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Wealth-Driven Competition in a Speculative Financial Market: Examples with Maximizing Agents

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates how both quantitative and qualitative results of a general, analytically tractable asset-pricing model in which heterogeneous agents behave consistently with a constant relative risk aversion assumption can be applied to the special case of optimizing behavior.

The analysis of the asymptotic properties of the market is performed using a geometric approach which allows the visualization of all possible equilibria by means of a simple one-dimensional Equilibrium Market Curve. The case of linear (particularly, mean-variance) investment functions is thoroughly analyzed. This analysis highlights the features which are specific to linear investment functions. As a consequence, some previous contributions of the agent-based literature are generalized.

JEL codes: C62, D84, G12.

Keywords: Asset Pricing Model, CRRA Framework, Equilibrium Market Curve, Expected Utility Maximization, Mean-Variance Optimization, Linear Investment Functions.

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1 Introduction

In recent years a number of theoretical models exploring the consequences of heterogeneity of traders for the aggregate price dynamics of a speculative financial market have been developed. Among many examples, let us mention the models of Day and Huang (1990), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1991), Chiarella (1992), Lux (1995), Brock and Hommes (1998) and Chiarella and He (2001). These and other “Heterogeneous Agent Models” (HAMs) have been recently reviewed in Hommes (2006). Within the “agent-based” literature, HAMs can be seen as an important branch of study supplementary to the numerous simulation models. Indeed, one of the problems with the simulation approach is that the systematic analysis of such models is made practically impossible by the enormous number of degrees of freedom. It is usually not clear which assumptions are responsible for the patterns generated and, as a result, robustness of the models is difficult to investigate. HAMs have appeared as a response to this problem and, consequently, are built in such a way as to make analytic investigation possible. It is not surprising, therefore, that heterogeneous agent models usually incorporate only few types of agents who differ in the ways they predict the future price but are homogeneous in all other respects, i.e. in the functional form of demand, available information, etc.

Even if the analytic models have already answered a lot of theoretical questions concerning the consequences of behavioral heterogeneity for market dynamics, they suffer from some important drawbacks. First, most of the contributions are built within the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) framework, that is under the assumption that demand is independent of wealth. This leads to simplification in the analysis, because otherwise the wealth of each individual portfolio along the evolution of the economy would have to be taken into account. However, this assumption is rather unrealistic if compared with other possible behavioral specifications, e.g. with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), see Levy, Levy, and Solomon (2000) or Campbell and Viceira (2002) for a discussion. Second, the majority of the models consider only few types (or classes) of behavior, thus substantially reducing the realistic level of heterogeneity\(^1\). Third, the tests for the robustness of the results with respect to the change of simple behavioral assumptions are very difficult to perform inside such models. For example, in order to understand the consequences of the entry of an agent with a new type of behavior in the market, one has to analyze a completely new model from scratch. Summarizing, one can say that at this moment HAMs lack a general framework, flexible enough to incorporate different realistic agents’ specifications.

An important step in the direction of a general framework has been made in Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto (2006) and Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006), where some analytic results are obtained for a market populated by an arbitrarily large number of technical traders whose possible demand functions belong to a relatively large set. The only imposed restriction on the individual demand functions is that they have to be proportional to current wealth. This requirement is consistent with the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) framework. Consequently, the price and agents’ wealth are determined at the same time and both price and wealth dynamics are intertwined. To model the agents’ behavior, Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006) introduce deterministic investment functions which map the past history of returns into the fraction of wealth which is invested in the risky security. These investment functions

\(^1\)For instance, DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1991) consider two types of investors, the model of Day and Huang (1990) is populated by three types of traders, while Brock and Hommes (1998) provide a number of examples with two, three and four different types. One recent exception from this rule is the model of Brock, Hommes, and Wagener (2005) where the low-dimensional Large Type Limit with the number of types converging to infinity is introduced.
are left unspecified, so that the obtained results are very general.

The purpose of the current paper is to provide an illustration of how this general, analytically tractable agent-based model can be applied to important particular classes of investment behavior. Our main interest is focused on the functions which can be derived from the optimization principle and, therefore, can be considered as “rational”. According to conventional economic wisdom such optimizing behavior is a characteristic of the majority of the agents in financial markets, and therefore corresponding investment functions deserve a special analysis. We consider the investment functions derived from two types of rational choice procedures, expected utility (EU) maximization and mean-variance utility (MVU) maximization.

It is a well-known problem of the EU maximization framework with CRRA-traders that the resulting demand functions cannot be computed explicitly. In order to overcome this obstacle a geometric tool called the “Equilibrium Market Curve” will be used. It allows one to characterize both the location of all possible equilibria and (partially) the conditions of their stability independent of the specification of the traders’ demands. In this way we obtain some predictions of equilibrium dynamics with EU maximizers even without explicit knowledge about their investment functions.

In contrast to the EU framework, the solution of the MVU optimization problem can be derived explicitly. The resulting demand depends on the agent’s expectations about mean and variance of the return for the next period. It turns out that for some large class of these expectations, the investment functions become “linear” in the sense which will be clarified later. Since different types of expectations can still lead to different investment functions, we keep the discussion as general as possible and investigate the dynamics in the market with “linear” investment functions. In particular, we demonstrate that the phenomenon of multiple stable equilibria cannot emerge in such markets. This can be a limitation of the “rational” framework with respect to the general case.

The analysis of the linear investment functions brings us to another goal of this paper. We show that one of the first analytical models developed in CRRA framework, namely the model of Chiarella and He (2001), can be easily understood and generalized, when considered within the general framework of Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006). As a direct consequence, we can discuss the validity and limits of the “quasi-optimal selection principle” originally formulated by Chiarella and He. We show that this principle is a consequence of particular market behaviors and it does not hold in general.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section a stochastic model of a speculative market is introduced. In Section 3 the steady states of its deterministic part are derived and characterized geometrically. The immediate applications for two special cases of investment behavior are discussed. In Section 4 the question of stability of the steady states is addressed with discussion of consequences for two special cases. The model of Chiarella and He is reconsidered in Section 5 and some final remarks are given in Section 6.

2 A dynamic model for asset price and agents’ wealth

In this Section we present the general analytic model of a market in which the individual demand functions for the risky asset are proportional to the agents’ wealth.
2.1 General setup

Consider a simple pure exchange economy, populated by a fixed number $N$ of traders, where trading activities take place in discrete time. The economy is composed of a riskless asset yielding in each period a constant interest rate $r_f > 0$ and a risky asset paying a random dividend $D_t$ at the beginning of each period $t$. The riskless asset is considered to be the numéraire of the economy and its price is fixed to 1. The ex-dividend price $P_t$ of the risky asset is determined at each period through a market-clearing condition, where the outside supply of the asset is constant and normalized to 1.

Let $x_{t,n}$ stand for the fraction of the wealth $W_{t,n}$ which, at time $t$, agent $n (n \in \{1, \ldots, N\})$ invests in the risky asset. The evolution of the economy is described by the system containing the individual wealth dynamics and the market-clearing condition:

$$W_{t,n} = (1-x_{t-1,n})W_{t-1,n}(1+r_f) + \frac{x_{t-1,n}W_{t-1,n}}{P_{t-1}} (P_t + D_t),$$

$$P_t = \sum_{n=1}^{N} x_{t,n} W_{t,n}.$$ (2.1)

Assume that the individual demand for the risky asset is proportional to the current wealth, so that $x_{t,n}$ is independent of $W_{t,n}$. Price and wealth are determined simultaneously in this case. Hence, one has to solve the system (2.1) in order to obtain the evolution of $P_t$ and $W_{t,n}$ in explicit form.

Introduce the price return $r_{t+1} = P_{t+1}/P_t - 1$, the dividend yield $y_{t+1} = D_{t+1}/P_t$, and the wealth share of agent $n$ in the total wealth $\varphi_{t,n} = W_{t,n}/\sum_m W_{t,m}$. With a bit of algebra one can show that under suitable conditions\(^2\) the implicit dynamics (2.1) is equivalent to the following system of the return and wealth shares

$$r_{t+1} = r_f + \frac{(1 + r_f)\sum_n(x_{t+1,n} - x_{t,n})\varphi_{t,n} + y_{t+1}\sum_n x_{t,n} x_{t+1,n} \varphi_{t,n}}{\sum_n x_{t,n} (1 - x_{t+1,n}) \varphi_{t,n}},$$

$$\varphi_{t+1,n} = \frac{1 + r_f + (r_{t+1} + y_{t+1} - r_f)x_{t,n}}{1 + r_f + (r_{t+1} + y_{t+1} - r_f)\sum_m x_{t,m} \varphi_{t,m}} \forall n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}.$$ (2.2) (2.3)

Notice that the dynamics in (2.2) and (2.3) do not depend on the price level directly, but, instead, are defined in terms of price return and dividend yield. In compliance with intuition, in the CRRA framework, where agents’ demands are growing with their wealth, the equilibria can be identified as states of steady expansion (or contraction) of the economy.

