SSOAR

Open Access Repository
www.ssoar.info

Security in a Globalized World - Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships: New Faces Conference 2006, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo, Norway 20–22 October 2006

Brockmann, Kathrin (Ed.); Hauck, Hans Bastian (Ed.)

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Konferenzband / conference proceedings

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Brockmann, K., & Hauck, H. B. (Eds.). (2007). *Security in a Globalized World - Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships: New Faces Conference 2006, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo, Norway 20–22 October 2006* (DGAP-Bericht, 6). Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-129794

Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

gesis Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften

Mitglied der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft

DGAPbericht

Forschungsinstitut der
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

Nº 6

Security in a Globalized World

Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships

New Faces Conference 2006
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo, Norway
20–22 October 2006

DGAP Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Auswärtige Politik e.V.

DGAP Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.

NUPI Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) is the national network for German foreign policy. As an independent, non-partisan and non-profit organization, it actively takes part in the political decision-making process and promotes understanding of German foreign policy and international relations. More than 1800 members – among them renowned representatives from politics, business, academia and the media – as well as more than 80 companies and foundations support the work of the DGAP. The DGAP comprises the research institute, the journal IP and its Global Edition and the library and documentation center.

The DGAP's research institute works at the junction between politics, the economy and academia. The research institute works interdisciplinary, policy-oriented and in all areas of German foreign policy, which are anything but static in globalizing world: security and supply risks, international competition, integration and network issues.

The DGAP publishes Germany's most renowned foreign policy journal – INTERNATIONALE POLITIK (IP). It provides a forum for the discussion of German foreign policy and major international topics. IP Global Edition is the quarterly English-language magazine of the German Council on Foreign Relations. It brings the missing European voice on global issues to readers across the world and is essential reading for everyone who is working in the field of politics and global economic issues.

The DGAP Library and Documentation Center (BiDok) is one of the oldest and most significant specialized libraries in Germany open to the public. It holds substantial collections on German foreign and security policy.

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) was established by the Norwegian Parliament in 1959 in order to promote a better understanding of international issues in Norway. NUPI has sought to achieve this by undertaking a wide range of research activities and by disseminating information on international issues.

The Institute has an independent position in studying matters of relevance to Norwegian foreign policy and economic relations. NUPI's research programs include: International Politics, International Economics, the Centre for Russian Studies, Development Studies, Training for Peace in South Africa and a project group for studies of the Persian Gulf. As a small nation, Norway depends strongly on stable and open ties to the rest of the world. Consequently, the understanding of international relations and the constantly evolving international economy is a vital prerequisite when the foreign, as well as domestic policy of Norway is to be shaped. With more than 40 years of experience, NUPI is one of Norway's leading independent centres for research and information on political and economic issues.

Kathrin Brockmann, Hans Bastian Hauck (eds.)

Security in a Globalized World

Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships

New Faces Conference 2006

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway
October 20–22, 2006

German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Berlin 2007

With the support of:

Robert Bosch Stiftung

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

NATO OTAN

UTENRIKSDEPARTEMENTET
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

VERTEIDIGUNG · BEVÖLKERUNGSSCHUTZ · SPORT
DEFENSE · PROTECTION DE LA POPULATION · SPORTS
DIFESA · PROTEZIONE DELLA POPOLAZIONE · SPORT
DEFENSIUN · PROTECZIUN DA LA POPULAZIUN · SPORT

Kompetenzbereich Wissenschaft und Technologie

Contents

Introduction 3

Security in a Globalized World: Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships 7
Foreword by Alyson J. K. Bailes, Director, SIPRI

Panel I – Regional Security Cooperation: Current trends

Recent Trends in Research on Regional Security Cooperation 11
Martin Sjögren

It's a Long Way to … Regional Strategic Actorness. Assessing the EU's Ongoing (R)Evolution in Strategic and Regional Affairs 19
Claudia Major

A New Strategic Partnership? Deepening UN-NATO Relations 33
Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss

Panel II – Chains of Interdependency: Coordinating Regional/Global Energy Security

The Venezuelan Oil and Gas Hub: A Regional and Global Perspective of Energy Supply and Security Policy 43
Gerardo J. Briceño P.

Panel III – Re-Inventing the Carrot: ENP as an Alternative to EU-Enlargement?

The ENP and the EMP: Exploring a Division of Tasks between Overlapping Initiatives 53
Eduard Soler i Lecha

Panel IV – The Role of Regional Security Institutions and Strategic Alliances in Asia

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A New Security Provider for Central Asia? 61
Natalia Touzovskaia

The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Necessity for Asian Strategic Stability 73
Rafeh A. Malik

Panel V – After the Roadmap: Cooperation between Multinational Actors in the Middle East

Regional Security in the Middle East: Cooperation between Multinational and Regional Actors? 83
Mohamed Ibrahim

Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Emerging EU Alternative 91
Stuart Reigeluth

Participants and Organizers 99

Introduction

The end of the Cold War brought with it the end of the traditional, bipolar geo-strategic model of explaining world affairs. "Feindbilder," which used to be defined in geographical terms ("East" vs "West"), have been replaced by security threats perceived to be truly global and functional in nature, yet regional in origin: Terrorism and proliferation, migration, organized crime and corruption or, at the root level, the lack of democracy and good governance in certain parts of this world. The realization that in today's globalized and interlinked world regional conflicts can have global fallout has increased the need for policy analysts to better understand the highly complex nature of different regional security dynamics. For policy makers, the question is how to address regional security issues efficiently and effectively.

In this context, regional security organizations such as NATO and the OSCE have recently been joined in their efforts to promote peace and stability by other, general-purpose or even economy oriented regional organizations. Such "securitization" of agendas can be observed in the transformation of the European Union and the development of its CFSP and ESDP, in the change of nature of G7/8 summits, but also in the addition of significant security related dimensions to the agendas of the Arab League, AU, OAS, ECOWAS, ARF and SADC, among many others. Regional security cooperation has thus become an increasingly important part of the larger debate on the "new regionalism," and the question of how to coordinate national, regional and international actors now features as the key to successful regional integration and stability.

During DGAP's 9th New Faces Conference entitled "Security in a Globalized World: Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships," participants from 18 different countries and from all over Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Russia and the US presented papers on how regional cooperation and strategic partnerships between states, regional and international organizations as well as civil society actors and the private sector contribute to enhance security. Divided into five panels, these case studies aimed at closing a gap in current policy research, which largely focuses on economic aspects of regional cooperation, thereby neglecting the above-mentioned "securitization" of political and economic agendas, institutions and fora.

The introductory panel gave a brief overview of recent trends in literature on and practice of regional security cooperation.

Panel II addressed the issue of energy security, which now shapes the foreign policy of states and results in strategic, if sometimes uneasy, partnerships and alliances. Participants discussed ways to further coordinate energy security efforts and promote stable energy systems at both regional and global levels.

Panel III focused on enlargement as the EU's key instrument to project stability. Given the current enlargement fatigue and the ongoing debate about the EU's limited absorption capacity, participants discussed the European Neighborhood Policy as a potential alternative instrument to promote security and stability in the EU's neighboring and partner countries.

In Panel IV, participants discussed the role of regional security institutions, strategic partnerships, alliances and other forms of regional and international cooperation in Asia. They elaborated on the potential value-added of actors such as ASEAN and its Regional Forum (ARF), the SAARC, the SCO and others vis-à-vis single-state global actors such as China, Russia and the US.

The Middle East, a volatile region with few and only formally existing regional security institutions, took center stage in this conference's final panel. Participants discussed the prospects of the Barcelona framework, one of the very few truly regional initiatives. Whether third party intervention could compensate for the apparent lack of regional security cooperation, keeping in mind the limitations of the UN, the Quartet and the EU as potential actors in the region, was also highly debated.

The 9th New Faces Conference was jointly organized by the International Forum on Strategic Thinking and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).[1] It took place at NUPI's premises in Oslo, Norway, on 20-22 October 2006. The academic program was complemented by social activities in and around Oslo, as well as a festive dinner and a keynote speech by Nils Morten Udgaard, one of Norway's outstanding foreign policy commentators.

The International Forum on Strategic Thinking is DGAP's main instrument for promoting young professionals and scholars in the area of foreign and security policy. It holds three major events per year: an International Summer School, a New Faces Conference and an Expert Conference. New Faces Conferences gather 20 promising young professionals and scholars pursuing an active career

1 We would like to thank NUPI for organizing this conference with us, and especially Sverre Lodgaard and Elana Wilson for all their support, for sharing their insights and thoughts and for being wonderful hosts. We would also like to thank the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Ministry of Defence and NATO's Public Diplomacy Division for their financial support.

in the field of foreign and security policy. Participants present their own research, compare arguments and approaches, and share feedback and constructive criticism through a forum of like-minded peers. Their diverse academic and regional backgrounds create a stimulating atmosphere for open debate. This workshop-style format allows participants to intensely engage with each other, get to know different perspectives and deepen their professional networks. Participants are encouraged to pursue their own ideas and thinking, reflecting their national background, work experience, academic education and area of specialization.

Following the conference, participants are given time to consider their peers' feedback and revise their work for publication through DGAP. This volume presents selected articles drafted by participants of the 9th New Faces Conference and makes them available to the interested public. We hope that this volume will proof to be a valuable contribution to the debate and literature on regional security cooperation and encourage further research in this area.

Hans Bastian Hauck & Kathrin Brockmann

Participants of the 9th New Faces Conference gather at NUPI

Sverre Lodgaard and Fritjof von Nordenskjöld address the “New Faces”

Security in a Globalized World: Towards Regional Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships

Foreword by Alyson J. K. Bailes, Director, SIPRI

The issue of unilateralism versus multilateralism sometimes makes me think of the old fable of the hare and the tortoise. The unilateralist hare, untrammeled by obligation or by slower brethren, leaps swiftly and sometimes even elegantly to his goal. The multilateralist tortoise has to totter along on not just four, but a monstrous multiplication of legs (27 now in the EU, 26 in NATO), often trying to walk in different directions. The familiar twist of the fable is that the tortoise may, through sheer dull persistence, nevertheless arrive closer to the target in the end. A nuance less often remarked on is that the tortoise's natural protection is much tougher and more resilient than the hare's.

Multilateral groupings of the three basic different kinds—of regionally contiguous states, of non-contiguous states, and (near-)global—have in fact shown an excellent survival rate since the Second World War. Compared with the pre-war period, disappearing institutions have been rather rare: an important recent exception is the windup of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, also called COMECON) and a less important one is the mothballing of Western European Union (since its active functions passed to the EU in 2000). Much more common have been the cases of institutions enlarging themselves with strategically significant effect—ASEAN as well as NATO and the EU—and of institutions with initially narrow competencies branching out into different fields. Multifunctionalism as well as multilateralism seems currently to be on the rise; and it is intriguing to note that cases of initially economic or functional groupings branching out into security dimensions are easier to find than the reverse. (The purely military regional pacts CENTO and SEATO disappeared early in the post-war period, and neither the—otherwise remarkably durable—Western alliance NATO nor Russia's Comprehensive Security Treaty Organization looks like breaking out of its "hard" carapace any time soon.) Such a trend can be largely explained by the changing modern or post-modern conception of "security," which reduces the centrality and weight of the military dimension to focus increasingly on issues at the interface of defence and economics like proliferation, energy and environmental security. It may also be relevant that the most powerful understandings, and real-life versions, of modern multilateralism are those built on interpenetration between and common regulation of internal communities (the "integrative" model), rather than just traditional state-to-state ties. If "the family that prays together stays together," the multilateral

group that spends resources and/or obeys laws together may be more likely to stand together and to obey a collective interest in the longer run. On this reading, recent attempts to revive a system of bilateral trade deals would be just as much of a false track as the more egregious cases of use of unilateral force.

Returning to the security agenda, it seems hard to deny that successful regional groupings have helped their members in many ways. They help to suppress risks of conflict, to insulate any stubborn hotspots (like Northern Ireland), to design systems and mobilize resources against transnational threats like terrorism and natural hazards, and—increasingly often—to promote and consolidate good governance and reform, not only in the state apparatus. These blessings may more easily be counted by considering the many dangers and handicaps that face regions without effective cooperative frameworks, such as the greater Middle East, South Asia and North-East Asia (the China/Japan/Korea/Taiwan complex). On the down-side, it is now better understood that even the most advanced groupings can suffer repeated crises of confidence and disunity as collective competence is pushed out into newer and tougher areas; and the EU, as the most advanced model, has been the first but may not be the last to run into a barrier of popular dissent and distrust.

Are there similar contradictions when it comes to the impact of organized regions and other specialized groupings on security and welfare at the truly global level? In the economic sphere, it can certainly be argued that regional groups which shelter their own members against some of the pressures of globalization may intrinsically distort the overall workings of comparative advantage and competition, besides holding the power to block as well as promote global trade negotiations. In security terms, however, there would seem to be clearer advantages all round if an increasing number of regions can keep themselves peaceful, gradually pacify any "black sheep" in their midst, export the capacity to help out in other people's crises, and develop models to minimize their exposure to universal transnational threats. Last but not least, does regional solidarity contradict the powerful twentieth-century idea of voluntary strategic partnerships between larger and smaller powers from different continents who see their survival as inter-linked? This issue is being played out right now in the evolutionary contest between the EU and NATO, and there will no doubt be many twists and turns before the lessons are clear. This writer's best guess is that it will grow steadily harder for the USA to sustain an incomplete, adversarial grouping in any given region (China's neighbors against China or Iran's neighbors against Iran), and easier to stabilize relations between any given outside power and a region that is

inclusive or "whole" in itself. The tortoise cannot mimic the hare's style, but a little self-restraint could help to keep the hare alongside the tortoise.

No special justification is needed for a seminar and volume dedicated to exploring these issues. Our theoretical models for understanding different modes of security cooperation have failed to keep pace with the re-imagining of security itself. The strength of feelings, on both sides, about recent US excursions into unilateralism (and occasional anti-institutionalism) has squandered energies that could have been spent on an objective study of the outputs and outcomes, strengths and weaknesses of various multilateral alternatives. It is a particularly interesting experiment, however, to try to make up some of this lost ground by encouraging a younger generation of thinkers—the "new faces" of this publication—to tackle the subject at an early stage in their careers. At first sight, the vitality and confidence associated with youth might seem closer to the drivers of unilateralism. More significant, however, may be the facts that young thinkers deal more easily with degrees of complexity that have baffled the preceding generation (whether in IR or IT); that they still have the generosity to look for everybody-wins solutions; and that they are not easily discouraged from attempting the impossible. All those qualities will be needed if an increasingly globalized, and threatened, world is to have any chance of exploiting the full future value of cooperation and partnership in all their forms. The present volume offers inspiration for tackling the task, and even more importantly, hope.

Elana Wilson and Kristin Haugevik from NUPI

During a stroll through the Vigeland Sculpture Park

Recent Trends in Research on Regional Security Cooperation

Martin Sjögren

Martin Sjögren

Introduction

In an increasingly globalized world, and with a global competitive market as well as the emergence of transnational security threats such as terrorism and international crime, it is not surprising that cooperative frameworks have been established in most regions in order to address these issues more effectively. Some form of regional organization now exists in virtually every region, although the formal frameworks that exist in South Asia and the Arab region do not actually lead to much cooperation. There are, however, notable exceptions to this trend, such as the Northeast Asian region.

As has been widely documented, regionalism experienced a resurgence during the 1990's and is now commonly termed "new regionalism".[1] The new regional organizations and already existing organizations that underwent further development were designed to deal with a steadily growing range of issues. Although economic cooperation has remained the dominant issue for a lot of these organizations, cooperation in the field of security was a goal of several of them from the outset and has been a continuing development for others.[2]

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term "region." Geography is of course an important determinant for the demarcations between various regions, with continents forming natural regional borders. As the current debate about the further expansion of the European Union (EU) to countries such as Turkey reveals, however, these regions are also to a large extent political constructs. This is further demonstrated by the fact that some of the larger world powers, such as the US, Russia, and China, play an influential role in several of these regions simultaneously.

This paper begins by discussing recent research on the topic of regional security cooperation, of its gaps and of the efforts being made to fill them. The second part of the paper addresses possible areas for future research, focusing on the

1 See Louise Fawcett/ Andrew Hurrell (eds.). Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, New York, 1995.

2 Significant security-related cooperation has also taken place at the sub-regional level, especially in Europe, Africa, and to a lesser extent in Latin America. It is assumed that much of the analysis in this paper applies to both regional and sub-regional frameworks.

question why regional security cooperation has failed to develop in some regions, paying particular attention to Northeast Asia.

Research on Regional Security Cooperation

There has been a significant amount of research conducted on the theme of regionalism in international politics, as well as on regional cooperation. Although some of this research was done during the Cold War, most of it coincided with the so-called "new regionalism" of the post-Cold War era. The majority of this research has looked at economic cooperation and the role of regional groupings in the globalized international political economy.

However, some research has also been conducted on issues of regional security. This research generally falls within one of two categories. The first category, which was developed in the early 1990's, focuses on regions as security entities within the international security system. This research has taken issue with Realists, who tend to view states as the predominant actors in international relations, as well as Globalists, for whom states are losing their importance in an increasingly globalized world. The new research emphasizes regions as primary arenas for security. Perhaps most important among these is the work by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and their concept of Regional Security Complexes (RSCs). The central premise of their theory contends that the world is divided into a number of regions, and that most security concerns and activities are internal to these regions rather than global in nature.[3]

The second category of research takes a different approach, focusing instead on specific regions and the security dynamics and patterns of cooperation within them. Within this body of research there is a substantial and growing amount of literature focusing specifically on regional security cooperation. This has been the case with Europe in particular, where much research has been carried out on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP),[4] as well as on other organizations such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[5] Although this research provides a lot of insight into security cooperation taking place in Europe, its contribution to the comparative understanding of regional security cooperation

3 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, 2003, chapter 3.

4 See Pål Jonsson. The Development of the European Security and Defense Policy: An Assessment of Preferences, Bargains and Outcomes, Stockholm 2006, <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir1967.pdf>.

5 For a recent assessment of the OSCE, see Pál Dunay. The OSCE in Crisis (Chaillot Paper no. 88), Paris 2006. <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai88.pdf>.

elsewhere in the world is limited because of the peculiarities of European organizations—notably their advanced nature and multiplicity.

Indeed, recent literature on regionalism and regional cooperation lacks theoretical and comparative studies of the forms and tasks of regional security cooperation. This gap is unfortunate given the increasing involvement of regional organizations in security affairs and the aspirations of more distant regions towards developing such frameworks.

In an effort to bridge this gap in the literature, a series of recent and forthcoming publications by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has sought to categorize the current forms of regional security cooperation, as well as establish criteria for assessing the impacts of various regional groupings.[6] There are four general patterns and functions of regional organizations in the field of security. Firstly, these regional organizations serve as frameworks for security dialogue for conflict prevention and management, either indirectly or more actively through the establishment of field missions, as in the case of the OSCE, or by sending peacekeepers, as in the case of the African Union. A second general pattern is that regions have developed new forms of military cooperation, which place more emphasis on dialogue and cooperation than on traditional arms control. Examples of this, such as NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) and ESDP, have developed cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and even peace enforcement.

The third new pattern of regional security cooperation has been a growing commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights. This is perhaps most obvious in Europe, where a number of organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, actively work to promote democracy among their member states. The European Union has also specified strict democratic requirements for membership, and has also made efforts to promote democracy beyond its borders. Promoting democracy among their members has also been an important task of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU), while other regional organizations, such as those in the Asia-Pacific, have been more cautious in this regard.

A fourth and final new trend in regional security cooperation has been the effort to address the so-called "new threats" encompassing the broader security agenda. Several of the regional groupings have developed more comprehensive security

6 Alyson J.K. Bailes and Andrew Cottey. Regional Security Cooperation in the Early 21st Century, SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford 2006; Bailes and Cottey (eds.). Regional Security Cooperation In the Twenty-first Century, Oxford, (forthcoming).

concepts, attempting to address such disparate issues as energy security and violent non-state actors, particularly those involved in terrorism. Such cooperation can grow naturally out of cooperation in the economic sphere, even for groupings with no previous specific security agenda. Examples of this are the Mercado Común del Sur's (MERCOSUR) and the Association of South East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) policies on both terrorism and piracy.

Apart from these efforts to categorize the new patterns and functions of regional security cooperation, recent research has also attempted to establish criteria for evaluating whether regional groupings have positive aims and effects. Although regional groupings such as the EU and NATO have generally had positive effects for their member states, this was considered necessary since other groupings, like the Warsaw Pact, have been largely detrimental for many of their constituent members. Five such criteria have been suggested: whether cooperation is coerced and hegemonic; whether it is based on a zero-sum relationship with the outside world; whether it is rigid or static; whether it is artificial and superficial; and whether its management and resource use is inefficient.[7] One region in which the newly formed regional groupings may have "failed" on several of these counts is in the former Soviet Union. Groupings such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are to a great extent dominated by their larger member states (Russia in the case of the CSTO, Russia and China in the case of the SCO), have largely undemocratic practices and are often seen as trying to "block" US or Western strategic influence.[8]

As has been demonstrated in this section, research relevant to regional security cooperation is being conducted (although not thoroughly enough) and efforts are being made to fill gaps in this research. But the research in this field still remains underdeveloped. The following section suggests possible areas that require further exploration.

Further Research Areas

Despite attempts to address gaps in the research on regional security cooperation, much research still needs to be done in this important field in order to fully understand its implications and potential. As a starting point, all new security-related patterns and functions mentioned above need to be explored further, especially if the roles and functions played by regional security organizations continue to develop in these areas. A number of other possible research directions could be

7 For an elaboration on these criteria, see A. J. K. Bailes and A. Cottey (fn. 6), pp. 215–218.

8 A. J. K. Bailes, Vladimir Baranovsky, and P. Dunay. Regional Security Cooperation in the Former Soviet Area, forthcoming in: SIPRI Yearbook, 2007.

pursued as well, such as the interactions between these regional groupings and the wider implications of security regionalism for global governance.

