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Katharina Hofer

The role of Evangelical NGOs in International Development A comparative case study of Kenya and Uganda¹

Abstract

This paper examines the public role of a new type of Christian mission in sub-Saharan Africa: evangelical Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Since the early 1980s, NGOs have played an ever more prominent role in development co-operation. Yet within the non-governmental sector, faith-based organisations now seem to excel secular organisations, both in number and budget. Their growing recognition can be explained in terms of their expanding international networks and well-established local alliances, as well as their steady supply in private funding and voluntary work force. Faith-based NGOs, it will be argued, represent a vital component in the globally expanding evangelical network between the northern and southern hemispheres: By helping to advance church-planting campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa, faith-based NGOs broaden the international support bases for conservative Christian groups in North America. In the fall of 2001, President George W. Bush approved a new government programme that aims at expanding the share of religious organisation in the domestic and international welfare sectors. This paper examines the link between foreign missionary interventions and the privatisation of public services with reference to the education sector in Kenya and Uganda, and assesses the political implications of these developments.

Keywords

Kenya, Uganda, Christian Church, religious association, political Protestantism, fundamentalism, Pentecostalism, non-governmental organization, foreign aid/development aid, interest group, United States, United Nations, school education, private education funding

¹ This paper is based on field work carried out in Kenya and Uganda from June to September 2001 and January to May 2002. The field work forms part of a doctoral thesis that was submitted to the University of Freiburg in September 2003.

Much academic literature has been produced so far on the “third wave” of Christianity, the charismatic revival that has led to a mushrooming of Pentecostal churches especially in the developing world since the 1980s. And more recently, Europeans have, at times nervously, observed the growing visibility of Christian conservatism in American public discourse. Little effort has yet been made to investigate how these developments may be connected to one another. This paper argues that fundamentalist and charismatic Christianity have gained much common ground in the public realm of both Western and African societies in recent years, by uniting people with similar social and political concerns in a globally expanding evangelical network. Thus, whilst the contemporary international evangelical movement relates to conservative social agendas in Africa, its success at church-planting and –franchising around the world has strengthened the position of right-leaning Christians within the mainstream American public. As a movement without centralised organisation and hierarchical structures, evangelicalism has been able to spread rapidly within the informal development market. Both development and faith-based organisations arrange themselves on a familiar pattern: a tendency to multiply by splitting and re-joining in loose associations, and a tendency to cover territory rather than take root, implying a high degree of flexibility and adaptability to different social and political environments. Both secular and religious missionaries strive in the domains of health and education. In the wake of structural adjustment and privatisation policies in the developing world, NGOs have been entrusted with the delivery of public services on a hitherto unknown scale. Especially in the domain of education, it will be argued, evangelical missionaries can make a lasting impact on social and political formation in sub-Saharan Africa. Before assessing the evangelical missionary factor in Kenya and Uganda, however, this paper will briefly look at the movement’s historical narrative, its contemporary political concerns and its interventions in American foreign policy towards the developing world.

The Evangelical Movement

In his *World Christian Encyclopedia*, David Barrett refers to evangelicals as Great Commission Christians, that is, Christians who claim a divine mandate to urgently save as many souls as possible before Christ’s Second Coming, believed to be immanent. He counts 647.8 Mio. adherents in this group, the majority of which are to be found among the 523.7 Mio. Pentecostals, as well as revivalist Protestants and charismatic Catholics (Barrett et al. 2001: 23, 25).

The religious market of the United States has always been pluralistic. It is therefore difficult to catch the various contemporary religious streams along denominational lines. Thus, the evangelical missionary movement emerged at the dawn of the 20th century and drew massive financial support from various Protestant congregations across the anglophone world. It sprang from the protestant Holiness revival that spread among Methodists, Quakers, Presbyterians and

Baptists. Pentecostalism, although institutionally distinct, is closely associated with the world-wide charismatisation of Christianity during this period. Pentecostalism has been described as a faith-based movement of the African-American diaspora and immigrant communities, as socially heterogeneous and grass-roots oriented. Towards the late 1970s and early 1980s, the label “Black Pentecostalism” emerged in the academic literature and the term “African Independent (or Instituted) Churches” (AICs) now designated autonomous *African* Pentecostalism. This terminology suggests a growing awareness about the distinctiveness of independent, local forms of Pentecostalism with little or no missionary incentive, and an expanding evangelical Pentecostalism with a strong missionary zeal that appeared to break with much of the charismatic movement’s original social dynamic. In contemporary Kenya and Uganda, the two groups can be identified with two distinct umbrella organisations, the Organisation of African Instituted Churches and the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya and Uganda, the national chapters of the World Evangelical Alliance. Whilst the membership body of AICs has been shrinking since the 1970s, evangelical Pentecostal churches have multiplied during the same period. In both countries, evangelicals make up between 25-30% of the population, whereas traditional Pentecostals amount to a mere 10% (Barrett et al. 2001: 25).²

Christian Fundamentalism, an inter-denominational Protestant movement, made its first appearance at the beginning of the 20th century, parallel to the emergence of Pentecostalism. The term was coined by a series of pamphlets published under the title *The Fundamentals* in 1912. The movement attacked secularisation tendencies, evolution theory and historical relativism both within society and the church and promoted the reconstruction of society according to the patriarchal model of the Hebrew Bible. Its philosophy of “social-reconstruction” lends to the promotion of economic liberalism and a rejection of the welfare state that would weaken patriarchal dependencies. Baptist televangelisers Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson stand in the tradition of Christian Fundamentalism. They joined with Pentecostals like Oral Roberts and Billy Graham to form, in their own words, “the largest and most active conservative grassroots political organization in America”,³ known as the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition and the Religious Right. The Moral Majority was promoted by Falwell in 1979 in an attempt to move Fundamentalists from their hitherto isolated position into a mainstream conservative block that would have sufficient weight to make an impact on national politics.⁴ Susan Harding, in her analysis *The Book of Jerry*

2 Note that the distinction between traditional and evangelical Pentecostalism is not always evident and that numbers could vary for both countries. Generally speaking, AICs are more numerous in Kenya than in Uganda.

3 See self-presentation of the Christian Coalition of America, <http://www.cc.org/aboutcca/index.html> [as of 16/07/03].

4 Falwell organised a pro Reagan march in Washington in the 1980 election campaign and invited Reagan to speak at the National Religious Broadcasters Convention at his Thomas Road Baptist Church. The Christian Coalition was founded in 1989 by Pat Robertson after his defeat in the Presidential elections in 1988. With Falwell’s Moral Majority disappearing in the late 1980s, Robertson took over many of its followers. Falwell later re-emerged as leader of Liberty Alliance, an integral movement of the Christian Coalition. Robertson promotes, among others, a messianic reading of the Bible that urges America’s divine obligation towards the Holy Land. He toured Israel several times and received a State of Israel Friendship Award from the Chicago chapter of the Zionist Organisation of America in summer 2002. He has also been credited with a questionable involvement in diamond trade in

Falwell, assumes that the “Moral Majority moniker” was a public relations stunt in which Falwell appeared as the self-initiated leader of a Christian value coalition in national public life (Harding 2000: 20). The merger with Protestant and Pentecostal congregations and their globally expanding evangelical missionary movement was an important factor for the Religious Right’s growing public recognition from the early 1980s onwards. The new alliance also contributed to a dominance of right-leaning evangelical and Pentecostal groups over more liberal forces within these movements.⁵

The Pro-Family movement that formed in response to the 1973 Supreme Court ruling on *Roe v. Wade*, repealing state bans on abortion, is Falwell’s brain child (Harding 2000: 20). The movement did not become vocal immediately after the court decision but by the early 1980s it had become a central focus of the Religious Right movement in the United States. The movement’s main concern is to protect the family against influences which it broadly defines as secular and liberal. In the 1990s, Pro-Family groups had taken their concerns to the global level via the international evangelical movement.