Concerning the stochastic (due to random dividend payment $D_t$) yield process $\{y_t\}$ we make the following

**Assumption 1.** The dividend yields $y_t$ are i.i.d. random variables obtained from a common distribution with positive support and mean value $\bar{y} \in (0,1)$.

This assumption is common to a number of studies in the literature, see e.g. Chiarella and He (2001, 2002); Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto (2006), and also roughly consistent with the real data. We assume that the structure of the yield process is known to everybody. Consequently, the information set available to traders at round $t$ reduces to the sequence of past realized returns $I_{t-1} = \{r_{t-1}, r_{t-2}, \ldots\}$.\(^2\)

\(^2\)These are the conditions to guarantee that price is positive. See Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto (2006).
2.2 Behavior of traders

To close the dynamical system (2.2) and (2.3) we only need to specify the set of investment shares \( \{x_{t,n}\} \). Let us, first, discuss a number of possible ways to do so.

Maximization of Mean-Variance Utility. One way to derive the investment choice from the standard economic framework is to consider the mean-variance (MV) problem

\[
\max_{x_t} \left\{ E_{t-1}[W_{t+1}] - \frac{\beta}{2 W_t} V_{t-1}[W_{t+1}] \right\}, \quad \text{where} \quad \beta > 0. \tag{2.4}
\]

The wealth evolution of an agent is given by \( W_{t+1} = (1 + r_f)W_t + x_t W_t (r_{t+1} + y_{t+1} - r_f) \) and depends on the unknown at time \( t \) total return \( r_{t+1} + y_{t+1} \). Thus, an agent has to form expectations \( E_{t-1}[W_{t+1}] \) and \( V_{t-1}[W_{t+1}] \) about the first two moments of his future wealth on the basis of the information set \( I_{t-1} \) available before period \( t \).

In contrast to the standard MV framework, the coefficient measuring the sensitivity of the agent’s utility to the risk decreases with wealth in (2.4). Therefore, the risk aversion is not constant but decreasing function of wealth. This is consistent with experimental studies, see e.g. Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport (1988).

A simple computation shows that the solution of (2.4) is given by

\[
x_t = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{E_{t-1}[r_{t+1} + y_{t+1} - r_f]}{V_{t-1}[r_{t+1} + y_{t+1}]} \tag{2.5}
\]

and does not depend on the current wealth. \( E_{t-1}[r_{t+1} + y_{t+1} - r_f] \) and \( V_{t-1}[r_{t+1} + y_{t+1}] \) stand for the agent’s expectations about the excess return and variance, respectively.

Alternatively, one can get (2.5) as a solution of the MV problem written in terms of the agents’ return \( \rho_{t+1} = r_f + x_t (r_{t+1} + y_{t+1} - r_f) \). Maximization of \( E_{t-1}[\rho_{t+1}] - \beta V_{t-1}[\rho_{t+1}] / 2 \) instead of (2.4) stresses another empirical finding that agents are concerned about the relative change of wealth and not about the level of their final wealth (see Kahneman and Tversky (1979)).

Maximization of Expected Utility. A more sophisticated way to derive the demand is to maximize an expected utility (EU). Consider the power utility function of wealth

\[
U(W; \gamma) = \frac{W^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1 - \gamma}, \quad \text{where} \quad \gamma > 0. \tag{2.6}
\]

It is straight-forward to see that the solution \( x_t^* = \arg\max E[U(W_{t+1}; \gamma)] \) is independent of the agent’s wealth \( W_t \). On the other hand, this solution depends on the agent’s perception of the distribution of the total return \( r_{t+1} + y_{t+1} \). Unfortunately, an explicit functional form of this solution cannot be derived for all reasonable distributions.

Another possibility is to consider the EU maximization problem with exponential utility function \( U(\rho_{t+1}; \beta) = -\exp(-\beta \rho_{t+1} / 2) \) of the agents’ return \( \rho_{t+1} \). One can show that if agents perceive a normal distribution of the total asset return with expected value \( E_{t-1}[r_{t+1} + y_{t+1}] \) and variance \( V_{t-1}[r_{t+1} + y_{t+1}] \), then the solution of the corresponding EU maximization coincides with (2.5).
Generalization: Investment Function. Let us compare these examples of the agents’ behavior. In all the cases discussed above the optimal share of the wealth invested in the risky asset is independent of the contemporaneous variables, current wealth and current price.

In some cases this share $x_t$ is given explicitly by (2.5) and depends on the agent’s beliefs about expected excess return and its variance. These beliefs, in turn, are based either upon the commonly available distribution of the dividend yield, or upon the previous return history, or both. Essentially, the share $x_t$ is evolving as a function of previous information.

For the EU maximization with power utility the optimal share $x_t^*$ is unknown in explicit form. But if the agent perceives some distribution (e.g. log-normal) for the return $r_{t+1} + y_{t+1}$, he will have to update the parameters of this distribution on the basis of past information. Ultimately, the optimal share is again some function of the information set.

This similarity between different examples suggests the following assumption.

**Assumption 2.** For each agent $n$ there exists a finite memory time span $L$ (which, without loss of generality, can be assumed to be the same for all the agents), and differentiable investment function $f_n$ which maps the present information set consisting of the past $L$ available returns into his investment share:

$$x_{t,n} = f_n(r_{t-1}, \ldots, r_{t-L}).$$

The function $f_n$ on the right-hand side of (2.7) gives a complete description of the investment decision of agent $n$. The knowledge about the fundamental dividend process is not included in the information set but is embedded in the function $f_n$ itself.

Assumption 1 and equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.7) define a stochastic dynamical system. To get insight into the dynamics of the system we will follow the strategy common in this type of literature (see e.g. Brock and Hommes (1998); Chiarella and He (2001); Chiarella, Dieci, and Gardini (2006)) and substitute the realization of the yield process by its mean value $\bar{y}$. The corresponding deterministic system reads

$$
\begin{align*}
x_{t+1,n} &= f_n(r_t, \ldots, r_{t-L+1}) \\
r_{t+1} &= r_f + \left(1 + r_f\right) \frac{\sum_n (x_{t+1,n} - x_{t,n}) \varphi_{t,n} + \bar{y} \sum_n x_{t,n} r_{t+1,n} \varphi_{t,n}}{\sum_n x_{t,n} (1 - x_{t+1,n}) \varphi_{t,n}} \\
\varphi_{t+1,n} &= \varphi_{t,n} \frac{1 + r_f + (r_{t+1,n} + \bar{y} - r_f) x_{t,n}}{1 + r_f + (r_{t+1,n} + \bar{y} - r_f) \sum_m x_{t,m} \varphi_{t,m}}.
\end{align*}
$$

Before proceeding further let us establish the relation of the model presented so far with some previous contributions. Assumption 2 makes our framework relatively rich in terms of possible agents’ behaviors. It includes the entire model of Chiarella and He (2001), where the agents’ investment shares are given by (2.5). As another special case the model includes the behaviors considered in the simulation models of Levy, Persky, and Solomon (1996) and Zschischang and Lux (2001), where agents maximize the expected power utility. The model also generalizes the contribution of Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto (2006), where the agents’ demands are given as arbitrary functions of the exponentially weighted moving averages of past returns.

At the same time, some standard approaches to the modeling of the agents’ behaviors are not consistent with Assumption 2. For instance, in the models of Brock and Hommes (1998), LeBaron, Arthur, and Palmer (1999) and Brock, Hommes, and Wagener (2005) the agents have constant absolute risk aversion demand functions, where $x_{t,n}$ depends on the contemporaneous wealth $W_{t,n}$.
3 Equilibria in the deterministic skeleton

Below we characterize the fixed points of system (2.8), first, for the general investment functions and then for the special cases. The next Section is devoted to the stability analysis of the steady-states. These steps allow us to get insight in the long-run behavior of system (2.8).

3.1 General result and the Equilibrium Market Curve

A fixed point of the skeleton is composed of the price return $r^*$, the equilibrium investment shares of all the agents $x^*_n$, and the relative wealth shares of the agents $\varphi^*_n$. The agents with $\varphi^*_n \neq 0$ are called survivors.

