EU-ASEAN political and security dialogue at the beginning of the 21 century: prospects for interregional cooperation on international terrorism

Umbach, Frank

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

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An Overview of the Political and Security Dialogue until 2002

The basis of the structured relations between the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) started with a political dialogue at the level of Foreign Ministers in 1978 and a cooperation agreement signed in 1980. ASEAN is thus the EU’s oldest regional dialogue partner. Economically, ASEAN with its ten member countries has meanwhile become EU’s second-largest sales market and third-largest trading partner in Asia (after Japan and China), whilst the EU is the second-largest investor in ASEAN and its third-largest trading partner (accounting for 14% of ASEAN’s trade) after the United States (16.5%) and Japan (16%). In 2002, EU exports to ASEAN – with its combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 656 billion Euros, a total population of 532 million people and accounting for 27% of world GDP – were estimated at 61 billion Euros, while EU imports from ASEAN were valued at 42 billion Euros. The EU-ASEAN trade represented 5.1% of total world trade. But the proportion of the total amount of EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) received by ASEAN has steadily declined from 3.3% in 1998 to 2.6% in 1999, 1.6% in 2000 and 1.8% in 2001, reflecting that other emerging markets (such as China) have become more attractive as destinations for EU investments. At the beginning of the 1990s, Southeast Asia acquired 61% of all EU-
FDI flows to entire Asia. Ten years later, it is China that is accumulating 61% of all EU-FDI that go to Asia, whereas the ASEAN states receive only 10%.

More positive progress has been made on the political level. Both sides have strengthened and deepened their interregional cooperation, and particularly their security dialogue when the EU has become a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the “Track-One” (government dialogue) forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as the supporting ”Track-Two” institution (involving Academic experts and government officials in “private capacity”) in 1993/94. In 1996, both sides established in addition the Asia-Europe-Meeting (ASEM) process, supported by the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) as the ”Track-Two” institution. Since the second half of the 1990s, the EU also supported the democratic government transition in Cambodia and East Timor, helped to finance the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) for de-nuclearising North Korea and has supported the refugee flows in and from Afghanistan.

In reality, however, all these multilateral dialogue frameworks and even the ARF have only slowly developed a shared understanding of basic concepts and the needed habits as well as customs of close multilateral political and security consultation. Moreover, all security discussions in the ARF have focused hitherto primarily on threat perceptions and confidence-building measures rather than on concrete management of regional security conflicts and conflict resolution mechanisms involving legal obligations and not just non-binding political declarations. Even more concrete initiatives in this direction within track-two processes and their constrained security agendas have not been transformed entirely into formal govern-mental ones due to key countries and their unwillingness or hesitation to do so. Furthermore, although those new forms of multilateral security cooperation have enhanced state-to-state relations, state building, and created “epistemic communities” (networks of experts) within the region as well as beyond with the United States (US) and Europe, they have not significantly contributed to the creation of wider civil societies, neither at the domestic nor regional level. With the waves of the Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and its impact on Asia, European politicians and the public have begun to recognise that despite the geographical and psychological distance of many local and regional conflicts from Europe, they have and will have direct or at least indirect impacts on Europe’s future economic and political stability. That is one of the reasons why Germany’s foreign and security policies has become increasingly globalised during the last decade. Thus regional security developments in Asia are now becoming much more important for the European foreign and security policy, as it is admitted, for instance, in the new sub-regional Southeast Asia concept paper of the German foreign ministry, published in May 2002: “Regional and security developments in Asia are now having a greater impact on European foreign and security policy.”
A Comparison of the Major EU-Asia Concept Papers 1994-2003 – A Comment

If one looks back and compares the various regional and sub-regional concept papers of the EU and its member states since 1994, when the EU published its first comprehensive “Asia concept” paper, the European Commission has already admitted before September 11, 2001 that the growing interregional trade between Europe and Asia is becoming increasingly dependent on the future national and regional political-economic stability in East Asia. The new EU-Asia concept paper of September 2001, for instance, reflects a much better balance between the EU’s economic and political strategic interests in East Asia and Southeast Asia. The field of political and security dialogue is mentioned even at the first place ahead of our economic cooperation, though the real implemented policies very often differ from the concept paper due to the lack of political coherence of the different national European foreign and security policies vis-à-vis Asia as well as the political unwillingness of the EU member states to implement a real Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Nonetheless, these concept papers determine the direction of the future development of the EU-policies in Asia. The EU-Asia strategy paper of September 2001, for instance, has demanded:“The EU should play a more active role in regional fora, support conflict prevention by sharing common experiences and enhance EU-Asia dialogue in the realm of justice and home affairs. This will include areas such as asylum, immigration and arms trafficking amongst others.”

