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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
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Managing Rivalries – Regional Security Institutions and Democracy in Western Europe, South America, Southeast Asia and East Asia

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Gestaltung, Satz und Herstellung: atelier-raddatz.de und DSF
Druck: Günter Druck GmbH, Georgsmarienhütte
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Printed in Germany 2009

Spendenkonto der Deutschen Stiftung Friedensforschung:
Sparkasse Osnabrück, Konto-Nr. 1230, BLZ 265 501 05
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Abstract

The absence of war between democracies is regarded as one of the few law-like correlations in international relations. The causation of this empirical phenomenon, however, remains contested; and the democratic peace in search of its cause. The project tries to fill this theoretical gap by arguing that inter-democratic institutions are causally responsible for the remarkable stability between democracies. Furthermore, the project contributes to the ongoing debate on the effects of international institutions. While most scholars have recently agreed that some institutions, due to their specific form, are more effective than others, it remains contested which form characteristics contribute to the peace-building effects of institutions.

By combining liberal theories on the democratic peace and research on the effects of international institutions, the project is able to identify trans-national and trans-governmental networks as crucial features of inter-democratic institutions. The main hypothesis of the project asserts that a) these characteristics distinguish inter-democratic from traditional institutions between non-democratic states or with a mixed membership, and b) explain their distinct peace-building effect.

The project is designed as a controlled case comparison. We analyse the level of stability of five pairs of states. With regard to comparability, we restrict our cases to the group of strategic rivals, i.e. pairs of states which look back to a history of conflict and violence and hence, are more prone to military confrontation than average dyads. From the sample of strategic rivals, we select dyads of endangered states which a) are located in highly institutionalized regional settings, and b) differ with regard to their political regime. We explore the peace-building effect of relevant regional security institutions on the level of stability of the following five dyads: France - Germany; Greece - Turkey; Indonesia - Malaysia and Argentina - Brazil as well as Argentina - Chile. Concerning the South American cases, we also compare the level of stability before and after the wave of democratisation in this region. In addition, we incorporate the relationship between Japan and South Korea into our research. This odd case of a democratic dyad of rivals, whose security relationship is only minimally institutionalized, allows us to assess alternative explanations of the democratic peace.

The results of our research confirm our main hypothesis. Firstly, our work demonstrates that inter-democratic institutions differ with regard to their embedment in trans-national and trans-governmental networks. Secondly, we show that these institutional differences are responsible for the observed differences in the level of stability of our dyads. Moreover, our case selection allows us to undermine alternative explanations. The surprisingly low level of stability of the Japanese - South Korean dyad reinforces theoretical doubts concerning the liberal assumption that the democratic peace is caused by state properties. The high level of tensions between Greece and Turkey, both NATO member states, invalidates realist as well as neo-institutional explanations which attribute the effectiveness of institutions to the presence of a hegemonic leader or to their level of institutionalisation.
Zusammenfassung

Bis heute gilt der Demokratische Frieden als einer der wenigen gesetzesartigen Zusammenhänge in den internationalen Beziehungen. Allerdings sind die Ursachen dieses Phänomens umstritten. Vor diesem Hintergrund plausibilisiert das Forschungsprojekt die These, dass inter-demokratische Institutionen entscheidend zur auffälligen Stabilität zwischen Demokratien beitragen und die kausale Lücke im Verständnis des demokratischen Friedens füllen. Darüber hinaus trägt das Projekt zur laufenden institutionalistischen Debatte über die Wirkung internationaler Organisationen bei. Hier wird der Befund einer ungleichmäßigen Wirkung von internationalen Institutionen zunehmend anerkannt, wobei nach wie vor umstritten ist, auf welchen institutionellen Merkmalen die friedensstiftende Wirkung einiger Institutionen beruht.

Mit der Zusammenführung liberaler Ansätze zum demokratischen Frieden und Arbeiten zu internationalen Institutionen identifiziert das Forschungsprojekt mit transnationalen und transgouvernemental Vernetzungen spezifische Formmerkmale inter-demokratischer Institutionen. Diese Formmerkmale, so die forschungsleitende Vermutung, unterscheiden inter-demokratische Institutionen einerseits von herkömmlichen Institutionen zwischen Nicht-Demokratien oder gemischten Dyaden, erklären andererseits deren besondere friedensfördernde Wirkung.

Das Projekt ist als kontrollierte Vergleichsstudie angelegt. Untersucht wird das Stabilitätsniveau zwischen fünf gefährdeten Staatenpaaren, die auf eine Geschichte von Gewalt und Konflikt zurückblicken und die daher mit einem größeren Risiko militärischer Konfrontation behaftet sind. Aus der Menge der gefährdeten Staatenpaare wurden Fälle ausgewählt, die sich in regional hochverregelten Settings bewegen, sich aber in Bezug auf ihre Zusammensetzung unterscheiden: Auf der einen Seite stehen rein demokratische Staatenpaare und auf der anderen Seite solche, in denen mindestens ein Staat nicht-demokratisch verfasst ist. Im Einzelnen wird der Einfluss relevanter regionaler Sicherheitsorganisationen auf die Konfliktanfälligkeit der Dyaden Deutschland-Frankreich, Griechenland-Türkei, Indonesien-Malaysia (vor der Demokratisierung Indonesiens) und Argentinien-Brasilien-Chile (vor und nach der Demokratisierungswelle im südlichen Lateinamerika) analysiert. Zusätzlich wird mit Japan-Südkorea eine Dyade demokratischer Rivalen in die Fallauswahl einbezogen, deren Sicherheitsbeziehungen kaum institutionalisiert sind.

1. Introduction

Do international institutions contribute to peace and cooperation among their members? Although the origins of this debate date back to the years of the Enlightenment, and although functionalists, neo-functionalists and neo-institutionalists have contributed important pieces of work, we still know surprisingly little about the relationship between IO-membership and conflict behavior. We are still puzzled by the observation that some institutions seem to stimulate cooperation among their members while others fail spectacularly. And we are still confronted with persistent realist objections.

The findings we will present on the following pages suggest that even if membership in international institutions as such does not correlate with peaceful relations among their members, a sub-group of institutions is indeed very well suited to promote deep cooperation. We argue that inter-democratic institutions, due to their specific form characteristics, exert an independent and positive effect on the conflict behavior of their members. Our study contributes both to the research on the democratic peace and to the institutional debate. Concerning the former, we argue that institutions are a missing link in democratic peace theory. Concerning the latter, we add to ongoing attempts to identify context and form-characteristics that might explain the varying effects of international institutions.

We develop our argument in two steps. First, we lay the theoretical foundations for our argument. We start by taking issue with liberal approaches to the democratic peace. Instead we advance the argument that inter-democratic institutions are its key causes. We then build on recent findings of the institutional debate. Distinguishing ourselves from institutional and moderate-realist approaches, we argue that institutions with specific form characteristics - those embedded in transnational and trans-governmental networks - are especially able to foster peace. Next, we take recourse to the study of war to specify our dependent variable and causal mechanisms between membership in international institutions and conflict behavior. Finally, we explicate our case selection. In a second step, we present our findings on how those institutions impact on the conflict behavior of their members.
2. Democratic Peace and International Institutions: an Auspicious Relationship

2.1 Shortcomings of democratic peace theory.

The democratic peace has often been characterized as a law-like correlation in search of an explanation (Lipson 2003: 1). Approaches referring to state properties or a combination thereof like liberal norms or democratic institutions have failed to account for the bifurcated nature of the democratic peace (Geis 2001; Geis/Wagner 2006). Recent rationalist explanations account for this dyadic behavior, but these have shortcomings as well. Bueno de Mesquita et.al. (1999; 2003) conceptualize the democratic peace as a case of successful deterrence. Democratic governments, depending on large winning coalitions, risk losing power if they involve their country in a prolonged war, or if they actually lose a war. Hence, democratic governments prefer negotiated solutions. They fight only if there is a fair chance of winning quickly and decisively. Therefore, democracies tend to win the fights they pick (Lake 1992; Reiter/Stam 1998). These traits make them reliable negotiating partners and formidable enemies. Among democracies, these qualities alleviate the search for negotiated solutions. Autocratic leaders, who need to secure the support of a much smaller winning coalition, are guided by a different cost-benefit calculation. Their domestic power position might actually improve when their countries fight protracted wars. Their resulting preferences for bullying tactics, even at the expense of a higher risk of war involvement, explains the frequency of wars between non-democracies and among mixed dyads. This approach, although it accounts for the bifurcated nature of the democratic peace, faces two profound objections. Firstly, most observers agree that the relationship between democracies is not characterized by deterrence (Dixon/Senese 2002; Gelpi/Griesdorf 2001). Secondly, it has been disputed that autocratic leaders run less severe risks if they lose a war (Rosato 2003; 2005).

