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‘Second-order’ versus ‘Issue-voting’ Effects in EU Referendums

Evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty Referendums

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ABSTRACT

Are referendums on EU treaties decided by voters’ attitudes to Europe (the ‘issue-voting’ explanation) or by voters’ attitudes to their national political parties and incumbent national government (the ‘second-order election model’ explanation)? In one scenario, these referendums will approximate to deliberative processes that will be decided by people’s views of the merits of European integration. In the other scenario, they will be plebiscites on the performance of national governments. We test the two competing explanations of the determinants of voting in EU referendums using evidence from the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty. We find that the issue-voting model outperforms the second-order model in both referendums. However, we also find that issue-voting was particularly important in the more salient and more intense second referendum. Most strikingly, attitudes to EU enlargement were much stronger predictors of vote at Nice 2 than at Nice 1. This finding about the rise in importance of attitudes to the EU points to the importance of campaigning in EU referendums.

KEY WORDS
- effective campaigning
- issue voting
- Nice Treaty
- referendums
- second-order model
Introduction

Are referendums on EU treaties decided by voters’ attitudes to Europe or by their attitudes to their national politics and to the incumbent national government? The political science literature is sharply divided on the matter. Given the raft of upcoming referendums on the EU constitution, the significance of this issue can hardly be overstated. Denmark, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom are due to hold referendums on the new EU constitution in 2005 or 2006. Referendums are also very likely to occur in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and may occur in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia.1 In one scenario, these referendums will approximate to deliberative processes that will be decided by people’s views of the merits of European integration and of the new constitution. In the other scenario, they will be plebiscites on the performance of national governments. In this paper we assess the relative strength of these two rival interpretations of voting in EU referendums: do people vote on the basis of their attitudes to the EU (what we call the ‘issue-voting’ or ‘attitudes’ explanation) or on the basis of domestic political concerns (the ‘second-order election model’ explanation)? We also assess the impact of the salience of the referendum campaign on the relative strength of these two explanations.

We focus on the referendums on the Nice Treaty in the Republic of Ireland. This is a useful case for two reasons. First, Irish citizens were the only ones who were asked what they thought about ratification of the Treaty of Nice. Thus, Ireland is the only case we can draw on relating to the most recent EU treaty. Secondly, there were two referendums on the Nice Treaty in Ireland that yielded two different results. In a referendum in 2001, Irish citizens rejected the treaty, dealing a dramatic blow to the EU’s plans. The Nice Treaty could not be implemented unless, and until, all member states ratified it. The Irish government then held a second referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2002 and this time Irish voters endorsed the treaty.2 We explore the extent to which the move from rejection to endorsement was a function of change in the relative weight of the ‘second-order’ and ‘attitudes’ factors. The first Nice Treaty referendum campaign was a classic case of an ineffective campaign, with low levels of citizen interest in, and knowledge of, the treaty. After the shock of defeat in the first Nice referendum, a much more vigorous campaign was mounted at the second referendum, with resultant increases in the salience of the issue and in citizens’ levels of information. We can thus investigate the issue we are concerned with – the relative strength of the different interpretations of voting – in two contexts that were more or less identical except for a variable of crucial interest, namely the intensity of campaigning.
We start by describing the two competing explanations of EU referendum voting in more detail. We then specify how the relative merits of these explanations can be assessed in the context of the referendum campaigns on the Nice Treaty in Ireland. After describing the data used in the analysis, we report our results. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings in the context of the impending EU referendums on the new EU constitution.

Conflicting interpretations of EU referendum voting

There are, as noted, two distinct schools of thought on why people vote the way they do in EU referendums. One school focuses on individuals’ attitudes, values and beliefs. People support or reject EU treaties, the argument goes, on the basis of their underlying broad attitudes towards the EU project. People who are generally positive towards European integration and the development of the EU will be likely to support an EU treaty and vote ‘Yes’. People who are generally sceptical about integration and the EU ‘project’ will vote ‘No’. Of course, a person’s general outlook on the EU may take somewhat different forms. Some people may worry about losing political and economic independence; others may be concerned about the possible militarization of Europe; still others may feel that the EU is big enough and should not take in a large number of additional states. Furthermore, views on the role of the government in the economy or one’s position on the social liberal–conservative dimension may influence attitudes to the EU. Whatever the particular nature of a person’s attitude to the EU, the issue-voting approach suggests that it is primarily voters’ views on the development of the EU that drive voting in a referendum on an EU treaty. (For example, on the Nordic countries, see Aardal et al., 1998. On Denmark in particular, see Siune and Svensson, 1993; Siune et al., 1994; Svennson, 1994, 2002. On the Baltic states – testing the hypothesis that authoritarian values lead people to reject membership of the EU in a referendum – see Ehin, 2001. On Norway and Britain – focusing on the relationship between economic left–right positions and support for membership – see Pierce et al., 1983.) Overall, the ‘attitudes’ approach assumes that views on the EU and/or on the substance of the treaty are the main determinants of voting behaviour in EU referendums.