Two observations help to characterize the fixed points of the multi-dimensional system (2.8). First, the last equation in (2.8) gives the evolution of the agent’s relative wealth. Similar to the replicator dynamics known from evolutionary biology, it provides the selection mechanism. If an agent gets return higher (lower) than the average return, his relative wealth grows (declines). Due to such selection, in the fixed-point all survivors must have the same return. The return of agent $n$ is equal to $r_f + x^*_n (r^* + \bar{y} - r_f)$, so the investment shares of all survivors must be also the same. The only exceptions are the equilibria with $r^* + \bar{y} = r_f$ where both assets are equivalent in terms of return, and all the agents earn the same return independent of their investment shares. In such equilibria the wealth shares of all the agents are constant over time.

Second, the equilibrium return and investment shares are interrelated through the first two equations of (2.8). These equations provide, in a sense, consistency conditions between the agents’ behavior and the aggregate dynamics. They are considerably simplified in the fixed point due to the constant return history and consequences of the wealth evolution as discussed in the previous paragraph. Going through some simple algebra one obtains the following result.

Proposition 3.1. Let $x^*$ be a fixed point of the system (2.8). Then

$$x^*_n = f_n(r^*, \ldots, r^*) \quad \forall n \in \{1, \ldots, N\},$$

and the following two cases are possible:

(i) **Equity premium (EP) equilibria.** In $x^*$ there are $k$ survivors ($1 \leq k \leq N$) investing the same share $x_{1:k}^*$. The wealth shares of survivors are arbitrary numbers summing to 1, while the remaining agents have zero wealth shares.

The equilibrium return $r^*$ satisfies

$$r^* = r_f + \bar{y} \frac{x_{1:k}^*}{1 - x_{1:k}^*}.$$  

(ii) **No equity premium (NEP) equilibria.** In $x^*$ the equilibrium return $r^* = r_f - \bar{y}$.

The investment and wealth shares of the agents satisfy

$$\sum_{n=1}^{N} x^*_n \varphi^*_n = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{n=1}^{N} \varphi^*_n = 1.$$  

Proposition 3.1 shows that two types of equilibria are possible. If two assets give the same return, there is no equity premium of the risky asset. The selection mechanism does not work, but the consistency conditions imply the constraint (3.3). In all other equilibria there is an equity premium, positive or negative. Our main focus will be on such “equity premium” equilibria. To give them a geometric representation we introduce a special geometric locus.\(^3\)

**Definition 1.** The *Equilibrium Market Curve* (EMC) is the function \(l(r)\) defined as

\[
l(r) = \frac{r - r_f}{r + \bar{y} - r_f}, \quad \text{for} \quad r > -1.\]

Equation (3.2) can now be written as \(x_{10k}^* = l(r^*)\). Together with (3.1), it implies that for every survivor

\[
l(r^*) = f_n(r^*, \ldots, r^*), \quad (3.4)
\]

Thus, the equilibrium return, \(r^*\), and the equilibrium investment share of survivors, \(x_{10k}^*\), are simultaneously determined at an intersection point of two curves. One curve is the EMC which depends on the risk-free interest rate and the dividend yield and is independent of the agents’ behavior. All individual behavior relevant for the equilibrium dynamics is encompassed in the second curve, which is the graph of the investment function under the constraint \(r_{t-1} = \cdots = r_{t-L}\). However complex the agents’ behavior might be, it is only its restriction on the constant return history that matters for the characterization of equilibrium. This almost tautological statement has important implications for the geometric characterization of equilibria. The decisions of an agent can be represented as a graph of the investment function defined in (2.7). In general, this graph is an \(L\)-dimensional surface, as illustrated in the left panel of Fig. 1 for the case \(L = 2\). However, all equilibria can be found in a diagonal cross-section of this surface. Starting with an arbitrary investment function we give the following

**Definition 2.** The *symmetrization of the investment function* \(f\) is a cross-section of the graph of \(f(r_{t-1}, \ldots, r_{t-L})\) by the diagonal hyperplane \(r_{t-1} = \cdots = r_{t-L}\).

The surface in the left panel of Fig. 1 is intersected by the diagonal plane and the resulting symmetrization is shown as a thick curve. From (3.4) it follows that all possible equilibria are intersections of the symmetrization with the EMC (a thin hyperbolic curve in the cross-section). In what follows, by a slight abuse of language, the symmetrizations of the investment function will be simply referred to as “investment functions”.

In the right panel of Fig. 1 the EMC is shown together with 3 investment functions\(^4\) marked I, II and III. Each of them is, indeed, a symmetrization of some multi-dimensional investment function. For instance, the nonlinear curve of agent I is the same as in the cross-section of the left panel. All four intersections with the EMC represent equilibria in such a market with 3 agents. Consider, first, point \(U_2\). The agent II with the linear investment function is the only survivor. The abscissa of \(U_2\) gives the equilibrium return, the ordinate gives the investment share of the survivor. The investment shares of the two other agents are the values of their investment functions for the equilibrium return (see the arrows and equation (3.1)). Analogously, in equilibrium \(U_1\) agent I is the only survivor and the equilibrium return is the

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\(^3\)Introduced in Anufriev, Bottazzi, and Pancotto (2006) in a slightly different notation, this curve was first called the “Equilibrium Market Line”.

\(^4\)The illustration corresponds to the case when \(r_f < \bar{y}\). This is consistent with the real data collected by Robert Shiller and available on [http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm](http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm). For the period from 1871 till 2005 the average real one-year interest rate was 0.029 and the average dividend yield was 0.044.
highest possible for such market. In $S_2$ agent II is the survivor and the return is the smallest possible. Finally, consider equilibrium $S_1$. Since two investment functions intersect the EMC at the same point, there are two survivors here. Agent II, who does not survive, has $\varphi^*_2 = 0$. But the only restriction on the two other wealth shares is $\varphi^*_1 + \varphi^*_3 = 1$. Therefore, a single point $S_1$ represents, strictly speaking, infinitely many equilibria of the system (2.8).

A reader may suspect that the latter situation with coexistence of different agents in the EP equilibrium is exceptional, since the only way for this to occur is that two or more investment functions intersect the EMC at the same point. Recall, however, that functions which we see on the plot are the one-dimensional symmetrizations of the investment functions. Imagine a situation where the agents have the same demand function which depends on the expected return. Agent $n$ take an average of past $L_n$ returns as predictor. Since in the equilibrium the span does not matter, the investment functions of different agents will have the same symmetrization. In the plot with the EMC they will be indistinguishable and any intersection with the EMC will define infinitely many equilibria with arbitrary division of wealth between agents. On the other hand, these equilibria generate the same price dynamics since the return is the same in all of them.

To summarize, we investigated the questions of existence and location for the fixed points of deterministic system (2.8). It is no surprise that with general specification of the investment function we do not get a definite answer. However, we showed that all possible fixed points belong to the one-dimensional Equilibrium Market Curve whose shape is completely determined by the exogenous parameters of the system. The EMC in Definition 1 is defined only for $r > 1$ which guarantees the positiveness of price. In such case we call the equilibrium feasible. Now we restrict the generality of investment functions and use the EMC for some special cases.
3.2 Equilibria for linear investment functions

Assume that the symmetrization of the investment function f is a linear function. This symmetrization will be simply called "linear investment function". The linear function is a special but not peculiar case. Consider, for instance, the investment share (2.5) derived from the MV optimization. An agent knows that mean and variance of the yield are constant. Estimating the first two moments of the price return as sample moments on the basis of the past L observations, she will get $E_{t-1} [r_{t+1}] = r$ and $V_{t-1} [r_{t+1}] = 0$, and her investment function will obviously be linear.

Let us now apply the equilibrium analysis of Section 3.1 for such linear investment functions. We consider only the equilibria with equity premium. In this case from Proposition 3.1 it is clear that the properties of all multi-agent equilibria can be easily understood by studying the single agent case. The geometric plot of the EMC suggests that there can exist at most two equilibria for any linear investment function.

To formalize this, introduce the following parameterization of the investment function:

$$f(r, \ldots, r) = (A + 1) + B \left( r + \bar{y} - r_f \right),$$

where $B$ is the slope of the function, and $A + 1$ is an intersection with the vertical asymptote of the EMC. This parameterization is illustrated in the left panel of Fig. 2.

The following statement describes all the equilibrium possibilities for the market with one linear investment function.

**Proposition 3.2.** Consider equilibria of the market with a single agent possessing the investment function with linear symmetrization (3.5). Then the following two cases are possible:

(i) **Constant function:** $B = 0$. For $A = 0$ there are no equilibria. If $A \neq 0$ there exists one equilibrium with return

$$r^* = r_f - \frac{\bar{y}}{A} - \bar{y},$$

which is feasible, i.e. generates positive price, when $A < 0$ and when $A > A_F \equiv \frac{\bar{y}}{1 + r_f - \bar{y}}$. 
Figure 3: Equilibria $r_1^*$ and $r_2^*$ computed in Proposition 3.2 as functions of the slope $B$ of the linear investment function for $A = -0.6$ (left panel), and their movement as a result of the rotation of the investment function on the EMC plot (right panel).