James Fearon’s (1994; 1995) explanation of the democratic peace rests on the assumption of a higher degree of transparency among democracies. According to this view, war is caused by private information, i.e. the absence of reliable information about the intentions, strength and resolve of the other side. Because ‘audience costs’ allow democracies better to signal resolve, they are able to avoid this kind of political malfunction when dealing with each other. Mixed dyads, by contrast, are plagued by private information and consequently a higher propensity for violence. We agree with the notion that the availability of information is of crucial importance. Yet, we take issue with the assertion that democracies, due to their state properties, are indeed as transparent as this approach maintains. Case studies point to the ability of democracies to conceal their intentions and resolve. Moreover, if democracies were indeed easily readable, it would be difficult to explain why autocracies so frequently lose wars against democracies (Hasenclever/Weiffen 2006).

Given these lingering doubts about the explanatory power of models that rely on state properties, we advance the argument that the democratic peace should be understood as an interaction phenomenon. Democratic dyads differ from mixed or autocratic dyads in the way they organize their relationship. This argument shifts the attention towards institutions among democracies. If inter-democratic institutions were responsible for the peaceful behavior among democracies, we would have to show that those institutions are a) different from traditional international institutions and b) able to exert an independent effect on the conflict behavior of their members.
2.2 Democratic peace meets the institutional debate

Early institutional research, explicitly or implicitly, treated institutions alike. Recent studies, however, have tried to identify contextual conditions and form characteristics of institutions that might explain the variation of their effectiveness. Conceptually, these attempts build on the functional understanding of institutions as instruments of states that are designed to meet certain informational demands (Peters 1999; Abbot/Snidal 1998). Depending on the given social structure (Zürn 1992) (independent variable), states will create institutions with a specific form (dependent variable). Form may include the degree of legalization and delegation, the scope, the membership etc. In a second step, form can then be modeled as independent variable, which influences the effectiveness of the organization (dependent variable). The conceptualization of form as both dependent and independent variable has inspired important work on institutional variation (Koremenos et.al. 2001a; 2001b; Sprinz 2003; for the application of this conceptualization in the area of security studies see Weber 1992; Wallander 2000; Haftendorn/Keck 1997; Keohane/Haftendorn/Wallander 1999).

Quantitative research has taken a similar turn. Early studies measured the effects of common membership in international institutions on risk of militarized interstate disputes (MID). Not surprisingly, they could not establish a correlation between IO-membership and MID occurrence (Singer/Wallace 1970). Domke (1988) was one of the first to argue that research should take the differences among IOs into account. Following this advice, recent studies have produced interesting results. While Pevehouse and Russett (2006) maintain that the peace-building effect of IOs correlates with the level of democracy of its members, Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) conclude that this effect depends on the level of institutionalization and the organization’s mandate. Highly institutionalized organizations with a clear security mandate contribute more to peace than other organizations.

Conceptualizing form as both dependent and independent variable, although promising, has significant theoretical pitfalls as well. Most importantly, this approach runs the risk of falling into the endogeneity trap. As the form of institutions is ascribed to the informational demands of member states and as institutions become thus endogenous to member states interests, their autonomous effect on outcomes becomes moot (Keohane/Martin 1999). Attempting to escape this trap, research has tried to identify sources of institutional autonomy or independence. In this regard, unintended effects of delegation and the leverage of self-interested international bureaucracies have attracted most attention (Barnett/-Finnemore 2004; Hawkins et.al. 2006; Haftel/Thompson 2006).

To summarize the state of institutional research: Most scholars agree that only some institutions contribute to peace and argue that this effect depends on certain design or form characteristics. There is, however, less consensus on which form characteristics and causal mechanisms are responsible. Moreover, scholars are increasingly aware of the endogeneity trap and the necessity to distinguish presumably autonomous effects of institutions from member-states’ interests. Neo-institutionalists, in particular, argue that the autonomous peace-building effect of regional security arrangements increases with the delegation of authority to common institutions, with majoritarian decision-making procedures, by a functional division of labor like role specialization and by the pooling of resources. Moderate realists, in contrast, are less preoccupied with the issue of endogeneity. They perceive institutions as buffers between state interests and outcomes. Although the stability of security institutions may depend on the availability of voice opportunities to some degree, their effectiveness ultimately rests on the presence, strength and will of a hegemonic power and the degree to which the institution’s rules and norms fit with the hegemony’s interest. Both causal models are relevant because NATO, the most important...
democratic security institution, has a hegemonic form and is highly institutionalized. NATO’s Secretary-General has a mandate to settle disputes among allies (Kay 1998: 37), its vast political and military bureaucracy enjoys considerable autonomy, and NATO’s integrated structure encourages role specialization and the pooling of forces. Moreover, important tracts of literature claim that NATO’s effectiveness rests on the American leadership or on its high level of institutionalization (Duffield 1994/95; Tuschhoff 1999: 151; Wallander 2000).

We follow this reasoning by conceptualizing form as both dependent and independent variable. We part with the current research program by pursuing a different escape route from the endogeneity trap. We argue that the autonomous peace-building effect of inter-democratic institutions rests on specific form characteristics. These form characteristics, although they relate to state properties of democracies are not intentionally designed but develop over time.

Two form characteristics distinguish inter-democratic from traditional international institutions. They are embedded in strong transnational networks, and they are connected with their member-states via strong trans-governmental networks. Trans-governmental approaches were first advanced by Keohane and Nye in the early 1970s. They define trans-governmental networks as “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the politics of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments (Keohane/Nye 1974: 43). According to them, trans-governmentalism flourishes around IOs, which offer themselves as forums for regular interactions of national bureaucrats.

Transnational approaches, too, date back to the early 1970s. Keohane/Nye (1972: xii) defined transnational relations as cross-border interaction involving at least one non-state actor. Subsequent research tried to specify the conditions that impact on the strategies and success of transnational actors (Risse-Kappen 1995). Under the guise of the term governance, transnational approaches have achieved broad acceptance even in the area of security studies. Again, this research regards IOs as focal points for transnational activities.

Most observers maintain that the rise of trans-governmental and transnational ties follows general patterns of functional necessities. Growing interdependence and complexity on the one hand and a reduced problem-solving capacity of the state on the other hand lead to a disaggregation of states into functionally distinct parts and a rise of sectorally organized networks of state bureaucrats and private actors (Slaughter 2004: 18). Hence, it is widely assumed that trans-governmental and transnational governance structures are evenly distributed around the globe and that all IOs are similarly affected. In fact, the UN system is regarded as one of the most important locations for transnational governance activities.

Throughout the following pages, we build on trans-governmental and transnational insights in order to depict institutional form characteristics as building blocks for a liberal approach to institutional studies. However, we take issue with the notion that the phenomenon of trans-governmental and transnational linkages is triggered solely by functional pressures and is thus uniformly distributed. Instead, we argue that democracies are more prone to develop trans-governmental and transnational links, while autocratic leaders tend to control their societies and political systems. Hence, we hypothesize that inter-democratic institutions, those composed of democracies, differ from traditional institutions with regard to the density and depth of trans-governmental and transnational links to member states and that these links are relevant for their ability to contain conflicts and foster cooperation among member states.
In the next step, we will present our theoretical understanding on how international institutions might prevent the onset of war and foster cooperation. Building on these causal mechanisms, we will specify our dependent variable.

