The European Union in Africa: the linkage between security, governance and development from an institutional perspective
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The European Union in Africa: the linkage between security, governance and development from an institutional perspective
Abstract

The international community currently favours an approach to development that stresses a triangular linkage between security, good governance and economic development. This approach clearly informs the European Union’s agenda in Africa, which has progressively integrated governance and security elements. This paper will show that this agenda is at least as much determined by the bureaucratic and national affiliations of the concerned EU actors as it is by African realities and international trends. African security indeed triggers a competition between the different European institutions, eager to be the driving force for a policy that can offer some additional resources and autonomy. The consistency and the credibility of the EU security policy in Africa will therefore depend on the responses provided to these institutional rivalries.

Introduction

The international community has been, over the last two decades, developing a holistic approach to development that stresses the linkage between security, good governance and economic development. The idea that drives this triangular approach is that development can only be achieved in a secure and democratic environment, conducive to long-term investments. This evolution can be traced back to the early 1990s, when political conditionality was added to what were formerly essentially economic development programmes (Robinson, 1993). Shortly thereafter, a security dimension was added to the ‘good governance-economic development’ nexus, which came with a new diagnosis. It is now assumed that conflict and under-development are rooted in state failure and that in order to prevent future crises, state weakness must be addressed through broad institutional reforms. The international community thus attempts to ‘bring the state back in’ (Evans et al. 1985), that is to re-establish its authority through capacity-building reforms.
The risks and limits entailed by this type of holistic approach are increasingly highlighted. Some argue, in particular, that the merging of development and security programmes is likely to promote a more military-based approach to development programmes. This may lead donors to favour security objectives over economic development and/or governance issues and provide them with the means to include traditional military assistance in development budgets. Authors thus underline that the three concepts – security, development and governance – may not be as naturally compatible as – and may even clash more often than - is implied by the current holistic approach to development (Châtaigner, 2004). Others question the uncritically accepted link between democracy and political stability, insisting that democratisation often brings about instability and can thus jeopardise a state’s developmental strategy (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). More generally, critiques underline the risks and limits of the current agenda that aims at transforming societies as a whole according to the one and unique liberal democracy model, whatever the realities and needs in the field (Duffield, 2001; Paris, 2003).

In spite of such reservations, the above-described understanding of the links between development, good governance and security clearly informs the European Union’s policy agenda in Africa. Through the so-called ‘multi-functional approach’ outlined in the European Security Strategy - the so-called ‘Solana Document’, adopted in December 2003 (Council of the European Union, 2003) - the EU is also promoting a holistic approach, where security, economic development and democracy are seen as essential contributions to the generation of political stability in the EU’s international environment. In doing so, the EU positions itself as a major actor on the international scene, one that can propose a multi-dimensional approach to crisis management and
therefore claim the status of international power (Piening, 1997; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Soeterdorp, 1999). The EU insists on its added value as a multi-institutional organisation likely to provide all types of crisis management tools – civilian and military as well as humanitarian – within a unique framework. Because of the multiplicity of the problems it is facing - war, poverty, humanitarian catastrophes, and so forth -, the African continent would seem to fit with this multi-functional approach.

This case study of the EU security policy in Africa shows that the linkage between security, governance and development relies for a large part on institutional dynamics. The EU security policies in Africa are at least as much determined by the bureaucratic affiliations of the concerned EU actors (Allison, 1971; Halperin and Kanter, 1974; Egeberg, 1999) as they are by African realities. African security can be seen as a field where EU actors are improving their institutional capacities: in fact, EU African security policies are often driven by internal power relations. The importance of these institutional dynamics can be seen through a threefold process:

- First, African security is a field likely to provide a new legitimacy for development policies led by the European Community (EC), which is responsible for the management of first pillar activities;

- Second, African security is a field of experimentation for the institutional actors responsible for the definition and implementation of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) – the so-called second pillar;

- Third, African security is a field of Europeanisation for traditionally bilateral member-state security policies.
The consistency and credibility of the EU security policy in Africa will depend on the convergence between these three processes.

**African security, a field of re-legitimisation for the European Commission?**

For some years now, a discourse that emphasises the role of security as a precondition for development has emerged within the EU’s community institutions. The first EU document focusing on African conflicts was proposed by the Commission (1996a) and promoted the notion of ‘structural stability’, which underlined the key-role played by development in the prevention and regulation of African conflicts. Increasing involvement in African conflict management issues constitutes a means for the Commission and its Directorate General Development (DG Dev), to respond to the doubts expressed about the efficiency of its development strategies in Africa (European Commission, 1996b and 2000), and the general validity of development aid (Lister, 1998a). Sub-Saharan Africa, which has long remained the very first and principal operational field for the community’s external relations institutions and DG Dev in particular (Lister, 1998b), is increasingly perceived as a difficult field for the promotion of economic and social development through aid. This in turn explains the growing attention given to conflict prevention and management through military means (Olsen, 2002). This security angle in the approach to development is determined by the interests of some Directorates General (DGs) within the Commission – DG Dev, in particular, often tends to consider Africa as its ‘exclusive territory’ (Dimier, 2002 and 2003) – in defending their privileged geographic area of intervention and investing in
a functional field in which they do not traditionally intervene. From the early 2000s, the EC has thus been entering the African security field on tiptoes, through the politicisation and securitisation of its development policy.

**Politcisation and securitisation of EC policies**

Relations between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa have long been reduced to the sole issues of trade and development cooperation through the Yaoundé and subsequent Lomé partnership agreements between the EU and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group of states (Lister, 1998b; GEMDEV, 2000). EU-Africa relations are being increasingly politicised and securitised, however, as was apparent in the two last Lomé agreements and their successor, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000. The adoption, by the EU, of the comprehensive approach that links good governance and development is evident in the Cotonou Agreement. Human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are defined as ‘essential elements’ in the Cotonou Agreement: a violation of any of these elements may lead to a suspension of EU assistance and trade cooperation with the concerned ACP country. Meanwhile, the very first article of the Cotonou Agreement closes the development-good governance-security triangle by underlining that the agreement was concluded ‘with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment’ (Cotonou Agreement, 2000 and 2005, art. 1), thus emphasising the third dimension – security.

The real innovation in the Cotonou Agreement, however, is the introduction of a ‘political dialogue’ between the EU and the ACP in article 8, which should ‘contribute
to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment'. After five years of implementation and some criticism, the mid-term revision of the Cotonou Agreement, in 2005, allowed for some adjustments. It was thought, in particular, that the preventive dimension of the ‘political dialogue’ as defined in article 8 was underused. Under the revised Cotonou Agreement, the dialogue should be held before the consultation procedure provided by article 96 of the same agreement can be launched. This amendment clearly strengthens the political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement, while the provision for a systematic dialogue with each partner country in effect complements the work of the EU special representatives (EUSR) sent to troubled regions and thus draws a link with the CFSP dimension of the EU’s relations with Africa. The assistance provided to partner countries is increasingly political rather than purely technical and the concept of rule of law clearly drives some of the reforms advocated in the Cotonou Agreement (art. 33).

