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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article

Informally Connected: New Institutionalist Explanations for Participation in Informal Networks

Peer Scheepers, Tom Van der Meer and Manfred Te Grotenhuis

In recent years, attention for social participation as an aspect of social capital has been on the rise (Stolle/Hooghe 2005). The extent to which individuals socialize with friends, neighbours or colleagues informally in the intimate sphere is what we label social participation. Social participation may be characterized in terms of quantity, i.e., frequency of contact, and quality, i.e., content of contact (c.f. Mangen et al. 1988). Social participation has profound effects on participation in the broader public sphere (Halpern 2005) as it provides instrumental and expressive benefits (Lin 2001; Moerbeek 2001).

Several authors actually propose that states and their institutions are important determinants of social participation (Levi 1996; Tarrow 1996; Onyx/Bullen 2001; Szreter 2002). However, little empirical research has been done to test the impact of state institutions on various forms of participation (Parboteeah et al.; Freitag 2006). Consequently, no more than a handful of comparative studies (e.g. Scheepers et al. 2002; Van Oorschot/Arts 2005) have looked at the association between state institutions and social participation.

We set out to answer the following questions: (1) to what extent do the levels of social participation differ cross-nationally? (2) to what extent do state institutions determine social participation, taking individual characteristics into account? (3) to what extent is the impact of state institutions on social participation similar across social categories?

This article contributes to the literature on social participation in three ways. First, we derive and test hypotheses following three lines of reasoning providing us with contradictory and complementary views. Second, this article takes a range of state institutions into account, whereas other research has limited itself to one such institution, most notably the welfare state. Third, we make a strict distinction between the *quantity* and the *quality* of social participation.

Hypotheses: Crowding out

The ›traditional‹ line of reasoning emphasizes the material incentives of social participation: social participation results from extensive considerations of costs and benefits. Social participation is not a goal in itself, but a means to fulfil a higher (economic) need (Flap 1999). To compensate for a lack of economic capital, people invest in their informal network ties to construct an economic safety net. Yet, this individual level hypothesis is not often corroborated by previous findings: generally, a positive relation is found between income and social participation (Komter/ Vollebergh 2002). Nevertheless, we consider this approach to social participation to be the rock bottom of the crowding out approach.

Family and friendship bonds function as a safeguard against economic hardship. States, however, may have come to substitute the function of this economic safety net by providing social security – not as charity, but as an individual right. Thereby, these states crowd out the role of family and friends: people no longer need to depend on their social network, but rather on the state, and therefore have less (material) incentives for social participation. Vice versa, states that lack such extensive social security systems induce them to social participation.

We expect that the inverse relationship between the state level social security and social participation is stronger for people with a low income than for people with a high income.

– H1a The lower the level of social security in welfare states, the higher the level of social participation.
– H1b There is a stronger effect of social security on social participation for the economically weak than for the economically strong – i.e. for the poor than for the rich.

Hypotheses: Socio-Economic Security

Maslow (1970) would not consider the need of socio-economic security to be a goal of social participation, but rather a precondition. The more citizens feel economically secure, the more they will look for ways to obtain a sense of belonging through social participation. Therefore, the higher the level of social participation.

States may contribute to meet the lower needs by providing social security as an economic safety net for citizens. They satisfy citizens' needs for economic security, and indirectly reinforce social participation. Contrary to the *crowding out thesis*, the *socio-economic security thesis* proposes a positive relationship with social security. Again

we expect the impact of social security on social participation to be stronger for the economically weak than for the economically strong.

– H2a The higher the level of social security in welfare states, the higher the level of social participation.
– H2b There is a stronger effect of social security on social participation for the economically weak than for the economically strong – i.e. for the poor than for the rich.

National income also may have a positive effect on the economic safety of citizens. Economic development at the national level raises the resources in a society (Halman 2003) and has a positive impact on pro-social attitudes (Van Oorschot/ Arts 2005). Therefore, we expect countries with high levels of economic development to show high levels of social participation.

