

Eastern European Political Cultures: Modeling Studies

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POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND MENTALITIES

**Eastern European Political Cultures.
Modeling Studies**

Edited by

Camelia Florela Voinea

Bojan Todosijević

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Contents

<i>Foreword</i>	6
Introduction:	7
Camelia Florela Voinea: <i>“Eastern European Political Cultures and the Need for Explanation. The Look from Inside”</i>	9
Section 1:	
Political Attitudes. Theoretical Models	21
Bojan Todosijević: <i>“Structure of Political Attitudes. A Literature Review”</i>	23
Section 2:	
Political Culture Computational and Simulation Modeling Studies	53
Bruce Edmonds: <i>“The Art of the Possible. Towards a Cognitive Model for Political Action Choice”</i>	55
Camelia Florela Voinea: <i>“Why Individual Interactions Are Not Enough? - Agent-Based Simulation of a Polity. An Operational Concept”</i>	77
Martin Neumann: <i>“An Ontology of Extortion Racket Systems”</i>	123
Section 3:	
Political Culture Analysis	135
Zoran Pavlovic: <i>“Political Culture vs. Rational Choice: Support for Democracy in Serbia”</i>	137
Section 4:	
Modeling EU Non-State Partnership	155
Sima Rakutiene: <i>“Non-State Partnerships in the International Politics: The Case of Civil Society Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy”</i>	157
Section 5:	
Modeling Welfare Culture	191
Dimitrios Kotroyannos, Apostolos Kamekis, Stylianos Ioannis Tzagkarakis, and Marinos Chourdakis <i>“Prospects for the Construction of a Sustainable Welfare culture in the Context of the Financial and Fiscal Crisis in Greece”</i>	193
Conclusions	207
Camelia Florela Voinea: <i>“Patterns of Paradigmatic Preferences and Tendencies in the Political Culture Studies of the Eastern European Political Phenomena”</i>	209

Foreword

This collective volume introduces ten European authors and their researches on political culture modeling. They share the interest for the political methodology, on the one hand, and for the political culture of the Eastern European post-communist regimes and their transition to democracy, on the other hand. Their research papers have been peer-reviewed and accepted as papers of the 2nd edition of the *European Conference on Political Attitudes and Mentalities*, ECPAM'2013, organized as a virtual conference by the *European Research Group on Political Attitudes and Mentalities*, EPAM, on November 8th, 2013.

The main theme of the conference has provided the subject of this collective volume: "*Political Attitudes and Political Cultures: Theoretical, Analytical, Computational and Simulation Models*".

At its 2nd Edition, the European Conference on Political Attitudes and Mentalities, ECPAM'2013, succeeded to bring together faculty, research scientists, and doctoral students from several European universities and research centres and institutes: Centre for Policy Modeling, Manchester Metropolitan University Business School (UK), University of Belgrade and Institute for Social Science (Serbia), Centre for Human Rights, Department of Political Science, University of Crete (Greece), Institute for Information Systems in Business and Public Administration, University of Koblenz (Germany), Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania) and University of Bucharest (Romania).

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Bucharest, November 8th, 2013

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Introduction

Eastern European Political Cultures and the Need for Explanation. The Look from Inside.

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This volume presents several authors who are developing research projects in various European universities and research institutions. In spite of the *independent* character of the analyses and of the most of the empirical observations and results reported here, there is something which unites them all, namely a certain *similarity* in looking at things from a political culture perspective. Moreover, there is something else which unites their perspectives over the Eastern European political cultures: a certain *look from inside*. The true motivation for what joins them all in this volume could be described as a need for explanation, no matter the different political and culture heritages of the countries, regimes, institutions and people targeted by the researches reported in this volume.

It is this need for explanation which makes the true binding – either implicit or explicit – of this volume. What makes these few Eastern European political culture researches reported here prove the same need for explanation is the way they share the perception of the post-1989 Eastern European democracy experience, and certain stereotypes in relating variate political phenomenology to political culture.

The need for explanation should not surprise anybody, especially if we are to study the Eastern European politics. Nevertheless, it is more than just the necessity to explain (*what?*) and *how?* is going on in politics. It is also the need to understand *why?*, *when?*, or *what for?* The long transition processes from the communist to democratic regimes made almost all Eastern European people and their countries experience during the past two decades the need to explain their choices, values, beliefs, norms, attitudes, and symbols. Their grievances or prejudices. Their institutions, regimes, and discourses. All these entail a deep understanding of both remote cultural roots and current political perceptions, steadiness and variability, contingency and necessity, change and resistance to change. They require not only to explain things. First and foremost, they require a concept, a paradigm, and a method. It often requires a *model*.

The modeling idea is as old as our philosophical thinking. It reminds us of Plato and makes us think about the city, world, society and politics as of imperfect shadows of one perfect idea. To understand them, we need first of all to overlap the “real” and the “ideal”, the “shadows” and the “model”. It is this overlapping which explains what the real construct – be it society or polity, tradition or institution, individual action or policy – actually needs in order to identify itself with the ideal construct.

Modeling is, as a matter of fact, a relevant component of Political Science: ideology, political regime, state, governance or voting – all of them have been modeled and analyzed by means of models.

Before anything else, a model “explains” the real world by capturing few but universal laws, principles. It thus makes both modeler and user develop expectations with respect to its explanative power. Whether these are finally fulfilled or not, this depends on the model. In the classical approach, models as explanative tools involve covering laws. For example, economic laws and ideas do explain the transformation processes in the Eastern European newly appeared democracies, but they cannot fully explain them, and obviously not them all.

After the first decade following the 1989- Eastern European political phenomena, students of democracy identified the main characteristics of the Eastern European transition to democratic regime processes and tried to explain their

unfolding. It was probably the first time when many agreed that, beyond economical difficulties, there were some others which did not fit this model and resisted explanations based on covering economical laws. Explaining politics requires more than social, economical and financial methodologies altogether: it requires political methodology. Moreover, it requires a political methodology able to reconsider such issues like variability, context-, path- and initial conditions dependence in order to explain one of the fundamental questions in the post-1989 political analysis and methodology (Tilly, 1995): how should we study the political change? – Long after the 1989 Eastern European political phenomena, people still argued on the nature of political change, on its real target and on its real means and ends. Invariable models of political change could not tackle anymore the complexity of the political history and failed to fulfill the need for explanation of both scholars, either old or young, and of the people, either ordinary people or elites.

Unavoidably, political culture came to the front. In spite of the hard critics and apparently never ending disputes, political culture theories have succeeded to find room for “impressive” coming-backs (Mishler and Pollack, 2003) and for managing ambiguity in definitions and terminology. It is not the first time when they do come back and, most probably, not the last. However, this time there is something missing in the room: explanative power requires explanative methodology. And a good explanation methodology cannot ignore or avoid modeling. Nevertheless, it is modeling which is actually missing in this room.

The past two decades have been known as a time of intensive theoretical and empirical research in Eastern European political cultures. Remarkable works have been published by now famous authors: “*The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland*” (Jan Kubik, 1994), “*Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 41 Societies*” (Ronald Inglehart, 1997), “*Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*” (Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer 1998), “*Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations*”

(Harry Eckstein, Frederick J. Flernon, E. P. Hoffmann, and William M. Reisinger (Eds.), 1998), “*Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture, and Society Since 1939*” (S. Ramet (Ed.), 1998), “*Political Culture In Post-communist Europe: Attitudes in New Democracies*” (Detlef Pollack, Jorg Jacobs, Olaf Muller, Gert Pickel (Eds.), 20003), “*Political Culture and Post-Communism*”, Stephen Whitefield (Ed.), 2005), “*Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe*” (Hans-Dieter Klingeman, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonga (Eds.), 2006), to name but few of the most relevant ones. Many books and articles of these and other authors represent now the foundation of a difficult work of disentangling the complicated historical and political heritages of the Eastern European political cultures, aimed at understanding how people, cultures and polities endured altogether the hard experiences of the communist regimes. All these major theoretical works have been published soon after 1989, when the Eastern Europeans were struggling and striving in the sophisticated transition processes toward democratization and economic stability. It was a time of high political contend. However, more than two decades have passed and, notwithstanding its weakness and scarcity, the democratic construction has provided a chance for reflection. As the time passed, the Eastern Europeans – citizens as well as elites – got enough distance from their personal experiences, sentiments and passions so as to be able to finally reflect as objectively as possible with respect to their communism and post-communism experiences. While much of the research works mentioned earlier were fundamentally about a *look from outside*, finally, a *look from inside* is now possible. How valuable it is right now or could be when compared with the above-mentioned high-level expertise works, depends on how much it succeeds to uncover its thick political culture roots. This volume is about this *look from inside*.

The volume is divided in four sections, ballancing the interest for theoretical modeling with that for computational modeling and simulation of political phenomena.

The 1stSection, “*Theoretical Models*”, concern theoretical modeling and introduces one research work which reviews major researches in the area of structure of political attitudes (structure of ideology) during the past 80 years in Europe. The

author, Bojan Todosijević, explains how political attitude and structure of ideology studies would impact the modeling of political action, especially in the Eastern European new democracies.

The 2nd Section, “*Political Culture Computational and Simulation Modeling Studies*”, concern computational modeling and simulation of political action, policy, and polity. The three research works included here address the political action modelling (Bruce Edmonds), the polity simulation modeling (Camelia Florela Voinea), and the modeling of corruption, extortion and fiscal evasion phenomena (Martin Neumann).

The 3rd Section, “*Political Culture Analysis*”, provides empirical comparative results on political culture vs. rational choice models, and proves their implications on the mass support for democracy in the Eastern European post-communist countries (Zoran Pavlovic).

The 4th Section, “*EUNon-State Partnership Modeling*”, includes one research work on the political culture of EU partnership in the non-member states: the European Neighborhood Policy as a political culture model of partnership in the European politics (Sima Rakutiene).

The 5th Section, “*Welfare Culture Studies*”, presents one modeling approach on welfare culture in Greece, combining governance, welfare economics and social assistance studies with public policy modeling (Dimitrios Kotroyannos, Stylianos Tzagkarakis, Apostolos Kamekis and Marinos Chourdakis).

The *Conclusions* (Camelia Florela Voinea) presents a general Eastern European picture of political culture studies, including several other authors and research works besides those contributing to the present volume. The Conclusions show that the Eastern European political culture research exhibits preferences for a particular relationship between (i) the political values, identity, behaviors and attitudes modeling, on the one hand, and for (ii) the generative simulation modeling of political phenomena, on the other hand. This relationship is described as a political methodological relationship between *political mechanisms* and *political cultures*.

Getting back to the rationale of this volume, we should emphasize again the independent character of the researches presented in this volume. It is important to do this for three reasons. One relates their independent character to the reality that Eastern European political science research is guided from within the society, and this proves both the awareness of researchers and the social utility of their approaches. Another one relates the scarce appearances of political culture modeling research in Eastern Europe to the scarcity of its research funding, which seriously limits its development, but nevertheless cannot stop it. And finally, a third reason concerns the extension of political culture theories so as to include new elements provided by the interdisciplinary research in areas like European welfare culture or neighborhood culture, which emerged from latest political unfoldings in Eastern and Southern Europe following either 2008 economical crisis or EU partnership policies.

First, although *independently* developed, some of the Eastern European political analysis researches included in the volumeshare a major theoretical tendency towards modeling approaches of political issues, including political action and political attitude, voting behavior and electoral campaigns, political messages and political images on the Eastern European electoral market, post-communist institutional authority and legitimacy, ethnicity and nationalism, constitutionalism and authoritarianism, corruption and extortion, and many others. As political methodology, Eastern European political phenomena modeling research reported in this volume addresses fundamental issues concerning (1) the type of democracy constructs elaborated by the Eastern European countries, and (2) political identity, sovereignty and political action of the new Eastern European democracies inside EU or outside EU, but expecting for the EU intergration.As concerning the type of democratic construct and democracy perception in each Eastern European country, these researches share the idea of political cultures as influence factors in the political change modeling.

From this perspective, two authors succeed to bring to the front old political culture research issues and to provide fresh answers.

Bojan Todosijević's research on the structure of political attitudes reports fundamental approaches during the past almost hundred years in the area of structure

of ideology. Political attitudes made the subject of political analysis and political methodology from the beginning of the 20th century. Todosijević systematically reports research on attitudes in Social Psychology emphasizing the difference between the long tradition and huge number of theoretical and analytical works, on the one hand, and their low level of impact on the attitude methodological research and development, on the other hand. He is a promoter of the idea that ideological dimensions have a relevant impact on the political behavior. Such orientation of research would not only help understanding political action, but has a special relevance in the Eastern European political space, where the communist ideology's late impact has shaped "*atypical ideological configurations*" (p. 35 in this volume). This idea points to the particular ways in which citizens in the Eastern European post-communist regimes "*organize and express their basic political views*" (*ibid.*). The study of political attitudes (formation, stability, structure, expression) in Eastern Europe would thus help in modeling the type of Eastern European democratic construct and explaining the atypical political behavior – a major concern in the EU structures, where the Eastern European democratic consolidation processes raise difficult problems, even long after the political integration of the new Eastern European democracies.

Though from a slightly different perspective, but still in the same area of political attitude research like Bojan Todosijević, **Zoran Pavlovic** addresses the issue of mass democratic expression and support for democracy in the Eastern European ex-communist regimes by introducing a comparative analysis between two competing explanative models of political behavior: political culture vs. rational choice. His post-elections survey research allows for the definition, empirical observation and analysis of socio-demographic, institutional and cultural predictors of the mass support for democracy. His variance modeling approach re-iterates the disputes concerning the explanative power of the defined survey variables. His approach tries to show the role the political values play in the development of a democratic political culture in a transitional society by influencing the consolidation of the democratic institutions. Pavlovic's approach gives support to the theories relating political values and

institutions by arguing in favor of combining effects of cultural and institutional variables. His preference assumes actually an Eastern European stereotype model of “*creating the democratic political culture*” by “*creating ‘democrats’ as well as creating democracy*” (p. 136 in this volume). This position is often encountered in the current Eastern European literature on attitude, behavior and mentality in transition to democracy and consolidation of democratic institutions and proves once more the similarity in the preferences, understandings and expectation analysis of many Eastern European authors (Srblijinovic, 2012; Atanasov and Cvetanova, 2012; Petricušić, 2013; Ferić and Lamza-Posavec, 2013).

Second, although quite few and disparate, the researches included in this volume prove a high interest and a considerable potential for research development in the area of political culture-based computational modeling and simulation of political phenomena. The issue seems rather strange for many of the works on political methodology published lately in Eastern Europe. For many reasons, computational modeling and simulations appears to Eastern European Political Science researchers as a remote area of research and development. Without being some particular weakness of the Eastern European research only, computational and simulation modeling has puzzled political methodology experts from all over the world by introducing a different concept on how we should describe and explain political phenomena. Following the example of Social Simulation, computational modeling and simulation has been accepted in Political Science as well. This volume succeeds to aggregate some disparate approaches on this modeling area and issues. The three research works presented in the 2nd Section of the volume address both the ontology and epistemology of political culture modeling, with a special focus on political methodology.

In his chapter on cognitive modeling of political action, **Bruce Edmonds** introduces the problem of relating modeling methodology with political phenomenology. He highlights the issues of abstracting the types, levels and granularity of social and political phenomenology by means of computational cognitive modeling descriptions of social actions, norms, interactions and goal-driven behaviors. As one of the leading experts in both social complexity modeling and agent-based social

simulation, Edmonds challenges the standard artificial society model by introducing elements of cognitive complexity in the individual agent descriptions. As a computational and simulation modeling approach, this endeavour brings to the front the now classical debate on the individual agency and the relationship between cognitive, social and political phenomena which might get computational and simulation expression in an artificial society model. The model he proposes actually challenges the classical KISS style (Axelrode, 1995), and extends the representation issue to a methodological issue in political action modeling.

Camelia Florela Voinea challenges both political methodology and simulation modeling of political phenomena. In her chapter, she addresses several issues in political phenomena modeling, like political mechanisms, processes and pathways, reviewing and revisiting some of their definitions and terminology. In addressing the political mechanism issue, Voinea answers the Tilly's well-known claim (1995) for a change in political phenomena modeling methodology by introducing both emergence and downward causation modeling in the generative simulation architectures. Inspired by the artificial society models, she introduces an operational concept of the generative simulation architecture in the artificial polity model. Her research aims at advancing the political phenomena modeling theory by including cross-recurrence and cross-recursivity in generative process descriptions. Voinea's approach addresses the need for a methodological shift towards complexity-based models in political phenomena modeling. In a much similar way to Edmonds' approach, her work combines both philosophy of science and virtual experiments of simulation modeling.

Martin Neumann focuses more on computational modeling by generalizing ontologies of Mafia-type systems to an artificial society model able to simulate the emergence and growth of extortion systems. Neumann uses his previous social simulation experience to develop computational models of social and political corruption which could allow for public policy modeling aimed at controlling the phenomenology of political and bureaucratic corruption. What makes his approach interesting for the theme of this volume is the use of agent-based system simulation in

the development of a political culture model of a mafia-type social configuration inside an artificial society. His ontology identifies elements of political culture which exist and could generate deviant behavior in any kind of society, especially in the weak new democracies situated at the margins of the Eastern Europe. Extortion ontologies is but one example of how can they be used to develop models of culture and explain the generation of subcultures.

Third, the researches on European political culture prove a tendency to extend their area by including new issues which emerged from the latest political developments in Eastern and Southern Europe. This explains the presence in this volume of two approaches on European welfare culture and EU non-state partnership culture.

Sima Rakutiene introduces a model of EU neighborhood culture which captures the non-state partnership experiences associated lately to the EU accession and integration pending processes in non-member countries, like Lithuania, the Baltic states as well as some of the South-Eastern states. Rakutiene's model description might suggest that computational and simulation modeling of such political phenomena should take into consideration revisiting the agent definition in agent-based systems, in which agents are usually described as either individuals, organizations or (nation)-states. Non-state actors might involve a complexity approach to agent definition and agency concept in artificial society and polity models.

Dimitrios Kotroyannos and his doctoral students, **Stylios Tzagkarakis**, **Apostolos Kamekis** and **Marinos Chourdakis** introduce a model of welfare culture which is being developed in a Greek national education and social assistance research project. The welfare concept is usually related to the economic welfare theories. This approach suggests the extension of political culture area so as to include welfare issues. Welfare culture modeling points to the subculture emergence in societies under economical and political stress – an issue which has not been approached so far in the literature on social modeling.

As it is, this volume highlights the Eastern European political culture modeling research resources, tendencies and methodological contributions. It aims at introducing

young Eastern European authors and their researches and provides a signal that political methodology research needs further consideration, funding and networking in Eastern Europe and not only.

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Section 1:

Political Attitudes
Theoretical Models

Structure of Political Attitudes. A Literature Review¹

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Abstract

The paper reviews social-psychological literature on the organization of social attitudes, or the structure of ideology. Research on this topic started nearly eight decades ago, inspired by the research on the structure of intellectual abilities. Since then, a large body of literature has been generated, which has not been systematically reviewed. Despite the long tradition, this literature has not resulted in proportional cumulative scientific development. It is hoped that this paper may help in this regard by listing the relevant studies, examining the research methodology and the main findings. The review ends with the critical summary of the main findings and methodological problems, and recommendations for the future research.

Keywords: social attitude, political attitude, ideology

Introduction: The Dimensions of Ideology

Social scientists often conceptualize ideology as a relatively organized set of attitudes towards various social and political objects that could be derived from more general values and world-views. They, however, disagree about the level of coherence in such attitudes, and the number and content of the basic ideological dimensions.

Advocates of the 'end of ideology' thesis have claimed that ideology "*had come to a dead end*" (Bell 1960, 370-3). Converse (1964) argued that the general public's political attitudes are unstable, disorganized, inconsistent, and hence non-ideological (see also Zaller 1992). Political science is dominated by the view that the most important ideological dimension is the left-right distinction (e.g., Fuchs and

¹ This is a revised and updated version of a chapter in the author's doctoral thesis (Todosijević, 2005).

Klingemann 1990; Huber and Inglehart 1995). Other authors see authoritarianism versus libertarianism as the main overarching ideological dimension characterizing the contemporary (Western) political culture (Flanagan and Lee 2003).

Social psychologists, however, contend not only that individual-level political attitudes exhibit a considerable degree of coherence and structure (if adequately measured) but also that they are generally organized along familiar ideological lines (e.g., Kerlinger 1984; Middendorp 1992, 1991, 1978; Shikano and Pappi 2004; Jost et al. 2009). Scholars, however, disagree on how this organization is best conceived. The views range from, for example, one-dimensional models where all specific attitudes are seen as reflecting a single basic underlying attitudinal dimension (e.g., conservatism dimension, Wilson 1973a), to multi-dimensional models where related attitudes are grouped together in a number of specific factors, which are themselves unrelated (e.g., nine-dimensional model of Sidanius and Ekehammar 1980).

The present literature review is concerned with the research on the dimensionality of ideology, or the structure of social attitudes. Structure of attitudes in this framework refers to the relationships between attitudes toward various objects, held by individuals in a certain population. According to Gabel and Anderson,

"Fundamental to this approach is the assumption that policy positions are structured by underlying ideological dimensions that account for covariation in these positions. These ideological dimensions represent the structure of political discourse, representing a linguistic shorthand for political communication and competition"

(Gabel and Anderson 2002, p.896).

Psychological literature often refers to social attitudes, but references to ideologies or political attitudes are also common. Attitudes are regarded as social when they refer to objects which have

"shared general societal relevance in economic, political, religious, educational, ethnic, and other social areas"

(Kerlinger, Middendorp and Amon 1976, p. 267).

When adjective 'political' is included, that often means that items referring to specifically political objects are involved (e.g., Durrheim and Foster 1995).

Social Psychology provided a significant contribution to understanding the structure of socio-political attitudes. Research on this topic started nearly eight decades ago, inspired by the research on the structure of intellectual abilities. Since then, a large body of literature has been generated. However, despite the long tradition, this literature has not resulted in proportional cumulative scientific development. One reason for such state of the affairs is perhaps the lack of a systematic review of the existing research. The aim of this paper is to help in this regard by listing the relevant studies, examining the applied research methodology, and critically summarizing the main results.

This review is divided into six parts: 1) brief presentation of the basic paradigm of the research field, 2) early studies, 3) Hans Eysenck's Two-Dimensional Model, 4) Wilson's Theory of Conservatism as unidimensional and bipolar dimension, 5) Kerlinger's Dualistic Theory, and 6) the 'Outliers'. Discussion and recommendations for the future research finalize the paper.

The Basic Paradigm

The basic paradigm in this field states that social attitudes are interrelated and hierarchically organized. The interrelatedness means that, for instance, if someone has a negative attitude toward premarital sex, we would not expect that she endorses a particularly positive attitude toward striptease bars. Hierarchical organization means that specific attitudes have their roots in more general orientations or general ideologies. These assumptions led to the investigation of the so-called primary, latent, or basic attitudes, which could explain the correlation between many specific or manifest attitudes.

The basic paradigm of this approach is represented by the Eysenck's (1954; Eysenck and Wilson 1978) studies of social attitudes. In this view, attitudes are hierarchically organized in four levels, as in the following figure:

- 4 IDEOLOGY (Conservatism)
 - 3 ATTITUDES (Anti-Semitic)
 - 2 HABITUAL OPINIONS (“Jews are inferior.”)
 - 1 SPECIFIC OPINIONS (“Finkelstein is a dirty Jew!”)
- (From: Dator 1969, 74).

At the bottom level is a large number of *specific opinions*,

“which are not related in any way to other opinions, which are not in any way characteristic of a person who makes them, and which are not reproducible”
(Eysenck 1954, p. 111).

On the second level are *habitual opinions*, which are reproducible and more persistent individual features. They are expressed through different specific opinions. The first two levels are usually represented by various items in attitude questionnaires. *Attitude* is built of a certain number of related habitual opinions. For example, an anti-Semitic attitude consists of and is expressed through a number of negative opinions about Jews. This level can empirically be represented by summarized scores on attitude scales or by primary factors emerging from factor analyses of attitude scales. Attitudes at this level usually are not independent of each other; they tend to correlate, forming the fourth level - *ideologies*. For example, attitudes like anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, patriotism, pro-religious attitudes and strict up-bringing of children are components of conservative ideology (*Ibid.*112-3). Substance to these general factors is often given in terms of *underlying dispositional features*, such as tough-mindedness (Eysenck 1954) or the fear of uncertainty (Wilson 1973b).

The other oftenly used model assigns the integrative role to *value orientations*. Here, more specific ideological dimensions and opinions are seen as derived from general values (e.g., Rokeach 1973; Maio et al. 2003). Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) argue for a model where general values, i.e. ideology, determines intermediate values, which then determine specific attitudes. The idea can be illustrated by the

following sequence: conservatism - economic attitudes - health policy attitudes. Thus, the 'deep' values, that is general ideology, is the source of attitude constraint.

In Middendorp's theory (1991), the 'theoretical' source of general conservative ideology can be found in two general values applied to their respective domains: equality to socio-economic and freedom to politico-cultural domain (1991, 113). In his words:

"the interrelatedness of various ideas – expressed by statements about reality – comes about through the common reference of these ideas to one or a few underlying values"

(Middendorp 1991, pp. 60-61).

However, Middendorp does not assume that each individual derives specific attitudes from general values on her own, nor that ideologies have to be consciously held.

Early Studies

Thurstone (1934) and Ferguson (1939) were among the first to use factor analysis in order to determine the structure of basic social attitudes. The attempts were inspired by the studies of the structure of intellectual abilities. At that time, possible research designs were limited by the unavailability of fast and powerful computers. Thus, factor analysis was applied not on correlations between scale items, but rather on correlations between scores on scales measuring specific attitudes. **Table 1** summarizes the main methodological features and findings of Thurstone (1934) and Ferguson (1939, 1940, 1942, 1973).

Table 1. Early studies: basic methodological features and results

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Thurstone (1934)	N=380, students, USA; ad hoc	11 scales; Equal-appearing-interval scale type; scoring: mean on each	Centroid extraction method; Orthogonal/graphic rotation	1. Radicalism-Conservatism; 2. Nationalism-

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
		scale		internationalism
Ferguson (1939)	N=185; students, USA; ad hoc	10 scales, each of 20 items; Equal-appearing-interval scale type (Thurstone); scoring: mean on each scale	Centroid extraction; 2 significant factors; graphic/orthogonal rotation (excluded not in accordance with the two basic dimensions).	1. Religionism; 2. Humanitarianism
Ferguson (1940)	N=144; reanalysis: N=790 students; USA; ad hoc	2 scales of 38 items each, on the bases of the above results	Same methods as above	Previous two factors confirmed
Ferguson (1942)	Reanalysis of data from 1939	Same methodology, previously excluded scales included in analysis	Same methods as above	Earlier two factors confirmed; added 3. Nationalism
Ferguson (1973)	N=1471 students; ad hoc	the same 10 tests as in 1939	Centroid 3 factors (G-K crit.) graphic/orthogonal and oblique	1. Religion 2. Humanitarianism 3. Nationalism

Ferguson began his analysis with 10 scales for the measurement of attitudes toward war, reality of God, patriotism, treatment of criminals, capital punishment, censorship, evolution, birth control, law, and communism (Ferguson 1939). The first factor, *Religionism*, was defined as the acceptance of God’s reality and negative attitude toward evolution and birth control. The orthogonal factor of *Humanitarianism* was defined by the attitudes toward the treatment of criminals, capital punishment and war. Later, he included the factor of *Nationalism* defined by positive attitudes toward law, patriotism, censorship and by negative attitude toward communism. His reanalysis in 1973 confirmed the stability of factors during time, with the suggestion that factors 1 and 3 could be collapsed into one dimension - Eysenck’s *Tender-mindedness - Tough-mindedness*.

Thurstone’s first factor, radicalism versus conservatism, should also be described, because it is representative of major factors in many subsequent models, usually labelled as conservatism versus liberalism in the US context. The *Radicalism*

pole was defined by positive evaluation of evolution theory, birth control, easy divorce, and communism (and with higher IQ), while the *Conservative* pole was defined by a positive evaluation of religion, patriotism, Prohibition, and Sunday observance (Thurstone 1934).

None of the authors provided more detailed justification for the inclusion of a particular set of attitudes for analysis. It seems that they relied on common sense to include attitudes that are representative for the whole complexity of relevant social attitudes in a particular context. However, this point is crucial regarding the purpose of the studies. Final factors can only be defined by the variables entered into the analysis. Hence, the obtained results should be interpreted as the structure of the *analysed* attitudes, not as the structure of *general* socio-political attitudes, but this remark applies to subsequent studies as well.

Hans Eysenck's Two-Dimensional Model

Eysenck's model of the structure of social attitudes is directly connected to the previously presented studies. His first study (in 1944) is partly a reanalysis of the Thurstone and Ferguson's data. A rather complete overview of Eysenck's studies, and studies by other authors related to his model, are presented in **Table 2**.

In this model there are two basic social attitudes: Conservatism *vs.* Radicalism (R-factor), and Tender-mindedness *vs.* Tough-mindedness (T-factor). Radical pole is defined, for example, as positive evaluation of evolution theory, strikes, welfare state, mixed marriages, student protests, law reform, women's liberation, United Nations, nudist camps, pop-music, modern art, immigration, abolishing private property, and rejection of patriotism (Eysenck 1954, 1976; Eysenck and Wilson 1978). The conservative pole is characterized by positive attitudes toward white superiority, birching, death penalty, anti-Semitism, opposition to nationalization of property, birth control, etc. (*Ibid.*). Tender-mindedness is defined by items such as moral training, inborn conscience, Bible truth, chastity, self-denial, pacifism, anti-discrimination, being against the death penalty, and harsh treatment of criminals (Eysenck 1951, 1954, 1976;

Eysenck and Wilson 1978). Tough-mindedness is expressed through favourable attitudes towards compulsory sterilization, euthanasia, easier divorce laws, racism, anti-Semitism, compulsory military training, wife swapping, casual living, death penalty, harsh treatment of criminals. Thus, tough-minded individuals tend to be in favour of more harsh and tough social measures, including rejection of ethnic and other minorities (*Ibid.*). Since Eysenck argued for significant genetic determination of basic personality traits, social attitudes are seen as partly genetically determined as well (Abrahamson, Baker, and Caspi 2002; Bouchard et al. 2003; Eysenck 1982).

Only the first dimension is interpreted as a “true” attitude dimension, in content similar to Thurstone’s Conservatism factor. The T-factor was explained as the projection of personality traits (‘extroversion’ in 1954, and in later works ‘psychoticism’), onto the social field, and hence there were very few items loading exclusively on this factor. After one study with a more representative sample the possibility of the existence of a *third dimension* was suggested (Eysenck 1975). The conservatism factor was split into two dimensions: predominantly religious and predominantly economic. The latter factor was labelled as Politico-Economic Conservatism *vs.* Socialism (Eysenck 1975).

Table 2. Methodological features and results of studies within Eysenck’s model of attitudes.

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Eysenck (1944)	a) reanalysis of Thurstone and Ferguson's results; b) 694 adults, ad-hoc sample	a) same as Ferguson (1939) b) 32 'propositions' for social change, 6-point, Likert-type	Centroid method of extraction, graphic rotation, 2 significant factors (GK ^a)	2 orthogonal factors: 1) Conservatism-radicalism; and 2. Practical-theoretical ² . Support for two additional factors: 3. Aggressive-restrictive, and 4. Freedom of interference-coercion.
Eysenck (1947, 1954)	N=750 (250 conservatives, 250 liberals, 250	40 item Inventory of Social Attitudes (ISA); Yes-no scoring	2 <i>interpreted</i> factors	2 independent factors ($r=-.12$): 1. Conservatism-radicalism (R); 2. Tender-tough mindedness (T)

²Later named tough mindedness *vs.* tender-mindedness.