The politicisation and securitisation of the EC’s policies in part reflects the current trends in and influences on donor policies. Among the fundamental principles set in article 2 of the Cotonou agreement is ‘ownership (of the development strategies)’, a widely used concept in donor and multilateral agency documents nowadays. It is indeed hoped that reforms and policies will rapidly be appropriated by local governments and communities so as to guarantee the sustainability of these reforms and prevent further external interventions. Another major trend is the current realisation that the world is increasingly interconnected and interdependent: Western powers now feel more threatened by ‘public bads’, i.e. collapsed or so-called ‘rogue’ states whose political disorder or aggressive policies may put their security at risk.
(Fearon and Laitin, 2004), rather than by other major powers. The politicisation and securitisation of development policies are thus justified not only by moral rights and the failure of previous development policies, but also by what M. Duffield (2001) calls ‘enlightened self-interest’: promoting development and good governance is in the interest of the international community as a whole since it will help prevent local conflicts and insecurity from spilling over. There again, the Cotonou agreement strongly reflects this trend: terrorism (art. 11a), migration (art. 13), drugs and organised crime (art. 30) and environmental protection and the management of natural resources (art. 32) are *inter alia* identified as common concerns that should be jointly addressed by the parties to the agreement.

The principles set in the Cotonou agreement are accompanied by concrete policies and instruments. The European Commission classifies its conflict prevention and peace-building efforts into two categories: direct and indirect initiatives. Direct initiatives range from humanitarian activities to support for conflict resolution initiatives and institutional reforms, while indirect initiatives refer to the mainstreaming of conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes, from development to trade.

Among direct initiatives are the humanitarian actions led by DG ECHO, the European Community Humanitarian Office created within DG Dev in 1992 and transformed into an independent DG in 2004. Humanitarian action is a shared competence, but it is implemented by the Commission’s institutions, and more precisely by DG ECHO, which enjoys an important latitude within the Commission, while its impartiality is established in article 7 of the humanitarian aid regulation.
(Council of the EU, 1996 and 2001a). In fact, the policies managed by ECHO are far from politicised. DG ECHO strictly defines humanitarian assistance as an apolitical, neutral and impartial activity: DG ECHO is not part of the ‘crisis management’ system and is therefore not a crisis management instrument, as the humanitarian policy does not aim to stabilise a political situation nor to prevent a crisis and can therefore not be considered a political instrument.

Direct initiatives also comprise early warning and action mechanisms. The Commission, its geographic desks and in-country delegations, are asked to closely monitor the political situation in all countries and to deliver assessments based on a list of root causes of conflict. These assessments are then used, by the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, to prepare a watch-list of countries at the start of a new Presidency every six months. In addition, risk factors are to be taken into account during the drafting of the Commission’s Country Strategy Papers so as to ensure a coordinated approach to conflict prevention. The Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit, within the Commission’s Directorate General External Relations (DG Relex), played an instrumental role in the introduction of these conflict assessments and in the integration of risk factors in the Country Strategy Papers. More importantly, however, the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit is in charge of coordinating and mainstreaming the Commission’s conflict prevention and management activities. As part of DG Relex, it also provides the necessary link between the Commission’s institutions in charge of conflict prevention and management and their Council counterparts.
Two supplementary, more technical tools, complement the ‘early warning and action’ system. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), managed by the RRM Management unit within the Commission’s DG Relex, has been used since 2001 to quickly bring a host of measures to bear on a conflict situation. The RRM can only finance a non-humanitarian operation where other instruments cannot respond within the necessary time frame, and for no longer than six months. A specific budget line, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is managed by the Commission’s DG EuropeAid,\(^{10}\) also finances both election observation missions and thematic crisis prevention actions, such as training, media, civic and voter education, generally conducted by partner NGOs and international organisations (European Commission, 2001; Gourlay, 2006a).\(^{11}\)

The Commission at times seems to suggest, in its policy documents, that any development programme can contribute to conflict prevention (European Commission website). This all-encompassing understanding of conflict prevention has not prevented the EU, however, from conceiving indirect initiatives in the form of more targeted policies that aim to practically link trade and security concerns. Of particular significance here are the efforts to regulate the trade of particular goods fuelling violent conflicts. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, that aims to prevent the trade of so-called ‘blood diamonds’,\(^{12}\) and the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), which regulates the trade of timber,\(^{13}\) are two cases in point. The EU’s ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative also underlines its willingness to promote economic development while mitigating the negative impact of trade liberalisation: it thus grants duty-free access to imports of all products from least developed countries without any quantitative restrictions, except to arms and
munitions.\textsuperscript{14} The EU’s efforts do not stop with its import activities, however: Europe has also shown signs that it was ready to take responsibility as an exporting region, especially with regard to weapons. Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement underlines the partners’ willingness to address the issue of landmines and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Efforts to regulate the trade of arms, however, remain tentative: the Council adopted a code of conduct on arms exports in 1998, but this is not a legally binding instrument and European member-states are among the world’s largest arms suppliers (Hugues, 2006).

**The EC, a unified actor?**

The intermingling of fields in conflict prevention and management policies requires close coordination between the different branches of the Commission. In fact, unclear divisions of labour are problematic inside the Commission, between its different sectors and directorates general. In the name of mainstreaming, DG Trade and DG Dev are asked, for instance, to carefully take into account the conflict prevention precautions pointed out by DG Relex. It is obvious, however, that these DGs often pursue different, or even contradictory, objectives. DG Trade will want to defend the EU’s commercial interests, DG Relex will be careful to increase the EU’s security, external relations and international visibility, while DG Dev should contribute to increased prosperity in the ACP states.

The EU’s current commitment in favour of regional integration illustrates the difficulty of coordinating and reconciling these different objectives. While African sub-regional organisations are increasingly considered key in the African security
architecture and the strengthening of their conflict prevention and management capabilities is increasingly supported, the Cotonou Agreement foresees the establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP regional organisations. At first sight, these two objectives would seem consistent. Some observers, however, underline that they may lead to very contradictory results. The official rationale behind the EPAs is to enhance regional integration in the ACP and integrate their economies into the world economy, thus creating incentives for increased cooperation – and regional peace – and breaking away from the ACP’s traditional isolation and underdevelopment. One of the principal aims of these EPAs, however, is also to submit EU-ACP trade relations to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, and to suppress the non-reciprocal trade arrangements that long prevailed between the EU and the ACP. External observers and representatives of the ACP states have already, on numerous occasions, underlined the flaws in this ‘peace and development through free trade’ logic and the risks entailed by a rushed-in liberalisation and integration of trade in the ACP countries. The risks concern, first, individual states: the opening-up of the ACP countries’ trade borders, it is feared, will deprive their governments of important trade-related revenues and force their often nascent public services and industries into a competition they are not yet able to face (Goodison, 2007). Authors have also underlined that the EPAs may fail to fulfil their primary objective, i.e. foster regional cooperation, by benefiting external – European – suppliers rather than regional ones (Gibb, 2000). The trade liberalisation entailed by the EPAs could, finally, create more ground for conflict than for peace: changes in commodity prices may exacerbate livelihood insecurity and create social tensions, and will also make it more difficult to control the flow of arms or conflict resources (Ochieng, 2005). The EC’s willingness to pursue EPA negotiations in spite of these
objections casts some doubt on its capacity to reconcile its different interests and institutions.