– H3a The higher the national level of economic development, the higher the level of social participation.
– H3b There is a stronger positive effect of economic development on social participation for the economically weak than for the economically strong – i.e. for the poor than for the rich.

Hypotheses: *Safe Refuge*

According to the third line of reasoning, social participation in the intimate sphere may be a safe refuge from a (distrusted) public space where public and private goals are difficult or impossible to reach (Eliasoph 1998). Social participation is both an end in itself (Lin's expressive benefit) as well as a means to an end (Lin's instrumental benefit). Individuals who can more easily pursue their goals in the public sphere are less likely to participate in the intimate sphere (Hochschild 1997). When it is more difficult to pursue these goals in the public sphere, individuals are more likely to seek a safe refuge and socially participate in the intimate sphere.

The *safe refuge thesis* claims that the more the institutional setting makes individuals feel insecure about reaching their goals in the public sphere, the more they use relatively secure intimate ties. Citizens feel more insecure in the public sphere to the extent that their civic autonomy comes under threat. To cope with insecurity and distrust, citizens then revert to social participation (Rose 1994). We propose some institutional settings that we consider to determine social participation.

First, social participation may be affected by the extent to which states enforce civil rights. Civil rights are a warrant for undisturbed access to the public sphere.

However, when states choose not to enforce these civil rights, we expect citizens to revert to social participation. This effect may be stronger for people with a low income than for people with a high income: financial means provide citizens with more autonomy to manoeuvre.

–   H4a The weaker a state effectuates protection of civil rights, the higher the level of social participation.
–   H4b The effect of civil rights on social participation is stronger for the economically weak than for the economically strong.

Second, corruption in the state bureaucracy hampers the freedom and impartiality of the public sphere (Transparency International 2000). People who think of the public sphere as corrupt and politicized will opt to participate in informal networks instead of in the broader public sphere (Eliasoph 1998). Family ties can be used to contact officials and find entrance to state arrangements (Mars/Altman 1992). Therefore, we hypothesize that:

–   H5   The more the state is (perceived to be) corrupt, the higher the level of social participation.

Third, in liberal democracies civic autonomy is protected rather strongly by the state. In young democracies, however, civil society has to emerge, and political life needs to stabilize before the public sphere functions as well and is *perceived* to be safe (Rose 1994). Therefore, we expect social participation to be high in new democracies compared to longstanding democracies:

–   H6   The younger the democratic regime of a country, the higher the level of social participation.

Data and Measurements

While testing these hypotheses, we control for individual level determinants that were found significant in previous research. We distinguish an individual level (level 1) and a state level (level 2). The individual level data were derived from the first wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002. These questions were asked in all countries that participated in the ESS 2002 (ESS 2002: 17) Western European countries, 4 former communist countries, and Israel. We split the German sample into the former West- and East-Germany. Luxembourg was left out of the analysis, as it is an outlier on several of the independent variables.

Dependent variables

We distinguished between two measures of social participation in the ESS data set. We treated them as measures of the frequency and content of social participation in the broad, informal network.

The *quantity of social participation* (or ›associational solidarity‹) was operationalized by the question how often respondents meet socially with friends, relatives or colleagues. Answers range from 1 (never) to 7 (daily). The *quality of social participation* (or ›functional solidarity‹) was operationalized as the extent to which respondents provide help to others, outside of work and voluntary organisations. It ranges from 1 (never) to 7 (daily).

Independent national level determinants

We used IMF-statistics on *social security*, which we standardized as a percentage of the GDP. As a measure of *economic development* we used GNI/Capita PPP, the national income per head of the population corrected for differences in price levels, again based on IMF data. Both measures correlate strongly with statistics from other sources (e.g. World Bank, OECD and Eurostat). The *length of democratic rule* (Inglehart 1997) indicates how long a country has been democratic without disruption (topping off in 1920). *Protection of civil rights* is based on the annual index from the Freedom House: countries are ranked on a scale that ranges from 1 (no civil liberties) to 7 (high level of enforced civil liberties). By absence of a measure of corruption, we used a measure of *perceived corruption*, namely the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2002, issued by Transparency International. The CPI is based on multiple surveys in which experts were asked to rate countries' levels of corruption from 0 (no corruption) to 10 (highly corrupt).

