

Democracy and denomination: democratic values among Muslim minorities and the majority population in Denmark

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
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Democracy and Denomination: Democratic values among Muslim minorities and the majority population in Denmark

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4 **Democracy and Denomination: Democratic values among Muslim minorities and**
5 **the majority population in Denmark**
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10 Peter Gundelach
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15 **Abstract**

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17 Based on a survey of ethnic minorities (immigrants as well as descendants) and
18 the ethnic majority, this article analyses the distribution and explanation of
19 democratic values in Denmark. Democratic values are measured according to
20 three criteria: Democratic principles, democratic rights and family democracy.
21
22 With respect to democratic rights, the analysis shows that Muslim immigrants
23 and descendants score slightly lower on democratic principles and family
24 democracy; however, they have more democratic values than the majority of the
25 populations in Western Europe. Democratic values do not differ between
26 immigrants and descendants of the same ethnic group, and differences in values
27 do not depend on immigrants' length of stay in the host society. Finally, among
28 ethnic minorities of mixed religious composition, the differences between the
29 Muslim parts of these groups are larger than the differences between ethnic
30 groups. Thus, differences in democratic values are explained by ethnicity, not
31 religion.
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44 **Keywords:** Immigrants; Islam; survey data; national identity, Denmark, democracy.
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47 **Islam, immigrants and democracy**
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51 Huntington's (1993, 1997) famous thesis about the clash of civilizations has generated
52 much debate. Huntington argues that a cultural cleft has emerged between Western and
53 Islamic civilizations - a clash of cultures that is strongly related to religion.
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55 Huntington's writings are perhaps best understood as a provocation, and many critics
56 have argued that his thesis cannot be substantiated at macro level (cp. the debate in
57 Huntington 1996).
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Huntington's argument refers to large cultural entities – civilizations – but he also argues that clashes of civilizations might be found inside Western European countries as a consequence of the increase in Muslim immigrants. Huntington claims that Europe is threatened by 'Islamization' (Huntington 1996, p. 204) and 'Muslims pose the immediate problem to Europe' (Huntington 1996, p. 204). According to Huntington, democracy is one of the important issues that divide civilizations. In particular, he notes that Islam is associated with authoritarian rule and Christianity with democracy.

However, we still lack studies that analyze a possible clash of civilisations (i.e. sizeable value differences) at the individual level in Western countries (for an exception based on the World Values Survey and consequently with very few respondents from ethnic minorities, see Pettersson 2007). This article addresses this need, using a relatively unique data set: A Danish survey of values among eight ethnic groups: Ethnic Danes and seven ethnic minorities in which all or some members are Muslims.

If Huntington's thesis were correct, we would expect a lower level of support for democratic values among Muslim minorities in Western countries compared to the support shown by the Christian majority population. Huntington's fear is shared by Fukuyama (2006) who is concerned that immigration to Western Europe - particularly the increasing number of Muslim immigrants - will result in a struggle between radical Islamism and liberal democracy.

Democratic values are fundamental to Western societies. Most European countries have references to democracy and human rights written into their constitutions, and democracy is codified as a principle of the European Union. The preamble of the 2004 draft treaty mentions 'the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law' (*Eur-Lex*, vol. 47, December 16, 2004, p. 3). Even for supporters of multiculturalism, who argue that societies should accommodate a large variety of values based on cultural differences, the acceptance of parliamentary democracy and freedom of speech and religion are seen as a non-negotiable principles (Borowski 2000).

Scholars like Fukuyama and Huntington fear that immigration may create problems for Western democracies for at least two reasons. Firstly, in general immigrants come from countries that are less democratic than the Western European

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4 countries they immigrate to (Puddington and Piano 2005). This observation is
5 documented in The Freedom House Survey that measures a country's level of
6 democracy according to two criteria: Political rights and civil liberties. There is some
7 variation these countries' total score but in general the score is lower than that of any
8 Western European country. Even though we may be able to estimate the character of
9 the regime we have very little reliable evidence about the attitudes in the general
10 population in these countries. Perhaps the support for democracy among the general
11 public is higher than one would expect, judging by the character of regime. At least this
12 result was found by Tessler (2003) in a study of Arab countries but even so it seems
13 reasonable to argue that in general the general support for democracy in these countries
14 is lower than in the Western world.

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16 Secondly, most of the immigrants to Western Europe come from countries that
17 are dominated by Islam. Some critics argue that Islam's relation to democracy is
18 ambiguous, if not dubious. Nasr claims that the 'Islamic view of democracy is not
19 something deeply legitimate, but at best ... a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining
20 the power to build an Islamic state' (Nasr 2005, p. 13). By contrast, Ibrahim (2006)
21 argues that 'several crucial elements of constitutional democracy and civil society are
22 also moral imperatives of Islam' (Ibrahim 2006, p. 7). The same difference of opinion is
23 found at a public discursive level in Western societies both among politicians and in
24 the general population.

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26 This article explores whether the Fukuyama/Huntington thesis about different
27 sets of values among Muslim minorities and the Christian majority population can be
28 substantiated in the case of Denmark. Our analysis is based on a survey among
29 immigrants, descendants, and Danes undertaken in spring, 2006. According to the
30 Fukuyama/Huntington thesis, a comparison of these groups would reflect a higher level
31 of democratic values among Danes than among Muslim minorities. However, the
32 Fukuyama/Huntington thesis does not allow us to determine whether the level of
33 democratic sentiment differs among immigrants and descendants; nor does it allow for
34 differences among ethnic minority groups. That is why a set of alternative hypotheses
35 is needed.