The Community pillar is not, finally, exempt from the interplay of national interests. Member-states, and France in particular, do not hesitate to emphasise their contribution to the European Development Fund (EDF) to favour the one or the other programme when these are discussed by the EDF Committee. They can also push forward their national interests through the presence of their European civil servants within the Commission. Belgian European civil servants, for instance, are important actors in the EU policy in Africa - in the Commission and in the Council - and can sometimes be seen, especially within DG Dev, as promoting Belgium’s national perceptions.

African security, a field of experimentation for the European Security and Defence Policy?

A number of documents and instruments adopted over the last few years illustrate the second pillar’s growing interest in and concern for Africa’s security problems, as well as its desire to become increasingly involved in their resolution. A major step was made with the adoption, in May 2001, of the Council Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. This common position developed at length an element that would thereafter constitute one of the essential bases of the EU’s security strategy in Africa, that is the idea of an increased multilateralism through a strengthening both of the capabilities of African regional organisations and
of the EU’s partnership with these organisations and with the United Nations (UN). This principle of multilateral cooperation is also emphasised in the *European Security Strategy* (Council of the European Union, 2003).

Although all these documents in theory provide a clear framework that could enhance the coordination of the European member-states’ activities in Africa, most of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) proposals still lack a practical translation. The clearest signs of the latter are the appointments of special representatives of the EU or of the Presidency to specific parts of Africa, but these appointments are still made on an *ad hoc* basis and cannot, therefore, be interpreted as a systematic ‘diplomaticisation’ of the EU’s presence in Africa. The exclusively political dimension of the CFSP, which would require deep institutional reforms and would most obviously threaten the member-states’ sovereign monopoly in international relations, thus remains underdeveloped. This in turn partly accounts for the fact that the EU has increasingly invested in the development of another dimension of the CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), perceived as a more technical and possibly straightforward policy field.

**Africa, a field of validation for the CFSP/ESDP means and procedures**

The field of conflict prevention and management in Africa constitutes an ideal field of experimentation and validation (Bagayoko, 2004a), especially for the Petersberg tasks, which comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Operation Artemis, launched
within the ESDP framework and led from June to September 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was clearly a founding act in the mobilisation of the second pillar instruments in Africa (Olsen, 2002; Faria, 2004). Beyond the geographic expansion of the ESDP potential field of intervention – it had not until then expanded beyond the Balkans –, Operation Artemis also inaugurated a new form of partnership between the EU and the UN (2003).

More importantly, however, the new EU military structures gained legitimacy both from an external and an internal perspective:

- First, Artemis proved that the EU was able to plan military operations autonomously, without resorting to NATO means and instruments, as had been the case for all ESDP operations led in the Balkans. The operation was indeed entirely and exclusively planned within the EU’s military structures – the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS) – which then worked in close coordination with France, the ‘framework nation’ in charge of operational planning. An alternative to the resort to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) was thus successfully tested. Africa is now often seen by ESDP actors as a field of European influence that could escape the strict implementation of the ‘Berlin Plus’ option and where the ESDP could gain increasing international credibility;

- Artemis also provided the ESDP with an increased legitimacy within the EU institutional architecture. Operation Artemis established that the decision procedures at the politico-military level – which depend on the relations between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee – could lead to rapid decisions, contrary to what had been suggested by the long planning delays for
Operation Concordia, launched in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) earlier in 2003.

Operation Artemis also paved the way for conceptual innovations, such as the joint proposal by France and the UK – joined by Germany – to develop a new ‘battlegroup concept’, that is the creation of battlegroups of about 1,500 troops with the appropriate supporting units, able to intervene anywhere and more particularly in ‘collapsing states’. These battlegroups are again meant to be part of the EU-UN partnership as they should be available for autonomous operations, in response to UN requests for participation in Chapter VII operations. They may also be seen as a potential experimentation field for the concept of ‘differentiated integration’ (Irondelle and Vennesson, 2002), which would enable willing states to intervene without being paralysed by internal differences within the EU.

Finally, Operation Artemis gave way to other ESDP operations which consolidated the EU’s contribution to peace and post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC. Two subsequent missions were indeed launched in the DRC, this time with a Security Sector Reform (SSR) focus. EUPOL Kinshasa is a police mission in the capital city Kinshasa, which contributes to the training of the Integrated Police Unit (IPU). EUSEC DR Congo, on the other hand, provides assistance and advice on the necessary reforms to the Congolese authorities in charge of security since June 2005. Another military operation, finally, recently confirmed the EU’s capacity to lead an efficient, albeit short-term, mission with a clear objective. EUFOR DR Congo was deployed in Kinshasa from 12th June to 30th November 2006, during the period encompassing the elections in the DRC. All three missions in the DRC were or are led
in very close coordination with the UN – EUFOR, like Artemis, was meant as a support to MONUC – and the Congolese authorities. A fifth mission, led in Darfur (Sudan), was meant to show that the EU is also able to implement at the operational level its partnership with the AU and to contribute to Africa’s security as defined in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Action Plan for Africa adopted in 2004. The EU civilian-military supporting action to AMIS II, the AU’s mission in Darfur, provides the AU with political, military and technical assistance, equipment and training at least until the UN/AU hybrid operation is deployed in Darfur. The EU is now seriously considering launching a complementary, bridging ESDP operation ‘in support of the multidimensional UN presence in Eastern Chad and North-Eastern Central African Republic with a view to improving security in those areas’ (Council of the European Union, 2007).

These last EU operations in Africa illustrate a major trend in ESDP operations, also obvious in the Balkans, the first experimentation field for the ESDP: the increasing development of the ESDP’s civilian dimension, where the EU has made faster operational progress than in the military dimension initially seen as a priority in the development of an EU crisis response (Nowak, 2006). The military dimension of the ESDP indeed represents a narrower field of action for the EU, which remains essentially dependent on NATO’s crisis management means – two of the four exclusively military ESDP operations led so far were implemented within the Berlin Plus framework. Only very few European member-states, moreover, have the political will, capacity and experience necessary for military interventions; France and the UK thus support half of the EU’s budgetary expenses and two thirds of its research expenses. Member-states thus now seem to agree on the rapid development of civilian
crisis management, where the EU has an added value in comparison with other international organisations such as NATO (Bagayoko and Kovacs, 2007).

The introduction of civilian elements has however led to the transformation of the type of EU involvement in Africa. While the development of ESDP activities in Africa was initially meant to provide rapid reaction means, these operations are in effect increasingly taking on a long-term approach (Gowan, 2004) – EUSEC DR Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa have now already exceeded 18 months. This ‘civilianisation’ of the ESDP in Africa has important implications for inter-institutional coordination. It requires, first, close coordination between the military and civilian dimensions of ESDP operations – an increasing number of ESDP operations, such as the current supporting action to AMIS II, combine civilian and military elements -, a coordination made more difficult by their separate management by different institutions and funding instruments within the second pillar.  

Second, while the military dimension of the ESDP is a second pillar exclusivity, its civilian dimension is necessarily linked to – and, at times, overlaps with – the community pillar’s civilian activities: The Commission, for example, managed EDF funds in support of the SSR programme in the DRC and close coordination with the subsequent Council-led SSR operations, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo, was therefore essential.

