

## Regional Factor of the Development of the Ukrainians' Political Culture

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article

### Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Stegniy, O. (2007). Regional Factor of the Development of the Ukrainians' Political Culture. In Y. Golovakha (Ed.), *Ukrainian Sociological Review 2004-2005* (pp. 88-121). Kiev: Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-105977>

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# **Regional Factor of the Development of the Ukrainians' Political Culture<sup>1</sup>**

### *Abstract*

*The author examines the regional factor's influence on integrative and activating functions of political culture of the population of Ukraine. As a factor of influence on the above-mentioned functions, the region is treated as a territorial organization of socio-political and socio-cultural aspects of a community's activity. The congruence of common socio-cultural values, as well as the level of political solidarity is researched on the basis of historical identity, spatial-territorial self-identification, a desirable line of the regional development related to the opposition "nationally integrated — regionally autonomous", as well as the degree of authoritarianism in a territorial community. Empirical data allow concluding about political culture of all regions of Ukraine that can be defined as tending to the integrative-passive type with slight differences.*

## **Regional Aspects in the Newest History of Ukraine**

In sociological books, a region is regarded mostly as a space of a certain social culture, power organization, and cultural traditions; this allows talking about a territorially differentiated community of people. According to the sociological approach, the territorial organization is an aggregation of territorial communities of various levels and interrelations [1, p. 6; 2, p. 178–179]. Regional distinctions are studied along with the activity of territorial communities. In sociological analysis of so-

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<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Ukrainian text "Regional'nyi faktor rozvytku politychnoi kul'tury naselennia Ukrainy", *Sotsiologhiia: teoriia, metody, marketynh*, 2005, № 3, pp. 94–122.

cial and territorial structure of society, researchers concentrate their attention on the social mechanism of functioning and development of social and territorial communities.

According to the data of sociological polls<sup>1</sup>, for most Ukrainians, the term *region* has two meanings: the place where they live and the part of Ukraine, which differs from an oblast by its history, economics, culture, and size.

At the beginning of 1990s, there were serious discussions on federal structure of the state. A convincing argument was that every historical region of Ukraine has its specific ethnic, socio-economic, cultural, and language characteristics. In the opinion of proponents of federal structure, the belonging to the unified Ukrainian nation does not deny this kind of social order; on the contrary, to save and strengthen the nation, there should be granted more autonomous rights taking into account local differences of Ukrainian regions.

Regional elites wanted to strengthen their positions in Ukrainian political life, and this activated the regional movements in 1998–1999. At that time, representatives of regional elites tried to realize their goals through various political parties<sup>2</sup> and public organizations, like *Region Revival (Vidrodzhennia Regionu)* in Odessa oblast, *Union of the Ukrainian Local and Regional Authorities' Leaders (Spilka lideriv mistsevykh i regional'nykh vlad Ukrainy)*, and the deputy group *Regions' Revival (Vidrodzhennia Regioniv)* in the Verkhovna Rada.

At present, regional movement has assumed an elitist character, because leaders of governmental organs and some of the people's deputies mostly laid its foundations. As a result, the regional movement is not consolidated: despite their common interests (a gradual decentralization of power and transfer of certain authorities to the regional level), there are discrepancies between economic interests of different regional and interregional groups.

<sup>1</sup> The all-national poll, 1200 respondents, conducted by the SOCIS Center in 1997 and the all-national poll, 1800 respondents, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine in 2004.

<sup>2</sup> In November 2000, the congress united *Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine (Partiia Regional'noho Vidrodzhennia Ukrainy)* with four other parties and established *Party of Regional Revival "Labor Solidarity of Ukraine" (Partiia Regional'noho Vidrodzhennia "Trudova Solidarnist' Ukrainy")*. In March 2001, the special congress gave this party a new name — *Party of Regions (Partiia Regioniv)*. In December 2001, it consisted of 460 thousand members united in over than 8 thousand party organizations, including 7200 primary ones (see: <http://www.polit.com.ua>).

During the presidential election of 2004, the following question was raised: what structural configuration of the political power had to be in Ukraine?

For the first time in the newest history of our state, the symbolic and cultural capital of the Western Ukraine's elite, the social capital of Ukrainian establishment and a part of economic capital belonging to the power elite of the whole Ukraine could have been concentrated in one center of influence and in hand of the one political group.

The situation was problematic, because it was the first time when the elite from Eastern Ukraine that, even in the soviet time, had exerted the economic power and strongly influenced political processes on a national scale, could have lost those means of influence at the level of presidential power. Eastern industrial and the capital-central elites did not manage to fight down the opposite candidate V. Yuschenko and his political group, which could have gained all main types of social capital after coming to power (by P. Bourdieux).

The attempt to proclaim the Southeastern Ukrainian Autonomous Republic was a social reflection of regional elite in Eastern Ukraine on the lost balance between regional and sectoral power groups, on the one hand, and sources of political influence, on the other.

To complete this brief historical description of the regionalism phenomenon in Ukraine, we would like to define its two main forms. The first one relates to the economic interests of regions and geographically coincides with the current administrative division. This form is potentially capable of becoming the decisive factor of regionalization. However, now, when it is too early to talk about the real balance between the national and local economic interests advanced at a regional level, the determinative is the second form — historical and ethnic, which being ignored, causes an acute tension in the internal political situation. In this context, social researchers consider four or six regions (if the East is divided into the North-East, *i.e.* Slobozhanschyna, and Donbas, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and South are regarded separately as well).

## **Regional Distinctions in Political Culture as a Subject Matter of Sociological Research**

Ukrainian sociologists pay much attention to historically specific features influencing the social development of territorial communities, people's attitude towards historical events in our country, national at-

tributes, as well as to the choice of its foreign policy directions and strategic partners [see: 3–10].

According to S. Makeyev, in Ukraine, regional subcultures are “the products of historical development, type of settlement, educational and age structures of residents, their way of life, customs and traditions, interpretation of reality, as well as social and economic conditions” [9, p. 8].

In the middle of 1990s, sociological researches aimed at revealing regional distinctions in political orientations of the residents of Lviv and Donetsk led to the idea that the most significant differences between the residents of two cities are ethnic and political, while social differences are of minor importance [11, p. 108].

During 1994–1999, monitoring on the dynamics of a personal self-identification and forming of identification models for representatives of three generations in Lviv and Donetsk revealed the significance of local identities for residents of both cities (*Lvivite and Donetskite*). Representatives of different generations in Lviv personified the more static social environment, while in Donetsk it was more dynamic [12, pp. 256–257].

Some national sociologists think that there is a political geography of Ukraine constituted by the election of 1994<sup>1</sup>, when L. Kuchma first elected as the President of Ukraine. It means that “historical, cultural, economic, and settlement differences became of political kind and were reduced to the means of struggle for domination, while to accentuate them is a rule of political game” [13, p. 6].

Social researchers notice that regional distinctions in a political culture exist not only in the line East-West. For example, N. Pohorila says about *horizontal* (West-East) and *vertical* (North-South) cultural division of Ukraine. Regarding the political culture as a combination of political competence, trust in politicians, and political activity, N. Pohorila stresses that the mentioned elements of political culture are hardly related to the line West-East. Moreover, in her opinion, opposition of political cultures like “civic-estranged” is more characteristic of the Center and South [14, pp. 64, 78].

