only meant to serve the power of the state.

“Power is as essential to wealth as wealth is to power, so that the reversible equation state power = economic power holds true – but also its unification, by attempting unification in labor relations, overall state price-and-quality control, and so forth. A combination of both may have helped to create the ‘Untertanen-state’ and a growing equality before the law.”

Most mercantilistic writers all over Europe held that both the population and the total volume of trade was constant, so that the game consisted in enlarging one’s own share at the detriment of others. Mercantilistic thought, however conceived, was amoral, “an emancipation from the belief in tradi-
tional, political, and social institutions” and “emancipation from religious and ethical ideas in the social field, a secularization and an moralization”.

“Non-religious and amoral views came to light from every direction, in the attitude to interest charges, – in the tolerance of heretics and Jews, as their being favorable to trade.”

The German and Central European states, virtually independent and sovereign after the peace of Westphalia in 1648, were the least well equipped for this power game. After the disaster of the war, most economies were in shambles, many towns ruined, agriculture neglected, the population reduced by a third. A long period of restoration was needed, primarily concentrating on cash crops. There was no mercantile or industrial bourgeoisie of any significance to play the role mercantilistic ideas envisaged for it, as in the Atlantic states. There was no group willing and capable of taking the necessary risks involved in the investing in government loans. Precisely because the German princes were such weak players in the great contest, the mercantilistic theory was taken more seriously in Germany than anywhere else: only in German universities was it part of the curriculum, but the men who had to carry out these policies, needed access to international finance, had to have the experience and know-how, and had to have a specific reason for running risks. Jews were willing to do so, because apart from the expectation of financial returns, they had a non-economic motive. By rendering service they could hope to obtain an amelioration of their own social – if not legal – position and that of their co-religionists, so that they were effectively helped by a large substratum of thousands of small peddlers, who were dealing in coins, participated in providing the means.

Jews could also more easily participate because Jewish financiers had, via the great international Marrano-Sephardic-Ashkenasic network, easier access to the money market, then located in Amsterdam – the great exception to a narrowly defined mercantilism, for bullion was exported! There Jews had greater freedom of movement; they could act as brokers on the Amsterdam exchange. Without support of the Amsterdam Jews the “court Jews” would presumably not have been able to manage.

In this light, the emergence of the German “court Jews” (the foundation was laid during the war, both contesting parties, Protestants and Roman Catholics borrowing from them) as well as the resentment their activities caused among the populace becomes understandable, as well as the fact that the “court Jew” was not an exclusively German phenomenon. After all, the ruler of the two richest countries of the age, King-Stadholder William 111 of Orange, extensively used Jewish middlemen and army contractors, even for

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the purveying of supplies and war material to the army in Ireland, at the time of the battle of the Boyne.\textsuperscript{111}

The system was indeed amoral in the sense that the common people did not fare any better, having to pay the new taxes and excises, were sometimes cruelly exposed to tax-farmers,\textsuperscript{112} were victimized by the debasement of the coinage,\textsuperscript{113} and suffered under the regulations the policies entailed. And even if some mercantilists had the common good in mind, these same commoners were not likely to appreciate their efforts, no more than those of their later free-trade antagonists, whose ideas were denounced by anti-Semites as “plunderous Jewish Manchesterism”, the trick of the wealthy to further rob artisans and peasants, and fully exploit the workers.

The Jewish community as such did not profit either. Apart from the few Jews living in splendor, the majority lived in dire poverty. Ghetto life continued. Excluded from crafts, they continued to live a hand-to-mouth existence, exposed to all sorts of restrictions. They had to pay extra poll taxes. Both in Austria and Prussia the rule was established that a Jew could not marry before the death of his father, or was prevented by other numerous clauses on marriage. On their wedding day Prussian Jews were obliged to buy porcelain from the royal factories, which they had to sell at their own risk. They could not, as a rule, own real estate, and were excluded from all institutes of learning, having to take care of all education themselves.

Even the court Jews were exposed to princely arbitrariness and whims. Their property could be sequestered at will, as already happened in 1601 to Mordechai Meisel, the Habsburg financier.\textsuperscript{114} Jacob Bassevi von Treurenb erg of Prague (1570-1634), the first Jew ever to be ennobled, died in poverty. Samuel Oppenheimer “Oberhoffaktor” in Vienna, fell into disgrace in 1702.\textsuperscript{115} His house was ransacked by an angry mob in 1700. When Frederic 11, king of Prussia, was in financial straits, he ordered his “Hoffaktors” Veitel Ephraim and Daniel Itzig, to debase the coinage. People grumbled about the new Thaler: “Von aussen schön, von innen schlimm, van aussen Friedrich, von innen Ephraim.”\textsuperscript{116}

The most serious case of sacrificing a Court-Jew, as a sop to the populace, was the death of Joseph Süsz Oppenheimer. As a deist, estranged from Judaism, he foreshadows the post-emancipatory assimilated Jew, who bore the brunt of the nineteenth-century popular hatred. After having put the Württemberg state-finance in order, he was cast aside and mercilessly hung, to the satisfaction of a jeering crowd. Lion Feuchtwanger wrote a beautiful novel about his life and Joseph Goebbels used it as the theme for a most scurrilous film, Jud Süsz. He personally watched the making of the film and saw
to it that not a single item that could be used for anti-Semitic propaganda was left out.\textsuperscript{117}

Another indication of princely arbitrariness, is what happened to the Prague Jews in 1744. When during the second Silesian War, the Prussians occupied Prague, King Frederic II demanded a tribute from the Jewish community. Its payment was for Empress Maria Theresa so obviously a sign of disloyalty, that after the Prussians withdrew, the Jews had to be punished by expulsion. For four years, Prague Jews aimlessly wandered through Bohemia without abode, until in 1748 at Anglo-Dutch instigation, the measure was rescinded. Amsterdam threatened to exclude Austrian mercury from the staple. To this day, the former Jesuit Church of St. Nicholas in Prague, now parish church, keeps as a reminder of this event, four more-than-life-size statues of the most vehemently anti-Jewish Greek Fathers of the Church, Cyril of Alexandria, Chrysostom, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Basil of Cæsarea; a theological justification for the expulsion. Greek fathers were chosen, because of their Jew-hatred, despite the fact that Latin fathers were more plausible in a Latin Church.\textsuperscript{118}

This seemingly, or real, less violent mercantilistic and absolutist interlude between medieval excesses and the re-emergence of anti-Semitism after the emancipation, is very well attested in the memoirs of Glikl Hamel.\textsuperscript{119}

These vivacious and humane writings in Yiddish provide a lively picture of what Jewish life was like in Germany in the upper layers of late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century society. Glikl belonged to the social layer of the Jewish community just beneath that of the Hoffaktors, with some of whom she had social contacts. Her learning and culture she owed to that position, though even there it was perhaps unusual for a woman in a society where girls receive much less education than boys. Showing a love of the Talmud and Jewish lore, she was apparently hardly influenced by contemporary Gentile learning and literature, to which she makes no allusions. She thus shows a social distance, which also manifests itself in her living in, and referring almost exclusively to a Jewish environment. The picture she draws is one of relative safety, with few other dangers than disease. Although she refers to places unfriendly to Jews, and persecutions in Poland, expulsions in the West, and sometimes shows fear, her personal experiences, despite her many travels outside Hamburg where she lived the greater part of her life, contain no indication of excessive hostility.

Widowed at an early age, her main concern is to provide for her children, to give them a good start in life. To that end she continues her husband’s business at her own risk, but with success. Money is important in an insecure age.
It is security for her children that motivates her and there is little indication of the capitalist mentality Sombart detected in her doings. She meets disaster and poverty towards the end of her life, when in Metz the business of her second husband failed.

Although she is not very explicit about the nature of her commercial activities, her sparse references seem to indicate that they were somewhat on the fringe of general mercantile undertakings. She never mentions lending, refers to the buying and selling of jewelry, but apart from that she is curiously silent about the nature of her merchandise, which is the general term she uses in her memoirs. Given her relations with Dutch Jews, her visits to Amsterdam, it is perhaps justified to assume that it largely consisted of colonial wares, easily transported, costly luxury goods. She never mentions textiles. Her whole book seems to confirm the image of a socially isolated, distrusted group discriminated against, but momentarily left in relative peace.

The general populace will not have cared that the vast majority of Jews were not Hoffaktoren. By deductive inference they will have considered the distrusted pawnshop keepers, cattle dealers, peddlers, as belonging to the same bad lot. As the saying was: “Traut keinen Fuchsen auf der Heid, Traut keinen Juden auf sein Eid.”

It may be true that in a sense the activities of the court Jews were a preparatory process for the emancipation, in the sense of making all Jews “mercantilistically” useful to the state; but this then implied that the resentment they caused, the social protest they provoked, was carried over to the emancipation discussion, and beyond. Once again, whatever the various contributions of the ideologues, an anti-Semitic mass movement seems only understandable if these ideologies fitted into and corroborated an anguish sooner or later felt by peasants, artisans, déclassé nobles, schoolteachers, small pensioners, and others, allegedly menaced in their existence by an iniquitous social order, that for reasons of its own, “plunderous” Jews promoted.

On the Gentile side emancipatory measures were indeed partly inspired by those very mercantilistic considerations, that had provided the Court-Jews with their social role, putting them in the limelight. The “Toleranz-edict” of Emperor Joseph II in 1782, giving the Jews recognition as permanent residents, legal subjects, but without full rights, envisaged making a much larger segment of the Jewish population economically useful to the state. 120

This measure, aiming at a better exploitation of their talents, is the exact counterpart of Joseph II’s liberation of the peasants, by abolishing the “Robot”, the corvées. Because the fruits of their labors tended to fill the pockets of the nontaxpaying nobility and clergy, instead of contributing to the state
treasury, it was a late-mercantilistic measure of Enlightened Despotism, no more inspired by love for the peasants, than the Edict of Tolerance was inspired by love for the Jews, or shame about their treatment. Their *Schmarotzerthum* provoked by force of prevailing circumstances, was deemed inefficient and should be abolished.\textsuperscript{121} In this sense Hannah Arendt was right when she claimed that the “emancipation” boiled down to extending the privileges of the court Jews to all or most Jews, although it is not justified to say that thereby Jewry as such was turned into the (main) financial apparatus of the state.

In the famous book by the Prussian official C.W. Dohm, *Uber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, though indeed inspired by enlightened ideals of tolerance, there is also an element pointing to the usefulness of the Jews for the state. The way they are now, they are no good, but they can be educated to become useful citizens, for the benefit of the state. Similar ideas were proclaimed by Malesherbes in France.\textsuperscript{122}

Another “mercantilistic” element in the discussion, is a desire for the unification of the state. Emancipation would end the anomaly of Jews being a “state within a state”, if only because Jews will no longer have their own law and judiciary. This feature so worried Fichte, that despairing of the chance to realize its abolishment, and despite his sympathies for the French Revolution, he turned so strongly anti-Jewish as to make him one of the most quoted “authorities” in later generations of anti-Semites, though this authority also rested on his protectionist view expressed in *Der Geschlossene Handelsstat*. It made him the idol of later anti-Semitic protectionist opponents of “Jewish Manchesterism”.

In the light of the resentment the court Jews evoked, it is only too plausible to argue that in the eyes of the common people, who for ages held that Jews were the protected profiteers of an iniquitous social system, emancipation merely meant that there were now more of these pernicious Jewish financiers. As Marx formulated it, the civil (bürgerrechtlich) emancipation of the Jews is identical to the emancipation of capital. The real emancipation is yet to come. “Die gesellschaftliche Emanzipation des Juden ist die Emanzipation der Gesellschaft vom Judenthum.”\textsuperscript{123}

All later crises, not only those of 1819 and 1848, but particularly the depression following the crash of 1873 and the great agrarian depression of the 1880s and 1890s would be seen in this light. “That is what you get when you give these plunderous Jews, these usurers, equal rights, which amount to unjust rights to exploit”, was the reaction shortly after the final emancipation with the founding of the German Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian “Ausgleich” in 1867.

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It was slogans like this which explain the relative electoral successes of the various Anti-Semitic parties and the strength of anti-Semitic organizations like the “Bund der Landwirte”;124 – the “Deutsch-Nationale Handlungsgehilfen Verein” and their counterparts in other countries, like Dubuc’s “Jeunesse antisemite” or the “Ligue des Patriotes” and the “Action Française”. Their pet enemies, main targets of their propaganda, were the prominent bankers, primarily the Rothschilds, but also Fould, Cerf-Berr, Bleichroeder, possibly the Pèreires of the “Crédit Mobilier”, who robbed people of their savings and ruined peasants and artisans with their usurious mortgage rates. On a par with them, as Toussenel wrote, are the Judaized Puritans: “Et qui dit Juif, dit protestant, sachez-le. L’Anglais, le Hollandais, le Genevois, qui apprennent à lire la volonté de Dieu dans le même livre que le juif, professent pour les lois de l’équité et les droits des travailleurs, le même mépris que le juif.”125 According to him, for Jews in particular the saying holds true “ubi aurum, ibi patria” (“Where is the gold, there is the fatherland”).

In the eyes of all European anti-Semites, the astonishing career of the Rothschilds epitomizes all the above reflections: international bankers, with no homeland, protégés of tyrannical princes, who due to the emancipation had access to unlimited plunder.

The founder of the house, Mayer Amschel Rothschild, a moderately well to do factotum from the Frankfurt ghetto, developed, as a young man, an interest in old coins, which he sold to a collector, the Landgrave William of Hessen-Kassel. This was the beginning of a modest “Hoffaktorship” for this avaricious prince, who had made a fortune by selling the English “Hessians” as mercenary soldiers during the American War of Independence, and by lending to German princes. Gradually Mayer Amschel managed to gain the trust of this prince in other financial matters, but he remained the typical Hoffaktor of the ancien régime, dependent on the whims of the prince.

His five sons, having inherited his extraordinary business acumen, settling all over Europe, were the product of the transition and emancipation of both the French Revolution and the industrial revolution. Nathaniel laid the foundation for the English branch of the firm by going into the new cotton trade in Manchester, and with the aid of his father, inducing prince William to invest in consolidated annuities, when the latter was put to flight by Napoleon. Nathan used the discount to buy cotton, which he sold at soaring prices in Germany, just before, and even after the Continental System was in full operation. Brother James settled in Paris, where Jews were now fully emancipated. He closely cooperated with brother Nathan, now in the capital of enemy England. Together they managed to transport English bullion
through France, under the very eyes of the French police, and with the consent of the imperial minister of finance, who believed thus to drain England of gold. .... but it was going to the troops of the Duke of Wellington in Spain, by using a network of Maltese and Italian bills of exchange. The father made his mark, not to his own disadvantage, by managing to keep the remainder of Prince William’s fortune out of the hands of Napoleon. The other sons settled in Naples, Vienna, and Frankfurt, thus completing the international aspect. Nathan, by using bearing tactics, made a fortune on the day of the Battle of Waterloo, by “looking sad”. He had bought a massive amount of consols at a low price, when the public believed the battle was lost. When the good news came, it set the price soaring again. The real breakthrough came in 1818 at the postwar international finance congress in Aix-la-Chapelle, when the brothers undercut Ouvrard and Baring. From there they moved in on French and Austrian railways – when the lease of the Nordbahn expired in 1886, Georg von Schönerer saw his chance for attack on the steelworks of Vitkovitz, and other industrial enterprises.

There was nothing unusual about the Rothschilds, save their acumen and wit, but all over Europe they became the symbol of an iniquitous social order, a symbol that was deeply entrenched in traditions going back to the Middle Ages. The charge of “usury” in its many shapes was presumably the most effective in rousing popular hatred, the most likely to be effective on a political platform, precisely because it had so long a history.

Paradoxically, as will be discussed in detail below, when either the anti-Semitic parties themselves, or more likely when other parties like the German Conservatives with their Tivoli program, or the “Bund der Landwirte” took on the complaints and redressed some of the grievances, anti-Semitic social protest lost much of its electoral appeal. Protective legislation was passed, which in fact was more advantageous to industry than to agriculture. Anti-Semites, too, profited by the legislation aimed at forestalling socialism, by regulating working hours, by social legislation, insurance against illness and unemployment. Anti-Semitic small entrepreneurs of artisan tradition more hit by strikes than the great industries profited from the social peace in the boom years before the First World War. Anti-Semitic parties were on the wane; the same held true for Austria and France, where after the end of the affair political anti-Semitism virtually disappeared.

Not for long though, for everywhere it reappeared after the war, which had made human life so cheap, that it contributed heavily to taking away any impediments to violence. Particularly in Germany, but not specifically, the loss of the war, inflation, the great Depression, mass unemployment, fear of Bol-
shevism created havoc. The very fact that anti-Semitism politically so closely responded to the business cycle, shows the significance of the economic aspect of the rejection of Jews. All the old images were revived, the substructural as well as the suprastructural. In so far as these dated from changes in religiosity, deism, and the emancipation discussion, they deserve separate attention.
CHAPTER 14

The Problem of Popularization

Strange as this may sound, some of the “intellectual” (in the sense of requiring some learning) superstructures of later anti-Semitic ideology seem to have had their roots in the anthropologies and world views of some of the eighteenth century philosophes, champions of religious tolerance. When this is true, the question can legitimately be raised whether the period of the Enlightenment was a watershed in the articulation of anti-Semitic ideology. If so, given the irreligious trends then prevailing at that time, attacks were presumably of a socioeconomic nature, rather than religious, and were to all likelihood though related to the traditional charges articulated in the terms of new anthropologies. New stereotypes may have existed side by side with older ones. This could perhaps explain a later dichotomy between religiously arguing anti-Semitism and the variety that, often anti-Christian, used racial arguments, both exoneratingly using the popular preexisting socioeconomic charges as analyzed above. The main question is whether attacks by philosophes fit into a genealogy of stereotypes, and if so, how.

Until the early eighteenth century “intellectual” (in the above sense) allegations of scholars about Jews, superstructures distinct from popular concepts, by exonerating social protest, were largely theology-based, or were like J. Eisenmenger’s Entdecktes Judenthum of wider, but still “religious” purport. At the time the book was considered to be so effectively inciting, so dangerous for Jewry, that it induced two prominent court Jews, Samuel Wertheimer and Samuel Oppenheimer to use their influence to prevent its publication. They at first succeeded, but after long litigation it was finally published in 1700, in Königsberg, outside imperial jurisdiction. One wonders whether their fears were justified, whether in fact Jewry was seriously jeopardized by it, for far from having a mass appeal, it attracted only those few, who were not deterred by its air of impervious learnedness. Eisenmenger used most of the traditional theological arguments, but clothed them in the terminology of the new Hebrew studies. He based his arguments on authentic Hebrew texts, while at the same time distorting their meaning. His method was to interpret
every text as binding for Jews, without regard for the development of Judaism
over the centuries, without regard for exegetical traditions. Even though
some anti-Semitic deists to all likelihood would use similar techniques to in-
criminate Judaism in their desire to prove not only that it was not a natural,
reasonable religion, but above all the seedbed of Christian obscurantism,
their belief system would be so far removed from Eisenmenger’s old-fash-
ioned orthodoxy, that their incriminations would be of an entirely different,
basically new, order. Both varieties, sufficiently popularized — and popular-
ization of such learned works is the problem — may have had an effect on later
anti-Semitic movements. Eisenmenger’s book was a model for the Talmud-
jude — a book by A. Rohling, the man who revived the ritual murder story in
the 1880s1 — and similar attacks of ultraorthodox or ultramontane inspira-
tion, whereas some Deist reflections presumably served as source of inspira-
for later racialist, often violently anti-Christian varieties of anti-Semi-
tism, thus giving rise to the above dichotomy in the articulation of anti-Se-
mitic ideology, the “Christian Social” version, as opposed to the anti-Christian
variety based on racial theory, though both often shared a virtually identi-
cal social protest.

