

### Post-Soviet Deinstitutionalization and Formation of New Social Institutions in Ukraine

Golovakha, Yevhen; Panina, Nataliia

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## **YEVHEN GOLOVAKHA,**

*Doctor of Sciences in Philosophy, Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine*

## **NATALIIA PANINA,**

*Doctor of Sciences in Sociology, Principal Research Fellow of the Department of Socio-Political Processes of the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine*

# **Post-Soviet Deinstitutionalization and Formation of New Social Institutions in Ukraine<sup>1</sup>**

### *Abstract*

*The article presents an institutionalization concept in a post-soviet society. The double institutionalization phenomenon was described as a specific social mechanism which supports social stability and integration under conditions when institutional bases of social life are ruining. In order to test hypotheses on specific character and tendencies of post-soviet institutionalization and new social institution formation, authors use the data of sociological monitoring on social changes in Ukrainian society conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine for many years.*

Categories “institution”, “institutionalization”, “institutional changes”, as well as most key sociological terms, do not have strict and simple meanings in contemporary sociological theory. Their interpretation greatly depends on the sociologist’s theoretical orientations and time-serving tasks to be solved. Therefore in order to substantiate the theoretical grounds chosen for discussion of post-soviet institutionalization,

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Translated from the Ukrainian text “Postradianska deinstytucionalizatsiia i stanovlennia novykh sotsialnykh instytutiv v ukrainskomu suspilstvi”, *Sotsiolohiia: teoriia, metody, marketynh*, 2001, N° 4, pp. 5–22.

we would like to present some preliminary remarks reflecting on the one hand the authors' understanding of institutional structures and processes and on the other hand the specific character of social changes taking place in the transforming post-soviet society.

If we talk about our understanding of "institutional" terms in social sciences, then, without insisting on the following rather hypertrophied statement that sociological theory can be defined as an attempt to explain institutionalization and deinstitutionalization processes [22], we can say that on the whole we share the traditional ideas of the social integration and social order studies which mostly pay attention to social institution formation, functioning, intercommunication and changes. Herewith we mean social institutions as well-ordered and relatively steady social formations, including the social bodies following officially or conventionally adopted regulations and control social behavior in certain spheres of public life by forced or voluntarily consent of most society members to the current social organizations and regulations.

According to such understanding of social institutions, institutionalization should be defined as formation of new social institutions in three aspects: 1) formation and acceptance of new social regulations (laws, normative structures, traditions and rituals) by society; 2) creation of organizational structures responsible for articulation and control over current regulations and forming social infrastructure of institutionalized behavior; 3) formation of mass subjects' attitude to social regulations and organizational structures reflecting that people consent to the current institutional order. Accordingly, deinstitutionalization is the destruction of institutional formations, change in social regulations and clearly expressed (or latent) rejection of institutional requirements for social behavior.

Accepting the traditional "sector approach" to classification of social institutions, which differentiates institutions in accordance with specific spheres of social life, we are going to discuss deinstitutionalization and formation of new social institutions in political, economical and socio-cultural spheres, including the institutions responsible for human reproduction and development in social culture (family, medicine, education, religion, science etc.).

By linking processes of radical social transformations (including the post-soviet transformation of society) to deinstitutionalization and formation of new social institutions, we want to stress that the destruction of institutional grounds of social life, in some of the above-mentioned sectors, creates preconditions of social crisis and threatens the society — its ability to satisfy the vitally important social needs. For example,

the total political deinstitutionalization leads to political shock, civil conflicts, anarchy and eventually to authoritarian or totalitarian political reinstitutionalization. Destruction of economic institutions deals with deep socio-economic crisis, fall in level and quality of life, economic chaos. As a rule, radical transformations of socio-cultural institutions are caused by political revolutions, when the regimes, seized power, set institutional prohibitions and innovations. In all cases of radical deinstitutionalization, societies suffer from serious shocks and deal with considerable losses related to reduction or fragmentation of institutional space. The “institutional lacunas”, formed as the result, become places of the mass social aggression, cynicism, anomical demoralization, political demagoguery and thoughtless conformism.

Unlike the radical deinstitutionalization, which causes social shocks and catastrophes, gradual changes in social institutions are the necessary conditions for societal development according to inner and external factors determining the necessity of social transformations. Although moderate deinstitutionalization is always related to anomic tendencies and problems of social integration, as a rule, they could be solved without social cataclysms due to gradual replacement of old institutions by new ones. These mechanisms were described in the concepts, like “institutional evasions” [16], “counter-institutional values” [3], “institutionalization of conflict”, “societal transformation with rising actualization of noninstitutional phenomena” [15], “change of symbolic universals” [2], “micro-to-macro transitional process” [6], “self-construction in conditions of institutionalized pluralism” [1]. As a rule, the researchers who study social institutions pay their attention to historic character, traditional character, continuity of institutionally controlled social order and social institutes [24], while the process of institution replacement is regarded as gradual reconstruction. This might be the reason why sociologists can not explain neither to foretell the explosive processes of deinstitutionalization. Various approaches to the radical deinstitutionalization, based on classical theories of social revolution under contemporary conditions of social development, are also unproductive because, as a rule, past revolutions resulted not only in replacement of ruling regimes and radical institutional innovations but in powerful counter-revolutionary movements, which led to civil wars, social chaos and inevitable phenomena of triumphant revolutionary or restoration dictatorship.