Therefore, the paper has called for broadening and deepening of the EU’s engagement policies with the Asia-Pacific region that reflects its growing global security interests. The EU’s new “Comprehensive Strategy for Future Relations with Southeast Asia” of July 2003 has gone even further and has specified the European security interests in Southeast Asia in the light of the new security challenges arising since September 2001 in the following areas:

- supporting regional stability and the fight against international terrorism;
- continuing support actions in the area of conflict prevention and conflict settlement;
- deepening and intensifying cooperation on the multilateral and bilateral basis on new agendas such as human rights (moving even at the top of the agenda of “new priorities”), good governance, justice and home affairs issues and fighting against international terrorism as part of a “comprehensive security concept” that reflect a wider security understanding in the post-Cold War era.

As Chris Patten, the EU’s External Relations Commissioner, has pointed out: “We are not only major trading partners, but partners in the fight against terrorism, organised crime, and drug trade.” In this light, the EU has declared its willingness to assist countries taking measures against international terrorism without prejudice to the respect by the countries concerned of basic human rights principles and peaceful political opposition. In this
context, the EU’s proclaimed strategic interest in cooperation in the field of energy security should also address, in the future, the field of supply security. Energy security and the projected growth in energy demand in Southeast Asia are also directly linked with maritime security and related security challenges such as piracy, terrorist attacks on ships and smuggling of migrants as well as illicit traffic in drugs and arms, especially in Southeast Asia such as the Straits of Malacca. Two-thirds of the global shipping trade (including Europe’s) runs through these choke-points of the Sea Lane of Communications (SLOCs) in Southeast Asia. The number of terrorist and pirate attacks against ships in the open seas has risen sharply during the last decade. In 2000, this number increased by not less than 40% in comparison with the year before. The most well-known examples of piracy and terrorist attacks on international shipping during the last few years were the brutal attack of American destroyer USS Cole by Al-Qaeda terrorists in the port of Yemen-Aden in 2000 – killing 17 people and wounding 42, whilst the ship suffered severe damage – and the attack on the French oil tanker Limburg off Yemen in 2001.

This incident was soon followed by a number of similar attacks against ships from other countries, mostly in Southeast Asia. The shipping traffic and particularly the container trade is strategically important for the Asia-Pacific region in general and Southeast Asia in particular, given that five of the “top six” container ports in the world are now all in East Asia (with Hong Kong and Singapore by far the biggest “megaports” in the world). Thus Northeast Asian countries such as People’s Republic of China, Japan and South Korea are also heavily dependent on stable oil imports and secure SLOCs from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf to East Asia. Only the joint implementation of regional maritime security strategies and multilateral cooperation are able and effective for countering these increasing regional threats.9 Given the strategic importance of energy and the geo-strategic key position of the ASEAN countries in the supply (Indonesia is presently the largest Liquefied Natural Gas [LNG] exporter in the world) and/or transport, the EU has also proposed a strategic dialogue and further cooperation in the fields of co-generation and renewable energies in its newest Southeast Asia Strategy paper of 2003.10

Future Cooperation Fields

In June 2003, the EU has adopted three new major documents on the EU’s CFSP:

a) a first-ever global EU foreign and security concept paper, which will be adopted at the end of the year, also called “Solana paper” (officially named: “A Secure Europe in a Better World”)11;

b) a declaration on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), officially called: “Basic Principles for an EU-Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”.12 This paper has also led to a joint EU-US statement to avert WMD on June 25, 200313;

c) a declaration on Iran which indicates a fundamental change in the EU’s Iran-policy in the light Teheran’s nuclear weapons ambitions and the
new importance of the EU’s non-proliferation policies.14

On the Solana Strategy Paper of June 2003:

This highly important document is serving as the basis for an officially declared “European Security Strategy” to be adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The new strategy is calling explicitly for extending the zone of security around Europe and to develop “strategic partnerships” not just with the US, Canada, and Japan, but also with China and India due to their important role “in their respective regions and beyond”. Even in a US view, this paper is seen as a remarkable document in many ways: it is “jargon- free, oriented to substance rather than process, and modestly self-confident rather than self-congratulatory”. It characterises the transatlantic relationship as “irreplaceable” and calls for strengthened US-EU ties to cope with the new and even more dangerous security challenges outside of Europe. The paper outlines basically three new major security threats to the EU: (1) international terrorism; (2) proliferation of WMD; and (3) failed states and organised crime. In contrast to some of the new security declarations of the Bush Administration, however, the paper also calls for extending the zone of security around Europe by emphasising the instruments of multilateralism and respect for international law that includes also East Asia and Southeast Asia.