Alternative hypotheses: Socialization and nation

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An alternative to the religious hypothesis is the assumption that political socialization will change the values of the individual. Almond and Verba's famous study, *The Civic Culture* (1963) argues that political socialization is a crucial mechanism for creating political values and skills among citizens. According to Sapiro (2004), the concept of political socialization had its heyday in the 1980s but has received less attention in recent decades. However, political socialization is becoming increasingly relevant to the development of political involvement and values among immigrants. A general socialization hypothesis suggests that the mere fact of living in a society with democratic institutions will teach individual citizens democratic values.

In order to analyse political socialization, we need to differentiate between two groups: Immigrants and descendants. Immigrants (including family-reunited individuals) are people who were born abroad and have come to Denmark either to work or as refugees from their home country. In other words, they have lived only part of their lives in Denmark. They are expected to have a lower level of democratic awareness than native Danes when arriving in Denmark. Based on the political socialization hypothesis, however, we would expect that the longer an immigrant lives in Denmark, the stronger his/her democratic values will become.

Descendants are people who have lived in Denmark all their lives. Their socialization has taken place in a society with democratic institutions and a democratic culture. More specifically, they have gone to Danish kindergartens and schools where one of the official goals (formally stated in a law from 1975) is to teach pupils fundamental democratic principles. A comparative analysis has found that Danish schools emphasize 'collaboration and consensus' and concern themselves particularly with 'education for citizenship and democracy, as well as with the academic goals of education' (Osborn 2001, p. 274). Following the political socialization hypothesis, this emphasis on democracy will have an impact on the values of pupils. For this reason, we would expect descendants to have a more positive attitude towards democracy than their parents (the immigrants). There would only small differences in democratic values between descendants of immigrants and Danes because both groups have lived in a democratic society all their lives.

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A second alternative hypothesis focuses on the role played by ethnicity rather than religion in determining democratic values. Earlier research has shown that ethnicity has a significant influence on the individual's values (Gundelach and Nørregård-Nielsen 2007). This finding may be interpreted as the result of a number of processes: Often, people from ethnic minorities come from the same region in the country of origin; they have a common destiny (be it as refugees or immigrants), and they are interrelated by family relations, common language and their daily interactions in their host country.

To be able to test the hypothesis about the relationship between democratic values and ethnicity (irrespective of religion), the ethnic group needs to reflect a variation of religious faiths. In some ethnic groupings, however, such differences do not exist. Among Turks or Pakistanis more than 95 per cent of the respondents present themselves as Muslims. In such cases, it would be impossible to ascertain whether it is the respondent's ethnicity or his/her religion that has had the greatest influence on his/her democratic values or lack of such. The ethnicity hypothesis can only be tested in ethnic groups with a varied composition of denominations. This limits the investigation to immigrants from West Balkan, where our survey reflects 69 per cent to be Muslims; to immigrants from Iran, where 55 per cent of respondents are Muslims; and to immigrants from Iraq where 82 per cent of respondents are Muslims.

To summarize, we operate with the following three hypotheses:

- A religious hypothesis that claims that Muslims have fewer democratic values than Christians.
- A political socialization hypothesis, which suggests that the longer a person has lived in Denmark the stronger his/her democratic values become. This means that Danes and descendants have more democratic values than immigrants, and that there will be little or no differences between descendants and Danes in terms of democratic mindset.
- An ethnicity hypothesis that argues that in ethnic groups with different denominations, ethnicity is a stronger indicator of democratic values than religion.

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4 Each of the hypotheses above will be explored in the following. As a precursor to such
5 an analysis, a short introduction to immigration in Denmark appears relevant,
6 describing the data and definitions of the dependent variables.
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10 11 **Immigration to Denmark** 12

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14 There has always been immigration to Denmark. Until the 1960s, the proportion of
15 ethnic minorities was very small, making Denmark a very homogeneous country in
16 terms of ethnicity. During the late 1960s, the first immigrants from Pakistan, Turkey
17 and the former Yugoslavia came to Denmark as so-called ‘guest workers’. By the early
18 1970s, immigration laws prevented more labour immigration, but from the mid-1980s
19 onwards, Denmark has accepted a number of refugees from countries such as Iraq,
20 Iran, Somalia and Vietnam.
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28 According to the Danish Ministry of Integration (2006a), a total of six per cent of
29 the Danish population are immigrants or descendants from non-Western countries. It is
30 not easy to estimate the number of Muslims in Denmark because the authorities do not
31 register religious denomination. Based on a careful analysis of a number of sources,
32 Jacobsen (2007) estimates that the number of Muslims in Denmark ranged around
33 207.000 in 2006. This corresponds to 3.8 per cent of the Danish population.
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39 The structural societal position of minorities is clearly less favourable than that
40 of native Danes. The rate of employment as well as the level of education and income
41 is considerably lower among immigrants - and among the descendants (Ministry of
42 Integration 2006b).
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47 **Definitions** 48 49

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51 Concepts such as ‘ethnicity’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘immigrant’ are contentious and difficult
52 to define. In this article, we ‘ethnic groups’ is used in accordance with Smith’s (2001,
53 p. 13) ‘working definition’ where *ethnie* is defined as “a named human community
54 connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories,
55 one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the
56 elite”.
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The concepts of immigrant and descendant are regrettably limited to the technical definitions provided by Statistics Denmark since these definitions constitute the foundation for our data collection. According to Statistics Denmark an immigrant is defined as a person born abroad whose parents are both (or one of them if there is no available information on the other parent) foreign citizens or were both born abroad. If there is no available information on either of the parents and the person was born abroad, the person is also defined as an immigrant. This means that the category immigrant also includes refugees.

