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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

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Main Stages and Tendencies in Transformation of Ukrainian Society: From Perestroika to Orange Revolution*

Abstract

This article is dealing with the analysis of main stages and tendencies of social transformations that have been taken place in Ukraine since the well-known Perestroika in the ex-USSR. Transformational processes are studied in very important ways for Ukrainian society aspects, such as: institutional, socio-structural, and socio-psychological. The authors gave special attention on the role of classes — elites and the broad masses in the different stages of this period have been analyzed.

In Ukraine, like in other post-Soviet countries for over 20 years (starting from the time when neo-nomenclature leader Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and up to the current post-Orange stage of social changes), social transformations are taking place and are waiting to be comprehended. Sociologists were lucky because Perestroika was accompanied by gradual disappearance of ideological bans on surveys.

dealing with the public opinion, mass estimations of economic and sociopolitical situation, values and orientations of people. Political censorship weakened and came to an end together with people’s fears of possible negative consequences arising from their openly expressed opinions in conversations with sociologists. As a result, Ukrainian sociologists gained the data of numerous surveys on the dynamics of the mass consciousness, psychological state, social well-being of the people, their attitudes toward the leadership and political institutions and specific features of comprehension of ethnic, social and class relations in society. Among such sociological data, special attention should be paid to the data of the long-term monitoring on social changes in Ukraine, conducted by the Institute of Sociology, NASU (1992-2006), the generalized results of which became a base for the conceptual conclusions presented by this article. We also used the results of polls conducted by us at the Sociological Department of the Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and All-Ukrainian Department of the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Studies (1986-1991). Many ideas (briefly mentioned in this article) were substantiated in a number of publications prepared by us in recent years. The empirical information is widely available due to the works published previously, so we concentrated our analysis mainly on logics of the social transformations of the recent two decades and specific character of social changes in the aspects determining Ukrainian society: institutional, socio-structural and socio-psychological. Special attention was paid to the role of classes, elites and public at the different stages of this social transformation.

### Social Changes during Perestroika and the Institutional Burst of 1991

In Ukraine, social transformations are mostly determined by historical experience related to formation of institutional, social and class structure of the society, as well as the basis type of personality in the soviet system, which, in the 1980s, found itself in a swiftly developing social and economic crisis that later gained a political component; the crisis led to collapse of the Soviet Union and establishment of new independent countries on its ruins. For citizens of the USSR and most foreign analysts, the dramatic end of Gorbachev’s Perestroika was unexpected and inexplicable in many aspects. Even now, when appropriateness and inevitability of changes are obvious, it is not easy to substantiate the in-
evitable collapse of the country pretended to be the world leader, having huge natural and human resources, the stable social structure, the privileged and united, as it seemed, power elites, the public that expressed support to the power and dominant ideology.

The following main components of the sustainable institutional system: 1) laws determining legality of social order, 2) embracing institutional infrastructure that involved a mighty repressive machine and the power vertical mechanism proved by the time, and lastly 3) consent of most people to accept the Soviet way of life as natural, mostly admissible and so legitimate. These components could support the country in its existence despite serious economic problems, oppositional moods of some part of creative intelligentsia, unfavorable foreign conditions and local military defeats. So the worsening economic situation, western pressure, war in Afghanistan or separatist moods in some republics could seem good reasons explaining the USSR's collapse only for those who were outside the country, where fantastically stupid Andropov’s methods for strengthening discipline were met with the mass enthusiasm, where a long queue of intellectuals wanted to become members of the Communist Party or reservists of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to visit other countries (the price was cooperation with KGB), where an always enormous number of people were ready to participate in great construction projects or liquidation of technological disasters, where the dissident movement was practically wiped off.

To our mind, the country was not ready for the institutional crisis and the collapse, and the following transformations in most post-Soviet countries (excluding Baltic ones) have proved it. After fifteen years of independent existence, the post-Soviet countries could not reach the Soviet level of GNP, most are ruled with authoritarian methods supported by a majority of the population and restrained mainly by international pressure. However, this article is devoted to social transformations in Ukraine, and so we will not discuss general problems of post-Soviet social changes. It is only worth mentioning that at first Ukrainian society did not differ institutionally from Russia or Belarus. Mass consciousness, social and class structures and levels of life were the same.

What was the decisive stimulus for crucial social changes in this case? It happened so that the beginning of post-Soviet transformations was connected to two key events: Mikhail Gorbachev’s coming to power and the Chernobyl disaster. The first event promoted a search for new ways of development for the Soviet society after a long period of stagnant gerontocracy. The second event revealed a dead threat for the State: the
syndrome (formed in a closed society) of people’s irresponsibility, while dealing with modern technologies fraught with total disasters. As a result, the rejuvenation team of soviet leaders chose the way of experiments in order to liberate social initiatives having been restrained for a long time; this led to the collapse of the country, which could not exist without any totalitarian ideology mortaring all the different components together. The institutional collapse was pushed by pressure from the West which was more effective in economy and more united in ideology and willing to liberate socialist countries from soviet dictatorship and its support (becoming a big burden for the stagnate economy of the USSR) of anti-west regimes in countries of the third world.