But even more important is the notion that the strategy paper calls for directly countering the new security threats. The strategy paper interprets some of those threats as being so dangerous and dynamic that they require reaction before the crises arise (pre-emption/preventive action). But it emphasises on the context of diplomatic crisis prevention so that the need for military action will not arise (as we have seen in October 2003 when the French, German and British foreign ministers visited Teheran with some success in order to persuade Iran’s government not to opt for a nuclear weapons capability). But the paper is also indicating that the door for pre-emptive military action has cautiously and partially been opened or is at least not totally excluded any longer, dependent on the characterisation of the concrete threat. Therewith, the EU’s CFSP and its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are moving closer to some controversial US-positions in this regard.15

On the Declaration on Non-Proliferation of WMD

Against the background of the Solana paper, the Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction for the first time declares, as a key policy objective of the EU’s CFSP and ESDP, “to deter, halt, and where possible, reverse proliferation programmes of concern world-wide.” In this context, the strategy paper no longer even excludes the political option of military action as a “last resort” to prevent dangerous developments of proliferation of WMD. But in contrast to the US position of a unilateral assessment and political decision, the EU restricts this possibility to the need of a legitimation by the UN Security Council. However, this option is no longer excluded per se as it was in the past, but also in the future, where the primary
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European focus will still be based on preventive diplomacies.

On the Iran Declaration in June 2003

The statement at the Thessaloniki-summit of the EU in mid-June 2003 is indicating a fundamental change of the EU’s Iran policy. In the past, both the EU as well its member states such as Germany was prided to have a “critical dialogue” with Teheran in the hope of strengthening Iran’s moderate and reform-oriented political forces. Now the EU is threatening Teheran by suspending economic and political ties. It does not even exclude economic and other sanctions if Iran weaponises its nuclear ambitions. This change of the EU-policy towards Teheran needs to be explained not so much by Europe’s strategic interest and intention to improve its relationship with Washington, but rather in the recognition that the EU and its member states have underestimated the new security threats such as the proliferation of WMD, international terrorism (particularly linked with WMD) in general and Iran’s political will to develop and to deploy nuclear weapons in particular. It may also mirror the disappointment in the EU about the critical dialogue with Iran and even been misled by the disinformation of Teheran during the last years. In a new report on November 10, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) came to the conclusion that the Iranian documents turned over to the IAEA confirmed a clear pattern of years of experimentation in producing small amounts of materials that could be fabricated into weapons, including plutonium.

Although the report did not officially confirm US’s accusation that Iran is using its civilian nuclear programme as a cover for its nuclear weapons programme, the report has revealed how far and how long (almost 18 years) a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory subject to IAEA-inspections could be making nuclear weapons while pretending to comply with international inspections! Ultimately, the value of the agreement with the three EU foreign ministers to suspend (and not “permanently end”) its uranium enrichment and giving the UN free access to all suspicious sites will depend not so much on the communiqué, but on the implementation of what has been agreed.16

Furthermore, it is not just Teheran but also other Arab states that seek to acquire WMD and long-ranging ballistic missiles that may threaten Europe much earlier than the United States. In a broader context, if both present crises, namely to Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions, cannot be solved diplomatically and if both go ahead with the nuclear weapons development, it might mean nothing less than the end of the global multilateral arms control regimes which are already in a major crisis since India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles tests in 1998. It particularly concerns the future of the nuclear NPTs and the IAEA inspection regimes as an independent UN watchdog whose existence is especially important for non-nuclear weapon countries in Europe such as Germany. Moreover, if Iran will develop and deploy nuclear weapons, other Arab and Persian Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia will follow soon as some recent statements from their side have
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already indicated. Hence an Iranian nuclear weapon option would not only be perceived in Israel as a deadly threat but also in other neighbouring Arab countries who distrust Teheran’s political aims for historical and geo-strategic reasons.

Perspectives for Interregional Anti-Terrorist Cooperation between Europe and Southeast Asia

“Archipelagic Southeast Asia is a relatively comfortable operating theatre for the terrorists compared with the Middle East where the governments have been much harsher on them. This is particularly so in the case of Indonesia, in view of its democratic space, weak governance, and poor law enforcement.”

