

### ISSP data report: attitudes towards the role of government

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Monographie / monograph

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:

GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften

#### Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Bechert, I., & Quandt, M. (2010). *ISSP data report: attitudes towards the role of government*. (GESIS-Schriftenreihe, 6). Bonn: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. <https://doi.org/10.21241/ssoar.26120>

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Leibniz-Institut  
für Sozialwissenschaften

Schriftenreihe

Band 6

## ISSP Data Report

Attitudes towards the Role of Government

*Insa Bechert and Markus Quandt*



ISSP Data Report

**GESIS Series**

published by GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences

**Volume 6**

Insa Bechert and Markus Quandt

**ISSP Data Report**

Attitudes towards the Role of Government

Insa Bechert and Markus Quandt

**ISSP Data Report**  
**Attitudes towards the Role of Government**

**Bibliographical information of the German National Library (DNB)**

The German National Library lists this publication in the German National Bibliography; detailed bibliographical data are available via <http://dnb.ddb.de>.

ISBN 978-3-86819-013-7

ISSN 1869-2869

Publisher, printing

and distribution: GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences  
Lennéstraße 30, 53113 Bonn, Germany, Tel.: x49 (0)228 / 22 81 -0  
[info@gesis.org](mailto:info@gesis.org)  
Printed in Germany

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## Acknowledgements

The preparation of this Data Report would not have been possible without the support and hard work of a number of people:

First of all we want to thank Anna Weißflug and Sophia Kratz, who both work as student assistants at the GESIS department “Data Archive for the Social Sciences” and contributed a lot to all kind of tasks that occurred during the creative process, such as the generation of the graphs, special research or proof-reading. We also want to thank Alexandra Pohl, who spent eight weeks as a student intern at the department and was deeply involved in finalising the ISSP Data Report in almost all respects.

Special thanks go to Prof. Jonas Edlund from Umeå University in Sweden, who read and commented on the chapters on social welfare and taxation. His criticism and suggestions have been a great inspiration.

Further, we are very grateful to Prof. Michael Braun of the GESIS department “Survey Design and Methodology”, who reviewed the first edition of the ISSP Data Report and also had some good recommendations that we took into account in this second edition.

Last but not least we are very grateful to Bettina Zacharias of the GESIS department “Specialized Information for the Social Sciences”, who did a great job with the layout.

Of course, the responsibility for all errors remains with the authors.

Insa Bechert and Markus Quandt



## Introduction

The *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) is a coordinated effort of research institutes from many countries across the world. Its annually repeated surveys are designed to cover various topics of high relevance to social science research. Very often, however, the topics of ISSP surveys – so-called modules – are of immediate political or social relevance beyond the borders of the scientific community. The “ISSP Data Report”, therefore, addresses not only a scientific audience; it potentially also reaches out to a wider public.

This first volume of the ISSP Data Report presents results from a module series under the title of “Role of Government”. This topic broadly refers to the mutual relationship of governments and their citizens. More specifically, the ISSP being a survey programme collecting data on opinions and attitudes, the Role of Government modules collect data on the rights and responsibilities of governments in the perception of their citizens. Role of Government has been the topic of choice for the very first implementation of the ISSP in 1985, then administered in only six countries, but has been repeated since in 1990, 1996, and 2006, with a continuously growing list of countries participating in each module (for a comprehensive overview of ISSP member countries and module participation see Appendix A.VII. The full list of topical modules is given in Appendix A.VI.).

Under the heading of “Role of Government”, the surveys deal with a number of certain subtopics all concentrating on different aspects of the greater issue. The system followed over the series of all ISSP modules is that at least two thirds of the questions are repeated from the previous instance of the same topical module, while the remaining questions may be changed. Such changes can either be methodological adjustments, or they can address entirely new topical areas within the Role of Government frame.

We have selected seven of these subtopics from the scope offered in the four modules. Six of them have been covered at two or more points in time, allowing us to look at changes, perhaps even trends. The seventh has been newly introduced with the 2006 module. The list of topics also provides the structure for the ISSP Data Report.

The first topic is that of civil liberties: how far are citizens allowed to go when expressing their political opinions, or to what degree are the state and its government entitled to restrict their citizens’ rights of expression and action? This topic has its roots in the 1970s and 1980s, when a number of Western nations experienced mass protests of the peace and ecological movements, but also some violence by a radical left. Public attitudes on civil liberties might well have changed since, with the same questions now being answered under a very different perspective. In particular in 2006, all discussion of powers for security and legal authorities could have become implicitly linked to fighting the new forms of international terrorism. But there is also a very different aspect to the topic of civil liberties: the more recent modules also include countries that do not yet have a long history of democratic regime. Their respondents can be expected to bring in a very different set of experiences and views.

The following four chapters deal with perhaps more benign, but no less elementary, issues: those of the provision of social welfare, of state interventions in the economy, of



spending priorities for certain government activities, and of the interaction of taxation and the redistribution of wealth. All these topics are interlinked by the classical ideological conflict between proponents of a strong, 'caring' state with 'big government' on the one hand and those who stress the virtues of free markets and prefer a 'lean government' on the other hand. Here, too, one might expect change to be induced by secular events – in this case, it is the largely unexpected demise of state socialism that started in the late 1980s and led to the rapid collapse of most socialist regimes of the 'Eastern Bloc' in the 1990s. The breakdown of welfare capitalism's foremost ideological competitor may well have changed the views that citizens of Western countries have of their own economic systems. But the ISSP has also many member countries from the former Eastern Bloc, so that we are able to look at how the attitudes of their populations have adapted to the new circumstances. Again, the diversity of conditions found in our data has greatly increased in the more recent ISSP modules, which also include countries whose economies have only partly crossed the threshold to industrialisation.

After looking extensively at what respondents expect of their governments, we return to individual activities of the citizens. The sixth chapter describes to what degree citizens are motivated to contribute to the functioning of the political system, and which chances of success they expect when trying to influence political decision making. Obviously, results on this will be most interesting in regard to the younger and sometimes less stable democracies. But also between well-established democracies, there are vast differences in the incentives they provide for forms of political participation such as the simple act of voting.

The seventh and final chapter deviates from the pattern of all the preceding ones, because it presents data only from a single point in time. The topic of corruption was surveyed in the 2006 module for the first time. Our perspective is focused here on comparing aggregate results across countries, with the worldwide composition of the ISSP membership in 2006 granting considerable variation of the results. We also use the opportunity to compare the assessment of national corruption levels as derived from the ISSP data with another source of such assessments.

Some remarks on the scope and intent of this book are in order at this point. While we have followed full scientific standards in the preparation of our data, this report is not meant to be a contribution to scientific research. Its foremost purpose is to present the data as such, in a simple descriptive way. We have, however, chosen to do this embedded into frameworks for interpretation that have some reputation among social scientists, or sometimes just accompanied by loosely collected ideas, to help with an initial understanding. Even readers without a social science background should often notice that there are other ways to think about the data presented, and scientifically educated readers certainly will. For both groups of readers, it should be clear that even when we offer speculative hypotheses or indicative conclusions, we do not purport to actually test, in a methodologically sound way, any of those hypotheses or conclusions. To keep the description accessible for a broader target group, we have intentionally abstained from deep theoretical and elaborate statistical analyses.

In addition to the modest analytical scope of this report, there are other factors that may limit the range of conclusions that can be drawn from our data sources. The first of these concerns is the fact that the samples of respondents drawn within each country may be very heterogeneous internally – respondents from the same country of course will often be very different from each other, with respect to their attitudes and other characteristics. We are partly neglecting this fact when we are describing attitudes in each country with just a single number, such as the percentage of respondents having chosen specific response categories. In keeping with our general approach, we have abstained from using more complex statistical methods that would be required to check for the importance of such within-country heterogeneity. We are, however, rather confident that the simple interpretations that we offer would rarely be affected by such problems.

A second remark must address the very nature of the data that the ISSP, as a survey of the perceptions, opinions, and attitudes of its respondents, is able to provide. Responses to survey questions can hardly ever be understood to be objective reflections of the reality that the respondents experience. Even if we do not ask for the respondents' evaluations or opinions but for factual information, there is always a subjective component to such responses. A large part of this subjectivity is introduced by the fact that respondents have no choice but to understand the questions they are being asked within their own personal mindset. Obviously, the extent and content of the information which respondents bring into interpreting and understanding a given question may be vastly different between respondents. Sometimes this can be regarded to be just a random 'disturbance' of a hypothetical true response; if some respondents err in one direction, others will err in the opposite direction. But when looking at respondents from different countries, as we will be doing in this report, it is not unlikely that the cultural context of each country will produce a mindset *specific* for that country, whereas respondents from another country will have a systematically *different specific* type of subjectivity. This may introduce an unknown bias to comparisons of responses from different countries. Researchers of course have tried to minimize this risk when developing the questions for the ISSP surveys, but it can never be completely excluded. We will hint at this possibility at some occasions, but could not systematically investigate how much it affects the comparisons we make between countries.

Finally, we turn to some more technical aspects that will be of interest mostly to readers who have some background in social science research, and who may want to perform analyses of their own with the datasets that have been used for this report. A first piece of technical information is that all results reported here use the weights provided in the datasets. This is necessary because the weights for some countries contain corrections for oversampling or design effects.

For all of the analyses that compare points in time, a cumulated dataset was used (its identification number at the GESIS Data Archive, where the dataset has been generated, is ZA4747). This dataset joins the individual, international datasets of the ISSP modules of 1985, 1990, 1996, and 2006, and allows for very convenient comparisons across these four modules. It contains only those country samples, and only those variables of the original datasets, that occur in at least two of the four individual modules and which

could be sufficiently harmonised to make valid comparisons. Thus, it collects data from up to 22 different countries.<sup>1</sup> The list of variables can be found in Appendix A.II; some guidelines for the cumulated data set of the four modules are given in Appendix A.III.

Apart from that, also the full dataset of ISSP 2006 (ZA4700) has been used in different chapters, reporting results from all 33 countries surveyed for the module. For 2006, new areas included were the fight against terrorism, the perceived performance of governments, and the perception of corruption.

Access to and methodological information on all the data used here is available free of charge through the website of GESIS, at <http://www.gesis.org/issp/>. The online portal of the GESIS Data Archive, ZACAT, allows for online inspection and download of the data, at <http://zocat.gesis.org/>. More information on using ZACAT can be found in Appendix A.V.

Further material of interest, including a comprehensive bibliography of research work using ISSP data, can of course be found on the official website of the ISSP, at <http://www.issp.org/>.

The first edition of the ISSP Data Report was published as “GESIS Arbeitsbericht Nr.7” for the annual ISSP conference in April 2009 that took place Vienna. The Data Report at hand is the second, slightly revised, edition.

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1 Each of the ISSP modules of 1996 and 2006 already contains a higher number of countries than the cumulated file, which however were not all included in the cumulation because they did not occur in both modules.

Germany is counted as one country, although we usually distinguish separate samples for East- and West Germany in the Data Report. The same applies for Israel, where the sample distinction is for regions predominantly populated by Jews or by Arabs.

Over the four years the Role of Government surveys have been conducted, the following countries participated:

	1985	1990	1996	2006
Australia	X	X	X	X
Canada			X	X
Czech Republic			X	X
Germany	X	X	X	X
France			X	X
Great Britain	X	X	X	X
Hungary		X	X	X
Ireland		X	X	X
Israel		X	X	X
Italy	X	X	X	
Japan			X	X
Latvia			X	X
New Zealand			X	X
Norway		X	X	X
Philippines			X	X
Poland			X	X
Russia			X	X
Slovenia			X	X
Spain			X	X
Sweden			X	X
Switzerland			X	X
USA	X	X	X	X



# 1 Civil Liberties

One of the topics all Role of Government modules are dealing with is every state's dilemma of guaranteeing civil liberties without putting public or even national security at risk, especially in situations of war and national crisis. In recent years, threats to national security have become more associated with acts of terrorism under the auspices of Islamist radicalism, while they formerly were understood to refer more to leftist political motives, ethnical or separatist conflicts, or just criminal motives.

In this chapter we want to examine whether a global change in attitudes towards civil liberties over time can be observed. Between 1996 and 2006 some devastating attacks on the national security of Western countries have happened. The first and probably most incisive incidents are the plane hijackings and their disastrous consequences of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 in the USA. But also the train bombings in Madrid on March 11<sup>th</sup> 2004, as well as the subway train bombings in London on July 7<sup>th</sup> 2005 fall in this period. In Germany, train bombings failed only by coincidence on June 31<sup>st</sup> 2006.<sup>2</sup> It can be assumed that these terrorist acts have increased the desire for national security not only in the countries directly affected, but, albeit to a lesser degree, throughout many parts of the world. In the wake of this change, one might further expect that attitudes towards civil liberties shift towards more restrictive and conservative points of view. Data from four ISSP modules - three collected before and one after the terrorist attacks - give us an opportunity to compare the levels of support of civil liberties over time and across countries. Not only would we expect that the mentioned political attitudes change over time, we also have to keep in mind that such attitudes will usually differ widely across cultural contexts, with each country's distance from the Western world and its threats, and last but not least with very specific political factors of a given country.

On the purpose of this examination, we are going to take a close look at two ISSP items addressing the respondents' sympathy for civil liberties. One item deals with the conflict of state protection against wrongful conviction bearing the risk of letting guilty persons go free. The second item we want to look at asks for the respondents' judgement of the claims of the conscience against the law. For both items we have trend data that enable us to look for a shift in attitudes. As a second step we are going to look at how respondents' perceptions of their governments' success in dealing with threats to national security relate to their attitudes towards certain civil liberties.

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2 This last event can only have an impact on part of the data, since in June 2006 some countries had already finished their fieldwork. In Germany, the module was in the field at that point of time. For detailed information on the fieldwork dates of all ISSP countries for "Role of Government 2006" see list in Appendix A.I.

## Variables and distributions

The first item we want to look at, asks whether respondents think it is worse to convict an innocent person or to let a guilty person go free. This question addresses the widespread principle that a person should be regarded as innocent as long as his/her guilt is not proven. The more protection against wrongful conviction is established in law, the greater the risk that some of the guilty might be acquitted. People who support civil liberties should rather be willing to take the risk of letting a guilty person go free than to accept the conviction of an innocent person. However, a guilty person going free might become a risk for security.

The question in all four modules was formulated as follows:

*All systems of justice make mistakes, but which do you think is worse...?*  
(ZA4747: V23)

- *To convict an innocent person*
- *To let a guilty person go free*
- *Can't choose*

The data depicted in *Figure 1.1* show that in almost all participating countries and over all module years, the majority of respondents is of the opinion that it is worse to convict an innocent person than to let a guilty person go free. The only exceptions are Hungary in 1990 and the relatively small sample of the Arab population of Israel in 1996, where the data show higher agreement with the conservative point of view. However, in both countries respondents show much more libertarian attitudes in the following years. In Hungary the very conservative outcomes of 1990 can be observed directly after the end of the socialist regime in the country. New democratic values of the developing democracy might have been the reason for improvement of the public consciousness towards civil rights here. Remarkably libertarian attitudes can be found in the Scandinavian countries, most notably Norway. This country presents constantly over 80% of respondents in 1990, 1996 and 2006 preferring to take the risk of letting a guilty person go free rather than to accept the conviction of an innocent person.

Although the chart reveals some small changes of attitudes over the years, in the 20 countries we have trend data for, there is no general pattern of attitude shift. In keeping with our assumptions, only Australia, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and Spain show increasingly conservative attitudes between 1996 and 2006. However, most of those countries that present data over all the module years from 1985 towards 2006 show a general trend towards more conservative attitudes over all these years, not only between 1996 and 2006.

Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and the small sample of the Arab population of Israel, on the contrary, show substantially more liberal attitudes in 2006 than in 1996. Even the USA show increasingly liberal attitudes in 2006 compared to the decades before. In the other countries the outcomes stay rather constant over these years. So, on the basis of this single item, the conception that the terrorist acts of the last years have




Figure 1.1 Respondents who think it is worse to convict an innocent person vs. letting a guilty person go free (in %)<sup>3</sup>

3 The percentages do not sum up to 100%, because respondents who answered “can’t choose” and those who did not answer at all are left out in this and all the following graphs.



caused a change towards more conservative attitudes within societies could not yet be underpinned.

The next item does not focus directly on classic civil liberties in terms of civil rights. It is a rather abstract question on people's principles - whether they think people should always obey the law or should follow their own conscience in certain situations. This item addresses the dilemma of individuality vs. civil obedience. Always obeying the law, even if one's own conscience or common sense rebels, means ranking the law and, therefore, the state higher than the individual's ability and right of judgement. Saying conscience is paramount, however, potentially means disrespecting laws, which were passed by a legally elected parliament. Beyond this, making individual decisions against the law might also mean risking the weakening of state protection. The already familiar expectation is that the wish for state protection may make people favour the conservative idea of civil obedience to the disadvantage of a libertarian preference of individual judgement, not only in those countries which were directly attacked by terrorists.

Respondents of all four Role of Government modules have been asked:

*In general, would you say that people should obey the law without exception, or are there exceptional occasions on which people should follow their consciences even if it means breaking the law? (ZA4747: V8)*

- *Obey the law without exception*
- *Follow conscience on occasions*
- *Can't choose*

Looking at people's attitudes on that issue in *Figure 1.2*, a clear change between the years 1996 and 2006 can be noticed. The majority of the countries follow the trend from trust in people's individual judgement towards the belief in the virtue of civil obedience.

Focusing on those countries that have actually been attacked, this shift is particularly obvious in the United States, where the most momentous terrorist attacks took place. Whereas constantly 40% of respondents answered in favour of law obedience from 1985 to 1996, this number increased to 54% in 2006. Spain is one of those countries where respondents expressed to be rather obedient to the law in both surveyed modules. The constant presence of the ETA<sup>4</sup> in the country and its terrorist activities might be a reason for this high level of state obedience. Nevertheless, between 1996 and 2006 the percentage increased from 62% to 67% of respondents favouring state obedience. Although also in Great Britain acts of terrorism, here committed by the IRA<sup>5</sup>, are not unknown, the level of state obedience compared to the belief in individual judgement is constantly comparably low, at around 40%. The shift from 1996 to 2006 in favour of law obedience, which could be ascribed to the recent terrorist attacks, is rather marginal at only 3%.

4 "Euskadi Ta Askatasuna" (Basque Homeland and Freedom) is a Basque terrorist organisation founded in 1959, which demands Basque independence from Spain and France.

5 The term IRA "Irish Republican Army" has been used for several paramilitary and terrorist organisations fighting for reunion of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland in the 20th and 21st century.

The percentage of German respondents who answered that people should obey the law without exception increased substantially from 23% in 1996 to 39% in 2006 in the West and from 25% to 32% in the eastern part of the country.




Figure 1.2 Respondents who say that people should obey the law without exception vs. following their conscience on occasions (in %)

There are some ISSP countries, however, where no development from liberal towards conservative attitudes has taken place, at least not between the years 1996 and 2006, and countries where even a slight shift towards liberal attitudes can be noticed. Here, one could argue, people remained rather untouched by the terrorist threats and attacks. The Jewish population of Israel is one of these examples – but in this case being ‘untouched’ by terrorism does hardly mean being unfamiliar with it. Omnipresent armed conflicts and bomb attacks in Israel put respondents in quite a different situation than that of other countries. It is not surprising that the terrorist attacks in the Western world do not seem to have left such a deep impression on the Jewish population of Israel in terms of law obedience, since they have been recurrently threatened in this manner for a long time. There was, however, a substantial shift towards more conservative attitudes in Israel as well, but it already occurred between the module years of 1990 and 1996. The shock following the assassination of Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 by a radical Jew claiming to follow his conscience, might have been a factor for this development.

The third item to be examined in this context directly addresses the question in which situations, if any at all, the police should be allowed to suspend civil liberties without a court order. For this reason, different scenarios were constructed concerning what the police should or should not be allowed to do in order to prevent a possible crime. The scenarios differ in the hypothetical subject: *whose* civil liberties would be infringed, as well as in the hypothetical consequences: *what* would happen? While in 1985 and 1990 the ISSP asked about the protection of a criminal’s rights of privacy, in 2006 it is the suspicion of a planned terrorist act which might or might not justify the violation of people’s civil rights. The questions which we want to deal with here is whether the authorities should be allowed to tap telephone conversations.

In 1985 and 1990 respondents were asked if the following was *definitely allowed, probably allowed, definitely not allowed, probably not allowed*, or if they *can’t choose*:

*Suppose that the police get an anonymous tip that a man with a long criminal record is planning to break into a warehouse. Do you think the police should be allowed, without a Court Order ...? (ZA4747: V20)*

- *To tap his telephone*

For the 2006 questionnaire the topic was brought to the “terrorism-context” by asking:


*Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen: Do you think the authorities should have the right to...? (ZA4700: V40)*

- *To tap people’s telephone conversations*

*Respondents had the possibility to answer: The authorities definitely should have the right, probably should have the right, definitely should not have the right, probably should not have the right or can’t choose*

Most countries that allow comparison over time for the “tap people’s telephone conversations”-item (see *Figure 1.3*) show significantly more approval for this action if the people in question are suspected to be terrorists rather than simple burglars, with the very notable exceptions of Hungary and Ireland. For Hungary we have already pointed to the exceptional situation in 1990, it remains unclear, however, how its situation of political and ideological change might explain the very liberal outcomes in 2006. In the Republic of Ireland, the rise of the new terrorism does not seem to change the respondents’ rather negative attitude towards tapping anybody’s telephone.