The Religious Right and Global Population Policy

In 1994, the United Nations’ population conference in Cairo agreed that education must spearhead global population policy.⁶ Among other things, the conference agreed that rising literacy levels among women would postpone the age of marriage and reduce the number of children, thus improving children’s health and prospects for education.⁷ The Cairo declaration was endorsed by 179 nations, including the United States under the Clinton administration, but was rejected by a number of Arab countries and by the Holy See delegation. Similar to the arguments of the original vetoes, the Pro-Family movement stresses that Western, and increasingly non-Western societies are under attack from “secular ideologies” which devalue the (traditional nuclear) family and labour towards their numerical decline. As Martin noted in *Foreign Policy*, “[t]he same values that underlie the Christian Right’s domestic policies also drive its international agenda. Religious activists have consistently opposed any foreign-policy initiative that might

war-torn Liberia and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. According to Dena Montague, Robertson invited Laurent Kabila to the United States in order to discuss business relations shortly before Kabila took power in 1996 (Montague 2002: 4).

5 On the phenomenon of amalgamation of Pentecostal with US-evangelical and Protestant Fundamentalist churches in Africa see Brouwer et al. 1996: 156f. For a more comprehensive discourse analysis on contemporary charismatic Christianity in Africa see also Kamphausen 1999: 63-71.

6 See *Programme of Action of the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development*, Chapter IV: Gender equality, equity, and empowerment of women, online document, <http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/Cairo/program/p00000.html> [as of 01/08/03].

7 *Ibid.*, Chapter XI, Education, population and sustainable development, <http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/Cairo/program/p11001.html> [as of 01/08/03].

weaken parental control over children, facilitate abortion, expand the rights of homosexuals, or devalue the role of the conventional housemaker and mother.” (Martin 1999). Pro-Family campaigners have argued that the export of contraceptives from the industrial to the developing world constitutes a paternalistic policy which imposes a “secularist ideology” on “religious societies” in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

With this critique, the Pro-Family movement echoes the opinions voiced by many Third World governments concerning some of the United Nation’s socio-political agendas and their underlying normative concepts. Whilst many policy-makers and diplomats from the South may seek to draw attention to the asymmetrical power relations in multi-national forums by challenging Western supremacy on an ideological level, for others, some of the UN’s perspectives on human development may in and by themselves be objectionable. Religious groups have thus become defenders of normative ethics associated with social and cultural settings. Hence, with the growing integration of local and global political processes, religious conservatives increasingly find more in common with religious conservatives of other faiths than they do with non-conservatives within their own faith traditions. According to Jennifer Butler, a representative of Ecumenical Women 2000 Plus, the social and political campaigns of religious groups at multilateral organisations “present a radical realignment of religious and political interests.” (Butler 2000: 4)

Religious groups have become ever more prominent in UN forums and continue to extend their role in shaping international public policy. Yet observers stress that it are conservative groups that constitute the new religious prominence, at the expense of liberal religious groups whose presence has been declining in recent years (see for instance Numrich 2001: 53-68). However, conservative Christian groups not only comprise of different Christian denominations but have formed alliances with conservatives of other faith traditions. Colum Lynch, UN correspondent for the *Washington Post*, summarises this trend as follows: “Conservative U.S. Christian organizations have joined forces with Islamic governments to halt the expansion of sexual and political protections and rights for gays, women and children at United Nations conferences.” He quotes Austin Ruse, founder and President of the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, a Pro-Family organisation with UN consultative status, “We have realized that without countries like Sudan, abortion would have been recognized as a universal human right in a UN document.” (Lynch 2002). It is this seeming contradiction between theological fundamentalism and institutional ecumenism which characterises conservative evangelicalism and which constitutes its political significance.

Pro-Family health and ethics research centres in the United States have registered NGOs specifically for the purpose of seeking delegate status with the UN and gaining access to UN conferences.⁸ These NGOs made their first appearance at the Beijing+5 women’s conference in 2000 where, according to observers of the meeting, they were less engaged in advocating their

8 It is noteworthy that the Religious Right movement is organised around major think tanks, such as the Family Research Center (FCR) of Gary Bauer in Washington DC, with an annual budget of 14 Mio. USD and a permanent staff of 120. For a more detailed treatment of Religious Right institutions (see Braml forthcoming 2004: 13).

own policy agendas than in disrupting meetings and blocking the adoption of programmes and agendas in several health and development related forums.⁹

Butler stresses that the organisers behind these grassroots interventions who registered several NGOs at the conference, all have well established links to the Republican Party. She adds that “the agenda of this ‘Pro-Family’ coalition has been shaped by US politics and represents a spill over of US politics into the NGO community and international arena. The rhetoric and polarization brought by ‘Pro-Family’ forces echo that of the current Republican Congress and Religious Right in the US. The rhetoric and strategies of the ‘Pro-Family’ forces also echo current struggles between the Religious Right, moderates and liberals in mainline Protestant churches in the US.” (Butler 2000: 9). Hence, if we believe Butler, it are political actors that seek the alliance of religious movements, rather than vice versa.

A central figure in this coalition appears to be Rev. Sun Myung Moon, previously known as a critic of the United Nations and supporter of a unilateral US foreign policy (see Moon 1986). The Moon organisation, also known as Unification Church, which disappeared and re-emerged several times in the US public arena since its support campaign for President Nixon during the Watergate scandal, has registered three NGOs at the United Nations.¹⁰ Moon built up an impressive business empire in the Americas, yet he is said to having established a voluntary organisations’ empire during the 1990s as well, with more than 1,000 NGOs being linked to his church (Paine et al. 2001: 3).

Taj Hamad, a key figure of Unification Church and director of International Religious Foundation, one of Moon’s three NGOs with UN consultative status, established the World Association of United Nations Non-Governmental Organizations in 2000, renamed the World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) in the same year. The organisation, founded shortly before the United Nations *Millennium Summit*, presented itself as central umbrella organisation for NGOs at the UN, and it appeared to challenge the role of the longstanding Conference of NGOs in Consultative Status with the United Nations. Rev. Chung Hwan Kwak, director of the Moon run Interreligious and International Federation for World Peace (IIFWP) is board chairman of WANGO, and Dr. Wally N’Dow functions as WANGO’s secretary general, a Gambian who served as Secretary General of the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements and as Officer in Charge of the United Nations Center for Human Settlements (Habitat) in Nairobi. N’Dow also appears as contributor to “Dialogue and Harmony Among Civilizations: The Family, Universal Values, and World Peace”, a report of the *World Culture and Sports Festival 2001*, funded by Rev. Moon which, although not formally linked to the UN, was held at various UN premises in New York.

9 Thus, according to Butler’s report, the World Youth Alliance, a group comprising mainly of young men from the Washington area who were little informed about the issues they sought to advocate, were employed to target specific forums to outvote Pro-Choice NGOs. In other instances, participants of the meeting were intimidated when “a group of cassocked Catholic friars surrounded individual women’s rights activists and began to pray, holding hands around them.” (Butler 2000: 7).