“A franker recognition of these [terrorist] problems is undoubtedly growing at least at leadership level. But ASEAN’s non-confrontational, consensus-based approach to addressing multi-lateral issues has never been conducive to tackling urgent problems head-on. Certainly, on the counterterrorist front none of these vulnerabilities is likely to see much improvement before the next major bomb goes off.”

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. in September 2001, in Bali in October 2002 and the JW Mariott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2002 tragically demonstrated the new dimensions and the global nature of the threat of international terrorism. Those new dimensions are:

- an increasing dominance of religiously motivated terrorism,
- a geographic shift away from Europe and Latin America to Northern Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia,
- the increasing global nature of international terrorism,
- escalating warfare strategies, which might make use even of weapons of mass destruction;
- inseparability of internal and external security of states being potential targets;
- new networks with internationally organised crime and making use of weak and failed states as operational bases;
- increasing relevance of non-state actors;
- hybrid terrorist-criminal groups as the result of convergence of terrorist groups and organised crime.

As the bombing in Bali and the Philippines in the autumn of 2002 have shown, Southeast Asia has become a new focal point in international terrorism that threatens the future of tourism and other important industries in the region during already difficult economic times. Southeast Asia has become both a main refuge of escape for Al-Qaeda members as well as a land base for the reconstruction of various loosely linked networks of regional Islamic terrorist groups, aiming to build a pan-Muslim state linking with Indonesia, Malaysia and the southern parts of the Philippines and Thailand. Recent events have also highlighted a development that locally inspired terrorist groups in moderate Islamic countries in Southeast Asia (like in Indonesia) have established links with international terrorist groups (like Al-Qaeda). They pose a direct threat not just to these countries themselves but also to neighbouring states as well as to the world at large.
Investigations and interrogations across the region since September 2001 have provided a contradicting picture. On one hand, it offered a much better understanding of the general threat posed by international terrorist groups that were virtually unknown before. According to new analyses, for instance, the terrorist network is much broader and more deeply rooted than was previously assumed. Reportedly, 400-600 Southeast Asians had been trained by Al-Qaeda and its associated terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, however, despite many arrests in Southeast Asia, very little is known even for terrorist experts about the full extent of the loose networks existing in the region. Furthermore, the proliferation of man-portable air defence missile systems (such as the Russian-made Strela-2M) has raised particular concern in the region and beyond. The greatest terrorist risks exist in Indonesia and the Philippines, and to a lesser extent, in Thailand.

Effective strategies for counter-terrorism need not only include short-term measures such as security and public order measures but also long-term strategies which address the complex and manifold root causes of terrorism (poverty, low education, failing pluralism and freedom of opinion etc). The EU is seeing the fight against international terrorism in a broader context that also seeks to address issues like reducing poverty, improving health and education as well as illegal migration and to support programmes for the rule of law, practicing good governance and democratic rule as part of its traditional development assistance to countries affected by terrorism. Special attention must also be paid on international cooperation against terrorist financing. Those financial activities that support terrorism include the use of individual network nodes; narcotic and weapon sales; kidnapping and ransom; charity use and abuse; corporate vehicle manipulation; financial benefactors, and the legitimate banking system. As the investigation of the attacks on September 11, 2001 has revealed:

“The 11 September cell funding flowed unimpeded to the terrorists, without the discovery of any assistance from corrupt officials, patterns of suspicious transactions, the flagging of large cash deposits, an increased scrutiny of account activity associated with high-risk countries or effective due diligence mechanisms for corresponding banking.”

Meanwhile, some important steps for an enhanced interregional cooperation between the EU and ASEAN have been taken. The 14th EU-ASEAN Meeting between the foreign ministers of the EU and ASEAN have adopted in January 2003 a “Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism”, while the ASEM-4 summit in September 2002 adopted a declaration and action plan on the fight against terrorism. Both sides are also working closely together in the framework of the ARF on counter-terrorism. The European Commission has provided financial assistance under its EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism to the Philippines in the fields of border management and money laundering, and has supported Indonesia to improve its judicial capacity building and its fight against the financing of terrorism. Malaysia might be offered financial support for establishing the “Counter Terrorism Centre” in its country. Until summer 2003, the EU has been supporting counter-terrorist measures in Southeast Asia with a total of 21 million
Euros. ASEAN also signed with the US a “Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Striking Terrorism” on August 1, 2002 to share intelligence, to prevent fund-raising, to prevent transnational cooperation and to draw up strict regulations for falsified documents of terrorists. In order to maintain a sustained global war against the international terrorism, the US, the EU and Asia must support regional and interregional counter-terrorism strategies instead of focusing on unilateral strategies and unstable coalitions of the willing.