Strikingly conservative attitudes can be found in Norway where 82% of the respondents answered that the police should definitely or probably be allowed to tap telephone conversations when a terrorist act is suspected. Even when we take into account that also in this question an attitude shift towards more support for national security issues might have taken place between the years 1996 and 2006, this comparison gives a good impression of how much more people are willing to expand the authority’s power and privileges in case of a suspected terrorist act to happen, compared to lesser threats such as burglaries.



*Figure 1.3* Respondents (1985/1990/2006) who think that it should definitely/probably be allowed to tap the telephone of a criminal respectively terrorist (2006) (in %)⁶

6 Germany and Israel are reckoned here as whole countries, since data for the separated samples are only available for 2006.

Measuring the actual impact of people's fear of terrorism on their attitudes towards civil obedience is very restricted when merely looking at the plain frequencies. But even if there are other reasons which could be responsible for the tendency we have observed, the huge shift in levels which took place between 1996 and 2006 at least allows the assumption that the threats of the last years might be one of those reasons. Furthermore, the shifting attitudes on tapping telephone conversations once more show that many people are willing to suspend civil liberties in case of a suspected terrorist act.

## National Security vs. Civil Liberties

With a view to the thesis that direct national threats and the resulting feelings of vulnerability cause people's wishes for more state control, even at the risk of weakening individual rights, we will finally look at how respondents assess their governments' performance in dealing with threats to national security. An item newly introduced in 2006 directly asks for this assessment. This allows posing a new question: Does the confidence in government performance influence people's willingness to grant a government more authoritarian powers in fighting terrorism? Two additional items newly introduced in 2006 specifically ask what kind of measures a government should be allowed to take when terrorist acts are to be expected. Since there is no trend data available for these items, we are limited to looking at the data of 2006. Respondents of 33 countries were asked whether they consider their government to be *very successful*, *quite successful*, *neither successful nor unsuccessful*, *quite unsuccessful*, *very unsuccessful* or if they *can't choose*:

*How successful do you think the government in [Country] is nowadays in each of the following areas? (ZA4700: V37)*

- *Dealing with threats to [Country's] security*

Furthermore, ISSP 2006 asked:


*Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen: Do you think the authorities should have the right to...? (ZA4700: V41, V43)*

- *Detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial*
- *Stop and search people in the street at random*

*Respondents had the possibility to answer: The authorities definitely should have the right, probably should have the right, definitely should not have the right, probably should not have the right or can't choose*

In the following charts we can see respondents' perceptions of governmental success in dealing with threats to national security. The first one (*Figure 1.4*) relates to attitudes towards the suspension of civil rights in terms of authorities being allowed to detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial. The second one (*Figure 1.5*) displays people's attitudes towards the suspension of civil rights in terms of the authorities being allowed to stop and search people in the street at random. We would

expect the following relation: Perceiving one's own government as unsuccessful in dealing with issues of national security most likely creates a lack of confidence in the government and its authorities. A lack of confidence, however, makes it unlikely that people agree to the suspension of civil rights that exposes them to the authority's judgement.



*Figure 1.4* Association (2006) between the perceived success of the government in dealing with threats of national security and attitudes towards authorities to have the right to detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial (in means). The vertical axis ranges from 1 “Very unsuccessful” to 5 “Very successful”, the horizontal axis ranges from 1 “Definitely allowed to detain people” (no support for Civil Liberties) to 4 “Definitely not allowed” (high support for Civil Liberties).

The charts clearly reveal a pattern. Most Western countries, particularly Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, and Australia are characterised by perceiving their governments as quite successful in dealing with threats to national security. Furthermore, or perhaps particularly because of that fact, they are rather willing to suspend civil rights,

in terms of allowing the authorities to stop and search people in the street at random as well as in terms of detaining people without putting them on trial. Support for stopping and searching people is higher than for detaining them, especially in Denmark and Finland. Nevertheless, these attitudes testify to a high level of confidence in the administration and police, since it is very unlikely to give authorities such a free hand unless you trust them not to abuse those privileges.




Figure 1.5 Association (2006) between the perceived success of the government in dealing with threats of national security and attitudes towards authorities to have the right to stop and search people in the street (in means)

The vertical axis ranges from 1 “Very unsuccessful” to 5 “Very successful”, the horizontal axis ranges from 1 “Definitely allowed to search people at random” (no support for Civil Liberties) to 4 “Definitely not allowed” (high support for Civil Liberties).

Other countries, in contrast, show substantially lower levels of perceived governmental success, and at the same time respondents are less willing to suspend civil rights even in case of a suspected terrorist act. In Taiwan, South Korea, and Venezuela the perceived governmental performance in dealing with threats to national security is poorer than in any other ISSP country. Furthermore, there is a strong resentment to suspending civil rights, in terms of allowing to stop and search people in the streets as well as in terms of detaining people without putting them on trial. Amnesty International accuses all these countries of detentions without trial (without the justification of a suspected terrorist act to happen) and imprisonment of people under appalling conditions (Amnesty International Report, 2006). For Venezuela there even are reports on human rights violations by the police including unlawful killings of criminal suspects.<sup>7</sup> In South Korea the “National Security Law” guarantees far-reaching and controversially discussed powers for the National Intelligence Service. In Taiwan and South Korea, missing confidence in their own governments might go together with the knowledge about the violation of civil rights and its consequences for the people nearby in China respectively North Korea causing strong resentments towards any suspension of civil rights.

Also in the Philippines, Russia, Latvia, and Uruguay, the fear of arbitrary police behaviour, once they are allowed to act without respect to civil rights, is a plausible determinant of the response behaviour. Even in Portugal one can assume that many people remember the times of dictatorship until 1976, when authorities have frequently disrespected civil rights and have therefore caused a lack of trust in the authorities. The only surprising country to be found in this cluster is Sweden. Since the Swedish did not have to suffer from a totalitarian regime and lived rather peacefully during the last 100 years, bad experiences with the authorities are probably less relevant in Sweden. But, the Swedes only differ in their attitudes towards detaining people from the other Western countries. In terms of letting the authorities search people in the streets at random, they are much more willing to allow civil right suspension and in this respect fit again in the cluster of the other Western states.

Interesting are the results in Israel, caused by the special situation of national security in this country. The Jewish population perceives their government as very unsuccessful in dealing with threats to national security, but, nevertheless, respondents show a high level of willingness to suspend civil rights. In contrast to this, the Arab citizens judge their government’s performance as better, but they are much less enthusiastic about the suspension of civil rights. These outcomes are not very surprising, since the Jewish population, even if their trust in authorities might not be too strong, probably perceive a necessity of suspending civil rights for the purpose of improving national safety. The Arab population, however, is at least in some regions much more at risk of being the object of the police practices referred to in the items, and therefore, does not approve very much of the suspension of these civil rights.

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7 “According to statistics published by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in July, between 2000 and mid-2005, more than 6,100 people were killed by police in 5,500 incidents. Of the nearly 6,000 police officers implicated, only 517 were charged and fewer than 250 were under arrest.” (Amnesty International Report, 2006: 279).



## Conclusion

In summary, it is exactly the set of countries which, through their specific history and current political setting, probably have the least stable civil rights situation where the rejection of possible infringements of civil rights is highest among the citizens. In contrast, citizens of the supposedly well established democratic countries appear to be more willing to grant the authorities new powers which limit civil rights. This is easily explained if we take into account that it is probably not the general evaluation of civil rights as such which shapes these results. The data presented here do not carry immediate information on that, and we have no reason to believe them to vary much across the countries all over the world. More likely, people probably judge the issues at hand against their specific national experiences: It might be exactly the lack of civil rights enforcement which makes people in countries like the Philippines or Venezuela detest the idea of giving police even more powers. Citizens in Denmark, Norway, or the Netherlands on the other hand would usually assume that they have nothing to fear from their police. Thus, they are less hesitant to have their police equipped with additional powers. A closely related logic probably shows through in the association of government performance and willingness to allow the searching of people at random. When moving to the more severe infringement of individual rights that is implied by actually detaining people at will, a relationship to perceived government performance in fighting terrorism is hardly discernible anymore – that right may be simply too basic to be sacrificed for short term measures.

## 2 Government's Responsibilities to Provide Social Welfare

A basic topic of domestic policy and therefore also of the Role of Government surveys is, as the title already states, the role of government in society. The item battery to be introduced in this chapter asks whether it is part of the government's role to provide for citizens' basic social needs, such as health care, a decent standard of living, a job for everyone and help for low-income students.

Depending on a country's political history, welfare provision is more or less taken for granted by citizens, as well as practised by their governments. In most advanced democracies, government-backed social insurance programmes in the form of compulsory health insurance, elderly age pension schemes and unemployment insurance have become established, even though on different levels, since the early twentieth century. But the question of whether those socioeconomic issues should be private matters or governmental responsibilities remains vivid in the political debate. Mirroring different conceptions and ideologies, in countries all over the world there are different forms of the welfare states established, based on different forms of interaction between the state, the market and the family. Therefore, these forms of welfare state systems are characterised by more or less governmental involvement, on the one hand, and individual responsibility, on the other hand. Beyond this, they differ in how and among whom welfare supplies are distributed. A prominent categorisation of these different types of welfare state has been established as "three worlds of welfare capitalism" by Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

In this chapter we will first have a general look at the level of support for several areas of welfare provision in the different ISSP member countries over all four module years. This comparison enables us to see how attitudes towards these different areas of welfare provision might have changed over the 21 years between 1985 and 2006 and how they relate to each other. Furthermore, we will have a look at some of the ISSP countries that are, according to Esping-Andersen, exemplarily representing different types of welfare states. The data provide us with an impression of the extent to which citizens are supporting the welfare state policies of the countries they live in and, beyond this, how they judge their governments' performance in these respects. Therefore, we will see how the citizens' demands and the governments' performance relate to each other.

## Variables and distributions

In all four module years 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006 the following questions were posed<sup>8</sup>:

*On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to...? (ZA4747: V50, V52, V53, V55-V58)*

- A. Provide a job for everyone who wants one*
- C. Provide health care for the sick*
- D. Provide a decent standard of living for the old*
- F. Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed*
- G. Reduce income differences between the rich and the poor*

In 1990, 1996 and 2006 two items were added:

- H. Give financial help to university students from low-income families*
- I. Provide decent housing for those who can't afford it*

*Respondents had the possibility to answer: definitely should be, probably should be, probably should not be, definitely should not be or can't choose*

The data clearly show that there has been almost unlimited support in all countries over all module years for the idea that the government should be responsible for providing health care for the sick (item C, *Figure 2.1*). Between 80% and almost 100% of the respondents in all ISSP countries support this issue. Likewise, governments' financial help to university students from low-income families (item H, *Figure 2.2*) is generally approved by the respondents of all societies over the available three module years. Except of Japan, showing only about 50% of the respondents thinking this support is definitely or probably the responsibility of the government, among the other countries this level ranges between 70% and 100% of respondents. At first glance we see surprisingly low levels of support for this issue in the Scandinavian countries. Sweden even ranks behind Japan as the second least supportive of all 33 countries participating in the 2006 module in terms of "providing financial help for students from low-income families". That residents of the Scandinavian countries put so little weight on this issue, however, might not be due to a lack of support for students in general. Since the welfare system in Scandinavia is highly developed and support for students is granted regardless of the socioeconomic status of their parents, respondents might have been rather surprised that the question only referred to students from low-income families. Approval would probably have been higher had the question asked for financial help for all students, regardless of their financial background.

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8 Items B and E of this item battery deal with economic intervention of the government and will be introduced in the next chapter.




Figure 2.1 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the government to provide health care for the sick (in %)





Figure 2.2 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the government to give financial help to university students from low-income families (in %)

A comparison of the items D, I and F, all asking for the governments' responsibility to provide a decent living standard for different beneficiaries, clearly shows that the public support for state organised welfare also depends on *who* is going to receive the benefits. The charts below demonstrate this impressively on a few examples representing the vast majority of countries.



**Figure 2.3** Respondents (2006) who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the government to provide a decent living standard for the old (item D), decent housing for those who can't afford it (item I) and a decent standard of living for the unemployed (item F) (in %)

As we can see in *Figure 2.3*, people highly support the idea of state responsibility in terms of providing a decent standard of living for the old (item D). In 30 out of 33 countries, however, people are less enthusiastic about the idea of the government providing decent housing for “those who can’t afford it” (item I) than for the old, and in 29 out of 33 countries, they are the least approving of the idea of the government supporting those who are unemployed and cannot afford a decent standard of living for this reason (item F).

The support for those who suffer from the consequences of unemployment has weakened over the years in 17 of the 22 countries for which trend data is available (see *Figure 2.4*). These results match the outcomes of item A (*Figure 2.5*), showing attitudes towards support for “the government’s responsibility of providing a job for everyone who wants one”, as one possibility of reducing unemployment.

Support for “providing jobs” also declined over the years in most ISSP countries and is especially low in the more advanced countries. In 2006, in Australia, Canada and the USA, all countries with a well established free-market ideology, it is even the absolute majority of people, who say that it should definitely or probably not be the government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one. A socialist history and high unemployment rates may be reasons for the high support on this item we can observe in other, mainly less advanced, countries.

Another issue that welfare states do more or less take care of is the reduction of differences in income between the rich and the poor. In 2006, it is the absolute majority of people in almost all countries, except New Zealand and the USA, that support the idea of the reduction in income differences by the government (item G, *Figure 2.6*). The trend data even show that there is a slight increase in support for this issue in 15 out of 22 countries over the period of up to four module years. This result is especially interesting when compared to the previous item. On the one hand, the willingness to support the unemployed decreases. But, on the other hand, that does not seem to indicate that people agree with all consequences of unrestrained market forces. The increasing support for government initiated income redistribution may well be a counter-reaction to the increase of income inequality that has been observed for a number of OECD countries in recent decades (Atkinson, 2003).




Figure 2.4 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the government to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (in %)






Figure 2.5 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the government to provide a job for everyone who wants one (in %)




Figure 2.6 Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the government to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor (in %)

## Attitudes towards different models of welfare states

The organisation of welfare is very different across societies. National specific institutional configurations<sup>9</sup> make a comparison of welfare states difficult, if not impossible. But, that also means that there can be numerous different approaches for their categorisation.<sup>10</sup> We have chosen the probably most prominent classification according to Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999), who distinguishes between four<sup>11</sup> different models of what he calls welfare regimes, for our categorisation:

- the “**liberal model**”, relying on the markets and characterised by little involvement of the government in the provision of social welfare, with social security seen to be a matter of individual responsibility;
- the “**conservative model**” assumes the standard male bread-winner family and is based on a higher level of state involvement with high levels of social insurances, mainly financed by contributions from dependent workers;
- the “**social democratic model**”, securing a high level of universal social welfare, financed mainly through taxes; rights are based on citizenship and attached to individuals, not to families, which guarantees women the same benefits as men;
- and the “**familialistic model**”, characterised by the provision of a rather basic level of social security by the government, which makes the role of the family in welfare production especially important.

The ISSP data shed light on how far citizens from different countries support the ideas of the welfare state systems they live in. Besides, newly introduced questions from ISSP 2006 will help to find out not only about the opinions regarding to what degree governments should be responsible, but also about the perceived level of success that governments reach with the policy they use. Respondents in 2006 were asked if they perceived their government as *very successful*, *quite successful*, *neither successful nor unsuccessful*, *quite unsuccessful*, *very unsuccessful* or if they *can't choose*:

*How successful do you think the government in [Country] is nowadays in each of the following areas? (ZA4700: V35, V36, V39)*

- *Providing health care for the sick*
- *Providing a decent standard of living for the old*
- *Fighting unemployment*

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9 About the diversity of welfare state programmes, see Pestieau, 2006: 21f.

10 For an overview on the different approaches of categorization of welfare states see Bonoli, 1997.

11 Esping-Andersen originally carved out three distinct welfare state regimes in his book “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990). The “Mediterranean/East Asian fourth world” constructed by Esping-Andersen (1999: 89f.) is more an additional offer for special research interests and a reaction to different critics such as Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Lessenich, 1995; Castles, 1996 as well as Jones, 1993; Rose and Shiratori, 1986.

We are now going to have a close look at some prominent examples of countries that can be assigned to each welfare state model according to the “Esping-Andersen scheme”. ISSP representatives of the liberal welfare state are the USA, Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia. For the conservative welfare state model we will focus on East Germany, West Germany and France. The social democratic welfare state is represented by the Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, whereas for the familialistic model we will have a look at Portugal, Spain and Japan. The intention is to see, on the basis of the ISSP data, whether these countries fulfil the underlying expectations in attitudes, which can be assumed to have partly been shaped by the system people live in. Furthermore, we will get an impression of how content those respondents are with their governments’ performances.


### The liberal welfare state

The USA is the most prominent example representing the liberal welfare state model. Looking at all “welfare-state-items”, the USA is in international comparison always among those countries where respondents do not expect a very high level of responsibility of the state in providing social welfare. The only exception is “financial help to students of low income families” which is highly supported in the USA as well. However, generally, US Americans’ attitudes towards the welfare state nowadays seem to have become somewhat more approving of state responsibility than during the 1980s and 1990s. Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand are another three countries that can be assigned to the liberal welfare state model. While Australia and New Zealand show in most respects quite similar outcomes to the USA, the British seem to expect more involvement from their government. Especially in terms of providing a job for everyone, providing a decent living standard for the unemployed and the reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor, the differences become very obvious.

Looking at the results of the items on governments’ performance in terms of “providing health care for the sick” (*Figure 2.7*), the success in Great Britain is perceived to be better than it is the case in Australia, in Australia better than in New Zealand and in all three countries better than in the USA. However, we can see that the expectations towards government actions stand in an appropriate relation to these outcomes: the lower the level of expectations, the lower the perceived level of success. The USA proves to be the most definite example of the liberal welfare state. In international comparison, US American respondents do not expect as much from their government as respondents in other countries and coherently they judge it to be at best moderately successful.<sup>12</sup> The

12 These conclusions have to be seen in international comparison. US Americans do undoubtedly not expect as much support from a welfare state as the citizens of most other countries do. However, there are, after all, in 2006 55% of the US respondents who think it should definitely and 35% who think it should probably be the responsibility of the government to provide health care for the sick and it is only 4%, who think the government has been very successful and 21%, who think it has been quite successful in doing so.

empirical findings for the liberal welfare state countries let us assume that those citizens who live within a rather limited welfare state do not necessarily see this as a deficit.




**Figure 2.7** Association (2006) between governments' responsibility to provide health care for the sick and the governments' success in doing so  
 The horizontal axis ranges from 1 "Definitely should not be responsible" to 4 "Definitely should be responsible"; the vertical axis ranges from 1 "Very unsuccessful" to 5 "Very successful".

### The conservative welfare state

Famous examples for the "conservative model" are Germany and France. The vast majority of respondents of both countries support the idea of government-organised welfare as it is practised in their countries. Except of "providing financial help to students from low-income families" and "providing health care for the sick", the expectations of government involvement are higher in France and Germany than in the USA, Australia and New Zealand. In terms of the reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor, Germany is pretty much on the same level as Great Britain, whereas the French

are more enthusiastic. Over all items, expectations on social welfare support towards the government are higher in the eastern part of Germany than in the western part. East Germany's socialistic roots are most certainly the reason for these outcomes.

The conservative welfare state model is more supportive than the liberal model. The data show that people living with this concept expect more support from their governments than those who live in countries where the ideological foundation stresses the responsibility of the individual.



*Figure 2.8* Association (2006) between governments' responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one and governments' success in fighting unemployment

The horizontal axis ranges from 1 "Definitely should not be responsible" to 4 "Definitely should be responsible", the vertical axis ranges from 1 "Very unsuccessful" to 5 "Very successful".

*Figure 2.8* shows the respondents' expectations of their governments to provide a job for everyone who wants one in relation to the perceived success of governments in fighting unemployment. The countries in the top left quarter can be characterised by not feeling the need of governments' involvement to providing jobs, probably because they already

perceive their governments as quite successful in fighting unemployment. Respondents in countries located in the down right quarter, however, do want their governments to take responsibility for providing jobs and they do not perceive them to be very successful in this respect so far. West Germany and France are placed in the down left quarter of the chart. This position indicates expectations to be not particularly high, but still higher than in those countries with a liberal welfare state. The governments' success, however, is perceived to be much lower than in those "liberal" countries. The French and the people in West Germany therefore may be rather discontent with their countries' welfare policies. In the eastern part of Germany the situation is even worse, since the divergence between expectations and perceived fulfilment is even higher.

