

Pragmatic, Not Liberal Peace? Examining the State of Research on Brazil's Engagement in International Peace Operations

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Pragmatic, not Liberal Peace?

Examining the State of Research on Brazil's Engagement in International Peace Operations

Younna Christiansen

June 2021

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ABSTRACT

This literature review contextualizes, reviews, and critically discusses the scholarly debate surrounding the emergence of a “Brazilian way of peacebuilding.” Since the 2000s, Brazil has increasingly contributed troops to UN-led peacekeeping missions, specifically in Haiti and Sub-Saharan Africa. Opposing the dominant liberal peacebuilding paradigm, Brazil has staged itself as an advocate, promoting a more pragmatic, democratic, and sustainable peacebuilding approach that emphasizes local ownership, non-conditionality, and non-militarization. Investigating, whether portrayals of a “Brazilian way” are substantial, and how coercive Brazil acts in comparison to traditional Western actors, the paper examines motivations, paradigms, and the operationalization of its peacekeeping and peacebuilding endeavors. It first situates Brazil in the larger debate on rising powers and traces the evolution of Brazil's engagement in UN peacekeeping. This then allows to zoom in on conceptual and normative debates surrounding the security-development nexus and Responsibility to Protect vs Responsibility while Protecting, and to comparatively assess the successes and failures of Brazil's engagements in two concrete cases: Haiti and Guinea-Bissau. Overall, the findings are ambiguous, as Brazil does resort to coercion, hence contradicting its exceptionalist, pacifist discourse. Nonetheless, recognition of Brazil's efforts to contest and simultaneously mimic liberal peacebuilding is crucial to measure Brazil's transformative impact on multilateral operations. This, however, requires scholars to fill the substantial gap in empirical research concerning the concrete practices and consequences of Brazilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions on the ground.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Literaturbericht bietet eine Kontextualisierung, Auswertung und kritische Diskussion der akademischen Debatte über die Herausbildung eines „brasilianischen Ansatzes der Friedenskonsolidierung“. Seit den 2000er Jahren hat Brasilien zunehmend Truppen für UN-Friedensmissionen bereitgestellt, vor allem in Haiti und Sub-Sahara Afrika. Dabei hat Brasilien sich bewusst gegen das vorherrschende liberale Paradigma der Friedenskonsolidierung positioniert und betont einen pragmatischeren, demokratischeren und nachhaltigeren Ansatz, der lokale Eigenverantwortung, nicht-militärische Mittel und den Verzicht auf politische Konditionen in den Vordergrund stellt. Das Working Paper untersucht Motivationen, Paradigmen und die Operationalisierung des brasilianischen Engagements und ergründet so, wie weit die Idee eines „brasilianischen Ansatzes“ trägt und wie zwangsbasiert bzw. zwanglos Brasilien im Vergleich zu traditionellen westlichen Akteuren handelt. Zunächst wird der Aufstieg Brasiliens im Rahmen der wissenschaftlichen Debatte über sogenannte rising powers kontextualisiert und die historische Entwicklung des brasilianischen Engagements in UN-Friedensmissionen nachgezeichnet. Auf dieser Basis werden die konzeptionellen und normativen Debatten über den security-development nexus und die Responsibility to Protect/Responsibility while Protecting näher beleuchtet und die Erfolge und Misserfolge des brasilianischen Engagements in zwei konkreten Fällen vergleichend analysiert: Haiti und Guinea-Bissau. Mit Blick auf die allgemeine Frage nach einem „brasilianischen Ansatz der Friedenskonsolidierung“ ergibt die Analyse kein eindeutiges Bild, da Brasilien durchaus auf zwangsbasierte Maßnahmen zurückgreift, die seinem friedlicheren Diskurs widersprechen. Nichtsdestotrotz ist die Anerkennung

der Friedensbemühungen Brasiliens, welche das liberale Paradigma der Friedenskonsolidierung sowohl herausfordern als auch imitieren, entscheidend, um die potenziell transformativen Auswirkungen Brasiliens und weiterer rising powers auf multilaterale Operationen zu messen. Dies erfordert jedoch zunächst, dass die Forschung die erheblichen Wissenslücken schließt, die mit Blick auf die konkreten Praktiken und Konsequenzen brasilianischer Friedenssicherungs- und Friedenskonsolidierungsmissionen „on the ground“ bestehen.

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List of Abbreviations

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CCOPAB	Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil / Brazilian Joint Peace Operations Centre
CPLP	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa
IBSA	India Brazil South Africa
MINURSO	Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation de la République centrafricaine / United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation de la République centrafricaine / United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo / United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti / United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NDB	New Development Bank
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ONUC	Opération des Nations Unies au Congo / United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RwP	Responsibility while Protecting
UN	United Nations
SENAI	Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial / National Service for Industrial Learning
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAVEM/MONUA	United Nations Angola Verification Mission/United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

1 Introduction¹

The return to a multipolar world order today is most evidently reflected in the rise of emerging actors that are reshaping the global economic landscape and norms guiding multilateral institutions. In this context, scholars have begun to assess how these emerging actors are (re)structuring the dynamics of the international peace and security architecture (Acharya 2016; Stefan 2016). More specifically, debates on the role of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) in multilateral peacekeeping missions have surged.

This literature review synthesizes the scholarship on Brazil's role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, with a particular focus on the notion of a "Brazilian way of peacebuilding". The research question guiding this review is: Has a "Brazilian way of peacebuilding" manifested itself in practice, and if so, how does it differ from traditional peacebuilding paradigms and practices? Following the introduction, chapter 2 contextualizes the rise of Brazil historically and conceptually, presents the main debates preoccupying the field, and addresses the research methodology guiding this literature review. Chapter 3 then explores the motivations, operationalization, and implications of Brazil's international peace and security efforts, focusing on two dominant strands in the literature: The security-development nexus, and the normative issue of Responsibility while Protecting. The chapter will also zoom in on two prominent Brazilian missions – in Haiti and Guinea-Bissau. The review concludes that the features of an emerging "Brazilian way of peacebuilding" are ambiguous, because Brazilian activities have proven a high degree of coerciveness in line with the robust turn in liberal peacebuilding. The lack of detailed empirical research on the practice and outcome of Brazil's international engagement should serve as a wake-up call for scholars. While Brazil may no longer represent a serious competitor to traditional actors at the moment, given its retreat and merely relative successes, dominant liberal peacebuilding actors should consider and apply lessons learnt from the beneficial results that have been achieved thanks to Brazilian peacebuilding activities. Lastly, Brazil is not the only actor that has challenged the liberal order, raising important implications for the study of other emerging actors in multilateral peacebuilding.

2 Contextualizing the emergence of Brazil as an international "peace-builder"

2.1 *From BRICS to IBSA – "Emerging powers" and their involvement in international peace operations*

Three complementary trends have guided the advent of Brazil in international peace and security affairs, the first being the rise – and consecutive demise – of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, advocated by scholars such as Roland Paris in his well-known publication *At War's End – Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (2004). To end intrastate conflicts, Paris argues, the international community has to prioritize the creation of strong liberal institutions, before introducing political and economic liberalization and marketization policies.² However, critical scholars such as Oliver Richmond have strongly opposed the liberal peace because it recurrently fails to produce sustainable peace, and has even proven to exacerbate conflicts in some cases.³ While the two United Nations reviews in 2015 have sought to acknowledge these weaknesses by advancing the concept of "sustained peace," its real implications on the ground remain to be seen.⁴

1 This Working Paper was written during an internship at PRIF in the summer of 2020, as part of the research project "Coercion in Peacebuilding" (see <https://www.hsfk.de/en/research/projects/projects/coercion-in-peacebuilding>).

2 Although Paris has since engaged with some critiques of liberal peace, he claims that "Peacebuilding agencies should preserve the principal goal of liberal internationalism (...) but rethink the way in which they pursue this goal." See: Paris, Roland "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." *International Security* 22(2), 1997, p. 57.

3 Richmond argues that the liberal peace paradigm is coercive, and thus defends a more balanced, emancipatory peacebuilding approach which allows for more local agency and hence legitimacy. See: Richmond and Frank 2009, Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015, Call and de Coning 2017, p. 2.

4 The concept of "sustaining peace" entails 1) uniting peace, security, human rights and development pillars of the UN, 2) fostering inclusive national ownership, and 3) realistic timelines for post-conflict development engagements, in an effort

Secondly, the end of the Cold War not only enabled the expansion of UN activities and capacities in the realm of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peacebuilding. Besides, the dynamics of intrastate conflict since the early 1990s have promoted international debates about the international responsibility to protect civilians affected by violence within “sovereign” territory. This has propelled a redefinition of some of the most profound international legal norms such as the sovereign equality of states, as well as the principle of non-intervention. Hence, while sovereignty had dominated peacekeeping discourse and activities up until the 1990s, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace* proposed a more interventionist agenda that surpassed peacekeeping and urged for the active prevention of conflict as well as post-conflict sustainable development efforts to allow for enduring peace. Similarly, the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty launched the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the 2005 UN World Summit. R2P mandates the international community to collectively protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and authorizes the UN Security Council (UNSC) to recur to the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to that end. This norm reflects the changing nature of state sovereignty, which is defined as an internal responsibility to be fulfilled rather than a mere right to prevent external aggression. The rise of the so-called Global South constitutes the third major development. Debates about so-called emerging or rising powers have primarily focused on their increasing economic weight and relevance in relation to the West. Yet, over the past two decades, a growing literature has begun to investigate the role that the BRICS (Richmond and Tellidis 2014), and other actors such as Turkey (Kocadal 2019), and Qatar (Barakat 2012) are playing in the broader global governance system, including their stakes, agency, and rationales for participating in international peace operations.