2.3 Studies of war and the effects of international institutions

Studies of war have identified three crucial pathways towards war. The risk of escalation increases if states a) perceive each other as power rivals and fear that the tide might turn against them, b) take recourse to unilateral strategies and bullying tactics and c) if the relationship between them becomes polarized, that is, if the interactions on every policy field converge into one big confrontational attitude (Hasenclever 2002b; Dembinski/Hasenclever/Wagner 2004). International organizations can reduce these risks. They can provide reliable information about the other side’s military capabilities, resolve and strategic intentions (Keohane/Haftendorn/Wallander 1999: 330). The availability of reliable information may increase military stability, make the resort to unilateral strategies less attractive and increase the chance of cooperation. Furthermore, international organizations can prevent the polarization of a relationship by creating robust boundaries between policy fields (Rittberger/Zürn 1990). As hypothesized above, inter-democratic institutions are better suited to provide credible information. They are also better suited to insulating policy fields. The ability of governments to link policy fields in ways that would hurt interests of private actors is mitigated by their ability to monitor, assess and influence developments and decisions on the level of the international institution.

These causal mechanisms allow us to specify our dependent variable. Since war is an increasingly rare phenomenon and since the absence of wars and MIDs may be caused by a variety of factors like successful deterrence, bandwagoning, common threats, internal weaknesses or a shared interest to preserve authority in the face of internal instability, we have decided to concentrate on the likely effects of institutions. Military stability varies between a sense of profound insecurity and awareness that the military forces of the other side do not pose a threat. Cooperation varies between bullying tactics and attempts to preserve military autonomy and deep cooperation, including a disposition for role specialization and pooling of forces. Polarization varies between the propensity of a spill-over of conflicts from one policy field to others and a strong tendency to insulate policy fields despite tension.
3. **Case Selection**

Our study is based on a most similar case design. We compare the conflict behavior of strategic rivals (Thompson 2001), i.e. dyads of states with a history and hence a propensity for violent conflicts, which are embedded in strong regional security institutions. Our cases vary with regard to the institutional settings - inter-democratic versus traditional international institutions. We choose the French-German relationship within NATO and the EU (inter-democratic), the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia within ASEAN (traditional) and the relationship between Argentina, Brazil and Chile within Latin-American institutions. The latter case is especially interesting since the transformation of many Latin-American states including Argentina, Brazil and Chile from non-democracies to democracies since the 1980s allows a longitudinal comparison.

This design, however, is hampered by a significant drawback. Because state properties are the building blocks of institutional properties, our cases vary with regard to two important variables. Although we have theoretically refuted the proposition that democratic state properties as such explain the democratic peace, we would nevertheless be on safer ground if we could control for the effects of state properties. We have therefore incorporated the relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea - the only case of a strategic rivalry among democracies that is not embedded in an inter-democratic institution - into our project. Finally, we have added another odd case - the Greek-Turkish relationship - the only case of a non-democratic strategic rivalry that is embedded in a strong inter-democratic institution. This case speaks directly to the French-German case and allows us to control for the effect of the American hegemony and the level of institutionalization.
4. Findings of the Case Studies

We treat all our cases similarly. After a very brief recapitulation of the history and causes of conflict, we will a) ask how the relevant institutional setting developed and b) how the institutional framework influenced the conflict behavior of our dyads during and after periods of crisis or uncertainty.

4.1 France-Germany: From arch-rivalry to security partnership

Origins of the conflict and level of tensions

After 1955, Franco-German relations moved towards ever closer cooperation (Gordon 1995; Haftendorn 2004; Krotz 2003). Being accustomed to the long peace in Western Europe, we tend to take this development for granted. In fact, it is highly surprising, and it was made possible by a set of multilateral and bilateral security institutions. In our view, these institutions have continued to play a crucial role up to the present day. Over the following pages, we give a brief overview of the evolution of the institutional network that ties France and Germany together. We show how international institutions that began as restrictive instruments designed to control the rising power of West Germany lost their importance and how these same institutions were turned into instruments of cognitive reassurance. Their main function was to make credible the peaceful intentions of West Germany and to signal West Germany's robust integration within the transatlantic security community. In a second step, we argue that for France cognitive reassurance was of major importance to maintain cooperation even in times of rising doubt about Germany's foreign policy preferences. While Paris was repeatedly tempted to return to classical balancing policies, in the end it always chose to strengthen and develop international institutions that have locked Germany into the Western Alliance. In this paper, we will restrict ourselves to the French perspective, since the French reaction to Germany's rise is more puzzling than the German perspective.

State properties and institutional form: from material control to cognitive reassurance

With Germany's rearmament in the 1950s, a French nightmare had come true (Kocs 1995: 16). To minimize the security risks, France insisted on strong institutional controls of Germany's economic, political and military rise. These institutional devices included supranational European arrangements like the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Euratom treaty, which envisaged stringent controls like ownership of all fissile materials by a supranational body (Grosser 1989: 132-141; Kimmel/Jardin 2002: 10-19). Additionally, and at the time more importantly, German power was to be contained by the bipolar alliance structure of the emerging Cold War world. The Paris Accords of 1954, whose conclusion the government of Mendès-France had been actively pursuing even before the collapse of the European Defense Community (Trachtenberg 1999: 125-140), restored, but also restrained, German sovereignty. The Paris Accords finalized the creation of a leading and lasting deployment of U.S. military forces in Western Europe, preserved the right of the Western powers to station troops on German soil and to intervene in extraordinary circumstances, secured the full integration of the new German army into the (US-dominated) NATO structure, and barred the FRG from negotiating a reunification treaty on its
own. Last but not least, Germany would be non-nuclear and, by joining the WEU, would accept additional military restrictions.

As time passed, these restrictions lost their significance. The ECSC never really managed the German coal and steel industry. The restrictions of the WEU-treaty concerning Germany were soon abrogated. The Euratom Treaty, instead of creating a material control regime, began a safeguards regime that has relied on cognitive reassurances. Additionally, the durability and resilience of the Paris Accords was increasingly questioned by Mendès-France successors, mainly because its foundation, the American military commitment, remained doubtful. Under Charles de Gaulle, France eventually turned away from NATO as a restrictive device. This is all the more surprising, because his attempts to forge strong bilateral security institutions with Germany had largely failed. The only visible results of the 1963 Elysée Treaty were regular meetings between the French and the German defense ministers and between French and German chiefs of staff (Gordon 1995: 14; Krotz 2003). This does not imply that international institutions had become worthless to France’s security. When De Gaulle pulled France out of the integrated structure of NATO, he took care not to jeopardize the alliance (Bozo 2006: 115; Meimeth 1990: 45-47; Treacher 2003: 40). Institutions became the solution to the German question, not because of their ability to control German power materially, but because of their ability to reassure France about Germany’s peaceful intentions.

Relevant bilateral and multilateral security institutions could fulfill this function because their form developed according to our theoretical expectations. Although NATO and the EPC/CFSP were designed as intergovernmental institutions, they steadily developed strong transgovernmental and transnational networks. In the case of NATO, the originally rather meager NATO bureaucracy developed into vast and constantly operating consultation and negotiation machinery, closely tying together the military and security policy establishments of its member states across various levels of the national decision-making hierarchies. This close interaction left its mark on the behavior of national representatives. Students of NATO agree that the alliance has not only developed a norm of early consultation, but that national representatives actually follow a practice of early consultation (Risse-Kappen 1995). Furthermore, despite its military functions and security requirements, NATO has developed a rather astonishing level of transgovernmental networks. NATO maintains a vast public diplomacy division and is engaged in comprehensive outreach activities. NATO has not only forged close links among the defense industries of its member-states. It is also embedded in a network of research institutes and is linked with the society of its member states via the family of Atlantic Treaty Associations and its Parliamentary Assembly.

