Mobilizing migrants, making citizens: migrant domestic workers as political agents

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Mobilising Migrants Making Citizens: Migrant Domestic Workers as Political Agents

Abstract

It is now more important than ever to consider migrant mobilizations and how political communities are constructed. This paper describes how Waling Waling, a migrant domestic workers’ organization, and their support group, Kalayaan, forged citizenship ‘from below’ and waged a successful campaign to change the immigration status of domestic workers in part through turning constraints into opportunities. It also discusses how the logic of state sovereignty can recapture radical takings, and the opportunities and challenges that are faced in the new political climate of migrants as victims of trafficking.

Keywords: migration, domestic workers, citizenship, trafficking, illegality, trades unions

In the summer of 1984, staff at the Commission for Filipino Migrant Workers (CFMW) in West London began to notice a pattern emerging among the Filipinos who were coming to them for advice and support. They were domestic workers in private households, arriving with no passport, unpaid wages, no belongings and disturbing reports of brutal conditions. Moreover they were all living and working ‘illegally’. As the
months passed and the numbers increased the structural nature of the problem became clear: the workers had been allowed into the UK only on the basis that they were working for the employer they entered with. If they left that employer they had no permission to work in the UK and were effectively forced into illegality.

It became increasingly difficult to respond to their needs on a case by case basis, and in November 1984 CFMW set up a meeting attended by seventeen domestic workers and ten supporters with the purpose of sharing their experiences and discussing a way forward. This grouping became formalized as ‘Waling Waling’, a Tagalog word for a flower that grows hidden under stones in the mountains of the Philippines. Thus began many years of organizing and campaigning for the right to an immigration status that recognised domestic workers as workers, the right to change employer, and the right to legal status for those who had become undocumented as a result of the injustice of the immigration regime.

Using this example as a case study this paper will consider how migrant domestic workers, working with supporters (both UK and non UK citizens with status) asserted citizenship claims and won legal status in part through turning their constraints (as women ‘confined’ to the private sphere) into opportunities. I will also examine how ‘radical takings can nevertheless be captured by the logic and practices of state sovereignty’ (Nyers 2003) through a consideration of post campaigning developments.
The practicalities: organising for rights

These migrants had all entered the UK as domestic workers accompanying wealthy employers. These included business people and executives, diplomats, rich tourists, and UK residents returning from abroad with their domestic staff. When work permits for resident domestic workers were phased out in 1979 the government made exceptions for those accompanying wealth employers. This was on the grounds of ‘national interest’, concerned that

If wealth investors, skilled workers and others with the potential to benefit our economy were unable to be accompanied by their domestic staff they might not come here at all


The UK government seems to have regarded this category of worker as an unfortunate necessity and in this case specifically devised a concession under which the employer could bring in their worker under one of two categories, as ‘visitors’ or as ‘persons named to work with a specified employer’. In practice there was a ‘concession culture’ under which domestic workers accompanying their employers were admitted to the UK with a wide variety of visas and many were given a stamp under Code 5N, namely ‘Leave to enter, employment prohibited’. So, these workers had all entered the UK legally accompanying wealthy employers
as their cooks, cleaners, nannies, and carers, but they had not been given an immigration status independent of their employers. This meant that employers could effectively exploit and abuse domestic workers with impunity. (Anderson 2000).

