

## Excessive use of deadly force by police in the Philippines before Duterte

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## EXCESSIVE USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY POLICE IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE DUTERTE

**Abstract:** Under President Duterte the Philippine National Police have killed several thousand suspects in so-called legitimate encounters. While this has engendered much media attention and scientific research, earlier police violence is still a black-box in many respects. This article provides at least a partial filling of this void. It establishes several indicators for measuring lethal police violence. Moreover, it presents a detailed mapping of regional and sub-regional patterns of armed police encounters for the decade from 2006 to 2015. The spatial and temporal comparisons show that even though actual levels of deadly police violence have been quite low in several Philippine provinces and cities, the Philippine National Police almost always shot to kill suspects and not to incapacitate them. While there was significant variation over time and between sub-national units, neither the magnitude nor the levels of lethality of the violence are related to the threat levels to which the police officers were exposed.

**Key words:** extra-legal killing, extra-judicial execution, fatal police violence, police vigilantism

Since Rodrigo Duterte became President of the Philippines on June 30, 2016 the Philippines have made global headlines for waging a relentless war on drugs that has cost the lives of several thousand people. One prominent segment of this campaign has been the active involvement of the Philippine National Police (PNP), who killed more than 3,000 people in the first year of the Duterte presidency in the context of so-called legitimate encounters under the pretext of self-defence.

Although lethal police violence under Duterte has engendered a significant amount of research, police practices in the past have remained woefully under-researched. Currently, we neither know how many civilians have been killed and wounded by the police nor do we know the extent and patterns of sub-national and temporal variation of such killings. Lacking appropriate data, it is also impossible to compare the Philippines with other countries.

This article introduces a new [dataset](https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8JXQCG) [https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8JXQCG] that fills this void. It presents the first results of a mapping of fatal and non-fatal police violence in the context of “legitimate” armed encounters between the PNP and

suspected criminals in 43 sub-regional units for the last decade of Philippine “normalcy” from 2006 to 2015.

This makes it possible to assess the validity of explanations provided by existing studies on Philippine police violence that draw on and generalise from qualitative knowledge of a small number of prominent cases of Duterte and pre-Duterte police violence. These studies explain fatal police violence through generalised patterns such as organisational culture, a fit between police practice and public expectations and norms that view fatal police violence as an acceptable “form of informal or street punishment for breaking the law” in the light of a “dysfunctional criminal justice system,” or as an integral part of the everyday practice of a “police force accustomed to extortion and execution” (Coronel 2017, 187, 189). Others focus on the current killings of criminals as a specific “spectacle of violence” (Reyes 2016, 111) or “penal populism” (Curato 2016, 91), anchoring fatal violence against suspected criminals in practices and cultural expectations of social control that exclude criminals from the community and consequently from state protection in a way similar to the “homo sacer” in ancient Roman law (Reyes 2016).

The almost exclusive focus on prominent cases does not permit assessment of whether these are representative of or aberrations from general patterns. As will be shown below, there has always been a huge variation in levels of police violence between sub-national units and within units over time that clearly limits the utility of relying on prominent cases. If general patterns – such as organisational culture – are to explain fatal police violence, they must be able to account for spatial and temporal variation.

This study argues that the hard data on state-perpetrated violence that targets suspected criminals in the Philippines is still too insufficient to allow for a causal

analysis of factors that either inhibit or encourage such killings. In this respect, the Philippines is no exception in international comparisons. Except for a small number of countries, scientific knowledge about the particular practice at state or sub-state levels is almost non-existent (Osse and Cano 2017).