Emerging powers, rising powers, middle powers? – Definitions

To contextualize the emergence of Brazil as a peace-builder, it is relevant to sketch a definition of what its emerging power status concretely entails.

Table 1: Juxtaposition of traditional and emerging middle powers according to E. Jordaan (Jordaan 2003)

	Traditional Middle Powers	Emerging/ Rising Middle Powers
	Multilateralism + Compromise + “Good International Citizenship”	
Constitutive	Cold War: Strategic and military outlook	Post-Cold War: Economic outlook
	Wealthy and stable	Semi-peripheral
	Egalitarian	Inegalitarian
	Established democracies	Fragile democracies
	Absence of regional influence	High regional influence
Behavioral	Ambivalence towards regional integration	Strong drive for regional integration, yet an ambition to stand out next to other states in their region
	Concessions to global reform pressures	Reform but no radical global change

To be clear, emerging powers are a subcategory of traditional middle powers. The traditional middle power concept arose during the Cold War when middle powers such as Canada were positioned in-between great powers exerting great influence at all times, and small powers that would never achieve meaningful participation in global politics (Chapnick 1999, Kenkel 2019, p. 645). Adam Chapnick distinguishes a functional approach, relating to a state’s capability to exert influence via responsibility, a hierarchical model, directly related to a state’s material capabilities, and a behavioral approach that focuses on the multilateral outlook of these states (Chapnick, 1999). While

to implement the UN Charter’s goal of saving “succeeding generation from the scourge of war”. See: United Nations (2015), “The Challenges of sustaining peace - report of the Advisory group of experts for the 2015 review of the United National peacebuilding architecture” https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/07/300615_The-Challenge-of-Sustaining-Peace.pdf [last accessed March 2021] or Call and de Coning (2017), p. 2.

Chapnick's functional definition does not reduce middle powers to their material capabilities, instead ranking them "according to context-dependent frequency of states' attempts to realize their potential power" (Kenkel 2019, p. 645), Jordaan argues that Chapnick's theory ignores a state's agency (Jordaan 2003). In general, the concept of middle power remains highly debated among International Relations (IR) scholars until today, as some argue the concept is more about exerting influence and coercion than about establishing a coherent substantial concept (Robertson 2017). As depicted in the above table, the classic characteristics of middle powers in the Cold War were their

"tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide their diplomacy. They are, in short, the 'stabilisers and legitimisers of world order'" (Kenkel 2013b, p. 88).

Thus, traditional middle powers generally seek to maintain the status-quo, yet simultaneously act beyond their self-interest, often by participating in conflict mediation and resolution efforts.

The concept of emerging powers, in turn, refers to those middle powers that see global institutions as a way to leverage their status in world politics. As displayed in the table above, according to Jordaan emerging powers are characterized by peripheral positions in the global political economy, deep societal cleavages and inequality, democratic instability, high regional influence, and vivid support for regional integration. This gives emerging powers a two-faced profile, as they

"are supporters of an overall order that privileges them in relation to their weaker neighbours, yet wish to reform that order where their position in it is unfavourable vis-à-vis the determinant powers. In other words, these powers are simultaneously followers and leaders in the global system. Often there is a tendency for emerging powers to use regional dominance as a springboard for consideration as players disassociated from their regional environment. However, the same factor that propels them to seek greater influence – regional dominance – can be weakened by the very attempt to actualize it into a global role" (ibid, p. 90).

A particular avenue through which emerging powers have sought to increase their power status is via increasing involvement and leadership in humanitarian aid provision and development cooperation. For instance, regarding development assistance, emerging donors have established separate fora outside of the OECD framework: In 2004, the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) Dialogue Forum was created with the purpose to empower South-South cooperation in the fight against poverty. Other examples include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the BRICS' New Development Bank (NDB), financial instruments that allow Southern states to acquire financial support through non-Western channels (Paczyńska 2020, p. 6).

Simultaneously, emerging powers are leading large segments of international peacebuilding efforts, both via bilateral and multilateral avenues. In line with Jordaan's conceptualization, Parlar Dal indicates that although not identical in nature, rising powers have four characteristics in common: Self-interests-based preferences, status-seeking attitudes, a cost-oriented normative approach (meaning that they do not like to cooperate with great powers as this would force them to breach their strongly propagated principle of non-interference), and regionally-focused priorities (Parlar Dal 2018, p. 2210). He asserts that rising powers are inevitable when it comes to contemporary conflict management, thus arguing in favor of "a new and much more effective institutional foundation, new concepts and a new distribution of roles among traditional and non-traditional actors" (ibid, p. 2218). Besides, critical scholars like Richmond and Tellidis have emphasized that emerging actors are unlikely to overthrow the existing global order, and will rather act as status-quo powers in defense of the liberal order (which could, however, lead to coordination difficulties between traditional and non-traditional actors), or as critical states challenging the order from within (which would, however, harm their legitimacy) (Richmond and Tellidis 2014). In general, emerging actors follow the "solidarity within sovereignty" principle (ibid, p. 565), and support South-South technical and economic cooperation, yet this does not imply that they are always favorably perceived

by recipient countries. Richmond and Tellidis further deny that emerging actors are ambiguous, asserting that one should instead perceive their position as complex:

“They [emerging powers] resist some aspects of the liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal statebuilding process and embrace others. They are often both donors and recipients, drivers of some processes and the subjects of others, while simultaneously rejecting OECD- DAC-led approaches. They are sensitive to anything that smacks of Northern hegemony, but are also aware of a capacity deficit in some areas. At the same time as they keep their distance from the donor system and peacebuilding, BRICS also stay connected to it for these reasons. (...) In effect, the BRICS and new donors work through the existing international peacebuilding architecture as well as seeking to change it. They are both ‘status-quo’ and ‘critical’ actors, depending on their local, regional or global interests; norms and ideological preferences; and historical experiences of war, peace and development. *No clear alternative model, ideology, or model of the state or peace is offered by the BRICS and/or other emerging powers*” (Richmond and Tellidis 2013, p. 8, emphasis added).

In contrast, raising the question whether “rising powers [are] breaking the peacebuilding mold,” Call and de Coning argue that as “their influence on global governance increases over time, their approaches to peacebuilding may significantly *influence how peacebuilding will be understood and practiced in global governance in the future*” (De Coning and Call 2017, p. 5, emphasis added). In the concluding chapter of their edited volume, Call and Coning synthesize their findings by juxtaposing the key differences between traditional and rising peacebuilding actors. Highlighting the absence of a universally accepted definition of peacebuilding, they underline that peacebuilding is, unsurprisingly, commonly understood in the context of UN missions (Call and de Coning 2017, p. 246), where “traditional donors have shaped the Western understanding of peacebuilding as largely a type of program funded for a specific purpose, different from “normal” development, and thus exempted from some of its requirements” (ibid, p. 247). This traditional peacebuilding is top-down and state-centric in nature, aiming at the short-term establishment of security and institutions rather than supporting sustainable economic development supported by civil society. In contrast, rising actors seek to counter attempts at changing “the behavior of the political system [in the host countries] that causes marginalization and inequality by introducing incentives that encourage greater political pluralism and political freedoms” (ibid, p. 253) In their conclusion, Call and de Coning list six rationales that distinguish rising actors’ approaches abroad to those of traditional Western peacebuilders: 1) The centrality of history and state identity; 2) The long-term outlook on peacebuilding; 3) The strong respect for national sovereignty and ownership; 4) An absence of conditionality and a will to embrace a less hierarchical world order; 5) Mutual respect, equality, and cultural awareness; and 6) The absence of monitoring given the emphasis on sustainability and the long-term (ibid, p. 162). That being said, they conclude: “Ultimately, the impact of rising powers on peacebuilding institutions, policies, and practices is likely *to derive more from their discourse, concepts, and moral authority as their resources.*” (ibid, p. 268, emphasis added)

Nonetheless, the authors admit that a dichotomization between traditional and emerging powers has its caveats. Call and de Coning point out that while the term emerging powers is appropriate for some states, it “derives from a realpolitik framework that emphasizes traditional military prowess and aspirations that do not reflect the way that these countries see themselves today” (ibid, p. 245). Also, it is important to note that “emerging powers” are a heterogeneous group of states. Their respective civil-military relations and internal political systems are relevant aspects shaping their involvement in international conflict management (Duarte Villa and Jenne 2020, p. 426). Hence, while the above-mentioned typology provides a ground that allows distinguishing emerging from traditional, Western donors and peacebuilders, this rather simplistic divide has to be treated with caution. Focusing on a nuanced analysis of each emerging power’s particular peacebuilding approach and then comparing them one another is crucial for an informed understanding of their respective future roles and aspirations in global governance.

For example, “Brazil’s discourse is closer to the mainstream liberal peace discourse (compared to China, Russia, and other emerging powers) when it comes to upholding and respecting human rights and democratic norms as part of its foreign policy” (Richmond and Tellidis 2014, p. 570). Hence, seeking to overcome the dichotomic discourse collectively juxtaposing “traditional” and “emerging” actors that currently dominates academic debates, this paper critically inquires how Brazilian policymakers and scholars have narrated the “Brazilian way of peacebuilding”.