(ii) **Non-constant function:** $B \neq 0$.

Set $D = A^2 - 4B\bar{y}$. If $D < 0$, then there are no equilibria. Otherwise, when $D \geq 0$, there are two equilibria (coinciding when $D = 0$) with the following returns:

$$r_1^* = r_f + \frac{-A - \sqrt{A^2 - 4B\bar{y}}}{2B} - \bar{y}, \quad r_2^* = r_f + \frac{-A + \sqrt{A^2 - 4B\bar{y}}}{2B} - \bar{y}. \quad (3.7)$$

The equilibrium is feasible if the return exceeds $-1$.

**Proof.** See appendix A. \qed

This Proposition provides all possible equilibrium values of the return for different linear investment functions (3.5). When $B = 0$ the agent’s investment does not depend on the past information and his function represents the horizontal line as shown in the right panel of Fig. 2. For $A$ positive the unique equilibrium belongs to the left branch of the EMC and generates negative equity premium. This equilibrium is feasible only if $A > A_F$, otherwise the prices are negative. For $A$ negative the equilibrium belongs to the right branch of the EMC, so that there is a positive equity premium.

When $B \neq 0$ one can distinguish between two cases (see the left panel of Fig. 2). If the investment function is decreasing, so that $B < 0$, it is always the case that $D > 0$ and, therefore, two equilibria exist. From (3.7) it follows that equilibrium $r_1^*$ belongs to the left branch of the EMC, while equilibrium $r_2^*$ belongs to the right branch of the EMC. In the opposite case, when $B > 0$, the investment function increases and can have 0, 1 or 2 equilibria. In the latter situation, $r_1^* < r_2^*$ and both equilibria belong to the left (right) branch of the EMC when $A > 0$ ($A < 0$).

Notice how easily one can do comparative statics exercises with the aid of such plots. For example, let us fix $A$ and change the slope $B$ of the investment function. In the left panel of Fig. 3 we draw the equilibria derived in Proposition 3.2 for $A = -0.6$ as functions of $B$. But these plots are obvious even without computations if one uses the EMC! Indeed, look at the right panel of the same figure. Start with vertical investment function and rotate it in the counter clockwise direction, so that $B$ increases from $-\infty$. First, there exist two equilibria with returns close to $r_f - \bar{y}$. In one of them the equity premium is positive and the return
Figure 4: Stratification of the parameter space \((A, B)\) according to the number of feasible equilibria. The dark grey (light grey, white) area represents the parameters for which there are two (one, zero) equilibria. See the text for the explanation of the regions marked by Roman numerals. Two specific examples illustrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 5 correspond to the movement along the directions shown by the arrows.

Increases. In the second equilibrium the equity premium is negative, the return decreases and becomes equal to \(-1\) at some value \(B = B_F\). This equilibrium is not feasible for \(B > B_F\). Increase \(B\) further until zero value. Now the investment function is horizontal with unique equilibrium. Further rotation leads to the emergence of the second equilibrium in the right branch of the EMC. The return in this equilibrium decreases. Finally, at some value \(B = B_T\) the investment function is tangent to the EMC and two equilibria coincide. For larger \(B\) there are no equilibria.

In Fig. 4 the stratification of the parameter space \((A, B)\) according to the number of different equilibria is shown. For the parameter pairs from the white area there are no feasible equilibria, for those pairs which belong to the light grey area only one such equilibrium exist, and, finally, if parameters belong to the dark grey area there exist two different equilibria. Three loci are important for the stratification of the parameter space. They are shown by the thick curves and divide the space into seven different regions marked by the Roman numerals. The first locus is a horizontal straight line corresponding to \(B = 0\). In this case the investment function is horizontal and there exist one equilibrium. Any change of \(B\) leads to the appearance of the second equilibrium which can be with negative prices (unfeasible), though. The curve with parabolic shape contains the points with \(A^2 = 4B\bar{y}\), i.e. those parameters for which the equilibrium is unique due to the tangency between the EMC and the investment function (3.5), like in Fig. 3 for \(B = B_T\). Thus, this parabola separates the parameters for which there are no equilibria (region V) from those for which two equilibria exist. This locus is called “tangency curve”. Finally, the third locus corresponds to the parameter pairs for which linear investment function passes through point \(F\) of the upper-left branch of the EMC, like in Fig. 3
for $B = B_F$. These pairs lie on the increasing line $A = \bar{y}/(1 + r_f - \bar{y}) - B(1 + r_f - \bar{y})$. With the crossing of this locus, which we call the “feasibility curve”, one feasible equilibrium is lost.\footnote{At this point the reader is highly encouraged to follow the discussion drawing the different possible mutual locations of the linear investment function and the EMC.} If $B < 0$, the equilibrium on the upper-left branch of the EMC disappears with decrease of $A$, so that two regions I and II are determined. If $B > 0$ and $A < 0$ then, as we mentioned above, both equilibria (if they exist) belong to the lower-right branch of the EMC and both are feasible, so that area VII is determined. Finally, if both $A$ and $B$ are positive, let us denote as $(A^*, B^*)$ the parameter pair defining the investment function which passes through $F$ and, at the same time, is tangent to the EMC. In region III only the equilibrium with the smallest return $r^*_1$ is feasible. When $A$ decreases there are two possible options: either $r^*_1$ also becomes infeasible or $r^*_2$ becomes feasible. From the EMC plot it is easy to see that the first case happens for $B < B^*$, i.e. when at point $F$ the investment function is flatter than the tangency line. In this case from region III we move to region VI. The second case happens when $B > B^*$ and we move from region III to IV.

An example of linear investment function. Following Chiarella and He (2001), let us consider an agent with constant relative risk aversion $\beta$ whose investment share is given by (2.5). Assume that his expectations are as follows
\begin{align}
E_{t-1}[r_{t+1} + y_{t+1}] &= r_f + \delta + d m_t, \quad (3.8) \\
V_{t-1}[r_{t+1} + y_{t+1}] &= \sigma^2 (1 + b (1 - (1 + v_t)^{-\xi})), \quad (3.9)
\end{align}
where $m_t$ and $v_t$ denote the sample estimates of the average return and its variance computed as equally weighted averages of the previous $L$ observations
\begin{align*}
    m_t &= \frac{1}{L} \sum_{k=1}^{L} (r_{t-k} + y_{t-k}) \quad \text{and} \quad v_t = \frac{1}{L} \sum_{k=1}^{L} (r_{t-k} + y_{t-k} - m_t)^2.
\end{align*}
The expression for the variance is justified in Franke and Sethi (1998), however, this choice and, in particular, positive parameters $b$ and $\xi$ turn out to be irrelevant for the equilibrium analysis. The specification of the expected conditional return (3.8) is important, however. It is defined as the risk-free rate $r_f$ plus the excess return. The latter is composed of a constant component representing a risk premium, $\delta \geq 0$, and a variable component, $d m_t$. The parameter $d$ represents the way in which agents react to variations in the history of realized returns and can be used to distinguish between different classes of investors. A trader with $d = 0$ will ignore past realized returns and, consequently, can be thought as a fundamentalist. If $d > 0$ the agent can be considered a trend follower, if $d < 0$ he can be considered a contrarian.

Direct substitutions of (3.8) and (3.9) into (2.5) gives the investment function
\begin{align}
f^{CH}(r_{t-1}, \ldots, r_{t-L}) &= \frac{\bar{\delta} + \bar{d} m_t}{1 + b (1 - (1 + v_t)^{-\xi})}, \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{\delta} = \frac{\delta}{\beta \sigma^2}, \quad \bar{d} = \frac{d}{\beta \sigma^2}. \quad (3.10)
\end{align}
In the equilibrium of the deterministic skeleton $m_t = \bar{y} + r^*$ and $v_t = 0$. Therefore, we are dealing with linear symmetrization
\begin{align}
f^{CH}(r, \ldots, r) &= \bar{\delta} + \bar{d} (\bar{y} + r). \quad (3.11)
\end{align}
Investment Share
Price Return
M
r M
EMC
trend-follower
fundamentalist
chartist

Figure 5: Example of linear investment functions: the case of homogeneous agents in the model of Chiarella and He (2001). **Left panel:** Equilibria as function of extrapolation parameter $\bar{d}$. (Cf. Figure 1 from the original paper.) **Right panel:** Investment functions for the contrarian, fundamentalist and trend-follower.