Statistics Denmark (2008) defines a *descendant* as a person born in Denmark whose parents (or one of them if there is no information on the other parent) are either immigrants or descendants with foreign citizenship. If there is no available information on either of the parents and the person in question is a foreign citizen, the person is also defined as a descendant.

Ethnic group refers to the country of origin as registered by Statistics Denmark. If a descendant has parents with different ethnicities, the descendant is assigned the ethnicity of his/her mother (for details, see Statistics Denmark 2008).

This assigned ethnicity does not necessarily correspond with the respondent's perceived ethnic belonging. However, the data contain no information about the respondent's self-reported ethnic origin – with one important exception: Respondents were asked if they were of Kurdish origin. A statistical analysis (Gundelach and Nørregård-Nielsen 2007) has shown that people who say they are Kurds do not differ significantly from other immigrants from the respective country of origin. A similar result was found in a survey among Turkish immigrants in Denmark (Necif 1996). A special problem relates to immigrants and refugees from the Balkans since Statistics Denmark only registers the state where the immigrant comes from. The first immigrants came to Denmark in the early 1970s from former Yugoslavia, and in the 1990s, Denmark accepted a number of refugees primarily from Bosnia-Herzegovina. A comparison (not shown here) of the so-called guest workers from ex-Yugoslavia, their reunited family members and the refugees from the Balkan countries in the 1990s shows no significant difference in democratic values among these groups. This may be due to the fact that they come from roughly the same region of ex-Yugoslavia

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4 (Fledelius 2006). For the purposes of this article, it seems acceptable to consider
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6 respondents from West Balkan as a single group.
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8 Finally, 'Danes' refer to people who are not immigrants or descendants. It would
9
10 be more correct to use the term 'ethnic Danes' as many immigrants are in fact Danish
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12 citizens, but the term 'Danes' has been chosen for the sake of brevity.
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14 15 **Data**

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18 Our survey was based on phone interviews with nine ethnic groups: Immigrants and
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20 descendants from Pakistan and Turkey, immigrants or refugees from West Balkan,
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22 Iraq, Iran and Vietnam, and Danes. Since this article concerns the possible relationship
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24 between Islam and democracy, the Vietnamese immigrants have not been included in
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26 the subsequent analysis because none of the Vietnamese respondents were Muslims.
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28 Among all the other ethnic minorities (except for the Danes), some or all of the
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30 respondents have stated that they are Muslims.

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32 Among the ethnic minorities, only people who have lived in Denmark for three
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34 years or more were included in the survey. The three-year limit was chosen because
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36 Danish law grants the right to vote at local elections after three years residency in
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38 Denmark.

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40 Compared to the general population, the age distribution among the immigrant
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42 groups is skewed. Almost all of the respondents were below 50 years of age.
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44 Consequently, the survey population was defined as persons aged 18-50. The largest
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46 immigrant group was the Turkish immigrants where the population was 22,587; the
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48 smallest group of immigrants was the Vietnamese (5,910 persons). Among
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50 descendants, only two groups had a size that permitted further study: Turkish
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52 descendants amounted to 5,967, and Pakistani descendants numbered 3,268.

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54 Respondents were randomly chosen by civil registration number. Interviewers
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56 were bilingual and both immigrants and descendants could choose to be interviewed in
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58 Danish or in their mother tongue. About 500 persons in each ethnic group were
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60 interviewed. The average response rate was 54 per cent, varying between 67 per cent
for Danes and 41 per cent for Pakistani descendants. The main reason for the relatively
low response rate was the difficulty encountered when having to establish a clear

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relation between the respondent's civil registration number and his/her phone number. Once contact was established, the number of rejects was relatively small. In the tables, weights are used to compensate for the low response rate. In the statistical analyses, no weights were applied.

The number of 'don't know' answers varied from question to question and between ethnic groups. In general, the 'don't know' answers were lowest among Danes. As it is difficult to establish the reasons for such differences, 'don't know' answers have been excluded from the analysis. All data may be obtained from the Danish Data Archive (DDA-21171).

The dependent variables: Democratic values

Democracy theory tells us that the term 'democracy' has at least two meanings: 'popular sovereignty' and 'the liberty of the individual members of society' (Thomassen 1995). The interpretation of these meanings and their interrelation varies in the different normative democracy theories, but that is of less relevance to the concerns of this article. For our purposes, the two-dimensional structure that these meanings suggest is of greater importance.

