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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Lami, R. (2015). Impact of social groups in political discourse. *International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences*, 52, 111-121. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2019072015364666968507>

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Impact of social groups in political discourse

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Keywords: ideology; social groups; politic parties; pragmatism; social value

ABSTRACT In this article, ideological confusion is explained based on the structural-functionalist perspective. Analysis of the phenomenon in question focuses mainly on the interdependence created between the “deeply-social” factors of and political discourse. This analysis is undertaken to better understand the circumstances that condition political parties on representing social categories in different social contexts and on showing the implications of political identity building based on the type of discourse used by the political actors.

1. INTRODUCTION

Political representation was conceived between two tensions: on the one side we have the rights with individual character and on the other we have the social importance that interests of different segments have in a complex society. This kind of tension is present mainly in countries with consolidated democracy; parallel with the establishment of representative political structure itself, we have the expression of interests of all movements and groups with many different features. At the same time, we also have the structuring of political parties that claim to be the main filter through which goes the political representation (Graziano 2002).

Interest groups generally have an important role in the consolidation of democracy. Some interest groups try to protect public partial or general interests. They support political institutions of western democracy system, thus institutionalizing national political life. Bill Covall (1999) presents some arguments in the context of the contribution of interest groups in the governance system.

a) Interest groups improve and enhance the quality of governance by providing specialized information and experience.

b) Interest groups perform a political intermediate function especially in reaching agreements between them and with governments, which reinforce the government's strategy of liberal democracy of compromises and consensus.

c) From competitive position, interest groups possess the potential to offset the power of the government; they are “additional resources” of unofficial political opposition to the government, which acts alongside the official opposition.

However, “in transition countries, such as Albania, socio-economic elites are disorganized.” (Tarifa 2010: 14). Those groups existing within the executive, occupy institutions, and impede the influence of other interest groups, whose role is not only positive but also necessary, as it minimizes the influence of a clan and groups that are closer to power. These groups hold back the implementation of decisions and functioning of the decision-making process. They also impede “the functioning of independent media through economic and political pressure and the judiciary pressure at the same time.” (Lubonja 2010: 17). Therefore, interest groups (not within the institution), organized in non-governmental organizations, are irreplaceable - alongside genuine opposition party. The situation of interest groups is problematic. In many transition countries, interest groups are characterized by a series of highly specific features, such as the decline of the membership, especially in workers interest group, their significant fragmentation, polarization and lack of cooperation (Offe 1991; Stark 1996; Glass 2003). The decline in membership is mainly due to radical transformations of the state economy. The closure of a number of manufacturing enterprises that could not afford the demands of the market economy and the restructuring of

existing public enterprises influenced significant limitation of the workforce (Offe 1991). A similar situation occurred in Albania after the regime change. Below it is analyzed the role and function of interest groups.

2. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this paper is closely related to the interpretation of the data obtained from secondary sources. These sources are the basis of theoretical material that I have received over the years of my academic studies, as well as information collected from scientific journals, national and international institutions, Internet, etc. Based on the reliability of these data, I have reached the conclusion given at the end of this paper.

3. Results and Discussion

3. 1. Social groups in rural areas

After the regime change, the agricultural economy was deployed specifically to meet the nutritional needs of the rural families. In these conditions, agricultural products were destined mostly just to feed rural families. Agricultural enterprises were few in number and highly unstable, having an unfavorable financial situation. This sector was covered by the work of members of rural households mostly run by parents. Land was considered an unsaleable family fortune. It was seen as the main tool to enable the reproduction of rural family (Bardhoku 2011).

Almost 90% of the rural population owned and used the lands. The average size of the family properties, according to the World Bank (2003), was about 0.72 hectares, which indicates that a family had very little opportunity to increase agricultural activity. The main source of income for poor families was agricultural activity (37 %), followed by employment (27 %). Non-agricultural business provided about 6 % of the income of poor families, something less than transfers (8 %) and economic aid (7 %). Also, according to the World Bank (2003), agriculture was limited by small farms, uniform and fragmented land segments, with an average farm size of 1.3 hectares (in mountain areas this average was even lower, 0.8 hectares). Meanwhile, almost half of the farmers did not sell products on the market.