As to political culture, politologists differentiate three vectors of influence in Ukrainian political space: southwestern that determines cultural and religious processes; southeastern that contributes to economic decisions; southern (including the Autonomous Republic of Cri-

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<sup>1</sup> In that year, there were held parliamentary and early presidential elections.

mea) that makes for separatist and autonomist tendencies in Ukrainian politics [15]. Besides, in present-day Ukraine, there are three political subcultures — Russian, Ukrainian, and western, differences between which can be explained mostly by different social and economic activities, as well as attitude to the national interests [16, pp. 142–143].

So, we can talk about segmentation of Ukrainian political and cultural space. Now the regional communities are characterized by a specific regional consciousness based on their regional identification, regional interests and values, common historical and political experience, ethnic and confessional features, presence of regional “agents” forming a political culture.

We can conclude that the present-day Ukrainian society has *no consensus political culture* with the coincided attitudes of citizens of the whole country to certain political forces standing for corresponding ideological values and political vector of development, to the foreign policy course, in particular, under the expanding globalization.

On the contrary, there exist *conflict political cultures* in regional measurements. Our research is aimed to reveal the impact of such conflicts, especially components of political culture affected over time.

To research a political culture, we applied the functional approach<sup>1</sup>. The most important functions of political culture are the following:

- Cognitive (indicators: interest in politics, political knowledge).
- Evaluative (assessment of political situation, political events and activities of political organizations and leaders).
- Orientational (attitude to ideological values and political forces standing for them).
- Integrative (trust in political institutions and political identification).
- Activating (electoral preferences, political participation, political competence, readiness to political actions).
- Prognostic (hopes or fears related to political prospects).

The subject matter of our survey is a regional influence on the most important functions of political culture in territorial communities of Ukraine for the first decade of Ukrainian state independence. Taking into account the mass social unrest in the end of 2004 (*the Orange Revolution*) and possible new scenarios of the socio-political development,

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<sup>1</sup> Ye. Golovakha suggested this approach within the framework of the research study *Political Culture of the Ukrainian Society; Current State and Developing Trends*, performed by the Department of Socio-Political Processes, IS NASU.

the most essential, among all the above-mentioned functions of political culture, are the integrative and activating ones. Combining them, we can construct the following types of political culture: integrative-activating, integrative-passive, disintegrative-activating, and disintegrative-passive.

The typology can be applied to determine the prospects of civil society in Ukraine (with a certain level of social self-organization) and public support of the social order according to the line “unitary-autonomous”.

As a factor of influence on the above-mentioned functions of political culture, a region will be considered in terms of political, social, and cultural life of territorial communities. Congruence of common socio-cultural values and the level of political solidarity will be analyzed as to historical identity, spatial-territorial self-identification, and desirable lines of regional development related to the opposition “national integration — regional autonomy” [more see: 4], as well as the degree of authoritarianism in territorial communities.

We revealed the regional distinctions in political culture of Ukrainian population using the data of the all-national polls conducted within the framework of the monitoring survey *Ukrainian Society in 1994–2005*, the second wave of the all-national poll *Political Culture of the Population of Ukraine* (November 1991)<sup>1</sup>, and the all-national poll of 1997 carried out within the sociological project *Regions in Ukraine: The Dynamics, Movements, and Politics*<sup>2</sup>.

The regional factor's influence on political culture is regarded in four macro-regions: the Center, the West, the East, and the South. Such a division is advisable, because we can increase the sample size for statistical analysis. Moreover, the territories of the mentioned macro-regions correspond to the geographical distribution of electoral preferences during parliamentary and presidential elections of the last decade.

Table 1 represents the sample distribution in macro-regions. To see quantitative differences, we put: 1 — for the monitoring survey *Ukrainian Society*; 2 — for the second wave of *Political Culture*; 3 — for *Regions*

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<sup>1</sup> The poll was conducted within the framework of the international program on political culture studies of the population in Eastern Europe. The data were collected by a standardized interview. Representative sample included 1752 respondents.

<sup>2</sup> The matter concerns the project carried out by the *International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation with Scientists from the New Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union (INTAS)* № 94-3938. The data were collected by a standardized interview. Representative sample included 1200 respondents.

in Ukraine. Differences in the macro-regional distribution were caused by different sample design and size.

In all tables, the data are presented according to the number of answers but not to the total number of respondents.

**Table 1**

**Distribution of Samples as to the Macro-regions of Ukraine**

Macro-regions	Oblasts included	N		
		1	2	3
The Center	Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Kyiv (with the city of Kyiv), Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv	590	456	329
The West	Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi	326	366	251
The East	Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk	402	281	294
The South	Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Kherson, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea	482	649	326

### Regional Factor of the Integrative Function

Analysis of the regional factor of integrative function for political culture is based on the definition of historical identity of territorial communities, their spatial-territorial self-identification and orientations to the desirable line of development in the “unitary-autonomous” dimension. The integrative function indicators are trust in political institutions (basic triumvirate, *i.e.* President–parliament–government) and political identity.

People’s apprehension of the historical past produces their orientations to the future and, as a result, tools for collective actions and strategic potential of a territorial community. Authors of the joint monograph on formation of regions in post-socialist Europe understand history as a “repository” or a “container” for symbols that can be forgotten, activated, reconstructed, or presented in a new form for communicative interaction [17, v. 1, p. 33].

According to the all-national survey conducted with the author’s participation [4], the majority of Ukrainian citizens say that knowledge of

culture and history is important for ethnic identification of a person. However, attitude to the historical events is of specific character.

After Ukraine had declared independence, its history was revised under the slogan *Restoring Historical Truth*. There were published new textbooks for secondary schools. The history-making figures, which had been stigmatized as “nationalists” and “traitors” of Ukrainians' interests in the soviet period, got new evaluations that often were completely opposite. This fact makes analysis of attitude towards events of Ukrainian history rather complicated.

However, the attitude to the most important events of the national history enables, on the one hand, to retrace the historical memory; on the other hand, to reveal how the evaluation of a historical event influences the current political orientations of respondents.

Historical memory, as a kind of social memory, includes people's experience and their evaluations of significant events reflected in the public responses to reality. “Symbolic capital” can be considered as a “repository of knowledge and symbols”, which is popular in the whole society or a social group. The collected symbolic resources can be materialized in discourses and collective actions towards various signs, in the apprehension of certain historical events and presentation of facts, concepts, points of view, or theoretical constructions.

At the same time, we have to remember that historical cognition depends on political organization of society and try to prevent the mythologization of historical consciousness.

To understand how estimation of a prominent figure or historical event makes for the construction of social self-identification and modern imagined communities, we use the **historical identity** term taking into account that it was formed due to the official interpretation of history and an individual's memory. Historical identity together with memory enables to get a personal positive evaluation of history-making figures or events regardless of the time elapsed; it corresponds to the opinions about historical events, which were molded from the knowledge acquired in secondary schools and universities, as well as due to the statements of various political figures presented by the mass media [8, p. 27].