Consequently, this article takes a step backwards. Instead of searching for causes of current and past fatal police violence, it confines itself to establishing a fairly detailed mapping of such fatal (and non-fatal) police violence for 26 provinces (Regions 3, 4a, 4b, 7, 10) and the 17 component parts of the National Capital Region (NCR) of the Philippines for the decade from 2006 to 2015. Chosen were regions with extraordinarily high and low levels of killings by the police during the first year of the Duterte presidency (based on the ABS-CBN dataset). Independent cities that are economically tightly linked to the neighbouring province or serve as the provinces' seats of government are included in the respective data for the provinces. The data were established through extensive online media search. Sources are from 27 national broadsheets and 38 regional and local news-outlets. Other datasets established by Fatal Encounters and the Washington Post on deadly police violence in the United States attest that such detailed online analysis of newspaper accounts provide a rather comprehensive picture of the actual situation. Reliability of the data is further supported by a comparison with the only available Philippine source, the news reports of the Bulacan provincial police. Our search netted 38 cases for 2015, only 2 short of the 40 reported by the Bulacan provincial police (minus 5%; Bulacanpnp nd).

The dataset establishes not only the number of encounters, of suspects killed and wounded for all encounters with the police, but also the corresponding numbers of police officers who became victims. It first operationalises three dimensions of police violence: its magnitude, the threat level experienced by the police and the lethality of

encounters. Following this, the spatial and temporal patterns of pre-Duterte police shoot-outs will be discussed for the regional and sub-regional units encompassed in the dataset with respect to the three dimensions mentioned above. This provides answers to several hitherto open questions: How prevalent and uniform was fatal police violence in pre-Duterte Philippines? To what extent can the police legitimately argue that they killed in self-defence? What kind of temporal variation can be observed among the units involved?

Throughout the paper the data established for the Philippines will be compared with the United States, Brazil, Mexico and Jamaica to allow a rough ranking of the “normal” pre-Duterte police practice in the Philippines.<sup>1</sup>

## **MEASURING EXCESSIVE LETHAL POLICE VIOLENCE**

Any effort at establishing the extent to which lethal police violence is excessive has to differentiate between real self-defence, encounters, in which violence may have been excessive but was not employed intentionally in order to kill the suspects but to avert a subjectively perceived imminent threat (putative self-defence), and targeted killings.

In the absence of trustworthy post-incident investigations, precise attribution of individual cases to these categories must remain the exception to the rule. However, given a sufficient number of cases, indicators can be established, through which legitimate use of force can be differentiated from targeted killings. They are derived from the legal framework legitimizing the application of force by the police worldwide. In the Philippines these are spelled out in the Philippine Police Manual:

During an armed confrontation, only such necessary and reasonable force should be applied as would be sufficient to overcome resistance put up by the offender; subdue the clear and imminent danger posed by him; or to justify the force/act under the principles of self defense, defense of relative, or defense of stranger.... The excessive use of force is prohibited. The use of weapon is justified if the suspect poses imminent danger of causing death or injury to the police officer or other persons.... Moreover, unlawful aggression should be present for self-defense to be considered as justifying circumstance (PNP 2010, 3).

Surprisingly, there are no established scales for differentiating legitimate use of deadly force from excessive violence. The most systematic effort in this direction is Chevigny's (1990, 1991, 1995) work on police deadly force in Jamaica, Brazil and Argentina. Chevigny proposed several indicators for establishing whether use of deadly force by the police has been excessive. Except for a recent study on Mexico by Correa, Forné and Rivas (2015) there have been hardly any efforts to follow the path towards the establishment of such an empirical foundation for intra- and international comparative research on police violence. Thus, both the development of indicators and the analysis of the Philippine cases must be understood as an exploration of a woefully under-researched field and as aimed at encouraging more research. In the following section, two indicators will be established for each of the three dimensions of magnitude, perceived threat and lethality.

### **Magnitude of lethal force used by police**

A straightforward measurement of the magnitude of the killing of suspects in police encounters is the number of suspects killed per million population by on-duty police officers. This scale parallels the common international measurement that is used to establish the severity of crime.

To better reflect the nature of the environment in which police officers operate it is sensible to relate lethal police violence to levels of criminal violence. This ratio of suspects killed to criminal killings, in other words murder and intentional homicide, provides a second denominator for the magnitude of killings by the police. It takes account of the probable effect of variations of the perceived threat level of the environment in which police officers operate.

