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Representation and alienation in the political landscape

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The question of representation in the definition of landscape is arguably at the nexus of important theoretical issues in the social sciences and humanities, and is in evident need of clarification. A key but largely overlooked concept in the debate on landscape and representation is the concept of alienation and, by extension, the concepts of commodification and reification. This paper will first examine the relation between landscape representation and alienation in terms of its substantive historical meaning, the transferral of ownership of rights in the land/property and the loss of rights which effectively makes one an alien, or foreigner, in the land. It will then examine this relationship in terms of the philosophical concern with alienation and objectification, particularly as explicated by the literary scholar and philosopher Georg Lukács.

In the introduction to a widely read collection of articles, Stephen Daniels and Denis Cosgrove defined landscape as ‘a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing or symbolising surroundings’. Though this definition would have been commonplace in art history, it had a cathartic effect for many geographers, causing a shift in focus from the study of the landscape as a material phenomenon to the landscape as representation. A spate of books and collections of articles exploring this theme followed. This notion of landscape also spread to other social sciences, as when the sociologist John Urry used ideas borrowed from this body of work as the basis for a classic deconstruction of the alienated tourist gaze. The archaeologist and anthropologist Tim Ingold, however, criticized Cosgrove and Daniels, declaring that landscape is not a form of representation but a lived phenomenon. This argument prompted the anthropologist Eric Hirsch to argue, in his introduction to a book on the anthropological approach to landscape, that Daniels and Cosgrove only took “one pole of experience intrinsic to landscape (the representational)” and generalized “this experience into landscape tout court”. In Hirsch’s view, their definition therefore ignored “the other half and the cultural processes of which both poles of experience are a part and through which both are brought into relation”. The question of the role of representation in the definition of landscape, which has been brought to the fore by Daniels and Cosgrove, has thus come into conflict with an approach to landscape that emphasizes the phenomenology of landscape experience. A key to understanding this debate over landscape and representation, I will argue, is the concept of alienation and, by extension, the concepts of commodification and reification.
This essay will first explore the representation of landscape in connection with alienation in the substantive historical sense, meaning the alienation of land, and in relation to its meaning as estrangement. It will then conclude with an examination of the representation issue in relation to the philosophical concept of alienation, particularly as elucidated by the twentieth-century literary historian and philosopher Georg Lukács, whose work helped stimulate a renewed interest in the concept. The role of representation in objectifying the meaning of landscape, and hence the link between landscape and alienation, becomes clearer, I will argue, when the word is broken down into its component parts, land and -scape. When the two are examined separately and then reconstituted, it becomes easier to understand the substantive importance of the landscape concept, and to comprehend why its meaning is necessarily so difficult to define and objectify (“substantive” is used here to mean real rather than apparent, belonging to the substance of a thing as used in the legal sense of creating and defining rights and duties).6

The land in landscape, and the -scape of the land

The land in a statement such as “The land rose in rebellion” is a social phenomenon, a country or a people.7 Land, in this sense, is something to which a people belong, as to a commonwealth. It is in this sense that a land is constituted by the people that belong to it (England is the land of the English). They belong to the land insofar as they have “become attached or bound [to it] . . . by birth, allegiance, residence, or dependency”.8 The land of a people was historically divided into smaller lands, which might belong to a communality (e.g. the common lands belonging to the village community) or to a figure seen to represent or embody the land (e.g. the lands of the prince). The term land is applied here not just to the people of a land in the social sense, but also to the material substance (e.g. dry land) that is encompassed by such a land. In its original, substantive sense alienation means the transferral, and hence loss, of rights in the land/property. If one has a sense of belonging to the land, as the place of one’s family, community and heritage, such loss is also psychologically alienating. One becomes estranged from the land to which one belongs – an alien is a foreigner or a stranger, and alienation literally means to be made foreign, to be estranged.

Landscape is distinguished from land by the suffix -scape, which is equivalent to the more common English suffix -ship. This suffix generates an abstraction. Thus, there might be two friends, comrades or fellows in a room, both concrete beings, but between them they share something abstract and difficult to define, friendship, comradeship or fellowship. The suffix -ship designates “something showing, exhibiting, or embodying a quality or state” of being, in this case that of a friend, comrade or fellow.9 -Ship thus designates the abstract “nature”, “state” or “constitution” of something. In this text I have repeatedly condensed these various synonyms to the trilogy nature, state and/or constitution in order to bring home the way these words are interlinked both as abstract essences (e.g. the nature, state or constitution of something) and as concretized and institutionalized entities (e.g. nature, the state and a constitution).10

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Citizenship thus carries some of the same abstract and ideal qualities identified with friendship and fellowship, but also suggests a more institutionalized quality, related originally to the existence of a polity, of which one might be a citizen. A land, in the sense of a country, is likewise something of which one can be a citizen, or landsman (a fellow countryman), and in this context it is important to have a sense of the nature, state or constitution of that land. Knowledge of what constitutes the abstract nature, state or constitution of being friends, fellows, citizens or landsmen belonging to a land is clearly important to an understanding of the functioning of these relations, but such abstractions are inherently difficult to grasp. This is where objectification through representation comes in.