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
	socialists)			
Dator, (1969)	192 High Court and 15 Supreme Court judges from Japan	24 items selected from Eysenck 1947. Translated, and modified.	Unspecified	Confirms Eysenck's two dimensions, but with different names: 1. Progressive-conservative (or Superiority-equality), and 2. Religiosity.
Eysenck (1971)	N=2000, ad hoc sample, but covered gender, age and class	28 items, selected from ISA, 5-point Likert-type scoring	PC extraction; Promax rotation; 9 primary and 2 second-order factors	1. Authoritarianism-humanitarianism, 2. Religionism. Factors interpreted as rotated versions of the R and T factors.
Eysenck (1975)	N=368, quota sample from London	88 items, 5-point Likert type	PC extraction, 29 factors; retained 15 factors, in Promax rotation; 10 factors interpreted, 3 second-order factors extracted	1. Conservative-radical factor, 2. Tough-mindedness – tender-mindedness, and 3. Politico-economic Conservatism – Socialism.
Eysenck (1976)	N=1442, quota sample	68 items; Wilson-Patterson type of scale; Yes-no scoring	PC extraction, 13 primary factors (19 with eigenvalues > 1); 2 second-order factors	1. R. and 2. T factors.
Stone and Russ (1976)	N=206; univ. students; USA, ad hoc	20-item Mach IV scale, and 18 items from Eysenck's ISA	PC extraction; 2 components Varimax rotated (23% variance)	1. Radicalism-Conservatism, 2. Machiavellianism
Bruni & Eysenck (1976)	N=850, ad hoc sample (students, teachers, priests, adults); Italy	48 items, three point, Likert-type scoring; Italian version of Eysenck's ISA	Image extraction, Varimax + graphic rotation of two significant factors	1. R, and 2. T factors.
Hewitt, Eysenck, & Eaves (1977)	N=1492 volunteer adults, 70% females; Canada	60 items Public Opinion Inventory; Yes-no scoring	PC extraction, 2 factors retained out of 40 with eigenv. > 1, oblique rotation	1. Conservatism-radicalism; 2. Tender-tough mindedness
Singh (1977)	N=215, probability sample (mail survey; response	28 items, adapted from ISA; 5-point Likert type scoring	Varimax rotation; 4 factors, retained 2 factors (scree test), expl. 53.8% of var.	1. R, and 2. T factors.

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
	rate = 43%;			
Smithers & Lobley (1978a,b)	N = 539 univ. students	40 items Rokeach's D-scale,	Extracted 1 st principal component	Dogmatism factor, independent of Conservatism; suggested similarity between Dogmatism and Eysenck's T-factor.
Stone, Ommundsen & Williams (1985)	286 students, USA; 273 students, Norway	60 items measuring left-right orientation and tough-mindedness; various formats various types	PF analysis, Varimax rotation; imposed No. of factors (2)	1. Conservatism (bipolar), 2. Tender-mindedness (Humanism)
	N = 286 univ. students, USA			1. Nonpolitical Humanism, 2. "Normative and tough-minded with a tinge of Conservatism" factor

^a Guttman-Kaiser criterion for factor extraction.

^b Principal component method of factor extraction.

Replying to Adorno et al.'s (1950) positive psychological portrayal of (genuine) liberals,² and an unflattering depiction of the conservatives, Eysenck (1954; Eysenck and Wilson 1978) suggested that British communists and fascists are both equally tough-minded, that is authoritarian. Thus, tender-minded liberals are contrasted with tough-minded extremists on both sides of the political spectrum (fascists are 'tough conservatives', while communists are 'tough radicals'). In this way, Eysenck tried to supply empirical support for what is to be known as the 'extremism theory' of the relationship between ideology and authoritarianism (e.g., Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Shils 1954).³

Regarding the methodology in Eysenck's studies, it can be noted that none of the surveyed samples were randomly selected, though occasionally considerably large and heterogeneous. Most studies used statement-scales in Likert format, with various possible degrees of agreement. The most interesting feature of data analysis is quite subjective determination of the number of significant factors. It is difficult to refute the model if two-factors solutions are imposed on the data. Relatively restricted range of items also favoured obtaining desired results. Nevertheless, the revision in 1975, i.e.,

dividing conservatism in economic and religious-moral part, is a significant evolution of the original model.

Conservatism as a unidimensional bipolar dimension

Glenn Wilson began his investigations as Eysenck's collaborator and co-author. While Eysenck shifted his interest the T-factor and its relationship to personality, Wilson remained focused on attitudes and the R-factor. He postulated unidimensionality and bipolarity of social attitudes: social attitudes are various aspects of one underlying dimension - Conservatism, with its opposite pole Radicalism (occasionally also called Liberalism, or Progressivism). In Wilson's description, typical adherent of conservative ideology is characterized by religious fundamentalism, pro-establishment politics, insistence on strict rules and punishments, militarism, ethnocentrism and intolerance of minority groups, preference for the conventional in art, clothing, institutions; anti-hedonistic outlook and restricted sexual behaviour, opposition to scientific progress, and superstition (1973a, 5-9).

According to factor analysis results (Wilson and Patterson 1970), these traits converge into four related attitudes or components of the general conservative ideology: 1. Militarism or Punitiveness, 2. Antihedonism, 3. Ethnocentrism, and 4. Religious Puritanism. Table 3 presents not only studies on the base of which Wilson formulated his theory, but also works of other authors applying his scales in different settings.

Wilson and Patterson (1968, 1970) developed a new technique for measuring social attitudes: the so-called Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale (the 'C-scale'). It consisted of a list of words or 'catch-phrases', like *Religion*, *Death Penalty* or *Abortion*, and respondents were asked to express their approval thereof. Studies reported in **Table 3** tend to support the unidimensionality hypothesis although sometimes relying on tenuous empirical foundation. For example, when the first principal component accounts for only 18% of variance (Truett 1993).

Table 3. Basic methodological features and results of Wilson’s main studies, and of other authors’ studies using Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale

AUTHOR / YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Wilson & Patterson (1970)	Samples from: UK, Netherlands, New Zealand, West Germany	50 items Wilson-Patterson (W-P) Conservatism Scale (C-scale), yes-no scoring	PC extraction, no rotation	Conservatism as general factor, consisting of 4 components: 1. Militarism-Punitiveness, 2. Anti-Hedonism, 3. Ethnocentrism, 4. Religion-Puritanism,
Nias (1972)	N= 441 children between 11-12, England	50 items, adapted WPAI scale	PC extraction, interpreted 1 st PC, and 4 Promax factors	a) special version of Child Conservatism, and sub-dimensions: Religion, Ethnocentrism, Punitiveness, and Sex (hedonism).
Robertson & Cochrane (1973)	N= 329 students, Edinburgh	50-items WPAI	PC, Varimax, 17 factors; interpreted 1 st component, and 4 factors explaining 28% of variance (1 st comp. only 12,9%)	1 st component: Religiosity; and 4 factors: 1. Religiosity, 2. Prurient Sexuality, 3. Racism, 4. unnamed. “C scale does not measure a general dimension of conservatism”.
Wilson & Lee (1974)	N= 356, adults, ad hoc, Korea	WPAI, adapted version	PC extraction, oblique rotation of 4 factors	General factor of Conservatism; 1 st order factors: 1. Militarism, 2. Antihedonism, 3. Ethnocentrism, 4. Religious Puritanism
Sidanius, Ekehammar & Ross (1979)	N= 327 Australian & N= 192 Swedish psychology students	36-item, S5 Conservatism Scale (W-P type), (3 answer options: yes, no, ?)	PAF extraction, Oblimin rotation, “psychological meaningfulness” as a criterion for the no. of factors	6 factors, of which 5 common in both samples: Auth. aggression or Punitiveness, Soc. Inequality, Religion, Pol.-eco. Conservatism, & Racism. Unique: Australia - Pro-west; Sweden: Xenophobia.
Sidanius & Ekehammar (1980)	N= 532; “relatively representative for students in Stockholm”; Sweden	36 items WPAI (Conservatism) scale	Principal factors extraction, 9 factors with eigenval. > 1; no inf. about rotation or correl. between factors	1. Political-economic Conservatism, 2. Racism, 3. Religion, 4. Social inequality, 5. Pro-West, 6. Authoritarian Aggression, 7. Conventionalism, 8. Ethnocentrism, 9. Xenophobia

AUTHOR / YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Green et al. (1988)	N= 499 students and nurses; USA and New Zealand	50-items; W-P Conservatism scale	PC extraction; Varimax; 3 ad 4 factors solutions tested	General factor of Conservatism, but not previously defined sub-dimensions
Katz (1988a)	N= 356 Israeli undergraduates (252 Jews & 104 Arabs	50-items, W-P Conservatism Scale	PC extraction; Varimax; 4 factors according to scree-test	General Conservatism, and the same 4 factors as in Wilson 1970
Katz (1988b)	N= 217 Israeli schoolchildren (Mean age= 12.8)	Children's Scale of Social Attitudes (W-P type)	PC extraction; Varimax; 7 factors with eigenval. > 1; 4 factors according to scree-test	The same as above
Ortet, Perez & Wilson (1990)	N= 185 university students; Catalonia	50-items WPAI	PC extraction; scree-test for No. of factors; 5 factors extracted; no rotation	1.General Conservatism and 'specific content' factors: 2. Realism-Idealism, 3. Permissiveness-Conventional Institutions, 4. Women's Liberation, 5. Punitiveness.
Walkey, Katz & Green (1990)	Volunteers : 203 from South Africa, 252 Jews and 104 Arabs from Israel, 219 from Japan	23 items from W-P Conservatism scale	PC extraction; no rotation; interpreted only 1 st principal component	C scale measures concept "related to the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, with its firmest roots in the English speaking branch of that tradition" (p.988)
Heaven (1992)	N= 273, heterogeneous sample, Australia	50-items revised C-Scale (W-P)	PC extraction, Varimax rot., 15 eigenval. > 1; extracted 4 factors, according to scree-test	1. Religion/morality, 2. Equality, 3. Punitiveness, 4. Hedonism

AUTHOR / YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Truett (1993)	N= 29055(!) volunteers ; 14466 twins & 14589 their family members; USA	28-items W-P Conservatism Scale; Likert 3-point	PC extraction; no rotation; interpreted only 1 st PC accounting for 18% of variance	General Conservatism
Riemann et al. (1993)	N= 184; univ. students; Germany	162 items - "political issues currently discussed in Germany"; W-P type; 7-point Likert	PC extraction; 10 factors eigenval. > 1; 4-factor Varimax solution retained	a) 1 st principal component as General Conservatism dimension; b) 4 Varimax factors: Conservatism, Social welfare and women equality, Liberalism and technological progress, and Taxation for environmental purposes.

Strategy of the data analysis, i.e., the interpretation of the first principal component as a general dimension, and then *orthogonal* rotation of theoretically correlated four factors – elements of conservatism – is questionable. If lower-order factors are elements of the higher-order factor, they have to be correlated, and thus obliquely rotated. Interpretation of the lower-order factors in orthogonal position is inconsistent with their hypothesized role as related components of a general dimension. In cases when analytic methods were less restrictive, the results provided less clear support for a general overarching dimension. For example, Sidanius, Ekehammar, and Ross (1979) and Sidanius and Ekehammar (1980) ended their analyses with 6 and 9 factors respectively, thus suggesting rather loose organization of primary social attitudes.

Riemann et al.'s (1993) research is a good example of studies following Wilson's approach. Using a relatively small student sample from Germany (thus providing a cross-cultural test), they applied a 162-item W-P type of scale referring to a wide set of "political issues currently discussed in Germany". The first principal component was interpreted as the General Conservatism dimension. Varimax rotation of four factors

resulted in the following components of the general conservatism: (1) Conservatism, (2) Social welfare and women equality, (3) Liberalism and technological progress, and (3) taxation for environmental purposes. Although the results lend some support for Wilson's model, it is clear that particular attitudinal configuration depends on the context, but especially on the particular set of items included in the analysis. This explains, for example, the emergence of an environmentalist factor. However, Riemann et al. provided an independent test of the psychological roots of ideological orientations. They correlated a Big-Five personality questionnaire with the isolated attitudinal dimensions. They found that Openness to experience was strongly related with general conservatism. This is important since this trait is related both to Wilson's concept of the fear of uncertainty and to Eysenck's concept of psychoticism.⁴ Conscientiousness correlated with general conservatism as well. This personality trait is similar to what was in earlier psychological vocabulary referred to as anal character or obsessive personality.⁵ Finally, agreeableness, as well as openness to experience, was positively related with the social welfare factor and with environmentalism.

Sampling of respondents and items in this group of studies is again far from being representative, making the conclusions difficult to generalize to non-student populations. However, an interesting and valuable feature of the studies in this group is the attempt to test the scale and theory in various cultural settings. Several studies (e.g., Green et al. 1988; Heaven 1992; Robertson and Cochrane 1973; Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990) supported the almost abandoned idea about the multidimensionality of social attitudes and their cultural determination. For example, Walkey, Katz, and Green (1990) found that the first principal component was less consistently structured the more the samples were culturally distant from the Western, English-speaking samples. However, their conclusion that the C-Scale measures a concept “*related to the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, with its firmest roots in the English speaking branch of that tradition*” (Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990, 988), is not necessarily a difficult theoretical problem for the Wilson's theory. He psychologized the concept of conservatism, viewing it as

“a reflection of a generalized fear of uncertainty, whether *stimulus uncertainty* (complexity, ambiguity, novelty, change, etc., as states of the physical and social environment) or *response uncertainty* (freedom of choice, need conflict, etc., originating from within the individual)” (Wilson 1973b, p. 187, italics in original).

Hence, it is predictable that in different environments the fear of uncertainty (i.e., the personality foundation of conservative attitudes) should be expressed in different ways.

Kerlinger’s Dualistic Theory

The main feature of Kerlinger’s (1984) model is a *dualistic* conception of social attitudes: Conservatism and radicalism (or liberalism) are not opposite extremes of one dimension. Rather, they are orthogonal, independent dimensions. One’s position on the conservative dimension does not tell anything about one’s position on liberalism. The explanation is that for the conservatives, *criterial referents* are different than for liberals. Private property or religion are, for example, criterial referents for conservatives, while civil rights and socialized medicine are for liberals. Thus, according to the theory, one can be both: conservative and liberal, or neither. Frequent negative correlations between Conservatism and Liberalism according to Kerlinger (1984) are the result of improper scaling, factoring, or sampling bias (too many extremists in samples, who are by definition *against* something).

Results of his analyses led to the conclusion that the higher-order Conservatism factor is defined by three lower-order factors:

1. *Religiosity* (and corresponding referents: religion, church, Christian, faith in god, etc.);
2. *Economic Conservatism* (referents: profits, money, business, free enterprise, corporate industry, capitalism, private property, etc.), and
3. *Traditional Conservatism* (referents: discipline, law and order, authority, family, tradition) (Kerlinger 1984, 239).

Five Liberal factors received repeated confirmation:

-
1. *Civil Rights* (civil rights, blacks, racial integration, desegregation),
 2. *Social Liberalism* (social security, socialized medicine, poverty program, economic reform, social welfare, etc.),
 3. *Sexual Freedom* (equality of women, women's liberation, birth control, abortion),
 4. *Human Warmth and Feeling* (love, human warmth, affection, feeling), and
 5. *Progressivism* (child centred curriculum, child's interests and needs, pupil personality, etc.) (Kerlinger 1984). Kerlinger's main results and works of some of his associates are presented in **Table 4**.

Middendorp and deVries (1981) performed an important methodological test in their research. Namely, they compared the catch-phrase and statements types of scales (80 items in each of the two types of scales), and, despite some differences, obtained generally similar results. In this way, the claim that some differences between various models are entirely based on methodological grounds was refuted. Although they started from the Kerlinger's model, their conclusions provided the basis for the later more elaborated Middendorp's (e.g., 1991) model of the structure of ideology. They concluded that behind the obtained structure, one can detect a theoretical ideological model of the "progressive-conservative domain". In their words,

“progressive attitude ‘applies’ the value of *equality* to the *economic* realm (equality of income, property, life chances, etc.) and the value of *freedom* to the *non-economic* realm (e.g., tolerance, permissiveness). Conservative attitudes are the opposite of this: freedom is applied to the economic realm (free enterprise, opposition to government interference) and equality, in some sense at least, is applied to the non-economic realm (e.g., conformist to conventional social norms and to traditional standards of behaviour).”

(Middendorp and deVries 1981, p. 252, italics in original).

Many methodological features of studies in this group are similar to the previously reviewed studies, but there are significant improvements. Several Dutch studies are based on random national samples. Kerlinger (1984) adopted Wilson-

Patterson type of scales (calling the items ‘referents’), but he selected referents out of more than 400 possibilities found through the systematic analysis of literature in political philosophy, public discourse, etc. He was more methodical in data analysis as well, systematically performing higher-order extraction and applying confirmatory procedures. Still, the applied methodology favoured the confirmation of the theory through subjective determination of the number of significant factors and through the orthogonal rotation of the second-order factors.

Table 2. Kerlinger’s studies and studies testing the dualistic theory of social attitudes

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Kerlinger (1972, 1984)	N ~ 530; students of education, teachers; USA	50 items/referents selected from the sample of 400; 7-point, Likert	Principal factors (PF) extraction, Promax rotation, 6 first-order and 2 second-order factors	Two independent factors: 1. Liberalism, 2. Conservatism
Marjoribanks & Josefowitz (1975)	N=460, secondary school students; England and Wales	50-items Conservatism Scale (W-P), + 2 other Likert-type scales	a) PF analysis of each scale, b) PF of 41 selected items, 8 factors extracted 2 nd -order factoring - 2 factors; Varimax rot.	8 1 st -order factors: Racial prejudice, Nationalism, Patriotism, Social conservatism, Disrespect for authority, Political activism, Modern art, and Sexual freedom; Conservatism and Liberalism as 2 nd -order factors.
Kerlinger, Middendorp and Amon (1976)	N=1925; students from USA & Spain & random sample from Netherlands	72-78 items, W-P type REF VIA scale; “freely adapted” for European countries	PF extraction; subjective criteria for No. of factors; 8-12 1 st -order factors; Promax rotation; three 2 nd -order factors	”General support” for independent factors of Conservatism and Liberalism which “underlie many or most social attitudes”.
Kerlinger (1984)	12 samples, N from 206 to 685; mostly students; USA and West Europe	Total ~200 items; 6 different scales, mostly W-P type; 30-78 items, 7-point Likert	Principal Factors analysis; Analysis of covariance structures	Two independent dimensions: 1. Conservatism, 2. Liberalism
Middendorp and deVries (1981)	N=815; general population; Netherlands	80 items - referents (W-P type); 6-points of dis/agreement	PF extraction; Varimax & Promax rotations; extracted 4 factors - the ‘best interpretable’ solution; two 2 nd -order factors	1 st -order: 1. Consensus, 2.Libertarian-Traditional, 3. Left-Right, 4. Liberalism-Conservatism; unclear 2 nd -order factors

	N= 1927; general population; Netherlands	80 items - statements, based on the above referents; 5 or 7-point Likert		1 st -order: Liberalism- Traditionalism, 2. Left-Right, 3. Liberalism-Conservatism, 4. Attitude towards social change
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'Outliers'

There is a considerable number of socio-psychological studies more or less directly related to the problem of the structure of general social attitudes which are not related to the reviewed three models. Some of them are presented in Table 5.

The importance of these studies is twofold. First, they show the dependence of the results on theoretical background and methodological approach (variables, samples, statistical analysis). Second, they document a considerable similarity between findings in these studies and those from the previous three groups, in spite of the differences in methodology.

Table 5. Outliers: Methodological features and main results of some relevant studies out of the three main approaches.

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Sanai (1950)	N≈300 adults; London, UK	16 items; 7-point Likert type collapsed to 2 points	Burt's Bipolar Analysis; extracted: 1 general factor and 2 bipolar factors	1. Progressivism-conservatism, 2. Atheism/socialism vs. Social progressivism, 3. Socialism vs. atheism/agnosticism
O'Neil & Levinson (1954)	N=200 university students	32 items: 10 from Traditional family ideology, 8 - ethnocentrism, 8 authoritarianism, and 6 religious conventionalism	Centroid method, 4 orthogonal factors extracted	1. Religious Conventionalism, 2. Authoritarian submissiveness, 3. No name, 4. Masculine strength façade.
Rokeach & Fruchter (1956)	N=207 college students	43-item Dogmatism scale (D), and 9 other scales	Analysed are summarized scores on scales; Centroid extraction, orthogonal rotation of 3 factors	1. Anxiety, 2. Liberalism-conservatism, and 3. Dogmatism/authoritarianism/rigidity

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Comrey & Newmeyer (1965)	N=212 volunteers ; USA	120 items: 4 homogeneous items for each of 30 attitude variables; 9-point Likert	a) FA of items intercorrelations and construction of 25 'micro' attitude scales for the main analysis; b) 'homogeneous-item-dimension' extraction, Varimax rotation	One second-order factor: Radicalism-Conservatism, and 5 first-order factors: 1. Welfare-State attitudes, 2. Punitive attitudes, 3. Nationalism, 4. Religious attitudes, 5. Racial Tolerance.
Kerlinger & Rokeach (1966)	N=1239, mostly students, USA	D-Scale (40 items) F-Scale (29 items); 7-point Likert type	Principal axes analysis; Promax rotation, 2-nd order analysis	2 nd -order factors: 1. Dogmatism, 2. & 3. Authoritarianism (fascistic version)
Durrheim and Foster (1995)	N=244 psychology students, South Africa	27-item, shortened C scale	4 factors (Scree test), Orthoblique rotation	1. Inequality, 2. Religious conservatism, 3. Political and economic conservatism, 4. Punitiveness.
Enyedi & Todosijević (2003)	Random national sample of adult Hungarians (N = 1002)	18 statement-type items & 22-item catch-phrase scale	PC extraction and Oblimin rotation; Scree test; 4 factors explaining 36,3% of variance	(1) Conventionalism, (2) Socialist conservatism, (3) Right-wing conservatism, (4) Libertarianism
Todosijević (2005)	Random sample of Belgrade residents (N=502)	70 Likert-type items, derived from theoretical and empirical literature	Initial extraction, construction of mini-scales – 15 primary dimensions; 4 order factors	Four 2 nd order factors: 1) socialist conservatism, 2) right-wing conservatism, 3) social order and hierarchy orientation, and 4) post-materialist orientation
Todosijević (2008)	Hungary: national random sample, N=1000 Serbia: students, N=120	17 Likert-type items, "relevant for constructing more general ideological orientations."	PC extraction; 2 factors according to Scree test; explain 38.12% and 27.92% of variance in Hungary and Serbia, respectively.	Hungary: (1) social alienation & socialism and (2) nationalist anti-socialism. Serbia: (1) social alienation & egalitarianism; (2) pro-communist nationalism
Kandler et al. (2012)	872 twins, Germany	8 bipolar items, intended to measure the left-right differentiation	PCA extraction; 2 factors according to the minimum average partial tests for the number of components.	Two factors: (1) acceptance of inequality [AI], and (2) rejecting system change [RC].

A particularly interesting example is Comrey and Newmeyer's study. It is one of the methodologically best studies reviewed here, but without much visible influence on later research (apart of Todosijević, 2005). Yet, the results fit the Eysenck's and Wilson's models well. A serious problem in many of the reviewed studies based on item analysis is low commonality and consequent low percentage of explained variance. The root of the problem is in the inadequate reliability of the single items. One solution is to use hierarchical factor analysis. Another answer to the problem, adopted by Comrey and Newmeyer (1965), is to construct 'micro-scales', consisting of several semantically close items, thus providing more reliable measures for the beginning of analysis. At the end of their analysis a single second-order factor accounted for 42% of variance, which is considerably more than, for example 18% in Truett (1993).

In recent years, several studies were conducted in Eastern Europe (Enyedi & Todosijević 2003, Todosijević 2005, 2008). Todosijević (2008) conducted a study based on a random sample of Belgrade residents (N=502) in the Spring of 2002. The results showed that Serbian mass political attitudes vary along fifteen latent dimensions, including dimensions such as nationalism, militarism, economic liberalism, and environmentalism. Second-order factor analysis revealed four general ideological dimensions: 1) socialist conservatism or the "regime divide", 2) right-wing conservatism, 3) social order and hierarchy orientation, and 4) the post-materialist orientation. This, as well as various other studies in the post-communist context, provide evidence of the association between political left and authoritarianism (e.g., Enyedi and Todosijević 2002; McFarland, Ageyev, and Djintcharadze 1996), suggesting the importance of political history and socio-cultural factors.

Yet, on another level, the same evidence supports the general association between personality dispositions and attitudes. In Serbia, authoritarianism correlated both with the 'socialist conservatism' and the more common type of right-wing conservatism. Hence, authoritarianism appears to be at the roots of *psychological* conservatism and anti-democratic orientation more generally, the expression of which depends on particular cultural context.

Discussion and implications

It is difficult to make firm generalizations about the reviewed studies because of differences in the applied methods and in the amount of details reported. However, some principal tendencies and features can be outlined. Three models of the structure of social attitudes have dominated the field for several decades: Eysenck's, Wilson's and Kerlinger's. Eysenck's Conservatism-Radicalism dimension served as the basis for the development of Wilson's and Kerlinger's models, disputing over its bipolar or dualistic nature (Kerlinger 1972, 1984; Wilson 1973a; Wilson and Patterson 1968). Tough-mindedness has been linked to psychological variables, such as authoritarianism (e.g., Eysenck and Wilson 1978; Ray 1982) or dogmatism (Rokeach 1960). However, it is difficult to see which of the models is on firmer empirical grounds.

Most studies are based on small, ad hoc samples, usually social science students. Two types of instruments have dominated the field: lists of statements in Likert format, and Wilson-Patterson lists of referents. The size of scales varies from less than 20 to more than 200 items. The content of the items and process of their selection often remains unexplained, but there are exceptions where the selection of questions is explicitly justified (e.g. Kerlinger 1984, Middendorp 1989, Todosijević 2005).

The interpretation and labelling of the extracted factors is a separate problem. Many of the proposed labels are synonymous. Sometimes the same label denotes different factors, and vice versa - similar factors have different labels. Frequently, there is not enough information to compare the content of factors besides their labels. For example, Ortet, Perez, and Wilson (1990) named one of their second-order factors as idealism vs. realism. However, the real meaning of this factor is clearer after finding that the realism pole is defined by the support for apartheid and white superiority.

Overall, more than thirty different factor labels figure in the reviewed studies, various versions of conservatism and liberalism being the most common. Other frequent labels are nationalism (and varieties like ethnocentrism, racism, patriotism), tender-mindedness (and related concepts - authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, Punitiveness, dogmatism), and religiosity.

The review shows that it is not always easy to connect theoretical concepts with the empirically obtained attitudes. In order to avoid subjectivity, it is useful to pre-define ideological content of the items. In this way, the obtained factors will be interpreted in a more 'objective' manner, but also the results would have more explicit theoretical importance. If a dimension contains items or scales supposed to measure different ideological dimensions, yet they still appear on a single factor, such results suggest 'factor convergence' specific for the analysed case. This strategy is not applicable in a purely inductive research.

It is important to note that the reviewed theories evolved over time. Eysenck (1975) introduced the third dimension, representing the economic left-right division. Wilson and collaborators extensively compared results from various cultures. They observed that with the greater cultural difference from the English speaking Judeo-Christian tradition there is less evidence of the ideological unidimensionality (Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990). Middendorp and deVries' (1981) results provide the basis for the integration of Kerlinger's dualistic and Wilson's bipolar theories.⁶ When there is a consensus in the population about certain referents, they are not the basis for the left-right division. Inclusion of referents about which opinions are polarized produces polarized factors.

Referring back to the hierarchical model of attitude structure, the literature proposes different origins of co-variation between elements in the hierarchy. Semantic similarity and logical constraints operate predominantly on the lower levels. Common psychological functionality, elite discourse, basic political values are more relevant for the structuration at higher levels. Moreno (1999), for example, sees the source of the most general ideological configuration in elite divisions and visibility of different elite fractions. Middendorp (1991) attributes the strongest influence to the elite discourse and influential intellectual traditions, as well as to the general political values from which the main ideological streams are derived.

Researchers in the socio-psychological tradition offer potentially universally applicable models attempting to explain individual differences in ideological

orientations (Jost et al. 2009). Dispositional and personality concepts such as authoritarianism, the 'need for cognitive closure' (Jost et al. 2003; Maltby and Price 1999), "the tough-poise, extroversion and rigidity" (Birenbaum and Zak 1982, 512), fear of uncertainty (Wilson 1973b), or general values (Rokeach 1973; Maio et al. 2003), contributed significantly to our understanding of the integrating factors behind certain attitudinal configurations. Recent research suggests that causal chain might start before personality – in genetic factors. According to Kandler et al. (2012), political attitudes are transferred between generations not environmentally but genetically, via personality.

The best contribution of the future research would, perhaps, be in comparative analysis of the interplay between psychological and socio-political determinants of the attitude structuration. Thus far, we know that both personality and social factors (e.g. class divisions, political history) and politics (ideological polarization) affect the attitude organization. but, we lack the knowledge about the nature of interaction between these factors.

Methodological implications

Several methodological improvements could move the field forward. It would be useful to develop more reliable measures of primary attitudes, through creating 'mini-scales' for measuring habitual opinions (for examples see Comrey and Newmeyer 1965; Todosijević 2005). Without more reliable measures at the lower level, it is difficult to obtain reliable and valid measures on higher levels. Kerlinger's three second-order factors (Kerlinger, Middendorp, and Amon 1976), for example, accounted only for 18% of total variance of 11 primary factors. With results such as these, it is difficult to justify the claim that higher-order factors are really relevant 'underlying dimensions' of all social attitudes.

The selection of items should be substantively representative for the domain in question. Biased and partial coverage of the ideological dimensions often characterizes both empirical models and more theoretical accounts. Reliance on *ad hoc* sampling of variables tends to violate one of the basic requirements for discovering the 'laws of

structure', namely, representativeness of the sample of variables for the domain under investigation (Nesselroade and Cattell 1988).² In some contemporary studies in post-communist context (Todosijević 2005), for instance, theoretical and empirical literature about relevant political-ideological dimensions guided the selection of items.

Particular attention should be given to the interpretation of the obtained factors. It can be enhanced by systematically relating the isolated factors to a broad set of theoretically relevant independent and dependent variables. The former group, for example, would include standard socio-demographic background variables, dispositional variables such as personality dimensions, authoritarianism, prejudice, and political preferences.

Additional avenues for the future research include the question of the relevance of ideological dimensions for political behaviour. Describing how political attitudes are structured and explaining individual difference thereof are important topics in their own right. The significance of such knowledge, however, vastly increases if it helps understanding political action. For instance, in Serbia in 1998, the dimension of pro-communist nationalism strongly correlated with party preference, unlike the alienation-socialism factor (Todosijević 2008).