### The social democratic welfare state

The most developed welfare state is the "social democratic model" represented here by the Scandinavian countries. In general, attitudes in these countries appear, as expected, very supportive towards welfare state issues. In almost all respects, Scandinavian respondents express more approval of state responsibility than respondents experiencing liberal or conservative welfare state models. Only in terms of providing a job for everyone and especially the reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor the picture is not that clear. Concerning the provision of jobs, all Scandinavian countries are more enthusiastic than the representatives of the liberal welfare state model, but only Norway shows more support for this idea than West Germany and France. Concerning the reduction of income differences, the conservative representative, France, appears unexpectedly supportive while the social democratic, Denmark, is not as enthusiastic as expected. As mentioned before, the comparably weak support for helping low-income students in the Scandinavian countries probably results from the reference to "students from low-income families", which excludes other students from state support. This indicates the deep-rooted understanding of universalism that is the basis of a social democratic welfare state.

*Figure 2.7* shows the Scandinavian countries to be located relatively close to each other in terms of expectations and perceived governmental implementation of providing health care. In Norway, Denmark and Finland, people expect somewhat more responsibility from their governments than in Sweden. But also governmental success is perceived as lower in Sweden than in Finland and Denmark. Only Norway shows a discrepancy here: high demands, but a comparably low level of perceived success, that might lead to a rather high level of discontent in Norway in terms of governmental provision of health care.

The locations of the Scandinavian countries in *Figure 2.8* lie much more distant from each other, at least on the axis indicating governmental success in fighting unemployment. These outcomes very clearly mirror the national unemployment rates that are

significantly higher in Finland and Sweden than in Denmark and Norway.<sup>13</sup> They lead to the conclusion that people who live within social democratic welfare states do react on unemployment rates and view the government as responsible for them. But, unlike many other countries, they do not seem to perceive “providing a job for everyone who wants one” as an appropriate instrument for fighting unemployment. Labour market policies, such as investment in occupational retraining to increase the job opportunities for the unemployed, might be seen here as more appropriate instruments.

## The familialistic welfare state

Spain and Portugal are here taken as representatives of the “mediterranean-familialistic” model. In both countries social welfare highly depends on well functioning family networks, but the data show that people actually approve very much of the idea of state organised welfare. In 2006, there are for all welfare related items around 90% of respondents from both countries supporting the idea of state’s responsibility on these subjects. One factor that these countries share and that might come into action here is the omnipresence of the Catholic social doctrine holding that public institutions should care about those unable to do so for themselves (Greeley, 1989: 487).

Another country where welfare provision highly depends on family support, and which, therefore, can be counted under the “familialistic” model, is Japan. But in contrast to Spain and Portugal, Japan is in all welfare state-issues among those countries with the lowest preference for government responsibility. These attitudes probably result out of ideological and historically grown convictions that caring for the social needs of an individual are families’ and not governments’ duties.

Looking at *Figure 2.9* that shows attitudes towards the welfare state issue of providing a decent living standard for the old, we can see that expectations in Portugal and Spain lay almost on the same high level, as the countries representing the social democratic welfare state. All the charts show that, in contrast to the Spanish, who are quite content with their government’s success, the Portuguese are much less satisfied with the performances of their government in the respective areas. Among all 33 ISSP countries of the year 2006, satisfaction with the government with regard to providing a decent living standard for the old is poorer only in Latvia and Russia. The Japanese have, next to Switzerland and South Korea, the lowest expectations of their government on this issue. Even in the countries that can be assigned to the liberal welfare model, demand is higher, while perceived success is not particularly high. In this respect Japan is on the very same level with the USA.

In all three countries, which belong here to the “familialistic” model, welfare state support in fact is rather low and the families and social networks have to work well to be able to compensate. The striking difference is that the Japanese seem to accept that concept while the Spanish and Portuguese expect more support from their governments. The

13 For an international comparison of unemployment rates see: OECD-Statistics: Harmonised Unemployment Rates and Levels.



difference between Spain and Portugal, however, is that the Spanish perceive to get that support and therefore are not as unsatisfied with their government as the Portuguese.




Figure 2.9 Association (2006) between governments' responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the old and governments' success in doing so.

The horizontal axis ranges from 1 "Definitely should not be responsible" to 4 "Definitely should be responsible"; the vertical axis ranges from 1 "Very unsuccessful" to 5 "Very successful".

## Conclusion

In a very descriptive manner, we have shown some attitudes towards state responsibilities and perceived success on the same issue in the charts. It becomes quite obvious that countries, although they can be assigned to the same welfare state model, are not necessarily very close in their attitudes and perceptions of certain welfare state issues. The Swedes, for example, often referred to as living within the prototype of the social democratic welfare state model, seem to become more and more dismissive of state responsi-

bility and generally appear less content with their government's performance than the Norwegians. Japan, Portugal and Spain apparently have in common that responsibility for welfare provision is assigned to private families, but only Spain and Portugal share rather high expectations towards the government in this matter.



### 3 Government's Intervention in the Economy

While the previous chapter looked at the immediate 'exchange' between the state and its citizens – welfare benefits and taxes –, the current chapter deals with people's attitudes towards the role of government in the economy at the systemic level. Should governments try to 'steer' economical processes, or should self-regulation of the markets prevail? To measure those attitudes, the ISSP asked whether the respondents were in favour of the government controlling basic market standards, such as wages and prices. Beyond this, people were asked what they think about the government actively guiding the economy and taking regulating action to protect and create jobs. On the one hand, a passive role of the government in the economy means to leave the development to the free market and its rules. This, thereupon, might aggravate social inequality within the society. Active involvement in the economy as well as in socioeconomic issues, on the other hand, necessarily makes the government's administration grow and increases the tax burden. Furthermore, big governments run the risk of becoming inflexible and ineffective. Therefore, government's involvement as well as non-involvement has far-reaching consequences on a society and its citizens.

In this chapter we will concentrate on whether public attitudes have changed over the last two decades – and if they have changed, whether the development has taken place in favour of governmental intervention or rather in favour of free market ideas. Bearing those results in mind, it will be interesting to see if certain patterns of equally developing national attitudes across countries with similar prerequisites can be identified. This examination will focus on the former socialist countries that have been subject to common historical and ideological influences. Moreover, their citizens are in a quite similar situation now, sharing experiences with systems of state ownership and a centrally planned economy whereas lately they have to face the new free-market oriented developments in their countries. Have the attitudes of citizens in these countries moved in a consistent way between the two ideological poles? Put in other words, is it the heritage of the past that we see in people's attitudes even in recent years, or have they adjusted to ideas of capitalism in the meantime?

As a last step, we will compare cross-national attitudes on two different forms of governmental activity: on the one hand, interventions in the economy and, on the other hand, the provision of welfare state supplies for the citizens. We will take a look at the relationship of these two issues with each other and how that relationship might have changed during the 21 years the Role of Government modules cover. Once more, the underlying question is whether the radical change of systems from socialism towards capitalism that took place in many countries in the early 1990s somehow manifests in the data.

## Variables and distributions

In all modules the ISSP asked:

*Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favour of and which you are against. (ZA4747: V29-V34)*

- A) Cuts in government spending*
- B) Government financing of projects to create new jobs*
- C) Less government regulation of business*
- D) Support for industry to develop new products and technology*
- E) Support for declining industries to protect jobs*
- F) Reducing the working week to create more jobs*

*Respondents had the possibility to answer: strongly in favour of, in favour of, neither in favour nor against, against, strongly against or can't choose*

**and:**

*On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to...? (ZA4747: V51, V54)*

- G) Keep prices under control*
- H) Provide industry with the help it needs to grow*

*Here respondents had the possibility to answer: definitely should be, probably should be, probably should not be, definitely should not be or can't choose*

A first observation is that in most of the countries and all over four module years, support is strong for governmental actions enabling industries to help themselves, such as governments “financing projects to create new jobs” (item B, *Figure 3.1*), giving “support for the industry to develop new products and technology” (item D, *Figure 3.2*) and “providing industry with the help it needs to grow” (item H, *Figure 3.3*).




Figure 3.1 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the government financing projects to create new jobs (in %)



Figure 3.2 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the government supporting the industry to develop new products and technology (in %)




Figure 3.3 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the government providing industrie with the help it needs to grow (in %)



With only some exceptions the outcomes show that attitudes towards these issues are very stable within the countries and over the years. One of these exceptions is New Zealand, where we can observe more enthusiasm towards government intervention in 2006 than in 1996 in terms of “financing projects to create more jobs”. The outcomes for the USA stand out even more since attitudes have become substantially more supportive towards government involvement in 2006 compared to the years before over all three items. One explanation for this shift might lie in the bursting of the so called “dot-com bubble”. The boom in internet and communication technologies had been accompanied by a huge extent of speculation in the stocks of so called dot-com companies, which finally came to an end in a crash of that sector of the stock markets. Between March 2000 and October 2002, many of the dot-com companies went bankrupt causing high unemployment and job insecurity. Another explanation might be the fears of a world-wide recession after the terror attacks of September 2001. However, although both crises have had an impact on the stock markets of all Western nations, we do not see attitude reactions towards more state intervention by supporting the industry to create and protect jobs in Western countries except the USA. In Germany and Great Britain, there even is a distinct decline of the support for state intervention.

In contrast to these examples of rather indirect government intervention in the economy, direct intervention seems generally to be perceived as less desirable. On the question of whether or not people are in favour of *less* governmental regulation of business (item C, *Figure 3.4*) in most countries between 40% and 60% of respondents express attitudes in favour of less intervention. A marked shift towards a strong resentment against governmental intervention can be observed between 1996 and 2006 in Germany, in the eastern part of the country even a bit more than in the western part. In Poland and the Czech Republic, a shift in the same direction took place between those years, whereas in Russia, Japan, and Israel shifts towards more appreciation of government intervention can be observed. Strikingly high is the level of appreciation of government intervention in Russia. The Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland have experienced steady economic growth after the system change (World Fact Book, 2006). Respondents in these countries can be content with the recent developments and consequently express their appreciation of less regulation of business by the government. The increase of wealth was more rapid in Slovenia than in the other countries, which might explain the high outcomes on this item already in 1996, while in the Czech Republic and Poland the shift in attitudes can be noticed not until 2006. For Russia, these outcomes cannot be explained by economic developments, because the Russian economy experienced a decline in growth directly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the years before the ISSP survey in 1996. However, in the years before the ISSP survey 2006 the Russian economy recovered and showed a positive trend. Factors specific to the Russian system may be pegging support for free market ideas at its extremely low level.




Figure 3.4 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of less regulation of business by the government (in %)

According to their history and ideological roots, the USA and Australia could be expected to show very positive attitudes towards free-market ideas, which means in this context strong support for less governmental regulation of business. The outcomes, however, show that support in both countries, compared to other ISSP member countries, is only around average (for Australia it is even decreasing between 1996 and 2006). But, this does not necessarily contradict the idea that the populations of the USA and Australia stand firmly in a pro-market belief system. It must be kept in mind that the statements given by citizens in response to the ISSP items always refer to hypothetical *changes* in a realised level of state activity. It is these changes that the respondents are measuring against the current status quo and their own ideological beliefs. Thus, US or Australian citizens might make relatively moderate statements about state interventionism because even the level of interventionism attained *after* the changes would still be comparatively low.

The same fact should be kept in mind when looking at the next item concerning the support for cuts in government spending (item A, *Figure 3.5*). In most of the 22 countries offering trend data, the idea of cuts in government spending is supported by a majority of respondents. It is only in 2006 that the majority of respondents for spending cuts has turned into a minority in some more countries (Australia, Ireland, Russia, and Switzerland, at levels of between 30% and 40%). Great Britain has always been on very low levels of support in this respect.

So, the data show that people in most countries generally support cuts in government spending. However, we have already seen that interventional actions of the government, such as financing projects to create new jobs or providing support for the industry to develop new products and technology, are generally supported at the same time. These somewhat inconsistent response distributions might, on the one hand, be based on the respondents' wish of gaining both: the advantages of an active and those of a passive role of government in terms of economic interventions. From a methodological point of view some of the inconsistency might have been provoked by the switch of the scaling direction made over the different items. While for all the other items of that item-battery, "strongly against" means being strongly against government intervention in the economy, in the case of "cuts in government spending" and "less regulation of business", "strongly against" means the opposite, that is being in favour of an active role of government in economy. Some respondents might have missed this switch.




Figure 3.5 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of cuts in government spending (in %)

Support for direct intervention of the government in the economy is generally weaker than for indirect intervention, as tapped by items B, D, and H. *Figure 3.6* shows respondents attitudes towards governmental support for declining industries to protect jobs (item E).

The picture here differs remarkably between the countries. In Ireland, Israel, Italy, and Spain, the support in all module years has, with between 70% and 80% of respondents approving, been strong over all available module years, while in Canada, the Czech Republic and New Zealand, with only around 30% and 40% support has always been comparably weak. In the USA one can see very stable outcomes of around 50% for the first three module years. In 2006, however, this number strikingly increased up to 67%. This attitude shift in direction of more enthusiasm towards government intervention in the economy could already be observed at the other items in this context.

The lowest general support for governmental actions influencing the economy can be noticed for “Reducing the working week to create more jobs” (item F, *Figure 3.7*).

In most countries there has been a substantial decrease in support for this item over the years. The USA and Australia are, and have been since 1985, especially unsupportive to the idea of reducing the working week for the benefit of creating more jobs. Also in Russia, New Zealand, and the Czech Republic support for such a government action has, at only between 20% and 30% of respondents appreciating, always been very weak. In France, Ireland, Switzerland, and the Philippines support substantially decreased between 1996 and 2006.

However, it might be questionable if this item can be seen in direct context with the other items on government intervention in economy. Reducing the working week does not necessarily mean less working hours with the same income for employees, as the proposal in some European countries was. The construct could as well be understood to lead to less income for those who already have a job. To the working individual, the assumed consequence of losing income is probably more threatening than collective employment is desirable. The issue of reducing the working week to create more jobs has been discussed with different background prerequisites in different societies at different points of time. Therefore, the prevalent interpretations of the discourse can also be very diverse across all our samples, even if these are from the same country.




Figure 3.6 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the government supporting declining industries to protect jobs (in %)




Figure 3.7 Respondents who are (strongly) in favour of the reduction of the working week by the government to create more jobs (in %)

An item that also implies more or less direct interventions in the economy is the control of prices (item G, *Figure 3.8*). It should be noted that ‘controlling prices’ can be achieved through very different measures, ranging from the indirect approach of a strict monetary and fiscal policy to the very direct approach of the administration actually prescribing fixed prices for given products. While this item does not allow strong conclusions about the specific measures that respondents prefer, it can be taken for granted that the control of prices, in a very broad sense, is always under the responsibility of the government (or the Central Bank). Thus, the item at least gives a good impression of the degree of attention that respondents want to see paid to this issue in relation to other government tasks.

The item is taken from the item battery concentrating on welfare issues, introduced in the second chapter. Since these items only have a four point scale, the “price control” item is not exactly comparable with the other items presented in this chapter, because those feature a five point scale including a neutral “neither nor” category. Leaving that aside for now, the data show that support is strong for governmental price control.

In all 22 countries, over all module years, an absolute majority of respondents think that the government should definitely or probably be responsible for keeping prices under control. The highest response rates of over 90% can be found in Italy, Russia, Ireland, the Philippines, and within the Arab population of Israel. Taking into account the high and unsteady inflation rates in these countries in the 1990s and the early 21<sup>st</sup> century (World Fact Book, 2006), those results are not surprising. The least enthusiasm is shown by the Czech Republic, with comparably weak support for price control measures at 64% in 2006 – in 1996, this figure was still higher at 80%. In Great Britain, support gradually declines over the years, from 90% in 1985 to 80% in 2006. In the USA, we can once more see support for government activity increasing from 64% in 1996 to 78% in 2006. Apart from those changes, the outcomes on this item are remarkably stable over time within the countries. Increasing prices is an issue that citizens experience, and often suffer from, most personally and directly. So, public opinion almost everywhere exerts a strong pressure on governments to act against this problem.






Figure 3.8 Respondents who think that the government should definitely/probably be responsible for keeping prices under control (in %)

## Cross-national patterns

From the partly dramatic changes in attitude levels that we have observed between adjacent Role of Government modules for a given country, it is apparent that national-specific influences, be they short-term or long-term, have a strong impact on national results as well as on the general picture. It might, however, still be true that more global trends and events produce systematic patterns that hold at least for whole groups of countries, and in spite of national divergences give an overall structure to all the different attitudes we have discussed so far. An example for such a pattern could be expected among the former socialist countries, represented here with trend data by the Czech Republic, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Slovenia and Russia. Arguably, in such countries, according to their ideological roots, attitudes should have changed over the years from supporting the idea of extended governmental intervention towards an increasing belief in free-market ideology (Lane, 2007). We will have a look now at the outcomes in these countries on the basis of the item that most directly addresses governmental involvement in economy - that is, whether citizens wish more or less governmental regulation of business (item C, *Figure 3.4*). The more respondents answer (strongly) in favour of less governmental regulation of business, the smaller the mean value, indicating, that more respondents tend to approve of free-market ideas.

Taking into account the time frame of ten – in the case of East Germany and Hungary sixteen – years, *Table 3.1* shows that the assumption is true in the case of the Czech Republic, East Germany, Poland, and Latvia. Attitudes in Slovenia have not changed much, whereas in Hungary (1996) and Russia a change in attitudes towards favouring governmental intervention has taken place. While in 1996 39% of the Russian respondents approved of the free-market idea of less regulation of business, in 2006 there are only 23% left. The average response value shifted from 2.82 to 3.26. Although, as already mentioned above, official numbers clearly show economic growth within these 10 years of new economic policies in Russia,<sup>14</sup> the perceptions of these policies seem to be rather negative.

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14 For the development of the Russian economy see: Russian Economic Reports of The World Bank, 2006.

*Table 3.1* Respondents' attitudes towards less governmental regulation of business in 5 former socialist states (in means)

MEANS <sup>15</sup>	1990	1996	2006
Czech Republic		2.70	2.31
Poland		2.66	2.42
Slovenia		2.38	2.33
Russia		2.82	3.26
Latvia		2.73	2.46
Hungary	1.95	2.57	2.50
East Germany	2.77	2.60	1.98
Former Socialist means		2.64	2.47

In Hungary, however, the number of respondents expressing the wish for less governmental regulation of business is on a very high level in 1990. After a decline in 1996, the numbers match the average of the other countries much more. Therefore, the high support for less regulation of business in Hungary in 1990 could be interpreted as a strong counter-reaction against former policies that diminish to a "normal" level over the years as the new policies became established. East Germany, the only other former socialist country for which data from 1990 is also available, does not show similar outcomes, but here we have an extraordinary close relation and therefore orientation towards the western part of Germany, offering very good conditions for a system change. Phenomena like in Hungary almost necessarily lead to an extension of the original question: it should not only be asked whether people's attitudes within the former socialist Eastern European countries are becoming more free-market oriented, but rather: are they accommodating to their Western European neighbour countries? *Table 3.2* shows the means for the attitudes towards governmental regulation of business in the former socialist states and the single and average outcomes for five Western European countries for comparison.

*Table 3.2* Respondents' attitudes towards less governmental regulation of business in 5 Western European states (in means)

MEANS	1996	2006
West Germany	2.47	2.02
France	2.16	2.36
Great Britain	2.66	2.57
Switzerland	2.55	2.70
Sweden	2.63	2.61
Western European means	2.49	2.45
Former Socialist means	2.64	2.47
Gap in means	0.15	0.02

15 MEANS (item C) vary between 1 "Strongly in favour of" and 5 "Strongly against".

The gap between the country group means of the former socialist states and their Western European neighbours, here represented by West Germany, France, Great Britain, Switzerland and Sweden, indeed declines slightly between 1996 and 2006. However, the results show that although the overall mean is a little lower for the Western states, individual countries of this cluster show less free-market orientation in terms of our item than some of the Eastern cluster. Great Britain, for example, shows less market oriented attitudes than the Eastern European average in both years. As already stressed, that is primarily because of the great differences in the levels of governmental intervention in a certain state at the time when the respondents are asked. So, taking into account the nation-specific roots, political events and developments, a one-dimensional model of change, even among countries with certain similar prerequisites, does not seem to work too adequately to explain the differences in attitude between these countries.


### Support for market-liberalism and interventionism

As a last step, we want to look at the structure of national attitudes towards governmental intervention in the economy, compared to attitudes towards interventions in the form of social welfare measures<sup>16</sup> (see chapter 2) over time. The question we want to address here is whether the relationship between supporting these two issues stays the same despite the various changes in ideology, politics and global economy, short- and long-term, that have taken place over the last twenty years. In other words: Even with national populations changing their average attitude positions on each of these issues quite profoundly over time, is there still a ‘market-liberal’ syndrome and a ‘pro-interventionism syndrome’? Have these ideological patterns survived the changing environment over the last decades?