Albanian territory of 28,748 square kilometers is extremely rugged. "Because of the mountainous terrain, especially in the northeastern part of the country, the usable agricultural area represented only a quarter of the total, i.e. approximately 24% of the territory. Meanwhile, forest area covered about 36% of the territory (World Bank 2003). This land structure created few opportunities for maximizing the production. Also, this conditioned the cultivation of a range of products. But what is most important, the level of income provided by its use was minimal.

Referring to data published by the World Bank (2003), in these areas poverty was several times higher than in urban areas. The number of poor people in rural areas was 66 % higher compared to the capital and 50 % higher compared to other urban areas. Referring to the report, per capita consumption amounted to 7,224 ALL, about four-fifths of consumption levels in urban areas. Also, 34.8% of the rural population was poor.

Regarding the use of the mechanization, farmers faced many problems. Only 74% of families dealing with agriculture, worked in their lands with mechanized tools, 23% of them used the animals and 59 % of them worked mechanically, mainly farms in mountain areas (75%) and small farms 0 -1 acres and medium-1- 2 hectares (MBUMK 2007: 8-12).

Income from the sale of agricultural products was about 220 thousand ALL per farm, of which 58% from livestock products. "About 43% of farms received about 55 thousand ALL and only 13% of farms received an average of over 400 thousand ALL. Districts of Kukes, Lezha, Dibra, and Korca were below average. Fier, Vlora and Berat were above average." (Ibidem). According to the specialist Ethem Bitaj (2011) there are about 300,000 Albanian farms with about 2,000,000 parcels distributed into 700,000 hectares; all this leads to total lack of mechanization.

For many agricultural specialists, this situation deteriorated even more due to insufficiency of technological and technical infrastructure, lack of agricultural loans, malfunctioning of irrigation canals, very low level of veterinary and agronomic services, poor support of agricultural economy

by central and local government, as well as lack of organization in the form associations to influence change.

This entire context, in terms of capital and human resources, reflected the political behavior. Unable to get organized in the form of organizations or associations with the aim of tracking their interests in decision-making processes, farmers were nonexistent in the eyes of politics. At the same time, political parties, not facing clear interest groups, were reluctant to calculate the costs that may bring about failure to meet their requirements from a political perspective.

If we refer to the number of farmers and stockbreeders associations there is a negligible number regarding the influence in political decision-making processes. "We do not have yet organized groups to form associations or effective interest groups to represent the interests of farmers and stockbreeders." (Bibaj 2011:4). The limited number of persons employed on farms, low education level, low level of professionalism and lack of culture of working in group, did not allow their inclusion in activities related to their common interests.

This situation affected the behavior of political parties in relation to these fragmented groups. Even a political force like the Environmentalist Party, which formally addressed the problems of these people, failed to provide political support and did not survive in the political market - unlike other countries, where such party played a considerable role in the parliament.

"Have no interest groups, the political parties were forced to pursue an overall vision in relation to specific issues in different in rural areas." (SSBU 2007: 23). Usually, there were policies trying to deal with the basic problems of this population – with their final goal: maximizing the vote. Given this political calculation, the two main parties did the same game; it was difficult to notice the difference between left and right. The two political forces promised to the electorate subventions, facilitative fiscal system, public investments, construction of sewerage and water supplies, etc.

3. 2. Social groups in peri-urban areas

Social processes were accompanied by a massive rural exodus leading to a demographic concentration in some major cities of the country. These internal migratory movements have changed in a short time the relationship between rural and urban populations. Such migratory movements created peri-urban areas in some suburban towns. "The areas in question consisted of informal settlements and structures, and often had no relation to basic utilities (water, electricity, sanitation)." (World Bank 2003: 9).