Quite different situation can be seen in most cases of contemporary “institutional explosions” (this term means quick realization of all-embracing institutional reorganization and adoption of new legislative grounds of social life) related to post-communist society transforma-

tions. So called “velvet revolutions”, post-communist transformations, held in countries of Central and East Europe, displayed a possibility of extremely quick, in historical time, radical changes in institutional system without the total social destabilization inherent to such processes in the past. Although in some post-soviet states, there were outbreaks of political violation and instability, in a whole, the post-communist transformations of the past decade were less destabilizing than one could expect taking into account how explosively these states abandoned institutional grounds of their social lives.

The “velvet” nature of post-communist deinstitutionalization promoted the concepts, like “the end of history”, author of which, however, was forced to correct essentially his prognoses about Clio’s fate, her death was announced prematurely [7]. This happened because that experience of post-communist states does not reflect the global civilization development tendency but only the unique historical phenomenon, an explanation of which (Ukrainian society was taken as an example) is presented in this work; the empirical base of post-soviet institutionalization analysis was formed of the results of sociological monitoring studying the dynamics of Ukrainian society; the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine conducts this monitoring for many years (1992–2001). (In order to carry out the empirical part of monitoring, the authors selected a representative sample of the adult Ukrainian population (N.Panina, M.Churylov). The sample is noteworthy because additional polling places include respondents in every Ukrainian oblast (proportional to the number of inhabitants in each oblast), Crimea, and the city of Kyiv. The selection quota reflects the specific regional distribution of basic socio-demographic characteristics (sex, age, education). Each oblast was represented by central city, town and village (also corresponding to certain proportions). To ensure a representative sample selection within the quota, and to achieve randomness, the search for respondents was carried out by interviewers following a previously assigned route and maintaining quota characteristics (the interviewer gave questionnaires only to those respondents who corresponded to necessary quota features). The adult population (over 17 years old) of Ukraine constituted the general aggregate. The total number of respondents was 1800. The polls were conducted by the method of handout questionnaires (respondents filled the questionnaires by themselves). We used the national polling network of the Institute of Sociology and the Socis Company.)

Analyzing the problem, we begin from the statement, fundamental for sociological science, which says that social integration, social order and even existence of socium would be impossible without basic social insti-

tutions in political, economic and social spheres. Even if these institutions are formally constituted — the corresponding formations and laws are adopted and exist — the total unwillingness to live according to these laws and distrust in institutional formations inevitably lead to destruction of the current social order, critically high social instability, socio-political confrontation, collapse of economy, social disorders and a new “institutional overturn”. These prognoses follow from classical sociological theories on social changes and social revolutions. Let us discuss the situation in Ukrainian society after the USSR collapsed and a new independent state was established. There occurred some very specific changes in all sectors of the institutional space after Ukrainian independence was declared in 1991.

### ***Hypotheses on the Nature of Post-Soviet Deinstitutionalization***

The empirical fact that the soviet society institutional base collapsed, as a result of the USSR collapse and corresponding political, economic and socio-cultural changes, can hardly be disputed within the frameworks of contemporary sociological approaches to the institutional phenomenon. It would be sufficient to remember the super-state collapse, lost domination of communist ideology and one-party institution, lost monopoly of state property institution, lost odious totalitarian institutions in the spiritual life sphere, like censorship, atheistic education and etc. It is difficult to find at least one social institution, which was not fully or partially blasted as a result of the post-soviet transformations. The principal changes concern all institutions unless the family one. In this situation, the threat that social life will be totally destabilized and bring about social chaos becomes a reality, as far as institutional grounds of social order were practically ruined. However, in some post-soviet states (foremost in Ukraine), such radical deinstitutionalization did not lead either to social chaos (“*bella omnium contra omnes*”) or to dramatic social instability related to aggressive home-policy conflicts. In Ukraine, there were not observed even traditional (for such cases) aggravation of social-class and interethnic relations. Moreover, monitoring of social-class and ethnic tolerance in Ukrainian society, conducted for many years, showed that in Ukraine the social mechanism typical for the states and societies, which found themselves in crisis, failed: worsening socio-economic situation and social well-being of population did not cause rising social intolerance and ethnic discrimination [18]. In our

opinion, due to that, Ukraine presented a mechanism of good prospects for the human civilization, capable of maintaining social stability under conditions of permanently deepening socio-economic crisis. The remarkable fact is that even such a powerful social splash of protest activity, related to the “cassette scandal”, which involved all political intellectual Ukrainian elite, did not bring about any essential destabilization of socio-economic situation, which began to improve for namely the past two years, and this improvement caused a rise in social well-being of population [9].

The following two hypotheses could be regarded in order to explain these social phenomena from the institutional theory point of view: 1) *the deinstitutionalization was only demonstrative and did not affect the deep bases of institutional order, that is why old institutions preserved their regulative functions in new social conditions*; 2) *formation of new social institutions was as rapid as ruining of old ones, so the new institutions were able to perform the compensate integrating and stabilizing function*.