Construction of historical identity is of selective character, contrary to official interpretations of history where some facts or persons of the past are incorporated into the mainstream and become the objects of recognition and admiration, while others are isolated, ignored, or denied. The criteria for such a selection are political situation and values cherished by social, political and economic environment.

German culturologist Jorn Rusen suggested a typology of historical events according to their modality influencing the historical identity formation. These events are of positive or negative modality, as well as those helping to substitute old concepts of collective identity for the new. Moreover, J. Rusen divides historical events by their places in historical development of collective identity for any nation into three kinds: events as turning points, events that cancel the previous patterns of collective identity, and events that reanimate these patterns [18].

All historical events are selected to be tools corresponding to the mentioned typology and can be chronologically divided into three categories.

The first category includes events of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the period when Ukrainians bravely fought against Polish enslavement.

The Pereyaslav Council (*Pereyaslavska Rada*) in 1654 had legally established a union of Ukraine and Russia; Ukrainians accepted the union with the hope for possession of equal rights and help in the national liberation. However, these hopes did not come true because the first sprouts of Ukrainian state were cut off by Russia. This is a crucial point because proponents of the USSR's revival stress the goodwill of Ukrainians in 1654 without telling the real reason for Ukraine to establish this union [19; 20].

The second category is the period of Soviet power starting with the October Revolution of 1917 or the October upheaval, as some historians call it.

The third category includes the newest events, from the collapse of the USSR and declaration of the state independence of Ukraine.

To calculate the index of historical event evaluation, we employed a three-point ordinal scale where one point means the negative attitude, two points — the indifferent, three points — the positive.

One can see the dynamics in the apprehension of certain historical events by Ukrainian population according to regions in the data of the research survey *Regions in Ukraine: The Dynamics, Movements, and Politics* [4, p. 50] and in the results of the all-national poll *Ukrainian Society-2004* conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine.

The sample sizes and methods for collection of empirical data (a standardized interview and a handout questionnaire correspondingly) were different. However, in both cases, the question wordings and scales were similar. That is why, we can make a comparison and this will be correct maybe not as to absolute figures but as to the displayed tendencies undoubtedly.

**Table 2**

**The Dynamics of Evaluations of the Historical Events  
according to Macro-regions, Points**

Macro- regions	Evaluation of historical events							
	Pereyaslav Council		October Revolution		Collapse of the USSR		Declaration of the Ukrainian independence	
	1997	2004	1997	2004	1997	2004	1997	2004
The Center	2.47	2.36 <sup>a</sup>	2.01	2.15 <sup>a</sup>	1.64	1.55	2.22	2.29
The West	2.56	2.59	2.12	2.21 <sup>a</sup>	1.27	1.29	1.61	1.95 <sup>b</sup>
The East	2.18	2.14	1.57	1.79 <sup>b</sup>	2.40	2.29	2.82	2.83
The South	2.50	2.41 <sup>a</sup>	2.24	2.07 <sup>b</sup>	1.30	1.34	1.84	2.02 <sup>b</sup>
Ukraine as a whole	2.43	2.38	2.01	2.08 <sup>a</sup>	1.62	1.56	2.10	2.25 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> — Difference is statistically significant;  $p < 0.05$ .

<sup>b</sup> — Difference is statistically significant;  $p < 0.01$ .

The data allow concluding that the attitude of regional communities to certain events from the historical past of Ukraine can vary over time.

For instance, attitude to the Pereyaslav Council become less favorable among the respondents from the Center and South. The October Revolution was given more positive evaluations in all regions except the South where it is more disapproved in comparison with the poll of 1997. As to the attitude towards the USSR collapse, there were registered slight differences within the mentioned time period.

Due to the social and economic progress of Ukraine, the attitude of respondents from the East and South to the declaration of Ukrainian independence changed for the better. Although the disposition of these regions to the West and Center did not change, the attitude towards independence changed from a negative-neutral to a clearly neutral.

The latter should be emphasized because it enables to reveal a tendency towards gradual elimination of ideological contradictions between the West and East-South on the structure of Ukraine as a unitary state. At the same time, we must be aware of grave consequences if the central authorities accelerate this tendency by applying administrative measures.

However, the registered temporal differences do not deny the following two phenomena. Firstly, the historical events related to the establishment of Ukraine as an independent state were the most positively evaluated by respondents of the West. There is a statistically significant difference of their evaluations from the other macro-regions ( $p < 0.01$ ). Secondly, the negative evaluation of the same events of Ukrainian history is obviously characteristic among residents of the East and South<sup>1</sup>.

A regional factor influences the integrative function of political culture due to historical and **spatial-territorial identities** of regional communities.

In their behavior, social groups and individuals manifest identities of various kinds, including political and territorial. The latter takes shape and becomes a weighty factor of political life in the “multi-layer communities” (by A. Lijphart) where the population groups are divided according to the segment differences, mostly socio-cultural and ideological.

An individual enters a spatial-territorial community in the following way: he/she looks for the community, which gives the individual confidence; perceives that he/she is an element of this community, i.e. united with “us”; feels affiliation with this community, solidarity with it; internalizes group ideals, values, needs, aims, and standards; assumes a responsibility to this community.

Analysis of the spatial-territorial identification enables to determine an individual's identification with a spatial-territorial community, as well as his/her self-identification as a social actor within a certain spatial-territorial community.

Taking into account the contacts with different communities, an individual personifies and embodies identities that influence each other as self-identifications with these communities.

Distinctions between the regional political identities are determined by permanent and transitory factors. The former depend on settlement type, ethnic composition, confession, historical identity, orientations to democracy or totalitarianism, stereotype ideas of a regional autonomy or a unitary state. Transitory factors relate to the situative interests of regional elites, allocation of the national information resources and con-

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Heated discussions on granting warriors of the *Ukrainian Revolt Army (Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armija)*, the status of veterans of the *Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 (Velyka Vitchyzniana Viyna)* also confirm existence of different ideas, among regional communities of Ukraine, about the common past and differences in historical identities.

figuration of the regional mass media space, as well as current events (like election campaigns).

Being dependent on each other, all these factors may determine “the regional development pattern” — being historically formed, the type of regional identity reproduction, the “socio-cultural code” of a region essential to its entire development [21, p. 79].

In the social space, an individual's identities are presented in horizontal and vertical dimensions. We speak of a vertical identity being formed in the spatial-territorial sphere of communities on the different levels. That is why, the spatial-territorial identification can be regarded vertically: from a local settlement where an individual lives to the macro-identification with the “world citizens”.

In our surveys, to reveal the spatial-territorial identification, respondents were offered the 7-point scale where one point corresponded to the local level (of a settlement) and seven points meant the macro-level (world citizen). All gradations were integrated into the four levels of identification.

The local level included the identification with a settlement or a region. It was reasonable taking into account the specific interpretation of the term “region” by respondents. The national level corresponded to the identification with Ukrainian people and representatives of their own ethnicity/nation, the post-soviet level meant the identification with the ex-USSR's population. The transnational level united those who identified themselves with the citizens of Europe and of the whole world.