The first – 'popular sovereignty' – will be termed *democratic principles*. This variable is operationalized in the following question: 'What do you think about each of the following ways of governing Denmark? Having a democratic system' ('Very good', 'Fairly good', 'Fairly bad', 'Bad', 'Don't know'). This question is part of a battery of four questions that has been used by the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. The other three questions in the battery ask about support for 'Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections', 'Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country', 'Having the army rule the country'. These questions are sometimes combined in an index but in our data we could not find a satisfactory one dimensional structure for all groups. Therefore, the analysis only concerns the 'democratic system' question - the only question that use the word 'democracy'. Analyses show that the

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4 support for democratic principles is generally high in most Western countries (Fuchs,
5 Guidorossi and Svensson 1995; Klingemann 1999).
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8 The second dimension, democratic rights, is just as important for democracy as
9 free elections. In the present survey, the variable is an index based on two questions:
10 one on religious freedom and one on freedom of speech. Religious freedom has been
11 called 'the first freedom' in the sense that freedom of conscience is both
12 chronologically the first and may be seen as a precondition for other freedoms
13 (Casanova 1994, p. 40). It is measured by the following question: 'To what extent do
14 you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is important that all people in
15 Denmark have the possibility of carrying out their religious rituals and wearing
16 religious symbols' ('Strongly agree', 'Agree', 'Neither agree nor disagree', 'Disagree',
17 'Strongly disagree', 'Don't know').
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26 Freedom of speech and association is measured by the following question: 'To
27 what extent do you agree or disagree that all groups – even groups with extreme
28 attitudes – should have the right to hold meetings and state their cause?' ('Strongly
29 agree', 'Agree', 'Neither agree nor disagree', 'Disagree', 'Strongly disagree', 'Don't
30 know').
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35 The two questions are positively correlated for all ethnic groups (γ between 0,12
36 and 0,36. The γ 's are significant except for the Pakistani descendants (cf. Table A.1).
37 The low insignificant correlation in this group is due to the fact that the distribution of
38 responses is very skewed: almost everybody answers 'agrees strongly'. For each
39 respondent the answers are added up. The sum varies between 2 and 10. This is
40 recoded as follows: 2=1, 3=2, 4 or 5 = 3, other values = 4. If a question is answered
41 'don't know', the index is coded 'don't know'.
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47 Democratic values are not just related to the formal structural arrangements in
48 society but also to its political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963). Democratic culture
49 has been measured in many ways. In our survey, we decided to develop a measurement
50 for democratic values that was family related. If democratic culture pervades all
51 institutions in society, it would also encompass the private sphere. Democratic culture
52 in the family would mean that the individual members of the family have influence on
53 their own life and are not subjected to any authoritarian family structure. Giddens have
54 suggested a close relation between societal and family democracy.
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There is only one story to tell about the family today, and that is of democracy....
Democracy in the public sphere involves formal equality, individual rights,
public discussion of issues free from violence, and authority which is negotiated
rather than given by tradition. The democratized family shares these
characteristics. (Giddens 1998, p. 93).

Family democracy may be studied through the relations between spouses or through
the relationship between parents and their children. For the purpose of this article,
values concerning the husband-wife relationship are less useful because marital
relationships are heavily infused with gender roles issues. The parent-child
relationship, by contrast, is less contaminated when it comes to democratic values. The
index is based on the following question: 'How much influence should a young
person/parents have on the young person's a) choice of partner or b) choice of
education'. The respondents were asked to grade their answer according to a 10-point
scale, where 1 reflected total decision power to the young person, and 10 suggested that
parents should decide totally. There is a very high correlation (γ between 0,53 and
0,70) between the two variables for all ethnic groups, cf. Table A1 . The two variables
were entered into an index by adding the values of each variable, and the result
subsequently divided into three groups: Index value 2 = the young person has very
high influence (code 1), Index value 3-6 = the young person has high influence (code
2). Index value 7-20 = the young person has less influence (code 3). If one question is
answered with a 'don't know', the index is coded 'don't know'.

Are Muslims less democratic than Christians?

Table 1 reflects an initial overview of democratic values in the Christian majority and
in the Muslim minorities. The denomination of the respondents is measured by a
question on self-reported religiosity ('What is your religion?'). Non-believers have
been excluded from the table.

Figure 1. Model of democratic values for immigrants

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5 The table presents an interesting and quite surprising result. The respective positions of
6 the three groups vary according to which dimension of democratic values we
7 investigate. When it comes to democratic principles – i.e. whether the respondent
8 believes that a democratic system is good thing – the Danes score higher than the two
9 other groups. The Danes' high score on this variable is similar to what Svensson (2004)
10 has reported from the European Values Survey 1999. The two minority groups' score
11 are somewhat lower but still higher than what is found in many European countries and
12 in the immigrants' homelands (cf. Inglehart et al 2004). Consequently, we may
13 conclude that the support for democratic principles is high among Danes *and* the ethnic
14 minorities.
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22 It is thought provoking that the support for democracy is considerably lower
23 when it comes to the second aspect of democracy: Democratic rights. It is perhaps even
24 more surprising that in a country that prides itself on democratic principles, Danes
25 show a low level of acceptance of democratic rights when these rights concern the
26 liberties of minorities. More than twice as many among the ethnic minorities are
27 strongly in favour of democratic rights compared to the Danes. As we will discuss
28 below, this discrepancy is probably related to the general dissociation from Islam found
29 among many Danes.
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37 Finally, the data shows a lower support for family democracy among the ethnic
38 minorities that among the Danes. Although the difference is not that large, it is still
39 significant. It may be explained by differences in family structure and family values
40 among Danes and the ethnic minorities. In general, immigrant families are less
41 individualistic, reflecting a more authoritarian culture than we see in Danish families.
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This initial presentation of data shows that there is no reason to believe that there
is a clash of civilizations among Danes and ethnic minorities. On the contrary, in two
out of three democracy measures, the differences are fairly small. In the third
dimension (democratic rights), the ethnic minorities are more democratic than the
Danes. Since the ranking varies for different measures of democratic values, the pattern
cannot be explained by reference to a single variable such as the religion of the
respondent. Instead, the differences are probably best explained by the framework in
which Danes' generally perceive Islam.