10 The three NGOs with UN representative status are International Religious Foundation (IRF), Women’s Federation for World Peace, (WFWP) and Family Federation for World Peace (FFWP). For more information see Paine et al. 2001. For a more general treatment, see “*The Economist*, 7-13 November 1998.

The event was co-sponsored by Iran, the League of Arab States, Tajikistan, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Indonesia. It hosted a peculiar assembly of ex-officials, amongst others former UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former President of Poland Lech Walesa, a former governor general of Canada, the former presidents of Uruguay, Micronesia, and Barbados, and George Bush Sr.'s Vice President Dan Quayle.

Moon's inter-faith campaign is several years old. In 1996, the Unification Church launched the conference *Empowering the Muslim Family*, co-hosted by the African-American Islamic Institute and The Association for the Research of Middle Eastern Cultures. The conference was attended by 150 guests from Africa and the United States (Mesbah 1996). Looking at more recent events, it becomes obvious that Moon's coalition with selected Islamic and Third World countries formed in the mid 1990s. The Indonesian mission appears to be one of WANGO's main supporters. The missions of Mongolia, Iran, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Mozambique and Uganda, all sponsored WANGO conferences, of which almost a dozen were held in 2000 and 2001. The attendance of ex-officials, such as Oscar Arias of Costa Rica or Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was also a repeating pattern.

One month after the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, WANGO organised a conference entitled *The Millennium Declaration of the United Nations: A Response from Civil Society* that was again held at UN premises.¹¹ The conference sought to promote the establishment of a religious assembly within the United Nations' formal structures, a UN council consisting of religious leaders. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, WANGO organised a conference *Global Violence: Crisis and Hope* in October 2001, featuring familiar guests such as Dan Quayle, the former Indonesian President Wahid, and Rev. Dr. Jerry Falwell. Once again, the assembly stressed the need for greater involvement of religious and non-governmental actors at the national and international governance level to solve global problems (see Walsh 2001). Further, since 2000 WANGO organises an annual conference called the *United States and the United Nations* where the regular guests meet up with Congressmen, UN officials, and representatives of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The event is sponsored by IIFWP, the University of Bridgeport, the Washington Times Foundation, and the World University Federation, all of which are owned by Rev. Moon (Rothmeyer 1984: 23-71).

In 2002, the Bush administration decided to withhold funds worth 34 Mio. USD from the United Nations Fund For Population Activities (UNFPA) and to withhold another 200 Mio. USD from programmes in support of reproductive health and HIV/Aids education in Afghanistan. Funds were also withheld from the World Health Organisation, and USAID was advised to withhold funds from NGOs with reproductive health programmes in developing countries.

The United States made an effort to pull out from multilateral forums so as to seek an independent approach to global population policies, and it did so on the pretext that UN population programmes would promote abortion and promiscuity.¹² Even the highly appraised new anti-

¹¹ See the conference report, online document: www.wango.org/activiti/index.html [as of 07/02/03].

¹² For instance, John M. Klink, who had previously represented the Vatican at the Cairo summit and also functioned as the Holy See's spokesman for the Vatican's withdrawal from UNICEF in 1996, was appointed to represent the United States at several UN population conferences since 2001. Klink has rejected much of the UN's population

HIV/Aids scheme appears to be a continuation of this line, channelling funds to unilateral programmes carried out increasingly by the private sector and especially by “faith-based organisations”, i.e. NGOs run by religious organisations.

In December 2002, President Bush announced the establishment of so called centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (FBCI). This follows a number of similar provisions that were ratified already under the Clinton administration, including the International Religious Freedom Act passed in 1998 which emphasised the protection of religious groups around the world as a US foreign policy priority; and the so called “charitable choice provision”, an amendment which Senator John Ashcroft made to the Welfare Act in 1996 and which drew criticism because he did so without issuing a public statement in advance of the ratification.¹³ FBCI is launched among others at the Department of Agriculture and at USAID, with an office at the White House being assigned to the programme.¹⁴

Faith-based and community organisations have played an ever more prominent role in international development in the course of the 1990s. Before the launching of this programme however, USAID channelled funds for family planning programmes to secular and faith-based NGOs at about equal proportions. At this stage, it is not clear whether this policy will change in the medium term due to the introduction of the FBCI programme. According to members of the NGO community, many faith-based organisations remain sceptical about government funding as they fear it could undermine their autonomy. They would rather not rely on funding that is tied up with party political agendas which, after all, may change with the next elections. The programme is certainly not confined to evangelical organisations and yet many of the larger faith-based development NGOs belong to the conservative evangelical spectrum. Thus it is likely that those larger evangelical NGOs like Samaritan’s Purse and World Vision which are already on the government’s pay role may be able to extent their current budget through the new scheme.¹⁵

Summarising these developments, the American Pro-Family movement has a growing impact on United States’ and United Nations’ policies towards Africa in three ways: Firstly, privatisation of public welfare is being promoted through NGO campaigns at government level. Secondly, a specific operational approach is being promoted at the national and international levels that favours the support of faith-based organisations as agents of international development. And thirdly, the lobbying of religious freedom in US domestic politics, limiting state interference with church groups and widening the space for religious groups in schools and the general public, has

policy as promoting abortion in the Third World. See *The New York Times*, 25 May 2001, and *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 May 2001.

13 The bill permits public social services to be administered inside churches, grants a right to religious contractors to discriminate in hiring employees who are paid with tax-payers funds; and it grants all religious organisations a statutory right to contract with a state agency for the delivery of social services.

14 See the White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives, online document: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/> [as of 05/06/03].

15 For instance, in 2001 World Vision received 1,3 million USD worth of funds from USAID for projects targeting infant mortality and maternal health in Kenya and 3,25 million USD worth of funds for a micro-enterprise loaning scheme in Uganda, see Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) online registry: www.pvo.net/usa/id/.

impacted on foreign policy agendas as well. As a result, pressure is put on aid receiving governments to open up public space for religious groups they have traditionally treated with scepticism.¹⁶

Evangelicalism in Kenya and Uganda

Evangelical NGOs target rural areas in development countries where church planting missions cannot reach. They are a major force in what is commonly referred to as “frontier mission” which, unlike church-planting campaigns, is still the domain of Western missionaries. Through development projects they create friendly environments for the establishment of domestic evangelical church communities. Since the projects undertaken both by missionaries and evangelical development workers have common interests, they share part of their networks and resources at the local level.

In an article published in early 2002, Julie Hearn points out that “the US evangelical missionary project has an annual income of two billion dollars, equivalent to one fifth of aid transferred by NGOs worldwide, yet it is the impact that it has made in the Third World that makes it the formidable actor it is today.” (Hearn 2002: 40). Given the recent policy shift in US aid distribution, funds that are withheld from family planning organisations are increasingly channelled through faith based organisation. The movement’s impact will gain additional momentum. Hearn further remarks, “as NGOs, [mission organisations] have become valuable partners in implementing US objectives in Kenya.” (Hearn 2002: 56). Among these objectives she lists the supervision of population growth, the combat of HIV/Aids, and the privatisation of health services.

