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“The Fallacy of Tightening the Reins”¹

Im gegenwärtigen Diskurs über die Reformbedürftigkeit demokratischer Systeme wird versucht, der Unzufriedenheit der BürgerInnen mit Vorschlägen zur stärkeren Kontrolle der RepräsentantInnen zu begegnen. Dies soll auf der einen Seite durch eine Betonung der elektoralen Verbindung, auf der anderen Seite durch eine bessere Kontrolle der Bürokratie durch die gewählten RepräsentantInnen erfolgen. Die Überbetonung der Wahl stößt jedoch auf Schwierigkeiten: Wahlen können Quelle von Desinformation und Auslöser für populistische Politik sein, deren einziges Ziel der Wahlerfolg ist. Darüberhinaus ist im verbreiteten Modell der „gyroskopischen“ Repräsentation die Verweigerung der Wahlunterstützung eine leere Drohung. Vielmehr muss eine Form der „narrativen“ und deliberativen Accountability und eine Betonung der non-elektoralen Mechanismen angewandt werden, um die Responsivität des politischen Systems zu erhöhen und das demokratische Defizit zu verringern. Kommunikation und politische Bildung werden als Ergänzungen elektoraler Kontrolle präsentiert.

*Keywords: „gyroskopische“ Repräsentation, demokratisches Defizit, Accountability, BürgerInnenversammlung
representation, gyroscopic, democratic deficit, accountability, citizens' assembly*

1. Introduction

In both Europe and the United States, a significant recent response to dissatisfaction with democracy has been to try to “tighten the reins” by tightening the electoral connection.

Instead of tightening the reins – increasing control of representatives by voters through the electoral connection and control of bureaucrats by elected representatives – I suggest strengthening in other ways the relationship between constituent and representative, constituent and bureaucrat.

I first argue that empirically the electoral connection is too weak to sustain all the democratic hope we have invested in it. I then suggest, on the theoretical plane, that the standard theory of accountability through electoral sanctions ignores the frequently practiced and normatively justifiable forms of “gyroscopic

representation” and “gyroscopic bureaucracy” that in their pure form do not employ this form of accountability. These forms instantiate instead a little recognized “selection model” of principal-agent relations, which relies less on accountability through sanctions than on “deliberative accountability”. Deliberative accountability in turn requires communicative processes that go farther than elections. I suggest several non-electoral mechanisms of direct citizen action designed to enhance deliberative accountability, increase government responsiveness, reduce the democratic deficit, and enhance the representative process. Although these ideas are merely suggestive, they illustrate the larger point that we need to look beyond elections to sustain democracy. Non-electoral mechanisms ideally would supplement relations based on control through threat of sanction with relations of mutual communication and education.

2. Flaws in the electoral connection

As societies grow more complex and interdependent, many of their interactions, otherwise best left to decentralized market mechanisms, create increasing numbers of collective action problems that require for their solution ever more intrusions into “natural”-seeming interactions, including the market. To help solve these problems, government grows. But as the interactions become more complex and the polity grows in size, the link between citizens, representatives, and bureaucracies becomes attenuated. Citizens feel, correctly, that they have less control over the important decisions that affect their lives.

One strong and standard reaction to these developments has been to try to tighten the reins, to make the lines of control stronger between citizen and representative, representative and bureaucrat. A major problem with this strategy is that the electoral process, the putative source of control, itself has costs. Electoral campaigns are poor sources of information, distort information, and sometimes create perverse incentives for politicians.

In countries with considerable illegal political corruption there are obvious reasons not to rely heavily on the electoral process. In countries whose electoral systems are significantly bound up with clientelism and patronage, there are also reasons not to rely too heavily on the electoral process for the instantiation of democracy. Yet even in countries where there is relatively little illegal corruption or clientelism, we in the profession of political science and as members of the public may have made a fetish of the electoral process. We have put too much stress on electoral accountability, when the electoral process is itself somewhat flawed and tightening the electoral reins has counterproductive effects.

Because there are good arguments for the electoral connection, I would never suggest replacing it. I suggest only that we stress elections less and supplement them with other forms of citizen interaction with the state. Elections are irreplaceable in democracy at the very least because parties organize opinion and crystallize

issues in the electoral process, electoral campaigns discover and bring out issues and information that the other side would like to hide, and, most importantly, votes for representatives have some effect on political outcomes and are thus deeply legitimating.

So some gains in reducing the democratic deficit can be made by reforming electoral processes, particularly when existing processes embody biases. I shall not, however, address these reforms here. I shall argue instead that the electoral connection itself is a weak reed on which to rest the government “of” and “by” the people that is said to be characteristic of democracy. I restrict my remarks here to the relatively successful, relatively uncorrupt, relatively unclientelistic advanced democracies, suggesting that even here the electoral connection is problematic.

Why? First, the electoral process is an extremely blunt instrument. The vote is a binary tool (yes/no) and gives a binary signal, much like the market (buy/don’t buy). As Albert Hirschmann (1970) points out, a binary signal (“exit”/“no exit”) communicates much less information than “voice”.