It is the difference between Karl Lueger and Georg von Schönerer in Aus-
tria, the former founder of the Roman Catholic, Vienna-based, Christian So-
cial party, and the latter a convinced, very Teutonic racialist, who organized
pagan festivals in honor of Woden, and who dated his letters from the entry
of Germans into history, the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutons, 105 BC. In
his “Los von Rom” movement he attempted to convert his followers to “truly
German” Lutheranism, and introduced a bill in imitation of the American
Homestead Act of 1862 to combat Jewish mortgages (it contained a proposal
for an execution-free minimum) and likewise in imitation of the American
Chinese-Exclusion Act, a bill to prevent Jewish immigration. (His preoccu-
pation with the US was probably based on misconceptions derived from his
racialist nationalism. He conceived of the US as an as-yet uncontaminated,
basically rural Germanic society, and a Republic at that; that suited his 1848
“Herrenvolk-democratic” convictions. He saw the US as threatened by alien
inferior races, but by means of racist legislation fully capable of defending it-
self.)3

In France the dichotomy in ideologies is the difference between the ultra-
montanist Roman Catholic compiler of all medieval accusations, Gougue-
not des Mousseaux, and the Communard Gustave Tridon, who in his Le
Molochisme Juif defended the thesis that Christianity as thoroughly Jewish
was c-responsible for capitalist exploitation. In his view the only way to liber-
ate the workers, was to abolish Christianity. It is the difference between the editions of “La Croix” of the Redemptionist Order, and the wholly irreligious and racist Henri de Rochefort, editor of l’Intransigeant, both periodicals vehemently anti-Dreyfusard.

In Germany it is the difference between an Eugen Dühring, hero of F. Engels anti-Dühring, and the Christian-Social pastor Adolf Stoecker. Dühring wanted to do away with Christianity altogether because as a futile attempt of the Aryan Jesus to improve Judaism it was contaminated by pernicious Jewish mentality. In between were racists like Th. Fritsch, H.S. Chamberlain or Arthur Dinter, who verging towards Dühring often wanted a Christianity exclusively based on the New Testament.

As indicated the two types had often in common the acceptance of a historically grown popular social protest, the concept of Jewish usury and plunder, which the formally Christian tradition interpreted as the result of “Talmud morality” and the other as the consequence of a racially determined Bedouin mentality of nomads reared in the desert, mortal enemies of a settled society, preferably grazing their flocks on arable land. “Mobile” capitalism was the modern outcome of this nomadic mentality.

They both held that mortgages were implements for Jewish plunder, that the gold standard, in Germany allegedly introduced at the instigation of Bismarck’s Jewish banker Bleichroeder, he was an opponent – with its allegedly price-lowering effect was a Jewish trick to expropriate the peasants who with their inelastic production could not pay the interests on their mortgages. Bankruptcy and execution followed, resulting in the Güterschlächterei or as it was called Güterschächterei (schachten is Jewish ritual slaughter). They also held that the inheritance law of the Code Napoleon was imposed on the nation by emancipated Jewish lawyers. It was called a law, coming from the sewers of Byzantium, invented by criminals at the time of Emperor Justinian. Allegedly these Jews knew, that by its non-entail, freiteilbarkeit, regulations the oldest son, when inheriting a farm had to pay financial compensation to younger brothers and sisters, so that the holding was indebted and could easily be expropriated by Jewish bankers. Such reasoning was also at the basis of Schönerer’s aforesaid Homestead Act. Craftsmen, having to compete with “Jew-financed” industries, were in a similar way expropriated.

Both varieties objected to the “venal Jewish press”, deliberately misinforming, to the new freedoms introduced by Liberals in the pay of Jews, such as freedom of settlement, freedom of occupation without a certificate of capacity, Befähigungs-nachweis, which combined with the other allegedly Jew-introduced freedoms, like freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and so
forth, only served to give the Jew more scope for his pernicious actions. Both rejected existing parliaments as highly unnecessary *Schwatzbuden* or *Diätent-Vertilgungs-maschinen*, or as impediments for vigorous presidents, doomed to be figureheads as it was said in France. Both varieties held that Jewish or “Judaized” stock exchange jobbers with fraudulent bull-and-bear campaigns promoted doubtful industries and ruined the reliable ones to the detriment of shareholders as much as of the workers, ill-paid or mercilessly sacked at a moment’s notice.

A joint conceptualization of the ills of “Judaized” society however was not necessarily a basis for cooperation. It was tried in Austria by the temporary union of “Die Vereinigte Christen” – Christian meaning non-Jew – until Schönerer seceded and the two wings became mortal enemies. The bones of contention were Schönerer’s 1848 Great German Concepts, his attempts to seek *Anschluss* for the German-language provinces to Germany, his fervently anti-Habsburg attitude, his promoting nondenominational education in primary schools, part of his “Los von Rom” attempts to promote “national” Lutheranism, unpalatable to Lueger’s clerical friends, and his vehemently racial, nonreligious interpretation of what he saw as the Jewish evil, which in fact made him the mentor of the young Adolf Hitler. The climax of the contest came in 1934 when Austrian National Socialist disciples of van Schönerer murdered the heir of Lueger, Engelbert Dolfusz, made defenseless by his own violently wiping out the socialists.

Though less clear-cut, the situation was comparable in other countries. It is, of course, possible that anti-Semites, as such highly opinionated people who know no doubt, are therefore quarrelsome when contradicted, but it remains nonetheless noteworthy that more often than not, the differences were racialist, “socialist”, irreligious, as opposed to a religious interpretation, using the anti-Jewish potential of the New Testament.

In France Jacques de Biez, when temporarily joining Drumont, in 1886 spoke about mounting the red horse, instead of mounting the white one. The allegiance did not last, for soon de Biez distanced himself from Drumont’s clericalism and conservatism. A disciple of Alphonse Toussenel, the Fourierist socialist, who denounced the early capitalism of the July-monarchy as thoroughly Jewish, result of the emancipation, in his vehemently anti-Semitic book *Les Juifs, rois de l’époque*, de Biez, although anticlerical and irreligious, stubbornly tried to prove that Jesus was an “Aryan”. He shared this racial preoccupation with a number of anti-Semites from the left, who all adhered to some form of “utopian” socialism, stood in the revolutionary tradition, and as such perhaps in the anti-clerical tradition of the Enlightenment.
and its anti-Jewish inclinations.\textsuperscript{21} German racists likewise were convinced that Jesus was Aryan or even Germanic.

Considering that possible contributions of the Enlightenment could easily be of a socioeconomic character, one could surmise contributions by the Physiocrats. The theory of the Physiocrats could work against the Jews or could be beneficial for them. With their emphasis on production, mainly agricultural, as the only way of creating economic values, the Physiocrats could easily enhance the old idea, that since Jews never work with their hands, do not produce, they are useless exploiters. Physiocrat theory could also promote emancipatory efforts. According to their ideas it could also be maintained that Jews by artificial barriers robbed of their productive capacities, when given better opportunities would cease to be sponges. Perhaps the theorists recalled the agrarian pursuits as described in the Old Testament.

On the whole Physiocratic writings and ideas seem to have been beneficial for Jews or neutral. Quesnay did mention the Jews in neither positive nor negative sense. Turgot, when minister of finance, favored greater liberties for the Jews, and Dohm, the Prussian official, with his book \textit{Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden} champion of emancipation, though not a full-scale Physiocrat, retaining mercantilist traits, used these ideas to formulate his concept of educating Jews to full citizenship.\textsuperscript{22} It is unlikely that later agrarian protest, articulated in anti-Semitic terms, as existed in the last decennia of the nineteenth century, was inspired by the ideas of the Physiocrats. Strongly anti-liberal, it loathed the \textit{laissez faire, laissez passer} principle first formulated by them.

The socioeconomic charges of the period of the late eighteenth century—if any—are therefore likely to have been of the traditional anti-usury and anti-exploitation character. Enlightened renovations fitting in the presupposed genealogy of stereotypes can therefore only have been related to religious traditions in the widest sense of the word. Given the strong anti-religious or even anti-Christian tendencies of the period those are likely to have been reversals of the original concepts. It is conceivable for example that the old \textit{Verus Israel} argument, Christianity as the true keeper of the message once given to Moses, was used in an anti-Jewish sense. If Christianity is no good, per implication its recognized seedbed is no good either, as in rare perceptiveness Drumont realized: “Voltaire…a attaqué surtout l’Ancient Testament en haine du Nouveau.”\textsuperscript{23}

It is, of course, also possible but not probable, that the attacks of the philosophes were unrelated to the tradition; idiosyncrasies in a later stage as \textit{gesunkenes Kulturgut} integrated into them. If they were not so incorporated

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they cannot possibly have contributed to the articulation of the ideology of later anti-Semitic movements. There is no a priori reason not to accept that, for not every anti-Jewish opinion ever ventilated becomes necessarily and automatically part of the whole system of rejection, as has often been uncritically assumed.

Late-eighteenth-century anti-Jewish opinions may have been as abortive as pre-Christian pagan prejudices are supposed to have been. Without further ado claiming that Voltaire and the other philosophes significantly contributed to later ideology, without considering the reception of their ideas is lending primacy to ideas over soci(a)(ologica)l processes. Only these can explain acceptance of abstract ideas by virtually illiterate people.

This caveat does not mean to convey that Voltaire and some of his fellow “philosophes” did not influence ideology formation—they most probably did—but only that popular reception and digestion of their ideas is not self-evident.

It does seem incongruous, it hurts to assume that an intellectual movement that deservedly is known for its reasonableness, tolerance, humanism, for its averseness to dogmatism, to uncritical credulity and obscurantism, for the best form of skepticism in short—to which it dogmatically adhered!—has significantly contributed to the articulation of anti-Semitic ideology. The fact that it did so is no more incongruous, however, than the fact that a religion preaching neighborly love, also did. After thus delineating the minefield of problems, it is time to carefully enter it.

What is most curious, but perhaps shedding light on general conditions, is that these late-eighteenth-century attacks came mostly from French Enlightenment, as is perhaps suggested by a possibly one-sided comparison between Jew-friendly Cumberland and Lessing, on the one hand, and Voltaire and fellow anti-Jewish philosophes on the other. Though none of them is truly representative for their national situation; the contrast could indicate something on the respective attitudes vis-à-vis the Jews. Cumberland and Lessing are not likely to have been successful in a violently anti-Jewish environment: there must have been a certain receptiveness.

It is not strange that British, that is, largely Scottish Enlightenment contributed very little to the rejection, there hardly being a “Jewish question” of old in Scotland, but all the more astonishing is the mildness of some representatives of German Enlightenment, Jew-hatred in Germany allegedly being endemic; as recently Goldhagen has contented.

The difference is certainly not only attributable to the genius of Moses Mendelssohn, and his effects on German intellectuals, for during his lifetime
his works were translated into French, and read in France, influencing a pro-Jewish wing of French Enlightenment. Mirabeau and Grégoire, the champions of emancipation during the early years of the Revolution, were greatly indebted to him, to the extent that it could with some justification be argued that the French emancipation of 1791 was made in Berlin. The three prize-winning essays in the contest of the Academy of Metz, one of them by Grégoire, heavily leaned on Mendelssohn. The question was: “How to make Jews more useful and happier.”

It should therefore be surmised that a German, –or Prussian – exception-ally benevolent, unfortunately not continued, attitude was due to a different social structure and to the role of the Jews therein.

As a European phenomenon, the Enlightenment can be conceived of as an emancipation movement of some noble but mostly bourgeois intellectuals claiming their place in the sun. The generation that witnessed the Newtonian discoveries, demonstrating the range of human reason, and fed on Locke, felt that as reasonable people, who followed the Ancients where necessary, ought to be allowed to take their fate, religious as well as political in their own hands, and break the fetters of unwanted authority. A. Pope’s famous lines, “Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night, God said: ‘Let Newton be,’ and all was light”, was almost a program, epitomized in such books of the period as Newton per le donne.

Even though such ideas of self-determination in the Robespierrean application of Rousseau’s Volonté Générale could result in destructive totalitarian democracy, foreshadowing a later variety of the “General Will” of the form of “Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer”, and all that stood for, those excesses were unheard of in the halcyon days of enlightened optimism. It should, however, be hastily added, that Rousseau is in no way to blame for such an anti-Semitic application of his Volonté Générale, for like Montesquieu he was one of the eighteenth century writers who was by no means anti-Semitic. In the fourth volume of his Émile, in the “Profession de foi d’un vicaire savoyard” he defended the Jews, and thereby incurred Voltaire’s wrath.

In Germany a struggling bourgeoisie recovering from the disasters of the 30 Year War, and other wars, and an academically formed officialdom with aspirations, would object to princely absolutist arbitrariness. The urgency of solving the problems of absolutist whims and the reactions these provoked is palpable in Heinrich von Kleist’s superb “Michael Kohlhaas”. That arbitrariness was to some extent made possible by princes relying on a rootless, defenseless and therefore from princes wholly dependent and consequently subservient Jewish finance. Critics of the prevailing circumstances may have
felt, that by giving the court Jews a stake in society, and ending their utter dependence on princes would end their role of being mere implements of royal whims. It is the compendium of the considerations of an “enlightened despot” like Joseph II of Austria, who on mercantilist grounds held that contemporary Jews were just as disadvantageous to the state, the sponges they were, as the peasants, who exploited by non-taxpaying nobility and clergy contributed little to the finances of the state. In his case emancipation of Jews and their talents and of peasants were two ways of improving state-finance, and thereby the power of the state. Two ways of dealing with the flaws of the ancien régime that immediately regard the Jews.

Jews were affected in yet another way. The financial elite was culture-hungry. It was not content with mere wealth and was resentful of the continuous civil disability, popular ill-will and degradation so manifest in the Prussian charter of 1750. It made a fine distinction between the non-protected, the regularly protected and the specially protected Jews; only the last mentioned had unlimited right of residence. Mirabeau qualified it as a law “worthy of cannibals”.

Jews tried to break the fetters indirectly by gaining recognition in the field of art and learning. They eagerly visited the theatres and avidly imbibed contemporary art, science and learning in a way perhaps detrimental to traditional Jewish studies and culture. Jud Süsz, the most well-known victim of absolutist arbitrariness — after sanitizing the Württemberg finances he was hanged to please the populace angry about the new taxes and imposts he introduced — had almost Deist conceptions, and his library contained mostly books of Gentile learning. More or less the same held true for I. da Pinto, the Dutch-Jewish antagonist of Voltaire. The assimilationist tendencies found their clearest expression in the Berlin salons of Henriette Herz, and other cultured Jewish women, belonging to the elite. Lessing, the Humbolds, the young Fichte, Lessing, Dohm and many other representatives of the German Enlightenment frequented them. They met there with the shining light of the Jewish Enlightenment, the autodidact philosophe Moses Mendelssohn, who stood model for Nathan in Lessing’s play Nathan der Weise.

The Berlin intelligentsia drew from these contacts — in a beneficial way ending social distance! — the conclusion quite contrary to that of the populace at large and the conservatives, that emancipation apart from serving the financial interests of the state in Josephinist manner, would foster the rule of law, and would end the “Jewish state within the state”. (Litigation among the Jews themselves was still subject to Jewish law). Mendelssohn very near to
Deism, contrary to the strictly orthodox, also held that emancipation was desirable, and could be achieved without relinquishing the essential values of Judaism, by merely doing away with the “atavisms”. It was a view shared by Lessing, who used the topos of Italian origin, the parable of the three rings, conveying the equality of the three monotheistic religions in a special way: all three rings were false, only Deism being true.

In Mendelssohn’s perception, Jews should speak German instead of Yiddish and should absorb the culture and learning of the hosts. They should therefore become Germans of Jewish persuasion, that he considered to be a variety of the “natural” undogmatic religion the Deists dreamt of. What was revealed was Jewish law, he argued, not the religion. His interpretation was so much in accordance with the norms of the Enlightenment that he was challenged by the Swiss theologian Lavater, to publicly defend his reasons to stay within an (adapted) Judaism or in general that of the Haskalah, Jewish Enlightenment.30

It may be true that in the end the Mendelssohn program from the point of view of Jewish orthodoxy had undesirable consequences, resulting as it did in a gliding scale of loss of Jewish religiosity and identity, ranging from the assimilationism of the “Reform Judenthum”, to the apostasy of baptism, atheism or agnosticism, but it gave Jewish talent the entrance to secular learning, to art and literature, and to many more openings in the economy than was traditionally the case, even before formal emancipation ended all disabilities.

The price was high, however, for to many Gentiles, the emancipation of the Jews implied widely opening the gates for exploiting Jewish financiers, protected by the state, and for money-lenders, or in other words it implied the emancipation of thieving capitalism, as no less a person as Karl Marx also contended. In his far-from-lucid essay “Zur Judenfrage” on emancipation, he stated that with the oncoming of bourgeois society, and the victory of the power of money, Jews have in fact emancipated themselves, by turning Christians into Jews. The true emancipation of the Jew in his view can only be achieved when society is emancipated from Jewishness, that is, economic egoism, and unlimited desire for gain.31

By equating emancipation of Jews, with exploitation of the poor, social protest against modern ways of production and distribution, resulted in a novel articulation of anti-Jewish resentment, mostly among farmers and artisans, who had so to say a vested interest in bygone social structures, and who had nothing to expect from international solidarity as the new classes of factory workers could hope.

Emancipation also led to a loss of Jewish identity. Quite symbolically: all
Moses Mendelssohn’s grandchildren were baptized, as were Heine, Börne, Marx and a host of others. Jewish auto-emancipation also resulted in the emergence of what Isaac Deutscher called the “non-Jewish Jew”, the descendant of devout Jews, who relinquished all religious observance, was often politically a radical, or socialist, but who lovingly preserved Jewish customs and folklore. He is the pet enemy of later, mostly racist anti-Semites. He is feared the most, because “invisible”, not recognizable as Jew, he is less easily controlled and can moreover stealthily penetrate into a gentile “in-group” when that is not sufficiently alert. This was grist to the mill of nascent racism. When the Jew is no longer definable by religion, the pseudo-definition of race is used in order to set him apart. Baptism no longer provides an escape from social pressure. Marx, Heine, Börne and so forth continued to be regarded as Jews. Despite his baptism Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy was attacked by Wagner as Jew in his notorious “Das Judenthüm in der Musik”.

