

### Understanding vote choice when voters have two votes

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## Understanding Vote Choice When Voters Have Two Votes

### ABSTRACT

The paper tests a simple model of vote choice in a mixed electoral system when voters have two votes with survey data collected at the time of the 2010 North Rhine Westphalia election. We show that local candidate preferences and local chances affect only the local vote while party and leader ratings influence both votes though more strongly the list vote. Contrary to expectations, coalition preferences influence the local vote as well as the list vote. There is clearer evidence of the local vote being contaminated by the list vote than the other way around.

Understanding why people vote the way they do is *the* central question in the field of electoral studies. There is a vast literature on the factors that lead citizens to vote for a particular party or candidate in a given election. The question that we address here is how to make sense of the choices that people make when they have two votes.

There is surprisingly little research on this question in spite of the fact that the number of elections where people have to make two choices is growing. According to Carter and Farrell (2010, 27), 35 countries, about one out of five, use a mixed system for their legislative elections, and the great majority of them have two votes (Massicotte and Blais 1999), almost always a party list vote and a vote for a candidate in a local constituency.

The presence of two votes has spurred interest about the magnitude and determinants of ticket-splitting, that is, people voting for a candidate associated with a party different from the party that they support on the list vote (Gschwend 2007; Gschwend et al. 2003; Karp et al. 2002; Moser and Schneider 2005, 2009; Pappi and Thurner 2002; Burden 2009; Helmke 2009).<sup>1</sup> There has also emerged a number of studies investigating the presence or absence of contamination effects, that is, whether one's choice in one election affects the choice in the other election (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Herron and Nishikawa 2002; Ferrara et al. 2005; Karp 2009).

Yet, as far as we can tell, there has been no systematic *comparative* investigation of the factors that affect each vote when people have two decisions to make, one with respect to the choice of a candidate in the local constituency and one with respect to the choice of a party list. We intend to fill that gap here.

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<sup>1</sup> There is also a vast literature on split ticket voting in the United States (see Maatei and Howes 2001; Fiorina 1996; Jacobson 1990; Garand and Lichtl 2000; Burden and Kimball 2002). The difference between ticket splitting in the US and in mixed electoral systems is that in the former the votes are for different offices and that the electoral formula is the same (first past the post).

We propose a simple model of the proximate determinants of choice for each vote. We formulate and test a number of hypotheses about the relative import of each factor for each vote. In so doing we provide a different perspective on ticket-splitting and contamination effects.

The model comprises five basic proximate determinants of vote choice: party rating, leader rating, local candidate preference, local chances, and coalition ratings. To put it simply, a voter is more likely to vote for a party when she thinks of herself as close to a party, when she likes the party, its leader and its local candidate, when she believes that the party has some chance of winning locally, and when she likes the coalition that the party is associated with.

We understand that the vote decision is affected by other considerations, perhaps the most obvious being issue positions and ideology. But we assume that these are more distant factors whose effect is basically indirect. We assume that voters' ideology and attitudes affect how much they like or dislike the various parties and leaders, and that these likes and dislikes in turn determine the final vote choice. We focus here on the more proximate factors.

The research question is whether these factors have a similar influence on the two votes. We test four specific hypotheses. The first prediction concerns local candidate ratings and the party's perceived chances in the local constituency. *These two considerations should affect the local candidate vote choice but they should have no impact on the list vote.* Logically, whether one likes the local candidate or not should have no influence on the decision to support or not to support a party list. In the same manner, since the total number of seats a party gets is independent on the number of votes it gets in a constituency, there is no reason to defect from a party in the list vote because that party is unlikely to win in the local constituency. We thus predict these two factors to affect only the local candidate vote.

The second prediction has to do with party and leader ratings. *We expect these two factors to have a stronger effect on the list than on the candidate vote.* The list vote entails expressing support for a given party, and we should thus observe a strong correlation between how much one likes a party and the propensity to vote for that party list. The correlation should be weaker in the case of the candidate vote since people are explicitly asked to express support for a person. We do expect a correlation, however, between party ratings and the candidate vote since people may well prefer to be represented in their local constituency by a person associated with a party that they like and trust even if they don't particularly like that person.

The same should apply to leader ratings. Leader ratings should influence the decision about which party list to support because one is voting for a party that is led by a given individual and it matters a lot which individual happens to be at the helm at the time of the election. Poguntke and Webb (2005), especially, have argued that leaders have become increasingly important in contemporary political parties. They are the public face of the party during election campaigns, they exercise considerable control over the extra parliamentary party and its resources, and they lead the elected members in the legislature. Voting for a party is thus also implicitly voting for its leader. Again we expect a weaker correlation between leader ratings and the candidate

vote because the latter entails supporting a particular person in the constituency but we still anticipate some correlation because, everything else being equal, one must prefer the local candidate to be under the direction of a « good » party leader.