Second, electoral campaigns embody incentives that encourage distortion. As television and constantly improving production techniques accustom the viewer to a shorter and shorter attention span, political ads use shorter and shorter soundbites, which distort what citizens can learn from the campaign. As techniques of reframing information in one’s own favor become so well developed that citizens become cynical, they assume that they cannot trust anything, and that very cynicism keeps them from absorbing new information. As campaign strategists advise candidates not to respond to their opponents’ attacks on the grounds that any response directs media time and attention to the grounds on which the candidate is weakest, citizens rarely hear the explanation for the actions that are attacked. In the 2004 Presidential election in the United States, for example, Senator Kerry never responded fully to the Swift boat lies. President Bush never responded to Kerry’s accusation that his administration was giving incentives to outsource jobs. Future empirical

research, based on content analysis of candidate speeches, campaign ads, media coverage, and citizen surveys, will probably demonstrate that the United States is an outlier on this dimension of failure to respond, but varieties of such failure are nevertheless endemic to political campaigns. For this reason among many others, campaigns provide little opportunity for education, either by representatives of citizens or by citizens of representatives. The recent United States Presidential campaign, for example, spent 718 million dollars and the entire electoral campaign, including Congress, cost more than 1.5 billion dollars, yet the citizenry was not much better informed at the end. One would expect multi-party systems to have more capacity to inform at least the members of their own parties of the information relevant to the issues. Yet, as is well known, political campaigns in general often fail to inform the citizenry and even distort the facts that citizens eventually remember. Distortions created by soundbites, spin, and modern campaign techniques pervade the electoral process.

Third and finally, the electoral connection creates perverse incentives for politicians both in and out of office. For politicians in office, particularly in single-member districts with poorly disciplined party systems, the re-election imperative creates strong incentives to seek short-term gains and neglect the long term. Representatives also have little capacity to explain complex issues to the citizenry. They thus have strong incentives to avoid policies that can be attacked with a soundbite or a distorting advertising campaign.² Context is critical. But even in Europe, where party-list systems make representatives more responsible to parties, which then have somewhat longer time-horizons, the electoral connection still tempts politicians and parties toward the short term. In addition, for politicians not yet in office, candidate-centered systems generate a perverse selection for individuals with sufficient ambition to put up with a grueling campaign, the capacity to withstand the abuse of self and family, and even (in the United States) the willingness to spend much of their time fund-raising. Except in the most protected party-list systems, campaigns also usually select for people who want to win. In

some contexts, campaigns select for people who can dispense money or other forms of patronage.³

In clientelist systems the incentives are different, but here too the electoral connection does little in the way of educating the public about important policy questions, selecting public-spirited individuals for office, and providing incentives to act in the long-run public good when in office.

I conclude, therefore, that the electoral connection, at least as presently established, is a necessary condition for good representation, but not a sufficient condition. As a vehicle for representation it has many flaws.

Yet in spite of these flaws, many suggestions these days for reducing the democratic deficit place even more emphasis on the electoral connection. In the EU, for example, common suggestions for reducing the democratic deficit include making parties more central in the European Parliament, making elections for Parliament more important, perhaps turning the Council into a cabinet accountable to the Parliament, and perhaps instituting an elected European president. These reforms all focus on strengthening the electoral connection, despite elections being too blunt an instrument to convey much accurate information, electoral campaigns encouraging distortion, the re-election incentive undermining concern for the long term, and the electoral process sometimes selecting against those who would bring primarily a concern for the public good into office.

3. Flaws in the practice of control and sanction

Another problem with tightening the electoral connection involves human motivation. Simply put, people do not do their best work when they are tightly controlled. This is as true of a legislator or bureaucrat as of any of us.

Psychological research has established that in general extrinsic motivation drives out intrinsic (Deci et al. 1999). In one of many well-replicated experiments, subjects – were asked to solve some three-dimensional puzzles in three

sessions. In the first session, all subjects worked on the puzzles without pay. In the second session, one set of subjects was paid for the completion of each puzzle. In the third session, during which the experimenter left the room, those who had been paid earlier for doing them did fewer puzzles than those who had not been paid. The extrinsic motivation of the pay had driven out the intrinsic satisfaction of doing the puzzle (Deci 1971).

So too with representatives and bureaucrats. People work less well under the whip than when they like what they are doing or think the goal toward which they are working is good.⁴

Advocates for increased political accountability rarely take these features of human psychology into consideration. They often act as if the threat of sanctions had no cost in the motivations of, say, elected representatives.

Similarly in the civil service, the more someone in public service is micro-managed, the more that person has to report back on everything to a superior, the more tightly the reins are held, on average the less good work that person will do – if that person is already internally motivated to do good work.

These considerations do not mean that we should advocate eliminating control by voters of elected representatives or control by elected representatives of the bureaucracy. They mean only that more “accountability” in the sense of more monitoring and sanctioning does not always produce better performance.

4. Flaws in the practice of transparency

A similar analysis holds for transparency, that familiar cure for the ills of democracy advocated by both the public and political science. Although some transparency is good – indeed necessary – for democracy and in many cases these days we need more transparency, more transparency is not always better.