**First hypothesis** looks like more sociological fantasies than the social reality. Although, some elements of “institutional mimicry” can be registered for new social institutions (for example, the state property institution has been partly reproduced in the incorporated privatization system, the presidential power institution mostly reproduces the old system of one-party management, and the party privilege institution changes into a privilege system for the democratically elected power), nevertheless, these signs of institutional regeneration cannot be decisive if we assess whether the old institutions are still capable of controlling social relations and social behavior. The decisive argument is that indisputable fact that old social institutions are being ruined “from above” — with the help of legislation and further reorganization of institutional grounds. Whatever economically inefficient privatization of state property was for its first years, it was based on laws, which excluded state monopoly on property in production and trade sectors. Whatever spiritually close to the soviet party power the institution of executive power was in the post-soviet states, its powers, legislatively determined, and the way of its functioning (based on democratic elections) essentially differ from the one-party power institution. So, we can state with confidence that as a result of the post-communist transformation, the old social institutions, which provided certain social stability and society integrity, lost at least two of three institutional attributes — legality and organizational infrastructure. And so far, the hypothesis on possible preservation of old institutions under new social conditions would

be hardly appropriate for explanations of social stability in Ukrainian society of the post-soviet transformation period.

Carrying out this analysis, we are going to originate from the fact that social institutions can have various status in society as to legality and legitimacy criteria, and correspondingly they can affect differently social integration and social order development. This statement was expressed clearly enough by W.Buckley: "If we are going to use the term "institution", it appears that we must be prepared to distinguish "legalized" from "legitimized" institutions, and "legitimized" from "nonlegitimized" institutions; social power from legitimized authority, and utilitarian or coercive compliance from normative conformity and value consensus" [4, p.167]. This understanding of social institutions implies consideration of several types of institutional formations with various affect on integration processes and social stability in society. Among them, only those having all institutional attributes — legality, legitimate and institutional infrastructure — can be recognized as of totally integrative and stabilizing potential.

Without legal status and organizational infrastructure, old social institutions exist only within the frameworks of traditional conventional norms and stereotypes of mass consciousness related to the soviet tradition when people consented to those norms of social relations and behavior. Therefore, in the current conditions, preservation of soviet institutional system can be regarded only in the traditional legitimacy context, which is evident due to still existing state paternalism institution, essential influence of communist parties on political life of post-soviet society, dominance of "pseudoprivatized" (as if incorporated) enterprises in production structure and etc. Traditional legitimacy could be enough for acknowledgement that old social institutions still affect social relations and people's behavior, however, it is insufficient for explanation of social stability and integration in Ukrainian society. Quite the contrary, the residual influence of institutional norms, illegal and conflicting with the aims declared by the state, can bring about destabilization and collapse — can cause protest against new legal social institutions. Such manifestations of social protest, based on "norms of soviet conduct", were registered in Russia in October 1993 and in Ukraine (with considerably less violation), the latter were reflected in the mass protest votes for Ukrainian communist party during Parliamentary and Presidential elections.

**Second hypothesis** is that, for a short period of time, new social institutions gained the necessary attributive qualities for performing integrative and stabilizing functions — this can be somehow explained by their legal status and presence of new institutional infrastructure for-



mally supporting the regulative function performance. The first reasonable question would be how is it possible such a sudden emergence of principally new and effective social institutions? Classical theory of social institutions says that this is impossible because institutions can not be born as “Aphrodite from the sea spume”. In order to institutionalize a role structure and normative system, a long evolutionary period of time is needed. We can suppose that new social institutions were gradually forming inside the soviet institutional system and when the independent states of CIS got formed these institutions got their legal status. There are serious grounds for such an idea. As it was mentioned above, as a result “of social mimicry”, some old social institutions preserved their dominance and still perform their functions in new social conditions. Instead of their degeneration, as it could be expected, we can observe something like their regeneration, in other words, “reincarnation”. Thanks to this, the social structure of the post-soviet society preserved many status and role positions for social actors, who occupied similar positions in the past. For example, in the new state structures, old nomenclature placed itself practically without any material, socio-status and moral losses. New institutions also did not emerge out of nowhere as far as in the soviet past some shady social institutions were born, and they had some specific legitimacy — they performed their functions and developed outside the legal field but had the mass support as compensate regulators for “natural” human and business relations under conditions of artificially legal and ideological limitations of totalitarian system. So the soviet institutions of universal protectionism and “shady economy” could quickly bring out, with the help of legalization, institutions of private property and entrepreneurship.

This social phenomenon was studied by representatives of “neoinstitutional approach”, who, in their researches on social changes, pay their foremost attention to institutional succession, growing “institutional space” and who are against the interpretation of quick social changes as breaks in succession of institutional development; in particular, they stated that in the USSR for a long time there existed the institution of “administrative market”, which arranged transition to market economy [26].