In the meeting organised that cold November night in 1984 the group recognized their common experiences and decided to continue to see each other to facilitate mutual support. It grew quickly. Workers supported each other psychologically and also met the immediate needs of those who had recently escaped from employers, often with only the clothes that they were wearing. As time went by and they grew in confidence workers began to organise events and trips, concerned that members should be leading as ‘normal’ a life as possible, whatever their immigration status. This work was affective as well as practical, and as affective work was crucial to the formation of a political community (Isin 2002). What was particularly innovative about Waling Waling was that they did not organize around country of origin, but type of employment and immigration status While in recent years this kind of organizing has proliferated (Laubenthal 2007) this was highly unusual in the mid 1980. It is important to note too that this multinational organizing was also a new development in the European and international organization of Filipinos. The CFMW had offices in several European states and had originally been established by activists and refugees many of whom had been organizers in the anti-Marcos groups in the Philippines. It therefore had a strong orientation towards the nationalist struggle in the Philippines.
However, after only a few months non-Filipinos began to join the organization, initially as a result of contacts established in wealthy households which often employed more than one nationality of domestic worker. Thus the material reality of the arrangement of work for migrants in private households, rather than nationality, shaped the organising of migrant domestic workers. At an individual level this meant that networks and contacts established within often oppressive private homes, became an important resource that some workers managed to tap. As the organization grew, approximately half were Filipinos, with considerable numbers of Indians and Sri Lankans, and smaller numbers from Anglophone and Francophone African states. In all more than 30 nationalities were members, but notably none from Eastern Europe, and very few from Latin America.

In 1987 the organization Kalayaan was founded. Waling Waling became a self-organised group with a membership of domestic workers, while Kalayaan comprised their supporters. The two worked closely together, but while Waling Waling members were on the management committee of Kalayaan (but not vice versa) in order to facilitate accountability to migrant domestic workers.

Legal and substantive citizenship: the case of migrant domestic workers
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the philosophy, politics and practice of citizenship. Those interested in immigration and asylum, have drawn attention to the ‘inward-looking’ framework of some of this literature, its assumption of a universalist ethic, that citizenship means ‘everyone’ (Bosniak 2006). Bosniak argues that this is ‘romantic’

The idea of citizenship is commonly invoked to convey a state of democratic belonging or inclusion, yet this inclusion is usually premised on a conception of a community that is bounded and exclusive. Citizenship as an ideal is understood to embody a commitment against subordination, but citizenship can also represent an axis of subordination itself’ (2006: 1)

Citizenship, while epitomising rights and inclusion, also works to exclude and deprive, as those working practically and theoretically with migrants and refugees are all too aware.

There have been attempts to bridge this gap, by understanding citizenship not as simply a legal status bestowed by the state¹, but also as the creation and engagement with polity, (Balibar 2004). Thus it is not simply a legal status bestowed by the state, but actively constructed through action and through participation in the public. As Balibar puts it:

We can view these demands (by migrant workers who demand legal residence for the undocumented) based on resistance and the refusal of violence as partial but direct expressions of the
process of creation of rights, a dynamic that allows the political constitution to be recognized as ‘popular sovereignty’ or democracy

(Balibar 2004)

This views citizenship as a process of constructing relations, in which all can be directly engaged including those who are formally excluded from the polity. As undocumented migrants demand rights, through public campaigning and negotiation, so they actively make citizenship. They are not simply passive recipients of citizenship, but in rejecting the state’s denial of rights, effectively forge them as a collective project. The assertion of oneself as a political actor is an act of ‘dissensus’, highlighting the contradictions between the ‘Rights of Man’ and the positions of those who are refused recognition of political subjecthood (Rancière 2004).

Not all non-citizens are however equally excluded. Balibar has described borders as ‘polysemic’ (Balibar 2002) in that they have a differential impact on those crossing them. In this case, the wealthy employers of domestic workers were acknowledged by the British state in their capacity as visitors or business people and were granted the normal protections against crime for example – so if an employer complained that a domestic worker had stolen from them, the police would investigate the theft. This did not apply to domestic workers, who had no protection against for example their employer holding their passport, or refusing to
pay their wages. The members of Waling Waling were not just excluded from the political by their ‘illegal’ immigration status, but also by virtue of their work. The household is the place for private individuals, not political, nor indeed market actors (Anderson 2007; Olsen 1983; Pateman 1988). These two exclusionary frameworks worked together: citizenship/foreigner, public/private. Domestic workers were effectively consigned to the private, allowed entry to the UK only on the condition that they remained within the employer’s household space. When they left their first employer they almost all continued to work in private homes as live-in domestic workers partly as a means of protecting themselves from the state. While there is little compunction about breaking into the private homes of migrants and requesting their papers, middle class citizens are unlikely to face this intrusion. The private household then was not just a space of abuse and arbitrary power where the state offered no protection, but also a space of refuge from the state itself. By speaking out workers literally ‘made visible what has no business being seen’, the work they performed, the abuse they endured, and the inhumanity permitted by a liberal democratic state.