A short answer is that they apparently have survived at a global level, even with the changes being massive at the level of each nation. Although the scales of both item batteries cannot be compared directly because of the different ranges, the general trend becomes quite obvious when we look at the country means for both issues. Over the 20 years, government intervention in the economy generally appears less popular than support for welfare state issues. But, as we can see in *Figure 3.9* and *Figure 3.10*, the more government welfare support is desired in a country, the more intervention in the economy is usually wanted as well. In 2006, many less advanced countries participated in the ISSP. In these countries we observe the tendency of wanting state intervention in both respects at a higher level than in the more advanced countries. Therefore, the cloud of all countries moved and expanded in 2006, compared to 1985 to the top

16 To compare attitudes towards issues of governmental intervention we computed the mean value over all the items involved separately for the welfare state issues and the economy issues. Welfare state issues are: A: provide a job for everyone, C: provide health care, D: provide decent living standard for the old, F: provide decent living standard for the unemployed, G: reduce income differences, H: give financial help to university students, I: provide decent living standard for those who can’t afford it. In 1985 welfare state items H and I were not surveyed. The economy items used are those introduced in this chapter.

right of the chart. Interestingly, individual country outcomes of those countries originally observed in 1985 have changed in 2006 in such a way that the original pattern of association has vanished. For example, the USA and Australia have become more enthusiastic towards state responsibilities in both respects, while Germany has become less enthusiastic. Looking at the larger picture of 2006, however, it gives the impression of the association being entirely intact. The countries that joined the ISSP since 1985 seem to have taken most of the positions vacated by these original countries. Ideological structures may have changed massively within these ‘old’ Western countries, but in a global perspective, there still is structure and consistency in economical belief systems.



*Figure 3.9* Association (1985) between attitudes towards governmental intervention in economy and welfare state issues (means)  
 Welfare variables, on the vertical axis, range from 1 ‘Definitely should not be’ to 4 ‘Definitely should be’; economy variables, on the horizontal axis, range from 1 ‘Strongly against’ to 5 ‘Strongly in favour of’.



*Figure 3.10* Association (2006) between attitudes towards governmental intervention in economy and welfare state issues (means)  
 Welfare variables, on the vertical axis, range from 1 'Definitely should not be' to 4 'Definitely should be'; economy variables, on the horizontal axis, range from 1 'Strongly against' to 5 'Strongly in favour of'.

## Conclusion

We have observed in this chapter that, in general, public support is strong for any government actions that enable industries to help themselves. When it comes to rather one-sided supportive actions, however, public support tends to decline. One case that particularly stood out in this examination are the USA, where a general tendency of more governmental intervention in the economy can be observed. The former socialistic countries displayed an overall tendency of a movement towards free-market ideas, although we also realized that this development is much more complex than could be explained by the one dimension we offered in our analysis. Beyond that, we found that the over all correlation between public support of government intervention in the economy, compared to welfare state issues stayed pretty stable over the last twenty years despite the comprehensive global changes during that time.



## 4 Government's Spending Priorities

One basic aspect that shapes the role of every government in every society is the amount and the focus of public spending. This chapter concentrates on citizens' attitudes towards governments' spending priorities, building on eight ISSP items. Respondents were asked whether they would like to see more or less public spending on policy areas which we have grouped into three dimensions: "law and order", "welfare state" and "post-materialistic" policy goals. To make respondents aware of the conflict between the demand for more, or even much more, spending on certain areas, and the omnipresent wish for a reduction or at least no increase of taxes, the question text includes the note: *"Remember that if you say 'much more', it might require a tax increase to pay for it."*

On the one hand, attitudes on government spending might be short-term reactions due to current national political conditions, such as current budget changes, which can be, as we have already seen in the previous chapters, quite different among the countries. On the other hand, we have also already seen that larger ideological or developmental patterns can provide some structure to the overall picture. In this chapter we will therefore try to use the ISSP items on spending priorities to make some considerations about secular value change in societies. A popular point of departure for that kind of endeavour is the theory of Ronald Inglehart, who has famously postulated a value shift from materialism to postmaterialism in advanced industrial societies (Inglehart, 1977). Based on Abraham Maslow's "hierarchy of human needs" (Maslow, 1943), Inglehart assumes basic human needs, such as physical and economical well-being, as well as safety demands, to give rise to materialistic values. Postmaterialistic values, in contrast, are in this context driven by more abstract needs, such as freedom, happiness, and self-realisation, and they only come into play after the basic, material needs have been provided for (Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 24). Inglehart's theory argues that a society's values move from materialism to postmaterialism as a result of perceived physiological and psychological safety, which can only occur in periods of material affluence and absence of war. The longer these periods of material affluence last, the more people experience prosperity in their formative years, which, according to Inglehart, is a prerequisite for the manifestation of postmaterialistic values in a society. After looking at the individual ISSP items in national comparison, we will examine whether different value priorities of materialism or postmaterialism can be observed in different ISSP countries.

### Variables and distributions

The ISSP item-battery on government's spending priorities was surveyed in all four module years as follows:

*Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. (ZA4747: V35-V42)*

- A. The environment
- B. Health



C. *The police and law enforcement*

D. *Education*

E. *The military and defence*

F. *Old age pensions*

G. *Unemployment benefits*

H. *Culture and the arts*

*Respondents had the possibility to answer: spend much more, spend more, spend the same as now, spend less, spend much less or can't choose*

We will take a look now at the results for individual items, and possible changes in attitudes over time. The charts below show, for each country, the respondents' spending priorities, as expressed by agreeing to one of the two affirmative response categories in favour of (much) more spending.

Taking into account the vivid discussion about global warming within the media during the last years, one might assume that an increasing collective awareness of environmental protection should have developed within the societies. So, it could be assumed that the growing public interest in that issue should also be visible in the data. But as we can see in *Figure 4.1*, responses do not turn out to be as clearly in favour of that issue as expected. In half of the countries where data from 1996 and 2006 is available, respondents wanted even more government spending on environment in 1996 than in 2006. With the exception of Israel, all countries we have trend data for since 1990 or 1985 actually show the most interest in government spending for environmental protection in 1990. In 2006, the Dominican Republic, South Korea, and Ireland are, with around 70% of respondents answering the government should spend (much) more on environmental protection, the countries where respondents place the most weight on this issue. Respondents in both parts of Germany (East: 33%, West: 38%), the Netherlands (33%), New Zealand (36%), and the Scandinavian countries (Finland 43%, Sweden 40%, and Norway 39%) are the least supportive of more government spending on environmental protection. It seems plausible that these outcomes mirror the current situation in the respective countries. In the more advanced countries the level of the governments' investments into this policy issue has increased over the last decades, not unlikely due to the public concern felt in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of the most visible sources and consequences of environmental pollution have thus been reduced. Hence, citizens might not see an urgent need to support additional spending in this area.<sup>17</sup> In the less advanced countries, however, immediate environmental pollution could still be a more obvious problem. The new ISSP module on environment that will be conducted in 2010, following the Environment modules of the years 1993 and 2000, might give more information on this phenomenon.

17 Another reason for the low appreciation of environmental issues might be that the 'new' debate on climate changes uses a different terminology than the older debate over pollution. 'The climate' is not the same as 'the environment', and carbon dioxide emissions perhaps are not so much regarded as a toxic 'pollutant', as e.g. pesticides or ozone emissions were, with their more immediate effects even on human health.




Figure 4.1 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on the environment (in %)

In chapter 2, we have already noticed that people across all nations participating in the ISSP think that their governments are responsible for providing health care for the sick. Now we see that support for more and even much more government spending on this issue is strong across these countries as well (*Figure 4.2*). In 2006, more than 90% of the respondents in the Dominican Republic, Chile, among the Arab population of Israel, Hungary, Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, and South Africa want (much) more government spending for “Health”.

The lowest levels of support on this issue are observed in Japan (60%), West Germany (58%), France (57%), Taiwan (55%) and, with only 49% of supporting respondents, Switzerland. It is quite conceivable that these attitudes highly depend on the current status quo of the country in question. For example, in Switzerland the vast majority of respondents think that their government is already successful in providing health care for the sick (see *Figure 2.7*), while at the same time the level of health related expenses is very high already. Consequently, there is no need for additional government spending on health.

The question on government spending on the police and law enforcement (*Figure 4.3*) appeals to the respondents’ need for safety. The outcomes differ as much across the countries as their internal political situations do. In some countries, such as Portugal and Japan, the desire for more spending on this area is very low (13% in Portugal, 23% in Japan in 2006). However, agreement to the same categories is, with around 80%, very high in other countries such as Uruguay and Ireland. In most countries, the outcomes are relatively stable over time. Exceptions are New Zealand, Hungary, Great Britain, and Germany, where the desire for more or even much more spending on the police and law enforcement was much stronger in 1996 compared to 2006.




Figure 4.2 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on health (in %)




Figure 4.3 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on the police and law enforcement (in %)

Almost everybody has received state education in her or his life and thus has a pretty good idea of what more spending on education would mean in terms of equipment and infrastructure to those who are still at school. Beyond this, good public education is known to have a positive effect on social equality within societies. These are certainly some of the reasons why spending on education generally has a high priority in all ISSP member countries (*Figure 4.4*). The most developed countries, however, tend to show rather weak support for more spending on education. The lowest level of only 42% respondents on these answer categories can be observed in Finland in 2006. Since the PISA studies<sup>18</sup> certified Finland to have an excellent education system, respondents probably do not see any necessity of more spending in this area. The same might be true for Japan. In Australia, Germany, and the USA, respondents have become increasingly supportive of this issue over the years since 1985. In Great Britain support increased as well until 1996, but decreased in 2006.

Enthusiasm for more spending on military and defence (*Figure 4.5*) is, at a rate of fewer than 10% of respondents supporting this idea in some Western countries and a maximum of 63% among the Jewish population of Israel and in Russia, comparably low. One reason for the low support of government spending on that area might be that the actual benefits for individuals on this issue are rather remote compared to other items of this battery. Furthermore, people might be convinced that peace could be secured better by cuts rather than by additional government spending on military and defence areas (Haller, 1990).

It is interesting to see, however, that in almost all countries from which we have data since 1990 or even 1985, the least support for increasing spending on the military and defence can be observed in 1990. The breakdown of the Soviet Union and therewith the end of the Cold War seem to have cooled down the urgency of this matter for respondents almost cross-nationally. Beyond this, the strong presence of the peace movements in the 1980s, protesting against nuclear weapons and against the NATO Double-Track-Decision<sup>19</sup>, might have had an impact on the respondent's attitudes. In the majority of the countries, however, support increases again between the years of 1996 and 2006 when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq might have brought the need for military and defence back to the surface of respondents' perceptions. Only 4% of the West Germans, for instance, who had the Cold War in their front yard, wanted (much) more spending on this area in 1990. In 2006, there were 12%.

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18 For a comprehensive overview on the PISA study's results see: OECD, 2006.

19 The NATO Double-Track Decision (December, 12th 1979), on the one hand, offered negotiations to the Warsaw Pact about the mutual limitation of middle range nuclear weapons in Europe. On the other hand, it announced, in case of unsuccessful negotiations, the deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons in Western Europe.




Figure 4.4 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on education (in %)




Figure 4.5 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on the military and defence (in %)



Old age pensions and health are those areas where governments already have to spend the most money on. Because of the demographic change towards aging societies, which usually goes along with the modernisation process, governments will have to spend even more on these issues in the future, if only to maintain the current standard. High support on these items (*Figure 4.6* and *Figure 4.2*) in many countries shows that most people have realised this fact and accept it. However, it is again the more advanced countries, such as the Netherlands, France, Canada, and Denmark that show with only between 40% and 50% of respondents lower support levels than the less advanced countries. Chile, Croatia, Ireland, the Arab population of Israel, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Uruguay, and Venezuela in 2006 show support levels for more government spending on old age pensions around 90%. That is probably due to the fact that in the more advanced Western countries pension systems are already better developed than in the less advanced countries.

Although, in times of mass unemployment in many countries, most people should have a good idea of what investments in unemployment benefits would mean for the individuals concerned, this area is quite unpopular as an area of increased government spending (*Figure 4.7*). We have already seen this phenomenon in chapter 2, where respondents show rather weak support for the idea of governments' providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed. The prevailing opinion seems to be that it is to a certain degree people's own fault if they are unemployed, so it should not be the societies' duty to pay for it. The outcomes in 2006 show especially low support in New Zealand, with only 6% expressing the wish for (much) more spending on unemployment benefits. Support in the Netherlands and Australia with 11%, and France as well as Great Britain with 13% is also rather low for more spending on this area. Countries where a collective wish for more spending on this issue is expressed are Venezuela and Chile with 80% and 79%, South Africa with 70%, Croatia with 66%, and Uruguay with 62%. Again, these numbers certainly mirror the current situation in the countries in question, with rather low levels of unemployment benefits. The higher the unemployment rates and the worse the consequences of unemployment for the individual are, the greater the wish for more governmental spending on unemployment benefits. Attitudes on this issue are, in the most countries, remarkably stable over time.

Government spending on culture and arts (*Figure 4.8*) is among the least popular spending areas in all ISSP countries. However, the differences in support for this issue vary greatly between the countries. While in the Scandinavian countries, West Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Great Britain only 8% to 14% of the respondents express the wish for more or much more spending on culture and arts, in Croatia it is 52%, among the Arab population of Israel and in Russia it is 53%, in the Philippines 56%, in the Dominican Republic 62%, and in Venezuela even 71%. These results have, once more, to be interpreted on the background of usually very low spending for culture and arts in less wealthy countries.




Figure 4.6 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on old age pensions (in %)




Figure 4.7 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on unemployment benefits (in %)




Figure 4.8 Respondents who say that the government should spend (much) more money on culture and arts (in %)

## Materialism and Postmaterialism

Let us have a look now at whether we can observe different value priorities within societies that are at different stages of modernisation, through these data. Following Ronald Inglehart's theory of value change we should expect high appreciation of elementary, "materialistic" values within those societies that have not experienced long periods of material affluence so far and where a high percentage of the population might have grown up lacking basic material needs. The ISSP items asking for more government spending on "The police and law enforcement" and "The military and defence" to some degree represent those materialistic values in our data. Postmaterialistic values are tentatively assessed by the items on "Environment" and "Culture and arts". Appreciation of so called "postmaterialistic" values should, according to Inglehart, be high in those societies which have experienced long periods of material affluence. In those societies the fulfilment of elementary, "materialistic" values can be taken for granted and people can generally "afford" to care more about their quality of life, with regard to goals such as self-expression, aesthetic concerns and a healthy environment.

Five ISSP member countries that experienced relatively peaceful and prosperous last decades after World War II and currently produce a comparatively high GDP per capita<sup>20</sup> are Norway, the USA, Sweden, West Germany, and France. Those ISSP member countries that produce the lowest GDP per capita are in 2006 South Africa, Uruguay, Venezuela, Chile, and the Dominican Republic. From the more advanced Western states the Inglehart thesis would predict higher spending priorities for the postmaterialistic goals than for the materialistic goals, whereas expectations for the less advanced countries are reversed. *Table 4.1* shows the means and the rank of priority for the items representing those values in the different societies.

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20 For an international overview on the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita see: World Fact Book, 2006.

*Table 4.1* Advanced and less advanced countries, means and rank of the “postmaterialistic” items “Environment” and “Culture and Arts” and two “materialistic” items “Police and Law enforcement” and “Military and Defence”. The rank refers to all eight items on social spending introduced above. The values rank from 1 ‘Spend much more’ to 5 ‘Spend much less’.

Country	Environment		Culture/Arts		Police/Law		Military/Defence	
	mean	rank	mean	rank	mean	rank	mean	rank
West Germany	2.6	5	3.3	7	2.5	4	3.5	8
France	2.4	3	3.4	6	2.8	5	3.6	8
Norway	2.6	5	3.5	8	2.1	2	3.4	7
USA	2.5	5	3.1	8	2.4	4	2.8	7
Sweden	2.6	5	3.4	7	2.2	2	3.5	8
Uruguay	2.5	6	2.6	7	1.8	4	3.5	8
Venezuela	2.4	7	2.1	6	2.0	5	2.6	8
South Africa	2.6	6	2.7	7	2.1	5	2.8	8
Chile	2.7	6	2.7	7	2.4	5	3.3	8
Dominican Rep. <sup>21</sup>	2.3	4	2.3	5	2.4	6	2.5	7

The outcomes clearly show that respondents in less developed countries generally tend to demand more spending on *all areas offered*, compared to the advanced countries. That is not surprising, since they currently spend on lower levels. However, it turned out that also the priorities of the spending areas do not vary as expected according to Inglehart’s theory. The less advanced countries are expected to reveal higher priorities for safety demands. But the data from 2006 show that in all those countries, spending on the military and defence ranks at the last place of the priority-list, just as in West Germany, France, and Sweden. In Norway and the USA, contrary to our assumptions, this item even ranks one place better. The situation in the USA might be special, since the country has been at war with Afghanistan and the Iraq, recently. Beyond this, the terrorist acts of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 might have caused the feeling that war had taken place in their own country for some respondents and, therefore, governmental spending on the military and defence might be given a higher priority by US-American respondents than in other advanced countries. However, this explanation can hardly be true for Norway. Spending on the police and law enforcement is also, contradictory to Inglehart’s theory, generally more appreciated in the advanced than in the less advanced countries. While in Norway and Sweden this item even ranks second behind “Health”, in the less advanced countries it enjoys the most popularity in Uruguay, where it only ranks at place number four.

21 In the Dominican Republic questions on “unemployment benefits” were not posed. So, for this country, the priority scale only reaches up to seven items.

In the case of the postmaterialistic items, we have to distinguish between “Environment” and “Culture and Arts”. The results for spending priorities on the environment go along with Inglehart’s assumptions. The ranking here shows substantially more enthusiasm among the more advanced countries, seen in relation to the other spending areas. But this is not true for the “Culture and Art” item. In the Dominican Republic, it ranks even higher than in all of the advanced countries.<sup>22</sup> In Norway and the USA, spending on culture and arts ranks at the last place on the popularity-scale – lower than in all of the less advanced countries.

## Conclusion

As we can see from the data, attitudes towards social spending seem to depend on the current status quo of spending within the respondent’s home country. In general, the wish for more social spending is more pronounced in less affluent countries.

Apart from that, a look at the materialistic and postmaterialistic values shows that the results from ISSP data do not match Inglehart’s ideas very well. This could have many reasons. One reason could be that even the “less advanced” ISSP countries might already be too advanced to show priorities on materialistic values instead of postmaterialistic values. Another issue could be that national factors, such as policy changes, have such a strong impact on attitudes towards spending priorities that it is simply not possible to assess underlying fundamental values with this item-battery.

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22 See, however, the preceding footnote.

## 5 Taxation – Redistribution

Taxes are the main source of revenue for most modern states and thus are the prerequisite for any kind of government spending. While indirect taxation, such as sales tax, is roughly equal for all citizens of a certain country, direct taxes, such as personal income tax, often involve a progressive element, meaning that those with higher incomes pay a larger *share* of their income in tax compared to low-income earners. Hence, most public debates about taxation policies are also intrinsically linked with the issue of the redistribution of wealth.

Therefore, this chapter will first look at the extent to which the people of the ISSP countries support the general principle of government redistribution of income. For this, we will return to an item that we have already briefly shown in chapter 2.

In a second step, we will move on to the practice of progressive income taxation. Respondents of the ISSP surveys 1985 and 1990 were asked whether they think that those with higher incomes should pay larger or smaller proportions of their incomes in taxes.<sup>23</sup> In 1996 and 2006 respondents were given the opportunity to evaluate their own tax system's distributive effects. Both sets of questions, those of 1985/1990 and those of 1996/2006, basically express the same idea: The wish for redistribution of wealth through targeted taxation of specific income groups. We will compare these outcomes with the general desire for redistribution presented before and see if they match each other, or whether there appear essential differences in attitudes on the general desire and its specific realisation through taxes.

The very same ISSP items may also shed some light on the dilemma that governments spending money for public goods at one end have to collect that money at another end. The question that almost inevitably results is this: are people willing to pay for what they demand from the government? Therefore, in the third part of this chapter we will examine whether people in favour of increased government spending are also in favour of increasing taxes.

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23 How adequately citizens are able to understand tax policy concepts in general, and especially through standard survey items as they have been used in the ISSP, may be debatable. The question is whether people really understand the progressive concept behind terms such as “proportion” and “percentage”. Some argue that citizens' understanding of these concepts is generally inadequate (Roberts, 1994). Others challenge this “non-attitude”-thesis. It has been proved, for example, that there is no evidence that people do not understand the concept of progressive taxation in Sweden (Edlund, 2003). This uncertainty of respondent's understanding, however, should be kept in mind while analysing the data.



## Variables and distributions

### Generally: redistribution of wealth

The first item looks at the principle of making the redistribution of income a government responsibility.


In all four module years the ISSP asked:

*On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to...? (ZA4747: V56)*

- *Reduce income differences between the rich and poor*

*Respondents had the possibility to answer: definitely should be, probably should be, probably should not be, definitely should not be or can't choose*

As we have already seen when looking at this item in chapter 2, there is predominant support for reducing income differences between the rich and the poor, over all countries and module years. Particularly high levels of support show Chile, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, and Uruguay at more than 80% of respondents in favour of government redistribution of income. The other end of the distribution is occupied by some non-European countries with an Anglo-American heritage: we observe comparably low support for government redistribution in the USA, New Zealand (with only between 40% and 50% of respondents in favour of redistribution), Australia, and to a lesser degree, Canada. But also the Czech Republic, Japan, and Denmark have rather low rates of agreement.



*Figure 5.1* Respondents who think that it should definitely/probably be the responsibility of the government to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor (in %)

### Specifically: progressive taxation

With the next step, we turn to attitudes on progressive taxation, which is here expressed as differential taxation of different income groups.