### **Establishing the link between application of force and threat level**

While criminal killings per million population are a first indicator of the abstract threat to which on-duty police officers are exposed, a more direct indicator of perceived threat is the extent to which members of the police force have been victims in such encounters (Parent 2006; Jacobs and O'Brian 1998). This indicator assumes that police officers feel especially threatened when a high number of their colleagues has become victims. The indicator relates the number of police officers killed to the overall strength of the police force.

### **Determining the lethality of the application of force by the police**

The core question, however, is the extent to which police-officers shoot in real or putative self-defence or resort to targeted killing. If we assume that police officers are

acting in self-defence according to regulations, then, given a sufficient number of cases, we should expect a certain number of killed or wounded among the police, too. For example, with 100 suspects but no police officer killed or wounded in encounters, it seems impossible that the vast majority of victims were killed in self-defence. This makes this ratio of suspects killed to police officers a strong indicator for or against targeted killings by the police. Chevigny (1990, 396) proposes that ratios of 15 suspects killed to each police officer killed clearly “suggest that deadly force may be employed for purposes other than the protection of life.”

A second indicator for establishing the lethality of police violence focuses on the duty to apply only the minimum amount of violence necessary to subdue the threat. If the police do not shoot to kill, then we should expect a large number of suspects wounded as compared with a smaller number of suspects killed, at least when analyzing a large numbers of cases. Thus, an excessive number of suspects killed and low numbers of suspects wounded is a clear indication of police vigilantism. Chevigny (1990, 396) proposes that a ratio larger than one makes it sensible to argue “that deadly force may be excessive.”

### **Indicators on lethal police application of force**

The above discussion leaves us with six indicators that allow for a fairly precise descriptive comparison of Philippine police practice with respect to armed encounters. (see Table 1).<sup>2</sup>

### **ARMED POLICE ENCOUNTERS (2006–2015)**



Taken together, the online media search of police encounters yielded a total of 882 cases with 1,612 suspects killed and 86 wounded, as well as 40 police officers killed and 89 wounded in the period from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2015. These are very unevenly distributed across the selected regions (see Table 2).

### **Comparing magnitudes of lethal police violence**

At 161, the annual average number of suspects killed during the decade preceding the Duterte presidency was only a fraction of the number killed during Duterte's first year. This number is lower than studies that rely on a small number of prominent cases would suggest. Extrapolated to the Philippines the data suggest that most probably fewer than 300 suspects were killed by the PNP per year. This would be slightly fewer than the respective numbers for the United States. The datasets provided by Fatal Encounters, the Washington Post and the Guardian document approximately 1000 killings annually in recent years. This would approximate 310 killings for a population of 100 million. In contrast, the police of Jamaica killed 169 suspects annually during the period from 2011 to 2017 (Independent Commission of Investigations, various reports). Adjusted for population this would amount to more than 6,000 police killings per year for the Philippines. Corresponding numbers for Brazil are between 2,000 and 3,000 fatal police encounters per year. Adjusted by population this would approximate. 1,000 to 1,500 police killings, or three to five times the projected Philippine rate.

The Philippine average, however, masks huge regional and sub-regional variation (see Table 3). In the NCR, 7.17 suspects per million population were killed annually during the 10-year period, whereas the corresponding numbers for Regions 4b and 10 are 0.07 and 0.05 respectively. Even a highly integrated megacity such as Metro

Manila (NCR) exhibits a dramatic level of variation. Not a single killing was recorded for the municipality of Pateros and San Juan City, and only an annual rate of 1.18 killings per million population for Pasig City. The cities of Manila and Quezon exhibited almost identical rates of 14.5 killings per million population annually. These high levels of variation are replicated in all other high-violence regions (see Table 3).

The regional ranking is unchanged when the number of killings is related to the number of criminal killings (see Table 4).<sup>3</sup> In the NCR there are approximately eight criminal killings for one killing by the PNP, while in Region 10 there are only 0.03 killings by the police for 10 criminal killings.

