

### International cooperation and its new challenges in fighting the new security threats

Umbach, Frank

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:

SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln

#### Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Umbach, F. (2004). International cooperation and its new challenges in fighting the new security threats. In *Global Terrorist Threats: New Security Challenges. Implications for European-Japanese Security Cooperation* (pp. 11-30). Berlin: Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-131595>

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## International Cooperation and Its New Challenges in Fighting the New Security Threats\*

Frank UMBACH\*\*

German Council on Foreign Relations

### Introduction

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have and will have lasting profound impacts on international stability and the future security policies of the United States, the EU member states, Japan and many other countries in the world. When the Cold War ended at the beginnings of the 1990s, many states and international experts expected some kind of peace dividends. Although the last decade was widely seen as a new era with new and different security challenges compared to those during the Cold War, the security and defense policies of the United States, Europe and Asia were largely driven and determined by traditional security policies in the 1990s. However, even at that time, the new threats linked with the implosion of the Soviet Union (like “loose nukes” and a brain drain of nuclear as well as other experts of mass destruction weapons) played a considerable role in international and interregional cooperation between the U.S., EU and Japan (such as the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)) to cope with these new security dangers, aimed at curbing and containing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

The expansion of technology in the age of globalization has an increasing dominant influence in lives of most people and presents certainly numerous benefits and opportunities. But at the same time it has also posed new security challenges. The globalization of economies and widespread technology availability and acquired technological expertise on the global scale provide new opportunities for terrorists with a power of modern weaponry and transnational links, which are unprecedented in human experience.<sup>1</sup>

In the light of these new global security threats after September 11, 2001, the EU and Japan have agreed at the 10th EU-Japan Summit held in Brussels in December 2001

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\* This analysis is the result of an ongoing research project of the author, funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, at the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), in Berlin.

\*\* Resident Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Rauchstr. 18, 10787 Berlin

Tel.: 030/25.42.31.36, E-Mail: umbach@dgap.org

<sup>1</sup> See also Andrew TAN/Kumar RAMAKRISHNA (Eds.), “The New Terrorism. Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies,” Singapore 2002; John PARACHINI, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,” in: *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2003, pp. 37–50; Rensselaer W. LEE III, “Smuggling Armageddon. The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe,” New York 1998; Anthony H. CORDESMAN, “Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Defending U.S. Homeland,” Washington–London 2002; Steven SIMON/Daniel BENJAMIN, “America and the New Terrorism,” in: *Survival*, Spring 2000, pp. 59–75, and “America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange,” in: *ibid.*, Summer 2000, pp. 156–172.

on a new Action Plan for future EU-Japan cooperation. It also includes a new joint initiative for international cooperation and combating international terrorism.<sup>2</sup>

**Excerpt of the Joint EU-Japan Action Plan of December 2001**

Further promote coordinated international action to prevent and combat international terrorism by taking the following joint measures as first steps:

- Enhanced cooperation in all relevant international and regional fora;
- Early signature and ratification of relevant counterterrorism conventions and protocols, and smooth and rapid implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions;
- Early finalization of the UN Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism;
- Enhancing common efforts to stop the financing of terrorism, including freezing of funds and other financial assets of terrorists;
- Reinforcement of technical cooperation to developing countries for their capacity buildings in the field of counter-terrorism.

**Continue combating terrorism through:**

- Early finalization of the international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism;
- Strengthening of nonproliferation regimes of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies connected with terrorism;
- Cooperation between the European Police Office (Europol) and Japanese police authorities;
- Enhanced drugs control and active measures to reduce the supply and demand of drugs.

In addition, both sides issued a joint “Declaration on Terrorism” on December 8, 2001. In this document, both sides agreed on the following specific actions:

- Strengthening policy dialogue and coordination aimed at ensuring the peace and stability of Afghanistan and its neighboring countries in support of ongoing UN efforts intended to install in Afghanistan a legitimate, broad-based, multi-ethnic government committed to establishing human rights in Afghanistan;
- Active cooperation in providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Afghanistan and in its neighboring countries;
- Assistance for reconstruction in postwar Afghanistan;
- Assistance to Pakistan and to other countries neighboring Afghanistan.<sup>3</sup>

However, the 9/11-attacks were not the first proof of these security challenges. The example of the Aum Shinrikyô Doomsday Cult in the mid-1990s has already underscored those grave hazards with new dimensions. The sarin nerve gas attack in the heart of Tôkyô on 20 March 1995, killing 12 people and injuring about 5.500 others, was indeed the first use of nonconventional weapons by a pseudo-religious sect using terrorist means. At the same time, destructive intentions of fanatical individuals and groups have also been manifested in the United States as with the terrorist attacks in

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<sup>2</sup> “Shaping our Common Future. An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation,” adopted at the 10th EU-Japan Summit, December 2001 (here via Internet: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/japan/summit\\_12\\_01/actionplan.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/japan/summit_12_01/actionplan.pdf); downloaded 20 October 2003).

<sup>3</sup> See “Declaration on Terrorism,” adopted at the 10th EU-Japanese Summit, Brussels, 8 December 2001 (here via Internet: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/japan/summit\\_12\\_01/terror.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/japan/summit_12_01/terror.htm); downloaded 20 October 2003). To U.S.-Japan security cooperation see Michael GREEN, “Terrorism. Prevention & Preparedness. New Approaches to U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation,” Tôkyô 2001 and “Bioterrorism & Consequence Management. New Approaches to U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation,” New York 2003.

Oklahoma (killing 168 people) and the first one on the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 had already been demonstrated. But for Japan, which has one of the lowest crime rates in the world, and which has never experienced terrorist challenges like the United States or European countries (such as Italy, France or Germany) until 1995 it was a deep and lasting shock.

In the following analysis, I will give at first a short overview of the Aum Shinrikyô story. It is followed by an analysis of the new dimensions of international terrorism before and after 9/11. Then I will outline the perspectives for anti-terrorist cooperation between the EU and Asia/Japan by describing the challenges and the countermeasures adopted by the EU and NATO in Europe. Thereafter, I will analyze the terrorist challenges in Asia (with a focus on Southeast Asia) and the problems of regional as well as international cooperation, including terrorist threats to maritime security. Finally, in my conclusions, I will offer a perspective what needs to be done beyond what has already been agreed by national states or on a regional and international level.