Privatisation in Kenya and Uganda

The donor community became increasingly wary of government corruption in Africa towards the mid 1980s. Almost simultaneously, all major donor countries changed their aid distribution policies, effecting a dramatic increase of NGOs in numbers and budgets. The number of NGOs enjoying consultative status at the Economic and Social Council at the UN has grown from 41 to 1,350 since the council’s inauguration. Within less than a decade, the total amount managed by NGOs in Africa has more than tripled, from 1 billion USD in 1990 to 3.5 billion USD in 1998 (Chege 1999:1). Between 1995 and 2000, the United States were channelling 35% of aid through

¹⁶ The investigations of the Ugandan police following the Kanungu massacre and closure of some Pentecostal churches, were criticised by the United States International Religious Freedom Report. See *International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Uganda*, online document: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13861.htm [as of 04/05/03].

NGOs,¹⁷ and a similar policy has been adopted by the World Bank. The share of World Bank sponsored projects involving NGOs increased from less than 10% in 1990 to over 40% in 2001 (World Bank 2003).

The official development aid (ODA) paid out at government level has decreased accordingly. ODA's share in government expenditure has declined all over sub-Saharan Africa. In Uganda, ODA fell only little from 835 Mio. USD in 1995 to 819 Mio. USD in 2000. With a 76.8% share in government expenditure, Uganda's aid dependency is among the highest on the continent. In Kenya, the shift was more dramatic with ODA falling from 734 Mio. USD in 1995 to 512 Mio. USD in 2000, and ODA share in government expenditure dropping from 28.5% to 16% (World Bank 2001).

In Kenya, the World Bank's and IMF's decision to withdraw government funding was consequential. Although financial assistance provided through these organisations fell short of ODA provided by unilateral donors, the bank's withdrawal was significant in that it discredited Kenya's government as exceptionally corrupt. In Kenya, both corruption and political repression were systemic during the 1980s and early 1990s. Western donors partially followed the bank's line by channelling more aid through the informal sector whilst implementing financial sanctions to put pressure on the Moi government. Given the peaceful democratic transition in December 2002, that followed the introduction of a multi-party system in 1992 and a constitutional review process with broad public participation, it could be argued that this donor policy was met with success. International pressure could unfold a positive influence on political reform because it was backed up by internal pressure, coming from rights organisations, churches, the media, and the Kenyan public at large. Another effect of the cutback of ODA, however, was the rapid growth of the informal aid sector.

Health and education used to be the domains of missionaries in colonial Kenya and Uganda. Upon independence, the Kenyan and Ugandan governments sought to appropriate these sectors and integrate them into a state managed welfare systems. In Kenya, these attempts failed in the long run due to insufficient capital reserves. "Mzee" Jomo Kenyatta became synonymous with the patrimonial ruler, using state resources and government assets to deliver to his own constituency and to bribe political opponents, rather than developing a social welfare system that would suit the country's needs and abilities. Building on the Gikuyu tradition of self-reliance that had emerged during colonial times, Kenyatta institutionalised voluntary self-help initiatives known as Harambee, "pulling-together". Thus, long before the term "NGO" was established in international development speech, Kenya had its own community based voluntary sector. While churches provided health and education, Harambees built and maintained roads, wells, bridges, market stalls and other municipal buildings. These efforts, however, were not autonomous from the state but formed part of its system of patronage (Barkan 1992: 177). From the perspective of Statehouse, Harambee fulfilled two purposes: firstly, it reduced the financial strain put on central government budgets; secondly, it tied local leaders to their rural constituencies and kept

17 U.S. Agency for International Development, *President Bush Approves Faith-Based Office for USAID*, USAID Press Release 138 (2002), 12 December 2002.

them busy with organising local activities rather than interfering with national politics. Public demands were de-politicised and their scope was limited to community concerns, thus shielding politicians in the capital from their local electorate. The outcome was a steady improvement of infrastructure in the Central Province, building on substantial colonial infrastructure along the railway running from the coast via Nairobi to Lake Victoria. The areas south and north of this strip remained desperately underdeveloped by contrast.

Between the mid 1970s and late 1980s, the number of NGOs active in Kenya rose by 229% (Kameri-Mbote 2000: 2). Structural Adjustment Programmes that were implemented in Kenya during the same period led to a shrinking of government budgets allocated to social services. NGO activities complemented public services and filled the gaps where the state had defected. Moreover, unabated regional imbalances in resource distribution and growing political repression under the one-party regime of Daniel arap Moi furthered the mushrooming of advocacy and rights organisations during the 1980s and 1990s.

In Uganda, the public sector eroded soon after independence and eventually collapsed during the Amin years. Because of the disintegration of the administration, state-building efforts were impeded right from the start. While state managed infrastructure deteriorated where it existed, church run institutions continued to receive funding from Western partner organisations. As a consequence, church run schools and hospitals were able to maintain and extend their services. With its decentralisation policy, the Ugandan Movement government has undertaken a state-building effort from the community level upwards. Local governments have been given powers to collect taxes, to enforce civic law, and to implement community projects formerly administered by the central government. In southern and eastern Uganda, where infrastructure remained relatively intact and where conditions for agriculture are favourable, these measures have been met with moderate success. In the western and especially northern parts of the country, where violent conflicts continue to inhibit the development of infrastructure and soil and climate are less favourable, local efforts would often arrive at little. Generally speaking, the amount of taxes collected at the district level does not suffice to substantially improve living conditions. International and national NGOs as well as community based organisations (CBOs) that are sponsored by larger NGOs or development agencies operate as the main service suppliers in these areas. CBOs are not unlike the Kenyan Harambee initiatives: whilst they are formed by locals for community based projects, they need to satisfy the expectations of foreign development agencies or central government ministries in order to secure funding.

In Uganda, much foreign aid is channelled to local NGOs, either directly or through the Ugandan government. Many country-wide development projects were introduced by NGOs where no government agency was previously active. In addition to the development of physical infrastructure and improvement of agricultural production, the Ugandan government contracts NGOs for civic education, gender, ethics, and HIV/Aids campaigns. While Kenyan NGOs were able to build autonomous structures or to build on existing ones, NGOs in Uganda are often outlets of government agencies.

Janet Museveni, who worships at Kampala Pentecostal Church, an offshoot of the Cana-

dian Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and at the Church of the Universal Kingdom of God, a church run from Brazil, acts as patron of several evangelical charities. She has established a partnership with Samaritan's Purse, an organisation of Billy Graham's son Franklin which co-ordinates several USAID sponsored Aids projects, and collaborates with Tear Fund, an NGO created by Bono, lead singer of the Irish rock band U2. These activities are part of a wider continental trend towards the establishment of major quasi-governmental NGOs. In 2002, the first ladies of 18 countries of sub-Saharan Africa launched the African First Ladies Organisation Against HIV/Aids in Davos. The organisation's primary mission is of a diplomatic nature: it seeks to encourage co-operation between neighbouring countries and regions, as well as to lobby for support in the United States and Europe. Yet all participants are running their own national charity organisations. In Gabon and Cameroon, charity foundations created by the first ladies now channel far greater amounts of money for the fight against the disease than the respective ministries of health. Due to the growing visibility of these organisations in society and their impressive financial means they attract skilled labour force from the civil services into their ranks.