Social and political context affects attitude structure - ideology appears differently structured in Western Europe, Middle and Far East, and post-communist world. In order to understand the logic of variation, additional comparative research is needed. For instance, 'new democracies' of Eastern Europe provide an attractive ground for the discovery of atypical ideological configurations. On the one side, these countries are, in the global perspective, relatively close to the 'West' in terms of cultural and social features, and in their exposure to the main ideological currents and intellectual traditions inspiring them. Yet the unique experience of the communist monopoly over political discourse has left at least a temporary mark on the way citizens organize and express their basic political views (e.g., Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004; Evans and Whitefield 1993).

Finally, reliance on national representative samples would be more than welcome. It would secure that respondents of various ideological orientations are adequately represented. The typical student samples are likely to introduce biases, particularly in this area.

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Endnotes

- 1 Later named tough mindedness vs. tender-mindedness.
- 2 Adorno et al. (1950) were concerned primarily with the psychological sources of ethnocentrism and prejudice. However, the authoritarianism dimension that they described and the F-scale measuring it have remained an important influence in this field. For instance, four components of general conservatism in Wilson's (1973a) model (Punitiveness, antihedonism, ethnocentrism and religious puritanism) are described as characteristic for individuals with high score on the F-scale.
- 3 Shikano and Pappi (2004), though coming from entirely different research tradition, recently reported broadly corresponding findings. Their second dimension of political space in Germany was defined as "the degree of radicalism in the sense of non-established vs. established parties" (Ibid., 10).
- 4 And to recently elaborated concept of the need for cognitive closure as well (Jost et al. 2003).
- 5 In this sense, their results are in line with Adorno et al.'s (1950).
- 6 Birenbaum and Zak (1982) argue that Kerlinger and Eysenck models can be integrated as well. Birenbaum and Zak's results support Kerlinger's idea about criteriality, as well as Eysenck's hypothesis about the role of personality. They obtained two orthogonal factors in Israel, similar to Kerlinger's conservatism and liberalism factors. Personality correlated with one of the dimensions, i.e., "only traditional attitudes correlate with personality traits" (Birenbaum and Zak 1982, 512). This personality trait is described as consisting of "the tough-poise, extroversion and rigidity" (Ibid., 512).
- 7 Saucier's (2000) lexical study of ideology is clearly an example of the care given to the selection of variables.

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Representative publications:

Todosijević, B. (2013). Social, psychological and ideological roots of nationalist attitudes in Serbia. *Psihologija*, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 279-297.

Todosijević, B. (2012). Transfer of variables between different data-sets, or Taking 'previous research' seriously. *BMS: Bulletin of Sociological Methodology*, 113, pp. 20-39.

Todosijević, B. (2008). *Politics of world views: Ideology and political behavior in Serbia 1990-2002*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag.

Todosijević, B. and Enyedi, Zs. (2008). Authoritarianism without Dominant Ideology: Political Manifestations of Authoritarian Attitudes in Hungary. *Political Psychology*, 29(5), pp. 767-787.

Section 2:

Political Culture

Computational and Simulation Modeling Studies

The Art of the Possible.

Towards a Cognitive Model for Political Action Choice

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Abstract

The consideration of political action by individuals is constrained by what those people consider possible, in terms of not only their immediate actions but also in terms of what changes in the world those individuals believe could occur because of their, or others', actions. However, there are two major complications to this picture: (a) people are heavily influenced by others they are in social contact with in terms of both goals and assessment of possibility, and (b) since what people do is influenced by what world-changes they consider possible, and people know this, what can change is influenced also by what others think others around them think is possible. Politics thus involves complex processes at several levels, including: the spread of goals and possibility assessments throughout a local social network, and adjustments in what people think about others' possibility judgements. An implementable cognitive model suitable for building into an agent-based model is proposed, drawing on existing cognitive structures to simulate social contact, goal-directed action choice, negotiation and social norms.

Introduction

This paper represents the view of a computational social modeller, not an expert in political theory or literature. This is therefore somewhat of an outsider's view of what might be appropriate. It outlines a proposal for a possible cognitive model that directly addresses the question of action choice in political situations – ones where the actions of one actor (or actors) constrain what is possible for others, that is where some have power over another or over what may transpire.

I will start with some example situations to highlight the core elements of the proposed model. Both of these are highly simplified accounts of such situations, involving only a few of the different political viewpoints that might be involved, but they do highlight some important factors that (I argue) do need to be taken into account but are amenable to computational simulation.

In the discussions below, I will use a style of diagram that directly corresponds to the cognitive representations that might be used in a simulation of actors³. They represent states of the world (the nodes) and what transitions between these states (the arrows) are believed to be realistic possibilities. The transitions between states are labelled by the events or agent actions that may cause the transition. These actions are not necessarily those of the actor with the beliefs illustrated, since many transitions depend upon the actions of others (otherwise politics would be redundant). The states of the world come with their valency for the agent – that is, how desirable the agent considers them. However to keep the diagrams simple I will usually leave valency out, since it is clear by context.

This is an extension of the possible world semantics (PWS) of Kripke (1963). In standard PWS, nodes represent possible states of the world and directed arcs the possible transitions between those states. Here this is slightly extended to allow the accessible labelling of nodes and arcs, which can be explicitly reasoned about by the actors. Each actor may have a different “map” of what the relevant possible states of the world and the connecting actions are (and, very relevantly, who they think can do those actions). Of course, their mental maps may turn out to be wrong, and be updated by future events, but this snapshot of maps does form a coherent and powerful model for how such political decisions are made.

In the paper below I seek to show that this kind of reasoning is especially important for political reasoning and action.

³For a history of the many people involved in the development of this style of representation, see the appendix of (Edmonds and Hales 2004).

Examples

The following examples are not tied to any particular observed situations, but are rather abstract examples to demonstrate the plausibility and potential explanatory power of the modelling approach.

Example 1. Protest

Whether people protest does not only depend on the existence of a legitimate grievance and the danger in protesting (if any), but crucially on (a) whether they think protesting could change anything and (b) whether they think others will protest. Whether others protest is based on similar considerations. If people think that the effect of any protest will likely be blocked by those opposing change (i.e. there is no real possibility of contributing to any change) and the danger is high, any protest will be poorly attended despite the existence of a legitimate grievance. If people believe that there is a possibility that protest might have some effect then whether they protest will depend on their willingness to face any danger but also whether they think others will protest. If everybody thinks others will protest they may all come out to do so. If everybody thinks others would not join a protest, then they will not. This is particularly the case if they think they may only be in danger if there are only a few on the protest.

To make this clearer, let us draw some of the states of the world and the transitions considered possible by this citizen. Say these citizens live in a strong dictatorship. Maybe this person's mental map looks a bit like that of **Figure 1**.




Figure 1.

A Citizen's View of Possibilities in a Strong Dictatorship

Here the citizen believes that a small protest is possible but then there is a possibility they would be arrested and thus put in danger. This person does not believe that even if a protest of significant size were possible that this would lead to any change, even given that they would likely be safe in such a protest. Since they reckon that many others share this reasoning, they would doubt that many would protest. This reinforces the conclusion that the only possible outcome of protesting is danger so there is no protest.




Figure 2.

A Citizen's View of Possibilities in a Weakened Dictatorship

Contrast this with the situation where the citizen thinks there is a possibility that significant protest could lead to change. In this case, even if this person thinks that a significant sized protest is not possible, they might risk arrest and protest, since they can reason that change is possible in the following manner. If others share their view that significant protest might bring about change and they see people joining a small protest they may see the possibility of a large protest and, even relatively timid people join it since they may be safe then but still might achieve change. The result might be then a significantly sized protest and maybe change. In a safe country where one does not risk arrest by protesting the size of the protest will be of less concern and the existence of protest driven largely by the judgement as to whether there is a chance of causing change.

The government might well take steps to prevent change in this circumstance in three ways: ensure people are aware that there is a real possibility of being arrested if

there is a small demonstration, emphasise that things will not change regardless of protest, and try to encourage the perception that even if a few protest most will not. Further they might try to socially denigrate few protesters by portraying them as “extremists” or otherwise antisocial. It is notable that many of these steps are matters of persuasion/propaganda as well as actions of force.

Those agitating for change might try to persuade people that change is possible if enough protest and that it is likely that many will protest. If they can persuade enough people to join the protest that others will feel relatively safe in joining in they might obtain a significant protest, since the bigger the protest the less dangerous it will appear to join it. Further, they will know that the social experience of joining with others on a social experience may help persuade people of the possibility of change. Their problem is getting enough to protest if it is perceived as being pointless, that few people will join and thus would be vulnerable to individual arrest.

Example 2. A Political Dialogue

This example is loosely derived from a report on the Maaswerken negotiation process (van Asselt et al. 2001) designed to achieve a consensus about flood prevention measures in the Maas river basin. Here there are some possible flood prevention measures: building dykes and extending flood plains. Clearly, the Netherlands, with their tradition of working towards a consensus, is very different from one in a dictatorship where suppressed conflict might be the norm.

For both citizens and government it is overwhelmingly important to prevent getting to the state possible floods anytime in the future. The citizen thinks it is possible to prevent this by getting to one of the high flood defence states since even High rain will not then cause floods (**Figure 3**). The government thinks there is a possibility of abnormal rain that the citizen does not think possible (Figure 4). Hence, the government does not think that attaining to the state of High flood defences will prevent the possibility of getting to possible floods in the future. Other things being

equal the citizen prefers not to accept high taxes and the government does not want to build high flood defences.




Figure 3.

Citizen's View (simple)




Figure 4.

Government's View (simple)

In this case, there is quickly a stalemate since in the government's view building high flood defences would not prevent any possibility of flooding because abnormally high rain would overwhelm them. The citizens would prefer high flood defences even at the cost of higher taxes because they think it would prevent the possibility of flooding (since they do not believe in the reality of abnormally high rain).

However if the view of both parties is expanded to include a new possibility, namely flood plains, which are environmentally attractive and will mitigate (but not

prevent) flooding, then the outcome can be very different. These expanded views are shown in **Figure 5** and **Figure 6**.




Figure 5.
Citizen's View (extended)




Figure 6.
Government's View (extended)

Now the outcome might be different, namely to accept higher taxes and build flood plains. This is despite the fact that the citizens would prefer high flood defences, which (they think) would prevent all flooding. The fact that citizens and government prefer flood plains to the current position means that they can agree upon that. How such “expansions” or changes in beliefs can occur can make the difference between a political process that comes to a consensual decision and one that does not.

Example 3. Corruption

Consider the case of corruption, where a citizen requires some official document. If corruption is not only common, but considered endemic, then the pattern of possibilities might be considered to be as in **Figure 7** by a citizen. This citizen assumes that even if the request for a bribe is reported then nothing would happen as the officials to whom this is reported are equally corrupt. In this case there are two rational actions, to do without the document and hope not to be detected, or to pay the bribe and get the document. If the citizen suspects that he can not afford the bribe it might well be better not to apply for the document in the first place.




Figure 7.
Citizen's View in a Corrupt Society

In a different society, one might believe that one would obtain a document eventually, and that the official risks significant sanction if you reported the request for a bribe. In this case refusing the bribe and maybe reporting the official is the rational course of action. Critically in these cases, it is not whether an official is likely to be arrested when reported that is crucial but whether citizen and official think he is likely to be arrested – it is the perception of possibilities that makes the difference.




Figure 8.

Citizen's View in a Less Corrupt Society

Summary of Characteristics

In this section, I summarise the main issues and distinctions to realise the picture of reasoning about action that is implied in the examples above. These will directly relate to the elements in the suggested simulation framework of such political action.

Goals

The above examples already assume what people's goals might be. Here a goal is represented as a state from which people can reason about what actions they might take (to reach it). If one has a goal to get to an airport by a certain time, then one can

think about how to achieve this. This is completely different from “indicators”, such as happiness, prosperity, amount of food, pain, fairness etc. Although, overall, what people desire in terms of these indicators is pretty clear (if not for themselves then for family or others), they are not something from which one can reason to determine what action to take. Just because one desires more happiness does not mean this helps directly in determining what to do to get it.

Indicators do help in determining goals, but as feedback for learning goals. Thus, one might learn that some experience of some state of the world does change indicators in a desirable direction and so, subsequently, attaining to this state might be adopted as a goal. Similarly, others might suggest goals, which might be “sold” on the basis that it might increase desirable indicators (or decrease undesirable ones). For example, it might be suggested that everybody works hard and puts up with temporary discomfort in order that a project is attained that will eventually benefit all (e.g. bringing in the harvest). Thus, goals change from time to time and which goals are adopted is a political matter. For a more comprehensive discussion of indicators, goals and goal-directed reasoning, see (Milgram 2001).

Which goals are most important to individuals is often a matter of dealing with immediate problems or constraints in their lives. Thus, even though growing enough food might be a general goal, if it gets cold enough staying warm might rise above this in importance for a while. Thus, in crises preventing an indicator from becoming too bad (too little food, too much unhappiness, too much pain, too great a chance of death etc.) might become an immediate goal. Clearly, by threatening people with a severe deterioration of such indicators one can motivate people to behave in ways one wishes (if one has the power to enforce this), however there are two solutions to such a threat: to comply and avoid the consequences or to get rid of the possibility of the threat.

Possibility Beliefs

Key in both of the above examples is which destination states people believe are reachable, i.e. what they think is possible. In the first example, what was key was which actions (causing transitions between states) individuals believe could occur, and

which transitions between states were possible. In the second example, the suggestion of new possibilities in terms of new states and transitions enabled a decision to emerge despite the fact that (overall) citizens and the government had different views of what was possible. This structure of beliefs and possibilities was implicit in (van Boven and Thompson 2001) and made explicit in (Edmonds and Hales 2004).

Social Influence

Others can suggest both beliefs about possibility and which goals might be adopted. In particular if a person is a part of a group they identify with and they think that a majority of others share certain beliefs then it is particularly likely that they will come to share them. Goals can be adopted if people share their possibility, salience and broad desirability. The effect of participating in a crowd or tight group can be particularly powerful, with people being persuaded of things that they might later reject. For example in such situations one can feel temporarily powerful and immune in a way that is far beyond that supported by an objective evaluation.

Reflexivity

As illustrated in the above examples, what is considered possible is not only what an individual directly considers, but what they consider are other people's beliefs about possibilities. Although not always the case, one of the biggest clues as to what others might believe is what you believe – an individual might thus project their beliefs upon others around them, assuming they think the same things are possible as you think are possible. Of course, occasionally, what happens might be determined by what others think your possibility beliefs are, or what others might suspect your beliefs are. For example, if you think the authorities suspect you believe it is possible to overthrow them you might well act differently than the case where you believe they can not know that you believe this. This inherent and deep reflexivity in human belief about others can thus be critical to what actions are taken.

Culture

Although clearly societies develop means to constrain the real affordances available to individuals in terms of which actions are possible (for example making keys so that only people with the keys can open a door or start a car), another set of constraints is in the assumptions passed down within cultures as to what is considered possible (Sugden 2000)⁴. Not only might this body of cultural beliefs be difficult to question (since one would be brought up assuming them), but such beliefs may be self-confirming (due to the fact they are widespread). For example, if a certain distinguishable group in a population is considered as particularly aggressive then people may actively look for signs of aggression when interacting with them, and by their anticipations prompt the aggression they were expecting. Those who are expected to be aggressive might find that they will be perceived as aggressive anyway and so lose nothing by being aggressive. Thus the culture of expectations might entrench itself over time, providing all with many apparent confirmations of their assumptions. To give a more positive example, if everybody thinks there is a high probability that the corrupt will be found out and prosecuted then fewer people will be corrupt and also the social institutions that enforce non-corruption will have a greater chance of being effective (since they have a manageable number of cases to deal).

Thus human institutions are not only distinguished by the visible structures of power (legal rules, sanctions etc.) but significantly also the less visible structure of the raft of cultural assumptions about what is possible, what people will think possible, what is expected, social norms etc. that hold. It is perhaps these assumptions that, taken as a whole, best characterise the different “political mentalities” that seem to be common within each country.

Of course, there is rarely only one such set of cultural assumptions that exist in any country, but rather an “ecology” of different assumptions. For example, different

⁴Indeed (Elkins & Simeon 1979) consider political culture as the set of assumptions held.

classes, sexes, ethnic groups, religions etc. might share and pass on different sets of assumptions.

Towards a Computational Cognitive Model

The basic cognitive model I am proposing should be somewhat clear from the above discussion. It combines elements that are already present in previous social simulation models. This style of model is not designed to be parsimonious but rather descriptive in style (Edmonds and Moss 2005), though if my arguments that beliefs concerning possibility are key to determining political action are right, it is difficult to see how a simpler model would suffice.

Core Structures

A working model of the simulation following the above suggestions is not available here, but rather a closer specification of what it would consist of. The framework is an ambitious one going beyond the current state of the art, however all its elements have been included within past simulations, so their combination in the way discussed below is entirely plausible, and I hope that future versions of this paper would include working examples.

The basic elements of this model are:

Beliefs. The agent's beliefs are encoded as a set of states of the world and transitions between them that the agents considers relevant and possible. This is represented as set of nodes and directed links between them. The nodes represent the possible world states and the links possible transitions between them. Transitions are labelled with the conditions for them occurring which will be typically a combination of events and actions that might occur by the agent or others. States might also be labelled to enable communication about these between agents. Actions or events occurring would trigger a change in the state of the world, which may or may not correspond with what an individual's model of the world said would happen.

Current State of the World. One of the possible states will be the one that corresponds to the individual's perception of the current state of affairs. This perception might be misconceived or biased, for example when an individual thinks many more will come out in protest than actually occurs.

Fundamental Indicators. As discussed under the goals subsection these are some kind of comparable indication of how desirable (or far from undesirable) states are from the point of view of the agent. They are associated with the states in the cognitive model. The simplest way to do this is via floating point numbers⁵. These might well be built into the agent and relate to its basic well being (e.g. lack of pain, status with peers, amount of money etc.)⁶. There might typically be more than one relevant dimension of such indicators⁷. Indicators will be updated from the world (i.e. an external change such as getting hungry) or due to a change in the world state.

Environmental/scarcely resource frustrations. Each of these dimensions is associated with a threshold for each individual; such that if the indicator drops below this, redressing this particular becomes a priority for the agent. Thus an indicator dropping below its minimum can change the current goal of the agent to a state where this indicator is improved (e.g. if one gets hungry then eating becomes a goal unless there is another overriding objective). The values given to these indicators are not directly effectible by the agents themselves but only by changing state of the world via actions (e.g. eating).

Current Goals. Given the: current values of the indicators, the current state of the world, and what transitions are considered possible by the agent, the agent may

⁵ In general, it is only essential that enough of the states can be compared to determine which is better when faced with a choice. Not all pairs of states need to be comparable; indeed, for many possible pairs it may not be meaningful to compare them.

⁶ For any particular modelling task, these dimensions will probably be fixed, but one kind of subtle political action involves the introduction of a new dimension, e.g. amount of freedom, which provides another dimension under which nodes can be judged. However, it is probably difficult for a third party to "create" effective minimum thresholds for another. Thus unless an agent comes to value the dimension a lot (e.g. it becomes part of their self-image which takes time) then this dimension might only be used to compare states if all other, more entrenched, indicators are at satisfactory (above threshold) values.

⁷ It is not necessarily true that all states are associated with all indicators, so some states might be comparable using some indicators but not others. However, it is simpler to give a value for all indicators to all states. Another extension might be to add some uncertainty or fuzziness to these values.

determine which state of the world is their current goal (if any). This goal helps determine what actions will be taken. The situation is complicated because achieving many goals requires coordination with others (e.g. protesting together). The agent then tries to achieve this state via its actions, including negotiating with others for them to take appropriate contributing actions (or withholding from taking actions that might prevent the goal being achieved).

Environment. The agents are embedded into an environment that gives meaning to their perceptions of which world state they are in, and which may determine the values of their indicators. In most political situations the most important parts of this are the other actors and their actions – a wide range of other actors will impact upon the world states relevant for any individual, whether they know them or not. Additionally, there may be a real set of states of the world and transitions, upon which the perception of the agents is based – a “Ground Model” (e.g. whether it really is possible to build dykes that prevent floods under any weather conditions), but often there is no accessible ground model of truth. Some beliefs may simply be individual and others determined by the beliefs of others (e.g. whether most consider that they inhabit a democracy).

Action Plans. Since in many political cases, in order to obtain many goals, immediate reactive actions and not sufficient but coordinated plans of action are necessary, plans of action with a degree of commitment may need to be remembered. However, these are subject to continual comparison against alternative plans and evaluated as to their likelihood of being completed.

Social Influencers. Some of the other actors will be influential upon an individual in terms of their beliefs. These may be personal social contacts, or people with power or status (such as leaders, TV presenters, etc.). The web of influence may be represented by a social network or just be implicit in the structure of the environment (e.g. neighbours). For example, social norms prevalent among these influencers may determine whether a particular goal is acceptable or what actions are

permissible in the current situation (Conte, Andrighetto, Andrighetto, in press). It is probably sensible to distinguish friends from other influencers.

Basic Processes

The following computational processes will need to occur in either a cyclic, event-driven or a parallel fashion⁸.

Current State. The agent needs to determine which state (that they believe in) the world is in (or they are in). This may be the result of external observation, but also might be based on which previous state they perceived was current, updated by the events and actions they believed to have occurred in the intervening period.

Belief Update/Creation. Beliefs may need to be continually updated/revise, created or discarded. This is primarily from two sources: (a) observation of the external world, including the traces left by others there and (b) as a result of communication from others. The former requires some inference and/or induction from what is observed. The later may be more direct in terms of statements of what is true and/or possible. However, it does not mean that belief acceptance is straightforward or “rational”. One persuasive and possibly realistic scheme for belief acceptance/revision is Thagard’s theory of “explanatory coherence” (Thagard 1989), where beliefs are accepted or rejected according their total coherence with an actor’s existing beliefs¹⁰.

Indicator Update. The current levels of each agent’s indicators need to be updated. Often this is concerning the ground model and the agent’s situation therein. However, indicators can be socially grounded so that their update depends on the states of other agents, e.g. reputation or status.

⁸The order these occur in can be important. Thus it may be that these have to effectively occur in parallel, with time represented at a fine enough grain so that the necessary sequences of decisions represented.

⁹That is, not necessarily rational in the sense of adhering to some normative scheme of rationality, e.g. economic rationality or Bayesian learning.

¹⁰In later work, Thagard extends this to include the coherence between goals and beliefs, so that beliefs that are in dissonance to one’s goals (e.g. travelling and climate change) might be dismissed regardless of their evidential base.

Goal Selection. Given an agent's situation, beliefs and indicators a goal needs to be selected in the form of deciding upon a state the agent will try and reach next. This has to be a state that the agent believes is accessible from the current state, even if this might involve events and/or actions by others that cannot be guaranteed (e.g. one only enters a lottery if there is a possibility, however remote, that one could win). If different goals are considered accessible then the selection of a goal state might involve weighing up the benefit (in terms of improved indicator values), risk (perceived probability of events and actions outside the agent's control of occurring) and cost of actions. As mentioned above, attention might be restricted to indicators whose value has dropped below the minimum acceptable to the individual.

Action Negotiation. The individual may enter a sequence of communications with other agents to see if they might collectively agree on a joint plan of action that is coherent with everyone's goals. This is composed of an: exploratory series of offers, suggestion of joint plans, and their acceptance by necessary participants. See (Edmonds and Hales 2004) for details about how this works within the context of a working simulation of such negotiation processes. This is especially important in this context since most political actions are in the context of cooperation or opposition where goals are socially co-dependent (Conte and Sichman 1995).

Action Choice. Given the assessment of the above, an action (or action plan) is executed.

State Update. Given the actions of the agents (and possibly external factors) the state of any Ground Model needs to be updated.

Initialisation

Politics always has a history. This poses a problem for the simulator because they have to start their simulation at some particular point. There are basically two approaches to this: (1) running the simulation from some null or random state for some period of time until the effects of the initialisation seem to have disappeared (2) initialising the ground model, agents' beliefs etc. to represent some kind of specific

situation¹¹. Both have different disadvantages: approach (1) may result in artificial situations that have never been observed (and maybe would never be observed), approach (2) is onerous and might require a very details initialisation, for which one may only have partial data and thus requiring much guesswork.

If one has access to stakeholders or their accounts it might be possible to elicit their beliefs or extract some of these, as in (Hare et al. 2002a, Taylor 2003, Bharwani 2004) or by analysing the narrative texts as in (Urquhart 2012). One interesting possibility is that of eliciting such data by engaging participants in role-playing games (Hare et al. 2002b, Bharwani 2006).

Concluding Discussion

This kind of model can be seen as an answer to the critique of theoretical models of politics that were “too neat” in (March & Olsen 1984). In that they made a strong critique of theories that either were reductionist or “too efficient” in terms of functionally reaching desirable societal goals. In that paper they came against the barrier of how much complexity might be included in a political theory, however agent-based modelling breaks this limitation, allowing complex mixes of social, normative, institutional, individual and economic processes to be investigated together, without premature simplification. In this way individuals embedded within their societies (neither over- nor under-socialised) can be posited, explored and (ultimately) confronted with empirical data (Granovetter 1985).

The Use of This Kind of Model

A simulation constructed using such a cognitive model will not be a predictive model in a probabilistic sense. That is, it will not estimate probabilities of sequences of events occurring. However, it would allow the mapping out of real possibilities, including those that would not have been considered otherwise. In this sense it is a possibilistic model. This can be a fruitful source of hypotheses for further empirical

¹¹One can also have a mixture of approach (1) for some aspects and (2) for others depending on what is practical and/or known.

research¹², or in the design of “early warning indicators” of developing socio-political processes (e.g. growing inter-community tension).

Prospects for Validation

Scenarios constructed from the outputs of such models can be presented to stakeholders and other domain experts as a test of their plausibility. Also one can form a list of kinds of situation that one would expect to be possible given certain initialisations (e.g. those derived from case studies) and then the simulations inspected to check for their occurrence. However, this kind of model does have a distinct advantage in that not only the outcomes but also the process by which they develop within the simulation is suitable for inspection and critique. A particularly strong result is if unexpected outcomes emerge from a model and these turn out to be confirmed by domain stakeholders/experts that allows for a “cross-validation” of both micro- and macro- levels of a simulation (Moss and Edmonds 2005).

The fact that any such model can only be partially validated is not an obstacle for it being attempted, nor indeed for its utility. It is likely that good models of political processes will only emerge after many iterations of model building and empirical research. What is important is that the process is begun and that it is accessible to critique, re-implementation and improvement by other researchers as part of an open and long-term joint scientific effort (Edmonds 2010).

Further Development

I hope that the ECPAM'2013 conference will provide a chance to confront the computational structures I present with some of the known case studies and political theory and enable a more sophisticated model to emerge, one that is more rooted in evidence.

¹² For a more detailed discussion of model types and purposes, see (Edmonds et al. 2013).

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Why Individual Interactions Are Not Enough?

Agent-Based Simulation of Polity. An Operational Concept

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Abstract

Social modeling research has had major contributions to mechanism and process modeling by introducing micro-macro models able to replicate social mechanisms and allow for bottom-up constructive approaches like the artificial societies. Applied to political mechanisms, the social simulation modeling paradigm proves one major weakness, namely its low capacity to deconstruct the political phenomena and thus explain the macro-micro patterns. In this paper we argue that the individual interactions mechanism is not enough for the computational and simulation modeling of political phenomena. We suggest a political culture approach to polity agent-based modeling and simulation and introduce an operational concept and architecture.

Keywords: political mechanism, political culture, artificial polity, simulation modeling

Motto:

*“But there is more to social mechanisms than just individual interactions...”¹³
“Give me a good speculative mechanism any day rather than a batch of useless survey data”¹⁴*

¹³ Steel D. 2003. Social Mechanisms and Causal Inference, *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, No. 34, p.58.

¹⁴Gambetta D. 1998. Concatenations of mechanisms, in: “Social Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach To Social Theory”, Hedström P. and Swedberg R. (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, Ch. 5, p.120.

Introduction

Social modeling is understood as a complex way of explaining social phenomena. It has been successfully used in Social Simulation as a way of explaining social action and emergent phenomena. With just a step behind, Political Methodology has included simulation modeling only recently and only in some areas of simulation modeling research, International Relations and Voting Behavior being the most preferred for their rather easy appropriation of agent-based system models.

In Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), the current specifications of the concepts *artificial society* and *artificial polity* share the notions of “agent” and “individual agency”, and also the methodological individualism approach on social action modeling. However, as simulation models, they prove notable differences. Compared to the Coleman’s model of social action (Coleman, 1986, pp. 1322; Coleman 1990, pp.19-21), the *artificial society* would mainly address the micro-macro link in explaining emergent social phenomena (Squazzoni, 2008), while the *artificial polity* would also address the macro-micro link, where by “emergence” we take as a basis the view proposed by agent-based system modelers of the social phenomena as macro (high-level) effect of the micro (low-level) interactions (Axelrod 1997, p.4; Epstein and Axtell 1996, p.35), which are not deducible from the laws characterizing the lower-level domain phenomena (“strong emergence”, Chalmers, 2006).

Explaining these differences is important for both theoretical and experimental modeling purposes. In our approach it is important for explaining the role political culture theory might play in the modeling and simulation of both society and polity.

Premises and Basic Terms

For modeling purposes, we compare the *artificial society* and the *artificial polity* in a scenario of attitude change and show that, in experimental setups based on emergence, (political) culture and recurrence of phenomena, the artificial polity models prove “downward causation” (Sawyer, 2002). We generalize these results as a conclusion drawn from the comparison of these two abstract models used for political culture-based simulation of political phenomena (**Table 1**).

Table 1. Comparative View: Agent-Based Modeling of Social vs. Political Phenomena

	Social Science	Political Science
Computational and Simulation Modeling	- Social Modeling - Social action model (Coleman, 1986)	- Political Methodology - International Relations (Axelrod, 1995)
Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation Systems	- MAS - CAS - ABMS	- ABMS: state-actors in International Relations (“tribute model”, Axelrod, 1995) - CAS: (Cederman, 1997)
Reference Model(s)	Artificial Society “Sugarscape” Model (Epstein and Axtell, 1996)	Artificial Polity “RebeLand” Model (Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2009, 2010)
New scientific disciplines and research areas	- Social Simulation - Computational Sociology	- Computational Political Science
Modeling Paradigm(s)	- Methodological Individualism - Interactions among micro-level individual agents - Generative mechanisms and processes	- Methodological Individualism - Interactions among individual agents (state-agents) - Generative mechanisms and processes - Social forms (Simmel, [1908]1971) and generative configurations (Cederman, 2003a, 2003b)
Simulation Patterns	1. micro-level interactions (social life) 2. micro-to-macro phenomena (social structure)	1. macro-level interactions (example: IR emerging phenomena, like violence, terrorism or armed conflict) 2. macro-to-micro phenomena (example: influence of the international relations context on the individual state-agents)
Simulation outcome(s)	1. Emergence of macro-level phenomena	1. Emergence of macro-level phenomena 2. Downward causation

Earlier Simulation Modeling Studies of Polity

We should mention first the agent-based models of nation-states as individual agents in modeling and simulation research on war, rebellion, civil unrest and armed conflict (Cederman, 2003b; Cioffi-Revilla and Gotts, 2003) or collective identity agent-based models (Lustick, 2000) which include both methodological individualism and

(political) culture as modeling dimensions, but employ them only at the state-, and collectivity-level agent. We should also mention the differences from the individual citizen agent-based models inspired by the “sugarscape” model (Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Epstein, 2002), which use the individual agent as a typical basic agent, involve methodological individualism as an interaction generative paradigm, and also include self-organizing and complexity features (Ilachinski, 2004), but do not address (political) culture theories as a modeling dimension. Finally, we should mention differences from the approaches which include psychology and social psychology (Bennet, 2008) or institution representation aspects (Bhavnani, Miodownik and Nart, 2008) as modeling dimensions, but which again do not involve (political) culture as generative or influence factors of the individual agents relationships with the institutions and with the state itself.