The perception of Islam and the granting of democratic rights

It is indeed striking that the Danes are the most positive group in relation the democratic system but the most reluctant when it come to accepting the constitutional rights of all citizens in relation to civil liberties. One explanation for this may be found in the framing of the questions and the survey itself. Based on in-depths interviews about democracy among Americans, Chong (1993) shows that people's perception of concepts and their immediate social context greatly influence their way of answering survey questions. Finding themselves within the framework of a democratic constitution, people are generally positive when asked about relatively abstract democratic ideals. When it comes to specific civil liberties, however, the framing appears to become group-specific; respondents fear that their own liberties will be affected – even infringed – when applied to people of a different faith.

Since our survey was framed within the context of immigration it is likely that the respondents (Danes as well as ethnic minorities) read 'neutral' questions through the lens of current immigration debates and attitudes in Denmark. The wording of the question on religiosity may point in the same direction. Part of the question concerned the issue of whether people should have the right to carry religious symbols. Since the wearing of religious symbols is of little significance to most Danes, the perception of the question has probably been coloured by the Muslim headscarf debate, leading respondents to assume that the question only related to Islam. This may explain the low percentage of Danes in favour of religious freedom. An overview of survey evidence (Andersen 2002) has concluded that Danes seem to have particular resentment towards Islam. For many Danes, religion and ethnicity are intimately related. Therefore, an unfamiliar religion such as Islam might be mistrusted because it is perceived as offering an alternative allegiance – a potential negation of what it means to be Danish.

Does living in Denmark breed democratic values?

According to theories of political socialization, living in a society with democratic institutions and democratic rule will educate the individual in democratic values. Following this hypothesis, the individual's democratic values will become stronger the

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4 longer this person lives in a democratic country. Let us apply this general hypothesis to
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6 the three groups concerned here:
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- 8 1. *Immigrants*: the longer an immigrant has lived in Denmark, the more positive
9 his/her democratic values will be.
- 10 2. Comparing *immigrants and descendants*: Since immigrants have lived in
11 Denmark for a shorter period, they are expected to have fewer democratic
12 values than descendants.
- 13 3. Comparing *descendants and Danes*: Since people in these two groups have
14 lived in Denmark all their lives, there will be only minor differences in their
15 democratic values.
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24 *Immigrants: Length of stay and democratic values*

25 A socialization hypothesis predicts that immigrants who have stayed in Denmark for a
26 longer period will have stronger democratic values than immigrants who have only
27 recently arrived in Denmark. Pettersson's (2007) analysis of world values survey data
28 suggest, however, that the values among immigrants in Europe only change slowly. In
29 contrast Camp's (2003) study of Mexican Americans found that 'Mexican Americans
30 begin to adopt the American definition of democracy after having resided in the United
31 States for only one year' (Camp 2003, p. 14). Later in the text, however, Camp modifies
32 his conclusion. It appears that it is not the length of stay as such but the immigrant's
33 language proficiency that is the more important determinant of his/her changing values.
34 Camp does not present an interpretation of this conclusion, but his study implies that
35 immigrants who command the language of the host country are more committed to
36 adapting to the ways of their new country and will develop a stronger sense of
37 belonging towards the host country.
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49 We used Camp's finding to create a statistical model where the three measures of
50 democratic values are dependent variables. The intervening variables are: The
51 respondent's sense of belonging vis a vis Danish society, the respondent's proficiency
52 in Danish, and the length of the respondent's stay in Denmark. The independent
53 variable is ethnicity. Data was analyzed by so-called 'chain graphical models'
54 (Lauritzen 1996) using strategies and techniques described by Kreiner (1996)
55 integrating analyses of data with graphical theoretic analyses of Markov graphs. The
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4 basic idea underlying analysis by graphical models is nearly identical with Rosenberg's
5 (1968) classic concepts of elaboration and specification in connection with analyses of
6 conditional relationships. Rosenbergs' concept of explanation corresponds to
7 conditional independence of variables. The Markov graph is a statistical model that has
8 no links between variables if the association between the variables can be completely
9 explained by the remaining variables in the model. While Rosenberg and colleagues
10 had to limit the analysis to fairly few variables the use of modern computers and allow
11 for analysis of high-dimensional contingency tables. The statistical analysis uses the
12 DIGRAM computer program (Kreiner 1989). Partial γ coefficients were used
13 throughout the analysis to measure association among ordinal and/or dichotomous
14 variables. Associations involving nominal variables were investigated using χ^2 tests of
15 conditional independence. The significance of test results was in all cases evaluated by
16 Monte Carlo tests as described in Kreiner (1987).
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28 This statistical analysis is chosen because of the character of the data. Ethnicity,
29 the core variable, is a nominal variable and the other variables are ordinal: This makes
30 it problematic to use for instance traditional regression analysis. The advantage of the
31 graphical model technique is that there are there are no statistical requirements for the
32 character and distributions of the variables. Another advantage is that all variables can
33 be included in the model from the outset of the analysis including all three dependent
34 variables..
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40 Figure 1 shows the result of our statistical analysis.
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44 *Figure 1. Model of democratic values for immigrants*
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47 The analysis renders the following result: Only ethnic group influences all three
48 dependent variables. Furthermore, the analysis confirms Camp's findings. The length
49 of the respondent's stay in Denmark correlates positively with language skills, but there
50 is no direct relationship between length of stay and democratic values. The variable
51 language skill only correlates with family democracy. The respondent's sense of
52 belonging to Danish society correlates positively with democratic principles and family
53 democracy, but the attitude towards democratic rights only correlates with ethnicity.
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59 This leads us to conclude that ethnicity is the most important determinant of democratic
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4 values, and furthermore that the length of stay in Denmark has only an indirect or no
5 impact on respondents' democratic values. In other words, our analysis refutes the
6 socialization hypothesis (a result that supports Pettersson's (2007) findings from
7 Europe).