In the postmodern world, an individual enters a new system of the self-determination and self-identification. Due to active interaction with various cultures, with the help of mass media, the individual identifies himself/herself not only with local communities (*here and now*), but also becomes involved in the global social space.

There is another reason to analyze the position “world citizen”. On the one hand, it can be understood as the extent to which an individual realizes his/her freedom gained due to the fallen “iron curtain” of the closed soviet system, liberation from the total control, and desire to become acquainted with the achievements in the world culture. On the other hand, it can mean an indifference to the national achievements and values or be a result of broken connections between generations and disregard of traditions.

“Internationalization” and “globalization” are very popular terms in the present-day discussions. In Eastern and Western Europe, more attention is paid to the international aspects of politics and public orienta-

tions. But it should be remembered that these orientations corresponds mainly to the elite's ideas, while people feel restful and orient themselves well mostly among their local community.

In Ukraine, belonging to a region or a nation is the dominant space for social experience, orientation, and emotional contacts. For the past five years, the level of local self-identification has been lowering, while the national one has become stronger. Many people consider themselves still belonging to the USSR as the space for their emotional identification. For the mentioned period, their number has significantly decreased, but it is rather considerable.

The fact that in the preamble to the Constitution of the USSR of 1977, there was declared a new community called the soviet people, gave a strong ideological support to the soviet totalitarianism and left its imprint on the mass consciousness. The Soviet Union has collapsed, but the soviet people exist.

Sociological surveys evidence that many Ukrainians manifest their new political identities according to the economic circumstances. In the spring of 1996, i.e. five years after the independence had been declared, only one fourth of respondents supported the Ukrainian independence. This happened because of the unfavorable social and economic situation [4, pp. 46–47].

Due to gradual improvement of the economic situation, there was an increase in the number of proponents of Ukraine's independence. In 2001, over 56% of respondents were ready to confirm their choice of the independence of Ukraine in the case of referendum<sup>1</sup>.

The cosmopolitan identification and desire to become a citizen of the world are still in the last place. Moreover, in 2005, the number of such respondents is half as much than it was in the first poll.

Sociological monitoring registers a gradual lowering of the local self-identification level in all regions for the past five years. A sharp drop is observed in the West. In 2000, this region had the most numerous group of the local self-identification; five years later, this number reduced to the average for the whole country. As to regional communities of the East and South, the number of local self-identification bearers did not decline significantly, but there is another reason to talk about them. A painful fact that the candidate whom they had supported in the last

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The matter concerns the all-national poll within the project *SOCIS-Omnibus*. A representative sample included 1200 respondents. The method of data collection was a standardized interview in the place of residence.

presidential election failed did not cause (as would be expected) any growth of the local self-identification being one of the possible ways to express a disagreement with the other candidate's victory.

**Table 3**

**The Dynamics of the Spatial-territorial Selfidentification according to Macro-regions, %**

Self-identification level	The Center	The West	The East	The South	Ukraine as a whole
<i>Local</i>					
2000	36.8	44.5	37.2	36.9	38.3
2004	41.7	36.6	37.8	31.9	37.3
2005	31.9	26.7	32.6	31.3	31.0
<i>National</i>					
2000	49.8	43.9	34.4	34.0	41.1
2004	47.8	57.2	38.8	47.4	47.4
2005	60.1	66.9	50.3	50.8	56.7
<i>Post-soviet</i>					
2000	7.8	1.8	20.2	17.8	12.2
2004	6.4	2.5	18.2	15.5	10.8
2005	4.9	1.8	13.2	12.0	8.1
<i>Transnational</i>					
2000	5.5	9.8	8.2	11.2	8.4
2004	2.5	3.1	3.5	3.8	3.2
2005	2.4	3.1	2.7	5.0	3.3

At the same time, the national self-identification has significantly grown in all regions; this is a positive tendency for the integration of Ukrainian society. In the East and South, a considerable drop in numbers of those who identify themselves with the population of the USSR may bring about changes in the configuration of political identity for territorial communities of these regions.

The regional factor of integrative function for political culture is also determines the orientations of territorial communities to the ***desirable line of a region's development in the dimension of "national integration — regional autonomy"***.

There are two directions of the desirable vector of regional development: a) unitary, oriented mainly to the connections with the other regions (oblasts) and integration in Ukraine as a whole; b) autonomous that implies to use the potential of a region. The data of two polls, *Regions of Ukraine* of 1997 and *Ukrainian Society* of 2004, formed our empirical base.

The question wordings did not differ; however, in the first case, respondents had six options, while in the second one — only three. It happened so, because in the poll of 1997 there were options related to the foreign policy orientation; it was methodologically wrong. It is not important for our survey, because we do not compare absolute figures but reveal only the general trend in the unitary and autonomous orientations. The data presented in Table 4 do not include other factors of regional development, apart from unitary or autonomous.

**Table 4**

**The Dynamics of Orientations to the Desirable Line of Development for Macro-regions, %**

Macro-regions	Orientations to the line of development			
	Unitary		Autonomous	
	1997	2004	1997	2004
The Center	37.1	52.1	11.9	25.0
The West	43.8	57.5	10.8	25.5
The East	22.8	55.1	13.6	30.0
The South	26.7	49.1	10.4	30.8
Ukraine as a whole	32.2	53.0	11.7	27.7

Among all macro-regions, in 1997, residents of the West and Center manifested the strongest support of the unitary way of development; there is a statistically significant difference between them and the East-South ( $p < 0.01$ ). As to the support of autonomous development, there was no essential difference between macro-regions.

Seven years later, residents of the West gave the strongest support of the unitary development. As distinct from the first poll, there were revealed significant differences not only in the South, but also in the Center. In the East, the support of unitary development was almost the same as in the West. As to the autonomous development vector, it is still equally supported among all macro-regions. There is one exception: the South and Center manifested two extreme positions — the strongest and weakest support of autonomous development correspondingly. However, it is important that in both polls the number of those who supported the development of connections with other regions and integration into Ukraine is essentially more than the number of those who preferred to rely on regional resources and supported centrifugal tendencies in the political system.

Analyzing the integrative function of political culture, we can determine people's orientations as to political system, basic values, and political institutions.

Legitimacy of political system is based on the **trust in political institutions**. Political system and government having a high degree of legitimacy are more effective when they work out and pursue the strategy of political development. In democratic societies, election on a competitive basis and observance of constitutional procedures provide for legitimacy of state power. In transitional societies, including Ukraine, political leaders usually lay their claims to legitimacy making promises during an election campaign, which are often unfulfilled.

When L. Kuchma took the place of L. Kravchuk as a political leader, the strongest trust in the governmental authorities was registered in the West and Center. Ten years later, the situation changed crucially; the level of trust in political triumvirate was noticeably higher in the East and South. This is an evidence of different attitude of regional communities to the political regime under L. Kuchma. The results of the election of 2004 demonstrated that different levels of trust deeply influenced electoral preferences in regions. At the same time, irrespective of absolute figures, the trust in all branches of power grown after the Orange Revolution can eliminate the registered regional distinctions.