In 1985 and 1990 the ISSP asked:

*Some people think those with high incomes should pay a larger proportion (percentage) of their earnings in taxes than those who earn low incomes. Other people think that those with high incomes and those with low incomes should pay the same proportion (percentage) of their earning in taxes. Do you think those with high incomes should...? (ZA4747: V25)*

- *Pay a much larger proportion*
- *Pay a larger proportion*
- *Pay the same proportion as those who earn low income*
- *Pay a smaller proportion*
- *Pay a much smaller proportion*
- *Can't choose*




Figure 5.2 Preference for paying responsibilities: Those with high incomes should pay a larger or smaller proportion of their earnings in taxes (in %)

Attitudes on progressive taxation in 1985 and 1990 (*Figure 5.2*) show vast majorities (between 56% in the USA 1985 and 91% in East-Germany 1990) in favour of those with high incomes paying a (much) larger income proportion in tax in every country. Almost nobody (mostly under 1%) wants those with a high income to pay smaller proportional taxes than those with a low income. Not very surprisingly, the highest agreement to the category “pay the same proportion as those who earn low income” – which means being in favour of a flat rate model instead of a progressive taxation model – are to be observed in countries with predominant free market beliefs (cf. Ch. 3), such as the USA and Australia. With the exception of Great Britain, where respondents appear to favour progressive taxation more in 1990 than they did in 1985, attitudes appear quite stable over the five years.

In 1996 and 2006, the questions focused on public evaluations of the actual distribution of taxes across different income groups.

*Generally, how would you describe taxes in [Country] today? (We mean all taxes together, including wage deductions, income tax, tax on goods and services and all the rest.) (ZA4747: V67-V69)*

- *First for those with high incomes*
- *Next for those with middle incomes*
- *Lastly, for those with low incomes*

*Respondents were asked if they consider taxes as much too high, too high, about right, too low, much too low or if they can't choose.*

Responses to the questions asked in 1996 and 2006 do not mirror the results from 1985/1990 exactly. But the larger picture is quite the same: in the majority of countries, most respondents think that people with a high income should pay higher taxes than they currently do, while for those with a middle or low income, taxes are generally perceived as too high or about right.

In almost all countries in 1996 as well as in 2006, simple majorities of respondents support the principle of progressive taxation, saying that taxes for those with a high income are still too low (*Figures 5.3.1* and *5.3.2*). Exceptions in 1996 are Ireland, Israel and most surprisingly, the Philippines with only 13% of respondents answering taxes for those with a high income are too low and 47% saying taxes were too high. In the USA, attitudes seem to be almost balanced between the two options. In 2006, attitudes in Ireland and the USA shifted substantially towards the progressive idea, while in New Zealand, Australia and Canada a shift towards the opinion that those with a high income pay too much tax can be observed. The new participant South Africa shows quite similar outcomes as the Philippines do.

The results for the item asking about the situation for those with a middle income fit well into this picture. In all countries and over both years (*Figures 5.4.1* and *5.4.2*), small minorities of less than 10% of the respondents think taxes for this income group are too low. However, in 1996 in 7 out of 24 country-samples and in 2006 in 9 out of 35 country-samples, simple and even absolute majorities are of the opinion that taxes for those with a middle income are about right. Except for the Philippines in 1996 and South

Africa in 2006, in all ISSP countries over both modules absolute majorities of respondents perceive taxes for those with a low income as too high (Figures 5.5.1 and 5.5.2).




Figure 5.3.1 Description (1996) of taxes for those with high incomes (in %)




Figure 5.3.2 Description (2006) of taxes for those with high incomes (in %)




Figure 5.4.1 Description (1996) of taxes for those with middle incomes (in %)




Figure 5.4.2 Description (2006) of taxes for those with middle incomes (in %)






Figure 5.5.1 Description (1996) of taxes for those with low incomes (in %)




Figure 5.5.2 Description (2006) of taxes for those with low incomes (in %)

The results so far suggest that the principle of progressive taxation receives strong public support, and, further, that the public in a large majority of countries would welcome a political strategy devoted to increased tax progression. There are, however, some notable exceptions from this general pattern. In New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, and to a lesser extent also in Venezuela, the support for higher taxes for those with a high income is very low. The New Zealanders simply perceive taxes for all income classes as rather too high than too low, which could be due to the already well developed and extraordinarily efficient tax system (Dalsgaard, 2001). In contrast to all other countries, in the Philippines and South Africa there are substantially more people who want higher taxes for those with a low income, than there are people who support higher taxes for those with a middle income. The Philippines are the most extreme outlier here, with even more respondents wishing higher taxes for those with a low income than there are respondents who want higher taxes for those with a high income.

The reasons for that could lie in different factors. One of these, but one of particular interest in our international setting, is the comparability of seemingly identical measurements across different countries. When the concept of progressive taxation is not well understood by a majority of people in a society, their response patterns will hardly look the same as in societies where progressive taxation is common practice. It is likely that in some countries, namely those with an omnipresent welfare state based on a clear and transparent tax system, the everyday environment and the political communication will have a stronger educational influence on the understanding of redistributive concepts in the public. In these countries, citizens are simply better informed and the concepts might be better internalized by respondents, and therefore also better retrieved by the ISSP questions than in countries without redistribution through taxation being common practice (Edlund, 2003).

## Comparison of the two concepts

We will now take a look at whether attitudes towards the general alleviation of social inequality through a general income redistribution policy are different compared to the questions that related specifically to taxation. Generally, we can observe that the more abstractly formulated principle of government redistribution of income is more supported than the more concrete formulated practice of progressive taxation. This becomes particularly clear in the examples of the Philippines, South Africa and Venezuela. On the one hand, in 2006 68% of the respondents in the Philippines, 71% in Venezuela, and in South Africa even 81% of the respondents support the principle of government reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor. As we have seen in the section above, the practice of progressive taxation, on the other hand, is not supported in these countries at all. In Venezuela in 2006 only 23% of respondents think taxes for those with high income are (much) too low; not so many less think the same for those with middle and low income. This is by no means a pattern typical of poorer countries: the Dominican Republic, Chile or Uruguay do not fit into that pattern. The relative wealth of a country, therefore, seems not to play a straightforward role for the dominant evaluation of tax paying responsibilities.

In the Anglo-American countries, the response distributions for the different sources match somewhat better. In international comparison, the support for government redistribution is rather weak here. The same attitudes become clear on the items on progressive taxation. Still, for example in Australia in 2006 after all 56% of respondents support the principle of redistribution, but only 26% think taxes for those with a high income are too low. Either Australians are very content already with the success of redistribution policies in their country, or these results might be an indicator for the sympathy for the poor fading when it comes more concretely to paying.

In the USA, taking into account the free-market oriented background of this country, a remarkably large number of respondents express the wish for higher taxes for those with a high income. These attitudes might refer to a “super-rich” group of society that does not even exist in every society, at least not to the extent or with the visibility that it does have in the USA. US Americans are, to a comparably high degree, against the reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor, but they still seem to perceive that the “super-rich” might not pay their share to the appropriate extent (Johnston, 2003). In other words, taxation does not seem to be understood as a redistributive tool among US citizens, at least not to the same extent as in many other OECD countries, but rather as a form of punishment (Edlund, 1999, 2003; Svallfors, 2006).

In conclusion, there is a general pattern that is valid in a large majority of countries: solid public support for the principle of government income redistribution and progressive taxation. Also, when the public judges their own current tax system, a large majority tends to support increased tax progression, although in some countries support turns out to be somewhat weaker when concrete income groups are addressed.

## The relationship between social spending and taxes

Finally, the data of the 2006 module allow a check on the compatibility of respondents' demands on government expenses of any kind and their willingness to pay for these services. Chapter 4 has already introduced the question battery on government spending.<sup>24</sup> The introductory text for this battery includes the warning: *Remember that if you say 'much more', it might require a tax increase to pay for it.*

It is obviously interesting to ask how many citizens hold consistent attitudes when it comes to the relationship between taxation and public spending. How common is a "wanting something for nothing mentality" in the public and, moreover, does it vary across countries? In *Figure 5.6*, four types of tax-spending attitudes are shown. The first bar for each country shows the percentage of citizens that hold consistent attitudes, where consistency can occur in two ways: if they are in favour of "much more" spending on balance, they are also in favour of increased taxation. If, on the other hand, they are not in favour of "much more" spending, they are also not in favour of increased taxation. The second bar shows the inconsistent attitude set-ups, again, there are two of these. The first is the "something for nothing" group: They want "much more" spending on balance, but they are not willing to raise taxes. The last group consists of those that are not in favour of "much more" spending, but still are in favour of increasing taxes.<sup>25</sup>

Consistent answers are those either in favour of much more governmental spending and higher taxes or those in favour of not much more governmental spending and no higher taxes. Inconsistent, by contrast, are those answers, in favour of much more government spending but not favouring higher taxes, and those, not in favour of much more government spending, but still in favour of higher taxes.

The smallest groups over all ISSP countries are, on the one hand, the consistent type representing respondents who express their wishes for generally much more government spending and accept increasing taxes in return and, on the other hand, the inconsistent type of respondents who want more taxes but not that much more government spending. Interestingly, the second group is even slightly larger than the first in many countries, although one should assume that if people are all set to pay more taxes, they might at least want to receive something in return.

24 Here the ISSP asked whether people support government spending on the environment, health, the police and law enforcement, education, the military and defence, old age pensions, unemployment benefits and culture and arts.

25 When we speak of respondents 'wanting spending', we refer to a preference for much more spending, averaged over all kinds of government spending areas that the ISSP asked for. When we speak of respondents being in favour of tax increases, we refer to agreement with taxes being much too low or too low, averaged over all (high, middle, low) income groups.




Figure 5.6 Relation between respondents who answered consistently and those who answered inconsistently to the questions about the amount of governmental spending and the tax rates to pay for it (in %)

The remaining two groups are much larger, comprising respondents who do not want tax increases. One group indicates consistency, with respondents accepting the contingency between increased spending and tax increases, and therefore wanting neither of these. The other large group comprises respondents who, in contrast, show inconsistency by wanting “something for nothing”. As shown in the figure, the shares of those two types vary greatly across countries. In 13 out of 33 countries, we can see that the inconsistent category “wanting something for nothing” is larger than the consistent category. In Ireland, this group of respondents is, at 67%, extraordinarily large. However, there are 20 countries where consistent attitudes prevail: in New Zealand, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden even majorities of over 70% express their wishes for not wanting much more government spending but at the same time not wanting taxes to increase.

The graph shows a pretty clear pattern. Predominantly, the citizens of comparably poorer countries – but also of Ireland and Israel – want “something for nothing” from their governments. As noted before, this is probably caused by the currently very low levels of social protection through the state, confronted with high levels of poverty that make a concession towards more taxes almost impossible. In the wealthier, mostly Western countries, however, the pattern suggests that respondents predominantly perceive government spending to be more or less sufficient already. The results of chapter 4 have shown that people in the Western countries want more government spending as well, mostly on social areas. But they do not seem to feel this need so urgently that majorities would want an increase in spending without having an idea who might pay for it.

## Conclusion

We have clearly registered some imbalances in attitudes when it comes to social spending and taxation: a not insignificant number of citizens seem to want increased public spending, but they are not prepared to pay for it through increased taxation. The frequency of this attitudinal inconsistency varies quite extensively across countries, but it seems to be more common in poorer countries than in the rich Western countries.

## 6 Political Efficacy and Political Participation

Political participation can imply a great variety of participatory activities, from political discussion to campaign participation. The basic form of participation, however, is simply casting one's vote at general elections. Since in democracies the legitimacy of a government depends on elections depicting the people's choice, an effective democracy itself depends on the willingness of its citizens to vote. But an election does not guarantee that the elected leaders in the end come up to their voters' expectations. Furthermore, one might ask whether it is rational behaviour to vote, since one single vote matters little in relation to the general turnout (Downs, 1957: 260f.). However, if everyone decides against voting, acting up to the belief that it will not change anything, the legitimacy of a government declines.

A good premise for any citizen's political participation is a sense of political efficacy. The items that are used to tap into the concept of political efficacy in the Role of Government surveys can be assigned to two dimensions, called internal and external efficacy. Closely related to external efficacy is the trust that citizens have (or do not have) in public officials. Therefore, the question battery also comprises two items on incumbent-based trust. Internal efficacy describes the degree to which respondents deem themselves capable of understanding politics and handling its complexities. This is an important factor for political participation in at least two ways: First, well-informed and self-confident citizens are usually taken to be a normative precondition for democracy – if citizens did not trust their own judgment of politics, how could elections be expected to produce outcomes that benefit the democratic majority, and eventually, how could democracy be seen as the ideal form to regulate power in a society? Second, internal efficacy speaks on the individual motivation for political participation. Citizens who believe that politics is beyond their judgment would be unlikely to support the political system, and they would probably hardly be willing to cast a vote for some goal or programme which they do not understand. External efficacy points to the belief that the political system is at all responsive to the opinions and actions of its citizens. Only then can citizens expect that their participation in politics is likely to change things, and only then it is reasonable to even attempt to make one's opinion heard. Finally, one important aspect that contributes to a systems' responsiveness is the trustworthiness and integrity of its public officials – even citizens who believe in their own ability to transfer their political opinion into a political mandate for the administration may eventually be disappointed by a lack of responsiveness in that final stage of the political process.<sup>26</sup>

The first step will now be to describe and compare the national outcomes for the dimensions of political efficacy. While all ISSP member countries have democratic regimes nowadays, there is considerable diversity in the historical trajectories they have taken towards democracy. For example, the demise of the 'iron curtain' has initiated a sudden wave of democratisation in the Eastern European countries, who had formerly seen long decades of autocratic one-party regimes. That experience may still be engrained in the

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26 For the definitions of the different concepts see Balch, 1974 and Craig, 1990.



attitudes and perceptions of a society's members, even after some twenty years have passed. But where comparisons across time are possible, it can be expected that we see marked shifts or trends in the efficacy beliefs of these countries, with different national conditions determining where these trends have arrived at the time of the more recent surveys. In contrast, long-established democracies like Great Britain, the United States, or the Scandinavian countries would seem much less prone to sudden shifts in their levels of political efficacy. After that, we will take a look at how these attitudinal dimensions affect participation at the polls across the ISSP member countries.

## Variables and distributions

The investigation of trends is somewhat hampered by the sparse availability of data. None of the questions on political efficacy were asked in sufficiently similar form in all four modules of the Role of Government surveys. Most of the analyses will therefore focus on the data of 1996 and 2006.<sup>27</sup> To cover at least the 1990, 1996, and 2006 surveys, we fall back on an item that is closely related to internal efficacy. This is the personal interest in politics:

*How interested would you say you personally are in politics? (ZA4747: V60)*

- *Very interested*
- *Fairly interested*
- *Somewhat interested*
- *Not very interested*
- *Not at all interested*
- *Can't choose*

Figure 6.1 shows that the general interest in politics differs somewhat among the ISSP countries and within the countries between the module years of 1990, 1996, and 2006. The highest and most stable interest can be observed in Australia. But also other countries from the Anglo-American context, the USA, Canada and New Zealand, and some Western European countries, such as the Netherlands, France, Denmark, and Norway, as well as Venezuela and Israel's Jews show a rather high political interest with around 40% or more of the respondents answering to be very or fairly interested in politics. The least general interest in politics is found in Taiwan, with only 6% of respondents in the same answer categories. In South Korea, Russia, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, Croatia and Chile the interest is, at between 10% and 20%, also rather low. One pattern that can in fact be observed is that political interest is generally quite low in the former socialist states. However, a general trend over time towards more or less general political interest cannot be observed, neither for all countries nor for regional or political sub-groups.

<sup>27</sup> ISSP 1985 did in fact ask for political efficacy with question wordings very similar to those of ISSP 1996 and 2006. However, the response scale format in ISSP 1985 is so different that the data cannot be made comparable.




Figure 6.1 Respondents who say that they are very/fairly interested in politics (in %)

A battery of questions addressing political efficacy directly was asked in 1996 and 2006:

*How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (ZA4747: V61-V66)*

- A. People like me don't have any say about what the government does*
- B. The average citizen has considerable influence on politics*
- C. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country*
- D. I think most of the people are better informed about politics and government than I am*
- E. People we elect as members of the parliament try to keep the promises they have made during the election*
- F. Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country*

*Respondents had the possibility to answer: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree or can't choose*

Items A and B of this item battery ask for external political efficacy, that is the respondents' belief in the effect of their own political participation on the government's actions. For item A (*Figure 6.2*), "People like me don't have any say about what the government does", high percentages on the "agree" and "strongly agree" categories indicate a low level of external efficacy. Item B (*Figure 6.3*), however, is phrased in the opposite direction. Therefore, people who agree to "The average citizen has considerable influence on politics" show well developed external efficacy. In most countries, the responses to these items are consistent to each other. Venezuela in 2006, for example, shows a high level of external political efficacy on both items, with 72% of respondents (strongly) agreeing that the average citizen has considerable influence in politics and only 24% (strongly) agreeing to the statement that "people like me" have no say about what the government does. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and East Germany we see a mirrored picture for both module years: while large groups of respondents (between 70% and 80%) do not think to have a say about what the government does, consistently only up to 10% of respondents think the average citizen actually has influence in politics. Thus, in these countries we can speak of a low level of external efficacy.




Figure 6.2 Respondents who (strongly) agree that people like them have nothing to say about what the government does (in %)




Figure 6.3 Respondents who (strongly) agree that the average citizen has influence in politics (in %)

In Taiwan, South Africa, and also France, however, the outcomes do not match so coherently. In Taiwan and South Africa, there are high levels of respondents agreeing to both of the opposed questions, while in France, respondents tend to disagree with both statements.

Looking at changes over time, the data display a striking increase of the sentiment not to have a say on government actions for Latvia and Russia between 1996 and 2006. People in these two young democracies obviously felt much more confidence in their ability to influence their government in 1996 than they did in 2006. The positively worded item B reflects the same finding of decreasing external efficacy for Latvia; in Russia, the level of agreement to that item was already so low in 1996 that there was hardly any space left for a further decrease in 2006. In Latvia, this happened on the background of a dense series of re-formations of the governing party coalitions; in Russia, the background might be (then) President Putin's growing dominance in Russian politics.

Items C and D were constructed to measure internal efficacy more directly than the question on political interest which was presented above. Again, the two related items are phrased in opposite directions. Responses on the two "agree"-categories of item C – understanding of politics (*Figure 6.4*) – represent a high level of internal efficacy, while responses on the same categories of item D – personal level of information, compared to others (*Figure 6.5*) – indicate a low level of internal efficacy. Respondents in Australia, Canada, and Denmark have a very positive self-perception of their understanding of political issues in both available module years. Coherently, in these countries the relative personal information-level is also perceived as rather high. Latvia, Russia, and Hungary are again some examples of low efficacy, now on the internal side. But in contrast to the case of external efficacy, Latvia and Russia display no relevant change over time. It seems plausible that the low internal efficacy observed here is partly a result of the non-democratic past of these countries, while the slump in external efficacy may be related to the national political conditions at the time of the 2006 survey, when any 'honeymoon' phase of the new democracies certainly was over.




Figure 6.4 Respondents who (strongly) agree to have a good understanding of political issues (in %)




Figure 6.5 Respondents who (strongly) agree that most people are better informed about politics and government than they are (in %)



The concept behind items E: are members of parliament trying to keep their promises? (*Figure 6.6*) and F: can civil servants be trusted to do what is best for the country? (*Figure 6.7*) can be called incumbent-based trust. Both items are phrased in the same direction; the higher the response rates on the “agree”-categories, the higher the level of incumbent-based trust. A first observation to be made is that the trust invested into incumbents is somewhat lower than feelings of external efficacy among the respondents. Most respondents, across most countries, seem to distinguish between the responsiveness of the democratic system as such, which they perhaps implicitly refer to when responding to the questions on external efficacy, and the responsiveness of the persons who actually run the administration. If this is true, the actual personnel of administrations would seem to be unable to claim the credit that is assigned to the democratic system as such, for which they purport to act.

The highest levels of trust in members of the parliament and civil servants can be observed in Denmark, Switzerland, Ireland, and interestingly, South Africa, as the only non-Western country, which, in addition, has seen political turmoil in its very recent history. In the Philippines there is a comparatively high level of trust towards members of the parliament, but not for civil servants. However, this observation can only be made in 1996. Towards 2006, trust in both respects has decreased substantially. Again, there is a likely explanation in the national political conditions. In 2005 and 2006, the Philippines have been subject to events which have likely undermined the legitimacy of the elected administration – among these ethnically and ideologically motivated guerrilla warfare, an alleged attempt of a coup d'état, and a short period of martial law, which according to international NGOs, marked the beginning of a phase of deteriorating civil rights (Amnesty International, 2006). Especially low trust in members of the parliament can also be observed among the Jewish population in Israel, where some political key figures had been connected to different scandals, and a political debate about Israel's warfare in Lebanon raged. The lowest levels of trust in both respects and both module years can be observed in Japan, Russia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Croatia and Italy. Notwithstanding some exceptions, the trust expressed in members of the parliament is even a little lower than trust in civil servants.