However, the only legalization of “shadow institutions” is obviously insufficient for their transformation into principally new effective institutions, corresponding to the new declared aims for the state and society development. It is not enough to legitimate “plundering of state property” in the way of privatization or “shadow economy” in the way of entrepreneurship, if you want these institutions to gain legitimized status in so-

ciety and people to express their consent to living in accordance with these norms and regulations and not as participants of “shady side of social life” but as good citizens of democratic state. The nonlegitimized nature of new political and economic institutions was revealed no longer after they were legalized in independent Ukraine. This fact is confirmed by the polling data on people’s trust in the basic social institutes; the extremely low trust rating, registered in 1994, still remains practically at the same level (Table 1).

**Table 1****Social Institutions in Ukraine: Trust Rating, %\***

	1994		2000	
	Trust	Distrust	Trust	Distrust
Family and relatives	86.9	3.6	93.0	2.7
Yourself	89.6	2.4	93.5	2.3
Neighbors	40.7	20.3	39.0	21.7
Fellow citizens	30.2	18.7	30.4	20.6
God	61.2	14.2	68.8	12.5
Colleagues	37.5	15.5	38.7	17.9
Church and clergy	35.6	27.3	38.8	30.0
Astrologers	16.9	44.7	15.8	51.3
Mass media	19.9	36.6	29.1	31.3
Militia	12.8	57.1	12.5	57.0
Communist party	14.5	65.0	16.9	59.2
Nationalists	7.4	69.4	6.6	69.3
Supreme Council (parliament)	10.1	51.2	7.1	62.3
Armed Forces	38.1	24.1	34.8	26.0
Government	11.4	48.8	13.9	49.8
President	16.1	52.8	27.1	43.2
Private entrepreneurs	13.8	43.4	16.7	46.3
Large state enterprise managers	13.9	42.1	12.4	47.1
Trade unions (traditional)	14.5	47.3	12.5	49.2
New trade unions	8.8	41.2	6.7	49.1

\* In the table, there is no data reflecting positions of those respondents who answered “it is difficult to say if I trust or not”.

It is easy to see that citizens, who trust in political institutions, are rather an exclusion than a rule. For the past years, the trust rating did not grow, and for some of positions, there is even a decline. The higher rating of trust in the President of Ukraine mostly relates to fact that in 1994 the poll was conducted just before the Presidential election, and in 2000 it took place after elections. But even trust in the newly elected President is less than distrust. The real trust was expressed by majority of Ukrainian citizens only in themselves, their relatives and God.

The characteristic features of the moral-psychological atmosphere, which arose for this period, are mass demoralization, total disappointment in social ideals and a great deal of social cynicism. To illustrate the latter, we present the polling data of 2000, where we had a series of positions (of tests on social cynicism and anomic demoralization) reflecting people's opinions about the very possibility to believe in something or to trust in somebody in Ukrainian society (Table 2).

**Table 2**

**Attitude of Ukrainian Citizens to Judgements  
about Faith and Trust in Society, %**

	Agree	Do not agree	Do not know
Under the current disorder and vagueness, it is difficult to understand in what you should believe	78.5	14.6	6.9
Now the problem is that most people do not believe in anything	87.9	7.3	4.8
Distrust in anybody is the safest	52.0	31.7	16.4
Most people cannot be trusted	34.5	46.2	19.3
In the past, people felt better because everybody knew how to act in the right way	72.1	15.8	12.1

If you judge on people's agreement or disagreement on the above-mentioned statements, then the moral-psychological atmosphere in Ukrainian society looks extremely oppressive. However, it cannot be other now, if we take into account the current condition of institutional system, when old institutions already lost regulative functions and the new ones have not been formed yet. This can be confirmed by the data on distrust in old and new institutions (for example, most Ukrainian citizens equally distrust in large state enterprise managers and in private entre-

preneurs, in old and new trade unions, in communist party and the multiparty institution). In this situation, the priority goes to the temporal situative norms dealing with the necessity of survival “here” and “now”. Namely this situative nature, temporality and instability of social position take away people’s trust in society and their faith in social justice.

However, this distrust is not strong, as not strong is the transitional society that caused it. Even in the past when, according to the three fourth of Ukrainian citizens, “people felt better because everybody knew how to act in the right way”, not many people sincerely believed that everything was being done in the right way. Although everyone knew for what the totalitarian system would encourage them, and for what it would punish. It was the “immoral definiteness” atmosphere, where it was enough to adopt behavior regulations once for all, and you needed anymore to solve daily “Hamlet’s problems”. In other words, people fully trusted in power, in its ability to punish everybody, who would show their distrust or give up publicly their faith in communist ideals. As far as this trust was amoral, most citizens of the USSR rather easily renounced their state, its ideology and its moral norms. The current nostalgia is understandable if we take into account that most people cannot live psychologically without some social definiteness, faith and trust.

In these conditions, the main compensate function is performed by two factors allowing people to keep definite psychological stability and feel some prospects: people trust in themselves and in their relatives. For overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizen, nominally people themselves together with the friends and relatives closest to them are their social-psychological resources for physical, spiritual and moral survival under conditions of socio-economic crisis and total anomie. The second factor relates to still existing hopes for the future. And we talk not about the nearest prospects, which most Ukrainians evaluate very sceptically.