In contexts where the elected representatives and appointed civil servants are in general competent and honest, after an important minimum in transparency each increase creates obvious costs in efficiency, as each agent fills out reams

of paper that allow every step in a process to be reconstructed for public inquiry. That inefficiency produces a concomitant cost in motivation, as more of each day is spent creating a paper trail and less on the job that optimally the agent intrinsically wants to do. But the greatest cost of transparency is often that many negotiations, great and small, are best conducted behind relatively closed doors. Negotiators need to be able to say things for which they will not be held accountable to their constituents, because they need to show those with whom they are negotiating that they understand their positions. The much-maligned European comitology system, for example, has produced reasonably good results, given the large numbers of factors the decision-makers have had to take into account. It has forged bonds among the members of the civil service of the many nations of the European Union. The compromises have been hammered out not by taking positions in public, which encourages grandstanding, but by building friendships and trust among the negotiators and creating packages that are eventually acceptable to all participants in that negotiation.⁵

When transparency in the process has costs like these, we should favor not extreme transparency in process, but instead transparency in procedures, information, reasons, and the facts on which the reasons are based. In the Supreme Court of the United States the deliberations and the negotiations around the decisions are secret, but the facts on which the decisions are based and the reasons for the decisions are public. When EU bureaucrats have been asked to be more “transparent”, they have in most cases responded appropriately in this more communicative fashion – giving reasons, explanations and facts, and improving notification, rather than opening their processes to public monitoring (Lodge 1994; also Keohane/Nye 2001; Magnette 2003, 151). As we shall see, however, these features of one-way “narrative accountability” need to be supplemented with systems that provide more two-way “deliberative accountability”, with lines of communication that are open, accessible, and initiated by both sides.

The greatest dangers in much of the current EU are not that the bureaucrats will be incompetent or dishonest but first, political pressure (that they will succumb to pressures from major political interests), second, self-serving bias (that they will come to think their own agency's mission more important than an informed member of the public would think it, and so promote that mission at the expense of other public goods), third, the exclusion of some interests and perspectives from the process as a whole, and fourth, the general unwillingness of bureaucrats to consult those affected. It is important to curb these tendencies. Yet it is not clear that the best way to curb them is through the standard model. That model makes the electoral link between constituents and representatives carry the burden of conveying the right information to the bureaucrats to offset self-serving bias. It also allocates to the representatives alone the job of monitoring and sanctioning the bureaucrats to counteract bias, prevent undue external pressure, and insure full participation of all interests.

5. Flaws in the theoretical model

Problems arise not only in the practice of the electoral connection and control through monitoring and sanctions, but also in the theory behind this practice.

5.1. *Introducing a "selection model" of principal-agent relations*

A frequently overlooked "selection model" of principal-agent relations applies in the small but significant set of cases with two characteristics. First, the potential agent, for some exogenous reason, wants internally to act much as the principal wants that agent to act. Second, the principal has good information about the internal reasons (or the pattern of past action from which internal reasons may be deduced) of the potential agent. When these two characteristics are present, it is more efficient for the principal to invest in selecting that agent and then leave the agent relatively unmonitored and

unsanctioned than to select an agent who needs more continual and extensive monitoring, sanctioning, and inducement.

Although this selection model has great power in some real-world cases, it does not appear significantly in principal-agent theory as it has been developed up to this time.⁶

5.2. *Gyroscopic versus induced representation.*

The rational choice model of political representation, which is now the standard model in political science, relies on traditional sanction-based principal agent theory. It is an "induced" rather than a "selection" model. In this model the voter (the principal) exerts power over the representative (the agent), getting the representative to do what the representative would not otherwise do through the threat of sanction or the use of force. The model assumes that absent the voter's power, the representative would act differently. Because the voter induces the representative to have preferences and take actions that he or she would not otherwise have, I call this form of representation "induced representation".⁷

In practice the constituent-representative relationship often works on the selection model. This alternative has a normative status at least equal to the normative status of traditional induced principal-agent theory. It has the further advantage that, in the opinion of several political scientists, it accurately describes much actual interaction between voter and representative in the United States (Kingdon 1981, Bernstein 1989, Stimson et al. 1995, Fearon 1999) and I believe also in Europe. In this model, which I call "gyroscopic" representation, because in it the representative acts like a gyroscope (*ein Kreisel*) setting its own direction, the voter selects a representative but does not induce any change in that representative's preferences.⁸ In the pure case of gyroscopic representation (and no case is pure), the voter exercises no power at all over the representative. Instead, the voter exercises power over the political system by putting into that system a rep-

representative who already has, internally, a certain direction. The voter thus affects not the behavior of the representative but the behavior of the legislature, and through the legislature the rest of the polity.⁹

Gyroscopic representation is not intrinsically elitist. It should therefore not be confused with the “trustee” form of representation, derived from the writings of Edmund Burke. Trustee representation is only one kind of gyroscopic representation, the least democratic kind, and rarely prevails today, at least in the United States. The word “trustee” implies hierarchy, even aristocracy. It suggests that some individuals are wiser, more far-seeing, more educated and cultured than others, and that only these individuals should rule. A “trustee” is “one to whom something is entrusted, one trusted to keep or administer something” or “one holding legal title to property which he must administer for the benefit of a beneficiary”¹⁰, with the strong implication that the trustee knows better what is good for those for whom he or she administers the trust than do those individuals themselves. A financial trust is often created on the paternalistic assumption that it is better if the beneficiary never gets his or her hands on the funds at all. By contrast, a gyroscopic representative is not set above his or her constituents. Gyroscopic representation need have no hierarchical, aristocratic, or undemocratic implications. Voters choose among candidates whom they predict will act in certain ways, and place these individuals rather than others in the political system. Although the individuals they select are usually more educated than the constituents, the constituents often look for representatives who in many other respects are “just like” themselves. The gyroscopic representatives often present themselves as being “just like” their constituents. Edmund Burke did not.