A comparison with Brazil, Jamaica and the United states helps interpret these numbers in international comparison. If weighted against crime level, the extent of lethal Philippine police violence was high but not exceptional in international comparisons during the decade before Duterte. For Rio de Janeiro 9010 intentional violent deaths and 1519 killings resulting from police intervention were recorded from 2010 to 2014. Police killings then stood at 16.86 times the number of criminal killings (AI 2015, 35; for detailed data see Bueno, Cerqueira and de Lima nd). For the United States, the FBI computed a total of 88,228 murders and non-negligent manslaughters for the period from 2006 to 2015, the database by Fatal Encounters (nd) shows a total sum of 5,654 police killings for the same period, that is, police killings accounted for 6.41% of criminal killings, which is 71% higher than the corresponding data for the Philippine sample. Put simply, if lethal crime is considered, Philippine police officers have been less inclined to resort to fatal violence during the past decade than their US counterparts.

## Comparing threat levels

In order to analyse whether regional variation in the Philippines can be attributed to variation in the threat level of the police environment the data on criminal killings can be related to the corresponding data on fatal police violence (both adjusted to per million population).

If the perceived threat emanating from criminal killings were the core driving force of lethal police violence, then we would expect higher levels of lethal police violence in regions with higher levels of criminal killings. Quite surprisingly, however, the objectively measurable abstract threat (criminal killings per million population) is lowest in the two regions with by far the highest levels of police violence per million population (NCR, Reg. 3). It is highest in regions 7 and 10, which actually have comparably low or extraordinarily low levels of police encounter killings.

Another perspective on threat perception focuses directly on the victims on the police side. Sub-national units with higher ratios of police officers killed relative to police strength should exhibit higher levels of lethal police violence. Yet, overall the number of police victims has been quite low (4 per year). NCR police officers and those in Region 4a clearly face the largest threat of being killed in shootouts, which is in line with the threat hypothesis. Despite this and contrary to expectations, the threat level in high police violence Region 3 did not exceed the one in low police violence Region 4b (see Table 6).

A more detailed picture of the NCR component cities again shows no relationship between number of police officers killed and the propensity of the police to resort to lethal violence (see figure below). Actually, the two by far most populous cities of Manila and Quezon had low levels of police officers killed as a ratio of police

force, while exhibiting per capita killings of suspects that were almost 300% higher than those of the next highest cases (Pasig, Navotas), indicating more of an inverse relationship. The six units that had no reports of police officer killed between 2006 and 2015 vary widely in terms of the ratios of suspects killed by the police.

This qualitative impression is underlined by the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the component units of the NCR that revealed only a weak and statistically insignificant correlation ( $r_s=0.366$ ;  $n=17$ ;  $p=0.15$ ). Despite some caveats on account of the disproportionate effect that may result from small numbers, it is safe to argue that differences with respect to the concrete threat of becoming a victim is not an important explanatory variable for the variation in fatal shootings by police officers. This is similar to the United States where a Spearman rank correlation coefficient also showed no correlation between police officers killed and strength of the police force and levels of homicide per 100,000 population ( $r_s=0.211$ ;  $n=51$ ;  $p=0.14$ ) at the state level.

To sum up, the above analyses show no relationship between the level of lethal violence employed by police officers and the threat levels experienced in different environments.

### **Comparing the lethality of police use of force**

Philippine police reports on armed encounters uniformly state that the suspects shot first. If this were the case, it would be sensible to assume that police officers should also have been wounded or killed. Further, if the aim was to incapacitate the suspects, more suspects should have been wounded than killed. However, for the whole sample, the ratio of suspects killed to police officers killed stands at 36.2, meaning that 36 suspects were killed for each police officer on average during the decade from 2006 to 2015.

Once again, ratios vary widely with an extreme level of 146 for Bulacan in Region 3, with 98 for Rizal and 89 for Cavite (Region 4a). On the other hand, for several administrative units neither suspects nor police officers were reported killed for the whole decade (Pateros, San Juan, Marinduque, Occ Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Siquijor, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Occidental).

A glimpse at the other “top scorers” in fatal police violence shows how striking the Philippine ratios cited in the previous paragraph are. For the United States the respective ratio for the decade from 2006 to 2015 is 18. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, a city that is notorious for excessive police violence against suspected criminals had a ratio of 23.3 suspects killed for every police officer killed for the period from 2010 to 2014 (AI 2015, 34-35). In Jamaica, the police killed approximately 200 civilians while 13 police officers were killed per year between 2003 and 2011, which yields a ratio of 15.4 (The Gleaner 2017). A recent analysis of police killings in Mexico showed ratios between 1.1 and 10.4 for the period between 2008 and 2014 (Correa, Forné and Rivas 2015).