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11 This result shows that primary socialization seem to be stronger than secondary
12 socialization. Another explanation is that the living conditions of ethnic minorities may
13 limit the impact of secondary socialization from the Danish society. The survey shows
14 that only about half of the immigrants in Denmark have a paid job - in some cases, the
15 immigrant's job will not involve direct contact with Danes at all – and only 30 per cent
16 have regular communication with Danes. Moreover, immigrants are typically married
17 to someone with the same ethnicity as themselves. This indicates that immigrants'
18 contact with Danish society is relatively limited and consequently that the probability
19 for political socialization is relatively small.
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29 *Immigrants and descendants*

30 Since descendants have been born in Denmark, the socialization hypothesis would
31 predict that they have a stronger democratic mindset than that of their immigrant
32 counterparts. Descendants have joined Danish schools, kindergartens and have
33 generally had more intimate contact with Danish society. At the same time, however,
34 they have grown up in a family that is different from the average Danish family,
35 implying that their family socialization may conflict with the impact of societal
36 institutions.
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43 Only the Pakistani and Turkish minorities can be used for the comparison of
44 immigrants and descendants as these are the only two groups that have lived in
45 Denmark long enough for there to be second generation ethnic minority groups of a
46 sufficient size to undertake analysis. A comparison of immigrants and descendants is
47 complicated by the different age structure of the two groups. There are no descendants
48 over 35 years of age in the data. For this reason, it is only possible to compare
49 descendants and immigrants between the ages of 18 and 34. Table 2 shows the
50 percentage of high the level of democracy values in the four ethnic groups; these
51 groups have been further subdivided into two age groups (18-24 years of age and 25-24
52 years of age).
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Table 2 about here.

The scenario reflected by the table is somewhat complicated. Firstly, there are no significant differences between immigrants and descendants in relation to democratic principles, which support the general findings in relation to this variable. Secondly, in relation to family values, we might expect that descendants are more democratic than immigrants, but the table shows no general pattern here. Among the 18-24 year-olds, the Pakistani descendants are more democratic than their immigrant counterparts, but for the Turks, it is the other way around. Among the 25-34 year-olds, there is only a noticeable difference for the Turkish minorities, but here the correlation is reversed: Turkish descendants are more democratic than Turkish immigrants. These differences appear difficult to explain, but it looks as if their family values depend on the specific situation of the ethnic group. Finally, as regards democratic rights there is no difference between descendants and immigrants in the 18-24 year age group. Among the 25-35 year-olds, descendants are, surprisingly enough, less democratic than the immigrants. In fact, it seems as if descendants are becoming more like the Danes (who are very low on democratic rights) than their parents' generation (cf. Table 1). This leads us to a closer analysis of the differences between descendants and Danes of the same age.

Danes and descendants

The best way of testing the denomination and socialization hypotheses is by comparing people of different denomination, who are all socialized in Danish society. We matched the descendants of Muslim faith with Christian Danes of the same age (18-34 years).

Table 3 presents an overview of the distribution of the three dependent democracy variables in these groups,

Table 3 about here

The figures in the table present a picture that we recognize from our general description. The Danes are generally more positive towards democratic rule, but their