**Representing the land**

The suffixes -scape and -ship stem ultimately from an ancient Germanic root, spelt shape in modern English (basically a Germanic language). The power of this sense of shape lies in the dynamic relation between the meaning of shape as, on the one hand, an expression of -ship as an underlying nature, state or constitution which manifests itself through an active, creative, shaping process and, on the other, the material form which that process generates – its shape. By representing the abstract nature, state or constitution of the land in a more concrete objective form one concretizes it, and makes it easier to both grasp and facilitate the process by which the land is shaped as a social and material phenomenon.

Representation can take a number of forms. The representative body of a land provides a means by which the abstract collective will of the citizenry or landsmen can be objectified and made manifest through the verbal discourse of a parliament – the parlia deriving from the Old French parler, parler, ‘to speak’. The constitution of something is by nature an intangible essence, and when English jurists refer to the “ancient constitution” they refer to something that has not been written down, but which can be extrapolated from custom and legal precedence going back to a time out of mind. It was this ancient constitution that legitimated the existence of the English parliament. The constitution of the land, however, can also be represented in written graphic form, as in the United States, where it was based on the reasoning of a body of men, and served to institutionalize the nature of a modern federal state.

Through representation the nature, state or constitution of the land is concretized and can be acted upon. The constitution thus provides the foundation for a formalized state that can act on behalf of the people as represented in a representative body. The map provides a tool for administering that land, and the visual landscape representation provides a basis for comprehending the land’s physical and social makeup. There is thus a certain circularity between the abstract, ideal nature of the land, its representation, and the shaping of the land. This circularity, however, is greatly influenced by the way in which the land is represented, because the mode of representation (as will be seen) is not neutral. This can be exemplified through a comparison of discursive verbal representation with perspective pictorial representation.
Discursive verbal representation

The ancient Germanic name for the representative legal and political body of a land was the thing or moot – the root of the modern words thing and meeting. It is the deliberation of the thing that builds the land as a polity or res publica, known in the Germanic languages variously as a landschap (Dutch), Landschaft (German), landskap (Swedish) and landscape in the Old English spelling. This is landscape in the modern sense of a “political landscape” as “a particular area of activity”.13

The philosopher Martin Heidegger delved into the meaning of the thing during the later years of his life. In this analysis the thing is not the physical object, to which authentic being is attached as in his phenomenology, but a representative gathering facilitating the discourse upon which the res publica as a social entity is built:

To be sure, the Old High German word thing means a gathering, and specifically a gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a contested matter. In consequence, the Old German words thing and dinc become the names for an affair or matter of pertinence. They denote anything that in any way bears upon men, concerns them, and that accordingly is a matter for discourse.14

We still use this meaning of thing when we say that someone “knows his things”, or we speak of “things in law”. In this context, “things” do not have social lives; they are the essence of the social, the res- (meaning “thing” in Latin) in res publica.

The Romans called a matter for discourse res. The Greek eiro (rebetos, rhetra, rhema) means to speak about something, to deliberate on it. Res publica means, not the state, but that which, known to everyone, concerns everybody and is therefore deliberated in public.15

As a matter for discourse, res thus meant thing in the same deliberative context as the notion of thing that gave its name to the Germanic representative body. Representatives of the land met at the moot or thing to discourse on things in law, or realis (the real) in medieval Latin.16 The thing thereby laid down the law of the land according to which the use of the common material and social resources of the land was regulated. Material objects thus become endowed as real things (in law) that are capable of being ordered and laid in place as the common wealth of the res publica.

The common law of the land is rooted in custom, which is an expression of community practice. The legendary seventeenth-century English jurist Edward Coke stated that custom is “defined as a law or right not written; which, being established by long use and the consent of our ancestors, hath been and is daily practised”. It is because custom is rooted in this “common usage” for “time out of mind” that “custom lies upon the land”.17 Coke seems to have weighed his words carefully when he writes that custom “lies” upon the land. The word law derives from the Old Norse liggja, meaning to lie, and is akin to the plural of lag, meaning “due place, order”. The law, this suggests, was laid down, layer-like, through practice, thereby establishing a sense of emplaced order – the lay(out) of the land. It was in this way that customary rights in the land, such as rights in the commons, created a sense of belonging to, and having a place in, the land. Such emplaced rights could give rise to relatively egalitarian medieval republics with representative legal and political institutions, as in Switzerland or the Frisian lands. More usually, however, they constituted part of a larger, complex
organization in which the rights of the differing estates (the nobility, the clergy, the
burgers, the farmers and the prince or king) worked together, or opposed each other,
in a creative (or destructive) tension that often involved representative legal and
political bodies. Even under rather despotic conditions, customary rights, particularly
in the commons, could form the basis for a moral economy that has acted as a bulwark
for the poor up to the present. Though the commoners were individually weak they
were numerically strong, and they ferociously exercised and defended their customary
rights and the habitus generated by those rights.

As time passes, the physical appearance of the land is increasingly shaped in the
image of the laws of the land as formalized by the thing. The physical land, thus
- scaped, becomes an expression of the nature, state, or constitution of the land as the
embodiment of a res publica or commonwealth. The law, then, does not just lie upon
the land; it shapes the land, and that shape will in turn have an effect upon the law. The
creation of dykes under the customary law of a Friesland Landschaft polity will thus
build the land in a concrete way. The consequent dependency of the Landschaft com-
monwealth upon those dykes will in turn shape that community, its customs and laws,
and can lead to the writing down of its by-laws and the institutionalization of the power
of the bodies that manage the dykes and use the water. This will, again, influence the
future shaping of the land. The landscape geographer may, then, study the land as thus
shaped; but the goal from this perspective, should be not simply to comprehend the
land as a physical thing, but rather to comprehend the more abstract - ship of the land,
its substantive nature, state or constitution as a polity interacting with its place.