In general, such explanation look plausible. However, even under such difficult conditions, the Soviet leaders had a real way to save the country and its institutional basis, if the strategy (opposite to Gorbachev’s Perestroika and publicity) of political closeness had been accepted. An example was demonstrated by Yuriy Andropov just before Perestroika. In the mass consciousness of Russians, Belarusians and even Ukrainians, Andropov is still one of the most attractive political leaders. Similar strategy was adopted by China, where the communist ideology, party dictatorship and political censorship were combined with elements of market economy and modernization of people’s way of life. At the same time, there was a significant difference between the USSR and China. This difference is usually related to specific features of different cultures and psychology, but people rarely pay attention to the fact that the powerful elite, that was changed due to the mass repressions and ambitious newcomers from the party lower strata who filled the empty places, came to power in China 20 years later than in the USSR. Where, after the Stalin’s epoch, nomenclature became sacral and untouchable. Such slow changes in the most desirable social positions along with swift growth in the group of pretenders for the high places in the status hierarchy, became a mighty stimulus to start transformations in Soviet society.

As was shown in surveys on social and professional orientations from the 1970s, long before Perestroika was in the consciousness of generations entering their independent lives, the professions and posts leading to the highest places in the social hierarchy became objects of the mass orientations — while the mass professions and ordinary posts were unattractive for the majority of young people. The growth in social and status claims became a source of destabilization for the formed social hier-
archy because unrealized expectations led to growing dissatisfaction with the social system among most new groups.

New privileged social positions were needed in order to satisfy new ambitions and claims and they could not be realized within the limited and ideologically closed nomenclature. There were too many pretenders for a limited area of soviet elites; the tested Bolshevik method of shooting the old one and feeding a new nomenclature could not be used anymore; so, the only way was to apply some unrestricted social and economic measures and to direct the growing thirst of gaining entrance into the private economic initiative sphere. However, this way was not very attractive for creative and scientific intelligentsia full of capable and ambitious people ready for career growth and gaining corresponding privileges. Professor D. Lane in his book “The Rise and Fall of State Socialism. Industrial Society and the Socialist State” underlined the special role intelligentsia played in Perestroika, assuming that among highly qualified specialists of intellectual labor, there were people mostly oriented toward market economy and political pluralism. That’s of course is correct. But we have to say that, during Perestroika, creative and scientific intelligentsia was especially active in removal of limitations that restricted their self-expression and career growth in creative unions, scientific and educational institutions. Those people supplied the neo-nomenclature with their representatives after the failure of the SCSE and the following institutional burst.

The institutional burst as we understand it, is an alternative to evolitional changes in social institutions, quick all-embracing institutional reorganization and establishment of new laws in social life. In the Soviet society during Perestroika, gradually weakening institutional grounds suited as a whole the newly formed nomenclature in the ruling structures of the USSR and of most of its republics. However, this process did not suit a traditional privileged layer — it could lose its positions as a result of evolitional changes. Now we know why heads of all law enforcement departments and the defense industry entered the SCSE: namely their infrastructure and personnel could suffer from governmental changes to the most extent.

The Putsch of August of 1991 played a key role in the collapse of the USSR. The old nomenclature demonstrated their hesitation and organizational impotence. This finally convinced people that the old system would not do anything good for “ordinary people”. At the end of the year, when the economic situation worsened so that a threat of hunger became a reality, national bureaucracies seemed to be closer and more per-
spective for people than the USSR governmental losers. That is why the people, who supported maintaining the USSR at the March referendum, were indifferent to its liquidation as a result of the Belovezh agreement. The special role in the liquidation was played by Ukraine, where two years of Perestroika made it possible for the powerful elite to appreciate advantages of independence in comparison to dictatorship, while the population believed in the exceptional economic power of the country, development of which was strained by chains of the USSR. Moreover, at that time, in the mass consciousness, there was a romantic attitude to democracy ensuring high living standards as it was in developed capitalist countries. Although the Communist Party of Ukraine was formally banned, “the unity of party and people” was maintained. The powerful elite, the democratic opposition and the majority of people supported further independence of the country. It seems that namely Ukraine played a key role in the end of the idea about a renewed union, so long as Yeltsin and his Russian colleagues admitted various options to maintain the former republics as a united country (if only M. Gorbachev was removed from power).