Let us fix the risk premium $\bar{\delta}$ together with the risk-free rate $r_f$ and analyse the equilibria for $\bar{d}$ varying. Cumbersome computations result in Proposition 3.1 and Figure 1 in Chiarella and He (2001). One can immediately reproduce these results looking at the EMC plot. Indeed, the linear function (3.11) in this case passes through the point $M = (-\bar{y}, \bar{\delta})$, which does not depend on $\bar{d}$. The slope of this function is $\bar{d}$ and so the change of the extrapolation parameter translates to the rotation of the line around point $M$. Three typical situations are presented in the right panel of Fig. 5. The horizontal investment function corresponds to $\bar{d} = 0$, i.e. to the fundamentalist type of behavior. Analogously, any trend-follower possesses an increasing investment function, while the chartist’s function is decreasing. The rotation argument immediately explains the left panel of Fig. 5 which is essentially Figure 1 from Chiarella and He (2001). The meaning of points $d_F$, $d_L$ and $d_U$ becomes clear. The former point corresponds to the investment function of contrarians passing through point $F$ of the EMC, while two latter points correspond to the tangency between the investment function and the EMC.

It is also useful to represent the family of functions (3.10) on the stratification diagram. Since function (3.11) in representation (3.5) has coefficients $A^{CH} = \bar{\delta} + \bar{d} r_f - 1$ and $B^{CH} = \bar{d}$, all couples $(A^{CH}, B^{CH})$ lie on the straight line with positive slope marked by the corresponding arrow in Fig. 4. The movement along the line corresponds to the change in the extrapolation parameter $\bar{d}$. Notice that the line intersects regions I, II, VII, V and (ultimately) IV, which is consistent with Fig. 5.

### 3.3 Equilibria for the EU maximizers

In the previous Section the EMC plot was effectively used to study the effects of change of different parameters of the demand functions. The real advantage of our geometric approach, however, can be seen in the situations when the demand function is not known explicitly. One such case arises when agents perceive any non-trivial distribution of the future wealth and maximize the EU with power function (2.6).

The way to resolve the problem is to derive some approximation of the solution. There are some issues with this approach. First, different approximations are possible. For instance,
Chiarella and He (2001) use the continuous-time approximation and get the mean-variance share (2.5) with the risk aversion coefficient $\gamma$. Campbell and Viceira (2002) derive another continuous-time approximation (formula (2.25) on p. 29) which differs from (2.5) on the constant term. Second, even if an approximation is precise in the limit when the time unit converges to zero, the error of the approximation for actual time scale can be large. Usually no estimation of the error incurred due to the approximation is provided, and so the reliability of such an approach is under question. Third, it may happen that the additional specific assumptions imposed on the return distribution (necessary to derive the approximation) are in contradiction with the realized dynamics. In this case the approximation is not justified anymore.

To overcome the problems with approximation let us, first, derive some properties of the actual solution. The EU maximization problem with power utility (2.6) leads to an investment function which depends on the risk aversion coefficient $\gamma$ and on the agent’s belief about the distribution of future excess return $z_{t+1} = r_{t+1} + y_{t+1} - r_f$. Let us denote this perceived distribution as $g(z)$, the expected value of the excess return as $\bar{z}$, and the corresponding investment function as $f^{EP}(\gamma, g(z))$. Then the following applies

**Proposition 3.3.** Let $f^{EP}_\gamma$ stand for the partial derivative of the investment function $f^{EP}$ with respect to the risk aversion coefficient $\gamma$.

If $\bar{z} \gtrless 0$, then $f^{EP} \gtrless 0$ and $f^{EP}_\gamma \gtrless 0$.

**Proof.** See appendix B. \qed

This Proposition together with the general results of Section 3.1 allows us to discuss some of the equilibrium properties of the market with the EU maximizers even without complete knowledge of their investment functions. For instance, it is immediately clear that such a market cannot be in equilibrium with $r^* + \bar{y} < r_f$. Such equilibria lie in the left branch of the EMC where the agents have positive investment shares. Therefore, they have to expect positive excess return which is inconsistent with the realized return.

Furthermore, Proposition 3.3 implies that, independently of the agent’s perceived distribution of the return, an increase in the risk aversion will result in a downward movement of those parts of the investment functions which lie above the horizontal axes and in an upward movement of those parts which are below the axes. It opens the way for the comparative statics. Assume that the market populated by the EU maximizers is in equilibrium. As it was shown above, these equilibria lie in the right branch of the EMC. If the agents expect positive (negative) excess return $\bar{z}$, then according to Proposition 3.3 they have to have a positive (negative) investment share and an increase in their risk aversion leads to some shift of the investment function down (up). Looking at the EMC one concludes that the equilibrium return $r^*$ will decrease (increase).

### 4 Stability analysis

The EMC can help with the comparative statics analysis. However, such analysis is not very informative if the equilibria under consideration are not stable. In this Section the stability analysis of the equilibria will be performed. It is organized much in the same way as Section 3; after the presentation of the general results the applications to the special cases are discussed.
4.1 Stability of general system

The local stability conditions are derived from the analysis of the roots of the characteristic polynomial associated with the Jacobian of the corresponding system computed at an equilibrium. The complete stability analysis for all equilibria of (2.8) is performed in Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006). Here we only reproduce some relevant parts of that analysis and proceed in two steps.

4.1.1 Evolutionary selection of agents

The following statement provides the first set of stability conditions.

Proposition 4.1. Let \( x^* \) be an EP equilibrium of system (2.8), found in Proposition 3.1(i), where the first \( k \) agents survive. The fixed point \( x^* \) is (locally) stable if the following two conditions are met:

1) the equilibrium investment shares of the non-surviving agents satisfy the relations

\[
-2 - r_f - r^* < x_n^*(r^* + \bar{y} - r_f) < r^* - r_f, \quad \text{for} \quad k < n \leq N.
\] (4.1)

2) after the elimination of the non-surviving agents, the same equilibrium is locally stable for the corresponding reduced system.


To understand this result notice that condition 2) is independent of the behavior of the non-survivors. It says that the stable equilibria are “self-consistent”, i.e. they remain stable after all non-surviving agents are removed from the economy. We investigate this condition below. Now turn to the condition 1) and specifically to the rightmost inequality in (4.1). Remember that the survivor’s investment share \( x^*_1 = (r^* - r_f)/(r^* + \bar{y} - r_f) \). Thus, in the equilibria on the right branch of the EMC (with positive equity premium) this inequality reduces to \( x_n^* < x^*_1 \), while on the left branch of the EMC (with negative equity premium) it becomes \( x_n^* > x^*_1 \). In words, the survivors must be the most aggressive investors in equilibria where the risky asset is more attractive among the two, otherwise they have to be the least aggressive investors. This result is a direct consequence of the replicator dynamics governing the evolution of the wealth shares (cf. the last equation in (2.8)) and provides the condition for evolutionary stability against the invasion of the market by another agent. An incumbent would start to lose her wealth if an infinitesimally small initial wealth is assigned to an agent with higher share to invest in the most attractive asset among the two.

In the left panel of Fig. 6 we report in grey those regions where inequalities (4.1) hold. For the same market as in the right panel of Fig. 1 equilibrium \( S_2 \) turns out to be unstable, since the investment function of the non-surviving agents there has greater value and does not belong to the grey area. Analogously \( U_1 \) is unstable since agent II is more aggressive in this equilibrium. On the other hand, in \( U_2 \) and in all the equilibria in \( S_1 \) the condition 1) of Proposition 4.1 is satisfied.

4.1.2 Stability of equilibria without non-survivors

Consider now the second condition of Proposition 4.1. When all the non-survivors are eliminated, the reduced system has still the same form (2.8). When is the equilibrium of this system stable? Let us, first, discuss the simplest case and then generalize.
Case of one survivor with $L = 1$. The wealth dynamics is irrelevant in the reduced system with a single survivor. If the memory span $L = 1$, the system becomes two dimensional, and one gets

**Proposition 4.2.** The fixed point of system (2.8) with a single investment function $x_{t+1} = f(r_t)$ is (locally) asymptotically stable if

$$
\frac{f'(r^*)}{l'(r^*)} < 1, \quad \frac{f'(r^*)}{l'(r^*)} < 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{f'(r^*)}{l'(r^*)} > -1.
$$

where $f'(r^*)$ and $l'(r^*)$ stand for the first derivative of the investment function $f(r)$ and of the EMC $l(r)$ computed in equilibrium, respectively.

The equilibrium is unstable if at least one of the inequalities in (4.2) holds with the opposite (strict) sign. The stability is lost through a Neimark-Sacker, fold or flip bifurcation if the first, the second or the third inequality, respectively, is violated.