**Unclear division of labour within the second pillar**

The European security structures are very young and are therefore all struggling for legitimacy. This legitimacy must be won: first, against external actors, such as NATO (and particularly the US interests within it); second, against older and more
experienced EC institutions; third, one against another. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of the member-states’ PSC ambassadors, plays a central role in the definition and follow-up of European crisis responses. It provides the political control and strategic direction for the ESDP operations, basing its decisions on the recommendations expressed by the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM). The EUMC is composed of the member-states’ military commands; it follows the progress of military operations, makes recommendations to the PSC on all military aspects of the ESDP and gives instructions to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). CIVCOM, on the other hand, was created in 2002 to define and supervise civilian operations. It is also in charge of seeing to the inter-pillar coordination of the EU’s civilian actions.

To these Council institutions must be added the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), led by the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR), with its directorates general. Among them, the DG E, in charge of external relations, is divided into geographical and functional directorates. The responsibility to coordinate the management of African security issues is at the heart of a competition between these directorates. If DGE VIII – in charge of defence issues - were tasked with coordinating the activities in Africa, it could gain renewed legitimacy. Indeed, DGE VIII is currently having some difficulties in imposing its views on the Military Staff, also located within the GSC. Moreover, both DGE VIII and the Military Staff are also competing with NATO. Because the ESDP is comprised of two closely interlinked fields - military and civilian crisis management -, the recently established civilian-military cell could also seek the responsibility of trying to coordinate the civilian and military aspects of the EU security policy in Africa.
Nevertheless, DGE IX, which is in charge of the civilian aspects of crisis management and has no rivalry with NATO, is perhaps in a better position at the moment: indeed, DGE IX seems to be getting closer and closer to the Commission services – such as DG Dev or DG ECHO – in charge of implementing civilian programmes in the security field.

Finally it is also important to stress the role played by professional interests, which have appeared since the launching of the ESDP. In fact, a new profession has emerged within the traditionally civilian organisation which the EU used to be. The military officers stationed in Brussels are trying to promote both their values (such as symbolic patriotism) and their working methods (such as a culture of planning) as opposed to those of their civilian counterparts (Bagayoko, 2006). Whatever their nationality, they generally feel they have more in common with military counterparts from other countries than with the European civil servants coming from their own country. These rivalries and the perceived necessity to consolidate an EU military profession may lead to additional tensions and attempts at investing new fields in the name of the development-governance-security triangle.

African security, a field of Europeanisation for member-states security policies?

African security issues offer an interesting field, where European member-states can make their security policies meet, interact, coordinate, and in effect, ‘Europeanise’. C. Major defines Europeanisation as ‘an ongoing, interactive and mutually constitutive
process of change linking national and European levels, where the responses of the member-states to the integration process feed back into EU institutions and policy processes and vice versa’ (Major, 2005: 177). Through its security policy in sub-Saharan Africa, the EU indeed aims to ‘integrate the policies and actions of its member-states’ (Ginsberg, 1989). But the launching of a dynamic ESDP in Africa is also the symptom of the Europeanisation strategies of the former colonial powers’ traditional African policies and of their capacity to be the driving force for a collective policy on the continent.

**EU Member-states and African security**

Traditionally, most EU member-states do not identify any significant political or economic interest in Africa. Germany, in particular, has long insisted on the necessity to limit the ESDP to the enlarged European space and been hostile to the idea of any EU involvement in the management of Africa’s conflicts. But the former colonial powers have been successful in recent years in generating a growing interest for African security matters among their European partners.

Rather than being a driving force, France has long been an obstacle to the EU’s further involvement in African security issues. France’s unilateralist policy in Africa acted as a disincentive on other European states, which were reluctant to associate their image and the image of the EU with a policy often considered neo-colonial. France, however, is now increasingly trying to obtain a multilateral legitimacy for its interventions on the continent. The integration of French interventions within the ESDP framework could allow it to remain involved on the African continent – still
considered a central asset for France’s position on the international scene – while rendering groundless the accusations of paternalism and neo-colonialism. Operation Artemis offered an interesting illustration of the progressive Europeanisation of France’s involvement in African crises\(^30\) and proved that European member-states could decide collectively to contribute to a crisis management operation that had been initially wanted by one of them only. Operation Artemis was thus an interesting synthesis of the interests of the EU and one of its member-states, since it reconciled a young ESDP in search of credibility and a former colonial power in search of legitimacy after some deeply contested unilateral interventions. It also enabled France to re-engage in the Great Lakes region and beyond, in Central Africa, from which it had progressively withdrawn since the much criticised Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. Beyond these central political issues, the Europeanisation of its Africa policy also enables France to share the costs of military and defence cooperation. This desire to rationalise the costs of the French military cooperation first translated into the efforts expended since 1998 towards the emergence of inter-African capabilities of crisis management. This was essentially done through the Programme for the strengthening of African peacekeeping capabilities (RECAMP - \textit{Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix}), which is based on a regional approach to assistance and lies at the heart of the multilateralisation of the French security policy in Africa.\(^31\) The objective, regularly stressed since 2002,\(^32\) is to make RECAMP ‘the operational reference for the ESDP in Africa’, that is a federative framework for EU member-states’ security policies in Africa. The future of RECAMP is now clearly linked to France’s capacity to convince its European partners to participate in the financing and equipment as well as training of African armies.
The Franco-British rapprochement in Saint-Malo led to both the creation of the ESDP and the Europeanisation of the two countries’ African policies, even though the UK has since seemed less anxious than France to Europeanise its African policy. Since 2001, the United Kingdom’s efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities – through British Peace Support Teams (BPST) which are providing training in former British colonies - have become part of a much more ambitious conflict prevention project known as the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), which draws together the conflict-prevention resources of the Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD). The thematic focus of the ACPP, from enhancing peace support operations capabilities to addressing the economic and financial causes of conflict, underlines a holistic understanding of conflict prevention. The UK has placed a strong emphasis on African peacekeeping by setting up a special fund, the Africa Pool. The UK highly values its bilateral activities in Africa. Unlike the French, the British are not worried when their activities do not have a European label: their approach is less institutional than the French one. At this stage, the British consider that their bilateral programmes in Africa are very efficient, particularly in the SSR field, and therefore do not need to be Europeanised.

Portugal is also an important European actor in Africa. Since the early 1990s, it has been developing technical and military cooperation with African Portuguese-speaking countries (PALOP). Portugal also has its own African peacekeeping capabilities support programme, the Programme for the support of Peace Missions in Africa (PAMPA - Programa de Apoio às Missões de Paz em África). Like France, Portugal would like the PAMPA programme to be integrated in the EU training
policy framework. Portugal, however, does not wish the programme to be fully Europeanised.

EU member-states seem increasingly convinced of the importance of Africa to European security. The rather impressive list of contributing nations to EUFOR RD Congo confirms this. Moreover, some member-states such as the Netherlands or Sweden have in effect recently stepped up their involvement in African security issues. Alongside France and Portugal, Belgium - which recently resumed a more active Africa policy after having largely withdrawn from the African scene following the assassination of ten of its parachutists in Kigali in 1994 - is one of the most active supporters of a substantial European commitment in Africa. It is followed on this by Spain and Greece.