The beginning of Waling Waling lay in individual acts of resistance, in individual’s refusal to endure any more and in them taking the huge step of escape (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). These were brave moves, and it was in the sharing of this and subsequent experiences that domestic workers turned them into political acts. The first action of citizenship is
political speech (Nyers 2003) and in this case, the first political act of political speech was to each other

    Before, when I was alone, I didn’t trust anyone. ... When I began to talk to people in similar situations and I saw that I was not alone, I realized that the problem was not just to do with me, that it was the Philippines and Britain and the government in those countries. (Anderson 1993)

Speaking to each other, ‘coming out’ about legal status, meant that domestic workers began to feel less isolated and divided from others.

**Workers and Citizens**

A key feature of organizing and campaigning was Waling Waling’s demand to be recognized as *workers*. This assertion, that they were workers, worked on several levels. Firstly it asserted the dignity and value of their work, for themselves, employers and the wider public. They were not ‘helping’ but contributing socially and economically to households and wider society; they were not ‘girls’ but women (and men) who were often sustaining extended families back home. It also asserted their legitimacy as public actors, their right to be heard and to be treated with respect, and it was accompanied by the demand that this labour be recognized as a route to formalized citizenship.
Waling Waling members claimed legitimacy as political actors then on the basis of their legitimacy as economic actors. This claim was directed at the state, but Waling Waling also turned to other groups, religious, human rights and labour organizations for recognition both for its own sake and as a means of pressurizing the state. The trade union the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) played an important symbolic and material role through its recognition of migrant domestic workers as workers. The fact that they welcomed their membership, despite the sector they worked in and their immigration status gave a real boost to the organization and to individuals. Of enormous importance to the migrants, many of whom were without their passports, was the possession of a union membership card. This was viewed, partly as a document confirming their identity, and partly as a way of demonstrating that they belonged to an officially recognized organization. This made members feel less vulnerable and with some protection from the police and immigration. There were additional benefits: workers were given advice and support at special meetings to advise them on what little employment rights they had. Organisationally the TGWU supported domestic workers’ participation in Labour Party conferences (and politicians’ commitments at those conferences were later to prove critical). Crucially membership of the TGWU meant that Waling Waling could bring the issue of migrant domestic workers before grassroots TGWU membership, and learn about the experiences of other low waged workers, particularly women, in the UK.
The claim that migrant domestic workers were workers built on the slave/worker binary, (1995, Slavery Still Alive was the title of one conference organized). Migrants asserted their claim that they were not slaves but workers, and used this assertion to demand a suitable immigration status, one that recognized their right to work. It is important to recognize that this move, from worker to citizen, is not straightforward (Gordon 2008). Indeed, while able bodied citizens have a duty to work, non-citizens’ access to the labour market is generally highly regulated and indeed for some, working may result in deportation. It is rarely questioned in public discourse that British people have prior claim to work, and it is not assumed that migrants generate a right to citizenship through work, particularly when they are working ‘illegally’.

However, when migrant domestic workers ‘intruded’ into the public space there were important ways in which the very mechanisms that work to exclude migrants and to exclude domestic workers facilitated the recognition of migrant domestic workers. Importantly, domestic work in private households (like sex work) is not constructed as a sector where jobs are ‘taken’ from British workers. Rather, when it is acknowledged that paid domestic work takes place, the home is imagined as a space where jobs are made, with British women having their entry to the labour market facilitated through domestic employees. Moreover (and in this instance, unlike sex work), domestic work, though low status, is often rhetorically valued, especially when it involves care of the elderly or children (Cox 2006; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001). Thus, unlike many other
low waged sectors, this work is both ‘priceless’ and yet not one that is unfairly being snatched from British nationals, for, while valued in rhetoric it is not valued economically. It is one thing to acknowledge the value and dignity of the work in theory, and another to pay for it.