According to the data of the poll conducted by Socis company in the fall 1998 (1200 respondents made up the sample representative of the total adult Ukrainian population), only 17% of Ukrainian citizens expressed the hope that “the current hardships in economy and social life” would continue for less than 5 years. However, the more remote perspective the higher people’s hopes. Answering the question “If you think over the situation in our society, how will you evaluate perspectives of its change in the future?”, 45% expressed their hopes of gradual positive changes in social situation and only 22% were assured that the current situation would become worse.

These hopes are mostly based on the mass idea that Ukraine will evolve in the same direction as developed democratic countries, for which the current hardships of Ukrainian society are the problems left in the past. As to the most Ukrainian people's opinions, the so-called western socio-economic model should be the reference-point for the further state and society development. Evaluating development perspectives for the human civilization and their own state in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Ukrainians expressed different opinions: optimistic, neutral and pessimistic. However, for some positions, optimistic evaluations were more frequently expressed about Ukraine than about the world as a whole (Table 3).

**Table 3**

**Attitudes of Ukrainian Population to  
Social Changes in the World and Ukraine in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century  
(according to the polling data of January 2000), %\***

In the 21 <sup>st</sup> century there will be:	In the world		In Ukraine	
	less	more	less	more
Starving people	31.7	32.6	35.1	38.0
Victims of armed conflicts	25.8	33.8	37.1	15.1
Healthy people	46.2	26.1	46.6	28.9
Terrorist attacks	24.2	31.8	33.2	17.8
Ecological catastrophes	22.8	36.1	28.9	27.5
Outstanding scientific discoveries	8.5	46.6	13.1	42.3
National intolerance	26.1	18.9	32.2	15.2
Corruption (bribery)	21.3	40.4	24.7	42.1
Crises in economy	25.1	33.6	28.8	36.1
Just happy people	29.8	32.9	32.1	33.9

\* In the table, there is no data, reflecting positions of the respondents, who answered "there will be as many (much) as now".

As one can see, for their own country, Ukrainians see perspectives more optimistic than for the world according to the following positions: terrorism, armed conflicts, ecological catastrophes, national intolerance. There are some positions where pessimistic evaluations are dominant (they are almost the same for Ukraine and for the world) — health, economic crises, corruption. The very significant dominance of optimis-

tic evaluations was registered only for one position — outstanding scientific discoveries in the world and Ukraine. In a whole, the hopes of progress in Ukraine are similar to the hopes of human civilization development. Although in some cases pessimistic evaluations were more frequent than optimistic ones, they relate to the future of Ukraine in the same measure as to the future of mankind.

As we see, the institutional space of Ukrainian society is extremely contradictory and inexplicable for the both hypotheses presented above. On the one hand, most society members distrust in old and new institutions and feel anomic demoralization, on the other hand, they keep social self-control, tolerance and faith in society development prospects within the general course of civilization process. What social mechanisms can cause such a contradictory picture? If new institutions are still not legitimized and old institutions are not legal any more, then which institutional formations can perform sufficiently effective regulative, integrative and stabilizing functions? In order to answer this question, we need to discuss the specific and in many respects unique nature of the post-soviet institutionalization.

### ***Double Society Institutionalization Phenomenon in Post-Soviet Ukraine***

There are some bases for discussing the unique nature of post-soviet institutionalization. The same social transformations have been registered in the whole post-communist world, however, we think, that the post-communist transformations of social institutions in the countries of former “socialistic camp” differ from the post-soviet ones. Although Polish sociologists stress that “the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe led to the dramatic transformation of political and economical institutions” [21, p. 183], in Polish society, there were already legal and legitimate new institutions at the very beginning of transformations — market economy, “Solidarity”, catholic church [20]. Besides, only in the post-soviet conditions, there appeared the phenomenon of total corruption that undermined legitimization of new social institutions. This phenomenon was described by Russian sociologists: “In the post-soviet situation, the ruining authoritarian normative structures created the situation of corruption in all value-normative society systems of various levels (including the personal level); and this situation is as serious and dangerous as the widely discussed corruption in economic and political systems” [13, p. 512]. In Ukraine, this phenomenon

is reflected in the mass consciousness as a strong belief that, among all other social groups in the new state development, the leading role is played by Mafia [18].

Lastly, only in the post-soviet states of the whole post-communist world (apart from Baltic countries), all generations had almost no experience of social life under political democracy and market economy. Therefore the social integration and stability, maintained in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and other countries of “late communization”, have other institutional foundations than in Russia and Ukraine, which made it possible for them to perform quick and effective “shock therapy” and achieve positive socio-economic results, while economies of post-soviet states collapsed and political life was characterised by the restoration processes that developed rapidly. Nevertheless, even in these conditions, Ukrainian society avoided the “second coming” of communist Messiah and aggressive social conflicts. In our opinion, this can be explained with the help of the hypothesis on specific nature of institutional processes, which could be brought to the following key statements:

- 1) after they lost their legality as a result of perestroika and collapse of the USSR, the basic institutions did not lose their traditional legitimacy — people still consent to social regulations based on ideology of state paternalism, on the fact that large enterprises belong to the state property, on socialist privileges for population and special privileges for ruling elite, on the same state control of social sphere — education, health care, science, art culture, control over confessional and interethnic relations;
- 2) illegal (shadow) institutions of soviet society — shady market (“under-the-counter” production and speculation while there are shortages), protection and corruption, criminal Mafia, double moral norms (different public and private moral positions) — were transformed into legal institutions of “transitional society”, but did not gain the proper legitimacy because people think that they are of “legitimized lawlessness”; that is why people refuse to live according to the formally legalized but still “shady” regulations and to accept new institutions as basic institutional infrastructure of society;
- 3) experiencing demoralisation, distrust and dissatisfaction with their position in society, most Ukrainian citizens are of ambivalent concern to institutional formations, legacy or legitimacy of which is not supported by laws or moral norms; this ambivalence reveals in the mass consent to living in such an institutional space, where legality is provided by the only legitimized existence of new institutions, and legitimacy is provided by still existing mimicked old in-

stitutions, which keep performing traditional regulative functions and supported by elements of old social infrastructure, old social positions and role directives.

*So, only this double institutionalization ensures the original institutional strength of Ukrainian society based on people's consent to living in such an institutional space, where old and new institutions work together, providing, with the help of their contradictory coexistence, all institutional attributes necessary for social integration and stability.*

Let us see how these abstract regulations are realized in social practice. We start with the examples of the double institutionalization phenomena. It is known that, in the soviet society, health care and education institutions were controlled by the state with the necessary legal and legitimate attributes. In the shady institutional space, there existed illegal medical and private tutor practice. In new social conditions, the state institutions of free medical services and education exist as legal and practically fully reproduce the old soviet infrastructure. Not only organizations are still the same, but staff positions, status positions and roles, which all together form these institutions. In spite of this, the were legalized private clinics and educational institutions, which should (ideally) compete with the state ones and raise quality of education and health care. However, in the conditions of total corruption, private medicine parasitizes on the state infrastructure, and in most cases medical staff play two roles simultaneously — they are unselfish state white collars with low salaries and specialists providing expensive private services on account of lowering quality of free medical care. The same two roles are played by school teachers, which, on the one hand, get misery salaries and provide free education at state schools, and on the other hand, they permanently make a deal with parents about contribution for good results of their children. The double institutionalization paradox means that, being patients and parents, most Ukrainian citizens accept this institutional system as inevitable evil, in other words, as not the worst grief because they have some freedom for making decisions in this contradictory institutional space. Double roles — of elected representatives of people and active businessmen — are played by the deputies of all of levels, because power institutions and private enterprises formed something that we can call, with the help of Inglehart's term, "symbiotic interdependence" [12]. Such interdependence is characteristic of practically all institutional formations, so, in every institutional sector, Ukrainian citizens experience this double institutional pressure and look for the attributes of legality and legitimacy that are necessary for social consent.



We are not going to limit grounds for the hypothesis to illustrative material only, nevertheless, we regard it in accordance with two criteria capable of confirming or refuting the double institutionalization idea. The first criterion is how institutional processes correspond to the mass consciousness in Ukraine. This means that duality of institutional regulations should be reflected in the dominant psycho-ambivalent attitude of people to institutional bases of social life. The mass ambivalence phenomenon in Ukrainian society was described by us earlier [8]. Here let us say that it has not changed for the whole monitoring period. One of most general examples of ambivalent attitude to institutional bases of society (old or new) is duality of two different social systems, the names of which reflect the principal institutional opposition: capitalism-socialism. The following data present how Ukrainian citizens answered the question about their attitude to alternative political forces (Table 4).

**Table 4**

**“Political forces today are presently divided into those which want to return to socialism and those which want to develop capitalism. What is your personal attitude towards such forces?”, %**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
I support the proponents of socialism	22.1	22.5	20.1	20.9	23.6	23.4	25.5	23.6
I support the proponents of capitalism	12.7	13.2	13.3	10.8	11.1	10.9	17.1	12.9
I support both of them to avoid conflict	23.7	18.7	17.8	16.9	19.6	20.5	18.0	17.6
I support neither	20.0	23.8	25.3	26.1	23.5	22.5	20.4	24.2
Other	1.8	2.8	2.0	2.1	2.9	3.2	3.5	3.2
Difficult to say	19.3	19.1	21.6	23.1	19.4	19.2	18.5	18.3
No answer	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1

As we see, only one third of respondents are ready to support one of two opposite positions — “to capitalism” or “going back to socialism”. Every fifth Ukrainian citizen does not have their clear opinion. The rest expressed their ambivalence with either conform or nihilistic orientations. In sociology, the term “ambivalence” first was used by Merton, who regarded duality and discrepancy of personal social position as a result of social anomie [16]. The specific character of post-totalitarian ambiva-

lence is revealed in several aspects: firstly, in the mass and individual consciousness, opposite value-normative subsystems coexist not as antagonists but as co-ordinate elements of one consciousness type and emotional attitude to social reality; secondly, contradictory value systems are typical not for different social groups, when competition between them could eventually end in establishment of hierarchical system, but in fact they are typical for each big social group, and thirdly, ambivalence reveals itself in contradictory combinations of democratic goals, which set for social transformations, and totalitarian ways for implementation of democratic ideas. The brightest revealence of ambivalence could be seen in parallel personal orientations towards opposite values and norms. An owner of ambivalent consciousness could simultaneously support market economy and controlled prices, support absolute independence of Ukraine and be against its leaving the USSR. We remember the referendum of March 1991 when Ukrainian population gave their voices to federation and confederation at the same time. In sociological researches, this phenomenon could be registered when you analyse attitudes of the same people to opposite political institutions.