Edmund Burke’s classic Speech to the Electors at Bristol (1774) also suggests, and the term “trustee” implies, that the representative will act for the good of the nation as a whole, not merely the good of the district. Gyroscopic representation does not require this implication, although the public-interested gyroscopic representative (of whatever political persuasion) is by far the

most common kind. A voter could place in the system a gyroscopic representative who would not act for the good of the nation as a whole but would only always vote for a particular policy, such as benefits for a particular group, that the voter might desire for purely self-interested reasons. The concept of a gyroscopic representative is in theory indifferent to the reasons (public-spirited or not) motivating the representative. It does, however, provide the democratic framework through which we may understand the independent stance of a public-spirited representative.

Past democratic theory has tended to treat a representative who acts independently, and is not influenced by others’ attempts to exercise power over him or her, as in some way undemocratic. As we have seen, the trustee concept was in its origin quite undemocratic, being based on the aristocratic concept that the representative as trustee came from a class of people who knew better than others what was good for the country. But gyroscopic representation is the democratic substitute for the “trustee” concept. In gyroscopic representation the voter remains in charge. But in this model the voter does not change the behavior of the representative (and may well not even want to change the behavior of the representative). The voter wants only to change the behavior of the legislature.

Gyroscopic representation couples intrinsic motivation on the part of the representative with control (over the legislature, not the representative) on the part of the voter. It can often get voters more of what they prefer than can the standard, induced-preference model, because in the gyroscopic model the motives of the representative are more aligned with those of the voter than in the standard, induced preference model. In a horse race you are more likely to win when you select a horse that wants to run than when you rely on the whip to make the horse run. So too a constituent may be far more satisfied with an honest, competent representative who wants intrinsically to pursue the same kinds of policies that the constituent wants than with a representative who is only seeking reelection and thus responds only to the promise of votes or the threat of withdrawing those votes.¹¹

Importantly, in this alternative to induced representation the reins can be completely slack, or even non-existent. There need be no reins at all on the gyroscopic representative. If the representative is driven from the inside, believing in some set of policies, and if the voter has an accurate understanding of the direction in which the representative, driven from inside, will go, then the voter need do no more than place this representative in the political system and go home. No control is needed, because the representative's motivation is intrinsic, not extrinsic.

Although the model of gyroscopic representation was derived from a U.S. context, the selection model itself is context-free. The open question is how the selection model more broadly and gyroscopic representation more specifically illuminate both European national systems and EU governance. In European systems of representation, voters as principals often select parties to represent them on a gyroscopic basis. Party platforms, which indicate the direction the gyroscope will travel, result not only from active party members' desires to gain votes but also from their inner "gyroscopic" political convictions. Parties undoubtedly vary in the degree to which their platforms continue to follow their activists' inner gyroscopes when voter sentiment has changed against them. The "gyroscopic" versus "induced" dimension is intended to enhance our capacity to analyze these changes and refusals to change, moving beyond the simple concepts of political ideology or political preference.

The normative criteria appropriate for gyroscopic representation are first, good system-wide deliberation at the time of election, and second, relative ease in both maintaining one's selected representative in office or removing that representative and placing another in the system. In gyroscopic representation, the better the information and the deliberation at the very first election, the lower is the likelihood of the voters needing or wanting to replace that representative in the future. If the quality of deliberation is excellent in the first election of a representative and the choice is therefore good, there is in this model no reason to think that the constituents would ever want to replace that rep-

resentative. He or she can carry on until retirement.

Although gyroscopic representation rests on selection, it departs at its core from the model advanced by Joseph Schumpeter (1981), which is entirely induced. The gyroscopic representative is internally driven, while in Schumpeter's model the politician as entrepreneur offers on the market whatever he or she thinks the public will want and will therefore buy.

The crucial problem in both the individual theory (and to a lesser degree the party theory) of gyroscopic representation is the very electoral system whose flaws I described earlier. Electoral systems that fail to convey accurate information harm gyroscopic systems of representation as much as any other. Moreover, only if voters can add and remove gyroscopic representatives relatively easily at appropriate points will those voters be able to exercise their democratic power over the system. Incumbent privileges that impede removal and term limits that prevent maintenance block the effective use of that power. Gyroscopic representatives often do, however, care intrinsically for the long term in ways that counter some tendencies of the electoral system. This is their important advantage.

The civil service also benefits from a "gyroscopic bureaucracy". Some theories of democracy condemn extensive delegation from an elected legislature or executive to an appointed bureaucracy. But in our own lives each of us frequently exercises our freedom to delegate. I am not clear what theory of democracy forbids the demos from doing in this respect what we as individuals want and need to do. Bureaucrats will always "make law" as well as applying it; such relative autonomy is inherent in efficient delegation. When the bureaucrats are relatively honest and competent for exogenous reasons – as they mostly are in the UK and parts of the EU, particularly in Scandinavia – and when the process of delegation follows justifiable procedures, it makes sense in motivation and efficiency, and is normatively justifiable as reasonable democratic delegation, to let them work with a minimum of monitoring and sanctions, and fight the sources of distortion largely outside the electoral process.