Regarding the social influence in the political and democratic processes of the country, this group of people constituted a significant social category. We can highlight the fact that only in the capital of Albania population was multiplied within a very short period of time. Based on official records, it results that newcomers were originally 39% from northern regions and 38% from southern regions. Most of them were located in suburban areas of Tirana and specifically in local government unit 4 (area around Allias), local government unit 6 (area around the combine), local government unit 11 (area around Lapraka) (Karaguni & Dumani 2007). From the development perspective, these units were the lowest ones in Tirana district. Such an assessment was explained by the low level of average per capita consumption, high level of poverty, high level of unemployment, low level of education (Karaguni & Dumani, 2009: 89). So the territorial neighbors were very similar – the same as the entirety of demo-economic and social development. This entire panorama enabled diversification of identities and in some cases there was lack of cohesion.

Typology of political behavior of the groups located in peri-urban areas has a special social status. These social groups can be considered as transitional groups as they displayed a dual nature (they were changing residence, were unstable as the transitive process itself. "They were the embodiment of cultural and economic fabrication of a post-communist period and therefore were somewhat unstable, vaguely defined, very open to other groups, and simultaneously always ready to remake and dissolve themselves. They represented a social group with a temporary unstable and undefined identity." (Fuga 2004: 212).

These social groups were dynamic, acquiring a social status with many dimensions. "Their identity was being changed with the same dynamic; this identity in some cases in the process of being created" (Ibided). These groups were fluid social communities. They had no clearly defined social boundaries. But for political actors it was necessary to recognize their characteristics, in order to adapt the political language despite the high degree of fluidity that they represent. Of course, this social dynamism displayed in these groups did not create room for stable premises regarding the party programs.

This fact influenced the political discourse of political parties. This social structure actor defined the social action of the political parties. As the main parties showed tendency to offer solutions to short-term interests for these social groups in order to maximize the votes, they were being pragmatic and inclusive. Normally the transformation of groups is associated with transformation of the political offer.

3.3. Social groups in urban areas

During the transition, it was implemented a neoliberal economic model which created an economic structure that relied mainly on services and less on manufacturing or processing. This economic model, where trade had 47.1% of GDP structure, significantly limited the space for work. Another important factor i.e. attracting foreign investment and especially European, defined this macroeconomic reality. The economic model built over the years as well as consuming capabilities, significantly limiting the absorption of foreign investments, which faced not only with a limited consumers' market and a high degree of informality but also an unskilled labor force. Consequently, Albania occupied the lowest level for foreign direct investment per capita, compared with all other European countries (World Bank 2009).

In addition to the above indicators, it is important to note the relationship of the citizen to the property as the source of all material and cultural goods of society. During the transition period, this relationship had been problematic. According to Fuga (2003), this delicate process can be described by referring to three key moments. The first moment happened in the years before the change of the political system. In this period started were undertaken the first structural reforms with price liberalization, privatization of small shops and commercial services, the privatization of housing, land distribution etc. The second moment was the first term of democrats government when a number of enterprises administered by the state were privatized. By this reform, a large number of workers were unemployed and began taking social aid and, what is more important, new relationships with property owners highlighted many aspects. The third moment covers two mandates of socialist governance. In this period there were more the privatizations of large enterprises and public services.

In the beginning of the system change there are two important social partners; organizations of employees and employers. The very term "employer" appears as soon as system changed after 90s. They were working class organizations - otherwise called the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Albania and the Confederation of Trade Unions of Albania.

Trade unions

The first serious attempts to create a non-governmental organization for the rights of workers were made in January 1991. This initiative taken by the miners was followed by a strike several days later, when it was established the first independent trade union of Albania, known as the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Albania (BSPSH).

BSPSH, more than a union of miners and employees of other sectors of the economy, was a "political organization and very active against the communist government." (Olldashi 2010:157). Although in its early days they did not achieve the desired success, unions played a determining role in supporting student strike against the system in February 1991. This role is highly regarded in May of that year, when "general strike led to government resignation and consensus for holding new parliamentary elections." (Krasniqi 2003: 56).

