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Kastoryano, Riva

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enough multiculturalism in the Netherlands. The lesson could just as well be that the combination of enforced cultural assimilation, as is the course the Dutch have taken since the rise and fall of Pim Fortuyn in 2002, and malign neglect in the socioeconomic sphere are a sure recipe for Islamic radicalization.

References

EWALD ENGELEN is Associate Professor at AMIDSt at the University of Amsterdam. Address: Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130 1018 VZ, Amsterdam. [email: e.r.engeelen@uva.nl]

Contested Citizenship

RIVA KASTORYANO
*Center for International Studies and Research, Paris*

This book is a systematic and solid cross-national comparative analysis in the domain of immigration, integration and cultural diversity. Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy (hereinafter KSGP) have brought together their data (collected in France, Germany, Netherlands, UK and Switzerland), and their reflections on issues related to citizenship, nationalism, post-nationalism and transnationalism. Brubaker’s typology of citizenship and
nationhood where civic and territorial membership is opposed to an ethno-cultural one is the analytical basis for this comparative research (1992). KSGP, however, aim to elaborate a broader theoretical framework by including immigrants’ claims. The main argument is that cross-national variations depend primarily on the different conceptions of national identity, in other words, the ways in which (nation) states and their understanding of membership play a role in the integration of immigrants and in the formulation of their claims. While Brubaker focused on individual access to citizenship, KSGP are equally interested in cultural group rights as the locus of debates on multiculturalism, so the combination leads to a new typology such as, for example, ethnic vs. civic distinction combined with multicultural vs. ‘assimilationist’. KSGP propose a conception of citizenship as a ‘conceptual and political space with different actors, which includes nation-states and sub-national actors’. This leads to three types of citizenship regimes: ‘ethnic or exclusive’, ‘assimilationist and republican’, and ‘multiculturalist’.

The institutional and discursive opportunity structure as a framework of analysis allows KSGP to highlight the mobilization of collective actors and their influence on decision-making processes: institutional structures affect their claims for equal citizenship, for cultural rights, the fight against racism, and gives a legitimacy to their demands, while discursive opportunity structures (public speeches, events, publicity and media) facilitate the visibility of both actors and claims in the public arena, which in return affects political decisions. *Contested Citizenship* considers the interaction between these two structures, and shows how institutional and discursive structures shape political contention on integration and cultural diversity, and redefine citizenship. The objective is not necessarily to explain the evolution over time but to underline the dynamics that makes each case specific. Key theoretical positions such as multiculturalism, postnationalism and transnationalism are examined within this framework.

As a method, the authors have chosen a ‘content analysis’ of daily newspapers in five countries in order to explore the political claims made in the public sphere as well as protests and speeches. The political opportunity structure is combined with social movement and collective action analysis. While data on protest would allow the authors to measure a social movement from collective claims, political discourses reported in the newspapers are, according to the authors, a way of asserting the visibility of the claims and the ‘challenges [to] the dominant cultural and political norms’. These sophisticated combinations of analytical frameworks and the collected data make *Contested Citizenship* a book rich in ideas, analysis and approaches, and also an important source for discussing methods and concepts.

I have, however, several methodological concerns. First, are newspaper reports enough for the analysis of such an important and sensitive topic?
Obviously newspapers report on the most visible events, on violence, on what is controversial in terms of the national ideology. For example, they highlight claims around religion in secular societies and focus on Islam perceived as a ‘permanent difference’. The media have a selection bias, though, and the power to make their stories the dominant discourses. They create what we think we know, especially where we do not have direct experience, for example, our perceptions of migrants and Islam. The media reproduce the official rhetoric and report the facts that confirm its validity. Universalism, republicanism and egalitarianism are the common currency in the French media – as is confirmed in this book. Although in France and Germany there are many voluntary associations that are active on the local level and play an important role in the formulation of claims and the mobilization of immigrant populations, in negotiating their collective cultural needs (the opening of a mosque, for example) and/or social rights (education) with local authorities, they are rarely present in the media. These associations are active in civil society, have questioned the dominant ideology and have shaped society without being in the public sphere as captured by the media.