The perspective of graphic representation: this is not a pipe landscape

“It is well known”, Denis Cosgrove tells us, “that in Europe the concept of landscape
and the words for it in both Romance and Germanic languages emerged around the
turn of the sixteenth century to denote a painting whose primary subject matter was
natural scenery.” It is certainly true that the concept of landscape as scenery emerged
at this time, even if the older political meaning of landscape pre-dated the pictorial
meaning. Daniels and Cosgrove also argue that landscape is “a cultural image, a
pictorial way of representing or symbolising surroundings”. While this is not untrue,
the Belgian surrealist painter René Magritte provides a key to understanding just why
the full meaning of landscape should not be defined simply as a form of representation,
an image or picture, and why that picture is not simply a symbolic representation of
“surroundings”.

Magritte’s most famous artwork might well be his 1929 painting of a pipe with the text
written on the canvas, “This is not a pipe”. The painting is entitled The treason of
images. The image is treasonous because it is not a pipe, even if it looks like a pipe.
The picture is, in fact, a representation of a pipe – to be more precise, it is a represen-
tation of the idea of a pipe – an ideal, archetypal pipe, as Michel Foucault points out in
a book on various versions of this painting. This point is brought out in a version of
the painting in which the image of the pipe, and the text that tells us that this is not a pipe, is placed upon the image of a canvas lying on an easel (Figure 1). Above the easel another image of the same pipe floats freely in space like an idea in a cartoon. By the same logic, it would be appropriate to write, “This is not a landscape” on a landscape painting, because it is not a landscape tout court, and as an artwork it need not simply be a symbolic representation of something concrete (like “surroundings”). It is likely to represent, rather, an abstract idea of the nature, state or constitution of the land as concretized and objectified through visual reference to surroundings. A pastoral landscape painting thus uses visual reference to grazing land to create an image of the natural human fellowship represented by the pastoral ideal in the iconography of classical antiquity and Christianity. The artwork, however, represents this symbolic ideal not just in its subject matter but also in its form and structure.

In another artwork by Magritte, Where Euclid walked (Figure 2), we see an easel in a room upon which stands a painting of an urban landscape. The same landscape, which is the subject of the painting on the easel, is simultaneously visible through a window in the room in which the painting stands. The painting is positioned in such a way that the representation on the canvas overlaps the scene viewed through the window, so that one blends into the other. In this case Magritte’s artwork seems to be making the point
that both the landscape on the easel and the landscape seen from the window represented in the painting are (like the pipe) not landscapes, but representations of landscape. The painting is not just a representation of a landscape however; it is the symbolic representation of the idea of landscape as an expression of an ideal geometric archetype. The painting has a subtext, which reads ‘Where Euclid walked’, and if we look closely we see that the tower of a building has the same Euclidean shape as the boulevard that stretches from the window out to the horizon. The painting is thus not just a representation of landscape, but a representation of the way a perspective representation of landscape is generated through the use of Euclidian geometry as framed by a square window.

Art historians will know that Magritte’s window cannot be just any window, but must be the famous window described in Leon Battista Alberti’s Renaissance classic *On Painting*, which provided the first written instruction on the geometric laws of perspective drawing. Alberti was, among other things, a cartographer, and there is much to indicate that the techniques of perspective drawing were extrapolated from the sciences of surveying and cartography – the landscape drawing is thus basically a map projected from an oblique angle, rather than from the top down. Central to Alberti’s construction of the
perspective illusion was the frame: “I inscribe a quadrangle of right angles, as large as I wish, which is considered to be an open window through which I see what I want to paint.” The quadratic frame of the painting is thus not simply a *parergon*, an ornamental accessory or embellishment. It provides the framework for the lines of perspective, in the process creating, as Jacques Derrida has shown, the means by which the work of art is set apart, as representation, from the world that it presents.

Alberti was not just a cartographer; he was also a painter and architect (like his friend Filippo Brunelleschi, from whom he learnt the technique of perspective drawing), and he was deeply concerned with the importance of geometry. “It would please me”, he wrote, “if the painter were as learned as possible in all the liberal arts, but first of all I desire that he know geometry.” Geometry, to the neo-Platonists of Renaissance Italy, provided a means of expressing the archetypal Platonic ideas. “For Plato,” the art historian E. H. Gombrich writes, “the universal is the idea, the perfect pattern of the tree exists somewhere in a place beyond the heavens, or, to use the technical term, in the intelligible world.” He continues:

Individual trees or horses or men, such as the painter may encounter in real life, are only imperfect copies of those eternal patterns … It was on these grounds that Plato himself denied art its validity, for what value can there be in copying an imperfect copy of the idea? But on the same grounds, Neoplatonism tried to assign to art a new place that was eagerly seized upon by the emerging academies. It is just the point, they argued, that the painter, unlike ordinary mortals, is a person endowed with the divine gift of perceiving, not the imperfect and shifting world of individuals, but the external patterns themselves. He must purify the world of matter, erase its flaws, and approximate it to the idea. He is aided in this by the knowledge of the laws of beauty, which are those of harmonious simple geometrical relations, and by the study of those antiques that already represent reality ‘idealized’, i.e. approximated to the Platonic idea.