The third prediction is about coalition preferences. The hypothesis is that *coalition preferences affect only the list vote*. There is empirical evidence that in those countries where coalition governments are the norm people's vote choice depends not only on how they feel about the parties but also on how they feel about the coalitions that could be formed after the election (Abramson et al. 2008; Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Blais et al. 2006; Gschwend and Hooghe 2008, Meffert and Gschwend 2010). Such consideration, however, should enter the calculus decision only for the list vote since the local candidate vote has no consequence on the number of seats won by the various parties (and thus on the likelihood of different coalitions).

The above predictions assume no contamination effect, that is, that how one's choice on the list vote does not affect her decision with respect to the local candidate vote, and vice versa. But how can we tell whether there is contamination or not? We propose a simple test. If we find, contrary to our prediction, that local candidate ratings and local chances affect the list vote, we will conclude that the list vote is contaminated by the candidate vote. Likewise, we will infer that the candidate vote is contaminated by the list vote if we observe that coalition preferences influence local vote choice.

We follow an approach similar to that used by Ferrara et al. (2005, chapter 5) and Karp (2009). Ferrara et al. determine whether local candidate ratings have an independent impact on vote choice in the 1999 New Zealand elections, controlling for a host of other factors. Ferrara et al. find (2005, Table 5.1, page 73) that they do and thus conclude to the existence of a contamination effect on the local vote on the list vote. We should note that the effect is weak.<sup>2</sup> Karp for his part uses the 2002 New Zealand election and determines whether the presence of an incumbent increases the propensity to cast a list vote for the incumbent's party in the case of the two main parties (Labour and National) and whether the presence of a local candidate enhances the likelihood of supporting the party's candidate in the PR vote, again controlling for many other variables. Karp reports a small incumbency effect for Labour vote but none for National and no candidate presence effect for the minor parties. The overall conclusion is that « the overall impact of candidate effects appears to be quite small. » (page 49).

These previous studies have tested whether the list vote could be contaminated by the local candidate vote, but they have not examined the reverse possibility, that is, the local vote being contaminated by the list vote. We consider that possibility here. In the same way that local considerations should not influence the list vote in the absence of contamination effects, we would expect coalition preferences not to affect the local vote. If we were to find that they do have an effect, we would have to conclude that the local vote is contaminated by the list vote. As far as we can tell, no previous study has attempted to measure this other type of contamination.

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<sup>2</sup> Because they have a very large sample (about 6,000 respondents), this weak effect is statistically significant.

We test all these predictions below with a special data set that includes all the necessary information about the six proximate determinants of vote choice identified above in the case of an election where voters had two votes, one for a party list and one for a local candidate in their constituency.

### **The 2010 North Rhine Westphalia Election Survey**

The paper deals with the 2010 North Rhine Westphalia (NRW) state election. North Rhine Westphalia is the most populous state in Germany, with a population of 18 million people. The election was conducted on a mixed compensatory system with voters having two votes, one for a local candidate in their constituency and one for a party list. There were 128 local constituency seats and 53 compensatory list seats. The CDU came in first with fewer than 6000 more list votes than the SPD. Both parties respectively obtained about 35% of the list vote and 67 seats. This was the worst result for CDU since 1950 and the worst since 1954 for SPD. The Greens got 12% of the vote and 23 seats, the FDP 7% of the vote and 13 seats, and Die Linke 6% of the vote and 11 seats. The two largest parties, CDU and SPD, received slightly more candidate votes (39%) than list votes while the reverse holds for all other parties.

The polls published during the campaign put CDU slightly ahead of SPD, the Greens slightly above 10% of the vote, and FDP and Die Linke slightly over the 5% threshold required to have representation in the *Landtag*. CDU and FDP formed the incumbent government and had indicated their willingness to continue together, though they appeared very unlikely to have enough support to do so. On the left, SPD and the Greens had announced their intention to form a coalition but it was not clear whether they would have enough seats to form a majority government (they came out one seat short). Die Linke had stated that it would not be part of government and all other parties had said that they did not want to make a deal with them (but some negotiations between Die Linke and the SPD and Green did take place after the election). Exploratory talks to form a grand coalition between CDU and SPD as well as talks to start negotiations about a SPD/FDP/Green coalition failed. Finally, two months after the election a SPD/Green minority coalition government was formed.