We think no one would deny the explosive nature of the changes in the institutional basis of the Soviet society, which happened as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the accompanying political, economic and socio-cultural transformations. It would be enough to mention the phenomenon of the collapse of the super-power, the lost domination in the communist ideology, liquidation of the single party institution, liquidation of the State property institution monopoly and disappearance of odious totalitarian institutions in the spiritual life. It is difficult to name at least one social institute not being destroyed completely or partially as a result of post-Soviet changes. Principal changes were not registered only in the institute of the family. Old social institutes were destroyed with the help of laws, and then institutional organizations were reorganized radically. Even if, at first, it was not very economically efficient, privatization of the State property was legally grounded and this ensured absence of the governmental monopoly in industry and trade. Even if, in the post-Soviet countries, the institute of executive power looks like the soviet party monopoly, its powers, legally determined, and the way of its functioning (based on democratic elections) principally differ from the single party institute. So, we can state with confidence that, as a result of post-communist transformations, old social institutes that ensured certain social stability and integrity of society lost at least two of three of their institutional attributes: legality and organizational infrastructure.
At that time, new basic social institutes arose and got their legality practically simultaneously: the presidential vertical line of the power, the multiparty system without domination of the banned CPSU, private property and large-scale business, and de-ideological law enforcement structures. An absolutely new institutional infrastructure was created: at that time, it was widely supported by the population and started to gain its legitimate status. However, there was an institutional paradox: the legitimate status was given to a system of institutions unable to execute what was necessary for support of the declared norms and values of a democratic society. Powerful elites were not ready to have discussions with the public and opposition, the judicial power still depended on the executive one, entrepreneurs felt that their property was stolen from the government; and science, culture and education were still the last in the list of governmental economy preferences. Despite the declared support of the market economy, political democracy and legal State, the mass consciousness was still full of paternalist stereotypes, psychology of dependence on the government and helplessness against its tyranny. In other words, Ukraine was ready to destroy the old institutional system to the same extent as it was not ready to establish a new one.


In Ukraine, at the beginning of 1992 was an institutional situation that seemed to promote political and socio-economic reforms necessary for establishment of democracy and a market economy. However, the majority of powerful bureaucracy and ordinary people were not interested in crucial reformations of the existed social order, even though they declared their support of crucial changes in the social system and deepening of market reforms. People were dissatisfied with most components of the social system, apart from the ensured employment and possibility of vertical mobility for those originated from the working class and peasants. Of course to ensure this, the country needed to create enormous and structurally unbalanced working places and prestigious social positions. Contrary to capitalism regularly suffering from over-production of commodities and services, socialism over-produces producers and consumers with the correspondingly distorted socio-class and socio-professional structures. There was no other country in the world having so many doctors and teachers as was the case in the USSR (and also in Ukraine). Before the USSR collapse, the same could be said about al-
most all socio-professional positions of higher qualifications. Had the new power reformed the socio-professional structure by making it a sacrifice to the market economy, millions of people of high qualifications would have become unnecessary in the new structure. A similar situation was in the socio-class structure: extensive development of material production (along with ideological orientation to support of the vanguard of Soviet society) led to over-production of the vanguard of the working class (industrial workers) in the USSR and Ukraine.

As a result, we got a specific Ukrainian model of post-communist development which significantly differs from the Baltic, Russian, Caucasian and Middle Asian models. At that time, among all former republics of the USSR, only Belarus and Kazakhstan were close to Ukraine, although their evident inclination for Russia and absence of the coupon hyper-inflation excluded them from supporters of the following social survival: a socialist society without any communist ideology, with a regulated State economy and spontaneously forming market relations. On the scale “closed society — open society”, the place of Ukraine was like a “half-open society” with significantly advance openness to political liberties and absolutely insignificant achievements in the economy.

It is only natural that such a political and economic centaur could not be sustainable. The world experience of social organization does not possess any sustainable examples of political freedom existing in economic arbitrariness. However, the Ukrainian model of post-communist development appeared and is worth analyzing. First of all, this happened because it survived under very hard social and economic conditions, and secondly, it may help to solve social conflicts that often become aggressive and bloody in transforming societies.

The Ukrainian version of an “economic miracle”, when the level of life for the majority of the population dropped to complete poverty, can be of significant theoretical interest for future historians and economists who will be studying development of post-communist world after the collapse of the USSR. At the first stage of post-communist transformation, the Ukrainian model was absolutely inefficient, apart from its ability to maintain peace in the country without open home aggression and bloodshed. It was the reason why L.Kravchuk, the President of Ukraine, considered his home policy successful, and the success had to be a vote for the conservative and guarding strategy which was chosen by the power in the socio-economic shocking conditions similar for all post-communist countries. Anyway, as to the home situation, Ukraine happened to
be one of few former soviet republics that managed to avoid uncompromising confrontation of political forces and bloody conflicts.

It could be that Ukraine gained experience of peaceful transition from communist dictatorship and a plan-administrative economy to an open democratic society and that experience is of exclusive historical value, worth reproduction in other countries giving up their communist past. It could be that the price for the “absence of conflicts” at the beginning of independence — we mean destroyed economy and mass anomie — is not so high to deny the development strategy that ensured “the bad peace being better than a good war”.

The essence of the Ukrainian model was determined by the power striving for social balance with the help of minimal social changes and preservation of old structures and mechanisms for social control in order to avoid any essential rise in a socially unclaimed layer being the inevitable consequence of radical destruction in social grounds. When the model is put into life, the result is an absence of large-scale violent conflicts on the one hand and decline of the economy and socio-political activity on the other hand. To get the mass support of that strategy in the society, they implanted a total fear of any conflicts including the conflict, necessary for democratic development, between old totalitarian management and a civil society. As a result, the people’s fear of constructive social conflicts became a mechanism restraining all constructive actions meant to overcome social and economic problems.