In 1991 the former communist organizations of workers decided to change the name, program and leadership, becoming the Confederation of Trade Unions of Albania (KSSH). Initially, its role

was purely symbolic, but later, thanks to political support from the Left, it had some influence. "Even this union functioned more as a political satellite of left forces rather than defending the rights of workers (Olldashi 2010:160)

In the years to come, there were countless initiatives for the creation of new unions, but in general it must be admitted that only two above unions managed to survive. Despite this fact, it should be underlined that their success in domestic competition does not mean that they fulfilled their mission. Each year their membership was declining, which led to their gradual loss of power and influence. Closure of factories and state enterprises and privatization of many of them substantially weakened the union movement. These organizations did not have a program or a clear vision on how to solve the problem of high unemployment and collective dismissals, and at the same time they were not able to get organized in the new realities.

The lack of trade union tradition in Albania and financial problems transformed these organisms within a very short time into extensions of political parties. Unions lost their natural function and were not dealing with the regulation of working social relations, but the fulfillment of political interests. Instead of increasing their impact in constraining the deep reforms of the market economy which led to the high social costs, they did in many cases the contrary; they supported the government in any reform. Therefore, they did not use their tools typical for any union movement, such as strikes, the demand for collective working contracts, better conditions for the workers, 13th salary, etc.

A further important aspect was related to the sources of funding, when workers' contributions were symbolic. The low level of membership "created problems regarding financial and personal resources of the organization." (Olldashi 2010:157). On the one hand there was the common requests of the union statute to pay the membership fee which constituted 1% of the gross income of the person, where "referring to Albania only 25-30% of the members could pay the quota". On the other hand, most of members were pensioners, and low income limited their contribution to these organizations." (Ibidem).

This situation of financial dependence continues to be used even today by various governments which – with financial bids – maintain full control of the trade union structures. Union leaders fail to create a sense of solidarity and unity, mainly due to the use of their mandate for personal interests. Consequently, unions rather than defending the rights of workers function as associations - satellite of two largest parties in the country. These important decisions were taken initially in the respective party headquarters and later, without prior consultation from the members. In this context, the trade union movement was not a movement for workers' rights but served political interests.

This way the operation has significantly affected their organizational capacity and therefore has significantly reduced the level of participation in the drafting of government strategies or political decision-making process. Therefore, citizens and employees were no longer supporting strikes and protests organized by these organizations. "Union leaders were corrupt or involved in the forums of parties; they also became part of the oligarchy" (Lubonja, 2009: 17). At the same time, the problems that the workers face did not reflect the formulation of laws by the legislature, as organizations that should represent them, were not able to exert influence over the political factor.

Business groups

The private sector was developed after 90s. It needed to get organized and to establish organizations of employers according to the branches of economic development. Although private employers were established as a result of private initiatives, since their beginnings in 1993, they began to create the first organizations of employers - Union of Democrat Businessmen. In 1995 enterprises small and medium enterprises were organized in Community of Business – KONFINKOM; in 1997, Organization of Free Albanian Employers (SPLSH); in 1998, the Union of Albanian Business Organizations (BOBSH); in 2000 the Council of Employers' Organizations (KOP) etc. In addition to these large organizations, other organizations were created within the various branches of the economy, as Albanian Agribusiness Council (KASH), the Union of Industrialists and Investors in 2000, Organization of Construction Businessmen etc. Also, chambers

of commerce were established in all districts of Albania. Their members were representatives of the business community.

From a legal standpoint, the freedom of association and the right to join and ask the government to reconsider the complaints is considered a normal and democratic thing. However, from the experience of two decades, "the level of influence has been very low. Lack of capacity and experience regarding the organization and the quality of responsibility in representation leaves much to be desired." (Partners Albania 2010). The inability of possessing the advocacy mechanisms toward policy formulation processes has led to a standstill of the lifespan of the policies and to failure to channel the political decision in the interest of the vast majority of interest groups.

It is worth mentioning that the major part of the laws that were approved under the MSA by the government was not subject to discussions or consultations with stakeholders (SOROS 2009). Their non-inclusion in the processes of discussions is explained by many researchers with the "low level of awareness and organization of interest groups." (Hoxha 2009: 23). This situation created incentives for the government to approve legislation with political benefits as local costs were not perceived by the local actors. Even if such costs were perceived, the interest groups were unable to exert pressure on the government. The opposite happens in consolidated democracies where interest groups force governments to negotiate with them to undertake a reform or law affecting their interests. For this reason, Fukuyama (1992) argues that in an unstructured society opportunity for radical reform from the government is greater than in a well-structured society. Developments in Albania best illustrate this thesis.