According to the literary theorist J. Hillis Miller, the word ‘idea’

comes from the Greek *idein*, to see. An idea was a visual image, the image something made on our eyes and therefore on our power of seeing … But for Plato, the priority of things over its idea was reversed. The idea came to be ‘seen’ (in the sense of ‘conceived’) as the origin of the thing, its archetype or celestial model, therefore as invisible.

The invisible lines of perspective that structured the perspective drawing of an artwork, or the painted backdrop of stage scenery, which focused upon the eye of the beholder, could thus be seen to represent abstract Platonic ideas, and ideals. They thereby gave order and meaning to the image of the material world represented on the surface of a painting – perspective painting thus represented a Platonic perspective on the land. The material objectification of a Christian version of this ideal is made manifest, for example, in the popular Italian Renaissance paintings of the Annunciation, in which the idea of the incarnation of the godhead in the material body of Christ as an earthly being is depicted in scenes where the announcing archangel and Mary frame a space in which the eye is drawn out into the material world by invisible geometric lines of perspective that penetrate and structure an idealized pastoral nature. Seeing was believing.

Perspective scenery came to play an important role in an elite form of theatre that emerged in the Renaissance, the *masque*, with evident reference to the Greek theatrical
use of masks in *prosopopeia*, “meaning the ascription of a voice or a face to the absent, the inanimate, or the dead". The mask, as used in Greek theatre, or in medieval seasonal rituals such as carnival or theatre, was worn by individual performers who interacted with a surrounding public. The masque performed in the new Renaissance perspectivistic theatre, framed by the proscenium arch, did not necessarily require the individual actors to wear masks, however, because the entire stage functioned as a mask for the representation of the landscape of the state. The mask, when expressed in perspective scenery, provided a means of representing to the eye a visualization of the invisible – and hence absent – idea of the state. As the French philosopher Régis Debray remarked, because nobody has ever either seen or heard a state, a state must, at any price, make itself visible and let itself be heard: “It is the theatre of the state which creates the state, just as the monument creates memory.” The architect of the stage and its scenery thus emulated the supreme architect (God) in creating the theatre of state, through which the monarch, as head of state, speaks through the masks of those who work and speak for the state.

In the Renaissance masque the land as polity is reified as the material scenic groundwork upon which the edifice of the state as an absolutist national unity is built, and the parliament is marginalized, if not abolished. Land becomes one with the physical property of the state, and with those who serve its political estate and hold a share in that property. Landscape as scenery thus provides a means of masking and envisioning the land as a national territorial unity, its boundaries (rather than its parliament) defining its state. The landscape scene, however, both objectifies the abstract ideas behind the state and simultaneously masks them behind the aesthetic form of the ideal national image it presents to the public. In this way ideas can become ideology, in the sense of false consciousness. Thus, when such landscape representations are conflated with the object represented (“This is a pipe landscape”) the abstract and essential nature, state or constitution of the land, symbolized in the representation, becomes reified as scenery, giving birth to essentialism, and to the ideologized landscape. A staged landscape scene might thus signal an ideal national peace and harmony, but it may also conceal the oppression of an extremely hierarchical society under the supervision of a surveillant state. It becomes even more difficult to penetrate the mask when these staged representations of an ideal landscape are used to model the transformation of actual physical environments outside the theatre, as was the case with British landscape gardens.

**Enclosing landscape**

Perspective landscape representation, and the cartographic techniques upon which it was based, not only provided a means of demarcating the land of the Renaissance state in terms of its physical property. It also provided a means of subdividing that land into smaller properties under the control of a propertied class or estate. The art historian Samuel Edgerton argues that the use of surveying and maps to demarcate geometrically measurable parcels of private property fitted in well with the growing mercantile economy.
of the age, as did the use of the same techniques to visualize and objectify the land as scenery.\textsuperscript{41} In such an economy, the abstraction of money reduced the exchange value of goods to the measure of a monetary-economic common denominator, measured according to the physical common denominator of an abstract unit of weight or space (as in the case of land) which was quite different from the equivalency of use values that characterized barter. The continuing erosion of medieval strictures against the alienation and sale of land made it possible, in practice, to transform land into property, even if this violated mores sanctioned by ancient custom.\textsuperscript{42} Cosgrove’s work on the relationship between the emerging graphic techniques of landscape representation and cartography and the transformation of the Venetian \textit{terra firma} is illustrative of the early connection between the origins of the idea of landscape as scenery and the desire to enclose and transform land as property.\textsuperscript{43} This geometric ideal, furthermore, continued to inform the ideology of enclosure. For the thinkers of the Enlightenment, writes Basil Willey, “The laws of nature are the laws of reason; they are always and everywhere the same, and like the axioms of mathematics they have only to be presented in order to be acknowledged as just and right by all men.” The vision of an ideal state of nature constituted by these laws was used in the eighteenth century “as a means whereby the new ruling classes could vindicate, against the surviving restraints of the old feudal and ecclesiastical order, their cherished rights of individual freedom and of property”.\textsuperscript{44}

One consequence of enclosure was that land that might previously have been held in common was alienated from the commoners, becoming something that belonged to individuals as property over which the owner had exclusive rights. The transformation of land into private property was also alienating in the psychological and social sense, particularly for the poor, whose rights in common land disappeared when that land was enclosed. This not only reduced their resource base, leaving them much more dependent upon the property owners, it also estranged them from their sense of having a place in the land as a polity. This is well illustrated in John Barrell’s classic study of the relation between enclosure, the idea of landscape as scenery, and the estrangement and madness experienced by the early nineteenth-century English agricultural labourer and poet John Clare.\textsuperscript{45}