2.2 Brazil – Prominent debates amongst scholarly circles

While Brazil has attracted much scholarly interest in the field of IR over the past three decades, debates on Brazil’s role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding have emerged only recently. Most publications have been issued between 2010 and 2020, in response to Brazil’s increasing engagements abroad under President Lula – as reflected in Brazilian leadership of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004–2017). In elaborating this review, three aspects stood out across the literature: First, Brazilian debates on peacebuilding are closely linked to its engagements in development cooperation, foreign policy, and global governance. This is in large part due to Brazil’s very broad definition and conceptualization of peacebuilding. Second, the literature on Brazilian peacebuilding remains relatively superficial and descriptive, mostly focusing on the Brazilian peacebuilding discourse as well as its manifestations on the ground in Haiti. Consequently, while only a limited number of scholars treat Brazilian peacebuilding as a concrete individual focal-point, gaining a deeper understanding of Brazilian peacebuilding requires looking beyond this circle of literature, and proves the necessity of further scholarly research in this particular niche.⁵ Lastly, most debates have revolved around four main questions: 1. What motivates Brazil to engage in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding? 2. Why has Brazil’s stance on the use of force and interventionism changed so radically over the years? 3. Does Brazilian participation in Chapter VII interventions reflect the ambiguities and dilemmas it faces regarding its pacifying constitutional norms and its status-seeking ambitions? 4. How does Brazilian peacebuilding translate into practice, and how does it conceive of security and development in comparison to defendants of the traditional liberal peacebuilding paradigm?

2.3 Research questions and methodology

This paper synthesizes the literature on Brazil’s role in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and investigates whether a “Brazilian way of peacebuilding” has emerged. This question is tightly linked to the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt’s current research program *Coercion and Peace* (PRIF 2018), which departs from the standpoint that the relation between peace and coercion is ambiguous – while peace seems to require coercion to ensure a certain order and stability, on the one hand, coercion can very easily become a threat to peace, on the other. Thus, the research program aims to “analyze how to achieve as much peace as possible with as little coercion as necessary” (ibid, p. 4). Ostensibly, this is precisely what the “Brazilian way of peacebuilding” is all about.

The particular case of Brazil therefore provides valuable insights when seeking to investigate the relationship between peace and coercion. While Brazil has increased its peacekeeping contributions numerically, it has constantly contested and sought to defend its conservative stance on established international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. Thus, Brazil – in discourse for the least – is presented as an ambiguous actor: Its status and recognition ambitions can stand in direct contradiction to the very nature of its self-portrayal as a non-interventionist and non-coercive peacebuilding actor. The very nature of Brazil’s status as an emerging power is pertinent when analyzing the extent to which systemic constraints – i.e. the way the international order and power

5 The niche consists of the following authors: Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes De Neto (focusing particularly on Brazil’s role in Africa), Kai Michael Kenkel (specializing in the South American security culture), Oliver Stuenkel and Marcus Tourinho (concentrating on interventionism and the use of force), and Charles T. Call and Cedric de Coning (focusing on rising powers and their impact on the international peace system).

constellations and dominant discourses – influence Brazilian peacebuilding activities and, thus, the effectiveness and legitimacy of its interventions abroad. Instead of simply juxtaposing Brazil and traditional actors and investigating the (non)coerciveness of its peacekeeping and peacebuilding endeavors, this also raises the question to what extent Brazil itself may be coerced into behaving the way it does.

Thus, the central questions that this paper seeks to elaborate on are: Is there a “Brazilian way of peacebuilding”? If so, how (non)coercive is its approach compared to traditional liberal peacebuilding? These can be broken down into the following three sub-questions:

1. *Why?* What motivates Brazil’s engagement?
2. *How?* Does Brazil act less coercive than traditional actors? How does it implement its agenda?
3. *So what?* What are the consequences of Brazil’s engagement? What can traditional actors learn from Brazil’s successes or failures? How does Brazil’s understanding of peace and security change the international system? What does Brazilian peacebuilding reveal about the limitations and future of liberal peacebuilding?

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, the general evolution of Brazilian engagements and its core principles and motivations to assist UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are presented. Second, two core debates are portrayed – Brazil’s conceptualization of the security-development nexus, followed by Brazil’s stance on the Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) initiative – both of which are essential to the overarching question of coercion and peace. After empirically assessing how Brazil’s discourses and norms have manifested in two missions – Haiti and Guinea-Bissau –, the last section analyzes the implications and future trajectories of Brazil’s peacebuilding.

3 A “Brazilian way of peacebuilding”? – Exploring its motivations, operationalization and implications

“The peace operations conducted by the United States are more or less that, violence and victory, and ours, what we were proposing and what four years later I can say we are achieving, is something else, this paradigm of development of the country, revitalization of institutions and the reconstitution of the fabric of society” (Igor Kipman, Ambassador of Brazil to Haiti, as quoted in: Kenkel 2010, p. 584).

3.1 The evolution of Brazil’s engagement in multilateral peace operations

Brazil’s peacebuilding norms are deeply enshrined in South American security culture. South American states have been subject to colonialism, US hegemony, and interventions. Normatively, in line with their military weakness, peripheral location in international affairs, and focus on regional politics⁶ in which armed forces are “not traditionally considered a part of the foreign policy toolbox” (Kenkel 2013b, pp. 86), South American states emphasize peaceful conflict resolution and defend a very conservative interpretation of sovereignty as the inviolability of borders (ibid). This strict understanding of non-intervention and resistance of peace enforcement is anchored in the so-called *Calvo and Drago doctrine*, which has prevented the occurrence of violent conflict involving Brazil since the 1870 War of the Triple Alliance when Brazil along with Argentina and Uruguay defeated Paraguay. This absolutist interpretation of sovereignty is reinforced by the diplomatic legalist tradition of *jurisdicismo* (Herz 2013, p. 29). Thus, as Kenkel displays, South American states such as Brazil “have not warmed to the idea of a more robust use of force in peace operations, nor has there been a discernible move towards greater ethical content in their foreign policies” (Kenkel 2010, p. 586).

Institutionally, Brazil’s decision-making processes regarding peace operations have been characterized as “underinstitutionalized, fragmented, and hostage to both bureaucratic and partisan

6 I.e. regional platforms such as Mercosur, UNASUR, the OAS, or the CPLP.

politics” (Kenkel 2013b, p. 92). The aim of provoking better cooperation between the Foreign and Defense Ministries and subordinating the defense sector to the civilian one has motivated Brazil to participate in multilateral fora (Kenkel 2013c, p. 13, Sotomayor 2014).

Given this context, it appears contradictory for South American actors like Brazil to engage its military abroad. What, ultimately, *has* caused Brazil’s increasing engagement in peacebuilding activities? According to Kenkel, the rise of Brazil and other South American states in the international security architecture is explained as follows: The factual shortage of personnel within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation (UNDPKO), where South American states are “fill[ing] the void in manpower, materiel, and even money” (ibid, p. 1) has meant that Brazil now seeks “to recast this progress into commensurate influence on the global political stage, and to reap the domestic benefits of peacekeeping for the consolidation of democracy” (ibid, p. 2). In line with this, Sotomayor Velazquez underlines that South American states have participated in peacebuilding through multilateral fora “for three main reasons: international signaling, domestic reform and monetary incentives” (Sotomayor 2013, p. 46).

Altogether, relevant themes in the rise of Brazil as a peacebuilding actor are the context of a growing “gap between Western powers and major contributors from the global South, leading to a division of labor increasingly separating peace enforcers from peacebuilders; the effects of civil-military relations and democratization; and the interaction of peacekeeping participation with regional integration processes” (Kenkel 2013b, p. 2).

A short chronology of Brazilian Peacebuilding

While there has been a recent surge, Brazil’s participation in peacekeeping activities reaches back to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first armed UN Peacekeeping Mission in response to the Suez Crisis in Egypt in 1956. As a founding member of the UN, Brazil has engaged in over 50 out of 71 UN peacekeeping operations contributing a total of over 55,000 military, police, and civilian personnel (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Although Brazil is not a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), it is the state to have served second most frequently on the Council and has consistently sought a permanent UNSC seat as part of the G4.⁷ Besides, Brazil has regularly stimulated important debates and initiatives, for example in the creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in 2005, and by initiating the Responsibility while Protecting concept, which the UN Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti presented to the UNSC on November 9, 2011. The initiative was a response to the Responsibility to Protect principle, which Brazil deems risky of abuse, particularly by powers seeking to overthrow a regime, as has been the case in Libya in 2011. The Brazilian initiative has, however, faded due to a lack of continuity and changes in political leadership.

Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations is generally divided into three phases: a first phase from 1957 to 1993; a second phase from 1994 to 2003, and a third phase starting in 2004, as depicted in the table below.

7 The G4 comprises four states – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan – which aim for a permanent UNSC seat.

Table 2: Partial Overview of Brazilian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions visualizing the three phases of Brazilian peacekeeping.⁸

Phases ⁹	Country	Mission	Year	Contributions ¹⁰
I) Non-intervention Post WW2 – Western global leadership.	Egypt	UNEF I	1957–1967	Infantry Battalion of 600 soldiers
	Congo	ONUC	1960–1961	Air Force Unit
II) Non-intervention as a regional power = Participation in Chapter VI missions. Non- coercive.	Mozambique	ONUMOZ	1994	Infantry Company, Military Observers, Police Platoons
	Angola	UNAVEM I, II, II & MONUA	1991–1998	200 engineers, 2 field hospitals
	East Timor	UNTAET – UNMISSET	1999–2000	50 police
III) Non-indifference as a rising power with global reach = Participation in Chapter VII missions. Coercion as a last resort only.	Haiti	MINUSTAH	2004–2017	Army infantry battalion, a Marine Corps operations group, and a military engineering company, second Army battalion post-2011
	Current missions (March 2020): Contribution of 258 blue helmets to 9 peacekeeping missions. ¹¹			
	Lebanon ¹²	UNIFIL	2011 – present	A frigate and a contingent of 220–280 Marines
	Democratic Republic of Congo	MONUSCO	2013 – present	20 staff officers
	South Sudan	UNMISS	– present	8 staff officers, 5 Experts of Mission, 7 police
	Central African Republic	MINUSCA	– present	6 Staff officers, 4 Experts on Mission
	Western Sahara	MINURSO	– present	8 Experts on Mission
	Darfur	UNAMID	– present	4 Police
	Cyprus	UNFICYP	– present	Contingent Troops
	Abyei	UNISFA	– present	Contingent Troops
Yemen	UNMHA	– present		

The first phase up until Brazil's engagement in the United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1994 is described as symbolic – Brazil resisted interventions in foreign countries and had not established a global standing yet. During the military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985 Brazil completely disengaged from the international peacekeeping stage.