Disagreements between member-states

Germany’s position has considerably evolved, over the last years, from reluctance to a readiness to contribute to short-term ESDP missions, such as EUFOR, whose operational command was provided by Germany. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of reluctance, especially within the German Ministry of Defence, to engage more in Africa. Germany is very anxious to prevent the EU from taking a neo-colonialist turn and imposing its views on its African partners. The new EU member-states, which have no traditional African policy nor specific interest in this geographical area, are generally in favour of reinforcing African capabilities in order to create an autonomous African security system and avoid increasing costs to the EU.
Indeed, funding constitutes a central issue. Their limited defence budgets can lead some countries to favour a European option, in order to see the EU shoulder part of the cost of their African security policy. Some member-states, such as France or Portugal, thus share a strong desire to have access to the Community development cooperation funds, although they are not ready, in exchange for this, to hand over their management of military cooperation to Community actors. This preoccupation can explain why their African security policies are increasingly trying to promote the linkage between security, governance and development, as suggested by the RECAMP concept (RECAMP website). Other European partners wish to avoid a situation where some member-states’ African policies would be funded by the EU, especially by the EC budget. Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands are thus particularly cautious when it comes to funding EU security activities in Africa. Most new member-states share this financial concern: they wish to see a fair balance between the structural funds they receive and the development aid dedicated to non-EU states.

Moreover, countries such as Germany and the Nordic countries favour an ethical approach (Châtaignier, 2004) and consider that development funds should not be used to finance the ESDP, whose progress they do not consider as crucial as France does. The UK, on the other hand, is already implementing a policy that clearly puts the stress on the linkage between security and development. The British position on the question is therefore not so much driven by ethical concerns as it is by a reluctance to ‘Europeanise’ a policy that is considered already efficient at the national level.

Finally, the issue of multilateral cooperation with other Western actors is another bone of contention. France’s insistence on involving the EU in Africa can be read as an
attempt to avoid coordination with other actors, and in particular with NATO and the United States.\textsuperscript{37} The UK, on the other hand, insists on the necessity of coordinating EU member-states’ activities with non-European actors such as the United States, Canada and Norway. The EU strategy for Africa and the G8 Gleneagles Plan for Africa are viewed as totally interconnected. The British, followed in this by Germany, also promote cooperation between NATO and the EU.\textsuperscript{38}

**Inter-institutional relations: competition or cooperation?**

Each and every new policy paper focusing on the EU’s security policy in Africa insists on the necessity of inter-institutional and inter-pillar coordination and mainstreaming. In fact, one of the conditions of success of the European approach to conflict prevention and management in Africa depends on the EU’s capacity to overcome the rivalries born out of the different institutions’ desire to play the role of a ‘lead agency’ on these issues. Some of the strategic choices made by the EU in Africa therefore depend on the interests of each department involved in the continent’s affairs and are often the result of compromises between these departments. It appears that the linkage between security, governance and development is still frequently at the core of an EU inter-institutional competition, although some recent evolutions also show that the EU institutions increasingly share a common vocabulary and approach to African security issues.

**Cross-pillars rivalries**
The Commission can have a determining influence over the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the African continent (Krause, 2003) — for example through the implementation of CFSP sanctions adopted by the Council or through the mobilisation of first pillar resources for the implementation of common actions — but also over the implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The African Peace Facility (APF) provides an interesting illustration of the institutional issues at stake in the linkage security-development: it is a good example of the Commission’s capacity to encroach on the Council’s prerogative over the CFSP and ESDP. The APF is a funding instrument dedicated to financing peacekeeping operations led by African actors. Launched in 2004, the APF was funded from the resources of the 9th European Development Fund (EDF), which is drawn from member-states’ voluntary contributions. Although the EDF is not part of the Community budget, the Commission is in charge of managing it, which gives it a determining influence. With regards to the African Peace Facility itself, however, the member-states have the last word. The APF was supposed to be a provisional instrument and its perpetuation created heated debates between member-states and the Commission. Some object that the APF ‘diverts’ funds that were initially meant for development aid towards security concerns. The issue of the APF also had a concrete impact on the considerable disagreement between the Commission and the member-states over the notion of ‘effective ownership’ through multilateral cooperation and the terms of its implementation. The debate, in effect, concerned the type of African multilateral organisation that should be supported. The use of the African Peace Facility was therefore at the centre of a competition between the Commission, which wanted the APF to focus on support to the AU, and the GSC and some member-states, which wanted these funds to be also — or even exclusively — used
to support sub-regional organisations.\textsuperscript{42} This debate found a de facto – provisional –

conclusion when the AU was called upon to intervene in Darfur: The € 200 million,

which were earmarked in the initial APF for peace support operations, were thus

nearly exclusively allocated to the AU missions AMIS I and II (NEIMACRO, 2006).

The EU agreed, in April 2006, to provide an additional amount of € 300 million under

the 10\textsuperscript{th} EDF to be able to continue the APF for another three-year period (2008-

2010).\textsuperscript{43}

Another example of the EU institutional rivalries over African security is the

recent case brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which

also underlines the problems entailed by the unclear division of labour between

Council and Commission. In February 2005, the Commission, in an action against the

Council, accused it of assuming the right to contribute to ECOWAS in the framework

of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). For the Commission,

the Council decision affects Community powers in the field of development aid, since

actions against the spread of SALW are already covered by the Cotonou Agreement

and the regional indicative programme for West Africa (Court of Justice of the

European Communities, 2005).

Finally, it is important to underline that inter-institutional rivalries may

sometimes also originate in philosophical divergences. The position of DG ECHO is a

telling example. As mentioned above, DG ECHO strictly defines humanitarian

assistance as an apolitical, neutral and impartial activity: it thus contests that

humanitarian missions can be considered as an integral part of the ESDP military

missions, as currently defined by the Petersberg tasks. The development of the ESDP
has indeed led some, within ECHO, to fear even greater confusion between humanitarian and military actors. These positions explain in large part the near absence of contacts between DG ECHO and the EUMS, the EUMC or the General Secretariat’s DGE VIII. DG ECHO rejects the political pressure emanating from the second pillar institutions and denounces what it thinks is a desire to use humanitarian activities for political purposes.

**Towards increased cooperation?**

The current evolution towards longer missions, with a growing civilian dimension and a focus on good governance and sustainable development, renders essential a tight cooperation between the civilian and military crisis management activities of the second pillar and the traditionally civilian activities of the first pillar (Gourlay, 2006b; Kohl, 2006).

The GSC, the Commission and the EU member-states have recently engaged in common reflections on the EU’s policies in the field of African security. A first important document, the *EU Strategy for Africa*, was jointly designed by the Commission and the GSC and adopted in December 2005. This document defines the EU’s general strategy in Africa and therefore goes beyond the sole security aspects. Nevertheless, the very first section of the document deals with ‘Peace and Security’ and recommends: fostering the African Peace Facility (APF) through a long-term arrangement; building EU engagement in Africa on member-states’ bilateral activities; assisting the AU in implementing the African Standby Force (ASF); providing support to African military and civilian operations (including the deployment of battlegroups);
continuing efforts to fight the production and the circulation of small arms and involving Africa in the struggle against terrorism. This broad document, however, did not give way to any practical implementation.