Being afraid of possible social chaos when radical social changes take place, the majority of people supported the same political idea as the power — they declared their support of society democratization, market reforms and construction of a legal State — but they did not do anything to meet those political goals. They did not trust in politicians but they did not insist on making politicians’ efforts more active in construction of a democratic country with an effective market economy. Namely that fear — common for the governing elite afraid of losing the control to which they accustomed and the “silent majority” clutching at the elite because they consider it (due to its ruling and directing image rooting from the good old times) a pledge of “bad peace” — became the main source of economic degradation and the discredited idea of the State’s independence.

Talking about the Ukrainian model appeared at the beginning of post-communist transformations, we have to take into account the special system of inter-elite relations established in Ukraine as a result of post-communist differentiation in political elites. Under certain condi-
tions, they could act as a political force stabilizing a social situation or they could initiate an organized social protest. Specific character of social and political organization of society determines the specific features of the elites’ existence, ways of their interrelations and zones of consent and conflicts. There is a general law: the toughness of governmental control over social behavior in main social spheres — economic, political, social and cultural — is directly connected to the extent of inner and outer differentiation in corresponding elites. It means that the most integrated ones are the elites of societies with a single totalitarian ideology and a mighty repressive machine. They exclude any possibility of political opposition as a main source of inter-elite conflicts. The special “absence of conflicts” belongs to communist countries toughly controlling not only politics and ideology but also the economy. Under “non-communist totalitarianism”, market relations, private property and competition are able to exist and this inevitably leads to differentiation in economic elites and inter-elite conflicts. Power of communists makes it possible to maintain the “elite monolith” for a long time.

At the beginning of post-communist transformations, the situation seemed to change radically due to differentiation in socialist nomenclature and appearance of new political, economic and intellectual elites born by the collapse of communist ideology and independent development of Ukraine. Namely the conflict between new and old elites initiates a social burst in a post-totalitarian society: in critical periods, opposition between elites and the mass (apart from separate spontaneous actions easy to be suppressed by united elites) can become revolutionary in character with massive bloodshed and a civil war only if the powerful elite’s interests are incompatible with interests of opposite political forces. Despite the fact that, in Ukraine, the differentiation in elites led to the evident ideological fight between the “party of power” and the opposition, an all embracing mass dissatisfaction with the power and distrust in their abilities to overcome the crisis, they were not an active enough and organized force to turn the long evolutionary process (when an old social system has to die off) into a revolutionary burst with the help of the mass distrust in the power structures and dissatisfaction with economic situation in the country.

Dozens of legally registered political parties declaring their opposition to the powerful elite could not become a real opposition to the power producing the phenomenon (typical for the developed socialism) of omnipresent “party of power”. The only difference between it and the CPSU was an absence of evident ideological doctrine impossible to be revised.
Both of them had the same essence: to be in charge of main control levers in the State and kolkhoz economy and development of laws to control distribution of property. The “party of power” easily sacrificed some ideological dogmas and political figures in order to conserve the closed system for control over social and economic relations: executors could be changed, but the mechanisms, perfected by decades of economic suppression, — never. All the efforts for making the system functioning as a social protector of people were uncharacteristic and therefore turned into the farce that made the majority of the people poor and needing governmental care. So, they reproduced the phenomenon of “a party and people being united” when the “party” regularly takes care to make more people poor in society and the poor clung to the “party” because they are afraid of losing achievements of socialism; but somehow they started to see that their hands voting for preservation of old order in the economy may look like hands asking for the dole.

So, despite the fact that in Ukraine differentiation in elites caused enmity between the “party of power” and opposition, there was not an active and organized enough force able to turn the long evolutionary process (when the old social system has to die off) into a revolutionary burst with the help of the mass distrust in the power structures and dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the country. It happened because the elites divided zones of influence between themselves: economy belonged to the old nomenclature elite, while ideology was passed to the most organized new one formed on the basis of strengthening the national State.

The neo-nomenclature and national-democratic elites formed a strong “centrist buffer” that deterred any social burst. The right nationalist and left communist movements alleviated any extremist explosive danger due to their uncompromising struggle (contrary to Russia, where national chauvinists and communists jointly provoked putsch and mass disturbances). As a result, neither these nor those could have gotten the decisive support of lumpenized and marginalized layers being the main destructive force in social protests.


Despite all political reforms and economic experiments of new power, the first years of Ukrainian independence did not bring in society new institutes with legal status and active institutional infrastructure. In those conditions, there were more and more evidence of the Soviet insti-
tutional system being re-legitimized: State paternalism, communist party, pseudo-privatised (looking like joint-stock) enterprises and so on. Many old social institutions started working again under new social conditions. They did not die off, instead they re-incarnated. The social structure of post-Soviet society preserved many status and role positions for social actors, similar to those occupied by them in the past. For example, in the new governmental structures, the old nomenclature survived practically without any material, social, status and moral losses.

Although the Ukrainian government stressed their adherence to western ideology and intention to integrate with the West, the formed “State-centaur” (with a head turned to the West, but unable to go there because its basis was stuck in socialism) was a “transition society” with more and more unidentified status as to the democratic and market perspective. When the mass disappointment with miracles of democratic declarations intensified nostalgia for the lost “social order”, the “social organism”, pushed into different political and economic directions, started to develop in the direction opposite to what was previously declared.

