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Postprint / Postprint

Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Sindic, D., & Reicher, S. D. (2008). The instrumental use of group prototypicality judgments. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 44(6), 1425-1435. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.05.007>

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Accepted Manuscript

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PII: S0022-1031(08)00096-6

DOI: [10.1016/j.jesp.2008.05.007](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.05.007)

Reference: YJESP 2098

To appear in: *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*

Received Date: 31 January 2008

Accepted Date: 21 May 2008



Please cite this article as: Sindic, D., Reicher, S.D., The instrumental use of group prototypicality judgments, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* (2008), doi: [10.1016/j.jesp.2008.05.007](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.05.007)

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Running head: THE INSTRUMENTAL USE OF GROUP PROTOTYPICALITY

The instrumental use of group prototypicality judgments

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This research was conducted while Denis Sindic and Stephen D. Reicher were in the School of Psychology, University of St Andrews. Denis Sindic is now at the Department of Psychology, University of Limerick

This research was made possible thanks to a St Andrews University scholarship awarded to the first author. We would like to thank Susan Condor, John Dixon, Stephen Gibson and Bryn Coles for their helpful comments on the first version of the manuscript.

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Abstract

Recently, Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel and Boettcher (2004) have shown that ingroup members often tend to judge the ingroup as more prototypical of the superordinate group than other subgroups. In this paper, we argue that, in addition to the motivational processes that have been posited to explain this phenomenon, prototypicality judgments may vary according to instrumental considerations. In particular, those who believe their ingroup interest to be undermined by remaining part of the common group will *downplay* ingroup's prototypicality as a way to sustain their separatist position. In a first study ($N = 63$), we found that Scottish respondents who support Scottish independence judged the Scots to be less prototypical of Britain than the English, as compared with Scots who do not support independence. In a second study ($N = 191$), we manipulated the rhetorical context within which prototypicality judgments were made. Results showed that the pattern found in study 1 only applied when the issue of independence was made salient. When the issue of the importance of Scottish history in Britain was made salient, the opposite pattern appeared, i.e. supporters of independence judged the Scots more prototypical than the English compared to non-supporters. These results were also interpreted in instrumental terms.

Keywords: group prototypicality, ingroup projection, instrumental, social identity, self-categorization, independence.

The Instrumental Use of Group Prototypicality Judgments

Judging the Prototypicality of Subgroups within a Superordinate Group

This paper is concerned with how people make judgments of the extent to which their sub-group is prototypical of a superordinate group. More specifically, we examine Scots' ratings of Scotland as prototypical of Great Britain as a whole. We suggest that these ratings can be seen as arguments aimed at advancing the group interest as participants see it. Notably, for those who believe in separatism, Scotland will be described as having low prototypicality in order to suggest that it does not belong in Britain. In more general terms, then, prototypicality ratings are not only perceptions of social relations in the present but also instrumental acts aimed at influencing social relations in the future.

The issue of prototypicality judgments lies at the heart of Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). SCT assumes that people compare and evaluate ingroups and outgroups as a function of how much they are seen as being prototypical of the relevant superordinate category, this latter providing the relevant dimensions of comparison. More recently, Mummendey and her colleagues have argued that people tend to be biased towards perceiving ingroups as more prototypical of the superordinate category than other subgroups - i.e. to yield high scores of relative ingroup prototypicality (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003).

Mummendey and her colleagues argue that this phenomenon may be underpinned by a process of *ingroup projection*. The notion of ingroup projection draws upon the older social psychological concept of 'social projection' (Allport, 1924). This refers to the tendency for people to think that their own personal characteristics are shared by others more than they actually are, or than other people would judge them to be. People therefore see themselves as

more prototypical of people in general than others are (Clement & Krueger, 2000; Krueger & Clement, 1996). Mummendey and others extend this construct to the intergroup level. They claim that group members tend to project their ingroup's characteristics on to superordinate groups, a process which in turn leads to a tendency to believe that one's own subgroup is more prototypical of the superordinate category than other subgroups.

Levels of Explanation for Subgroup Prototypicality Judgments: Motivational, Cognitive and Instrumental

Three types of explanations have been offered for the processes which might underlie the phenomenon of ingroup projection. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) favor a motivational explanation based on the assumption within Social Identity Theory that group members strive for a positive social identity (Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus they propose that rating one's subgroup as more prototypical than others is a form of ingroup favoritism. The difference with more classic forms of favoritism is that, due to the projection of ingroup's characteristics on the superordinate group, there is a bias in favor of the ingroup in the very selection of the dimensions of comparison and not just in the judgment of where the ingroup and outgroup stand on these dimensions.