In Clare’s day, the land was not merely transformed into private property, to be exploited for agricultural “improvement,”; it was also transformed into vast pastoral pleasure parks, ideologically shaped to resemble an idealized commons, while, at the same time obliterating “real” (in law) working commons.\textsuperscript{46} In this way the representation of ideas of the ideal nature of the land in landscape art and gardening, in the Renaissance Italian tradition, creates an ideological landscape which is doubly alienating to those, like Clare, whose lives are attached to the working pastoral landscape. The social reality defined by shared rights in land is here transformed into private realty and its accompanying scenic landscape backdrop. “Land” and “place” became equated with “propriety” – meaning in seventeenth-century English both \textit{property} and \textit{knewing one’s place}.\textsuperscript{47} Whereas the term \textit{estate} had once referred to one’s place in the polity, landed property itself now became known as an \textit{estate}, the seat of one’s status in the countryside and nation; one’s place in the country was thus effec-
tively defined in terms of the possession of a country place. Those to whom property did not belong thus tended to be disenfranchised as citizens, as with regard (for example) to participation in representative legal bodies. They were thereby largely estranged from the democratizing process that swept through nineteenth-century Europe, and excluded from the sense of identity engendered by participation in this process. The solution for many workers was to seek to reclaim their rights in the land.

**Representing commons landscapes as public parks**

Long after enclosure, the idea of common land tended to carry symbolic meanings that drew upon earlier notions of shared resources and regulatory regimes expressing participatory forms of governance rooted in custom. Examples of this kind abound in Western society. In Copenhagen, as in many European cities, the workers active in the labour movement parade through the streets on the first of May. Many bear budding branches reminiscent of folk rites of spring, and all finally congregate at a park called ‘The Commons Park’ (*Fælledparken*) (Figure 3). In the late nineteenth century, when the labour movement began, this place was not the manicured park that it is today, but a shaggy commons, and it is likely that many of the workers, fresh from the countryside, would have had memories of socially levelling, carnivalesque rural spring festivities held on a local commons. Initially, government troops were mobilized to disperse the workers, and the latter had to fight to win the right to meet on the commons.

The British agitation for access to the country, which took place during the first decades of the twentieth century, was often spearheaded by leaders of the labour movement who expounded on the working class’s unjust loss of rural rights in the land to workers who may well have known rural life first-hand. An example of this was the famous 1932 mass trespass of the Kinder Scout moorlands adjacent to the village of Hayfield, organized by the Manchester Area committee of the British Workers’ Sports Federation. The high point of the trespass occurred when its secretary, Benny Rothman, climbed up on a ledge and made a rousing speech outlining “the history of the injustice of enclosures, which had stolen Common Land from the people” (Figure 4). After the trespass Rothman was arrested; the court, it turned out, did not share his beliefs concerning “the rights of ordinary people to walk on land stolen from them in earlier times”, and he was sentenced to four months in jail. The Kinder Scout trespass set a precedent for a series of demonstrations and trespasses in the same year, such as the demonstration at Winnats Pass, Castleton, which was held on 26 June and reportedly attracted 10,000 ramblers, and a trespass along Stage Edge on 16 October, which was broken up by mounted police and foot patrols with Alsatian dogs. This movement countered contemporaneous right-wing ‘back to the land’ movements with a nationalist cast, for which the issue was blood and soil rather than class. The mass trespasses led by the leaders of the labour movement were a deliberate attempt to regain what was believed to be ancient customary rights of commons. This movement was as much about enfranchisement in a country long dominated by the propertied classes as it was about the desire for physical exercise on often cold, windy, damp
and soggy moorlands. This movement, though controversial, mobilized a political clout which was to achieve the establishment of national parks in Britain. The movement, however, was broader than this, and it also included less radical organizations, such as Lord Eversley’s Commons, Forests and Footpaths Society (now known as the Open Spaces Society), which were able to effectively use English common law to argue for the preservation of common land as parks, particularly in urban areas. A contemporary visitor to many of England’s city parks is likely to forget that these places were once working commons; but the idea that cities and nations ought to have shared landscapes, to which the larger citizenry has rights of access, springs from a long heritage of ideas rooted in shared rights to common land. A park of this kind is a far cry from the private landscape parks created by estate owners on what was often enclosed common land.

The landscape of alienation

Alienation has here been discussed in terms of its substantive historical meaning: the transferral of ownership of rights in the land/property, and the loss of rights which
effectively makes one an alien, or foreigner, in the land. Alienation, however, is also a philosophical concept, with implications for the analysis of the historical role of landscape representation. Alienation is a vital theme in the tradition of the early nineteenth-century idealist philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, in which the material being of humankind is seen to be foreign (or alien) to the ideal natural realm of pure ideas; and a century later it was revived again as a central philosophical concept. I will largely take my point of departure in the influential work of the literary scholar and philosopher Georg Lukács, who helped spark the renewed twentieth-century interest in alienation, and whose ideas are of clear relevance to the analysis of landscape presented here.