There were also ways in which the intrusion of domestic workers was used to reinforce ideas about ‘foreigners’. Honig has elucidated how political communities, often with a myth of the ‘foreign founder’, re-found themselves with reference to foreigners (Honig 2003). She examines the perpetual revisiting and reinterpreting of the migrant as founder and as threat and asks ‘what problems does foreignness solve for us?’ in order to unpack how the symbolic politics of foreignness reinstills ideas of ‘heartfelt community…. And a consent producing liberal individualism’ (2003:7). There is evidence that these processes were at work in the relatively sympathetic public response to the situation of domestic workers. The campaign often found itself working against strongly gendered and racialized images of the abused domestic worker and the abusive (male) employer. This notion – of evil foreigners importing slavery, of the importance of the triumph of British values of freedom and democracy – were expressed at all levels, by supportive MPs as well as the tabloid press (Anderson 2000). In rescuing her from the clutches of the employer, the UK was portrayed as re-enacting its status as an upholder of justice and liberty. The ‘good’ migrant contains the ‘bad’, the victim has a parallel villain, the UK may accept the domestic work, but will extirpate the employer (rarely portrayed as British, or indeed white).
While this forging of citizenship through political speech was a real achievement, one must not forget however the importance of formalized legal status (Bosniak 2006) – this is after all Waling Waling (and many other groups still) were demanding. Being recognised as a political actors in themselves was not itself the fulfilment of the demands even when this was acknowledged by civil society. This highlights a deep contradiction in many regularization movements: at the same time as challenging the authority of the state to ‘illegalize’, they are demanding ‘legalization’, that is a re-drawing of boundaries to include a new group of people. This re-drawing inevitably excludes for it is not the abolition of boundaries all together. The power of the state to draw boundaries and exclude is reinscribed at the moment that it responds to the challenge. In this case, when, in 1997 the Home Office announced it was to bring domestic workers under the immigration rules, they invited Kalayaan and Waling Waling to assist in drafting the new immigration rule. There was considerable discussion about this, but the argument that it was important to ensure the rule was as good as it could be, as long as that did not constrain criticism of it, won in the end.

**Regularization and its discontents**

In 1997 the incoming Labour administration gave migrant domestic workers the right to change employers and put them under the Immigration Rules (rather than a special ‘concession’). It also offered the
opportunity for regularization of those who had entered under the old system. This was expressed as a humanitarian response rather than a victory following many years of organizing and campaigning. However, despite the significance of this victory there were also ways in which it was ‘re-taken’ by the state.

The regularization exercise was enacted individually on a ‘case by case’ basis with each case judged according to its ‘merits’. Moreover this regularization was a ‘special exercise’ i.e. not under legal jurisdiction. This meant operational definitions were not open to legal challenges and it was extremely difficult to appeal in those cases where people were refused. At first sight the requirements for ‘straightforward cases’ seemed relatively simple: a valid passport; proof that one currently is employed as a domestic worker and able to support and maintain oneself without recourse to public funds (a letter from the employer stating salary details and other ‘in kind’ payments); and proof that one entered as a domestic worker. Supporting documents, together with a standard application form for variation of leave to remain, and a photograph were to be sent to the Home Office. Obtaining these ‘simple’ requirements was often far from straightforward. Migrant domestic workers typically had their passports taken by their employer, while of those who had their passports, it was not unusual for people to have been in the UK for many years and their documents expired. Holding a valid passport usually meant reporting it lost or stolen to the police and then applying to an embassy or consulate for replacement documents. While many had no difficulty with this – the
Philippines Consulate was particularly sympathetic – there were real problems with particular countries and officials especially for those whose original employers were diplomats, working in those same embassies. One man went to his Embassy and found that it was his former, abusive employer who was responsible for issuing him his replacement passport. ‘It is not stolen, I am holding it’ the employer announced, refusing to give him another one. The worker could not apply for regularization.