The Ugandan policy to register churches only in conjunction with a charitable project has resulted in the accreditation of over 2,000 HIV/Aids projects, the majority of which are affiliated with an evangelical church.¹⁸ Moreover, churches themselves are registered as "faith-based NGOs", the number of which climbed over 600 alone between 1992 and 2000. They constitute roughly 20% of the total number of NGOs registered during that period in Uganda (Kasigaire 2000). However, virtually none of the registered "faith-based NGOs" are voluntary non-profit organisations. Uganda has no statute for the registration of churches as church, society, or association, hence registration with the NGOs board is the only means to obtain clearance from the government. Yet registration with the board allows churches to gain tax-free status as organisations and entitles them to apply for government funding, credit schemes, and development aid, even if no social or advocacy function is involved. The implication is that a church is free to operate like an NGO and to hand in proposals for public development projects. NGO registration applies to domestic as well as foreign churches and mission agencies.

The Kenyan legislation is slightly different: Churches are not required to register as NGOs unless they have actually founded a non-profit voluntary organisation operating in relevant fields. In theory, church run schools are registered with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, and church run clinics are registered with the Ministry of Health. Churches and mission agencies, by contrast, are registered under the Societies Act. Although the system itself appears to be more transparent, the handling of these statutes is often rather ambivalent. In practice, many organisations that fail to register under the Societies Act, or cannot obtain clearance from the relevant ministry, end up registering an NGO. Kenyan and international human rights organisations have repeatedly demanded that the Societies Act be revised so as to limit the possibility

18 Interview Uganda AIDS Commission, August 2001. See also Lacey 2003.

of arbitrary denial of registration.¹⁹ The Societies Act also gives far-reaching power to authorities to de-register organisations on suspicion of irregular business practice. The same applies to the Non-Governmental Organisation Act, whilst matters are further complicated by the existence of two parallel institutions dealing with NGOs: The NGO Coordination Bureau of the Office of the President where all national and international NGOs are registered and de-registered; and the NGO Council that deals with additional administrative matters but has no autonomous powers (Kameri-Mbote 2000: 5).²⁰

The degree of government patronage over the NGO sector is high both in Kenya and Uganda. Whilst government authorities can easily withdraw the legal status of disfavoured organisations, there is little obligation and limited capacity to execute transparent control over NGO activities. Aili Mari Tripp constitutes about the situation in Uganda that “although there is little regulation of NGO activity, the fact that regulatory laws are in existence means that they can be enforced *if* the regime feels sufficiently threatened by various activities.” (Tripp 2000: 62, emphasis added).

Private schools

Evangelical NGOs are increasingly active in the field of formal education. Already before the recent introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) in Kenya, the Moi government committed itself to the programme Basic Education for All (BEFA). The Kenyan Ministry of Education introduced a private partnership scheme for the promotion of BEFA in which it targeted specifically religious organisations. Given that government funding was considerably lower in this sector than in other sectors of education, NGOs held the majority stake in BEFA even before the introduction of UPE. The Kenyan government provided 50% of the funding of primary education, 90% of which was paid for teachers' salaries (Ogachi: 2002: 2f.). Hence, only 10% of the expenditures for construction, maintenance and teaching materials were covered with public funds. The remaining costs are covered by parents, church communities, and NGOs, mainly the larger faith-based organisations such as PLAN International, the Christian Children's Fund, and Compassion International.

The Kenyan government has now begun to implement UPE, one of the key pre-election promises of Mwai Kibaki who was inaugurated as Kenya's new president in January 2003. Like in Uganda, around 70% of education expenditures now go to primary level education so as to cope

19 See for instance a report by Eddie Adiin Yaansah and Barbara Harrell-Bond, Wolfson College, Oxford, “Regulating the non-governmental sector: the dilemma”, online document: <http://www.fmreview.org/rpn191.htm> [as of 03/11/03].²⁰

20 For instance, the Kenyan think tank Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) was de-registered by the Bureau upon demand of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on pretext of subversive activities after it had published a report on corruption in Kenya. According to CLARION, the Bureau had not consulted the NGO Council on this matter, as required by the constitution.

with the massive influx of new students. Recent studies suggest that enhanced financial efforts still fall short of UPE demands. A study of the Ugandan education sector compiled for the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) in 2001 finds that "although resources have been provided to increase the number of teachers, textbooks, and classrooms in the country, these increases have been overwhelmed by the dramatic upsurge in enrolment. (...) [T]here are indicators, particularly in rural areas, that the majority of students are not able to read and write even after six years of primary school."²¹ In Kenya, prospects are not much better. Even before the recent launching of UPE, the Assistant Minister of Education has found that there is a shortage of 5,000 teachers in secondary schools and a shortage of 9,000 teachers in primary schools, "but the government cannot recruit because it has no money and the World Bank has said 'no'" (Onyango 2002). Instead, demands for cost-sharing have led to a considerable rise of tuition and admission fees at secondary and tertiary levels.²² The situation is further complicated by the fact that privatisation of public schools and introduction of cost-sharing arrangements have not been implemented in accordance with official procedures. Many schools charge irregular extra tuition fees. Moreover, many teachers seek to boost their meagre salaries by teaching private classes in the afternoon. According to a report for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), teachers often refuse employment with schools in poor neighbourhoods where residents cannot afford extra-curricular tuition.²³ Apparently, this problem is not limited to disadvantaged rural areas. In Nairobi, almost half of the children between six and 13 years of age are out of school. Of the other half that are enrolled, 53% drop out at primary level.²⁴ The report also stresses that poor urban areas suffer greater shortage in adequate school buildings than do rural areas. In Nairobi, this affects approximately 60% of the population. Yet the report makes an interesting recommendation: rather than rushing to build more schools, the government should consider giving grants to existing schools set up by churches and NGOs so that they can expand their facilities.²⁵ Already under BEFA, the Kenyan government invited churches to become stakeholders in its public schools. For instance, Africa Gospel Church sponsors 344 primary schools and 63 secondary schools and co-ordinates the schools' religion

21 Kevin A. Makokha, *The Effects of Public Expenditure Policies on the Education and Health Care under Structural Adjustment*, p. 161., online document: web.forumsyd.se/Arkiv/uploaded/SAPRI_8_PubExpend.pdf [as of 25/04/03].

22 Secondary education can cost up to 30,000 KSh (345 USD), higher education fees stand at around 50,000 KSh (875 USD) per annum. Most state employed teachers earn less than 5,000 KSh (66 USD) per month, so that their salaries would not cover the costs of the degrees they once studied for. Fees and salaries are estimates based on oral sources.

23 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Kenya: Feature – The Challenge of Providing Free Primary Education*, quoted in: IRIN Africa-English Service, 07 February 2003.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

classes. The church collected 35,221 USD for this purpose via its Indiana based World Gospel Mission.²⁶

Africa has ten larger evangelical universities, the number of smaller private institutions of the evangelical tradition being much higher. One of the largest private religious universities is the Methodist African University which was established in 1992 in Zimbabwe, amongst others with the support of USAID. Another prominent institution is Daystar University. Setting off as a technical college in the 1960s, it began offering Master's courses in collaboration with the US evangelical universities Wheaton College and Messiah College in the 1970s. Eventually Daystar moved to Nairobi where it enrolls nearly 2,000 full-time students.