On this basis, Mummendey and Wenzel argue that stronger ingroup identification will *necessarily* lead to higher relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP), provided that people also identify with the superordinate group. Indeed, in order for the bias to occur, ingroup members need to take the superordinate category as a relevant normative background for their judgments. Overall, then, they predict that high RIP should be related to high levels of dual identification (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Wenzel et al., 2003).

However, in addition to the motivational account, Waldzus et al. (2004) mention that there are two other ways of explaining ingroup projection. One is cognitive. That is, projection of the ingroup characteristics on the superordinate group may result from the

greater cognitive accessibility of information concerning the ingroup when forming a representation of the superordinate group, as has been argued to be the case for the social projection of self characteristics onto the ingroup (Clement & Krueger, 2000; Krueger & Stanke, 2001). The other is strategic or instrumental. That is, projection may be a conscious and public act aimed achieving desired goals. As Waldzus et al. put it themselves: “the process itself might be one of disagreement, discourse, dispute and social influence.... we assume that strategic concerns about the positive identity, status and power of one’s group should render claims for prototypicality an argument in a discourse” (2004, pp. 397-398).

It is this third suggestion which we address in this paper, although it is important to stress strongly and from the outset that we (like Waldzus et al., 2004) see the various explanations as complementary rather than competing. Our perspective fits with a growing body of work on group action which suggests that we need to consider not only the cognitive and motivational processes which create the instigation to behave in particular ways but also the instrumental considerations which shape the public expression of behavior – the so called SIDE perspective (Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects) named after its origins in the analysis of anonymity and visibility on group action (for reviews, see Klein, Spears & Reicher, 2007; Postmes, Spears, Lea, & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). For instance it has been shown that basic features of collective judgment such as ingroup bias, which traditionally have been treated predominantly in cognitive or motivational terms, can also be understood as public acts designed to achieve such goals as gaining acceptance as an ingroup member (Noel, Wann, & Brandscombe, 1995) or urging fellow group members to defeat the outgroup (Scheepers, Spears, Doojse & Manstead, 2003). Moreover, insofar as the expression of bias may be instrumental, so instrumental concerns may, under certain conditions, lead to a lack of ingroup bias or even to outgroup bias. For instance, Klein and Licata (2003) show how the Congolese nationalist, Patrick Lumumba would moderate his

anti-colonialist critique when speaking to Western audiences in the hope of limiting their opposition to Congolese independence.

The same logic can be applied to ingroup projection. Thus, on the one hand, there are a number of instrumental reasons for emphasizing the prototypicality of one's subgroup. These include claiming equal treatment where inequity is seen to exist (Widdicombe, 1998), claiming rights and resources over which the superordinate group has control (Klein & Azzi, 2001; Klein & Licata, 2003; Roosens, 1989), legitimating inter-subgroup status differences (Weber, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2002) or else claiming authority and control over the governing structures of the superordinate group (Reicher & Sani, 1998; Sani & Reicher, 1998, 2000). On the other hand, there may be instrumental reasons for minimizing the prototypicality of one's subgroup. Notably, just as van Knippenberg and van Oers' (1984) have shown that people may minimize ingroup bias and even stress outgroup superiority in order to highlight the inequality of the status quo, so the same can be achieved by stressing the greater prototypicality of the outgroup within a superordinate frame. In particular, the cause of those who favor of separation from the superordinate category may be served by reducing ingroup projection or even displaying outgroup projection. It is a means by which they can proclaim: "this group reflects our rivals, we will always be badly served within it".

There are three aspects of the SIDE perspective and its application to prototypicality judgments which need to be clarified at this point. First, the analysis is concerned with instrumentality as it relates to the actor's interest *as a group member*. That is, the focus is on how individuals act in order to secure a collective advantage: either their position in the group or else the position of the group in the world. As a consequence, SIDE processes (and the instrumental use of prototypicality judgments in particular) only operate to the extent that a relevant social identity is salient and hence the group is of importance to the individual.