**Proof.** See appendix C.

The region where conditions (4.2) are satisfied is shown in the right panel of Fig. 6 in coordinates $r^*$ and $f'(r^*)/l'(r^*)$. The second coordinate is the relative slope of the investment function at equilibrium with respect to the slope of the EMC. If the slope of $f$ at the equilibrium increases, the system tends to lose its stability. In particular, in the stable equilibrium the slope of the investment function is smaller than the slope of the EMC. Once again let us consider the market in the left panel of Fig. 6 and suppose for the moment that these are the functions of the agents with memory span 1. We immediately see that equilibria $U_1$ and $U_2$ are unstable, due to the violation of the second inequality in (4.2).

**General case.** In general, the stability depends on the behavior of the individual investment functions in an infinitesimal neighborhood of the equilibrium $\mathbf{x}^*$. In contrast to the single survivor case the investment functions of all survivors are important for stability, and in contrast to the case with $L = 1$ the derivatives with respect to different variables matter.
Introduce the stability polynomial of the investment function \( f \) in \( x^* \) as

\[
P_f(\mu) = \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_{t-1}} \mu^{L-1} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_{t-2}} \mu^{L-2} + \cdots + \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_{t-L+1}} \mu + \frac{\partial f}{\partial r_{t-L}},
\]

(4.3)

where all the derivatives of \( f \) are computed in the point \((r^*, \ldots, r^*)\). The general stability conditions can be formulated as follows

**Proposition 4.3.** Let \( x^* \) be a fixed point of system (2.8), where all \( k \) agents survive. Let \( P_{f_n}(\mu) \) be the stability polynomial of the investment function \( f_n \). The equilibrium \( x^* \) is (locally) stable if all the roots of the polynomial

\[
Q_{1ok}(\mu) = \mu^{L+1} - \frac{(1 + r^*) \mu - (1 + r_f)}{(r^* - r_f) l'(r^*)} \sum_{n=1}^{k} \varphi_n^* P_{f_n}(\mu),
\]

(4.4)

lie inside the unit circle.

**Proof.** See appendix F in Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006).

The analysis of the roots of \( Q_{1ok}(\mu) \) can be used to reveal the role of the different parameters in stabilizing or destabilizing a given equilibrium. Such analysis is quite complicated and almost no general conclusions can be obtained. Notice, however, that if the survivors’ investment function are horizontal in the equilibrium, all the roots of polynomial \( Q_{1ok} \) are zeros and \( x^* \) is stable. Since the roots of a polynomial are continuous functions of its coefficients, we conclude that equilibria with flat enough investment functions are stable, similar to the case \( L = 1 \). Furthermore, since the stability polynomials of the investment functions are weighted in (4.4), the equilibria can be stabilized if the survivors with the steep investment functions have small enough relative wealth.

### 4.1.3 Optimal selection in the equilibrium

Before applying the stability results to the special cases, let us have another look at Proposition 4.1. The total wealth in the economy asymptotically coincides with the wealth accumulated by the survivors. Therefore, the inequality on the right hand-side of (4.1) can also be interpreted as follows. The economy never ends up in a situation where its growth rate is lower than it would be if the survivors were substituted by some other agents. This result can be called an optimal selection principle since it suggests that the market endogenously selects the best aggregate outcome.

It is important to keep in mind two limitations of this principle. First, condition 2) of Proposition 4.1 indicates that the principle does not apply to the whole set of equilibria. Namely, the reduced system should satisfy the conditions of Proposition 4.3. For instance, the market in the left panel of Fig. 6 will never end up in \( U_2 \) even if these are the equilibria with the highest returns. Second, there are single investment functions generating multiple stable equilibria, as an example in the left panel of Fig. 7 demonstrates. Equilibria \( S_L \) and \( S_H \) are stable, as the investment function is (almost) horizontal in these two points. Thus, the optimal selection principle has only a local character: the economy does not necessarily converge to the stable equilibrium with the highest possible return.
4.2 Stability for a single linear investment function

In Section 3.2 we characterized possible equilibria in the market where a single agent has investment functions with linear symmetrization. Can we tell something about their stability? One problem here is that the assumption of linearity of the symmetrization does not provide any information about the \( L \) partial derivatives of the function \( f \) in equilibrium, which appear in the stability polynomial (4.3). However, if \( L = 1 \), then Proposition 4.2 gives stability conditions explicitly. Therefore, we strengthen here the assumption about the linear form (3.5) for the “symmetrization” of the investment function and assume that the investment function itself is linear:

\[
 f(r) = (A + 1) + B (r + \bar{y} - r_f). \tag{4.5}
\]

Linear investment choice based on a naïve forecast of the future return represents a possible interpretation of such behavior. From (4.2) we obtain the following conditions sufficient for stability:

\[
 \frac{B}{l'(r^*) \frac{1 + r_f}{r^* - r_f}} < 1, \quad \frac{B}{l'(r^*)} < 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{B}{l'(r^*) \frac{2 + r^* + r_f}{r^* - r_f}} > -1, \tag{4.6}
\]

where \( r^* \) stands for the equilibrium return. Corresponding values of the return were computed in Proposition 3.2. Plugging them into (4.6), one can express stability conditions and bifurcation loci through parameters \( A \) and \( B \). The resulting expressions are quite cumbersome, so we provide only their geometric illustration.

In Fig. 8 we consider the parametric space \((A, B)\) and produce its stratification according to the validity of the stability conditions for both equilibria found in Proposition 3.2. In each point of the space we compute the corresponding equilibrium (if it exists) and check whether each of the three inequalities (4.6) holds. In the grey regions the corresponding equilibrium exists, it is feasible and stable. Otherwise, the parameter couple belongs to the white region. Apart from the “tangency” and “feasibility” curves (thick lines) which we used to get Fig. 4, we show as dotted thick lines different bifurcation loci. They correspond to the points where one of the inequalities (4.6) changes its sign. For example, the convex parabola corresponds to those points where the first inequality changes its sign. In these points the system exhibits the

Figure 7: **Left panel:** In the market with single agent multiple stable equilibria can be generated by non-linear investment function. **Right panel:** Equilibria in the market with the EU maximizing fundamentalists.
Figure 8: Stratification of the parameter space \((A, B)\) according to the stability of equilibria. **Left panel:** stability of the first root \(r_1^*\). **Right panels:** stability of the second root \(r_2^*\). The corresponding root is stable if parameters belong to the grey area.

Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Analogously, the concave parabola in the left panel and another concave parabola in the right panel represent points of the flip bifurcations, where the third inequality (4.6) changes the sign.

Fig. 8 suggests that even if two feasible equilibria can coexist for linear investment functions, at least one of them will be unstable. We prove this in the following

**Proposition 4.4.** There is at most one feasible stable equilibrium in the market with the single linear investment function (4.5).

*Proof.* See appendix D.

This Proposition shows that the restriction of the analysis to the market populated by the agents with linear investment functions (in particular, those who derive their demand through the MV optimization) leads to the impossibility of having the phenomenon of multiple *stable* equilibria in the single agent case. If non-linear investment functions were allowed, many stable equilibria could co-exist. As a consequence of this limitation, the range of possible market dynamics can be oversimplified if only “linear” behaviors are considered.

### 4.3 Stability for the EU maximizers on the EMC

In Section 3.3 it was shown that even if the investment functions are not given explicitly, the EMC can help in the comparative statics analysis. The stability results, especially Proposition 4.1, enrich this analysis even further. Let us consider the population of the fundamentalists, i.e. EU maximizers with homogeneous expectations which do not depend on the past returns. This assumption implies that the investment functions are horizontal. Depending on the sign of the expectations for the excess return, \(r_t + y_t - r_f\), two cases are possible.

If expectations are positive, then the investment functions are positive (Proposition 3.3). Now, from the general stability analysis it follows that if the investment shares of all the agents are less than 1, then the only stable equilibrium is generated by the most aggressive agent. Using once again Proposition 3.3 we conclude that only the agent with the smallest risk aversion survive in the stable equilibrium \(S_p\), see the right panel of Fig. 7. Notice, however,
that if such a market has an agent with so low risk aversion that she is willing to go short in
the riskless asset, the situation without stable equilibrium can arise.

Analogously, if fundamentalists believe that the excess return will be negative, their inv-
vestment functions lie below 0 and now the agent with the highest risk aversion coefficient will
survive in the stable equilibrium. Notice, however, that in this equilibrium the realized excess
return is positive, which is inconsistent with the expectations.