8 Table adopted from: Ribeiro, Karla Pinhel "What next? Mali: An overview for Brazilian Peacekeeping," LATIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTERS, 2017 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325020019_What_next_Mali_An_overview_for_Brazilian_Peacekeeping [last accessed January 3, 2021].

9 According to Esteves, P. (2020, p. 100, 102). Esteves acknowledges that her periodization does not follow the presidential cycles, instead her phases are constructed around macro-trends in global politics - here: the *Agenda for Peace* published in 1992 and the publication of the ICISS report in 2001 – and the consequential Brazilian foreign policy strategies adopted.

10 s. Kenkel (2018).


11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015) "Brazil and UN peacekeeping operation" [last accessed July 20, 2020].

12 s. Abdenur (2016).

1994 marked the start of the second phase, with Brazil’s commitment increasingly crystallizing, following the creation of institutional arrangements that explicitly structured its engagements in peacekeeping affairs: the 1996 National Defense Document and the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in 1997 (Santos and Almeida 2014, p. 2). As Brazil rose economically and achieved regional power status, it also began to more actively contribute to UN Chapter VI peacekeeping missions (Hamann Passarelli and Gabrielsen Jumbert 2020, p 158). The focus on Chapter VI missions “reflects the way Brazilian military are trained, with a reluctance to use unchecked force and the continued attempts to find alternative solutions and negotiate compromises” (ibid, p. 162). However, it also sent battalions to ONUMOZ (1994), the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM, 1991–1998), and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 1999–2000) (Kenkel 2010, p. 588), thereby signaling its intent to militarily contribute to multilateral peacekeeping, which was put into practice in the wake of the third phase. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004 under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s *Partido dos Trabalhadores* government (2003–2011) initiated the third phase. MINUSTAH was the first Chapter VII mission, allowing peacekeepers to resort to force to restore peace and security. It, therefore, represented a turning point, and the beginning of Lula’s agenda for the following decade: Brazilian commitment to operations beyond Latin America, the Caribbean region, and Lusophone countries into Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East (Abdenur 2016), and Central and South Asia (De Carvalho, Gabrielsen Jumbert, Esteves 2020, p. 7). Until today, reportedly, Brazil has participated in 74% of UN Chapter VII missions (Hamann Passarelli and Gabrielsen Jumbert 2020, p. 158).

The rupture in the 2000s was further marked by the creation of institutional arrangements and a new foreign policy doctrine: Following the 2001 creation of the *Centre for Preparation and Evaluation for Peacekeeping Missions of the Brazilian Army* which would serve to align peace operations with national interests (Hirst and Nasser 2014), in June 2010 the merging of the Army’s center and the Marine Corps School led to the creation of the *Brazilian Joint Peace Operations Centre* (Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil, CCOPAB), which allowed for a more coordinated oversight of its missions (Kenkel 2010, p. 587). Moreover, Chancellor Celso Amorim, inspired by the African Union, introduced the notion of non-indifference in the Brazilian foreign policy arsenal. Hence, while phase one (1957–1993) was guided by a mentality of strictly peaceful conflict resolution and phase two (1994–2003) still saw humanitarian intervention as coercion, the non-indifference doctrine of the third phase accepts humanitarian intervention as a last resort (Esteves 2020, p. 98).

Figure 1: Brazil’s Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2018



Source: Kenkel, Michael K. “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Brazil,” updated February 2019. <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Brazil-Kenkel-05-Feb-2019-002.pdf/> [last accessed July 30, 2020].

As figure 1 above indicates, Brazilian troop contributions to peacekeeping missions have been dropping since the peak of MINUSTAH in 2012/3, mainly due to Brazil's political and economic challenges since the departure of Lula, succeeded by Dilma Rousseff (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2011–2016), Michel Temer (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro 2016–2018), and most recently Jair Bolsonaro (Partido Social Liberal, then Independent, 2019 – present). Nonetheless, as of March 2020, Brazil still contributes 258 blue helmets to the 9 out of 13 contemporary UN peacekeeping missions as listed in the table above (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).

Characteristics of the “Brazilian way” of Peacebuilding

Brazilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding policies are guided by its foreign policy framework listed in the 10 principles and anchored in article four of the 1988 Constitution – national independence; prevalence of human rights; self-determination of peoples; non-intervention; equality among states; defense of peace; peaceful solution of conflicts; repudiation of terrorism and racism; cooperation among people for the progress of humanity; and concession of political asylum. As section 4.12 of the 2005 Brazilian National Defense Policy states,

“Brazil acts in the international community respecting the constitutional principles of self-determination, non-intervention, and equality among states. In those conditions, under the protection of multilateral organisms, the country participates in peace operations, seeking to contribute to peace and international security” (quoted in: Kenkel 2013b, p. 94).

With regards to the specificities of such peace operations, the Foreign Ministry explicitly states that Brazil “prioritizes participation in operations in countries with which it maintains closer historical and cultural ties” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Besides, the Brazilian approach prioritizes close contact to local populations and local ownership, the exportation of own policies against poverty, hunger, and underdevelopment, as well as an understanding of security where politics, development, and stability complement each other (Call and de Coning 2017, Kenkel 2013b, p. 100, Abdenur and Call 2017). In addition, Brazil focuses on South-South solidarity as the following quote by de Abreu, director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, ABC)¹³ in 2013 suggests:

“The policy of Brazilian cooperation is based on international solidarity [...] we react to the demands (we don't have previously prepared projects to be presented to partners). [...] The principle of South-South cooperation that we follow is that of no conditionality, which is the non-linkage between technical cooperation and pursuit of economic and commercial goals and benefits or concessions in areas of services in exchange for cooperation” (quoted in: Abdenur and Call 2017, p. 21).

Furthermore, the meaning of the term *peacebuilding* (*consolidação da paz*) is highly context-dependent. For example, while Brazil uses the term within the UN or IBSA when it comes to peacekeeping missions, it is not used in the context of infrastructure cooperation and assistance projects. This is because Brazil does not have to adhere to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee regulations which defines funding regulations for peacebuilding which are opposed to development activities, allowing Brazil to follow a holistic peacebuilding rationale that is

“less narrowly understood than in Western settings or in the UN, and incorporates development, humanitarian, infrastructure, health, education, jobs creation, mediation, dialogue, and reconciliation activities, as well as more conventional post-war reconstruction and institutional support” (Call and de Coning 2017, p. 264).

¹³ The ABC is the agency in charge of Brazil's international technical cooperation. It is part of the Brazilian Ministry of Ministry of External Relations.

In consequence, Brazil does not temporally distinguish between pre-, in-, or post-conflict (ibid, p. 251), and follows a concept that is “more pragmatic, flexible, and all-encompassing (...) [reflecting] direct economic gains as well as security or principled interests of rising powers” (ibid, p. 252).

With regards to Brazil’s motivations communicated through its peacebuilding discourse, scholars have asked two particular questions: First, whether Brazil is really contesting, or even opposing the liberal order – and if so, whether it is not following an ambiguous policy in seeking to achieve status in the international system whilst simultaneously opposing it; second, a rather limited, yet no less important portion of scholars has questioned the actual translation into practice of the above-mentioned rationale guiding Brazilian peacebuilding.

Concerning the first, Call advances the argument that interests and, therefore, realist and liberalist theories best account for the emergence of Brazil’s *engagement* in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, while ideas-based theories such as constructivism and post-colonial theories provide the necessary context for the *content* of the policies Brazil advocates for – from national identity to social and historical experiences (Call 2018). Call provides several arguments to prove that Brazil does not merely act according to its own agenda and benefits. For example, in Haiti, Brazil focused on development work, such as road construction, and integrated the NGO *Viva Rio* to create a favorable atmosphere among locals. In addition, the cultural affinity between the Brazilian contingents and Haitians let Brazil appear more genuine than the robust agendas executed by traditional actors such as the USA, France, or Canada (ibid, p. 2282). He further notes that the resistance against the implementation of R2P in Libya in 2011 – when a NATO coalition intervened to establish a ceasefire and terminate civilian attacks by the Gaddafi regime -, as well as the focus on countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and East Timor – which are neither economically nor strategically relevant to Brazil – confirm its solidarity approach (ibid, p. 2285).

In line with Call and Kenkel, Newman and Zala stress that while MINUSTAH has served as the “stage for unprecedented levels of cooperation, (...) and for the development of alternative conceptions of peacebuilding to challenge the ‘liberal peace’ (...)” (Kenkel 2013c, p. 5) what matters “is contestation over who is setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules themselves and the kind of order that they underpin” (Newmann and Zala 2018, p. 871). Similarly, Esteves, Gabrielsen Jumbert, and de Carvalho in an edited volume on Brazil as a status-seeking power ask the following questions:

- a) how Brazil’s principled stance on humanitarianism and peacekeeping translated into practice,
- b) how Brazil sought to reshape the international agenda on humanitarianism and to what extent it has succeeded in doing so, and finally,
- c) what the key drivers behind Brazil’s humanitarian policy are, and what consequences this engagement has for Brazil’s international standing (De Carvalho, Gabrielsen Jumbert and Esteves 2020, p. V).