The development of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy followed a similar pattern. The European Political Cooperation started out as an arrangement of infrequent, cozy and reclusive meetings of high-ranking diplomats. However, it quickly developed into highly flexible information, consultation and coordination machinery involving practically the entire foreign policy staff of member states. Most observers agree that the mushrooming of communications, committees, and meetings on various levels and venues has changed the behavior of diplomats and indeed the character of foreign policy in Western Europe. Students of CFSP observe not only a deep rooted consultation and coordination reflex. They have also identified a fusion of national bureaucracies, putting the whole concept of national foreign policy into question. Transnational networks developed as well. By now transnational networks of interest groups like the arms industry, civil society organizations and think tanks follow the CFSP, provide input, report on and work with supranational bureaucrats and national representatives.
On the bilateral level, the Elysée-Process was revitalized in the 1980s. While the regular French-German summits have never been suspended since 1963 and have proven to be of major importance for effective policy coordination among the two European neighbors (Fontaine 1978: 66), Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand decided to break new ground in the field of defense and security at their meeting in October 1982 in Bonn (Kimmel/Jardin 2002: 238-240). Within the framework of the Elysée-Treaty, the two heads of state created a new Franco-German Commission on Security and Defense. The three working groups of the commission – on arms collaboration, military cooperation and political-strategic issues – quickly agreed on blue-prints for closer defense cooperation. In 1986, Bonn and Paris signed an agreement promoting defense research at the Franco-German Research Institute of Saint Louis. In 1987, a major Franco-German military exercise “Kecker Spatz” was launched. In January 1988, a Franco-German Defense and Security Council was established, which became the diplomatic centerpiece of ever intensifying French-German security cooperation (Krotz 2003). In the same year, Bonn and Paris agreed on a Franco-German military brigade, which formed the nucleus of the subsequent Euro-Corps. Already in 1984, Bonn and Paris had orchestrated a revival of the WEU. The organization was to facilitate the construction of a common European defense policy. In 1986, the members of the WEU followed France and Germany and signed “The Platform on European Security Interests”, stating their common conviction that “an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense”. Again, Paris did not expect these bilateral and Europe-wide multilateral institutions to provide material reassurance. They were to serve instead as platforms for cooperation and exchange of information.

Finally, the transnational networks of societal, political and military actors have increased significantly in number and quality over the last forty years. As early as 1948, the French-German Institute in Ludwigsburg was founded. It was followed by the Comité d'études des relations franco-allemandes (CEFRA) in Paris, which was established by an intergovernmental agreement in 1954. In March 1982, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand decided on the creation of a common Centre d'information et de recherche sur l'Allemagne contemporaine (CIRAC) that was designed to deepen the mutual understanding of both countries. According to its founders, CIRAC was to operate as a seismograph: to detect change in the societal and political fabric of Franco-German relations that could affect France's security (Weisenfeld 1982: 335). The three institutions organize regular meetings and Franco-German seminars; gather high-ranking officials, military officers, academics and journalists to discuss issues of defense and security. The results of the meetings are regularly published in a series of high-profile documents and academic journals. Moreover, the CEFRA is currently administered by the Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP). IFRI was founded in 1979 and is France's leading independent research centre on international affairs. The IFRI maintains close working relations to the DGAP and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), its German counterparts. These three institutions too, regularly convene major conferences and academic workshops on Franco-German security and defense issues. Following Germany’s reunification, a number of new transnational fora were created by major political foundations such as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and the ASKO Stiftung to discuss the future course of the Franco-German relationship. In 1999, the FES, for instance, established a Cercle stratégique franco-allemand together with IFRI. The Cercle meets twice a year and is considered one of the most important discussion forums on French-German defense and security issues. Media are also heavily engaged in supervising the Franco-German defence relations. The national newspaper “Handelsblatt”, for instance, regularly organizes conferences on security policy and armament industry.
International Organizations and their impact on the level of tensions

The evolution of the institutional network that ties France and Germany together followed a clear pattern. Since the end of the Second World War, France has addressed the German question systematically and independently from Germany's democratic political system. Although to varying degrees, major segments of the French political elite never ceased to consider Germany a latent but enduring threat that would have to be controlled (Haftendorn et al. 2006: 12; Irondelle 2003: 218f.; Sauder 1997: 202). For this purpose, international institutions were designed both to integrate Germany's power into the Western alliance and to signal as early as possible any change in Germany's foreign policy preferences that might give rise to serious conflicts. This holds true even after the Cold War, as documented by France's manifest irritations about Germany's reunification (Haftendorn 2006: 88; Hoffmann 1993: 135-142; Neßhöver/Schrader 1997: 69; Stark 2006: 110; Tiersky 1992: 132ff). While the Soviet Union no longer posed a threat to Western Europe, and although Germany was known as an unreliable partner for out-of-area missions (Hoffmann 1993: 137; Soutou 1996: 407), Paris decided to invest considerable political capital into the adoption and re-organization of common security institutions. This policy makes sense only if France is still convinced that Germany's power preferences have to be controlled (Meimeth 1999: 515).

The importance that France attached to international institutions becomes visible in times of crisis, when doubts about Germany's reliability as a security partner arise in Paris. Under these conditions, France puts aside its traditional preference for national autonomy (Meimeth 1990: 23), it moves closer to international organizations, and it searches to develop common institutions in a way that improves mutual understanding and increases the probability that conflicts can be detected and managed according to agreed-upon principles and procedures. Over time, this institutional network has developed features that we consider to be typical for inter-democratic institutions and that were considered necessary by their member states to improve their effectiveness.

A first practical test for the stability of the Franco-German relationship came with the German detente policy in the first half of the 1970s. France was deeply concerned by the "Ostpolitik" of the Brandt-Scheel government, while doubts about the reliability of the American commitment towards European security reached new heights (Gordon 1995: 15; Haftendorn et al. 2006: 15; Meimeth 1997: 38-42). After some lukewarm attempts to revitalize a special Franco-Soviet relationship to counterbalance Germany, the French government consistently turned to Western institutions in order to anchor Germany to the Western Alliance (Meimeth 1990: 62-73; Soutou 2006: 238). It urged the United States to remain committed to the protection of Western Europe in general and of Germany in particular. First of all, Washington was not to jeopardize its nuclear superiority during the SALT I negotiations. In return, France strengthened its defense cooperation with NATO-Forces as documented by the Valentin-Ferber accords in 1974 and the closer coordination of French and Allied tactical air forces. The French rapprochement to NATO also resulted in the Ottawa Declaration from 1974. According to Georges-Henri Soutou (2006: 251), the declaration "reaffirmed Atlantic solidarity at a time when the Germans (at least Brandt and Scheel) were exploring the possibility of a new European security system and of a European defense outside NATO". Additionally, France simultaneously orchestrated some important European initiatives that resulted in the creation of the European Council in 1974 (Meimeth 1990: 75; Soutou 2006: 249).

A second test for the stability of the French-German relationship came with the so-called "Euromissile Crisis," which started in the second half of the 1970s. At that time, France again was deeply concerned by the perceived weakness of the US, which presumably...
jeopardized its nuclear superiority in the SALT II talks and which indicated readiness to decouple from Western Europe while Moscow deployed newly developed intermediate-ranged nuclear forces (Kocs 130-138; Meimeth 1990: 29f). For France, the Soviet policy clearly suggested aggressive intentions. Therefore, Paris considered it of utmost importance that Washington proves its firm commitment to defend its allies with all necessary means and that NATO move forward to close the credibility gap by deploying Pershing II and Cruise Missiles. Otherwise, the German question would certainly have re-emerged (Bozo 1991:158; Buffet/Heuser 1998: 190; Soutou 1996: 367). Given the lack of reliable security guarantees, Bonn would have been tempted to accommodate Moscow. In the long run, this would have necessarily led to a Soviet-German condominium over Western Europe.

Consequently, France was a driving force behind the NATO Dual Track Strategy, as decided in December 1979 (Meimeth 1990: 55; Soutou 1996: 366). President Carter’s decision to go along with the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe, however, did not suppress French fears for long. When the deployment sparked mass protests in Germany, the French political elites again saw the specter of “Finlandisation” (Kocs 1995:187; Soutou 1996: 367). France reacted with a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, Paris publicly supported the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western Europe. Since the rupture with NATO in 1986 this was an unprecedented move towards the Atlantic Alliance (Bozo 1991 157-158; Link 1990: 194f). On the other hand, France intensified its bilateral security relations with Germany (Bozo 1997: 158; Gauzy 2005: 125-127; Gordon 1995: 18-19). In 1982, Bonn and Paris created a Franco-German Commission on Security and Defense and a Franco-German Defense and Security Council in 1988. In the same year, Bonn and Paris agreed on a Franco-German military brigade, which later became the nucleus of the Euro-Corps. Already in 1984, Bonn and Paris orchestrated a revival of the WEU.