One such area that requires further research, and which the rest of this paper will attempt to address, is why regional cooperation has not taken root in certain regions or sub-regions. These under-regionalized areas often have plenty of internal security problems, which in a globalized world have implications far beyond the region's borders. Many examples can be mentioned in this regard, such as the greater Middle East, where organizations like the Arab League remain very weak and the Gulf Cooperation Council is both weak and potentially divisive, and South Asia, where the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has failed to develop into the effective regional organization many hoped it would.[9] This section will, however, seek to explore this question in relation to Northeast Asia, where analysts increasingly speculate that security threats such as those posed by North Korea, as well as tensions among other states in the region, can only be addressed through institutionalized regional cooperation.[10]

Several factors may explain why certain regions have not been able to develop strong frameworks for regional security cooperation.[11] Firstly, regions with a clear power discrepancy among their states have tended to develop weaker institutions, since the smaller states suspect that such an organization would be dominated by the larger state(s). This pattern holds true in Latin America, where the OAS has remained weak due to the overwhelming power of the US, as well as in South Asia, where smaller states such as Sri Lanka remain wary of the intentions of the much larger India. NATO does, however, stand out as a notable exception to this trend.

Differences in size and power largely explain the problems with regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. Most obviously, the size of China makes other states in the region wary of its intentions and possible influence. This has not only been the case with states such as Japan, but also with North Korea, for whom China remains the closest ally. North Korea has attempted to gain increasing independence from China, largely due to lingering mistrust stemming from the perceived Chinese ideological betrayal through market liberalization and rapprochements with South Korea and the USA.[12]

9 For more on regionalism in South Asia, see A. J. K. Bailes (ed.), Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy, SIPRI Policy Paper (forthcoming).

10 Zdzislaw Lachowski and Martin Sjögren. Confidence-building Measures on the Korean Peninsula during and after a Peace Process (forthcoming SIPRI publication).

11 Bailes and Cottey (fn. 6), pp. 219–221.

12 Peter M. Beck and Nicholas Reader, China and North Korea: Comrades Forever? (Part 2), in: Korea and World Affairs, Summer 2006, pp. 201–237.

The other power with disproportionate influence in the region is the USA, especially in relation to its allies South Korea and Japan. Tension has been growing here, too, especially between the US and South Korea due to the latter's efforts to implement a more independent foreign policy. The discrepancy between the approaches of both states towards dealing with North Korea, coupled with mounting public discontent over the presence of American military bases in South Korea, has caused the USA-South Korea alliance to come under increasing strain.

Another related factor that may explain the lack of security cooperation in certain regions is adversarial intra-regional relations. Regions with low levels of tension among their states have normally been more successful in establishing cooperative security frameworks, as was the case in Western Europe following the Second World War. Conversely, regions with higher levels of tension among two or more key players, such as South Asia and the Middle East, lack such frameworks. This explanation also applies to the case of Northeast Asia. There is not only obvious tension between North Korea and almost all the states in the region. Territorial disputes are still very much alive, such as those between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands and between Japan and South Korea over Dokdo Island. In addition to this, a long-standing rivalry persists between Japan and China, stemming partly from historical events, but also from growing competition between the two states for regional supremacy.

As the experience of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the 1970s–80s demonstrates, however, such high levels of tension may not necessarily be a barrier to developing security cooperation, as long as the region is clearly divided into two blocs. Although never to the same extent as in Europe during the Cold War, this may have partly been the case in Northeast Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, however, tensions have emerged within the respective blocs. As we have seen, China and North Korea have been drifting further apart, especially since the revival of international concern over North Korea's nuclear policies. Relations between the USA and South Korea have also been weakening. This lack of a clear bloc structure has made the region all the more complex, undermining efforts at building regional security cooperation.

Historical reasons may also explain the lack of regionalism in Northeast Asia. Most importantly, the region does not have any past experience of regional cooperation. Relations between the states in the region, as in East Asia as a whole, have traditionally been conducted on a bilateral basis. Until now, the USA has deliberately cast its own key Asian relationships in that form. Although all states in the region (including North Korea) now take part in the meetings of the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF) and most are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) framework and the new East Asian Summit grouping, a strong commitment to the values of regional cooperation has not yet taken root, and multilateral activities have hardly penetrated the spheres of security and democracy-building. Added to this lack of experience of cooperation is the historical legacy of war and colonization in the region. Japan's colonization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as its invasion of China during the Second World War, still cause tension. This is evident from the frequent disputes over Japanese textbooks, the issue of Korean "comfort women," and the tensions erupting over former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's regular visits to the Yasukuni shrine.

Do all these negative factors indicate that Northeast Asia and regions with similar problems will likely fail in their efforts at regional security cooperation? The current situation does not look promising, especially in light of North Korea's nuclear tests on October 9th, 2006. However, discernible trends in the region hint at a brighter future. Firstly, several states in the region have expressed the desire to establish such regional structures. This is most notably the case in China and South Korea, but more recently the USA has also made motions in this direction. Secondly, there are signs that bilateral relations between the states in the region may improve. The new Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, chose Beijing and Seoul as the destinations for his first official visits abroad, raising hopes that Japan's relations with China and South Korea may improve. Indeed, if anything

Discussants Matthieu Briens and Kristin Haugevik follow Martin Sjögren's presentation

positive may come out of the North Korean nuclear tests, it could be that states in the region will realize that regional cooperation offers the best hope of addressing the common threat posed by North Korea. A new commitment to such cooperation was manifested by the relatively quick adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea.

Regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia would greatly benefit both the region itself and international security as a whole if it follows the criteria outlined earlier as closely as possible. Threats emanating from the region, as well as from other under-regionalized regions such as the Middle East, have truly global consequences, especially in the case of nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, looking at the benefits other regions have gained from such cooperation, a framework for regional security cooperation seems like the most promising long-term solution to the region's security problems.

Conclusion

The trend towards increased regionalism in world politics that arose during the 1990's lost its momentum and appeal a couple of years ago. The first Bush administration was in many ways outright hostile towards regional groupings, preferring to conduct its foreign relations bilaterally or through ad hoc "coalitions of the willing". Furthermore, the most advanced of the regional organizations, the EU, was in crisis following the failure to adopt its constitution. However, several recent developments seem to indicate that the trend is again turning towards increased enthusiasm for regional cooperation. Foremost among these developments is a change in US policy, as outlined in the revised National Security Strategy of March 2006, which expresses support for regional and global cooperative institutions.[13] Moreover, the ESDP has continued to develop despite the lack of a European constitution. Other regional organizations have gained in popularity and influence as well. Both India and Pakistan have expressed interest in joining the SCO.

This revived enthusiasm indicates that regional cooperation is likely to continue to flourish and develop into an integral part of the international system. As this paper has attempted to demonstrate, some research is currently being conducted on this topic. This research does, however, remain underdeveloped. It is therefore essential that it become the subject of further research in order to improve understanding of its various dynamics and impacts.

13 The US National Security Strategy of March 2006 states that "relations must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching," <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>.

It's a Long Way to … Regional Strategic Actorness. Assessing the EU's Ongoing (R)Evolution in Strategic and Regional Affairs[1]

Claudia Major

Claudia Major

Introduction

For a long time, the European Union (EU) has been considered an economic giant but political dwarf. Yet at least since the inception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU aimed at establishing itself as an actor in international politics, thereby striving to complement its economic weight with political influence. This paper assesses the progress the EU has made in the realm of security and defense with regard to its ability to promote itself as a strategic actor. It claims that despite criticism, draw backs and remaining challenges, the EU has considerably advanced in its development towards becoming a European strategic actor.

1 I would like to thank the participants of the 9th New Faces Conference in Oslo, October 2006, as well as Christian Moelling and Mike Adkins for their useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Opening Session with Fritjof von Nordenskjöld, Martin Sjögren, Sverre Lodgaard, Claudia Major and Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss

The EU is a unique political entity in that it is less than a state, but more than an international alliance. CFSP and ESDP are located in the second, intergovernmental pillar of the EU. They are thus subject to unanimous decision-making, which assures great influence of the nation states.[2] Given these particular preconditions, to what extent can the EU be expected to develop into a strategic actor capable of unified and efficient actions? Moreover, how to assess the EU's actorness? Is there not a self fulfilling prophecy of "non actorness" if one tries to assess the EU's strategic actorness with the help of criteria usually applied to nation-states?

This paper first defines the terms of analysis, that is, "strategy" and "actorness", and outlines criteria to assess strategic actorness. Second, concrete achievements of the EU will be discussed. The paper concludes with suggesting policy recommendations on how to further the EU's strategic development.

Defining the Beast: What Strategy, What Actor?

Strategy and strategic actorness are currently highly fashionable terms, and their sloppy and inflationary use easily obscures their meaning. The unique context of the EU as a political entity sui generis requires the thorough definition of both terms with regard to the EU.

Strategy

The term derives from the Greek word strategos, which referred to a "military commander" during the age of the Athenian Democracy.[3] It describes a long term plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal, as opposed to tactics or immediate actions. By defining the theory and practice of the use and threat of the use of organized force for political purposes, a "strategy" provides a bridge between political and military spheres.[4] Beyond its military connotation, the term is now increasingly employed to describe the art of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of security policy, such as diplomatic, economic, military, and informational tools, to achieve objectives that contribute to the security of the issuing body.

Traditionally, strategies were double state-centred, in that they (1) focussed on defending state interests but neglected trans-national and intra-state security

2 There are some areas in CFSP/ESDP where decisions can be taken with Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), such as the nomination of Special Representatives or the implementation of Joint Actions or Common Positions once they have been adopted.

3 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: the logic of war and peace, Cambridge 1987, p. 248 f.

4 John Baylis, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, James Wirtz, Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford 2002; Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford 1999.

issues, and (2) were issued by nation states. This was challenged by the growing importance of collective security organizations, such as NATO, and forms of political integration, such as the EU, that also issued strategies to define their security objectives and instruments.[5] Applied to the EU, a strategy is here considered a "policy making tool, which, on the basis of the values and interests of the EU, outlines the long term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end."[6]

Strategic actorness

If a strategy is the art of co-ordinating all economic, diplomatic, and military resources and policies available to an entity to achieve agreed goals, then, put simply, a strategic actor is the agent who emits and implements these strategies.

There are numerous attempts to define "European strategic actorness", or "strategic culture" as precondition of strategic actorness.[7] Bretherton and Vogler[8] define five criteria:

- shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles;
- the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies;
- the ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system;
- the availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments;
- domestic legitimating of decision processes, and priorities, relating to external policy.

However, several authors have recently insisted that the ability to use and the actual use of force are core elements of actorness. Edwards and Cornish stress the "political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, coupled with the external recognition of the EU in the military sphere" as defining element of a European strategic culture that paves the way for European actorness.[9] For Matlary, strategic actorness requires that both criteria—"the ability to threaten the use of force […] and the ability to actually deploy such force"—are fulfilled.[10] If the EU is to be effective as foreign policy actor be-

5 Such as the NATO Concept (1999) and the European Security Strategy (2003).

6 Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for a Positive Power, Aldershot 2005.

7 Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler: The European Union as a Global Actor, London 1999; Paul Cornish, Geoffrey Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report, in: International Affairs, No. 4/2005, pp. 801–820; Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: the Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003, Manchester 2004; Janne Haaland Matlary, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?, in: Security Dialogue, No. 1/2006, pp. 105–121.

8 Bretherton, Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (fn. 7), pp. 38–42.

9 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union (fn. 7), p. 806.

10 Haaland Matlary, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible? (fn. 7), p. 112.

yond the candidate countries (over whom it has economic and political coercion) it must be able to deploy coercive diplomacy, which in fine includes not only the existence but precisely the deployment of military force.

Drawing upon these definitions, three main criteria will guide the following analysis. A strategic actor can be assessed through (1) its capacities for strategic decision making; (2) the means at its disposal; and (3) the implementation of policies.[11]

1) A strategic actor must dispose of the capacities especially for:

– common threat analysis
– decision making
– representation and negotiation
– implementation.

This enables for the formulation of common policies (such as in form of strategic documents or ad hoc policy decisions) that are consistent with the common ground of values and political priorities.

2) A strategic actor requires the means and resources to implement its strategies and decisions. This criterion assesses the availability of, and capacity to use, the relevant policy instruments available at the EU level, that is, civilian, police and military capabilities. Besides civilian crisis management tools, this includes the ability to threaten the use of force, and to employ it.

3) Is the EU able to implement its strategies? Put simply: is the EU able to act? Evaluating the implementation of policies will offer pointers to assess the effectiveness of a strategic actor.

These three criteria will now be applied to the EU.

Is There Strategic Actorness? Assessing Recent Achievements of the EU

The EU is a comparatively young actor in terms of security. Although the European Political Co-operation was already created in the 1970s, the EU only sharpened its foreign and security policy profile in the 1990s with the inception

11 It is worth mentioning that strategic actorness includes an internal and an external dimension. Internally, a strategic actor must be capable to develop, implement and monitor strategies and dispose of the necessary resources for that. Externally, it must gain recognition as actor. This analysis focuses on the internal dimension. The external dimension can be assessed through an analysis of its international / external recognition and perception.

of CFSP and ESDP. This witnesses not only the development of the EU from a security consumer to a security provider. It also reflects the move from a military dominated definition of security towards a comprehensive security concept including social, economic and environmental dimensions—areas where the EU had experience and tools to offer, as compared to other international actors, such as NATO, or the nation states.[12] To what extent can thus the EU be considered a strategic actor?

Capacities

With the inception of CFSP and particularly ESDP, the member states intended to equip the EU with capacities of strategic analysis, decision making, representation and negotiation. New institutional settings were created within the Council.[13] This included the Secretariat General with its nine Directorates Generals; the services located under direct authority of the High Representative (HR), such as the Policy Unit and the EU Military Staff (EUMS); decision-making entities run by the member states, such as the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Political and Security Committee (COPS); and the Secretary General/HR himself, Javier Solana.[14] By putting at HR Solana's disposal staff and instruments for developing European positions and policies and for monitoring their implementation, the member states laid the basis for an increasingly unified European actorness.

In terms of strategy, the first EU documents have been published by the Council in 1999 on Russia and Ukraine.[15] The development of a general European security strategy however turned out to be rather controversial. Following the inception of ESDP, the member states decided to push through those elements on which agreement could be found. Accordingly, institutional settings were built up and common military capabilities were envisaged. However, in view of ongoing dissent between member states on strategic topics, such as over the degree of autonomy the EU should strive for with regard to NATO and US, the strategic dimension was deliberately left vague.[16] Once initiated, it was hoped, the ESDP's "finalité" would become obvious from the context. However, far from that, the

12 Sven Biscop, Rik Coolsaet, The World is at stage—A global security strategy for the European Union (Notre Europe Policy papers, No. 8/2003), December 2003, <http://www.notre-europe.asso.Fr/IMG/pdf/ Policypaper8.pdf>; Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for a Positive Power, Aldershot 2005.

13 It is worth reminding that the Commission already disposed of capacities and experience in some areas that the CFSP and ESDP now were to be responsible of, mainly crisis management.

14 The first High Representative was nominated in 1999, at the Cologne European Council, Germany, see: Presidency Conclusions. Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm> (01/02/2006).

15 European Council: Common Strategy on Russia, 4 June 1999, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/russia_99.pdf> (01/06/2006); European Council: Common Strategy on Ukraine, 11 December 1999, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/ukraine_99.pdf> (01/06/2006).

16 Alyson J.K. Bailes, The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History (SIPRI Policy Paper, N° 10), February 2005; Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy (fn. 12).

emphasis on capacities and types of operation rather than policy goals created what Bailes labelled a "conceptual gap."[17]

It was only closed in 2003 with the publication of the European Security Strategy (ESS).[18] Building upon a common threat analysis, the ESS outlines main objectives, challenges and principles of EU foreign action. However, it remains vague about how these should be achieved. While this allows the EU to maintain a wide margin for manoeuvre, it also threatens to render the ESS something of a "strategic junk room."[19] Meanwhile, regional and sectoral strategies have further developed the ESS. For example, in 2003 a "Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction"[20] was adopted and in 2005, the British EU presidency proposed an "EU Strategy for Africa."[21]

Finally, the ESS also raised, if only indirectly, the profile of the Secretary General and his supporting institutions. The General Secretariat considers Solana's intensified travel agenda, as well as the broadened thematic and geographic diversity of his engagements, to be the translation of the ESS into every day political life.[22] Moreover, thanks to its leading role in drafting the ESS, the Policy Unit positioned itself as the coordinating body of European strategic thinking. The member states became used to the idea of the Council playing a role in foreign and security policy and to the idea of "strategies" at the EU level, and "they were looking (more and more exclusively) to Solana and his team to produce them."[23]

---

17 Bailes, The European Security Strategy (fn. 16), p. 4.

18 A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (01/01/2006). The unique context of the genesis of the ESS between Iraq war, looming eastern enlargement of the EU and growing transatlantic divergences, such as in form of the National Security Strategy of the Bush government, as well as it unique drafting process, cannot be discussed here. For further details see Bailes, The European Security Strategy (fn. 16); Erich Reiter, Die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU, in: Thomas Jäger, Alexander Höse, Kai Oppermann (eds.), Die Sicherheitsstrategien Europas und der USA, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 57-65; Jean-Yves Haine, Idealism and power: The new EU Security Strategy, in: Current History, March 2004, pp. 107–112; Klaus Becher, Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe's Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy, in: European Security, Winter 2004, Special Issue: Old Europe, new Europe and the future of the transatlantic security agenda, pp. 345–359.

19 Claudia Major, Henning Riecke, Europe's little blue book. More strategic debate in the EU, in: Internationale Politik—Transatlantic Edition, No. 2/2006, pp. 44–51; Caroline Pailhe, Une Europe sûre dans un monde meilleur: Un concept stratégique utile mais dangereux (Note d'Analyse du GRIP, GRIP DATA : G2077), 6 January 2004, via <http://www.grip.org> (01/08/2005).

20 Council of the European Union: EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Brussels, December 2003, 15708/03, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf> (01/02/2006).

21 Council of the European Union: The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, Brussels, 19 December 2005, December, EU 15961/05 (Presse 367), <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/communications/docs/the_eu_and_africa_towards_a_strategic_partnership_european_council_15_16_12_2005_en.pdf#zoom=100> (10/11/2006).

22 Major, Riecke, Europe's little blue book (fn. 19).

23 Bailes, The European Security Strategy (fn. 16), p. 5.

To sum up, with the integrated structures of the Council, such as the Secretariat General or the EUMC, the EU disposes of the institutional settings for common threat analysis and decision making. The ESS and other regional and sectoral strategies bear witness to this capacity. However, in their "broadness," these strategies also mark the confines of strategic thinking within the limits of inter-governmentalism and unanimity,[24] a confinement also perceptible in the work and influence of the institutions. Besides the unanimous decision-making process, the difficult balance of power between the member states in institutions like the EUMC also impact upon the rapidity of decision-making and limits the probability that a common position be reached.

In addition, the development of both the institutions and the strategic documents seems to be at least partly crisis driven, i. e. reactive but not pro-active. The Kosovo crisis helped putting the inception of ESDP on the agenda. The Iraq crisis did not cause the ESS, but certainly encouraged the EU member states to think about common strategic objectives.

Policy Means and Resources

The inception of ESDP, while the Kosovo war was still going on, reflects the agreement that the EU cannot do without its own military capabilities. ESDP was created in order to give the EU the "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."[25] In December 1999, the member states agreed upon the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) which aimed at establishing a "European Rapid Reaction Force" composed of 60,000 troops, deployable in 60 days and sustainable for one year, to be operational in 2003.[26] It became quickly evident that the target would not be met, even if, in 2001, a more cautious and realistic time table had been established. The EU has since redesigned its guidelines for force structures and planning. In June 2004, the Headline Goal (HG) 2010 had been drawn up, in which the EU stated its intent to develop, beyond the corps-size structure of the HHG, small, self contained and quickly deployable "battle groups." These 1500 man strong units, to be deployable in 15 days and sustainable for about 30 days, are fully operational since January 2007.[27]

---

24 There are some exceptions. Once a general agreement on the deployment of a mission has been reached, particular aspects of its implementation can for example be decided upon with majority voting.

25 Presidency Conclusions. Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm> (01/02/2006).

26 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#external> and <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm> (01/02/2006).

27 Headline Goal 2010. Approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May and endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>

In view of improving intra-European co-ordination, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was set up in 2004. The EDA should assist the EU in the development of defense capacities and strengthen the European defense industrial dimension. Beyond being an armament acquisition institution, the EDA should encourage the member states to make serious commitments in order to meet the HG 2010.[28]

In terms of civilian capabilities, the EU defined, at the Feira European Council in June 2000, four main areas where capacities should be developed: police, judiciary, civilian administration and civil protection.[29] Most of these requirements have been met. The civilian dimension is constantly evolving, as demonstrated for example by the inception of the European Security and Intelligence Force (ESIF) in 2001. Composed of up to 5000 police officers, the ESIF should be able to conduct preventive and repressive action in support of international peace keeping missions.[30] Another example is the adoption, in 2004, of the Civilian HG 2008, which defines targets regarding police force and civilian personnel.[31] Its parallel formulation with the military HG 2010 underlines the comprehensive security approach of the EU, linking military and civilian means.

To sum up, there are military, police and civilian capabilities at the disposal of the EU. However, the translation of political declarations into material capabilities is often not only slow but unsatisfying, as witnessed by the limited implementation of the HHG. Ultimately, the strength of the EU military capabilities depends upon the commitment of the member states. In fact, there is a lot of activity—but very little result. Besides a lack of political will, the soft governance mechanisms in CFSP / ESDP—mainly the decision-making structure based on unanimity in the intergovernmental pillar and the lack of sanctions mechanisms at the EU level—contributes considerably to this weak performance.[32] In terms of capabilities, this eventually risks undermining the credibility of the EU as a whole, in that the weak performance creates an increasing gap between the EU's strategic expectations on the one hand and available crisis management capabilities on

(01/09/2006); Christian Moelling, EU–Battlegroups. Stand und Probleme der Umsetzung in Deutschland und für die EU, SWP Diskussionspapier, März 2007.

28 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union (fn. 7), pp. 801–820.

29 Presidency Conclusions Santa Maria de Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm> (15/01/2006).

30 Rachel Bronson, When Soldiers Become Cops, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002, pp. 122–132; Graham Day, Christopher Freeman, Police-keeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Post-war Iraq, in: International Affairs, No. 2/2003, pp. 299–313, p. 313.