In particular, they advance the thesis that the achievement of a global player status is the main motivation behind Brazil’s engagement in humanitarianism, thus following Barma, who has denied the dichotomization supported by some scholars that “rising powers are presented with a binary choice: assimilate to the existing order, or challenge it” (Barma et al. 2009, p. 529). Santos and Cravo claim that “Brazil appears to be caught between the simultaneous legitimation and contestation of the international power structure” (Santos and Almeida 2014). As Esteves et al. succinctly remark


“rising powers engage in these activities as they are part of the toolkit great powers have at their disposal for “system maintenance”—just as other smaller states seeking higher status do (see de Carvalho and Lie 2015). For while great power status to some extent depends on resources and geopolitics, it is also a social role, with specific rights and duties ascribed to it.” (De Carvalho, Gabrielsen Jumbert and Esteves 2020, p. 6)

Concerning the second debate – the manifestation of the “Brazilian approach” on the ground – scholarly contributions remain very limited. This is because the dominant narrative does not explicitly distinguish Brazilian normative discourses from their empirical validity. Yet, as the missions in Haiti and Guinea-Bissau examined in section 3.4 highlight, this deficit leads one to oversee important aspects in the implementation of the Brazilian approach, which in turn could also be useful in explaining Brazilian motivations in the first place. Kenkel underscores that

“while we see the emergence of a distinctly South American approach to peace operations and peacebuilding – the bulk of these efforts continue to take place *within the overarching context of UN efforts shaped by the ‘liberal peace’*” (Kenkel 2013d, p. 189, emphasis added).

Duarte Villa and Jenne, taking the cases of Brazil and Indonesia, raise the question why these two countries have adapted to the robust approach of peacekeeping even if this contradicts their traditional foreign policy principles – and why alternative ideas that stand closer to these traditions have failed to prosper. They maintain that the gap between discourse and practice since the 2000s “can be explained with reference to civil-military knowledge imbalances” (Duarte Villa and Jenne 2020, p. 408). In combination with a coercive turn in the UN agenda, the civilian “defense knowledge deficit” (ibid, p. 409) has offered the Brazilian military sufficient autonomy to engage more coercively than civilian leaders would have wished. As figure 2 below shows, Brazil has participated in 18 explicit and 2 implicit Chapter VII missions between 1988 and 2018 (ibid, p. 417). Duarte Villa and Jenne state that were Kenkel and Harig’s argument about norm contestation to hold, there would have been a fierce debate in the two countries on the role of coercion in peacekeeping. Such debate, however, has remained absent (ibid, p. 411). Thus, while public declarations have reinforced the traditional discourses as late as 2017, prominent figures in the military such as General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, who has served as a commander in Haiti from 2007 to 2009 and in Congo from 2013 to 2015, in his 2017 Cruz Report on improving the security of UN peacekeepers strongly support the robust approaches advocated by traditional actors – “including the use of snipers and special forces in urban areas as well as the acceptance of “collateral damage” amongst civilian populations” (ibid, p. 421). Hence, Duarte Villa and Jenne conclude, “it has been civilians’ knowledge deficit and lack of guidance that has prevented a political debate and consequently a sovereign decision about the use of force in peacekeeping” (ibid, p. 423).

Figure 2: Brazil’s and Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations according to mandate, 1988–2018



Source: Duarte Villa and Jenne, based on United Nations Security Council resolutions, retrieved from <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0>.

In sum, this section has shown that further research on the implementation and execution of Brazilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding is necessary, as there seems to be a strong divergence between

discourse and actual practices. Taking a look at the practices provides valuable insights into Brazil's aims.

The next two sections offer a closer look at two core themes of the “Brazilian way” of peacebuilding that dominate the literature – its understanding of the security-development nexus, as well as its reluctance towards the use of force and violations of state sovereignty.

3.2 Security-Development Nexus – Brazil's understanding of Peace and Security

Unlike traditional Western actors, Brazil conceives security as conditional upon and complementary to development. Without a long-term vision of sustainable development, security is unachievable. Thus, in 2011, Brazilian diplomat Antonio Patriota said:

“In general terms the UN has focused too much on the pillar of peace and security versus development. Decisions have been toward militarized solutions.... In our view, peacekeeping and peacebuilding shouldn't be sequenced, but should be dealt with together, in tandem. When dealing with a post-conflict situation, one must deal with the causes of the conflict— institutional, political, social and environmental” (Patriota, 2011).

This specific understanding of security can be traced back to Brazil's own experiences as a former colony and its severe domestic racial issues and high rates of poverty – incarnated in the Rio favelas. Brazil believes in modernization theory, according to which “developmental progress enables a social system to become more politically complex” (Call and de Coning 2017, p. 255). Hence, in its peacebuilding ventures, it prioritizes development and assistance in infrastructure, agriculture, or education. To what degree this translates into reality will be presented in the next section on the Haitian mission, yet, as Kenkel addresses, “in terms of their role in fulfilling the security pillar of the mandate established under Resolution 1542, *there is little difference between Brazilian troops' actions and those of typical robust peacebuilding*” (Kenkel 2013b, p. 101, emphasis added).

In contrast, Abdenur and De Souza Neto find that, unlike Western donors, Brazil rejects applying notions such as “failed state” or “narco-state” to Guinea-Bissau and has sought to address the multiple causes of instability beyond the mere curbing of narco-trafficking, insisting on security sector reform, social development initiatives, and the building of institutions like the reform of the Military and Police Academy (Abdenur and De Souza Neto 2014b, p. 13).

Based on a critical analysis of Brazil's security-development nexus in its domestic so-called pacification programs in 2008 (*Unidades de Policia Pacificadora*) and its foreign peacebuilding missions such as MINUSTAH, Siman and Santos offer crucial empirical insights on how Brazil's discourse translates into action, both at home and abroad. They argue that in opposition to Brazil's discourse, its operationalization reflects an understanding of security as the “militarised provision of public ‘order’ (...), [while] the production of any broader sense of ‘progress’ is permanently deferred, as the promise of a development which goes beyond relief assistance is usually rendered conditional on the elimination of certain risks” (Siman and Santos 2018, p. 63). Hence Brazil's security-development nexus is understood as the “rearticulation and (re)production of a militarised “solution” to the “problem” of (urban) violence which, one may say, is closely related to the meanings prevailing in other contemporary stabilization/ pacification missions” (ibid). This understanding converges with trends in UN stabilization missions and counter-insurgency tactics that seek to establish trust among locals through proximity, yet in reality represent a form of community-policing (ibid, p. 66). In other terms,

“stabilisation operations are not conceived to promote reconstruction and wider social transformation processes. These operations are designed to ensure a degree of calm and order, promote minimum capacities of the public authorities and generate the conditions for a modicum of economic activity until such a moment as the state in question is able and willing to resume its basic functions” (ibid).

In the case of MINUSTAH Brazil actually applied coercive force to resist violent gangs in areas such as in Port-au-Prince:

“Unlike the discourses, Brazil actually acts in a way that promotes stability and public order over social inclusion, development, and the reduction of structural violence (...) Those development/assistance projects which remain, thus, are limited in scope, focusing on the development of a minimal amount of resilience in vulnerable communities, to the expense of more expansive peace horizons. In this perspective, marginalised populations are supposed to adapt to threats and to be responsible for securing themselves” (ibid, p. 75).

3.3 Normative intervention dilemmas: Responsibility while Protecting and the non-use of force

Undoubtedly, Brazil’s reserved stance on R2P in the wake of the Libyan NATO intervention in 2011 has preoccupied academics, questioning Brazil’s stance on interventionism and global responsibility in cases of grave human rights abuses. As this section illustrates, most scholars have concluded that deeming Brazil a norm-contester is too simplistic. Rather than contesting the substance of the norms, Brazil opposes the hierarchical, coercive, non-consensual processes by which the norms are translated into practice (Kenkel 2012, Harig and Kenkel 2017, Tourinho 2015).

Historically, up until the Cold War, Brazil has welcomed US interventions in Latin America to a certain degree, as it was struggling to prevent European intermeddling. Yet, in the context of the Cold War and the advance of decolonization, Brazil’s stance shifted as it began to support the non-aligned movement. This general reluctance to intervene has since guided Brazil’s actions within the UN collective security architecture, where Brazil is said to have initially shown a posture of non-engagement in cases such as Kosovo, Darfur, or Libya, followed by timid, and finally “responsible engagement” – that is tolerating the use of force only to protect civilians (Hamann Passarelli and Gabrielsen Jumbert 2020, p. 154). Hence, one can recognize an evolution of Brazil’s stance on the use of force, as it is seeking prominence and recognition while simultaneously trying to commit to its longstanding traditions of non-intervention and peaceful conflict resolution.

While Brazil might, therefore, appear an ambiguous foreign policy actor, Harig and Kenkel have maintained that “the basic evaluation criteria leading to assessments of inconsistency and ambiguity reflect the perspectives and interests of established powers and thus create misleading perceptions of rising powers” (Harig and Kenkel 2017, p. 625). They add that traditional powers, unlike emerging powers, are more focused on creating effective decision-making bodies and procedures. Rising powers tend to prioritize aspects of legitimacy and representativeness. Hence, Brazil’s intervention rationale has to be viewed “within the fluid context of continuous contestation, fluctuating meaning and non-linearity” (ibid, p. 629). Similarly, Kenkel and Destradi maintain that

“Reluctance is not outright rejection and resistance. It is more ambivalent, and the hesitation dimension reveals that reluctance can be the result of the tension between a principled belief in the justificatory dimension of norms and a rejection of some of their applicatory aspects — as well as of the very process of responsibility attribution” (Kenkel and Destradi 2019).

Agreeing with Kenkel, Harig, and Destradi, Tourinho further notes that Brazil considers itself and is seen as a rather Western country, especially in comparison to other emerging powers such as China or India or the Arab monarchies, yet it remains “evidently ‘non-Western’ when considered in contrast with the ‘global’ manifestations of the Anglo-Saxon empire such as Australia or Canada” (Tourinho 2015, p. 79).