Of course every system needs some monitoring of both elected officials and bureaucrats. But that monitoring need not be systematic and on-going. Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984) distinguish between “fire-alarm” and “police patrol” oversight, contending that it is more efficient for individual citizens and interest groups to send in the alarm when they come across wrongdoing in the bureaucracy rather than have their representatives engage in continual monitoring. The same might be said of the elected representatives themselves when exogenous factors, such as internal commitment, produce a high probability of honest, competent behavior.

Moreover, both among elected representatives and the appointed civil service, what organizational theorists call “network” – or “horizontal,” or “professional” – accountability can often substitute effectively for “vertical” accountability, that is, the accountability of the standard model.¹² If members of a network have a strong enough internal commitment to the norms of their profession, or even if those members have only a self-interested concern for the reputation of their network, they will have an incentive to monitor and sanction the behavior of others in the network to keep potential defectors up to network standards. The ambitions of one section of the bureaucracy will also check in some respects the ambitions of others. These networks of horizontal accountability, along with recruitment systems and larger social norms, help produce honesty and competence outside the electoral system. When these processes are functioning effectively, the amount of external monitoring and sanctioning needed is only the minimum that experience shows is necessary to prevent the unraveling of a system of motivation based primarily on internal incentives and horizontal accountability. That is often not very much.

4.3. *Deliberative accountability.*

In the “principal/agent” theory derived from economics, the accountability of an agent depends on the principal’s capacity to monitor and

sanction – particularly sanction. Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes write that “governments are ‘accountable’ if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interest and sanction them appropriately” (1999, 40). They add, “In a pure accountability model, voters use the vote only for one purpose, which is to sanction the incumbent” (1999, 44). James Fearon spells out the relation: “In the jargon of economic theory, relations involving accountability are *agency relationships* in which one party is understood to be an ‘agent’ who makes some choices on behalf of a ‘principal’ who has powers to sanction or reward the agent” (1999, 55). A definition making sanctions central is also commonplace in everyday life. As Robert Behn puts it: “When people seek to hold someone accountable, they are usually planning some kind of punishment” (2001, 4).

An earlier understanding of accountability, however, stresses “giving an account” (*rendre compte, Rechenschaft abgeben*). Not only a numerical but also a narrative account is inherent in the concept of accountability. It is not just a matter of the principal monitoring and sanctioning; it is a matter of the agent showing, explaining, and justifying (Behn 2001, 4; Philp 2004, 12). I call this process “narrative accountability”. Seeing the constituent-representative relation only in terms of making the representative subject to sanctions diverts attention from this central communicative process of “giving an account” – explaining and justifying one’s action.

Ideally, however, this process of accountability should be not just narrative, in the one-way sense of giving an explanation, but deliberative, in the two-way sense of both principal and agent having input and response.

For this purpose, new institutions are required, beginning from below.

5. Citizen action

Regarding elected representatives I conclude that if the quality of citizen deliberation at election-time is good and if the electoral system makes it relatively easy both to maintain repre-

sentatives in office and to remove them, then it is normatively quite consistent with democracy to leave them alone. Let us dislodge, normatively, the standard single-minded focus on voter control of representatives, with its across the board opposition to incumbency and obsession with turnover in office. When an initial selection has been a good one, neither voter control of the representative nor turnover are necessary for good democratic representation. As for the civil service, if they are doing a good job, leave them alone too. As a demos, we are permitted to delegate.

Yet a democracy that is plausibly “by” and “of” the people cannot consist only of a system in which voters select good representatives and leave them alone. Even if we were somehow able to create a world of perfectly public-interested elected representatives and appointed bureaucrats, all working on intrinsic motivation, doing everything they could to further the public interest without even self-serving bias, practical and normative problems would still arise. Practically, not always being connected to local knowledge, these representatives and civil servants would make mistakes. Normatively, their very capacities would tend to incapacitate the people they served, who would be encouraged to leave everything to them.

By contrast, active citizenship fosters public capacities. Although it is hard to measure such things empirically, an active role in politics very probably generates in the citizenry greater information, critical intelligence, political efficacy, political self-respect, and perhaps even mutual respect among the citizens themselves.¹³ Moreover, because even under gyroscopic representation and bureaucratic delegation citizens are the ultimate decision-makers, who choose the gyroscopic representatives and pass judgment on the civil service, active citizenship is the ultimate guarantor of both individual interests and the common good.¹⁴ To play an active role in the democracy, constituents should ideally not only vote but also have an on-going relationship with the political process between elections. They should have a continuing role in educating the representatives and bureaucrats about the reality that they, the

constituents, are experiencing and a continuing opportunity to educate themselves both about their own reality and the reality that the representatives and bureaucrats see.

So, in the large, representative democracies require at least three processes. First, they need selection processes that, at least to some degree, foster and choose elected representatives and bureaucrats who intrinsically want to pursue the public interest. As political scientists we have not looked carefully enough at our institutions to ask what features in what contexts encourage and discourage the selection of individuals with public spirit and integrity. Second, as a continual although optimally somewhat peripheral process, democracies require a modicum of monitoring and sanctioning, as in the classic principal-agent model, with some degree of induced preferences, to prevent systems based on integrity and concern for the public good from unraveling. And third, democracies need mechanisms by which, even when public-spirited gyroscopic representatives and civil servants are working well, citizens can enter the process, educate their elected representatives and their civil servants, and learn themselves more about their own interests and the issues.