Alienation is implied in Platonism, where the ideal realm is identified with the archetypal geometric forms linked to astronomy and the elevated utopian nature of the heavens. The Christian neo-Platonist artists of the Italian Renaissance brought this realm down to earth by using geometry as an invisible framework through which to create a scenic objective space in which the ideal is made visible by the lines of perspective focusing on the eye. Visual space distances the viewer from the ideal scene, while simultaneously creating an image of a tantalizingly objective utopian ideal. It was this utopian expression of the ideal nature, state or constitution of the land that Renaissance architects sought to realize in their geometric city plans, and in their mapping and

FIGURE 4  Scene of the 1932 ‘Kinder trespass’, in which labourers demonstrated for the right of access to the English open countryside. (Photograph by author.)
landscaping of the countryside into regular geometric parcels. Though the use of cartography to survey the land as alienable property is identifiable with the new mercantile spirit of the Renaissance city, it also has a long idealistic heritage. This is because the alienation of land was initially encouraged by the Church, the keeper of Roman legal tradition, with its concept of possessio in relation to land as property.\(^{58}\)

The alienation of land, though in violation of custom, provided a means of facilitating the transferral of the possession of land to the Church as a gift to an unworldly God, thereby providing a means to buy entrance to the heavenly realm and an exit from the material world and body. The alienation of land thus provided a means of countering alienation from God, one of the earliest uses of the word alienation.\(^ {59}\)

The dialectical process whereby the painting of landscape scenery distances the viewer from the natural, while simultaneously making possible the perception of the land as nature, is well described in a passage from George Lukács' *History and class consciousness*, which draws its inspiration from an unnamed work by the philosopher Ernst Bloch:

> When nature becomes landscape – e.g. in contrast to the peasant's unconscious living within nature – the artist's unmediated experience of the landscape (which has of course only achieved this immediacy after undergoing a whole series of mediations) presupposes a distance (spatial in this case) between the observer and the landscape, for were this not the case it would not be possible for nature to become a landscape at all. If he were to attempt to integrate himself and the nature immediately surrounding him in space within “nature-seen-as-landscape”, without modifying his aesthetic contemplative immediacy, it would then at once become apparent that landscape only starts to become landscape at a definite (though of course variable) distance from the observer and that only as an observer set apart in space can he relate to nature in terms of landscape at all.\(^ {60}\)

The objectified representation of landscape achieved by the artist is dependent, in Lukács' view, upon the alienating effect of distance. Lukács perceives such alienation as a historically positive force in the philosophical tradition of Hegel. In this tradition the subject–object unity of (in this case) the peasant’s unconscious living within nature is replaced by an antithetical distancing, through which the nature of the land is separated and alienated from the perceiving subject. It is through this process that the perceiving subject becomes aware of its nature as a subject, and thereby is gradually able to establish its ideal human nature as a reflective thinking being. The historical result of this process is thus the reversal of the original situation in which there is a subject–object unity, dominated by an unconscious living within nature. At the end of this dialectical process alienation is abolished, and there is “the return of self-consciousness to itself, thus realizing the identical subject object”.\(^ {54}\) In *History and class consciousness* Lukács sought, in the fashion of the young Marx, to ‘stand Hegel on his feet’ not by emphasizing the realm of the mind, as with Hegel, but by focusing on the sociohistorical process that “culminates when the proletariat reaches this stage [i.e. the return of self-consciousness to itself] in its class consciousness”.\(^ {62}\)

*History and class consciousness*, first published in 1922, influenced many Marxists, while helping to stimulate a more general revival of philosophical interest in alienation that involved a variety of philosophies, that Lukács himself questioned, including the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. The
philosophical discourse on alienation has subsequently had an important impact on the
approach to landscape in geography, ranging from the phenomenology-inspired insider–outsider dialectic explored by Edward Relph to the Marxist analysis of the duplicity of landscape in a classic article by Stephen Daniels.63 Daniels' article in turn is inspired by a passage in a novel called Border country by Raymond Williams, an admirer of Lukács. In the novel the central figure, who resembles Williams himself, returns home after spending years in London to discover that the place of his childhood has become, for him, a landscape scene of a living world from which he has become alienated. This is described in a passage which reads as if it could have been inspired by Lukács' statement on landscape quoted above:

It was one thing to carry its image in his mind, as he did, everywhere, never a day passing but he closed his eyes and saw it again, his only landscape. But it was different to stand and look at the reality. It was not less beautiful; every detail of the land came up with its old excitement. But it was not still, as the image had been. It was no longer a landscape or a view, but a valley that people were using. He realized as he watched, what had happened in going away. The valley as landscape had been taken, but its work forgotten. The visitor sees beauty: the inhabitant a place where he works and has friends. Far away, closing his eyes, he had been seeing this valley, but as a visitor sees it, as the guide book sees it: this valley, in which he had lived more than half his life.64

The role of landscape representation in objectifying and distancing people from their environment is alienating when seen from both the Hegelian and the Lukácsian perspectives; and in both cases alienation helps liberate (albeit in different ways) the subject from a state of subject–object identity. This dialectic, in either case, has the negation of alienation as the teleological movement of history. For Hegel and Lukács this negation is progressivist, its ideal lying in a future “return of self-consciousness to itself”. Such a dialectic, however, can also lead to an idealization of the primitive condition of subject–object identity that precedes alienation. Tim Ingold, whose notion of landscape is rooted in archaeological and anthropological study, fits this latter mould. He criticizes the insider–outsider dualism prompted by the understanding of landscape as representation, and rejects the very “distinction between inner and outer worlds – respectively of mind and matter, meaning and substance”. For him the experience of landscape effectively abolishes alienation because ‘as the familiar domain of our dwelling’, landscape “is with us not against us, just as we are part of it”.65 Ingold would thus reverse the Hegelian historical dialectic, by returning us to the identical subject–object relation expressed by the peasant’s unconscious living within nature in the Heideggerian mould (albeit minus Heidegger’s above-mentioned concern with the res publica).66 There is now a growing literature on the phenomenology of landscape inspired by Ingold and Heidegger.67