In 2005, the World Summit Outcome Document established the principle of R2P, which calls upon the UNSC to mandate member states to intervene militarily to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Brazil was a strong supporter of including the four crimes into the document in 2005 (ibid), as Brazilian diplomats began to support the Protection of Civilians (PoC) doctrine. However, in the wake of the 2011 Libyan intervention, many countries, including the BRICS, critiqued the extensive operationalization of the UNSC Resolution 1973 mandate (Pattison 2016, p. 104). Hence, in November 2011, Brazil forwarded a “conceptual note” entitled “Responsibility While Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion of a Concept” to the UNSC, which proposed “an additional conceptual step” and “a new perspective” on the third

pillar of R2P (ibid, p. 105). RwP contained three central principles guiding the application of R2P: First, “A strict line of political subordination and chronological sequencing” should assure that pillars one and two of R2P (primary state responsibility and the development of cooperation measures to help in prevention) would have to fail before pillar three could be executed. Second, the use of force should be “judicious, proportionate and limited to the objectives established by the Security Council” and “enhanced Security Council procedures” should be established for monitoring purposes. Third, “the use of force must produce as little violence and instability as possible and under no circumstance can it generate more harm than it was authorized to prevent” (ibid, p. 106). Some have argued that the motivation behind RwP was to prevent R2P from being a license to intervene (Hamann Passarelli and Muggah 2013), or to create unity and serve as a bridge between R2P proponents and opponents (Kenkel and Stefan 2016), thereby supporting the view that RwP “is a clear and direct engagement, and in many ways also an acknowledgment, of R2P” (Hamann Passarelli and Gabrielsen Jumbert 2020, p. 165). In contrast, others have directed fierce critique at Brazil’s restrictive approach. Central issues concerned the chronological sequencing which places sovereignty over human rights, hence posing a risk to a timely response in case of humanitarian disasters, as well as the moral question of why the use of force should require a universal template (Pattison 2016, p. 108). Randall Schweller has gone so far as to call Brazil “the rising spoiler” (Schweller 2011, p. 293). Most, however, agree that Brazil’s concept of RwP has so far failed to materialize: It has remained too vague, faced opposition from great powers, and the domestic change in Brazil’s political landscape has shifted its priorities elsewhere (Pattison 2016, p. 97). To conclude, Brazil’s stance on R2P/RwP alerts that

”even in cases falling under the third pillar, where the Security Council’s authorization is fundamental, it is necessary that the international community observes a certain discipline because it is not acceptable that someone intervenes militarily to protect civilians and causes greater vulnerability to civilians than what existed before, like what happened in Libya” (Hamann Passarelli and Gabrielsen Jumbert 2020, p. 167).

3.4 Brazil in its Caribbean proximity and in Sub-Saharan Africa

Having portrayed the core characteristics of the Brazilian way of peacebuilding, this section synthesizes research on Brazilian peacebuilding missions in Haiti, on the one hand, and Sub-Saharan Africa, more specifically Guinea-Bissau, on the other. In doing so, it compares the previously discussed Brazilian discourse with what we know of Brazil’s actual practice on the ground. Haiti has been Brazil’s longest mission (2004-2017), thus much has been written about it, which enables to deduct a detailed image. Analysis of African missions remains rather limited. Nonetheless, a focus on the African continent seems relevant, as Brazilian development cooperation and technical assistance to African countries have increased significantly under the Lula administration. In particular, a few scholars have juxtaposed the two missions in Haiti and in Guinea-Bissau, arguing that the former was a stabilization mission and should be considered peace enforcement, whereas the latter has proven to be closest to the concept of peacebuilding (Abdenur and De Souza Neto 2017b).

Haiti – a peacebuilding laboratory?

The engagement in Haiti represents Brazil’s longest and most intensive intervention. Although Brazil has not led the UN mission, over the span of 12 years – from 2004 until 2017 – eleven Brazilian Generals have commanded MINUSTAH’s military contingents, a role that seems surprising, given Brazil’s non-coercive peacebuilding discourse.

While MINUSTAH was established through UNSC Resolution 1542 on April 30, 2004, Haiti had been suffering from chronic instability since the first democratic elections in the 1990s and it had also been subject to prior UN missions under the leadership of the USA, France, and Canada (Beauvoir 2017). In 2004, shortly following the coup against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the UNSC set up MINUSTAH, with the aim “of facilitating humanitarian assistance, providing support

to the Haitian police and Coast Guard and to establish and maintain public safety and law and order and to promote and protect human rights” (Parra 2019, p. 489). However, the Haitian scenario was unfamiliar to Brazil, which was neither facing a conventional war, nor a UN mandate supported by a peace agreement (ibid, p. 481). Rather, a complex insurgent scenario with violent urban gangs, amongst other, were destabilizing Haiti’s governing institutions. Thus, the mandate focused on the axes of security, reconciliation and development (De Paula 2019, p. 56).

Why did Brazil participate given such circumstances? There is wide agreement that Brazil perceived the Haitian mission as the perfect opportunity to leverage itself and prove that it had the potential to become a global power as part of the current liberal order. For example, Chancellor Amorim stated

“Brazil was experiencing excellent international projection and this was an opportunity (...). Hitherto, actions in Haiti had been led by the major powers, usually the United States...But no Latin American country or specifically a South American country had ever led such an operation. The U.S. difficulty in engaging militarily created the opportunity for Brazil and other South American countries to participate” (in: Beauvoir 2017, p. 4).

Sotomayor Velazquez reflects this rationale, adding that besides its aspiration to “demonstrate that it possessed sufficient leadership skills to be considered a so-called global player or emerging power (...) in other words (...) to redefine its global identity” (Sotomayor 2013, p. 54), Brazil sought to improve inter-bureaucratic cooperation, and saw a “valuable opportunity for reform of an anachronistic military institution” (ibid). As the table below illustrates (Kenkel 2010, p. 590), Latin American countries made up a large part of MINUSTAH contingents, with Brazil serving as the largest troop-contributing country.

Table 3: South American contributors to MINUSTAH, 30 June 2010

Country	Troops
Argentina	710
Brazil	2,187
Chile	510
Ecuador	71
Guatemala	148
Paraguay	31
Uruguay	1,131
Total South America	5,506
Total MINUSTAH	11,578
South America % of MINUSTAH	48
Brazil % of MINUSTAH	19
Brazil % of South American TCCs	39

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Ranking of Military of Police Contributions to UN Operations’, 30 June 2010, at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/june10_1.pdf. Participation in the police pillar of the operation by Latin American states is considerably less.

Kenkel highlights,

“This dominance within the operation gives the South American nations the ability to use MINUSTAH as a stage to implement several distinctive and often innovative homegrown elements of peacebuilding. These elements include: a marked initial reluctance to use force, coupled with its judicious and successful use when unavoidable; a focus on sustainable development projects based on bilateral involvement often using technologies developed in the sending country; contextually coordinated action among TCCs [troop-contributing countries] not members of an alliance that would otherwise automatically provide this

integration; and the close contact of the military contingents with the local population, including through programme delivery” (ibid, p. 589).

Yet, how did this opportunity manifest in practice? Beauvoir describes that Brazil presented its activities as “active solidarity” (Beauvoir 2017, p. 6) within a post-colonial setting. It appeared as a partner that faces similar challenges as Haiti, with slums, high unemployment, and a focus on long-term development projects. 60% of the troops deployed in the Maré Favela in Brazil were also present in Haiti (ibid, p. 7). However, in reality, the Brazilian leadership of MINUSTAH was called upon by France and other Western states, and was meant to hide accusations that Western traditional peacebuilding was hegemonic (ibid, p. 9).

The mission’s first two years were accompanied by immense challenges, especially due to the lack of experience of South American actors in UN Chapter VII missions, in addition to the special environment of Haiti, where regular Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration programs have failed to address the issues at stake (Braga 2010, p. 713). Braga mentions several particular challenges: the quantitatively poor troop contingent, pressure from human rights organizations against the use of force, as well as the pure fact that the UN, supporting the Transitional Government of Haiti and the Haiti National Police, were not acting neutrally. He, therefore, concludes that “in its first two years, MINUSTAH tended to engage more in peace enforcement than in classic peacekeeping” (ibid, p. 715). As Parra mentions, “the absence of a transitional process created a security first approach” (Parra 2019, p. 495) which meant that the local population did not perceive MINUSTAH as a legitimate operation. Especially post-2010, following the earthquake that marked the beginning of the humanitarian crisis, many Haitian locals were disappointed in the lack of support they received from the international community.

Addressing Brazil’s involvement from a geopolitical perspective, Müller and Steinke argue that MINUSTAH’s “nation-branding” strategy undermined a successful sustainable peacebuilding mission. Each actor followed their geopolitical interests. “Brazil’s geopolitical ambitions fit those of Northern actors” (Müller and Steinke 2020) – more local ownership, fewer costs, and increased legitimacy. With the USA being occupied with the “War on Terror,” Brazil’s engagement “was marked by a substantial degree of autonomy, power, and agency as well as geopolitical reasoning” (ibid, p. 63). Thus, even if Brazilian NGOs such as *Viva Rio* worked on community violence reduction on the ground, this occurred in close collaboration with and following “military logics” (ibid, p. 68). Müller and Steinke conclude that MINUSTAH exemplifies the continued power asymmetries between traditional and emerging actors: “There are no visible representatives. But that is a strategy. Those who make the decisions, who control, are the Canadians, the French, the Americans. Not soldiers, but strategists. The visible one is Brazil” (ibid, p. 75). Yet, according to Nieto, Brazil still perceives itself engaged in a win-win situation, arguing that, amongst others, the proliferation of national pride is a core aim of Brazilian multilateral peacebuilding contribution, quoting a Canadian Colonel: “[I]t seems clear that Haiti has become part of Brazilian nationalism; it is utilized, for lack of a better word, to showcase Brazil as a growing global power” (Nieto 2012, p. 169).