5  Equilibria with multiple Mean-Variance investors

Let us start with a brief review. In Section 2.2 it was shown that the mean-variance op-
timization leads to the demand function consistent with the constant relative risk aversion
framework. In Section 3.2 the special property of the corresponding investment functions,
namely linearity, was identified and the consequences for the location of equilibria were in-
vigated. Finally, in Section 4.2 it was proven that the market with such single function
cannot have multiple stable equilibria. The last step consists in the analysis of the market
with heterogeneous MV optimizers. Such analysis has been performed in Chiarella and He
(2001), henceforth CH. In this Section we reconsider it using the geometric tool of the EMC.

5.1 Model of Chiarella and He: review of the results

CH consider agents with investment function $f^{\text{CH}}$ given in (3.10). All these agents have
the same risk aversion coefficient $\gamma = 1$. First, the model with homogeneous expectations
is analyzed. The risk premium $\bar{\delta}$ of identical demand functions of agents is fixed and the
extrapolation parameter $\bar{d}$ is changing, so that the situations of fundamental, trend-following
or contrarian behavior as described in Section 3.2 are possible. Stability analysis is performed
for the case $\bar{d} = 0$, when the unique equilibrium is asymptotically stable and for the case when
$\bar{d} \neq 0$ and $L = 1$ when the sufficient conditions for stability are derived (Corollary 3.3). For
larger memory span $L$ the numerical approach is exploited which shows that the stability can
be brought to the system through increase of the memory span. The qualitative aspects of
the equilibrium and stability analysis of the single-agent case are summarized in Figure 1 of
that paper.

Second, the market with two investors is analyzed and four different scenarios are consid-
ered. In the first scenario there are two fundamentalists with different risk premium. The
equilibrium analysis shows that there are two equilibria in such a market (Proposition 4.2),
but only one of them is stable (Corollary 4.3). It leads to an “optimal selection principle” for
this scenario, which states that the investor with the higher risk premium will survive.

The second scenario corresponds to the market with one fundamentalist and one contrarian.
There exist three steady-states for such a market, but the price return is positive in only
two of them (Proposition 4.4). Fundamentalist dominates the market in one of these two
steady-states and contrarian dominates the market in another one. The stability analysis can
be performed analytically only for the former steady-state (Corollary 4.5). As a result of
numerical analysis of the stability of the latter steady-state, CH conclude that the long-run
return dynamics depend on the relative levels of the returns in these two steady-states and
follow a similar optimal selection principle. Namely, the steady-state is stable if it generates
the highest return.

In the third example of heterogeneous market fundamentalist meets trend-follower. Such
market has one equilibrium where the fundamentalist survives. It also can have zero, one or
two equilibria with surviving trend-follower (Proposition 4.6). Similar to the previous example, the stability conditions for the latter equilibria are obtained through numerical investigation. It is found that for small extrapolation rates (i.e. for relatively small value of $\bar{d}$ of the trend-follower) there exist two equilibria where the trend-follower survives. The highest return is generated in one of these equilibria which is, however, unstable. Between the two remaining equilibria “the stability switching follows a (quasi-)optimal selection principle”, depending where the return is higher.

Finally, in their last example CH consider the market with two chartists. In this case there exist multiple steady states. If traders extrapolate strongly one of the steady-states is stable. For weak extrapolators, “the stability of the system follows the (quasi-)optimal selection principle – the steady-state having relatively higher return tends to dominate the market in the long run”.

To summarize, Chiarella and He have found a quasi-optimal selection principle which allows the prediction of the long-run market dynamics in the case, when there are multiple equilibria. There is an important difference between it and the optimal selection principle which we formulated in Section 4.1.3. The principle in CH has a global character. When the ecology of the traders is fixed, it can be applied to the market, so that a unique possible outcome is predicted. Our optimal selection principle has a local character, instead. For a given traders’ ecology there can be different possibilities of the market long-run behavior, i.e. multiple equilibria. The final outcome depends on the initial conditions and, in the stochastic case, on the yield dynamics, and cannot be predicted a priori. However, independently of the realized equilibria, the survivors will be chosen in “optimal” way: to allow the highest possible growth rate of the economy in this point. In some sense, our principle selects among investment functions, while the principle in CH chooses among equilibria.

### 5.2 Model of Chiarella and He: geometric approach

We have already seen that analytic results of equilibrium analysis of the CH model for the single agent case become clearer if one uses geometric tools. Stability analysis for the case $L = 1$ can also be illustrated in the stratification diagram in Fig. 8. In particular, any horizontal (fundamental) investment function is stable, and such equilibrium remains to be stable for $\bar{d}$ close to 0. Moreover, the equilibrium $r_1^*$ is stable for very small negative $\bar{d}$, while the equilibrium $r_2^*$ is stable for very large positive $\bar{d}$.

Now we turn to the two-agent case and illustrate four scenarios in Fig. 9 with the EMC plot. Consider, first, the case of two fundamentalists with different risk premia $\tilde{\delta}_1 > \tilde{\delta}_2$ (the left panel, first row). These traders have horizontal investment functions passing through the points $M_1 = (\bar{y} - \bar{\delta}_1)$ and $M_2 = (\bar{y} - \bar{\delta}_2)$. From the assumption on the risk premia it follows that $M_1$ is above $M_2$. There are two equilibria in such a market: $S$ and $U$. Each of these equilibria would be stable if the corresponding agent were to operate alone. When the two agents operate together, then equilibrium $S$ with the highest risk premium is stable, while $U$ is unstable. Notice that this result can be immediately generalized for the case of an arbitrary number of fundamentalists.

Let us now suppose that a fundamentalist with risk premium $\tilde{\delta}_1$ encounters in the market a contrarian with risk premium $\tilde{\delta}_2$, so that horizontal and decreasing investment functions are competing. CH distinguish between two cases depending on which of these risk premia is higher. Geometrically, it corresponds to the location of points $M_1$ and $M_2$. We start with the
Figure 9: Equilibria in the model of Chiarella and He with two agents. See text for explanation.
case in which $\bar{\delta}_1 \geq \bar{\delta}_2$, i.e. when point $M_1$ is above $M_2$ (the right panel, first row). With respect to the previous case we have made a rotation of the lower investment function around point $M_2$. It is obvious that the equilibrium $S_f$ is always stable in this case, while the equilibrium $S_c$ cannot be stable. Thus, the left plot in Figure 3 of CH illustrating the qualitative features of this situation is obtained. In the second case, when $\bar{\delta}_1 < \bar{\delta}_2$, there are different possibilities. If the contrarian extrapolates not very strongly, so that an absolute value of $\bar{\delta}_2$ is small enough (left panel, second row), then $S_f$ is, certainly, an unstable equilibrium. Therefore $S_c$ remains to be the only candidate for the stable equilibrium in this market. It will be stable only when it is stable in the single agent case, which happens for relatively small $\bar{d}_2$ (see the left panel in Fig. 8). Otherwise, there is no stable equilibrium in the market. If, on the other hand, the contrarian extrapolates strongly (the right panel, second row), then $S_f$ is the only stable equilibrium. Comparing this analysis with the second graph in Figure 3 in CH, we can see that the situation of possible absence of any stable equilibrium in the market has been overlooked.

In the third example we consider the case when the fundamentalist with the risk premium $\bar{\delta}_1$ competes with the trend-follower with the risk premium $\bar{\delta}_2$. In this example, we again distinguish between two cases depending on which of the risk premia is greater. Let us, first, assume that $\bar{\delta}_1 \geq \bar{\delta}_2$. There are two possibilities. If the trend follower extrapolates not too strongly, the equilibrium $S_t$ is not stable (the left panel, third row). The equilibrium $S_f$ is stable in this case. If the trend follower extrapolates more strongly, her investment function rotates and the equilibrium $S_f$ loses its stability. $S_t$ remains to be the only candidate for the stable equilibrium. If it exists and is stable in the market with the trend-follower alone, then it is also stable in the two-agent situations (the right panel, third row). Otherwise, there are no stable equilibria in the market with two agents. Such will be the case for $d_U > \bar{d}_2 > d_L$, since in this situation there is no equilibrium in the market with surviving trend-follower. But it also happens for some $\bar{d}_2$ lower than $d_L$. Finally, for very strong extrapolation, when $\bar{d}_2 > d_U$, the market may have a stable equilibrium, if it exists for the trend-follower. In the case when $\bar{\delta}_1 < \bar{\delta}_2$ (the left panel, fourth row) it is obvious that equilibrium $S_f$ cannot be stable, therefore the market will have a stable equilibrium $S_t$ whenever it is stable for the trend-follower, that is for small enough $\bar{d}_2$.