In this context, the most important characteristics of the initial stage of post-Soviet transformations and the stage that followed the first two years of institutional changes were the following:

- Orientation to the market mechanisms for control over economy
- Mass support of the State independence
- Communist party loses the mass support
- Communist regime is responsible for depression in the country

1994–1998
- Orientation to the governmental support of industry
- Prevailing support of re-integration
- Communist party is the main opposition force and a pretender for power
- The power democratically elected is responsible for what is happening

Those changes became possible due to significant evolution of the mass consciousness, in which dissociation from the multiparty institute grew and positions of those, who were against private property on land and enterprises, strengthened. It seems that for a couple of years of free life, the established layer of proprietors and the mighty splash in private economic initiatives had to promote the gradual death of communist habits and moods among the majority of the population. However,
neither this factor nor democrats with a young generation, infected with communist orientations to the least extent, led to an extension the influence of democratic values. The ghost of communism became real and got serious power ambitions.

At the same time, Ukrainian society managed to avoid the second coming of the communist messiah and aggressive social conflicts. We think it could be explained by the concept of the “institutional hyper-full-value” paradox:

1. On the one hand, the Soviet institutes that formed the system did not lose their traditional legitimacy together with losing their legal character as a result of Perestroika and the USSR collapse. People agreed with social rules based on the State paternalism ideology, preservation of the State property on big enterprises, socialist privileges for the population and privileges for the powerful elites, preservation of the State dominance in education, health care, science, art culture and control over confessional and interethnic relations.

2. On the other hand, illegal (shadow) soviet institutes (the shadow production and profiteering from commodity deficiency, protection and corruption, organized crime, double moral standards for the public and private moral positions) transformed into the legal institutes of “transforming society”, but did not gain the necessary legitimacy because people perceived them as “legal illegality”. That is why people did not want to follow the rules of legal formally but shadow in essence and accept new institutions as a basic institutional infrastructure of society.

Being anomically demoralized and feeling distrust and dissatisfaction with their positions in the society, most Ukrainians were ambivalent to the institutional formations, legality or legitimacy of which were not ensured by laws or moral norms. Such ambivalence manifested itself in the mass consent to live in the institutional space, where legality is ensured by the only fact of legal existence of new institutions and legitimacy is ensured by preservation of old institutes with the same traditional regulative functions and based on the preserved elements of social infrastructure, old social positions and role instructions. The described aspects formed the “institutional hyper-full-value” of Ukrainian society based on people’s consent to live in the institutional space, where old and new institutes ensure, with all their contradictory existence, all attributes of institutionalism necessary for social integration and stability. A classic example of institutional duality is activity of people’s deputies of Ukraine: most of them actively participate in entrepreneurship, because the power and commercial institutions formed the “symbiotic
relationship” (the term by R.Inglehart). Similar ties connect practically all institutional formations, so, in all institutional sectors, Ukrainian citizens can get double institutional pressure and find those attributes of legality and legitimacy necessary for social consent.

The parallel existence of two social structures supported a new social order, in which the most active new social actors did not tend to destabilization of society (being afraid of communist restoration), while representatives of the mass old layers tried, with the help of the double institutionalization, preserve, at least partially, their usual social roles and positions. As a result, almost all society was happy about the social situation: old and new social institutions co-existed due to contradictory influence of legality and legitimacy in the current social order.

Establishment of that institutional system was accompanied by essential worsening of economic situation in the country — GNP dropped, unemployment grew, the level of life fell, and so there was a rise in pessimistic moods, dissatisfaction with life, uncertainty in the future and distrust in the power structures. However, there was some social stability that made it possible for the power structures to carry out a number of political and economic reforms, very important for the further solution of social and economic problems: the Constitution was adopted, the monetary reform and mass privatization were put into life. As a result of the latter, in 1998, most enterprises became private property and mainly because of that, by L.Kuchma’s second Presidential term, the basis for economic rise was formed. The rise was necessary for the business class that initially grew on pseudo-operations or operations conducted outside the market — we mean trust and currency frauds, barter and rents based on State subsidies or priority rights for natural resources use.

**New Institutional Crisis and Orange Revolution (1999–2004)**

Ten years of L.Kuchma’s Presidency created the following paradox: the economic failure of 1994–1999 was accompanied by political stability while his second Presidential term, economically successful, was characterized by stormy political disturbances and found its infamous end with the 12% rise in GNP (there was no higher achievement in the post-communist world). The end was partially related to the cassette scandal and badly chosen successor at the election of 2004. However, those events (which played a role to trigger the anti-Kuchmism manifestation) had deeper reasons. The institutional system, formed in previous
years, found itself in contradiction with the needs of most of the active layers of the population and needs of the influential oppositional political elites, who did not find (or lose) their place in the power hierarchy. The first rebellion of the elites against President L.Kuchma in 2001 was not successful because resources of the double institutional system were not exhausted and, for most people, maintaining the stable situation was more important than to dismiss L.Kuchma. The first signs of the people’s adaptation to new social conditions appeared only in 1999, while any growth of real incomes had was not seen until 2001 — although the macro-economic situation started to improve. Under those conditions, the society was still more caring about its basic economic survival than about political fights between the power and oppositional elites.