**Political identity** of regional communities is also of great importance to the integrative function of political culture. It can be operationalized by means of questions about the adherence to a certain political ideology or movement (political preferences), national pride, and respondents' perception of Ukraine as their native land.

**Table 5**

**The Dynamics of Trust in Political Institutions by Macro-regions**

Political institutions	The dynamics of trust								Ukraine as a whole	
	The Center		The West		The East		The South		N	Points
	N	Points	N	Points	N	Points	N	Points		
President of Ukraine										
1994	597	2.48	324	2.73	403	1.90	483	2.19	1807	2.32
2004	588	2.19	326	2.00	402	2.50	481	2.43	1797	2.29
2005	590	3.65	325	4.08	401	2.65	482	3.16	1798	3.37
Government										
1994	597	2.43	324	2.44	403	2.11	483	2.27	1807	2.32
2004	587	2.22	326	2.18	402	2.40	480	2.37	1795	2.29
2005	589	3.24	325	3.71	399	2.54	480	2.94	1793	3.09
Verkhovna Rada										
1994	597	2.34	324	2.41	403	2.19	483	2.21	1807	2.29
2004	587	2.12	326	2.04	402	2.23	482	2.30	1797	2.18
2005	590	3.09	325	3.41	401	2.43	480	2.80	1796	2.92

As regards the *adherence to a certain political ideology*, there are four categories. Proponents of the left-wing parties, in our case, communists and socialists, form the first one. The second category includes adherents of centrists: social democrats, national democrats, Christian democrats (according to the poll of 1994), and Green politics (the polls of 2004 and 2005). We added to them a small group of those who supported the religious (fundamentalist) ideology. The third category consists of the right-wing proponents: nationalists and liberals. The last category collected those who have not defined their position or kept away from all main political forces.

Comparing the data of 2004 and 2005 with the ones of 1994, we can note certain changes. For example, the following ideologies, such as anarchist, anarcho-syndicalist, and fundamentalist (religious), were not included, while the environmental one was added. As a result, the list was shortened to eight political ideologies.

**Table 6****The Dynamics of Political Preferences**

Segments of the political spectrum	The dynamics of preferences as to macro-regions								Ukraine as a whole	
	The Center		The West		The East		The South			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>The Left</i>										
1994	593	17.9	320	6.6	396	34.6	481	24.1	1790	21.2
2004	590	25.6	323	10.5	402	34.8	482	27.8	1797	25.5
2005	590	21.2	326	10.1	402	26.1	482	21.6	1800	20.4
<i>Centrists</i>										
1994	593	14.5	320	29.1	396	11.6	481	14.1	1790	16.4
2004	590	24.1	323	34.7	402	16.2	482	24.9	1797	21.8
2005	590	26.1	326	39.9	402	29.1	482	30.1	1800	30.0
<i>The Right</i>										
1994	593	3.4	320	6.6	396	3.5	481	3.1	1790	3.9
2004	590	3.1	323	7.4	402	2.0	482	1.9	1797	3.3
2005	590	1.7	326	8.9	402	2.0	482	2.1	1800	3.2
<i>Have not defined their position / Distanced themselves</i>										
1994	593	63.1	320	56.9	396	51.5	481	58.8	1790	58.3
2004	590	46.4	323	47.1	402	46.0	482	44.8	1797	46.0
2005	590	50.9	326	38.0	402	40.8	482	45.2	1800	44.8

The obtained results confirm that, for the past decade, there have been significant differences in the attitude to political ideologies in regions. However, as to the integrative function of political culture, there could be seen a gradual reorientation of regional communities to the centrist political forces. This tendency is crucial for respondents of the East and South where the last two years made the number of centrist proponents larger than the number of left-wing supporters. Moreover, special sociological surveys registered inessential influence of political parties, including the Left, on the current protest movement in Donbas [22, p. 120]. A considerable number of left-wing supporters in the Center can be explained by the fact that, in this region, the electorate of the Socialist Party leader, O. Moroz, is concentrated.

The new parliamentary election campaign of 2006 can bring about changes on the political scene. Most political parties and blocks are tending towards populism, Left rhetoric, paternalistic ideas, and governmental intervention in economic activity. At the same time, there is no influential party would be able to stand for liberal values. Under such circumstances, the distinctions between most parties are eliminated and the opportunity for “political maneuvering” is afforded mainly for the left ideological direction.

*National pride* is one of the basic indicators of the attitude to political system and nation. Under political instability and social transformation, this feeling of common identity and common history can consolidate the society.

The 5-point scale measured the level of national pride, where one point meant the absence of pride, and five points — the greatest pride. We used the data of *Ukrainian Society* monitoring.

**Table 7****The Dynamics of the National Pride Level, %**

Macro-regions	2002	2003	2004	2005
The Center	3.38	3.17	3.15	3.66
The West	3.73	3.42	3.50	3.99
The East	3.07	2.83	2.82	3.06
The South	2.96	2.86	3.06	3.29
Ukraine as a whole	3.26	3.06	3.11	3.48

As we can see, the highest level of national pride was registered in the West. It showed growth and was at the high in 2005. This is an evidence of the regional identity of people who live in Western Ukraine, especially Galychyna; it can be clearly seen in their understanding of historical heritage and attitude to the national idea.

At the same time, residents of the East identify themselves with local communities without “historical identity”. Symbolic poverty is a result of history of this region, especially Donbas, being an area of heavy industry, a center of activity for tycoons and workers that were mainly peasants by origin.

It is worth mentioning that, for the past three years, especially after the Orange Revolution, there has been a gradual growth of national pride in all macro-regions. This is favorable for the integrative function of political culture of regional communities.

However, we have to keep in mind the attention of the world community to the events in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, especially in Western Europe and North America. Ukrainians were happy that their country was talked about, first and foremost in the context of the mass social uprising, *wakening of Ukrainian people*.

National pride of respondents goes together with the *attitude to Ukraine as their native land*. To measure this attitude, we used two indicators: perception of Ukraine as their native land and choice of Ukraine as their native land. The data of *Ukrainian Society* formed the empirical base.

**Table 8**

**The Dynamics of Respondents' Attitude to Ukraine  
as their Native Land, %**

Macro-regions	Perception of Ukraine as their native land			Possibility to choose Ukraine as their native land	
	2002	2003	2005	2004	2005
The West	91.8	88.0	97.5	74.2	88.6
The Center	89.2	84.6	94.4	58.9	83.6
The East	82.7	70.6	84.8	56.1	67.1
The South	69.5	61.4	86.1	61.4	66.1
Ukraine as a whole	84.2	76.7	90.6	61.3	78.8

First of all, we would like to stress the growth in positive attitude of respondents to Ukraine as their native land after the Orange Revolution in all macro-regions.

However, residents of the West and Center more often think of Ukraine as their native land than those who live in the East and South (differences are statistically significant;  $p < 0.01$ ). The number of those who would choose Ukraine as their native land ("*undoubtedly yes*" and "*possibly yes*") was the largest in the West and the smallest in the South.

So, the integrative function of political culture, according to the attitude to Ukraine as their native land, is the most explicit among residents of the West, while the lowest results belong to the South. The Center is closer to the West, while the East is closer to the South (there were registered slight differences).