The ambivalent type of political consciousness is characterized by uncritical accepting or refusal from any political alternatives. The conform-ambivalent consciousness thinks that “yes” for capitalism does not mean “against” returning to socialism. The nihilistic-ambivalent consciousness resists any attempts to take society out of critical transitional period. Ukrainian citizens of nihilistic orientation belong to the most considerable part of respondents, which together with conformists make up 40%. The rest — who have a clear political position or found it difficult to answer — are not characterized by such evident ambivalence when contradictory positions can be seen in one judgement. And even though they do not express their obvious contradictory political positions, many people suffer from hidden ambivalence when they deliberately declare certain political positions, while their inner positions (of which they are often unconscious) tend to the opposite ones. This type of personal consciousness is mosaic-ambivalent. For a democratically oriented person, their conflict of mosaic consciousness means contradictions between democratic ideals and democratic process realization (its speed and range). This conflict leads to intention of speeding up the democratic renovation by all means, including those of well mastered totalitarian arsenal — to fight against all “enemies of democracy”. For convinced conservatives-socialists, this conflict can be seen in their very

paradoxical appeals to provide them with all democratic freedoms, which are obviously incompatible with their communist believes.

Generally speaking, an ambivalent person more corresponds to the transitional society than a perfect proponent of democratic society with clear, undiscrepant consciousness and determined attitude towards democratic norms. In conditions of the double institutionalization, the ambivalent consciousness is normal, it corresponds to the ambivalent and contradictory institutional control over social relations and behaviour. So, the mass ambivalence could be a good evidence in order to prove that the double institutionalization phenomenon exist.

The second criterion of the specific post-soviet institutionalization could be grounded on corresponding changes in social structure. In sociological theories, there is a recognized statement that institutional changes become significant for society only when there happened the corresponding changes in social structure and stratification. The sociological theory of social structure transformations is based on rather long monitoring of the western society development, where the social stratification bases and democratic institutions were developed for centuries and revolutionary changes took place when social sciences could not be even regarded as science. Attempts to substantiate a necessity of revolutionary attacks on social-class structure, made by Marx, brought bitter fruits not only to those states, where the founders of Marxism offered their theoretical and practical recommendations on radical society transformations.

The western world succeeded in avoiding the seductive communist recipes for society rehabilitation and could happily say that gradual changes in social structure brought about the “diamond-shaped” model of social stratification, which is necessary for civilised development and in which the tops and bottoms belong to minorities while the base is formed by the most numerous middle class, interested in preservation and further development of this social structure. And when the West goes on with harmonisation of social-class relations under the globalization conditions, the post-soviet world experiences the second (for the century) revolutionary crush of social structure.

The first stratification explosion, related to the radical destroy of ruining class structure, eventually brought about a division of society into two classes: higher and lower, party nomenclature and the “mass”, which was the overwhelming majority of population (in social sense and identification) without any difference to what official social layer people belonged — to working class, kolkhoz peasantry or “working intelligen-

tsia". At the same time, of course, there existed certain distinctions between nomenclature of different levels and representatives of other social groups of various status and prestige. This supported the social-status hierarchy of the "triangle" shape (or the pyramid-shaped), on top of which there were the nomenclature places and the bottom was filled with the most numerous layer, social dominance of which was reduced to national support of nomenclature decisions.

However, long before the perestroika, as it was shown in research on social-professional orientations, the real "triangle" of social-professional positions "turned over" in consciousness of generations, which started their independent life: the professions and posts, which made it possible to occupy the higher positions of social hierarchy, became the aims of mass orientations, so, most mass professions and ordinary posts became unattractive for the overwhelming majority of young people [5]. This "overturn" was one of the factors that destabilized the existing social hierarchy, because for most representatives of new cohorts, unrealized primary status pretensions led to dissatisfaction with social system, as far as the social system could not solve a conflict between the ideological orientation to raised pretensions and the old social structure. In the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, there happened a sharp rise in social pretensions of young people, which was registered in the researches by V.Magun, who called this process "revolution of pretensions" [14].

In order to satisfy new ambitions and pretensions, they needed new privileged social positions, and this could not be realized within the frameworks of limited and ideologically closed nomenclature class. There were too many people wanting to take a few places of narrow circle of soviet elite, and since the old Bolshevik method, when the old nomenclature was executed by shooting and a new nomenclature was lured, could not be applied any more, there remained the only way — to allow some socio-economic freedom and direct the growing desires to the private economy sphere.