By 2004, the situation changed. The level of life and social well-being rose essentially. The everyday and exhausting fight for survival stepped back, and many Ukrainians turned to political collisions related to the end of L.Kuchma’s epoch and the necessity to choose his successor. However, the double institutional system failed. Making a choice of strategic course for the country and society, it could propose only ambivalent decisions by providing contrary development directions with legality and legitimacy.

Double institutionalization is a temporary phenomenon preventing democratic transformation of society. It overloads the institutional space with roles, norms and infrastructures and reproduces the feeling of social helplessness and dissatisfaction with social position among the majority of people. This dissatisfaction opens a door to simple and clear slogans suggested by the political opposition, like “Bandits will be put into prison!”, “Power has to be separated from business!” and so on. Simplicity of those slogans was an advantageous contrast to the power multi-direction character that often excused duplicity and uncertainty of political and moral positions. The multi-direction position has an advantage: there is no need to make a decisive choice between West and East, business and politics, justice and corruption. Thus, resources of the double institutional system (possibly to avoid choosing between the old and new in the institutional space) happened to be unclaimed in the presidential campaign of 2004.

The Orange Revolution destroyed the administrative scenario of presidential election in Ukraine in 2004 along with most tendencies in the development of the mass consciousness. Some tendencies changed their directions, others radically intensified. Such significant changes
that occurred in the mass consciousness with the help of revolutionary events of the Presidential election made it possible to conclude that the democratic development in Ukraine came to a turning point. The monitoring survey of the beginning of 2005 revealed (for the first time) a rise in democratization of the mass consciousness according to a number of indices starting from the political, moral and psychological sphere. However, the results of the survey conducted just after the parliamentary election of April 2006 convincingly showed that people’s orientations and moods about democratic principles returned to the positions of the beginning of 2004. As a result, the significant improvement in a number of indices was nothing more than temporary splashes of democratic moods.

In the beginning of 2005, the most significant rise in the moods was registered by the following indices: trust in the President, government, representative power; trust in the multiparty system institute, parties and party leaders; realization of own political efficiency (confidence in the fact that ordinary people can influence political processes in the country); and social optimism (expectations and confidence in the fact that the situation will improve in the country). However, the revolutionary expectations, hopes and illusions were ruined by the post-revolutionary reality that brought the stagnation tendencies and recurrent moods back into Ukrainian society.

**After the Revolution... a Year Later**

The social transformation stage that followed the stormy events of Orange Revolution is far from its end. Its role in the democratic development of Ukrainian society is waiting to be analyzed. However, we have got the results of monitoring surveys, which make it possible to evaluate how the Orange Revolution and its consequences have influenced the mass consciousness, opinions, social evaluations and moods of Ukrainians. The results of those surveys have not been published yet, so we introduce not only our conclusions but also the empirical data being the basis for the conclusions.

In 2005, a revolutionary splash in social optimism led to the fact that the number of optimists doubled the number of pessimists for the first time during Ukrainian independence. A year passed and domination of social pessimism practically returned to the previous level.

That year changed radically people’s moods about the future of Ukraine. The dynamics of social moods is characterized by a significant
rise in a group of those who expressed negative moods and a fall in a group of those who have positive feelings about the future of Ukraine. For example, the share of those who think about the Ukrainian future and feel optimism, interest, confidence, joy and satisfaction decreased, while the share of those who mostly feel anxiety, confusion, helplessness, fear, pessimism grew essentially. Optimism was dominant by the beginning of 2005, and anxiety was dominant by the beginning of 2006. The growth in pessimistic moods was accompanied by a fall in optimistic prognoses and expectations about development of various social spheres in Ukraine.

Unfortunately, in Ukraine, social and political processes were disturbed by the massive splash in people’s trust in the power structures and certain political leaders that appeared during the first months after the revolution. This relates mostly to disappointment with the President: a year later, the level of trust in the President fell by 20%. Along with the fall in trust in the President, there was a fall in evaluations of his activity. Since 1998, the monitoring has included questions about evaluation of presidential activity in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and USA (the scale of 10 points). For the whole period, the highest evaluation belonged to B.Clinton, US President (1998–2001). In 2001, it reached 7.7 points. After G.Bush came to power, the evaluation of the US President’s activity dropped. In 2004, the G.Bush’s rating was 4.5 points. Thus, this rating was higher than the points given by Ukrainians to their President, L.Kuchma (3.2 points). Russian President, B.Yeltsin (1998–2000), was the only to reach L.Kuchma as to unpopularity. After V.Putin came to power, the Russian President’s rating rose significantly in Ukraine. V.Yushchenko’s coming to power brought an essential rise in popularity of Ukrainian President (5.6 points). In March 2005, V.Yushchenko almost reached V.Putin (6.0 points) and A.Lukashenko (5.8 points), and was ahead of G.Bush (5.0 points). However, by the beginning of 2006, the rating of Ukrainian President happened to be the lowest (3.8 points), while the ratings of V.Putin and A.Lukashenko became even higher and reached the same 6.3 points.