It could be ventured that the German Enlightenment, particularly in Prussia was so incisive, because the problems were more acute. There were more court-Jews than anywhere else, because at the time there was no bourgeoisie, willing and capable to take economic risks, as in the Atlantic states. But precisely because a nascent bourgeoisie in this way sought to make its mark, – Jewish emancipation coincided with emancipation of the bourgeoisie – the repercussions were presumably more vehement. Eugen Dühring in attacking Lessing’s advocacy of the Jews laid the foundation for his own racialism.

The German situation both in its positive and negative aspects in short was somewhat exceptional. In Great Britain, Jews by much greater freedom and by being respected as free merchants, were not in the same position of urgency as the German Jews, even though as is obvious from eighteenth-century caricatures, and the failure of Pelham’s Jewish Naturalization Act of 1753, which would have given Jews about the position of Christian dissenters (Though accepted by both houses, popular protest torpedoed it) there was still widespread popular anti-Jewish sentiment.

In France, even that was presumably not the case outside Alsace-Lorraine, even though there may have been memories of the Middle Ages. It makes the vehement anti-Semitic attacks of French Enlightenment all the more enigmatic. After the final expulsion from the French kingdom of the late fourteenth century only three groups of Jews had reentered in the course of the subsequent three centuries (The Jews of Papal Avignon not considered, even though they often tried to settle in France). There were the Sephardic Jews of the Bayonne and Bordeaux areas, descendants of Marrano fugitives from Spain, there were the Ashkenasic Jews of Alsace-Lorraine and a handful of
both Sephardim and Ashkenasim in Paris. The expulsion laws did not apply to the Jews of Alsace-Lorraine, former Imperial territory, conquered in the course of the wars with Habsburg; there Jews lived de facto under the local German law. Though indispensable for provisioning the army, particularly horses, in this border area of almost constant warfare they were on the whole desperately poor. They spoke Yiddish or the local German dialect and were primarily small money-lenders, hated as such, who stood wholly outside the mainstream of Paris based French culture, with the possible exception of some Metz-Jews.

The same holds true for the closely knit communities of the Sephardic Jews, even though some were prosperous merchants trading with the French overseas territories, Bordeaux being the main port for that commerce. In fact the Dutch Jew Isaac da Pinto, when he temporarily sojourned in Paris, was about the only Jew who participated in the French Enlightenment movement. He was in fact a virtually Deist philosophe though primarily known as an economist. In the former quality he was the defender of – only Sephardic! – Jews against Voltairean attack.

So in France, though Jews could not be conceived of as tools of absolutism as in some German countries, there was no stigma-corrective interaction of the élites as in these countries either. Newly ventilated enlightened objections to Jews could be imbibed undilutedly, whether or not mixed with traditional incriminations of Alsatian origin, or stemming from old memories.

Apart from possible but unlikely charges originating in Physiocratism, novel attacks are likely to have been generated by the new attacks on established religion, mostly of a Deist, or Deist-like or even atheistic nature, in which Judaism was conceived of as the seedbed of everything that was held wrong with Christianity. It is worth our while to investigate these religious changes.

In the course of the seventeenth century the wars of religion ended in a stalemate, no clear winner. War weariness not only resulted in gradually increasing overall laicization, as possible outcome of former “polítique” attitudes, but also in admittedly small, but vociferous groups, who with John Locke held that the state had no right to interfere in religious life, somebody’s persuasion being a private matter. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 was perhaps the last act of war, more political than religious in character.

Resultant concepts of tolerance, also voiced by Locke, resulted often in a mood of opposition to any form of dogmatism, as the main source of the internecine conflict. It led to a quest for undogmatic forms of “natural” religion, “modernism”, based on reason, and discarding irrationalism and the
belief in miracles. This quest can be subsumed under the name “Deism”, a
variegated phenomenon, which, however, was much more than the cliché of
belief in “God the watchmaker”, because it had far-reaching ethical implica-
tions.38 Such changes in religiosity are likely to have had profound repercus-
sions on the religiously determined conceptualization of Jews and Judaism.
As in the case of the Physiocrats these could be positive or negative. They
would be positive when Judaism was conceived of as a “natural” way of wor-
shipping the Creator, in Mendelssohnian fashion, that is, as a reasonable way
to articulate the craving mankind has for the majesty of the divine, with over-
all valid ethics based on natural law. In so far as it did not meet these require-
ments, the deviation could be written off as persecution engendered atavism,
impeding its true development.

By means of a not so very dissimilar argumentation, only with different
emphasis, Judaism could also be considered as a with Talmudism hopelessly
hairsplitting, maximally credulous religion, and worse, as the seedbed of
Christian obscurantism, intolerant dogmatism, and irrationality.

Deism originated in England, but its effects on the conceptualization of
Jews both positive and negative was presumably greater on the continent, be-
cause of easier conditions in Great Britain. The first and perhaps the most
radical Deist was John Toland, 1670-1722, a former Irish Roman Catholic,
converted to Anglicanism, where he did not feel happy either. Consequently
he began his search for a simplified, “natural”, reasonable and undogmatic
form of Christianity. The book Christianity not Mysterious was the result of
his reflections. In this book he wrote that all the elements of credulity, all the
contradictions, belief in miracles, in short all the irrationalities, were due to
the fact that original Christianity had been tampered with by converted Jews,
metaphysicians and superstitious former pagans.39 He deservedly has the
reputation of having been a friend of the Jews, largely on account of the book
Reasons for Naturalising the Jews in Great Britain of 1715, ascribed to him.

Here it was argued that Judaism in essence answered to the criteria for a
natural, reasonable religion, and that Great Britain economically stood to
gain from naturalization.40 This reminds one of the emancipatory measures
of Emperor Joseph II in Austria, though conditions were very different, Jews
in Great Britain enjoying much more freedom than their Austrian co-religi-
onists. Both situations show the radically changed socioeconomic position
of Jews, heralding the full emancipation, and its repercussions. In that sense
they are indicative of a changing mood.

Right from the start Deism showed a certain ambivalence more pro-
nounced in later adherents. An interesting example among many is the Ger-
man theologian Reimarus, who despairing of all the contradictions in Christianity finally opted for a Deist position. One of his doubts concerned the question why God had chosen the Jews, when according to their own records they were so wicked and stubborn. Lessing who knew the works of Reimarus, under his influence adopted a Deist stand, without, however, sharing his anti-Jewish bias. Many others, however, did share it, the alleged violence and wickedness of (only the ancient) Jews being an ever recurring theme.

In most pronounced form the negative aspect of the Deist ambivalence was expressed by Voltaire, the positive by Lessing, even though even he made one of the actors say to the Jew Nathan: “Du bist ein Christ, ein besserer Christ war nie.” Was that his own view, Christianity as norm, or was it inspired by the logic of the situation. The astonishment of a noble Christian character in the play, about the unexpected nobleness of a Jew.

A lot has been written on the Jew-hatred of Voltaire. Was it due to the psychological structure of his personality, an irascible temperament, also manifest in the vehemence of his *Ecrasez l’infame*, with which he Cato-like ended all his letters? In his case too, hatred of the obscurantism of the Church may have implied his aversion towards the Jews. Perhaps the fact that he had two rather unpleasant financial deals with Jews played a role. Perhaps it was the stage Jew he saw performed in England, or things he heard while in Prussia.

However this may be, whatever the motive, it does not make his position automatically portentous. Despite all his rationalism he may have cherished a rather common, “instinctive” dislike of Jews; “Ils me gênent”, as it was later often phrased.

What could make his position portentous, so to say anticipating future laicization and anticlericalism is the anti-Christian setting of the articulation of his Jew-hatred, an intellectual representation of a dual emotion.

He condemns Jews – ancient as well as contemporary – for committing or imagining all the horrors, deceits, treasons, human sacrifices described with such candidness in the Old Testament, but is utterly silent about the lofty visions of prophets, psalms, or Ecclesiastes. Did he condemn the much-admired Greeks for committing or imagining the deeds of Medea, Tantalus, Clytemnestra, for the sacrifice of Iphigenia, and so forth, described with equal candidness by the great poets and tragedians? Did he condemn the Romans for founding their in his eyes admirable society on the murder of Remus and the rape of the Sabinian virgins? No, he exclusively condemns the evil in the Jewish tradition, because they allegedly were the “Chosen People”, and as such the seedbed of the Christianity he detested. The self-styled leader of later French anti-Semitism, Edouard Drumont, for once seems to be right,
when he wrote that Voltaire hated the Old Testament, because he had such troubles with the New.\textsuperscript{42} By shooting his arrows at the Jewish legacy, he was true to his Ecrasez l’Infâme.

The argument that they have crucified Christ, – the hard kernel of the traditional rejection – means very little to him. “Si du temps de Tibère quelques pharisiens, en qualité de \textit{race de vipères} (my italics) se rendirent coupables d’une crime inexprimable, dont ils ne connaissaient pas les conséquences, nesciunt quid faciant, je ne dois point vous haïre, je dois dire seulement felix culpa.” (The usage of this time-honored expression of the Church, to indicate that from Jewish guilt emanated salvation is noteworthy though). He attacked time-honored religious concepts when he wrote: “ils furent donc avec raison traités comme une nation opposée en tout aux autres; (c.f. Tacitus earlier in this book) les servant par avarice, les détestant par fanatisme, se tenant de l’usure un devoir sacré. Et ce sont nos pères!” or “C’est la le peuple Saint! Certes les Hurons, les Canadiens, les Iroquois ont été des philosophes pleins d’humanité, comparés aux enfants d’Israel,” or “prenez que tout cela est un type, une figure qui annonce Jésus Christ.” He continued: “la loi juive est la seule dans l’univers qui ait ordonné d’immoler les hommes,” and ended, “Enfin vous ne trouverez en eux qu’un peuple ignorant et barbare, qui joint depuis longtemps la plus invincible haine pour tous les peuples, qui les tolèrent et qui les enrichissent. Il ne faut pourtant pas les brûler.”

This select anthology from, among others, the \textit{Dictionnaire philosophique} presumably contains the essence of Voltaire’s views on the Jews. Though some charges like the “immoler” ("human sacrifice"), may have come from ancient pagan sources, like Apion or Celsus, as well as the charges of misanthropy, the references to avarice, usury, exploitation, are indicative of a more recent source of inspiration, since as indicated above such charges were completely lacking in the by him much admired Ancient literature. His views are clearly not a mere revival of pagan concepts as has been contended.

Voltaire’s views were moreover not mere idiosyncrasies, as in less vehement form they were shared by Diderot, d’Alembert, d’Holbach,\textsuperscript{43} among others, but that does not make them necessarily into contributions to the articulation of the ideology of a mass movement, in an age when the overwhelming majority of the population still belonged formally, if not really, to some form of Christian persuasion. Although this did not necessarily imply that they revered the Old Testament, the way the Church wanted them to do – the vast majority of the still largely illiterate population had probably next to no idea what the Old Testament was about – they presumably respected the Church – not necessarily individual Churchmen – and were not prepared to
see it identified with evil Jews, even though remnants of earlier Chiliastic beliefs, condemning both the Church and the Jews may have lingered on; these anyhow differed from the later, racial, anti-Christian articulation.

Penetration of the somewhat elitist ideas into the popular mind, into the masses, is therefore not so easily explained, for they were not institutionalized the way the stigma of some 900 years ago was. It was not like then a question of the rejection being accepted, because no longer corrected by daily interaction. There was no real reason, as long as some form of religious sentiment prevailed why the populace should re-articulate its dislike of the Jews in other terms than those time-honored of the tradition: God-forsaken plundering, cheating and murderous Deicides, inspired by a colossal hatred for Christendom, and as such “fifth-column” agents for all its enemies; a view still embedded in, however noncanonical, religiosity.

Acceptance of derivate, among which should be reckoned the later racist views, of the Voltairean view or kindred ideas therefore seems only explicable by changes in or loss of that religiosity. A beginning popular de-Christianization or laicization would thus be a necessary condition for making notions derived from *Ecrasez l’infâme*, denuded of their literary connotations comprehensible, or at least imaginable, whereby that de-Christianization is perforce an independent variable.

One source of popular laicization, or even loss of religiosity could have been the Constitution Civile du Clergé and the conflicts over the sworn and unsworn priests it engendered, the counter-revolt of the “reactionary” Vendée and the radicalism of the Herbertists and their “Cult of Reason” – G. Tridon called himself a Herbertist – and more in particular the *sans culotte* readership of the paper “Le Père Duchesnes”, voicing their anti-Semitic? — social protest. To what extent was there literacy among these Paris poor, however? Antireligious indoctrination could be effective despite the fact that often women – why women more than men? – who had participated with their husbands in revolutionary actions, who showed revolutionary fervor, would literally whip unsworn priest from their hiding places and force them to say Mass. They apparently could not do without its magic, but that would wear thin in the long run.

This is not the place to discuss at length the reasons why in the course of the nineteenth century not only bourgeois liberals, but also working-class people and impoverished craftsmen turned their backs on established religion. The conflict between science and religion is not likely to have motivated the masses.

The post-revolutionary period everywhere, but at first particularly in
France enhanced the growth of a lay spirit. The July Monarchy was a period of rapid industrialization and the time that the bourgeoisie had its finest hour, as-yet unimpeded by working-class or artisan protest, unprotected as these were because guilds or trade-unions were forbidden by the “loi le Chapelier”, or by rules such as the “Combination Acts” as in England. The Churches would at best provide comfort, but little practical help. Many may have felt as it was later phrased by Louise Michel, that “charity was a lie”.

People working in the new industries, increasingly mechanized, were more estranged from nature than groups exposed to and dependent of the vicissitudes of climate, like peasants, fishermen, vegetable-growers and the like, and were consequently sooner inclined to relinquish the “magical” aspect of religion than the latter, and therefore more open to antireligious attack. They had to rely on self-help, the more so when they felt that Churches teaching obedience were on the side of the ruling classes. They were consequently more prone to formulate their resentment in irreligious or anti-religious terms, than the other groups mentioned, perhaps already with notions of religion being a soporific.

The early nineteenth century was also the period when Jewish international banking, particularly the Rothschilds came fully to the fore. In fact limitations on Jewish commercial and financial activities of Napoleon’s “Décret Infame”, severely limiting Jewish freedom of action again — being rescinded during the July monarchy it seems in fact justified to say that the full emancipation in France took place during the reign of Louis Philippe. It thus seemed a question of putting two and two together, by stating with the young Marx, that emancipation of the Jews was identical to the emancipation of capital.

In those circles of “utopian” socialists and early anarchists that in the above-described manner had undergone or actively supported a certain degree of de-Christianisation religious impediments to accept a racial interpretation of the Jew’s “haute finance” as they saw it diminished. Those groups who stayed within religious convictions presumably accepted a more traditional interpretation of the Jew’s behavior, thus giving shape to the above-described dichotomy in a “racial” or a “Talmudic” interpretation. A clear example of that would be in Germany. Otto Glagau, who attacked Jewish finance and the stock exchange, from an in those days already somewhat anomalous pure guild ideology. He bewailed the disappearance of the guilds and blamed the “Jew-liberals” for it, without explicitly mentioning the “loi le Chapelier”. A linking up of social protest and de-Christianisation was very pronounced indeed. Michelet is a clear example, even though it is by no means
sure that he has to be considered a full-fledged anti-Semite, confessing that with pain, for he loved Jews, he wrote on the Jews in his “Bible de l’Humanité.” There he described Jews as belonging to the peoples of the darkness. He was anti-Christian in the Voltairean sense, in particular objecting to any form of predestination, as utterly unjust. He preferred the God of Justice of the Revolution: “Que signifie l’Être suprême? Est-ce le Dieu du Moyen Age, l’injuste Dieu qui sauve les élus, ceux qu’il aime et qu’il préfère, les favoris de la Grâce. Ou bien le Dieu de justice, le Dieu de la Révolution?” He did express the notion of the Jew as the “natural” exploiter in a phrase often quoted by anti-Semites:

Au Moyen-Âge, celui qui sait où est l’or, le véritable alchimiste, le vrai sorcier, c’est le juif; ou le demi-juif, le Lombard. Le juif, l’homme immonde, l’homme qui ne peut toucher denrée ni femme, qu’on ne la brûle, l’homme d’outrage, sur lequel tout le monde cache, c’est à lui qu’il faut s’adresser. … Pendant tout le Moyen Âge, persécutés, chassés, rappelés, ils ont fait l’indispensable intermédiaire entre le fisc et la victime du fisc. … Mais il leur en restait toujours quelque chose… affranchis par la lettre de change, ils sont maîtres, de soufflets en soufflets, les voilà en trône du monde.

Michelet was a half-hearted racialist, and yet the birth of racism had a lot to do with laicization, de-Christianization, and “Voltairean” skepticism.

A shattering experience both by creating doubt about fundamental Christian truth, and as necessary condition for a racist interpretation, was the confrontation during the age of discoveries and vast European expansion, with many hitherto unknown cultures, and with a great many people culturally and above all somatically very different. Sailors, colonizers, and their relatives were perturbed, so that it was not only scientific and intellectual circles, anyhow on the basis of their Deism often inclined to doubt the literal truth of some biblical stories, who began to wonder, whether in fact all men were descended from one and the same forefather, Adam. This question became more urgent when it turned out that somatic variations were not simply attributable to climatic differences. Black people in Europe bore black children!

The idea emerged that there were “pre-Adamites” and also that instead of descendence from one forefather, egalitarian monogenesis, there was polygenesis, pluriform descendence. This notion reversely was eminently suited to
throw doubt on biblical authority and was a weighty argument in the desire to *Ecrasez l’Infâme*. Voltaire on these grounds, rather than for biological reasons, which anyhow were somewhat beyond his sphere of interests, was a convinced polygenist, holding with many others, that Africans, and particularly the aborigines of South Africa, (the Khoi people, abusively nicknamed Hottentots by their Dutch masters and exploiters, who informed Europe about their inferiority) were crosses between men and the recently discovered apes, only half-humans.¹

The story of Genesis and by implication the creation in the image of God, and the from that derived concept of Man as the master of all creation — *Genesis* 1, 26 — 29 — was thrown into doubt. In Linnaean fashion man became a species among the species, a mammal among the mammals, which like all other species had subspecies. Some — Deist or not — attackers of traditional Christianity, on these grounds minimizing the elevated position of man, were only too willing to concede that some subspecies were more *sapiens* than others. This was the genesis of racial theory at first elaborated by people reared in the new skepticism. It could very well be that on these as well as economic grounds, the very Assemblée that emancipated the Jews in 1791, still considering them *sapientes* (but that would change), was unfaithful to its own Declaration of the Rights of Man, refusing to manumit the black slaves in the French colonies, however much Grégoire propagated the idea.² These were held to be inferior people, beaten in war, and as such by Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy condemned to serve the master race. Segregation in a somewhat selective Christian interpretation was also defended by invoking *Genesis* 1x 25-27.

Soon the new racist views were applied to Jews. Added to the pseudo-biology was the linguistic confusion, that together contributed so much to devise racial theory, and particularly racial anti-Semitism, up to the days of National Socialism.