In November 2005, following a French request, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) asked the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) to design a Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. This concept seeks to enhance the coordination between the European Community, the second pillar and member-state activities and promotes three categories of measures. The first category comprises measures meant to strengthen consistency and coordination at the EU level by ensuring coherence between the EU’s different institutions, developing a support and coordination structure and ensuring consistency of financial support. The second set of measures focuses on a strengthened partnership with the AU and the sub-regional organisations. The third group of measures, finally, aims to strengthen African capabilities by providing support for the training of African troops; this will probably be done by opening member-states’ depots and by turning member-states’ training programmes – such as the French RECAMP, the only bilateral programme to be mentioned as such in the concept paper – into means for delivering EU policies. The PSC made note of the Concept on 29th September 2006 and stated that it should be seen as part of the implementation of the EU strategy for Africa. The GSC and the Commission were once again invited to explore and find practical ways of implementing the options proposed in the paper, in cooperation with African partners. Indeed, a number of financial and institutional issues remain unresolved, that underline the disagreements that still oppose member-states as well as the rivalries within and across pillars.
Meanwhile, there is no obligation, in the concept paper, for member-states to proceed with the implementation of the concept.

As far as funding is concerned, there is an urgent need to address the absence of harmonisation of the existing financial tools. At the moment, financial resources from member-states have to be mobilised to support African capabilities such as military training, not eligible for funding under the CFSP budget or the African Peace Facility (APF). Some progress has been made since the adoption, in November 2006, of the Instrument for Stability, which aims to ensure a better linkage between short-term crisis response and long-term development instruments. This instrument adopts a comprehensive approach, as it aims to contribute to stability in situations of crisis or emerging crisis and to help build local capacities to address specific global and trans-regional threats and pre- and post-crisis situations, often rooted in bad governance and under-development. Its capacity to solve current funding issues, however, will in great part depend on the interpretation that the EU institutions choose to make of it. While it clearly combines a number of formerly separate instruments, it does not as yet provide a clear perspective on the future of other instruments such as the African Peace Facility. Article 4.3 of the regulation establishing the instrument for stability would nonetheless seem to suggest some ways of complementing, if not replacing, the APF. Certainly, this new instrument will be the object of further inter-institutional negotiations, which will most probably in turn determine its efficiency. Whatever the results of these negotiations, some problems will remain, however: the status of military cooperation, in particular, remains unclear.
The strengthening of the coherence between the EU’s different institutions is also a complex problem. Some member-states have proposed the implementation of a coordination structure that would be both responsible for coordinating bilateral activities of EU member-states and for planning EU activities in Africa. The implementation of such a coordination structure is related to the EU architecture itself: it is interesting to note that a geographical question – security on the African continent - can create functional development at the EU institutional level. At the moment, there is no agreement concerning the institutional situation of this structure. France wishes to promote the establishment of a cell – in effect a European equivalent of the French Military and Defence Cooperation Directorate (Direction de la Coopération Militaire et de Défense – DCMD) - within the GSC, which would be responsible for preparing, coordinating and implementing EU activities in Africa. Other member-states, such as Portugal or the UK, are against the establishment of a rigid permanent coordination structure, particularly if it is supposed to take initiatives, as the concept paper suggests. They support the implementation of a lighter mechanism, for example a coordination cell introduced within the Africa Task Force in the Policy Unit which is already bringing together all Africa-related activities.

The coordination of member-states training programmes is another issue at stake here. France would like to make the RECAMP concept an operator for EU activities in Africa and extend the ‘framework nation’ concept to African-European partnerships – France being the natural candidate to this position. This ‘framework nation’ concept, however, remains to be defined; it is not clear, in particular, how the strategic direction of activities in Africa would be shared between the ‘framework nation’ and the EU organ in charge of the political control and the strategic direction of EU operations –
namely the PSC. Whereas the UK used to insist on how important it was for member-states to keep control over their national programmes, it now seems more willing to collaborate with France.

**Conclusion**

The EU’s security policy in Africa provides an interesting example of the coordination and competition processes within the Community first pillar, within the second pillar and across these pillars. One of the biggest challenges for the EU policy in Africa will most probably be cross-pillar coordination, that is the coordination of CFSP/ESDP activities and EC development programmes. Reconciling their objectives is obviously a matter of close coordination and institutional diplomacy. The examples of the African Peace Facility and Instrument for Stability show that devising new instruments alone does not constitute a sufficient response to inconsistencies, and that much depends on *ad hoc* institutional interpretations and experimentation in the field. Some coordination issues will also remain unresolved as long as the documents defining the EU’s external relations and security policies and instruments are not clarified and adjusted to the current international environment and to the EU’s most recent institutional evolutions.

Beyond this and more importantly, the EU’s policy in Africa is an interesting case study in how new international relations concepts – here the linkage between security, governance and development - can in reality be widely driven by institutional issues. Indeed, the linkage between security, governance and development, which informs the EU’s current security policies in Africa, largely relies on institutional dynamics and
national interests within the EU. African security, more than security in the Balkans – where the EU has traditionally intervened in close coordination with NATO –, represents an ideal field for internal development and legitimisation within the EU: It has the potential to provide for the re-legitimisation of the EC’s development policies, the experimentation and development of the ESDP and the Europeanisation of member-states’ Africa and security policies. This three-fold process, however, also suggests far-reaching institutional ambitions and interests: African security triggers a competition between the different European institutions, eager to be the driving force for a policy that can offer some additional resources and autonomy. Meanwhile, the triangle formed by security, governance and development pre-supposes coordination and cooperation between these same institutions, which are little used to working together. Some of the inconsistencies observed in the field, when policies are actually implemented, can in turn be explained by this experimentation process and the inter-institutional dynamics it is linked to.

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1 J.-M. Châtaigner (2001) gives two examples of obvious clashes between donors’ security, governance and development agendas in Africa. The fist concerned the external military assistance granted to Guinea when it was attacked on its Eastern border with Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2000-2001: contrary to general practice, no requirement of transparency in the Guinean state’s security system was attached to this assistance. On the other hand, Rwanda and Uganda continued to receive development aid while their troops were directly and openly supporting rebel troops in the Congolese war.

2 It is important here to put the stress on the EU institutional sharing of responsibility. While the Council is responsible for negotiating international treaties, the Commission is in charge of implementing their community elements. The Commission, however, also enjoys a power of initiative and often designs the treaties. This is especially the case of the EU-ACP agreements, which the Commission’s DG Dev and, since the Cotonou Agreement, DG Trade are in charge of managing and implementing.

3 The Council actually wanted to add ‘good governance’ to the list of essential elements, but was opposed here by the ACP countries that felt that the three essential elements already covered the most important aspects of good governance and that its inclusion could lead to arbitrary decisions. Good governance, therefore, is a ‘fundamental element’, that is with the exception of serious cases of corruption, a state facing governance problems will be offered support and advice to improve its performance (Council of the European Union, Cotonou Agreement, article 9.3).

4 An Article 96 procedure can be launched if a party to the agreement – the European Community and the member states of the European Union or an ACP state – considers that the other party has failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. This consultation procedure can lead to the adoption of ‘appropriate measures’ and, as a last resort, to a suspension of the agreement (Mackie and Zinke, 2005).