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4 tolerance towards freedom of speech and religious faith is lower than that of the ethnic
5 minorities. When it comes to young people's influence on their own life (choice of
6 education and spouse), the difference between the ethnic groups is much smaller than
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8 when discussing more abstract democratic values. There is a significant difference
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10 between all the ethnic groups.
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13 As the figures in the table reflect, value differences exist in spite of the fact that
14 all three ethnic groups have gone through public education in Denmark. Thus, the
15 hypothesis about formal socialization cannot be supported. The differences must be
16 explained by other factors. One possibility is family socialization. Descendants are not
17 only socialized by social institutions, they also received specific ethnic socialization
18 through their family and network.
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21 We lack general information about family socialization in Denmark. However, it
22 would be reasonable to expect that at least some of the descendants have been exposed
23 to relatively strong Islamic values in their families. Some of them may also have
24 attended private Islam-oriented schools but we have no information about this in the
25 data. In the immigrant family, values are shaped both by the country of origin as well
26 as the host society (Foner 1997). In many immigrant families, religion plays a much
27 stronger role than in Danish families, whose lifestyle is generally quite secular. This
28 returns us once more to Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' hypothesis. Is it plausible
29 to assume that devout descendants have less democratic values, whereas religious faith
30 among the Danes has no affect on their democratic values?
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33 A multivariate statistical analysis – not shown here because space does not allow
34 it – reflects that for Danes, there is no relationship between religious values and
35 democratic values. Among descendants, however, democratic values are influenced by
36 the religion of the respondent, but there is no difference in democratic values between
37 the Pakistani or Turkish respondents. Figure 2 shows the distribution of democratic
38 values for people with strong religious faith (who report themselves to be 'very
39 religious' or 'somewhat religious') and people who are less devout (who say that they
40 are 'not very religious').
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58 *Figure 2. Democratic values by religiosity among Pakistani and Turkish descendants.*
59 *Per cent.*
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6 The differences between 'very' and 'less devout' descendants are relatively small, but
7 there is a tendency for the more religious respondents to be less attracted to democratic
8 principles and family democracy and to value religious freedom and freedom of speech
9 higher. This result may be interpreted with reference to Fukuyama's (2006) hypothesis
10 about identity politics among young Muslims. Fukuyama argues that when Muslims
11 move from traditional Muslims societies to Western societies, they experience an
12 existential disparity between their inner identity as member of a Muslim cultural
13 community and their exterior lives and behaviour in their new European context.
14 According to Fukuyama, this disparity is particularly prominent among descendants.
15 'Stuck between two cultures with which they cannot identify, they find a strong appeal
16 in the universalistic ideology offered by contemporary jihadism' (Fukuyama 2006, p.
17 11).

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19 While there is no indication in the data that there is a strong fundamentalist
20 Islamic minority in Denmark, Fukuyama's observation may contain some truth,
21 especially for the more religious second generation immigrants for the simple reason
22 that this group is more exposed to the pressures of different value systems. Such an
23 interpretation is supported by an interesting finding in our survey: When asked whether
24 they feel that they have become more religious during the last three years, 37 per cent
25 of the descendants answer in the affirmative, compared to 26 per cent of the
26 immigrants from the same ethnic groups, and 9 per cent of the Danes. Another viable
27 explanation is found in the fact that the descendants may feel that their religion is being
28 discriminated against by the native majority; this leads them to put more emphasis on
29 their right to religious freedom and freedom of speech.

30 **Is religion more important than ethnicity in relation to democratic values?**

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32 Generally, it is difficult to distinguish between ethnicity and religion because most of
33 the immigrants only belong to one denomination: Islam. As has been shown above, the
34 respondent's degree of devoutness has an influence on his/her democratic values, but in
35 the following we shall explore whether differences in democratic values are higher
36 within ethnic groups or within religious groups. If a religious explanation were to be
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4 substantiated, it would mean that the democratic values of Muslims are relatively
5 similar irrespective of their ethnicity. This hypothesis is challenged by an ethnicity
6 hypothesis, which claims that differences among ethnic groups are greater than those
7 among denominations due to the impact of common history and destiny. An analysis of
8 these hypotheses can only be conducted among ethnic groups with a varied
9 composition of denomination, i.e. immigrants from Iran, Iraq and West Balkan.

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15 Figure 3 shows the distribution of democratic values among the mixed ethnic-
16 religious groups.
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21 *Figure 3. Democratic values among three groups of Muslim immigrants. Per cent.*
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24 The statistical tests show that there are no significant differences in democratic values
25 among the denominational groups in each ethnicity group. This strongly supports the
26 ethnicity hypothesis - i.e. that the destiny and living conditions of a certain group are
27 the more important determinants of a democratic mindset. However, if an ethnicity
28 hypothesis should be supported, it would also require significant differences among the
29 Muslims in all ethnic groups. This is precisely what we see in Figure 3. For each
30 variable, there are significant differences among the ethnic groups. Thus, there is no
31 basis for arguing that Muslim respondents are less democratic than non-Muslims
32 respondents.
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39 In all three cases, Muslims from Iraq have the strongest democratic values,
40 followed by Muslims from Iran and Muslims from West Balkan. This result is difficult
41 to interpret but might be explained by the history of the three countries or perhaps with
42 reference to the different types of Islam that characterize the groups (e.g. Sunni, Shia).
43 Unfortunately, no data exists that may support such a conclusion.
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50 **Conclusion**