31 Civilian Headline Goal 2008, Brussels, December 2004 <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st15/st15330-re03.en04.pdf> (01/10/2006).

32 Christopher Reynolds, All Together Now? The Governance of Military Capability Reform in the ESDP (College of Europe Working Paper Series, No. 1), Bruges, October 2006.

the other. Needless to say that the late development of a strategic document (ESS in 2003) did certainly not help to improve civilian and military capacities: without a raison d'être and a goal, it is difficult to raise awareness, credibility and commitment from the member states. Finally, also the development of military capacities seems partly crisis driven, with the call for military capacities arising during the Kosovo War. This emphasizes once again the reactive nature of EU strategic development.

Implementation

Actorness requires the implementation of the agreed policies with the help of established means. Since the first EU mission Concordia, launched in March 2003 in Macedonia, the increasing number of missions witnesses the international presence of the EU, even if it does not always equal international recognition of actorness as such. The EU has successfully carried out civilian and military missions, the latter as well with recourse to NATO assets as agreed upon in the "Berlin Plus" agreement (such as Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina), as on an EU-only basis (such as Artemis in DR Congo in 2003). Current EU missions reflect the implementation of the EU's foreign policy priorities as outlined in the ESS: such as the support mission to the police force in the Palestinian territories (EUPOL COPPS) or the mission to train Iraqi judges, prosecutors and security forces (EUJUST LEX). The mission Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taken over by the EU from NATO in 2004, reflects again the EU's commitment to link the military and civil dimensions of its conflict management capabilities.

EU missions have been of growing significance in that more and increasingly various tasks have been accomplished. Eighteen missions have been carried out or are currently in place, covering the whole range of civilian, police and military operations.[33] Moreover, they are significant in that a "greater sense of responsibility for the EU as a credible strategic actor" has emerged, thus also boosting the self-confidence of the EU.[34] Each mission represented an opportunity to "improve policy-making capacity, to achieve greater consistency and coherence in integrating the EU's different policy instruments, and to ensure a consensus among all member states".[35]

However, the successful implementation of EU actions is conditioned by the intergovernmental decision-making structure as much as by diverging expectations of the member states. The hesitancy among the member states about sup-

33 EU operation as end of May 2006: <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDPoperations.jpg> (01/10/2006).

34 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union (fn. 7), p. 807.

35 ibid.

porting the UN mission in DR Congo for the elections in summer 2006 shows that the sole existence of a strategy and of military and civilian capabilities does not automatically lead to action.[36] Preceding strategic deliberations such as in the Africa strategy or the ESS might have made it easier to consider EU involvement in Africa. But it also means that the African states and the UN could take the EU by its word and demand greater engagement. The Congo mission exemplifies that the sole existence of institutions, strategies and resources does not automatically increase the sense of responsibility of the member states, nor does it accelerate or improve the decision-making at the EU level and the interaction of the EU with national levels.[37]

This analysis leads to an ambiguous conclusion. On the one hand, the EU seems to be a rapidly developing and constantly improving strategic actor. It disposes of strategic guidelines in form of the ESS and other regional and sectoral strategies. It is equipped with the institutional settings to decide, implement and monitor policies. It possesses an increasing set of military, police and civilian capacities. Finally, the EU is present as actor in some regions, such as in the Balkans.

However, even if the EU does play a significant role in some areas, its influence on critical issues of international politics, such as in the Middle East, remains limited. As Edwards and Cornish put it, the EU's commitment "is comprehensible in declaratory terms, but not in implementation."[38] Its performance as well as its perception as strategic actor are in fact rather limited. A fully fledged actor entails not only the existence of institutional and material capacities and capabilities but precisely their rapid, credible and efficient applicability and application. This is rarely the case for the EU, as reflected by the ongoing shortfalls in military and civilian HGs or painfully long decision-making processes, such as regarding the EUFOR Congo.

As identified above, one major obstacle to cooperation and effective action seems to be the persistent lack of political will of the member states. It is illustrated by their persevering reluctance to move beyond intergovernmental co-operation as well as by their inability to reconcile EU capabilities with rhetoric of strategic actorness. As Gross and Giegerich point out, the main dilemma for the EU lies in the conflicting demands for efficiency (as actor) and legitimacy (required for actions).[39] For them, the core problem is a dual inefficiency at the EU level:

36 Major, Riecke, Europe's little blue book (fn. 19).

37 ibid.

38 Cornish, Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union (fn. 7), p. 806.

39 Bastian Giegerich, Eva Gross, Squaring the Circle? Leadership and Legitimacy in European Security and Defence Cooperation, in: International Politics, No. 43/2006, pp. 500–509.

ineffective national solutions on the one hand and non-existing supranational solutions at the other hand. The existing intergovernmental solution in form of CFSP/ESDP has so far proved unsatisfactory since it has avoided tackling the question of efficiency and legitimacy. If the consensus and unanimity required in CFSP/ESDP provided legitimacy, the costs of such are reduced efficiency.[40] This raises the thorny question whether – in order to improve efficiency—the input into CFSP/ESDP decisions ought to be a function of a country's contribution, be it in terms of money or troops.[41]

Where Do We Go From Here? Policy Recommendations to Further European Strategic Actorness[42]

How can the EU improve its strategic actorness? In a first step, the EU needs to address the "old" question of what international role it wants to play in what particular scenarios. The EU should not limit itself to a unique role, but rather define how it will react under which circumstances. This requires a further definition of "European interests," as called for in the ESS. Only then can a sense of European togetherness emerge. The above outlined weaknesses are originated at both national and EU levels. Both are addressed in the following recommendations:

EU needs to further develop existing strategy

The EU's regional and sectoral strategies require further refinement. The painful debate about whether and how the EU should engage in the DR Congo proved that regional strategies are not sufficiently developed. Closely linked: the EU needs to discuss its priorities and criteria for regional stability missions.

Go ahead even without the Constitutional Treaty (CT)

The CT addressed a major weakness of EU actorness, that is, the intergovernmental decision-making structures based on unanimity. The member states should strive for strengthening the EU's and Solana's role independent from the future of the CT. In order to enhance Solana's leadership role, he could receive more influence on the CFSP agenda, in defining policy and he could be given more responsibility for dialog with partners. More generally the soft governance rules in CFSP/ESDP need reform. So far, the required consensus and unanimity provide legitimacy, but at the cost of reduced effectiveness. How to conciliate

40 ibid.

41 Giegerich, Gross, Squaring the Circle? (fn. 39); Steven Everts, Berlin-Paris-London, in: Alfred Pijpers (ed.), On Cores and Coalitions in the European Union: The Position of Some Smaller Member States (Clingendael Institute), The Hague 2000, pp. 15-32.

42 This section strongly draws upon Major and Riecke 2006 (fn. 19) and further develops their argument. This note shall serve as reference for the whole section.

leadership and legitimacy? It is worth discussing, as raised by Evert and Gross & Giegerich, whether the input into CFSP/ESDP decisions ought to be a function of a country's contribution, be it material or financial.[43]

Create capabilities

The EU must display convincingly to its partners and the outside world that it wants to act and has the capabilities and capacities to do so. The implementation of the military HG 2010 and the civilian HG 2008 is one step. The EDA assists in co-ordinating member states' procurement and joint projects. However, it has no leverage to urge reluctant governments to live up to their promises. Eventually, the ability to fulfil the EU's capability needs lies in the hands of the member states.

Enhance co-operation

Strategic debate is not worth much if it does not lead to co-ordination of EU instruments and between the member states. Cross pillar co-ordination is needed, for example on security, trade and development, as well as on migration and law enforcement. All European actors—governments, representatives of council, commission and parliament—must be involved in the strategic development. The Civil-Military-Cell, composed of personnel from different EU agencies as well as the member states, is a good example for such a co-ordination.

Increase member states commitment

The member states are key to the development of a European strategic actorness. Solana cannot run CFSP/ESDP alone; he needs the commitment of the member states to turn indifference into attention and action. Just as the UK and France have put Africa on the agenda, other states can shape strategies of regional or sectoral engagement. With regard to the national level, governments need to update their security concepts and policies and put them into perspective with EU documents. The Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, issued by the German Federal Foreign Office in 2004, refers to the ESS. Furthermore, national governments need to identify their defense needs on the basis of the EU threat assessment, define the levels of ambitions for participation in EU missions, and specify their contributions.[44]

Conclusion

Several criteria corroborate the initial hypothesis that the EU has considerably advanced in developing its strategic actorness. The EU disposes of a strategy,

43 Giegerich, Gross, Squaring the Circle? (fn. 39).

44 Wim van Eekelen: From words to deeds. The continuing debate on European Security (Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), Brussels/Geneva 2006, p. 292.

institutions and decision making capacities, of increasing civilian, police and military capabilities, and is worldwide involved in civilian, police and military missions. On the other hand, its slow decision-making process, the ongoing shortfalls in the material dimension and the lack of presence in important issues of international politics, eventually reveal the lack of international recognition and ultimately point to the limits of European strategic actorness.

It would, however, be too easy to dismiss the EU's strategic actorness so quickly. It is worth reminding that the EU's strategic development only seriously took off with the inception of ESDP (1999), less then seven years ago, with the first missions being carried out only in 2003. As a very young actor, the EU has not only to develop and get used to its tools, but it also has to compete with long established actors, be it the nation states or international organizations such as NATO. The strategic development of the EU cannot be assessed without taking into account its partners, and in particular, the transatlantic ties. In fact, one reason why the EU actorness is so quickly dismissed is that the criteria used to assess its accomplishments might not be adapted to evaluate the EU and might therefore generate unreasonable expectations. For example, the EU does not strive to become a defense organization (at least not yet). Consequently, a comparison with NATO is potentially little meaningful if not misleading. The question should rather be: what can the EU reasonably be expected to be?

As it stands now, the EU will only be a supplementary foreign policy tool for the member states, it will not replace national policies and actions. Since the member states remain reluctant to confer greater power to the EU in the sensitive realm of security and defense, the decision-making at the EU level is confined to unanimity with its inherent limits. If the main obstacle is thus a lack of political will, one possibility to develop the EU into a more relevant strategic actor would be to impact upon the very logic of the nation states' strategic interests.

Thus, how to raise the interest of the member states to act through the EU framework or to further confer responsibilities to the EU level? The challenges that the member states face today are not longer solely national and territorial, and it is increasingly difficult to tackle them on a solely national basis. So the interest of the nation states in acting through the EU framework with access to the extensive EU tool box might increase as it offers additional means and opportunities.[45] For example, military interventions have become increasingly risky, just as it is ever more difficult to gain domestic support for them. In fact, it is the ongoing

45 Haaland Matlary, When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible? (fn.7).

development of the international security environment itself that might make acting trough the EU framework increasingly attractive for the EU member states.

Eventually, the success of the EU in strategic terms depends upon the commitment of the member states. That they were able to agree on a common strategic paper (i.e. the ESS) demonstrates that the EU started to think in global terms; and that member states are starting to engage with challenges beyond their reach, their available means and strategic horizon. The adoption of the ESS affirms the EU's ambition to make a proper mark on the course of global events in what Mark Leonard calls the emerging "New European Century." According to him, the 21st century will be a European one, not because "Europe will run the world as an empire, but because the European way of doing things will become the world's."[46]

However, this vision will only materialise if the EU convincingly turns ambitions into actions and lets deeds follow words. Strategy is the implementation of objectives, based on an outline and enabled by the appropriate means. Consequently, implementation is also the ultimate test of a strategy. To keep the EU's strategic (r)evolution alive, the EU should above all assure the implementation of its current level of ambition. This may include disappointments, sometimes even failure, which may raise political concerns about the EU's capacity as appropriate agent. But it may also allow for learning, evidence based adoption of strategies, and a growing record of serious achievements, recognized by internal critics as well as by the international community. Any other approach is a dead end on the way towards strategic actorness.

46 Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st Century, London 2005, p. 143.

A New Strategic Partnership? Deepening UN-NATO Relations

Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss

Benedikta
von Seherr-Thoss

"As we enter a new century of challenges and inevitable crises, it is critically important for us to draw on each other's strengths in pursuit of peace and security."
(Kofi Annan, 1999)[1]

The threats and challenges posed by today's security environment are so complex that no single state or international organization can tackle them all by itself. Accordingly, the question of how to build new ties between key international institutions has emerged as a major issue in the current international security debate. As two of the world's most important security providers, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) could benefit greatly from a more structured relationship.

Historical and Strategic Background

During the Cold War period, UN and NATO almost did not co-operate at all—their functions and responsibilities were significantly different. What is more, their perceptions of each other were largely negative. NATO, as one of two rival military alliances in Europe, was regarded in UN circles as being part of the problem of high arms expenditures and confrontational policies rather than being a guarantor for peace and security. The UN, on the other hand, was perceived by some NATO members as politically ineffective due to the stalemate in the UN Security Council (UNSC), and militarily irrelevant to the collective defence arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic Area.[2]

The dramatic events in the early 1990s changed all that. They brought about a very different security environment which forced international organizations involved in peace-building to rethink their strategies. Traditional East-West tensions were replaced by security challenges that were much more multifaceted in nature. They included terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms. Conflicts between states decreased, but violent internal conflicts multiplied. Some of these threats

1 Statement by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at NATO headquarters, 28 January 1999, <http://152.152.96.1/docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm>.

2 Derek G. Boothby, Background Paper, in: IPA Seminar on UN/NATO Relationship: Co-operation between the UN and NATO: Quo Vadis?, New York, 11 June 1999. Martin A. Smith, At Arm's Length: NATO and the United Nations in the Cold War Era, in: International Peacekeeping, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 56–73, p. 56.

were not new, but they had gained an unprecedented global dimension which seriously affected national security and international stability.

The new strategic environment also demands more complex forms of peacekeeping. Going beyond security in the narrow military sense, peacekeeping today encompasses political reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), governance, economic regeneration and development.[3] The aim is to create reliable domestic institutions and stable conditions which prevent countries from relapsing into conflict. This also means that engagement has to be long-term. In a speech at NATO headquarters in January 1999 UN Secretary General (SG) Kofi Annan stressed this point, saying: "No one […] can expect our future tasks to be easy in execution or short in duration."[4]

As the diversity of the task has grown, so too has its quantity. Over the past decade, the demand for the UN to undertake peacekeeping operations has multiplied and the number of peacekeeping operations has increased more than four-fold. Whilst only 13 operations were established in the first 40 years of the UN's history, 47 missions have been conducted since. There are currently more than 90,000 personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations.[5]

For NATO, the post-Cold War changes were equally profound. As the major challenges for transatlantic security would increasingly emerge in regions beyond Europe, NATO had to be enabled to address these challenges wherever they originated. As a result, NATO gradually shed its traditional "eurocentric" focus, and shifted towards the conduct of out-of-area operations ranging from combat to peacekeeping operations, and from training to humanitarian relief. Accordingly, NATO also transformed its military forces. For example, it developed rapid reaction forces that could be deployed over long distances and sustained over extended periods of time. The UN, on the other hand, had to realize that it was no longer able to address crises on its own—it needed to find suitable partners. This was the starting point for co-operation with NATO.

Co-operation to Date

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Practical co-operation between the UN and NATO began in 1992, when the Alliance decided to support the UN's peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, thus ac-

3 Eirini Lemos-Maniati, Peace-Keeping Operations: Requirements and Effectiveness; NATO's Role (NATO Academic Forum Report), June 2001, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/lemos-maniati.pdf>.

4 Statement by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at NATO headquarters, 28 January 1999, <http://152.152.96.1/docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm>.

5 United Nations Peacekeeping. Meeting New Challenges, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.

tively entering the field of peacekeeping and conflict management. This decision constituted a revolutionary break with previous NATO policies, as the Balkans produced many more "firsts" for the Alliance: the first out-of-area deployment, the first peacekeeping operation and the first significant co-operation with other international organizations. Initially, NATO ships monitored operations in the Adriatic in support of a UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia.

This readiness of the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UNSC was officially expressed by NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1992. Alliance members indicated that they were ready to respond positively to further UN enquiries for NATO assistance. Subsequently, co-operation was extended including, inter alia, maritime and air operations, close air support for the UN Protection Force and air strikes to protect UN "Safe Areas."

In its 1999 Strategic Concept, the Alliance repeated its offer "to support, on a case-by-case basis, and in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UNSC […], including by making available Alliance resources and expertise."[6] Although NATO does not want to serve as toolbox to the world organization, it is prepared to act within the parameters of the sub-contracting model.[7] NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer reiterated this offer in his address to the UNSC in November 2004.

Until 2004, the Alliance helped maintaining a secure environment and facilitating Bosnia and Herzegovina's reconstruction. During this time NATO forces worked closely on the ground with other international organizations, including those of the UN, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN International Police Task Force.

Today, NATO continues to assist Bosnia in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. For example, it has maintained a military headquarters in the country to help it with the reform of its defence structures and its eventual accession to NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. The Alliance also remains in close contact with UN representatives, with whom it discusses a wide range of issues such as civil-military co-operation, detention and DDR.

6 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/stratcon.htm>, para. 31.

7 Dick Leurdijk, NATO and the UN. The Dynamics of an Evolving Relationship, in: RUSI Journal, No. 3, June 2004, pp. 24–28, p. 27.

Kosovo

The Kosovo crisis and the Alliance's 78-day air campaign constitute a significant chapter in UN-NATO relations. For one year, the international community had watched internal fighting, which culminated in massive human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. After all diplomatic means had been exhausted, NATO decided to launch an air campaign to force the Serbian authorities to abort their ethnic cleansing. The UN had been unable to act or even to formulate a UNSC Resolution, due to a stalemate caused by Russia. Hence, NATO was forced to apply force without UN mandate. This put it into a serious political, moral and legal dilemma and caused one of the most controversial debates in NATO's history.

Since the vital national interests or physical security of NATO's member states were not directly threatened by the ethnic violence in Kosovo, the Alliance was not able to justify the use of force as an act of self-defence.[8] Instead, it intervened explicitly on humanitarian grounds, knowing that this was the only way to halt a humanitarian catastrophe. Being an alliance of values, NATO was ready to defend peace and security not only for its own members but within the whole of Europe. The morality of the intervention was thus stronger than the problem of not being mandated by the UN.

The UN's reaction to NATO's autonomous action was twofold: SG Kofi Annan stressed that the UNSC was the sole source of legitimacy on the use of force. With equal emphasis, however, he stated that there were "times when the use of force may be legitimate for the pursuit of peace."[9] When international action was urgently needed in Kosovo, the SC failed to unify these two elements due to the above-mentioned stalemate. As NATO's intervention was designed to restore peace and security and defend human rights, the Allies considered it acceptable.

Generally, however, the UN demands that the fact that it is the only power that can authorize the use of force be recognized by all its members. All other paths, it fears, might lead to anarchy.[10] This is why the Alliance's ongoing demand to decide autonomously on the use of force is frequently criticized within UN circles. Even though the Alliance accepts the UNSC's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it is not willing to regard this as an exclusive right.[11] Instead, it retains the right to decide autonomously on the

8 Legally, NATO is a collective defence system as defined under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This article allows the use of force without UN mandate, as part of self-defence (United Nations Charter, <http://www.un.org>).

9 UN SG Kofi Annan's speech in The Hague, 18 May 1999 (UN Press Release SG/SM/6997).

10 Ibid.

11 Leurdijk, UN Reform and NATO Transformation: The Missing Link (Netherlands Institute of International Organizations, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, No. 4), October 2005, pp. 6 and 33.

use of force, without a formal authorization by the SC. This is not justified with NATO's character as a collective defence organization, but rather with its self-perception as a contributor to collective security and as a community of values.

Following NATO's air campaign in April 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution 1244 which established NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), through which it continued its engagement in the region. NATO's future involvement will depend on the outcome of the Kosovo status talks and on the security situation following the settlement. What is already clear, though, is that NATO's military and political presence will be maintained for some time to contain any possible outbreaks of violence.

Afghanistan

In August 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF—the International Security Assistance Force. This is the first NATO-led peace-support operation, far away from its own territory and far outside the Euro-Atlantic area. ISAF is an Article VII operation and could be taken as an example of NATO serving as sub-contractor to the UN. Each step of NATO's expansion from Kabul into the regions, a presence that now covers the whole of Afghanistan, required a UNSC mandate. So did the establishment of NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).

From the beginning, a close partnership existed between UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) and NATO-led ISAF. Every three months, NATO's chief commander sends a report to the UN SG informing him about the latest developments in the country. NATO also has a Senior Civilian Representative who is located in Kabul. He carries forward the Alliances political-military objectives, liaising with the Afghan government, civil society and of course representatives of UNAMA. As in the Balkans, UN and NATO representatives discuss a wide range of topics. These include drugs, terrorism, civil-military co-operation, disarmament and reintegration as well as elections and the build-up of democratic structures.

Iraq

In Iraq, under the terms of the UNSC Resolution 1546 and at the specific request of the Interim Iraqi Government, NATO is providing assistance in training and equipping the Iraqi security forces. NATO and the UN, which had both suffered a severe internal crisis as a result of the Iraq controversy, each decided to engage in Iraq in this way. It allowed them to help create peaceful and stable conditions in the country without engaging in the actual conflict.

Darfur

NATO also provides logistical assistance to the African Union's (AU) UN-endorsed peacekeeping operation in Sudan. In response to the deteriorating situation in Sudan's Darfur region, the AU asked NATO in April 2005 for logistical support for its mission (AMIS). This included the co-ordination of strategic airlift support for the deployment of AMIS units as well as staff capacity building. On several occasions, NATO expressed its readiness to support a possible future UN mission in Darfur.

Pakistan

In October 2005, in response to a request from Pakistan and UNHCR, NATO launched an operation to assist the relief effort following a devastating earthquake. NATO airlifted supplies donated by NATO member and partner countries as well as by UNHCR to the troubled region. In addition, it deployed engineers and medical personnel from the NATO Response Force (NRF). To address this humanitarian crisis as effectively and quickly as possible, NATO's Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre co-ordinated closely with relevant UN agencies.

Looking at these operations, it can be said that UN-NATO co-operation in the field has largely been successful. The question that has to be answered now is what the organizations will make of their existing relations and whether they want to expand and structure them.