Thus ‘the content analysis’ of articles in the media necessarily limits the reality of collective action, the motivation of actors, their mobilizing force, their resources and also the response from the public – immigrant or non-immigrant. Take, for example, the riots in the French suburbs that have shaken French society and beyond, alerting the international public to the problems that France is facing with regard to cultural diversity. In reality, the riots were not a new phenomena, it was just that those of autumn of 2005 lasted longer and were on the front page of the media. French public opinion was used to attributing such scenes to the black ghettos of big American cities, because of the discriminatory and segregationist policies attributed to the ‘American model’. According to the permanent official rhetoric of France as a universalistic, republican and egalitarian society, such a situation was inconceivable: at least, it would not be a structural characteristic of French society. This despite the fact that for more than 20 years, social questions raised by immigration, rather by the settlement of the immigrants of the 1960s, have been crystallized in the banlieues (suburbs), and have been backed up by research on cities, housing policy or by community studies since the 1980s. Yet the banlieues only attract the media’s attention when the problems can be sensationalized, as in the successive headscarf affairs, which mainly concern schools in the banlieues. Then the role the media takes on is that of warning the political class and the public generally about Muslim communautarianism, to ring the alarm bells for the republican ideology and the principles of the laïcité (secularism). Paradoxically, in the riots of 2005, what was at stake was the social and cultural exclusion of the youth of the banlieues and their collective claim was to demand an alignment between the Republican rhetoric and the
social reality. The young generation of Maghrebian and African origins brandished their French identity cards and claimed their Frenchness, by birth, by culture, by right, and rebuked France for failing to live up to its principles. While this was based on social reality, the France known to the newspapers was that of a society facing various Islamic challenges.

My methodological concerns are not confined to the reliance on the media but extend to concepts such as ‘social movement’. The concept seems to lack a clear definition. Charles Tilly, for example, defines social movements ‘as a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people made collective claims on others’ (Tilly, 1993). For the French sociologist, Alain Touraine, a social movement is a movement of protest, contestation and a way of orienting society (Tilly 1993). These abstract visions raise the question of how to measure the outcomes of social movements: effect on social policy, incorporating a larger part of the population beyond the group itself, a collective benefit for the society? KSGP analyse the Extreme Right as a social movement, as a new national configuration in which ethno-national xenophobic claims are expressed and activists situated within certain institutional and discursive structures develop an action repertoire and a specific understanding of nationhood. Yet, in the case of the cultural claims of Muslim immigrants what is at stake is the conceptual change in liberal democracies that consider the recognition of cultural rights, with Islam – a religious collective identity – at the core and this does not arise out of a social movement or collective action, and the social force of the claims may be underestimated if all one relied on was newspapers.

The authors show that collective claims are now part of citizenship and complementary to individual rights. They develop a set of empirical indicators for the two dimensions of citizenship – individual equality and cultural rights – and show that all European countries, or rather all liberal democracies, are moving in the same direction, even though each national model is specific and distinctive. The convergence among countries that have a different understanding of individual and collective rights, in their tendency towards a distinctive national politics of recognition, has led the authors, like many other scholars to question the relevance of transnational and/or postnational membership. It has been argued that new political opportunity structures, like supranational institutions, have been offered to immigrants or to Europeans as a whole to make collective claims in the field of immigration politics, to fight against expulsion, and fight against racism (Guiraudon, 2005). These institutions are beyond national institutional structures and induce individuals to bypass national frameworks for their collective actions. Based on their comparative empirical research, KSGP conclude that postnational claims are marginal; in the majority of cases claim makers are firmly situated within the national context of the country of settlement. Moreover, they argue that ‘such claims beyond the
nation-state were found to be generally less supportive of immigration and migrant rights than national ones, which goes against the assumed benevolence of supra and transnational arenas relative to national ones’ (p. 337). Supranationality is not replacing a national basis for claim making, but KSGP do not recognize that, as a matter of fact, supranational institutions are setting norms for states, norms that are also internalized by claim makers and used in the formulation of their claims against the state. The authors appreciate that transnational networks and ties with the homeland are part of immigrants’ social organization, but show that citizenship regimes affect the degree to which certain group identities make homeland-oriented politics possible and argue that an inclusive regime (France) limits, while colonial (Great Britain) and gastarbeiter (foreign worker) regimes (Germany and Switzerland) encourage homeland politics. Nevertheless, at the same time, their empirical study emphasizes that some groups are more oriented towards building transnational networks than others, such as the Kurds and Turks, and regardless of the country of settlement, even though it may be the case that transnational organizations, like supranational institutions, remain a reference-point in negotiating their claims and citizenship with the country of settlement.