How is this process of continual mutual communication and education to take place? How can we achieve deliberative accountability?

This is the time and place for institutional innovation. Here I sketch a few possibilities, all of which I advance only experimentally. Only practice will show which of these, or of other similarly directed innovations, actually produce an active, better informed, more efficacious, intelligently critical, self-respecting and mutually respecting citizenry and, perhaps, better collective decisions as well. Only practice will show how particular innovations interact with various forms of electoral representation.

One set of reforms, while neither deliberative nor aimed at the common good, nevertheless helpfully decentralize sanctions from the electoral process to the point of service. Extensive recent efforts at “reinventing government” (Osborne/Gaebler 1992) to increase competition, flexibility, and “customer service” have

created one form of non-electoral accountability both in the United States and Europe. Despite the virtual absence of deliberation from these processes and their treatment of citizen as consumer (features that have produced some scorn among normative theorists), they do generate some communication and mutual education, both through complaint and response at the point of service and through the binary signals of “buy/don’t buy”. By shifting some power to the citizen, these reforms usually produce greater bureaucratic respect for citizens’ perceived needs and personal dignity. To some degree they inform bureaucrats of citizens’ real needs. And the microscopic bursts of empowerment they produce may conceivably also set the stage for more active citizen engagement on policy matters.

Other more deliberative reforms could build on existing institutions. The office of ombudsman, for example, although usually seen as acting only to preserve citizen rights could also enhance deliberative accountability by encouraging citizens to take issues to the ombudsman as a group and receive in return not only a potential redress of grievances but also an explanation of why those grievances had been allowed to come about. A similar innovation would facilitate group petitions through the existing right to petition in the European Union and on the national level.

To open existing neo-corporatist institutions to active citizenship and deliberation, Phillippe Schmitter (1995) has suggested a far-reaching reform that would give each citizen at regular intervals the capacity to cast, say, five vouchers for one to five organizations of the citizen’s choice (open to all interests but restricted to non-profits with democratically selected leaders, transparent finances, etc.) to receive public funds from the general budget and to represent the interests and ideals that the citizens wanted to promote most vigorously in the years before their next choice. This innovation, which some small state might introduce experimentally, would make neo-corporatist (associative) institutions more inclusive and less static, more responsive to changing citizen interests and preferences.

The late EU constitution and many polities provide for citizen initiatives. But these initiatives now trigger only referenda, and are rarely deeply deliberative. Instead, citizen initiatives could be put to new uses. First, citizen initiatives could trigger mandatory public hearings, in which the elected representatives or appointed bureaucrats responsible for an unpopular policy would be required to face questions and objections from the public and to explain their reasons for these policies.

Second, citizen initiatives could trigger citizens’ assemblies randomly selected citizens, modeled loosely on the ancient Greek system of the lot. Sometimes called “citizens’ juries” or “deliberative polls”, versions of these assemblies have already been used in the Commonwealth countries, in Denmark, and to a lesser degree in the United States (Luskin et al. 2002; Crosby 2003; Hansen 2004; Citizens Assembly 2004).¹⁵

In this innovation, if sufficient numbers of citizens did not like a parliamentary vote or a ruling from Brussels, they could collect signatures and demand a representative citizen assembly on the topic. The process of demanding a citizens’ assembly would also give citizens an incentive to learn more about the issues.¹⁶

Other innovations might also enhance citizen deliberation (see Barber (1984) on two-stage referenda, Ackerman and Fishkin (2004) on deliberation days, and Fung and Wright (2003) on participatory budgets).

The particular form that these suggestions have taken is less relevant than their aim, which is to provide deliberative counterweights to the greater autonomy that a gyroscopic norm affords representatives and civil servants. Thus this analysis aims first to establish the normative democratic basis for relative autonomy among elected representatives and bureaucrats selected for, among other things, their public interest motivation. Second, it aims to add to present systems a greater responsiveness to informed public desires, a greater respect for public knowledge and perceptions among representatives and bureaucrats, a greater public voice in decisions, and a greater capacity for mutual education, communication, and deliberation be-

tween state actors and the public. In all of these suggestions for innovation, therefore, the arrow of control and information bypasses the electoral system to go directly from the citizens to those responsible for a policy. Ideally, causality becomes in many cases two-way, with power and information traveling in both directions.

This ideal of democracy is deliberative rather than aggregative, educative rather than static. It respects all three crucial sets of actors in the political world – the citizens, the elected representatives, and the appointed bureaucrats – and asks what settings will encourage them to develop their capacities in ways that foster critical intelligence and concern for the public good.

6. Potential problems

Several problems arise with supplementing the electoral connection in these ways.