Deepening Co-operation

Dealing with conflicts nowadays involves a wide range of issues, which in turn requires a wide range of actors: military, civilian, humanitarian and development organizations. To work effectively, these institutions have to have a clear understanding of each other's cultures, policies and strengths. Every international organization has something different to offer and its particular skills must be used to best effect. Pragmatism and open-mindedness are essential conditions for developing a culture of co-operation and greater understanding of each other's capabilities.

NATO, for example, is still widely perceived as a purely military organization. Yet it has many other useful tools at its disposal, such as capacity building, training and assistance, and dealing with defence aspects of security sector reform. Moreover, the Alliance is also a forum for consultation, not only amongst its 26 member states, but also within an extensive and growing network of partner nations. These tools could be exploited in conjunction with those of other international

bodies and organizations to deliver a coherent and comprehensive approach to today's security challenges.

Of course, NATO also has substantial military assets that are in short supply elsewhere. These include capabilities for both combat and post-conflict reconstruction. The availability of NATO airlift, communications, logistics arrangements, technical skills and high readiness units such as the NRF could be a valuable asset for the UN. In the Balkans, for example, NATO has been a crucial actor in supporting restructuring, training and equipping of national armed forces. Lack of this particular expertise is severely hampering the International Community in post-conflict peace operations today. In many troubled countries—DRC, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan—the construction and implementation of an effective and democratic security sector presents one of the main obstacles to successful stabilization and long-term stability. This area has particular potential in deeper UN-NATO co-operation in peacekeeping.

UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno underlined the significance of rapidly deployable military assets for peacekeeping during his visit to NATO HQ in January 2006. He argued that given the nature of spoilers in post-conflict contexts and the signal a credible force can provide, the speed and effectiveness of such assets was often far more crucial than the actual size of the deployment.

Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss

With the steep rise in demand for UN peace operations, the UN soon realized that doing the job alone was impossible given the organization's lack of resources. Already in 1992, SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested that regional actors could ease the burden of the UN. To enable and facilitate co-operation, he demanded a structured approach and conceptual frameworks.[12] As a first step, he set up a "High Level Panel" consisting of the UN, regional and other international organizations. It meets on an annual basis to discuss co-operation and better co-ordination.

Boutros-Ghali's successor Kofi Annan shared this view.[13] At the UN World Summit in 2005, he underlined the importance of developing predictable partnerships and formalized arrangements between the UN and international organizations.[14] Annan laid particular emphasis on NATO.

In March 2004, during a visit of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to New York, he urged expanded NATO engagement in Afghanistan and stronger support for UN efforts in Africa. He suggested that the Alliance might be employed in a "peace-enforcement" role, as a bridging force before the deployment of a UN operation.

The issue of NATO supporting new UN peacekeeping operations was also discussed during the round table meeting in New York a few weeks later. UN officials underlined that whilst there was a need for robust military capabilities to deter challenges, there were substantial operational weaknesses which could jeopardize any UN mission, such as lack of interoperability among the troops, lack of common training, and lack of intelligence. With a view to these shortfalls, they expressed interest in NATO's capabilities.

This demonstrates that the UN has clearly recognized the advantages that NATO could bring in the context of peace operations and conflict management. Making use of Alliance assets, however, requires a more structured relationship which goes beyond ad hoc operational engagement. At the moment, the good co-operation in the field contrasts with a lack of co-operation at the institutional level. In 2003, a first staff meeting took place at headquarters level and a few more have followed since. However, there is no structured exchange between the organizations.

12 UN SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, A747/277-S/24111, New York, June 1992.

13 Report of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities, 28 July 2006 (A/61/204-S/2006/590*).

14 Para 93 and 170 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

To change this, a UN-NATO declaration is currently being developed. It comes as an answer to Annan's frequent call for co-operation and, at the same time, demonstrates NATO's readiness to support UN peace efforts.[15] This support is clearly in the interest of all NATO Allies. By responding to security threats where they occur, NATO can safeguard peace and security of its own members. Many weak and failing states have disintegrated into safe-havens for terrorists. Hence, operations designed to prevent state failure and frustrate terrorist networks—even on other continents—is in NATO's strategic interest.

The UN-NATO declaration is supposed to add an institutional element to, and serve as a political framework for, the already good co-operation in theatre. The aim is to make relations more predictable and provide a platform for intensified dialogue. This would lead to a greater understanding of each organization's modus operandi on issues of common interest. Ideally, it would result in broader and more effective co-operation without duplication.

Practically, this could involve regular staff-level meetings and frequent exchanges on issues in which both organizations are active and interested. The Secretary Generals could meet and NATO could brief the UNSC. Moreover, a NATO civilian representative could be posted at the UN Department for Political Affairs. He/she would ensure regular political exchange and ideally improve the speed and effectiveness to identify and react to conflict.

Conclusion

Recently, the idea of "civil-military co-operation" has begun to feature prominently on the agendas of both NATO and the UN. Behind this is the conviction that greater harmonization and co-ordination between international organizations, and mutual support of civil and military efforts, are vital factors to ensure the success of a peace mission. Only this way can the activities of the international community be optimized. Afghanistan serves as a perfect example. Whilst military operations are going well, synchronization with stabilization and reconstruction efforts remain imperative for the overall success of the mission. This means that crises have to be tackled in a holistic fashion, with specific organizations addressing the issues that lie in their areas of expertise.

15 For example, see: Keynote address by NATO Secretary General Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 24 May 2005, <http://www.NATO.int/docu/speech/2005/s050524a.htm>, in which he stressed that NATO's relations with the UN had to go beyond ad hoc co-operation on the ground. He underlined that structured relationships at the institutional level were needed as well as strategic co-ordination, not just tactical co-operation.

The rationale of co-operation between the UN and NATO lies in their adaptation to the new security environment. Both organizations have understood that today's challenges can only be addressed and countered together. However, even though a partnership seems logical and necessary against this background, the situation is not quite that simple. Sensitivities and misperceptions still exist between the UN and NATO. For example, some nations within the UN perceive NATO as a toolbox for US interests and fear that it might seek to be a world policeman, even though NATO vehemently denies having that ambition. On the other hand, at NATO, voices can be heard that are critical or doubtful towards the UN. This considerably slows down the process of establishing a structured relationship.

The key for the future is thus to remain flexible and pragmatic. Enhanced UN-NATO co-operation, particularly at the institutional level, would provide a good basis for meeting the challenges of the 21st century more effectively.

John Byrom, Marcel Gerber and Stuart Reigeluth

The Venezuelan Oil and Gas Hub: A Regional and Global Perspective of Energy Supply and Security Policy

Gerardo J. Briceño P.

Gerardo J. Briceño P.

In a new world order characterized by anxiety over energy supply, rising energy prices promote changes in world politics. In the light of initiatives on global energy security that have been adopted under Russia's presidency of the G8, stable oil prices and energy cooperation are at the top of the foreign agenda. Venezuela is positioning itself as an energy hub for the entire sub-continent, creating interdependencies with many countries in the region and beyond.

Among Venezuela's projects for regional integration are pipelines designed to link it with Brazil and Argentina. A pipeline going from Colombia across the Pacific Ocean, which would facilitate Asian access to Venezuelan petroleum, is also being considered. With these plans, Venezuela responds to the current Iranian crisis, triggered by Iran's refusal to end its program of uranium enrichment. In addition, and besides campaigning for a temporary seat in the UN Security Council,[1] the Venezuelan government has recently signed several arms and energy deals, though not with its traditional partner in both areas, the US. Instead, Moscow seems to have guaranteed the emerging Caracas–Beijing strategic partnership by supplying aircraft, weapons, and technology.

World demand for energy, especially for limited oil and natural gas supplies, is increasing as large industrializing nations such as China, India and Brazil expand their economies. Therefore, future oil producers will be able to choose their buyers. This situation presents a new outlook for global oil governance. Current changes in world politics caused by rising energy prices have influenced this new reality, which derives from both a regional net of energy supply within Latin America and global partnerships with Asia in security matters. Propelled by vast amounts of energy resources, the Venezuelan government has adopted a policy of using energy as a political commodity in its foreign relations, counterbalancing US energy market expectations. This paper focuses on interdependencies resulting from energy demand, addressing the latest developments of the Venezuelan oil and gas policy and its impact on the new architecture of global energy security.

1 After two weeks of voting and 47 ballots, it was an outsider, Panama, who emerged as the winner of the seat of the UN Security Council. Panama became the compromise candidate after a stand-off between Venezuela and its rival, Guatemala. Finally, both candidates withdrew in favour of Panama. See: Simón Romero. 'Latin Fight for U.N. Security Council Seat Ends,' The New York Times, November 2, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/02/world/americas/02nations.html?ex=1320123600&en=e7dd01652b514671&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.

1. Global Energy Security

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of China, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and the emergence of the US as the unchallenged leader in world affairs have dramatically altered the dynamics of regional and global security. What is more, scenarios of possible conflict are today linked to potential oil and gas suppliers, such as the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Sudan, northern Siberia, the southern Chinese Sea, Indonesia, and Venezuela.[2] In light of initiatives on global energy security that have been adopted under Russia's presidency of the G8, stable oil prices and energy cooperation have reached the top of the foreign agenda. At the G8 summit in Saint Petersburg in July 2006, global energy security principles were stated. Leaders of the G8 must commit to:

- open, transparent, efficient and competitive markets for energy production, supply, use, transmission and transit services as a key to global energy security;
- enhanced dialogue on relevant stakeholders' perspectives on growing interdependence, security of supply and demand issues;
- diversification of energy supply and demand, energy sources, geographical and sectorial markets, transportation routes and means of transport;
- safeguarding critical energy infrastructure; and
- addressing the energy challenges for the poorest populations in developing countries.[3]

Venezuela is the world's fifth-largest oil exporter, and its oil reserves are among the top ten in the world. Increases in world oil prices over the last few years have allowed Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to push the government's social program spending, expand its commercial ties to other countries, and boost his own international profile.[4] The New York Times reports that the huge amount of unconventional extra-heavy crude oil reserves in the Orinoco Belt region (located southeast of Caracas), estimated around 235 billion barrels, if added to those 78 billion barrels of conventional crude oil, could allow Venezuela to rival the oil

2 Genaro Arriagada, Petróleo y gas en América Latina – Un análisis político y de relaciones internacionales a partir de la política venezolana (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Especial Energía – DT N° 20/2006), Madrid 2006, p. 1.

3 For the official web site of the G8 presidency of the Russian Federation in 2006 and its statement concerning global energy security, see: <http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/11.html>.

4 Cesar J. Alvarez, Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy (Council of Foreign Relations), New York, November 27, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12089/>.

production of Saudi Arabia, provided this extra-heavy oil could be turned into a more marketable product.[5]

Regional Oil and Gas Cooperation in Latin America

Latin American oil integration remains a geopolitical commodity, aimed at establishing mechanisms of cooperation and integration by using the energy resources of the regions of the Caribbean, Central and South America as the basis for the socioeconomic improvement of the sub-continent. The Venezuelan government looks to build a unified South America that could function as an independent bloc and counterbalance expectations of the US energy market. Propelled by its energy wealth and the steady rise in oil prices, it has become much more powerful and aggressive in expanding its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. In order to achieve its aims, the Venezuelan President has officially taken direct control of growing international reserves and used them to build influence abroad.

Nevertheless, this boom has not yet succeeded in uniting the region. Since its admission into MERCOSUR in July 2006, Venezuela's participation has depended on the changing price of oil. Venezuela, South America's third-largest market, is positioning itself as an energy hub, creating interdependencies with many of the region's countries. Increased oil revenues have allowed the government to provide domestic social programs with generous funding, thereby bolstering its image in the country as well as the region.

Regional Net in Big Format: PetroAmérica

Within Latin America, the Venezuelan oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S. A. (PDVSA) has made generous oil deals. According to official sources,[6] PetroAmérica is viewed as an organization capable of ensuring the coordination and harmonization of energy policies, including oil, oil-derivatives, gas and electricity as well as the efficient use of these resources, technological cooperation, training, development of energy infrastructure, and the employment of alternative sources of energy. PetroAmérica's initiative of energy integration is characterized by:

5 Juan Forero, For Venezuela—A Treasure in Oil Sludge. As Prices Soar, the Orinoco Belt Becomes an Economic Battleground, in: The New York Times, January 6th, 2006, C Section, p. 1.

6 For detailed information see the Energy Integration Portal (Petróleos de Venezuela, S. A.), <http://www.pdvsa.pdv.com>.

- redefining existing relations among South American countries on the basis of their resources and potentials;
- taking advantage of economic, social, and cultural accomplishments to reduce differences in the region;
- reducing the negative effects of energy costs on the countries in the region, caused by speculative and geopolitical factors;
- strengthening other regional initiatives like MERCOSUR, CAN, ALBA, etc.

Areas of Cooperation

PetroAmérica and its homologous sub-regional agreements have made progress in several fields: direct negotiations among states, declarations and development of joint initiatives by regions, subscription of integral agreements of cooperation, identification of areas of cooperation, bilateral agreements between companies and institutes of the signatory states, and the establishment of societies under agreements of specific cooperation on several subjects. Three sub-regional initiatives of energy integration make up PetroAmérica: PetroSur, PetroCaribe, and PetroAndina.

1) PetroSur

Signatory countries: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela.
As the greatest provider for MERCOSUR, Venezuela will limit its participation mostly to oil investments. This agreement calls for the construction of a gas pipeline that would carry natural gas southwards from the Caribbean Sea across the Amazon jungle to Brazil and Argentina.

2) PetroCaribe

Signatory countries (not exclusive): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Venezuela.
The PetroCaribe agreement improves the financial conditions of latter agreements by proposing a scale of financial facilities related to the price of crude oil. Besides that, it foresees an expansion of the payment period to 25 years, limiting interest rates to 1% if oil prices exceed $40 per barrel.

3) PetroAndina

Signatory countries: proposed to the countries from the Andean community of nations (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela).
This agreement calls for pipelines designed to link Venezuela and Colombia, as well as another oil pipeline across Colombia to the Pacific Ocean, intended to facilitate Asian access to Venezuela's petroleum.

Asia: A Global Partnership of Energy Supply and Technology Transfer

The emergence of China as the world's largest consumer of raw materials looms as a new major issue in global geopolitics. This development has occurred so quickly that until now governments did not have time to ponder its implications.[7] At the same time, significant alliances are currently in the making. Venezuela is building a very promising strategic alliance with China. This global integration provides an open door to Asia,[8] where Russia also plays a decisive role. Within this partnership, both countries need each other. China, currently the world's second largest oil consumer, craves oil. To maintain its prodigious growth, China needs to increase its energy supply by around 4 million barrels p/d by 2010, nearly twice of what it currently imports.[9] Energy anxiety has forced China to diversify its sources of oil supply. Because of new price trends, Asia has emerged as a major player within the world economy and on the global energy scene.[10] As part of this dynamic process, China could receive some of the oil that Venezuela currently supplies to the US, as the Venezuelan president stated during his last

7 David Hale, China's Growing Appetites, in: The National Interest, summer 2004, p. 137.

8 Günther Maihold, China and Latin America, in: Gudrun Wacker (ed.), China's Rise: The Return of Geopolitics? (SWP Research Paper, RP 1), Berlin, February 2006, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3170>, pp. 37-45.

9 Gabe Collins and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, Beijing's Bolivarian Venture, in: The National Interest, January 9, 2006, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=11912>.

10 Paul Isbell, Fire-breathing dragons: Asia and the challenge of energy security (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, WP N° 17), Madrid 2006.

Discussions continue well into the coffee breaks

visit to China in summer 2006. This reorientation of oil flow from Venezuela to China requires a new infrastructure.

According to Chávez, China will receive a large share of Venezuelan oil exports not only by decreasing deliveries of Venezuelan oil to the US, but also by increasing the overall output of oil. The amount of oil supplied to China by Venezuela will thus increase almost sevenfold, meaning that Venezuela will supply around 20% of China's actual oil needs, thereby overtaking Angola, which currently produces 18% of all oil China consumes.

China's increased association with Venezuela also coincides with a new evaluation of the Iranian crisis after Iran's refusal to halt its uranium enrichment program. This alliance could allow China to withstand a possible loss of Iranian oil, in case the international community imposes further sanctions on Teheran for continuing its nuclear program.

Shipping Routes: Panama, Nicaragua and Tankers in Big Scale

Since forming its partnership with Venezuela, even a war in the Persian Gulf does not threaten Beijing. Venezuelan oil is completely profitable and can, in case of war, substitute the Iranian oil supply. Nowadays, oil can be delivered from Venezuela to China only by ship, and the closest shipping channel is through the Panama Canal, which is too narrow for large tankers. Under current conditions, Venezuelan oil is shipped to China by sea across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, which takes around 45 days and significantly affects the final price.

Beijing has of late succeeded in solving this problem. The Hong Kong firm Hutchison Whampoa recently won the bid for the management of the canal's ports contract. According to Chinese officials, the owner, Hong Kong businessman Li Ka-Shing, is loyal to Beijing. As result of the planned expansion,[11] the canal will in the future be navigable by tankers with displacements of more than 300,000 tons. It is expected that after the expansion,[12] oil tankers from Venezuela could reach Chinese shores in 24 days, which is approximately the same amount of time currently needed for oil deliveries from Angola to China.

11 See Panama approves canal expansion, in: BBC news, July 15, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5182472.stm>.

12 The referendum took place in October and was finally backed by the Panamanians. Voters have overwhelmingly approved the expansion project. See Panamanians back canal expansion, in: BBC news, October 23, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6074106.stm>.

As a rival in Central America, Nicaragua has announced plans to build a waterway linking the Pacific and Atlantic, which would carry bigger ships than the existing Panama Canal.[13] If built, the Inter-Oceanic Nicaragua Canal will be a real alternative to the existing conditions in Panama. It would also carry super-ships of up to 250,000 tons, which are significantly bigger than the vessels that currently pass through Panama.

Hugo Chávez and Hu Jintao also ratified a deal in May 2006, in which Venezuela agreed to purchase 18 Chinese oil tankers for $1.3 billion. In 2007, Venezuela plans to buy 42 tankers, thus tripling the size of its oil fleet and ending its dependence on ships rented from the US. As a result of this contract, Venezuela will own one of the largest tanker fleets in the world.

The Role of Moscow: Guarantees for the Caracas-Beijing Tandem

Having created its energy security net, Beijing must now maintain it. Perhaps out of fear of spoiling its relations with Washington, China has not signed any weapons contracts with Venezuela. However, Moscow supports the China-Venezuela geopolitical tandem by supplying the Venezuelan government with Russian weapons, technology, and know-how. This unexpected aid from Moscow has taken the form of recent contracts to deliver 100,000 AK-47 Kalashnikovs, 53 military helicopters, and 24 Sukhoi SU-30MK2 planes, which will form the backbone of the Venezuelan security forces. In addition, two other contracts were signed: one for the construction of a factory in Venezuela to produce AK-103 automatic weapons under license, and another venture for manufacturing 7.62 mm calibre cartridges. The total cost of these contracts to modernize Venezuela's military comes to around $3 billion. In addition, Russia's energy giant GAZPROM is also thinking of participating in the construction of a $15 billion gas pipeline linking Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina by 2011.

Relations between the US and Venezuela: Ideologically Divorced but Economically Married

Despite negative commentary, such as Chávez's statement at the 61st UN General Assembly in September 2006,[14] Venezuela is still one of the top four suppliers of crude oil and fuel to the US. The United States absorbs about two-thirds of Venezuela's exports, around two million barrels a day. Even though the develop-

13 See Nicaragua plans rival canal route, in: BBC news, October 4, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5405884.stm>.

14 For full video and transcript from the UN, see <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/gastatement20.shtml>.

ment of emerging Asian markets could reduce the ties between Venezuela and the US, trade relations remain strong between the two countries.

The US currently obtains between 13% and 15% of its oil from Venezuela via three major US-American enterprises—Chevron Texaco, Exxon, and Conoco Philips. All of them hold investments in Venezuela, mainly in the Orinoco heavy oil belt. Nevertheless, Venezuela began selling oil to China in December 2004 and has also invited mainly state-owned companies from Russia, Iran, China and India to invest in its oil sector.

US-American society depends on oil and natural gas, which in turn makes reliable energy supply a national security issue. Energy analysis from the US Senate[15] addresses the following dangers (among others) concerning their energy supply, which in turn might apply to the Venezuelan oil industry: an abrupt disruption of supply, the finite nature of energy resources, and the use of energy as a geopolitical weapon.

Supply disruption

As one of OPEC's founding members, Venezuela follows decisions taken by the cartel. The members coordinate their production quotas and agree to raise oil prices by keeping supplies low. The Venezuelan oil strike of 2002 dramatically affected supplies, driving up the price of oil. From December 2nd, 2002 to February 2nd, 2003, PDVSA went on strike to protest against the policies of President Hugo Chávez. Production fell from around 2.9 m b/d to 1.5 m b/d and all exports stopped. As a result of the strike, the oil sector virtually shut down. According to a recent report published by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO),[16] even though Venezuelan oil production has fallen since 2001, exports of crude oil and petroleum products to the US have remained relatively stable with the exception of the strike period.

Finite Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas

Emerging and growing economies in both the East and the West continue to drive up prices and energy requirements in the short term. Since one can only measure the resources of energy on a national scale, it is not clear how long it

15 For speeches and documents from Senator Dick Lugar (R)—Lugar Energy Initiative—see: <http://lugar.senate.gov/energy/security/index.html>. For Senator Barack Obama's (D) speech on February 28, 2006, see: <http://obama.senate.gov/speech/060228-energy_security/index.php>.

16 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Energy Security, Issues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production, June 2006. To view the full GAO report, including the scope and methodology, see <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-668>.

could be before the world faces the prospect that energy supplies may not be abundant and accessible enough to support continued growth around the globe.

Use of Energy as a Geopolitical Weapon

Economies worldwide rely so heavily on oil and natural gas that energy-rich nations can intimidate or blackmail other nations by threatening to cut off supplies. Thus, oil exporters who disagree with the US sometimes threaten with the restriction or redirection of energy supplies. For example, Venezuela's oil minister and president of PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez, warned that eventual military aggression from the US against Venezuela would result in a redirection of Venezuelan oil to other markets, namely China.

Despite pre-existing energy policy in the foreign agenda of consumer countries, heightened competition between consumers to obtain energy from producer nations will further increase geopolitical tensions in the future, raising the risk of military conflicts for control of resources.