Despite the registered differences, we can talk about the basic tendency towards the formation of common national and state identity in

Ukraine. In the West and Center, this fact can be explained by V. Yushchenko's victory that aroused great admiration, while in the East and South, there are other factors. A plausible reason for strengthening of positive attitude to Ukraine in those macro-regions could be a protective reaction after they had been accused of separatism and absence of patriotic feelings.

## **Regional Factor of the Activating Function**

Analyzing the influence of a regional factor in the activating function of political culture, we take into account the infrastructure of social and political activity, the regional agents forming a political culture, and the degree of authoritarianism in territorial communities. We consider the following indicators: political activity and political involvement, as well as political efficiency and readiness to social protest.

The diversity of this **infrastructure** at the regional level may be considered as an environment to involve the mass in social and political life in order to organize territorial communities socially and politically.

Available information sources<sup>1</sup> confirm that there are sufficient numbers of public organizations, political parties, and unions registered in all macro-regions of Ukraine. However, special surveys [23; 24] show that actually working public organizations, for a variety of reasons, are difficult to notice. Firstly, the three-level registration system without exchange of information between governmental authorities creates severe obstacles; secondly, the complicated liquidation process may also entail numerous dummy organizations. As a result, among more than 40 thousand registered non-governmental organizations, only one tenth can be considered as capable of functioning [23, p. 3]. The same situation can be seen as to political parties and blocks, most of which are the "sofa" organizations.

So, at the regional level, there exists an adequate infrastructure for social and political self-organization of territorial communities, but its ability in influencing the social and political self-organization of people is still uncertain.

Under existing conditions, the **regional agents forming a political culture**, especially regional elites, assume importance.

Regional elites had quite pragmatic motives to support the Ukraine's independence. Those who had exercised power in the soviet time re-

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<sup>1</sup> So: Web-portals of the *Counterpart Creative Center* (<http://ccc.kiev.ua>) and the information project of the *Committee of Voters of Ukraine "Political Ukraine"* ([www.polit.com.ua](http://www.polit.com.ua)).

garded independence as the most effective means to retain all what they had in the period of economic slump enveloped all spheres of the post-soviet economy. Regional elites had what they did not want to lose, that is why they readily shared the construction of ideological and cultural facade of the state with national-democrats.

Attitude of regional elites to the central Ukrainian power as an inherited system includes two strategic lines and interaction patterns, such as modernistic and anti-modernistic. In every Ukrainian macro-region, some representatives of regional elites demonstrate modernistic orientations, while others tend to authoritarianism like in the soviet time.

In such a system, as to relations with a political structure, political actors can be regarded as "our" and "strangers". "Our" are interested to preserve the *status quo*, while "strangers" adhere to reforms and demand changes in legislation with the hope for an improvement of current state. But "strangers" support changes only until they constitute a threat to their safety. In this case, their own political longevity becomes more important than political programs and conceptions. So, politics is not a realization of social well-being, but rather logic of the seizure of power, as Lenin saw it.

What behavior pattern do regional elites prefer, modernistic or authoritarian? We can answer this question according to the approaches suggested by German sociologists, taking into account: attitude to the current transformations of regime and regional policy; political goals and strategies for their achievement; discursive practices of territorial communities; their positions in political system of Ukraine, and external contacts [17, p. 168].

To elucidate this approach, we offer the typology of regional elite in Lviv oblast represented by two main groups. The first one consists of moral nationalists, and the second one — of functional-pragmatic actors. In the first group, there are two subgroups: a) authoritarian nationalists, who stress the strong centralization of power and authoritarian government, b) civil nationalists with democratic ideas about the state development. Both subgroups stirred the masses to greater political activity in the end of 1980s — beginning of 1990s and participated in the Orange Revolution. The second group includes the former soviet administrators who work, as a rule, at government bodies and politically active business people taking a pragmatic approach to politics [17, p. 168].

Despite the mentioned differences, the elite of Lviv reaches a consensus on the national issue. Moreover, the elite's attitude corresponds with the attitude of common people. This can be seen in their electoral behavior, like support of right and right-centrist parties.

As to the regional elite of Donbas, its orientations are determined by the high concentration of industrial enterprises, which were tools of political and social control over workers in the soviet time. Through a collective, the plant manager can define the solidarity level and either unites workers or separates. In the soviet time, it was quite a symbolic collectivism, because the collective was not a self-organization of workers but organized from the top. Workers depended on managers and expected from them protection from risks at their places of work. However, some of the applied strategies brought about the individualization effect. Trade unions were also organized from the top; they were elements of the plant management.

Nowadays, low professional mobility, tendency towards professional and territorial self-identification are especially characteristic of the coal industry where most workers identify themselves with their plant and local population. They still depend on managers not only at work, but also in various kinds of social maintenance. In such social and economic conditions, the leading regional actors, forming political culture among residents of the East, are directorial boards of the large-scale industrial enterprises.

The local elite is proud of its belonging to the “old industrial region”; they refer to labor traditions and engineering achievements. Because they do not see alternative path of the region’s development, except industrial, attitude to changes is passive.

The agents forming political culture also influence the **popularity of authoritarian attitude** among regional Ukrainian communities. This issue is especially important if we talk about legal aspects of events related to the presidential election of 2004 and prospects of a political reform.

In 1994, authoritarian attitude enjoyed the widest popularity in the East and South, in contrast to the Center and West. Ten years later, the number of those who preferred the “strong arm” increased, first of all, in the West and then in the Center, while residents of the East and South became more democratically oriented. After the Orange Revolution, the situation has changed crucially.

The presidential election of 2004 confirmed that trust in political institutions depends significantly on the public attitude to laws currently in force. During the election, manipulations of the electoral law resulted in contradictions between right and law, legitimacy and legality. Legitimacy without laws loses its procedural character and becomes limited. As a result, during the election of 2004, in Ukraine, there was no presi-

dential contender of full value. Instead of this, we had “half-presidents of the three presidents’ half-republic” [25]. One of them was the mandatory of Maidan, the second — of the Central Election Commission, the third — of the Constitution. Law was incapable of protecting the interests of society by following legal procedure.

Manipulations of the electoral law that disregarded the interests of society and was not based on the authority of judicial branch, led to the crisis situation when laws lost their legitimacy and application of laws failed. Moreover, the main figures of the election acknowledged their own ignorance of law. The first presidential contender rushed to take his oath at the parliament, while another demanded from the Central Election Commission announcement of the returns of the second round of voting prematurely. Before the second round re-voting, in mass meetings, both candidates appealed to their supporters not to admit the competitor's victory.