The study is based on an Internet campaign survey conducted by Harris/Decima between April 29 and May 8 (the day before the election), with 1016 respondents and a post-election wave, conducted between May 10 and May 17, with 809 of the campaign respondents. A stratified quota based sampling approach was used, the quotas being established for age, gender, and education. The contact rate was 15% and the response rate 12%. The data set is weighted so as to reflect the actual vote distribution.<sup>3</sup>

The dependent variables are the two vote choices reported in the post-election wave. The list vote distribution is: 35% each for CDU and SPD, 12% for the Greens, 7% for FDP, 6% for Linke and for other parties. SPD has two more points for the candidate vote while CDU, the Greens

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<sup>3</sup> Quotas had been established for age, gender, and education, and so the sample is quite representative of the electorate with respect to these three characteristics. The un-weighted sample underestimates support for CDU and overestimates support for SPD, Linke, and other parties.

and Linke have one point less. In the multivariate analyses presented below, we consider only those who voted for one of the five main parties, since the survey does not include ratings of small parties.

Table 1 shows the relationship between the two votes. All in all, 85% of the votes are straight tickets and 15% are split tickets.<sup>4</sup> The frequency of split ticket is relatively low, perhaps because this was the first time that people had two votes in the NRW election (though voters were used to having two votes in federal elections). The SPD was the most successful party in terms of keeping its list support in the candidate vote while the FDP was the least successful.

As mentioned above, our model includes five proximate determinants of the vote: party rating, leader rating, local candidate rating, local chances, and coalition preferences. Table 2 presents descriptive information about the variables. Party and leader ratings are based on questions asking respondents how much they like or dislike the various parties and leaders on a 0 to 10 scale.<sup>5</sup> All the variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1. We can see that SPD is clearly the best liked party while Linke is the most disliked.

Local candidate preference comes from responses to the question whether there is a candidate that the respondent particularly likes in the constituency. Only 29% of those who voted mentioned a candidate, almost all of them referring to a CDU or SPD candidate. The local chances variable is the score given to the perceived chances of each party winning in their constituency, on a 0 to 10 scale and rescaled to run from 0 to 1. Typically, CDU and SPD candidates are perceived to have the best chances of winning in the constituency.

Coalition preferences were tapped through questions asking people how much they like or dislike (on a 0 to 10 scale) eight different government coalitions that could be formed after the election. For the purpose of this study, we focus on the two most plausible coalitions, those involving SPD with the Greens on the one hand and CDU with FDP on the other hand. We simply subtract the score given to the center-right coalition from the score given to the centre-left coalition, divided by 10. The mean score is .10, an indication that the left-wing coalition was more popular than the right-wing one.

## Findings

We estimate a conditional logit model of vote choice including these five proximate factors, plus age, gender, education, and party identification.<sup>6</sup> Party ratings, leader ratings, local candidate preference, local chances, and party identification are party-specific, which allow us to obtain a single coefficient reflecting the general impact of the factor on the propensity to vote for a given

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<sup>4</sup> All the analyses reported here are restricted to those who voted for one of the five main parties. The proportion of ticket splitters increases to 18% if we include the vote for other parties.

<sup>5</sup> All independent variables are measured in the pre-election survey, while vote choice was tapped in the post-election survey.

<sup>6</sup> Slightly more than half of those who voted are party identifiers, with the CDU and SPD each counting 20% partisans. The correlations between party identification and party ratings go from .18 (FDP) to .50 (CDU and SPD).

party. Coalition preference (as well as age, gender, and education) is individual-specific, that is, we determine how a relative preference for the SPD/Green coalition over the CDU/FDP coalition increases (decreases) the likelihood of voting SPD, Green, FDP, or Linke over CDU (the reference category).

The results of the conditional logit model are presented in Table 3. They confirm our first prediction, that is, local candidate preference and local chances affect local candidate vote but not list vote. This makes perfect sense. This is an important reason why the SPD does better than its partner, the Greens, in the constituency vote. The SPD leads the Greens on every dimension but the gap between the two parties is particularly substantial with respect to local candidate preference and local chances. And so a major source of ticket-splitting comes from supporters of small parties who are willing to desert their party at the constituency level because they either like a local candidate associated with a big party or do not want to waste their vote on a party that is very unlikely to win.