A different approach to explaining voting behaviour in EU referendums focuses on concerns quite separate from the EU. This explanation is associated with the theory that certain elections are best seen as ‘second-order’ elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk et al., 1996; for a similar approach, see Anderson, 1998). ‘Second-order’ elections are elections (or, generally, electoral contests) such as local, presidential and European Parliament elections.
and referendums on EU and other matters that are not perceived by political actors – including voters – to be as important as national or general elections (which are ‘first-order’ elections). According to the theory, voting behaviour in such second-order electoral contests is heavily influenced by first-order considerations. Following this logic, voters might be expected to use second-order contests as mechanisms for signalling their support, or lack of support, for their domestic political parties and government. (On the application of the second-order model to EU referendums, see Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien, 1994; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994; Franklin et al., 1995; Franklin, 2002; Svensson, 2002; Marsh, 1998; and Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004). Voters who, for whatever reasons, are not satisfied with the performance of the incumbent government may take the opportunity to punish the government by voting against the government’s wishes in a ‘second-order’ election such as an EU referendum. Voters who are satisfied with the performance of the party (or parties) in government may vote in line with the government’s wishes (supporting the governing party, or parties, in the local election, voting ‘Yes’ in an EU referendum, etc.). Thus, an EU referendum may, in fact, be a general election by another name.

A key element of the second-order election theory relates to the notion of salience. Domestic considerations, the argument goes, will be a particularly powerful determinant of voting in situations where the election or referendum is perceived to be very unimportant. The more important the election or referendum in question is seen to be, the lower the role that will be played by domestic political (second-order) effects and the higher the role played by citizens’ attitudes towards, or views on, the EU and the substantive content of the treaty in question.

Several authors have also argued that the institutional context affects how strong second-order factors are likely to be. In a development of Schneider and Weitsman’s analysis (1996), Hug (2002) and Hug and Sciarini (2000) distinguish between a referendum that is constitutionally necessary and one that the government chooses to hold. Level of satisfaction with the incumbent government and domestic party political factors are likely to play a weaker role in the former compared with the latter. This is because much more damage can be inflicted on the government in a non-required referendum; losing a referendum that you did not have to hold in the first place makes the government look particularly silly. Hug (2002) and Hug and Sciarini (2000) also distinguish between a binding and a non-binding referendum. In relation to the former, the result cannot be overturned, whereas the parliament might possibly change the decision of a non-binding referendum. Second-order effects are likely to be stronger in non-binding than in binding referendums. This is because, in a non-binding referendum, voters
who wish to punish the incumbent government by voting against the refer-
endum can hope that, if the referendum is rejected, the outcome may then be
overturned by the parliament.

On balance, we would characterize both the Irish Nice referendums as
necessary and binding (for a discussion of the institutional context and, in
particular, of the initiation of referendums in Ireland, see Sinnott, 2002:
811–14). It may seem odd to view the first referendum as binding because it
clearly was not so, in the sense that the government did not accept the
decision as final and went on to hold a second referendum. However, it was
binding in the sense that the only way to overturn the decision was by having
another referendum. The first Nice referendum was also constitutionally
necessary in the sense that the government almost certainly would have been
brought to the High Court and forced to have a referendum if it had tried to
argue that the treaty did not have fundamental constitutional implications
and thus that a referendum was not necessary. A successful judicial challenge
of this sort had forced the government of the day to hold a referendum on
the Single European Act and this set a precedent that would apply to any
subsequent proposals for significant changes to EU treaties. The second Nice
referendum was politically necessary for two further reasons. The first was
that Irish political leaders have repeatedly committed themselves to holding
referendums on any changes that even approach the magnitude of those
contained in the Nice Treaty. Secondly, the government was under severe
pressure to hold a second referendum because the result of the first referen-
dum plunged both the accession process and Ireland’s relationship with the
EU into crisis. If Hug and Sciarini (2000) are right, then we would expect
second-order effects to be less evident in both the – necessary and binding –
Irish Nice treaty referendums. Accordingly, the Irish Nice referendums
present a tough test of the second-order election interpretation. However,
given what we said above about the change in the salience of the campaign
between Nice 1 and Nice 2, second-order effects are likely to be more evident
at Nice 1 than at Nice 2.