Figure 6.6 Respondents who (strongly) agree that MPs try to keep their promises (in %)




Figure 6.7 Respondents who (strongly) agree that civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country (in %)

## Political efficacy and electoral participation

Some more elaborate analyses for the data of 2006 reveal that in many countries, the external efficacy-dimension cannot be measured as distinctively as the dimensions on internal efficacy and incumbent-based trust.<sup>28</sup> Therefore we will now concentrate on the two stronger dimensions to look at the correlations between political efficacy and actual electoral participation in 2006. All ISSP modules contain information on the respondents' participation in the most recent election as a background variable. For internal efficacy and incumbent-based trust, we computed simple indices as the means of the three, respectively two, variables measuring each concept. The indices therefore vary between 1 and 5. 1 means that the respondent perceives him/herself as very interested, having a good understanding, and a high level of information on politics, respectively has strong trust in members of the parliament and civil servants, whereas 5 indicates low levels of interest, understanding, information, and trust.

The following table shows the levels of self-reported electoral participation for all countries, and it reports the association of electoral participation with the two efficacy-related indices for the respondents of each country. As one would expect, in all countries there is a majority of respondents who said that they cast their vote in the last general election. Sometimes this is a vast majority, up to nearly universal participation (e.g. Australia and Denmark), sometimes only around 50% of all respondents report having cast a vote (e.g. Switzerland and Slovenia). Apart from the motivational factors on the citizen level, such as internal efficacy (and some others, for example the subjective assessment of the importance of a given election), there are relevant factors on the societal level, too. One is the existence of national laws which make citizens obliged to go to the polls. Such laws are formally in place in Australia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, France, The Netherlands, The Philippines, Spain, some provinces of Switzerland, and Uruguay. But only Australia and Uruguay enforce compliance with that law to some degree.<sup>29</sup> Denmark, on the other hand, achieves a similar reported electoral participation of around 90% without such laws. However, compulsory voting laws are only an expression of the fact that voting is regarded as a good citizen's duty in most, if not all, societies. A well-known consequence is that survey results usually show much higher participation rates than those which can actually be observed at the polls. In other words, survey respondents tend to overstate their compliance with the social norm of participation.

The two right most columns of the table show correlation coefficients of electoral participation and the efficacy and trust indices. These coefficients can assume any value between '-1' (for a negative association, saying that high efficacy/trust goes with low

28 A so-called 'principal component analysis' shows all three of the dimensions named above only in 7 out of 35 country samples. In the remaining 28 out of 35 national samples, only the dimensions for "internal efficacy" and "incumbent-based trust" are clearly depicted. On the basis of this analysis, we decided to exclude the sample for the Arab population of Israel in the remainder of this chapter, and also to leave out the results for internal efficacy correlations of Russia and the Philippines.

29 For further information on compulsory voting see: International IDEA, 2001.

participation), over '0' (for no association at all), to '1' (for a positive association, saying that high efficacy/trust goes with high participation).<sup>30</sup> The results show substantially higher positive correlations between internal efficacy and participation than between incumbent-based trust and participation, although even the coefficients for efficacy are only low to modest. In 30 out of 31 country samples there is a significant correlation for the first combination, with the highest coefficients in Switzerland and the USA. It might be these well established democracies with relatively low voting turnout where the individual motivation plays a real role in the decision to (not) cast a vote. In terms of incumbent-based trust and political participation, only in Finland and Ireland do we actually see a substantial correlation. In all other countries, the results are not significant or do not reach a value of 0.1.

*Table 6.1* Self-reported electoral participation (ISSP background variable: VOTE\_LE) and its correlations with internal efficacy and incumbent-based trust, Pearson correlation reported

Country	Self-reported Electoral Participation <sup>1,2</sup>	Percent	Correlation internal efficacy / Elect. Part.	Correlation incumbent-based trust / Elect. Part.
Australia <sup>3</sup>	Yes	92.2	.102**	.005
	No	5.8		
	Total	98.0		
Canada	Yes	81.6	.214**	-.032
	No	16.3		
	Total	97.9		
Chile <sup>4</sup>	Yes	64.8	.029	.019
	No	4.6		
	Total	69.45		
Croatia	Yes	74.8	.102**	.025
	No	22.8		
	Total	97.7		
Czech Republic	Yes	65.6	.243**	.053
	No	30.9		
	Total	96.5		
Denmark	Yes	92.5	.096**	.010
	No	6.9		
	Total	99.5		
Dominican Republic <sup>6</sup>	Yes	71.1	.103**	.005
	No	28.5		
	Total	99.6		

30 Such correlation coefficients are not the methodologically most elaborate tool to assess the degree of association for the present data, but they yield good indicative results for our purpose.

Country	Self-reported Electoral Participation <sup>1,2</sup>	Percent	Correlation internal efficacy / Elect. Part.	Correlation incumbent-based trust / Elect. Part.
Finland	Yes	74.3	.232**	.142**
	No	14.7		
	Total	89.0		
France <sup>7</sup>	Yes	81.6	.076**	.073**
	No	15.4		
	Total	97.1		
Germany-East	Yes	81.0	.186**	.082
	No	16.0		
	Total	97.0		
Germany-West	Yes	80.1	.211**	.047
	No	11.2		
	Total	91.3		
Hungary	Yes	76.4	.229**	-.007
	No	22.7		
	Total	99.1		
Ireland	Yes	71.1	.254**	.119**
	No	28.4		
	Total	99.4		
Israel-Jews	Yes	75.4	.147**	.057
	No	22.7		
	Total	98.2		
Japan	Yes	75.5	.165**	.055
	No	19.9		
	Total	95.5		
Latvia	Yes	50.2	.166**	.079*
	No	28.7		
	Total	79.0		
Netherlands <sup>8</sup>	Yes	64.3	.197**	.087**
	No	30.4		
	Total	94.7		
New Zealand	Yes	72.9	.141**	.021
	No	4.3		
	Total	77.2		
Norway	Yes	84.4	.112**	.062*
	No	9.5		
	Total	94.0		
Philippines <sup>9</sup>	Yes	76.6	x	.005
	No	22.4		
	Total	99.1		
Poland	Yes	65.4	.199**	.067*
	No	30.6		
	Total	96.1		

Country	Self-reported Electoral Participation <sup>1,2</sup>	Percent	Correlation internal efficacy / Elect. Part.	Correlation incumbent-based trust / Elect. Part.
Portugal	Yes	71.9	.111**	.028
	No	26.8		
	Total	98.7		
Russia	Yes	64.4	x	-.048*
	No	35.6		
	Total	100.0		
Slovenia	Yes	50.6	.248**	.089*
	No	20.4		
	Total	71.1		
South Africa	Yes	67.1	.068**	.061**
	No	26.8		
	Total	94.0		
South Korea	Yes	65.9	.119**	.071**
	No	32.7		
	Total	98.6		
Spain	Yes	60.2	.187**	.029
	No	23.2		
	Total	83.5		
Sweden	Yes	82.9	.135**	.078**
	No	15.7		
	Total	98.6		
Switzerland <sup>10</sup>	Yes	49.6	.369**	.024
	No	35.2		
	Total	84.8		
Taiwan	Yes	70.4	.123**	.035
	No	17.0		
	Total	87.5		
United States	Yes	66.0	.354**	-.045
	No	32.9		
	Total	98.9		
Uruguay <sup>11</sup>	Yes	89.7	.097**	-.081**
	No	9.8		
	Total	99.5		
Venezuela	Yes	78.0	.216**	.006
	No	18.5		
	Total	96.6		

The category "Total" reports the summed percentage of all valid responses, the percentage missing to yield 100% is comprised of different forms of non-response, and in some cases, of respondents not eligible to vote. These cannot be distinguished in the present data.

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

1 The information on electoral participation is not available for Great Britain in 2006.

- 2 See the list which election is addressed by this question in the different countries in 2006 in Appendix A.I.
- 3 Compulsory voting law: Strict enforcement.
- 4 Compulsory voting law: Weak enforcement.
- 5 For Chile, respondents not registered to vote were not asked this question. Such persons would usually be counted as non-voters, but here they are simply not included, along with persons not responding for different reasons.
- 6 Compulsory voting law: Not enforced.
- 7 Compulsory voting law: Information on enforcement not available.
- 8 Compulsory voting law: Not enforced.
- 9 Compulsory voting law: Not enforced.
- 10 Compulsory voting law: Only in one province (Canton Schaffhausen).
- 11 Compulsory voting law: Strict enforcement.

## Conclusion

We can see from the data that political efficacy in general is less developed in the former socialistic countries than in the Western countries. Following our expectations, it turned out that also the political participation in form of voting tend to be rather low in these countries. The correlations in the table show that compared to the personal motivation to vote, the trust in the elected politicians and civil servants seems less crucial in the decision to vote. A possible interpretation could be that engaged citizens do, in fact, vote also to support the democratic system, and even a lack of trust in the incumbents does not deter them from doing so. However, this correlation accounts for the new democracies as much as for the long established democracies.





## 7 Corruption

The phenomenon of “corruption” is as old as political systems are. A definition is not easy, because corruption can appear in different modalities in all areas of society. Joseph Senturia described it broadly as “the misuse of public power for private profit” (Senturia, 1931: 448). Corruption has increasingly attracted the attention of the media as well as of social and political research during the last two decades. A high degree of corruption is destructive not only because it may disturb the citizenry’s confidence in politics and bureaucracy, but also because corruption causes financial losses for the state and the society. Beyond this, corrupt civil servants will slow down bureaucratic working processes to underline the “necessity” of bribes for speeding up again, which often also hamper economic activities. With respect to administration’s interactions with individual citizens, corruption causes inequality and, therefore, discontent.

The ISSP addressed the topic of corruption in 2006 for the first time. Therefore, there is no trend data available yet, and we are confined to looking at the cross-country comparison. Respondents have been asked about their perceptions of corruption among politicians and civil servants as well as about their trust in public officials and their direct experience with bribery. Once again, we have to keep in mind that social survey data by their very nature always reflect two components: one component is the reality which respondents are asked to reflect in their responses, the other component is the subjectivity in perception and evaluation which the respondents necessarily bring in. What is perceived as acceptable tipping in one country may be viewed as bribery in another. The ISSP items have tried to avoid at least the evaluative input, by asking respondents very specifically about their factual beliefs. We will later briefly check how well this has worked by comparing selected ISSP items with a measure of corruption derived from expert judgements.

### Variables and distributions

The first two questions asked on corruption in the ISSP 2006 deal with people’s trust in public officials:

*In your opinion, how often do public officials deal fairly with people like you?  
(ZA4700: V58)*

- *Almost always*
- *Often*
- *Occasionally*
- *Seldom*
- *Almost never*
- *Can’t choose*

*Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in [Country] depends on who they know? (ZA4700: V59)*

- *Definitely does*
- *Probably does*
- *Probably does not*
- *Definitely does not*
- *Can't choose*

In the great majority of ISSP member countries, majorities of respondents answer that public officials almost always or often deal fairly with “people like them” (*Figure 7.1*).

The exceptions here are the Dominican Republic, Japan, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and the Arab population of Israel, where majorities of respondents consider themselves being treated fairly only seldom or even almost never. The one Western country where almost one third of all respondents answered that way is the USA. The example of the USA makes it very clear that the issue of fairness can also be an issue of discrimination: The group of US respondents who do not feel treated fairly is composed to a strikingly high share of “non-whites”. There are significantly more African Americans, Hispanics and people of other origins (47%)<sup>31</sup> in this group than those who refer to themselves as “White” (27%) (table not shown).

To the question whether people think that the treatment people get from public officials depends on who they know (*Figure 7.2*), great majorities in almost all countries answered that this is definitely or probably the case in their country. Matching the results of the previous variable, responses to these answer categories are at 86% extremely high in the Dominican Republic. In the USA, however, the results show, with 88% agreeing to the non-trusting categories, an even less optimistic picture. The outcomes for Japan also stand out, seen in international comparison. While Japan can be found among those countries where the belief in fair treatment turns out to be rather weak, the Japanese are, taking into account the general pessimistic feelings in all countries, at 56% still among those countries where mistrust in respect to the relevance of connections is not overwhelming.

Especially characteristic are the results for the Scandinavian countries. Denmark is the only country with a majority of respondents answering that treatment by public officials does definitely or probably not depend on connections and only 38% saying it does. Finland is, with 51% of respondents on the non-trusting answer categories, the second most optimistic country among the ISSP members. Also, their neighbour Norway belongs, with 63% of respondents in these answer categories, on international comparison, still to the most trusting countries. The striking exception in this pattern is Sweden, where 85% of respondents think that fair treatment depends on connections, falling behind the USA, the Dominican Republic and Chile among those ISSP countries where trust in public officials is least developed.

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31 The composition of the overall sample is 28.5% respondents from other origin and 71.5% “Whites”.




Figure 7.1 Respondents (2006) who answered: Public officials deal fairly with people like me; Almost always/Often, Occasionally, Seldom/Almost never (in %)



Figure 7.2 Respondents (2006) who answered: Treatment by officials depends on contacts; Definitely/Probably does, Definitely/Probably does not (in %)

The next two questions ask for the respondent's perception of corruption among politicians and civil servants:

*In your opinion, about how many politicians in [Country] are involved in corruption? (ZA4700: V60)*

*And in your opinion, about how many public officials in [Country] are involved in corruption? (ZA4700: V61)*

- *Almost none*
- *A few*
- *Some*
- *Quite a lot*
- *Almost all*
- *Can't choose*

It is no surprise that these questions highly correlate with the questions on incumbent-based trust (see chapter 6), asking for citizens' trust towards elected members of the parliament and towards civil servants to do what is best for the country. We have seen there that trust is generally not strongly developed. Therefore it is only consistent that the questions on civil servants being involved in corruption show very similar distrustful perceptions. In many countries majorities of respondents believe that politicians, as well as public officials, are involved in corruption, although there is usually more trust in public officials than in politicians (*Figure 7.3*). The greatest shares of respondents answering quite a lot or almost all politicians, respectively, public officials are involved in corruption can be observed in Israel, where 80% of respondents in both sub-samples express their mistrust in politicians and more than 60% of the Jewish population and more than 70% of the Arab population mistrust in public officials. But also in Croatia, South Korea, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic, mistrust is high. The lack of trust can usually be traced back to publicly known problems or scandals which often affect even the highest positions in the state. Taking Israel – the country with the most extreme levels of mistrust – as an example, it is easy to name a series of scandals in which prominent members of the cabinet, up to the later Prime Minister and the President, were involved.<sup>32</sup> We dare to speculate that it is the combination of such scandals with a well functioning press which rises public awareness to the exceptional levels seen in Israel (see also the results for the last item below).

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32 A brief check of international press sources brought up investigations against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the late 1990s, against Secretary of the State Ariel Sharon with the charge of illegal campaign contributions in 2002, against then Trade Minister, later resigned Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert in 2003 to 2005. Rumours of corruption of President Katzav, who recently resigned under several charges, had also been known for a long time. All these publicly debated events will have left their marks on citizens' attitudes.




Figure 7.3 Respondents (2006) who answered: Quite a lot/ Almost all Politicians/ Public officials are involved in corruption (in %)

As was the case for the two previous questions, low levels of mistrust in public servants are to be observed in the Scandinavian countries. The lowest shares of respondents answering quite a lot or almost all politicians or public officials are involved in corruption can, again, be found in Denmark with only 3% of respondents for both items. The outcomes for Finland and Norway are also very low, by international comparison. Although Sweden again shows the highest levels of mistrust among the Scandinavian countries, in international comparison the Swedes perceive their public servants as not very corrupt, which is in contrast to the question on connections being helpful. Alongside the Scandinavian countries, the perception of corruption is rather low also in Switzerland, Australia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. As a side note, we observe that in those countries where people generally trust their politicians and public officials more, there tends to be less mistrust in politicians than in public officials. This is a reversion of the dominant pattern of countries with higher levels of mistrust, where public servants seem somewhat more trustworthy than politicians.

The last question concentrates on the respondents' degree of personal exposure to bribery:

*In the last five years, how often have you or a member of your immediate family come across a public official who hinted they wanted, or asked for, a bribe or favour in return for a service? (ZA4700: V62)*

- *Never*
- *Seldom*
- *Occasionally*
- *Quite often*
- *Very often*
- *Can't choose*

Looking at the outcomes of this item (*Figure 7.4*), one might suspect an influence of social desirability on the response behaviour. If a public official wanted a bribe, it is at least imaginable that he or she actually received it from the respondent or the family member. Since offering bribes is almost as morally condemnable and criminal as accepting bribes, some respondents might not have answered this question absolutely truthfully. Nevertheless, the outcomes are plausible. Matching the results of the previous items, the lowest exposure to bribery is reported in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. Also in Australia, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, less than 1% of respondents report bribing experiences. In other countries, such as Russia, South Africa, the Philippines, Croatia, Latvia, Chile, and the Czech Republic, there is a much higher number of people who experienced bribery demands from public officials. The extreme case in this respect is Venezuela with 71% of respondents claiming to quite or very often have come across public officials who wanted a bribe in return for a service. We take care to note that Israel does have a somewhat above average level of bribery experiences, but is by far not as extreme as with regard to perceived corruption of politicians and officials, which we take as indication that it might be the visibility of scandals and of the involved persons which contributes to the latter.






Figure 7.4 Respondents (2006) who answered: Public official wanted bribe; Never/Seldom, Occasionally, Quite/Very often (in %)

## Comparison of ISSP outcomes with the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

To get an idea of how well the ISSP items mirror other, more comprehensive, measurements of corruption, we finally compare the ISSP outcomes with the outcomes of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of 2006. The CPI was developed in 1995 by the non-government organisation Transparency International as an internationally comparable measure of corruption. The aim of this index is to give an impression of the actual level of corruption in different countries; still, the CPI is also using survey data of a special kind, since objective sources for such information are understandably rare. The CPI is a composite index, making use of surveys conducted by different independent research institutes, using different samples and different methodology<sup>33</sup> (Lambsdorff, 1999, 2006). The main difference between the CPI and the ISSP data is that the CPI data is based on expert judgements provided by business people and staff of think tanks, while the respondents of the ISSP survey are sampled to (ideally) represent the whole population of their respective countries. The ISSP responses, therefore, can claim much less professional expertise than the CPI responses. But perhaps they reflect the situation in their respective countries based on a more immediate experience, and in a broader sense. There is no way of proving that one of these approaches better mirrors the 'true' situation in a country than the other. However, we can check to which extent their results coincide. The more they do, the more confidence can we have in both, independent, ways of assessing corruption.

For this comparison, we created a very simple index with those two ISSP variables that ask directly for the respondents' perception of corruption among politicians and civil servants. Our index varies between 1 "almost no perceived corruption among politicians and civil servants" and 5 "almost all politicians and civil servants perceived to be involved in corruption". The scores of the CPI, however, range in the opposite direction from 10 "free of corruption" to 0 "profound corruption". Since the index values cannot be compared directly, we will only look at the relative ranks of countries that result from the values of each index. *Table 7.1* shows the results of both indices compared to each other for all ISSP countries that participated in the Role of Government survey in 2006.

33 The CPI 2006 includes data from the following sources: CPIA, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment by the IDA and IBRD (World Bank), 2005 EIU, the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006. FH, Freedom House Nations in Transit, 2006. IMD, the International Institute for Management Development, Lausanne. MIG, Grey Area Dynamics Ratings by the Merchant International Group, 2006. PERC, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Hong Kong. UNECA, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Governance Report 2005. WEF, the World Economic Forum. WMRC, the World Markets Research Centre, 2006.

*Table 7.1* Comparison: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Index based on ISSP variables V60, V61 for those countries participating in ISSP 2006 CPI ranges from 10 'Least possible corruption' to 0 'High corruption', ISSP index ranges from 1 'Almost none involved in corruption' to 5 'Almost all'.

CPI Rank <sup>34</sup>	Country	CPI Score	ISSP Rank	Country	ISSP Score
1	Finland	9.6	1	Denmark	1.830
1	New Zealand	9.6	2	New Zealand	2.446
2	Denmark	9.5	3	Switzerland	2.478
3	Sweden	9.2	4	Finland	2.498
4	Switzerland	9.1	5	Norway	2.541
5	Norway	8.8	6	Australia	2.697
6	Australia	8.7	7	Netherlands	2.738
6	Netherlands	8.7	8	Sweden	2.758
7	Great Britain	8.6	9	Ireland	2.841
8	Canada	8.5	10	Great Britain	2.892
9	Germany	8.0	11	Canada	2.957
10	Japan	7.6	12	Germany	2.976
11	France	7.4	13	Japan	3.153
11	Ireland	7.4	14	United States	3.174
12	Chile	7.3	15	Uruguay	3.204
12	United States	7.3	16	Taiwan	3.208
13	Spain	6.8	17	France	3.303
14	Portugal	6.6	18	Chile	3.356
15	Slovenia	6.4	19	Spain	3.437
15	Uruguay	6.4	20	Czech Republic	3.444
16	Israel	5.9	21	Slovenia	3.455
16	Taiwan	5.9	22	Hungary	3.511
17	Hungary	5.2	23	South Korea	3.580
18	South Korea	5.1	24	Venezuela	3.581
19	Czech Republic	4.8	25	Portugal	3.586
20	Latvia	4.7	26	Poland	3.596
21	South Africa	4.6	27	South Africa	3.608
22	Poland	3.7	28	Latvia	3.766
23	Croatia	3.4	29	Dominican Republic	3.817
24	Dominican Republic	2.8	30	Croatia	3.848
25	Philippines	2.5	31	Philippines	3.888
25	Russia	2.5	32	Israel	3.890
26	Venezuela	2.3	33	Russia	4.101

34 Countries holding the same CPI value have the same rank.

The two measurement tools of corruption, one based on expert interviews, the other on probability samples, reveal astonishingly similar results. Both indices confirm that more advanced countries tend to have lower levels of perceived corruption than less advanced countries. The data also confirms the results of all ISSP variables on corruption in terms that for both indices in Denmark, Finland, Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland the lowest levels of perceived corruption prevail. While the CPI rank of Sweden appears in line with its Scandinavian neighbours, showing very low levels of corruption, in the ISSP Sweden ranks somewhat lower. Also, in Israel corruption levels are somewhat higher per ISSP data than per CPI, while, on the other hand, Venezuela ranks better in the ISSP index.<sup>35</sup> Apart from that, the differences in the outcomes are quite marginal.