Global Oil Governance – Strategies for Energy Security

Energy and security represent part of the nucleus of contemporary international strategic debate. The last century saw rapid growth in fossil fuel consumption, and a corresponding expansion in exploration and discovery of new energy sources and resources. Energy consumption continues to rise in all regions of the world, with the highest growth rates now registered in Asia. China's quest for energy and energy security is now a fundamental feature of its international diplomacy in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Russia, altering the global energy security equation.

The inherent instability in regions that provide most of the world's oil and gas constitutes a grave concern. Instable governments like Venezuela contribute to sudden supply reductions, using oil and gas as political weapons with severe global consequences. Both China and India are more than ready to take advantage of it, and have consequently been invited to participate in the Venezuelan oil industry. Pipeline networks are also diplomatic tools through which exporting countries as well as transshipment countries can exercise political, diplomatic and economic leverage.

The political and security risks in Venezuela's energy investment environment are largely associated with legislation that centralizes power around President Hugo Chávez. The management of Venezuelan oil company PDVSA has become

increasingly politicized, with money for maintenance and development being diverted to pay for a surge in public spending. Nevertheless, the country has sufficient resources to maintain its high level of production. Politics and ideology are driving the confrontation, as President Chávez seeks to limit American influence around the world, starting in Venezuela's oil fields. The Venezuelan President recently decreed that Venezuela would take control of heavy oil fields in the Orinoco Belt, a region southeast of Caracas of so much potential that some experts say it could give the country more reserves than Saudi Arabia. The United States Geological Survey describes the area as the "largest single hydrocarbon accumulation in the world," making it highly coveted despite Mr. Chávez's erratic policies.[17]

A decent energy security policy should stay loyal to market principles and not treat energy as personal revenue for governments. The most important objective of an energy security policy is to create stable conditions under which the market will determine the appropriate use of the resources. Market integration via interdependency might be the most important element of such an energy security strategy.

17 Simón Romero & Clifford Krauss, High Stakes: Chávez Plays the Oil Card, in: The New York Times, April 10, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/business/worldbusiness/10showdown.html?ei=5087&em=&en=aad2996f4aca8b0f&ex=1176350400&pagewanted=all>.

Mehmet Tezcan elaborating on Turkey's foreign energy policy

The ENP and the EMP: Exploring a Division of Tasks between Overlapping Initiatives

Eduard Soler i Lecha

Eduard Soler i Lecha

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process, has received extensive criticism. In spite of the enormous expectations that it created in 1995 and the ambitious goals inscribed in the Barcelona Declaration, the results are not satisfactory. The Barcelona declaration specified that the Partnership should transform "the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity which require a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures."[1] Despite these goals, the EMP has made minimal progress and its accomplishments have not acquired adequate visibility.

As for the goal of transforming the Mediterranean into a secure and stable area, one should note that major regional conflicts such as in the Western Sahara as well as in the Middle East remain unresolved. There has not been a significant improvement of neither democratic nor human rights standards on the Southern Shore.[2] As for the economic dimension, in spite of the fact that most southern countries have signed association agreements, which would allow for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area in the future, south-south integration remains weak, and such advances have not led to the extension of prosperity in the region. On the contrary, the World Bank reports that regional imbalances have increased. For instance, in 1995 Spain's GNP per capita was eleven times higher than that of Morocco, in 2002 it was thirteen times higher. Simultaneously, European investors have not yet sought to invest in the economies of these countries.[3] The cultural and social dimensions of the Barcelona process, which encompass a great variety of areas including the promotion of civil society and people-to-people dialogue, have been considered the "Cinderella" of the EMP: a basket full of rhetoric but empty of content.[4]

1 Barcelona Declaration, Barcelona, 28 November 1995, <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm>.

2 EuroMeSCo's 2005 report, entitled "Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States," <http://www.euromesco.net/media/barcelonaplus_en_fin.pdf> is a useful tool to understand the developments and deficits of the political basket during the last decade.

3 In total, investments towards MPCs represent only 1 per cent of European foreign investment.

4 As for the cultural dimension see Paul Balta, La culture: le parent pauvre, in: Euroméditerranée, un projet à réinventer, in: Confluences, Fall 2000, pp. 69-80. In recent years there have been some advances in the cultural dimension, such as the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation and some projects in the education field. Nevertheless, there has been no relevant progress on aspects such as human migration.

The EMP is at risk. As this paper will demonstrate, different initiatives and particularly the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could marginalize this eleven-year-old project, which, at least rhetorically, offered a cooperation framework and equal footing between the EU and Mediterranean countries. This paper will give a brief overview of different cooperation frameworks that can compete with the EMP. It will concentrate on the functioning and aims of the ENP, and propose a division of tasks between the ENP and the EMP. A division of labor could mutually reinforce both policies and could be beneficial for citizens on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

Alternatives to the Barcelona Process

In 2005, Barcelona hosted an extraordinary Euro-Mediterranean summit. For the first time, benefiting from the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the Heads of State and Government from 35 European and Mediterranean countries convened in the Catalan capital in order to revamp a stagnant framework. This revitalization was particularly urgent due to the existence of other regional and sub-regional initiatives, which risked substituting or at least eroding the centrality of the EMP. Some of them existed before the launching of the EMP, i.e. the 5 + 5 (a Euro-Maghreb cooperation framework) or the Mediterranean Forum.[5] Some are led by non-Mediterranean actors, such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA). Two other initiatives are genuinely European and could potentially substitute the EMP: the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking in the Spanish Parliament about the preparation of the 2005 Euro-Mediterranean summit, perfectly illustrated the fear of EMP substitution or marginalization. Miguel Ángel Moratinos explained that the summit would take place at a very critical moment for the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations, since the EU was simultaneously discussing the ENP and the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. According to his speech, Spain wishes to prevent the ENP from becoming a hidden pre-accession strategy for Eastern Europe, and to ensure that

5 The 5+5 was supported mainly by France in the late eighties and includes Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. In recent years, it has reinforced the justice and home affairs and the defense dimensions. The Mediterranean Forum has a slightly larger membership. It is a French-Egyptian initiative, which functions as an informal mechanism to exchange ideas among Mediterranean countries before the Euro-Mediterranean meetings.

the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East does not draw the EU's attention away from the Barcelona Process.[6]

In spite of these fears, the Strategic Partnership is no longer a real threat to the survival of the EMP. It can be considered a project responding to the US-led BMENA. Under the Irish EU presidency in 2004, the UK stressed this initiative. With the Strategic Partnership, the EU proposed a single framework for cooperation with the members of the Barcelona Process, as well as for the rest of the Arab world and Iran. Nevertheless, this initiative was considerably diluted by member states (mainly Spain), which feared EMP substitution. Consequently, the Strategic Partnership became little more than a document without an institutional mechanism or funds.[7]

In contrast, the ENP still presents a real threat (but simultaneously an opportunity) for the survival of the EMP. The ENP was originally designed for eastern European countries that were to become EU neighbors after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Belarus). Subsequently, the members of the Barcelona Process, with the exception of Turkey (considered an EU

6 See Comparecencia del señor Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (Moratinos Cuyaubé), para informar sobre las líneas generales de la política de su departamento, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (asuntos exteriores), VII legislatura, n. 24, 19 May 2005, p. 7.

7 These impressions were confirmed through several interviews in Brussels in July 2005 with diplomats in charge of the Mediterranean dossier in several EU Member States' Permanent Representations and in some delegations of the EU Mediterranean countries.

Eduard Soler and Kathrin Brockmann during the debate on enlargement alternatives

candidate), Libya and the three South Caucasus republics were also integrated into the same strategy.

The rationale behind the ENP is rooted in enlargement policy. EU member states have confirmed that enlargement policy is the most effective tool to gain real influence in third countries. However, the EU is not willing to extend the membership perspective further. Consequently, the EU needs to offer an alternative for those countries in Eastern Europe, which would like to become members but are not offered that option by the EU. Correspondingly, the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, as well as most of the EU Mediterranean members, have recognized (and still recognize) that the EU has been overly focused on eastern integration at the expense of southern cooperation. They therefore advocated enlarging the geographic scope of this new policy to include the eastern as well as the southern EU neighbors.[8]

The EU has tried to replicate the enlargement method (gradualist, result-oriented and focused on the negotiation of the acquis) for those who are not to become EU candidates. However, if the EU is not able to offer the same incentives, it cannot expect the same commitments from its neighbors. This characterizes the nature of the ENP and its goals. The ENP is a bilateral policy which gives a "à la carte" model for cooperation with third countries. The EU promises concrete progress towards further integration of the third country into the EU internal market and offers it further areas of cooperation in several fields. In exchange, the EU asks for definite and demonstrable commitments to political, legal, economic and technical reform.

This policy consists of: (a) a General Strategy, based on the guiding principles of the ENP; (b) Country Reports, issued by the European Commission, which scrutinize the situation of the neighboring country in multiple areas; (c) Action Plans, also proposed by the European Commission, but negotiated with the third country and specifying in which areas the third country should pursue further reform, as well as what the EU can offer to accompany these reforms and what it can offer as "award" when these reforms are satisfactorily fulfilled; and (d) the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, which merges the two programs TACIS and MEDA into a single fund.

The mere existence of this single fund illustrates to what extent the supporters of the EMP have reasonable fear concerning the dilution of the EMP into the

8 Regarding the links of the ENP and the enlargement method and experience see: Judith Keeley, New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, No. 1/2005, pp. 29-55.

ENP. Some would evidently like the ENP to disappear and for Europe to revert to the pre-2004 situation. But the ENP is permanent. The best way not to bury the EMP's future is to find an appropriate division of tasks between the two initiatives. This requires exploring areas in which the EMP can provide an advantage and in which fields both projects can be mutually and reciprocally reinforcing.

Proposing a Division of Tasks

Before proposing a division of tasks, one should delineate five different scenarios within a five to ten year framework. The first consists of the complete substitution of the EMP with the ENP. The second is to maintain both initiatives, while marginalizing the EMP, like the Western European Union in terms of security. The third is to maintain both with an effective division of tasks. In the fourth scenario, both initiatives remain active but pursue contradictory goals and hamper each other's respective progress. The fifth consists of the failure of the ENP to offer concrete incentives or deliver substantial results. The last scenario may imply maintaining the old EMP as the only functioning framework for regional cooperation. Neither the first two options, nor the last two, are satisfactory for the interests of the EU or the Mediterranean, as they would damage the EU's credibility. This paper will therefore elaborate on the remaining scenario, which calls for a fruitful division of tasks between the ENP and the EMP.

Robert Khorolskyy and Quijun Zhou discuss their perspectives on energy policy

Tobias Schumacher foresaw that the ENP would concentrate on bilateral issues and on very specific topics, while the EMP would focus on multilateral and institutional dimensions.[9] In five to ten years time, the ENP could concentrate on the purely bilateral dimension, with very specific goals, which could be framed in a larger Euro-Mediterranean forum. To give an example, the Action Plans, which could be adopted in the following years, should take into account the guidelines fixed in the Euro-Mediterranean five-year working plan, which was adopted at the 2005 Barcelona summit.

Besides fulfilling this guiding role, other elements would justify maintaining the EMP. The Barcelona Process is recognized as being the only forum to bring Israel and its Arab neighbors to the same table, not only at a ministerial level but also among lower ranking officials. In contrast, the ENP is a vertical European policy, devoid of the regional perspective or south-south dialogue. Thus, these south-south contacts are the greatest assets of the EMP.

Political willingness is the only way to reinforce the utility and the visibility of this dimension of the EMP. Many differences prevail among its 35 members. Besides the classical north-south divide, several north-north and south-south divisions exist. In order to reduce the harmful effects of these divisions, ad hoc or stable north-south, north-north and south-south alliances need to be established. Simultaneously, stronger institutions need to be built.[10]

The institutional structure and the functioning of the EMP have received extensive criticism, primarily due to their Eurocentric character.[11] In recent years, however, there have been some steps to rectify this aspect of the EMP, such as the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly or the Anna Lindh Foundation. There have been proposals to establish a system of Co-presidencies (north-south), a Permanent Secretariat, and a Mr./Ms. Mediterranean or a Euro-Mediterranean Bank, though these have not made any headway. Nevertheless, these institutions could potentially reinforce the feeling of ownership in the Barcelona Process, provide more visibility for its achievements, and, more importantly, consolidate the institutional dimension that the ENP lacks, thus giving the EMP a concrete purpose.

9 Tobias Schumacher, Riding the Winds of Change: the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in: The International Spectator, No. 2/2004, pp. 89–102 (p. 91).

10 For further details see: Eduard Soler i Lecha, Barcelona + 10: Cleavages and Alliances, in: CFSP Forum, No. 2, March 2006, <http://www.fornet.info/documents/CFSP%20Forum%20vol%204%20no%202.pdf>.

11 As for the institutional dimension of the EMP see: Dorothée Schmid, Les institutions européennes dans le fonctionnement du PEM : de la répartition des compétences à la gestion dynamique du quotidien (EuroMesco Paper 36), October 2004, <http://www.euromesco.net/media/euromescopaper36_schmid.pdf>.

Taking these factors into account, a useful division of tasks could be as follows. Due to its gradualist, bilateral, flexible, and results-oriented nature, the ENP is likely to obtain a greater level of success by concentrating on most of the policy issues. In contrast, the EMP could focus on politics through stronger institutions and both regular ministerial and under-ministerial contacts, as well as on some policies requiring south-south cooperation. This would include several aspects of transport, energy, environment and, to some extent, education, migration and cooperation in justice and home affairs.

As for the reinforcement of the political dimension, three factors are necessary. The first involves the positive evolution at the international level towards resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Experience shows that the greatest advances in Euro-Mediterranean relations occurred when there was some optimism regarding the solution of this conflict. During the worst phases of the conflict, the EMP suffered from the atmosphere created by the Arab-Israeli hostilities. This hampered progress in fields such as security negotiations (e.g. the approval of a Charter for Peace and Stability in 2000) and polluted the discussions. The second factor is stronger leadership and increased political willingness. EMP progress cannot rely solely upon the willingness of southern European countries. Both the Mediterranean partners and the non-Mediterranean EU members have to show a stronger commitment to the EMP and to solving the different challenges of that region in general. Undoubtedly, Italy, France and Spain will continue to lead the project. This leadership needs reinforcement, although it is crucial to prevent competition between these three countries. There is also the possibility for the other 32 members of the EMP to assume leadership in various fields. The third and final factor would be ambitious institutional reform. As mentioned, the current initiatives of the Barcelona Process require increased public visibility, as do the existing EMP institutions such as the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. Creating new institutions would also help reach the threefold objective of increased visibility, ownership, and effectiveness. The creation of a Permanent Secretariat might be a way to achieve these goals.

In parallel, the EU will need to assure the success of the bilateral policy dimension of the ENP and of the few policies that are designed and implemented regionally. If the EU wants to remain a credible and central partner for the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, it cannot afford another failure. Perceived as such, the EU may need to revise to what extent the incentives offered by the ENP appeal to its new and old neighbors, and whether it will be able to deliver what it has promised. In contrast to the EMP, it is still too early to evalu-

ate the outcomes and shortcomings of the ENP. Nevertheless, there is a serious risk that the ENP might fall short of its expectations.

Conclusion

There is room for the mutual coexistence and reciprocal reinforcement of the ENP and the EMP. Some still fear a "Mediterraneist school," which does not appreciate the purely bilateral level of the ENP and which anxiously foresees the swallowing of the EMP by the ENP. However, a careful analysis of the strengths and the weaknesses of both initiatives may lead to a stable and fruitful division of tasks between the Barcelona Process and the Neighborhood Policy. The Barcelona Process would concentrate on policies and regional integration (mainly south-south), the politics of Euro-Mediterranean relations, and the institutional dimension. The ENP would provide the framework for increasing the effectiveness of most policies currently included in the Barcelona Process and would manage the overwhelming majority of the funds. A clear and shared strategy, stronger leadership, an enlarged and more diversified political willingness, and concrete and reliable incentives will ensure visible success for both the EMP and the ENP.

John Byrom presents an inside view on US counter-insurgency strategies

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A New Security Provider for Central Asia?

Natalia Touzovskaia

Natalia Touzovskaia

The war on terror re-opened a Pandora's box of security challenges in Central Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a six-nation group that includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has rapidly been gaining influence in the changing context of regional security. Today India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia have obtained observer status. After celebrating its fifth anniversary in Shanghai in June 2006, the SCO found itself facing even more questions than at the time of its creation in 2001. To some extent this is due to the participation of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad at the summit who talked of Iran's intention to join the organization. Hosting controversial visitors is only a part of a complex future that the SCO faces at the moment. The institution is still in search of its own identity. While its agenda has widened and now embraces discussions of economic and energy security cooperation, in practice its members have narrowed their joint activity to anti-terrorist exercises and most of these efforts are still implemented on a bilateral basis.

The following questions arise in this context: to what extent can this organization become an efficient security provider despite the differences among its members? How could it help solve regional security problems? How could the Shanghai Cooperation Organization fit into the overall picture of the region and interact with other security actors? This paper will look at the evolution of the organization and its latest developments, analyze limitations of its capabilities, and examine its prospects as a security provider in the region.

In Search of Identity: "A New Model of Successful International Cooperation" or "Oriental NATO"?

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established on June 15th, 2001. China, Russia and the four Central Asian republics, excluding Turkmenistan (which has a neutral status), signed the Shanghai Declaration, formally setting up a new framework for future cooperation. In practice, however, this document grew out of agreements on measures of mutual trust and on joint reduction of armed forces between three Central Asian countries, Russia, and China. These initial agreements were signed during a series of meetings of the so-called Shang-

hai Five Forum in the 1990s.[1] At that time, Uzbekistan did not participate in the Shanghai Five Forum because of its strong anti-Russian stance.

The Forum was created in order to tackle traditional security challenges in the region, which some analysts in Russia call "the Soviet heritage."[2] The disintegration of the Soviet Union left Russia and the Central Asian republics with unsettled disputes over one of the longest borders in the world, the border with China. This was successfully resolved after Russia and China initiated a settlement process. Moscow and Beijing have signed a series of agreements since 1990 and a bilateral treaty in 2001 that reiterated the absence of territorial claims. Bilateral agreements between Beijing and the Central Asian states were concluded in 1994–2000.

It soon became clear that the border issue was not the only problem requiring collective action. New challenges and threats, primarily terrorist and radical Islamist activities, illegal drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking, illegal migration and shortage of water supplies have caused Russia and China to unite their efforts. The rise of the Taliban in 1996 in neighboring Afghanistan also helped boost this cooperation. To a certain extent the Central Asian republics, China, and Russia were pioneers facing a whole set of modern challenges long before they entered the security agenda of the West.[3] Their deliberate attempt to unite their efforts shows the limits of unilateral action when trying to handle new threats. Even Uzbekistan, which does not share a border with China, positioned itself as an independent player in the region and decided to take part in the SCO. This caught the attention of many analysts at the time.[4] The creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization appeared as an achievement in enhanced regional cooperation.

Within five years the SCO has formally developed a wide range of tools to improve its performance, especially on an institutional level. The initial structures adopted are as follows: the Council (heads of states), the Council (heads of governments), Foreign Ministers Council, Meetings of Ministers, Council of

1 The term "Shanghai Five" was introduced in 1996 at the summit in Shanghai between five heads of states, although meetings of these five powers have been taking place since the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991.

2 A. Lukin, A. Mochulskij, Shankhaiskaya Organizacia Sotrudnichestva: strukturnoe oformlenie i perspektivy razvitia, in: Analiticheskie Zapiski (MGIMO MFA RF), February 2005, No. 2, p. 4.

3 The Shanghai Five states had already officially condemned religious extremism and international terrorism in the Almaty declaration signed in July 1998. A year later they agreed to adopt a set of common measures to tackle these challenges.

4 I. Facon, Les enjeux de sécurité en Asie Centrale: la politique de la Russie, in: Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales (AFRI), 2004, p. 658, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/etudes-recherches_3119/annuaire-francais-relations-internationales_3123/afri-2004_24430.html>.

National Coordinators, and the Secretariat (based in Beijing).[5] The first Secretary nominated was the former Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Deguang. The Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) was first introduced in Tashkent in 2004, which some analysts see as a key SCO tool to promote regional security.[6] During the last two years this institutional structure expanded and shifted its emphasis from antiterrorist tools to economic cooperation and energy security. The SCO Business Forum took place in September 2006 in Kazakhstan and experts are currently discussing an initiative to create the SCO Energy Club.[7]

The organization of the core SCO document provides an elaborate conceptual basis for SCO performance. This "Charter," signed on July 7th, 2002 in St. Petersburg, states a broad range of principles shared among all members: equality of all participants, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states, non-interference in their internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, openness to the participation of others, and the agreement not to target third states or any international organizations. It is these principles that make the SCO particularly attractive to its participants. If Russia and China had declared these principles to be essential elements of their foreign policy early on and had kept emphasizing their importance during the 1990s, the Central Asian states would have been more likely to adhere to them because these principles would not threaten their newly-acquired sovereignty after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In practice, non-interference in internal affairs brings benefits not as much to states, but to their regimes. It offers them stability and maintains their *status quo* in the region, yet another advantage that the SCO can bring to political elites in troubled Central Asia. Moreover, the stated equality among SCO participants makes the organization even more attractive to small countries despite the participation of regional giants such as Moscow and Beijing.

Another document sometimes recognized as the SCO's contribution to international law[8] is the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, signed in July 2001. It gives clear definitions of all the three notions ("three evils" according to Chinese interpretation):

– Terrorism: "an action with intent to cause death of a civilian … as well as planning, aiding and abetting an action for the purpose of intimidating the

5 Khartia Shankhaiskoi Organizacii Sotrudnichestva (the SCO Charter), Chapters 4–11, adopted on June 7th, 2002, in St.-Petersburg, <http://president.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2002/06/106755.shtml>.

6 A. Lukin, A. Mochulskij (fn. 2), p. 12.

7 A. Khasenov, U SCO budet svoi energeticheskii klub, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25th, 2006, p. 8.