#### The Aum Shinrikyô Story<sup>4</sup>

It revealed a new form of international terrorism (involving religion) which turned to be more devastating than ever seen before in the world. As it had been uncovered after the sarin attack:

- The Aum cult had successfully infiltrated various departments of the Japanese society and industry including elements of law enforcement, the military and the defense industry.
- Moreover, the cult acquired conventional armaments and attempted to acquire non-conventional weapons and technologies from the United States and the former Soviet Union.
- It had planned attacks not only on the Japanese but on the U.S. government too.
- Neither their intentions nor the technology acquisitions were fully discovered by the Japanese and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence services until the Tōkyō gas attack on 20 March 1995.
- Furthermore, the Japanese investigators found evidence that not only Sarin had been produced, but also other chemical weapons such as tabun, soman and VX.
- Furthermore, they also embarked upon intense research and development programs for the production of biological weapons, using agents such as botulism and anthrax, Q-fever and even ebola. Reportedly, they had actually attempted to use bacterial warfare. Thereby, the cult followers developed and produced those chemical and biological elements “on a scale not previously identified with a subnational terrorist group” as a final report of the U.S. Senate subcommittee on investigations of the Aum Shinrikyô gas attack concluded in October 1995. It stated further:

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<sup>4</sup> See David E. KAPLAN/Andrew MARSHALL, “The Cult at the End of the World. The Incredible Story of Aum,” London 1996, and F. UMBACH, “Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Cooperation – A View from Europe,” in: Kurt W. RADTKE/Raymond FEDDEMA (Eds.), “Comprehensive Security in Asia. Views from Asia and the West on a Changing Security Environment and Their Implications for Europe,” Leiden–Boston–Köln 2000, pp. 66–133 (114 ff.).

“The ease with which the cult accessed the vast international supermarket of weapons and weapons technology is extremely troubling. It is especially troubling in light of the current state of the economies and governments of the former Soviet Union. How much this cult acquired and how much more they could have obtained is still a mystery. How much the next group may be able to acquire is the question that also remains unanswered.”<sup>5</sup>

- The Aum Shinrikyô Cult was developing not only chemical weapons, but also biological ones, studying laser arms, trying to mine uranium and making uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons in Australia, assembling guns and rifles, making drugs and narcotics like LSD, and using truth serum on its own followers. Thereby, they operated worldwide: in Japan, the United States, Russia, Australia, Germany and other countries.

Compared to West European countries, both the United States and Japan seemed for a long time rather distant from the source of international terrorism and smuggling illegal nuclear or other special mass destruction material. There were several reasons why not only Japan, but also other East Asian and Western countries as well as Russia should have been concerned about Aum Shinrikyô's sarin nerve gas attack in 1995 as a precedent of a new form of terrorism and fundamental security challenge:

- 1) The willingness of the cult leader Asahara and his followers to use mass destruction weapons;
- 2) The truly global nature of the terrorist cult;
- 3) The amount of intellectual followers including lawyers, officers, scientists and engineers;
- 4) Highly sophisticated research and production facilities for mass destruction weapons;
- 5) The failing control of Internet providing sensitive information to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
- 6) The manifold unpreparedness of Japan and other high-industrialized countries to the new form of terrorism and security challenge.

In this light, the timely development of common strategies and appropriate mechanisms and means by the West, Russia, Japan and other East Asian countries for countering and preventing the use of nonconventional weaponry by terrorist groups is a *conditio sine qua non* for future regional and global stability.

## New Dimensions of International Terrorism

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. in September 2001, in Bali in October 2002 and the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2002 tragically demonstrated the new dimensions and the global nature of the threat of international terrorism. At least the following eight new dimensions can be identified:

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<sup>5</sup> Staff Statement U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Hearings on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, Washington, October 31, 1995, here p. 55.

- An increasing dominance of religiously motivated terrorism;
- A geographic shift away from Europe and Latin America to Northern Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia;
- The increasing global nature of international terrorism;
- Escalating warfare strategies, which might make use even of weapons of mass destruction;
- Inseparability of internal and external security of states being potential targets;
- New networks with internationally organized crime and making use of weak and failed states as operational bases;
- Increasing relevance of nonstate actors;
- Hybrid terrorist-criminal groups as the result of convergence of terrorist groups and organized crime.<sup>6</sup>

Nonetheless, many security experts in the aftermath have assumed that most terrorist groups will also use in the future rather nonconventional weaponry and may prefer the use of chemical and biological weapons instead of nuclear weapons (or so-called “dirty bombs”). However, even nuclear terrorism could not be totally dismissed any longer:

- Whilst only few groups have the means and skills to acquire nuclear material, unfortunately, most potent terrorist groups are likely to be both most capable of a determined pursuit of objectives and most capable of acquiring and handling weapons-grade nuclear material.
- Furthermore, the fact that the quality of fissile material is only important for bomb making. But most other forms of nuclear terrorism would be just as effective using industrial-grade fissile material as weapon-grade material or a nuclear-enriched conventional explosion (by a crude, nonfissionable atomic bomb, also called “dirty bomb”). The Chechen case in Moscow in November 1995, when terrorists had hidden four cases of radioactive caesium (310 times the normal amount of radioactivity) in the most well known Ismailovo Park confirmed the use of a conventional device with a highly radioactive coating rather than an operational nuclear bomb. It created chaos and helplessness in Moscow’s security circles for some time, whereas Moscow officially downplayed any wider fears.

In this light, “thinking about the unthinkable” was and is the only reliable, but certainly also most unpopular policy guideline of changing the current unpreparedness of highly vulnerable Western industrial societies. Until September 11, 2001, in the West only the U.S. Energy Department maintained a nuclear emergency search team trained to disable terrorist nuclear devices—a program, however, which was under-financed and understaffed according to many U.S. experts at that time. In the light of 9/11, the following

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<sup>6</sup> These hybrid terrorist-criminal groups are involving two different types: (a) Criminal groups who have used terror tactics to gain political leverage and control via direct involvement in the political processes and institutions of a state (such as in Maritime Russia and Albania); (b) criminal terrorist groups who become so much engaged with their involvement in criminal activities that their ideological underpinnings and political agendas become compromised (examples are Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FRAC) in Colombia or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia). See Tamara MAKARENKO, “A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (JIR), August 2003, pp. 6–11.

strategic trends of the “new terrorism” need to be taken into account for any effective terrorist counter-measures:

- While organized crime organizations and other non-state actors are forming powerful multinational alliances (such as the Russian and Colombian criminal organizations), the greater availability of expertise and resources could overcome former technological barriers. The threat of bioterrorism is seen by many terrorist experts in particular rising which demands more national and international attention, countermeasures and closer international cooperation although their use—dependent on the climate such as rain and wind—is very problematic and can therefore not be as easily controlled by terrorists as chemical and nuclear weapons.
- When the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were followed by a spate of letters bearing anthrax bacteria, the United States were indeed largely unprepared and many of its countermeasures inappropriate, particularly in the light of a larger and more systematic attack. Even more alarming was the fact that the Islamic terrorists were only able to carry out their deadly mission because they managed to evade the U.S. intelligence agencies and slip through a porous domestic security system—despite the fact that Usama bin Laden and his followers were identified as a dangerous terrorist group that has developed a vast terrorist network and had already organized a series of deadly attacks on U.S. installations around the world.
- Although their attacks have been carefully planned and financed through an extensive international network of funding sources and secure economic channels, they also highlighted the vulnerabilities of an open and in many ways ill-prepared society.
- As the first U.S. investigations after the attack found out, diminished human intelligence resources, a scarcity of regional experts, and poor coordination among information-gathering agencies have helped the terrorists to exploit the loopholes in the U.S. immigration and in the commercial aviation security system. In addition, as international terrorist experts have warned for years, critical infrastructure in telecommunications, civilian nuclear and chemical plants, hospitals and other areas remain vulnerable to mass disruption.
- Although the operational power of Al Qaeda appears being constrained today, more than a dozen regional militant Islamic groups are showing increasing strength and broader ambitions in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the Caucasus to North Africa. Most of them are only loosely affiliated with Al Qaeda, but they are drawing inspiration from Usama bin Laden. They have established new training camps in Kashmir, the Philippines and West Africa. The mutation of these new terrorist cells is spreading beyond their regional causes and territories, making it difficult to monitor their communications and financial flows. Thus Al Qaeda’s biggest threat today seems its ability to inspire other groups to launch attacks in their own countries as well as in the West. A UN monitoring group estimated that some 30 to 40 Islamic terrorist groups are affiliated with Al Qaeda in one way or another.<sup>7</sup> Some of their new leaders (like Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi—one of the most dangerous terrorist leaders today) are seen as capable of continuing their fight against the U.S. and the West regardless of Al Qaeda’s fate. As a loose collection of regional networks, they operate more

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<sup>7</sup> See Raymond BONNER/Don Van NATTA Jr., *International Herald Tribune* (IHT), 9 February 2004, p. 5.

autonomously than in the past. Therefore, the war on terrorism has become a multi-front conflict with no end in sight.

- In 2002, Pakistan introduced a plan to eliminate the teaching of extremist views in Islamic schools, called madrassahs. Musharraf's reforms were aimed to teach modern disciplines such as English, science, mathematics, economics, and computer science. But according to many experts and even Islamic conservatives in Pakistan, many madrassahs have not changed their fundamentalist religious programs. Furthermore, they are still financed by the Wahhabi clergy in Saudi Arabia to the tune of about 300 million a year. Many conservative Islamic groups continue successfully to oppose any government interference in the curriculum of the madrassahs.<sup>8</sup>
- Recent Investigations into the secret nuclear weapon of Iran and Libya as well as the questioning of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan have revealed that the extent of a global market in nuclear technology and access to related materials as well as technologies is much greater than previously thought. Khan's networks of suppliers and middlemen in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, for instance, is much more extensive in regard to their coordination and cooperation, comparable only with an organization by selling nuclear secrets at high profits. Khan himself has warned that nuclear weapons are becoming easier to acquire, to build, to hide, and to transport, both for states and terrorist groups. Small terrorist groups of fanatics could gain the power to threaten great nations and the world peace as never small groups could ever do in the history of mankind.<sup>9</sup>
- Although all nuclear warheads were removed from the former Soviet republics and today independent states, nuclear trafficking remains a serious security concern in the former Soviet Union (such as Central Asia). The removal of contaminated substances, inter alia, could be used for potential terrorists for their objectives.

Against this background of a new global security environment after the September 11, 2001 events and in order to prevent or at least to curb those new security threats as well as to stabilize and not to undermine regional and global stability, a much broader and deeper security cooperation as well as networking between the U.S., the EU and Japan are urgently needed in the new global security environment.

At the same time, many nation-states are losing their monopoly on the use of force or are voluntarily relegating it to private security companies. Meanwhile these companies are providing all the services normally carried out by national military forces, including even intelligence. But the expansion of these security services often lack transparency and parliamentary control and oversight (or of any other public institutions). Moreover, they are guided and motivated by business profit and not by national foreign policy or security interests. If these trends are continuing and becoming even more widespread, the privatization of security could pose new serious threats to international peace and security, rather helping to curb security threats, including international terrorism.

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<sup>8</sup> See Ron SYNOWITZ, "Pakistan: Despite Reform Plan, Few Changes Seen at Most Radical Madrassahs," RFE/RL-Feature Articles, 24 February 2004.

<sup>9</sup> See Charles RECKNAGEL, "World: A Lively Nuclear Black Market Raises Fears of Terrorists Getting the Bomb (Part 1)," RFE/RL Feature Articles, 26 February 2004 and idem, "World: Stopping Proliferation Requires Tough New Laws (Part 2)," *ibid.*, 26 February 2004.

## Perspectives for Antiterrorist Cooperation

In order to maintain a global war against the international terrorism, the U.S., the EU and Asia must support regional and interregional counterterrorism strategies instead of focusing on unilateral strategies and unstable coalitions of the willing. They must also be able for flexible strategies and operational tactics because international terrorist groups will seek to identify loopholes and gaps in Western security architecture enable them to breach security and overcome Western countermeasures. It is also expected that in the next years, East African Islamic groups, influenced by Al Qaeda, will increasingly join other international terrorist groups by attacking the West. But Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the Achilles heels for Western security and intelligence agencies.<sup>10</sup>

### EU

Already before September 11, the EU had established a number of counterterrorism measures. The most important was the creation of a Counterterrorism Unit within the Europol Organized Crime Department. In light of the new terrorist threats, the number of Islamist elements that Europe has attracted is of great relevance today for the EU. In this respect, the EU is facing at least five dimensions of the new terrorist threats, each of which has contributed to the difficulties that European states are experiencing in strengthening their counter-terrorist policies<sup>11</sup>:

- *Freedom of Movement*: Individuals in criminal and terrorist groups alike have taken advantage of the freedom of movement between countries signed up to the Schengen agreement—which allows countries to remove their internal borders and permits people to travel between countries without checks—and the relatively porous borders along EU boundaries. That has facilitated the establishment of logistical bases for Al Qaeda and Algerian terrorist groups including the Armed Islamic Group and Islamic Jihad in France, Germany and Italy. Furthermore, given the example highlighted by the continued successes of international trafficking operations, it is probable that terrorist networks have harnessed the ability to move critical individual across borders and can rely on the same trafficking routs to move illicit commodities and material into Europe.
- *Asylum and Immigration*: Terrorist groups have benefited from relatively open and weakly monitored asylum and immigration systems in most European states. In the UK, for example, this resulted in numerous “unaccounted for” individuals in the run-up to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Although most members of international terrorist groups based in Europe entered the region through legal immigration channels or are born national, there is little doubt that the asylum system has been abused. As illustrated by Algerian groups, illegal immigrants—dependent on the support of Diaspora communities and forged identify documentation—inherently exist in illegal

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<sup>10</sup> See also Rohan GUNARATNA, “Al-Qaeda Adapts to Disruption,” in: JIR, Feb. 2004, pp. 20–22 (22).

<sup>11</sup> See Tamara MAKARENKO, “Europe Adapts to New Terrorist Threats,” in: *ibid.*, Aug. 2003, pp. 24–27.

networks. It is this combination that makes international terrorist cells in Europe difficult to infiltrate.

- *Policing and Law*: Although many European institutions and regimes are conjoined, police and justice systems are not. Before September 11, 2001, this proved to be a significant obstacle to immediate cross-jurisdictional cooperation and extradition requests. The United Kingdom, for instance, refused to entertain a 1995 request from France to extradite an individual allegedly responsible for sponsoring a wave of Algerian terrorism in France.
- *Civil Liberties*: The most difficult problem to address is the fact that international terrorist groups and their sympathizers have depended on and benefited from European civil liberties, which allow for the freedom of assembly, religion and speech. This abuse has been most evident in the UK, where the authorities have allowed some imams to preach radical extremist and subversive ideas to their congregations. This helped the UK become a sanctuary for numerous Al Qaeda and Algerian terrorist sympathizers, and a center of radicalization and recruitment. Although three of the September 11, 2001 suicide hijackers lived in Germany for many years, it was the radical environment in the UK that helped turn several individuals currently under investigation to terrorism. Richard Reid, the convicted “shoe bomber” is indicative of this trend.
- *Finance*: International terrorist groups have benefited immensely from access to European financial networks. In addition to moving monies through money exchange bureaus, European cells have raised finances through petty crime, credit card fraud and small-scale trafficking operations. These combined vulnerabilities have allowed access to European territory by members and sympathizers of international terrorist groups. Cells were allowed to organize and operate for almost a decade, or in some cases longer, with impunity. Furthermore, because of a lack of knowledge and responsibility from financial institutions, and limited investigative personnel to follow-up any suspicious transaction reports European authorities seldom traced financial flows. This created an ideal fundraising environment, and the establishment of relatively sophisticated communications structures to maintain contact with the wider terrorist network.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, suppressing terrorism financing has proven difficult not just for developing countries to implement it.

From the mass of amended, redrafted and new legislation currently being implemented in Europe it is evident that EU counter-terrorism efforts are currently focused on four components<sup>13</sup>:

- 1) *Suppressing Terrorist Finances*: The single most important initiative taken by the majority of European states has been to introduce measures that could be used to suppress the financing of terrorism. In addition to ensuring that the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was signed and ratified, many states have drafted amendments to their banking policy and money laun-

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<sup>12</sup> See also Maurice R. GREENBERG/William F. WECHSLER/Lee S. WOLOSKY, “Terrorist Financing,” Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York 2002.

<sup>13</sup> See Tamara MAKARENKO, “Europe Adapts to New Terrorist Threats,” here p. 25 f.

dering laws to incorporate key recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force on fighting terrorist financing. More specifically, states including Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain have either added the financing of terrorism and the collection of funds for terrorist groups to their penal codes, or have introduced special legislation to address this issue. Amendments to money laundering and banking laws have also been made by states including Denmark, Finland and the UK. These allow for the almost immediate freezing of suspected terrorist funds; ensuring that any suspicion of terrorist financing is followed up with a full investigation; and extending responsibility for reporting suspicious transactions from banks to all financial institutions, and any individual—who in the course have cause to suspect suspicious financial activities. Finally, countries such as France, Germany and Italy have gone a step further by creating specific units dealing exclusively with the financing of terrorism. Between September 2001 and June 2002, European countries had frozen or seized about \$35 million in suspected terrorist assets as part out of a total of \$115 million confiscated worldwide. This sum has increased by December 2003 by only \$23 million and to \$138 million respectively. It is not so much a success for constraining the financing of terrorist groups but rather an indicator that they have effectively improvised their financing in response to the initial crackdown. Al Qaeda, for instance, has converted its assets to trade in commodities such as illicit drugs, weapons, cigarettes, diamonds, gold and other commodities, which are even harder to trace. Wealthy Saudi citizens and others are continuing substantial support for radical madrassahs (religious schools) throughout the Muslim world. In Saudi Arabia alone, estimations suggest more than 300 private charities that collectively yield over \$6 billion a year to overseas Islamic causes. Although the Saudi government has established stricter controls on charities, it seems unable and/or unwilling to control them entirely. Furthermore, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), responsible for mandatory tightening, naming, “shaming” and blacklisting lax or unduly secretive banking practices worldwide, comprises only 33 member states. Moreover, as of December 2003, just 83 of the 191 UN member states under the Security Council Resolution 1373 have committed themselves to submit reports on terrorist financing. Even many European jurisdictions still lack statutory authority permitting the neutralization of shell companies (as opposed to just bank accounts) linked to terrorist groups. Any comparable concord with non-European states, especially Muslim ones, is even harder to build.<sup>14</sup>

- 2) *Defining Terrorism*: Attempts have been made to place terrorism as a crime that is specifically defined in either the penal code or within another specific piece of legislation. Denmark, Finland, France and Italy, for instance, have specifically criminalized acts of terrorism and support for terrorism in their criminal codes. Furthermore, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK released legislation that includes the Ant-Terrorism Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Crimes of Terrorism Bill and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act respectively.