Thus, the overall rate of 36.2 suspects killed for each police officer exceeds by far the extreme cases of Rio de Janeiro and Mexico. This is all the more surprising, as the decade from 2006 to 2015 saw neither a “war against drugs” nor an iron-fisted policy that typically result in a large number of armed confrontations and deaths. This clearly signals a disproportionate use of deadly violence in relation to a relatively small threat before Duterte.

This analysis is strongly underlined by taking the number of wounded suspects into account. Put simply, when PNP officers engaged in armed encounters, they almost without exception shot to kill, not merely to incapacitate the suspects. Whereas 1,612 suspects were reportedly killed, only 86 were wounded – i.e., for each person wounded, nearly 19 suspects were killed. In a number of regions the reported survival rate was

zero, such as in Tarlac with 46 and Rizal with 98 suspects killed but none reported wounded.

While international comparisons are hard to come by, at least four exist – Jamaica, Chicago and Philadelphia and Mexico. In Mexico, the ratio of suspects killed to suspects wounded stood at seven on average for the Mexican Federal Police and at eight for the army units engaged in the war against drugs (Correa, Forné and Rivas 2015); this means seven to eight suspects were killed for each suspect wounded. In Jamaica the police killed 1422 and wounded 1,115 persons from 2000 to 2007 in armed engagements (ratio: 1.27) (AI 2008, 22). Police in Chicago were involved in 435 shooting incidents between 2010 and 2015 resulting in 92 people killed and 170 wounded by the police, (ratio: 0.54) (Richards et al., 2016). In Philadelphia, police injured 47% of suspects and killed 23% while 30% were not injured in 364 encounters from 2007 to 2013 (Fachner and Carter 2015, 29). This means that of all those hit by police bullets approximately two-thirds survived (ratio: 0.49). Thus, all other cases – even that of Mexico – pale in comparison with the Philippine ratio of suspects killed to wounded.

### **Armed police encounters (2006–2015): Stability and change within regions and sub-regional units over time**

Until this point, the analysis has been “spatial,” involving comparisons between regional and sub-regional units, but without regard to changes over time. This image of rather stable (sub-)regional units that represent either high or low police violence will now be dissected to establish the extent and the patterns of temporal variation.

A temporal analysis of the complete sample of provinces and cities reveals a stunning result. First, lethal police violence is “wave-like,” with strong distinct amplitudes and low points that almost perfectly correspond to the Philippine electoral cycle (see figure 5). Put simply, election years (2007, 2010, 2013) are characterised by extraordinarily low levels of police violence but rises sharply during the non-election years. Second, this wave-like pattern is superimposed on a strong rise of about 120% in 10 years from 90 to 199 suspects killed by the police per year.

These dramatic fluctuations indicate that lethal police violence can to a certain extent be controlled as seems to have been generally done during election years, when the police were kept busy thwarting election violence.

The slow but continuing rise in fatal police violence strongly suggests that the rash of killings by the police under Duterte was preceded by consistent changes in police practice during a period when the targeted killing of suspects did not yet receive official support from the highest political circles.

## **CONCLUSION: FATAL POLICE VIOLENCE BEFORE DUTERTE**

The detailed mapping of Philippine police violence for the decade from 2006 to 2015 established significant new knowledge about its extent and its special and temporal variation.

It showed that Philippine fatal police violence stood at approximately the level of the United States during the past decade. While this is a fairly high level, it is well below the numbers that are “normal” for Brazil or Jamaica. Cause for concern is that during this decade the level of lethal police violence rose by more than 100%, clearly indicating a shift for the worse that preceded the Duterte campaign.

Lethal violence was spread highly unevenly. This variation is in no way related to local variations in fatal crime or numbers of police officers killed; in other words, it cannot be attributed to differences in threat perceived by police officers assigned to more or less dangerous environments.