Second, while the instrumental approach is clearly motivational in the sense that it relates to the deliberate pursuit of the group interest, it differs in a crucial respect from what we have labeled ‘the motivational explanation’ as the Mummendey group uses this term. That is, whereas they assume that enhanced prototypicality necessarily advantages the ingroup, we suggest that the way in which prototypicality is evaluated depends upon how members construe the nature of the group interest. Different ways of construing this interest may lead members to consider it advantageous either to stress how prototypical the group is of a superordinate entity *or* how unprototypical it is. We stress the ‘instrumental’ character of this approach precisely because the variability in prototypicality judgments derives from the variability in judgments of group interest.

Empirically, this distinction between the ‘motivational’ and ‘instrumental’ explanations is reflected in different predictions concerning the relationship between ingroup identification and relative ingroup prototypicality. According to the former, identification or salience is directly related to high RIP (provided that there is also superordinate identification). However, from an instrumental perspective, the effect of identification on RIP will be moderated by the nature of perceived group interest. In concrete terms, where the group interest is seen to be best served within the superordinate group, then higher identification will lead to higher RIP as a means of making claims upon and within this group. However, where the group interest is seen to be best served by leaving the superordinate group then higher identification will lead to lower RIP as a means of justifying the need for departure.

More generally, both ingroup and outgroup projection can be explained in instrumental terms. But ingroup projection can be equally well explained in motivational or cognitive terms. What renders the instrumental approach distinctive is in its ability to predict when outgroup projection will occur. Accordingly, in our study of the instrumental bases of

prototypicality judgments, we will focus on the conditions under which subgroup members may judge other subgroups as equally or more prototypical of the superordinate group than themselves.

Finally, the use of the terms ‘group interest’, ‘collective advantage’ and ‘instrumentality’ should not lead one to think of the SIDE perspective as a form of realistic conflict theory (RCT: Sherif, 1966; Jackson, 1993; Bobo, 1983). The key difference is that, whereas RCT predefines that which constitutes ‘interest’ in material terms, we argue that the definition of interest depends upon the definition of the group identity and upon identity-related motivations (Sonnenberg, 2003). In the particular case of Scottish identity, those who argue for or against independence do so around the question of how it will impact on the Scottish way of life (Sindic & Reicher, 2007). Certainly, there are those who argue for independence on economic grounds, but they do so on the underlying basis that wealth will improve the ability of Scots to preserve their identity-based values and practices (Sindic, 2005). Hence wealth cannot be used as the case for independence if it comes at the expense of ‘way of life’ and, equally, independence can be supported as preserving ‘way of life’ even if it comes at the expense of wealth. Indeed there have been many who have supported an independent Scotland while explicitly acknowledging that it may well not be economically advantageous to leave Britain (e.g. see McClure, 1988).

Political Attitudes to Superordinate Groups and Prototypicality Judgments

Thus, in this paper we focus on Scottish people’s judgments of how prototypical Scotland and England are of Great Britain as a whole. Scotland and England have been joined in a Union since 1707 when the Scottish Parliament was formally dissolved. In 1999, however, a new Scottish Parliament was set up with devolved but limited powers within the United Kingdom.

Since before the Union up to the present there has been a lively debate over the relationship of Scotland to the British state (Marr, 1992). In recent years, opinion polls suggest that between a quarter and a third of Scots support independence (McCrone & Patterson, 2002). Moreover, in 2007 the Scottish National Party (the only major party supporting independence) became the largest in the Scottish Parliament with some 32 % of the popular vote and formed a minority administration. One of their key manifesto pledges was to hold a referendum on independence.

Analyses of political texts, speeches at public meetings and of interviews with politicians (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Sindic, 2005; Sindic & Reicher, 2007) suggest that one of the principle arguments for independence is that English values and English interests are divergent from and incompatible with those of Scotland. Moreover, given that the population of England is more than ten times that of Scotland, this inevitably means that the English interest predominates within the Union. This position is encapsulated in the title of a famous pro-independence pamphlet “In bed with an elephant: The Scottish experience” (Scott, 1985). By contrast, those opposed to independence tend to argue that Scots play an important part in shaping the Union which consequently does reflect Scottish values and priorities.

It follows from these respective arguments that one would expect those Scots who are strongly pro-independence to show high relative *outgroup* prototypicality (ROP; that is, they will emphasize that England not Scotland is prototypical of the UK) while those who are anti-independence will show high relative *ingroup* prototypicality (they will emphasize that Scotland not England is prototypical of the UK). That is, overall there will be a decrease in judgments of RIP (or an increase in judgments of ROP) as support for independence increases. Moreover, to the extent that this is an instrumental process, one would only expect this relationship to be found where the issue of independence is made salient. It is only in the

context of this controversy that separatists would have an interest in stressing the Englishness of Britain.