When linguists by means of comparative studies discovered affinities and similarities of the various languages, they began to systematize their findings by constructing families of languages. These views were taken over by polygenic racialists arguing that if groups of people spoke languages so closely akin, they must have had common descent and were therefore biologically akin. Despite the warnings of the Oxford linguist Max Müller, who in his youth had dabbled in such theories, but who when mature wrote that it was as nonsensical to speak about an Aryan or Semitic race, as about a dolichocephalic dictionary, or a brachycephalic grammar, such views gained credit.³

One of the first to adopt them, and who contributed much to their popu-
lar acceptance was Ernest Renan. As unfrocked priest, in the tradition of Voltaire, he sneered at the apostle Paul: “O, chaste and lovely images of the true gods and goddesses, this ugly little Jew has stigmatized you with the name of idols.” His linguistic, racist inclination is obvious from the proud sentence: “Je suis donc le premier à reconnaître que la race Sémite, comparée à la race Indo-européenne représente réellement une combinaison inférieure de la nature humaine.” Although such a sentence could easily be, and often was, interpreted as staunchly anti-Semitic, the odd truth is that Renan as an early champion of linguistic racism, was not anti-Semitic. He saw Jews as exceptions and Arabs as the true representatives of the “Semitic race.” Much the same holds true for other exponents of nascent racialism, like Michelet, or even Gobineau.

Nevertheless what they all share, and which is indeed portentous, is that “Voltairean”, anti-Christian, or at least Christian orthodoxy doubting attitude, combined to a new anthropology, biological as well as linguistic, which is very much at odds with basic attitudes of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

It is portentous in the sense that this unification of pseudo-biology and pseudo-linguistics combined to an existing anti-Jewish social protest of medieval origin, against bourgeois capitalist society during and after the emancipation gave anti-Semitism a new lease of life by the aforementioned racist “Bedouin” interpretation of capitalism, Jewish mentality being shaped in the desert as also the famous economist Werner Sombart maintained. These new conceptualizations made the ideology in fact far more dangerous than it had ever been, in the end even aiming at the most horrendous final solution.

The new anti-Christian or un-Christian racist attitude related to Enlightened skepticism, removed the only reticence prevailing Jew-hatred up to then had known, to wit the idea that God awaits the conversion of His people, so that therefore Jews should not be killed, and that baptism takes away all the alleged blemish. A racially determined blemish cannot be removed by baptism, racists will maintain.

Moreover Jews after the emancipation were no longer protected by that phenomenal mutual solidarity that also had characterized and brightened somewhat the dismal ghetto life. As the psychologist Lewin remarked before the emancipation the social pressure was born collectively, and thereafter individually. Mutual help was also undermined by the to auto-emancipation related gliding scale of loss of religiosity, which implied a growing loss of collective sense of identity.

Finally, emancipation, purely juridical, only removing civil disabilities, did very little to change the social position of the Jews and the resentment
that created. They continued to be primarily engaged in commercial occupations, and neither in agriculture nor in industry. A change-over was not facilitated. In Vienna a Jewish trade school met with strong opposition because Gentile craftsmen feared the competition.\textsuperscript{58}

Only in eastern Europe Jews were often engaged in crafts and even in agriculture, and after emigration of Russian and Polish Jews into the U.S. In the Netherlands and later in Antwerp, Jews were frequently engaged in the diamond trade, both as employers and workers. Amsterdam in the seventeenth century became the staple market for (then mostly Brazilian) diamonds. Since there were no guild regulations for the diamond trade, cutting, or polishing, Jews could freely enter. The same held true for the tobacco trade and later cigarmaking. (Jews actually participated in the tobacco growing.) Since Dutch merchants trading with the Middle East exported Hebrew texts to Smyrna and the Middle East, Amsterdam Jews became prominent in the printing trades. Later active in the respective trade unions Jews played a significant role in the general trade union organization.\textsuperscript{59} It could be surmised that as in Greece Jews playing so conspicuous a role in the labor movement in these countries.

Apart from these rare exceptions Jews continued to be negatively described as \textit{Schacherer}, traffickers, who because of the emancipation had allegedly more scope for their evil practices. There was one possible escape that emancipation also offered, art, literature, journalism and science, but it was not a reliable escape. A certain prominence in journalism soon resulted in the accusation, that a venal “Jewish” press manipulated the news to the advantage of Jewish commercial interests, and served the bull and bear campaigns at the stock exchange with unreliable information. Jewish art and literature were described by the \textit{Völkisch} press as mere tinsel, that only in the stone desert of the great metropolises where the Jew felt at home, had some effect. The true art, however, as they wrote, came from Bayreuth and small towns or rural areas.

Science seemed to provide some real escape from disparagement. Medical science of old had been an escape. Jewish physicians to the popes and cardinals did not have to wear the Jew badge. Jews taught at the medical school of Salerno, on equal terms with Christian and Muslim teachers; a unique isle of tolerance in an intolerant world. Natural science was an escape. The young Jewish intellectual according to the afore mentioned essay by Th. Veblen, no longer quite at home in the one world, not quite knowing the taboos and mores of the other, can best maintain himself with sceptics. “He is a skeptic by force of circumstances over which he has no control.”\textsuperscript{60} In natural sciences, where skepticism is systematized, he can be prominent.
In relation to Jewish excellence in physical sciences one could also think about Zilsel’s\footnote{61} famous thesis, about experimental science being spawned by a conflict between rationalism and voluntarism. Rationalism is then the worldview wherein everything in reality happens the way it happens because it cannot happen in another way, ruled as the whole universe is by immanent reason, a Nous. Voluntarism is the concept of the creation of the Universe by a Will, outside that universe, that, however, can at all times interfere in that reality. In the latter concept is the explanation of the universe no longer reserved for deductive logic, because on voluntaristic grounds the truth of deductive logic may be doubted, and can only be tested by experiments. Judaism had probably an even stronger voluntaristic conceptualization of total reality manifest in its linear concept of time than the Christians of the early scientific revolution, but Jews to a large extent owing their entry to the Culture of the Gentile world to the rationalism of the Enlightenment, were therefore according to Zilsel’s thesis exceptionally qualified for a leading role in experimental sciences.

Jewish skepticism inherent in a scientific attitude would soon be considered to be zersetzend, undermining generally accepted truths, and the results of the work would be denounced as Judenphysik. Anti-Semites cannot bear skepticism!

And yet according to the hypothesis formulated above it was Enlightened skepticism that created the conditions for a new racist articulation of Jew-hatred. Popular doubting of Christian truths need not have been the result of popular skepticism, but was rather the result of changing social conditions.

On the basis of the presumed ideological innovations analyzed above it is possible to make certain prognoses about further developments. The pseudo-linguistic aspect of the novel racist theories is likely to have the strongest appeal in areas where what Lewis Namier called linguistic nationalism (as opposed to territorial nationalism) prevailed.\footnote{62} That is to say in areas where soon after the Napoleonic period reforms resulted in virtually general primary education. The teaching of reading and writing in the vernacular, and the teaching of history created in hitherto isolated communities the awareness that they belonged to the much greater units of what under influence of the French Revolution and the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars began to be considered as nations. Wherever this growing awareness, this new sense of belonging expressed in the newly discovered common language was at odds with the prevailing political system, the language aspect of growing national consciousness was used to express the desire for some degree of autonomy. In what thus became a multi-national Empire the Habsburg territory, hither-
to united by dynastic interests, the new nationalisms, German, Czech, Polish, Hungarian, Slovak, Italian, and so forth became disruptive forces, at odds with a state-nationalism loyal to the dynasty, and warring against each other. In Germany the growing awareness of being German implied paying less allegiance to being Bavarians, Hessians, Württemberger, Prussians and so on, and this made the prevailing system of “Kleinstaterei” politically unacceptable. In France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, among others, where nation and state largely coincided, where there was thus less reason to pay extreme allegiance to the language group, which was unproblematic, territorial nationalism prevailed, with different loyalties.

Nationalist feelings were not only ways of expressing allegiance and loyalty, however, but also provided a sense of belonging in periods of stress, compensation for individual weakness.

When due to the piercing of the traditional demographic ceiling, due to better agricultural techniques, the population began to grow fast, internal migration took place, more and more people moving into towns where they felt alienated. Between 1830-1880 percentages of rural and urban population in Germany were reversed. Feeling disoriented in the new surroundings, weak and vulnerable, the newcomers could derive some comfort from the compensating awareness, that they were members of the strong and powerful nation. The same held true for the vicissitudes of economic life. Farmers and artisans, in distress, the former by declining prices, the latter by loss of customers and by increasing industrial competition indebted, blamed the creditors, believed to be the usurious Jewish outsider, not a member of the nation, but an alien Bedouin. Linguistic nationalism proved an excellent implement for articulating, with the aid of linguistic racism a Jew-hatred that could use all the elements of the tradition, though in variegated manner marginalizing the old theological issues, sometimes partly preserving them, sometimes in the anti-Christian origin of the racist theory abolishing them entirely.

It therefore seems justified to assume that a racist un- or anti-Christian articulation prevailed in areas of linguistic nationalism, as seems illustrated by the great number of racist, Völkisch writers in the German language area. Linguistic racism, though in fact initiated in France, and propagated by some utopian socialists, never struck root in France as it did in the German-speaking area, presumably for the very reason, that French territorial nationalism, rooted in “La terre et les morts” as Barrès phrased it, was of revolutionary origin, the third estate grown political derived some of its strength from resentment of the loss of “French soil”, from chagrin about the lost war of 1870. Lan-
language was no problem, for at least in theory he who spoke French (with the exception of the French-Swiss and the Walloons) was a Frenchman, he who was a Frenchman, spoke French; they were citizens. Anti-Semitism, in so far as it was not religiously inspired, could thrive on socioeconomic protest, and on financial scandals, like the Crédit Mobilier, the bankruptcy of the Union Générale, and “Panama” and the “treason” of A. Dreyfus.

The end of the Dreyfus Affaire also implied that French anti-Semitism has spent its forces. Though it returned somewhat under Vichy, it was no longer a political force of great significance.

In the U.K., for reasons comparable to those in France, there never was linguistic nationalism, and hence no linguistic racism to speak of. Jews in England ever since the seventeenth century enjoying more freedom than in most other European countries, were never formally emancipated. Civil Disabilities, in so far as they existed were removed one by one, the last step being the admittance of L. Rothschild to the House of Commons in 1859.63

The industrial revolution took place without commercially engaged Jews playing a significant role in it. The idea that Jews were responsible for the pains it caused was not likely, so the idea that emancipation of the Jews was identical to emancipation of capitalism did probably not strongly take root.

The U.K. could because of her overseas markets and her industrial lead, so to say afford to neglect her agriculture somewhat. Moreover since most arable land was rented, the farmers did not have to pay mortgages rent, disastrous in times of falling prices. Their income was affected not their property as in the case of many colleagues on the continent.

The story of the by means of mortgages expropriating Jews was there not in the least credible. The U.K. lacked therefore the agrarian anti-Semitic social protest of Austria and Germany. In fact the only form of anti-Semitic protest of any significance was the anti-alien agitation aimed mostly at Jewish refugees from Poland and Russia, allegedly responsible for driving up the house rents by living with several families in a single-family dwelling, and allegedly responsible for the continuation of sweated labor, willing to work at any price, and not joining the trade-unions. The agitation resulted in the Alien Immigration Act of 1906, supported by Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, who in this way, by promoting a law against the free import of labor, hoped to win over the labor vote for a protectionist legislation. The interesting feature is an anti-Semitic movement, where the rejecting stereotype was the Jewish poverty.64

There was definitely a social anti-Semitism in Great Britain, like in most other countries, refusing Jews’ admittance to golf links, ostracizing them

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from social events, organizing festivities on the Friday evening, but the U.K. was bad soil for a political anti-Semitism of any significance, before Mosely’s fascism. The question could be raised why a combination of all elements of a genealogy of stereotypes into a murderous and destructive ideology could take place in some countries more than in others: why Romania, Germany, Austria, more than Greece, Bulgaria, or Great Britain. None of the elements discussed were particularly German. Linguistic nationalism existed in large parts of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Italy.

Linguistic racism, born in France, Gobineau and Renan, struck roots in many other countries. The medieval usurer-syndrome was with the possible exception of Italy and the southern Balkans, almost universal, as was its gradual transformation into the bogey of capitalist and stock exchange jobber, that motivated the “Utopian” socialists, as well as the young Marx.

The “Voltairean”, anti-Christian teachings of some “philosophes” was not limited to France, for the racist tradition in the German areas, Marx, Dühring, von Schönerer, Chamberlain, was in that sense just as inclined to fight obscurantism and belief in miracles. Opportunists as many anti-Semites have always been, they did not hesitate even though anti-Christian racists, to strike a deal with the believers, who in their turn having relinquished a good deal of the original Christian rejection of Jews and Judaism, and emphasizing the “social question” as caused by the greediness of the “Talmud morality”, were on these grounds quite prepared to make a deal with not too extravagant racists, however anticlerical. Jew-hatred turned out to be an excellent binder for all sorts of controversial concepts, but it was so only under special circumstances. As indicated an anti-Semitic revolution could have taken place in France. It was prevented by the shrewdness of Waldeck Rousseau and the prosecution of notoriously riotous anti-Semites by the “Haute Cour”, the senate, turned into a judiciary body and the end of the “Affaire”.

The special circumstances are decisive. There is no reason to assume that German racist writers were more influential in Germany than French racist writers in France, for the likelihood that all the masses following Hitler, the bulk of the S.A. men, had read one letter of philosophy and foreign languages quoting Chamberlain or Dühring, is as great as the likelihood that the “Villette Butchers” of Marquis de Morès, the anti-Dreyfusard rioters, had read Voltaire, Renan or Gobineau.

National character does not seem to provide an adequate answer. Italians can be as violent as Germans, Bulgarians as violent as Rumanians. Numerous times it has been argued that German history was in large part to blame. Arguments to substantiate this were for example Luther and Lutheranism. Why
did it not have that effect in Scandinavia? Why was Roman-Catholic Austria just as anti-Semitic? Germans are not the only people who have been notoriously unpolitical. Is the German tendency to obey the Obrigkeitstat, indeed so outspoken as often maintained? The Dutch, traditionally not strongly anti-Semitic are not known for rebelliousness. They will only act when strongly provoked, as in case of the “February Strike” of 1941, in protest against persecution of the Jews.

Stereotypes as discussed were indeed the ingredients of National-Socialist ideology, particularly linguistic nationalism, but in all fairness it should be admitted that in free elections, even those of 1933 after the Machtübernahme, Hitler never received much more than one-third of the votes, and a great many Germans did not vote for anti-Semitic reasons, believing that Hitler was able to do something about unemployment and the depression. There was unfortunately small and somewhat incompetent opposition. It should always be remembered, however, that in Berlin alone, 5000 Jews survived the persecution, and the “U- boats” as they were called, must have been helped by a multitude of Gentiles. Moreover it should not be forgotten that in the occupied countries there were a great many collaborators, in anti-Semitic policy. Jews were arrested by policemen who were Dutch, French, Belgian, and so on. Jews were transported to the camps by autochthonous engine drivers.

A lost war, inflation wiping out their savings, and somewhat later mass unemployment made many Germans receptive to the charismatic eloquence of Hitler, when he harped on themes they all knew from experience or hearsay. Hitler was a product of prevailing, Austrian anti-Semitism; he did not create it, he was wholly unoriginal.

Every society has its criminals. A great many German criminals had a field day when their evil inclinations suddenly became “legal”. They terrorized their fellow countrymen into submission or, worse, into the above-analyzed discriminatory attitude.

They all acted on the basis of an ideology developed over a period of two-thousand years, but the development is analyzable. Mere description of part phenomena, however helpful for the reconstruction for the development of ideology, by themselves cannot explain. Given its mass character, and thereby its openness to social science approaches, it is one of those problems, rare in history, that possibly lend themselves to reasonable conjecture and refutation, to a hypothetical-deductive approach.

Antisemitism regrettably is not a thing of the past, but fortunately its past may help to understand it when asked the right questions. The past may seem to be like the god Proteus Homer described. This minor sea god had the gift

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of prophesying, but he was unwilling to use it. So when Odysseus and his mates caught him, he constantly tried to escape by transforming himself into all sorts of slippery animals, meanwhile answering their questions with half-truths. But in the end, held in the correct, firm wrestler’s grip, he gave in and told them the full truth. 69

According to the main premise of this book, the past of racism, when held in the firm grip of hypothetical-deductive reasoning, may perhaps not tell the whole truth, but substantial parts of it, enough to be on one’s guard. It is often said: ‘We do not learn from the past.’ Is that the past’s fault, or ours?
A Historiographical Epilogue

Chris Quispel

This is the first publication of Van Arkel’s book, but it is not a new book. Though he has worked on its central themes until recently, the groundwork for this book was laid in the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Consequently, literature from after around 1980 has not, as a rule, been taken into account.¹ Current discussions among historians of Jewish-gentile relations and the history of anti-Semitism do not find a place in Van Arkel’s book. This raises some fundamental questions. Most importantly, is it always necessary to read the latest books and articles to develop new and original ideas? In the exact sciences, the obvious answer is: “yes, of course”. Any chemist or physicist who has been away from his or her job for a couple of years can attest to the fact that it is extremely difficult to catch up again, let alone start doing new research all over again. But is this also true for the humanities? Would The Drawing of the Mark of Cain have been very much different if Van Arkel had been better aware of more contemporary historical work? For an answer to the question we must first consider what historical claims Van Arkel makes. Next, we provide a brief survey of the recent historical literature with the intention of finding out if there is any possible historical refutation of Van Arkel’s principal views in that literature. Or in the words he would himself prefer, does recent historiography falsify his model?

Van Arkel draws some important conclusions about the history of Jewish-Christian relations which, if proven unfounded, would seriously undermine his ideas. First, there is a difference between pre-Christian animosity between Jews and non-Jews, and the accusations that from the New Testament onward are leveled against the Jews in Christian sources. Second, after the original stage of “secession friction”, Christian-Jewish relations were strained because both religions sought to proselytize among the pagan Roman population. Third, notwithstanding all of this, in early Christian Europe relations between lay people among both Christians and Jews, remained reasonably open until the tenth century. Fourth, at some time around 900, a process of economic specification must have started that cannot be explained by the ef-
fect of the existing theological stereotype. Fifth, although in the later Middle Ages Christians and Jews continued to meet, it was in a more “labeled” way. A thorough search for the validity of these conclusions would clearly fall outside the scope of this introduction and is rather up to the experts in these diverse fields, yet the brief survey of the literature here undertaken may be of help to the reader to gain at least a first impression.