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<sup>14</sup> See “Financing Islamist Terrorism. Closing the Net,” Strategic Comments (ed. by the IISS, London), Vol. 9, Issue 10, December 2003.

- 3) *Strengthening Immigration Policies*: Recognizing weaknesses in their asylum and immigration policies, most European states have sought ways to specifically strengthen their processing and monitoring of asylum applications. Denmark, for example, adjusted its Alien Act to empower the government to expel any individual deemed to be a danger to national security, public order or the health of the population. The UK implemented the most extreme legislation, which allows for the imprisonment without trial of foreigners suspected of terrorist activities.
- 4) *Collecting Intelligence*: Almost every European state has made a concerted effort to increase their intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination between domestic departments (law enforcement, military and security services), European states, and internationally. In fact, given the numerous arrests and foiled terrorist plots in Europe since September 11, it may be concluded that intelligence cooperation is on an unprecedented high level.

While France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK have taken the lead in the bilateral and multilateral cooperation area, cooperation within the EU has also generally increased. This is a result of the EU implementing a draft framework decision on combating terrorism, strengthening the role of Eurojust, an EU body established in 2002 to deal with the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border crime, and introducing an European Arrest Warrant which is hoped to be implemented in 2004.<sup>15</sup>

But despite a growing awareness of the dangers linked with the “new terrorism” and the steps and improvements in cross-border cooperation as well as communication within Europe, the diverse civil and military emergency-response agencies still lack standardized procedures for coping particularly with biological and chemical threats on critical European infrastructure. Very soon, a wider EU will have 25 different national emergency plans. Hardly surprising for most security experts, the few exercises to test national emergency plans that have taken place until today in Europe have revealed a critical lack of interoperability between all these structures and procedures.<sup>16</sup> These achievements are also hampered by an uneven implementation.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, while the EU has competence in civil protection and security, its direct involvement is limited by the principles of “subsidiarity” and “proportionality” as well as funding constraints and its reliance on experts from member states to supplement its own relatively small groups of officials and experts. Overall, despite the increased cooperation within national states in Europe as well as within the EU, Europe is still insufficiently prepared to cope in particular with WMD terrorism. In this context, however, one should not overlook another major European-Transatlantic security organization.

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<sup>15</sup> See Tamara MAKARENKO, “European Adapts to New Terrorist Threats,” in: JIR, August 2003, pp. 24–27.

<sup>16</sup> See also Brooks TIGNER, “Europe Works to Coordinate Terror Response,” in: *DefenseNews.com*, 23 February 2004.

<sup>17</sup> See also Frank GREGORY, “The EU’s Role in the War on Terror,” in: JIR, January 2003, pp. 14–17.

## NATO—New Tasks and Missions

Before September 11, terrorism was essentially seen as a domestic, law-enforcement concern. The acute threat of new international terrorism and their organizations, motivated by an extreme ideology and acting consistently and with determination to commit terrorist mass murders, have posed new challenges for existing security organizations. They have proven their strength that despite counter terrorist efforts by security forces around the world, they are capable of carrying out terrorist attacks on a number of continents and inflicting many casualties due to their operational flexibility and decentralized structures. These new forms of international terrorism, which have blurred the former distinction between external and internal security, cannot successfully be fought against alone by traditional police, intelligence services for domestic security and prosecution forces. They must be adequately addressed by a broad spectrum of political, economic, law-enforcement measures and military engagement. Any future successful campaign against international terrorism must be conducted intensively, continuously, aggressively, and to a greater extent than in the past. Thereby, the military countermeasures must be part of a political strategy, encompassing many nonmilitary strategies alike. In the context of a comprehensive security concept, NATO had already widened its security tasks since the mid-1990s. It also includes its willingness to fight international terrorist threats, particularly linked with the use of WMD.

At the Prague Summit of November 2002, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) leaders endorsed a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (called “Action Plan”).<sup>18</sup> According to this “Action Plan”, NATO should help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks directed from abroad and to help national authorities to cope with the aftermath of attacks. The decision is based on the common assumption that all their countries are facing the same security challenges and that only by working together would they be able to cope with the new terrorist threats. Indeed, many Partner countries—especially those in Central Asia—have been victims of Al-Qaeda-sponsored terrorism and have already provided significant support to allies for operations in Afghanistan by, for example, providing over-flight rights and access to bases.

The Action Plan itself foresees the promotion and facilitation of increased cooperation among their countries through political consultation and practical programs under the auspices of the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace. Since NATO’s interest in promoting Partnership transcends military goals, allies also will benefit from the terrorist countermeasures contained in the Action Plan to promote democracy and nurture cooperation among Partners. In this way, potential sources of instability and conflict in the Euro-Atlantic area should be reduced. Moreover, the five Western European neutral members of the EAPC—Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland—have expressed their strategic interest in joining those allied efforts. To take the Action Plan forward, the strategic focuses have been placed on the following areas:

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<sup>18</sup> See also Osman YAVUZALP, “Working with Partners to Fight Terrorism,” in: *NATO-Review*, Spring 2003 (Internet-version: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art3.html>) and Christopher BENNETT, “Combating Terrorism,” in: *ibid* (Internet-version: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art2.html>).

### Political Consultations

- Consulting regularly on shared security concerns related to terrorism;
- Providing the possibility for Partners to seek, in accordance with agreed procedures, direct political consultations with NATO, either individually or in smaller groups, on concerns related to terrorism.

### Information Sharing

- Development of an EAPC/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit should enhance information sharing. In this context, the possibility of establishing permanent working contacts among intelligence agencies of interested EAPC countries and especially those in the Caucasus and Central Asia could prove particularly useful.

### Border Control

- A number of Partners have expressed their wish to initiate or enhance cooperation with NATO in the area of border control. In this unique context, priority may need to be given to Partners from Central Asia, which, because of their geographic location, may require assistance to prevent illicit movement of personnel and material across international borders.

### WMD-related Terrorism

- Procedures have to be agreed to cater for Partner support for and participation in NATO-led activities to enhance capabilities against WMD-related terrorism and share appropriate information and experience in this field.