Independent individual level determinants

For *education* we used a cross-national measure on the level of education that ranges from 1 (›not completed primary (compulsory) education‹) to 7 (›second stage of tertiary education (leading directly to an advanced research qualification)‹). *Income* was measured as the actual amount of money available to the household (i.e. net income), categorized into 12 groups (with 1 being the lowest income). For *income source* we distinguished between those who get money from salaries or profit (as the reference group) and those who do not: the pensioned, the unemployed, those who depend on other social benefits and those who depend on other sources of income.

We used both *age* and age-squared in the equations, as previous studies showed topping off effects for age. Length of *residence* in a community is measured in years.

Level of *urbanization* ranges from rural to urbanized. *Sex* has males as the reference group. In the survey respondents were asked to report whether they are *citizen* of the country they live in. Our measure of *marital status* distinguished between those who are married (the reference group) and the divorced, the separated, the widowed and those who never have married (yet). *Household size* was measured as the number of people living in a household. We also know whether respondents have or have had *children* living in their household.

For *religious denomination* we took the non-religious as our reference group, to which we compare the Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox and people from other religions. *Religious attendance* was measured by a quasi-metric scale ranging from never to daily.

For *media consumption* we included separate measures of the amount of time people claim to spend listening to the radio, reading a newspaper and watching television. *Lack of health* was operationalized by the subjective report of respondents of his or her health. We knew to which extent respondents *feel unsafe* in the neighbourhoods they live in. *Lack of social trust* was measured by the single question whether most people can be trusted, or that you can not be too careful in dealing with people. *Lack of happiness* was operationalized by the respondent's claim to what extent he or she is happy taking all things into consideration. A final constraint was *lack of income satisfaction*: the extent to which respondents find it difficult to live on the current household income.

Analyses

As social participation is a function of both individual level and contextual level predictors we employ multi-level analysis (hierarchical modelling) (Snijders/Bosker 1999) using the ML-WIN 2.0 package. Respondents with one or more missing values on any of the variables were left out of the analyses; subsequent models are all based on the same set of respondents.

First, we will briefly describe the cross-national differences in the diverse modes of social participation, presented in the figures below.

Meet socially with friends, relatives, colleagues

Help people outside work/volunary organisations

Figures 1a–1b: Modes of social participation by country

We find large country level differences on both modes. The frequency of meeting socially with friends, relatives and colleagues is circa 80% in Norway and Denmark, which is nearly twice as high as in Poland, Greece and Hungary. Generally, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe score relatively low, including former East Germany. As for provision of help, the German-speaking countries are all at the high end of the spectrum of providing help, whereas the Latin Rim countries are all at the low end.

Variance analyses show that these country level differences are significant. We found significant variances at both levels for all modes of social participation (see Table 1).

	Frequency of social meetings	Providing help
Mean	5.0	3.8
Standard deviation	1.6	1.8
N	26860	26860
Baseline model		
s^2u_{0j}	0.227	0.246
s^2e_{0ij}	2.193	3.026
Intraclasscorrelation	0.093	0.075
-2LL	97415.48	106064.30
Composition model		
s^2u_{0j}	0.200	0.254
s^2e_{0ij}	2.014	2.930
Intraclasscorrelation	0.090	0.080
-2LL	95133.93	105197.50
Deviance	2281.55	866.80
Df	23	23
Significance	>0.001	>0.001
Full model (model A)		
s^2u_{0j}	0.078	0.124
s^2e_{0ij}	1.955	2.904
Intraclasscorrelation	0.038	0.041
-2LL	94317.09	104940.40
Deviance	796.17	242.90
Df	14	14
Significance	>0.001	>0.001
Full model including cross-level interactions (model B)		
s^2u_{0j}		
s^2e_{0ij}	0.074	0.124
Intraclasscorrelation	1.954	2.902
-2LL	0.038	0.041
Deviance	94304.74	104921.10
Df	12.35	19.30
Significance	3	3
	0.006	>0.001