The ‘attitudes’ and ‘second-order’ national election interpretations of
doing behaviour in EU referendums are quite distinct from each other. The
attitudes approach assumes a rational and reasoned calculation by the voter
based on his or her views on EU matters. The second-order approach sees
doing in EU referendums as simply a chance for voters to express their
domestic political preferences and vote either in line with or against the
governing parties’ wishes (a vote mainly reflecting their satisfaction/dissatis-
faction with the government/governing party(ies)). The question of which
interpretation is most accurate – or has the greatest predictive power – has
important implications for how we interpret the role of referendums and the
part that referendums play in EU democracy. As Svensson puts it: do voters ‘really address [the] issues and involve themselves actively in the policy-making process on a vital issue or [do] they merely vote for or against the current government?’ (2002: 733). If the latter is the case, then the upcoming referendums on the new EU constitution will be decided by a mishmash of extraneous factors that have little or nothing to do with European integration or with the painstakingly negotiated EU constitution. Likewise and more generally, if the second-order model is correct, we should beware of inferring, in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote on EU treaty changes, that the electorate was in favour of the substantive content of the treaty in question.

Two hypotheses follow from this discussion.

**Hypothesis 1:** Relative to second-order effects, issue-voting effects are stronger predictors of voting (Yes/No) in EU referendums.

**Hypothesis 2:** Relative to low-salience EU referendums, high-salience EU referendums are likely to show stronger issue-voting effects.

### The Nice referendums in Ireland

Three issues were particularly relevant in the referendum campaigns on the Nice Treaty in Ireland. First, citizens who were in favour of retaining as much independence and sovereignty in Ireland as possible were likely to have voted against the Nice Treaty. In contrast, citizens who were in favour of sharing (or pooling) sovereignty and decision-making powers with other EU states were likely to have voted ‘Yes’ (in favour of the referendum). Secondly, citizens who favoured maintaining the Irish position of military ‘neutrality’ – in the sense of having nothing to do with a militarized EU – were likely to vote ‘No’ to Nice. People who favoured moves towards a strong European military capability were likely to vote ‘Yes’. Third, the expansion of the EU to include a large number of (relatively poor) countries was supported by some citizens and opposed by others. The latter perhaps regarded such an expansion as a threat to Ireland’s ability to continue securing large amounts of money from the EU. Ireland, in fact, was likely to become a net contributor to, rather than beneficiary of, the EU. (For more detailed descriptions of how divisions and debates in these areas played out in the Nice 1 and Nice 2 campaigns, see O’Mahoney, 2001; Hayward, 2002, 2003; Gilland, 2002, 2003.)

After the shock of defeat in the 2001 referendum, the pro-Nice camp sought to address what they perceived to be the concerns of the citizenry. The governing parties (Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats), the pro-EU opposition parties (Fine Gael and Labour) and the rest of what the anti-Nice
camp regards as the pro-EU ‘establishment’ – including the major trade unions and business organizations – ran a very spirited and vigorous campaign emphasizing the advantages of the European Union. The energetic pro-Nice campaign in 2002 contrasted starkly with the lax and lethargic campaign of the pro-Nice lobby in 2001. O’Brennan (2003), for example, states that a key reason for the success of the ‘Yes’ side in Nice 2 was their ‘much more vigorous and visible campaign’. At Nice 1 their campaign had been ‘lacklustre and indifferent’ and lacked ‘energy, passion, intensity, and, crucially, a visible campaigning presence on the ground in individual constituencies. The No campaign in contrast was charged with conviction, well organized and gained in confidence as the campaign went on.’

One indication of the increased salience of the campaign at the second referendum compared with the first is the fact that citizens found the media to be more useful sources of information in relation to the referendum at Nice 2 than at Nice 1. At Nice 2, 64% of respondents found newspaper articles either very or somewhat useful (compared with 44% at Nice 1), 73% found television news and current affairs programmes very or somewhat useful (compared with 51% at Nice 1), and 68% found radio news and current affairs programmes very or somewhat useful (compared with 46% at Nice 1). There was also a marked increase in the proportion of citizens who found discussion with the family, friends and colleagues very or somewhat useful (64% at Nice 2 compared with 48% at Nice 1). One consequence of the higher-salience campaign at Nice 2 was the increase in citizens’ level of knowledge of the treaty and issues relating to the treaty. At Nice 1, 36% of respondents reported that they had either a good understanding of, or understood some of, the issues relating to the Nice Treaty. This figure had risen to 61% by the end of the Nice 2 campaign. Thus, there had been a significant increase in citizens’ comprehension of the treaty and issues relating to the treaty between Nice 1 and Nice 2, suggesting that the energetic and vigorous campaign that occurred at Nice 2 was indeed effective.