5 The EUSRs promote the CFSP in troubled regions and countries and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law. They report to the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR).

6 M. Duffield (2001), however, underlines that the notion of ‘ownership’ carries a somewhat hypocritical dimension in that reforms and policies remain externally-induced and highly disruptive, however ‘owned’ they might appear: ‘People in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected to do it willingly (sic) themselves’ (p. 34).

7 Root causes are listed under eight headings: legitimacy of the state; rule of law; respect for fundamental rights; civil society and media; relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms; sound economic management; social and regional inequalities; geopolitical situation (European Commission, no date).

8 Each Country Strategy Paper (CSP) is drafted during negotiations between the European Commission and the concerned country’s government and thereafter signed by both parties. It provides a framework for European Commission assistance programmes under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement for periods of five years.

9 The Commission’s representative within the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM) is a member of the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit.
DG EuropeAid is assisted in this by the Human Rights and Democracy Committee, which is comprised of member-states’ representatives and is chaired by a representative of DG Relex. It examines financial planning and delivers opinions on projects over €1 million.

The Instrument for Stability, established in November 2006, repeals, in particular, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). We will come back to this Instrument for Stability in the last part of this paper.

The EU has been a participant of the Kimberley Process since its inception. The scheme is implemented through a Council Regulation applicable in all member-states, which lays down the procedures and criteria to be followed in the import and export of rough diamonds into and from the EU and sets out provisions for self-regulation by the European diamond industry. The European Commission actively supported the setting-up of the monitoring system and chairs the Kimberley Process this year.

The Action Plan places particular emphasis on forest governance reforms and capacity building in timber-producing countries. FLEGT actions should also aim at developing multilateral cooperation to reduce the consumption of illegally harvested timber in the EU (European Commission, 2003).

Imports of rice and sugar, however, are not fully liberalised yet, which has triggered considerable criticism against the seemingly generous ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative. Duties on those products will be gradually reduced until duty free access will be granted for sugar in July 2009 and for rice in September 2009.

France has traditionally been the very first contributor to the EDF - its contribution represented 24.3% of the 9th EDF (2003-2008). This is about to change, however, as Germany will be the first contributor to the 10th EDF (2008-2013), while France’s share will drop to 19.5%.

Interview with an EC delegation staff member in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, March 2006. The EDF Committee consists of member-state representatives and meets every two months in order to validate the programmes proposed by the Commission.

There are, generally, many Belgian civil servants working within the European Commission: The latest figures published by the Commission (July 2007) show that Belgian civil servants represent 21% of the Commission’s staff. This is very obviously due to the Commission’s headquarters being located in the Belgian capital city, Brussels (European Commission Civil Service, 2007). Beyond this figure, Belgian civil servants have, lately, occupied key-positions with regards to the EU’s security policy in Africa: The Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, is, of course, Belgian, as are the head of the Council Secretariat General’s Africa Unit and the Deputy Head of the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit in the Commission’s DG Relex.

On the role played by member-states and their appointed Commissioners and civil servants in the shaping of Community policies, see, in particular, Dimier, 2006.

Mr Aldo Ajello holds the position of EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region since March 1996, Mr Pekka Haavisto was appointed EUSR for Sudan in July 2005, while Mr Hans Dahlgren’s mandate as the Presidency’s special representative for the Mano River region has been regularly renewed since 2001.

The Petersberg tasks were defined in the Petersberg Declaration, adopted by the Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers on 19th June 1992 and subsequently integrated word for word into article 17.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. These tasks thus constitute the legal definition of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). There is a real resolve, within the EU, to broaden the initial scope of the Petersberg missions to take on board the new threats to European security and the post-9/11 international security environment. To that end the draft Constitutional Treaty stipulated that the Petersberg tasks ‘shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation’ (Article III-309). In spite of the non-adoption of the Constitutional Treaty, the extended Petersberg missions are being implemented de facto, as is shown in the assistance provided to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Assembly of Western European Union, 2007).

Launched on 12th June 2003, Operation Artemis aimed to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Ituri, in the North East of the Democratic Republic of Congo, then torn up by the violent fighting opposing the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The operation was thus explicitly mandated by the UN’s Security Council (Resolution 1484) in order to maintain the security in the camps hosting the internally displaced, secure the airport in Bunia and protect civilians, UN staff and humanitarian agencies in the region. The aim was to ensure the control of the situation while the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was reinforced and its strength increased.
As shown by its ongoing support to the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS), NATO has however since stepped up its interest and expertise in Africa, which tends to qualify this idea that Africa could constitute an ideal field for the experimentation of an autonomous European defence.

Berlin Plus is a strategic partnership agreement between NATO and the EU. It allows the EU to make use of NATO’s logistical and planning means in its crisis management activities.

In response to a crisis, or to an urgent request by the UN, the EU should be able to undertake two battlegroup-size operations for a period of up to 120 days simultaneously. Forces should be on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. Larger member-states will generally contribute their own battlegroups, while smaller members are expected to create common groups. Each group will have a ‘framework nation’, which will take operational command, based on the model set up during the Operation Artemis.

Taking as a basis the guidelines set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU has now defined the security sector as a system which includes: the core security actors, that is armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, intelligence and security services; the security management and oversight bodies within the executive and legislative branches and in civil society; the justice and law enforcement institutions; and the non-statutory forces such as liberation or guerrilla armies, private security companies and political party militias. Security Sector Reform (SSR) involves addressing issues of how the security system is structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled. It seeks to increase the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal and external security needs in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, human rights, transparency and the rule of law (Council of the European Union, 2006).

This document, adopted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 16th November 2004, sets out the following recommendations: provision of technical advice, liaison officers to be sent to the AU and to the sub-regional organisations, database of African officers trained by EU member states in Europe or in Africa, expert teams responsible for supporting the planning of operations led by the AU and the sub-regions, training by EU staffs of African military and civilians in DDR, and so forth (Council of the European Union, 2004a).

While the military side of the ESDP is essentially conceptualised and implemented by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS), its civilian side is managed by the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM). A civilian-military cell was created within the EUMS in 2004 to enhance civilian-military coordination in crisis management operations. This cell is, however, only responsible for coordination within the second pillar. The civilian and military aspects of the ESDP are also financed separately: the civilian aspects are covered by the CFSP budget or additional financial instruments such as the African Peace Facility, while military expenditures are managed by a special mechanism called ‘Athena’ (Council of the European Union, 2004b).

The ESDP was launched during the June 1999 European Council held in Cologne and was declared operational in the December 2001 European Council held in Laeken.

The following therefore report to DGE IX: the Police Unit, which plans and leads crisis management missions comprising a police deployment; the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit), an instrument of strategic and geopolitical analysis at the service of the High Representative for the CFSP; and the Situation Centre (SITCEN), in charge of 24-hour intelligence, analysis and warning.