The fact that local candidate preference does not influence the list vote suggests that there is no contamination effect from the candidate vote to the list vote. This nil result may appear to contradict the findings of Ferrara et al. (2005) and Karp (2009) who both report some evidence of contamination. The difference may be more apparent than real, however. Karp indicates a candidate effect on the list vote for only one of the five parties that are considered, and this effect is quite small. Ferrara's model is closer to ours (we both use a conditional logit model and we both have local candidate ratings) but it must be kept in mind that the candidate rating coefficient is quite small. In our estimation local candidate preference has the expected sign (for a contamination effect) but does not reach statistical significance. The consensus emerging from these three studies is that the contamination effect from the candidate vote to the list vote appears to be very limited.<sup>7</sup>

The second prediction, according to which party and leader ratings should have a stronger impact on the list vote than on the constituency vote, is also supported. The coefficients associated with each variable are lower in the local vote estimation than in the party list vote.<sup>8</sup> Note that party ratings do influence the local vote, though to a weaker extent, which is consistent with our assumption that some people simply vote for their preferred party's candidate in the local constituency. The results are more ambiguous with respect to leader ratings, whose coefficient in the local vote estimation does not quite reach statistical significance.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the impact of party and leader ratings on the propensity to vote for the CDU for a voter who is at the mean for all other variables. The figures show that the effect of

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<sup>7</sup> This does not preclude, though, that some voters might derive their partisan preferences from their evaluation of local candidates.

<sup>8</sup> In order to test such cross-model hypotheses one has to estimate both models simultaneously to get the (co)variance. Using a Wald test, the differences between the coefficients are statistically significant at the .03 level for party ratings and at the .10 level for leader ratings.

party rating is greater than that of leader rating but also that the effect of both ratings is more substantial with respect to the list than to the local vote.

The third prediction, that coalition preferences affect only the list vote, is disconfirmed. Table 3 shows that they are significant for both votes. Everything else being equal, the more one prefers the SPD/Green coalition over the CDU/FDP coalition, the less likely one is to vote for the CDU list. Interestingly, liking the SPD/Green coalition does *not* induce people to support the leader of the coalition (SPD) over its junior partner (the Greens). This suggests that there is no “strategic sequencing” vote (Cox 1997, 194) whereby voters care about which party will have a plurality of the seats. The absence of such strategic sequencing is not surprising, given that there is no formal advantage in being the largest party in the NRW government formation process.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps more surprising is the fact that those who liked the SPD/Green coalition were *not* less inclined to vote for the extreme left-wing Linke. The big fight that was going on between the left and the right coalitions did not convince Linke supporters to rally to the SPD or the Greens. Linke does not seem to have been handicapped by the fact that it was extremely unlikely to be in government.<sup>10</sup>

These coalition preferences have a weaker influence on the local vote but, contrary to our prediction, their impact is only slightly smaller.<sup>11</sup> This suggests the presence of a contamination effect from the list vote to the candidate vote. The implication is that those who come to decide to vote for a given list are prone to support the candidate of the same party in the constituency. Such contamination effects tend to reduce the amount of ticket splitting. Previous research on contamination effects (Ferrara et al. 2005; Karp 2009) has focused on how the local candidate vote could influence the list vote. But the influence can go in the other direction. And the results presented here provide clearer evidence of the list vote affecting the candidate vote than the other way around.

This may not be surprising. After all, it is the list vote that is the most important, that is, it determines how many seats the party gets in the legislature.<sup>12</sup> It makes sense to assume that some people are focused entirely on the list vote and then decide to vote for the candidate of the same party in the local constituency. Furthermore, the contamination effects on the party side are clearly from the PR component to the FPTP. That is, in compensatory systems such as in NRW where the PR dimension dominates, parties tend to nominate more candidates in the local

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<sup>9</sup> There is an informal norm according to which the strongest party of a coalition should get the Prime minister post. There is thus an advantage in being the largest party within a coalition. There is no real advantage, however, in having more seats than all other parties.

<sup>10</sup> The survey included a question asking respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement that there is no point voting for a party that has no chance being in government. 37% agreed with the statement but opinions on this issue do not have an independent effect on vote choice.

<sup>11</sup> The differences are not statistically significant except in the case of the vote for Linke. However, the fact that each of the four coalition preference coefficients is higher for the list vote than for the local vote suggests that views about coalitions matter more for the list vote.

<sup>12</sup> This needs not be the case for all voters. Some may care more about local candidates than about parties but they are a minority. Only 29% of the respondents indicated that they had a preference for a local candidate.



constituencies than they would “normally” in a FPTP election because they have already decided to be present in the PR election (Ferrara et al. 2005, 63).<sup>13</sup> Our results suggest that for both parties and voters contamination effects flow from the more “important” component (PR) to the less important (FPTP).