In 2005, along with the fall in trust in the President, a share of those who trusted in other power structures, like the government or Verkhovna Rada, decreased as well, and so the current attitudes toward the representative and executive power are characterized by dominant distrust as it was previously (before the Orange Revolution). A splash in positive attitudes to the multiparty institution which was registered
right after the revolution changed in a course of a year to a rise in negative orientations and a drop in positive ones.

Such changes in democratic orientations are mostly related to dissatisfaction with leaders of the Orange Revolution. The people who mentioned that they lack “leaders capable of governing the State” increased by 15%. Answering the question: “Did You support political leaders of the Orange Revolution and Do You support them now?”, 15% of respondents said that they “supported them but do not support now”. Some people clearly realize this change in their orientations, others easily jumped to new opinions with the help of “complaisant” memory. In the beginning of 2005, 27% of population answered “did not support and do not support now”, and in the beginning of 2006, already 39% did not support and do not support now. Only a year later, a share of those who think that they failed as a result of Orange Revolution tripled, while a share of those who think that they gained halved. The negative dynamics was registered in answers to the question: “How will the results of presidential election influence the well-being of your family in 5 years?”

Only one year was spent by the incompetent political management to put an end to positive changes in Ukrainian democratization, so we returned to the initial level at the beginning of 2004. At the same time, negative tendencies (like growing anti-market orientations, weakening geopolitical orientations to the West, etc.), registered in all years of Ukrainian independence, have intensified noticeably.

From March 2004 to March 2005, essential changes were revealed in economic evaluations, orientations and positions of Ukrainians: a steep rise in the anti-market moods and negative attitudes to privatization of land, small and especially large enterprises. Less people want to open their own business (an enterprise, a farm and etc.) or work for a private owner. In 2005, due to the “anti-oligarch” rhetoric, the anti-privatization moods rose even higher. By the beginning of 2006, a part of the people with negative attitudes to privatization of large enterprises reached 67%. In the survey of 1992 conducted just after Ukraine declared its independence, such people made up approximately 32%. There was registered an essential growth in negative attitudes to privatization of land also. In 1992, 14% and 64% had negative and positive attitudes correspondingly; in 2006, the corresponding figures were 53% and 24%. The highest jumps in the privatization negativism were in two recent years.

The revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods not only led to anti-market moods, but also strengthened orientations of the mass consciousness to the Eastern geopolitical direction in the international con-
solidation of Ukraine. There was a steep rise in negative attitudes to entering NATO. To tell the truth, a growth in negative orientations had been registered for the whole period of the monitoring survey. In the beginning of 2005, just after the Orange Revolution, a number of those who were against NATO jumped (owing to some part of those who were neutral or even supported NATO before) and made up over a half of the population. By the beginning of 2006, the part of those who were against joining NATO increased by 14% (!) and reached 64%, while the part of those who supported the idea dropped to 13%. In 2005, 54% of Ukrainians expressed their positive attitudes to the “idea of joining the union of Russia and Belarus” (28% were against of the idea).

Despite the spread of the positive orientations toward the Eastern-Slavic union in 2005, part of its supporters decreased (in comparison to the data of 2004, when 63% expressed their positive attitudes and 20% were against of it) but in 2006 the number of supporters rose again and reached 61%. The mass consciousness expresses certain ambiguity, because it approves (along with the Eastern orientation) the possibility of Ukraine joining the EU: in 2006, the idea was supported by 61% of the population. However, the part of those who are against it grew essentially — from 12% in 2004 to 25% in 2006. As a whole, about 20% of the population can be characterized by geopolitical ambivalence: they support the idea of Ukrainian entering both unions — the Eastern and the Western ones.

Sometimes the geopolitical orientations of Ukrainians are in opposition to their electoral choices. Analysis of the support of certain political forces in electoral campaigns often reveal a gap between people’s personal political positions and programs of the political forces they vote for. For example, those who supported the union with Russia made up 36% of voters for V.Yushchenko in the third round of the presidential election in 2004 and 36% of voters for “Our Ukraine” at the parliamentary election of 2006. Also among voters for the BYuT and Socialist Party at the parliamentary election of 2006, there were 31% and 57% of those who supported the idea of entering the union of Russia and Belarus correspondingly. Among the voters for V.Yushchenko in the third round of the presidential election in 2004 and for “Our Ukraine” at the parliamentary election of 2006, there were 43% and 40% of those who were against entering NATO correspondingly. The percentage of such people among voters for the BYuT and Socialist Party at the parliamentary election of 2006 made 42% and 61% correspondingly.
People explain those changes in their moods mostly by disappointment with leaders of the Orange Revolution. Thus, to our mind, such metamorphoses in the mass consciousness can be explained by both objective results of certain politicians’ activity and the fact that, in the first post-revolutionary months, the clearly expressed optimism was mostly of a “parasitical” nature. It was accompanied by an “unbelievable” (for sociological monitoring) splash in trust in new political leaders, and first of all in the newly elected President of Ukraine. However, together with that enormous credit of trust, the public consciousness passed to the new power the full responsibility of further development in the country and people’s well-being. Apart from participation in the revolutionary events, the level of political and civil activity of the population was traditionally low. Having not gained all the expected in a trice, people felt deeply disappointed with the new power. At first sight, it seems unfair because, even according to self-reports of respondents, their wages (pensions, scholarships) rose by 45% on average, and income per person grew by 31%. At the same time, almost two fifths of the population (39%) mentioned that the material conditions of their families had worsened for the past year, the part of those whose material conditions improved made up only 14%; while a year ago, the latter figure was 20%. The part of those who think that they “cannot tolerate such a disastrous condition anymore” increased from 21% to 29%. We have to say that those moods were expressed under conditions when indices of material well-being (like a number of mobile connection subscribers that has doubled for the past year) rose and the social well-being improved.