The implementation of MINUSTAH has to be understood in the context of a so-called “robust turn” in UN peacekeeping: Short-term stabilization missions are supposed to prevent further conflict escalation, all without deep long-term commitments. Harig contends that MINUSTAH has proven how Brazil is seeking to re-import this robust approach and apply it to its internal pacification programs, which currently remain outside of the military’s domain. In Haiti, he argues, “Brazilian troops were accused of acting disproportionately and engaging in targeted killings of gang leaders” (Harig 2019, p. 141) which had delegitimized Brazil in the eyes of locals. Harig’s central claim is that

“[MINUSTAH] served to legitimise the deployment of the armed forces in the context of urban violence, created high levels of frustration among participating troops and propelled calls for a more coercive posture in internal missions” (ibid, p. 150).

He shows that it is the coercive nature of MINUSTAH – a mission located within the UN framework – that causes Brazilian militaries to remedy their restricted competencies in their national territory. Thus, participating in a UN mission does echo nationally, and has enhanced a robust turn within the thinking of Brazilian Generals, such as General dos Santos Cruz, a former commander in Haiti and Congo, and supporter of the use of overwhelming force to protect peacekeepers (ibid, p. 151).

Before turning to the case of Guinea-Bissau, it is relevant to mention two critical scholars, who provide some more abstract theoretical perspectives and explanations concerning Brazilian actions in Haiti.

Gomes, applying a constructivist lens, argues that “debates regarding emerging power interventionism are mostly based on traditional, and still hegemonic, ontologies and epistemologies” (Gomes 2016, p. 854). She asserts that one should understand

“participation in MINUSTAH as a foreign policy practice that acts to reinforce and stabilize a specific representation of the Brazilian self, placed at the time under threat in face of the ambiguities and contradictions related to Brazil’s “internal Haitis” (...) [T]hrough the making of foreign policy (that) Brazil has tried to re-inscribe a specific conception of the Brazilian self – which is historically perceived as integrationist, with a conciliatory nature when dealing with difference, war averse, and that tends to settle peacefully its disputes” (ibid, p. 856, 866).

Similarly, in their analysis, Moreno et al. highlight

“the hybridism and ambivalence of all [both neo-colonial and post-colonial] identities. The recognition of this condition provides new analytical lenses through which one can see the multiple improvisations and negotiations inherent in the encounters between the liberal peace operation model and its multinational agents” (Moreno et al. 2012, p. 388).

In sum, while Brazil does to some extent “challenge the notion that holds stabilization as a separate – and even rival – endeavor within the wider efforts of peacebuilding” (Napoleão and Kalil 2015, p. 92). MINUSTAH has illustrated the stark contrast that remains and the challenges that Brazil has faced in implementing its developmental, non-coercive discourse of peacebuilding, as well as the domestic repercussions on civil-military relations.

Brazilian peacebuilding in Africa and the case of Guinea-Bissau

Brazil’s multilateral cooperation with Africa – through the UN, African Union (AU), and Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP) – has starkly increased over the past two decades. Brazil has articulated its regional focus – the South Atlantic -, as shown by its activities in Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, or South Sudan. Brazil has primarily specialized on economic trade and development aspects, hence “[its] involvement with African security issues is still piecemeal and occurring primarily through indirect channels” (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2014a, p. 1). Its contributions to UN Peacekeeping missions have not included troops, but mostly observers supporting and training police and security forces or monitoring electronic voting procedures in unstable countries. Much of the literature agrees that Brazil is widely perceived by African states as a consensus builder between the different states, an arms exporter, and a cooperation partner for new security threats. In contrast, scholars often describe Brazil as following a “culturalist discourse” (ibid) of Southern solidarity.

According to former Brazilian Ambassador José Vicente de Sá Pimentel this is only one of the two schools of thought that exist with regard to visions on Africa-Brazil relations. As Nieto indicated, opinions amongst Brazilians are divided: While so-called *Nostalgicos* feel that Brazil carries a responsibility towards Africa, so-called *Catastrofistas* believe that Brazil does not and should not play a role in African conflicts and instability (Nieto 2012). During his presidency, President Lula clearly showed a strong will to expand Brazil’s footprint in Africa, and the opening of 17 new embassies in Africa reflects the political relevance Brazil ascribes to the continent (Kenkel 2013a).

A concern, however, exists that as trade relations and Brazil's presence increases, so will the exposure of ex-patriates to threats (Abdenur and de Souza Neto. 2014c, p. 58). In addition, "[g]iven the recent growth in trans-Atlantic smuggling of drugs, Brazil is interested in collaborating with African countries to stem the flow of illicit goods" (ibid, p. 65). With regards to its involvement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, "[w]hile Brazil has recognized the importance of peacekeeping missions, as in the case of the DR Congo, it has stressed that the military component of the UN Mission must be part of a broad political strategy leading to dialogue and peace" (ibid, p. 62). Moreover, Brazil has predominantly supported African states which have suffered chronic instability, in two areas: The first is assistance in holding democratic elections, and the provision of electronic voting equipment to Angola, Mozambique, Tunisia, and Guinea-Bissau where Brazil has taken over the UNPBC leadership in 2007 (ibid, p. 69). Second, it has trained security and police forces, especially in the case of Guinea-Bissau, where it has filled the void of Western actors that have left the field (Abdenur and de Souza Neto 2014b, p. 13). Despite its observer status at the AU, Brazil has had limited interactions with the AU's Peace and Security Council (ibid). A peculiarity is that Brazil does not apply labels such as "failed" or "fragile" to states, as it believes such categories serve as a pretext for interventionism (Abdenur 2017b).

Fernández and Da Silva Gama argue that Brazil has to be seen neither as a "child" nor an "adult," but instead a teenager with better local knowledge on Africa than Europeans and that it does not contest the liberal order yet differentiates itself from traditional donors by its unconditional assistance (Fernández and Da Silva Gama 2016, p. 75). In addition, Brazil perceives African instability as exogeneous and shares the lessons of its democratization with recipient countries. Thus, they conclude that

"Brazil has a privileged kind of knowledge towards Africa – one that, on the one hand, standardizes African states and societies into a single knowable whole called "Africa". On the other hand, this "Africa" is knowable because it represents part of another totalizing, standardized entity (called "Brazil"), which would amount to an identifiable similarity" (ibid).

Zooming in on the Guinea-Bissau case, concrete empirical research remains limited, aside from two peer-reviewed articles published by Abdenur and Neto (Abdenur 2017b, Abdenur and De Souza Neto 2014b). Abdenur argues that while South-South cooperation is often said to take place in "bubbles," and to overemphasize infrastructure at the expense of political reforms, the case of Guinea-Bissau proves – to some extent – the contrary: Abdenur mentions the project between the Brazilian government and SENAI (National Service for Industrial Learning), a Brazilian non-profit association, that has built an educational training center in Bissau offering classes in various domains (carpentry, computer maintenance, construction etc.) for free (Abdenur 2017a).

Photo 1: Centro de formação profissional Brasil-Guiné-Bissau.



Source: <https://igarape.org.br/en/brazilian-south-south-cooperation-in-guinea-bissau/> [last accessed April 29, 2021].

She argues that

“social technologies (adapted to local demands and context) help assure the proper use of the space and the quality of capacity-building. In contrast, for instance, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and a variety of donor countries also support Bissau-Guinean police training but lack dedicated installations, which forces them to rent spaces that are not adequately equipped—and that thus constrain the range of activities undertaken” (ibid).

Thus, Brazilian bilateral technical cooperation in Guinea-Bissau, considering the multidimensional drivers of the conflict, “reflects a somewhat different emphasis than the approach promoted by actors that have concentrated more narrowly on curbing the drug trade” (Abdenur 2014b, p. 1). However, Abdenur also repeatedly emphasizes Brazil’s efforts to prioritize development over securitization. She highlights that “Brazil’s biggest technical cooperation project in Guinea-Bissau involves the establishment of a police and security forces training center, part of a broader effort to help professionalize Guinea-Bissau’s police forces and separate their functions from those of the country’s powerful military” (Abdenur 2017b, p. 467). At the multilateral level, Brazil has led the multilateral Peacebuilding Commission Country-Specific Configuration for Guinea-Bissau, where it has integrated the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the prevention of coups in Guinea-Bissau (Call and Abdenur 2017, p. 12). Yet, most of the reforms have focused on security sector reform and combating the flow of drugs and illicit goods, rather than sustainable development initiatives (Abdenur 2017b, p. 469). On an organizational level, Abdenur highlights that a lack of Brazilian coordination with UN efforts represents a key challenge to successful South-South cooperation (ibid).

To conclude, drawing a comparison between Haiti and Guinea-Bissau is difficult, given the lack of scholarly inquiry on the concrete implementation of Brazil’s missions in African countries. In both cases, however, Brazil maintains similar discourses of Southern solidarity, which diverge from the experiences and activities on the ground. Sustainable results have remained limited up until today: Haiti experienced violent protests following the murder of a lawyer in August 2020 (United Nations 2020a). Guinea-Bissau, where the UN-led peacekeeping mission has come to an end in December 2020, still faces severe political instability and requires international actors to facilitate the implementation of the Conakry Agreement (United Nations 2020b). In terms of coerciveness, however, while Brazil acted coercively in Haiti, it has had a less coercive approach in Guinea-

Bissau. Overall, this makes it hard to speak of a “Brazilian way of peacebuilding.” Both, a cross-case comparison, and a comparison between Brazilian and traditional actors merit further study, especially in view of recognizing the limits of liberal peacekeeping. As Kocadal illustrates, emerging powers do tend to mimic liberal peacekeeping, even if they oppose it in discourse (Kocadal 2019). While a more robust judgment in this regard requires the study of further Brazilian interventions, it can be hypothesized that Brazil’s approach will be highly context-dependent, yet driven by its own security concerns.