## Conclusion

In summary, the outcomes of the ISSP questions on corruption show the same general pattern that the CPI reveals: by and large, poor countries tend to have a higher perceived level of corruption than wealthier countries. If we take that to reflect true levels of corruption – now with some more confidence –, researchers can use the ISSP data to explore the reasons and consequences of that pattern. Looking at institutions and policies, the negative correlation of wealth and corruption may well be based on reciprocal causation: in poor countries civil servants sometimes earn so little money that their sustenance may depend on receiving bribes, which thus becomes common practice in their countries. But this practice, at the same time, is probably one of the reasons why institutions of all kinds remain inefficient and, therefore, the economy in such countries fails to produce more wealth (Nield, 2002). To follow up on such considerations, researchers will have to combine ISSP Role of Government results with more detailed contextual information on the relevant countries.

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35 Had we also used the item on bribery experience in the ISSP index, Venezuela might have moved down considerably in ISSP ranks. We abstained from doing so to maintain the extreme simplicity of the index.



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## Appendix

### A.I Fieldwork Dates and Elections Reference

Country	Time of Field Work	Question	Date of Election
Australia	July, 11 – October, 16 2007	Did you vote in the Federal Election held on October, 9 2004?	October, 9 2004
Canada	March, 3 – October, 31 2006	Did you vote in the last federal election?	January, 23 2006
Chile	June, 24 – July, 13 2006	Did you vote on the last parliamentary elections of December 2005?	December, 11 2005
Croatia	October, 1 – November, 30 2006	Did you vote in last general election?	January, 16 2005
Czech Republic	October, 19 – November, 27 2006	Let's go back to the last elections to the Chamber of Deputies that were held on 2 and 3 July, 2006. Did you take part in the elections?	June, 2/3 2006
Denmark	January, 30 – May, 5 2008	Did you vote in the previous election the 8 February 2005, or were there some reason that you didn't have opportunity to or desire to vote?	February, 8 2005
Dominican Republic	November, 16 – December, 4 2006	Did you vote in the last presidential elections in 2004?	May, 16 2004
Finland	September, 20 – November, 24 2006	Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections in 2003? Please circle the most appropriate answer.	March, 16 2003
France	September – December 2006	Did you vote in last first round of the 2002's French presidential election?	April, 21 2002
Germany	March, 18 – August, 21 2006	The last general election took place on September, 18 2005. Were you eligible to vote in that election?	September, 18 2005
Great Britain	June – November 2006	Variable not available.	
Hungary	January, 5 – January, 23 2006	Question text not available.	April, 9 2005

Country	Time of Field Work	Question	Date of Election
Ireland	October 2005 – February 2006	Did you vote in the last general election?	May, 17 2002
Israel	March, 15 – August, 15 2005	Did you vote last election?	January, 28 2003
Japan	November, 18 – November, 26 2006	Did you vote in the House of Representatives' election in September last year?	September, 11 2005
Latvia	May, 29 – June, 19 2007	Did you vote in the 9th Parliament elections on the 7th of October 2006?	October, 7 2006
Netherlands	March – December 2006	For which party did you vote at the Local Council elections of March 7 2006?	March, 7 2006
New Zealand	August, 10 – October, 10 2007	At the 2005 General Election, who did you vote for?	September, 17 2005
Norway	September, 20 – November, 17 2006	Did you vote in the national election this year?	September, 11/12 2005
Philippines	March, 8 – March, 14 2006	Did you vote in the May 10, 2004 election or not?	May, 10 2004
Portugal	October, 9 2006 – February, 19 2007	Did you vote in the last elections?	February, 10 2005
Russia	January, 3 – January, 22 2007	Question text not available.	December, 7 2003
Slovenia	October – November 2006	It has past two years since last parliamentary elections. Did you vote?	October, 3 2004
South Africa	August, 22 – October, 10 2006	For which party did you vote for in the last election, which was held in 2004?	April, 14 2004
South Korea	June, 25 – August, 31 2006	Did you vote in the last local government elections?	May, 31 2006
Spain	January, 15 – March, 15 2007	Could you tell me which party or coalition did you vote for in the general elections of March 2004?	March, 14 2004
Sweden	February 7 – April 28, 2006	Did you vote in the latest general elections?	September, 15 2002
Switzerland	February, 8 – August, 14 2007	For which party did you vote at the last federal elections in October 2003?	October, 19 2003

Country	Time of Field Work	Question	Date of Election
Taiwan	July, 16 – September 18, 2006	Did you vote in the last legislator election?	December, 11 2004
United States	March, 7 – August, 7 2006	In 2000, you remember that Gore ran for President on the Democratic ticket against Bush for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?	November, 7 2000
Uruguay	November, 6 – December, 23 2006	Did you vote in the last National Elections in 2004?	October, 31 2004
Venezuela	November, 13 – December, 15 2006	Question text not available.	December, 3 2006



## A.II Correspondence List of Cumulated Variables and Replications

Cumulated dataset		Role of Government				Other modules
Variable Number	Variable Label	1985	1990	1996	2006	
V8	Obey laws without exception	V6	V4	V4	V4	Social Inequality 1987: V6 Good citizens: always obey laws
V9	Public protest meetings	V7	V5	V5	V5	
V10	Protest publications	V8	V6			
V11	Protest demonstrations	V9	V7	V6	V6	
V12	Occupation gov. office	V10	V8			
V13	Damage gov. buildings	V11	V9			
V14	National anti-government strike	V12	V10	V7	V7	
V15	Revolutionaries: hold public meetings	V13	V11	V12	V8	Social Inequality 1987: V15 Allow public meetings -overthrow government
V16	Revolutionaries: publish books	V15	V12	V13	V19	
V17	Racist: public meetings	V16	V13			Citizenship 2004: V16
V18	Racist: publish books	V18	V14			
V19	Known criminal: police tail	V19	V15			
V20	Known criminal: tap phone	V20	V16			
V21	Known criminal: open mail	V21	V17			
V22	Known criminal: police detain	V22	V18			
V23	Worse type of justice error	V27	V19	V14	V10	
V24	Computer threat privacy	V28		V15		

Cumulated dataset		Role of Government				Other modules
ZA4747 Variable Number	Variable Label	1985	1990	1996	2006	
V25	How much income tax rich	V29	V23			Social Inequality 1987: V58 1992: V66 Tax rates: high-low income
V26	Gov.: redistribute wealth	V30	V24	V16		Social Inequality 1999: V57
V27	Gov.: control wages by law	V74	V25	V17		
V28	Gov.: control prices by law	V75	V26	V18		
V29	Gov. and economy: cuts in gov. spending	V76	V27	V19	V11	
V30	Gov. and econ.: Financing projects for new jobs	V77	V28	V20	V12	
V31	Gov. and econ.: Less gov. reg. of business	V78	V29	V21	V13	
V32	Gov. and econ.: Support industry to develop new products	V79	V30	V22	V14	
V33	Gov. and econ.: Sup. declining industries to protect jobs	V80	V31	V23	V15	
V34	Gov. and econ.: Red. working week for more jobs	V81	V32	V24	V16	
V35	Gov. should spend money: environment	V82	V33	V25	V17	
V36	Gov. should spend money: health	V83	V34	V26	V18	
V37	Gov. should spend money: law enforcement	V84	V35	V27	V19	
V38	Gov. should spend money: education	V85	V36	V28	V20	
V39	Gov. should spend money: defense	V86	V37	V29	V21	
V40	Gov. should spend money: retirement	V87	V38	V30	V22	
V41	Gov. should spend money: unemployment benefits	V88	V39	V31	V23	

Cumulated dataset		Role of Government				Other modules	
ZA4747 Variable Number	Variable Label	1985	1990	1996	2006		
V42	Gov. should spend money: culture and arts	V89	V40	V32	V34		
V43	Gov: keep down inflation	V92	V41				
V44	Power of trade unions	V93	V42	V33			
V45	Power of business and industry	V94	V43	V34			
V46	Power of government	V95	V44	V35			
V47	Gov. role: electric power	V96	V46				
V48	Gov. role: steel industry	V98	V47				
V49	Gov. role: banking, insurance	V99	V48				
V50	Gov. responsibility: provide job for everyone	V101	V49	V36	V25	Social Inequality 1987: V51 1992: V59	Work orientations 1989: V44 Religion 1991: V5 1998: V5
V51	Gov. responsib.: control prices	V102	V50	V37	V26		
V52	Gov. responsib.: provide health care for sick	V103	V51	V38	V27		
V53	Gov. responsib.: provide living standard for the old	V104	V52	V39	V28	Social Networks 2001: V56	
V54	Gov. responsib.: help industry grow	V105	V53	V40	V29		
V55	Gov. responsib.: provide living standard for unemployed	V106	V54	V41	V30	Social Inequality 1987: V53 1992: V61	Work orientations 1989: V45 Gov.: Unemployment pay
V56	Gov. responsib.: reduce income differences between rich and poor	V107	V55	V42	V31	Social Inequality 1987: V49 1992: V57	Environment 1993: V62004: V5 Religion 1991: V6 1998: V6



Cumulated dataset		Role of Government				Other modules
Variable Number	Variable Label	1985	1990	1996	2006	
V57	Gov. responsib.: financial help to students	Q17: loans or grants	V56	V43	V32	Social Inequality 1987: V50 1992: V58 Gov.: more poor children to university
V58	Gov. responsib.: provide decent housing	V57	V44	V33		
V59	Gov. responsib.: laws to protect environ.	V45	V34			
V60	How much interested in politics	V58	V46	V44		Citizenship 2004: V42
V61	People like me have no say about what gov. does	V47	V45			Social Networks 2001: V64
V62	Average citizen: influence in politics	V48	V46			
V63	Good understanding of political issues	V50	V47			Citizenship 2004: V38
V64	Most people better informed than I am	V52	V48			Citizenship 2004: V39
V65	MPs try to keep promises	V53	V49			
V66	Trust in civil servants	V54	V50			Citizenship 2004: V43 Religion 1991 and 1998: optional part
V67	Taxes for high incomes	V57	V51			Social Inequality 1987: V55 1992: V63 Religion 1991 and 1998: optional part
V68	Taxes for middle incomes	V58	V52			Social Inequality 1987: V56 1992: V64
V69	Taxes for low incomes	V59	V53			Social Inequality 1987: V57 1992: V65

## Background Variables

Cumulated dataset		Role of Government			
Variable Number	Variable Label	1985	1990	1996	2006
SEX	R: Sex	V118	V59	V200	SEX
AGE	R: Age	V117	V60	V201	AGE
MARITAL	R: Marital status	V120	V61	V202	MARITAL
COHAB	R: Steady life-partner		V62	V203	COHAB
EDUCYRS	R: Education I: years of schooling	V122	V80	V204	EDUCYRS
DEGREE	R: Education II: highest education level	V123	V81	V205	DEGREE
WRKST	R: Current employment status	V109	V63	V206	WRKST
WRKHRS	R: Hours worked weekly	V108	V64	V215	WRKHRS
ISCO88	R: Occupation 1988 ISCO/ILO occupation code			V208	ISCO88
WRKSUP	R: Supervises others at work	V113	V74	V216	WRKSUP
WRKTYPE	R: Working for private, public sector, self-employed	V114	V71	V212	WRKTYPE
SELFEMP	R: Self-employed	V112	V72	V213	
NEMPLOY	R: Self-employed - number of employees		V73	V214	NEMPLOY
UNION	R: Trade union membership	V116	V77	V222	UNION
SPWRKST	S-P: Current employment status	V135	V94	V207	SPWRKST
SPISCO88	SP: Occupation 1988 ISCO/ILO occupation code			V210	SPISCO88
HOMPOP	How many persons in household	V121	V98	V273	HOMPOP
HHCYCLE	Household composition: children+adults	V121	V142	V274	HHCYCLE
PARTY_LR	R: Party affiliation: left-right (derived)	V130	V82	V224-V247	PARTY_LR
VOTE_LE	R: Vote last election: yes, no	V139	V85	V249-V271	VOTE_LE
ATTEND	R: Attendance of religious services	V133	V89	V220	ATTEND
RELIGGRP	R: Religious main groups (derived)	V132	V88	V219	RELIGGRP
CLASS	R: Subjective social class	V134	V90	V221	
nat_REG	Region	V115	V103	V300-V323	nat_REG
WEIGHT	Weighting factor	V141	V114	V325	WEIGHT



### A.III Guide for the ISSP “Role of Government” cumulation of the years 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006 (ZA4747 and ZA4748)

The data release consists of two separate data files. The main file, ZA4747 “ISSP Cumulation ROG”, contains only cumulated variables. That means it includes:

- all topic-related variables of the master questionnaires, so called module variables, which appear in at least two “Role of Government” modules and
- most of the so called background variables, mostly covering demographics, which appear in at least two “Role of Government” modules collected by
- all those ISSP member countries that participated in at least two “Role of Government” modules (22 countries).

However, there are other, mainly national-specific background variables, which belong to the current ISSP standard, but cannot be cumulated for various reasons. Although not being comparative over time, these variables might still be useful for many analyses. Therefore they are integrated in a second data file with the study number ZA4748 “ISSP Cumulation ROG Add On”. ZA4748 is a separate data file going along with separate documentation on ZACAT. The contained variables, however, can be matched easily to the cumulated file if necessary.

The cumulation and its “Add On” file are based on the data of the integrated data files of the modules ZA1490 (1985), ZA1950 (1990), ZA2900 (1996) and ZA4700 (2006). It does not go back to the individual country files of each module. A general rule is that the cumulated data follow the coding of the 2006 module as closely as possible, because this module represents the current ISSP standard. In terms of the background variables that means that whenever the module data allows it, the coding of the “The ISSP Background Variable Standard” set in 2001([bv2001\\_20060425.pdf](#)), is realized, again, as closely as possible.

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<sup>1</sup> ZACAT (<http://zacat.gesis.org>) offers direct and comprehensive access to a variety of social science survey data with a focus on international comparative studies and election studies. It enables users to locate and search for appropriate studies, to analyse data online and to download data sets or subsets of them in different formats (among others SPSS, SAS, Stata). Access to ZACAT is free of charge, analysis and download requires registration.

## 1. Countries

Over the four years the “Role of Government” surveys have been conducted, the following countries participated:

	1985	1990	1996	2006
<b>Australia</b>	X	X	X	X
<b>Canada</b>			X	X
<b>Czech Republic</b>			X	X
<b>Germany</b>	X	X	X	X
<b>France</b>			X	X
<b>Great Britain</b>	X	X	X	X
<b>Hungary</b>		X	X	X
<b>Ireland</b>		X	X	X
<b>Israel</b>		X	X	X
<b>Italy</b>	X	X	X	
<b>Japan</b>			X	X
<b>Latvia</b>			X	X
<b>New Zealand</b>			X	X
<b>Norway</b>		X	X	X
<b>Philippines</b>			X	X
<b>Poland</b>			X	X
<b>Russia</b>			X	X
<b>Slovenia</b>			X	X
<b>Spain</b>			X	X
<b>Sweden</b>			X	X
<b>Switzerland</b>			X	X
<b>USA</b>	X	X	X	X

For Germany (except for 1985) as well as for Israel (except for 1990) there are two subsamples available in the data for each year. In case of Germany one sample contains the West German respondents and the other one the East German respondents. Since 1990 the ISSP has been administered in both parts of the country. Since Eastern Germany is oversampled in every integrated data file, it is strongly recommended to use the correcting weighting factor, if Germany as a whole country is analysed. In case of Israel, two subsamples can be distinguished by districts. In 1990 only Jewish dominated districts were covered. Whereas in 1996 and 2006 sampling was extended to cover Arab dominated districts as well. Only for 1996 the resulting “Arab” subsample constitutes a disproportional oversample. Therefore, as for Germany, the cumulated data file offers a weighting factor for Israel to correct this disproportion.

## 2. Variables

Both data files contain a number of administrative variables:

The “Study number” (V1) and the “Edition of the data file” (V2) exactly indicate the data file at hand. The respondent’s ID-numbers (V3) are those of the integrated data files and have not been changed for better comparability of the cumulated with the integrated data of each individual module (exception: Australia, 1985, needed serial numbering). However, the ID numbers are only unique within its respective country and year of the module. To provide a unique identification across the data files it is necessary to combine V3 and V7.

While V4 “Year” allows the splitting of the data by modules, variables V5 and V6 indicate the countries. The “Country” variable (V6) offers codes for the country as a whole, whereas the “Country\_Sample” variable (V5) specifies also the subsamples within certain countries. As a “cumulation specific” variable, V7 “Country\_Year” combines the information of V6 and V4, prepared as a supporting tool for analysis. According to the current ISSP standard, the codes for all three variables which deal with country identification make use of international three-digit “ISO 3166 Codes”.

To match both datasets it is necessary to use the “ID” variable V3 as well as the “Country\_Year” variable V7 as key variables.

### Example for SPSS:

`SORT CASES by V3 V7. /** use this on BOTH input files.`

`MATCH FILES`

`/FILE='put path of your data file here\ZA4747.sav'`

`/FILE='put path of your data file here\ZA4748.sav'`

`/BY V3 V7.`

`EXECUTE.`

### **2.1 Variables of the cumulated data file ZA4747 “ISSP Cumulation ROG”**

All module variables, which have been asked in at least two “Role of Government” modules, are included in the cumulated data file ZA4747. For a detailed overview on these variables see the correspondence list at section 6 of this document.

Besides the module variables, ZA4747 contains the following background variables:

SEX, AGE, MARITAL, COHAB, EDUCYRS, DEGREE, WRKST, WRKHRS, ISCO88, WRKSUP, WRKTYPE, SELFEMP, NEMPLOY, UNION, SPWRKST, SPISCO88, HOMPOP, HHCYCLE, PARTY\_LR, VOTE\_LE, ATTEND, RELIGGRP, CLASS, nat\_REG and WEIGHT

The “Region” variable (nat\_REG) is the only national-specific variable that can be cumulated over time, because the administrative divisions of regions did not change too much over the

years. According to the current ISSP standard it is split by country, but cumulated over the module years.

## 2.2 Variables of the supplementary data file ZA4748 “ISSP Cumulation ROG Add On”

The “ISSP Cumulation ROG Add On” data file ZA4748 contains all those background variables which cannot be cumulated for various reasons. The national-specific variables are all split by country as well as by module. A prefix of two ISO code letters indicates the country and a two-digit suffix the module year.

- **nat\_DEG** for the years 1985, 1990 and 2006

The national-specific DEGREE variables for 1996 do not appear in the data file, because in 1996 the countries were supposed to hand in a standardized DEGREE variable, which is not national-specific at all. For DEGREE 1996 see the cumulated variable in the cumulated data file.

- **nat\_PRT** for the years 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006
- **nat\_VLE** for the years 1985, 1990 and 1996

This variable, asking for the party respondents voted for in the last election, does not exist as a background variable in the ISSP anymore after 1997 and therefore is not available in the data of 2006.

- **nat\_SIZ** for the years 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006
- **National occupation variables (nat\_OCC and nat\_SOC)** mainly for the years 1985 and 1990, when the ISCO scheme had not been established as a standard yet, and 1996 for all those countries that did not hand in either ISCO68 or ISCO88
- Respondent’s income and Family income for the years 1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006 (**nat\_RIN and nat\_INC**)

The income variables have been brought to the current ISSP standard. That means that for the earlier modules, original enumerated value codes for income categories are recoded into the midpoints of the classes for which they stand. These variables could now technically be cumulated. We decided against doing so, because in some countries variables have been surveyed quite differently. Information varies widely, for example, whether the survey asked for income per month or year, before or after tax and in what currency. Last but not least, it is hardly useful to cumulate income data in a range of twenty years, without accounting for inflation.

- **nat\_ETH** for the years 1990, 1996 and 2006

In addition to those national-specific variables, there are some variables that are not to be cumulated, because there is too much coding variation. These variables are available as well in the “ZA4748” file:

- WRKTYP85, URBRUR85, URBRUR90, URBRUR96, URBRUR06

As in the integrated data, URBRUR85 and 90 remain unlabeled, because the information asked for within these variables differs too much across the countries. The country-specific labels, however, are available through the documentation on ZACAT.