The breakdown of the Soviet Empire in 1989 and German reunification marked a third, and even more serious, test for the stability of the Franco-German relationship. The German political elite did not appreciate Mitterrand’s last minute attempts to prop up the collapsing East German regime. French political elites also deeply resented what they interpreted as Germany’s unilateral decision to pursue unification. According to Stanley Hoffmann (1993: 135) “the nightmare of an unfettered German rediscovering Bismarck’s ‘Schaukelpolitik’, moving away from the West and toward the East, agitated French conversations”. After some initial hesitation, however, Paris firmly followed the course of deepening the European integration (Soutou 1996: 402). Additionally, France tried to develop a common European Security and Defense Identity but eventually ended up strengthening the transatlantic security structures (Meimeth 1999: 515). Moreover, France sought to impose strict ceilings on the number of German military personnel. This was achieved by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and by means of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany” (Two plus Four Agreement). Under the terms of these treaties, Germany not only reaffirmed its renunciation of manufacturing, possessing and control over weapons of mass destruction, but it also agreed to limit its combined armed forces to no more than 370,000 troops.

Soon thereafter, however, Paris’ interest in material restrictions waned. France decided not to reintegrate into the military structures of the alliance at this point in time. And the provisions of the CFE-Treaty and the Two plus Four Agreement never became relevant. Instead, Paris unequivocally embarked on the European path to security. This turn-around is surprising because the European structures provide no reliable material restrictions. France became at least as dependent on European structures as Germany. Even more striking, Paris chose this course, knowing that the reunited Germany, now located in the
middle of Europe, would inevitably become the strongest European state. Obviously, the decision not to rely on the American hegemony and not to continue the autonomous defense policy required a huge amount of trust in Germany. This trust was generated by Western security institutions.

4.2 Greece-Turkey: relations of conflict despite NATO membership

Origins of the conflict and level of tensions

Until the end of the 1990s, the conflict between Greece and Turkey had been highly militarized. Both sides maintained higher-than-average defense budgets and prepared themselves against the worst case of an armed attack by the other side. Both sides resorted to bullying tactics. Ultimatums, red lines, and threats of war were commonly used by both sides to signal resolve (Coufoudakis 1985). After 1955, the worsening security conflict tainted all other areas of the Greek-Turkish relationship. Wary and limited attempts to establish functional cooperation collapsed as soon as political relations again worsened. This became most manifest with regard to economic exchange. Bilateral trade as a percentage of the overall trade of Greece and Turkey was rather low for the whole period 1923-2000. Furthermore, time-series data indicate that the level of trade depended on the state of the political relations. After 1955, bilateral trade dropped significantly only to take a further blow after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

The relationship improved only after the European Council decided in December 1999 to countenance membership talks with Ankara. For two reasons, the high level of tension before 1999 is puzzling. Firstly, the issues at stake between the two countries, like the delineation of the continental shelf, are rather mundane. Most observers agree that both countries, despite their perception of the other side as aggressive and expansionist, are rather status-quo oriented. The issues at stake did not cause the high level of tension, but the tension imbued the issues with antagonistic overtones. Secondly, both countries had been members of, or closely connected to, strong Western regional security institutions. Both acceded to the Council of Europe in 1949, have been founding members of the OEEC and the CSCE, and both have been closely related to the EC/EU. Within the WEU, Turkey was almost on par with the full members. Since 1952, both have been members of NATO. If the long peace in Western Europe can be attributed to Western security institutions, and if the dynamic of the Greek-Turkish conflict was powered by the security dilemma and should have been amenable to an institutional cure, why did Greece and Turkey’s membership in this set of organizations not lead to a reduction of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Two possible solutions to this puzzle have been advanced in the literature: Realists assert that the apparent institutional effect has in fact been caused by the American hegemony within NATO. According to this view, the US has pursued different strategies. While she encouraged the development of multilateral institutions in Western Europe, she contented herself with the management of bilateral relations in the Eastern Mediterranean (Oguzlu 2004a; 2004b). Institutionalisms attribute NATO’s effectiveness to its level of institutionalization and argue that NATO’s founding fathers created two different institutional structures under the same name: a highly institutionalized, multilateral organization for Western Europe, and a less institutionalized framework for the Eastern Mediterranean.

1 See also Dembinski 2006.
We argue that a careful reconstruction of historical developments contradicts both propositions. Instead, we suggest that the different levels of tension in Western Europe and in the Eastern Mediterranean are related to different patterns of transnational and transgovernmental relations between Western security institutions and member countries in both regions.

Greek-Turkish conflict and its impact on NATO

Admittedly, after 1945 American and British post-war planners contemplated for a while whether Turkey (and Greece) should be included in NATO. In the end, however, the United States decided to bring both countries into the Western European structure. America’s interest in the region is reflected in the importance it attaches to the Allied Headquarters Southern Europe in Naples, the deployment of the Sixth Fleet, the substantial military assistance to both countries and the positioning of American troops and nuclear weapons in Greece and Turkey (Moustakis 2003: 33). By the late 1960s, there were about 24,000 US military personnel deployed on Turkish territory (Hale: 123), more than in most Western European countries. More importantly, America pursued a multilateral approach in the Eastern Mediterranean as well. Washington convinced its partners to accept Greece and Turkey as NATO members, offered them full participation in the Marshall Plan, and made them founding members of the OEEC. America’s strategic interest in the region persisted even after the end of the East-West conflict. Washington continued to attribute strategic importance to the Eastern Mediterranean and, as its support for Turkey’s accession to the EU underlines, remains committed to a multilateral approach.

At first glance, the institutional approach fares better than explanations which focus on the American interests. In the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO looks indeed rather different from Western Europe, resembling a fragile roof under which two strictly autonomous armed forces confront each other. However, a closer look at the historical evidence reveals that stability in the Eastern Mediterranean has not been lower because NATO had been weakly integrated and institutionalized. Instead, NATO came apart because conflicts had spiraled out of control. Initially, patterns of military interaction in the Eastern Mediterranean did not differ much from other regions of NATO. Greece, for example, accepted a special role within NATO’s overall division of labor that confined its military forces to lightly armed units designed to combat an insurgency and to delay the advance of an attacking force until NATO reinforcements had arrived. Only after their conflict became militarized, did both countries discover that the loss of autonomy associated with NATO-membership was too costly. As a consequence, both sides increased the autonomy of their forces and military-industrial structures and basically dismantled the political and military structure of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean.

While NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean did not differ with regard to the hegemonic form and the institutional structure available in NATO in Western Europe, the transnational and transgovernmental networks looked strikingly different. Bilateral Greek-Turkish institutions and transnational contacts were basically non-existent. At the multilateral level, Turkish interest groups, academics and NGOs were not part of the transnational networks centered on NATO and the EU. Moreover, those transgovernmental contacts that did exist within NATO were much less significant in the case of Turkey because even Turkish representatives at NATO were basically cut off from the secretive security and defense decision-making system in Ankara.
NATO and its impact on the Greek-Turkish conflict

At best, NATO’s impact on the conflict had been minimal. If at all, the American hegemonic influence exerted within and outside of NATO dampened tensions somewhat. The United States failed to prevent the Turkish invasion in 1974, but managed to defuse imminent confrontation in 1967, 1994 and 1996. However, despite all US efforts, the American hegemony failed to resolve the security dilemma and the high level of tension.

NATO and its institutional structure had almost no impact on the conflict. Both sides torpedoed the countless mediating efforts by NATO representatives, both sides disregarded the norm of early consultation (Akbulut: 78f; Kay: 53), and both sides foiled NATO’s transparency mechanisms by withdrawing vital parts of their force structure from NATO’s oversight.

Although it is logically impossible to ascertain that non-existing transgovernmental and transnational networks caused the high level of tension, two observations nevertheless support this conclusion. Firstly, the comparison of the Greek-Turkish dyad with the Franco-German dyad indicates that, other independent variables being rather similar, the different institutional forms do indeed explain the different values of the dependent variable. Secondly, it is interesting to note that the improvement of the Greek-Turkish relationship after 1999 was preceded by a strengthening of civil society in Turkey during the 1990s and the establishment of bilateral as well as multilateral transnational contacts. The bilateral rapprochement was certainly triggered by the decision of the European Council to open accession talks with Ankara. However, the astonishing stability of this reconciliation despite all Turkish disappointments with Europe might more fundamentally be due to the process of democratization and liberalization within Turkey and the creation of bilateral and multilateral transnational and trans-governmental networks (Dembinski 2006).