**Table 9**

**The Dynamics of Regional Distribution of Answers to the Question:  
“Do you agree that several strong leaders can do for our country  
more than all laws and political discussions?”, %**

Agreement/ disagreement expressed	The Center	The West	The East	The South	Ukraine as a whole
<i>1994</i>					
Agree	33.7	39.3	46.2	46.2	40.8
Do not agree	18.8	19.8	16.8	13.5	17.1
Do not know	47.6	40.9	36.9	40.3	42.1
<i>2004</i>					
Agree	44.1	50.9	45.3	48.3	48.3
Do not agree	16.5	16.6	19.5	21.2	18.4
Do not know	39.4	32.5	35.3	30.5	34.8
<i>2005</i>					
Agree	58.0	60.7	63.8	57.6	59.7
Do not agree	24.2	22.7	16.4	23.7	22.1
Do not know	17.8	16.6	19.7	18.7	18.2

At the election of 2004, fight for the presidency was so hard because of unquestioned authority of the state leader. This aspect is especially important if we take into account the people’s attitude to the prospects of a political reform and the expected public support of the transition to a parliament-presidential form of government.

As to the support of totalitarianism, there is a growth of authoritarian values in all macro-regions and so throughout Ukraine. A side effect of the changes in attitude to the “strong arm” is that the number of those who could not define their positions decreased.

**Political activity and involvement** of people indicate their participation in social and political life. To operationalize this index, we used the following empirical indicators: membership in public or political organizations, participation in political meetings and contacts with activists of public and political movements or parties.

According to the data obtained, the involvement of Ukrainians in public or political organizations differences does not vary greatly. Over the last eleven years, the level of membership has been decreased noticeably in the West and increased in the South. In the other regions, as well as throughout Ukraine, this value has not changed significantly. The latter confirms that not only ordinary people, but also the subjects of social and political activity, first of all, primary branches of political parties and public organizations, are passive.

**Table 10**

**The Dynamics of Membership in Public and Political Organizations by Macro-regions, %**

Macro-regions	1994	2004	2005
The Center	16.7	16.1	13.4
The West	21.9	23.9	16.0
The East	14.8	12.9	17.7
The South	16.0	13.9	18.9
Ukraine as a whole	17.0	16.2	16.3

The public opinion polls demonstrate that the participation in political meetings and contacts with activists of political parties were infrequent in comparison with the first years of Ukrainian independence. It was typical of all regions. For instance, in November 1991, residents of

the West took the most active part in political meetings. However, in 2004 this index dropped and was almost the same as in the East. By the way, people's participation in political meetings remained the same only in the East. As to the contacts with activists of political parties, in November 1991, people were more active in the West than in the South or East; in the Center, this index was the same as throughout Ukraine. According to the poll of 2004, such contacts were frequent only in the West.

Perhaps, this is evidence of a low people's activity, as well as of weak organizational infrastructure of leading political subjects at the regional level.

It is worth mentioning that the monitoring survey of 2005 revealed striking differences between regions during the Orange Revolution. For example, almost the half of residents from Kyiv and Western Ukraine but only about one fourth from the Center supported meetings. In the East and South, their proportion was essentially smaller (8% and 5% respectively).

Table 11 represents the dynamics of participation in meetings and contacts with activists. However, it is not taken into account how often people participate in meetings or contact with political activists.

**Table 11**

**The Dynamics of Participation in Political Meetings and Contacts with Political Activists, %**

Macro-regions	Participation in meetings				Contacts with activists			
	November 1991		2004		November 1991		2004	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
The Center	16.0	78.2	9.7 <sup>b</sup>	89.1	19.0	73.2	11.2 <sup>b</sup>	86.2
The West	23.4	72.1	17.2 <sup>a</sup>	80.1	24.2	69.4	18.5	76.9
The East	13.4	83.0	12.2	85.8	15.6	81.2	7.3 <sup>b</sup>	87.2
The South	14.4	81.3	7.8 <sup>b</sup>	89.1	16.1	79.6	8.5 <sup>b</sup>	87.1
Ukraine as a whole	16.5	78.9	11.1 <sup>b</sup>	86.7	18.5	76.1	10.9 <sup>b</sup>	85.0

<sup>a</sup> — Difference is statistically significant;  $p < 0.05$ .

<sup>b</sup> — Difference is statistically significant;  $p < 0.01$ .

*Political efficiency and readiness to express a protest* are regarded as an ability of citizens to exert influence on the subjects of political activity. We measured this index of political culture on the basis of the following empirical indicators: ability of respondents to resist the governmental and local authorities when they violate people’s rights and interests; readiness of respondents to participate in various actions to assert their rights and interests.

Within the last eleven years, the proportion of those who were able (at least verbally) to resist the government decrees infringing the rights and interests was small. After the Orange Revolution, their number increased significantly throughout Ukraine, but more than half of respondents considered themselves as incapable of influencing the higher authorities. The Center was the only one region where the number of respondents capable of influencing the government has increased.

**Table 12**

**The Dynamics of Self-appraisals of the Ability to Resist the Decrees of Governmental and Local Authorities, %**

<i>Self-appraisal</i>	<i>The Center</i>	<i>The West</i>	<i>The East</i>	<i>The South</i>	<i>Ukraine as a whole</i>
<b>Government decrees</b>					
<i>1994</i>					
Yes	3.0	7.8	7.6	6.0	5.7
No	65.9	65.5	59.1	70.4	65.5
It is hard to say	31.1	26.7	33.2	23.6	28.8
<i>2004</i>					
Yes	4.4	8.3	7.0	6.4	6.2
No	70.2	64.6	70.6	69.5	69.1
It is hard to say	25.4	27.1	22.4	24.1	24.7
<i>2005</i>					
Yes	9.9	11.4	7.5	9.3	9.5
No	52.8	51.8	63.9	60.4	57.1
It is hard to say	37.3	36.8	28.6	30.3	33.4

**Table 12 (end)**

<i>Self-appraisal</i>	<i>The Center</i>	<i>The West</i>	<i>The East</i>	<i>The South</i>	<i>Ukraine as a whole</i>
<b>Decrees of the local authorities</b>					
<i>1994</i>					
Yes	8.1	14.9	18.4	11.3	12.4
No	58.9	56.8	48.3	60.9	56.8
It is hard to say	33.0	28.3	33.3	27.8	30.8
<i>2004</i>					
Yes	13.6	15.4	12.7	12.1	13.3
No	55.6	44.3	58.6	58.4	55.0
It is hard to say	30.9	40.3	28.7	29.5	31.7
<i>2005</i>					
Yes	18.3	19.0	13.2	17.8	17.2
No	43.8	41.4	54.5	45.5	46.2
It is hard to say	37.9	39.6	32.3	36.7	36.6

As we can see, the proportion of those who think that they can resist is twice as much in the case of decrees of the local authorities. Analyzing the dynamics within the past eleven years, we have not revealed any radical changes. Some positive tendencies were registered in the Center, while the negative one in the East.

In 1994, the public opinion poll registered that the largest proportion of able (at least verbally) to resist the decrees of local authorities infringing people's rights and interests was in North-Eastern and Western regions. Ten years later, in the former, their number decreased; while in the latter, it slightly grew. Difference between the West and Ukraine as a whole was statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ).

Before raising a protest, one should **choose the most effective and acceptable for direct participation ways and means to assert one's own rights and interests.**

In the poll of 1994, the following actions were considered as unapproved: boycotts; non-sanctioned meetings and demonstrations; strikes; seizing buildings and blocking roads; forming of armed detach-

ments. In the poll of 2004, the list was shortened: the last option was excluded as the less practicable, but it was again included in the poll of 2005 along with the new one — participation in election campaigns.