So, rights are negotiated with national states but ‘postnational’ membership is a normative perspective for collective (as well as individual) rights. True, claims are formulated in relation to national policies, to national understanding of integration and in relation to national principles of statehood and nationhood, but they do not merely reproduce an existing national self-understanding and framework. In my book, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (2002) – interestingly ignored in Contested Citizenship – I show precisely how states (institutional structures that have their own internal logic that influences actors) and national rhetoric affect identities around which communities are formed and become legitimate basis for claim and recognition. Yet migrants’ claims change policies with regard to immigration, integration and citizenship, and lead the states to negotiate what will become, through these interactions, the core element of the national self. National models remain as rhetoric but, interactions between states and immigrants’ claims formulated in relation to state’s legitimacy bring a new dynamic to the understanding of citizenship and of nationhood. Claims in France, for example, contrary to the results in Contested Citizenship, which argues that they are made ‘in terms of social equality regardless of origin’, focus also on the collective recognition and representation of Islam in public institutions, which in return questions the definition and the limits of the laïcité and of citizenship.

In different ways, all European countries are facing the principle, the politics and/or the reality of multiculturalism – the second important issue addressed in this book. The authors use the term ‘multiculturalism’ to refer ‘to immigrants’ particularist group demands’, in this way keeping
themselves away from normative evaluations of this controversial concept. They affirm that in western European countries, the ‘liberal dilemma’ has been over ‘multiculturalism and Islam’. To respond to this dilemma, KSGP propose an empirical investigation by taking into consideration group demands that go beyond rights of citizenship, on the one hand, and demands that require accommodation by the state on the other. Their research in three countries (Netherlands, Britain and France) shows that for 53 percent in France, 61 percent in Britain and 60 percent in the Netherlands, collective identities are expressed in religious terms and ‘group demands are made through one religious self-identifications, i.e. Muslims’ (p. 154).

Comparative to other religions – Jews, Hindus – the authors highlight the ‘Muslim exceptionalism’ in group demands, which according to them is because of the nature of Islam and its understanding of private and public.

Other studies too have put Islam at the core of the question of recognition (Modood and Kastoryano, 2006; Parekh, 2006). For them, the normative issue is the equal recognition of all religions within the existing institutional settings. These approaches put the onus on the secular and liberal state either to reshape its institutions in order to include Islam into the general framework of recognition. ‘The “deficit” then does not lie in Islam, or solely in Islam, but in the British conception of race relations’ (Modood, 2005), or in an inflexible ideology of laïcité as a reaction to collective claims around Islam (Kastoryano, 2002).

The organization of Islam in France, for example, is a response to the ‘institutional structure’ that exists and would give to Islam – within the framework of CFCM – the French Council for Muslim Worship (not mentioned in the book) – the legitimacy of collective claims, a legitimacy rooted in the definition of laïcité itself. From a normative perspective, such an ‘institutional assimilation’ can lead to an identification with the state institutions and be considered as the post-multiculturalist approach where collective identities are part of a de facto religiously pluralist society.

References


Contested Citizenship: False Claims and ‘Double Dutch’

A reply

PAUL STATHAM

University of Bristol, UK

Having been central to the research programme that culminated in this publication for more than a decade, I think I have pretty much heard every objection to approach and method that it’s been possible to hear. Indeed, responding to criticisms contributed to refining and developing our perspective, which is how the academy ought to work. Other reviews for Contested Citizenship engage in a way that critically unpacks the book’s contributions and arguments, and offer alternative viewpoints and critical commentary with regard to key issues. By contrast, the reviews of Engelen and Kastoryano, are strewn with factual errors and misrepresentations. Disappointingly, our book simply serves as a vehicle for them to assert their own opinions on pet topics.

It would be tiresome to go through systematically and correct the factual mistakes and misrepresentations of our study. An edited highlights includes: Engelen saying that we find more cultural group rights demands in the Netherlands and the UK than France, whereas the whole point of Chapter 4 is the reverse, that they are equally (and unexpectedly for institutional channelling approaches including our own past research) present also in France. Kastoryano fails to notice that our two-by-two diagram (p. 10) for