Next to the three public universities, Jomo-Kenyatta-University, Moi University, and the University of Nairobi, Kenya has ten private universities, two of which are Catholic, one is Vedic, and three are Evangelical. The Kenya Conquerors Business Directory, an evangelical yellow pages, lists over a dozen evangelical colleges and universities.²⁷ Among those that have been accredited by the Ministry of Education is Africa Nazarene University, founded in 1993 in co-operation with Olivet Nazarene University, Illinois,²⁸ Kenya Methodist University founded in 1995 in collaboration with Andrew United Methodist Church in Kathleen, and Hope Africa University established in 2000 with support from Free Methodist Church and Greenville College, Illinois. The African Inland Church's Scott Theological College, founded in the 1960s, was granted university status in 1997. Uganda has seventeen universities, all of which were founded in the 1990s, with the exception of Makerere University. The majority of these newer institutions are faith-based, including three Islamic, one Anglican, one Catholic, and three Evangelical universities.

Education at evangelical universities is not inexpensive. Daystar University for instance charges a total of 138,700 KSh (1,819 USD) in tuition, admission and examination fees per year for a BA. Daystar stresses that its tuition fees are modest compared to European and North American standards, and that it are the contributions of individual well-wishers, churches, and Christian organisations that keep the costs low. Still, the University of Nairobi merely charges 18,900 KSh (248 USD) for government sponsored students, and 87,900 KSh (1,153 USD) for private students on its BA programmes.²⁹

Unlike the Anglican, Catholic and Islamic institutions, evangelical universities put much emphasis on business administration, accounting, IT, and teachers' training, with theology being taught at some of these universities but not all. There are hardly any courses offered in the humanities and social sciences. The emphasis on technical skills reflects the curriculum of evangelical secondary schools which focus mainly on technical training and little highlight religious

26 see the organisation's field report, online document: www.wgm.org/cms/Fields/cmsFieldShow.asp?did=91 [as of 14/05/03].

27 Harvest Time Travel (ed.), *Kenya Conquerors Business Directory*, Nairobi, 2001, pp. 51-55.

28 The Church of Nazarene is one of the largest Pentecostal churches in the United States and worldwide. The church's health ministry and church planting mission is present in virtually all countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Nazarene has theological colleges in Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria, some of which may soon be up-graded to University status.

29 The enrolment fees are published on the universities' website: University of Nairobi: www.uonbi.ac.ke, and Daystar University: www.daystarus.org.

education. In fact, the assets they market in advertisements is their low cost/high quality service. Rather than religious formation being presented as among the schools' primary objectives, it is promoted as accessory of marketable leadership quality. This responds to students' needs who often choose a Christian college not because it is Christian but because faith-based institutions grant them access to foreign private sponsorship and thus make secondary education more affordable.

Both local educators and foreign sponsors stress leadership qualities as a major contribution to economic development in Africa. As a lecturer at Kenya's Nazarene University states, "The technological level of Kenya has been rising rapidly in the past few years, and those business and computer majors who have done their studies well feel prepared to 'ride the wave', as it were, helping their country find its own technological and economic footing."³⁰ Daystar University says in an advertisement inviting foreign students to join its academic exchange programme, "The real war is for the minds of Africa's youth. But in the heart of Africa, on the front lines of that battle, a Christian college has educated 5,000 leaders for that crucial continent and for the world."³¹

The introduction of universal primary education and cost-sharing arrangements has opened up another field for NGO activity in Kenya and Uganda. Evangelical NGOs have been able to extent their local networks through public-private partnership in this sector. Moreover, a comprehensive network of evangelical higher education is build through private sponsorship and development co-operation. In many areas, these evangelical networks excel the infrastructure maintained by mainline church organisations. Giving the plans of the Bush administration to channel more funds through faith-based NGOs, it appears likely that an increasing number of evangelical organisations will cater both for basic and higher education in the developing world.

Evangelical Politics in Kenya and Uganda

As we have seen, Statehouse and the Office of the President retain some control over mission agencies and their affiliate churches. However, this circumstance, which affects secular NGOs much the same, would not in itself allow for the conclusion that faith-based organisations act on behalf of government interests. And yet, many evangelical mission agencies embrace a political theology that promotes economic initiative and competitiveness, whilst encouraging submission under authoritarian leadership in the political domain. Moreover, in an attempt to extent their support bases in the countries where they operate, evangelical missionaries and local evangelical church leaders have tended to lend support to the authoritarian regimes of former President

30 Tim Crutcher, lecturer in Theology and Biblical Studies, Nazarene University, online document: http://www.nazarene.org/iboe/riie/Didache/Didache_vol2_2/culture.html [as of 08/04/03].

31 *Journey of the Heart*, An Opportunity to Experience the Miracle of Daystar, student exchange programme, online document: <http://www.daystarus.org/joh2.htm> [as of 08/04/03] (emphasis added).

Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, as well as to the Ugandan Movement regime of President Yoweri Museveni.

Kenyan politics stumbled into crisis with the gradual establishment of a one-party regime, growing political repression and the collapse of the economy from the mid 1980s onwards. Moi's government came under increasing internal as well as external pressure to lift its ban on political parties. The first peak of the crisis was reached with the President's move to abolish the secret ballot box and introduce a queuing system instead.³² The patterns of conflict that emerged during the so called "queuing crisis" had a lasting impact on the relationship between religious and political leaders. The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), the umbrella organisation of Kenya's Protestant churches, was among the most vocal organisations to protest the new scheme. NCCCK was attacked from several officials of the ruling party on suspicion that it acted on behalf of foreign interests – presumably British interests –, determined to destroy the unity of the nation. The Gikuyu based African Independent Pentecostal Church, as well as the US-evangelical Full Gospel Church and United Pentecostal Church broke away from NCCCK during the queuing crisis, arguing that they were opposed to political polarisation that would undermine national unity. The evangelical African Inland Church, to which President Moi was affiliated, also distanced itself from the council, saying it was becoming too political. However, the church's leadership has not officially resigned from NCCCK. The defecting Pentecostal churches came together in the Kenyan Evangelical Alliance, now Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya (EFK), and African Inland Church took over its chairmanship. This double affiliation of the President's "own church" as well as the hasty inauguration of the evangelical umbrella organisation gave rise to the widespread perception that EFK was created out of convenience.

Following the second freeze of a World Bank credit scheme amidst increasing internal and external pressure to lift the ban on political parties, the President in his New Year's speech of 1995 promised to call in a commission to review the constitution. Following this announcement, NCCCK which for several years had actively been lobbying for the repeal of section 2a – the article limiting political competition – emerged as one of the main organisers of the participatory review process. The process was put on halt several times due to disagreements over legal procedures. When the 1997 elections were approaching, the leaders of Kenya's mainline churches, Catholic Archbishop Ndingi, Anglican Bishop Gitari, the chairman of the Episcopal Conference John Njue, and NCCCK chairman Musyimi held several private talks with President Moi in an attempt to persuade him to allow for minor constitutional changes. Moi refused and suggested that the churches be joined by Hindu and Muslim leaders as well as EFK to make their campaign more representative. An inter-faith coalition, "Ufungamano", was formed, however, when disputes arose over the nomination of representatives, the evangelical churches jointly split from the rest of the group.

³² With the establishment of a *de jure* one-party regime, President Moi became increasingly wary of the possibility of an internal mutiny. The queuing system, after which each citizen would line up behind his candidate and the winner would be determined on the basis of the length of the queue, would have helped Moi to control party loyalties.