The requirement that workers should not have recourse to public funds suggests that the regularization was not as ‘humanitarian’ as was made out to be. Those too old or sick to work, or who were unemployed did not qualify. Letters confirming employment from a current employer were accepted as proof, but employers were often extremely reluctant to offer them as they were concerned about being implicated in an immigration offence. Such was their resistance that the Home Office was eventually forced to give a reassurance that employer sanctions were never envisaged as intended for private households, in order that Kalayaan could encourage employers to support applications. This is not the same as tying a worker to an employer. Indeed some domestic workers made full use of the freedom to change employer offered by illegality to find people prepared to write letters. However, ironically what this requirement did was to reinscribe dependence on the employer as a gateway to status.
The last requirement, proof of entry as a domestic worker, was particularly difficult. The government was anxious to limit access to the regularization, to re-draw the boundary in such a way that while this group was incorporated its members did not bring less deserving others with them. As the regularization progressed it became clear that under the ‘concession culture’ certain nationalities were more likely to be granted certain visas. For example domestic workers from many African countries were particularly likely to be given visas to enter as family members, while those from the Philippines were more likely to be given a visa with the name of the employer written in it. There is no suggestion that this reflected any immigration guidance, merely that this was the practice. It was particularly difficult for those with family member visas to be regularized, as there was reluctance on the part of the Home Office to ‘open the floodgates’ by offering regularization to overstayers of visitors’ visas, as they feared abuse of the regularization process. So the decision of the immigration officer, the individual official who admitted them, continued to shape workers’ chances. This mapped on to other racialized and nationalized constraints and facilities (including the relative supportiveness of different embassies). For example, many of the Filipinos had entered the UK via the Middle East, and had gone to the Middle East through an agency. While they did not particularly intend to come to the UK, they had a specific migratory project. They were often well educated with a high degree of English fluency. In contrast, many of the Indians had come to the UK with wealthy Indian employers. They themselves were rural to urban migrants, often with little English or
education, and were it not for their employer, would not have considered international migration. These sorts of differences mapped on to a labour market that is highly racialized (Anderson 2007; Cox 2006). At that time employers were particularly interested in employing Filipino workers, meaning that Filipinos were more likely to find jobs and were more likely to be able to find an employer who was prepared to write a letter of support.

Regularization proceeded on a case by case basis, and in facilitating individuals’ applications, Kalayaan became more and more orientated to a service rather than a campaigning role. This was also against a changing political, social and institutional background including the professionalization of advice work that regulated the previously unregulated world of immigration advice. The relation between the organizations began to shift as Waling Waling members became ‘clients’. Just after regularization was announced, Waling Waling was attracting between 200-300 people to its Sunday meetings. But members began to prioritise their own cases, to organize visits home and bring families to join them in the UK. There was some discussion in both organizations, about possible future organising and campaign work, a switch of focus perhaps to work related rights in private households, or on other types of immigration status that incorporate domestic workers, but there was little appetite for this, particularly as so many workers wanted to spend time with families that they had long been separated from. Thus in some ways the strength of the campaign – its relentless focus on immigration status,
which both united workers and helped develop a clear strategy and demands, was also at this stage something of its weakness. Where to go from here was not immediately clear. Being parted from loved ones and from time consuming responsibilities that caring brings, meant that migrants had devoted time to political struggles, time which they often now wanted to spend rebuilding family relationships that had suffered severely as a result of immigration status. The organizations had not developed a means of opening political possibilities from this re-prioritization, but rather were struggling with individual case work. The case by case nature of the regularistion thus posed problems both at an individual and an organizational level.

One step forward, two steps back?