Filling out the questionnaire, a respondent could choose several variants, but in that case the number of those who supported these measures was incorrect. To calculate this index precisely, we took into account the only one choice made by respondents.

We would like to discuss legal aspects of a boycott as a possible form of social protest. Generally, the boycott as a response to decrees and actions of the governmental and local authorities or managerial employees (or their inactivity), to the court decisions, which infringe people's rights and interests, is considered to be non-sanctioned. At the same time, the laws currently in force accept boycotts as a legitimate way of protecting people's rights and freedoms if the governing bodies or other subjects of legal relationship in various spheres of activity violated them. The matter concerns the clause 5 of the Resolution adopted by the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of Ukraine on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of December 1997, No.13 *"On the Court Examination of Complaints about Decisions, Actions or Absence of Actions of the Governmental and Local Authorities"*. In the first poll, 7% of respondents choose boycotts as the most effective and acceptable way for social protest, while in the last poll — only 3%.

We can note the growing popularity of the idea that the most effective and acceptable for personal participation ways are collecting of signatures on petitions, as well as lawful meetings and demonstrations.

It is interesting to see respondents' attitude to the unapproved actions of social protest after the Orange Revolution. According to the presented data, in comparison to the previous (*i.e.* 2004) year, in all regions, the number of those who were ready to support unapproved protest actions has grown. However, we have to note that in the East and South, the number of supporters of the unapproved protest actions was almost the same as in the first year of L. Kuchma's presidency. The most plausible reason is that many residents were frustrated because of defeat of the presidential contender whom they had supported. In the West and Center, most residents of which had voted for the winner of the last presidential election in Ukraine, on the contrary, the proportion of those who were ready to support non-sanctioned forms of protest has increased.

At the same time, the most serious drop in numbers of the socially passive people who do not want participate personally in any offered forms of social protest was registered in the Center and West. In the East and South, the situation has not changed noticeably.

**Table 13****The Dynamics of Ways, Acceptable for Personal Participation, to Protect One's Own Rights, %**

Ways to protect one's own rights	The Center	The West	The East	The South	Ukraine as a whole
<i>Participation in election campaigns</i>					
1994	16.6	15.4	15.9	14.3	15.6
2005	27.0	22.2	24.1	20.3	23.7
<i>Collection of signatures on petitions</i>					
1994	15.0	20.1	19.9	15.5	17.2
2004	20.5	20.3	22.6	23.8	21.8
2005	23.2	22.2	29.1	24.1	24.6
<i>Lawful meetings and demonstrations</i>					
1994	12.8	16.4	20.9	18.2	16.6
2004	19.8	25.2	17.2	16.0	19.2
2005	35.4	37.7	35.3	29.5	34.2
<i>Unapproved protest actions</i>					
1994	9.2	9.6	13.2	10.4	10.5
2004	6.6	6.8	4.7	3.7	5.4
2005	12.2	12.9	9.0	10.8	11.2
<i>None of the above-mentioned actions</i>					
1994	32.3	34.0	29.5	32.7	32.2
2004	32.9	30.5	39.1	43.5	36.7
2005	22.4	19.4	26.9	31.1	25.2

**Conclusions**

A variety of evaluations as to the historical past, caused by different socio-cultural preconceptions of historical events, have a noticeable effect on comprehension of the current political life, political orientation

and electoral preferences of regional communities. It is worth noting here two kinds of regionalism. Western Ukraine, principally Galychyna, is an example of readiness to sacrifice the autonomy to the unitary national state. But this does not apply to the existing political system. At the same time, the East and South demonstrate the regionalism of self-sufficiency when the primary purpose is to protect interests of territorial community. In contrast to Donbas, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea does not represent an economic self-sufficiency, but rather a social, cultural, and ideological estrangement. As to the territorial community of the central part of Ukraine, it took an intermediate position between the West and East-South concerning the Orange Revolution. The existing regional differentiation of political orientations means a certain ideological contradiction between the West and East-South, though, according to the other indicators of political culture, the regions have no major differences. For the last decade, the differences in national self-identification between the residents from Ukrainian regions have been evened out. Moreover, the growth in the national spatial-territorial self-identification along with decline in the local one is to be observed.

Since Ukrainians move to the centrist political platform, the influence of ideological differences between the two opposite segments of the political spectrum, the Left and Right, becomes weaker. The prevalence of centrist platform among the others in all regions means that, according to the index of adherence to certain political ideologies, political identities could not be the disintegrating factor of political culture in the present-day Ukrainian society. We would also like to note that a large number of those, who have not defined their political orientations or distanced themselves from any political ideology or movement, diminish the influence of this indicator on the political identity in regional communities.

Regional distinctions in development of the Ukrainians' political culture are inconstant, because they are influenced by such factors, as interests of regional elites, configuration of the media space, potential of the information sources, and current political processes.

The same region can manifest the different dynamics of the certain indicators of political culture depending on specific time intervals. So, differences between regions enclose not only distinctive features of regions in a certain period (*static differences*), they are also a result of the different intra-regional dynamics as a response of regional community to the changes in social and political life for the last decade (*dynamic differences*). Taking into account a low trust of regional communities in

governmental and local authorities, lack of mass support of political leaders and separatist movements, we are entitled to the conclusion that there are no sufficient "institutional preconditions to make the state or territorial community fragmented" [26, p. 165].

As regards the regional elite, it is not interested in deterioration of relations with the central power either, because it is unable to compete with mighty financial and industrial Russian groups and fears to lose business. In Donbas, the local elite has privatized almost all financially attractive enterprises. So, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine is a necessary condition to preserve the capital of the national economic elite irrespective of the place of residence.

An adverse reaction, the Donbas elite's resistance to the central power, could be caused by Kyiv's attempt to re-privatize the large-scale enterprises and so to "press down" regional oligarchic groups. But this scenario is grave; it should be remembered that many voters from Donbas consider themselves to have lost the presidential election and hope to win back at the parliamentary election of 2006.

Differences in historical identities of regional communities did not affect the index of civic consciousness being an aggregated indicator of political involvement, activity, and political efficiency. According to the public opinion poll of 2005, increasingly active participation in lawful meetings and demonstrations is mainly a result of the mass social uprising during the last presidential election. We can judge whether it is influenced by situation or there is a tendency towards growth of social activity and self-organization in Ukraine only after the parliamentary election of March 2006.

So, thanks to a functional approach taken for our analysis, we can conclude that political culture of all Ukrainian regions tends to the integrative-passive type with slight differences, without regard to the Orange Revolution period being rather an example of extraordinary social and political situation.

As to the development of political culture in regional communities, the following fact can arouse anxiety: in all Ukrainian regions, but mostly in the West, there was registered a noticeable growth of authoritarian values after the Orange Revolution. So, the political elite of the country has to legitimate the laws currently in force; otherwise it would be impossible to develop the innovative-democratic type of the mass political culture and move towards the sustainable democratic system, like in Western societies.

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