In Asia itself, the arrest of Al-Qaeda terrorists or those linked with Jemaah Islamiah in Singapore and other ASEAN states have signalled that terrorism is a regional and not just a national security problem, affecting the entire region and even beyond. In this light, global security challenges such as international terrorism require regional and global strategies to cope with these new security threats. On a more basic level, extremism in Southeast Asia is centred primarily on debates within the Muslim communities of the region. Hence any strategy designed to counter terrorist threats must also address understandable concerns that those anti-terrorist strategies could upset social and political domestic stability and thus cause even more regional instability. Inappropriate state anti-terrorist responses and an excessive use of military force against the civilian population, and general political as well as administrative ineptitude can therefore, at the end, greatly support the terrorists’ aims and ultimately undermine the counter-terrorist strategies.

Although regional security cooperation has made important progress, it seems more than questionable whether the present regional cooperation for countering terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is adequate enough to prevent further terrible attacks such as those in Bali in 2002 for instance. This does not mean that we should overlook what has already been achieved. Initially, a troika of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia has been formed for discussing common policies in the face of extremist threats in those countries. Broader cooperation has increased, for instance, between Indonesia and Malaysia, and first-meetings of ASEAN’s military chiefs have been held. Counter-terrorism is also high on the agendas of the ARF, CSCAP and even Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to improve intelligence sharing, blocking terrorist funds and tightening borders. The latest APEC meeting in October, for instance, has produced an agreed declaration of the group’s 21 countries “to dismantle, fully and without delay, transnational terrorist groups” and to “confront other direct threats to the security of our region” as well as to “eliminate the severe and growing danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of deliveries”. Those anti-terror measures also included controls on portable, shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile systems.

But ultimately these agreed regional anti-terrorist cooperations seem still insufficient in the context of effective regional responses as well as in regard to addressing the root causes of discontent which is not just limited to poverty as empirical studies of terrorism have already revealed since the mid-1990s.

What are the problems for a closer regional cooperation on international terrorism in Southeast Asia? Like always,
new funding is needed to build new regional networks to address economic disparity, good governance and human rights while at the same time the region needs to build an intelligence network aimed at cutting off funds used by terrorist groups. However, this need still seems insufficiently implemented not just in Southeast Asia, but also in the EU which would have a significant positive global impact on fighting international terrorism.

ASEAN states also still face difficulties of arresting leaders in particular, and not just mid- and low level members of Jemaah Islamiah and Al-Qaeda. It illustrates the inexperience and problems by the major ASEAN states in dealing with these new forms of international terrorism. Those problems are compounded by the fact that there is no specific overall security institution in Asia that is comparable to institutions such as Interpol or Europol. Furthermore, these difficulties are complicated by the fact that some countries are heavily affected by terrorism such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines whereas others are thus far only a potential target for terrorists in the future. That explains the difficulty in promoting joint regional agendas for combating terrorism when not all the grouping’s members are affected in the same way by these new security challenges.

As past experiences also show, gathering intelligence on the neighbouring countries in which terrorist groups are located is based on one’s own intelligence assets in the neighbouring countries. The sharing information can thus compromise their own intelligence assets. Moreover, the overall lack of a real regional strategy leads to a situation in which each country looks after its own territory and operations, and passes on only selective intelligence information to its neighbours. In general, however, the ASEAN states have long overlooked the activities of Islamic groups like many European states too. The biggest problem in Southeast Asia is, however, the leadership vacuum in organising a joint anti-terrorism strategy amongst members being divided by to which extent they should coordinate their efforts and strategies closely with those of the United States and other non-subregional powers.28

Symptomatic of the slow progress in finding regional solutions to address international terrorist threat is the creation of the Southeast Asia Anti-Terror Centre in Malaysia. Its idea has been promulgated in early 2002. The centre has become operational just in July 2003. Originally it was planned as a joint US-Malaysian initiative. But neither the military nor the police have been involved in the centre until today. It will focus just on studies of terrorist organisations and activities, giving instructions on border security and analysing strategies dealing with the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Thus the centre will only provide basic training in methods of identifying and tracking terrorist groups rather being a centre in which a joint regional strategy can be formulated and intelligence efforts between regional nations can be coordinated.