Fast forward to March 2006 when the Home Office came forward with new proposals, Waling Waling (renamed the United Workers Association) was largely inactive. Kalayaan had become a professionalized registered charity offering ‘advice, advocacy and support’ and widely recognized both inside and outside of government as able to provide expert advice on issues around the migrant domestic worker visa. At this time the UK government announced it was to introduce a ‘points-based system’ as part of ‘Making Migration Work for Britain’ agenda. This aimed to limit economic migration to the UK principally to those with ‘skills’ that are in demand (Home Office 2006). As part of these changes the government determined to change its policy in respect of migrant domestic workers
who enter the UK accompanying their employer. It was proposed that they would have the name of their employer written on their passport, enter as a ‘business visitor’ (i.e. not a worker and with no employment protection) and have a maximum stay of six months. This would give the employer time to train up an EU migrant to take this work (note that it was still not proposed that they train up a UK national).

Kalayaan challenged the Home Office proposals on the grounds that they constituted ‘trafficking’ by turning domestic workers into trafficking victims (Kalayaan 2007). Trafficking was not a term in common usage in the 1990s but it had since risen on the political and popular agenda. Governments, particularly in Europe, blame traffickers for the proliferation of irregular migration and the abuse of migrant workers. The government has as a stated aim to ‘make the UK a hostile environment for trafficking’ (Home Office 2007b) and a whole raft of policies and initiatives have been developed in order to counter this problem. ‘Trafficking’ has replaced asylum as a means of resolving tensions between immigration controls and human rights (O’Connell Davidson 2005). Stricter immigration controls help prevent trafficking and exploitation and therefore are to the benefit of migrant workers who would otherwise be abused. This is a relatively new discursive development. In 2002 numbers of victims of trafficking (VoT) were ‘small’ and the majority of illegal migrants were held to be in the UK ‘by their consent’ (Home Office 2002). But five years later, organised crime seems to have taken
UK immigration system by the scruff of the neck and by 2007 then Home Secretary John Reid was warning that

Failure to take on the people traffickers, who are behind three-quarters of illegal immigration to this country, leaves vulnerable and often desperate people at the mercy of organised criminals.

(Home Office 2007a)

A lack of definitional clarity allows a constant slippage between ‘illegal migration’ and ‘trafficking’. This is not reflected even in the problematic international definition of the Palermo Protocol: migration does not have to be ‘illegal’ nor indeed across international borders, to constitute trafficking (Gallagher 2001). This slippage is however rhetorical only. In practice only the most victimized who are unable to act for themselves can qualify as Victims of Trafficking and become entitled to the state’s assistance and protection. The figure of the evil employer and trafficker throws a shadow over the role of the state in constructing vulnerability. For the individual victim it is the employer, pimp etc who denies access to basic social rights such as medical treatment. But if these individuals were not denying access, for those who are illegalized, the state would. Indeed state legitimated restriction of access to social rights is a key source of vulnerability. The state that ‘rescues’ victims of trafficking in response to a claim to human rights, is the same state that denies access to rights on the basis of non-citizenship (Sharma 2003).
In its critique of the government proposals Kalayaan underscored the relation between employers’ coercion and abuse of their workers with the British state’s proposed immigration legislation. It foregrounded physical coercion but went further to argue that this would be reinforced by a state-enforced inability to leave an employer.

Thirty two per cent of migrant domestic workers who registered at Kalayaan during 2005-2006 had their passports withheld by their employer, and 23% had been physically abused. The removal of any option to challenge or leave an abusive or exploitative employer is in direct contravention to the Home Office stated policy to protect victims of trafficking and to stop trafficking ‘at source’.

(Kalayaan 2007)

Thus immigration controls were presented as potentially part of the problem.

The UK Home Office in contrast emphasized that immigration controls can be used to refuse entry to abusive individual employers. This is in line with the UK Trafficking Action Plan which recognises borders as points of intervention:

As part of our continued work to combat trafficking, our emphasis will be upon developing robust pre-entry procedures, including appropriate safeguards, such as the identification of cases of possible abuse at the pre-entry stage to minimise the risk of subsequent exploitation.
This implies that if the abuse is not taking place on UK territory, but is detected through pre-entry procedures, preventing entry is a sufficient response. In practise, the idea of refusing entry to employers and their domestic workers on the grounds that the employers were abusive would mean that they are likely to return to a state where the employer has a great deal of power over their worker. The refusal of entry to the UK would be unlikely to make them more sympathetic to their employee, and indeed could have catastrophic consequences.