8 A. Lukin, A. Mochulskij, (fn. 2), p. 8.

population, disrupting social security and forcing authorities or an international organization to commit an action or restrain from it …"

– Separatism: "an action with intent to break a territorial integrity of a state, including separating a part of its territory, its violent disintegration, as well as planning to aid and abet such an action …"
– Extremism: "an action with purpose of a violent seizure of power, violent hold of power and violent change of constitutional order, as well as social security violation, including organizing illegal armed formations and participating in them."[9]

These definitions form a reference point for international law, which member state officials praise as "a new model of successful international cooperation."[10] Yet from the very beginning the range of SCO activities remained very broad. They included economic issues, energy dialogue and the use of natural resources, emergency relief, transport and communications, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation.[11] Such a variety showed that the field for cooperation and the number of issues requiring collective efforts was vast, but it also raised the question of SCO identity. It is still unclear today how the SCO can help solve regional security problems.

While Russian experts emphasize multilateralism, dialogue, and strong antiterrorist tools,[12] Western and especially American analysts point out that the SCO is gradually developing a confrontational attitude towards the US and often label it as "Oriental NATO" or "OPEC with nuclear weapons."[13] Lately this anti-American stance of the SCO has gained popularity among Moscow officials as well as in the Russian press.[14] Some Russian officials have made quite eloquent remarks while avoiding any explicit statement on the issue.[15]

The US has made progress in the region since the start of the global war on terror. The anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan proved to be a strong consolidat-

9 Shankhaiskaia Konvencia o bor'be s terrorizmom, separatizmom i extremizmom, June 15th, 2001, <http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf/0/d160d59ec0ac159043256b560053735a?OpenDocument>.

10 V. Putin, SCO – Novaya Model' Uspeshnogo Mezhdunarodnogo Sotrudnichestva, in: Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June 14th, 2004.

11 Khartia Shankhaiskoi Organizacii Sotrudnichestva (the SCO Charter—fn. 5), Chapter 3.

12 A. Kokoshin, ShOS formiruet "poias druzhby" vdol' granic Rossii, <http://shanhai.rfn.ru/interviews/doc.html?id=438>.

13 G. Dyer, R. McGregor, Opposition to US inspires "NATO of the East." Is Shanghai Cooperation Organization a Threat to the West?, in: The Financial Times, June 22nd, 2006.

14 Some of the recent articles in Nezavisimaya Gazeta describe the SCO as "a NATO competitor." See: A. Blinov, ShOS Mozhet Stat' Konkurentom NATO, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 20th, 2006.

15 For instance, President Vladimir Putin admitted that the creation of the SCO reflected "the necessity for new centres of power" in the region. See interview in: The Financial Times, September 10th, 2006, and P. Sonders, Na blizkom rasstoianii i bez kopania v dushe, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25th, 2006.

ing factor for the development of the SCO and boosted the institution's activity as an opposition to American presence. The prevalence of anti-Americanism, however, does not always imply that cooperation with the West has lost ground in the region. In reality, the situation is more nuanced. The SCO states (with the exception of China) initially saw US military presence in the region as a strong means to tackle the Taliban threat.[16] Originally, SCO states considered US presence to be linked directly to the military campaign in Afghanistan rather than a permanent institution. They examined it in quite pragmatic terms as another tool to keep the situation under control.[17] It was only after the security situation in Afghanistan started to deteriorate, extremist movements had regained ground, and drug trafficking had grown substantially, that the criticism of American presence in Central Asia became quite open. Moreover, the closure of the US base in Uzbekistan was more a reaction to the US criticism of the Andijan tragedy of May 2005 and to the subsequent cut of the financial aid Washington granted Tashkent (after the agreement reached on October 7th, 2001 concerning the military base), than a substantial policy change. Germany was allowed to keep its base in Termez because it took a low-key approach to the events in Andijan,[18] and is now the only NATO country which deploys troops in Uzbekistan. Despite talks of leaving Termez as a sign of solidarity with the US,[19] the German military acknowledges its importance for an anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan.[20] At the same time the US and Kyrgyz authorities have finally reached a new agreement concerning the Manas base, which currently serves as one of the key NATO bases in the region. In the aftermath of 9/11, the US and France used the Kulob base in Tajikistan on the basis of bilateral agreements.[21] This base has continued to operate as a NATO transit point since 2004.

Even before Washington's active presence in the region, the fight against the "three evils" has been at the heart of the SCO agenda and was initially strongly emphasized by the member states suggesting the institution's identity could have developed in that direction. Indeed, all of the SCO states are facing all three challenges. Russia is coping with terrorism, extremism and separatism, including fighting Chechen separatists and groups of religious extremists in the Northern

16 I. Facon (Fn. 4), p. 659.

17 I. Zviagelskaya, Central'naya Azia: evolucia parametrov bezopasnosti i stabil'nosti, in: Yuzhnyi Flang SNG. Central'naya Azia, Kaspii-Kavkaz: energetika i politika, Moscow 2005, p. 38. See also: I. Facon (Fn. 4), p. 663.

18 Uzbek allow Germany to keep base, in: BBC News, December 11th, 2005.

19 Uzbekistan: Germany Likely to Leave Uzbek Base, February 1st, 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/70a79f46-8130-4757-b36a-4690670d30c6.html>.

20 Interview with Colonel Yury Morozov, Head of Research Task Group on Russia-NATO security cooperation in CIS space, Institute of Europe (RAS), Moscow, October 2006.

21 V. Socor, NATO Leader Makes Historic Visit to Central Asia, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 25th, 2004, <http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3118&article_id=2368742>.

Caucasus. China is preoccupied with activities of the Ouigour separatists in the western province of Xingjian. The Central Asian republics have long been fighting extremists groups and religious organizations, the most influential ones being "Hizb ut Tahrir" and the extremist religious movement "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan." In 2001 this organization renamed itself to "Islamic Movement of Turkistan" (IMT), implying that it aimed at establishing a theocratic Islamic state not only in the Fergana valley in Uzbekistan but throughout Central Asia.[22] In 1999–2000 there were a number of armed uprisings in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan organized by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and supported by Tajik and Afghan extremists. Currently the IMT is included in the State Department's list of international terrorist groups.

Regardless of their interest in combining efforts in the fight against terrorism, most of the SCO activities have been implemented on a bilateral basis. There has been only one multilateral anti-terrorist exercise so far, "Interaction—2003," which took place in August 2003 between Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The rest of the exercises have been accomplished bilaterally: China and Kyrgyzstan organized joint exercises in October 2002, joint Chinese-Russian military exercises were held in August 2005, and Chinese-Kazakh anti-terrorist exercises took place in August 2006. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) remains more of a project than a reality. This organization was created in 2002 for the purpose of collecting and analyzing data on terrorists and extremist activities, intelligence sharing, and legal cooperation. Although it became operational in June 2004, its main activities still remain only on paper. The information exchange between SCO states as well as the sharing of intelligence is in a very initial phase. Even Chinese officials, who were rather enthusiastic about RATS at the beginning, showed less optimism in their more recent statements.[23]

"The Big Two" versus "The Small Three"

To some degree, the SCO consists of two groups of countries. China and Russia play a leading role within the organization (implied by the choice of the SCO official languages: Russian and Chinese). On the one hand, the Central Asian states have so far accepted this leadership, also backed by Beijing and Moscow downplaying human rights issues and undemocratic trends in the political developments of the region. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan sometimes join their efforts within the SCO as the so-called "Small

22 See L. Montanaro-Jankovki, Les coopérations sécuritaires face à la criminalité transnationales en Asie Centrale, in: Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales (AFRI), 2005, p. 359.

23 The Chinese Vice-Minister of Public Security Meng Hongwei noted on August 21st, 2006 during one of its press-conferences that RATS developments were rather "satisfactory," <http://www.china.org.cn/russian/255128.html>.

Three." Looking at the level of economic performance of the SCO members, this division is natural: while China, Russia and, to some extent, Kazakhstan have relatively strong economies, the three Central Asian economies in comparison are extremely weak. Today an average salary in Kyrgyzstan, still high relative to neighboring Tajikistan, amounts to 20 USD per month and in some regions to 5 USD per month.[24]

Such a division however serves mostly as a tool to trace the different agendas of each group of countries and examine the disputes that exist within each of these groups. Besides, Kazakhstan does not currently seek a position within one group. Due to its strong economic performance (9,5% economic growth in 2004) and its growing role as an energy supplier in international markets, Astana wishes to be recognized as a regional leader,[25] gradually leading to competition with Russia and other Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan in particular), also claiming regional leadership.

A Chinese-Russian Couple: Bones of Contention

Beijing strongly supported the creation of the SCO because it saw a chance to pursue its old security agenda with new means. In fact, the SCO contributed to solving three of China's major concerns:

- territorial integrity and the fight with Ouigour separatism in Xingjian;
- promoting a model of a multipolar world and projecting power into Central Asia with the long-term objective of effecting a "Big Nation" renaissance;
- solving the growing need for energy supplies.[26]

All three have been addressed: political issues have been negotiated within the SCO framework and energy security questions have been discussed on a bilateral basis, mainly with Kazakhstan and Russia. Beijing signed a number of deals with Astana for long-term investments of $8 billion and agreed to build a pipeline from Kazakhstan to Western China.[27] However, power projection in Central Asia remains problematic because of Russian dominance, and Beijing has so far been very cautious in this regard. Yet the ambitions remain and are pursued by other means. China tends to highlight the necessity of stronger economic cooperation,

24 I. Zviagelskaya (fn. 17), p. 43.

25 See Kazakhstan seeks recognition as regional leader, ISN Security Watch (ETH Zurich), September 26th, 2006, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16722>.

26 A. Jafalian, Equilibres Géopolitiques en Asie Centrale: la montée en puissance de la Chine, in: Annuaire Stratégique et Militaire, Paris 2005, p. 136.

27 Ibid., p. 140.

which would put it in a stronger economic position than Moscow. At the same time, Beijing never misses the opportunity to act on a bilateral basis in order to gain political dividends with smaller states. After the tragic events in Andijan in 2005, when Moscow did not react immediately, Beijing was the first to welcome President Islam Karimov with an official visit.

To some extent Russia's agenda is similar to that of China. Moscow is concerned with promoting a model of a multipolar world and spreading its influence in Central Asia after a long period of retreat from the region in the 1990s. Energy security has become an issue of growing importance over the last two years, especially after the gas crisis with Ukraine. In fact, it was Moscow who proposed the creation of the SCO Energy Club in 2006.

Though officially relations between Russia and China are currently "at their best [level]… in our entire history,"[28] the agendas of these two leading countries create inherent competition. Today there are three areas of emerging differences:

- Agenda priorities: Beijing believes economic issues should be given the same priority as the fight against terrorism and should receive even more attention in the future. Moscow still underscores the importance of its security agenda and prioritizes only the energy dialogue among economic issues.
- Models of economic cooperation: according to Moscow, economic integration is a long-term goal and current cooperation should be enhanced among the countries with similar levels of economic development. In contrast, China with its impressive economic potential insists that a common economic partnership is necessary in the near future.
- Views on further enlargement: China accuses Russia of a pro-Indian stance and strongly objected to providing New Delhi with the status of an SCO observer.[29] There are also disagreements between the two countries on how far the SCO should extend its zone of responsibility.

Unresolved Issues among "The Small Three"

Among the three Central Asian republics there are even more serious discords than between the two leaders of the SCO. The disputes between "The Small Three" date back to the time they became Soviet republics, and today are aggravated by more recent ethnic and religious divides in the region.

28 Vladimir Putin in: The Financial Times, September 10th, 2006.

29 S. Luzianin. „ShOS ne speshit raspakhivat' dveri, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 26th, 2006, p. 76.

Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan

The borders still remain undefined between these two countries and the prospect of settlement looks grim. There are 70 to 100 areas of dispute, depending on different readings of old Soviet borders.[30] The delimitation process has been complicated by two Uzbek enclaves on Kyrgyz territory (Sokh and Shakhimardan) and one Kyrgyz enclave in Uzbekistan (Barak).

Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan

The border between these countries is also not delimited. There are about 70 contentious areas and a Tajik enclave (Vorukh) in Kyrgyz territory that was already the centre of Kyrgyzo-Tajik ethnic tensions in Soviet times. Moreover, the situation is currently deteriorating due to growing activity of radical Islamist groups. The armed incursions of radicals on Kyrgyz territory in 1999/2000 came from the territory of Tajikistan. According to Kyrgyz authorities, this provides solid proof that there are extremist training camps operating on Tajik territory.[31]

Tajikistan-Uzbekistan

Potentially the most disrupting problems for the region lie in Tajiko-Uzbek relations, complicated by long-standing and unresolved ethnic conflict. A community of one million Uzbek inhabitants plays an active role in Tajik internal political life, and there are five million Tajik individuals in Uzbekistan, though they are less active in the politics of the country. The ethnic Tajik population, which amounts to one fourth of the whole population of Uzbekistan, lives mainly in the poorest areas along the Tajiko-Uzbek border and reportedly has links to radical Islamist groups. During the 1999/2000 uprisings, some Tajiks supported the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan radicals. As a result, Uzbek authorities are currently resettling ethnic Tajiks by force. The Uzbeko-Tajik border is systematically mined from the Uzbek side, leading to numerous civilian casualties.[32]

The SCO has not tried to settle these issues, and none of the problems mentioned so far have been discussed within the organization's framework, though it could have had a real impact on the situation given its unique and very successful experience settling the border between former Soviet republics and China.

Apart from internal disputes of the member states, the relations between the two groups of countries have not always been smooth. The most controversial issue turned out to be the question of SCO enlargement. The "Small Three"

30 Uzbekistan insists the border should be delimited on the basis of a 1924 map, while Bishkek suggests a 1954 version. See ibid., p. 81.

31 Luzianin (fn. 29)., p. 83.

32 Ibid., p. 85.

strongly objected to expanding the membership and including India and Pakistan because of the continued conflict in Kashmir. They contend that since many existing problems have yet to be solved, the organization should not use its scarce resources in other areas.[33] As a result, India, Pakistan and Mongolia were only granted observer status in 2005. A contact group with Afghanistan was also created, but full Afghan membership was never approved. In 2006, Iran showed serious interest in membership and participated in the SCO Shanghai summit, thereby also attaining observer status. However, Teheran's participation created great controversy from the beginning, causing vivid debates between member states and eliciting a strong international response.[34] In the end, SCO enlargement was suspended after discussions at the eve of the Shanghai summit.

Prospects of SCO development

Several factors demonstrate the serious limitations of the SCO as a security provider: implicit and explicit disputes between member states, their different agendas and priorities, the significant role of external factors, which to some extent consolidate institutional development more than internal dynamics, and an inability to solve key security problems of the region even between member states.

It would be presumptuous to expect a five-year-old organization that includes more than one third of the world's population and operates in one of the most instable regions in the world to become an efficient mechanism of regional cooperation. It does, however, have the potential to become an active player since the SCO has so far provided an attractive model of cooperation for both regional giants and small regional powers, and draws attention of other key Asian actors. The question remains as to what extent this model serves as a common ground for all members or simply allows each of them to follow their own agendas. In order to make the SCO a viable regional institution, its members will have to agree on a number of common issues that have previously caused dispute between them:

- the zone of responsibility and future enlargement;
- further forms of cooperation in already prioritized fields: fight against terrorism (in particular enhancing the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure activity), extremist groups and drug trafficking, future modes of economic cooperation;

33 Luzianin (Fn. 29), p. 7.

34 Iranian President to cause a stir at security summit, in: The Financial Times, June 14th, 2006. The US also applied for observer status in the SCO but the application was rejected. Among the other countries who expressed interest in the SCO are Japan and Belarus.

– solving old disputes between member states, in particular the border problems of the Central Asian republics;
– interaction with other regional organizations, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and international players in the region, such as NATO.

Questions also arise regarding the prospects of cooperation with Western players. How might Western powers and security institutions plug into this regional game? The US and NATO are already operative in the region. NATO, in particular having taken greater responsibility for the military operation in Afghanistan in October 2006, simply cannot afford to ignore any possibility of cooperation with regional actors. Currently though, NATO engages in another channel of dialogue with the Central Asian countries through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program that has so far proved to be more efficient than multilateral dialogue. This is particularly true in the case of Kazakhstan which upgraded its relations with the Alliance from PfP to the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The Uzbek IPAP program, however, has been suspended after the Andijan tragedy. At the same time, NATO maintains its dialogue with Russia through the NATO-Russia Council and holds a joint program in training specialists to fight against the trafficking of illegal drugs in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Russia's position towards strategic alliances is presented by Natalia Touzovskaia

However, the Alliance should not downplay the SCO channels since the security situation in Afghanistan is currently deteriorating, an issue that will continue to dominate the regional agenda. NATO could also be more attractive for Central Asian states since it provides a multilateral framework and has a more positive image in the region than the US. Potentially the most fruitful field of cooperation for the Alliance could be the fight against drug trafficking. However, NATO currently restrains itself from this issue. In order to stabilize the region in the long term, this issue requires serious attention. Joint training programs with Russia are not enough. As Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov pointed out, since the start of the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan in autumn 2001, the turnover of drug trafficking in the region has more than doubled and has continued to grow since.[35]

In the near future it is unlikely that the SCO could enter into any serious competition with Western institutions, mainly because it still needs to develop itself as a security actor and overcome the differences between its member states. Instead, this organization might compete with other regional structures, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Uzbekistan became a member in 2006 and China is not participating. The CSTO (initially: Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) could become a more important tool since Russia and China might increase their competition for regional leadership. In this context Moscow would play up any structures that exclude Beijing; it already uses CSTO to increase its influence in granting preferences in arms sales and to provide free training and education for the militaries of member states.[36] It also tries to refocus NATO's interaction with CSTO countries, turning from a bilateral track to full cooperation between two institutions, as it had suggested in 2004 when it proposed a NATO-CSTO dialogue.[37]

In the long term, the prospect for SCO development looks fragile. So far, the institution has been attractive for its members mainly because it allowed them to preserve their *status quo* in Central Asia. With the changes among regional elites and the slow but steady modernization of Central Asian societies, it will certainly need to look for a new *raison d'être* or at least try to turn its existing ambitious agenda into reality.

35 See A. Lukin (fn. 2), p. 20.

36 I. Plugatarev., Vozvrashchenie bludnogo Uzbekistana, in: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, September 15th, 2006.

37 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Karasin interview to Interfax on November 8, 2005, <http://www.mid.ru/ns-rsng.nsf/3a813e35eb116963432569ee0048fdbe/432569d800221466c32570b3002f4f3f?OpenDocument>.

The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Necessity for Asian Strategic Stability

Rafeh A. Malik

Rafeh A. Malik

Inter-state conflicts in Asia have continued to prevent peace in the region. The balance of terror among major actors, such as India and Pakistan, and China and her neighbors has prevented a genuine process of détente within the region, thereby hindering arms control and economic cooperation among the Asian states. Regional economic organizations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) lag behind the European Union, yet Asian states remain bigger investors in the arms industry. They have been developing and purchasing lethal weapons, including nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

The Cold War experience has demonstrated the need for a regional institution to manage and resolve conflict. The Asian strategic environment lacks such an institution. Although the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) appears to be an attractive candidate for such a role, it lacks credibility. Theoretically speaking, ARF has a global orientation, but its performance has been unimpressive regarding nuclear non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula, diminishing the traditional animosities between China and her neighbors, and cementing the peace process between India and Pakistan.

Asian security challenges require a new approach to conflict management and resolution. A new dynamic has developed in Asia. Emerging centers of political and economic power are forcing states to reassess national interests and prospects. Trade opportunities and commercial ambitions foster new bilateral agreements, and growing energy demands promote intra-regional dependencies. Strategies for addressing issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking require cross-national cooperation. Established, inactive regional organizations and recently formed ones seem poised to offer more integrated approaches to common concerns. Meanwhile, with the advent of a greater multilateral and international framework, Western and especially American influence has receded.

Still, this transformation should not be overstated. The Asian political and economic scene has changed. Even while an increasing interdependence among states determines the future of many people from different nations, national sovereignties in Asia still reign supreme and undermine regional structures. Core national interests continue to steer foreign policies. Traditional alliances along with historic

suspicions and rivalries impede new alignments. Deeply entrenched leaders and elites delay changes. The United States of America remains a major player in Asia even while its quasi-unilateral international leadership has diminished.

Within this context, ASEAN has gained influence and the ARF seems to be a viable forum for conflict resolution. Despite the importance of sovereignty as a founding principle, any upheaval in one member state closely affects the others. Since smaller members are more at risk than their bigger counterparts, interdependence remains asymmetrical.[1] The bigger states tend to enjoy a greater deal of influence over their smaller partners. This institutional approach proves the viability of ARF. Simultaneously, the success of ARF requires active participation from Asian nations and other big powers. Will ARF play an important role in enhancing Asian security? Is ARF a realistic forum for conflict management and resolution?

The Asian Strategic Landscape

The Asian continent has experienced many rapid changes in the past decades, including the alignment and non-alignment of states, alliances, and pacts made and ignored by bigger partners. The United States abandoned Pakistan after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The emerging power of China has brought about a shift in Indian policy and aligned her more closely with the United States.

Many now picture Asia as a breeding ground for global terrorism. For American foreign policy, 9/11 was a watershed event originating in Asia. It led to US intervention in Afghanistan to oust al-Qaeda and their Taliban allies, and was used to justify the invasion to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The US traced terrorist attacks in East Africa and Yemen and the planning of 9/11 to southern Afghanistan. For the last five years, Washington has viewed American and international efforts to ensure the security and recovery of Afghanistan as indispensable to prevent the country from again becoming a radical Islamic state hospitable to terrorists.

Although Pakistan was an ardent supporter of the War on Terror since its very beginning, many in Washington still doubt Pakistan's capacity and determination to meet her commitments. Realistically, without the active participation of Pakistan, the future of Operation Enduring Freedom seems bleak. Untamed jihadist organizations and tribal groups are believed to have made common cause with al-Qaeda and aided the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan. The limited progress

1 Christopher Hill, The Foreign Politics of Foreign Policy, New York, NY, 2003, p. 176.

made in reforming madressah education evidences Pakistan's role as a breeding ground for extremists. Iran has been accused of sponsoring terrorism through its support of militant movements in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon. Similarly, many believe that Bashar's Syria aids radical groups.