In the inter-referendum period, the pro-Nice camp sought to increase the importance of the substantive (European) issues relative to the troublesome issues of ‘party politics’ (aka second-order effects) and military neutrality. Specifically in relation to the issue of neutrality, which was widely felt to have contributed to the rejection of the treaty at Nice 1, the government agreed – at the Seville summit in June 2002 – two Declarations with its European partners that were then added to the Nice Treaty. The ‘National Declaration’ by Ireland states that ‘Ireland is not party to any mutual defence commitment’ and that ‘Ireland is not party to any plans to develop a European army’. The ‘Declaration of the European Council’ states that ‘Ireland’s policy of military neutrality is in full conformity with the Treaties, on which the
European Union is based, including the Treaty of Nice and that there is no obligation arising from the Treaties which would or could oblige Ireland to depart from that policy'. Further, the government inserted a clause into the proposed constitutional referendum text guaranteeing that Ireland would not join any EU common defence. It is likely that these actions served to de-emphasize the importance of the pro- versus anti-military alliance dimension in the run-up to Nice 2.

The pro-Nice camp also sought to de-couple issues relating to domestic party politics from the issue of the referendum. As noted earlier, all Irish parties, apart from the small Sinn Féin and Green parties, advocated a ‘Yes’ vote in Nice 1 and Nice 2. However, at Nice 2 the main opposition parties (Labour and Fine Gael), in line with the government parties (Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats), emphasized the importance of detaching the referendum issue from the issue of support for the governing parties. This is nicely illustrated by a slogan used by the opposition Labour Party, which sought to persuade voters not to treat Nice 2 as a means of manifesting their opposition to the main government party, Fianna Fáil. The slogan was: ‘Hold Your Fire. Fianna Fáil Can Wait. Europe Can’t.’ Labour thus urged voters to save their anti-Fianna Fáil ammunition for another day. In effect, the pro-Nice parties were implicitly subscribing to the ‘second-order election’ interpretation; to the extent that their countermeasures were successful, they will have served, in line with hypothesis 2 above, to weaken any potential second-order effects in the case of Nice 2.

Data

The data that we use to test our hypotheses come from two post-referendum nationally representative surveys commissioned by the EU and conducted by EOS Gallup (for an extensive analysis of these two surveys, see Sinnott, 2001, 2003). To tap attitudes to European integration, the 2001 and 2002 surveys asked respondents the following question:

*As regards the European Union in general, which of the following comes closest to your views: Ireland should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union OR Ireland should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Union?*

Respondents choosing the first statement are labelled ‘pro-integrationists’, respondents choosing the second statement are labelled ‘anti-integrationists’, and respondents indicating that they either did not know or could not choose are labelled ‘neither pro- nor anti-integrationists’. To tap attitudes to EU enlargement, respondents were asked:
It is envisaged that, over the coming years, there will be further enlargement of the EU. The EU is at present negotiating with 12 candidate countries. Ten of these countries are in eastern and central Europe. The other two are Cyprus and Malta. We are interested in how people feel about further enlargement of the EU and what people see as the possible advantages and disadvantages of such enlargement. First of all, in general terms, are you in favour or against such enlargement of the EU?

Respondents choosing the response option ‘in favour’ are labelled ‘pro-enlargement’, respondents choosing the option ‘against’ are labelled ‘anti-enlargement’, and respondents indicating that they did not know are labelled ‘neither pro- nor anti-enlargement’. To tap attitudes to military neutrality, respondents were asked which of the following two statements they agreed with:

Ireland should do everything it can to strengthen its neutrality even if this means being less involved in EU co-operation on foreign and defence policy OR Ireland should be willing to accept limitations on its neutrality so that it can be more fully involved in EU co-operation on foreign and defence policy.

Respondents were asked to place themselves on a nine-point scale (1 = agree fully with the first statement and 9 = agree fully with the second statement). To retain the same metric as the measures of integration and enlargement, we trichotomize responses: 1-4 = ‘pro-neutrality’; 6-9 = ‘anti-neutrality’; 5 (‘no opinion’ and ‘don’t know’) = ‘neither pro- nor anti-neutrality’.