For starters, there is Peter Schäfer’s work on attitudes towards the Jews in antiquity. His conclusions are clear and diametrically opposed to Van Arkel’s. Regarding anti-Semitism, he writes: “...we are the heirs of antiquity”. According to Schäfer, accusations of xenophobia and misanthropy are at the core of anti-Semitism. These can be traced back to the early third century, with roots going back to Egypt and the exodus story. Jews, according to a long list of Greek Hellenic authors, all cited by Schäfer, refused to have contact with other people. They not only refused to share a meal with foreigners (xenophobia), they felt a real hatred towards others (misanthropy). Greek-Jewish political rivalry lay at the root of many of these accusations. Anti-Semitism, Schäfer states, predates Christianity and is to be understood as a Greek response to the political threat of the Jewish communities in the second century BC.²

Other historians agree. For the Greeks, Zvi Yavetz writes, “Jews were in many respects barbarians like all the others, they were in some respects a little more so.”⁴ What made them different was not the fact that they had strange customs, like the dietary laws or circumcision. What set them apart was that they never received the admiration Romans felt for the courage and physical strength they encountered among barbarians during their many wars. But the Jewish fighters who defended the temple in 70 AD and Masada during the Bar Kochba uprising never got that kind of recognition. Neither were Jews praised for erudition or intellectual achievements. After a successful campaign, Roman generals often added the name of the people they conquered to their name, “Germanicus”, “Africanus”, “Dacicus”, but never “Judaicus”.⁵ Taking the name “Judaicus” could have meant endorsement of Jewish customs and religion, something the Romans specifically did not want to do. Hatred of the Jews did not start with the Romans. Like Schäfer, Yavetz finds the origin of anti-Jewish sentiments in ancient Egypt. Here in the third century BC an Egyptian version of the exodus story, in which the Jews were depicted as lepers, was made public. Later, Greeks in the Seleucid Empire felt frustrated by Jewish successes during the uprising of Judas Maccabeus. When the region came under Roman influence, the Greeks used the earlier Egyptian accusations and added new ones to blacken the Jews in the eyes of the Romans.⁶ Among these charges was the story that the Jews kept the head of an ass in
their sanctuary for worship, and the fact that each year they fattened a man to sacrifice him to their God.

Are these arguments sufficient to dismiss Van Arkel’s claims about the abortiveness of anti-Semitic attitudes in pre-Christian antiquity? Schäfer and Yavetz do not base their work on new evidence. Their arguments are part of an ongoing discussion that was started in the late nineteenth century, when anti-Semitic authors were looking for the support of classical authors to prove their anti-Semitic ideas. Nowadays participants in the discussion about anti-Jewish attitudes in antiquity are not of course motivated anymore by anti-Semitism. Their discussions are about definitions, about judeophobia, anti-Semitism, and anti-Judaism, and the subtle differences between them. Evidently non-Christian authors in the Greek and Roman world sometimes felt a great dislike towards Jews, but was it different from dislike of other ethnic groups? And, just as important, Jews, Greeks, and Romans lived in the same society and had plenty of opportunities to get to know each other—were there no positive mutual influences? According to Tessa Rajak, there is no doubt that the Jews in Hellenistic times were very conscious of the differences between themselves and the Greeks, and at the same time they assimilated “many of the other side’s habits of thought and life”. Ernst Baltrusch has drawn a comparable conclusion: “Das Urteilsspektrum in der heidnische, griechisch-römische Literatur über die Juden und das Judentum, bewegt sich zwischen Bewunderung, einer gewissen Duldung, sowie scharfe Ablehnung” (“In the spectrum of judgments about Jews and Jewry found in the pagan, Greek-Roman literature one moves from admiration, via a certain tolerance, to harsh rejection”).

Without underestimating the depth of the hatred that some authors in the Greek and Roman world felt towards the Jews, there are, I think, two important arguments that make this hatred not particularly relevant for Van Arkel’s book.

One concerns the political context. Both Yavetz and Schäfer state explicitly that the Greek accusations were part of a power struggle between Greeks and Jews in the second century bc. Obviously the exodus story refers to such a struggle, and Roman anger against the Jews was stirred by long-lasting wars. This is different from anti-Jewish accusations in the Christian world, where there was no real power struggle and no wars have ever taken place. Church leaders were afraid for a long time of Jewish proselytism, which probably was their main reason to accuse the Jews, even though ever since Constantine this has ceased to be a real threat to Christianity. Christian accusations were all about things that the Jews were supposed to have done, but never did.
Second, pre-Christian accusations fall outside the “genealogy of stereotypes” that Van Arkel has constructed. The accusations are different, there is no mention of usury, desecration of the host, ritual murder, well poisoning, economic manipulations, or other accusations that in later ages would be the cause or pretext for numerous persecutions. In antiquity, when the political conflicts came to an end, the accusations disappeared. At precisely that time Christians began to blame Jews for matters unheard of in the non-Christian world. These accusations were to remain alive up to and including the present day, supplemented in the meantime by numerous others also unknown in antiquity, like the usury accusation. Whereas Jews were accused of many bad things in antiquity, there never was a notion of a devilish Jewish conspiracy to hurt and dominate the rest of the world. This phenomenon, the genealogy of stereotypes, that is central to Van Arkel’s argument, simply did not manifest itself with older anti-Jewish accusations and in a non-Christian situation.

Much has been written in recent years about the position of Jews in the latter centuries of the Roman Empire and especially about the relationship between Jews and Christians once the Roman world became Christian. Most authors stress the fluidity in the relationship between Jews and “others”. There seems to have been a lot of ambiguity, strong denunciations on the one hand, good neighborly relations on the other. In the second century, according to Judith Lieu, the image of the Jew still shifts with author, context, and literary genre. To make matters even more complex, it is highly unlikely that we can speak of one Jewish religion and culture. After the fall of the temple, there was no central authority anymore for the growing number of Jews in the Diaspora and we may expect a rising number of variations within the Jewish religion, each with different relations with other religions. Proselytism, important to Van Arkel to explain the animosity of Church leaders, also gets a nuanced treatment in modern historiography. Though there is general agreement that Jewish proselytizing was not comparable to that of the Christian Church, historians seem to concur that there was at least some kind of Jewish proselytizing. According to Goodman, it is only in the third century that Jews begin to see proselytizing as a religious duty, but there was never unanimity on the subject. No text exists in which Jews are called upon to convert pagans and Christians, but it seems to be certain that many rabbis approved of such behavior.

Benjamin Isaac’s book The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity is of special interest, especially since Van Arkel regards the history of anti-Semitism as part of the history of racism in general. According to Isaac, racism
did already exist in antiquity. Greeks and Romans believed in what Isaac calls “environmental determinism”, which in some cases could lead to a belief in unchangeable characteristics and unshakeable stereotypes that Isaac calls proto-racist. Interestingly, though attitudes towards Jews could be described as “ethnic hatred”, anti-Jewish prejudice cannot be described as proto-racist. Romans did view Jews as “frivolous, lying, treacherous, libidinous and generally morally depraved”, yet according to Isaac they were not, as in later centuries, seen as “clever, greedy and unreliable traders” – a point also prominent in Van Arkel’s book. In Roman times these negative qualifications were only used for Syrians and Phoenicians. Isaac further notices an important difference in the attitude of Romans towards Christians and Jews, at least before the time of Constantine. The religion of the Jews was seen as inherited, Christianity as acquired. That is, the Jewish religion was in Roman eyes part of Jewish identity and culture. It had proper historical roots, unlike Christianity, which had no ethnic background and no historical legitimacy. Taken together, Isaac’s book and the other books and articles here mentioned do not give occasion to regard Van Arkel’s conclusions as refuted.

Can we draw the same conclusions from recent historiography on Jewish life in the early Middle Ages? Our knowledge of this period is very limited and due to lack of sources it will probably stay that way. According to Kenneth Stow, there was more continuity between early and late Medieval royal policies toward the Jews than has been assumed, and is also assumed by Van Arkel. But on the same page he has to admit that we simply know too little about Jewish life in transalpine Europe during this period. Jews in western Europe at this time lived mainly in southern France. This fits in nicely with Van Arkel, for whom the process of Jewish economic specification takes place in that region. Like Van Arkel, the few authors who write about Jewish life and Jewish-Christian relations in the early Middle Ages, notice hostility on the part of the church, invariably instigated by the fear that contacts between Jews and Christians were too close and could lead to conversions. Despite, or maybe because of, this ecclesiastical rejection, Christianity and Jewry were theologically closer than they would be in the later stages of the Middle Ages. Popular hostility toward the Jews cannot be found in the scarce sources that are available.

More sources are available for the later Middle Ages, so it comes as no surprise that a good deal more has been written about this period, much of a rather recent date. How does Van Arkel’s work stand up to this recent literature? There is much to suggest that the Jewish position in European societies began to deteriorate from the twelfth century onward. Religious
changes played an important part. There was a growing emphasis on the humanity and suffering of Christ, inevitably focusing attention on the Jewish guilt of the crucifixion. According to Abalafia, the image of the cross, “the reminder of what Christ had been willing to suffer for the sake of humanity”, became more and more important. Whereas in earlier ages theologians sometimes tended to see Jewish involvement in the crucifixion as accidental, now they became convinced that this was a case of intentional deicide.

Greater importance was assigned to the Holy Trinity, for Jews (and also Muslims) a step back from monotheism, for Christians one more reason to denounce the misguided religion of the Jews. The discovery of the Talmud, unknown to Christians until the thirteenth century, changed the Christian perception of the Jewish religion. Christians never really understood the Talmud, which many of them believed to be a source of anti-Christian elements. To thirteenth-century Christian writers, Talmudic Judaism represented a break with the Judaism of the Old Testament. The Jew of the Talmud was seen as “heretic, deliberate unbeliever, agent of Satan, and an enemy of God, his revelation, and his church”. The Jewish apostate Nicholas Donin presented Pope Gregory with accusations against the Talmud, who reacted with a series of condemnatory bulls, as did Pope Innocent in 1244. Between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries, the Talmud was burned at different occasions under ecclesiastical direction. So far, none of this contradicts Van Arkel. Put in his terms, historians and theologians of later medieval relations between Christians and Jews agree about a growing importance of the anti-Jewish theological stereotype and an increasing emphasis on the guilt of the Jews. Already in 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council declared that Jews and Muslims would have to wear special clothes and badges. Though in the short run this had no important consequences, it still was a telling sign.

Reading this more recent literature however, one is struck by another tendency that seems less easy to reconcile with Van Arkel’s ideas. Most authors explicitly point out that the relationship between Jews and Christians in the later Middle Ages was not as bad as is often presumed. Jews, Haverkamp writes, were not a marginalized group in European society. They had strong organizations and stayed in close contact with Christian society. In many cities religious centers of Jews and Christians were close together. “Encounters between Jews and Christians were frequent enough” Peter Schäfer also points out that Jewish culture was still closely connected to the surrounding Christian culture. In his study on the Jewish community of Rouen in the Middle Ages, Norman Golb concludes that the twelfth century was a time of
great stability and cultural development for the Jews in that city. Speaking of that community he uses words like puissante, prestigieuse, and féconde. Gilbert Dahan concludes that, at the end of the Middle Ages in the fifteenth century, living conditions of the remaining Western European Jews were bleak. However, in earlier centuries he sees “an active Jewish minority, integrated into society, whose life is made up of exchanges with the Christian minority”. True, these authors are not blind to deteriorations in Jewish life that were taking place. New accusations, like ritual murder, were formulated. First heard of in 1144 in Norwich, the belief in ritual murder was strong enough to lead to the killing of the whole Jewish community of Blois in 1171. In the regnum Teutonicum there is, after 1280, a worsening of the Jewish positions that led, among others, to a growing number of pogroms. Jews everywhere became more and more dependent on their rulers, who could treat them however they wished. Already in 1221, Frederick of Hohenstaufen ordered the Jews of Sicily to wear distinct clothes. In the thirteenth century, Jews living at European courts were called Servi camere regie, a term with a somewhat obscure meaning, which, in any case, is unlikely to signal improvement. The growing dependence of the Jewish communities on the authorities can be illustrated by countless examples, and it would become a real problem after the end of the thirteenth century. However, in the perspective of most present-day historians, Jewish life in Europe prior to the late-thirteenth century was not that bad. Persecutions did take place, but were the exception. Jews played an active role in the process of urbanization. They often lived in close contact with Christian neighbors. Many a Christian visited a Jewish doctor, and Jews were well known for their knowledge of the natural world. To cite Haverkamp once more: “The more we find out about Medieval Jewry, the more we are struck by the extent to which Jews were significant players in all facets of life in their host societies”.

We find comparable ideas in R.I. Moore’s The Formation of a Persecuting Society. He discusses the persecution of Jews as part of a larger tendency in European society to persecute outsiders like heretics, lepers, sodomites, and others. This happened against a background of urbanization, demographic growth, economic change, and the first signs of modern state-building. The main culprits are ecclesiastical and worldly leaders. Stereotyping of Jews and others was a “top-down” process. Leaders and their literate co-workers deliberately created negative images of out-groups which in the end led to ostracism, segregation, and persecution. In the case of the Jews, Moore grants that every now and then the process may have been the other way around, so that “the passing of stories and stereotypes, up to the literates or down from
them, socially speaking, were mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive processes”.35 According to Moore the literates’ distaste of the Jews was motivated by a competition for cultural prestige and hegemony which was prompted in its turn by the circumstance that Jews were generally better educated, more cultivated, and more skillful than their Christian counterparts.36 In the meantime, worldly rulers subjected the Jews to a kind of servitude in which Jewish property was seen as something that could be used by the king at will. Though this process could be regarded as harmful to the Jewish communities, Moore does not always seem to think so. Jewish life in the twelfth century is described by him as peaceful without any widespread hostility.37

Although, of course, authors writing in this vein cannot have been aware of it, their judgments to this effect look at first sight like a strong indictment of important portions of Van Arkel’s model. In Van Arkel’s analysis, the condition of the Jews not only grew worse, but even became almost irreversible, with open contacts between Jews and non-Jews becoming more and more difficult. This is in contrast to the much more optimistic view of recent historians, who see a far more open situation in which open contacts were not only possible but did actually happen. The definitive answer can only be given by historians with a much better knowledge of medieval Jewish history and its sources than this author, yet a few remarks can be made even so. The optimism of present-day authors seems to be based mainly on two arguments. One is that Jews and Christians must have lived closely together and therefore must have met on a regular basis. The other is the fact that individual Jews could be important and well-known figures in finance, trade, and medicine, with rabbis still in a position to debate with Christian theologians. However, neither of these points is in dispute – many examples figure not only in these more recent books, but in Van Arkel’s as well.38 The difference is rather that, unlike Van Arkel, most of these authors are insufficiently aware of the underlying changes in Jewish occupational positions that took place during this period. Müller at least acknowledges that from the twelfth century onward Jewish artisans became more and more limited in their economic possibilities through the rise of the Christian guild system.39 Most authors are much more interested in theological disputes and the position of rich Jews at the royal courts. Or, as with Haverkamp, they give a long list of Jewish occupations without taking into account the fact that most of the Jews active in these occupations served only the Jewish community.40 Moore actually does provide several arguments that really point to a deterioration of Jewish positions in the twelfth century, while still insisting that Jews flourished as never before.41
What is missing here is not only the process of economic specification, but also the process of labeled interaction that Van Arkel connects to it. This is, of course, not meant as a reproach to these authors, who could have been aware of Van Arkel’s work only if they had stumbled upon his 1985 article mentioned in the preface. The point is rather that the concept of labeled interaction may well lead to important new insights in the relationship between social and economic contacts on the one hand, and the growth and decline of prejudices on the other. It is perfectly feasible to imagine a twelfth-century European society in which Jews and Christians lived together, worked together and even talked together, while at the same time mutual stereotypes were reinforced. Actually this is suggested by John Van Engen, too. Before the twelfth century, so he has argued, contacts between Jews and Christians were characterized by a combination of intimacy and distance. Later tensions arose due to this paradoxical combination. Ironically, according to Van Engen, it might have been the fact that they were forced to live more closely together, that led to higher levels of vituperation and violence. He observes that in medieval cities different people, rich and poor, master and servant, lived close together. Yet they lived in different worlds. In the same vein, Jews and Christians could still be living near each other while at the same time growing more distant.

In part this discussion is, of course, a matter of chronology. Few historians will dispute that after 1300 Jewish positions in Europe worsened quickly. But one cannot simply say, “Oh well, so Van Arkel is right, only a little bit later than he originally thought.” After all, the centuries between 1100 and 1300 saw the addition of new elements to the anti-Jewish stereotype, usury, desecration of the host and ritual murder. According to Van Arkel, all were related to a growing economic specification. If open relations only disappeared after 1300, the two phenomena would be unrelated. There is however another element of chronology that deserves our attention. The first persecutions of Jews in European history took place in the Rhineland in 1096. According to Van Arkel, this should mean that at that time the necessary and sufficient conditions of stigmatization, social distance, and terrorization were jointly met. But were they? Jews only came to the Rhineland after the beginning of the eleventh century. In Speyer, one of the cities hit by anti-Jewish violence, the first Jews arrived in 1084, only twelve years before the persecutions. They came for economic purposes, invited by the rulers of these towns, on whose protection the Jewish community counted. In 1096 most of these rulers did in fact attempt to give the Jews such protection, but they ultimately failed. Superficially the three conditions were met in 1096: stigmatization, in-
tensified of course by the religious fervor stirred up by the crusade; further social distance, already in place from the moment when the Jews arrived; and terrorization, apparent from the lack of power of the rulers to prevent persecution. The problem is that social distance was not caused by an autonomous process, but was more or less a “given”.

There are other problems. Most of the developments we have discussed so far, that according to Van Arkel, but also according to other historians, changed Jewish positions for the worse, happened only after 1096, or were just starting at that time. Whether it was the stronger denunciation by the church, or the emergence of new stereotypes, or the increasing importance of the Christian guilds, or the growing Jewish dependence on rulers, all this grew in significance after 1096. Important changes in Jewish-Christian relations, Michael Signer writes, took place after 1150, rather than after 1096. Moore comes to the same conclusion: the developments that changed Jewish positions were the work of the twelfth century, after 1096. The discovery of the Talmud by Church leaders took place in the thirteenth century. The first ritual murder accusation dates from 1144, and it would take another hundred years for that idea to become widespread. Desecration of the host is first heard of in Cologne in 1150. According to Alfred Haverkamp, Jews remained active in trade until the thirteenth century; only then did money lending and comparable activities become their main source of income.

So how to explain 1096? Can it still be explained using Van Arkel’s model, or does it have to be explained differently? If the latter, how does this affect the value of Van Arkel’s work?

Historians find it hard to give 1096 its proper place in the history of anti-Semitism. There is general agreement that before the First Crusade, Jews in Europe still fared relatively well. This makes it difficult to believe that the horrendous events of 1096 were the result of growing tensions between Jews and Christians in the Rhineland cities, a possibility that Van Arkel is aware of. Could it not rather be the other way around, and should we look at 1096 as the beginning of the worsening of the relations? To Langmuir, 1096 was an expression of anti-Judaism, that is, revenge for the crucifixion, while later persecutions were the result of irrational hatred of Jews and thus caused by anti-Semitism. Moore, for different reasons, also places 1096 outside the field of later anti-Jewish manifestations. To him it was a manifestation of popular Jew hatred, while in later times the responsibility of the authorities was much more important. Robert Chazan, who has written extensively about the First Crusade and the massacres of 1096, even doubts the importance of these events. “In sum, my investigation would reject the prevailing
view of 1096 as a watershed in European Jewish life. The year was an important and disastrous time; it did not however inaugurate rapid change and certainly did not ‘cause’ such change.”54 He even admits that the relation between 1096 and the new ways of thinking about the Jews that were to develop shortly afterwards need more elaboration. But he adds that the fact that almost immediately new Jewish migrants occupied the places of the victims of the persecution shows that at least contemporary Jews thought the situation to be safe again.55 Most explanations seem to fit in a traditional interpretation, which stresses the consequences of high religious fervor focused on the crucifixion, caused by ecclesiastical propaganda to take part in the crusade.