The most important is the possibility of undermining that electoral connection. Competent bureaucracies responding to citizens as consumers, neo-corporatist institutions whose members are ‘elected’ through vouchers, and extra-electoral participatory decision-making bodies such as citizens’ assemblies can all undermine the electoral connection, making elected assemblies less significant. This might not be a major problem in European countries like Germany and Sweden, where current electoral systems promote many parties and consequently both power and political responsibility are already relatively diffuse. Such systems might be able relatively readily to accommodate a few more decision-making or advisory entities. They are also relatively consensus-oriented. But where, as in the UK, electoral systems promote two-party majoritarian democracy, power is concentrated in the executive, and political responsibility is allocated through a “responsible party system”, it is far harder to accommodate separate centers of power. In the UK and also in France, any source of political power outside the electoral system, particularly if aimed at consensus, undermines both the conflict-based political culture that expects the majoritarian government to impose its political program without compro-

mise and the tradition of “*généralité*”, in which the state represents the general interest with no intermediaries (Schmidt 2005).

In the EU itself, the Parliament is already weak. In this context it is not clear whether instituting other routes of citizen influence would risk rendering the Parliament irrelevant or, on the contrary, give citizens a taste of power that would invigorate European citizenship and indirectly strengthen the Parliament.

Some experimentation should help reveal how serious this problem is in different contexts – and in what contexts we might expect direct forms of participation to substitute for the electoral connection rather than supplementing it or stimulating greater participation in electoral politics. The dialectics between the electoral system and any new mechanisms for direct citizen relations with the civil service need to be explored. How would they complement each other and how conflict? How would the citizens’ interest voiced through the new procedures be reckoned in elected institutions? In working out these issues, it is important to remember that I am not advocating here more citizen control over either the representatives or the civil service. That is the common rhetoric today. To the contrary, I am arguing that in circumstances when for exogenous reasons the political representatives and civil service are already honest, competent, and acting in the overall directions that the public desires, what democracies need is not more citizen *control* but more citizen capacity to initiate *deliberative accountability*. Bureaucrats need to understand more how what they do affects the lives of the citizens on the ground, and they need to hear that from the citizens themselves. For their part, citizens need to hear the ideas of the bureaucrats in contexts where the citizens can pursue their questions, pressing deeply and interactively into the responses. Elected representatives also need to be brought more in touch with the lives of their constituents, particularly when what they do differs from what their constituents want.

A second problem involves the question of how these new institutions might come about. Elected representatives now have few incentives to institute measures that bypass the electoral

process, especially given the expense of many of these new mechanisms. In Porto Alegre, Brazil, one political party campaigned and won office on a platform containing a promise to establish participatory institutions such as the eventual participatory budget. That party, being on the left, also benefited from the subsequent greater political participation of the poorer citizens in electoral politics. In British Columbia, an innovative prime minister who had himself been frustrated by the inequities of the province's electoral system, advocated establishing a citizens' assembly to make recommendations for change.

When an issue is too hot to handle, elected representatives might have an incentive to empower a citizen assembly, instead of using the courts or referenda to avoid responsibility, as some political systems now do. In another possible interaction with the electoral system, citizens' voices expressed through some of the new mechanisms might be taken up by political parties or individual representatives. We see this pattern with certain referenda today. Understanding the potential interactions of elected representatives with the new mechanisms of deliberative accountability that I suggest will require considerable further trial and error, and observation.

A third problem is perceived legitimacy. In part, legitimacy will depend on how thoroughly the citizens who do not themselves participate in these supplementary institutions identify with and perceive themselves as represented by those who do. When the representation by other citizens is in fact not biased, as in randomly selected citizens' assemblies, the media play a crucial role in legitimating the result. As the demands of the market drive newspapers and the television news into ever shorter, more cynical, and less policy-oriented treatments of issues (Patterson 1993), the media shies away from even reporting the results of non-conflictual deliberative processes. Thus in British Columbia, many citizens heard little of the arguments for and against the new electoral system that their citizen assembly had recommended and little of the process in the assembly itself. Partly as a result, the assembly's rec-

ommendation fell three percentage points short of the 60 percent approval on the referendum that it required to become law. Other mechanisms of direct citizen influence and deliberative accountability are also likely to get lost in the entertainment and information glut. These mechanisms must therefore be consciously tied into the media and consciously publicized through local media, associational news, and civil society networks, including the internet. The most important such mechanisms need budgets and personnel earmarked for dissemination.

Only further analysis and experimentation can determine which of the suggestions made here for increasing active citizenship are fanciful and which have practical possibility. Yet, given the flaws in the electoral process, reducing the democratic deficit requires looking not only at the electoral connection but beyond it, to other lines of mutual communication between citizens and representatives, citizens and bureaucrats. Social class differences sometimes stand in the way of equal communication of this sort, perhaps more in Europe than in the US. In all democracies, however, politicians and bureaucrats are currently tempted to think that citizens have little to offer directly to the governing process. Institutions of deliberative accountability might have a positive effect both on this perception and on the reality.

At present, "the EU benefits from the most elaborate of coordinative discourses ... (but) suffers from the thinnest of communicative discourses" between political leaders and the public (Schmidt 2005). These suggestions are aimed at strengthening those communicative discourses.

7. Conclusion:

This analysis has reviewed the many flaws in the electoral connection – among others, that it is a blunt instrument, encourages distorted information, undermines legislators' concern for the long term, selects against many who would bring primarily a concern for the public good into office, and supplants intrinsic with extrinsic motivation.

The electoral connection has, of course, even more flaws in politically corrupt and clientelistic systems.