When Ufungamano came together at its inauguration, Anglicans, Methodists, Catholics, Muslims and Hindus joined in an ecumenical prayer during an open-air mass at Nairobi's Uhuru Park. As the meeting commenced, EFK which had abstained the gathering, had called for a counter prayer in the same venue during which sermons were read that sought to discredit Ufungamano as political opposition in religious cloth.³³

Bishop Kitonga, vice president of EFK and leader of Redeemed Gospel Church, among Kenya's largest evangelical churches, published a paid-up interview in the newspaper *Daily Nation* few weeks after the "prayer incident" at Uhuru Park, in which he explained: "As for his rapport with the Government and loyalty to its leader, Bishop Kitonga says he upholds the teachings of the Bible that advocate respect for the king and the Government of the day. 'If that is being an apologist, so be it,' he says. He refers to the book of Romans 13 Verse 1, which reads: 'Everyone must obey the state authorities because no authority exists without God's permission, and the existing authorities have been put there by God.'" The interviewer challenges Kitonga, a Ugandan by birth, about a ruler like Idi Amin and asks whether he was put in power by God. Kitonga confirms, "when the church in Uganda ceased to pray and became lukewarm, Amin emerged from nowhere [sic] and started leading the country. It was God's ammunition." Kitonga and his fellow Christians prayed for divine intervention and Amin was eventually overthrown. The same applies to Kenya: change is to be achieved by prayer which will be effective if God permits.

Although the debate about the constitutional review process has ebbed in recent times, the polarisation between evangelicals and mainline churches persists. In March 2002, members of the Gikuyu based Mungiki group³⁴ stormed into the Luo dominated Kariobangi residential area and massacred all adult men that happened to cross their way. This incident, in which 21 people were killed, spurred fears of tribal clashes in the wake of the upcoming elections. Representatives of the Catholic, Anglican and Methodist churches called for an ecumenical memorial service at the site. On this occasion, the bishops deplore the fact that police had not intervened as the killings commenced for more than one hour and wondered how it was possible that 300 armed youth be transported in trucks and buses to Kariobangi without being noticed by security personnel.³⁵

Evangelical pastors did not participate in the service. A spokesman of the Evangelical Alliance of Africa, the continental evangelical umbrella organisation which shares a building with EFK, confirmed in an interview with the author that they had not been invited but admitted they would not have followed such an invitation. He argued that the gathering had not in fact been a memorial service but a political rally: "The statements that were made were supposed to be prayer but it was almost like a political campaign. They use the cloak of religion to attack. Instead we should have taken this as an opportunity to call for a national day of repentance. All of us, admitting that we have done wrong, collectively, not pointing at the leaders in government, and

33 See *Daily Nation*, and the *East African Standard*, 12-16 April 2000.

34 Mungiki is an ethno-religious group that draws on Christian, Islamic and Gikuyu traditions, however, it is not affiliated with any of the evangelical or mainline Christian churches.

35 *Daily Nation*, 06-08 March 2002.

asking God to have mercy upon us. That is what I think when I look at the unity of prayer.”³⁶ Although evangelicals refer to themselves as holistic, and occasionally may even explain their holistic worldview in terms of an African school of thought, the concepts of “dualism” and “holism” are understood in a peculiar way. Holism in the evangelical case implies a radical separation of religious and secular spheres that would allow for the application of concurring identities, such as citizen, patriot, or Christian. For evangelicals, religious and political processes run parallel and can replace one another – at the leaders’ discretion.

In Uganda, church-state relations are dominated by a polarisation between the Anglican and Catholic churches.³⁷ Traditionally, Anglicans have maintained amicable relations with consecutive regimes in Uganda, while Catholics have tended to lend their support to the Democratic Party, one of the larger opposition groups now restrained by the ban on political parties. Evangelical church leaders have so far kept a low profile in politics, however, it must be noted that part of the Anglican Church of Uganda (COU) belongs to the evangelical spectrum: Other than in Kenya, the East African Revival took firm root in the Anglican church as what in Uganda is known as the Balokole (“born-again”) movement. The East African Revival goes back to evangelical missionary endeavours of the colonial era. Because the former presidents of Uganda, Amin and Obote, restricted foreign missionary intervention, evangelicals frequently operated under the auspices of COU, hence the strong evangelical leaning of the church. The Anglican Archbishop Livingstone Mpalanyi Nkoyoyo himself is a Mulokole.

More recently, religious leaders have spoken out against the war in the north and have commented on Museveni’s move to change the constitution so as to allow him to stand for a third term in the 2006 presidential elections. Cardinal Wamala, head of the Catholic Church in Uganda, criticised the government for failing to work towards a cease-fire with the rebels, and in his Easter message of 2003 appealed to political leaders to reject the constitutional amendment for a third term.³⁸ The Anglican leader responded by urging Ugandans to stop discussing the issue altogether, a warning that had previously been issued by the President himself.³⁹ The two church leaders found themselves in a similar polarisation in the run up to the controversial 2000 referendum with which Museveni sought to postpone the introduction of a multi-party political system through popular vote: Immediately after the Cardinal had issued a statement in which he criticised the idea of holding a referendum on the country’s political system, the Anglican Archbishop issued one supporting it (Onyango-Obbo 2003).

Museveni who used to keep at a distance to the leaders of all religious groups, has come to chose evangelical churches as venues to address the nation on religious holidays. Evangelicals and Balokole appear to assemble themselves behind the President who, in an attempt to secure support from the evangelical leadership, has emphasised his born-again status on occasion.

36 Interview with the spokesman of the Evangelical Alliance of Africa, Nairobi, March 2002.

37 Note that both churches claim memberships at about equal proportions, with some 40% of Ugandans being Roman Catholics and 30% being Anglicans. On the Anglican-Catholic divide in Uganda, see also Gifford 1998: 116ff.

38 *The Monitor*, 17 April 2003.

39 *AllAfrica*, 11 July 2003.

Political rallies of evangelicals are rare in Uganda but may become more frequent once the political market opens. In an unprecedented incident, the Anglican Archbishop led a demonstration through Kampala city centre in protest against pornography in the media. According to press reports, the crowd was chanting "parliament, save us from pornography!" and "Joseph Koney and [Ugandan porn-magazine editor] Richard Tusiime are the Axis of Evil!".⁴⁰ The rally had been organised by the Family Life Network, a New York based "family centred" broadcasting ministry that has opened a branch in Kampala. The demonstrators were addressed by Scott Lively of the American Family Association, a Religious Right organisation that is involved in HIV/Aids campaigns across Africa. According to Lively, Uganda's high rate of teenage pregnancies is to be blamed on "increased consumption of pornography."⁴¹

Uganda has become a magnet for faith-based organisations under the Museveni presidency. All larger international evangelical NGOs are operating in Uganda, and local evangelical organisations are mushrooming. The NGO-isation of Uganda's welfare sector coincides with an increase of US aid in support of Uganda as a regional strategic ally. However, Uganda's privileged role is a legacy of the Clinton administration. It is worth noting that Uganda also hosts among the largest number of independent women's rights groups in sub-Saharan Africa, most of which formed in the late 1980s and early 1990s when "women's empowerment" was popular among donors. Faith-based NGOs are now advancing as the same organisations have gained increasing influence in the United States' public arena.

It seems plausible that the persistence of authoritarian political regimes in Kenya and Uganda facilitated the advance of extra-parliamentary political lobbies. Previous to the recent lifting of the ban on political parties, Kenya was ruled by a one-party government, de facto since independence, and de jure since 1982. Popular movements, community initiatives, the party's youth's and women's wings, all had been incorporated into the party machinery. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s when dissent was countered with state violence, international church organisations and, to a lesser extent, international academic and professional networks filled the void left by the disintegrating opposition parties. In Uganda, where the ban on political parties remains in place, women's organisations, professional lobby groups, and internationally affiliated rights observers have been able to influence Movement agendas, if only to a limited degree. In both countries, the monopolisation of political space has meant that independent external actors have been able to influence local politics via NGOs and extra-parliamentary pressure groups.