Previous and current simulation modeling research work on artificial polity has been and still is mainly concerned with macro-level agents (“states”) modeled as individual agents. Some of these approaches focus on the individual citizen as the typical agent, of which the *ReBeLand* Model (Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2009; 2010) is considered here to be most representative. It includes a culturalist approach of the origins of political instability by modeling the ethnical conflicts as a source of political violence. However, the debates on the appropriateness of the culturalist aspects in this and in other similar models like Cederman and Girardin’s model of ethnicity and nationalist insurgency (Cederman and Girardin, 2007, 2010), have weakened this hypothesis so as to leave the political culture modeling dimension open to further debate.

On the other hand, previous computational and simulation modeling of polity has intensively used agent-based models, namely *Sugarscape* Model (Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Epstein, 2002) in order to get bottom-up models of political violence, explaining it therefore as emergent macro-scale social phenomena rooted in the micro-dynamics of the interactions between individual agents (Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2010, p. 34). This has led researchers of emergent political phenomena to concentrate more on the micro-to-macro link so as to show how the dynamics of micro-level individual

interactions could impact the stability of the state. Such polity models like *GeoSim* (Cederman, 2003b), *RebeLand* (Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2009), *REsCape* (Bhavnani et al., 2008) address the relation between the individual agents and the state as a means to study the polity's response to variability in the individual interactions at the micro level.

In this respect, our approach looks very much similar since it models the polity itself as a macro phenomenon. The difference is that our model is applied to studies of the conceptual and operational principles which makes a polity model uncover the "downward causation" effect. To this aim, the model includes political culture as a modeling dimension.

Justification of Approach

The present paper, which combines *political culture modeling* and the simulation of an *artificial polity* in a complex account on political change phenomena, has been inspired by the computational and simulation modeling experiments which have been developed during the past years (Voinea, 2012, 2013). These experiments, aimed at computationally modeling and simulating the Eastern European political phenomena after 1989, included corruption, political attitudes towards the state, and trust in state. The experiments used agent-based simulation: an artificial society has been "grown-up" so as to model the above-mentioned phenomena. Earlier reports of experimental results and performances showed that the major weakness of the artificial society model, namely its poor capacity to account for the macro-level and macro-to-micro phenomena, can be overcome by constructing a more comprehensive model: the *artificial polity*. Our model employs political culture theories in order to model the macro-level and the macro-to-micro phenomena. Notwithstanding its apparent flexibility, robustness and attractiveness, the model we are trying to work out opens actually a kind of "Pandora's Box" of theories on 'political mechanism', 'process', 'modeling' and 'explanation'. Each of these concepts, already defined by earlier theories and modeling approaches, brings back old disputes, fuels new ones, and demands

further defining work, since polity simulation models might differ in some essential terms from their social counterparts. Studying the origins and natures of these differences has been a challenging experience, since all this might provide enough arguments for developing a polity simulation modeling paradigm: the political culture-based modeling paradigm of a polity. Since both *artificial society* and *artificial polity* share the agent-based simulation modeling methodology in order to account for the implicit methodological individualism of the macro emergence phenomenology described by each, a differentiation of these paradigmatic approaches should therefore focus on details, like (i) the type and level of complexity and emergence involved by each, and (ii) the ways in which macro-level and macro-to-micro phenomena are modeled in each.

Our approach is inspired by a social-psychological account of the relation between the individual agent (micro-level) and the polity (macro-level) and includes political culture as a fundamental modeling dimension. On this background, we reconsider agent's, mechanism's, process's, and polity's theoretical and operational definitions so as to specify the role they play in the modeling of political change phenomena. We have therefore proceeded to evaluate our previous experimental simulation experience in order to get the necessary background for a correct understanding of the nature and type of theoretical issues hidden in rich experimental clues.

The paper approaches the *artificial polity* as a political culture-based model of a body politic. It involves political culture concepts and theories to account for the complexity of domestic political phenomena, going from political attitude change at the individual level up to major political change at the society level. Architecture, structure, unit of interaction, generative mechanisms and processes are but few of the modeling dimensions manifold. Both conceptual and experimental issues are described so as to highlight the differences between the simulation models of society and polity.

This approach addresses in general lines fundamental problems of society and polity simulation modeling and, obviously, does not provide answers to all theoretical questions. However, it stands for one more step towards finding the proper answer to

an old fundamental requirement formulated by Charles Tilly in 1995 with concern to the way in which political processes are explained. Computational and simulation modeling scientists should perhaps pay particular attention to the requirements of political scientists and to their oftenly discouraging skepticism with concern to the newly developed simulation modeling methods, no matter how revolutionary these might be: what they ask for is not always what they get from us. Looking for the proper answer to their requirements, challenging their skepticism, and paraphrasing Tilly, we could ask ourselves: “*how, then, should we search for the causes of revolutions?*” (Tilly, 1995, p. 1602).

The present approach provides a theoretical account of several interconnected issues which are essential in our political change simulation model: (1) the artificial polity, (2) the typical agent, (3) political mechanisms and processes, (4) political culture-based modeling of political phenomena, (5) experimental setup, (6) the need and direction of further experimental and conceptual developments, and (7) half-title of this paper explained: *why individual interactions are not enough?*

Artificial Polity: A Political Culture-Based Simulation Model

Eastern European political regime changes initiated in 1989 provided shortly afterwards a particular impetus for the revived interest in political culture studies. Notwithstanding the major differences in the conceptual paradigms of the various schools of thought, and the hardness of their critical views with respect to their explanative power, these studies acknowledge the come back of *political culture theories* and shed light on several issues addressing its modeling propensities. Though not at all surprising, since such “revivals” seem to have been re-iterated by periodically emerging major crises and/or political changes all over the world (Elkins and Simeon, 1979; Inglehart, 1988), the post-1989 revival has been especially relevant for at least one reason: old and new political culture theories “clashed” on the atypical analysis “battle field” of the Eastern European post-communist political regime. One particular outcome of this after-1989 clash is considered one of the most challenging political

culture theories: Mishler and Pollack's "Thick-and-Thin" Neo-Cultural Synthesis (Mishler and Pollack, 2003).

Political Culture studies and analyses of the Eastern European political phenomena after 1989 put a special emphasis on the need to develop models of the complex processes of transition to democracy, democratization, and democracy consolidation in post-communist political regimes (Mishler and Pollack, 2003; Whitefield, 2005). Explanative by their definition and concept, *models* have been understood as abstract constructions which best capture the causality issue in context-dependent political phenomena (Merton, 1948, 1957). The undeniable need for models in an area of research in which empirical data and analysis are still the dominating paradigm, is perhaps the "engine" which has constantly moved things forward, even if not always fast enough for the expectations of the political scientists. From the times of the "*The Civic Culture*" (Almond and Verba, 1963) and its "clash" with the alternative theory elaborated by Lijphart (1968), the need for political culture-based models of political phenomena has increasingly fueled the controversies over their explanative power, and has more profoundly penetrated the epistemology of the domain, shaping the demand for a consistent methodological change (Eckstein, 1988, p.790) from model-invariant to context-based variation modeling paradigms. In spite of their long-standing principles, their clear dominance and stability in the domain's research methodology, and the substance and accuracy of their analytical achievements, the deductive-nomological explanations and their associated modeling theories (Hempel, 1965) have increasingly been subjected to critical evaluations and disputes during the past decades.

Completely different from the empirical modeling theories, newly emerging computational and simulation modeling technologies have definitely contributed to the decline of the model-invariant explanative theories and to the methodological shift towards generative mechanisms, bottom-up models, and virtual experiment techniques. Undoubtedly, this methodological change has been claimed long before, since scholars like Charles Tilly (to take but one example) have started to criticize the inability of model-invariant methodology to capture the variability and contextual dependences of

the major political change phenomena. All the way from the genuine demand of-, up to the proper methodological change has oftenly seemed a difficult-to-cross borderline between different epistemologic constructions of what a model could and should explain in political culture theories.

Computational and simulation models in social sciences have inspired much of the modeling work which has been lately developed in political science, in mainly two areas of research: International Relations, and Voting Behavior. Social Simulation, Computational Sociology, Complex Adaptive Systems, and Agent-Based Modeling Systems have provided the background concepts and techniques used now largely in political methodology in these areas of the simulation modeling research. Theoretical and formal social action models, for instance, which have inspired the well-known artificial society model (Epstein and Axtell, 1996), have provided the dominating modeling theory, concept and paradigm in the International Relations area of research. Political Methodology, traditionally based on empirical research and statistical tools of analysis, has increasingly manifested a clear tendency in the direction of identifying specific tools and evaluation frameworks (King, 1991) which could provide for a different and more believable approach on issues like context-, path-, and initial conditions-dependency of political phenomena. Not only the practitioners, but the theorists themselves (Tilly 1995, 2000, 2001), have given strong support to the claim for a radical change in the political methodological research paradigms, which should approach political phenomena in their real complexity. The interest on the complexity of phenomena has been transferred rather quickly on the complexity of methodology, so that individual agent, social interaction, emergent social phenomena, and society could thus be considered dimensions in the methodological shift.

Both computational and simulation modeling have brought from Social Simulation the basic concepts and paradigms which have assisted Computational Political Science to emerge and grow-up as a new discipline. Unavoidable though, controversies on both epistemologic and ontological aspects in the Social Simulation

theories have extended their reach to the modeling research, which has lately included both agent-based and complex adaptive modeling techniques.

(Political) Culture models on the one hand (Inglehart, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Eckstein, 1988; Diamond, 1996), and Social Simulation modeling theories (Axelrod, 1995; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005; Macy and Willer, 2002; Squazzoni, 2012) on the other hand, have been so hardly disputed as to make this methodological shift even harder. Nonetheless, political culture theories have endured and “... *not only survived but mounted an impressive comeback over the past decade...*” (Mishler and Pollack, 2003). The question now is what their impact actually is on the massive modeling re-shaping attempts supported by the newly developed social simulation and artificial society technologies? – As a matter of fact, this question is just a re-iteration of both Tilly’s famous request and Mishler and Pollack’s claim for renewing the political phenomena modeling methodology.

Natural and undoubtedly justified as it is, modeling is the missing part of this “*impressive comeback*” of political culture theories. Moreover, if there is a point of convergence of various types of skepticism and denial with respect to the explanative power of political culture modeling, than this has to be the simulation modeling. It is *this* particular weakness, *this* particular skepticism and, especially, *this* particular convergence point of denial positions with respect to political culture-based modeling that we are going to tackle in this approach.

With their neo-cultural synthesis, Mishler and Pollack (*ibid.*) have actually threw the glove to all modelers of political culture, political and social scientists as well. Notwithstanding its strength, their challenge has left some category of scientists untouched: the computational and simulation modelers. The reason? – To the satisfaction of those who have given support to the classical so-called “thick” theories and who hang on empirical data and statistical analysis, and to the disappointment of those who have given support to the so-called “thin” theories and who might expect something different than just survey stuff, in spite of Mishler and Pollack’s own claim for a unifying, synthetical approach, their political neo-culture synthetic model (*ibid.*, p. 247) is just a common analytical model. Though extremely challenging in theory,

their neo-cultural synthetic model itself is deeply rooted in the empirical analytical tradition.

Explaining what is disappointing in it would actually offer the chance to make a description and analysis of the modeling approach in the present paper.

Aim of approach

In the present approach, we aim at modeling what some authors call “situational context” (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998) or “downward causation” (Sawyer, 2002), namely the macro-level and the macro-to-micro phenomena.

From a theoretical point of view, our approach is a hybrid one, combining both *collectivist* and *individualist* tenets into an unifying view much inspired by the neo-cultural synthesis proposed by Mishker and Pollack (2003). The fundamental dimension of our approach is therefore the political culture and the role it plays in explaining and making effective the macro-to-micro link. We therefore aim to prove effective the four types of downward causation defined by Sawyer (2002, p. 217) in our artificial polity experimental settings.

The previous research approach, *Briberyscape* (Voinea, 2012, 2013), models corruption as a micro-to-macro emergent phenomenon in an authoritarian regime. It exhibits downward causation effects by increasingly getting the political macro structures (the state) constraining the patterns of individual interactions among citizens and among citizens and institutions. Both *Privilegescape* (also called the “Privilege Market” Model) and *Baronscape* (also called the Local Patron-Client Networking Model) model the macro emergence of political phenomena which characterize the failure from inside of an authoritarian regime: one such phenomenon was the emergence of autonomous networks of trust which parallel and weaken the network of trust in state. In these models, the downward causation concern (a) macro structures which constrain the individual interactions, (b) stable emergents, like emergent networks of trust, which constrain the individual agents and their interactions. The proposed model of the artificial polity has been further applied to the

analysis of scenarios of socialization (Voinea C.F., “*Culturepiles*”, forthcoming paper), in which political culture macro phenomena exhibit effects of downward causation by influencing the individual behavior.

Our simulation model uses both mechanisms and processes as generative engines, combining *substantialist* with *relationist* concepts of the generative theory of political interaction. The main differences from other approaches on polity simulation models concern (1) the type and domain of studied political phenomena, (2) the type of generative architecture and (3) the types of objects and/or processes which are considered as generative ‘engines’ in the hypothesized scenarios of political change.

The type of political phenomena considered is the political change phenomena, and the area of study is the political change in domestic politics, as a difference from approaches concerning political change in International Relations (Axelrod, 1995; Cederman, 1997, 2003b; Cioffi-Revilla, 2010b). We are mainly concerned with the transition-to-democracy political phenomena and, in particular, with political change phenomena in the Eastern European communist and post-communist regimes. As a difference from other simulation modeling approaches, ours models the *polity* by involving the political culture as a key component in describing the political change.

As it regards the *architecture* of a simulation model, the above-mentioned term “type of generative architecture” is based on the concepts of generative political mechanism and process, and includes social action issues (individual interactions), polity issues (power, inequality, coercion and institutions), and political culture issues (attitudes, beliefs, values, and norms).

As a modeling background, our approach starts from the social simulation prototype model: the artificial society described by the Sugarscape Model developed by Epstein and Axtell (1996). Our approach modifies this basic simulation model as to achieve an explanation of the macro-level and macro-to-micro phenomena and of their impact onto the behavior of the individual agents. In order to achieve this goal, the proposed simulation model introduces three levels of generative objects and processes: social, political, and culture objects and relations.

The idea of using political culture objects (beliefs, values, norms and attitudes) and their generative ontologies is aimed at proving that political culture objects and processes could and should be used as both generative and control engines with regard to the proper workings of a polity.

What is our approach arguing for?

Our approach constructs arguments on three issues:

(1) political culture as a matrix of recurrent political processes (macro operational level) and as a matrix of generative mechanisms and processes (micro operational level);

(2) modeling issues like “multilayer generative architecture”, “methodological individualism” and “relationism” should be used in combination so as to allow for both micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro explanations;

(3) “thick-and-thin” continua could be identified in social, political and culture phenomena.

What we argue for is briefly described below:

We argue in the first place that modeling as explanation of political change phenomena cannot exclude political culture as both change generative and change control ‘engine’. As an alternative to the “*figurations*” introduced by Norbert Elias (1978, 1982) and the topological “*configurations*” described by Cederman (2003a), we suggest a new taxonomy of configurations: political cultural configurations, which include attitudes, beliefs, values, and norms configurations.

Secondly, we argue that modeling of political phenomena could use various operational concepts, either (1) separately (i.e.: agents modeled as “objects”, and interactions and relations modeled as “processes”, which actually represents the current approach in the area), or (2) or combined (i.e.: agents, interactions and relations are modeled as “processes”, which is our suggestion).

Generative modeling in social science is based on mechanisms which generate social structure by means of individual interactions (methodological individualism).

The original model of the artificial society (sugarscape) provides for a bottom-up account on the emergent social outcomes of micro-level individual interactions. Simple as idea and efficient as architecture (two-layer architecture), the artificial society model is interesting for its methodological individualism and for introducing the concept of generative mechanism as a basic ‘engine’ of the social action. The model cannot however provide any account on the macro-to-micro social phenomena, nor does it use a (political) culture model¹⁵. Hedström and Swedberg (1998) have introduced the notion of “*structural individualism*”, which represents an advanced version of methodological individualism able to provide for an explanation of the macro-to-micro phenomena.

We start from this idea and modify the artificial society model. Our approach introduces a multi-level generative operational architecture concept. We describe and employ a class of experimental simulation models of (i) change in the attitude toward the state, and (ii) change of the trust in the state in both communist and post-communist Eastern European polity inspired by the political qualitative and empirical models elaborated after 1989 (Tilly, 2000; Whitefield, 2005; Kubik, 1994, 2012; Mishler and Pollack, 2003; Pickel and Pollack, 2013; Wildavaski, 1987; Diamond, 1996; Inglehart, 1992, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Rohrschneider, 2002, 2006; Sztompka 1993a, 1993b).

On the basis of this class of simulation models, we argue that political culture mechanisms and processes provide support to-, and are able to explain the idea of downward causation, by identifying the kind of influence of the macro-to-micro phenomena on the behavior of the individual agents.

¹⁵ Epstein and Axtell developed several research experiments on conflict resolution in terms of international relations and state agents. However, these researches cannot provide for a political culture model.




Figure 1.

Black area describes current Agent-Based Simulation Models (“sugarscape”).
 Blue area describes what capabilities the Agent-Based Simulation Models should include in order to be able to generate “macro-to-micro” phenomena.

Finally, we argue that the “thick-and-thin” continuum pattern could be identified at all levels of study: society, polity, and (political) culture. The concept of “thick” social system and interaction have been developed by Sylvan (2003, 2010). The concept of thick culture was theoretized by Geertz (1973b). The concept of “thick-and-thin” culture has been introduced and developed by Mishler and Pollack (2003). We extend this concept to the modelling of political phenomena by identifying several continua in the classical Coleman’s Model (1986): (1) an *interaction* continuum, which specifies the generative mechanisms and/or processes underlying agents interactions at both micro and macro levels, (2) an *interconnection* continuum, which specifies the mechanisms and/or processes underlying relations among agents at both micro and macro levels, and (3) a (*political*) *culture* continuum, which specifies the mechanism and/or processes which influence both micro-to-macro (emergent) and macro-to-micro (downward causation) phenomena and provide for the control modeling dimension.

“Thick & Thin” Continua




Figure 2.

The “Thick & Thin” continua in the Artificial Polity Model.

We introduce the idea that an agent-based simulation system is a multi-layered structure, by “layer” denoting a certain level of activity pattern characterized by a specific degree of complexity, namely: (1) the micro and macro layers, where the agents interact and their dynamic interaction patterns evolve in either directly observable or implicit frames, (2) the micro-to-micro and macro-to-macro layers, where the relations between agents emerge from their interactions and the dynamic relational patterns are described as interconnection processes, and (3) the micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro layers, where the political culture agents (values, beliefs, norms, attitudes) and their dynamic change patterns are described as emergent and/or downward control processes.

The advantage of this multi-layer structural architecture is that it provides the operational framework in which the macro-to-micro and macro-to-macro phenomena can be described.

Political Culture: On Modeling “Thick-and-Thin”

The debates on political culture addressing its explanative power are mainly based on the controversies concerning the definition of culture as either a “property of

colectivity” or as a property of the individual agent (Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p.129) emphasizing both a theoretical and a methodological ambiguity characterizing distinct schools of thought. The controversy comes from the different theoretical backgrounds: while the former is inspired by anthropologist and sociologic theories, the latter is of social-psychology inspiration. Advocates of the collectivity alternative as Bourdieu (1972), Geertz (1973a; 1973b), Inglehart (1990), Putnam (1993), or Huntington (1996), inspired by Tylor’s classical definition of culture (1871), are more concerned with anthropological and sociological perspectives on culture. A second school of thought advocates an individual-based view of culture, like Conover and Searing (1994), Norander and Jones (1996), McFalls (2001), who are generally inspired by classical works of Almond and Verba (1965) and Converse (1964), emphasizing concern with social-psychological perspective on culture. Conceptual controversies based on the dichotomy between ideatic (idealist) and economic (materialist) views of culture have generated also methodological controversies mainly focused on the methods of measurement and collection of empirical data. As much as the conceptual ones, the methodological disputes are opposing different views on the modeling methodologies.

Mishler and Pollack’s neo-cultural synthesis (2003) challenges both the collectivity-based, and the individual-based approaches by mixing them up in a continuum of cultural agency concept which associates to both societal and individual level of interactions.

Among the seven dimensions on which (political) culture is “poorly explicated” (Reisinger, 1995), the interaction between culture and polity highlights the instrumental role culture plays in the emergence and dynamics of political phenomena. Culture as a “control mechanism” (Geertz, 1973a, p.87; Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p.129) concerns a societal perspective on how culture is defined.

We base our approach on Mishler and Pollack’s definition of political culture (2003) as the conceptual support of a strategy of explanation based on an unifying paradigm of both micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro explanatory components of the political change phenomena. The political culture concept defined by Mishler and

Pollack (*ibid.*) brings to the forefront an unusual idea for the current definitional approaches on both the concept of political culture process and mechanism: the ‘continuum’. Their “thick-and-thin” definition uncovers several epistemologic hypotheses which have been and still are very much opposed by different schools of thought on what has been too much disputed a concept in both social and political sciences during the past half of century European intellectual history.

In their 2003 article, published in one of the best approaches to Eastern European post-communist transition to democracy, “*Political Culture in Post-communist Europe: Attitudes in New Democracies*” (D. Pollack, J. Jacobs, O. Muller and G. Pickel (Eds.), 2003), Mishler and Pollack argue for a neo-cultural synthesis which could explain the complexity of the attitudes toward democracy of the people in countries which have experienced authoritarian regimes and which undergo major political regime change processes. Their approach brings to the front the need for models able to provide explanations of both past and present phenomena unfolding in Eastern European politics and polities.

Though oftenly subject to intense conceptual debate in both social and political science, the issue of explanation should be approached from a culture-based modeling perspective. Causal models of explanations have been mainly elaborated in social theory with little or no cultural explanative factors. New emphasis on culture theories and on political culture in particular has emerged from both the study of social and political evidence and from the need to uncover the deep complexity of major political change phenomena like those discussed in the introduction part of this paper.

Mainstream political theory and modeling methodology is deeply anchored in the Humean inspired deductive-nomological framework of causation and explanation as it has been theoretized by Carl Hempel (1965). Nomothetic modeling is always in search for the so-called ‘covering-laws’, i.e. universal laws able to explain political phenomena no matter the spatio-temporal conditions and characteristics of their development (Bennet, 2003). Though extremely powerful at the level of global or universal regularities (patterns) extracted by comparative analysis from huge amounts of empirical data, the nomothetic models fail to capture the variability and context-

dependency of political phenomena. This methodological weakness induces a more subtle one at the conceptual level, since nomothetic modeling does not base causation in the variability of phenomena, and hence cannot explain it. The complexity of political phenomena made the model-invariant explanative solutions often inadequate.

The mainstream political modeling methodology has been challenged during the past decades by a powerful alternative, namely the generative theory.

Starting with Thomas Schelling's dynamic model of segregation (1971), the generative theory of social action covers both mechanism-based and process-based modeling approaches on social interaction. Mechanism-based modeling of social action is mainly concerned with the explanation of micro-macro phenomena described in the well-known Coleman's model of social action (Coleman, 1986). The strength of Coleman's model resides in its capacity to explain the micro-level and the micro-to-macro emergent social phenomena. In this model of social action, mechanism-based modeling's explanative power is limited to the micro-macro link (Sawyer, 2005; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2008).

"Downward causation" is a term used in the emergence theory to describe the influence the macro level phenomena might have on the micro-level phenomena (Sawyer, 2005; pp.69-73). It has been the subject of epistemologic disputes over the existence of the emergent structures at the macro level and of their impact on the individual level of social interaction. Mechanism-based versions of generative theory cannot explain macro-level, and macro-to-micro phenomena.

Process-based modeling is usually connected to the sociological process theory. While mechanism-based theories have been mainly employed to explain micro-to-macro emergent social structure, the process-based modeling has been used by the generative theory in what regards the explanation of macro phenomena. It has inspired two schools of thought: *substantialist* and *relationist* (Emirbayer 1997). The substantialist paradigm starts from individual actors and society as ultimate generative social units and works with ontologies of objects which are involved in dynamical processes of interaction. The relationist paradigm starts from the relations between

social units as the true dynamical generative processes (Emirbayer 1997; Cederman, 2003a).

One of the breakthroughs in the theories on political mechanisms was the concept of *relational mechanism* as a generative engine in scenarios of political change (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2008). It combines, at least in theory, the idea of object (individual actor) as generative mechanism with the idea of process as a generative “engine” in the study of political phenomena. This combination has actually represented the answer to an earlier request made by Charles Tilly during the mid’90s with concern to the need for new causal and explanative paradigms in political methodology. In spite of considerable development of computational and simulation modeling theories and technologies, Tilly has re-iterated his demand several times over a periode of fifteen years (1995, 2001, 2008).

Though there is a rich literature on epistemic and ontologic aspects of the political mechanism issue, the answer to Tilly’s 1995 claim has been provided by the computational modeling theories in social simulation by means of the generative techniques. They mainly refer to agent-based simulation modeling techniques. However, Tilly’s request has not received the full proper answer so far. He provides very interesting collections of empirical descriptions on political phenomena, mechanisms and processes which have not been addressed or used so far by the contemporary generative modeling theories. His examples have not been re-constructed on a generative modeling basis, though many authors admit the limitations of current models (Sawyer, 2004a, 2004b) and the need for enhanced process description and representation techniques (Fararo, 1989). There still is a considerable need for modeling in the area.

Model Structure

The basic configuration of the experimental simulation models is shown in **Figure 3**.

Model Structure




Figure 3.

Artificial Polity Model.

Basic configuration of agents: various types of citizens (circles, triangles, squares, stars), culture items (large coloured circles), and resources (large green shapes).

The Agents

A heterogeneous collection of agents (as “objects”) configures the three components of the model: active, environmental, and cultural.

Environmental Component: it consists of agents which represent resources (financial, economical, institutional); these agents have quantitative variability, and their dynamics depends on the interactions with the other agents. The state and the government are institutional resources, playing a normative role in their relationship with the individual agents.

Individual Agents Component: it consists of individual agents, which assume different social roles (ordinary citizens, bureaucrats, magistrats and politicians), and interact amongst them and with the resource agents. The dynamics of their interaction may result in emergent phenomena at the macro level.

(Political) Culture Component: it consists of agents which model values, norms, beliefs and attitudes.

At the micro level, the individual agent (citizen) interacts with the culture agents (values, norms, beliefs). Their interaction may result in relationships

characterized by an intensity attribute, which model how much an individual agent “holds” a belief, “appreciate” a value or “comply with” a norm. These relationships result in a “cultural networking” of individual and culture agents: the connections in this network are dynamic, expressing strong/weak (in various degrees) relationships.

In order to make the system operational, the activity of all types of agents inspired a bottom-up multi-layer architecture, where by “layer” we describe the types of generative mechanisms and processes and the dynamic patterns of activity they generate.

In the discussion part of this paper, we also describe agents as “processes” and how they might be used in a bottom-up simulation model.

Model Architecture

The operational architecture used in our approach is depicted in **Figure 4**.

Sugarscape Model is based on agents and generative mechanisms and processes. As a bottom-up model, it describes the emergence of phenomena and explain by means of micro-level interactions of individual agents. Sugarscape models a society in which individual social interactions could result in emergent social phenomena at macro levels.

Our present approach models both the society and the polity as different layers of the overall architecture of the simulation model. It differs from the Sugarscape Model in several aspects.

First, the generative mechanism-and-processes architecture is defined, described and explained as a multi-layer architecture, in which each layer is characterized by the same processing principle and structure.

The artificial society model uses a two-layered architecture of generative mechanisms: the basic layer is that of biological inspired mechanisms, like hunger, motion, reproduction; the second layer is that of socially inspired mechanisms, like interaction among the individual agents. Our model aims at further developing this type of architecture by including three layers: the basic layer is that of survival mechanisms, the second layer is that of social mechanisms, and the third layer is that of

cultural mechanisms. This three-layer architecture might be scaled-up at a multi-layer architecture in which several types of generative mechanisms and processes are included in each layer.

Multi-Layer Mechanism Architecture




Figure 4.

Abstract operational architecture.

Second, the structure consists in the generative mechanisms and the processes which they trigger and maintain. Both the mechanisms and the processes they produce are classified as (i) generative, and (ii) control. The generative mechanisms are basically social interaction mechanisms. In our approach however, the generative mechanisms include environmental and culture mechanisms.

Third, the control mechanisms are basically culture mechanisms: they consists in a structure of evolving culture entities, like values, beliefs, norms and attitudes, and the processes associated to them. The evolution of each such entity is described as a separate process which interacts with the other processes, producing a cultural context and influencing the processes associated to the generative mechanisms. This simulation model based on a generalized generative architecture is used to build-up an artificial polity, which represents the experimental setup in which several political phenomena, like the emergence of networks of trust or the emergence of corruption, are simulated.

Mechanisms

Political Mechanism has been the subject of intense theoretical debates during the past decades. Debates covered the theoretical definitions of political mechanism and focused on the comparative analysis with classical nomothetic models (Tilly, 1995, 2000, 2001; Bunge, 1997). The controversies over the nature of mechanisms and causal models start from the definitions of mechanisms and causal modeling of social phenomena¹⁶. With the advance of Social Simulation, this debate extended to computational and simulation modeling research with the aim of developing techniques and methodologies able to replicate real political mechanisms and provide for explanative computational models of political phenomena (Cederman, 2003).

The interest in political mechanisms and causal models has been justified and sustained by several theorists and philosophers in social sciences. The need for explanation with concern to major social phenomena has resulted in the mechanism-explanation model theories (Merton, 1948; Tilly, 1995; Bunge, 1997; Elster, 1998; Hedström and Swedberg, 1998).

While some authors are advocating a logical-based approach to mechanism (Tilly, 1995), others are advocating a methodological individualist approach, mainly promoted by the school of Analytical Sociology (Hedström & Swedberg 1998). The latter is close to the idea of mechanism used in Social Simulation. Both of them consider the agents as separate “entities”, and the overall variation of the system as “activity”, including both the interactions and the processes they generate and maintain. Though the mechanisms are defined in terms of their outcome, and not in terms of their making, this kind of definition avoids confusion and concentrates on their “generative” nature:

¹⁶Mechanism has been defined by several authors in very different ways: some authors define what mechanisms are, others define the way they work, their making or their outcome, some see them as having explanative properties, others as having generative properties. For discussions and exhaustive lists of definitions, see the works of Mahoney, Gerring and Gambetta.

“In order to explain macro-level outcomes, an additional step typically is required: the mechanisms must be assembled into a generative model which allows us to derive the macro-level outcomes they are likely to bring about [...] A social mechanism, [...] refers to a constellation of entities and activities that are organized such that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome.”