To Van Arkel 1096 is important. For reasons that he has explained in his book, this was the moment when the terrorization mechanism began to manifest itself. Time and again in that fateful year, the authorities, be they bishops or noblemen or rich citizens, failed to give the Jews the protection that they expected. In the preceding century, the process of economic specification had started. By the end of the eleventh century, few if any Jews were found in agriculture anywhere in Western Europe any more. However, Van Arkel himself also seems to have some doubts. Like most of the other authors mentioned, he is perfectly aware of the fact that prior to 1096 the living conditions of the Rhineland Jews were quite good; “one may assume that there was an open society with friendly social intercourse” (p. 348). Could it be that the massacres were entirely the work of outsiders, in this case from France? There, animosity toward the Jews was already growing, due to the combined processes of economic specification and of labeled interaction. Strong royal authority, joined during the Second Crusade to the moral authority of Bernard of Clairvaux, prevented the outbreak of massacres in France. In 1096, however, nobody was able to stop the French outsiders from murdering the Jews of Rhineland.

Let me conclude this epilogue with a few words about other recent works on the history of anti-Semitism. Because the main part of Van Arkel’s argument is concerned with the worlds of antiquity and the Middle Ages, I have focused on the literature about these periods. But some recent books about later periods or of wider scope deserve consideration as well. During the final decade of the twentieth century, debates about anti-Semitism have been dominated by Daniel Goldhagen’s book, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*, in which he draws two important conclusions. First, far more Germans than originally thought were actively involved in the executions of the Jews. Second, German anti-Semitism differed from the anti-Semitism we find in other countries; only in Germany was anti-Semitism based on the idea that the
Jews had to be exterminated. Van Arkel himself has written a strong rebuke of Goldhagen’s work. This is not the place to join in the debate about Goldhagen, however; suffice it to say that few historians have become convinced of the exceptionality of German anti-Semitism. But one of the positive consequences of his book is that it stimulated a great deal of new research on the history of German anti-Semitism. Several important books have been published recently, and although they doubtlessly would have appeared without Goldhagen’s book, the Goldhagen controversies have stimulated the authors to rethink German and European anti-Semitism even more carefully. Saul Friedländer, Claudia Koonz, and Eric Johnson have written important studies about the “forgotten” years of Nazism, 1933-1939. Though of course in many ways different in their analysis, they all agree that German anti-Semitism was in fact not dissimilar to the anti-Semitism found in many other European countries. The process through which German minds were prepared for the “final solution” as described in these books may be even more frightening than the workings of Goldhagen’s eliminationist anti-Semitism. According to Koonz, Germans were convinced first of their own racial superiority before being subtly persuaded of the existence of a Jewish problem. To Friedländer, Nazi anti-Semitism was “redemptive”. Nazis held an almost religious belief in the salvation of the German people, for which liberation from the Jews was a precondition. In the 1930s, the German populace was brainwashed to believe this. Johnson’s explanation stays close to the one found in Browning’s book, Ordinary Men. Many ordinary Germans did participate in the persecution of the Jews, many more knew what was going on, but almost no one broke the silence about their “terrible secret”. The most important conclusion that can be drawn from these books is how easily it was to appeal to long-existing anti-Jewish feelings to such an extent that “ordinary men” could be persuaded to commit the most terrible crimes. This of course bears a direct relationship to one of the main themes of Van Arkel’s book, the persistence of the anti-Jewish stereotype.

Finally, two recent books that are limited in size but broad in scope must be mentioned: Racism by George M. Fredrickson and The Changing Face of Antisemitism by Walter Laqueur. Fredrickson is one of the few authors who, just like Van Arkel, looks at anti-Semitism as part of the history of racism. Originally a historian of the Jim Crow South and of South Africa, he seeks in this book to bring together the history of the “two most prominent expressions of Western racism”, anti-Semitism and anti-black racism, which culminated in three openly racist Western regimes of the twentieth century: the Jim Crow South, Nazi Germany, and Apartheid South Africa. Laqueur in-
stead concentrates solely on anti-Semitism. A large part of his book, almost a third, is devoted to anti-Semitism after the Second World War and the rise of Muslim anti-Semitism. In little more than 200 pages, he discusses the history of anti-Semitism from ancient times till the present, ending with a gloomy conclusion: “At the present time anti-Semitism, by whatever name, is still much more than a mere historical memory.” The conclusion that anti-Semitism is not going to go away any time soon is one that Van Arkel, too, has felt compelled to draw after a lifetime of research, the outcome of which the reader has just read in the preceding pages. Whether it is tenable in the end, or not, or only partly so, it is hoped in any case that Van Arkel’s argument, subtle and complex as it is, has helped deepen the reader’s understanding of a difficult and unsavory subject, that remains timely.
Notes

Preface


Introduction

1 See for a well-argued recent example: Peter Schäfer, Judeophobia; attitudes toward the Jews in the ancient world (London 1998).
2 Persecutions took place in Egypt in the fifth century, but there is no continuity with later expressions of anti-Semitism.
3 See: J. Trachtenberg, The Devil and the Jews (New Haven 1943) and R. Chazan, Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Anti-Semitism (Berkeley 1997).
4 See: Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide. The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (London 1967, many reprints).
5 The classic example is of course Richard Wagner’s view on Jewish artists. See: Richard Wagner, Das Judentum in der Musik (Leipzig 1869).

Chapter I

1 There is a tradition of blaming Allied governments in this respect, and they have been accused of indifference and even anti-Semitism. See for example: W. Laqueur, The Terrible Secret. The Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s “Final Solution”


3. G. Wint and P. Calvocoressi, *Middle East Crisis* (Harm ondsworth 1957)


5. On Romanian anti-Semitism and the US as the only power to do something about it:


Enemy of the People, Antisemitism (Harmondsworth 1946) cover; Kushner, op. cit. p. 153.

17 The dictum is generally ascribed to A. Bebel. His point of view: A. Bebel, Sozialdemokratie und Antisemitismus (Berlin 1906).

18 See below.
20 H. Graetz, Volkstäümliche Geschichte der Juden, 3 Vols. (Vienna/Berlin 1923); S. Dubnow, Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes. Von seinen U ranfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Berlin 1925), translated from the Russian by A. Steinberg.
22 B. Lazare, L’antisémitisme, son Histoire et ses Causes (Paris 1894); N. Wilson, Bernard Lazare(Cambridge 1978).
24 Quoted from memory.
27 On the Limerick riots: They were instigated by Father Creagh of the Redemptionist order expelled from France, by the ministry of Emile Combes, for their role in the Dreyfus Affair. C. Emanuel, A Century and a Half of Jewish History, extracted from the minute books of the London Committee of deputies of the British Jews (London 1910); G.F. Abbott, Israel in Europe (London 1907). It was not a mere incident, and was widely discussed in the press: Spectator, 23 April 1904; Globe, 10 April 1904; and The Times, 13 May and 1, 4, 8, 12, 15, 18, and 26 April 1904.
36 See the essays in E. Simmel, *Antisemitism, a Social Disease* (New York 1946).
37 F. Bernstein, *Der Antisemitismus als Gruppenscheinung* (Berlin 1926).
45 R. Ankel, op. cit. p. 94.
47 E.g. Dohm, *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*.
Gordon convincingly argued that by no means were all Germans anti-Semitic. Many actually helped Jews, chapters 6-10. Even a number of party members opposed the regime's anti-Semitic measures, pp. 263-269. Anti-Semitism was not the main attraction of Nazism.


58 See note 66.


60 A most consistent attempt at interpreting anti-Semitism from a Marxist point of view, as a form of class struggle: A. Léon, *Conception Materialiste de la Question Juive* (n.p. 1946).


65 This is the theme of D. Prager and J. Telushkin, *Why the Jews? The Reasons for Anti-Semitism* (New York 1985).
67 It is virtually impossible for the layman to adequately summarize the vast psychological literature on anti-Semitism. Here may be referred to such classics as: T.W. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality, 2 Vols (New York 1954); E. Simmel, Anti-Semitism, a Social Disease (New York 1946); G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York 1958); W. Bergman ed., Error without Trial. Psychological Research on Antisemitism (Berlin/New York 1988); Current Research on Antisemitism, vol. 2
69 A. Wahrmund, Das Gesetz des Nomadenthums und die heutige Judenherrschaft (Berlin 1892, 1866); A. Wahrmund, Der Kulturrampf zwischen Asien und Europa (Berlin 1887).
71 E.g., Unverfälschte Deutsche Worte, June 1887, p. 172.
72 E.g., M. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Verträcht sich die Talmud-Moral mit dem deutschen Stats-Bürgerrecht? (Leipzig 1891); H. Greive, Geschichte des Modernen Antisemitismus in Deutschland (Darmstadt 1983) passim.
75 See chapter 11 in this book.
76 Ashley Montagu, Race and I.Q. (New York 1975) p. 28. Voltaire was a polygenist not for scientific reasons.
77 J. de Biez, La Question Juive; La France ne peut pas être leur terre promise (Paris 1886).
Ibidem 89.
81 See chapter xi1 in this book; Montagu, op. cit. p. 19.
84 A. Suzman, *Race Classification and Definition in the Legislation of the Union of South Africa, 1910-1960* (Johannesburg, n.d.)
86 H. Plessner, in such works as “Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch” and “Lachen und Weinen”.
90 See chapter xi1 in this book.
92 W. Marr, *Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum* (Bern 1875).
95 A. Stoecker, *Das moderne Judenthum in Deutschland, besonders in Berlin* (Berlin 18803); A. Stoecker, *Sozialdemokratie und sozialmonarchie*. Otto Baumgarten ed. (Leipzig 1891); A. Stoecker, *Dreizehn Jahren Hofprediger und Politiker* (Berlin 18953).
100 K. von Amira, ed., *Das Endinger Judenspiel* (Halle 1883).
101 T.S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago 19703).
103 G.W. Drost, *De Moriscos in de publicities van Staat en Kerk 1492-1609* (Leiden 1984) passim,

Notes
In the early 1920s in non-anti-Semitic Greece and the Netherlands, Jewish inhabitants made up respectively 2.2 percent and 1.7 percent of the general population, whereas in anti-Semitic Germany and France, these figures were respectively 0.4 percent and 0.9 percent. In the non-anti-Semitic US, 3.5 percent of the population was Jewish; this is as much as in notoriously anti-Semitic Austria. Most anti-Semitic reactions in Germany (not Berlin or other large cities) and Austria came from areas where there were hardly any Jews. No French city, not even Paris at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, could ever boast a 10 percent Jewish population as Amsterdam steadfastly could over a period of several centuries. No German or Austrian town could claim as many Jewish inhabitants as either Amsterdam or Saloniki could (20 percent). In 1890, five percent of the Berlin population was Jewish. A. Ruppin, *Die Soziologie der Juden.* 2 vols. (Berlin 1930); *Antisemiten Spiegel* (Danzig 1900) pp. 1-6; F.K. Günther, *Rassen kunde des Jüdischen Volkes* (Munich 1930²) pp. 328-333; F. Bosse, *Die Verbreitung der Juden im Deutschen Reiche* (Berlin 1885).


I.A. Agus, op. cit.


H.L. Strack, *Das Blut im Glauben und Aberglauben der Menschheit* (Munich 1900).


C.W. Mönnich, “Religieuze en Theologische Aspecten van het Antisemitisme,”

124 D. van Arkel, *Antisemitism in Austria*, op. cit. passim


127 Th. Fritsch, *Handbuch der Judenfrage* (Hamburg 1919 (28)).


129 On Himmler: see e.g. J.C. Fest, *The Face of the Third Reich* (Harmondsworth 1983) p.177.


**CHAPTER II**


3 See below: “sine ira et studio” is Tacitus’ famous statement of objectivity, he evidently transgressed while writing about Jews.


6 Genesis xl.111 32.

7 Exodus, i, 9 and following.

8 Esther, 111 – viii.

9 Esther, viii, 8.


11 Esther, 11 21-23.

12 Esther, vii 17.


15 See below.

**Notes**

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16 See also e.g.: Exodus xx11, 21; Leviticus ix, 18; Deuteronomy xx111, 7; Jer. xx11, 3; Ezechiel xx11, 29; Zachariah v11, 10.
19 Biblical evidence: Matthew xx111, 15; Acts, 11, 10; v1 5, x111 43, see below.
20 W. Sulzbach, Die zwei Würzeln und Formen des Judenhasses (Stuttgart 1959) p. 21.
22 J. Juster, Les Juifs dans l’Empire Romain, Leur Condition Juridique, économique et Sociale, two volumes (Paris 1914), vol. 1 pp. 180
23 This is, of course, denied by the second edition, in 1936! of Wörterbuch der Antike (Leipzig 1936) p. x.
24 Reinach, op. cit. p. 10-12.
26 Reinach, p. 8.
27 Radin, op. cit. p. 89; Reinach, p.169.
28 Radin, op. cit. p. 89.
29 Quoted by Radin, op. cit. p. 135.
30 1 Macc , i, 11. Macc. iv, 7 and following, v1, v11.
31 Tacitus, Historiae, v 8.
33 1 Macc. 14 and following, 11 23, 1x 23, 11 Macc. iv 9, 13 and following, x1v 3 and following; Radin op. cit., p. 141 and following.
37 Heinemann op. cit. p. 5.
38 Reinach, op. cit. pp. 57, 58.
39 Reinach, op. cit. pp. 131, 142.
41 J. Isaac, op. cit. p. 82; Radin, op. cit. p. 199.
42 Tacitus, Historiae, v, 4.
43 Reinach, Texts, p. 49.
44 Reinach, Texts, p. 137.
45 Democritus, Reinach, p. 121, Julius Florus, Contemporary of Antonius Pius, p. 333.
46 Tacitus, Hist., v 4, in v 5 he has apparently forgotten this, for there he writes: “Iu-daei mente sola unumque numen intelligent”.

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47 Reinach, p. 139.
49 Radin, op. cit. p. 171 and following.
51 Reinach, Texts, p. 74, 157; Heineman, op. cit. p. 27; J. Isaac, op. cit., p. 61, do not consider Manetho anti-Jewish; Radin, op. cit. p. 189 follows the Josephus tradition.
52 Reinach, op. cit. p. 14
53 Reinach, op. cit. p. 20
54 Reinach, op. cit. p. 99.
55 R. Isaac, op. cit. p. 61.
56 Heinemann, op. cit. p. 20.
57 Reinach, Texts, p. 56 and following.
58 Reinach, Texts, p. 128.
59 Radin, op. cit. p. 199. Isaac, op. cit. p. 82.
60 Reinach, Texts, pp. 117-120.
61 Reinach, Texts, pp. 63, 117-120.
62 Tacitus, Hist., v 3.
63 Reinach, Textes, p. 253.
64 Reinach, Textes, p. 359, 362.
65 See above, ritual murder.
66 Th. Fritsch, Handbuch der Judenfrage (Hamburg 1919(28)), many editions since then.
68 For a psychological interpretation, see E. Simmel, Antisemitism, a Social Disease (New York 1946) chapter.111, pp. 58.
70 Heinemann, op. cit. p. 6 and following; Isaac, op. cit. p. 75.
71 Heinemann, op. cit. p. 8, 9.
72 Roos, op. cit., p. 165; Smallwood, op. cit., p. 235 and following.
73 Tacitus, Hist., v. 9; Smallwood, p. 174 and p. 244.
74 Roos, op. cit., p. 166; Heineman op. cit., p. 9.
75 Heinemann, op. cit., p. 12.
76 M.P. Charlesworth, Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Claudius and Nero (Cambridge 1939) p. 5.
77 Charlesworth, Documents, p. 14.
80 Ibidem, p. 5. N.B. Claudius’ letter pp. 3 and following was translated by R. Graves in: Claudius the God (London 1944) Vol 1., p. 172-175.

Notes
81 Juster, op. cit., Vol. 1 p. 263, footnote 5.
84 Juster, op. cit., p. 213; Smallwood op. cit., p. 539.
85 Heineman, op. cit., p. 13; Radin op. cit., p. 272; Bolkestein, op. cit., p. 158; Juster, op. cit., Vol. 1, chapter 1, pp. 213 and following; Roos, op. cit., p. 154.
86 See below.
87 Smallwood, op. cit., passim, particularly p. 539
88 Smallwood, p. 467.
89 Simon, *Verus Israel*, op. cit.
90 Bolkestein, op. cit., pp.163-165.
93 Reinach, *Textes*, p. 166.
94 A) the ass, B) Bacchus, C) unus numen, D) Saturnus.
95 Reinach, *Textes*, pp. 292, 293.
96 Idem.
107 See below.
109 Applebaum, op. cit., p. 245.
110 R.L. Fox, *Pagans and Christians in the Mediterranean world from the second centu-
ry AD to the conversion of Constantine (Harmondsworth 1988) pp. 35, see also e.g. pp. 357, 258, 428, 479, 481, 486, 671.
111 Applebaum, op. cit., p. 245.
112 See above.
113 Deut. xxiv; Gen. xix, 2 and following; Ex. xx11, 9; Job xx1, 32; Radin, op. cit., p. 184.
115 Reinach, Textes, p. 255.
116 Idem.
117 Reinach, Textes, p. 293.
118 Tacitus, Hist., v 5.
119 Reinach, Textes, p. 176.
120 Ibidem, 262.
121 Ibidem, 42.
122 Ibidem, 245, see also pp. 102, 353, Strabo and Quintilianus.
123 Juster, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 47, fn5, Martialis; Reinach, p. 287; Ammianus Marcellinus, p. 353.
125 Tacitus, Hist., v 5.
126 Reinach, p. 288.
127 Sherwin White, op. cit., p. 98.
128 Carcopino, op. cit., p. 128.
129 Tacitus, Hist., v 5.
130 Smallwood op. cit., p. 206, objects to the term “mutuentes” and prefers “sympathisers” or “Judaizers”. See also Sevenster, op. cit. p. 198.
132 Tacitus, Hist., v 5; Reinach, Textes, pp. 244, 264, 290, 293.
133 Reinach, Textes, p. 92.
134 Smallwood, op. cit., p. 134 and following, quoting Suetonius.
135 Reinach, Textes, p. 237.
136 Ibidem, 259; J. Isaac op. cit., 98; Smallwood, op. cit., pp. 130 and following.
137 On Tiberius’ measure: Smallwood op. cit., p. 203.
139 Tacitus, Annales11, 85.
140 Reinach, p. 188.
141 Ibidem, 329.
142 Smallwood, p. 216; Sevenster, p. 196.
143 Sevenster, pp. 191-199 quotation p. 196.
144 Simon, op. cit., p. 126; Radin, op. cit., p. 342; Reinach, Textes, p. 198 (Dio Cassius), p. 343, Historia Augusta; Juster, op. cit., p. 15.
145 Radin, op. cit., p. 326.
146 Heinemann, op. cit., p. 15; Juster, op. cit., 1 p. 226; Simon, op. cit., p. 129; Smallwood, op. cit., p. 467.