### Enhancing Cooperation in Civil-Emergency Planning

- Continue working together to improve civil preparedness for possible terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction. To this end, Allied leaders at the Prague Summit endorsed a Civil-Emergency-Planning Action Plan for the improvement of civil preparedness against possible attacks against the civilian population with chemical, biological or radiological agents. Moreover, one of the principal objectives of the Action Plan is for Allies, upon request, to provide assistance to EAPC states in dealing with the risks and consequences of terrorist attacks, including on their economic and critical infrastructure.

### Information Exchange About Forces

- In the short term this is the exchange of information regarding forces responsible for counterterrorism operations and the facilitation of contacts among them.

### Force Planning

- In total, 22 Partners, including the three Caucasus countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, now participate in NATO's Planning and Review Process.
- In the wake of the decision to invite seven countries to begin NATO accession talks, the development of Partnership Goals aimed at improving the capabilities of these Caucasian and Central Asian countries will likely receive priority attention, since the Prague Declaration emphasizes "further enhancing interoperability and defense-related activities, which constitute the core of Partnership."

Overall, the Action Plan is an important document reflecting NATO-Partner solidarity in the face of the terrorist threat. It consists of both time-tested and innovative mechanisms for:

- Improving consultations and information sharing;
- Enhancing preparedness for combating terrorism;
- Impeding support to terrorist groups, and developing consequence-management capabilities;
- Assisting Partner efforts against terrorism.

On this basis, NATO's military concept for defense against terrorism includes four categories of possible military engagement:

- *Antiterrorism*: Defensive measures to reduce vulnerability;
- *Consequence management*: Post-attack recuperation (such as planning and force generation, providing capabilities for immediate assistance and coordination centers, and establishing training facilities);
- *Counterterrorism*: Use of offensive measures, including counter-force activities;
- *Military cooperation*: even with Russia, Ukraine, Partners, Mediterranean Dialogue countries and other states as well as organizations (such as the EU), especially within the context of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO-Russian Council.

## Asia

In Asia itself and particularly in Southeast Asia, the arrest of Al Qaeda terrorists or those linked with Jemaah Islamiyah in Singapore and other ASEAN states have signaled that terrorism is a regional and not just a national security problem, affecting the entire region and even beyond.<sup>19</sup> In this light, global security challenges such as international terrorism require regional and global strategies to cope with these security threats. On a more basic level, extremism in Southeast Asia is centered primarily in debates within the Muslim communities of the region. Therefore any strategy designed to counterterrorist threats must also address understandable concerns that those antiterrorist strategies could upset social and political domestic stability and thus cause even more regional instability as, for instance, in southern Thailand.<sup>20</sup>

Although regional security cooperation has made important progress (such as the last APEC meeting last October which agreed to dismantle transnational terrorist groups, tackle the dangerous proliferation of WMD, impose strict controls on portable anti-aircraft missile systems and use the Asian Development Bank to help improve port

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<sup>19</sup> See Michael RICHARDSON, IHT, 31 July 2002, p. 2; Anthony DAVIS, "Southeast Asia Fears New Terrorist Attacks," in: JIR, November 2003, pp. 15–19, and Andrew TAN/Kumar RAMAKRISHNA (Eds.), "The New Terrorism. Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies," Singapore 2002, here pp. 107 ff.

<sup>20</sup> See also Thaksin SHINAWATRA, "Thailand Confronts Separatist Violence in Its Muslim South," in: JIR, March 2004, pp. 20–25; Eric TEO Chu Cheow, "The Changing Face of Terrorism in Southeast Asia," in: *PacNet Newsletter*, No. 34, 14 August 2003; Shawn W. CRISPIN, "Strife Down South," in: *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), 22 January 2004, pp. 12–14; idem/Jeremy WAGSTAFF, "The Terror War's Next Offensive," in: *ibid.*, 28 August 2003, pp. 12–15 and Surin PITSUWAN, "Developing Thailand's South," in: *ibid.*, 12 February 2004, p. 22.

security and cut off the flow of money to terrorists<sup>21</sup>, it seems still questionable whether the present regional cooperation for countering terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is adequate and sufficient enough to prevent further terrible attacks such as those in Bali in 2002<sup>22</sup>:

*Effective Regional Responses?:* Initially, a troika of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia has been formed for discussing common policies in the face of extremist threats in those countries. Broader cooperation has increased, for instance, between Indonesia and Malaysia, and first-meetings of ASEAN's military chiefs have been held. Counterterrorism is also high on the agendas of the ARF and CSCAP. But it seems still insufficient in the context of effective regional responses as well as in regard to address the root causes of discontent, which is not just limited to poverty, as new empirical studies of terrorism have revealed since the mid-1990s.

*Funding:* Like always, also new funding is needed to build new regional networks to address to economic disparity, good governance and human rights while at the same time the region needs to build an intelligence network aimed at cutting off funds used by terrorist groups. However, this need seems still insufficient not just in Southeast Asia, but also in the EU, which would have a significant positive impact on fighting international terrorism in Asia.

*Inexperience:* ASEAN states face still difficulties to arrest particularly leaders and not just mid- and low level members of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda. It also illustrates the inexperience and problems by the major ASEAN states in dealing with these new forms of international terrorism.

*Denying and Downplaying Threats and Responsibilities:* As a recent U.S. investigation found out, a Malaysian was accused to be a major player in a vast network of trafficking in nuclear technology for Libya's secret nuclear program. The case was politically sensitive because the Malaysian Scomi Group is majority controlled by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi's only son, Kamaluddin. While the Malaysian government has accused the U.S. President of unfairly singling out Malaysia's role in the secret network and insisting that it was a sole known case of Malaysian involvement, the investigation and cooperation continues. But it indicates the wider security problems and the need of tougher laws to stop the illicit spread of weapons technology in Malaysia as well as many other South East Asian countries.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> See David E. SANGER, IHT, 22 October 2003, p. 10 and Victor MALLET, *Financial Times* (FT), 22 October 2003, p. 8.

<sup>22</sup> See F. UMBACH, "EU-ASEAN Political and Security Dialogue at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Prospects for Interregional Cooperation on International Terrorism," 5th EU-Asean Think Tank Dialogue "Revitalizing ASEAN-EU Partnership to Meet Global Security and Economic Challenges," Singapore, 6 to 7 October 2003, forthcoming in: *Panorama* 2004; Dzirhan MAHADZIR, "Lack of Cooperation Hinders ASEAN Anti-Terrorism Efforts," in: *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter* (A-PDR) December 2002/January 2003, pp. 28-29, and Dzirhan MAHADZIR, "ASEAN Anti-Terrorism Makes Slow Progress," in: *ibid.*, September 2003, p. 19.