Table 1: Variance analyses

In both the baseline and the composition model the individual and country level variances were significant. To ascertain whether multi-level analysis is not merely appropriate but also sensible, we looked at the intraclass-correlation. In the composition models respectively 9 and 8 percent of the variance was at the contextual level. This percentage is sufficiently high to look for contextual level determinants in a multi-level model.

Results

Tables 2 and 3 provide insights in the direct and the interaction effects of the individual and contextual level determinants on the frequency of social contacts and on providing help.

	Table 2		Table 3	
	Frequency of social meetings		Providing help	
	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3A	Model 3B
Individual level predictors				
Level of education	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Income	0.01 (0.01)	0.22 (0.06)	0.00 (0.01)	0.09 (0.07)
Source of income (profit/salary)	0.10 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)
· pensioned	0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.14 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)
· unemployed	0.25 (0.05)	0.26 (0.05)	0.16 (0.06)	0.15 (0.06)
· other social benefit	0.41 (0.08)	0.40 (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)
· other	-0.05 (0.00)	-0.05 (0.00)	0.05 (0.00)	0.05 (0.00)
Age	0.03 (0.00)	0.03 (0.00)	-0.06 (0.00)	-0.06 (0.00)
Age-squared (* 100)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Length of residence (* 10)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Urbanization				
Sex (man)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)	0.12 (0.02)
· woman				
Marital status (married)	0.28 (0.04)	0.28 (0.04)	0.18 (0.04)	0.18 (0.04)
· divorced	0.28 (0.07)	0.28 (0.07)	0.06 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)
· separated	0.37 (0.04)	0.37 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
· widowed	0.24 (0.03)	0.24 (0.03)	0.07 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)
· unmarried	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Household size	-0.12 (0.03)	-0.12 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Children at home				
Religion (none)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.15 (0.03)	-0.15 (0.03)
· Catholic	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.03)
· Protestant	0.08 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	0.13 (0.12)	0.12 (0.12)
· Orthodox	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.06)
· Other	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.15 (0.01)	0.15 (0.01)
Attendance of religious services	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.14 (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)
	-0.09 (0.01)	-0.09 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)
Citizen of country of residence	-0.02 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.05 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.01)

Lack of health	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)
Lack of social trust	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)
Time spent on watching tv	0.05 (0.01)	0.05 (0.01)	-0.07 (0.01)	-0.07 (0.01)
Time spent on watching politics	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Time spent on listening to radio	-0.09 (0.00)	-0.09 (0.00)	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)
Time spent on reading paper	-0.09 (0.01)	-0.09 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.02)
Lack of income satisfaction				
Lack of happiness				
Lack of feeling safe in neighbourhood				
State level predictors				
Social security expenditure	-2.57 (1.71)	-2.17 (1.85)	0.74 (2.16)	1.26 (2.37)
GPD/capita PPP (* 1000)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.06 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)
Years of democracy	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Civil rights	0.15 (0.15)	0.32 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.19)	-0.14 (0.20)
Corruption	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.17 (0.08)	-0.17 (0.08)
Cross-level interactions				
Social security * Income		-0.05 (0.12)		-0.12 (0.15)
GDP/Capita PPP * Income		0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
Civil Rights * Income		-0.03 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)

[a] *Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level.*

Table 2. Meet socially: linear hierarchical regression and Table 3. Help others: linear hierarchical regression: Linear hierarchical regression [a]

Country level effects

We are most interested in the direct effects of the state institutional determinants in Table 2 and 3. Although models B offer most information, we will go through the models from the least to the most elaborate. First we focus on the overall effects in models A, that we nuance and specify below in our description of models B.