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147 Heinemann, op. cit., p. 36; Isaac, op. cit., p. 129; Smallwood, op. cit., p. 130.
148 Sevenster, op. cit., p. 203.
149 See above.
151 See also: Sherwin-White, op. cit., p. 89, fn. 1
152 See above.
153 Smallwood, op. cit., p. 140.
156 Sherwin-White op. cit., p. 91; Smallwood, op. cit., p. 365.
157 See above.
159 Kraabel, op. cit., Mélanges, p. 20.
160 This is not undisputed. J. Isaac, denies it, so does Poliakov.
161 Simon, op. cit., p. 240.
164 Sevenster, op. cit., pp. 60-72. Quotes a number of interpretations with a priori reasoning.
165 Bolkestein, op. cit., p. 162; Isaac, op. cit., p. 123.
167 Sevenster, op. cit., p. 59; Simon, op. cit., p. 241; Sherwin White, op. cit., p. 99
169 Smallwood, op. cit., p. 542.
170 Smallwood, op. cit., p. 503.
171 See e.g., Fox, op. cit., e.g. pp. 425, 553, 598.
172 See below, next chapter, Decius’ persecutions. Fox, R. L., op. cit., pp. 450 and following.
173 D. J. van der Sluis e.a., Elke Morgens Nieuw, het Achttiengebed (Amsterdam 1978).
175 R. L. Fox, op. cit., p. 486.
176 It explains the bad name Pharisees have in the New Testament. See next chapter.
CHAPTER III

2 Quotations from Chairman Mao – Tse – Tung (Peking 1966) passim.
3 J.C. Visser, Bedrijfsbezetting. Het Verleden van een aktiemodel (Amsterdam 1986).
5 Isaiah, xliv 17 and following, xlv 22.
12 N. Cohn, op. cit., passim.
19 Isaiah lv 17, 18; lxvi 18, 23.
21 B.S. Bachrach, Jews in Barbarian Europe (Lawrence 1977) pp. 98 and following.
25 Acts vi 14, Matthew xxiv 2.

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27 Acts vi 9; Krauss, Synagogale Altertümer (Berlin 1922) p. 201.
28 Eusebius, The History of the Church, transl. and edit. by G.A. Williamson, (Harmondsworth 1984) p. 72; Acts xi 2, xv 5; Galatians 11, 12–14; Ruether, op. cit., pp. 82 and following.
29 Acts xi 11-16, x1 5–10.
30 Acts xv 39.
31 Acts xi 20, Galatians 11 7.
32 Galatians 11 1−15.
33 Acts xv 20, xx1 25.
35 See below.
36 Galatians, 11 10.
37 Galatians, 11 21.
38 Acts v 34–42.
39 Acts xii 1.
41 Ruether, op. cit., p. 58 and following; Flavius Josephus op. cit., p. 155; Lovsky, op. cit., p. 125.
44 Josephus op. cit., pp. 130−131.
46 Tacitus, Annales, xv 44.
48 Tacitus, Annales, xv 44.
50 Acts xxv, 12.
51 Acts xxvi 1, 32.
52 Acts xxiv 24−28.
53 Emanuel bin Gorion, ed., Geschichte aus dem Talmud (Frankfurt am Main 1985) p. 268, 270.
54 Ruether, op. cit. p.p. 57 and following, p.61; I. Epstein, Geschiedenis van het Joden- dom (Utrecht/ Antwerp 1965) p.p. 124 and following, translated from Judaism; A Historical Presentation (Harmondsworth 1959); H. Graetz, Volkstümliche Geschichte der Juden, 3 Vols. (Vienna/ Berlin s.d.(9)), Vol.11 p.11 and following.
56 Leo Baek, Das Wesen des Judentums (Wiesbaden, s.d (7)) passim, e.g. p. 4.
57 Josephus, op. cit., p. 155.

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60  John IV 22.
61  Talmon, op. cit., p. 353.
64  M. Simon, op. cit., p. 268.
65  M. Simon, op. cit., p. 179.
66  Matth. xxvii 17.
67  Matth. xxvii 25.
68  This is a theme of many of Paul’s Epistles, see below.
69  Parkes, op. cit., pp. 81 and following.
71  Dante Alighieri, *Divina Commedia*, Paradiso vii 47.
72  Matth. xxvi 28.
73  Matth. xxvi 42.
75  Acts xxvii 3; ACTS v 34–40.
76  11 Corinthians, xi 23–28.
77  I. Thessalonians ii 14–15.
79  Gager, op. cit., passim.
80  Gager, op. cit., pp. 161 and following.
81  Romans iv 10–14.
82  Hebrews xi 1–32.
83  Romans iii 21 – 31.
85  Romans vii 12–24; Phillips, op. cit., p. 32.
86  Romans ii 23, 24; Psalms v 10, CXL4, x 7, xxxvii 2.
87  Romans xi 26–30.
88  Romans xi 12–13; Malachi i 3.
89  Romans xi 23–24.
90  Romans xi 30.
91  11 Corinthians iii 7.
92  11 Corinthians iii 6.
93  11 Corinthians iii 12–15; Exodus xxiv 2, xxxiv 3–35.
94  See above.
95  Deuteronomy xx1 23.

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96 Galatians 111:10, Deuteronomy xxv11:26.
98 Galathians 111:12.
99 Galathians 111:8, Genesis x11:3, xx 18, xxv1:4.
100 Ruether, op. cit., p. 105.
101 Ruether, op. cit., p. 100; Galatians 3,4.; Phillippians 111:2,3; Phillips, op. cit. p. 5, 138.
102 Galathians v.11.
103 Galathians 13–19; Phillippians 111:4–11, Acts 1x 5.
105 Hebrews x1 4–34.
106 Hebrews x 3–4.
107 Hebrews x1 14, x 12; Matth. xxv1 27–28; Exodus xxix1 v 8.
108 Hebrews v 6,10, v1 20, v11 1–22.
109 Genesis xiv 18, xv111 5; Psalms cx 4.
111 J.N. Bakhuizen van den Brink and J. Lindeboom, Handboek der Kerkgeschiedenis Vol. 1. (The Hague 1942) e.g. p. 24.
112 Eusebius, op. cit., p. 136; Bakhuizen van den Brink, op. cit., p.29.
113 See above.
115 H. Jansen, Chr. Theologie, op. cit., p.p. 93 and following.

CHAPTER IV

1 Pagans, Fox, op. cit., p. 669.
10 See above; Lovsky, op.cit., p. 163.
14 See above.
16 See below.
23 Proselytizing and Judaizing: Anchel, op.cit., pp. 23 and following; Lovsky, op. cit., pp. 36 and following, pp. 139 and following, p.161; Poliakov, op.cit., p. 39; Simon, op.cit., pp.175, 336; Parkes, *Conflict*, p. 179; also: see infra.
25 Baron, op. cit., Vol. 111, pp. 5 and following. In the West the question of the images did not lead to open conflict. This did not mean that the problem did not exist. According to Anchel, op.cit., p. 25, fn. 3, Jew-baiter Agobardus was an iconoclast.
26 Williams, op. cit., passim; Parkes, *Conflict*, p. 291.
27 Numbers xx1 4-9, Exodus xx 4-7.
31 Baron, op. cit., p. 111 p. 33; Lovsky, op. cit., p. 110.
34 Juster, op. cit., 11 p.45 fn.2
37 Acts x1, 26.
38 Meeks, op. cit., p. 16.
40 Meeks, op. cit., p. 25.
41 Meeks, op. cit., p. 35.
43 Meeks/Wilken, op. cit., p. 18.
44 Eusebius, op. cit., p. 251.
45 Chrysostom, “Homilies against the Jews. 1 and v111”, in: Meeks and Wilken, op. cit., Homily 1 6, 8.
46 Meeks/Wilken, op. cit., p. 31 (p. 29).
48 Chrysostom, (Meeks), op. cit., Homily 1, 3.
49 Mattheus v 34-38; James v, 12; G.B. Ladner, op. cit., p. 871.
50 Ruether, op. cit., p. 171; See above.

516 THE DRAWING OF THE MARK OF CAIN
51 Ruether, op. cit., p. 171.
52 Chrysostom (Meeks), op. cit., Homily 1, 1.
53 Chrysostomos (Meeks), Homily 1, 11.
54 Chrysostomos (Meeks), Homily 1, 3.
55 Chrysostomos (Meeks), Homily 1, 2, viii 11.
56 Chrysostomos (Meeks), Homily 1, 5, viii 3, 5.
57 Chrysostomos (Meeks), Homily 1, 6.
58 Chrysostomos (Meeks), Homily 1, 6.
59 Chrysostomos (Meeks), Homily 1, 2; Ruether, op. cit., p. 174.
60 Ruether, op. cit., pp. 173 and following.
68 Bakhuizen v/d Brink, op. cit., p. 174.
69 Bakhuizen v/d Brink, op. cit., p. 171.
70 B. Russell, op. cit., p. 384.
72 See also: Acts XXVIII 26, Romans x 8.
73 Augustine, City of God (Harmondsworth 1972) i v 34 p. 178; v 18 p. 211; vii 11 p. 251 and following; xvi 2, p. 652.
74 Augustine, xx 29 p. 957.
75 Augustine, xvi 39 p. 704; xvii 7 p. 732.
76 Augustine, xvi 7 p. 732.
77 Augustine, xvi 26 p. 68, 786.
78 Augustine, v 18 p. 211.
79 Augustine, op. cit., xvi 37 p. 701; xvii 19 p. 752.
80 Augustine, op. cit., xvi 23, p. 680. Other themes are: “the elder shall serve the younger” xvi 35 p. 698. The dispersion is a testimonium veritatis, xvii 46 p. 872. All Jews are to blame, xx 30 p. 96.
81 B. Blumenkranz, Die Judenpredigt Augustins (Basel 1946) xi 1 p. 90.
82 Blumenkranz, Judenpredigt, op. cit., i 2 p. 91; v 6 p. 95.
84 Blumenkranz, Judenpredigt, v 6 p. 95.
85 Blumenkranz, Judenpredigt, v 8 p. 98; ix pp. 105, 106.
86 Blumenkranz, Judenpredigt, viii 11 p. 104.
87 Blumenkranz, Judenpredigt, vii 9 p. 101, Genesis xxv 23.

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88 Blumenkranz, Judenpredigt, 1x 13 pp. 107, 108.
89 Blumenkranz, Judenpredigt, v11 9, pp. 100, 101.
91 Reinach, op. cit., pp. 64, 85.
92 S. Katz, op. cit.; Baron, op. cit., 111 p. 38; Thieme, op. cit., p. 12.
93 Baron, op. cit., 111 p. 7.
95 So e.g., Montesquieu, Lovsky op. cit., p 105.
96 See above.
97 Williams, op. cit., pp. 300 and following.
100 Bakhuizen v/d Brink, p. 165.
101 See e.g.: Russell., op. cit., p. 359.
102 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, op. cit., Vol. 11 p. 145; Lovsky, op. cit., p. 158.
104 Ruether, op. cit., p. 192.
109 See below.
110 Parkes, History, p. 63.
111 P.G.G.M. Scholten, De Circumcellionen (Scheveningen 1984).
CHAPTER V

1 See above.
2 Lovsky, op. cit., chapter 111, pp. 83 and following; B. Russell, op. cit., pp. 344-345.
3 Gibbon, op. cit., Vol. v, p. 13. Though Alexandria was one of the oldest and largest diaspora communities, the number is probably exaggerated.
4 Bakhuizen v/d Brink, op. cit., p. 143.
7 A. Th. van Leeuwen, op. cit., pp. 279.
13 C.E.H. Ostrogorsky, passim.
15 Ostrogorsky, History, op. cit., pp. 135 and following; Ostrogorsky, C.E.H., p. 207.
16 Ostrogorsky, C.E.H., p. 216.
17 Ostrogorsky, C.E.H., p. 123.
19 Ostrogorsky 12.
20 Vasiliev, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 198 and following.
22 Lopez, op. cit., passim; A. Sharf, Byzantine Jewry, From Justinian to the Fourth Crusade (London 1971) passim.
23 Lopez, op. cit., p. 129.
26 Runciman, op. cit.

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28 Clough, op. cit., pp. 73 and following; Baron, op. cit., 111, p. 8.


30 Vasiliev, op. cit., p. 227.


32 L. Poliakov, op. cit., p. 41. chapter, particularly p. 298.

33 Dubnow, op. cit., Vol. 111 pp. 237, 257, 259. See also: Baron, op. cit., 111, passim.

34 Dubnow, op. cit., 111 p. 264; Baron, op. cit., 111 p. 8; Lovsky, op. cit., p. 187, f.n. 4.


36 Parkes, op. cit., appendix 11, Novella 146.

37 Lovsky, op. cit., p. 36.

38 Dubnow, op. cit., 111 p. 262, iv pp. 88; Lovsky, op. cit., pp. 116, 187; Baron, op. cit., 111 pp. 3, 10; Vasiliev, 1 p. 183.

39 Baron, op. cit., 111 pp. 8, 11, 13; Dubnow, op. cit., 111 p. 264, f.n. 11, p. 386.

40 J. Starr, ed., The Jews in the Byzantine Empire, 641 - 1204. (Documentos) (Athens 1939) chapter 1 p. 1, documents nrs. 5, 11, 12, 62, 63 - 67, 69, 71, 77, 78, 90. On Paulicians see also: Vasiliev, op. cit., 1, pp. 312, 313, 370. Ostrogorsky, p. 268, calls them Manichaeists, predecessors, of the Bogomil. On Leo v1, revoking the decrees of Basil 1, see: Starr, op. cit. doc. nº 84. See also: G. Caro, Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Juden im Mittelalter und der Neuzeit, 2 Vols. (Frankfurt am Main 1924) 1 p. 259. According to Sharf, op. cit., p. 53, Paulicians were actually “Judaizing” and the Athinganans (p. 75) fraternizing with the Jews. According to the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, J. Hastings, ed. (Edinburgh/New York 1961) Vol. 1X, p. 696, Paulicians were Manichaeists in a loose sense of the word, almost every deviant opinion being called Manichaist at the time. It is described as an originally Armenian sect, the name also being Armenian. According to their view, the “Son” is an angel, whom God commanded to be born of woman, and who was given the title: “son”. Paulicians opposed Mariolatry, worship of the saints, and accepted only adult baptism. This seems to argue against Sharf’s interpretation. On the “Vision of Daniel” see: Sharf, op. cit., p. 201.

41 Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 182; Caro, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 256.

42 See below, 57.

43 Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 77.


45 Gregory the Great, e.g., was strongly opposed to forced baptisms. Baron, op. cit., 111 p. 20; J. Parkes, Conflict, op. cit., p. 211.

46 Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 18, see also doc. nº 121, containing prescriptions of what Jewish converts should anathematize. Also see below 56.

47 Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 115, doc. nº 176; Caro, op. cit., p. 255.

48 Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 125.
51 See below.
52 Baron, op. cit., vol. 111, p. 11; Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 38, articles 9 and 57; on the "Basilics" Vasiliev, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 303, 366, 408, 416; see also: Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 121.
53 Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 121.
54 Starr, op. cit., docs. 4, 19, 60, 69, 75 and particularly 83; Baron, op. cit., vol. 111, p. 187.
56 Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 8.
57 Caro, op. cit., 1 p. 257; Starr, op. cit., doc. nº 182.
58 Starr, op. cit., p. 28, is sceptical about this information, although documents nº 74 and 176 could be interpreted that way. Baron, 1v p. 66 states that these occupations had low prestige. See above 50.
60 Starr, op. cit., documents nº 25 and 121.
62 Starr, op. cit., documents nrs. 4, 17, 25, 121, art. 7.
63 Starr, op. cit., documents nrs. 21, 50, 57, 102, 186.
65 Starr, op. cit., documents nº 23 and nº 75; Baron, op. cit., 111 p. 196.
66 Starr, op. cit., docs. nº 22, 81, 130, 137, 138, 150, 167 and 182.
68 Ciggaar, p. 248, § 2, 84-103. An interesting feature is that the Jew in question was not killed, but converted.
69 See above / infra.
70 Baron, 11 pp. 194-195.
71 This section does not pretend to be more than the rendering of a very preliminary impression of later Balkan developments.
73 Poliakov, op. cit., pp. 297.
75 Parkes, *History*, pp. 100; Wurmbrandt, op. cit., pp. 234 and following.
77 Epstein, op. cit., pp. 231.

**Notes**
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102 Suhl, op. cit., p. 278.

103 Suhl, op. cit., p. 275.

104 Starr, op. cit., doc. no. 182.


109 Dubnow, op. cit., x 262.


111 Iancu, op. cit., 102.

112 Iancu, op. cit., passim.

113 Iancu, op. cit., p. 90.

114 x

115 For the text see: Schuster, op. cit., p. 99.


117 Manifest an die Regierungen und Völker der durch das Judentum Gefährdete christlichen Staaten laut Beschlusses des ersten internationalen anti-jüdischen Kongresses, zu Dresden am 11-12 September 1882 (Chennnitz 1882).


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On Balt Bekker see e.g. Robbins, op. cit., art. Bekker. K. Baschwitz, De Strijd met de Duivel (Amsterdam 1948).

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CHAPTER VI

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2 As will be demonstrated below.


4 See above.


8 See above.

9 See above.

10 This is the theme of L. Dasberg, op. cit.


14 M. Bloch, La Société Féodale, op. cit., p. 606.


21 Juster, *Juifs* 165.
29 See below.
32 Agus, op. cit.; see below.
36 Slicher van Bath,, op. cit., p. 36.
37 Slicher van Bath, op. cit., p. 22.
40 See below, chapter x.
41 See below, chapter x.
45 See below Ch. x.


51 Quoted by Latouche, op. cit., p. 248.


56 Hodgett, op. cit., p. 65; see below.

57 Exodus xxii 25; Leviticus xxv 36, 37; Deuteronomy xxiii 19; Psalms xv 5; Proverbs xxviii 11, 8; Jeremiah xv 10; Ezekiel xiv 8, 13, 7; xxiii 12. Also: see below.

58 See below, Ch. x.


61 See above.


64 L. Finkelstein, ed., op. cit., p. 228.

65 E.g. Gies and Gies, op. cit., chapters 1, 11, 1v.

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106 E. Coornaert, op. cit., p. 32.
107 E. Coornaert, op. cit., passim.
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113 E. Coornaert, op. cit., p. 35.
114 E. Coornaert, op. cit., p. 33; S. Thrupp, *Early Medieval Society*, op. cit., p. 44.
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116 Coornaert, op. cit., pp. 213 and following; Planitz, *Deutsche Stadt*, op. cit., p. 77.
117 Alp. Mettensis, op. cit., Fol. 4v left column, lines 3 and following.