(Hedström & Swedberg 1998, p. 112)

Major advances in computational and simulation agent-based models of society and social systems have shaped the interest in emergentist models of explanation, which are based on generative mechanisms. Hedström has repeatedly explained and illustrated the strong connection between the two approaches on the basis of methodological individualism. He stressed the role structure plays in such approaches, elaborating a new version of methodological individualism, namely the *structural individualism* (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Hedström, 2005; Hedström and Bearman, 2009).

Mechanisms are classified in several types by different authors: McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2008) identify environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms, Hedström and Swedberg classify mechanisms in complex, mediating, and theoretical building blocks (Leuridan, 2012). Described as either a “mechanical engine” or as a process itself, the ‘mechanisms’ have been associated with the dynamic capabilities of agents, and are usually meant to represent these capabilities in an operational effective way in simulation models. In spite of diverse and multiple ways of defining it, the notion is still confusing, since no author provides a clear and complete idea.

For this reason, our approach on mechanism in the present model avoids the ‘mechanistic’ type of definition, and prefers the ‘emergentist’ one. The *generative mechanism* in our approach is an abstract model of processes unfolding, whose proper workings can-, but whose outcome cannot be described in terms of its inputs. It is rather a tentative operational description of what a mechanism is supposed to do in an agent-based generative setting.

In agent-based systems, mechanisms are usually regarded as basic elements which make a generative structure operational, and include pre-defined aspects either as combinations of contextual conditions and agents' interaction capabilities or as "black-boxes" (Boudon, 1998).

In this paper, we address two types of operational descriptions of mechanisms. The first is the usual one in social simulations, namely a condition-based or context-based evaluator & triggering engine. The second one is used by the emergentist modeling paradigm in complex adaptive systems, where a mechanism is sometimes operationally described as a set of processes which converge to a shared, global outcome (Cederman, 1997; 2003a).

Processes

In this paper, we base our abstract architectural concept on the notion of *process* as it has been associated to generative models by sociological generative process theorists (Fararo, 1989), by theories of social forms of Simmelian inspiration (Cederman, 2003a) and in the agent-based modeling literature (Emirbayer, 1997).

The notion of process in our approach combines the perspective of political process (Tilly, 1995, p. 1595) with the perspective of generative modeling (Schelling, 1978; Axelrod, 1995, 1996, 1997; Casti, 1997; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Epstein, 1999).

In generative modeling, political phenomena should be explained by constructing generative processes as artificial counterpart of the real ones and make them effective in contexts which are themselves artificial replications of real contexts. The idea of describing a process by actually generating and running it as a simulation has been introduced by Axelrod (1995) and also by Epstein and Axtell (1996) and it has been ever since considered as the basic principle in Social Simulation.

Following the description of Fararo (2000) we use the concept of generative process as a computational run of an operational construction whose behavior manifold reproduces a relational pattern by means of "*recursively iterated operations*" (Cederman, 2003a) of simpler (lower-level) processes, which we agree to identify as rules or mechanisms. This operational definition provides for modeling processes as

either variational structure-dependent or structure-emergent outcomes. As Fararo defines it, a process is the emergent phenomena associated to structural variation. The basic idea in using generative processes as recurrent outcomes of computational runnings of recursively iterated operations is to reproduce by means of simulation the recurrent patterns of political phenomena. The notion of recurrence has been employed by different social process theorists (Giddens 1979, p.5; 1989, p.252; Tilly, 2000, p.3; Fararo, 2000) as a generative principle of macro-level emergent phenomena.

In our artificial polity model architecture, the notion of recurrence addresses both the patterns of historical phenomena and the principles of their generative modeling.

The typical operational layer in this architecture combines the idea of continuum with the idea of ‘cross-recurrent’, ‘cross-recursive’ processes¹⁷, terms used in our approach to describe political processes with simultaneously or asynchronously recurrence (see Tilly, 1995) and political processes whose evolution is strongly influenced by their history and also by the history of other co-existing recursive processes. The operational structure consists in a set of processes, described as

17 The notion of ‘recursivity’ in social and political sciences has been addressed in various types of approaches including the dynamics of public relations (Holmström S. 2005. “Reframing public relations: The evolution of a reflective paradigm for organizational legitimization,” *Public Relations Review* No.31, Elsevier Science Inc., pp. 497–504), collective identity and political participation (Simon B. 2011. “Collective Identity and Political Participation,” in: A.E. Azzi, X. Chrysochoou, B. Klandermans, and B. Simon (Eds.) “Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies: A Multidisciplinary Perspective,” Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Part II: Introduction, pp.89-91), European security (Mallard G., Foucault M. 2010. “The Fractal Process of European Integration: a Formal Theory of Recursivity in the Field of European Security,” Working Paper No. 110-006, Roberta Buffet Center for International and Comparative Studies Working Paper Series, Buffet Center, Northwestern University), or governance (Crozier M. 2006. “Rethinking political communication as recursive governance,” paper presented for the 20th International Political Science Association World Congress, IPSA RC 22: Political Communication, Panel: Communication and Democratic Political Culture, Fukuoka, Japan; Bache I., Flinders M.V. 2004. *Multi-Level Governance*, Oxford University Press). The multitude of approaches highlight different ideas of recursivity, from Luhmann inspired complexity-based characteristic of societal communication processes, to game-theoretical descriptions of federalism and European integration. Most of these approaches put a special emphasis on the path-dependence aspects associated with recursive descriptions of institutions, organizations or political communication and are usually related to complexity-based modeling approaches on historical causality and self-organizing hierarchies (see also Page S.E. 2006. Path Dependence, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, No.1, pp. 87-115; Bonabeau E., Theraulaz G., Deneubourg J.-L. 1996. Mathematical Model of Self-Organizing Hierarchies in Animal Societies, *Bulletin of Mathematical Biology* Vol. 58, No.4, pp. 661-717, Elsevier Science Inc.).

generative nodes in **Figure 5**. Each process is defined recursively and its operational description might include as inputs other processes defined recursively themselves.




Figure 5.

In this case, we can describe the typical generative structure as a set of cross-recursive processes as depicted in **Figure 6**.

In the simulation experiments we used a set of cross-recurrent cross-recursive processes describing the political attitude change in individual agents (Voinea, 2012, pp. 130-135; 2013, pp. 41-43). The recurrence of one process (i) depends on the recurrence of another process (j) and each process is dependent on both its own history and on the history of the other process; at the moment of time $t + 1$, $process_{t+1}^i$ is described with a logistic function, in which the outcome of $process_t^i$ at the moment of time t is adjusted by the effect of a cross-recurrent $process_t^j$ (Zbilut and Webber Jr., 1992; Webber Jr. and Zbilut, 1998; Webber jr. and Zbilut, 2005).

An example of cross-recurrent cross-recursive processes in our simulation scenario (see **Figure 6**): *apolitical-attitude-change* is a process generated by the dynamics

of *trust-in-state* process (representing $process_i^j$). The ‘*trust-in-state*’ process is in turn described as depending on the “*individual responsibility*” process, in which ‘*responsibility*’ represents $process_i^j$: *trust-in-state* is modeled as a process which combines *responsibility* (towards state, family and self), *fairness* (in relations with other citizens and with the state), *honesty* (in personal relations amongst individual citizens). The cross-recurrent cross-recursive process description is further used to specify the *responsibility* process (i) as influenced by the *fairness* process (j), and so on. As the example in **Figure 6** shows, cross-recursivity is used as an unidimensional dependence relation between two processes only. We have limited the description for the sake of simplicity so as to be able to express in an operationally efficient way the idea of cross-recurrence, cross-recursive processes¹⁸. This allows us to express simple relationships between several processes in generative terms as follows: the individual agent develops a *political attitude* toward the state, which depends on the agent holding a certain belief (*trust-in-state*), appreciating a certain value (*honesty*), and complying (*fairness*) with the norms of centralized access to resources (coercive rules, as described in Voinea (2012)). As the difference between agent’s personal needs (in terms of personal resources) and what the state offers (constraining access to public resources) increases, the agent’s cognitive dissonance increases as well, which has a negative impact on the individual agent’s trust in state and, therefore, on her attitude toward the state. This circular dynamics makes the downward causation effective: the emergent macro phenomena, that is the emergence of new networks of trust and agents migration from one network to another have an explicit and quantifiable influence on the individual behavior (see Privilege Market simulation model in (Voinea, 2012)).

¹⁸For multiple cross-recurrence and cross-recursivity scenarios, the expression (1) requires a more complicated specification which however does not make the subject of this paper.




Figure 6.

Recurrence is thus based in both individual agents interactions (bottom-up or “emergent”) and interactions between individual agents and (political) culture agents (top-down or “downward causation”). This makes the operational architecture work as a continuum of generative processes – an operational idea which is meant to support the three continua description of the artificial polity conceptual model.

This architecture allows for the approach of political processes as context-, and path-dependent processes. The notions of “*increasing returns*” (Pierson, 2000) and the dynamically recurrence of complex conditions in structures of generative processes can thus be achieved in our operational architecture.

Our approach on recurrent process takes it into consideration in connection to the self-organization of complex processes (Voinea, 2012). Phenomena like context-dependence, path-dependence and recurrence described by Tilly, for example, get thus

an operational expression as cross-recurrent, cross-recursive processes generated by the operational structure described above.

Pathways

Addressing the issue of political change, Tilly's view was that the explanation of political change phenomena should be based on mechanisms and processes which, properly chained, could provide for real causal chains or "*pathways*" (Tilly, 2001). Introduced as an explanative concept, the *pathway* has been for some time the theoretical icon of explanative causal chains of political processes (J. Friedrichs¹⁹). Though causal modeling tried hard, the *pathway* concept has never become effective as a causal modeling technique. In our modeling approach, the *pathway* concept further extends Friedrichs' *recurrence*-based idea of the "*social pathway*"²⁰ concept and provides a new operational support. In our model, the *pathway* is defined as an activation path in a lattice of processes interconnected by means of shared political culture agents (i.e. beliefs, values, norms and attitudes). Its effectiveness resides in the capacity of the activation network to chain active processes on an cross-reference basis, by identifying shared activation context and/or constraints. The idea is not completely new for areas like semantic networks or coupled lattices, but its use in a political culture-based simulation model of a polity is new. The *pathway* could thus be considered and described as a phenomenon emerging from multiple interconnected (cross-recurrent cross-recursive) processes characterized by different levels of activation.

Without being causal in nature, but emergent, the *pathway* concept thus gets a considerable explanative power in much the same way in which this has been claimed by Tilly: it shows how processes describing political phenomena chain to one another

19 Friedrichs J. "*Causal Mechanisms and Process Patterns Thinking Within or Without the Box*," paper draft available by Author's courtesy, unpublished paper, currently under revise and resubmit with *Millenium*.

20 Joerg Friedrichs, "*Causal Mechanisms and Process Patterns Thinking Within or Without the Box*": "*The idea underlying social pathways is that the social world is punctuated by recurrent sequences of human interaction. Apart from causal mechanisms, process patterns are another promising subcategory of social pathways. They can be understood as recurrent sequences of human interaction that are observed prior to the specification of social domains over which empirical generalizations may be postulated. This opens a promising methodological route for research design and empirical research*", p. 2, unpublished paper, currently under revise and resubmit with *Millenium*.

on the basis of a generative principle of activation and provide therefore for a global outcome.

The Artificial Polity: A Political Culture-Based Simulation Model

There are several classes of generative mechanisms, which could be classified on several criteria. We only address in our approach two such criteria: (1) the level of generated patterns (micro, macro), and (2) the nature of generated patterns, such as (emergent) interaction, (emergent) structure, (emergent) interconnection, and (emergent) control patterns.

Following the criterion of the level of generated interaction, the generative mechanisms classify in two classes : (i) a class of generative mechanism at the level of micro (individual) agents, and (ii) another class of generative mechanisms at the level of macro (aggregate or emergent) agents. We include here generative mechanisms for micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro emergent phenomena.

Following the criterion of the type of generative capacity, there are three classes: (i) interaction generative, (ii) structure generative, and (iii) control generative mechanisms.

Our simulation model of artificial polity has been tested in three simulation scenarios: (1)the emergence of corruption as macro-level phenomena, (2) the emergence of networks of trust (privilege networks) generated by the change in the political attitude of the individual agent toward the state, and (3)the emergence of patron-clients networks generated by the dynamical decreasing levels of individual agents' trust in political institutions (“briberyscape”, “privilegescape”, and “baronscape” models, respectively, as described in (Voinea, 2012).

The Simulation Loops and the Simulation Runs

Political culture is used as a generative mechanism at both micro and macro levels.

The *micro-to-macro link* (emergence) employs the “thick-to-thin” direction on the political culture continuum. Emergence of macro-level phenomena as outcomes of

individual interactions are coupled with processes of political culture dynamics. As new networks of trust emerge and co-exist, the individual agent escapes the network of trust in state and joins private networks (the so-called “networks of privileges”(Voinea, 2012). As the sizes of private networks of trust grow, they insulate the network of trust in state. This results in emergence of change in political attitude towards the state. The *macro-to-micro link* (downward causation) employs the “thin-to-thick” direction on the political culture continuum, in which a shift in basic preferences emerges as attitudes (“thin” preferences) change: a change in the “thin” aspects of political culture like attitudes and beliefs, in the context of macro phenomena (corruption, emergence of networks of trust) induces a change in the preferences over the basic values, namely basic (materialist) values are preferred with respect to self-expression (post-materialist) values.

The main simulation loop (**Figure 7**): an artificial society with citizens (individual agents), resources (environmental agents) and political culture (culture agents), is grown-up. Individual agents interact in the dynamic normative and relational context of a particular type of polity, namely the Communist Polity Model (CPM), Democratic Polity Model (DPM) and their variants (see **Table 2**). Dynamic contexts are created by endowing the different types of agents with different capabilities of interaction: for example, in the CPM model, resources cannot be accessed unless the individual agents accept constraints and obey certain rules of access. Coercive centralized control of resources is thus achieved as an emergent outcome of individual interaction typology and variability. As individual agents interact in the context of coercive centralized control, two outcome emerge simultaneously: on the one hand, macro-level phenomena emerge, like the new networks of trust. On the other hand, individual agents’ political attitudes change as an effect of the macro-level emergent phenomena. All this result in modified individual behavior (downward causation). The system is run over long simulation time intervals.

Simulation Models

The experimental setup models a polity by selecting some of the relevant features of (a) authoritarian and (b) democratic regimes. Two main polity models have been constructed: the Communist (CPM) and the Democratic Polity Model (DPM). The Democratic Polity Model has also two variants: the Transition-to-Democracy Polity Model (Ts-DPM) and the Democratic Consolidation Polity Model (Cs-DPM) (Table 2).




Figure 7.
Simulation Loop.

For each of them, only some relevant features have been modeled: for the CPM, for example, we have modeled the centralized structure, the inequality of resource distribution, the co-existence of parallel networks of trust (the ideology-based and the resource-based networks of trust), and public politics.

In our approach the individual agents act always in a norm space, and with permanent reference to a value system: the individual actions and the patterns of collective action always include a relation to the associated value system.

The simulation scenarios are based on few number of mechanisms and/or processes. There have been developed several simulation scenarios for the study of emergent phenomena and their downward causation effects at the level of individual behavior. As a reference, the simulated political mechanisms and processes have been identified in Tilly's diagram of political mechanisms-based democratization (Tilly, 2001, p.32; Figure1) and selected from Table1 in same work (Tilly, 2001, p.34).

Table 2. The Simulated Political Mechanisms in the Artificial Polity Model

Simulation Scenario(s) / Political Mechanisms	Networks of Trust	Inequality
Authoritarian Polity Model (CPM)	a.Generalized network of trust; included in polity; b.Coercive centralized control and the macro-level emergence of parallel autonomous networks of trust (patro-client networks)	a.Coercive control of the access to resources enables relations of exploitation b.Generalized categorial inequalities in public politics
Democratic Polity Model (DPM)	a.Insulation of existing categorial inequalities from public politics b. Incorporation and expansion of existing trust networks into the polity	a.Dissolution of coercive controls supporting current relations of exploitation b. Insulation of existing categorial inequalities

The simulation system has been developed in NetLogo (**Figure 8**). The interface consists in agents, resources, and political culture components. The setup provides the initial conditions for the evolution of interactions. The dynamics of trust and attitude change are plotted automatically as the simulation runs.




Figure 8.

The NetLogo interface of the simulation system.

Model structure includes several types of individual actors, several types of resources (financial, economic and institutional), and a political culture system.

Political Attitude Change provide for the emergence of Network of Trust

One approach on polity models of the Eastern European communist and post-communist regimes starts from the hypothesis that the emergence of networks of trust is triggered by a set of interdependent mechanisms such as the inequality of distribution, centralized and coercive control of the individuals' access to resources, scarce resources and the existence of privileges of access²¹. Individual agents' trust behavior is defined as a process whose dynamics is dependent of the dynamics of the cognitive dissonance: as the cognitive dissonance increases, trust decreases and agents escape the current networks of trust and join parallel patro-client autonomous local networks of trust.

Model of emergence of networks of trust which insulate the official institutions and their associate networks of trust: "baronscape" models the emergence of networks of trust as networks of local corrupt elites concentrating wealth and power. The dominance of corrupt elites in the parochial domains provides the premisses for

²¹ See Precupetu, 207, 2008 for a complete study of the political culture and values in the communist regimes.

insulating the central authority and the emergence of parallel networks of trust: while official networks are networks of trust in state the local networks are networks of trust in the local baron, which becomes the true authority of the local domain (county).

Downward Causation Effect: local patron-client networks (emergent macro level phenomena) influence the political culture and behavior of individual agents. The attitude of individual agents toward the state changes as the newly emerged networks of trust co-evolve and attract more individual agents. Individual behavior is influenced: individual agents escape network of trust in state and join private networks of trust (patron-client networks or “baron networks”)²².

Political Attitude Change

A second experimental setup models the emergence of patron-client networks as a macro-level phenomenon in an experimental simulation of cognitive dissonance reduction of the individual agents (citizens) with direct impact on their trust in state. It models the emergence of the so-called “privilege markets”.

The “privilegescape” simulation model of corruption suggests a scenario of trust variability which is based on value change dynamics. The political mechanisms invoked here are both interaction and value change, even if at different time scales (asynchronous).

Downward Causation Effect: the privilege market, as a macro-level emergent phenomenon, influences the attitude of the individual agent toward the state (micro-level).

Discussion. Why Is Interaction Not Enough?

To answer this question, we address two issues: one is the *agent* in polity modeling. The other one is the issue of *relation*.

As regards the first issue: Individual interaction is not enough for simulating the downward causation effects. Therefore, simulation modeling concepts of individual

²²See also privilegescape model in (Voinea, 2012, 2013).

agent and artificial polity should be revisited. This issue has found a solution: the aggregate or collectively emergent macro-level agent.

As an essential difference from the *artificial societies*, which are described as *micro simulations* (Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Gilbert 1995; Sawyer, 2003), the *artificial polities* are *macro simulations*, i.e.: simulations based on macro-level emergent processes which model the dynamic of complex systems. In the current literature, the *artificial polity* is an agent-based simulation model which uses a single type of agent: the micro-level individual agent. In this context, the term *macro-level “aggregate” agent* might denote the kind of simulation agents usually involved in MAS (Conte, Edmonds, Moss, and Sawyer, 2001), DAI (Conte, Gilbert, and Sichman, 1998) and also in CAS approaches (Cederman, 2003). These kinds of agents could be described as micro-level collective agent (pre-defined structured agents, like in MAS and DAI, or emergent unstructured collective agents, like in the artificial societies or in CAS-based simulation models).

In our approach, this type of agent is described as *macro-level “connected” agent*, meaning a macro-level network of agents, in which the agents are actually *processes* interconnected by means of shared cultural attributes, like symbols, rituals, beliefs, values, norms, behaviors, attitudes. These interconnections are described themselves as macro-level emergent processes. In this context, both the agents and the relations between them are emergent phenomena (**Figure 9**).

The former is a typical agent in agent-based simulation models, where the unit of interaction is the individual agent. This agent is typically used in simulating the micro-macro social emergent phenomena, and the conceptual paradigm involved – the methodological individualism – provides appropriate background for explaining the emergence of social macro patterns. However, the macro-to-micro phenomena, and their impact onto the individual agent are not covered by this conceptual paradigm. This makes difficult to explain how macro phenomena can impact the micro level agent and the individual interactions.

The latter is a typical agent in agent-based simulation models of macro-level phenomena, where the unit of interaction is the *process*. A *macro-level process*

description assumes several micro-level agents and/or lower-level processes involved in a type of “activity” which connects them all in a particular activation pattern with a global emergent outcome. It is this type of agent that we aim to define and use in our present approach.

The concept of *agent* in agent-based systems, no matter if we talk about MAS, artificial societies, or CAS-based systems, is still influenced by the classical artificial intelligence type of agent defined as a separate entity (‘object’) in the world/environment, endowed with internal mechanisms and processes, (eventually) memory, a set of basic reactive and (eventually) cognitive capabilities. All these provide for one fundamental capability, which is that of interaction with both the environment and the other agents (see (Sawyer, 2004a, 2004b, 2005) for a comprehensive description of the agent concept in agent-based systems). This type of agent is characteristic for agent-based systems which model the social micro-level and the micro-to-macro emergent phenomena.

The concept of *agent* in our approach must meet the requirements of agent-based system able to model both micro- and macro-level phenomena, as well as micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro phenomena. Such systems might involve another type of interaction unit: the *process*.




Figure 9. Types of agents.

(a) the agent in the artificial society setting is a separate pre-defined entity able to interact with other agents and with the environment; (b) the agent in the artificial polity setting is a set of processes which might get connected in small networks, each such network becoming a macro-level emergent agent able to interact with other agents at both micro-, and macro levels.

For the second issue, we assume a more important role for relational dynamics in the artificial polity. In agent-based systems, social behavioral patterns arise as direct outcomes of agent interactions. However, it is not only *interaction* which makes social behavior patterns to emerge, but oftenly the dynamics of the *relationship* between ‘individual agents’ and ‘culture agents’, namely values, beliefs, norms, attitudes, symbols, rituals, etc. Relationships of this kind can vary as a consequence of dynamic normative, belief or attitude changes.

For example, in the communist regimes, individual trust in the state decreases over a long time interval. The autonomous patro-client networks of trust emerge as the trust in state decreases, but all this happen at a large temporal scale. The reason concerns values change: the individual agent changes the degree in which he or she values something (Archer, 1996). Level of trust in state in the Eastern European communist regimes took almost half-century to decrease up to the bottom because the process of values change was rather slow. This process took very long time, so that we cannot identify it with the direct outcome of an interaction mechanism. The other way around is also true: the level of trust in state in post-communist regimes has not increased in more than twenty years after the Fall of Berlin Wall, because individual agents are very slow in changing the materialist value system (Inglehart, 1997, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Therefore, patterns of trust cannot be identified with patterns of direct interaction between the agent and the state. Their emergence should be directly connected to the patterns of relationships (or ratherto the degree of intensity of such relationships) between the individual agent and a political culture which guides the interactions and which vary itself as significantly as to be considered as the very source of trust variability. Therefore, a political mechanism which could explain the variability of trust needs at least two levels of description: one is the level of direct agent interactions, the other one is the level of relationship between agent and a political culture. Relational patterns vary much more than individual interaction patterns actually do. Nevertheless, agent-political culture relationships and the relational variability provide the sources for the attitude and behavioral variability. This view, inspired by the Weberian concept of “value-directed action” and adopted by

the political culture-based modeling research, seems much more appropriate to explain how a particular political mechanism and process work in a polity.

Conclusions

Our present simulation models are aimed at testing the downward causative power and effectiveness of macro level phenomena.

We aim at elaborating a political culture model of polity which can give an account of both emergence and downward causation phenomena. Such model needs however strong philosophy of science and modeling defining approaches on the concepts of mechanism, process and culture.

The *artificial polity model* needs to be extended with a complete description at the institutional level and with a process-based architecture, so that generative agents and relations could be described in an uniform framework. It is not the “uniformity”, but the process-generalized view which seems to fit better the artificial polity modeling. Moreover, accommodation of political culture theories in polity simulation and modeling needs a more comprehensive approach on mechanisms and processes, since their definitions are still open to debate.

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An Ontology of Extortion Racket Systems

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Abstract

Extortion is forced extraction of money from a victim. The paper describes an ontology of extortion racket systems (ERS), derived from empirical evidence from the Sicilian Mafia. It is centered round a typology of Mafia type organizations distinguishing between Mafia in a traditional and non-traditional environment. In a traditional environment Mafia is perceived as a legitimate authority undertaking systematic extortion and offering private protection in return. It operates in a social environment consisting of a normative system characterized by distrust and a lack of civil society. Mafia in a non-traditional environment results from coerced migration and concentrates on legal and illegal economic activities.

Introduction

Extortion racket systems (ERS) are powerful and dynamically expanding criminal as well as economic organizations that cause considerable disruption to the global financial and economic system. If they are further more culturally entrenched in a society they shall be denoted as Mafia Type Organisations (MTO). In this talk an ontology of an ideal-typical MTO will be presented. Key terms and relations are based on a detailed analysis of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (Scaglione 2011). Empirical evidence indicates that the Mafia operates differently within different social environments. This begs for an explanation. For this purpose a simulation model will be developed that enables to study the dynamics of ERS. A first step is to integrate existing domain knowledge in an ontology that can be implemented in a simulation model. An ontology is defined as an explicit specification of a conceptualisation (Studer et al.

1998). Following the formalisation of Guarino et al. (2009), the notions of ‘explicit, of ‘specification’, and of ‘conceptualisation’ can be clarified using intentional logic. A conceptualisation can be defined as an intensional relational structure, consisting of a universe of discourse D , a set of possible worlds W and a set of conceptual relations R on the domain space $\langle D, W \rangle$. The set of possible worlds is introduced in order that the domain does not only consist of the relations that have actually been realised between the objects but includes also possible relations. Thus the formulation of an ontology enables *first* a formal precision of a summary of the knowledge about the domain of study. However, in our case the knowledge is derived from one particular case. *Second*, intensional logic is used to achieve a theoretical generalization of the description. This enables to overcome the restriction of the data basis. These features make an ontology a diagnosis tool. It allows identifying the elements which are necessary and sufficient for a certain state of a system, may it be cancer in a human body or the establishment of MTOs in human societies. Finding out what elements are present in a particular situation within a certain environment allows assessing the danger of establishment of ERS and their transformation towards an MTO. This is of particular relevance for Mafia migration or spontaneous emergence of ERS, i.e. for monitoring environments which are not traditionally affected by the presence of the Mafia.

The paper is organized as follows: first an overview of key concepts for the analysis of Mafia type organizations is outlined. Subsequently the ontology will be described. This consists of three steps: First, the general characteristics of the domain are outlined. Second, key terms and relations of the ontology are provided. While key terms describe the atomic elements, the relations specify the driving mechanisms of the system. Third, these are further specified by introducing details of organizations, the internal structure of the Mafia and the actors of the organisations. Finally, emergent properties that should be realised by the system will be listed.

Characteristics of the domain

The perception of the Mafia alternates between a cultural phenomenon and a hierarchical organization. While early scholars emphasized that individuals become Mafiosi because of their public perception (Hess 1970), in the 1980s its organizational structure became visible; in particular, the witness of so-called pentiti was important (Catanzaro 1988; Arlacchi 1989). The history of the Sicilian Mafia goes back to the mid-19th century. Until the 1950s it was primarily a rural phenomenon. The Mafia offered private protection and established a monopoly of violence (Gambetta 1993) in case of weak state authority and a lack of civil society. This triggered a view on the Mafia as a state-like organization (Nozick 1974). However, a process starting with smuggling cigarettes in the 1950s culminated in the 1970s and 1980s when the Mafia radically enlarged its business segment with drug trafficking and other illegal economic activities. Economic enrichment became a dominant motive (Gambetta 1993; Dickie 2006; Gambetta and Reuter 1995; Paoli 2003). This went along with two Mafia wars in the 1960s and from the 1970s to 1980s (Dickie 2006). Since this time the phenomenon is integrated in the discussion of transnational crime taking advantage of globalized markets (Shelley 2006). The process of globalization challenges the state-centered view of international relations theory. Other actors such as criminal organizations enter the stage (Madsen 2009). However, evidence remains mixed. In part, this depends on the definition of organized crime, namely whether emphasis is put on a stable organizational structure or on illegal market activities which can be undertaken also by small groups (Hagan 1983). However, while factually the Mafia migrated to other territories, often this was not voluntarily and changed the structure and the course of action (Varese 2011). Extortion remains a local phenomenon. There exist evidence that Mafia is a territorially based phenomenon that is not easy to reproduce in a foreign territory (Campana 2011; Varese 2012).

This can be summarized in the distinction between Mafia in a *traditional* environment, undertaking *systematic* extortion within a territory, and Mafia in a *non-traditional* environment, using opportunities of various types of legal and illegal

economic activities and only occasionally undertaking *predatory* extortion. In in a traditional environment the Mafia is perceived as a *legitimate* authority. However, the high number of victims in the Mafia wars and the subsequent war of the Mafia against the state, triggered the emergence of Anti-Mafia movements. These indicate a cultural change in the traditional environment, challenging the legitimacy of the Mafia as ruling authority (Battaglia 2012).

Conceptual relations

The Mafia can be characterized as a secret organization (Simmel 1999) in relation to other organizations, such as the police or companies that are extorted by the Mafia. Thus the events in the domain are determined by organizations. Nevertheless actions are undertaken by actors. Thus the basic unit of the domain are actors that belong to a certain organization. However, these are situated a) in a physical territory (such as Sicily, Northern Italy or Germany) and b) in a system of social norms and values. Both the dynamics of the internal organization of the Mafia as well as the relation of Mafiosi to the overall society is considered. A key research question is how the normative system of the society is related to the organisational norms in the various organisations and how cultural change triggers organizational structures.




Figure 1.
Key terms.

Organisations

Actors act as members of certain organizations. For this reason, organizations determine the actor classes, which determine the choice of actions for the individual actors. Thus, first the organizations of the domain system and the relations between these are outlined in **Figure 2**. This is a specification of the ‘organization’ package of **Figure 1**. The Mafia gains profit from extorting entrepreneurs and corrupting the public administration. Court and police fight the Mafia. However, they may get corrupted as well.




Figure 2.

Conceptual relations between the organizations.

Internal Organisation of the Mafia

Reflecting the internal organizational structure of the Mafia is the most precarious part of the domain ontology. The witness of approvers has made clear that the Mafia has an internal structure (Arlacchi 1992; Gambetta 1993). However, the

structure remains fragile (Arlacchi 1992). There exist no formal positions that are secured by enforceable rights. While rules exist, they are to be enacted by the way Mafiosi act. This is partly determined by habits and partly determined by individual, strategic interest (Arlacchi 1992). Moreover, Mafiosi actions are also influenced by the external organizations, such as Police or Politics and administrations. An ideal-typical reconstruction of the organization reveals the hierarchical structure of a secret society (Simmel 1999) is outlined in **Figure 3**.




Figure 3.
Internal organization of the Mafia.