Finally, party identification affects both votes.<sup>14</sup> It turns out that 85% of party identifiers end up voting for the party they feel close to, and the percentage is identical for the two votes.

These findings show that the factors that influence the two votes are mostly the same but that there are differences and that these differences make sense. Party and leader ratings as well as coalition preferences matter more for the list vote than for the local candidate vote while local candidate preference and local chances make a difference only for the local vote. Because the determinants are more similar than different, most people cast a straight ticket. There is also evidence for the candidate vote to be contaminated by the list vote.

### **Voter sophistication and the two votes**

The above analysis treats all voters as a homogeneous bloc. Zaller (1992), in particular, argues that citizens’ reaction to the flow of information depends to a great extent on their level of attention to political news. This raises the question whether the least and the most sophisticated fractions of the electorate make up their mind differently.

The first question that we address is whether the least and the most sophisticated make different choices. We address this question from two different angles. In a first step we determine whether the better informed are more prone to cast a split ticket than the less well informed. In a second step, we find out whether the most sophisticated are more inclined to support a particular party.

We have constructed an index of political sophistication which corresponds to the proportion of correct answers to 15 factual questions tapping respondents’ level of information about politics.<sup>15</sup>

Table 4 presents the results of a logistic estimation in which the propensity to cast a split ticket is regressed on the sophistication index, plus age, gender, education, and strength of party identification. We can see that the better educated and the better informed are more likely to

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<sup>13</sup> According to Ferrara et al. (2005), even small parties nominate candidates because they believe that presenting them on the ballot for the candidate vote also helps them garner more list votes. This may well be their perceptions but our findings, as well as those of Karp, suggest that the actual effect of having more candidates is very limited.

<sup>14</sup> The difference between the two party identification coefficients is not significant.

<sup>15</sup> Ten items dealt with matches of each candidate with his/her party. The other items were about the names of the German Finance minister and the American president, the names of the parties that promised to keep the three-tiered school system, and an item about the electoral system (whether the second vote is more important than the first vote in determining the number of seats a party gets in the Landtag) asked in both the pre-election and post-election surveys. The scale reliability coefficient is .84.

split their vote while a straight ticket is more frequent among older voters as well as among party identifiers.

Table 5 presents conditional logit models of local and list vote choice with the very same variables as in Table 3 but adding the sophistication variable. We find that the better informed are less prone to vote CDU than any of the other parties in the local constituency. The sophistication variable is not significant for the list vote.

The most important implication of Zaller's model is that people with different levels of political attentiveness make up their mind differently. The question is whether the same factors have different effects among different publics, defined in terms of political sophistication.

We test the following two hypotheses. The first is that the impact of local chances and local candidate preference on the local vote is larger among the most sophisticated fraction of the electorate. The second is that the effect of coalition preferences on the list vote is more substantial among the better informed. The logic behind these two hypotheses is that information about local candidates, the local race, and the coalitions that could be formed after the election is more costly to obtain, and those who do not follow politics very closely are less likely to take into account these more "complex" considerations when deciding how to vote.

Table 6 presents the conditional logit estimations including the hypothesized interaction effects. The first hypothesis is partly confirmed. The impact of local candidate preference on the local vote is indeed confined to the most informed segment of the electorate. Only those who are quite attentive to politics pay any attention to the local candidates. And it is mostly for that reason that the most sophisticated are more likely to split their ticket.

Interestingly, the tendency to abandon parties that have no chance of winning in the constituency is *not* correlated with the level of political sophistication. It is easy for everyone to figure out that, most of the time, only the two major parties are in the race for the local constituency seat. The concern for not wasting one's vote appears to be shared by even the least attentive.

The second hypothesis, according to which coalition preferences have a greater influence on the list vote among the most sophisticated, is also confirmed. Table 6 shows that the greater propensity to vote for a leftist party rather than the CDU, over and above how one feels about the specific parties and their leaders, when one prefers the SPD/Green coalition over the CDU/FDP coalition is stronger among the most attentive public.

## **Conclusion**

In many elections voters are faced with two decisions when they are making up their mind how to vote: which party list to support and which local candidate to support in the constituency. As far as we can tell, no previous study has examined simultaneously the determinants of the two votes.

We have proposed a simple model based on five proximate factors that affect the vote decision, and we have estimated the impact of each of these factors on the two votes. We formulated three hypotheses about the relative influence of these factors in the two vote decisions. As predicted, local candidate preferences and local chances affect only the local vote while party ratings affect both though more strongly the list vote. Contrary to our expectations, however, coalition preferences influence the local vote as well as the list vote.