Political rivalry among powers in East Asia has become quite intense. The United States, Japan, China and Russia have divergent security and defense objectives and goals. Japan and the United States do not share similar goals for East Asia either. Japan's territorial claims and disputes with South Korea regarding the Takashima islands, and with Russia regarding the Kuriles islands put it in a different mind set than the US. Japan plays mostly an economic role. Her political, defense, and strategic actions are much weaker than that of the US. In addition, Taiwan further complicates Sino-US relations.

The Korean peninsula remains divided since the outbreak of the Korean War (1951–53), and continues to reflect the atmosphere of the Cold War. The two Koreas, Japan, the United States, Russia and China are still struggling to achieve their respective goals in Northeast Asia and to make security arrangements in Southeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific region.

In reality, ASEAN countries do not want to have to choose between the United States, Russia and China. They want to involve all the great powers in regional

Rafeh Malik from Pakistan

interdependencies and institutions in order to promote moderation on the part of the big actors. However, China took a leadership role in the ASEAN Regional Forum,[2] and both Russia and China have become more assertive and less deferential to Washington, forming new political and economic alignments. Both are particularly anxious to keep the US from maintaining too much leverage in Asia, especially in their traditional spheres of influence. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has emerged as a challenger to the United States. Formed as an anti-terrorist organization that included all of the Central Asian Islamic states except for Turkmenistan, the SCO has evolved into a political and economic agenda that favors the gradual withdrawal of American forces from the region. Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia and India have observer status in the SCO.[3] Other regional groupings have seen some revitalization, such as SAARC and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Their meetings have stressed the importance of confidence building and economic growth. States have joined in new bilateral agreements, though most projects remain unfulfilled. Moreover, despite their common ground on many issues, most regimes in the region hold on to their suspicions of one another.

Horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation has become another significant development in the current strategic environment of the region. Although the international community acknowledges India and Pakistan as de facto members of the nuclear club, it remains apprehensive since these two states continue to act as bitter adversaries, conceivably embarking on an arms race. In 1999 during the Kargil crisis and again in the military buildup of 2001/2002, New Delhi and Islamabad were heading towards nuclear war. Fortunately, reason prevailed on both sides and they were able to control the escalation of the crisis. The nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan has had a destabilizing impact on the entire world economy because both states lie on the Indian Ocean. A military showdown between them in the Arabian Sea or in other adjacent areas would severely affect the safety of sea passage from the Strait of Hormuz (Iran-Oman) and the Strait of Malacca (Indonesia-Malaysia). Peace and the free flow of trade through the Indian Ocean are not only in the interest of coastal and hinterland states in the region, but also in the interest of the entire world.[4]

By 2006, the booming narcotics trade in Afghanistan produced over ninety percent of the world's supply of heroin. Although the US is not the prime market

2 Winberg Chai, The Ideological Paradigm Shifts of China's World Views: From Marxist-Leninism-Maoism to the Pragmatism-Multilateralism of the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era, in: Asian Affairs an American Review, No. 3/2003, p. 169.

3 See the article by Natalia Touzovskaia in this book.

4 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Nuclear Capable Navies of India and Pakistan: Impact on the Strategic Environment of the Indian Ocean, in: IPRI Journal (Islamabad), No. 1/2004.

for Afghanistan's heroin, it shares a deep concern about the flourishing drug trade with Europe and other states in the region. Washington and other capitals have started to feel the corrosive societal effects of these exports, and its corrupting influence has had a detrimental effect on the governance of Afghanistan. The likelihood that drug trafficking also fuels the country's mounting insurgency has intensified the dedication on the part of the US to disable the heroin market. To date, the US has spent over $750 million a year in what has so far been a losing battle to bring the drug trade under control. International efforts to eradicate the poppy crop have been counter-productive since they have alienated large sections of the rural population and allowed the Taliban to reassume their role as the protector of farmers, whose livelihood relies on the stable market for poppies.

The preceding discussion proves that strategic competition as well as inter- and intra-state conflicts have not only been holding Asia back, but could potentially have disastrous consequences for the entire world. Optimism for the development of the Asian community requires that their leadership sufficiently resolve these puzzles so that Asia's future will not resemble her past. Instead of sliding into anarchy or falling back into pre-Westphalian hierarchy, Asia has the potential to manage its insecurity and ensure its prosperity through shared regional norms, rising economic interdependencies, and growing institutional partnerships. Improved performance of associations like SAARC and ASEAN certainly enhance the economic interdependency and generate trust among member states. This would help replace enmity with amity between Asian states.

The strengthened economies in Asia and the global competition for energy resources have added a new dimension to international relations. Washington's policies have been forced to accommodate an increasingly economically powerful China as well as India's fast growing, diversifying economy. American policy has tried to balance criticism of China's trade and human rights policies with economic motivation because of the US's extensive commercial relations and China's huge dollar accounts. US foreign policy decisions in the Middle East remain devoted to insuring secure sources of oil and to defending friendly oil-producing countries. China's rapidly expanding economy puts it in even greater competition with the US for future oil and gas reserves. Since abandoning important sectors of its formerly static economy, India has enhanced its own economic opportunities and prompted rapidly expanding strategic partnerships. Russia has also emerged as a competitor for the Asian energy market in the development and distribution of resources.

While the US has usually been satisfied to conduct state-to-state relations, public attitudes towards American policies and policy makers have become increasingly unfavorable. Washington has expressed concern about the broad and deep antipathy toward American policies that has spread throughout the Asian public. Though a little less in India and Japan, surveys have generally shown a visible gap between the opinion of the ruling elites and the general population. Washington has gradually come to recognize the mounting constraints on its governmental policy makers. Even if no long-term allies have broken with the US, national leaders have been motivated to raise the price of their cooperation with the US. But rather than reexamining its policies, Washington has for the most part viewed this issue as a public relations challenge, and still seeks to win a better hearing for American foreign policy.

In terms of strategic stability, members of ASEAN have constructed a durable security regime, the ARF that has allowed them to solve and demilitarize a variety of disputes between them.[5] Based on the ASEAN experience, the ARF contends that sustainable dialogue can produce measurable improvements in political relationships. It provides a setting in which members can discuss current regional security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region. The ARF is characterized by consensus-based decision-making and minimal institutionalization.

The ARF: A Forum for Strategic Dialogue

The participants of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference, held in Singapore on July 23rd–25th, 1993, agreed to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum. The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on July 25th, 1994. In 1994, the first ARF meeting brought together foreign ministers from Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the USA and Vietnam. The ARF draws together 23 countries, which influence the security of the Asia Pacific Region. It is comprised of the ten ASEAN member states (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), the ten ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States), one ASEAN observer (Papua New Guinea), as well as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Mongolia and Pakistan. East Timor was admitted to the ARF in 2005.

5 Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, Rethinking East Asian Security, in: Survival, No. 2/1994, p. 11.

In a region with little history of security cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum has become the main forum for conducting security dialogue in Asia. The ARF complements the various bilateral alliances and dialogues, which underpin the region's security architecture. It fosters constructive dialogue and consultation on political and social issues of common interest, and makes significant contributions to confidence-building measures. The 1995 ARF Concept Paper set out a three-stage evolutionary approach to the development of the ARF, moving from confidence building to preventive diplomacy and towards conflict resolution capability in the long term.[6]

In its first ten years, the ARF has made modest gains in building a sense of strategic community. More recently, it has contributed to the region's counter-terrorism work. However, efforts to develop tools of preventive diplomacy and conflict management are still at an early stage. While the ARF continues to focus on confidence-building measures, its members have also agreed that preventive diplomacy should proceed parallel to these efforts, particularly in areas where these two initiatives overlap.

As a preventive diplomacy tool, ARF members have also agreed to enhance the role of the ARF chair in coordinating ARF positions to strengthen the organi-

6 ARF (Second ARF Ministerial Meeting), A Concept Paper, 18 March 1995, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/statements/arf2conc.html>.

Bob Deen shares his work experience from Central Asia

zation's ability to respond to situations affecting the security of ARF members during the period between Ministerial meetings. Another mechanism is an ARF Register of Experts and Eminent Persons, which, when operational, will provide a pool of expertise on regional security issues that may be useful for the ARF chair or individual ARF members.

Recommendations for the Success of the ARF

The ARF's role in promoting Asian strategic stability could be significant if a number of issues are taken into account. The resolution of the following matters would improve ARF's effectiveness and enhance its credibility in both the Asian strategic environment and world politics in general. A successful ARF requires the active participation and cooperation of all participants. ASEAN must always be sensitive to and take into account the interests and concerns of all ARF participants.

The defense ministers of ARF member countries should hold regular meetings aimed at encouraging dialogue for peace and security in the region by discussing various problems including defense policies, arms control, and disarmament.

ARF member countries should create a cooperative system for the exchange of information concerning drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. Although member states agreed to strengthen cooperation to combat terrorism at an ARF meeting on July 30th, 2002,[7] there remains a lack of realistic bilateral or multilateral steps for curbing these menaces.

Periods of rapid growth are often accompanied by significant shifts in power relations. This can lead to conflict. The ARF will have to manage these transitions carefully to preserve peace. ARF should recognize and accept different approaches to peace and security and try to forge a consensual approach to security issues. The region experiences residual tension with regards to unresolved territorial and other matters of contention. Any of these could spark a conflagration that could undermine peace and prosperity in the region. Over time ARF will have to temper these potential problems.

The ARF should tackle these challenges through a gradual approach using confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution mechanisms. In promoting confidence building, the ARF may adopt two approaches. The first approach derives from the experience of ASEAN, which provides

7 East Asian Strategic Review 2003 (The National Institute for Defense Studies), Tokyo, June 2003, p. 223.

the ARF with a valuable guide that has proven its own capabilities. ASEAN has succeeded in reducing tensions among its member states, promoting regional cooperation, and creating a regional climate conducive to peace and prosperity. The second approach will be to implement the above-mentioned measures, which ARF participants can explore and implement in the immediate future, and also make proposals, which they can employ in the long term. These models could also aid the Track Two Process in the immediate future.

The ARF must develop its own mechanism to practice preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. In doing so, the ARF will face quite a lot of challenges. There are no established roads or procedures for it to follow. Without a high degree of confidence among ARF participants, it is unlikely that they will agree to establish mechanisms perceived to be intrusive or autonomous. This is a political reality that the ARF should recognize. However, it would be useful in the initial phase of the Track Two Process to consider and investigate a variety of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms. This preventive diplomacy would follow confidence-building measures. Conflict resolution should be an eventual goal that ARF participants must pursue as they begin to develop the ARF as a vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability.

Conclusion

ARF participants assume that the ARF will be a success. But the experiences of regional organizations like ASEAN show that success results from hard work and careful adherence to the rule of consensus. ARF participants will have to work equally hard and be equally sensitive to ensure that the ARF process stays on track. Moreover, a great deal of innovation and ingenuity will be required to keep the ARF moving forward while at the same time ensuring the support of its diverse participants. This is a major challenge for the ASEAN countries and other ARF participants. The UN Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace" has recognized that "just as no two regions are the same, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labor must adjust to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity."[8]

8 General Secretary of the UN, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>, here: paragraph #62.

The International Forum on Strategic Thinking at its best – socializing, networking and making friends

Regional Security in the Middle East: Cooperation between Multinational and Regional Actors?

Mohamed Ibrahim

Mohamed Ibrahim

Since the second Gulf War and the peace process between Arab countries and Israel in 1991, regional dynamics in the Middle East have shaken the security of the region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israeli-Syrian conflict, as well as the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have had direct impact on the regional security of the Middle East. Furthermore, after the terror attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, global terrorism has been perceived as the main threat to the Western World. The United States as well as the European Union declared that the biggest threat came from the Middle East. To fight this threat, European and US politicians emphasized the need for democratization and reforms in the Middle East. They contended that the implementation of these reforms would bring about regional security. But why regional security in the Middle East still has not become a reality? This paper makes the assumption that regional security will only be achieved by solving the Israeli-Arab conflict since this issue has the most imminent impact on regional security in the Middle East.[1] Another assumption is that the Israeli-Arab conflict can be solved through intensive cooperation between multinational and regional actors. The Israeli-Arab conflict will only be solved when peace between Israel and the Palestinians is realized. This paper will discuss new regional dynamics since the second Gulf War, its implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as different multinational and regional initiatives and the reasons for their failure. It further suggests that the chance for a lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis has a much greater chance if multinational actors cooperate with a potential regional power like Turkey. Such a peace agreement would promote stability in the Middle East.

Regional Dynamics since the Second Gulf War and their Effects on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The peace process in the mid-1990s has changed the political and economic relationship of Arab countries with Israel. Before the Oslo Agreement in 1993, Egypt was the only Arab nation maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel. Since it signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1978 in Camp David, it was consequently excluded from the Arab League. Although the Oslo Agreement justi-

1 Cf. Anthony H. Cordesman. Iraq and "After": Rethinking the Major Policy Issues in the Wider Middle East (Center for Strategic and International Studies – CSIS), Washington, DC, 6.7.2004, p. 21.

fied official diplomatic relations between Arab countries and Israel, the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict still has direct implications on Arab-Israeli cooperation. No other conflict has bothered the Arab League more than the Israeli-Palestinian one. The final agreement between Palestinians and Israelis is in principle accepted by both parties: a two state solution, evacuation of most Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Jerusalem as the capital for both sides, and limited return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. The Palestinian government under Hamas implicitly accepts the idea of a two state solution by offering Israel a long-term cease-fire in exchange for the implementation of the above-mentioned conditions.[2]

The Oslo Agreement:

The first official dialogue between Arab countries[3] and Israel took place at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. This conference paved the way for direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, which then led to the Oslo Agreement in 1993.[4] The Oslo Agreement stated that final status negotiations should start after a five-year period. Unfortunately, the conflict escalated in the mid-90s and the Oslo Agreement failed. Israel expanded its settlements, which the Palestinians considered and continue to consider a major obstacle for a potential Palestinian state. Israel, on the other hand, was still waiting for the security it was claiming. In addition to these major factors, the negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis were conducted without any US or EU engagement. The failure of the Oslo Agreement lies in the fact that multinational and regional actors did not accompany the conflicting parties during the implementation phase. Although the international community provided intensive development aid to the Palestinians, the important issues that affected the daily life of the people were postponed for the final status agreement.[5] Multinational actors should have accompanied the conflicting parties on the ground, e.g. the inclusion of multinational observers within the joint Israeli-Palestinian security controls, in order to ensure that both parties complied with the agreed agenda. Without external help, a peace agreement between the two parties lies out of reach.

2 "Hamas Officials Already Recognize Israel's Right to Exist, Apparently": Prime Minister Ismail Haniya: "If Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders, peace will prevail and we will implement a cease-fire [hudna] for many years." Published in: News Center (CommonDreams.org), May 31st, 2006, <http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0531-23.htm>.

3 Jordan (the Palestinians were part of the Jordanian delegation), Lebanon, Syria.

4 A German version of its text in: Angelika Volle / Werner Weidenfeld (Hrsg.), Frieden im Nahen Osten? Chancen, Gefahren, Perspektiven. Beiträge und Dokumente aus Europa-Archiv und Internationale Politik, Bonn 1997, pp. 168–176.

5 These issues included Israeli settlements, the city of Jerusalem, regional borders, Palestinian refugees, and access to water.

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)

The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona in 1995 only two years after the Oslo Agreement, marked the starting point of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), a wide framework for political, economic and social relations between the member states of the EU and partners of the southern Mediterranean.[6] The agreement aimed at establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010 and at creating a region of peace, security and prosperity. Through the Barcelona Process, Europe seeks to promote democracy, political reforms and regional co-operation in the partner countries of the EMP. Most governments in the Middle East, however, oppose these explicit goals. Thus, the efforts of the EU to promote political reforms have become incompatible with the policy of Arab governments, which seem willing to accept only reforms that do not question their authority.[7] The Israeli-Arab conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular are not a stated priority of the Barcelona Process. It was not the explicit aim of the Barcelona Process to focus on or solve the Israeli-Arab conflict. On the other hand, the Barcelona Process had and still has direct implications on the Israeli-Arab conflict and therefore deserves attention. Due to a growing number of Jewish settlements

6 The group of nations included Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta.

7 Cf. Muriel Asseburg, Die transatlantische Debatte über den »Broader Middle East« und die Erfahrungen des Barcelona Prozesses, Discussion Paper during the 12th SWP dialogue, October 12, 2004, p. 4.

Mohamed Ibrahim during his presentation on regional security in the Middle East, with Hans Bastian Hauck

in the West Bank, the Arab League called for a boycott of Arab-Israeli relations at the European-Mediterranean Conference that took place in Malta in 1997. Furthermore, the Second Intifada in 2000 had a negative impact on the Barcelona Process.

The Roadmap

In April 2003 the Middle East Quartet[8] presented its "Roadmap" to the Palestinian Authority and Israel, an initiative that should have led to a two state solution by 2005. Both conflicting parties had reservations and tried to push their own initiatives through, without any significant success. The plan consists of three phases. In the first phase the Palestinians shall declare a cease-fire as well as acknowledge Israel's right to exist. Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority must disarm Palestinian groups and proceed with political reforms. Israel is to stop the expansion of settlements, evacuate those settlements built after March 2001 and withdraw its military forces from areas populated by Palestinians. The second phase is meant to start with Palestinian elections, an international conference, and the establishment of a provisional Palestinian state. The third phase would then deal with all unsolved questions, e.g. regional borders, Jerusalem, the settlements as well as Palestinian refugees. The weakness of the Roadmap is obvious. Like the Oslo Agreement, the most important issues would be negotiated only at the end of the process. The agreement is not described in detail and only refers to well-known documents such as United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.[9] Multinational actors' involvement in the Roadmap process is limited to observing its development on the international level. Even though an important instrument, international monitoring is not sufficient. The Roadmap is based on voluntary participation of the conflicting parties. Any means of international pressure or sanctions would constitute a breach of the agreement.

One of the main obstacles for the Roadmap to succeed is the fact that the conflicting parties have not been involved in the drafting process. The most important issues, such as Israel's security concerns, are not satisfactorily met in the agreement. On the other hand, Israel expected the Palestinians to give up their right of return. The failure of this initiative was inevitable.

8 USA, EU, Russia, UN.

9 The UN Security Council Resolution 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; cf. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement>. The UN Security Council Resolution 338 calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.

The New Middle East after September 11, 2001

Immediately after the terror attacks in the USA, the Bush administration accused non-democratic countries of promoting terror and therefore endangering the Western World. In order to fight this terror, the administration attempted to use military force coupled with political reforms. From this perspective, the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as the war against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq was meant to produce regional security in the Middle East. With the "Forward Strategy for Freedom"[10] authoritarian regimes should be "guided" in the process of liberalization and democratization. After controversial negotiations between the US government and the EU concerning the use of military force, the US government modified its plan for a "Greater Middle East." Any subsequent modifications could not hide the weakness of the plan. The Greater Middle East Initiative was created by the US government and later modified by the EU, but the countries of the Middle East were not included in the negotiations. Therefore, yet another initiative was bound to fail.

Both the EMP as well as the Greater Middle East Initiative do not mention the Israeli-Arab conflict as a priority. However, the Greater Middle East Initiative had and still has direct implications on the regional security of the Middle East. Kuwait was the only Arab country which officially supported the regime change in Iraq. The smaller countries of the Gulf as well as Jordan indirectly supported the war led by the US. These countries are becoming increasingly important for geopolitical strategy, especially that of the United States. The countries of the Gulf as well as Israel gained more importance in the Middle East after the war. The Israeli fear of being attacked from the East has been unfounded since the war against Iraq. Since the war, countries like Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have lost political power in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been accused of promoting terror, mainly by the US. Almost all assassins of the 9/11 attacks were Saudi Arabian citizens. Saudi Arabia is currently trying to get back its former standing towards the West but still suffers from the accusations of the West. Egypt has strongly opposed the attempts the US has made to promote reform in the region. While Egypt wants to sustain its support of the US with regard to the war against terror, it is fighting terror in its own country and fears that the enactment of political reforms would incite Islamic terrorism, which would lead to an unstable situation in Egypt and the whole region. The September 11 terror attacks have posed great challenges to regional security in the Middle East.

10 Fact Sheet: President Bush Calls for a "Forward Strategy of Freedom" to Promote Democracy in the Middle East, The White House, Washington, DC, 26.11.2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-11.html>.

As stated above, the Israeli-Arab conflict was not a priority for the "Greater Middle East Initiative." But the US government contended that the implementation of this initiative would resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. This assumption seems unrealistic since both the Greater Middle East Initiative as well as the EMP appear to Middle Eastern nations as a Western attempt to gain more influence in the region. Unless the desired reforms come from within the region itself, the "Greater Middle East Initiative" will fail.

Potential Regional Actors in the Middle East

Since the above-mentioned multinational initiatives failed in their attempts to provide regional security in the Middle East, the search for other approaches is pressing. One proposed solution is to include at least one regional actor in the Middle East in the development of future initiatives. Turkey is such a potential regional power.

Turkey as a potential regional actor in the Israeli-Arab conflict

The end of the Cold World War in 1989 decreased Turkey's geopolitical importance in the Middle East. NATO was in the process of closing military bases when suddenly the second Gulf War paved the way for Turkey's new role in the Middle East:

- military bases serving the war in Iraq;
- political and economic bridge to ethnic Turks in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan;
- stronghold against Islamic fundamentalism;
- means of accessing oil and natural resources at the Caspian Sea.

Due to this new understanding, NATO as well as the EU describe Turkey as an important ally. Turkey's interests in the region are compatible with those of the international powers and have led to increased cooperation with Turkey. The terror attacks of September 11th brought international powers closer to Turkey. The new Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East became clear when Turkey stood on the allies' side during and after the second Gulf War. Turkey also intensified its cooperation with Israel during the mid 90s. In 1996, both countries signed a military agreement. Despite this close cooperation, Turkey also has close political and economic ties with its Arab neighbors. Due to its cultural and religious roots, Turkey is part of the Islamic world. But in regard to the Israeli-Arab conflict, Turkey is the only regional power which maintains a close relationship with both conflicting parties.