Even though the magnitude of lethal police violence was far from remarkable, lethality levels clearly were. Lethality rates in many of the Philippine regions analysed dwarfed those for globally notorious hotspots for which data are available. This allows only one conclusion: in these regions, the targeted killing of suspects was already an established policy before Duterte, albeit used only “sparingly.”

The rather wide-ranging spatial and temporal differences suggest that general explanations such as, for example, organisational culture, cultural legitimacy or high levels of criminalisation of the police force are partial explanations at best.

Regional and temporal variations suggest that the appropriate level for analysing the phenomenon of police encounters in the Philippines is the sub-regional level (that is, provincial, city). The data strongly indicate the need for detailed assessment and comparison of relevant practices at the local level.

Given that election years have been crucial turning points in lethal police violence in several sub-regional units, the detailed analysis of the roles played by the local chief executives as actors who either inhibit or amplify lethal police-encounter violence is an obvious sequel to the present study. Such research could build on and link with analyses of the role of coercion in Philippine politics (Sidel 1999, Kreuzer 2012). It could also draw on studies of death squads (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1988; Alston 2008; HRW 2009). Throughout, these studies implicate deliberate decisions of municipal or provincial chief executives as drivers triggering, controlling and terminating political violence. It stands to reason that actors who in the past chose



to initiate and support deaths squads will opt for a legalisation of such types of crime-control vigilantism that allows them to publicly take the credit for the campaigns’ “success.”

While recourse to prominent cases is a reasonable entry point for analysis, it is of crucial importance to understand what makes them stand out and to give equal attention to sub-national units where fatal police violence was and is low or absent, and to also include cases where levels of violence have shifted significantly over time. Only in this way is it possible to arrive at empirically saturated comparisons that are also able to explain sub-national variation. Only in this way can we arrive at explanations for police officers’ decisions to shoot to kill that are not undermined by the wide array of spatial and temporal variation.

The lack of government information on the extent and patterns of armed police encounters are no excuse for the almost complete absence of such detailed research on this phenomenon in the Philippines and beyond. There are sufficient alternative methods for establishing the necessary datasets that allow scientifically sound assessments of the respective patterns and for sub-national and international comparisons.

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## **Supplemental Data**

Supplemental data for this commentary can be accessed [here](https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8JXQCG) [https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8JXQCG]. The electronic supplement includes all raw data on the numbers of encounters, of suspects killed and wounded as well as on police-officers killed and wounded during “legitimate encounters” in the National Capital Region, Regions 3, 4a, 4b, 7 and 10. It also provides additional information on the coding and an estimate of the accuracy of the data as well as a complete list of the online-sources from which the information were culled .

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<sup>1</sup> Whereas the United States has been the “top-scorer” with respect to fatal police violence among the 20 most developed nations (based on the human development index) for the past decade, Brazil and Jamaica have longstanding records of extreme police violence on a global scale. In recent years, police violence in Mexico has risen dramatically in the context of the government’s war on drugs.

<sup>2</sup> In order to calculate the rates for the various indicators several further datasets on population, crime levels and strength of the police force were established. Population data for the sub-regional units were calculated on the basis of the 2000, 2010 and 2015 censuses. The respective regional data on criminal killings (both murder and homicide) were drawn from monthly reports posted online by the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) plus the Economic and Social Database of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) for the years 2006 to 2013, most of which are no longer available online. Information on the strength of the police forces at the regional level is derived from the Philippine Statistics Authority (2012), which, however, only provides data for 2011. This has been supplemented with the relevant data for the sub-sample of NCR component units for the years 2011 to 2015 from the National Competitiveness Council (n.d.).

<sup>3</sup> Regional data are only available for the years 2006 to 2014. The year 2015 was computed by adding the numbers for numerical values for the two preceding years and dividing by 2.