Meanwhile, Malaysia is funding the centre alone because of its fears of increasing anti-US-sentiment among the majority of the Muslim Malay population. But a totally Malaysian sponsored and organised facility is clearly limiting its usefulness and regional importance. Up to now, there is still little active input,
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participation and contribution from other ASEAN states. Therefore the centre cannot adequately assist the region for the time being in formulating a real joint and effective regional strategy against terrorism.

Another problem is that ASEAN governments depend considerably on its police forces and, to a less extent, its immigration control agencies in fighting terrorism. But they are both generally overworked, underpaid, under trained and, in some countries, prone to corruption. Hence ASEAN counter-terrorist forces not only have to monitor terrorists but also some of their own police and immigration officials – a fact that also may deter regional information sharing by other regional countries.

On the positive side, however, this new field of security cooperation for counter-terrorist strategies on the regional and interregional level between Southeast Asia and Europe opens a wide range of opportunities for the EU to assist and support in the funding as well as training of police forces and immigration officials, and thus promote interregional cooperation in anti-terrorist strategies in their own strategic interests.

Conclusions and Perspectives

The EU’s external relations have become much more important as the result of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, the creation of a CFSP in 1993, which has been strengthened with an ESDP in 1999, and the increasing importance of Justice and Home Affairs for its relations with other countries outside of Europe, including Southeast Asia. Together with ASEAN’s integration efforts for an ASEAN Economic and Security Community, the pre-conditions for a strengthened interregional anti-terrorist strategy between the EU and Southeast Asia have been improved.

ASEAN and the ARF will continue to be the major focus of EU’s political and security dialogue with Southeast Asia. In the future, it will become even more important for the EU to play a proactive role in the ARF in order to address and to develop regional as well as interregional strategies dealing effectively with the new dimensions of the multi-dimensional threats caused by international terrorist groups. The progress in the interregional political and security dialogue between the EU and ASEAN depends, however, to a considerable extent, on the intra-regional integration processes on both sides, such as ASEAN’s traditional non-intervention clause and, therewith, on Southeast Asia’s regional understanding of sovereignty in the 21st century.

On the European side, after months of internal dividing lines and lack of real progress on the way to a real CFSP and ESDP, the EU will adopt its first ever global European Security Concept at the end of the year. It will focus on increasing interregional security cooperation in the field of international terrorism, proliferation of WMD as well as failed states and organised crime. Although some new forms of cooperation have already been implemented, much more needs to be done so that these new forms of cooperation will become more effective for both sides. The new discussions between the EU and ASEAN should also include
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debates on norms of the international law and its future development.

Let me conclude by pointing out a simple truth we have to face: “If we are not controlling the new security challenges and conflicts, they will certainly control us” – and that cannot be in the strategic interest of both parties.

Endnotes


3. To the various forms of multilateral, bilateral and unilateral security cooperation in Asia-Pacific, and specifically to the evolvement of the ARF, see Frank Umbach, Kooperation oder Konflikt in Asien-Pazifik? Chinas Einbindung in regionale Sicherheitsstrukturen und die Auswirkungen für Europa (Cooperation or Conflict in Asia-Pacific. China’s Tying into Regional Security Structures and the Implications for Europe; Oldenbourg Verlag: München 2002), 395 pp.


7. See also Communication from the Commission, A New Partnership with South East Asia.

9. To the background see Frank Umbach, *Kooperation oder Konflikt in Asien-Pazifik? (Cooperation or Conflict in Asia-Pacific?)* and idem, *Globale Energiesicherheit: Strategische Herausforderungen für die europäische und deutsche Außenpolitik (Global Energy Security: Strategic Challenges for the European and German Foreign Policy)*, (Muenchen: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), 328 pp. (in German), here chapter 3.


16. As it looks now, Iran will not give access, for instance, to its declared military facilities. Furthermore, Iran has still the option for breaking out of the NPT and to produce a large arsenal of nuclear weapons in a matter of weeks when necessary and should it choose to do so.
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19. These hybrid terrorist-criminal groups are involving two different types: (a) Criminal groups who have used terror tactics to gain political leverage and control via direct involvement in the political processes and institutions of a state (such as in Maritime Russia and Albania); (b) criminal terrorist groups who become so much engaged with their involvement in criminal activities that their ideological underpinnings and political agendas become compromised (examples are *Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/FRAC* in Colombia or the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan/IMU* in Central Asia) - see Tamara Makarenko, ‘A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations’, JIR, August 2003, pp. 6-11.