During the transition period, employers' organizations - regardless of the fact that from formal perspective they were numerous - basically were not powerful enough to exert pressure on the government so that the latter could properly implement the agreements. Lack of capacity was evident at all levels, due to the lack of professionalism and culture of the organization (Xhumari 2013:116). During these years, decision-making and policy-making were rather elitist than pluralist or at least corporatist.

In general, it was the state administration that had the main influence in drafting various laws or proposals. Recently-established interest groups dealt more with the consolidation of their organizations and contacts with the state administration and the Albanian parliament, i.e. the state, rather than the use of mechanisms that the system allowed for such organizations – save for representatives of banks, real estate companies, manufacturers of alcoholic beverages, which in some cases exerted influence on the formal and informal political decisions. However, this fact does not prevent us to come to the conclusion that the interest groups in the first two decades were very anemic. In a way, the anemia of their functioning was due to the lack of tradition in this field. This means that they needed to increase their vocational training and tools for public information, and to widen the tripartite structures in all spheres of public policy at national, regional and local levels and in all institutions of public policies (Xhumari 2013:121).

That is why Adams (1992) states that "the establishment and institutionalization of interest groups and associations in general cannot be understood as a benefit of a 'by-product' manufactured by the political parties and parliament, but as an equal and the institutional simultaneous development" (p. 75). Delays in the consolidation of interest groups hinder the very process of democracy consolidation. The main thesis of Schmitter (1996) is that if there are many centers of power there are in an open society, the mechanism of control over them and the balance between them will be more effective. Simultaneously, one of the main indicators measuring the political commitment of a particular community is the frequency and quantity of individuals who engage in such organisms.

Due to lack of these groups, political parties perceive society as homogeneous in terms of needs and requirements, ignoring the heterogeneous realities that are being created or have already been created thanks to the influence of social, economic, political and cultural factors. Because of the democratic tradition or culture, parties fail to manifest their interest. "In these conditions, political parties are oriented toward the center in order to maximize their votes, thus weakening their differences and targeting the same electorate." (Pellumbi 2002).

NGOs

In the early 90's NGOs emerged increasingly. Due to lack of tradition in the country, many international institutions were preoccupied to find ready models to "import" to Albania. During this period, there was an intensified empirical acquisition and model application through study tours, acquisition practices and best applicative models for the establishment of NGOs. Thanks to this interest, within a very short time, a significant number of such organizations flourished.

Many researchers, such as Sampson et al (1996), who analyzed such developments not only in Albania, raised the concern that the developments with quantitative character were in asymmetry with developments with qualitative character. Indeed, it was often observed behaviors and attitudes that did not comply with the mission and purpose of NGOs in the West. The reasons for this distortion, the authors in question argue, are related to the level of democracy in these countries. The tendency to dictate the priorities and practices "from the top" in countries like Albania, in many cases violated the social needs dictated by economic reality "from the bottom". A large part of the donors were international organizations and institutions that had available funds to different regions of the developing countries, but they did not sufficient information of the reality and needs of countries like Albania. In this way, "the distribution of funds was done on the basis of applications drafted by the NGOs seeking to benefit financially, regardless of the effectiveness of projects and their work on the ground." (Picari 2007:78).

In this reality of funds, changes in policies and priorities of donors led to NGOs closure. The most significant example is the case of Danish funding in non-governmental sector. Change of priorities in the Danish government brought about shortage in funds and consequently, within a very short time, numerous NGOs had no funds at all. At the same time, little support was provided from the central and local government. All this created tremendous gaps in the ability to compete for funds and to provide necessary services in urban and rural areas. As a result, projects existed as long as donors provided funds. (CIVICUS 2010).