Finally, in the right panel of the fourth row of Fig. 9 we consider an example when two technical traders coexist in the market. We draw the situation when both of them are trend-followers and have the same risk premium, so that their investment functions pass through the same point $M$. It is clear, that the agent with the lowest extrapolation rate will generate the equilibrium $S_2$ which will always be unstable. Instead, the equilibrium $S_t$ generated by the second agent will be stable if and only if it is stable in the single agent market. Comparing it with the panel (b) in Figure 5 in CH, we notice that with further increase of $\bar{d}_2$ the stable equilibrium (with growing return) becomes unstable and, eventually, disappears. So that for higher extrapolation rates the market does not have any equilibrium.

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6All plots in Chiarella and He (2001) which we mention here and below are just sketches obtained from the mixture of the analytic and numerical analysis. The advantage of our approach is that these qualitative sketches can be obtained from the EMC plot. Thus, on the one hand, they all become justified on an analytic basis. On the other hand, they also become clearer and, thus, can be easily generalized for the situations of three and more agents, and also corrected. For example, notice that in this case the return in equilibrium $S_c$ does not approach the return in equilibrium $S_f$ when $\bar{d}_2 \to 0$.  

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6 Conclusion

In this paper we have applied the general model of Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006) to a special class of agents’ behavior. For the application we have chosen the most common class in economics, namely the class of optimizing behavior, and demonstrated that the model has implications for a very large subset of this class.

The generality of the Anufriev and Bottazzi framework together with the geometric representation of their results allowed us to overcome well-known technical difficulties in the expected utility maximization setting. We have shown, for instance, that investment functions derived in this setting, which are only implicitly defined, shift downward with risk aversion. This immediately implies, given the geometric nature of the locus of all possible equilibria (the Equilibrium Market Curve), that the price return will decrease when the risk aversion coefficient of the agents increases. This result is not new in the economics literature: if the agents are willing to take a smaller amount of risk, they will also get a smaller return. What is new, however, is that we have rigorously obtained this result from the framework with endogenous price setting.

We have also analyzed the setting where the agents have mean-variance demand. In this case we have demonstrated that the qualitative results about market dynamics can be obtained using the EMC plot. As an application, we have shown that the analytic model with heterogeneous agents presented in Chiarella and He (2001) can be easily understood and generalized in many directions. Namely, the analysis can be extended for an arbitrarily large number of agents with arbitrary risk aversion and expectation rules. Probably, the easiest way to illustrate the advantages of the general approach is to have a look at the stratification diagrams at Fig. 4 and 8, drawn for a special, “linear” case of the agent’s behavior. Even in this particular case, the scope of the model of Chiarella and He is represented by a one-dimensional straight line. Moreover, only a small interval of this line is analyzed in that model, since the risk premium is assumed to be bound inside an interval $(0, 1)$.

In our view, the most interesting implication of this paper is that some features of the long-run market dynamics, like multiple equilibria, cannot occur in a market with this specific population ecology. The global, quasi-optimal selection principle of Chiarella and He may hold when all demand functions are derived from mean-variance optimization, but it does not hold in general. In this respect, it seems promising, for further research, to apply the general framework from Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006) to other, non-rational, types of behavior, e.g. those advocated by prospect theory or the behaviors based on threshold levels.

APPENDIX: Proofs of Propositions

A Proof of Proposition 3.2

In the case $B = 0$ condition $l(r^*) = f(r^*, . . . , r^*)$ implies that $A + 1 = l(r)$, which is a linear equation with respect to $r$. We get (3.6) as soon as $A \neq 0$. If, instead, $B \neq 0$, then from definition of the EMC we get the following quadratic equation with respect to $r + \bar{y} - r_f$:

$$B (r + \bar{y} - r_f)^2 + A (r + \bar{y} - r_f) + \bar{y} = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.1)

The discriminant of this equation $D = A^2 - 4B\bar{y}$. Solving (A.1) in the case when $D > 0$ one gets (3.7).
B  Proof of Proposition 3.3

Let us introduce the following function

\[ h(x_t, \gamma) = \int z (1 + x_t z)^{-\gamma} g(z) \, dz, \]

where \( g(z) \) is the perceived distribution of the next period excess return \( z \). This distribution, in general, depends on the return history. The value of the investment function \( f^{EP} \), or in other words, the investment share \( x^* \) of the agent who solves the EU maximization problem with power utility function (2.6) is the solution of the first-order condition (f.o.c.) \( h(x, \gamma) = 0 \).

Let us, first, assume that \( x > 0 \). Then, for both positive and negative \( z \) we have \( z > z (1 + x^* z)^{-\gamma} \). Multiplying both parts of this inequality on the function \( g \), integrating with respect to \( z \), and applying the f.o.c., we get \( \bar{z} > 0 \). Analogously, if \( x < 0 \), then \( z < z (1 + x^* z)^{-\gamma} \) for any \( z \neq 0 \), and, therefore, \( \bar{z} < 0 \).

Finally, when \( x = 0 \) f.o.c. implies that \( \bar{z} = 0 \). This proves the first part of the statement.

The f.o.c. actually defines \( x^* \) as an implicit function of the risk-aversion coefficient \( \gamma \). Applying the implicit function theorem we get that

\[ f^{EP}_\gamma = -\frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\int z \log(1 + x^* z)(1 + x^* z)^{-\gamma} g(z) \, dz}{\int z^2 (1 + x^* z)^{-\gamma-1} g(z) \, dz}. \]

The denominator of the last expression is always positive, while the numerator is positive when \( x^* > 0 \) and negative, otherwise. This proves the second part of the statement.

C  Proof of Proposition 4.2

We are dealing with a special case in which the system (2.8) has the form:

\[
\begin{align*}
x_{t+1} &= f(r_t) \\
r_{t+1} &= r_f + \frac{(1 + r_f)(x_{t+1} - x_t) + \bar{y}x_{t+1}x_t}{x_t(1 - x_{t+1})}.
\end{align*}
\]

The Jacobian matrix \( J \) of this system at a fixed point reads

\[
J = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & (1 + r^*)/(x^*(1 - x^*)) \\
-(1 + r_f)/(x^*(1 - x^*)) & (1 + r^*)f'/(x^*(1 - x^*))
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

It is well-known that the system is asymptotically stable if the following three conditions are satisfied: \( d < 1 \), \( t < 1 + d \) and \( t > -1 - d \), where \( t \) and \( d \) stand for the trace and determinant of the matrix \( J \), respectively. Inequalities (4.2) are obtained by direct substitution taking into account that \( f'(r^*) = x^*(1 - x^*)/(r^* - r_f) \).

D  Proof of Proposition 4.4

The constant investment function has either one or zero equilibria. For the increasing function consider the second inequality in (4.6). Substitution of the EMC’s slope in equilibrium leads to

\[
B (\bar{y} + r^* - r_f)^2 - \bar{y} < 0 \quad \iff \quad -A (\bar{y} + r^* - r_f) - 2\bar{y} < 0,
\]

where we used the relation (A.1). Plugging in the corresponding equilibrium values from (3.7), one can simplify the resulting inequality using \( B > 0 \) and get

\[
\sqrt{A^2 - 4B\bar{y}} + A < 0 \quad \text{in } r_1^* \quad \text{and} \quad \sqrt{A^2 - 4B\bar{y}} - A < 0 \quad \text{in } r_2^*.
\]

When \( A > 0 \), the left inequality is violated and therefore \( r_1^* \) is unstable. Otherwise, \( r_2^* \) is unstable.

Consider now the case of decreasing investment function \( B < 0 \). From (3.7) it follows that the equilibria are such that \( r_2^* < r_f - \bar{y} < r_1^* \). If the equilibrium return is negative, the first inequality in (4.6) leads to

\[
B (1 + r_f) (\bar{y} + r^* - r_f)^2 - (r^* - r_f)\bar{y} > 0 \quad \iff \quad -A (1 + r_f) (\bar{y} + r^* - r_f) - \bar{y}(1 + r^*) > 0.
\]
When $A \leq 0$, it, obviously, always holds with the opposite sign in feasible $r^*_2$, i.e. $r^*_2$ is always unstable in this case. Analogously, when $r^*_1$ is negative it will be unstable when $A > 0$.

The final case to consider is when both $A$ and $r^*_1$ are positive. The third inequality in (4.6) leads to

$$B(2 + r^*_1 + r_f)\left(\bar{y} + r^*_1 - r_f\right)\bar{y} > 0 \iff -A(2 + r^*_1 + r_f)\left(\bar{y} + r^*_1 - r_f\right) - 2\bar{y}(1 + r_f) > 0,$$

which is always violated. Thus, in all the cases when two feasible equilibria exist one of them is unstable.

References