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**Tables and Figures for Kreuzer: Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police in the Philippines before Duterte**

**Table 1. Indicators for establishing the presence and severity of police vigilantism**

Magnitude of deadly police violence	Absolute magnitude of police killings	$\frac{\text{suspects killed}}{\text{million population}}$
	Relative magnitude of police killings in relation to perceived abstract threat	$\frac{\text{suspects killed}}{\text{criminal killings}}$
Threat level experienced by police officers	Abstract threat	$\frac{\text{criminal killings}}{\text{million population}}$
	Concrete threat	$\frac{\text{police officers killed}}{\text{police force}}$
Lethality of police violence	Lethality as reaction to perceived direct threat	$\frac{\text{suspects killed}}{\text{police officers killed}}$
	Lethality as expression of will to kill	$\frac{\text{suspects killed}}{\text{suspects wounded}}$

**Table 2. Regional profiles of armed encounters from 2006 to 2015**

Region	Encounters	Suspects as victims		Police officers as victims	
		Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
NCR	505	857	43	19	48
Reg. 3	154	323	18	2	4
Reg. 4a	152	338	12	13	16
Reg. 4b	1	2	0	1	0
Reg. 7	68	90	13	5	19
Reg 10	2	2	0	0	2
Total	882	1612	86	40	89

Source: own dataset

**Table 3. Suspects killed per million population per year (2006–2015)**

<b>NCR</b>	<b>7.17</b>	<b>Region 4a</b>	<b>2.65</b>
Caloocan	3.1	Batangas	1.01
Las Pinas	2.52	Cavite	2.88
Makati	3.53	Laguna	3.78
Malabon	3.09	Quezon	1.31
Mandaluyong	4.11	Rizal	3.94
Manila	14.44	<b>Reg 4b</b>	<b>0.07</b>
Marikina	2.57	Marinduque	0
Muntinlupa	3.87	Occ Mindoro	0
Navotas	5.26	Or Mindoro	0.25
Paranaque	2.01	Palawan	0
Pasay	5.55	Romblon	0
Pasig	1.18	<b>Reg 7</b>	<b>1.3</b>
Pateros	0	Cebu	1.42
Quezon City	14.49	Bohol	1.63
San Juan	0	Siquijor	0
Taguig	2.68	Negros Or	0.62
Valencuela	3.8	<b>Reg 10</b>	<b>0.05</b>
<b>Reg 3</b>	<b>3.15</b>	Bukidnon	0
Aurora	0.5	Camiguin	0
Bataan	1.75	Lanao del Norte	0.11
Bulacan	4.99	Misamis Occ	0
Nueva Ecija	2.76	Misamis Or	0.07
Pampanga	2.31		
Tarlac	3.61		
Zambales	1.32		

Source: own dataset.

**Table 4. The relation between suspects killed by the police and criminal killings 2006-2015 (%)**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Suspects killed</b>	<b>Criminal killings</b>	<b>Suspects killed/ criminal killings</b>
NCR	857	10,977	7.81
3	323	9,040	3.57
4a	338	15,776	2.14
4b	2	3,239	0.06
7	90	10,069	0.89
10	2	7,813	0.03
Total	1,612	43,126	3.74

Sources: own dataset, DIDM, CIDG, PNP

**Table 5. Murder and homicide compared with suspects killed per million population per year 2006-2015**

	<b>NCR</b>	<b>Reg. 3</b>	<b>Reg. 4a</b>	<b>Reg. 4b</b>	<b>Reg. 7</b>	<b>Reg. 10</b>
<b>Criminal killings</b>	91.9	88.3	123.6	117.4	180.9	180.7
<b>Suspects killed</b>	7.2	3.2	2.6	0.07	1.3	0.05


Sources: DIDM, CIDG, PNP; PSA, own calculations

**Table 6. Police officers killed per year in percent of police force 2006-2015**

	<b>NCR</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4A</b>	<b>4b</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>Total average</b>
Police officers killed /Police force strength	0.016	0.002	0.13	0.002	0.006	0.000	0.009


Source: own dataset, PSA 2012

**Figure 1. Police officers killed as a percentage of police force in relation to suspects killed per million population in the NCR per year, 2006-2015**



Sources: own dataset, National Competitiveness Council [no date]

**Figure 2. Number of suspects killed by police 2006-2015**



Source: own dataset