Analyzing the reasons why the democratic shoots fade in the mass consciousness, we may explain it by disappointment with the Orange Revolution leaders who, fighting with each other, make rash political declarations and incompetent decisions — results of surveys seem to support this idea. However, to our mind, the roots of such mass moods are deeper and can lead to negative consequences for the democratic development of Ukraine.

Since Ukraine declared its independence, the population have to live in social anomie characterized by absence of the value-normative basis for social consolidation in society, and this consolidation is impossible without common understanding of “what is wrong and what is right”, what is encouraged and what is punished in this society. The old value-normative system that consolidated a totalitarian society has been destroyed, and a new one based on democratic values has not been established yet. In these conditions, over 80% of Ukrainians were led to high
anomic demoralization. However, anomic cannot last forever, and so the mass consciousness looks for values in the past and tries to find a messiah capable of restoring order in the country. In an anomic society, such a messiah could become an authoritarian leader of a fascist kind or a totalitarian leader with communist rhetoric or an archaic-traditional “spirit pastor”. In Ukraine, the wounds inflicted by fascist and communist leaders are fresh enough. Finding no acting democratic values or even basic laws in society, the mass consciousness appeals to the traditional value base for regulation of social relations. Intuition prompted to the new political force that came in the power the rhetoric and attributes corresponding to the values, which gain an image of moral and consolidating basis in society. As a result, we obtained the traditionalist orientation, rather strange for political leaders declaring a way to integration in a modern democratic society: archaic dresses and hair styles, public worships at the highest governmental level, attempts to introduce religious doctrines in the state educational system and nepotism as a main principle to choose personnel for the power structures, etc.

Unfortunately, those who criticize this behavior and politicians who underestimate the fact that archaic attributes and social behavior of new power correspond to the choice of the Ukrainian population (determined by a long period of anomic and illegality); they chose the traditionalist model of consolidation and society development.

The Orange Revolution that manifested itself as democratic happened to be cultural and ethnic in its value-normative essence. In the electoral division of Ukraine accompanied by further divergence in electorate, the factor of historical identity started to play a key role. This category was substantiated in a work by V. Sereda, a sociologist from Lviv, and we consider it to be the most adequate construct for analysis of centrifugal and centripetal forces in consolidating processes that appeared in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution — we mean divergence and consolidation of Ukrainian population on the West-East axis.

In Western Ukraine, people are consolidating on the basis of their historical memory and the corresponding feeling — “to break out from oppression of Russia”.

In Eastern Ukraine, the consolidation is based on historical memories and the corresponding feeling of “social and cultural ties with Russia”.

In Central Ukraine, people balance between the West and the East and experience double pressure of social uncertainty (anomic uncertainty and the difficult choice of historical identity), they are inclined to the West but cannot totally consolidate with it because of slightly differ-
ent historical experience. In the double uncertainty, the central part of Ukraine is the most probable place to expect a growing need in an authoritarian leader, like V.Putin or A.Lukashenko but with Ukrainian attributes.

To our mind, the paradox of national character of democratic development in Ukraine can be explained by the fact that democratic rhetoric of both the population and the new leaders can be characterized by pragmatism. It is more conditioned by the hope to get support and assistance from the “rich” West than by the actual desire to direct to democratic norms of social life, we mean such democratic values as command of law and equality of all before the law, respect of rights and interests of each citizen, freedom of speech, no discrimination, social solidarity, civil activity, etc. To make these values effective, the powerful elite have first and foremost to demonstrate the corresponding behavior.

Unfortunately, the new leaders began their work by breaking democratic norms. First of all it concerns the President and his too hasty inauguration and numerous dismissals, and continued as he carried out and commented his policies without taking into account existing laws. Then, the key figures of the processes for legitimacy of democratic laws, like Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs or representatives of Office of Public Prosecutor and courts, themselves were the subjects of law breaking scandals or were caught in a lies, but the upper power did not apply any sanctions to them.

The only way to consolidate society and turn its development into the direction of real democratic transformations could be if the leadership made strict control over execution of the current law and conducting of personal behavior in correspondence with the modern (not archaic) democratic values as its top priority.