While having his financial dependence NGOs were ill-equipped to achieve sustainability, or at least their plans did not go beyond the framework of existing conditions and opportunities. "Most of them (57%) were reporting that foreign donors (non-EU) were the main source of financial support, followed by the State (17.8%) and domestic companies (10%). Only a small part of the organizations listed their services (2.2%), their individual donations (2.2%) or membership fees (2.2%) as financial resources." (CIVICUS 2010: 17).

Besides the financial aspect, another very important component was related to the fact that NGOs in Albania, by not operating in an external and internal democratic environment, could not influence enough in the development process and democratization of the country. Qualitative changes were seen in some areas or in general for certain issues, were sporadic, because there was not any coordination of their activities to achieve sustainability.

Another problematic aspect regarding the functionality of NGOs was the manifestation of the cult of the individual. The leaders of NGOs, associations, foundations, unions and other organizations of civil society in general did not allow recycling of elites (Partner's Albania, 2002). Moreover, unlike the political forces, which formally vote leadership structures every two or three years, the majority of NGOs and other segments of civil society did not organize any voting. Their structures were still centralized and second-level staff did not participate in the decision-making process. In a detailed report on the status of NGOs in emerging democracies it is noted that the leaders of these subjects vital to the development of civil society, were also their founders. Boards of directors and advisory groups were appointed by the chairmen. They functioned as the formal structures and consisted of people who had no direct interest in the orientation of the work and objectives of NGOs. Also, the report stated that the composition of boards of directors, members of presidencies, bureaucratic staff and lists of speakers in the activities of NGOs were the same people, almost 15-20 people, leaders and members of state boards and NGOs, who worked for various NGOs and exchanged their positions with each other. Circle of action and their operation was confined to other persons and complete ideas (USAID 2006).

Another major problem was the low level of citizens' participation. Lack of engagement was a concept unknown to the public. This aspect is illustrated in a survey with 1500 respondents conducted nationwide by sociologist Dervishi (2005) precisely on the issue of volunteering; this survey shows that only 14.21 of respondents think that voluntary activity is a necessary condition for the advancement of society. The paradox was that citizens in many surveys were critical to the government's work or their employers, but this discontent was not addressed by organizations, forums and public institutions. Regarding this component, a poll conducted by CIVICUS (2010) shows that only 18.4% of respondents describe themselves as active members of social organizations such as sports clubs or voluntary organizations, and 23.7% stated that they were active members of a political organization. This low level of membership and voluntarism in social organizations underlined the indifference of the Albanian citizens to civic engagement and civil society in general.

Based on this problematic situation of the non-governmental organizations, we can understand the inability of NGOs to contribute to the consolidation of social group identities and to represent their interests in the political decision-making processes. Freedom House Report, 2002, revealed that NGOs were not yet able to protect the interests of marginalized groups. In many cases, they were converted into satellites of political parties rather than partners of the society. This way of working was observed specifically to the attitudes of the leaders of these NGOs, who were not in competing to produce ideas and civic movement bringing about positive results, but they wanted to side with the political parties. Even "at conferences and working groups there was a warm relationship between government representatives and NGO staff; representatives of the government were dictating their terms and were employing "their" people for the implementation of NGO projects." (Picari 2007:135).

Because of this close relationship NGO - government, few NGOs were speaking publicly against any government plan. Such actions rarely went beyond the newspaper articles and protests with limited number of people, because the connection with the politics devaluated discussions and issues in question. This is one of the reasons why some scholars see the problem not simply to the functioning of NGOs. According to them, it is important that the process of its consolidation should not be detached from the overall development of society. In this context, Corpora (2000) proposed that "the democratic process in Albania should start from the bottom up and not the opposite. For Klingemann, Fucha, Zielonka (2006), the development of NGOs could be successful if it was understood that they were the social civil movements (not only political movements) that could articulate the requirements for positive change in the life of society in response to various crises of the country.

Some researchers emphasized the link that should exist between NGOs and politics. According to Mayer (2003) and Blokker (2007), NGOs were weak when people do not find representation and protection of their interests and they were under the "umbrella" of political parties. Also, when NGOs did not show power and dignity to protect the interests of citizens, there was the process of further fragmentation of society or this fragmentation was not made visible for the politics. These authors went further, arguing that the fragmentation of the party system was the product of the failure of the system of associations to perform the function of expression and transmission of interests and concerns of different social categories. However, when NGOs are unable to perform the function of articulation and representation, the political parties have the tendency to fill this gap.