<sup>23</sup> See *Straits Times*, 13 February 2004 (Internet-version).

*No Effective Asian Interpol:* Those problems are compounded by the fact that there is no specific overall security institution existing in Asia that is comparable in its organizational efficiency to an institution such as Interpol in Europe.

*Regional Dividing Lines:* Furthermore, these difficulties are complicated by the fact that some countries are heavily affected by terrorism such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines whereas others are thus far only a potential target for terrorists in the future. That explains the difficulty to promote joint regional agendas for combating terrorism when not all the grouping's members are affected in the same way by this security challenge.

*Conflicting Goals:* As past experiences have shown, gathering intelligence on the countries in which terrorist groups are located can be compromised by strengthening the sharing of information activities in these countries by neighboring states. Moreover, repressive counter terrorist strategies can only serve to widen the gap between local people and authorities and push young Muslims toward Islamic militants such as in southern Thailand.

*Overlooking Terrorist Challenges:* In general, however, the ASEAN states have long overlooked the activities of Islamic groups like many European states. The biggest problem in Southeast Asia is, however, the leadership vacuum in organizing a joint antiterrorism strategy amongst members. They are often unable to agree specifically to which extent they should also coordinate their efforts and strategies closely with those of the United States and other non-subregional powers. Furthermore, terrorism's roots in Southeast Asia in particular are very diverse and resilient. Even the capture of key individual terrorist leaders such as the Indonesian Hambali, accused for conducting many terrorist attacks throughout the entire region, did not change very much in regard to the terrorist threats, albeit he provided new information and insights about the terrorist networks.<sup>24</sup>

*The Southeast Asia Anti-Terror Center as an Example of the Inherent Problems:* Symptomatic for the slow progress in finding regional solutions to address international terrorist threat is the creation of the Southeast Asia Anti-Terror Center. Its idea has been promulgated in early 2002.<sup>25</sup> The center has only become operational just in July 2003. Originally it was planned as a joint U.S.-Malaysian initiative. But neither the military nor the police has been involved in the center, which will focus just on studies of terrorist organizations and activities, giving instructions on border security and to analyze strategies dealing with the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Thus the center will only provide basic training in methods of identifying and tracking terrorist groups rather than being a center, in which a joint regional strategy can be formulated and intelligence efforts between regional nations can be coordinated. Meanwhile Malaysia is funding the center because of its fears to increase anti-U.S.-sentiment among the majority of the Muslim Malay population. But a totally Malaysian sponsored and organized facility is clearly limiting its usefulness and regional importance. It seems characteristically for the entire situation in ASEAN where each ASEAN country is looking after its own

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<sup>24</sup> See also Don GREENLEES, "Still a Force to be Feared," in: FEER 22 January 2004, pp. 14–17.

<sup>25</sup> See "Malaysia to Open Regional Anti-Terror Center," in: *New York Times* (Internet-Version), 29 June 2003.

territory and operations and passes on just selective intelligence to its neighboring countries. Therefore the center will not adequately assist the region for the time being in formulating a real joint strategy against terrorism. There is, hitherto, still little active input, participation and contribution from other ASEAN states.<sup>26</sup>

*Domestic Dependencies on Ineffective and Corrupted Force Structures:* Another problem is that ASEAN governments depend in fighting terrorism on its police forces and—to a less extent—on its immigration control agencies. But they are generally overworked, underpaid, undertrained and in some countries prone to corruption. Hence ASEAN counterterrorist forces not only have to monitor terrorists but also some of their own police and immigration officials—a fact that may deter regional information sharing by other regional countries.

On the positive side, however, this new field of security cooperation on the regional and interregional level between Asia and Europe opens a wide range of opportunities for the EU to assist and support funding as well as training of police forces and immigration officials—and thus promote interregional cooperation in antiterrorist strategies in its own strategic interest. An important interregional cooperation field between the EU and Japan as well as entire Asia in this respect is maritime security.

#### Responses to the Threat: Maritime Security

In the light of rising terrorist and piracy attacks worldwide, but particularly in Southeast Asia, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been giving high priority to review of existing international legal and technical measures to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks against ships and improve shipping security. The aim is to reduce the risk to passengers, crews and port personnel both onboard ships and in port areas and to vessels and their cargoes. As potential aerial and ground targets have been hardened, the vulnerability of the maritime domain to infiltration and strike has increased since September 11, 2001.<sup>27</sup>

Measures taken by the IMO include review of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Treaty) and encouragement of its wider ratification; accelerated introduction of a mandatory system of automatic identification fitted to all ships over 300 gross tons on international voyages; updated arrangements for seafarer identification; and amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), including the introduction of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). This code includes requirements for ships and port facilities such as the provision of security plans and officers, onboard equipment and arrangements for monitoring and controlling access. Ships will have to carry an International Ship Security Certificate issued by an appropriate authority in the “flag state.” Implementation of these measures is particularly challenging for

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<sup>26</sup> See also F. UMBACH, “EU–ASEAN Political and Security Dialogue at the Beginning of the 21st Century.”

<sup>27</sup> See also “Terrorism at Sea and Means of Protection,” in: *Asian Defence Journal* 10/03, pp. 62–64.

developing countries that lack the necessary administrative and legal capabilities. The U.S. places great importance securing the nation's transportation system from terrorist attack. Major U.S. initiatives with ships and their cargoes include<sup>28</sup>:

- The Container Security Initiative (CSI), which involves placing U.S. customs inspectors at major foreign seaports to prescreen high risk cargo containers before they are shipped to the United States;
- The Custom-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which encourages shippers and carriers to more carefully account for their cargo and their past records; and
- The Advanced Cargo Manifest Rule that requires detailed manifest information to be submitted to U.S. Customs 24 hours prior to final vessel loading in a foreign port.

The CSI is based on a series of agreements between the U.S. and foreign governments and now extends to most foreign ports that are major sources of containers being shipped to American ports. Core elements of CSI include the establishment of new security criteria to identify high-risk containers and the introduction of new technology to screen containers and make containers more secure. CSI and the advanced cargo manifest requirement constitute onerous requirements that involve costly changes to previous procedures.