Actors

Actors are affiliated to different organizations. Organizations are further differentiated. Others provide a reservoir for organizations and Anti-Mafia movements. These might evolve in the case that Mafia violence exceeds a tolerated degree. It is a key feature of the domain system that membership in organizations is not a disjoint feature of the actors. On the contrary, traditionally Mafiosi do have a legal job (Arlacchi 1992). This may result in conflicts between different behavioural rules and obligations. This can be reflected by using the EMIL architecture for normative software agents (Andrighetto et al. 2007). EMIL agents possess a normative board, containing normative beliefs and normative goals, organized and arranged according to the salience that they obtain in a specific social and cultural context. Thus membership in an organization may be stored in the normative board of the actors, activating a context in which organization-specific norms are stored. However, the subjective salience of the organizational context may vary. Salience determines the degree of the activation of a norm dependent on its consistency with other moral dispositions (Andrighetto et al. 2007). In particular, in case of conflicting normative demands from organizational and personal friendship contexts, organizational norms may be followed with different probabilities according to the salience of the context. This might trigger corruption. The different probabilities of different obligations can be implemented as event-action trees in the EMIL-S modelling platform (Lotzmann et al. 2013).




Figure 4.

Actor classes.

Emergent properties

The ontology describes the knowledge about the static components of the domain. The goal is to identify the elements and the relations between them to specify the mechanisms of the emergence and entrenchment of ERS in a society. It is known that societies which are infiltrated by MTOs exhibit certain characteristic systemic properties. Unknown is whether the knowledge of the elements and relations which is derived from the evidence of one particular case of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra is sufficient for the emergence of these systemic properties. For the purpose of testing the hypothesis that these are sufficient conditions, a simulation model will be developed. Implemented in a simulation model, the dynamics can be studied, i.e. whether a differential behaviour of Mafia type organizations can be observed in a simulation. If this test proves to be successful, the ontology can enfold its potential as a diagnosis tool. The central distinction is between Mafia operating in traditional and non-traditional environments. However, this requires further specification. Initially, only Mafia in a traditional environment is implemented. The hypotheses that should be

tested by a simulation is whether the domain knowledge is sufficient for a simulation to generate the following systemic properties:

Market: competitive / non-competitive (Cartel): Mafia activities may destroy a competitive Market by organizing the formation of Cartels (Arlacchi 1989; Gambetta and Reuter 1995). This may hold for all types of environment, i.e. traditional and non-traditional ones.

systematic / predatory extortion: The most important difference is whether it can be observed that different Mafia type organizations exhibit either regular extortion of a territory or occasional extortion of individual entrepreneurs (Scaglione 2011). However, beyond systematic extortion a traditional environment is characterised by a further element:

Legitimacy: It should be observed that the Mafia is perceived as a legitimate authority in a traditional environment. This is a question of degree, not of yes or no (Battaglia 2012). However, it should include that in the competition of Mafia and the court the normative sanctions of the Mafia are perceived as more relevant and trustworthy. In operational terms, this is dependent on a) the relative number of punishing events and agents, and b) the degree of corruption in the territory. Corruption lowers the number of police and court members that actually sentence Mafia activity and the perception of legal sanctions as predictable and legitimate.

traditional (consensus) / non-traditional environment (Mafia expansion): If both systematic extortion and legitimacy of a Mafia authority can be observed, one can speak of a Mafia operating in a traditional environment. While systematic extortion refers –also– to organizational power, the aspect of legitimacy refers to cultural differences (Scaglione 2011).

Mafia migration: The investigation of the cultural influence implies also the question whether migration of Mafia (i.e. Mafiosi) to a culturally different environment changes its organizational structure. This means that the Mafia is able to adapt to cultural changes by developing new business strategies (Varese 2011). These

may eventually include predatory extortion but primarily legal and illegal economic activities (Scaglione 2011).

Finally, any research on the Mafia is also research on what can be done against it. In Sicily in the past decades a strong anti-Mafia movement has emerged. The objective of this movement is to strengthen the civil society and public responsibility.

Cultural change: The ontology includes the possibility of the emergence of Anti-Mafia movements in case of excessive violence. During a simulation it can be tested what conditions foster the emergence of such movements, to what degree this influences the development of a civil society, and inasmuch a cultural change triggered by an anti-Mafia movement influences the effectiveness of a Mafia as a legitimate authority over a territory (Battaglia 2012).

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Section 3:

Political Culture Analysis

Political Culture vs. Rational Choice: Support for Democracy in Serbia

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Abstract

This paper deals with some predictors of the general support for democracy in the light of the two competing models, cultural and rational choice, which have different implications for the possibility of the development of mass support for democracy in former communist societies. The paper aims at clarifying the importance of certain “institutional” and “cultural” variables for the general support for democracy in Serbia. The data used in the paper were collected in the post-election survey, conducted after the May 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections on a representative sample of Serbian citizens (N=1,568). The relative importance of 15 predictors was analyzed: the socio-demographic variables (respondent’s gender, age, educational level, monthly household income), the institutional variables (satisfaction with Serbian democracy and economy, evaluation of the government performance before the election, the perceived level of respect for individual freedom and the quality of voters’ view representation in elections) and the cultural variables (political tolerance, authoritarianism, nationalism and socialist egalitarianism). In the hierarchical regression analysis, the general support for democracy was first regressed on socio-demographic variables, then the cultural variables were added as well as the institutional variables in the final step. Each model had a greater explanatory power, significantly increasing the explained percent of variance. The most important predictors of support for democracy were satisfaction with Serbian democracy ($\beta=.12$, $p<.001$) and evaluation of government performance ($\beta=.23$, $p<.001$); the citizens who were more satisfied with democracy and more inclined to positively evaluate the government performance were more supportive of democracy. The concluding part discusses the implications of the obtained results for the development of democratic political culture and consolidation of democratic institutions in a transitional society.

Keywords: political culture, democracy, political values, Serbia.

Introduction

It is almost a truism to say that effective functioning of a political system heavily depends on the quality of the prevailing political culture. Without the mass support for the rules of political game and consensus on the norms and principles it is based on, there is no legitimacy or stability of a political system (whether democratic or not). While this is almost self-evident in a stable or a slowly progressing society which „reproduces“ itself by socializing the citizens into its prevailing norms and values, rapid societal changes (such as an „overnight“ ending of the communist rule in the East European countries) put forth several dilemmas about the congruency hypothesis.

According to the well-known Dahrendorf's (1990) claim that it takes six months to replace a political system, six years to transform an economic system, and sixty years to change a society, the culturalist theory of political culture and political change posits rather pessimistic expectations regarding the possibility of democratizing post-communist societies. The proponents of this model argue that democratic political structure stems from democratic political culture and that, simply, “democracy cannot be built without democrats” (Klingeman et al., 2006, p. XI). In spite of the possible institutional changes, citizens will accept only those political and economic structures whose institutional and legal procedures are compatible with their relatively stable cultural orientations and political values. Being a product of the common (early) socialization, they can only be changed during the socialization process, under the influence of more general structural factors such as economic modernization, urbanization etc. (Almond & Verba, 1963/1989; Eckstein, 1988; Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1959; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Individual's political values and beliefs are heavily determined by specific social/political/economic circumstances from early childhood. After one reaches adulthood, the changes in political outlook are possible, but not that probable (Inglehart, 1990). The effects of the changed institutional context are necessarily delayed and postponed, visible only in younger cohorts or by the process of generational replacement in general population. The prevailing political culture can therefore change only slowly and in the long term, which is why it takes a

long time for democracy to consolidate in a previously non-democratic country (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Klingemman et al., 2006).

The rational choice (or institutional) model, on the other hand, posits that the current social context, i.e. more recent political, economic and social events, play a more important role than early socialization. The evaluation of system performances, in economic and political terms, and the quality of citizens' experience with the system shape the political attitudes and behaviours and contribute to the (lack of) allegiance to democratic institutions and norms (Jackman & Miller, 1996; Mishler & Rose, 2002; Muller & Seligson, 1994). Early instilled beliefs and values are not unimportant, but are strengthened or weakened by the later experiences. In a newly democratized society, citizens can and must learn to be "democrats" and that is only possible in the context of democratic civic culture and pluralism and through the experience with the democratic political process (Dalton 1994; Fleron, 1996; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). Thus, it is not that important to create democrats as to create democracy; once established, it is highly probable that democratic institutions will produce democratic values (Fleron, 1996). Democratic political culture is hence rather the effect than the cause of democratic structure.

Although the empirical tests of the relative explanatory power of the two competing models are rather limited and mixed, each model has its own empirical *pro* and *cons*. The failure of communist regimes to transform the pre-communist political culture (Almond, 1983) and to create the new socialist man (Gray, 1979) is considered to be the major argument in favour of the primacy of the culture over structure view. In the words of Brown, "it would appear that the dominant Czech political culture came much closer to changing Czechoslovak Communism than Czechoslovak Communism came to procuring acceptance of its official political culture" (cited in Almond, 1983, p. 137). Some more recent empirical findings support the view that the prevailing political culture in the East European countries lacks some main democratic qualities in spite of (more or less) limited experiences with democracy. Compared to the citizens of the Western democracies, the citizens of post-communist countries are

less supportive of democracy (Klingeman et al., 2006; Pavlovic, 2007), less politically tolerant (Gibson, 1998; 2002; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003) and less politically active (Dekker et al., 2003). Inglehart has argued that self-expression values are an essence of the democratic political culture, showing that their acceptance in post-communist countries was lower not only compared to the Western societies, but even to poorer and less developed African and Asian countries (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009).

However, some studies have called into question the culturalist view that the quality of the post-communist political culture is an obstacle to democratization. Gibson (1996) showed that the support for democracy in Russia and Ukraine was “a mile wide and more than an inch deep” (p. 417), suggesting that this was not a mere case of lip service to democracy. Other studies have suggested that democratic values in some former Soviet Union countries were present “at levels the pessimists would not have expected” (Reisinger et al., 1994, p. 185) or that there were no significant differences in the acceptance of numerous political attitudes and values between the citizens of East and West Germany (Dalton, 1994). Contrary to Inglehart’s (1990) assumption of unidirectional causation – civic culture affects democracy but not *viceversa* – some researchers have shown that democratization increased the importance of pro-democratic values (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000), as well as that most civic culture attitudes did not have any significant impact on change in democracy and some of them were rather effects of democracy (Muller & Seligson, 1994). Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that the levels of political tolerance (Duch & Gibson, 1992), trust in social and political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997) or support for marketization and democracy (Whitefield & Evans, 1999) in post-communist countries can be explained in rational choice terms, as the products of resocialization during the period of democratization, i.e. the effects of economic and political performance evaluations.

This paper aims at clarifying the relative importance of some cultural and institutional variables in explaining the support for democracy in the post-communist Serbian society. After almost half a century of communist regime and ten

years of Milosevic's authoritarian rule, democracy was introduced in Serbia overnight in 2000. The democratic political system was implemented in the society which survived severe interethnic conflicts, international isolation, NATO bombing and political, social and economic collapse. The studies from that period have shown that antidemocratic political attitudes and values were predominant in the Serbian population (Golubovic et al., 1995; Pantic, 2002; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Some of the main features of the non-democratic political culture (e.g., authoritarianism and ethnocentrism) remained intact in spite of democratic changes and are still relatively widespread (Biro et al., 2002; Kuzmanovic, 2010; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Mass protests which caused the fall of Milosevic in 2000 were rather motivated by a growing dissatisfaction with extremely poor life conditions than by intrinsic mass demands for democracy (Pavlovic, 2010). If individual's political outlook is primarily determined by relatively stable cultural orientations and political values, there was no fertile ground for the acceptance of democracy in Serbia. The prevailing political culture was marked by high authoritarianism, nationalism, intolerance etc., incongruent with the democratic political system which, according to the assumptions of the culturalist view, would result in the low support for the newly established democratic institutions and norms among citizenry. However, the opinions about the democratic political system before as well as after 2000 were quite favourable. Based on the data collected in the three waves of the World Values Survey in which Serbia participated (in 1996, 2001 and 2006), the measure of relative support for democracy, combining the acceptance of democracy and rejection of autocracy as used in similar analyses (Klingemann et al., 2006), showed that 56% of Serbian citizens were supportive of democracy in 1996 (during the Milosevic's era) and 69% of them in 2001 (after the democratic changes in 2000) (Pavlovic, 2010). The lowest support for democracy was registered during the democratization process, in 2006 (46%), while the acceptance of democracy was quite weakly linked with the acceptance of some more general pro-democratic beliefs and values (social tolerance, autonomy, gender equality, market orientation etc.). These, as well as some other studies pose questions regarding the sources of support for

democracy in Serbia and the relative importance of the “cultural” versus “institutional” factors.

Method

Sample and procedure. The data used in the analysis were collected in a post-election survey conducted on the representative national sample of eligible voters in Serbia by the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia. The probability-based sample with multiple stages of selection was used. It was based on the addresses from a national database of mailing addresses maintained by the Serbian Post. The total sample consisted of 3,455 households and one-individual-per-household principle resulted in the total sum of 1,568 respondents interviewed (the weighted response rate was 50.1%). The face-to-face interviews were conducted using the Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) method. Data were collected in the period from December 2012 to February 2013.

Variables and measures. The Serbian post-election study covered a wide variety of political beliefs, attitudes and values. Several fundamental political beliefs and attitudes, usually regarded as some of the main features of the democratic political outlook, often used in the post-communist political culture studies (Gibson, 1996; Dekker, 1996; Duch & Gibson, 1992) and very relevant for Serbian political context, were treated as cultural variables. These included authoritarianism, political tolerance, nationalism and socialist egalitarianism. Authoritarianism has been one of the most important concepts in explaining human political behaviour for decades, related with numerous attitudes and beliefs (see, for example, McFarland, 2010). It also bears special relevance for explaining political behaviour in Serbia (Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009; Todosijevic, 2006, Kuzmanovic, 2010), being one of the most important aspects of Serbian political culture in the past several decades. Nationalism has a special relevance in the Serbian context as well since it has not only been (more or less) the official ideology of the ruling class for decades, but one of the most important dimensions of differentiation between the supporters of the relevant political parties in Serbia (Todosijevic, 2006; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Political tolerance is one of the most

important components of the democratic political culture, often used in post-communist studies (Gibson, 1998; Karpov, 1999; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003), while socialist egalitarianism represents the general support for the economic aspect of societies liberalization, i.e. the rejection of some of the most important aspects of the former socialist political system (planned economy and economic egalitarianism).

Variables were measured in the following ways:

Authoritarianism. Six items of the scale of authoritarianism ($\alpha=.65$) were selected based on some previous studies (Todosijevic, 2006). The items represented the content of the well-known F scale (Adorno et al., 1950) and RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1988). Each item was followed by a five-point scale. The scale included items such as “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values for children” or “Authorities should censor the media”. Authoritarianism was operationalized as the first component yielded by the principal component analysis, explaining 31.18% of variance. All items showed positive factor loadings on the first component (see Appendix, Table 1).

Nationalism. Nationalistic attitudes were measured by seven items of the scale ($\alpha=.72$) covering a variety of themes that are most often the content of the nationalistic worldview (Dekker et al., 2003). A similar scale was used in some previous studies (Todosijevic, 2006). The scale included items such as “No nation has such a glorious and at the same time tragic history as the Serbs” or “There are few nations that contributed to the world’s culture and science as ours”. The principal component analysis yielded one factor, explaining 44.31% of variance. The obtained factor scores were used as a measure of nationalism. All items showed positive factor loadings (see Appendix, Table 2).

Political tolerance. Political tolerance was measured by the least liked group method (Sullivan et al., 1979), using three items ($\alpha=.82$). Respondents were asked to (dis)agree (on a five-point scale) on whether the members of the most disliked group they had in mind should or should not be banned, allowed to organize public demonstration or nominate themselves for public office. The principal component

analysis yielded one component, explaining 73.43% of variance. Factor scores were treated as a measure of political tolerance. All items showed positive factor loadings (see Appendix, Table 3).

Socialist egalitarianism. The Serbian post-election study included one item related to respondent's general belief regarding the governmental role in economy and economic egalitarianism, which was treated as an indicator of socialist egalitarianism. Respondents were asked how strongly they (dis)agreed (1. strongly disagree/5. strongly agree) with the following statement "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels".

The selection of institutional variables used in the analysis was guided by previous research with similar methodology and study aims (for example, Whitefield, 2005; Whitefield & Evans, 1999; Mishler & Rose, 1997) as well as the scope of the available data. Instrumental variables included several economic and political evaluations of the functioning of the Serbian democratic political system.

Evaluation of democracy. Measured by one four-point scale item "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Serbia?".

Evaluation of economy. Respondents were asked to estimate whether the state of the economy in Serbia had become better, stayed about the same or got worse.

Government evaluation. Measured by one four-point scale item "Having in mind the results of Government, how good do you think the government has done its job, during the last 4 years (before last elections)?".

Freedom and human rights evaluation. Respondents were asked to estimate the level of respect for individual freedom and human rights in Serbia on a four-point scale (1. no respect at all/4. a lot of respect).

Perceived representation. Respondents' evaluation of how well elections ensured that the views of voters were represented by Members of the Parliament (1. not well at all/4. very well) was treated as a measure of perceived representation.

Electoral system evaluation. Respondents evaluated the method of electing representatives as very good, good, bad or very bad.

Higher values in the afore-mentioned variables implied more positive evaluations.

Support for democracy. General approval of the democratic political system was the main dependent variable in the analysis. It was measured by a standard four-point scale (1. agree strongly/4. disagree strongly) item: "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government".

Socio-demographic variables. Respondent's gender, age (measured in years), level of education (primary/secondary/tertiary), monthly household income (estimated on the 11-point scale, 1. up to 9,999 RSD/11. 100,000 RSD or more) and an estimated likelihood to improve the standard of living (1. very unlikely/4. very likely) were included in regression models as well.

Results

The data were analyzed using the hierarchical regression analysis. Support for democracy was in the first step regressed on socio-demographic variables. Cultural variables were then added in the second step, while in the third step the institutional variables were included as predictors as well. The data are shown in **Table 1**.

The first model explains only 4% of variance in support for democracy. Respondent's monthly household income ($\beta=.134$, $p<.001$) and an estimated likelihood of improving one's standard of living ($\beta=.130$, $p<.001$) were the only significant predictors. Other predictors controlled for, the more affluent individuals showed higher support for democracy and *vice versa*. The same applies for the respondents believing in the possibility of improving their financial standard of living. The objective as well as subjective economic status obviously influenced one's attitude towards the democratic political system. Although the socio-demographic model rather describes than explains variation in support for democracy, these findings can be interpreted as a demonstration of a deprivation or a frustration based attitude towards democracy among Serbian citizens. Not having enough means as well as thinking that one deserves more than one has can be a cause for a critique and cynical attitude

towards the democratic regime, which is being blamed for the unsatisfactory standard of living and a lack of opportunities for its improvement. The importance of self-interest for the preference of democracy is quite in line with the propositions of the rational choice model.

The non-significant effects of gender, age and the level of education are informative as well. The differences in socialization practices and experiences related with gender and especially age are obviously not that important for allegiance to democracy. Age is considered to be one of the most relevant socialization variables, which gains special relevance in the post-communist societies. The culturalist model predicts that younger cohorts, especially those not socialized under the authoritarian regime, should be more supportive of democracy. Some empirical evidence has shown that there were generational differences in that sense (Hahn, 1991; Hageaars et al., 2003; Klingeman et al., 2006; Siemienska, 2006) and great similarity between youth in the post-communist countries and those in the old democracies (Catterberg & Zuasnar, 2010; Moreno et al., 2010; Siemienska, 2003). This finding does not support the assumptions of generational differences in the Serbian society. The level of education, systematically linked with a more liberal political outlook, does not play an important role in explaining individual differences in support for democracy.

Table 1. Hierarchical regression analysis – three models of support for democracy.

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Socio-demographic factors</i>			
Gender (male)	-.041	-.043	-.037
Age	.062	.078	.066
Education	.061	.048	.033
Household income	.134 ***	.128 ***	.108 **
Likelihood to improve standard of living	.130 ***	.130 ***	.065
<i>Cultural factors</i>			
Authoritarianism		-.119 ***	-.104 **
Nationalism		-.014	-.017
Political tolerance		.020	.044
Socialist egalitarianism		-.023	-.034
<i>Institutional factors</i>			

Evaluation of democracy			.115 **
Government evaluation			.229 ***
Evaluation of economy			.012
Freedom and human rights evaluation			.020
Electoral system evaluation			.008
Perceived representation			.009
<hr/>			
Adjusted R Square	.04	.05	.12
<hr/>			

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Adding cultural variables in the model improves its explanatory power significantly (R square change=.014, F [4, 919] = 3.54, p<.01), but only slightly (5% of variance). The influence of the two economic variables remains significant even when respondent's income loses its intensity. This can be interpreted as an argument in favour of the claim that the effect of respondent's economic status on support for democracy is, at least partly, moderated by certain dispositional and attitudinal factors, such as some of those added in this step. There is empirical evidence that nationalistic and authoritarian attitudes are related with economic and cultural deprivation in Serbia (Kuzmanovic, 1994; 2010), which could imply the indirect effects of socio-demographic characteristics through attitudes and dispositions. The data in this study partly correspond to it. Only one added variable significantly predicted the support for democracy – authoritarianism ($\beta = -.119$, $p < .001$). Higher authoritarianism was related with lower support for democracy, which is quite in line with the theoretical considerations on authoritarian personality as well as numerous research findings showing relations between authoritarianism and other attitudes and values that are antithetical to a democratic political outlook (Adorno et al., 1950; Meloen, 1993; McFarland, 2010) or the level of state authoritarianism (Meloen, 1996). It is important to note that, other predictors in model controlled for, none of the remaining cultural variables had a significant influence on the support for democracy. Out of all political attitudes and beliefs included in this study, authoritarianism seems to be by far the most important in explaining allegiance to democracy. Adorno et al. (1950) stated that political, economic and social beliefs of an individual were deeply rooted in his/her personality, which may be “regarded as *determinant* of ideological preferences” (p. 5,

italics in the original). It seems that, in the case of Serbia, this holds not only for preference for democracy, but perhaps also for nationalism, political tolerance and socialist egalitarianism, which does not gain significance once the level of authoritarianism and demographics are controlled for.

Finally, adding the institutional variables significantly improves the model's explanatory power (R square change=.014, $F [4, 919] = 3.54, p < .01$) and doubles the percent of the explained variance (12%). The most important predictors of the support for democracy are satisfaction with government performance ($\beta = .229, p < .001$) and Serbian democracy ($\beta = .115, p < .001$) in general. Those who evaluate these more positively are more supportive of democracy, which is what would be expected under the institutional model paradigm. None of the remaining institutional factors significantly influences the support for democracy.

The influence of authoritarianism on the support for democracy remained significant after the inclusion of the institutional variables, although the intensity of influence was slightly decreased ($\beta = .104, p < .001$). Monthly household income was also positively related to support for democracy but additionally lost its intensity (compared to Model 2). Again, this demonstrates the indirect ways of influencing the support for democracy, through dispositions as well as some evaluations. This especially stands for the perceived likelihood of improving the standard of living which, after the inclusion of instrumental variables, lost its significance. Political evaluations obviously moderate the effects of individual (relative) deprivation.

Conclusions

The presented data have several important implications. Bearing in mind the two competing models, empirical evidence presented here is rather ambiguous, neither discarding the explanatory power of any nor granting one's primacy. If one had to choose the most important predictor of the support for democracy in Serbia, it would undoubtedly be the institutional factor – the satisfaction with government performance. This finding can be well explained by the propositions of the rational choice model: the evaluation of system performance most significantly contributes to

citizens' allegiance to the democratic system. Furthermore, it (at least slightly) moderates the effects of some structural and cultural factors.

Creating and upholding the functional Serbian democracy seems to be one way of causing allegiance to it. Two important implications stem from this. The relevance of the system performance suggests the importance of an effective functioning of the democratic regime, which implies the very important role of the political elites. Securing benefits for the many would bring the prevailing satisfaction with the system performance and, in the end, a more favourable view on democracy. On the other hand, if the support for democracy is solely influenced by self-interest and individual or group benefits, one cannot help but wonder whether it is merely a lip service to democracy, as often argued by the proponents of the culturalist model (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) – only instrumental support for democracy (based on its effects) and not intrinsic support (based on democracy as a value in itself). This raises the question of stability of this type of support for democracy in a transitional society with its ups and downs in performance. If there is no deeper commitment to democracy, it is a small step from criticism of poor performance of the democratic regime to the rejection of the democratic political system.

However, at least in the Serbian political context, allegiance to democracy *is* influenced by some more general factors as well. Authoritarianism explains some variation in the preference for democracy not accounted for by institutional variables. Other things controlled for, the higher the authoritarianism the less favourable is the attitude towards the democratic political system. One of the most fundamental and general determinants of political preferences, treated here as the cultural factor, plays its part. As stated before, authoritarianism has been a very important component of Serbian political culture for decades and obviously still is, after twelve years of democracy. Furthermore, there are reasons to treat authoritarianism as a form of traditional parochialism in the Serbian context (Biro, 2006; Kuzmanovic, 1994; Rot & Havelka, 1973), the idea not completely discarded by the original view of authoritarianism as a personality or dispositional variable (Sanford, 1973). This points

to the relevance and continuity in political tradition, which speaks in favour of the cultural model.

In understanding and describing the development of support for democracy in a post-communist society, a more integral and coherent approach is needed. It would include the structural, cultural and institutional variables. Some authors argue that „instead of asking whether institutions cause culture or culture causes institutions, we should look for their joint effects“ (Elkins & Simeon, 1979, p. 143) and that political culture evolves in a “*reciprocal relationship between institutions ... and values, fundamental political beliefs and implicit understandings*” (Brown, 2005, p. 187). The consonance between the two is greater and more easily achieved if democratic institutions develop upward (from within the society) than downward (imposed on the society). The former statement more likely describes the Serbian situation, but nonetheless data presented here point to combined effects of the cultural and institutional variables as found elsewhere (Bennich-Bjorkman, 2007) and accurately described as a partial or dual adaptation to “external modernity and domestic reality” (Sakwa, 2005, p. 43). If there is a certain way for creating the democratic political culture, it is to be found in creating “democrats” as well as creating democracy. The two will then mutually reinforce.

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Appendix

Table 1. Authoritarianism scale – Factor loadings on the first principal component

Obedience and respect for authority are most important values for children	.702
People just reject youthful rebellious thoughts as they age	.576
Forgetting physical punishment leads to immoral conditions	.497
Authorities should censor the media	.689
Solve social problems by eliminating immoral people	.686
People can be divided into strong and weak	.524

Note: Extraction method - Principal Component Analysis; no rotation; 38.18% of variance.

Table 2. Nationalism scale – Factor loadings

The Serbs should be proud of their people	.658
Serbia has a more glorious and tragic history than other nations	.798
Serbia contributes more to world culture and science	.789
More important politicians are patriots than experts	.493
Serbia should seek peaceful reunification	.553
Schools should pay more attention to patriotic education	.647

Note: Extraction method - Principal Component Analysis; 44.31% of variance.

Table 3: Political tolerance scale – Factor loadings

Disliked group should organize public demonstrations	.884
Disliked group should nominate for public office	.909
Disliked group should not be banned	.773

Note: Extraction Method - Principal Component Analysis; 73.53% of variance.

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Section 4:

European Studies

Non-State Partnerships in the International Politics: The Case of Civil Society Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy

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Abstract

This article examines two modes of the EU's external governance – bilateral and multilateral - in relations with the Eastern neighbourhood countries and the role of civil society's organizations in the process. It is argued that European Union is seeking to transport not just the norms and standards of the EU *acquis communautaire* but also the interactional institutional structure based on multiple and multi sector, transgovernmental networking into its closest external environment. It is aimed to involve the civil society organizations into most of the stages and interactional modes of the EU's relations with the Eastern Partnership countries. The study involves the EU's documents analysis, qualitative interviews conducted between 2011-2013 from the respondents of the EU's institutions, and the members of the Eastern Partnership's civil society forum.

“The civil society dimension is vital for the overall success of the ENP...Information to the public of the EU and the ENP partners is a key component of the civil society dimension”.
(Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP , Commission of the European Communities, 2006:1).

The EU wants to foster democratic reforms, governance, stability in those countries and make them more sustainable and you can not go without the civil society... < > We are source of information but not only of course.

Interview, Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, member of the steering committee, 09 05 2013, interview by phone, EaPCSF2.

Introduction

The European Neighbourhood policy was established by the European Union in 2003-2004 with a goal to create the stable, democratic and prosperous neighbourhood. The first decade of the policy implementation is coming to an end. Despite the ambitious goals, the wide range and various institutional modes of partnerships and initiatives the results of the policy are very modest. Furthermore, looking at the scores of democracy in civil and political liberties research²³ made by the Freedom House organization, in the Eastern Partnership countries one might find that the situation is getting worse in several countries, e.g. Ukraine, when comparing with the situation after the Orange revolution (2004), and the high people expectations at that time. Therefore, on the one hand, the EU's policy and the seeking of democratization in the post soviet space face several challenges and shortcomings. On the other hand the negotiations for the free trade, including Association Agenda, DCFTA, visa dialogues, are intensifying. The Eastern Partnership summit in 2013 in Vilnius is expected to become a focal point in the region.

European neighbourhood policy and its results have been analyzed by a constantly growing group of scholars (van Vooren, 2012; DeBardeleben, 2008; Korosteleva, 2011; Schimmelfennig, Lavenex, 2009). Several scholars (Tassinari, 2009; Casier, 2010), emphasize integration – security dilemma, which became evident within ENP as it is not allowing to re-apply the most effective instrument of the EU (enlargement perspective) in its external environment. Others relate problems with the EU asymmetric power and normative dictate directed towards the neighbours without possibility to receive the “carrot” of europeanization (Bonvincini, 2006; Tassinari, 2005; Casier, 2008; Hillion, 2008). The problems are also raised by the lack of solidarity between the EU member states on what kind of policy should be applied in relations with the southern and the eastern neighbours. But the most agree that strong interdependence, various soft security problems and the political and

²³For more information look at the Freedom in the world: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/ukraine>. E.g. Ukraine's status in 2006 was 'free' while in 2013 'partly free'.

economical potential of the relationship do not permit the EU to isolate itself from the neighbouring countries. These neighbouring countries, mostly undemocratic and unstable ones, surround the European Union as an external ring and raise the questions for the Union of how this common neighbourhood might be governed.

This article mostly focuses on the EU's eastern neighbourhood, the so called Eastern dimension of the European neighbourhood policy, which involves six post soviet countries- Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. One segment of the European neighbourhood policy- civil society dimension- is analyzed in the paper. The article examines the international governance of the EU's Eastern neighbourhood policy, and the institutional modes of how the civil society organizations are being integrated into this process and what role they are provided to attain.

The European neighbourhood policy might be evaluated as the process of international democratization and institutionalization, whereas almost all the stages seek to involve civil society organizations into its governance. Both the negotiations for and the implementation of the European neighbourhood policy, highlight the importance of involvement of civil society organizations in order to have better results and outcomes.

Therefore, the main object is the integration of civil society organizations as the non-governmental actors into the international governance (neighbourhood) process. The research question underlines the importance of non-state and non-governmental partnerships in international politics and, the most importantly, the ways of how they are integrated, and what kind of problematic aspects the process create. As the research shows the official declarations made by the European Union institutions, mainly the European Commission, do not always reflect the practical reality of the processes. Therefore, article seeks to provide the full picture of how the civil society organizations are promoted within European neighbourhood governance officially, and what has been achieved in this process so far.