Operation Artemis was not strictly speaking the result of a European initiative; it was in fact initially a French intervention that was subsequently Europeanised. At the beginning of May 2003, in response to the UN General Secretary’s call, France considered intervening in the RDC, at the head of an international coalition. The initial operation, named ‘Mamba’, was eventually proposed by the French diplomacy to its European partners and took place within the ESDP framework. In accordance with the Council Decision of 12th June 2003, the operation’s command was entrusted to France, which took on the role of ‘framework nation’. In fact, the operational headquarter of Operation Artemis, set up in Paris, benefited from the work that had been previously for Operation Mamba. Constituted by a small core of French officers, the Operation’s high command was joined by officers from other member-states as well as by liaison officers from the EU Military Staff. France also provided the high command on the ground (Bagayoko, 2004b).

As shown by the Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire or recent interventions in Chad and the Central African Republic, France has departed from its abstentionist attitude of 1995-2002, although French engagement is now justified as a way to support African capabilities when these need to be complemented. France is also reorganising its military forces permanently stationed on the continent according to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as defined by the African Union.

In fact, two concurrent options for more effectively developing and fostering the RECAMP concept were put forward: Some advocated developing the partnership with sub-regional organisations and coordinating...
RECAMP with other bilateral initiatives such as the US ACOTA programme and the UK African peacekeeping support programmes; the other option consisted in promoting the partnership with the AU and the EU’s involvement. In September 2005, during his traditional annual speech to the French ambassadors, President Jacques Chirac clarified the French position and called for RECAMP to be placed within the European framework.

35 A key part of the UK’s long-term strategy to build African conflict management capabilities consists in supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects. The largest British commitment in SSR is in Sierra Leone, where the UK actively supports the reform of the army, the police, the judiciary system, as well as ad hoc institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and provides technical assistance to the government of Sierra Leone (Leboeuf, 2005).

34 The following EU member-states contributed to EUFOR: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. Turkey, although not an EU-member, is also among the contributing nations (Council of the European Union website).

33 Belgium is particularly active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is a former Belgian colony. The Belgian Defence Ministry, in cooperation with South Africa, provides training support to Congolese troops. Belgium also provided logistical and operational training to the Beninese battalion about to be sent to the United Nations Mission to DRC (MONUC).

32 Nevertheless, some of these new member-states are becoming more active in Africa: for instance, Poland contributed 150 soldiers to EUFOR (this commitment is linked to the close relationship between Poland and Germany, which commanded the EUFOR mission on the ground and provided funding for the strategic transport of Polish troops and for their logistics). A Hungarian observer was also sent to Darfur and afterwards to the Mali Peacekeeping School.

31 For instance, the new ‘maritime section’ of the RECAMP concept that is devoted to strengthening African states’ sovereignty over their coastlines, is designed to counter American influence on offshore oil production in the Gulf of Guinea.

30 For an interesting and more complete discussion of the interaction between member-states and between member-states and EU institutions with regards to Africa’s security, see Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, 2006.

29 The member-states discussed four options for the future financing of the APF. According to the first option, which was the one chosen in April 2006, new funds would be allocated to the APF from the current EDF. The second option offered to finance the APF through the CFSP budget under the new financial perspectives for 2007-2013. The role of the Commission would at the very least be reduced, while the European Parliament could control the use of the facility’s funds as part of its competence in the CFSP budget. The third option would lead to the creation of a new multi-annual and intergovernmental fund, which would be managed either according to the current APF procedure or through the ATHENA mechanism, currently used for the EU’s military operations. This type of fund would most probably be under the sole control of the member-states. According to the fourth option, the part of the APF which focuses on the building of the AU’s capabilities could be financed through Commission resources. EU Peacekeeping operations and any other type of EU military activity could not, however, be financed within this framework and the European Parliament’s control would be limited to the small EU funds provided for AU activities.

28 The concept of ‘effective ownership’ – or ‘African ownership’ – refers to the appropriation, by African partners, of the EU’s initiatives, in terms of financial and technical assistance and training, meant to increase their capabilities in conflict prevention, management and resolution. ‘Ownership’ therefore refers to the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’, that is that Africans should assume responsibility for their own affairs.

27 The Commission underlined that the AU had achieved considerable progress at the institutional level, and particularly through the creation of its Peace and Security Council. The AU’s Peace and Security Council could be seen as the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) security organ. The Commission’s preference for the AU is therefore consistent with the link it has been drawing between development and conflict prevention and management policies.

26 The GSC, spurred on by some member-states, favoured the sub-regional organisations and more particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which actually possessed the necessary operational experience and had started developing the adequate institutional framework (Nivet, 2006).
Nevertheless, the nature of the final mechanism will certainly depend on the interpretation of the Instrument for Stability, launched in November 2006 in order to improve consistency and coordination between the Community’s short-term and long-term conflict prevention and management instruments (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006).

This strategic cooperation was complemented by a more theoretical work of conceptualisation and definition of post-conflict strategies meant to guide future EU policies and interventions. The Council has thus developed its own concepts of rule of law and of civilian administration in 2003. In 2006, two new concepts were jointly defined by the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission: Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In the case of the SSR concept, two documents were drafted – one by the GSC, the other by the Commission – and thereafter joined under a single cover (Council of the European Union, 2006).

The French request directly stemmed from the will to Europeanise the RECAMP concept and to involve the EU in the training of African forces. France was very active, throughout 2006, in lobbying for the definition of this concept.

From July to September 2006, the final version of the concept paper underwent a validation process, during which five working groups of the Council - the political-military group (PMG), the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group, the Africa working (COAFR) group, the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) - were asked to prepare recommendations relating to the concept.

The CFSP budget cannot fund any expenditure of military character: the Treaty on European Union states that military expenditures are jointly financed by the member-states, but the latter do so outside the Community budget and in accordance with the Gross National Product scale (Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article 28.3, second paragraph). A special mechanism called ‘Athena’ has been put in place to manage these expenditures (Council of the European Union, 2004c).

The Instrument for Stability, however, does not represent the kind of institutional leap made in February 2000, when the European Commission created the European Agency for Reconstruction, which was initially in charge of implementing the EU’s assistance to Kosovo. Its mandate was thereafter extended to Serbia, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This independent community agency is accountable to the European Council and Parliament and was initially mainly in charge of ensuring the transition from emergency to reconstruction and development aid. It now essentially manages the projects financed by the European Community in support of reform programmes in the region.

As far as Africa is concerned, these are: the Action Against Anti-Personnel Landmines in Developing Countries; Rapid Reaction Mechanism; North-South Cooperation in the Campaign Against Drugs and Drug Addictions; Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Operations in Developing Countries.

‘Article 4.3 Pre- and post-crisis capacity building – Support for long-term measures aimed at building and strengthening the capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors in relation to their efforts in: (a) promoting early warning, confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter-community tensions; (b) improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. Measures under this point shall include know-how transfer, the exchange of information, risk/threat assessment, research and analysis, early warning systems and training. Measures may also include, where appropriate, financial and technical assistance for the implementation of those recommendations made by the UN Peacebuilding Commission failing within the objectives of Community cooperation policy.’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006).

The practice of negotiation within the EU pertains to a logic that is specific to the EU’s governance mode: as shown by Marc Abélès (1996; Abélès and Bellier, 1996), the dominant mode of political exchange at the European level is based on continuous negotiations, be they negotiations between the European institutions and external actors (states, pressure groups) or internal negotiations between the European institutions’ staffs.