In part because of these flaws, reducing the democratic deficit depends less on tightening the electoral connection – in the sense of making the representatives more responsive to actual or potential sanctions from the voters and making bureaucrats more responsive to sanctions from the representatives – and more on making an informed public itself the judge of good policy, by, among other things, improving deliberative accountability. The critical factor is the quality of two-way communication between representatives and constituents and between bureaucrats and constituents.

Reducing the democratic deficit depends on multiplying the forms of representation for citizens, while maintaining and improving the efficacy of government by fostering, selecting, and encouraging gyroscopically public-spirited representatives and civil servants. When for exogenous reasons certain potential representatives already want to act the way the citizens want them to act, and when citizens have sufficient information to predict those inner motives, it is rational for the citizens to select those individuals and place them in the system, thus economizing on the costs of monitoring and sanctioning. The same holds in the civil service.

As everyone realizes, improving the quality of the representative relationship enhances democratic legitimacy. But rather than simply promoting more control – by the people of their elected representatives directly and their appointed representatives indirectly – we should be looking for a better quality of representation in all levels of government, in which the people have a better chance to be heard, understood, and have an impact on the thinking of all of their elected and appointed representatives, while conversely, those representatives have a better chance to be heard, understood, and have a productive impact on the thinking of the constituents.

The American philosopher John Dewey once wrote, on the topic of the saying, “the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy”:

The old saying that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy is not apt if it means that the evils may be remedied by introducing more machinery of the same kind as that which already exists, or by refining and perfecting that machinery (Dewey 1994, 144).

That insight is worth repeating today.

NOTES

- 1 I thank the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study for providing the time to work on this topic; Archon Fung, Daniele Archibugi, Christina Lafont, the members of the Austrian Political Science Association who commented on the address, and the reviewers for this journal for suggestions that helped me clarify my thought; and Mai Bunagan and John Fang for research assistance.
- 2 See Mansbridge (1999) for the U.S. example of national “catastrophic” health insurance, which several members of Congress first voted for and then against after the insurance industry had mounted a campaign against it, telling a researcher (Bianco 1994) that if they had the time, they could explain to their constituents why the bill was good for the nation, but in the short time the television gave them, even combined with their own mailings and meetings with groups of citizens, they could not explain their position against the advertising’s distorting oversimplifications.
- 3 For empirical political scientists, electoral systems that combine proportional representation by list with single-member districts create an opportunity to investigate the kinds of representatives that each kind of electoral system selects and the incentives for representatives in each system to communicate with constituents in ways that illuminate policy issues.
- 4 Philp (2004, 22) makes a congruent point, arguing that an agent “who regards his conduct...as a matter of honour should not be held to account in a way that is itself dishonouring or shaming”. See also Goodin (1982) on moral incentives, Anechiaro and Jacobs (1996, 202: “if public employees are treated like second- or third-class citizens, they will act accordingly”), and Self (1972, 277-8: “The tensions between the requirements of responsibility or ‘accountability’ and those of effective executive action can reasonably be described as *the classic dilemma of public administration*”).
- 5 As Naurin (2004) points out, the costs of transparency are particularly great in potentially “integrative” or win-win solutions. For the first conceptualization and naming of integrative solutions see Follett (1942).
- 6 For a new “second generation” approach that stresses selection, however, see Besely/Coate (1997) and Besely (2005).

- 7 This category combines what I have previously called “promissory” and “anticipatory” representation (Mansbridge 2003).
- 8 Mansbridge (2003); also Philp (2004) on integrity-based vs. compliance-based systems.
- 9 The voter also has power over the legislature in the “induced” model, through affecting the behavior of the representative. The point of gyroscopic representation is that the voter can have power over the legislature without also affecting the actions of the representative through positive inducements or the threat of sanction.
- 10 Webster’s Third International.
- 11 Note that I have described a pure type. No actual representative is either purely gyroscopic or purely induced. Any primarily gyroscopic representative will undoubtedly change some features of his or her behavior, even if unconsciously, in order to be elected or reelected. Any primarily induced representative will undoubtedly have at least a vestigial gyroscopic core.
- 12 See Goodin (2003) for the particular appropriateness of network accountability in the “third sector” of non-profit institutions, on the grounds that a form of accountability based on “praising or shaming and shunning” (12) will work most effectively among actors motivated by the public good. See Keohane and Nye (2002) on network accountability in international organizations. As Goodin (2003, 41) points out, networks can also function as conspiracies against the public and “cozy cabals covering one another’s incompetence”; for these reasons some external monitoring and sanctions are always necessary.
- 13 For problems in measurement see Mansbridge (1999); for recent evidence of the effects of active citizenship see Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell (2002), Gastil, Deesse and Wieser (2002).
- 14 See Naurin (2004) for the appropriate caveats.
- 15 The legal authority of these assemblies derives from the elected representatives or appointed bureaucrats who establish them. Because their participants are not electorally accountable, their role has until now been advisory to other bodies, or, in the case of the British Columbia Citizens Assembly on the electoral system, to the citizenry at large through a referendum.
- 16 In the EU, for example, citizens would have to discover where in the EU’s multilayered system the decision to which they objected was taken. In 1995, Klandermans and colleagues (2001) found that only a quarter of the farmers surveyed in the Netherlands and less than five percent of those in Gallacia named the EU as having responsibility for their situation as farmers.
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