In most of the cases the role and the activities of civil society organizations are analyzed within internal political processes. However, today an increasing number of the researchers also look at how the civil society organizations have become important agents in foreign policy and in international relations field. Kristi Raik (2006) analyzed the EU's instruments, foundations for the non-governmental sector's support for the Eastern European countries, Kristian L.Nielsen, Eiki Berg and Gulnara Roll (2009) examined the possibilities of civil society organizations as the agents in European neighbourhood policy. T.Rommens, R.Thiers (2009), similarly to this article, researched the involvement of civil society organizations into the creation and implementation of European neighbourhood policy, making the case study of South Caucasus region. The activities of civil society organizations and their role are increasingly important objects as well as partners for the supranational EU's institutions, like the European Parliament and the European Commission.

Innovative partnerships and international governance

The international governance as the process is very much tied with the new institutionalism and the social constructivism (Thierry Balsacq, 2009). The notion of governance in international politics and European arena is associated with the new order and modes of regulations (Bartolini, 2011)²⁴ and how the problems might be solved by creating innovative partnerships. These types of partnerships creating interactions between state institutions, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, supranational institutions and local actors are needed collectively to solve the problems²⁵ because of increasing interdependences and the diminishing role of the sovereign states, especially in the European continent. Mathias Albert and Tanja Kopp-Malek (2002: 470) „...view the entirety of discourses on global and European

²⁴ Bartolini Stefano, New modes of European governance: an introduction in *New modes of governance in Europe. Governing in the shadow of hierarchy* (ed. Adrienne Heritier ir Martin Rhodes), Palgrave Macmillan, 2011: 1-19

²⁵ Torfing Jacob, Peters B.Guy, Pierre Jon, Sorensen Eva. *Interactive Governance. Advancing the paradigm*. Oxford University Press, 2012. P. 21

governance as an indicator of the establishment of ‚post-Westphalian‘ vocabularies within IR’s way of conducting ‚normal science‘²⁶.

The governance model is understood differently by scholars, and its poly-semantic meaning is often defined by formulating continuum from strictly hierarchical governance techniques to self - regulatory networks (Jan Kooiman, 2005; 2010), even though in most common sense the governance model is explained as an antithetic to hierarchical governance. The notion of governance has different meanings in comparative politics, international relations or European studies fields.

In the European and the EU’s neighbourhood policy studies, the governance is often divided into the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ one (Bosse, Polglase-Korosteleva, 2009)²⁷. The first one is related to the EU’s strict conditional policy (hard Europeanization) through the negotiation packet/hierarchy, and the second one – when the EU seeks a regulatory change through socialization (soft Europeanization) and networking (Lavenex, 2007).

The institutional setting of international governance in the EU’s external environment has been researched by an extending group of scholars (Lavenex, 2007; Ganzle, 2008; Bosse and Polglase-Korosteleva, 2009; Filtenborg, Ganzle, Johansson 2002; Cardwell, 2008; Schimmelfennig, 2009; 2012).

Ones of the most outstanding scholars in the field such as Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig (2009) formed the theoretical framework of „European external governance“. They asked in which circumstances the EU’s external governance could be the most effective. According to them: “the notion of governance is particularly suitable to grasp this process of rule expansion beyond formal membership in the EU polity” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 795). Other scholars (S.Lavenex, D.Lehmkuhl and N.Whichmann, 2009) analyzed the different EU’s external

²⁶Albert Mathias, Kopp-Malek Tanja,; The pragmatism of Global and European governance: emerging forms of the political ‚beyond Westfalia‘; *Millennium: Journal of International studies*, 2002 Vol.31, No. 3 P. 453-471 P.470

²⁷ Bosse Giselle and Polglase-Korosteleva Elena, Changing Belarus?: The limits of EU Governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2009 (44/2): 143-165. P. 146

governance modes' efficiency conditions in relations with the Western, Eastern, and Southern neighbours in a specific selected sectors (BUSP, trade policy, encouraging democracy, environment area). According to their research results sectoral dynamics are stable and not necessarily depend on the macro level institutional structures (Lavenex, Lehmkuhl, Whichmann, 2009). Other researchers group (E.Barbe, O.Costa, A.H.Surralles, M.Natorski, 2009) selected to examine the EU's relations with the certain ENP countries (Morocco, Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia). The main object of their research was the adoption of the rules in the common foreign and security policy. These scholars came to a conclusion that, in this sector and in the relations with these countries, negotiations are more often based on the international or collectively agreed rules than only based on the EU's *acquis* normative base (Barbe, Costa, Surralles, Natorski 2009). Richard Youngs' (2009) argues that hierarchical (conditional based) model could exist only in the relations with Balkan countries, while network governance is more appropriate in the relations with Ukraine and Southern Mediterranean countries (Youngs, 2009).

Therefore, in the European studies the governance model is analyzed through multiple, sectoral, multi-sector cooperation aspects, and most often is based on the scholarly positions of the institutionalism making the disjuncture between the hierarchical mode of the governance and the network based one.

The EU's governance research also involves the notion of border/frontier. Authors examine the governance by analyzing geopolitical, cultural, institutional, discursive, interactional, legal and other types of frontiers existing between the EU and its external environment (Smith, 1996; Ganzle, 2008; Korosteleva, 2011). According to them the international institutionalism based on the networking governance theoretically creates the possibilities for horizontal relations, some degree of autonomy (Simon Hollis, 2010), involves lower levels as well (Keohane, Nye, 1989) and lessen the boundaries, highlights mutual recognition and socialization (Barbe, Costa, Herranz and

etc.2009)²⁸. Scholars, that encourage adopting the network governance in the relations with neighbouring countries, accent the benefit of such a form of cooperation, creating a relationship based on openness and mutual responsibility.

In the article it is argued that both modes of governance are existent in the EU's relations with the Eastern neighbours. Also, it is suggested that the European Union seeks to transport not just norms of *acquis communautaire* to the Eastern neighbourhood countries, but also the institutional setting of its internal system based on multi-sectoral, transnational, multilateral networking. Two modes of the governance system are analyzed in the article: a) bilateral which is more related with the hierarchical mode of the relations, negotiation process for the Association Agenda; b) multilateral, which is related with the multi-sectoral, transnational networking in the Eastern partnership's four platforms, and other regional forums. The attention is paid on how the both modes of the governance integrate the civil society organizations.

International institutionalism as theory and research covers various norms, practices, and rules in a certain international environment and, in order to realize the connection among them and the occurring institutional/normative change, it is important to focus on how the institutions are created and developed (A.Sweet, N.Fligstein, W.Sandholtz, 2001).

Research method

The methodology used in this article is mostly of a qualitative nature. Following the governance and institutionalism theory and seeking to find out the institutional modes, the ties between the bilateral and multilateral frameworks of the EU's neighbourhood policy, hierarchical and network governance institutional setting and the role of the civil society in the process, the qualitative type of research has been

²⁸Barbe Esther, Costa Oriol, Herranz Anna, Nogues-Johansson Elisabeth, Natorski Michael, Sabuite A.Maria; Drawing the neighbours closer...to what?: explaining emerging patterns of policy convergence between the EU and its neighbours, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2009 44: 378-399, p. 383-384

conducted. The documents analysis and the qualitative semi- structured interviews are two most important methods used in the research.

In order to attain mostly the official side of the research question, an amount of the documents of the European Union were analyzed, starting with the common letter written by Christopher Patten and Javier Solana in 2002, and ending with the review of European neighbourhood policy of 2013. The document analysis includes various kinds of the ENP documents: regulations, annual strategic plans, ENP Action plans, documents and working papers of the European Commission and the European External Action Service, country reports and regional strategies. It is seek to find out the official part or the declarations of what kind of role is given for the civil society and the integrating approaches of civil society organizations into European neighbourhood governance.

The 14 qualitative semi-structured elite/experts interviews were conducted in Brussels and in the other places from the personnel of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission and the European Parliament, the diplomat of the Embassy of Lithuania in Brussels, and the representatives of the Eastern Partnership civil society Forum. The latter were conducted by phone in May 2013. The letters were sent out to all the steering committee members and to the other addresses provided at the website of the Eastern Partnership Civil society Forum. Unfortunately, only two representatives agreed to give the interviews. Other empirical research was conducted in 2011. The duration of the interviews varied between 24 minutes to 94 minutes. The interviewers were asked to give their position on the modes of the governance in the Eastern neighbourhood policy, effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral institutional settings, the role of civil society.

The selection of respondents was conducted according to the nature of their work and expertise. All the respondents work directly with the EU's neighbourhood policy making and implementation agenda, and programs. In order to ensure the discretion granted to the most of the respondents, they are encoded. The codes are given according to an institution represented by a respondent, and the numbers are given according to a date of an interview. Hence, it is only identified a respondent's

institution, a department, a date and a place of an interview. The list of the interviews is provided at the end of the bibliography.

The European neighbourhood policy: what role for civil society?

The formation of the ENP took several years of time (2002-2004) until it was defined as the conceptual framework of the policy. In 2003 in the “Wider Europe” initiative, the promotion of democratic governance to the neighbouring countries and the common values, such as the human rights, rule of law as the core elements, and strategic goals of the initiative were documented. One year later, in 2004, in the strategic document on the “European neighbourhood policy”, the similar seeking was defined, as well as the closer economical cooperation, political association and the first ENP Action plans started to be implemented. Even in these first documents an essential role was given for the civil society. Civil society organizations and the strengthening of people-to-people contacts are defined as the priority issue in the European neighbourhood policy. In most of the documents like in 2003²⁹, Wider Europe, the strategy document of the European neighbourhood policy, or in 2006 document written by the European Commission, the civil society organizations are highlighted as vital for the overall success of the policy implementation³⁰.

One of priority cooperation sectors-

“ people-to-people issues, including civil society development, activities in the fields of media and journalists’ exchanges, promotion of good governance and respect for human rights, ...” (ENP strategy paper, 2004:21).

In the regulation on the European neighbourhood and partnership instrument it is also defined as one of the priority of cooperation areas:

“supporting democratization, inter alia, by enhancing the role of civil society organizations and promoting media pluralism, as well as through

²⁹European neighbourhood policy. Strategy paper. COM (2004) 373 FINAL. P.19 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf

³⁰ Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf P.1

electoral observation and assistance” (Regulation, Laying down General provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument, 2006: article 2 (1) P. 4).

Later, in 2009, the specific Eastern dimension of the European neighbourhood policy was created by the establishment of the Eastern Partnership and the Eastern Partnership civil society forum. These initiatives highlighted the importance of the regional cooperation and networking within different sectors and policies between the six Eastern Partnership countries and the European Union. Even though Eastern Partnership is defined as one of the most intensive EU’s external policies (interview, LT1), but the goals in comparison with the European neighbourhood policy remained the same, including „everything but institutions“ without full accession to the EU. In 2011 during the Polish EU Council presidency, the civil society organizations received special attention. Two additional instruments were established: Civil society facility and the European Endowment for democracy. According to the respondent:

„...which is similar to the American „National Endowment for Democracy“..., which is a NGO that is independent from the government... but receives the EU’s support, and then decides how to distribute it. The idea, the establishment of such an organization would be to support the opposition movements not only in Belarus, but also in other countries such as Libya, Syria and elsewhere, in order to support various NGOs and human rights activists, and to do so in a more flexible and less formal way than the EU does... < > . We are working with the opposition, in the political dimension to help them organize themselves, to create the political ideas, mainly supporting them, when problems arise, or when they find themselves in jail or are oppressed, we put pressure on the regime, encouraging the extension of sanctions.. Interview, European Parliament, Diplomatic advisor to the President of the EP, 12 10 2011, Brussels, EP2.

Similarly to this point the head of the European Endowment for democracy, Jerzy Pomianowski, in his interview to “Carnegie Europe” highlighted the less bureaucratic procedures and more effective, fast support for the various pro-democratic

forces including “small, new unregistered groups³¹” (Dempsey, 2013). Potentially this European Endowment will increase the financing for civil society including political groups. According to the Europeaid in the period of 2011-2013 the Eastern neighbourhood Civil Society Facility covers 37 million euro³². Representatives of the Eastern Partnership civil society Forum agreed that the financing increased (nevertheless they couldn't provide the concrete numbers) and the civil society organizations by the EU institutions are seen as important partners, however as respondents noted not enough. On the other hand the respondents were happy to announce that:

The Eastern partnership civil society forum as a partner is invited to... < > ... all the platform meetings of the Eastern partnership. Interview, EaPCSF2.

The specific and important role for the civil society according to the European neighbourhood and Partnership regulation is devoted in the election monitoring missions, in supporting the democracy, in promoting media pluralism, multicultural dialogue and people-to-people contacts³³. As Chand K. Vikram suggests (1997:551):

“Technical and financial assistance to domestic civic associations by international groups can play a major role in developing election-monitoring groups that can provide a nucleus for the formation of an organized civil society.”³⁴

The diplomat of the European External Action service noted that the EU wants to convince the electorate, the civil society, that the European road of their country is

³¹ The full interview is available on the website: Judy Dempsey “Does Europe need an endowment for democracy?” January, 14, 2013. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=50602> Latest accessed on 06 08 2013.

³² Europeaid http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-east/csf_en.htm

³³ Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006. Laying down General provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument. L310/4

³⁴ Chand K Vikram, Democratisation from the outside in: NGO and international efforts to promote open elections, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No 3, pp 543-561, 1997, p.551.

a possibility (Interview, EEAS5) and the civil society organizations could become important partners.

The other area where the civil society could become an important mediator is the conflict zones, 'frozen conflicts' areas (N.Mirimanova, 2010; N.Tocci, 2008).

„However there is no theory in the respective EU documents that links the general strengthening of civil society with the enhancement of its peace building capacity except for vague declarations...” (Mirimanova, 2010:6)³⁵.

According to the representative of the Eastern partnership civil society Forum:

“...We discussed in theForum that we should involve not just the representatives from the Eastern Partnership countries but also from these problematic regions. And when it comes to the case of Transnistria for us is a little bit easier to involve and we had the cases when the Transnistrian representatives participated in the meetings, the NGOs used to collaborate with us in some projects, in some activities, as for Armenia and Azerbaijan the situation there is more problematic. < >...Whether we can negotiate, I guess the role of civil society is not so much as negotiating as create these bridges between the country itself and the problematic region, to involve civil society from the problematic region, to see what is going on, to be aware of initiatives of the governments, to get to know what is going on in the whole country”. Interview, Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, member of the steering committee, 22 04 2013, EaPCSF1.

The problematic issue emphasized by the respondents is that the civil society organizations from these problematic regions are very much controlled by the government and cannot make load declarations. According to G. Aybars, K.Onnik (2012:7):

“Both state and non-state actors should place a particular focus on youth since they have little to no contact with their counterparts across conflict-lines”³⁶.

³⁵ Mirimanova Natalia, Civil society building peace in the European neighbourhood: towards a new framework for joining forces with the EU, MICROCON Policy working paper 10, March, 2010, p.6

The process of international democratization and institutionalization of the European Neighbourhood policy involves various actors (supranational, national governmental bodies, non-governmental organizations, and private sector institutions) and modes of interactions (bilateral, multilateral).

Table 1. Involvement of CSOs into the European neighbourhood governance

The ways of integration of CSOs		Seeking
Bilateralism (bilateral approaches)	1. NGOs, CSOs integration into the negotiations of the ENP Action Plan, Association Agenda (setting of priorities); 2. NGOs, CSOs integration into the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of ENP Action Plan, Association Agenda.	1. To strengthen dialogue between civil society and national government of the ENP country; 2. To involve civil society into internal state reforming; 3. Independent NGOs, CSOs are the important source of information in the partner country;
Multilateralism (multilateral approaches)	1. Creation of long term regional networks of civil society organizations (EaP Civil society Forum, Black Sea Synergy forum); 2. Multilateral programmes (Eastern Partnership four platforms, Black sea synergy).	1. To establish permanent contacts between civil society in the region and spread of information, good practices; 2. Networking and strong partnerships of CSOs may have a bigger impact either towards the EU for funding or for national bodies; 3. To establish the trust among civil society in the region, "bottom-up regionalism".

Source: created by the author with reference to European Commission (2004, 2006), Raik (2006), Rommens, Thiers (2009), Tassinari (2005).

This policy (ENP) is perceived as a long term process seeking to create a stronger institutionalization of the relations by creating common rules of the neighbourhood governance in almost all the sectors of the cooperation, specifically in the ones which have the strongest impact on the neighbourly relations, like energy policy, common trade, migration and asylum policies. In the official and diplomatic discourse this process of international institutionalization is named the approximation of common rules and standards. Table 1 defines two modes of the EU's policy

³⁶ Gorgulu Aybars, Krikorian Onnik, Turkey's South Caucasus Agenda: the role of state and non-state actors, Imak Ofset Basim Yayin San., 2012: p.7
http://www.epfound.org/files/southcaucasusagenda24_07_12web.pdf Latest accessed on 14 07 2013

governance in relations with the Eastern neighbours, and further in the article these two institutional settings and the role of civil society in it are examined.

Bilateral cooperation: ENP Action Plans, Association Agenda

The European Commission recognizes that the power of civil society capacity varies in different neighbouring countries, thus, the dialogue with civil society, first of all, should take place on a bilateral basis on the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan, Association agenda template³⁷, the so called ,national platforms'in the ENP governance process.




Figure 1.
ENP policy formation and implementation
Source: author (S.Rakutiene doctoral dissertation, 2012:111)

³⁷ Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 2006.P.2 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf

Such political agenda is accomplished by the basis of the bilateral EU – specific neighboring country Action plan, or later Association agenda formulation and implementation. Action plan with a country, participating in the ENP, is formed by the basis of already signed treaty of Association or Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and it does not change, but add to already mentioned treaties. Bilateral Action Plans differ from a treaty in the way that they are fixed-term, and specifying particular reforms, that are to be implemented by a neighboring country within the negotiated term (3-5 years). The very process of implementing this plan is quite similar to the format used in the Enlargement policy. However, the degree of conditionality policy differs, as well as the ultimate aim – no perspective of a membership given. After the Action plan is implemented the negotiations for the Association Agenda is taking place. This bilateral institutional setting is associated with the hierarchical mode of the ENP governance. As the countries negotiating for the Association agreements which potentially will open up for them possibilities to participate in the EU common market and the visa dialogues seeking to create visa free travel regime- within both have to implement EU rules, part of *acquis communautaire* (interviews with EEAS4, EEAS6).

The importance of civil society and its potential in the official EU's documents is already marked at the first stage of shaping the ENP – when negotiating the priorities and aiming for reforms in a specific country's Action plan or currently the negotiations for the Association Agenda arguing that it is the civil society who clearly sees the processes in its own country, and, therefore, has to be integrated as soon as the negotiation process start. Negotiations on the Action plans proceed in the EU and a neighboring country's representatives (government) Council, which are identified as Associations, or Partnership and Cooperation Councils (depending on a signed treaty). This Council is the basic stage of the current EU neighborhood policy formulation. The Council also forms sub-committees, consisting of the EU and the neighbouring

country representatives. According to the Commission (2006:) discussions with civil society usually take place prior to sub-committee meetings³⁸. As the respondent noted:

„...on the national platforms we agreed that we will have these regular meeting with the EU and Moldova, at least once a quarter, we will be raising the most worrying issues related with public policies in Moldova or concrete situations. The last time we had the meeting and raised the questions related with free trade agreement, concrete information and transparency in this field. We discussed the corruption and violence issue. Interview, EaPCSF1.

On the one hand, the respondents agreed that civil society could express their opinion, make the concrete proposals. However, both respondents of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum said that they have no possibility to participate fully in this negotiation process.

“...national platforms express some concerns for example the negotiation on free trade agreement, < >... that civil society doesn't know exactly the contents of these agreements what Moldova is negotiating exactly about this trade agreement. ...Yes, recently there was a steering committee meeting and we raised this question, and visa, free trade agreements, there is the same situation when we speak about almost all the Eastern Partnership countries... Interview, EaPCSF1.

The similar answer was provided by the other respondent:

“Association agenda, Association agreements or DCFTA they are political bilateral appointments, this is negotiations between governments and they are not published. Therefore it is difficult for civil society to see what is agreed there. ..You can not have an input when you do not know what is exactly negotiated. < >...in the negotiations we are not taking part and even not getting the information what was negotiated on agreements”. Interview, EaPCSF2.

³⁸Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 2006.P.2 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf

Therefore, speaking about the negotiations for the ENP bilateral agreements practically the civil society representatives do not have the real possibilities to act in the process.

Finally, the European Commission carries out regular assessments, reports, evaluates the progress of implementation of the ENP Action Plans (The Commission's role here is very similar to the one it has in the Enlargement policy). The European Commission's document „Strengthening the ENP“, 2007 notes that civil society organizations have an important role not only in consultation for the Action Plan priorities, but also monitoring and evaluating processes. In the 2006 paper „Strengthening civil society dimension in the ENP³⁹“, it is also emphasized that the monitoring of the ENP Action Plan implementation cannot be done solely by official sources, because civil society always observes the impact of policies on everyday life and, especially, human rights, the business climate, the environment, access to government information fields better (European Commission, 2006). From the Commission's (2006) point of view, it is very important to strengthen the dialogue with civil society organizations, and their dialogue with their government by including local civil society in some specific processes of reforms. However, as respondents noted, this also depends on the national government as the situation in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia is very different from the Belarus or Azerbaijan. The EU's Eastern Regional Programme Strategy Paper (2007 - 2013) states that the support (assistance)⁴⁰ is provided for civil society organizations' assessments, monitoring, and information activities. „Civic associations can provide opportunities for concerned parties to relay information, testimonial, and analysis to governance agencies“⁴¹ (Scholte, 2001:17). Civil society organizations are important source of information, but not only as one respondent highlighted (Interview, EaPCSF2).

³⁹ Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 2006.P.2 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf

⁴⁰ European neighbourhood and partnership instrument, Eastern regional programme, strategy paper 2007-2013 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_eastern_rsp_en.pdf

⁴¹ Scholte Aart Jan, Civil society and democracy in global governance, CSGR (Centre for the study of globalisation and regionalism) , University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom Working paper No. 65/01, January 2001, p.17

According to the respondents, the monitoring processes involve civil society organizations better in comparison with the negotiations.

“Well of course in depends, there were different organizations in different years. There were organizations monitoring visa facilitation, of Moldova- EU accession process. It depends on the subjects, transparency International is monitoring the implementation of anti-corruption project. We give the evaluation to the representative of the EU delegation to Moldova”. Interview, EaPCSF1.

“Civil society organizations are consulted when we speak about the progress reports, we are consulted by the EU delegations and can give an input, Furthermore Civil society Forum is now conducting the next monitoring of the roadmap and we want to present the report before the summit, to see how the country is doing, implementing the roadmap, is it going to the right direction”. Interview, EaPCSF2.

Comparing the results with the previous research, it could be stated that the situation within the negotiations process did not get better, while the involvement of civil society organizations into monitoring process, consultations with them, increased.

Meanwhile, in 2008 the Open Society Georgia Foundation and the Eurasia Partnership Foundation study revealed that the involvement of civil society in Georgia ENP Action Plan 2006-2007 monitoring „was quite low“⁴², and was limited with cooperation with „only about 10“ NGOs. The experts of these independent funds stress the necessity of a wider and deeper involvement of NGOs in the implementation of the neighborhood processes. Also, 59% of the respondents were dissatisfied with the level of communication with the EU, and asked for more frequent and regular meetings of working groups, and for specific schemes of the involvement of civil society in the processes of neighborhood⁴³. One of the problems noted by the majority of the respondents was the absence of the Government in the meetings and discussions

⁴²Open Society Georgia foundation, Eurasia Partnership foundation. Civil society and monitoring implementation of European Neighbourhood policy Action plan. Civil society Survey results. Tbilisi, 2008, p.3 http://www.epfound.ge/files/enp_survey_2.pdf

⁴³Open Society Georgia foundation, Eurasia Partnership foundation. Civil society and monitoring implementation of European Neighbourhood policy Action plan. Civil society Survey results. Tbilisi, 2008, p.8

organized by the civil society⁴⁴. Rommens and Thiers (2009: 30, 31), who analyzed the development and implementation of the Georgian Action plan, noted that the inclusion of Georgian NGOs and civil society is lacking⁴⁵. The experts of Anti-corruption resource center (2008:5) also supported the research findings explaining that civil society is not sufficiently included in the European Neighbourhood Policy, while its the higher inclusion would prevent corrupt activities in the neighborhood process⁴⁶.

Civil society organizations encourage the European Commission to create more specific schemes and give better support in relations with national government. It is recognized that the establishment of relationship with the government usually depends on personal contacts⁴⁷. However, the European Commission (2006) accents that their role, just like the EU's members role is „to promote“, but it cannot determine the agenda for civil society organizations⁴⁸, which are independent from the government sector. The European Commission also stressed out that it refuses to openly and systematically engage into political struggles in other countries (Raik, 2006:21)⁴⁹, while the independent civil society groups, which need external support, in most countries are defined as the opposition, and government hostile forces, and this creates a problem for everyone to sit down to the common table of negotiations. Kristi Raik emphasizes that in order to avoid accusations of political intervention, the EU has to act and support civil society through „international foundations and NGOs“ (Raik, 2006:21)⁵⁰.

⁴⁴Open Society Georgia foundation, Eurasia Partnership foundation., op. cit. P.9

⁴⁵Rommens T., Thiers R., Strengthening the ENP through regional civil society cooperation. CEU political science journal. Vol.4, No.1 p.28-48 February 2009, p.30

⁴⁶Anti-Corruption resource centre. Transparency International. Corruption and the European Neighbourhood policy. 2008, P.5 <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=161> Latest accessed on 06 08 2013

⁴⁷Open Society Georgia foundation, Eurasia Partnership foundation. Civil society and monitoring implementation of European Neighbourhood policy Action plan. Civil society Survey results. Tbilisi, 2008, p.4

⁴⁸ Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf

⁴⁹ Kristi Raik. Promoting democracy through Civil society: how to step up the EU's policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood. CEPS working document. No.237/February 2006. P.21

⁵⁰ Kristi Raik. Promoting democracy through Civil society: how to step up the EU's policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood. CEPS working document. No.237/February 2006. P.21

As the European Endowment for democracy was already created, a step towards this direction has been made.

Multilateralism and regional networking

As indicated in the first table, the European Union is actively promoting the „networking“ of civil society activities, participation in the multi-regional cooperation processes. The ENPI Strategy Paper emphasizes the importance of the promotion of civil society cooperation at the regional level, creating a relationship between the partners and the EU⁵¹. Regional cooperation is considered extremely important in establishing new contacts, sharing of the „good practices“, spreading the information and solving common regional problems (as a form of “effective multilateralism” underlined in the European security strategy (2003).

Multilateral regional cooperation in the EU neighbourhood proceed in various levels, ranging from multilateral intergovernmental forums (Eastern Partnership four multilateral platforms and panels⁵²), multilateral parliamentary assemblies (Euronest with the Eastern partnership countries), and, finally, in order to form working on lower level- common multilateral networks of civil society. In the Eastern neighbourhood currently there are two regional initiatives approved: Eastern partnership⁵³, and Black Sea synergy⁵⁴. Eastern Partnership multilateral dimension created four platforms and many more panels for intensive networking among various actors: supranational, governmental/diplomats, bureaucrats and civil society representatives. This institutional setting is very similar to the EU’s internal institutional interactional model starting from the summit⁵⁵, also having meetings of

⁵¹ European Neighbourhood and partnership instrument. Eastern regional programme. Strategy paper 2007-2013

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_eastern_rsp_en.pdf p.18

⁵²Eastern Partnership Four Platforms are: Democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU policies; Energy security; People to people contacts

⁵³ Eastern partnership, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/index_en.htm

⁵⁴ Black Sea synergy, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/index_en.htm

⁵⁵Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May, 2009, Brussels, 7 May, 2009: 8435/09 (Presse 78). European External Action Service, The Eastern partnership Warsaw Summit (29-30 September 2011) http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/2011_eap_warsaw_summit_en.pdf

the various sectors of ministers, working committees and groups, parliamentary Assembly (Euronest) and also civil society representatives. This system creates the good conditions for the intensive socialization and networking, mutual learning process is taking place. As the Lithuanian diplomat noted one of the most important achievements between the Prague and Warsaw Easter Partnership summits was the establishment of these networks. “We now have a net. It’s time to catch a fish” the respondent highlighted, various institutional modes of interactions are working and now it’s time to get the concrete results of the projects (Interview, LT1).

On the basis of the empirical research data, we could distinguish types of the intergovernmental, transgovernmental, inter-parliamentary and civil society networking. Political networking, which could be classified into the intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary networking, covers the development of the relations between the EU and Eastern neighbourhood partnership countries’ politicians (MPs, ministers, parliamentarians), who make decisions of the most strategic importance. The transgovernmental networking covers the EU institutions, the EU member states institutions and Eastern partners institutions’ bureaucrats relations⁵⁶, cooperation form when implementing the EU’s political initiatives. The forum of the civil society of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood create the conditions for an active networking between the EU Eastern partnership countries’ civil society’s representatives, and the EU representatives. Eastern Partnership civil society Forum started to be invited into the working groups of the Eastern Partnership four platforms just recently⁵⁷ (2012), and as the respondents underlined, this is a good opportunity for them to convince the European partners about the better EU policies or decisions towards their countries.

⁵⁶Commission of the European Communities, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, meeting doc. 319/09, 1.12.2009 http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/2009_eap_implementation_report_en.pdf ; Calendar of events in the framework of the Eastern partnership multilateral track in the 2nd half of 2011. http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm

⁵⁷European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy. Joint Communication Delivering on new European Neighbourhood policy, Brussels, 15.5.2012 JOIN (2012) 14 final

“Civil society organizations at the each of the meetings have two representatives and they are experts they work on these issues of the platforms and panels”. Interview, EaPCSF2.

In the documents establishing these regional initiatives, as well as the ENP Strategy Paper the establishment and strengthening of human contacts is highlighted as one of the priority areas of cooperation, in this case, on a regional level, as well as civil society’s organizations presence in the regional forums. These aims are already in the process of implementation, and currently there are already Black sea synergyforum⁵⁸, and Eastern Partnership forum⁵⁹ created. Similar forums have already been created in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership context, too. As the diplomat of the European External Action service noted:

“Networking among politicians, is and has been but, I think, in these processes the networking among the people is much more important. The European Union focus a lot of its attention on the civil society, if you noticed, all the regional cooperation, policy for the region is supported by the civil society forums. Of course, there are countries where we have problems with the co-operation with the civil society organizations. For instance, there was a student, a PhD student, who came to Brussels and then lost her placement at a local university, and such cases are known to be discouraging for the civil society to cooperate with us, but this is more the exceptional cases. Hence, a cooperation and it’s density depends on a country, the society and on a question/issue. What issues we can solve with the civil society”. Interview, European External Action Service, official, department of ENP coordination, cross-border cooperation, 14 10 2011, Brussels, EEAS5.

The main aim of the establishment of such forums is a greater integration of civil society in the process of implementation of mentioned initiatives. Forums bring together non-governmental organizations at regional level, annual conferences, sharing of best practices take place. It is aimed to solve common regional issues, common projects are developed, se well as contacts among the civil society organizations of the regional countries, EU institutions, and NGOs in the EU member states are developed.

⁵⁸ Black Sea forum, http://www.blackseforum.org/seminar_10_11july2007.html

⁵⁹ Eastern Partnership civil society forum, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/civil_society_forum_2009_en.pdf

One of the aims of regional forums is to strengthen mutual relationships, as well as a dialogue with a government of their own country. NGOs, united in important forums, may influence them more.