Let us first have a look at the effects of social security expenditure on which we formulated contradictory hypotheses (1a versus 2a). We find that the effects of social security expenditures are not significant for both the quantity (meeting) and the quality (helping) of social participation, consequently refuting both hypotheses, the *crowding out thesis* (H1a) as well as the hypothesis on the economic safety (H2a). Yet, the effect of social security on meeting reaches significance at the .10 level, indicating some yet rather weak evidence in favour of the crowding out hypothesis (H1a).

Economic development is not significantly related to the frequency of meetings, but is significantly related to providing help. The higher the state level of economic development, the more people provide help to each other in the intimate sphere. This supports hypothesis H3a.

We find that state level enforcement of civil rights does not significantly determine the frequency of social meetings nor the extent of providing help. This refutes hypothesis H4a.

The state level of corruption is a significant determinant of help provision: in countries characterized by a high level of corruption, people tend to provide help less often. The state level of corruption is a significant determinant of social meetings at the .10-level: in countries characterized by a high level of corruption, people tend to have fewer meetings with others. Both findings refute hypothesis H5. Apparently, people in corrupt countries are not only likely to distrust their state, but moreover, are also less likely to seek refuge in the intimate sphere, as captured by this measure.

Finally, the age of a democracy is not related to social meetings, but is inversely related to providing help. This supports hypothesis H6: people in longstanding democracies provide less informal help than newly developed democracies.

Cross-level interactions

Building on our previous findings we set out to answer our third research question in models B of Table 2 and 3: to what extent is the impact of state institutions similar across social categories? Models B of Table 2 and 3 tell us that the effects of state institutions on either mode of social participation is not similar across social categories.

The effect of social security expenditure is not stronger for people with a low income than for people with a high income: the interaction term is insignificant. This refutes both hypothesis H1b and hypothesis H2b.

We do find, in model C of Table 3, that the interaction effect of state level economic development and individual income is significant and negative for providing help, supporting hypothesis 3b. In other words, the positive impact of economic development at the national level on providing help is stronger for poor people than for rich people.

The interaction effect of state level enforcement of civil rights and individual level income is significantly negative for social meetings. This finding implies that poor people respond more strongly to the enforcement of civil rights by the state than the rich. This supports hypothesis 4b.

Summary and Discussion

This paper studies the impact of a range of state institutions on social participation in a broad and informal social network, i.e. the associational and functional aspects of social participation. We take up an actor-centered institutionalist approach to answer three research questions on state effects. The first is to what extent social participation differs cross-nationally. Descriptive analyses show large differences between countries in the frequency of informal social meetings and the extent to which individuals provide help.

The second question we set out to answer is to what extent state level institutions determine these modes of social participation. This study demonstrates that some state institutions significantly impact social participation, also when we control for other individual level determinants.

The empirical evidence contained in this paper does not corroborate the *crowding out thesis*. This contribution offers mixed support for the second line of reasoning, the socio-economic safety thesis: social security is not, but economic development is significantly and positively related to providing help. Finally, we also find somewhat mixed support for the safe refuge thesis. A lack of state level enforcement of civil rights does not increase social participation. The length of democratic rule is significantly and negatively related to providing help, but not to social meetings. Finally, the level of corruption is a strong determinant of social participation, but contrary to the safe refuge thesis. State level corruption negatively impacts social meetings as well as providing help.

For our third research question we tested whether the impact of state institutions is the same for the economically weak as for the economically strong. It would be wrong to speak of the impact of state institutions on either mode of social participation as a single term. Rather, the impact of state institutions on the social participation of the poor is stronger than on that of the rich. Civil rights and economic development are a significantly stronger determinant for the poor than for the rich.

The cross-level interaction effects simultaneously show that the effect of individual level income on social participation is conditioned by state level characteristics. From this perspective, this association is significantly less strong in societies with more economic prosperity at the national level, and in societies where civil rights are more strongly protected. Especially in non-comparative analyses it would therefore be improper to look at the association between income and social participation, without taking the conditioning role of state institutions into account.

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