We have looked at how these patterns vary depending on voters' degree of sophistication. Our findings support Zaller's claim that people with different levels of attentiveness to politics react differently. We have shown that evaluations of local candidates and coalition preferences matter more for the better informed segment of the electorate while finding no significant difference with respect to the parties' perceived viability in the constituency.

We believe that the methodology proposed here is the most logical way to proceed. There are two votes so we must provide an explanation for each and we must test a model comprising the same variables in order to determine whether some of the factors have a greater influence on the local vote than on the list vote.

We have found some differences, and these differences make sense. The most important is that evaluations of local candidates affect the local vote but not the list vote. Our analyses help us understand why ticket splitting is not more widespread. The fact is that for both votes the most crucial proximate factor is how one feels about the parties. This is obvious with respect to the list vote but less so for the candidate vote. The two votes are first and foremost an expression of party preferences, and this is why most people support the same party in their two votes.

Our methodology allows us to make a contribution to the micro-foundations of contamination effects. Previous studies have examined whether the list vote is influenced by the local candidate vote and they have found some weak contamination effects. We observe no such significant contamination effect in the case of the 2010 North Rhine Westphalia election. This leads us to conclude that such contamination, if it exists, is limited. But contamination can go in the opposite direction, from the list vote to the local vote, and we have found clearer evidence of this other type of contamination, which, as we have argued, makes sense. We should expect people to pay greater attention to the most "important" vote, and influence should flow from the most to the least important decision.

These results are not definitive. We would need to estimate structural equations to ascertain the independent impact of each vote on the other. These structural equations raise additional issues that could not be solved with the data at hand. But this is clearly where the next stage of research needs to go. When people have two votes to cast simultaneously we need to look at each vote independently but also jointly, and we need to examine this at the micro-level if we wish to understand the psychological mechanisms that underlie this joint decision.

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**TABLE 1 : The Two Votes**

<b>Local Vote</b>	<b>List Vote</b>				
	<b>CDU (%)</b>	<b>SPD (%)</b>	<b>GREEN (%)</b>	<b>FDP (%)</b>	<b>LINKE (%)</b>
<b>CDU</b>	89	1	5	38	1
<b>SPD</b>	4	92	25	0	11
<b>GRUNE</b>	2	5	67	4	3
<b>FDP</b>	6	1	2	58	3
<b>LINKE</b>	0	1	2	0	82
<b>TOTAL (%)</b>	100	100	100	100	100
<b>TOTAL (n)</b>	193	199	71	38	32

**TABLE 2 : Descriptive Information**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<b>Party Rating CDU</b>	502	.52	.32	0	1
<b>Party Rating SPD</b>	502	.58	.29	0	1
<b>Party Rating GREEN</b>	502	.50	.29	0	1
<b>Party Rating FDP</b>	501	.39	.31	0	1
<b>Party Rating LINKE</b>	498	.22	.29	0	1
<b>Leader Rating CDU</b>	487	.53	.33	0	1
<b>Leader Rating SPD</b>	473	.60	.28	0	1
<b>Leader Rating GREEN</b>	354	.45	.25	0	1
<b>Leader Rating FDP</b>	409	.40	.30	0	1
<b>Leader Rating LINKE</b>	344	.31	.27	0	1
<b>Party Id CDU</b>	514	.24	.42	0	1
<b>Party Id SPD</b>	514	.22	.42	0	1
<b>Party Id GREEN</b>	514	.05	.22	0	1
<b>Party Id FDP</b>	514	.01	.11	0	1
<b>Party Id LINKE</b>	514	.02	.14	0	1
<b>Local Pref. CDU</b>	514	.14	.35	0	1
<b>Local Pref. SPD</b>	514	.13	.34	0	1
<b>Local Pref. GREEN</b>	514	.01	.11	0	1
<b>Local Pref. FDP</b>	514	0	0	0	0
<b>Local Pref. LINKE</b>	514	.01	.08	0	1
<b>Local Chance CDU</b>	463	.66	.26	0	1
<b>Local Chance SPD</b>	463	.68	.22	0	1
<b>Local Chance GREEN</b>	458	.42	.26	0	1
<b>Local Chance FDP</b>	458	.38	.27	0	1
<b>Local Chance LINKE</b>	458	.21	.24	0	1
<b>Male</b>	514	.54	.50	0	1
<b>Education</b>	514	.39	.24	.1	1
<b>Age</b>	514	48	13.60	18	79
<b>Coalition Preference</b>	488	.10	.61	-1	1
<b>Information</b>	514	.52	.25	0	1
<b>Split</b>	514	.15	.36	0	1