4.3 South America: growing cooperation with democratization

Origins of the conflict and level of tensions

Even though 20th century Latin America witnessed hardly any interstate wars, inducing some observers to call it a zone of peace (Holsti 1996: 157; Hurrell 1998a: 531f., Kacowicz 1998: 67f.), a high level of intra-state violence as well as interstate instability and bilateral rivalries characterized this period (Mares 2001). Territorial conflicts remained one source of tension, but the real reason for rivalry between the two largest South American states, Argentina and Brazil, were their separate ambitions to dominate the region. Geopolitics thus became the interpretive framework for bilateral relations and determined the course of foreign relations during the 1970s, when both states were ruled by military regimes and expansionist claims flourished (Child 1985, 1988; Kelly & Child 1988; Kahhat 2005). An intensive strategic rivalry between Argentina and Brazil developed that centered on hydro-power resources in their border regions and competing developments in nuclear technology. The fact that the militaries of both states pursued nuclear programs ostensibly aimed at the construction of nuclear weapons added to their threat perceptions. Between Argentina and Chile, it was unsolved territorial disputes that repeatedly motivated threats of the use of force and nearly caused war in 1978. Stability and cooperation have increased only since the process of democratization began to take hold of the Southern Cone in the 1980s.
State properties and the development of international institutions

As in other regions, the formation of international institutions in Latin America preceded democratization. In the pre-democratization phase the *Tlatelolco* Treaty was the most relevant institutional arrangement in security relations. For the co-ordination of economic positions, the most significant bodies were the Latin American Free Trade Area (ALALC), the Latin American Integration Community as well as SELA (*Sistema Económico Latino-americano*). However, those institutions remained shallow and operated on a strictly intergovernmental basis, and none of them managed to curb interstate rivalries.

In the process of democratization, new institutions were created. For the case of Argentina and Brazil the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), founded in 1991, plays a central role. Chile participates in the political integration of Mercosur as an associate member. In the security area, it is remarkable that the Organization of American States (OAS) was revived and reformed in the course of Latin American democratization. Within its framework, various new multilateral activities, particularly concerning arms control and confidence-building measures, have been initiated. The most important institutional innovation on the way to a collective management of defense and security issues has been the creation of the Committee on Hemispheric Security. Additionally, Argentina and Brazil as well as Argentina and Chile have established bilateral cooperation mechanisms in foreign and defense policy, such as the Permanent Committee of Security (COMPERSEG) between Chile and Argentina and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), which is responsible for easing nuclear tensions between the two states.

The re-definition of bilateral relations in the Southern Cone can be attributed to the breakdown of military rule (Fontana 2001: 49). Although democratization did not play a major role in the initial rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil (Resende-Santos 2002), the institutionalization of cooperation and further steps towards integration only became possible after re-democratization (Schmitter 1991, Kaltenthaler/Mora 2002: 74). In the case of the Chile-Argentina dyad, Argentine democratization contributed to the adoption of the Declaration of Peace and Friendship in 1984, which finally solved the Beagle Channel dispute (Schmitter 1991: 106). But only in the early 1990s, when Chile also democratized while Argentina went through an economic liberalization process, did integration initiatives increase. Therefore, we can assume that domestic transformation processes triggered stabilizing spillovers, which made the institutionalization of cooperation possible.

In the course of democratization processes in the region, transnational and transgovernmental contacts expanded and have by now become a characteristic feature of interdemocratic cooperation within the OAS and Mercosur. Most of the larger transnational civil society networks and epistemic communities are accredited to the OAS or have at least participated in OAS events. Although the opportunities for these organizations to express themselves within the OAS are still quite limited, they are growing (Cole 2003; Grugel 2006). In connection with Mercosur, there are a number of interest groups pushing for civil society participation, though most of them concentrate on social policy topics and the negative consequences of economic globalization (Grugel 2005). Increasingly, civil society organizations are not only granted access rights but are also called upon as experts (Dembinski/Freistein/Weiffen 2006).

Both organizations have developed transgovernmental features, and both of them channel sensitive information via these networks. For example, members of the OAS have agreed to exchange information on defense spending, weapons acquisition and on the confidence and security-building measures carried out in the region. Moreover, a pattern of continuous exchange between experts from the national defense bureaucracies and OAS personnel...
has emerged from the information collection and processing mechanism in the OAS. Mercosur’s institutional structure allows actors on different levels to participate in decision-making. However, the organization is characterized by less transparency and does not collect or monitor any information on its member states’ foreign policy or the defense sector. This may be attributable to the fact that defense cooperation in the Southern Cone is mainly managed by the bilateral institutions established during the 1990s. Therefore, the case of Mercosur demonstrates that the quest for economic integration was frequently the starting point for multilateral collaboration initiatives, whereas cooperation in security politics followed later on (Villagra Delgado 2003; Pion-Berlin 2005).

In the day-to-day political business of both organizations, contacts at various levels of bureaucracy are becoming a more frequent occurrence, but a practice of early consultation has only started to develop. In the framework of the OAS, emphasis on non-intervention is still distinct, whereas in Mercosur some of its basic documents do indicate the existence of a norm of early consultation. However, even in the economic realm, there is a contrast between the ambitious goals proclaimed by Mercosur and its poor institutional practice (Malamud 2005a, b). To summarize, especially when compared to prior organizations from the Cold War era, current international institutions in the Southern Cone are increasingly linked with expert communities that have evolved as important fora for informal consultations and with strong civil society organizations that have built networks across borders. Furthermore, institutions are characterized by regular contacts among the national bureaucracies such as the ministries of foreign affairs and defense.

International organizations and their impact on conflict behavior

The consensus in the literature is that the institutional framework established during the 1990s has helped to stabilize security relations and to stimulate cooperation (Barrios 1999; Rojas Aravena 1999; Pion-Berlin 2000, 2005; Villagra Delgado 2003). These effects became most visible during the economic and financial crises that first hit Brazil in 1999 and Argentina, even harder, in 2001. Although the institutional mechanisms of the regional institutions were not sufficient to prevent the crisis or manage its immediate effects, they secured the cooperation of both sides and prevented a destabilizing spillover. Even in these situations of strained relations, cooperation was never questioned. On the contrary, as a consequence of the crisis, new initiatives were proposed and more legalization demanded. Thus, cooperation within Mercosur proved to be robust. Polarization did not occur, and cooperation in the security area was not harmed by the problematic issues in other policy fields, but remained stable and transparent. Striking in this regard has been the relaxed Argentine response to the launch of the controversial Brazilian uranium enrichment program at the Resende facility in 2006. This attitude contrasts markedly with the alarmist worst-case scenarios that dominated the strategic thinking of the security elites during the period of military rule.2

In spite of recurrent economic crises, Argentina and Brazil’s interest in upholding and strengthening cooperation has grown, because since the 1990s they have come to regard Mercosur as an instrument to fortify their position in global politics (Gómez Mera 2005). In the bilateral relationship between Argentina and Chile, the commitment to cooperation is also unchallenged, particularly because their bilateral security institutions have stabilized

2 The calm reaction is all the more surprising considering that the current Brazilian government has abandoned plans to construct an additional nuclear power plant, which means that there is no justification for the indigenous production of enriched uranium. See WMD Insights, July/August 2006. <http://www.wmdinsights.com/I7/I7_LA1_BrazilianNuclear.htm>; José Goldemberg, Looking Back: Lessons from Denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina, Arms Control Today, April 2006. <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_04/lookingback.asp>.
cooperation immensely. Politicians of all three states affirm their confidence in their common institutions and their wish for deepened integration, which corresponds to the heightened degree of transnational and transbureaucratic links in those institutions. On the political level, transparency and mutual trust are fostered by the existence of expert communities bringing together politicians, diplomats and bureaucrats as well as economic leaders and academics. At the same time, given the sheer dimension of tourist traffic, job migration, bilateral trade and direct investments as well as local contacts and projects in the border areas, close cooperation with the neighboring countries is already a reality for broad sectors of the population in Argentina, Chile and Brazil. Civil society organizations, which increasingly operate transnational, channel societal demands for good and peaceful regional relations.

The main results of this case study are a) that democratization processes in Argentina, Brazil and Chile correlate with the establishment of bilateral and multilateral interdemocratic institutions and b) that the heightened degree of transnational and transbureaucratic links in these institutions leads to a stabilization of relations even in times of crisis. Ultimately, then, the case of the Southern Cone supports the hypothesis that democratization led to the establishment of inter-democratic institutions, which then, by means of their specific form characteristics, stabilized cooperation and contributed to the improvement of bilateral relations.