The phenomenological literature on alienation that History and Class Consciousness helped inspire – whether or not Lukács himself approved – is clearly still very much with us. For this reason it is interesting to examine Lukács’ later critique of his own use of the concept of alienation in the 1967 preface to a new 1968 German edition of History and class consciousness – which in turn formed the basis for the English translation used here.
Alienation revisited

Lukács, anno 1967, rejected his early interpretation of alienation within a Hegelian frame:

the proletariat seen as the identical subject-object of the real history of mankind is no materialist consumption that overcomes the constructions of idealism. It is rather an attempt to out-Hegel Hegel, it is an edifice boldly erected above every possible reality and thus attempts objectively to surpass the Master himself.68

Lukács argues that “even when the content of knowledge is referred back to the knowing subject, this does not mean that the act of cognition is thereby freed of its alienated nature”.69 Such an idea belongs rightfully to the realm of a mystical romanticism or, in his own case, to his youthful “messianic utopianism”.70 And he is equally critical of existential phenomenology’s sublimation of “a critique of society into a purely philosophical problem, i.e. to convert an essentially social alienation into an eternal “condition humaine””.71

“Objectification”, Lukács concludes some 45 years after first publishing History and class consciousness, is

a phenomenon that cannot be eliminated from human life in society. If we bear in mind that every externalization of an object in practice (and hence, too, in work) is an objectification, that every human expression including speech objectifies human thoughts and feelings, then it is clear that we are dealing with a universal mode of commerce between men.72

This means that even peasants and herdiers objectify and reflect on the land as landscape, and thus do not exist in an “unconscious living within nature”. Alienation comes about not through objectification in and of itself, but through the “repressive social conditions” (which can derive from objectification) that, according to Lukács, generate “the subjective marks of an internal alienation.73

Since objectification must be distinguished from alienation, it therefore must also be distinguished from the related notion of reification, and hence the fetishization of land, and other things, as commodities.74 As Lukács puts it, citing Marx,

private property alienates not only the individuality of men, but also of things. The ground and the earth have nothing to do with profit…[Profit is] a quality which the ground can lose without losing any of its inherent qualities such as its fertility.75

This has implications for the understanding of alienation in its literal sense, as related to the alienation of land. When the land is commodified as property and landscape scenery, it is reduced to a physical thing, material land (reification literally means ‘thingification’), and is estranged from its substantive social meaning, the land of a people as res publica. “Substantive”, as noted earlier, is used here to mean real rather than apparent, belonging to the substance of a thing as used in the legal sense of creating and defining rights and duties.76 In this sense the real is defined in terms of the things in law, realis, which determine what is real in a social and political context. Alienation means, in this context, the loss of the real through the reification of the rights in land that are the foundation of the res publica. Power then springs from the statutory

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right of property as a thing, rather than from the customary right of use that defines things in law, and thus the real. In this way the meaning of the real is reified, and the concept of the thing, as it defines the res publica, is itself thereby reified and alienated.

Conclusion

It is useful, following Lukács, to distinguish alienation from objectification as it occurs through representation. The transformation of common land into private property through enclosure is a process (as John Barrell has shown with reference to the poetry of John Clare) which can generate the subjective marks of an internal alienation. For Barrell’s Clare, as for Marx (as quoted above), “private property alienates not only the individuality of men, but also of things”. Clare objectifies the land through his practice of exercising his customary rights to the commons, and through his representation, and hence objectification, of that land in his poetry. This, however, is not the source of his alienation (though it may be fuelled by his alienation). The source of his alienation is the loss, shared by many other commoners, of rights in the commons through its enclosure as private property, and its reification as the scenic backdrop, and ideological mask, for the doings of the propertied class.

Enclosure, when viewed as a progressive process by which rural workers, exiled to city factories, eventually become alienated to the inevitable point at which they can reach the ideal stage of “the return of self-consciousness to itself”, is an example of “imperial landscape”. The vision of the imperial landscape has been a driving force in the dialectical ideology of a “progressive” modernity that has sought, throughout the world, to reduce the living and changing social and legal force of custom to picturesque tradition and costume, and thereafter obliterate it, often with disastrous social and ecological consequences. Enclosure thus often went hand in hand with the construction of parks which transformed working commons (shaped by practice and custom) into ideal pastoral landscape scenes, while literally alienating the commoners from the land. In this way the substantive landscape, to which people become attached through working practice, is reduced to an esthetic and edifying artwork, legitimating the surveyed and planned space of the propertied. Imperial landscape is a creature of the dialectical ideology that posits alienation as the driving force of a particular notion of progress that justifies the fate of people like Clare by making social and material loss the source of economic and spiritual liberation. But workers are also actors in their own social history, and they need not accept such alienation as the prerequisite of progress.