Other variables appear in their current form the first time in 2006 and therefore can not be cumulated:

- IL\_REG06, TOPBOT06, MODE06

### 3. Missing Values

The “Role of Government” cumulation introduces three codes for missing values which do not appear in the integrated data files in this form. These codes specify certain missing cases in the cumulation explicitly:

***-1 'Variable not available for this country in this module'***

This missing value is coded in the event that a country did not provide the variable in question.

***-2 'Country specific variable not applicable for this country'***

This missing value is coded for national-specific variables, indicating the cases of the other countries.

***-3 'Variable not available in this module'***

This missing value is cumulation-specific and is coded in the case of variables that are not part of a certain module at all. It is also coded, however, in the event that a variable cannot be cumulated and is therefore not available for this module in the cumulation file, but does appear in the “ZA4748” additional data file.

For reasons of consistency all missing values are coded into the negative range. So, those values which appear in the integrated data files as, for example, “8 Can’t choose” and “9 No answer” appear in the cumulated file as “-8 Can’t choose” and “-9 No answer”.



#### 4. ISCO88/SPISCO88

ISCO88 and SPISCO88 appear in the cumulated data file only for the years 1996 and 2006, since the mostly national-specific occupation codes and ISCO68 3-digit codes, which are available for 1985 and 1990, cannot be cumulated. All variables are available, however, in the additional data file “ZA4748”. To increase comparability, the ISCO68 variables of the integrated data file, handed in by some countries in 1996, have been recoded into the ISCO88 standard by a recoding scheme developed by Harry Ganzeboom<sup>2</sup>.

#### Occupation codes: (In 2006 all countries prepared ISCO88 (4-digit) occupation codes.)

ISCO	1985	1990	1996
<b>Australia</b>	Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO)	Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO)	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Canada</b>	-	-	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Czech</b>	-	-	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>France</b>	-	-	ISCO88 (4-digit) <sup>3</sup>
<b>Germany (East)</b>	-	ISCO68 (3-digit)	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Germany (West)</b>	ISCO68 (3-digit)	ISCO68 (3-digit)	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Great Britain</b>	OPCS 1980 occupation groups	OPCS 1980 occupation groups	Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 1991
<b>Hungary</b>	-	ISCO68 (4-digit)	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Ireland</b>	-	IRL: Irish List of Occupations	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Israel</b>	-	unspecified 1-digit code	ISCO68 (4-digit)
<b>Italy</b>	unspecified 2-digit code	unspecified 2-digit code	unspecified 2-digit code
<b>Japan</b>	-	-	-
<b>Latvia</b>	-	-	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>New Zealand</b>	-	-	ISCO 88 (4-digit)
<b>Norway</b>	-	ISCO68 (3-digit) <sup>4</sup>	ISCO68 (4-digit)
<b>Philippines</b>	-	-	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Poland</b>	-	-	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Russia</b>	-	-	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Slovenia</b>	-	-	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>Spain</b>	-	-	ISCO68 (4-digit)
<b>Sweden</b>	-	-	Nordic Standard Classification of Occupation (NSCO)
<b>Switzerland</b>	-	-	ISCO88 (4-digit)
<b>USA</b>	1970 Census of Population	1970 Census of Population	ISCO68 (4-digit)

<sup>2</sup> Ganzeboom’s Tools for deriving status measures on <http://home.fsw.vu.nl/hbg.ganzeboom/pisa/index.htm>.

<sup>3</sup> France also prepared a national-specific variable, containing the data coded to the “French Standard Classification of Occupations“(PCS). This variable is available in ZA2900 (1996).

<sup>4</sup> Norway also prepared a national-specific variable, containing the data coded to the “Nordic Standard Classification of Occupations“(NSCO). This variable is available in ZA1950 (1990).

## A.IV Basic Questionnaire 2006

### 2006 Role of Government questionnaire FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE

June 2005

#### General notes to members

1. All notes which are not part of the questionnaire and intended only for members (for example, translation notes) are enclosed in pointed, angle brackets <like these>.
2. All the elements in questions which require local adaptation are enclosed in square brackets. These instructions often relate to adding the name of the relevant country. For example, in Britain "Generally, how would you describe taxes in [Country] today?" would read "Generally, how would you describe taxes in Britain today?"
3. All the elements in questions which are optional are enclosed in double round brackets ((like these)).
4. Q-numbers in parentheses – for example (**Q1 1996**): question numbers in 1996 questionnaire. For countries who participated in 1996, please use the **same wording** for these questions as you did then. (**N**) = new in 2006.
5. Translation and clarification notes are provided after the relevant question.
6. In general, if translators have difficulty when translating answer codes, they should focus upon translating the **concepts** expressed by the codes rather than the precise **words** used.
7. In 1996 no general translation note was provided as to what we meant by 'government'. Unless there are very strong reasons not to, countries who participated in 1996 should use the same wording for 'government' as they did then. In general, by government we mean the central regime within a country (that is, *any* government that has been elected into power). In some countries the meaning of questions which refer to 'government' can be improved by adding 'of any party' after 'government' (to stress that it does not necessarily have to be the current government).

**(Q1 1996)**

1. In general, would you say that people should obey the law without exception, or are there exceptional occasions on which people should follow their consciences even if it means breaking the law?

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

(✓)

Obey the law without exception

**OR**

Follow conscience on occasions

Can't choose

**(Q2 1996)**

2. There are many ways people or organisations can protest against a government action they strongly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line.

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE))

	Should it be allowed?				
	Definitely	Probably	Probably not	Definitely not	Can't choose
a. Organising public meetings to protest against the government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Organising protest marches and demonstrations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Organising a nationwide strike of all workers against the government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<Precode: the word 'allowed' has the same meaning as the word 'permitted'. The main issue is whether people should be free or have the right to show to varying degrees their discontent with a government.>

<In Q2a, a 'public meeting' refers to an assembly or gathering which everyone is allowed to attend. In the context of this particular question, the purpose of the meeting should be clear.>

**(Q5 1996)**

3. There are some people whose views are considered extreme by the majority. Consider people who want to overthrow the government by revolution. Do you think such people should be allowed to ...

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE))

	Definitely	Probably	Probably not	Definitely not	Can't choose
a. ... hold public meetings to express their views?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. ... publish books expressing their views?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<In Q3b, 'publish books' can be translated as 'have their books published'.>

**(Q6 1996)**

4. All systems of justice make mistakes, but which do you think is worse ... (✓)
- ... to convict an innocent person,
- OR**
- to let a guilty person go free?
- Can't choose
- ((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

**(Q9c-h 1996)**

5. Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favour of and which you are against.

((PLEASE TICK <b>ONE</b> BOX ON EACH LINE))	Strongly in favour of	In favour of	Neither in favour of nor against	Against	Strongly against	Can't choose
a. Cuts in government spending	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Government financing of projects to create new jobs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Less government regulation of business	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Support for industry to develop new products and technology	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Support for declining industries to protect jobs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Reducing the working week to create more jobs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<5d refers to funding (financial aid) from government.>  
 <5e refers not only to direct financial aid from government (government subsidies) but could also include, for example, import restrictions imposed by government.>  
 <In 5f 'reducing the working week' refers to shortening the number of hours that employees are required to work in a week.>

**(Q10a-h 1996)**

6. Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it.

((PLEASE TICK **ONE BOX** ON EACH LINE))

choose	Spend much more	Spend more	Spend the same as now	Spend less	Spend much less	Can't
a. The environment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Health	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. The police and law enforcement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. The military and defence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Old age pensions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. Unemployment benefits	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h. Culture and the arts	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<6g refers to unemployment benefits. If there are no such benefits within a country (this applied to the Philippines in 1996), the question should not be asked.>

**(Q12a-j 1996)**

7. On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to ...

((PLEASE TICK **ONE BOX** ON EACH LINE))

	Definitely should be	Probably should be	Probably should not be	Definitely should not be	Can't choose
a. ... provide a job for everyone who wants one	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. ... keep prices under control	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. ... provide health care for the sick	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. ... provide a decent standard of living for the old	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. ... provide industry with the help it needs to grow	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. ... provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. ... reduce income differences between the rich and the poor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

h. ... give financial help to university students from low-income families	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i. ... provide decent housing for those who can't afford it	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
j. ... impose strict laws to make industry do less damage to the environment	<input type="checkbox"/> (1)	<input type="checkbox"/> (2)	<input type="checkbox"/> (3)	<input type="checkbox"/> (4)	<input type="checkbox"/> (8)

**(N)**

8. How successful do you think the government in [Country] is nowadays in each of the following areas?

((PLEASE TICK <b>ONE</b> BOX ON EACH LINE))	<b>Very Successful</b>	<b>Quite successful</b>	<b>Neither successful nor unsuccessful</b>	<b>Quite un- successful</b>	<b>Very un- successful</b>	<b>Can't Choose</b>
a. Providing health care for the sick?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Providing a decent standard of living for the old?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Dealing with threats to [Country's] security?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Controlling crime?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Fighting unemployment?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Protecting the environment?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<In 8c, by 'threats to [Country's] security' we mean security threats from within or outside the country in question. These threats might be posed by terrorist organisations, or organised crime (but only where this threatens national security) or by other countries. >

(N)

9. Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen. Do you think the authorities should have the right to...

((PLEASE TICK **ONE BOX**  
ON EACH LINE))

	Definitely should have right	Probably should have right	Probably should not have right	Definitely should not have right	Can't choose
a. ... detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. ... tap people's telephone conversations?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. ... stop and search people in the street at random?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<Question text: by 'terrorist act' we mean an action organised by a group that uses terror or violence as a weapon to achieve its aims. By 'authorities' we mean that group of public officials who are primarily involved in law enforcement.>

---

(Q13 1996)

((Now some questions about politics.))

10. How interested would you say you personally are in politics?

((PLEASE TICK **ONE BOX ONLY**))

- (✓)
- Very interested
- Fairly interested
- Somewhat interested
- Not very interested
- Not at all interested
- Can't choose
-

(Q14a-b, d, f-h)

11. Please tick one box on each line to show how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE))

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Can't choose
a. People like me don't have any say about what the government does	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. The average citizen has considerable influence on politics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. I think most people are better informed about politics and government than I am	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. People we elect as MPs try to keep the promises they have made during the election	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<In 11c, by 'pretty good' we mean "rather good" and not the negative reading "quite good".>

<If 11d, 'politics' should be understood as a general term to cover the political system, political affairs and political events and procedures.>

<In 11e, 'MPs' (Members of Parliament) are people elected for national parliament.

<In 11f, 'civil servants' are higher level non-political government paid officials. They are *not* elected to office – they applied for their posts and are senior public servants or government administrators.>

(Q17a-c 1996)

12a. Generally, how would you describe taxes in [Country] today?  
 ((We mean all taxes together, including [wage deductions], [income tax], [taxes on goods and services] and all the rest.))  
 First, for those with high incomes, are taxes ...

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

- ... much too high,
- too high,
- about right,
- too low,
- or, are they much too low?
- Can't choose



b. Next, for those with middle incomes, are taxes ...

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

- (✓)
- ... much too high,
- too high,
- about right,
- too low,
- or, are they much too low?
- Can't choose

c. Lastly, for those with low incomes, are taxes ...

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

- (✓)
- ... much too high,
- too high,
- about right,
- too low,
- or, are they much too low?
- Can't choose
-

**(N)**

- 13a) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
"There are only a few people I can trust completely"

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

(✓)

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Can't choose

- b) "If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you"

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

(✓)

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Can't choose

**(N)**

- 14a. Some people because of their job, position in the community or contacts, are asked by others to help influence important decisions in their favour. What about you? How often are you asked to help influence important decisions in other people's favour?

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

(✓)

Never

Seldom

Occasionally

Often

Can't choose

b. And are there people you could ask to help influence important decisions in your favour?

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

(✓)

- No, nobody
- Yes, a few people
- Yes, some people
- Yes, a lot of people
- Can't choose

<Precode: if necessary, the difference between 'a few' and 'some' can be clarified by using a term such as 'only a few'.>

---

(N)

15. In your opinion, how often do public officials deal fairly with people like you?

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

(✓)

- Almost always
- Often
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Almost never
- Can't choose

<Question text: by 'public officials' we mean both elected and non-elected public officials, and by 'fairly' we mean impartially, without any favouritism or prejudice. The phrase 'people like you' should be translated so as to refer to people with roughly similar characteristics to the respondent, but care should be taken not to use an expression that might offend.>

---

(N)

16. Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials in [Country] depends on who they know?

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

(✓)

- Definitely does
- Probably does
- Probably does not
- Definitely does not
- Can't choose
-

17. In your opinion, about how many politicians in [Country] are involved in corruption?

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

(✓)

- Almost none
- A few
- Some
- Quite a lot
- Almost all
- Can't choose

<Precode: if necessary, the difference between 'a few' and 'some' can be clarified by using a term such as 'only a few'.>

---

18. And in your opinion, about how many public officials in [Country] are involved in corruption?

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

(✓)

- Almost none
- A few
- Some
- Quite a lot
- Almost all
- Can't choose

<Precode: if necessary, the difference between 'a few' and 'some' can be clarified by using a term such as 'only a few'.>

---

19. In the last five years, how often have you or a member of your immediate family come across a public official who hinted they wanted, or asked for, a bribe or favour in return for a service?

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

- |              |                          |
|--------------|--------------------------|
|              | (✓)                      |
| Never        | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Seldom       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Occasionally | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Quite often  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Very often   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Can't choose | <input type="checkbox"/> |

---

(N)

20. On average, about how many people do you have contact with in a typical week day, including people you live with.

We are interested in contact on a one-to-one basis, including everyone with whom you chat, talk, or discuss matters. This can be face-to-face, by telephone, by mail, or on the internet. Please include only people you know.

Please select one from the following categories that best matches your estimate.

((PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY))

- |              |                          |
|--------------|--------------------------|
|              | (✓)                      |
| 0-4 persons  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5-9          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10-19        | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 20-49        | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 50 or more   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Can't choose | <input type="checkbox"/> |

<This final question is a compulsory background variable. It must be asked, but its position in the questionnaire is not fixed and can be decided by each ISSP country.>

## A.V ZACAT

ZACAT is an online data portal which allows searching for, browsing, analysing and downloading social science survey data, including all ISSP modules. The data which can be accessed is a selection of the complete data available at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.

ZACAT uses NESSTAR<sup>®</sup> technology and offers all the services of that technical platform to its users: Apart from a direct download of datasets, it offers detailed documentation on study as well as variable level and provides a direct access to further studies' background material. Furthermore, it is possible to search for keywords that are either contained in the questions and answers of the questionnaires or in the variable or value labels of the datasets. This search is not limited to only one defined data file, but covers all survey data retrievable at ZACAT. Besides, ZACAT enables the user to execute first analyses on a limited basis, as for example frequencies distribution, cross tabulations and regressions. It is also possible to generate diverse charts for these analyses, such as pie or bar charts. A few examples are depicted below. Detailed usage instructions are online available via the ZACAT page and the NESSTAR help system.

The use of ZACAT and the data download is free of charge. For the analysis and download of data, a registration is required. However, the only prerequisite is that the usage of the data is for scientific purposes; therefore a short description of the project is requested.

URL: <http://zacat.gesis.org>

### Examples for analyses on ZACAT

#### (1) Frequencies: Obey the law without exception or follow the conscience on occasions

The screenshot shows the ZACAT web interface. At the top, there are navigation links: 'Description', 'Table', and 'Analysis'. On the right, there are links for 'Contact us', 'Help', 'FAQ', and 'ZACAT Home'. Below the navigation is the dataset title: 'Dataset: International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government I-IV (ISSP 1985-1990-1996-2006)'. The main area contains three dropdown menus: 'Obey laws without exception' (selected 'Obey laws without exception'), 'Country' (selected 'CZ-Czech Republic'), and 'Type'. A 'CLEAR' button is located to the right of the 'Type' dropdown. Below the filters is a table with the following data:

	Code	Frequency	% of all	% of valid
<b>Obey laws without exception</b>				
Obey the law without exception	1	1073	46.6	49.7
Follow conscience on occasions	2	1088	47.3	50.3
NA, refused	-9	26	1.1	-
Cant choose, dont know	-8	114	5.0	-
Variable not available for this country in this module	-1	0	0.0	-
<b>Total</b>		<b>2301</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

- (2) Split file: Attitudes of respondents towards protest demonstrations, listed by countries and years (data is weighted)

[Description](#) [Table](#) [Analysis](#)


[Contact us](#) [Help](#) [FAQ](#) [ZACAT Home](#)

**Dataset: International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government I-IV (ISSP 1985-1990-1996-2006)**

Country\_Year:    
 Protest demonstrations:    
 Type:

Protest demonstrations	Definitely allowed	Probably allowed	Probably not allowed	Definitely not allowed	Total	N=
Country_Year						
AU_2006	39.5	35.3	16.2	8.9	100.0	2555
AU_1985	37.0	31.8	16.8	14.4	100.0	1440
AU_1990	32.8	45.5	17.3	4.4	100.0	2353
AU_1996	42.4	40.1	13.1	4.4	100.0	2044
CA_2006	51.3	32.9	9.9	5.9	100.0	858
CA_1996	58.4	27.4	8.2	6.0	100.0	1195
CZ_2006	30.2	40.2	21.3	8.2	100.0	1147
CZ_1996	25.7	32.7	24.4	17.2	100.0	1034
FR_2006	46.5	34.4	12.8	6.4	100.0	1700
FR_1996	53.2	32.2	9.7	5.0	100.0	1230
DE_2006	53.4	36.8	7.1	2.7	100.0	1532
DE_1985	9.7	21.0	38.8	30.5	100.0	1015
DE_1990	42.3	41.3	10.4	6.0	100.0	3645
DE_1996	41.9	46.5	7.1	4.5	100.0	3328
HU_2006	28.4	37.3	23.0	11.3	100.0	980
HU_1990	34.5	33.0	18.0	14.5	100.0	951
HU_1996	39.6	38.5	13.9	8.0	100.0	1457

(3) Cumulated bar chart: Association between voting participation and interest in politics in Switzerland







## A.VI ISSP Modules

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Year	Module
1985	Role of Government I
1986	Social Networks I
1987	Social Inequality I
1988	Family and Changing Gender Roles I
1989	Work Orientations I
1990	Role of Government II
1991	Religion I
1992	Social Inequality II
1993	Environment I
1994	Family and Changing Gender Roles II
1995	National Identity I
1996	Role of Government III
1997	Work Orientations II
1998	Religion II
1999	Social Inequality III
2000	Environment II
2001	Social Networks II
2002	Family and Changing Gender Roles III
2003	National Identity II
2004	Citizenship I
2005	Work Orientations III
2006	Role of Government IV
2007	Leisure and Sports
2008	Religion III
2009	Social Inequality IV
2010	Environment III
2011	Health ( <i>planned</i> )
2012	Family and Changing Gender Roles IV ( <i>planned</i> )
2013	National Identity III ( <i>planned</i> )

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## A.VII ISSP Members and Participation

Country Year	'85	'86	'87	'88	'89	'90	'91	'92	'93	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	
Australia																							
Austria																							
Germany																							
Great Britain																							
United States																							
Italy																							
Hungary																							
Netherlands																							
Ireland																							
Israel																							
Norway																							
Philippines																							
New Zealand																							
Russia																							
Bulgaria																							
Canada																							
Czech Republic																							
Japan																							
Poland																							
Slovenia																							
Sweden																							
Spain																							
Cyprus																							
France																							
Portugal																							
Slovakia																							
Bangladesh																							
Chile																							
Latvia																							
Denmark																							
Brazil																							
Switzerland																							
Venezuela																							
Finland																							
Flanders																							
Mexico																							
South Africa																							
Taiwan																							
South Korea																							
Uruguay																							
Croatia																							
Dominican Republic																							

Das *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) erhebt jährlich Umfragedaten zu sozialwissenschaftlich relevanten Themen. Der vorliegende Report beruht auf ISSP-Daten, die zu vier verschiedenen Zeitpunkten innerhalb von 21 Jahren in bis zu 36 Mitgliedsländern zum Verhältnis der Bürger zu „Staat und Regierung“ gesammelt wurden. Jedes Kapitel beleuchtet anhand spezieller Aspekte dieses Themas Inhalte und Besonderheiten der ISSP-Daten. In der Gesamtschau ergeben sich viele Einblicke in die jeweiligen nationalen Verhältnisse, insbesondere aber in die Unterschiede zwischen den Nationen und über zentrale Entwicklungen politischer Einstellungen innerhalb der letzten zwei Dekaden.

The *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) provides annual data on various topics relevant for social research. The current report deals with data collected at four different points of time over a 21 year span, from up to 36 ISSP member countries. The topics are broadly consolidated under the term "Role of Government". Each chapter focuses on an individual topic area under this heading, shedding light on the ISSP data with their specific content and particularities. Overall, this report offers some insights into specific national situations. It also specifically takes a cross-national comparative perspective while simultaneously displaying selected core trends in political attitudes over the past two decades.