„...once a year we meet about 200 civil society organizations each year to ... discuss the issues, we work in different working groups, and civil society organizations in different countries working on similar issues without a Forum would have be difficult to meet and to know it. When they meet, they can share their experience, their tactics, they can group together make common statements to the government, and of course they have another way as they come from civil society Forum and they are supported by many organizations and are different in comparing with one civil society organization in one country”. Interview,EaPCSF2.

The respondents also emphasized the importance of the EU’s financing in order to have all these meetings:

“the secretariat was established and financed by the Commission, and the financing of the Forum meetings, so yes the contribution is important part of the work, because you can imagine they would not have the funds to come together and to meet their counterparts, and as well the work in working groups, travel and accommodation are quite expensive and they get the funding from the EU side which is quite helpful”. Interview,EaPCSF2.

Therefore the European Commission and other EU’s institutions, the financing coming from the EU are essential for the existent of these regional forums.

Speaking about the Eastern Partnership civil society forum the respondents highlighted the negative aspects as well:

“I am really not satisfied with this Forum and I understand that every forum has still a bureaucratic procedure, we spend a lot of time on election process, we spent a lot of time on discussing formal things, what I would be happier to see is very concrete proposals... < > ... where each of this working groups are discussing concrete objectives, problems in the field, what can be done...How we can find resources to be much more concrete in our relations and activities in this platform.Interview, EaPCSF1.

Therefore the respondents seek a stronger input of the civil society forum into the concrete agendas.

What is more, regional synergy of different countries' civil societies empower them more not only in the relations with their governments, but also in negotiations with the EU⁶⁰. The EU's institutions have become not just important partners but also supporters:

“As soon as we would have some studies, outcomes the proves of the spread of high corruption or other field we would rather prefer to present our results to European Commission to get some protection as if it is virtual but is very important for us, and then spread message among public institutions. < >... because speaking about the issue of Moldova's accession towards this lets say European vector is important, and our government take the thing seriously that are promoted by the EU institutions.” Interview, EaPCSF1.

Therefore countries seeking the stronger integration with the EU (like Moldova) are sensitive to receive the negative EU's position and the support from the external actors, EU institutions is an important factor influencing the rise of the civil society's activeness in the international politics when speaking about the Eastern neighbourhood.

NGOs belonging to forums join specific networks: environmental, human rights, children and women rights, business associations, etc. The EU institutions also participate in such forums: the Commission, the Parliament, the advisory EU institutions – Regions committee, and European economic and social committee. The processes of multilateral cooperation are named as regionalism, and regional institutionalization, i.e. regionalization (in case of the creation of common regional institutions, and not only the development of regional-multilateral projects). The system of civil society's regional networking is usually explained as a creation of regionalism „from the bottom“. Sandra Lavenex stated that networks, networking

⁶⁰Rommens T., Thiers R., Strengthening the ENP through regional civil society cooperation. CEU political science journal. Vol.4, No.1 February, 2009: 26-48 Budapest. p.35

creation are associated with the development of a decentralized control system and the empowerment of civil society's organizations

„that do not necessarily exist in the ENP countries... < >... such policy networks are very much based on non-legal instruments such as processes of mutual learning and exchange of best practices, where influence relies on knowledge and expertise⁶¹“.

Regional institutionalization is understood as a process of socialization, during which is aiming to establish common regional values and practices. Furthermore, it is accented that the regional cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood is initiated by the external actors. Fabrizio Tassinari identified this as a regionalism „from the outside“, and saw a threat that externally influenced regionalism (eg. regional initiatives of the EU) does not create the conditions for further self-regional cooperation (2005:16). For instance, the political, civil society forums – Eastern partnership forum was established by the European Commission initiative, Black Sea synergy forum – by the Romanian government initiative. Thus, were formed not by the civil society organizations initiatives, but were „dropped“ from national and supranational actors, i.e. „from the above“ in order to accumulate the regional cooperation processes. In this context, it is not entirely correct to classify the civil society regional cooperation activities, happening in the Eastern neighbourhood, as the regionalism „from the bottom“, as these projects and initiatives were initiated „from above“. The European Commission (2009), understanding all these aspects, in the concept paper of the Eastern partnership forum establishment accented that in the future the Commission's role in the coordination of the forum's activities has to decline to the least possible⁶², in order that all the responsibility and initiative would be in the hands of civil society.

⁶¹Lavenex Sandra, A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy: integration beyond conditionality? The Study of the European Neighbourhood policy: methodological, theoretical and empirical challenges, University of Nottingham, 25-26, October, 2007. p.10 http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_icmcr/Docs/Lavenex.pdf Latest accessed on 06 08 2013.

⁶²Eastern partnership civil society forum, Concept paper, 2009, P.6 http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/civil_society/docs/concept_en.pdf Latest accessed on 06 08 2013.

While evaluating the success of the regional and sub-regional cooperation, the following criteria were established: establishment of the civil society and human contacts (the quantity of the important contacts); events, uniting partners of different countries, amount; new establishment and constancy of the cross-border cooperation initiatives by the civil society; common actions of the civil society organizations⁶³.

The weakness and the potential of the post-soviet civil society

The scientists and other experts agree that civil society in post soviet states continue to be very weak (M.Simecka, 2009; K.Raik, 2006). As the member of the European Parliament noted:

“Problematic situation, as I had to monitor the functioning of some non-governmental organizations and one can clearly see that, on the one hand, some of them are genuine, but there is a part that is a sinecure where political leaders dive straight from politics into NGOs, and have a privileged position and their offices look more impressive than that of the former Soros Open Society premises. There are very privileged ones, which are clearly favorite ones of the local politicians, and so we are seeing some imitation or simulation.” Interview, European Parliament, member of the EP, Committee of Human rights, 12 10 2011, Brussels, EP3.

The research also shows the very small trust in the NGO sector. As e.g. according to the research “...trust in NGOs is quite low in Armenia (only 5% fully trust), Azerbaijan (7% fully trust) and Georgia (4% fully trust⁶⁴)”. The representatives of the Eastern Partnership civil society forum agreed this is a problem which is also sometimes undermining the decision-making of the Forum as well:

“Well of course the issue of gang is an issue common in this area. We even discussed this issue in the steering committee meetings, and we had the cases when the leaders in national platforms of some civil society organizations

⁶³ENPI Eastern regional indicative programme 2007-2010, p.14

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_eastern_rip_en.pdf Latest accessed on 06 08 2013.

⁶⁴ The research was conducted in 2011 by CRRC. Gorgulu Aybars, Krikorian Onnik, Turkey's South Caucasus Agenda: the role of state and non-state actors, Imak Ofset Basim Yayin San., 2012: p.7 http://www.epfound.org/files/southcaucasusagenda24_07_12web.pdf Latest accessed on 14 07 2013

had an evidence of that, but since there is no very clear condition what would be gang, and there is no official definition and we don't know rules to separate these gangs from the non governmental NGOs. It is not easy to do this separation. And of course when you have to take a decision at the level of national platforms these gangs would reward report... And it is very difficult to make a decision at the whole platform. But it is also the way we have to go through if we want to grow into a democratic country." Interview,EaPCSF1.

As the respondent noted sometimes this problematic issue might hinder the effectiveness of the cooperation and the outcomes. According to the respondents, today the specific attention is made for the development of civil society. The EU is financing the projects for the strengthening of the civil society activities and their professional development.

"The structures are developing, Now, for example, we are involved in two projects of strengthening the abilities of civil society organizations, that organizations would become more professional by making applications and things like this". Interview,EaPCSF2.

The consolidation of the post-soviet civil society capacities and building of professionalism were defined by the respondents as the core objects in order to have better role, and provide concrete proposals in the public policies field for both sides: government and EU's institutions. On the other hand the respondent also highlighted the potential of future leaderships of these countries as a birth, outcome of current regional socialization and mutual learning processes.

"It is an essential thing, and we can see if the civil society projects succeed in some extent. Then, one can simply talk about an alternative leadership in those countries. If, rather than reproducing itself or giving a birth to the alike-themselves leaders of the country's political life, would have a chance to finally have other leaders who would have come from the civil sector, from the disento and unlike thinking, social criticism dimensions, from politicaly free academic level, it would be a chance, undoubtedly". Interview,European Parliament, member of the EP, Committee of Human rights, 12 10 2011, Brussels, EP3.

Therefore potentially the intensive EU's partnership with the civil society organizations, regional networking and innovative international partnerships might bring the institutional changes into the EU's closest external environment-neighbourhood. While now many problems are highlighted. In some countries the problems are raised by the ethno-political conflicts, resulting in fragmentation of civil society in the country (N.Tocci, 2007, 2008). While, in the other countries the civil society isolation and political participation problems are raised by the political regime. Today it is agreed that the strengthening and consolidation of civil society are important not just for civil activeness and political participation but, also, in giving the important role for civil society in the negotiations for the solution of international decisions and the building of the new generation of innovative international partnerships.

Conclusions

The EU in the relations with the Eastern Partnership countries forms an institutional structure, which creates opportunities for the constantly intensifying interactions and networking among the EU supranational, national (member-states), and neighbourhood countries' representatives in different levels. Two modes of neighbourhood policy governance- bilateral and multilateral- were examined in the article. As speaking about the bilateral mode of the governance and the negotiations for the Association Agenda the role of civil society is very minimal in the process. The respondents emphasized that they are not receiving the information what is negotiated for and cannot contribute to this process. On the other hand respondent agreed they are consulted by the EU delegations in their countries when the monitoring and evaluation of the policy implementation is made.

The multilateral mode of the ENP governance is promoted within regional, multilateral networking. The networking is being created not only among political players, but also among societies, because the regional cooperation is supported by forums of civil society that are funded and organized by the EU institutions. In this way the cooperation of civil society organizations, and the networking with each

other, and with the EU are promoted. In this case, intensive relations with the neighbouring countries' civil society representatives are built, and, according to the empirical research data, it is aimed to convince the neighbourhood countries' electorate that stronger association and integration to the EU are one of their nations ways to choose. Civil society organizations make the networking of the regional civil society representatives in the Eastern Partnership Civil society Forum, but also they started to take part in the Eastern Partnership four platforms where they have the possibility to convince European partners- supranational and EU member states- about the better decisions and choices for their country. The EU funding for such a kind of meetings is essential in order to have the civil society organizations present in the forums. Other problematic issue underlined by the respondents is the weakness of the civil society organizations, the issue of so called 'gang' who simulate the NGO, the privileged ones by the regimes but since there are no rules and procedures to dismiss them from this common governance process they are the ones who undermine the effectiveness of the regional cooperation.

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Section 5:

Welfare Studies

Prospects for the Construction of a Sustainable Welfare Culture in the Context of the Financial and Fiscal Crisis in Greece

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Abstract

The global financial crisis which affects extensively the Eurozone and especially the countries of the European periphery, is accompanied by austerity measures and expenditure restraint especially in the areas of Health Care and Social Security policies. Undoubtedly, in countries that are under financial supervision by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the fiscal adjustment measures focus primarily on reducing the services of the welfare state. From 2010 onwards the policies applied to Greece in order to face the financial crisis affect the middle economic groups and mainly the vulnerable social and economic groups. On the public spending cuts perspective, the benefits of the welfare state faced a dramatic reduce without increase in the effectiveness of social security services. Spending on health care, tackling unemployment policies and social insurance services have undergone a dramatic decline in a period less than three years. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the welfare state and the welfare culture more generally can become viable without dramatically reducing the minimal but important social role associated with the different welfare models. In this prism, policy makers should find alternatives to finance the need for social spending and reduce the cuts as they create huge social problems. One factor that may contribute to the future economic sustainability of the Greek welfare state is the expansion of the use of renewable energy resources, the profits from which can be used to support the social expenditure financing. It is well known that it will take several years to achieve this goal but this solution seems to be a viable alternative that will offer “life” and hope to the Greek welfare state and, respectively, to Greek society.

Keywords: welfare culture, health policies, financial crisis, public policies, citizenship, renewable energy resources.

Introduction

According to specific theories about the role of culture in social policies, there is a strong belief that culture is a dependent variable in their assessment (Jo, 2011; Marshall, 1972, van Oorschot, 2000). But, although recent developments of cultural analysis of welfare have been conducted (Pfau-Effinger, 2004; van Oorschot, 2006) there is still a lack of analysis and data collection about the effect of culture on social policies. “Culture” can be defined as the “system of collective constructions of meaning by which human beings define reality” (Neidhard et al., 1986: 11), and when it is interrelated with social policies it can be named as “welfare culture” (Pfau-Effinger, 2005: 4). There are two different notions (sub-meanings) of analysing and exploring the paths of this term. More specifically, the first notion includes “the whole complex of values, institutional traditions and institutional practices of welfare states”(Pfau-Effinger, 2005: 4). The second aims at analysing the ideas related to the welfare state policies (Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Hinrichs, 1997; Kaufmann, 1991; Offe, 1987, 1990).

The aim of this paper is to analyse the case of the Greek welfare culture, according to the second notion of the idea of welfare culture, in order to explore the inefficiencies of the Greek welfare system and propose possible ways of creating a sustainable welfare culture and state. The Greek financial crisis has imposed the necessity of implementing reforms in order to create a more efficient welfare state. This pressure affected the society and because of the existence of specific ideas which facilitate the development of a passive welfare state, created huge conflicts against the government. It is true though, that reforming the welfare state is essential but it can only be achieved if the ideas of the society will adjust to this new reality. Based on these principles, the analysis will be conducted according to the notion of the welfare culture which refers to the stock of knowledge, values and ideas related to the social actors, the institutions of the welfare state and the implementing welfare policies (Pfau-Effinger, 2005) aiming at proposing solutions of the creation of a new viable, effective and socially fair welfare state.

Welfare State in Greece: Policies, Culture, Inefficiencies

Due to the similarities that South European welfare states reveal, the academic debate related to the existence or not of a south European welfare state model which contains the Greek welfare state, has been recently intensified (Castles, 1995; Liebfried, 1993). In this context and in contrast to most of the North and West European welfare states, Greek welfare state deferred to develop and acquire a complete form due to various historical factors such as the dictatorship of the period 1967-1974 (Castles, 1995; Rhodes, 2009). Its rapid growth during the 1980s, when National Health System and general welfare policies were established (minimum pension for all citizens, social benefits, etc.), contributed to the creation of an integrated institutional framework of social solidarity and welfare but it had not resolved specific issues that proved decisive in the emergence of intrinsic malfunctions. The welfare culture that was developed during this period included values such as solidarity and social justice. On the other hand, partisanship and clientalism led to huge waste of public funds. Several of the current dysfunctions of the Greek welfare state originated from the existence of cliental relations and the perception of the large public sector maintenance as a solution for labor rehabilitation. This concept of stateness developed after the restoration of democracy in 1974 and expanded during the 1980s when public sector was inflated and extensive welfare state was created. In some of the Mediterranean European states that reveal similarities (Spain, Portugal, Greece) and mostly in Greece, the socialist party which assumed governance in the 1980s failed to overturn the paternalistic characteristics in the developing welfare state. Furthermore, due to the existence of strong leftist unions and maximalist party apparatuses, socialist parties like PASOK (Panhellenic Socialistic Movement) in Greece, quickly implemented policies of a *“modernizing and sometimes self-promoting and corrupt bourgeoisie”* (Rhodes, 2009: 10).

According to Ferrera (1996), Southern European welfare states, including Greek, are facing corruption, clientalisan partisanship, having a serious negative impact on public funds which in equally benefit specific privileged groups. This problems characterised as "the welfare syndrome".

Family has a very strong role in southern European societies and especially in Greece, compared to west and north Europe (Ferrera, 1996). Due to the importance of family in Greece, the welfare state adapted to this situation by creating a strong institutional framework of labor protection and extensive benefits as an attempt to confront breadwinner fathers' unemployment (Jo, 2011: 16). Moreover, family is still an institution which supports its vulnerable members, providing rudimental redistribution by "filling specific welfare protection gaps" (Rhodes, 2009: 10).

Benefits and services provided by welfare state during the 1980s had solved several social problems and became an important redistribution measure. However, the main issue was the existence of excessive and in several cases ineffective financing of its services and benefits. Therefore, the only viable solution since the creation of the Greek welfare state its reform in order to become effective and sustainable, while finding alternative funding resources. Since 1990, several reforms failed due to corporatist interests and clientalism. As a result, welfare benefits were not socially fair but they were applied because of the pressure from specific interests (Matsaganis, 2011). The absence of social dialogue between social partners who rarely showed convergence intention was an important element of the Greek system which can be characterized as reform resistant (Lavdas, 1997) with limited reform capacity (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008) acting as a deterrent for any serious welfare state reform.

Therefore, while the creation of the National Health System was highly ambitious, its implementation faced tremendous problems. More specifically, even though Greece has more than two hundred Health Care Centers, their practical contribution is dramatically inadequate as they are underfunded and understaffed. In addition, the continuous depreciation and underfunding of public health system degrades the quality of primary health care services and strengthens private initiatives in health sector (Sbarouni et al., 2012). This depreciation has negative impact on the economically disadvantaged social groups who are not able to pay for their health care in private health care facilities and lack equal health protection opportunities, which is one of the most important principles of the public health system.

All the stated factors contributed to the creation of a dysfunctional public sector and welfare state. The culture which was created, facilitated statism, stateness, clientalism and the influence of specific trade union and party interests in every reformative attempt. Working in the public sector was the main concern of the majority of citizens. The welfare system provided unequal attribution of benefits with limited social and economic criteria and did not take into account the new conditions such as the increasing life expectancy. Consequently, it became ineffective in solving the huge social problems and wasteful (Tzagkarakis and Kamekis, 2013). These factors accentuated the necessity of reforming the welfare state services. The financial and fiscal crisis since 2009 has intensified social problems due to the implementation of austerity measures but it also imperatively raised the need to find alternatives for funding and reforming the welfare state.

The impact of financial and fiscal crisis on welfare state

The financial and fiscal crisis in Greece, which was a result of external and internal factors⁶⁵, has a tremendous impact on the society due to the imposed austerity measures from the Troika (International Monetary Fund, European Commission, European Central Bank). These include huge budget cuts on public spending and in several occasions, horizontal cuts on social benefits. The main aim of austerity measures in the welfare state was to reduce public spending but also to retain a significant level of quality and effectiveness of welfare services. Unfortunately, this attempt had negative impact on the society mainly because welfare state was not yet able to implement reforms effectively. More specifically, rates of youth and general unemployment have dramatically increased and Greece is currently displaying the highest unemployment rates in the European Union⁶⁶, and the number of people who

⁶⁵ Internal factors are the intrinsic weaknesses of the Greek economic model and its huge public debt and external are the role and the pressures from international markets on national and supranational institutions especially after the collapse of a number of specialized lending institutions in the USA (Matsaganis, 2011).

⁶⁶ According to Eurostat (2013) the percentage of general unemployment in Greece is 27,1% (the highest in the EU) and the percentage of youth unemployment is 59,1% (the highest in the EU).

fall in to vulnerable groups shows an increasing ratio⁶⁷. It is not worthy, that according to Eurostat (2012) the percentage of citizens towards the risk of poverty is one of the highest in the European Union (31% of the total population).

The financial problems which citizens face in Greece, due to the ongoing depression, have a negative impact on trusting government, parties and welfare state services. The dramatical increase in social vulnerability rates and the high ineffectiveness of the welfare state services are two significant consequences of horizontal cuts in welfare benefits and services (Kotroyannos et al., 2013).

The implementing measures aim at changing the existing misconception on the form of the state (clientalism, stateness) and led to the emergence of extremist political views and behaviours based on populism and on the promise to maintain the status quoin the public sector and the state welfare. It should also be noted that due to the existing inefficiency and failure of the welfare state, the limitation of services and benefit sex acerbated social and economic problems and led several citizens to social marginalization and to the adoption of extreme political behaviours.

Therefore, there is a necessity to develop a complete reformative strategy of the welfare state in order to become less expensive and more efficient. This reform requires non-interference from the unions and acceptance of the perception of the creation of an active and “selective”⁶⁸ welfare state which can respond to current economic conditions.

Conclusion-Policy Proposals

Undoubtedly, financial crisis has negative impact especially on vulnerable social groups, however, it can become a trigger for radical changes in welfare state and public

⁶⁷ The group of NEETs, young people 15 to 24 years old who are not in Education, Employment or Training, is an example of a social vulnerable group that its percentage is increasing. According to Eurofound (2012) the percentage of NEETs in Greece is one of the highest in the EU (17,4%).

⁶⁸ The term “selective” refers to the selectivity of cases that need provision from the welfare state in the context of social solidarity and not to an unequal and socially unfair selection. By implementing this type of “selectivity” welfare state will be more effective and flexible in reducing social inequalities while spending less public funds. It is required for the Greek welfare state, in order to survive during the current economic conditions, to transit from a passive and universal form to a more selective, active and flexible.

sector to the benefit of society. These reforms should firstly aim at changing society's attitude towards specific social issues, such as the role of the public sector, and secondly at implementing the required reforms which will benefit the society, during the current economic situation. Political initiative, regardless of political cost, and acceptance of the concept of creating a completely new model of the welfare state is required in order to achieve these goals.

A key reform objective is the transition from passive welfare state, that separates the economy from society, to active, which will respond to the new economic conditions and will cut spending while offer provisions where they are most necessary. According to Rosanvallon (1995), this transition can be performed either through the subordination of society to market (neoliberal perception) or through the creation of an intermediate economic space. This includes the adoption of programs to resolve the key issues that have been created. Specific examples of these policies are: to facilitate the entry of young people into the labor market as a measure to decrease youth unemployment, to adopt programs that will re-educate and retrain those excluded from the labor market to subjects related to the needs of the labor market, to recruit unskilled workers and provide them with training in order to obtain a specialization that will benefit the finding a future job, to protect and encourage long-term unemployed to re-enter the labor market.

All these measure scan not succeed unless a long-term, of at least ten years, educational policy planning that puts education and training before the needs of the labor market, it is created. The mentioned policies can be characterized as "selective" because they aim at the protection of specific social groups which are facing serious economic problems and provide their members with the necessary incentives and guarantees for integration in employment, which is the main socioeconomic problem in the whole European Union.

Citizenship is a very important concept which has contributed to the proper functioning of society and its mechanisms in several countries, especially in Western Europe. In Greece this culture is not wide spread as there is a perception that

government agencies are solely responsible for the proper functioning and efficiency of social services. Moreover, the sense of responsibility and citizen participation for the common good is still limited.

Citizenship, voluntarism and participation are fostered in early social life from the education system. This is the mechanism that can create piece by piece the culture of belonging and offering to society. However, the Greek education system involves minimum citizenship education and does not develop the attitude of participation and offering to the society. The development of citizenship culture, mainly from education system and NGO's, will certainly made more convenient the successful transition from a passive form of welfare state and culture to active by generating a participatory, contributory and provisional civil society.

The Greek welfare culture will change if it overcome certain perceptions that hinder the development of a modern and sustainable welfare state. In addition to welfare services reform and the development of participatory and contributory culture to the society, the problem of financing services will remain unless further innovative policies be implemented. One of these could be the use of public investments as a vehicle to promote employment and economic welfare. But public investment can fulfil this purpose only if applied correctly and in specific sectors such as renewable energy resources, without hampering private investment. The fact is that, by exploiting its natural wealth, Greece can enhance its welfare state.

In this direction, a legislative framework that allows the state to impose taxes on the carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions can be implemented (Buchs, Duwe, Bardsley, 2009) and a portion of the revenue for this tax to finance the welfare state, either directly or indirectly, through redistributive measures such the reduction of electricity cost for low income households.

Furthermore, Greece has natural resources (sun, wind, waves, hydrocarbons) which if it can properly manage them, through exploitation of renewable energy sources infrastructure supported by public investments, without elimination of private investments in this sector, will raise revenue that can be used to support social funding.

Additionally, such a policy will open new “green” job vacancies that will reduce unemployment and alleviate the economic pressures to welfare state.

The political initiative and willingness of the entire range of democratic forces is required in order to achieve effective utilization of renewable energy resources for the benefit of citizens. The continuation of radicalism and unwillingness by some radical left-wing and populist parties, which base their existence in implacability and populism, hinders any attempt for reform. Moreover, the increasing left radicalism feeds extremism and strengthens the opposite extremity of the right (nationalists, neonazists)⁶⁹. This political context has generated polarization and does not contribute in raising serious alternatives for the “survival” of welfare state.

All these proposals aim at the creation of a new model of welfare culture in Greece in which welfare state will be flexible and intervene where it is most needed, will be able to perform any reforms necessary in order to save resources, will create a new culture of participation and contribution to the community, will promote transparency, reduce clientalism and exploit the natural wealth of the country for the benefit of the society while respecting the principles of environmental protection. Clearly, all these suggestions cannot be implemented immediately. In order these objectives to be successful, long-term, coordinated and scientifically documented policy design, that will provide economic rationalization, effectiveness and solidarity to welfare state and the principles of citizenship to civil society, is required.

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
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Conclusions

Patterns of Paradigmatic Preferences and Tendencies in the Political Culture Studies of the Eastern European Political Phenomena

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During the past decade, the Political Culture studies have shown a strong interest for the transition to democracy and democratic consolidation political phenomena in the newly appeared Eastern European democracies. Another area of high interest seems to be the study of the impact of recent (communist and post-communist) history on the current political unfolding in the domestic politics of the Eastern European ex-communist countries.

The idea of this chapter was to look for the particularities of the Eastern European Political Culture research, for its relevant ideas, theories and authors and, least but not last, to identify schools of thought on political culture which are currently influencing the political science research. The reason is that the “look from inside” provided by this volume might offer different perspectives and different explanations over the Eastern European political phenomena after 1989 and about major political change, in general. This chapter has intensively used two sources which provided insight in this subject: the ECPAM Conference Series and the EQPAM journal. These two sources mirror the latest developments in political culture research in the Eastern European countries after 2010. The authors, also members of the EPAM Research Group, have been concentrating in these papers on political culture studies, from either analytical or computational perspectives. The analysis of the patterns of paradigmatic preferences and tendencies should show if there is any convergence or shared areas of interest among independently developed research programs. There have been identified two fundamental areas of research: (1) theoretical and empirical research, and (2) computational modeling and simulation.

Theoretical fundamental research addresses the domains of: political science and political sociology, political philosophy and philosophy of culture, psychology and

social-psychology, anthropology. An important characteristics is that the fundamental researches are developed as interdisciplinary approaches.

Computational modeling and simulation research addresses the domains of philosophy of science, complexity theory, artificial life, agent-based simulation systems, artificial society, artificial polity.

In the area of empirical analysis, much of the efforts have been directed towards fundamental research and survey analysis. At a close look, these researches classify political culture studies into several interesting theoretical areas, like: political heritage, political culture values and their processes of change during the transition to democracy and democratic consolidation processes (Srblijinovic 2012, 2013; Ferić and Lamza Posavec, 2013), conspiratorial thinking (Blanuša, 2013), voting behavior and its connections to political attitudes, beliefs, norms and normative systems (Petricušić, 2013), political identity (Atanasov and Simoska, 2012, 2013), strength of democracy and corruption (Voinea, 2013), democratic consolidation (Petrović, 2012, 2013; Repak, 2012, 2013), feminism (Nadić, 2013), electoral systems and representation, gender discrimination (Petrescu, 2013), the impact of the communist past onto the authority and legitimacy of current democratic institutions: democratic institutions, mentalities, multiculturalism (Atanasov, 2012, 2013; Atanasov and Cvetanova, 2012, 2013), territorial identity, spatial mobility, and urban space, (Uršič, 2013), participative democracy and citizenship (Petrović, 2012a,b), philosophy of culture and political philosophy issues like the role of the Balkans in the imagery of Europe, ethnicity and nationalism (Koprivitsa, 2012, 2013). There have been identified some themes of particular high interest in the Southern Europe political culture research, like stateness and sovereignty, Europeanization, precommitment and constraint theory (Lavdas, 2012a,b).

There have been identified some fundamental research issues in Political Methodology, like situatedness and contingency of political phenomena (Srblijinović and Neumann, 2013), explanation and modeling, mechanism and processes, agent-based modeling and simulation (Voinea 2012, 2013a; Gulyás, 2013; Legéndiet al., 2013; Neumann, 2012), policy complexity (Fent et al., 2012), political attitude computational modeling and simulation (Voinea, 2012, 2013a; Jancović, 2012, 2013), cognitive modeling (Voinea, 2013b), voting behavior and computational modeling and simulation (Johnson, 2013), norms and normative systems (Atanasov and Cvetanova, 2013; Ferić and Lamza Posavec, 2013; Petricušić, 2013).

Interdisciplinary Research and An Unifying Theme

We may identify some specific themes of political culture research which share the interest of several authors from many Eastern European countries:

1. Political heritage and political culture in the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe
2. Political Identity, Multiculturalism, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balkans
3. Voting Behavior: empirical findings vs. agent-based simulations
4. Democratic institutions in the Eastern Europe after 1989

5. Political Methodology, Political Mechanism and Processes for Political Phenomena Modeling

6. Artificial Society, Artificial Polity and Agent-Based Simulations of political phenomena

These recurrent research themes show that the current political culture research in Eastern Europe is mainly oriented towards the *evaluation of the relevance and actual impact of the political heritage on the quality and stability of the democratic institution construction processes in the Eastern European countries.*

The prevalence of political culture issues (going from values, beliefs, norms, attitudes to political institutions, legitimacy, authority, identity or voting behavior) proves that the Eastern European research is mainly oriented towards political culture explanation and modeling of the unfolding of political phenomena after the fall of Berlin Wall until the present times. It is this particularity which makes the Editors believe that it might be considered the political philosophy dimension which unifies all these approaches into a meaningful approach. This major orientation reinforces our confidence that it is the main unifying theme which succeeds to aggregate all these variate research works like pieces in a huge puzzle of the contemporary thinking on the nature and outcomes of the Eastern European political phenomena after 1989. It therefore includes theoretical and empirical research as well as computational and simulation modeling research. While the former helps the reader identify the nature of phenomena and the political mechanisms and processes which could better describe and explain them, the latter identifies ways of configuring the possible outcomes of such phenomena, and of explaining their impact on the individual actors and institutions.

Particularity of the Recurrent Patterns of Preferences in Political Culture Studies

One particularity of these recurrent patterns of preference is that there is a systematic concern to both the political theoretical and the political methodology aspects. The researches reported here prove a high focus on several relationships, like: (i) political culture – political mechanisms, with a special concern to the types and explanative powers of the mechanisms and processes underlying governance and transition to democracy, (ii) political attitude – political behavior, with a special concern on the conflict between competitive normative systems, and (iii) political values – political norms, with a special concern on the political heritage from both communist and post-communist times.

These few relevant features make us believe that the EPAM Research Group succeeded so far to bring to the light a major dimension of research in Eastern European political culture: the intimate mental picture of the traces left by the communist regimes in the minds of several generations. And not only in their minds, but deeply in their culture: behavior, values, norms and attitudes. These traces need to be described and explained by a complex model of the “parallel worlds” context in which these

generations have lived, some of them for almost a lifetime: the world of inside reflection about the political regime, and the world of the real political regime.

The conflict between mental life and social life which has characterized the political culture of several generations during the communism is not an easy subject of study: it needs a complex approach which usually combines political and economical studies with culture, history and ideology studies. This dimension is particular to the times and trends in the political methodological, sociological and social psychology research on the current unfolding of the Eastern European political science and analysis developments.

They prove a clear political culture dimension, sustained and illustrated by this look from inside, which actually makes the subject of this volume, and almost sure, one of the main goals of future research developments.

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