Measures adopted by APEC include the Enhancing Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initiative, the establishment of the APEC-Counterterrorism Task Force and the adoption of the APEC Counterterrorism Action Plan. The latter plan includes a container security regime based on CSI. The plan also calls for enhanced cooperation and fighting piracy in the region between APEC forums and organizations such as the IMO and the International Maritime Bureau.<sup>29</sup>

Furthermore, the recent agreement between the U.S. and Liberia in February 2004 allowing U.S. enforcement agencies to stop and search any vessel with a Liberian flag, suspecting that it is carrying weapons, materials and delivery systems, offers unprecedented oversight about the second-largest ship registry in the world, which has been used extensively by smugglers for many years.<sup>30</sup>

In the EU, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), which was originally created to deal with marine pollution and safety following the Erika disaster of December 1999, has recently updated and modified the agency's tasks. But the European Parliament has not widened the agency's responsibilities to include security issues such as combating terrorism, which will continue to be an area for governments.<sup>31</sup> In the light of the new terrorist challenges, this is clearly inadequate and is hindering more effective antiterrorist countermeasures within Europe as well as EU's international cooperation on antiterrorism with Asia and other regions of the world.

Moreover, EU states such as France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom together with Poland, Australia, Japan and the United States have initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for indicting shipments of WMD materials. Originally it was focused in particular on North Korea. But it is also directed against other proliferators. Meanwhile, the initiative has been expanded by Canada,

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<sup>28</sup> See Sam BATEMAN, "Countering Maritime Terrorism," in: A-PDR October 2003, pp. 16–17 (17).

<sup>29</sup> See Sam BATEMAN, *ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

<sup>30</sup> See "Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation on the High Seas," *Stratfor.biz*, 16 February 2004.

<sup>31</sup> See Energy and Transport Digest (ed. by the EU, Brussels), No. 81, 6 February 2004.

Denmark, Norway, Singapore and Turkey. Although at least eight maritime exercises are planned until mid-2004, it remains to be seen how effective PSI will be in the future due to uncertainties of practicing interdiction, unresolved political issues as well as of international law.<sup>32</sup>

### Interregional Security Cooperation on Terrorism

Interregional security cooperation between the EU and Asia is taking place on various levels such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), in the framework of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process and bilaterally between European and Asian states. International terrorism has already been mentioned in the Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) of 2000, which marked the beginning of a formal security dialogue within ASEM, launched in 1996.<sup>33</sup> But it took another year before at the fourth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM IV) in Copenhagen in September 2002 both sides agreed to fight international terrorism more forcefully. Both sides stressed in the joint “Declaration on Cooperation against International Terrorism”:

“The fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach by the international community comprising political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means in accordance with our respective domestic laws, duly taking into account root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. . . .

We acknowledge that terrorism, including its possible links with transnational organized crime such as money laundering, trafficking in illicit drugs, forms a part of a complex set of new security challenges. This calls for a multi-faceted approach to the problems we are facing.”<sup>34</sup>

At that time, in a new era of uncertainty, there was still no existing mechanism within ASEM to address ad-hoc events and threats such as the Bali bombing. By establishing a new informal consultative mechanism enabling “ASEM Coordinators and Senior Officials to confer expeditiously on significant international events” and “to facilitate cooperation in the common fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime,” both sides also agreed to hold an ASEM seminar on antiterrorism in China in 2003. The seminar was aimed to discuss perspectives for strengthening the UN’s leading role and in particular ASEM’s cooperation on counterterrorism as part of the “ASEM Copenhagen Cooperation Program on Fighting International Terrorism.”<sup>35</sup> Another seminar on

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<sup>32</sup> See Mark VALENCIA, “Why Interdiction Could Fail,” in: FEER, 28 August 2003 and Dan SMITH, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Challenge too Narrow,” in: *Foreign Policy in Focus* (FPIF-Polica Report, October 2003 (here via Interent: [http://www.fpip.org/papers/prolif2003\\_body.html](http://www.fpip.org/papers/prolif2003_body.html); downloaded on 22 October 2003).

<sup>33</sup> See also Jörn DOSCH, “Changing Security Cultures in Europe and Southeast Asia: Implications for Inter-Regionalism,” in: *Asia Europe Journal* 2003, pp. 483–501 (494 ff.).

<sup>34</sup> “The ASEM Copenhagen Declaration on Cooperation against International Terrorism,” Fourth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM 4), Copenhagen, 23–24 September 2002 (via Internet: <http://www.ias.nl/asem/offdocs/ASEM4> (CopenhagenDeclaration\_InternationalTerrorism.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> “ASEM Copenhagen Cooperation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism,” Copenhagen, 23–24 September 2002 (via Internet – <http://www.ias.nf/asem/events/summits/asem4/ASEM4CooperationProgrammeonFightingTerrorism.pdf>).

combating underground banking and supervising alternate remittance services in European and Asian countries, organized jointly by Germany and Malaysia, was held in Germany on October 30-31, 2003 within the context of the ASEM Anti-Money Laundering Initiative. With these steps, ASEM states have tried to overcome their institutional and capability weaknesses in interregional security and antiterrorist cooperation. However, any further progress on interregional security cooperation depends on the future intraregional integration processes on both sides.

## Conclusions and Perspectives

In the past, counterterrorism priorities remained largely focused on the short-term perspective, and are often politically driven by domestic factors. But governments have the responsibility also to prepare mid- and long-term strategies that seek to decrease significantly the threat, while eliminating the real roots of growing discontent. Furthermore, more effective preventive counter-measures against terrorist threats are often hampered by inherent conflicting goals. The future trade for instance might not only be under threat from terrorism, but also from the measures that might be taken to combat it.

Moreover, future progress in the interregional political and security dialogue between the EU and Asia/Japan depends to a considerable extent on the intraregional integration and cooperation processes on both sides. But ASEAN's traditional nonintervention clause and the regional mistrust still existing in Asia (such as between Japan and PR China) are hindering both regional as well as interregional cooperation for more adequate international antiterrorist efforts. In the EU, too, antiterrorist cooperation has made some progress since September 11, 2001 but is hardly sufficient and efficient enough in fighting the new terrorist challenges. Both, within the EU as well as within national states (such as Germany), member states and federal states are still unwilling to give up sovereignty to the EU and the central government in order to improve coordination and capabilities of antiterrorist measures.

In this regard, both sides need to learn much more from the other side before their interregional cooperation on regional and international terrorist threats is becoming more effective. In this regard, both Japan and the EU still need to recognize much more than in the past the fact and the implications that security challenges outside their region may have a direct impact on their own security and stability.