In order to operationalize ‘second-order’ effects, the party preferences of respondents were tapped in both surveys and respondents were assigned one or the other of the following labels: supporter of a government party (Fianna Fáil or Progressive Democrats), supporter of a pro-Nice Treaty opposition party (Fine Gael or Labour), supporter of one of the small anti-Nice opposition parties (Sinn Féin or the Green party), or a supporter of either no party or a very minor party (other). Ideally, a question concerning how satisfied each respondent was with the government would also have been asked in both surveys. However, a ‘satisfaction’ question was asked only at Nice 2 and so we used ‘satisfaction’ only in our analysis of that particular referendum. (Age, social class and sex were also measured and are used in the analysis as demographic control variables.) The Appendix, which can be found on the EUP homepage, reports the frequencies for our main independent variables.

Results

Table 1 reports the results of three multivariate logistic regressions. Each regression includes issue-voting and second-order variables as predictors of
‘Yes’ voting in the referendum in question (controlling for demographic effects). Our issue-voting variables relate to attitudes to EU integration, EU enlargement and military neutrality. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, second-order effects are operationalized in terms of whether or not the respondent is a supporter of a governing party or of one of the opposition parties. In column 3 we re-run the analysis for Nice 2 but this time we also include a ‘satisfaction with government’ variable (which we have only for Nice 2) as part of the operationalization of the second-order model. All three regressions reported in Table 1 show that the issue effect and second-order effect variables are related to voting in the predicted direction. Respondents who are in favour of EU integration tend to vote ‘Yes’, as do respondents who favour enlargement and respondents who are in favour of limiting military neutrality. Also, those who support parties that are not in government are significantly less likely than respondents who support the governing parties to vote ‘Yes’. A similar pattern emerges when the explicit government satisfaction variable is included: respondents who are very dissatisfied with the incumbent government (the reference category) are less likely than those who are either less dissatisfied or those who are satisfied to vote ‘Yes’.

Although these findings are interesting in themselves, their real value is that they enable us to test our two fundamental hypotheses regarding the relative impact of second-order factors and issues on how people vote in EU referendums. We can test the relative strength of the two interpretations of voting by assessing how much each approach contributes to an explanation of voting in the referendums. We begin by focusing on Nice 1. We run a model (see top row of Table 2) using only demographics to predict voting behaviour (log likelihood = –339.9). Adding second-order effects to this model – operationalized in terms of party support – improves the fit of the model by 6.0% (log likelihood declines to –319.7). However, the addition of ‘issue effects’ to this ‘demographics + second-order’ model improves the model fit more substantially. The log likelihood declines from –319.7 to –267.6, representing an improvement of fit of 16.3%. When the same series of analyses is conducted for Nice 2 we also find that adding ‘issues’ to a ‘demographics + second-order’ model increases the model fit. However, this time the increase in model fit is much larger, 26.2%.

The key importance of issue effects also holds when we use a more comprehensive operationalization of second-order effects (see Table 3). For Nice 2, we run a model in which second-order effects are operationalized in terms of party support and level of satisfaction with the government. As reported in Table 3, this more comprehensive operationalization of second-order effects has little impact. The model improvement that results from the addition of ‘issue effects’ to a ‘demographics + “comprehensive” second-order model’ (99.5, or 23.7%) is still much larger than the model improvement that
results from the addition of a comprehensive operationalization of second-order effects to a ‘demographics only’ model (64.6, or 13.3%).

These results confirm both our hypotheses. First, in both of the Irish referendums on the Nice treaty, issues are stronger predictors of vote choice than are second-order effects. Secondly, when we compare the predictive strength of
Table 2  Contribution of ‘second-order’ and ‘issue-effect’ variables to the explanation of voting in the Nice referendums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nice 1 Log likelihood (df)</th>
<th>Nice 2 Log likelihood (df)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Intercept + demographics</td>
<td>-339.9 (9)</td>
<td>-484.0 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Intercept + demographics + second-order effects (party support)</td>
<td>-319.7 (12)</td>
<td>-457.1 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Intercept + demographics + second-order effects (party support) + issues (three issues)</td>
<td>-267.6 (18)</td>
<td>-337.2 (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in log likelihood (df)</th>
<th>Statistical significance of change</th>
<th>% improvement in log likelihood</th>
<th>Change in log likelihood (df)</th>
<th>Statistical significance of change</th>
<th>% improvement in log likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(B) compared with (A)</td>
<td>20.3 (3)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>26.9 (3)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) compared with (B)</td>
<td>52.0 (6)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>119.9 (6)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
issues across the two referendums, issues turn out to be stronger predictors in the second, more salient referendum.