4.4 Southeast Asia: konfrontasi revisited?

The konfrontasi crisis

The strategic rivalry between Indonesia and Malaysia started simultaneously with their emergence as new states. Tensions between them culminated in the konfrontasi-crisis (1963-1966), in which Indonesia acted as the aggressor and tried to satisfy its desire for supremacy in the region at the expense of the newly-founded Malaysia (Poulgrain 1998). These tensions developed out of their colonial heritage: while Indonesia projected itself as a regional power that had defeated the colonial oppressor (the Netherlands) in its anti-colonial struggle, Malaysia was released out of colonialism in close cooperation with the British administration. Indonesia under Sukarno was determined to prevent Malaysia from becoming a rival for hegemony in Southeast Asia, started terrorist attacks on Malaysian territory in 1963 and continued to challenge its neighbor. This confrontation (konfrontasi) lasted until Malaysia fought back with the help of its allies the UK, Australia and New Zealand and demonstrated that Indonesia had no chance of winning. Finally, a change of power in the Indonesian government sealed the peace deal between the two states (Mackie 1974; Liow 2005).

The experience of intra-regional conflict and the risk of letting external powers dominate the security politics of Southeast Asia, particularly against the background of an imminent threat from communism, induced five states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore) to create ASEAN as an institution that would consolidate peaceful relations between them (Mahathir 2004). The institution, however, had little impact on the bilateral relations of its members. Indonesian-Malaysian relations improved tangibly in the decades after the foundation of ASEAN. Despite some shared interests, the level of cooperation between them remained comparatively low (Leifer 1983; Anwar 1998; Nathan 1998; Smith 2000). Both states managed to keep vital areas such as defense politics and

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3 Particularly after Mahathir had come to power, the foreign policy directions of Indonesia and Malaysia even diverged (Liow 2005).
their economies almost completely closed. Furthermore, even though rhetoric indicated neighborly feeling based on a shared perception of racial similarities, the stability of their interstate relations remained fragile. Additionally, territorial disputes as well as occasional quarrels over illegal migrants and illegal logging strained the Indonesian-Malaysian relationship. Besides a heightened competition between a rapidly developing Malaysia and its larger neighbor Indonesia, this was at least in part due to their remaining mistrust about each others’ intentions, which could not be mitigated by ASEAN, due to its lack of communicative channels.

From the onset, ASEAN has been characterized by an extremely low degree of institutionalization and legalization (Rüland 2002). It never developed a dense network of transnational and transgovernmental structures, and it is known for its marked preference for elite diplomacy. Facing the same external threats and common interests, the regional states could have been expected to deepen cooperation, but they did not. For example, during the Cold War, ASEAN mainly served as an instrument to protect the interests of the ruling regimes and as a mechanism to build confidence among them (Severino 2006). Accordingly, a tradition of avoiding conflict – instead of solving it – and a strong emphasis on non-interference in the internal affairs of others evolved, which have characterized ASEAN cooperation for decades (Leifer 1989; Haacke 2005). Cooperation within ASEAN has remained robust, yet on a comparatively low level.

Most observers agree that ASEAN has contributed to maintaining stability and to preventing – or at least suppressing – conflict over the years (Acharya 2001; Weatherbee 2005; Liow/Emmers 2006). However, one can argue plausibly that several other factors account for the absence of interstate conflict in the region (Narine 2002): a shared threat perception because of the rise of communism in China/Indochina, which helped to suppress intra-regional rivalries; a lack of (military) capacities and internal instability; and, finally, the presence of external powers in the region.

Tensions resurface in times of crisis

That ASEAN was ill-equipped to mitigate tensions between its members was demonstrated during the crisis ridden years following the economic crash in 1997. When the economic and financial crisis struck and caused turmoil in many of its member states, it turned out that ASEAN was unable to prevent a regression into old patterns of conflict between its members. The haze problem over Indonesia and the SARS pandemic contributed further to destabilizing the region. While some observers had regarded ASEAN’s low degree of institutionalization as an indication of higher flexibility (Kahler 2000), the crisis revealed the problems inherent in the lack of legalized structures and mechanisms (Rüland 2000, 2002). Even from within the association, criticism of ASEAN’s inability to react adequately to the crisis was heard.

Remarkably, the Indonesian-Malaysian relationship was less perturbed than others (e.g. Malaysia-Singapore) during the crisis years. Most probably, the reason was that Indonesia’s domestic instability prevented it from quarrelling with its neighbors. Nevertheless, a kind of retarded effect of the crisis can be discerned in recent tensions between the two states, which have led to a partial destabilization of security relations and a decrease in

4 Malaysia, through other mechanisms of safety guarantees, such as the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA: Malaysia, Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand), made sure it did not have to rely on Indonesian assurances of friendly relations. Continuous cooperation within the FPDA framework suggests that at least Malaysia did not want or dare to forego its safety guarantees.

5 The potentially conflict-suppressing or even peace-promoting role ASEAN has played over the last decades was also consistently mentioned by political/academic experts in interviews conducted by one of the authors in the region.
cooperation. This trend can be observed in the public controversy about illegal immigrants in Malaysia and the conflict about a disputed region off the coast of Borneo (Ambalat). The immigrant issue had been on the agenda for some time, but it re-surfaced with new fervor during the Ambalat crisis, indicating an inability or unwillingness of both parties to keep these problems separate. Both conflicts were accompanied by populist nationalist paroles, even though politicians on both sides tried to calm the waters by ensuring each other of continued support and friendship. However, public rage and the call for a second konfrontasi during the Ambalat crisis in 2006 testify to some level of distrust between these states. Although it has been claimed that the constant meetings of state leaders within the ASEAN framework may have contributed to their wish to continue cooperation, observers have agreed that ASEAN could and would do little to alleviate tensions.

ASEAN activities, so far, have been largely intergovernmental – although this has been changing slowly since the Asian crisis with the democratization of some of its members, and the new Charter of 2007 might inspire further change (Acharya 2001; Caballero-Anthony 2005; Severino 2006). So far, however, ASEAN’s embeddedness in its member states’ societies remains negligible. Accordingly, the density of communicative channels between ASEAN and societal actors is still low. Furthermore, the communicative arena, including consultation mechanisms and decision-making structures of the institution, remains small. The Asian Crisis and the ensuing intra-regional tensions unleashed a new consciousness of ASEAN’s weaknesses, which led to a more positive attitude towards changing and reforming ASEAN, supporting societal participation and building new institutional structures to make ASEAN more efficient. Moreover, liberalization and democratization processes in some of the member states have reinforced reform dynamics. Nevertheless, most means of communication and coordination are still being dominated by state elites, largely excluding transnational agents within ASEAN. As is evidenced by the recent disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia, ASEAN is not equipped to mitigate or solve conflicts between its members.

4.5 South Korea-Japan: low levels of cooperation in the shadow of the US?

South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) and Japan share a long history of strategic rivalry and a short period of common democracy that commenced with the democratization of South Korea in the late 1980s. Relations between Japan and the ROK have been peaceful. However, in spite of common threat perceptions, shared interests, and a common hegemonic ally, the relationship between both countries has been marked by rivalry and mutual suspicion. On the one hand, rivalry was driven by the colonial heritage. After the Pacific War, Korea remained deeply suspicious about the intentions of its former colonizer, Japan, especially as Japan did not recognize the cruelty of its colonization of Korea. The relationship was also strained by the related problems of repatriating Korean forced laborers and Japanese living in Korea at the end of the war, and the mutual demands for compensation for forced labor or lost property. On the other hand, these countries are involved in a territorial dispute and conflicts over fishery rights. These issues prevented the normalization of relations until 1965. In the security field, both countries depend considerably on

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6 Some tensions had already arisen because of the unresolved territorial dispute over two islands (Ligitan and Sipadan), which were finally judged to be part of Malaysia by the International Court of Justice in 2002.

7 Interviews by the author in Jakarta, June 2006.

8 A recent study indicates that the lack of trust seems indeed to be a palpable phenomenon throughout the ASEAN region (Roberts 2007), as well among political and academic elites as among the population. However, respondents neither in Indonesia nor Malaysia voiced a fear of armed conflict with their neighbors.

the United States. In contrast to Western Europe, they refrained from developing bilateral or common security institutions. Until the end of the East-West conflict, Japan and South Korea confined themselves to their isolated roles within the American “Hub and Spokes” security approach in Eastern Asia. Because of these characteristics, the relationship between Japan and the ROK is of special interest to our project. It allows us to analyze the conflict behavior of two democratic rivals that do not maintain bilateral or multilateral democratic institutions.