However, the main social force of private economic interest is so creative namely because it turns social life according to its own derivative. So, if it needs new social positions, then it creates them as many as necessary. But unlike evolutional society development, when new elements of social structure gradually replace the old ones or fill the "vacant places" in developing socium, the new social structures and institutions emerged practically at once, as an instantaneous social reaction on removal of ideological taboo on private property and entrepreneurship.

At that time, most ruling bureaucracy and ordinary citizens were not interested in principal transformation of social stratification, even if they declaratively supported the idea of public system transformations and market reforms. People were not happy about the socialist system except the granted employment and possibility of growth for the working class and peasantry that inevitably required redundant, structurally unbalanced creation of working places and prestigious social positions.

Unlike the capitalist system that suffers, from time to time, from overproduction of commodities and services, the socialist society overproduced producers and consumers with the corresponding distortion of social-class and social-professional structure. For the last years of its life under the USSR, Ukraine could be proud, for example, that there were 8,2 students per teacher, whereas in developed western countries, the same index was almost twice as higher — 15,3, and in developing countries — 29,3 [23]. Just before the USSR collapse, the same situation was registered for the most social-professional positions, related to labour of higher qualifications. The pride could be valid unless the two factors, due to which the socialist society was able and forced to possess such luxury: the labour payment did not correspond to qualifications and the most skilled labour was not used in accordance with contemporary standards on material provision, organization and quality of labour activity.

Of course, we could forget our national pride and start to reform the social-professional structure by bringing it to market economy. But in this case, millions of people of high qualifications would not find places in the new structure. The same takes place in the social-class structure, where extensive development of material production, supported by ideological orientation to the strong advance-guard of soviet society, brought about overproduction of the “advanced working class” — industrial workers — in the USSR and Ukraine.

If now most intelligentsia and working class claims that the power is responsible for their low salaries, that are not paid in the proper time, if millions of workers of stopped enterprises have to be on unpaid leaves of absence, then this is how, preventing from reforms, bureaucracy defend interests of those social groups and layers, for which crush of social structure, due to radical economy transformations, will mean radical reduction in their numbers, lost employment perspective (as to their first profession) and a necessity of hard competition on labour market.

Even in Russia, being considerably ahead of Ukraine in socio-economic reforming, there is still the same old “stratification model”, when almost all the society is concentrated in the base layer” [25]. Moreover,

the years of Russian independence increased a new-nomenclature layer of state managers up to half as many. The main reason of this quantitative growth in Russia, Ukraine and other post-soviet states deals with the necessity of serving the old social structure, according to the institutional norms of which the most numerous social layers still live, and a newly-formed social structure — “business-layer”, small entrepreneurs, merchants etc. Inside this overgrowing bureaucracy, there is an invisible war for those administrative functions and working places, which deal with control over new structures, because this control is the basic prosperity source of corrupted bureaucracy.

When old social structure still exists and the party nomenclature became the ruling de-ideological bureaucracy, which made the luckiest democratic leaders their members, in society, there appeared a parallel social structure. The new structure develops according to its own institutional regulations, which could be adopted only by the most active and prepared individuals, who constitute an obvious minority in society, but potentially aspire to the dominant role. The new social structure involves the social-class and professional groups, which are few in numbers but their pretensions on property and income are surely much higher than expectations of traditional and mass layers. New phenomenon of unequivalent social exchange (when most people get less than their real endowment, and a minority gets much more than it is possible to get from the legal income sources) did not promote the merging of two structures, it brought about their principal division in the public opinion — on the one hand, “suffering people”, on the other hand, “succeeding Mafia”.

Independent existence of two social structures provides a new social order, in which the most active new social actors do not wish any society destabilization, being afraid of communist institutional-structural restoration, while representatives of mass old layers try, with the help of double institutionalization, to keep (even if partly) their usual social roles and positions. As a result, a majority of society finds consent in accepting the social situation, where old and new social institutions coexist, providing legality and legitimacy of social order by their contradictory influence.

### ***Prospects of the Post-Soviet Social Institutions Development***

It is evident that the double institutionalization is a phenomenon that is temporal, and is preventing democratic society transformations. It

creates the enormous institutional space and, for most people, permanently reproduces the feeling of social helplessness and dissatisfaction with social regulations. Their consent to live under the double institutional pressure is rather forced and conditioned by specific features of “homo postsoveticus” socio-cultural type, historical experience of these people still includes a fear of refusing from old institutional system, and their new post-soviet experience make them aware of no prospects for the double institutional order. This double normative-role pressure in the post-soviet society gives practically no room for noninstitutional social space, which, according to researchers of social capital development and new social movements, is a source of contemporary democratic society development and institutional innovations, supporting the harmonious social relations development [6; 7; 10; 12; 17; 19].

For Ukrainian society, prospects of transition to internally conflictless institutional system relate to the possibility of “noninstitutional policy” development, based on activity of amateur social movements and organizations, which promote perfection of noninstitutional space and form the social capital together with new forms of democratic legal, political, economic and spiritual culture. The potential of Ukrainian society in this context has not been evaluated yet, and in our opinion, it should be the priority direction of further studies on new social institutions in Ukraine.

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