When people do become victims, the state’s responsibility to extend assistance is acknowledged. In this view, trafficked domestic workers are the victims of bad employers. In the cases where these bad employers manage to gain entry to the UK and commit abuses in the UK, the government will extend some protections to the victims. Immigration control per se cannot be considered as a coercive tool that is used by employers. This is a fundamental difference between the approaches of states and many of those who would argue for migrants’ rights that goes to the heart of the relation between the state and employers. It could be argued that immigration control limits the rights of migrants as workers by giving employers additional mechanisms of control over labour and indeed some might argue by limiting freedom of labour (Steinfeld 2008). However in this case immigration controls are presented as part of a toolkit to detect and refuse entry to abusers. So while Kalayaan...
emphasised the role of the state in forging the conditions within which abusive employment practises – and hence ‘trafficking’ can occur, the UK government presented itself as a combater of trafficking from the outside. The question becomes to do with the broader issue of the role of immigration controls in constructing categories of people who are vulnerable to abuse. If certain immigration statuses create marginalized groups without access to the formal labour market, or any of the protections usually offered by states to citizens and workers, then how can the state prevent itself equipping employers with labour control and retention mechanisms that would not otherwise be available to them?

The appeal against trafficking seemed to have some leverage, and in the autumn of 2008 the government announced that it would not proceed with its proposals for at least two years and until it had conducted an assessment. However, while successful there are also dangers in attempts to ‘retake’ such state constructions. The language of trafficking is diametrically opposed to the ideas of citizenship as a process of constructing rights and relations, for it focuses on victimhood and on those who are unable to act for themselves. To pass the ‘test’ of trafficking one must be a true victim: injured, suffering and enslaved, an object of intervention rather than a political subject. To pass the test of trafficking one must be a true victim: unable to engage or make choices, only suffer and be rescued (Rancière 2004; O’Connell Davidson 2006)). Certainly the victim of trafficking cannot simply leave her employer, she must be physically imprisoned and make a dangerous escape, or she
must be rescued. Because they can only be helped and rescued they are not political subjects, rather the objects of negotiation. Since they cannot actualise their rights, they must be given to others to act on their behalf (Zizek 2005), and indeed there has been a veritable plethora of anti-trafficking organizations and initiatives. But the organizations cannot be comprised of trafficked people – for they are the victims. So the language of trafficking means that one cannot engage with the notion of citizenship as process, but only with citizenship as formal legal status administered by the state - and citizenship as formal legal status is a long way off being granted victims of trafficking.

Trafficking risks sucking out the politics of citizenship. On the one hand the importance of formal citizenship/legal status and the role of the state in constructing vulnerability through denial of legal status is obscured by reference to ‘human rights’ denied by individual actors. Yet neither does it allow for citizenship as a process that migrants are actively engaged in. So political conflict is turned into negotiated adjustments of interests, patching over contradictions, where negotiation and patching is not being done by migrants. Indeed, migrants must compete for the role of who is the most victimised, the most exploited.

Conclusion

It would seem then from this case that it is easy for the state to incorporate radical politics and that attempts to subvert state rhetoric come at a price. However, while critiquing these processes one should not underestimate these achievements. The regularization and
subsequent legislation made a significant difference to the lives of thousands of workers and their family members and developed a lasting sense of political agency. When the Home Office announced its 2006 proposals a meeting was organised at the Transport and General Workers Union. More than three hundred migrant domestic workers, some from the ‘old’ Waling Waling, some from the new ‘client base’ of Kalayaan, attended to voice their protest. In late 2008 building on this work a core group began to organise, offering mutual support, solidarity with trades union struggles and protesting against the new Immigration and Citizenship Bill…..watch this space…..

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