We now focus our attention on the individual issues – EU integration, EU enlargement and military neutrality – and assess the relative impact of these issues at each referendum. To do this we display again (in Table 4) the information presented in Table 1, but this time we report ‘conditional maximum effects’ instead of the raw coefficients (which do not lend themselves to easy substantive interpretation). In terms of the impact of issues at Nice 1, the sizes of the effects of the three different subjects were quite similar to each other. Pro-integrationists were 33 percentage points more likely than anti-integrationists to vote ‘Yes’, pro-enlargement voters were 25 percentage points more likely than anti-enlargement voters to vote ‘Yes’, and voters who favoured limiting neutrality were 29 percentage points more likely than voters favouring a strengthening of neutrality to vote ‘Yes’. However, the relative size of these attitude effects changed quite dramatically between Nice 1 and Nice 2. The impact of attitudes to integration declined slightly and the impact of attitudes to neutrality also declined somewhat, yet the impact of these

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log likelihood (df)</th>
<th>Change Statistical % improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept + demographics</td>
<td>−484.0 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept + demographics + second-order effects (government satisfaction)</td>
<td>−457.1 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept + demographics + second-order effects (party support and government satisfaction)</td>
<td>−439.5 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept + demographics + second-order effects (party support and government satisfaction) + issue effects (three issues)</td>
<td>−419.4 (14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reductions was more than offset by the rise in importance of attitudes to enlargement. In 2002, pro-enlargement voters were 51 percentage points more likely than anti-enlargement voters to vote ‘Yes’ (twice the size of the 2001 effect). Similarly, ‘centrists’ on enlargement were 43 percentage points more likely than anti-enlargement voters to vote ‘Yes’ in 2002 (compared with 7 percentage points in 2001). Overall, anti-enlargement voters were 50 percentage points less likely than other voters to vote ‘Yes’ (whereas they had been only 19 percentage points less likely at Nice 1). In the third column of Table 4, we see that a different operationalization of second-order effects – using level of satisfaction with the incumbent government in addition to party support – alters the size of each of the attitude effects only very marginally.

Thus, there was a change in the relative strength of second-order and attitude factors between Nice 1 and Nice 2, driven mainly by an increase in

### Table 4  Conditional maximum effects of each variable with remaining dummies at zero and other variables at their mean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002(a)</th>
<th>2002(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second-order effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats)</td>
<td>(+25)</td>
<td>(+20)</td>
<td>(+19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Gael/Labour</td>
<td>–21</td>
<td>–13</td>
<td>–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Féin/Green Party</td>
<td>–44</td>
<td>–33</td>
<td>–32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>–22</td>
<td>–23</td>
<td>–24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Very unsatisfied with govt)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite unsatisfied with govt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite/very satisfied with govt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitude effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Anti-integration)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>–18</td>
<td>–20</td>
<td>–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-integration</td>
<td>–18</td>
<td>–20</td>
<td>–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Anti-enlargement)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>–19</td>
<td>–50</td>
<td>–47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-enlargement</td>
<td>–19</td>
<td>–50</td>
<td>–47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Strengthen neutrality)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit neutrality</td>
<td>+29</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Table entries indicate that in 2001, for example, Fine Gael/Labour voters were 21 percentage points less likely to vote ‘Yes’ than were Fianna Fáil (FF) voters, other things being equal. In contrast, FF voters were 25 percentage points more likely to vote ‘Yes’ than were non-FF voters. Percentages in italics are not significant at the .05 level.
the significance of the issue of EU enlargement. Does this increase in the impact of attitude factors explain why the result of the referendum was different at Nice 2, or do we also need to take into account changes in the distribution of opinions on the individual second-order and attitude factors? We address this question by running two counterfactual simulations. First, we can look at Nice 1 under the conditions that (the distributions of the variables relating to) party support and attitudes were as they became at Nice 2 but keeping the Nice 1 model estimates of the impact of those conditions. The predicted vote using that model would not have been much different from the actual outcome at Nice 1: 48% ‘Yes’ instead of 46%. Second, we can look at Nice 2 under the conditions that party support and attitudes were as they were at Nice 1 but keeping the Nice 2 model estimates of the impact of those conditions. The predicted vote is, again, only slightly different: 61% ‘Yes’ instead of 63%.10 We can conclude from this that the different referendum result the second time around was not a function of changing marginals – i.e. a change in the distributions on party support and the issue variables. Rather, the result of the referendum changed because of the greater impact of the attitudinal variables. Even so, what was vital here was the changing impact of the different attitude factors, most notably the increase in the strength of the relationship between attitudes to EU enlargement and voting behaviour (and also the somewhat diminished impact of the issue of neutrality).