For this reason, Shapiro, Stockest, Wood, Kirshner (2010), who analyze issues of representation, state that NGOs play a considerable role in the contribution to address individual interests at the level of social group. They have – according to Nisbet (1996) - a special impact on the lives of millions of people - especially in our reality when a large number of people did not have referring points for work or social life. "Such people were passive, confused and inactive. Their lost world placed them far from the main symbols of common life and numerous human relations. They were a contingent that stays away from politics and ballot boxes." (Tusha 2008). To gather these people and to address their issues to the political parties – this is the role of NGOs. NGOs are not created simply by the desire to be together, but they are organized to achieve together what people

cannot do separately. Not surprisingly, the German sociologist and political scientist Eppler (2010), in support of the role of NGOs, has the view that the most effective way of reasonable solution with low costs of social problems, is not traditional way: from institutions that elaborate policies and make plans toward society for implementation, but rather from society that raises issues and sensitizes the public opinion toward the institutions that develop policies. Malfunction of such mechanisms does not allow for the issue to be resolved by politics – through imposition. And the latter, if it develops policies, is not certain about the social groups that will benefit and the policies that should be undertaken.

All this affected the political behavior. Political actors, not having a "geographical map" of social groups that are identified with certain issues, failed to represent them and, most importantly, they failed to calculate the political benefits of measures undertaken when they were in government or of issues articulated when they were in opposition. In these conditions, the two main political forces were focused on general issues that somehow affect the majority of society, without concentrating on specific aspects of social groups.

4. CONCLUSION

The study analyzed the structure of social and subgroups groups in rural, peri-urban and urban areas. Regarding subgroups and social groups who live in rural areas, we evidenced some of the problems they face as land fragmentation, lack of use of technology and technique, lack of agricultural loans, poor support for agricultural economy by the central and local government, low level of education and lack of organization in the form associations to influence change. This entire context, in terms of capital and human resources, reflected their political behavior. Being unable to get organized in the form of organizations or associations with the aim of conveying their interests in decision making processes, they were kind of non-existent in the eyes of politics. So, political parties were obliged to follow an overall vision in relation to specific problems appearing in different rural areas. Given this political calculation, the two major parties spoke about subvention for the farmer, mitigation of the fiscal system, public investments in the construction of sewerage and water supplies etc.

The same situation applies to subgroups and social groups located in peri-urban areas. Massive rural exodus of the past two decades brought about a demographic concentration in some peripheral areas of the main cities of the country. These social groups often displayed a temporary unstable and uncertain identity. Such a situation did not establish a premises for sustainable programmatic points on the part of political parties, as social groups in question were forced to suit themselves to the social, political and economic development of the area where they lived now. Notably, this reality affected the political discourse of political parties. As the main parties showed tendency to offer solutions to short-term interests for these social groups in order to maximize the votes, they were being pragmatic and inclusive. Normally the transformation of groups is associated with transformation of the political offer.

An unclear situation is also ascertained with social subgroups and groups living in urban areas. However, the situation is not similar to the two areas discussed above; from the social point of view of the situation is problematic: lack of tradition, low level of participation, a high degree of politicization and financial problems faced by unions transformed into bodies that function as extensions of the policy. The situation was problematic even to the level of structuring and organizing interest groups or expressed differently to business community. Lack of capacities and experience related to the mode of organization and to the quality of responsibility in representation left much to be desired. The inability to possess advocacy mechanisms to policy-making processes led to a deadlock for the lifespan of policies and to the failure to channel the political decision in interests for the vast majority of stakeholders. Also, NGOs played an insufficient role in the organization and mobilization of citizen to protect the interests of certain social marginalized or underrepresented groups. In these conditions, such social categories were recipients to insufficient economic and social policies. This structure limited the actions of political actors and negatively affected the ideological structure of DP and SP.

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