3.5. *Debating successes, failures, and the future*

Before concluding it is worth to synthesize the main results and reception of Brazil’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding endeavors, and to assess the future directions that this Brazilian engagement may take. MINUSTAH is largely perceived as a success story in public political and scholarly discourse, mainly because of the particular style of “Brazilian peacebuilding” that has accompanied the mission. In 2010, Kenkel writes:

“The degree of policy coordination, training quality, political support and accompanying bilateral investment connected to MINUSTAH is a distinct novelty in the region. These efforts have helped to give MINUSTAH the feel of a South American mission and have contributed significantly to both mission effectiveness in Haiti and political cooperation in the region (...) [adding that] the success of the burgeoning South American model encourages its further refinement as a possible counterpoise to the liberal peacebuilding model” (Kenkel 2010, p. 590).

Similarly, Braga argues that MINUSTAH has achieved several successes, amongst which the so-called “strong point” areas in which permanent military presence managed to control gang violence, the operation variety which included activities from patrolling to checkpoints to the protection of humanitarian convoys to the provision of security in day to day affairs such as carnival festivities of football matches as well as joint operations with the Haitian National Police and UN Police, and finally the high cooperation and involvement of Brazilian civil, military and governmental, and non-governmental actors (Nieto 2012, p. 169). Moreover, Nieto mentions that so-called “Immediate Impact Projects” enabled quick recovery from the damage that combat operations had produced in the respective neighbourhoods (Nieto 2012, p. 169).

Yet, a big critique has stemmed from the UN’s impartiality, as Resolution 1542 recognized the Transitional Government of Haiti: “Indeed, MINUSTAH came to be regarded as a sort of peace enforcer as well as tacit protector of the new, unconstitutional regime” (ibid, p. 170). In addition, following the earthquake in 2010, many locals had begun to question the effectiveness of the UN’s presence. As Nieto highlights, “[t]he 2010 earthquake on the island arguably showed that, six years into the mission, the Haitian government is still unable to care for its own population and still has to rely on this international mission to impose some kind of order” (ibid, p. 169).

Following 2017, despite being more stable, Haiti is still far from having reached long-term political and economic stability and societal peace. In light of the stabilization tendency and strong military presence in Haiti, which has caused a militarization and securitization of Brazilian public security, Hirst and Nasser point out that “abroad and at home, the Brazilian Armed Forces may be a central resource to deal with and contain eruptions of violence, but they cannot address the broader factors that cause insecurity” (Hirst and Nasser 2014, p. 8).

Although making predictions about future Brazilian engagements and their impact on the international peacebuilding exercise remains unclear, scholars tend to agree that “absent specific conditions conducive to Brazilian foreign policy aims, the country will not maintain current contribution levels to UN missions as a fixed commitment” (Kenkel 2013b, p. 103). In addition to, “[t]he low degree of institutionalization and questionable commitment of the state to these recent initiatives [that] make[s] their sustainability unclear” (Abdenur and Call 2017, p. 34), the changes and challenges Brazil has been facing since the recession in 2014 make it hard to predict what the

future will carry. Nonetheless, Kenkel states that, as Brazilian influence increases, it may face critiques that view its missions “too closely supporting a US hegemonic agenda” (Kenkel 2010, p. 592).

4 Conclusion and outlook

4.1 *Brief recapitulation: The fallacies of stigmatizing a “Brazilian way of peace”*

This literature review has sought to provide a comprehensive overview of the motivations, operationalization, and implications of Brazil’s participation in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Specifically, the review has aimed to decipher in what way the notion of a “Brazilian way” – characterized by a reluctance to use military force, non-conditionality, horizontality, and long-term development – is justified when considering Brazilian practices on the ground (in Haiti and in Africa), and in what way this “Brazilian approach” can be considered more or less coercive compared to traditional, Western-dominated peacebuilding. As shown, providing a universal answer to this question is difficult, given the multiplicity of factors and perspectives that come into play. Nonetheless, as the Haitian case study has illustrated, Brazil’s engagements are guided by an overall ambition to attain status, reputation, and a place in the club of the leaders of the liberal international order. Rather than querying the content of norms such as R2P, Brazil’s RWP initiative following the March 2011 NATO-led Libyan intervention seeks to challenge the *hierarchical processes* in which such interventions operate. The case study of Haiti has further demonstrated that although Brazilian commanders have encouraged sustainable development projects as showcased by the Guinea-Bissau mission, they have not been reluctant to apply force to stabilize the situation, hence welcoming the robust turn towards stabilization within the UN. Finally, casting a facts-based empirical judgment on the level of coerciveness applied requires scholars to study the operationalization of Brazilian peace encounters in Africa in more depth.

All of the above might highlight that, in practice, it is not (non)coerciveness per se that characterizes Brazilian peacebuilding missions, but 1) the historic and cultural identities determining the relations between donors and recipients, 2) the recipient’s prioritization by the international community, as well as 3) Brazil’s ambitions in the international power hierarchy: The degree of coercion present in Brazilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding is relative and context-dependent, and depends on the individual actor casting the judgment – whether that be a Haitian local, a Brazilian diplomat, a Brazilian national, or traditional peacebuilding actors which perceive the rise of emerging powers as a challenge. If the international community does not prioritize Brazil’s development efforts, as shown in the Guinea-Bissau case, Brazil cannot translate its ideas into practice. Given Brazil’s ambition of attaining a power status among the international community, it is evident that it will present itself as a benevolent actor by leveraging its soft power and history and distinguishing itself from the traditional liberal peace paradigm.

4.2 *Further questions and future research trajectories*

Several relevant points need further inquiry to fully comprehend the repercussions of the Brazilian “rise” and “way” in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

1) First, as the above review has illustrated, the literature on Brazil as a global actor is predominantly grounded on an analysis that strictly separates Brazilian domestic politics from Brazilian foreign policy ambitions and practices (Gomes 2016). Especially when seeking to comprehend a state’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, however, a thorough look at the domestic dynamics is inevitable. For example, while most scholars do mention Brazil’s approach to be grounded in its pacifist domestic constitutional principles, the increasingly coercive and militarist dynamics structuring its public security apparatus stand in strong contradiction to its externally projected image. In addition, Brazil is often presented as an actor opposed to the liberal peacebuilding paradigm that has dominated Western peacebuilding practices as endorsed by the UN and other global players such as the USA and the UK. While liberal peace has, over recent years, been

critiqued for its coercive, top-down approach, Brazilian peacebuilding is often portrayed in a way that lets one believe that Brazil treats citizens abroad better than it cares for its own people. Hence, taking a closer look at how the Brazilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda is perceived both domestically and among recipient governments and citizens is necessary to assess the “real” legitimacy and support that Brazil enjoys amongst its citizens and those receiving Brazil’s aid.

2) In line with the first point, the second question concerns the impact of peacekeeping missions abroad on civil-military relations at home. Many scholars agree that civil-military relations can pose a threat to peace when the military dominates the civilian sphere: For example, Cunliffe argues that peacekeeping encourages military coups in the troop-contributing countries (Cunliffe 2018), Dwyer contends that peacekeeping may trigger military mutinies (Dwyer 2015), and Sotomayor in his book puts forward that some countries may instrumentally make use of peacekeeping opportunities to broaden the military’s role in domestic public security affairs (Sotomayor 2013). Thus, there are ambiguities, especially because the military considers itself to be Brazil’s “guardian of the nation” (Harig 2019, p. 139). Kenkel highlights that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military “remain highly independent and produce policy preferences in isolation, on the basis of divergent criteria and motivations” (Duarte Villa and Jenne 2020, p. 425). Hence, focusing on the impacts of civil-military relations and robustness of peacekeeping operations to potentially determine causal directions would be helpful, especially when it comes to comparing Brazil with other nations, or learning lessons that could ameliorate the cohesion of UN missions.

3) Lastly, although some critical scholars have touched upon a holistic analysis of the international system and how the latter impacts Brazil’s motivations and its conception of peacebuilding, a more detailed systemic analysis is needed, linked to questions of status-seeking powers and their impact on the liberal international order that has experienced a rise and diversification of non-violent coercion. For example, De Paula, raising the question of whether Brazil’s non-indifference approach reflects the gendered power hierarchies in international politics or whether it is part of a “geopolitics as usual,” argues that “the process through which states pursue a ‘significant position’ in international politics is fundamentally gendered, limiting the space for the implementation of feminist diplomatic agendas” (De Paula 2019, p. 48). The “Brazilian way,” which is characterized by the promotion of less hierarchy and conditionality, and can be termed a feminist foreign policy agenda, thus creates an obstacle for “potential aspirants to the great power club [since] (...) the criteria for membership may militate against them” (ibid, p. 54). Her conclusion is that “some of the obstacles to the making of a world in which solidarity can be ranked as a quality of those who seek recognition, voice and power lie in established conditions of intelligibility through which different identities have been recognized as ‘appropriate’ in relation to particular positions and roles in the system” (ibid, p. 60). This hints to a systemic predisposition that may hinder Brazil to act non-coercively. Such theoretical analysis, however, cannot prosper without sound empirical studies engaging with the actual practice of Brazilian activities abroad. This requires more thorough empirical investigations of Brazil’s peace operations, including their implementation on the ground, and how they are perceived by local actors at home and abroad.

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