Discussion and conclusion

Referendums on the issue of the new EU constitution are pending in a substantial number of EU member states. Is voting behaviour in these referendums likely to reflect citizens’ thoughts on the future of the EU and on the new constitution, or is it likely simply to reflect citizens’ concerns about domestic party politics and their views on incumbent national governments? Our analysis of voting in the Irish Nice referendums suggests that, although the effect of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the incumbent government (i.e. the second-order effect) is detectable, it played a much smaller role in determining the outcome compared with the effect of attitudes to a range of European issues. In short, both Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty were closer to being processes of deliberation on EU issues than to being plebiscites on the incumbent government.

The Irish experience with referendums on the Nice Treaty also suggests that the more vigorous the campaign, the greater the effect of the key substantive issue relating to the referendum – in this case attitudes to EU enlargement – and the less the effect of second-order considerations. This is
quite an unusual conclusion in that, in relation to general elections, campaigns are typically viewed as much less important than ‘long-term’ determinants of voting such as social structure, party identification and ideology. It may be, however, that there is much more scope for a vigorous campaign to have an impact in referendums. All the main Irish parties – the pro-EU governing Fianna Fáil and Progressive Democrats and the pro-EU opposition Labour and Fine Gael parties – were shaken and stirred by the ‘No’ at Nice 1. Only the small anti-EU Sinn Féin and Green parties were pleased with the result. Rejection of the Nice Treaty in the first referendum was a serious and unexpected blow to the Irish political establishment. Instead of the brief and limp campaign at Nice 1, the main parties, and particularly their civil society allies, delivered a vigorous, spirited and lengthy campaign at Nice 2. Strategically, they sought to ‘de-couple’ two dangerous issues from the issue overtly at stake in the referendum. First, they sought – through the ‘Declarations’ and the constitutional provision mentioned above – to convince ‘anti-military alliance’ voters that the Nice Treaty was not in fact anything to be afraid of. The pro-camp also sought to defuse and neutralize the issue of domestic party politics. Thus they campaigned vigorously to persuade citizens that the treaty was about the future of Europe – and enlargement in particular – and not a referendum on the popularity of the Irish government. The pro-European opposition parties (Labour and Fine Gael) were particularly important in attempting to limit the impact of second-order effects on voting behaviour in the referendum. The fact that satisfaction with the government was significantly lower at Nice 2 than at Nice 1 does not seem to have negatively impacted on the result. Crucially, the effective campaigning of the ‘Yes’ side made the issue of EU enlargement the key issue in the Nice 2 campaign.

The implications for member state governments facing referendums on the EU constitution can be briefly stated. Government satisfaction levels and support for the domestic political parties are likely to play some role in determining the outcome, but this role is presumably much smaller than the role played by ‘issue effects’, that is by attitudes to European integration and to issues arising from the new constitution. However, the extent of the impact of such European attitudes on the outcome depends on the vigour and the effectiveness of the referendum campaign.

Notes

1 Referendums are unlikely to be conducted in the Slovak Republic, Hungary or Finland and will almost certainly not be conducted in Austria, Germany,
The main effect of the treaty was to make changes in the institutional structures and procedures of the EU with a view to the impending enlargement of its membership. The voting proportions were 53.9% ‘No’ to 46.1% ‘Yes’ in the 7 June 2001 referendum on a turnout of 34.8% and 62.9% ‘Yes’ to 37.1% ‘No’ on a turnout of 49.5% in the 18 October 2002 referendum. In our 2001 survey, ‘Yes’ voters are underrepresented (40.5%) and, in our 2002 survey, ‘Yes’ voters are overrepresented (74.2%). We thus weight our survey data so that they are representative of the actual results.

What we call the ‘issues’ and ‘second-order’ interpretations of voting in EU referendums cover two of the main schools of thought on the topic of voting in EU referendums. Ehin (2001) categorizes existing explanations into a three-fold typology: values (or ‘attitudes’), ‘domestic politics’ (or ‘second-order’ national election effects) and ‘utilitarian expectations’. The rational economic actor model (‘utilitarian expectations’ model) holds that EU integration differentially benefits certain segments of a national population and that individuals who believe they will benefit economically will vote ‘Yes’ in an EU referendum and people who believe they will not benefit economically will vote ‘No’ (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a, 1998b). These studies use class, sex and education as proxies for individual competitiveness, which they hypothesize is related to support for the EU (richer, more educated men are better able to exploit economic opportunities in the liberal EU marketplace and thus support a pro-EU position in referendums).