**TABLE 3 : The Determinants of the Votes:**

**Conditional Logit Estimations**

	List Vote		Local Vote	
<b>Party Rating</b>	6.52***	(1.72)	3.87***	(1.00)
<b>Leader Rating</b>	2.76**	(0.96)	1.08	(0.86)
<b>Party Id</b>	.54	(0.34)	.84**	(0.31)
<b>Local Preference</b>	.52	(0.46)	.69	(0.53)
<b>Local Chance</b>	.18	(0.68)	1.23*	(0.57)
<b>Coalition Preference X SPD</b>	2.65**	(1.23)	1.95*	(0.88)
<b>Coalition Preference X GREEN</b>	2.79**	(1.32)	2.11#	(1.17)
<b>Coalition Preference X FDP</b>	1.62	(1.05)	1.34#	(0.80)
<b>Coalition Preference X LINKE</b>	4.00**	(1.29)	2.25*	(0.95)
<b>Male X SPD</b>	1.85**	(0.56)	1.31*	(0.54)
<b>Male X GREEN</b>	1.18 #	(0.69)	.73	(0.67)
<b>Male X FDP</b>	.57	(0.74)	.30	(0.77)
<b>Male X LINKE</b>	.76	(0.78)	.62	(0.67)
<b>Education X SPD</b>	-1.30	(1.11)	-1.45	(1.05)
<b>Education X GREEN</b>	-0.45	(1.29)	-2.22	(1.44)
<b>Education X FDP</b>	0.90	(1.13)	-1.27	(1.28)
<b>Education X LINKE</b>	0.23	(1.58)	-1.33	(1.36)
<b>Age X SPD</b>	-.03	(0.03)	-.05#	(0.02)
<b>Age X GREEN</b>	-.04	(0.03)	-.05#	(0.03)
<b>Age X FDP</b>	-.05	(0.03)	-.04	(0.03)
<b>Age X LINKE</b>	0.00	(0.03)	-.03	(0.03)
<b>Intercept : SPD</b>	1.37	(1.48)	2.57#	(1.40)
<b>Intercept : GRUNE</b>	1.77	(1.40)	2.75#	(1.48)
<b>Intercept : FDP</b>	1.25	(1.36)	2.46#	(1.46)
<b>Intercept : LINKE</b>	-1.09	(1.65)	1.35	(1.43)

N (respondents): 405 411

Pseudo - R2 : 0.68 0.61

Log-likelihood: -190.52 -238.76

P<0.1 # , p<0.05 \* , p<0.01\*\* , p<0.001\*\*\*

NB: CDU is the reference category.

**Table 4 : The Determinants of Ticket Splitting :  
A Logit Estimation**

	<b>Ticket Splitting</b>	
<b>Information</b>	1.81**	(.67)
<b>Male</b>	.12	(.30)
<b>Education</b>	1.32*	(.54)
<b>Age</b>	-.03**	(.01)
<b>Party Id (Strength)</b>	-.90**	(.29)
<b>Constant</b>	-1.37*	(.61)