A later generation of British labourers eventually won back some of their rights of access to the commons by exercising their perceived customary rights in trespassing upon the land of property owners. In the process of doing this they no doubt gained insight into their abilities to act as the subjects of their own destiny as members of the labour movement – but this was not in fulfilment of historical teleology of the Hegelian or utopian sort. The ramblers’ movement, and the concomitant establishment
of national parks, has been socially empowering rather than alienating, down-to-earth and “topian”, rather than utopian.81

There is no doubt that the landscape duality and “duplicity”, captured by Magritte, Daniels and Williams, is vital. Visual landscape representation does distance the viewer from the objective scene created, and it can facilitate a “treasonous” confusion between the landscape represented in the visual image, the environment to which it refers, and the ideas it concretizes. But this objectifying distancing is not alienating in and of itself. With objectification, as Lukács points out, “we are dealing with a universal mode of commerce between men”. Alienation enters the scene because landscape is not simply scenery; it is also a substantive political landscape. In Williams’s case, it is significant that the figure in the novel who experiences the alienation from the working land represented by landscape scenery is a person who, like Williams himself, has moved to England from the “border country” of his native Wales, a country which has been socially and politically subjugated to England for centuries. Landscape, in the substantive sense, is not just an idealized cultural image. It is also an arena for labour, social practice and speech and text, in which every externalization of an object in practice (and hence, too, in work) is an objectification of human thoughts and feelings – a political landscape. The political or artistic representation of the abstract nature, state or constitution(-ship) of the land, as well as the reflexive critique of such representation, is not fundamentally alienating, but empowering, as it can facilitate an understanding of the social processes by which the land has been shaped, and can be shaped.82

Notes


Ibid., *belong*.

The word *fellow* derives, the dictionary tells us, from the ‘Old Norse *felagi*, from *fe* cattle, sheep, money + *-lagi* (akin to Old Norse *leggja* to lay) – more at FEE, LAY’. A *lag* was, and still is in modern Scandinavian, an organization such as a team, partnership or a guild. A fellow would thus appear to be a partner in a community of shepherds engaged in the laying (out) of sheep together on land upon which the fellows would have had customary rights in common. Grazing, in ancient times in Europe, as in much of the present-day developing world, functioned as a form of capital, and payment in kind could be based on the standard unit of a sheep or cow, which is why the dictionary tells us that *fe* means cattle, sheep and ‘money’. To this day, in fact, a *fellowsbip* is something you use to pay your *fees* and gain access to the common resources of a university and become a fellow of a college (with the jolly good right to walk on the commons). The concrete material activity of grazing animals in common, when suffixed by *-sbip*, then generates the more abstract notion of *fellowsbip* that, in turn, is vital to the functioning of a commonwealth or land, just as the notion of rights in the commons lays the basis for representative collective institutions such as the English House of Commons.

Merriam-Webster lists ‘nature, condition and quality’ as synonyms of the Germanic etymological roots of *-sbip*, stating that these are etymologically ‘akin to Old English *sceppan*, *scyppan*, meaning to shape’, referring the reader to SHAPE for more information. Under the body of the definition of *-sbip* it lists meanings such as ‘state, condition, quality, art and skill’. It also refers the reader to *-sbip* for the meaning of the suffix *-scape in landscape*.

Ibid., *landscape, -sbip*.


Ibid., p. 176.

Merriam-Webster, *real*.


The term *habitus* is largely identified with the theory of the French sociologist/anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu, from whom it has been borrowed by the historian E.P. Thompson and applied to the realm of customary law (which is also of central concern to Bourdieu). See P. Bourdieu, *Outline of a theory of practice* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 72–95; Thompson, *Customs in common*; E.P. Thompson, *Whigs and hunters: the origin of the black act* (New York, Pantheon, 1975), p. 102. The Latin term *habitus*, meaning ‘condition, appearance, attire, character, disposition, habit’, derives from *habere* meaning ‘to have, hold’ and is related to both *habitat* and *inhabit* (see Merriam-Webster: *habit, habitat*). This is thus a word with associations with a number of words relevant to the connection between custom and place attachment and, by extension, *alienation*. 

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21 Olwig, ‘Recovering the substantive nature of landscape’.

22 Cosgrove, *Social formation and symbolic landscape*, p. 9.


24 M. Foucault, *Dette er ikke en pibe* (Copenhagen, Reitzels, 1998 (orig. 1973)).


35 Miller, *Topographies*, p. 12. I am indebted to Jakob Stougaard-Nielsen, of the University of Washington, Seattle, for pointing me to the work of Miller, and helping me to clarify my ideas on this matter.


37 Olwig, *Landscape, nature and the body politic*, ch. 3.


49 On the levelling practices associated with carnival, see M. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and his world*. On levelling Danish springtime festivities, see B. Hansen, *Fester for sommerens komme: optegnelser i dansk folkemindesamling*, ed. C. Bregenhøj (Copenhagen, Foreningen Danmarks Folkeminder, 1980).


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68 Lukács, History and class consciousness, p. xxiii.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., pp. xviii, xxvii.

71 Ibid., p. xxiv.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Lefebvre, Le marxisme, ch. 2; Lukács, History and class consciousness, pp. xxiv–xxv; Mészáros, Marx’s theory of alienation, p. 117.

75 Lukács, History and class consciousness, p. 92.

76 See note 6 above.

77 Barrell, The idea of landscape and the sense of place.


79 J.C. Scott, Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1998).


81 Darby, Landscape and identity.

82 I would like to thank the then editor, Don Mitchell, for browbeating me into foregrounding the meaning of alienation in this essay – alienation has indeed been the missing link in my analysis of landscape, mea culpa.