The major difference between religious leaders' interventions in Kenyan and Ugandan politics can be attributed to country specific variables. The rift between Kenyan evangelicals and mainline churches can almost exclusively be explained in terms of the latter's strong political engagement. The evangelical counter-campaign, whether sponsored by the government or not, was reactive and aimed at impeding political participation. In Uganda, the evangelical quarter has

40 *The East Africa*, 19 May 2003, and *AllAfrica*, 13 May 2003.

41 See the American Family Association's online journal, July 2002, <http://www.afa.net/journal/july/2002/noi.asp> [as of 25/08/03].

not gained much political profile. Given the absence of concerted political action on the part of the mainline churches, the need for counter-action did not arise.

Conclusion

Structural adjustment programmes have encouraged the involvement of NGOs both at the local and international levels of development co-operation since the 1980s, thus improving the general climate for NGO activities. The significance of faith-based NGOs in development co-operation is increasing as a result of the intervention of conservative religious groups in American foreign policy and at the UN. Accordingly, conservative evangelical groups are in a better position than mainline and liberal groups to exploit the growing public recognition of faith-based organisation in international development. These developments have allowed evangelicals to extend their networks in Kenya and Uganda respectively.

The infrastructure created by foreign evangelical missionaries is predominantly business and technology oriented. Rather than building institutions that are maintained and directed by Westerners, evangelical missionaries have build close ties with expanding local networks which incorporate autonomous local church and business empires. Trans-national and inter-continental networks provide missionaries with financial means independent of the state. They can secure public funds through pressure groups that back domestic and foreign policy agendas. Lay communities thus continue to play an important role in financing the privatisation of public services. Once basic services and facilities are established, missionaries can access government funds both nationally and internationally. Evangelicals maintain an extensive network of NGOs that reach out into peripheral rural areas. This NGO force integrates local interest groups into global networks.

Eventually, the trans-national coalitions that arise from these missionary campaigns may be of growing relevance to the church and society in the West. Christianity's growth in the South and its embrace by conservatives world-over is something which, according to some observers, many people in the West tend to ignore. Philip Jenkins, author of a recent study on global Christianity, points out that the Anglo-American quarter of liberal reformers present a minority even among the 6% Americans within the Roman Catholic Church: From a global perspective, if they would advance their reform agendas, this would lead to some kind of an "American schism" (Jenkins quoted in Bacon 2002). The recent quarrels in the world-wide Anglican Communion illustrate this conflict: The evangelical Institute on Religion and Democracy, formed to counteract the mainline protestant National Council of Churches in the United States, has sought the help of Anglicans in the developing world for its campaign to get the Anglican Communion "back on track". Thus, Ugandan and Nigerian Anglicans were among the fiercest opponents to the promotion of a gay Anglican priest to the office of bishop in the United States and threatened with

breaking away from the communion.⁴² The language has sharpened in the wake of viable alternatives. After all, the contemporary evangelical movement presents itself not as a missionary enterprise of Westerners to save souls in the developing world, but as an international business and value coalition.

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42 See the statement by the Anglican Archbishop Akinola of Nigeria on BBC News, online document: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3238311.stm> [as of 03/11/03].

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Zusammenfassung

Der folgende Essay befasst sich mit einer Form christlicher Missionierung im sub-saharischen Afrika deren politische Bedeutung erheblich zunimmt: den evangelikalen Nicht-Regierungs Organisationen (NROs). Während die Zahl der NROs in der öffentlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit insgesamt bereits in den 1980er Jahren stark zunahm, stellen religiöse, insbesondere evangelikale Wohlfahrtsorganisationen erst seit der politischen Wende von 1990 ein überproportional wachsendes Segment in der NRO-Landschaft dar. Gründe für die zunehmende Popularität der christlichen Helfer sind neben ihrer guten internationalen Vernetzung und lokalen Anbindung ihre großen Ressourcen an Spendengeldern und ehrenamtlichen Mitarbeitern. Darüber hinaus halten manche Entwicklungsexperten sie für besonders geeignete Partner bei der Gestaltung von Bildungs- und Gesundheitsprogrammen, insbesondere in der AIDS Prävention. Evangelikale NROs, so wird argumentiert, bilden ein wichtiges Verbindungsglied im globalen evangelikalen Netzwerk zwischen Nord und Süd: Sie befördern Kirchengründungen in Afrika, stellen andererseits aber auch eine wesentliche Ressource für die christlich-konservative politische Bewegung in Nordamerika dar. Erst im Herbst 2001 setzte der amerikanische Präsident George W. Bush die sogenannte „Faith-based and Community Initiative“ (FBCI) in Kraft, die religiöse Organisationen verstärkt für die heimische wie überseeische Wohlfahrt rekrutieren soll. Am Beispiel der Länder Kenia und

Uganda wird der Zusammenhang zwischen missionarischer Intervention und Privatisierungspolitik im Bildungssektor diskutiert. Dabei wird auch der politische Einfluß der evangelikalen Netzwerke beleuchtet.

Schlagwörter

Kenia, Uganda, Christliche Kirche, Religiöse Vereinigung, Politischer Protestantismus, Fundamentalismus, Pfingstbewegung, Nichtregierungsorganisation, Auslandshilfe/Entwicklungshilfe, Interessengruppe, USA, UNO, Private Bildungsentwicklung, Schulerziehung/ -bildung

Résumé

Cet article examine l'implication politique et sociale d'une forme nouvelle de la mission chrétienne en Afrique subsaharienne: les organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG) évangéliques. Quand le nombre des ONGs actives dans la coopération au développement augmenta dans les 1980s, les organisations religieuses, particulièrement les organisations évangéliques, augmenta deux fois plus vite que les ONGs séculaires. Les aides chrétiennes sont populaires parce qu'elles possèdent un réseau international bien établi avec des alliances locales, et des ressources vastes et toujours renouvelées: des donations privées et une armée des collaborateurs volontaires. De plus, tant d'experts en développement trouvent qu'ils sont les partenaires privilégiés dans les domaines de l'éducation et de l'hygiène publique, notamment pour les campagnes contre HIV/SIDA. Les ONGs religieuses - ainsi qu'il est argumenté dans cet article - présentent un chaînon important dans le réseau missionnaire entre le nord et le sud: Ils sustentent la fondation d'églises en Afrique, mais autant ils constituent une ressource vitale pour le mouvement évangélique conservateur aux Etats-Unis. En automne 2001, le Président américain George W. Bush ratifia une initiative pour la promotion des organisations religieuses pour le bien public domestique et outre mer. La connexion entre les interventions missionnaires et la privatisation des secteurs publics de l'éducation, et l'influence politique du mouvement évangélique et son fondamentalisme protestant, a été analysée à l'exemple du Kenya et de l'Ouganda.

Mots-clé

Kenya, Uganda, Eglise chrétienne, association religieuse, protestantisme politique, fondamentalisme, pentecostalisme, organisation non-gouvernementale, aide à l'étranger/aide au développement, groupe d'intérêt, Etats-Unis, Nations Unies, éducation scolaire/formation scolaire, financement privé de l'éducation

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