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53 Besides being of interest in their own right, studies of ethnic minorities tell us a lot
54 about the host society (Davie 2007). Often, the conclusions drawn by such studies have
55 been relatively unclear because researchers only study the ethnic minorities and not the
56 majority. In this respect, the present study is an exception because it includes data on
57 the ethnic majority (the Danes) as well as data on a number of ethnic minorities.
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5 Our study undertaken has used three variables to measure democratic values: The
6 support for democratic principles, democratic rights and family democracy. The study
7 concludes that the support for democratic rights is high among the ethnic minorities as
8 well as the majority population. Even though minorities show less support for
9 democratic principles, they still score higher than the populations of many West
10 European countries. As regards family democracy, there appears to be a similar pattern
11 as for democratic principles (but we have no information about the distribution of
12 family values in other European countries). The most important difference is found in
13 the support for democratic rights - the freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
14 Here, the Danish majority population is much *less* democratic than the ethnic
15 minorities. Thus, democratic values do not give rise to a clash of civilizations, as
16 Huntington would have it - at least not when we consider immigrants in Western
17 Societies. Contrary to what Huntington's thesis suggests, Christian Danes are less
18 democratic than Muslim immigrants when it comes to granting democratic rights to *all*
19 members of society.
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31 Generally, democratic values do not differ between immigrants and descendants
32 of the same ethnic group, and a change in values does not appear to depend on the
33 length of stay in the host society. These results emphasize the role of ethnic belonging
34 rather than the denomination or socio-economic factors. For instance, we found that
35 among ethnic minorities with a mixed religious composition, the differences between
36 Muslims are greater than the in-minority differences.
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42 These results support our general findings: Ethnicity is more important for
43 democratic values than denomination. Ethnicity is important because of the common
44 history and destiny of the various ethnic groups. This 'ethnic habitus' means that
45 democratic values are based on a common history and fate and reproduced within
46 ethnic groups primarily through social interaction and a shared language within the
47 group.
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52 The importance of ethnicity might not come as a surprise to sociologists. As
53 noted by Davie (2007), immigrant populations arrive in Europe and their experiences
54 vary for specific historical reasons. The Muslim headscarf, for instance, is an
55 acceptable part of public life in Britain, but not in France. In Denmark, the headscarf is
56 quite common in public life but also a highly contested symbol. The difference in
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4 acceptance of foreign symbols and customs need to be understood in the context of the
5 individual country's history. Denmark has a history of a strong nation-religion
6 relations, and has been dominated by a single denomination. It would be interesting to
7 study whether other countries sharing the same characteristics also appear to be less
8 willing to accept the democratic rights of all citizens.
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60*Table 1. Democratic values among religious groups in Denmark. Per cent.*

	Democratic principles Very high	Democratic rights Very high	Family democracy Very high	Number of respondents
Christian Danes	89	21	64	371-376
Muslim descendants	68	53	51	911-949
Muslim immigrants	74	53	51	1848-1939
	$\chi^2 = 60.115$; df= 6; p= 0,000	$\chi^2 = 202.664$; df= 6; p= 0,000	$\chi^2 = 46.829$; df= 4; p= 0,000	

Notes: The entries show the percentage in the most democratic category. Data is weighted to compensate for bias in the data collection but not according to the size of the national minorities in the Danish population.

For operationalization of democratic variables, see text..

Table 2. Percentage with high democratic values by age and national group.


	Democratic principles		Democratic rights		Family democracy	
	18-24	25-34	18-24	25-34	18-24	25-34
Age						
Pakistan descendant	71	68	54	51	52	45
Pakistan immigrant	76	73	59	65	28	40
Turkey descendant	75	78	55	49	54	61
Turkey immigrant	77	72	54	65	66	49

Note: Ellipses show significant difference between descendants and immigrants in the same ethnic group (χ^2 , $p < 0,05$) when controlled for age.


Table 3. Democratic values among Turkish and Pakistani descendants and Danes aged 18-34.
Per cent.

	Democratic Principles Very high	Democratic rights Very high	Family democracy Very high	Number of respondents
Danes	90	23	61	231-235
Pakistan descendants	69	53	49	469-488
Turkey descendants	76	53	56	477-504
	$\chi^2 = 39,732,$ df = 6; p= 0,000	$\chi^2 = 106,816,$ df= 6; p = 0,000	$\chi^2 = 36,591,$ df = 4; p= 0,000.	


Figure 1. Model of democratic values for immigrants



Note: The analysis is based on graphical modelling. A line shows a significant relationship. Figures are partial γ -coefficients. Such cannot be computed with national group because the variable is nominal. In these cases, the measure of association is χ^2 . Only significant γ 's above 0,10 are reported. The analysis includes five immigrant groups (from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and West Balkan).



Note: The differences between the high and low religiosity categories are significant.
Democratic principles $\gamma = -0,21$ $p = 0,009$; democratic rights $\gamma = 0,17$ $p = 0,008$; family democracy = $-0,18$, $p = 0,006$.



Note: The differences between the national groups are significant. Democratic principles $\chi^2 = 41,018$, $df=6$, $p=0,000$; democratic rights $\chi^2 = 99,702$, $df=6$, $p=0,000$; family democracy $\chi^2 = 14,867$, $df=4$, $p=0,005$.

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Table A.1 Correlations between the variables in the index.

	Correlations between the two questions on democratic rights		Correlations between the two questions on family democracy		Number of respondents
	γ	p	γ	p	
Turkey immigrant	0,35	0,002	0,60	0,000	486-504
Turkey descendant	0,21	0,047	0,53	0,000	498-505
Pakistan immigrant	0,36	0,008	0,57	0,000	420-434
Pakistan descendant	0,12	0,313	0,62	0,000	477-488
West Balkan immigrant	0,21	0,001	0,66	0,000	483-503
Irak immigrant	0,36	0,01	0,67	0,000	491-513
Iran immigrant	0,14	0,06	0,70	0,000	492-506
Danes	0,31	0,00	0,69	0,000	515-521

Note: Don't know answers are excluded. For wording of questions see text.