n : 426

Pseudo-R2 : 0.10

P<0.1 # , p<0.05 \* , p<0.01\*\* , p<0.001\*\*\*

**TABLE 5 : The Impact of Information on the Votes**

**Conditional Logit Estimations**

	List Vote		Local Vote	
<b>Party Rating</b>	6.44***	(1.70)	4.00***	(1.03)
<b>Leader Rating</b>	2.60**	(0.96)	.95	(0.84)
<b>Party Id</b>	.54	(0.34)	.81*	(0.32)
<b>Local Preference</b>	.55	(0.46)	.64	(0.55)
<b>Local Chance</b>	.28	(0.71)	1.45*	(0.61)
<b>Coalition Preference X SPD</b>	2.91*	(1.28)	2.22*	(0.94)
<b>Coalition Preference X GREEN</b>	3.03*	(1.33)	2.35#	(1.20)
<b>Coalition Preference X FDP</b>	1.54	(1.05)	1.66 *	(0.80)
<b>Coalition Preference X LINKE</b>	4.09 **	(1.34)	2.36*	(0.98)
<b>Male X SPD</b>	1.87**	(0.57)	1.29*	(0.55)
<b>Male X GREEN</b>	1.14#	(0.69)	0.63	(0.67)
<b>Male X FDP</b>	0.62	(0.75)	0.27	(0.74)
<b>Male X LINKE</b>	0.64	(0.79)	0.49	(0.68)
<b>Education X SPD</b>	-1.44	(1.14)	-1.64	(1.08)
<b>Education X GREEN</b>	-0.82	(1.34)	2.58*	(1.45)
<b>Education X FDP</b>	1.08 #	(1.11)	-1.60	(1.29)
<b>Education X LINKE</b>	-0.23	(1.55)	-1.79	(1.37)
<b>Age X SPD</b>	-0.03	(0.03)	-0.05#	(0.02)
<b>Age X GREEN</b>	-0.04	(0.03)	-0.05#	(0.02)
<b>Age X FDP</b>	-0.05	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.03)
<b>Age X LINKE</b>	0.00	(0.03)	-0.02	(0.03)
<b>Information X SPD</b>	0.75	(0.93)	1.22	(0.94)
<b>Information X GREEN</b>	1.48	(1.11)	1.96#	(1.06)
<b>Information X FDP</b>	-.31	(1.40)	1.78	(1.32)
<b>Information X LINKE</b>	2.41#	(1.44)	2.36*	(1.25)
<b>Intercept : SPD</b>	1.01	(1.64)	2.01	(1.51)
<b>Intercept : GRUNE</b>	1.07	(1.50)	1.82	(1.58)
<b>Intercept : FDP</b>	1.38	(1.72)	1.66	(1.67)
<b>Intercept : LINKE</b>	2.35	(1.78)	-0.17	(1.49)

n : 405 411

Pseudo - R2 : 0.68 0.61

Log-likelihood: -188.94 -235.93

P<0.1 #, p<0.05 \*, p<0.01\*\*, p<0.001\*\*\*

**TABLE 6 : The Interaction Effects of Information on the Votes**

**Conditional Logit Estimations**

	List Vote		Local Vote	
<b>Party Rating</b>	6.01***	(1.57)	4.12***	(1.57)
<b>Leader Rating</b>	3.00**	(1.11)	1.00	(1.11)
<b>Party Id</b>	.65*	(0.32)	.81**	(0.32)
<b>Local Preference</b>	-.99	(0.95)	-1.26	(0.95)
<b>Local Chance</b>	2.83	(2.05)	1.64	(2.05)
<b>Coalition Preference X SPD</b>	-1.12	(2.37)	.62	(2.37)
<b>Coalition Preference X GREEN</b>	1.02	(2.41)	2.52	(2.41)
<b>Coalition Preference X FDP</b>	4.34	(3.07)	4.01#	(3.07)
<b>Coalition Preference X LINKE</b>	-.13	(2.58)	1.61	(2.58)
<b>Information X SPD</b>	0.39	(1.28)	1.23	(1.28)
<b>Information X GREEN</b>	2.09	(1.81)	3.51**	(1.81)
<b>Information X FDP</b>	-2.95	(2.60)	1.96	(2.60)
<b>Information X LINKE</b>	1.44	(1.80)	3.50*	(1.80)
<b>Information X Local Preference</b>	2.60	(1.73)	3.85*	(1.73)
<b>Information X Local Chance</b>	-4.73	(3.04)	-0.19	(3.04)
<b>Information X Coalition Pref. X SPD</b>	9.83#	(5.10)	3.11	(5.10)
<b>Information X Coalition Pref. X GREEN</b>	6.21	(5.60)	-0.11	(5.60)
<b>Information X Coalition Pref. X FDP</b>	-5.55	(4.82)	-3.74	(4.82)
<b>Information X Coalition Pref. X LINKE</b>	10.02#	(5.70)	1.77	(5.70)
<b>Intercept : SPD</b>	1.98	(0.02)	-2.45#	(0.02)
<b>Intercept : GRUNE</b>	1.41	(0.03)	1.28	(0.03)
<b>Intercept : FDP</b>	2.78	(0.04)	1.88	(0.04)
<b>Intercept : LINKE</b>	-1.58	(0.03)	-0.46	(0.03)

n : 405 411


Pseudo - R2 : 0.70 0.63

Log-likelihood : -177.81 -228.57

P<0.1 # , p<0.05 \* , p<0.01\*\* , p<0.001\*\*\*

Note : The variables Age, Sex and Education were included, but they are not reported in the table for reasons of space and clarity.

**Figure 1: The Impact of Party Rating on the Probability to Vote CDU**



**Figure 2: The Impact of Leader Rating on the Probability to Vote CDU**