The surveys used are those described in the ‘data’ section below. The question wording in the surveys was as follows: ‘There are many different ways in which people get information in relation to referendums. I have a list here of several possible sources of information. Please say how useful, if at all, you found each of them in the lead up to the […] referendum on the Nice Treaty […] Using this card, would you say you found each of the sources mentioned very valuable, somewhat valuable, of little or no value or did you not notice or come across the source in question at all?’

The wording of the question was: ‘By the date of the referendum [state date] how good was your understanding of the issues involved?’ The response options were: I had a good understanding of what the Treaty was all about; I understood some of the issues but not all that was involved; I was only vaguely aware of the issues involved; I did not know what the Treaty was about at all.

the second survey was conducted between 15 November and 9 December 2002 among a quota sample of 1203 adults. For replication purposes, the survey data on which the analysis presented in this paper is based are available at URL: http://www.ucd.ie/issda/dataset-info/nicedata.htm

8 There were some slight differences in the question wordings between the Nice 1 and Nice 2 surveys. Because of the ongoing nature of the enlargement negotiations, it was necessary to change the wording of the question in 2002: ‘The European Union is at present finishing negotiations with 10 countries about joining the European Union in 2004. We are interested in how people feel about this enlargement of the EU. In general terms, are you in favour or against this enlargement of the EU?’ There is no reason to believe that this shortened introductory wording rendered the results of the enlargement questions in 2001 and 2002 non-comparable. The over-time trends from the 2001 and 2002 surveys are very similar to those found by Eurobarometer 57 and Eurobarometer 58 from a standard enlargement question (see Sinnott, 2003: 8–9). The party preference question was also slightly different in the two surveys. In the Nice 1 survey, respondents were asked which party they would vote for if there was a general election tomorrow, and in Nice 2 respondents were asked to indicate the party that they ‘usually support’. The breakdown of responses to both questions is similar at both time points (see online appendix). Note that the wording of the ‘satisfaction’ question was: ‘Overall are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the government is running the country?’ The response options were: very satisfied; quite satisfied; quite dissatisfied; very dissatisfied. Finally, in both surveys, the age of the respondent was assigned to one or the other of five categories, and social class was measured using the usual market research AB, C1, C2, DE and F categories. The gender of the respondent was also categorized.

9 There is much discussion in the literature about the possible direction of the causal relationship between our two sets of independent variables: support for the incumbent government/ governing parties and attitudes to the EU. Anderson (1998), Gabel (1998c) and Ray (2003) argue that attitudes to the EU to some extent mediate the effect of attitudes to the incumbent government; in other words, whether or not you support the incumbent government determines whether you have positive attitudes to the EU, which in turn determines whether you support an EU treaty in a referendum. Thus, in the analysis reported in Tables 2 and 3, we include our variables in that order – ‘second-order’ effects first followed by ‘issue’ effects. (However, when we ran a model regressing EU support on party and demographic variables, we found no significant association between party support and EU support. Also, when we ran a model regressing support for enlargement on party and demographic variables, we found no significant association between party support and enlargement support. Thus, there appear to be no significant endogeneity effects and it does not seem that attitude effects are mediating party support effects. This is in line with the general finding in Irish data that voters tend not to distinguish between the main parties on EU issues.)

10 We do not include the ‘government satisfaction’ variable in our operationalization of second-order effects in either of the two simulations described in this paragraph. This is because, as noted, the question concerning
‘government satisfaction’ was asked only in the 2002 survey. However, if we were to include this (2002) variable in our simulation of what the result would have been in 2001 if the conditions of 2002 had pertained at 2001, then almost certainly our simulated/predicted result would have been lower than 48%. This is because contemporary opinion poll data suggest that government satisfaction levels were much lower in 2002 than they had been in 2001: satisfaction with the government dropped from 59% in May 2001 to 33% in October 2002 (see Table A at URL: http://www.tnsmrbi.ie/MSWord/IRISH%20TIMES%20TNS%20MRBI%20POL%20POLITICAL%20ISSUES.doc). Thus, the anti-government side of the Nice debate would have benefited if the (low) satisfaction levels of 2002 had existed in 2001.

References


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