After the end of the East-West conflict, when the American military presence seemed less secure than in the previous decades, Japan and the ROK started, albeit rather carefully and slowly, to build common institutions in the security area. The most important initiative is the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). This initiative is directed towards the North Korea problem. Noteworthy also is that it has been advanced by Washington, which, moving beyond the “Hub and Spokes” approach, has encouraged its East-Asian allies to forge closer bilateral and multilateral security institutions. Created in 1999, the TCOG remains a very young institution that allows only for rather shallow contacts on official levels, including military exchanges. Furthermore, these ties remain vulnerable. For example, in 2001 joint exercises and military exchanges were cancelled when the publication of Japanese history textbooks caused disputes.10

The lack of common institutions corresponds with a high level of tension between Japan and the ROK. One source of tension has been the colonial heritage. Although some observers point out that the experiences of the past and the ensuing suspicion should not be overrated (Cha 1999), it is nevertheless noteworthy that the distrust in South Korea directed towards its former oppressor Japan has remained strong. Other issues have put relations to the test as well. These included a territorial dispute over the islets of Dokdo/Takeshima and a bitter dispute over fishery rights. In 1995, this conflict escalated when the South Korean navy, in a show of force, conducted an exercise around the islets. Japan reacted by dispatching a coast guard patrol vessel to the islets, which was subsequently driven off by the South Korean navy.11 The issue cooled down with an agreement on joint exploration rights to the surrounding waters.

The islets are economically interesting for both countries, as their inclusion would enlarge their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Sea of Japan. The dispute again rose to prominence in 1998 when Japan unilaterally abolished the fishery treaty, which had been in place between the two countries since 1965. Because of the connection to the EEZ, the territorial question arose again, and it took until 1999 before a new agreement could be signed. In these cases, as during the Asian financial crisis, both sides demonstrated a surprising willingness to resort to strategies of self-help.

To conclude: Taking into account the shared democratic regime type, the common interests and the common threat perceptions (principally North Korea) in the region (Green 1999), the low level of security collaboration between Japan and the ROK and the relatively high degree of willingness to resort to unilateral strategies remains surprising. In all these disputes between Japan and South Korea, the lack of institutions has proven to be a serious problem.

At least there are indications that the political leaders of both states have recognized that a lack of institutionalized structures in security politics is obviously responsible for the lack of stability and cooperation between Japan and South Korea. This, of course, does not imply that Japan and the ROK will never develop inter-democratic security institutions. On the

11 Mentioned in Version 3.0 of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) of COW (Correlates of War) database; <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>.
contrary, the developments of the early 1990s indicate that, as soon as the American hegemony, on which both sides relied for their security, becomes uncertain, Seoul and Tokyo start to invest in common security institutions. This case implies, however, that shared democracy alone does not guarantee that former strategic rivals do not fall back upon old patterns of conflict behavior, even though the circumstances seem to favor cooperation.
5. Conclusion

As institutional theory passes through a critical period, we defend the claim that, even if not all institutions contribute to peace among their members, inter-democratic institutions do indeed live up to this promise and should be regarded as a key to understanding democratic peace. Our case studies confirm two major propositions. Firstly, they vindicate the claim that democratic dyads tend to differ from non-democratic or mixed dyads with regard to their institutional framework. As a matter of course, not all institutions among democracies feature the same level of transgovernmental and transnational networks. Neither are all institutions among non-democracies purely intergovernmental. However, institutions among democracies, due to the less restricted flow of information within governments and the demands from legislators and societal actors, have a tendency to develop stronger transgovernmental and transnational links than institutions among non-democracies. Secondly, our cases show that these differences in the institutional setup are related to observable differences in the level of stability, cooperation and autonomy. Development in South America as well as preliminary findings from the Southeast Asian region and the Eastern Mediterranean also indicate that the form of institutions changes with the democratization of their members.

Turning to the differences in the institutional setup, it should be stressed that the five pairs of states analyzed here qualify as strategic rivals. Four of them rely more or less deliberately on institutions as a means to deal with the insecurity resulting from their history of rivalry. The relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, for reasons outlined above, marks an exception to his pattern. Notwithstanding this similarity, we show that the democratic rivals in our sample have created common security institutions which differ qualitatively from those that have been created by non-democratic rivals. France and Germany are embedded in NATO and the EU. In addition they have created a dense web of bilateral security institutions. There is general consensus in the literature that NATO and the EU are set apart from other International Organizations by their extraordinary distinct transgovernmental networks (Gheciu 2005; Smith 2004: 90-116). The historically remarkable expansion of diplomatic and military relations within NATO and the EU has led to the creation of a transgovernmental field (Mérand 2008: 13) in which national diplomats and military officers find it increasingly difficult to avoid playing by the institutional rules of early consultation and cooperation. In fact, the intensity of transgovernmental cooperation has led to forms of cooperation beyond the nation state. In addition, both organizations are characterized by comparatively strong transnational networks. While the CFSP arrangements of the EU allow for intensive consultations with legislators, industry representatives and civil society organizations (Dembinski 2009), NATO still has fewer organized contacts with grass-roots NGOs (Mayer 2008: 124). However, even NATO maintains close relations with think tanks, defense industry groups and parliamentarians which stand out when compared with traditional regional security organizations.

In contrast, both ASEAN and the South American institutions prior to 1990 were organized along intergovernmental lines. During this period, they involved primarily the chief executives, and they pertained only to the last stages of the policy cycle. With democratization processes in South America (and, more recently, Southeast Asia) institutional characteristics have begun to change. Mercosur and the OAS are in the process of developing closer and more institutionalized relations with societal actors and parliaments. Also, the Southern Cone has witnessed a wave of institutional evolution. In contrast, ASEAN has only recently started opening up to more participation by non-state actors and initiated changes in its institutional design.
Turning to the second proposition, we find that institutional differences correlate with the conflict behavior of the pairs of states studied here. When assessing conflict behavior, we do not rely on interstate wars because wars are a rare phenomenon and the absence of war is over-determined. Instead, we concentrate on the level of stability, cooperation and autonomy of policy fields. These indicators are more closely related to institutional effects, and they allow us to assess the quality of relations short of war.

Relations between France and Germany have improved markedly over the last 50 years. Today, security relations between both countries are stable and cooperation in the area of security has reached a high level of integration. France has abandoned its quest for autonomy in security issues and has accepted mutual dependence. Occasional spats are easily isolated from and do not poison the atmosphere of neighboring policy fields. This development is all the more remarkable because the historical French nightmare of German unification has materialized and Germany’s Cold War ties have been weakened. Developments in Latin America corroborate this finding. Relations between Argentina, Brazil and Chile improved considerably with the level of institutionalization. Territorial disputes between Argentina and Chile, as well as the nuclear rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, were resolved during the 1990s.

In contrast, the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is still characterized by a certain level of insecurity, as Malaysia’s adherence to the Five-Powers Defense Agreements suggests. Both countries guard their independence in security affairs. Cooperation remains mostly fragile. In times of crisis, these states have resorted to autonomous reactions, and institutionalized cooperation has been in danger of being derailed. To be sure, countries in South-East Asia have been able to avoid wars and major MIDs. We do not know whether ASEAN or other factors like the weakness of states or common external enemies and internal dangers are responsible for the low level of inter-state violence. However, our case studies indicate that inter-state relations in South-East Asia are less secure than in Western Europe or in the Southern Cone.

Furthermore, our sample of cases allows us to discount competing explanations. The strikingly different developments between Germany and France on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other hand refute alternative institutional explanations of realist and neo-institutional provenance. Neither American hegemony nor the levels of institutionalization do explain differences in the conflict behavior of our dyads. Domestic structures (i.e. democracy/non-democracy) alone do not account for these differences either, as observations of the relationship between South Korea and Japan substantiate.

Finally, our research points to the impact of democratization on institutional developments. Domestic transformation processes seem to trigger changes in the form of regional institutions, including the evolution of forms typical of inter-democratic institutions. We have not been able to analyze this relationship systematically; however, further research in this direction could be an interesting and worthwhile endeavor.
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