This paper assumes that regional security is possible by solving the Israeli-Arab conflict through the implementation of a long lasting peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis. Multinational and regional powers must work together to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As stated above, Palestinians and Israelis have in principle accepted the framework of a final status agreement. It is now time for negotiations between a multinational actor, like the Middle East Quartet, the conflicting parties and a regional power like Turkey. The Arab Summit in Beirut in 2002 made an extensive offer for a long lasting peace between all Arab countries and Israel. It called for all Arab countries to sign an immediate peace agreement with Israel, acknowledging Israel's right to exist. Israel would have to withdraw from all territories occupied in 1967 and a Palestinian state would be established. There are two main reasons why Israel ignored this offer. First of all, Israel did not trust the Beirut offer of the Arab League. Second, this offer did not meet Israel's security interests. Due to Turkey's good relations with Israel, its role as a regional power can actively contribute to Israel's security when it comes to a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Turkey can become a bridge-builder in the region since it enjoys trust on both conflicting sides. However, Turkey's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be envisioned within a broader US and EU involvement. Due to the US-Israeli relationship, Israel may only accept a peace agreement that would include the US. On the other hand, NATO cannot serve as a multinational power in a Middle East peace initiative since the Arab world considers NATO to be a purely western institution. The sit-

Israeli-Palestinian encounter and dialogue during the NFC

uation in Afghanistan demonstrates this perception. If Turkey became a member of the EU, it could not maintain its role as a regional power with good relations to both conflicting parties. Other regional actors would question Turkey's role as a regional power, since the country would be perceived as part of the West. It is also important to mention that thus far no common EU foreign policy towards the region exists. This does not only apply to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As long as peace agreements do not result from cooperation between multinational actors and regional powers, security in the region will be difficult to realize.

This paper shows that one of the most important reasons for the failure of achieving regional security in the Middle East was the mistrust among conflicting parties. Turkey as a Muslim country with good diplomatic ties with the western world in general and Israel in particular could contribute to sustainable regional security in the Middle East. Turkey should not only mediate between Palestinians and Israelis. Turkey is the only regional power in the Middle East which could also give Israel the confidence that her security would not be endangered in case of a peace accord.

Karim Makdisi with emotional statements from Beirut, just weeks after the 2nd Israel-Lebanon War

Third Party Intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Emerging EU Alternative

Stuart Reigeluth

Stuart Reigeluth

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires the international intervention of a third party. The multinational force deployed to southern Lebanon is viewed as a possible precedent for international intervention in the Gaza Strip. A parallel could be drawn between the "Lebanon model" and the creation of a security buffer between Israel and the Palestinians, but the circumstances on the ground in southern Lebanon are different from those in the Palestinian territories. Since the "question of Palestine" remains pivotal to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the deployment of an international force to the Palestinian territories should therefore not be contingent upon the outcome of the UN/multinational force in southern Lebanon. The EU offers the best alternative for third party intervention in the Palestinian territories. Though the risks are high for the credibility of the EU, the launching of an initial military mission, a "Battle Group" of 1,500–2,000 troops, could bring about the cessation of Israeli-Palestinian hostilities, thus providing security for Israel and stability for the Palestinians.

Third Party Context

The Quartet (US, EU, UN, Russia) Roadmap has been derailed and bilateral negotiations suspended. The democratic recognition for armed resistance acquired by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has not facilitated dialogue with Israel. Consequently, the international financial embargo and Israeli military operations remain in effect. After the 2006 Lebanon War, international analysts agreed that Israel waged the war to restore a degree of military deterrence on its northern front.[1] The same desire for deterrence against the launching of Palestinian "Qassam" missiles applies to the repeated Israeli operations against the Gaza Strip. As a result of the Lebanon War, the deployment of a multinational force reinforces the UNIFIL mandate and ability to create a security buffer in southern Lebanon. In the Palestinian territories, Ehud Olmert's "convergence" plan – unilateral withdrawal – is being seriously reconsidered. A synchronized Israeli withdrawal with a similar third party "security buffer" deployment in the Palestinian territories could become a possibility. Similar to Hizballah in southern Lebanon, once the resis-

1 In reference to the 2006 Lebanon War, Robert Malley claims that the 2006 Lebanon War was a "war waged to reassert Israel's power of deterrence," and simultaneously that "greater international attention will mean more intense international involvement." See Malley, A New Middle East, in: New York Review of Books, September 21, 2006. Muriel Asseburg agrees that the 2006 Lebanon War was carried out with the goal of "re-establishing an effective deterrent." See Asseburg, An International Force for Lebanon?, Comments 20 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – SWP, Berlin), August 2006.

tance rationale is resolved, Hamas will have no incentive to maintain an armed militia or to become part of a unified Palestinian security force. As international momentum grows, now is an opportune time for third party intervention.[2]

Third party intervention is not a new concept. Martin Indyk proposed a US-led third party in the Palestinian territories.[3] Following the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August/September 2005, the EU deployed a civilian mission, EU BAM-Rafah, to monitor the passage of goods and people through the Rafah Crossing Point. Other clauses have yet to be fulfilled as part of the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) signed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). During the international deployment to southern Lebanon, PA President Mahmoud Abbas called for the intervention of an international body resembling the one in Lebanon. Abbas also stated that this international force would be in agreement with the emergence of a coalition Palestinian government.[4] Though historically adverse to third party intervention, Israel has been increasingly receptive to the involvement of a multinational force, as demonstrated in southern Lebanon. According to Yossi Alpher, this new receptiveness is due to the failure of the "traditional solutions, both military (conquest and occupation) and diplomatic (bilateral peace processes),"[5] and could be seen as a positive step towards resolving the conflict with the Palestinians.

The EU Alternative

Considering that the US is embroiled in Iraq and NATO is entangled in Afghanistan, the Palestinians would perceive neither authority as impartial. Both would appear as a threat to Arab/Muslim regimes such as Syria and Iran, and would be equally targeted by militant Islamist groups.[6] The other option would be a multinational force sponsored by the UN flag, but the legitimacy of the UN has been severely eroded since the 2003 Iraq War. The international inability to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions has been most perceptible with respect to Israel. The unilateral US veto to halt hostilities in the Gaza Strip as well as the postpone-

2 With the support of France and Italy, Spain initiated a call for a European peace plan for the Middle East, which would include five points demarcated by Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, including the deployment of international observers and / or a military mission to the Gaza Strip. See Peru Egurbide, España, Francia e Italia impulsan un plan europeo de paz para Oriente Medio, in: El País, November 17, 2006; Zapatero propone, Opinión, in: El País, November 17, 2006; and, Europe in Middle East Push, Al-Jazeera.net, November 17, 2006.

3 Martin Indyk, A Trusteeship for Palestine?, in: Foreign Affairs, May–June 2003, pp. 51–66.

4 Yoav Stern, Abbas Calls for International Force in PA as Part of New Government Plan, in: Haaretz, August 31st, 2006; Yoav Stern, PA Unity Government Could Ask for International Force, in: Haaretz, September 1st, 2006.

5 Yossi Alpher, Toward Trusteeship?, in: Bitterlemons, A Lebanon-style International Force?, September 18, 2006, über: <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>.

6 The public intentions of deploying European Member State soldiers to southern Lebanon to provide security for Israel, as proclaimed by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, arose much controversy and instigated angry Lebanese responses. See Lebanon's Top Shi'ite Cleric: UN Force only Protects Israel, in: Haaretz, October 16, 2006.

ment of a prompt diplomatic resolution to the 2006 Lebanon War further eroded the legitimacy of the UN.[7] The UN/multinational force in southern Lebanon should therefore not be replicated in the Palestinian territories. For lack of a better option, the EU now presents the best alternative for third party intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Due to geographic proximity and common security, the Middle East has become the most important region for EU foreign policy. The 2006 Lebanon War caused a sudden and fundamental change in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Joschka Fischer considers that an initiative to deploy militarily in the Middle East lies in the interest of EU Member States.[8] The current dilemma is that the EU does not have an effectively unified common foreign policy and its actions remain determined by national interests, as demonstrated by the deployment of national contingencies under the UN flag.[9] Though France initiated the deployment to southern Lebanon and transferred the leadership to Italy, incremental synergies should be encouraged between Member State contingencies rather than representative competition.[10]

Spain and Italy present such symbolic competition. In the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Socialist Party (PSOE) ascended to power in Spain, and José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero rapidly withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq. Romano Prodi, recently gaining electoral recognition for the Italian Socialist Party, has also called for an imminent withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq. Ironically, both EU Member States may be at as great a risk by legally deploying in southern Lebanon, just as they were when they deployed illegally in Iraq. Referring to UNSC Resolution 1701, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number-two of al-Qaeda, stated "the international peacekeeping force now deploying in southern Lebanon are 'enemies of Islam.'"[11] As France steps down from its colonial legacy in Lebanon, both Spain and Italy are asserting themselves in acting as peace-keepers/-makers in southern Lebanon. Both EU member states also play large roles in the two EU civilian missions (EUPOL-COPPS and EU BAM-Rafah) in the Palestinian territories.

Echoing the Palestinian demand for a replication of the international force in southern Lebanon, Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema called for the

7 See Richard Falk, The UN After Lebanon, in: The Nation, October 2nd, 2006.

8 Joschka Fischer, Europa cruza el Rubicón, in: El País, September 5, 2006, p. 13.

9 See Denis MacShane, Europe is Involved in Palestine, But not Coherently, in: The Daily Star, November 14, 2006.

10 La première fois, l'Europe peut jouer un rôle actif au Proche-Orient, in: Le Monde, August 25, 2006.

11 Richard Beeston, Al-Qaeda Threatens New Terror Offensive against Gulf States, in: The Times, September 12, 2006. UNIFIL II forces will not be targeted by Hezbollah but rather by extremist Sunni Muslim groups. See Robert Fisk, Conflict in Middle East is Mission Implausible, in: The Independent, November 15, 2006.

deployment of an international force in the Gaza Strip.[12] A proper EU approach should now be based on the common interest for security in coordination with the Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (currently Marc Otte) via EU Council High Representative, Javier Solana. Member States could contribute national contingencies to EU "Battle Groups" rather than contingencies beneath the UN flag. The difference is subtle, but important: instead of promulgating a national Member State force, each individual member state could contribute to a common EU effort. The EU can use this as an opportunity to develop a "coherent foreign policy toward the Middle East" based on a common defense and security policy, repudiating the power politics of military force, and defined by multilateral consent between engaging parties.[13]

Instead of an UN / multinational force led by one member state (as in southern Lebanon), the EU now has the capability to deploy a "Battle Group" of 1,500-2,000 soldiers. This may not be sufficient to secure the Gaza-Israel border and certainly not the West Bank. However, an initial Battle Group could be reinforced by subsequent Battle Groups once the EU has the capability to deploy over ten such groups with the operational ability "to undertake two simultaneous missions."[14] The deployment of a Battle Group would also revamp the EU civilian missions operating in the Palestinian territories. Subsequently, the EU monitoring role at Rafah Crossing Point could expand to include monitoring the other crossing points along the Gaza-Israel border, as well as along the Jordan-Palestine border. Simultaneously, EUPOL-COPPS could reinitiate the training of a Palestinian Civil Police force. This may be opposed by Israel because it may eventually lead to the formation of a Palestinian National Army. However, Israel could accept the emergence of a Palestinian National Army if the "burden of responsibility" were transferred to the surveillance and guidance of an international third party force.[15] Mentioning the emergence of a Palestinian National Army seems nonetheless premature if the Palestinians do not have a nation. International intervention must therefore be conditioned on mutual bilateral political commitment based on the parameters for a final settlement between Israel and the PA.

12 Meron Rapoport, Italian FM: Harsh U.S. Approach to Mideast Failed, in: Haaretz, August 25, 2006.

13 See Álvaro de Vasconcelos, A European Force: What For?, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Berlin / Lissabon 2006. Alvaro de Vasconcelos argues that the successful emergence of a common EU foreign policy will depend on "whether the force emanates from Europe's defence policy or whether it is the result of a coalition led by one member state."

14 See The EU Battle Groups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell (European Union Fact Sheet), February, 2005; "Battle Groups" to strengthen EU military crisis management?, in: European Security Review (ISIS Europe), April 2004; Markus Kaim, EU Battle Groups and Civilian Headline Goal – ESDP Targets, in: Volker Perthes / Stefan Mair (eds.), European Foreign and Security Policy, Challenges and Opportunities for the German EU Presidency (SWP Research Papers; RP 10/2006), Berlin, October 2006, pp. 19–22.

15 Israel's Political Options Vis-à-vis the Palestinians (Reut Institute, Tel Aviv), November 16, 2006, p. 7.

Political Commitment

European military engagement should be accompanied by political commitment. To reinforce the multinational military presence, the EU may take certain political initiatives:

1) Act as an impartial third party mediator, assist in the consolidation of a coalition PA government, including elements of the democratically elected Hamas and remnants of Fatah.
2) Push for Palestinian acquiescence to the three conditions demanded by Israel: recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and acceptance to previous agreements between the PA and Israel; on the condition that Israel also respect the previous agreements, namely the Paris Protocol (1994) and the Agreement on Movement and Access (2005).
3) Create confidence between the PA and the Government of Israel. The EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (Marc Otte) would willingly act as intermediary between the conflicting parties.
4) Expand the sectors of implementation for foreign funds via the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) to include schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, companies and clients.
5) Exert diplomatic pressure on Israel to return the monthly tax and customs revenues to the PA as stipulated by the 1994 Paris Protocol within the Oslo

Stuart Reigeluth on Third Party Intervention

Accord framework, and offer the reward of shifting the security burden of responsibility to the EU Battle Groups.

6) Ensure a two-state solution via a long-term 15–20 year hudna, or "truce," between the Palestinians and Israelis based on the pre-1967 borders (or the 1948 armistice line). The "convergence" plan is not set in stone. Small "outposts" can be incorporated within larger settlements, but these larger Jewish settlements can also be relocated within Israel proper (inside the demarcation line of 1948, prior to 1967), as a majority resides on Palestinian-owned land, or they could be swapped "for some equivalent territories in present-day Israel."[16]

Going for Gaza First?

The first and most attractive option for Israel is that an international force deploy in Gaza. There are preliminary advantages for Israel, the Palestinians, and the European Union:

1) Increase Israeli security in cities around the Gaza Strip, namely Ashdod, Askelon and Sderot. However, Israel must comprehend that eradicating the launching of "Qassam" rockets will not occur instantaneously, but that given time and space to maneuver, a multinational force could gradually reduce the number of missiles launched into Israel to zero. "Qassams" have generally had little impact on Israeli society or infrastructure, and have been employed by Israel as a reason to retaliate with excessive force. An international deployment could thus help demonstrate that "Qassam" missiles are counterproductive to Palestinian national aspirations and daily economic interests.
2) Provide security in the streets of the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians must understand the need to ease the explosive frictions between opposing factions. An international force could provide calm by patrolling the streets of Gaza City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah. Given enough credibility, this multinational force would provide the Palestinian National Unity Government the breathing space needed to operate effectively, which Hamas has repeatedly claimed is also in its interest. In cooperation with the coalition PA government, the Palestinian security forces should include the emerging Presidential Guard (Fatah) and the Executive Force (Hamas) as well as incorporate militant wings of respective groups, such as the most prominent two: the Izz al-Din al-Qassam (Hamas) and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah). The deployment of an international EU force should also be based on the condition that militias would be incorporated within a unified Palestinian civil po-

16 See Steven Erlanger, Israeli Maps says West Bank Posts Sit on Arab Land, in: The New York Times, November 21, 2006; Henry Kissinger, What's Needed From Hamas, in: The Washington Post, February 27, 2006.

lice force, which could lead to the emergence of a unified Palestinian armed force (similar to the multi-ethnic Lebanese Army) which would eventually replace the function of the international force in patrolling the streets of the Gaza Strip and the Gaza-Israel border (as well as the Gaza-Egypt border).

3) Enhance the visibility and effectiveness of the EU presence. The deployment of a multinational force could provide the security mentioned and thus permit the full implementation of the two EU civilian missions operating in the Palestinian territories: EUPOL-COPPS and EU BAM-Rafah. Both civilian missions are currently suspended due to circumstances on the ground, but could easily be reinvigorated with adequate security measures in coordination with Israel and the Palestinians. The renewal of full implementation would permit the passage of people and goods in and out of the Gaza Strip, thus assisting economic development. The creation of jobs and the general rejuvenation of the economy would decrease the incentive for individuals to carry out radical acts of violence. Despite the risk of failure, EU presence in support of civilian missions via military intervention would strongly increase the image of the EU in the Middle East.

The Gaza first option serves Israeli interests since it would relieve Israel of having to maintain a military presence within or around the Strip. However, to reduce militant threats, Israel would need to consent to the international deployment of troops on the Israeli side of the border, as well as the opening of numerous crossing points between Israel and the Gaza Strip, such as Erez, Karni and Kerem Shalom. Refusing to do so will only frustrate European attempts to bring security to Israel and stability to the Palestinians. The EU military deployment must therefore be conditioned by Israeli willingness to allow the physical opening of all respective crossing points to facilitate economic development. In turn, this may be in the interest of Israel since it would decrease the incentive for militant Palestinian activity.

The Palestinians, however, would be highly reluctant to accept the Gaza first option because it would not include the other part of what remains of Palestine. Already separated geographically, politically, and legally, opting for Gaza first would split the Palestinian territories further.[17] International intervention must therefore include final status conditions for the West Bank and Jerusalem, which are both substantially more complex and symbolic than the Gaza Strip. A final status settlement would have to include the question of refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and the national borders between Israel and Palestine. The Palestinian

17 Camille Mansour, Not Without a Political Horizon, in: Bitterlemons, A Lebanon-style International Force?, September 18th, 2006, über: <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>.

territories – the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem – must be treated as one for the third party mandate to be accepted by the Palestinians.[18] If not, the Palestinians will perceive an international force as a surrogate for Israel.

Many contentious points remain, such as the Palestinian right of return, the repatriation of refugees, and the border delineation along the Israeli "security fence" or along the 1948 armistice line. An international force would be deployed to ensure the total dismantling of the "separation wall." Territorial swaps could also ensure that the Palestinians retrieve a portion of land proportional to the amount they lost in the war of June 1967. Such a territorial swap would permit Israel to maintain some settlements in the West Bank in exchange for territory within Israel. All other Jewish settlements would be dismantled since they would be deemed illegal by international law. As consolidated by Israel prior to and during the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Greater Jerusalem could subsequently become an international city as envisioned by the 1947 UN partition plan. Acquiring international status for the three "people of the Book"—Christians, Jews, and Muslims—would be seen as a symbolic sign for religious reconciliation and political coexistence.

Conclusion

The EU offers a viable option for third party intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Because of its potential to compromise member state participation, this intervention should not be determined by the success level of the UN/multinational task in southern Lebanon. Rather, it should be seen as a necessary prerequisite to paving the path for a final settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. From such a perspective, a longer-term EU peacekeeping mission could then substitute the rapid deployment of a EU "Battle Group" of 1,500–2,000 European Member State troops. The initial deployment to the Gaza-Israel border would provide the security demanded by Israel and the stability needed by the Palestinians, as well as create the possibility to implement fully the two EU civilian missions in the Palestinian territories and the Agreement on Movement and Access signed by Israel and the PA. But as ever, the success of the EU alternative depends on what Israel will refuse for security reasons and what Palestinians would accept as national territory.

18 Ghassan Khatib, A Measure of International Seriousness, in: Bitterlemons, A Lebanon-style International Force?, September 18th, 2006, über: <http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/>.

Participants and Organizers

Participants

Gerardo Briceño (Venezuela) is a guest researcher at the Max-Planck-Institute for foreign and international criminal law in Freiburg, Germany.

Mathieu Briens (France) is Academic Assistant within the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium.

MAJ Jonathan Byrom (USA) is a cavalry officer in the US Army and is currently serving as an economics instructor and International Security Seminar Executive Officer in the Social Sciences Department at the United States Military Academy, Westpoint, USA.

Moty Cristal (Israel) writes his PhD on Negotiation Systems at the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics, UK.

Bob Deen (The Netherlands) is working as a Project Officer for the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Hague, The Netherlands.

Marcel Gerber (Switzerland) is a Policy Adviser in the Directorate for Security Policy in the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Berne, Switzerland.

Kristin M. Haugevik (Norway) is a researcher at the Department of International Politics at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway.

Mohamed Ibrahim (Germany) is working as a Program Manager for InWEnt-Capacity Building International, Berlin, Germany.

Robert Khorolskyy (Ukraine) is Assistant Professor of International Law and Constitutional Law of Foreign States at Yaroslav the Wise National Law Academy of Ukraine, Kharkiv, Ukraine.

Claudia Major (Germany) is currently completing her PhD in European Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK, and teaches at the Institute for Political Studies in Paris ('Sciences Po'), France.

Karim Makdisi (Lebanon) is an Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon.

Rafeh A. Malik (Pakistan) is working for the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Pakistan.

Stuart Reigeluth (Belgium/USA) works for the Africa and Middle East Program at the Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax) in Madrid, Spain.

Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss (Germany) is a member of the Policy Planning and Advisory Staff in the German Ministry of Defence in Berlin.

Rashad Shirinov (Azerbaijan) is teaching theories of international relations at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan.

Martin Sjögren (Sweden) is currently working as a Research Assistant within the project on Euro-Atlantic, Regional and Global Security at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden.

Eduard Soler i Lecha (Spain) is the coordinator of the Mediterranean Programme at CIDOB Foundation of Barcelona, Spain.

Mehmet Y. Tezcan (Turkey) is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science and Researcher at the Institute for European Studies at Free University of Brussels, Belgium.

Natalia Touzovskaia (Russia) is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.

Zhou Qiujun (China) is a doctoral student of International Relations jointly run by the School of Advanced International and Area Studies (SAIAS), East China Normal University in Shanghai and the Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines in Lyon, France.

Organizers

Kathrin Brockmann is Program Officer of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking.

Hans Bastian Hauck is Head of Program of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking.

Sverre Lodgaard has been Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) from 1997 until 2007.

Fritjof von Nordenskjöld is Executive Vice President at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin.

Elana Wilson is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian Studies at NUPI.

Impressum

September 2007
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V.
Rauchstraße 17/18
10787 Berlin
Deutschland

Tel.: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-0
Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16

info@dgap.org
www.dgap.org

Fotos
Konferenzteilnehmer

Satz
Tilmann Chladek

Belichtung und Druck
Bonifatius Druck • Buch • Verlag, Paderborn

ISBN: 978-3-9810553-5-1

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek.
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie. Detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

ISBN: 978-3-9810553-5-1