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118 Coornaert, op. cit., p. 50; Alp. Mettensis, op. cit., ibidem.
119 Planitz, Deutsche Stadt, op. cit., p. 372, 374, p. 78, fn 24, p. 74 fn; Alp. Mettensis, op. cit., Fol. 4v right column, lines 57 and following.
121 E. Coornaert, op. cit., passim, particularly p. 234, fn. 3; Planitz, Deutsche Stadt, op. cit., Ch. 11, pp. 61 and following; J.G. van Dillen, op. cit., p. 788.
123 Coornaert, op. cit., pp. 47, 212.
125 M. Bloch, Société féodale, op. cit., p. 493; Planitz, Deutsche Stadt, op. cit., pp. 98 and following.
126 Planitz, Deutsche Stadt, op. cit., p. 99.
127 Planitz, Deutsche Stadt, op. cit., pp. 102 and following, p. 106.
129 C. Wijffels, De Oorsprong der Ambachten in Vlaanderen en Brabant (Brussel 1951) pp. 140 and following.
131 Planitz, Deutsche Stadt, op. cit., p. 269.
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142 See below, chapter England.
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208 See below.
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CHAPTER VII

4 Norbert Elias, Prozess, op. cit.
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See 15. Indicative of sentiment in the lower-middle classes is the “Deutsch-Nationale Handlings Gehilfen Verein,” which, after de Bund der Landwirte, was the second-largest anti-Semitic organization.

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24 Van Arkel, idem, passim.
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66 See below; D. van Arkel, Antisemitism in Austria, pp. 14 and following.
69 Cohen, The Friars, op. cit., part 1, chapter 11 pp. 33 and following.

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80 M. Stern, Urkundliche Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. 11, nº 176 pp. 4 § 2.
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117 See above, chapter xiv

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119 Ranulf, see above.

Chapter VIII


Notes
17 Idem, p. 8.
20 Idem, p. 52.
22 See above chapter 111.
24 H.L. Strack, *Das Blut im Glauben und Aberglauben der Menschheit* (Munich 1900⁶) pp. 54 and following; P. Steiner, *Ritualmord? Kriminilastik Hamburg* (Hamburg n.d.) pp. 9 and following; On the improbability of Jewish ritual murder, see above chapter 1v.
29 Idem, p.37; Dante Alighieri (G. Vandelli, Ed.), *La Divina Commedia* (Milano 1949¹¹) Inf. xxvi, 94.
31 Matths., p.37.
38 Idem, op. cit., p.75.
46 Steiner, *Ritualmord? Kriminilastik Hamburg*, pp.11, 14; H.L. Strack, *Das Blut im Glauben und Abergläuben der Menschheit* (Munich 1900⁸) passim, particularly p. 177; see below; chapter v111.
48 The accusation is to a large extent based on guilt feelings: it was quite normal for white men to have sexual relations with black women. Likewise the usage of the sacraments to kill one’s enemies (for example by saying Mass for a living person to hasten his demise, or by using the Host as charm) could cause guilt feelings, and their displacements on Jews; K. Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic. Studies

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66 See above chapter 1v.
69 See below.
W. Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, Act I scene 111


Idem, op. cit., p. 31.


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*Notes*
96 Conditions in 19th century England are discussed in an as yet unpublished manuscript.
98 This aspect is discussed in an as yet unpublished manuscript on 19th century anti-Semitism and in van Arkel, Antisemitism in Austria.
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102 Idem, op. cit. p. 296.
103 Richardson, English Jewry, p. 27.
105 Adler, Jews of Medieval England, p. 196; Richardson, English Jewry, pp. 26, 27.
107 See above: chapter 11.
109 Richardson denies the story, but even so, the stir remains equally tell-tale.
110 Roth, A History of the Jews in England, p. 82.
111 Idem, op. cit., pp. 40, 70, 95.
112 As formulated in chapter IV, V, and VI.

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11 H. Nolthenius, *Duocento* (Utrecht/Antwerp) p. 84.
14 Bocaccio, *Decamerone*, Introduction.
24 Dante Alighieri, *Paradiso*, vii 1, 47.
25 See e.g., P. Lapide, *De laatste drie Pausen en de Joden* (Hilversum 1967) p. 18.
30 Bocaccio, *Second day 111*.
33 Roth, *Italy*, op. cit., pp. 69, 71.
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37 See above.
40 N. Elias, Über den Prozess, op. cit.
41 See above.
43 See above.
44 For illustrations see e.g., L. Santini, Palermo, Monreale Dintorni (Terni 1982).
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63 See above, v11.
64 Milano, Storia, op. cit., p. 587.
65 E. Kantorowicz, Friedrich ii, op. cit., Ch. v.
66 Kantorowicz, Friedrich ii, op. cit., Ch. v; G. Procacci, op. cit., p. 32.
67 R. Straus, op. cit., p. 104.
68 Straus, op. cit., p. 106.

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70 Milano, Storia, op. cit., p. 99.
71 Kantorowicz, op. cit., passim, e.g. pp. 240 and 247.
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76 See e.g., I.W. Schwarz, ed., Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People (New York 1956).
78 M. Stern, Urkündliche Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. 1, n° 3, p.14; n° 4, p.6; n° 5, p.17; n° 6 ,p.17; n° 7, p.18; n° 8, p.21; n° 22, p.36; n° 34 p.38, n° 32, p.42; n° 37, p.45; n° 50, p.57; n° 58, p.64; n° 60, p.65; n° 61, p.65; n° 64, p.67; n° 65, p.68; n° 66, p.72; n° 69, p.74; n° 71, p.74; n° 75, p.76; n° 98, p.94. Vol.11, n° 181, p.14; n° 182, p.17; n° 183, p.17; H. Vogelstein, History, op. cit., p. 179.
79 I. Münz, Die jüdischen Ärzte im Mittelalter (Frankfurt 1922) passim; M.A. Shulvass, The Jews in the World of the Renaissance (Leiden 1973) section v111, chapter 8, pp. 315 and following, section 1X, pp. 324 and following.
81 Cassuto, Firenze, p. 179, p. 182.
82 M.A. Shulvass, Renaissance, op. cit., section v1, pp. 215 and following, section v11, pp. 252, section 11, pp. 324 and following.
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88 A. Milano, Storia, op. cit., p. 81.
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91 See 90.
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95 Shulvass, Renaissance, op. cit., p. 114; Roth, Italy, op. cit., pp. 107, 123; Cassuto, Firenze, op. cit., p. 80.
98 See above, Roth, Italy, op. cit., p. 45; Translator of text: Vogelstein, Rome, op. cit., p. 114.
99 Roth, Italy, op. cit., p. 42; Waagenaar, Rome, op. cit., passim.
100 Waagenaar, Rome, op. cit., chapter x, p. 70.
101 Waagenaar, Rome, op. cit., chapter x, p. 78; F. Gregorovius, Der Ghetto und die Juden in Rom (Berlin 1851) p. 55.
105 See above, Stern, Urkündliche Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. 1, n° 40, p. 46.
106 Roth, Italy, op. cit., pp. 176, 281 and following, 291; Shulvass, Renaissance, op. cit., p. 114; Vogelstein, Rome, op. cit., p. 251 following; Firenze, op. cit., p. 80.
110 Taaff, Assisi, op. cit., pp. 32-45.
111 Taaff, Assisi, op. cit., p. 48.
112 Taaff, Assisi, op. cit., pp. 52, 73.
113 Taaff, Assisi, op. cit., p. 54.
116 Taaff, *Assisi*, op. cit., p. 64.
118 Trachtenberg, *The Devil and the Jew*, op. cit., passim.

122 See below.
123 Burckhardt, p. 1.
127 Roth, *Italy*, op. cit., p. 407.
129 Stern, *Urkündliche Beiträge*, Vol. 1, no 100 and following, pp. 98 and following, no 112 and following, pp. 117 and following.
137 Pullan, *The Jews of Europe*, p. 163; see above.

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152 See below.
There is a general consensus that there hardly was any autochtonous anti-Semitism in Italy, e.g.: De Felice, Lapide, Michaelis, Milano, Nolte. There is a difference of opinion on the origins of the 1938 programme, however Michaelis emphasizes the Interlandi campaign of 1934, more than, for example, De Felice. There seems to be general agreement that there was no direct German pressure; J. Horn and E. Sira, “Het Italiaanse Fascisme, Opkomst, Overwinning, Consolidering en Ondergang”, in: Anne Frank Stichting, ed., Oud en Nieuw Fascisme (Amsterdam 1981) do not discuss anti-Semitism; Lapide, De laatste drie Pausen, op. cit., p.105 quotes Badoglio on German pressure; an interesting view is: A.J. Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism. The Rationale of Fascism (New York 1969) who relates Italian concepts of a “dynamic” race; contrast with the sociological traditions of Gumplowicz, Pareto, et al. p. 260.

4. Buitenkant, op. cit., p. 82; Nolte, Der Faschismus, op. cit., pp. 294, 586, fn. 422; On Falashas, see above; De Felice, Storia, op. cit., p. 193, 242; Macciochi, op. cit., pp. 73, 75, 79, 94 and following.

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190 De Felice, Storia, op. cit., p. 311.
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197 Buitenkant, op. cit., p. 22.
198 M.G. Debenedetti, 16 October 1943. Een Joodse Kroniek (Amsterdam 1985).
201 Milano, Storia, op. cit., p. 459.
202 See above.
203 De Felice, Storia, op. cit., p. 12.
205 Buitenkant, op. cit., p. 15; De Felice, Storia, op. cit., p. 12.

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7 Idem.


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26 Aronius, op. cit., nº 155, p. 65.

27 Aronius, op. cit., nº 165, p. 69.


30 See above chapter v1.

31 Aronius, op. cit., nº 164, p. 68.


34 See above 22, 23.

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36 Aronius, op. cit., nº 125, p. 54.


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81 Kisch, op. cit., p.110.

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99 Aronius, op. cit., nº 30 p. 11.

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116 Marcus, op. cit., p. 349.
119 Rabinowitz, op. cit.
122 See above; Caro, op. cit.; Adler, op. cit.
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126 Niermeyer, op. cit., see above.
127 Aronius, op. cit., nº 79. p. 29.
140 Aronius, op. cit., the numbers of respective references in the index were counted.
141 Blumenkranz, op. cit., pp. 22 and following, pp. 375 and following.
142 Aronius, op. cit., n° 67, p. 25.
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144 Aronius, op. cit., n° 82, p. 32.
146 Aronius, op. cit., n° 102, p. 43.
147 Aronius, op. cit., n° 111, p. 49; n° 126, p. 55; n° 279, p. 123.
148 Aronius, op. cit., n° 170, p. 71; n° 171, p. 74.
149 Neubauer, op. cit., p. 191.
150 Agus, passim.
151 Chazan, op. cit. p. 34.
152 Chazan, op. cit. p. 15.
153 Aronius, op. cit., n° 104, p. 45.
154 Aronius, op. cit., n° 164, p. 68.
156 Grayzel, *Church and Jews*, op. cit; Kisch, op. cit., p. 214.
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*Notes*
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5 Neubauer and Stern, op. cit. p. 170.
6 Neubauer and Stern, op. cit. pp. 84, 90, 91, 116, 142, 159, 218.
7 Neubauer and Stern, op. cit. pp. 94, 179.
8 Cohn, op. cit. passim.
9 Aronius, op. cit., nº 168, p. 69.
12 Neubauer, Stern, op. cit., pp. 199 and following, pp. 204 and following.
13 See below.
14 Chazan, op. cit., p. 27.
15 Elias, op. cit., passim.
16 Dasberg, op. cit., p. 139; Aronius, op. cit., nº 205 p. 94, nº 207 p. 95, nº 185, p. 86.
17 Dasberg, op. cit., passim.
18 Neubauer, Stern, op. cit., p. 87.
19 Runciman, op. cit., nº 136.
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21 Runciman, op. cit., nº 123.
22 Runciman, op. cit., nº 131.
23 Cohn, Pursuit, op. cit., p. 48.
24 See below, see also: Caro, op. cit., nº 207.
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28 Aronius, nº 181, p. 83.
29 Aronius, nº 189, p. 89.
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47 Neubauer/Stern, op. cit., p. 196.
48 Chazan, op. cit., p.34.
51 Elbogen, e.a., Germania Judaica, op. cit., passim.
52 See below Ch. x11.
53 Pounds, op.cit., p.108.
55 Runciman, op.cit., p. 137.
56 Runciman, op.cit., p. 223.

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6 See above; Dobson, op. cit.
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8 D. van Arkel, Clio en Minerva (Leiden 1966); G. Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South or the Failure of Free Society (Richmond 1854); G. Fitzhugh, Cannibals, or Slaves without Masters (Richmond 1857).
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30 J. Le Goff, *De Cultuur van Middeleeuws Europa* (Amsterdam 1987) p. 43 e.a.
32 See above.
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39 See above.
41 J. Guérin, *Les trafiquants de l’antisémitisme. La maison “Drumont et Co”* (Paris 1905). Comparison with other daily newspapers of the same date proves that this allegation is true. Guérin, himself an anti-Semite guilty of the type of frauds he accuses the Jews of, in his book mentions shady dealings of Drumont. The two had more in common than anti-Semitism.
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44 A. Stöcker, *Das moderne Judenthum in Deutschland, besonders in Berlin* (Berlin 1880²); A. Stöcker, *Dreizehn Jahren Hofprediger und Politiker* (Berlin 1895²).

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111 O. Glagau, *Deutsches Handwerk und Historisches Bürgerthum* (Osnabrück 1879³); O. Glagau, *Des Reiches Noth und der neue Culturkampf* (Osnabrück 1880³); A. Wahrmundt, *Der Kulturkampf zwischen Asien und Europa* (Berlin 1887).

112 G. Tridon, *Du Molochisme Juif* (Brussels 1884); see e.g.: E. Dühring, *Die Ersatz der Religion durch Vollkommeneres, und die Ausscheiding alles Judenthums durch den modernen Völkergeist* (Karlsruhe/Leipzig 1883).


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**CHAPTER XIII**


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17 Proverbs xxx1, 33.
18 Matt. x, 10; Luke x, 7; Tim v, 18.
22 Personal communication. Prof. Dr. D.H. de Boer, medievalist.
29 Baek, op. cit., p. 241.
30 White, op. cit. p. 83.
32 Ranulf, *Middle Class Morality*, op. cit., see above, chapter 1.

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38 The Biblical Texts: O.T., Exodus xxiii, 25; Leviticus xxv, 36,37; Deuteronomy xxi11,19,20; xv, 2,6,8; xxiv, 10,11; xxi11,12,44; Psalms xv, 5; Proverbs xxviii, 8; Ezekiel xviii, 8, 13, 17; xxi 1 1 2; N.T.: Matthew xx, 27; Luke vii, 35.


41 Hoffmann, op.cit.


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95 On this affair: Oberman, Zuwelni, op. cit., pp. 197 and following; Israel, European Jewry, op. cit., p. 11.
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97 L. Mumford, The City in History (Harmondsworth 1973) e.g. p. 410.
100 Battenberg, op. cit., pp. 250 and following; Israel, op. cit., p. 68.
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110 J.G. van Dillen, Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van het bedrijfsleven en het gildeween van Amsterdam, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicaties nº 69 en nº 79 (Governments Historical Publications) passim.
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### Chapter XIV


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6 See e.g., E. Dühring, *Der Ersatz der Religion durch Vollkommerenes und die Ausscheidung alles Judenthums durch den modernen Völkergeist* (Karlsruhe/Leipzig 1883).


9 A. Dinhter, *Die Sünde wider das Blut*, novel about the evil effects of mixed marriages between Aryans and Jews.


12 Gold standard e.g.: O. Glagau, *Der Reiches Noth und der neue Culturkampf* (Osnabrück 1880) pp. 186-212, pp. 230/231; Th. Fritsch, *Handbuch der Judenfrage*
The “Certificate of Capacity” is an ever-returning shibboleth of German and Austrian anti-Semitic movements. Its abolishment was regretted by those laudatores temporis acti, praising the former guild organization without Jews as ideal. O. Glagau, originator of modern anti-Semitic economic protest. O. Glagau, Deutsches Handwerk und historisches Bürgerthum (Osnabrück 1875). Its reintroduction was a plank in the platform of the so-called “Linz-program” by Schönerer e.a., Van Arkel, Anti-Semitism in Austria, op. cit., p. 188. Appendix to: Schönerer, op. cit., pp. 133 and following. Innumerable examples in the anti-Semitic literature. See e.g.: J. Jurik, Episteln gegen die allgemeine Verjudung (Aarau 1885). F. Elbogen, Ein Mahnruf an das arbeitende Volk (Vienna 1885).

E.g. D.J. Jacquet, Concours de la Libre Parole sur les moyens pratiques d’arriver à l’anéantissemement de la puissance Juive en France (Paris 1897) favouring a strong presidency, and holding that parliamentary government was powerless against the Jews.
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19 See e.g.: J. de Biez, *La Question Juive: La France ne peut pas être leur terre promise* (Paris 1886).
23 Drumont, *La France Juive*, 2 vols., Vol. 1, p. 235. See below. This was also the position of later left-wing anti-Semites like Gustave Tridon.
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33 R. Wagner, *Das Judenthum, in der Musik* (Leipzig 1869).
34 E. Dühring, “Die Ueberschätzung Lessings, und dessen Anwaltschaft für die Juden” (Karlsruhe/Leipzig 1881).
35 E. Fuchs, *Die Juden in der Karikatur* (Munich 1921).


See e.g.: G.A. Williams, *Artisans and Sans-Culottes* (London 1973) passim.

Hufston, see above.


O. Glagau, *Deutches Handwerk und historisches Bürgerthum* (Osnabrück 1879).


J. Comas, *Racial Myths* (Unesco Paris 1952) p. 44.

As quoted by E. Wilson, *To the Finland Station* (New York 1953) p. 41, from E. Renan, *Origines du Christianisme*.


Idem, p. 11.

W. Sombart, *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (Leipzig 1911) final chapter.

See e.g.: *Deutsches Volksblatt* (Vienna) daily; June 27, 1889; Nov. 21, 1889.


See above, Veblen


So e.g.: Nationality and Liberty, in: L. Namier, *Vanished Supremacies* (Harmondsworth 1962) p. 46. See also: p. 216.

It implied the removal of the last impediment of a religious nature.

Notes
A HISTORICAL EPILOGUE

1. The work of Gavin Langmuir is an exception.
2. Schäfer, Judeophobia, 11.
3. Ibid. 203.
5. Ibid. 16.
6. Ibid. 21, 22.
14 Ibid. 499.
20 Abulafia, *Christians and Jews* 118.
28 Dahan, *Christian Polemic*.
Maybe we should exercise some caution here. Good neighborly relations are not always as good as they seem. In a recent and ominous study, the historian Jan Gross has written about a horrible massacre that took place in the community Jedwabne in Poland in July 1941. Despite the fact that before the Second World War there were no signs of bad feelings between the Polish and Jewish populations of Jedwabne, almost all the Jews of the community, about 1600 people – half of the population – were brutally murdered by members of the Polish community. Jan T. Gross, Neighbors. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (London 2001).

60 Johnson, Nazi Terror, 381.
62 Laqueur, Changing Face, 208.
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