Study 1

In our first study we asked Scottish participants to complete measures of political attitudes to Britain, the extent to which Scotland and England are prototypical of England and their level of identification as Scottish and British. The order in which these measures were presented varied between participants.

Our first hypothesis concerned the relationship between political attitudes (i.e. level of support for independence) and RIP. Following the logic outlined above, we hypothesize that the degree of RIP will vary depending on level of support for independence. More specifically, our particular interest lies in showing that those high in support for independence show less RIP than those who do not support independence (**H1**).

Our second hypothesis concerned the effects of order of presentation upon these relationships. As we have argued, we are not suggesting that separatists and unionists have inherent and fixed differences in their judgments of prototypicality. Rather, we suggest that separatists use outgroup prototypicality as an argument for independence and only do so when independence is at issue. The different orders of presentation of the questions allowed us to address this. Given that the study was not introduced as related to the constitutional status of Scotland in Britain, the topic of independence could only have been salient to participants while they rated subgroup prototypicality in those conditions where they had completed the measures of political attitude first. Thus, we expected that there would be an interaction between order of presentation and support for independence on RIP such that strong supporters of independence will show lower RIP than opponents when political attitudes are measured before subgroup prototypicality rather than after (**H2**).

Our third, and last, hypothesis concerned the relationship between levels of identification, support for independence and ingroup projection. As also argued above, we would expect that the more one identifies with the ingroup, the more one should be concerned with the group interest, but the way this affects prototypicality judgments will be dependent upon how the interest is construed – that is, upon political attitudes. In the present context, then, we predicted that Scottish identification would interact with support for independence in predicting judgments of prototypicality. For those who oppose independence, ingroup identification should lead to higher RIP. However, for those who support independence, a higher degree of identification should lead to lower RIP (**H3**).

Method

Participants

69 students at the University of St Andrews of Scottish nationality took part in the study. Six participants had to be excluded from the analyses because they did not complete the measures of Scottish and English prototypicality. Of the remaining 63 participants, 37 were females. They were aged between 17 and 30 years – with 75% of participants being between 17 and 21 years.

Procedure

Participants were approached in university accommodation and asked to fill in a short questionnaire about Scottish and English people's perception of each other and of Britain. After completion of the questionnaire, which took about 5 to 10 minutes, participants were thanked and debriefed.

Questionnaire

Prototypicality of the Scots and the English. The dependent measure was directly borrowed from Walczus et al.'s (2004) ingroup projection studies. People were first asked to generate traits which they thought were characteristics of each subgroup as compared with the

other subgroup (3 for each subgroup). They then had to rate how much each of those self-generated traits applied to members of the superordinate category in general (i.e. to British people, on a scale ranging from 0 to 10). The mean scores for each subgroup on these items gave us an index of how prototypical the members of this subgroup were judged to be of British people in general, and the difference between the scores for the ingroup and the outgroup on this ‘British prototypicality’ measure constituted the index of RIP.

Attitude towards the independence of Scotland from Britain. Two Likert-type items were used: “Scotland should become an independent country, separate from the rest of the UK” and “The goal of having a parliament in Scotland should be ultimately to achieve total independence in the long-term”. Participants’ answers ranged from 0 (*strongly disagree*) to 10 (*strongly agree*). The two items were taken from a scale of political attitudes to Britain which we developed in the context of other studies (Sindic & Reicher, 2005).

Measures of identification. In this section of the questionnaire, participants were first asked to indicate their nationality, and then were asked to fill in a scale of Scottish identification (if they were Scottish), followed by a scale of British identification. These two scales consisted of 4 Likert-Type items, such as “Being Scottish/British is very important for me” and “I feel strong ties with other Scottish/British people”. All 4 items were taken up from existing identification scales in the literature (Haslam, 2001). Participants’ answers ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

These measures of identification were included to serve two purposes: first, to test hypothesis H3 involving the degree of Scottish identification, and, second, to control for the degree of dual identification in the test of H1.

The order of the three scales was alternated, thus yielding six different types of questionnaires. At the end of the questionnaire (irrespective of the order of questions), there were additional questions relating to personal details (age, sex, membership in political

association), along with space for open comments. The questionnaire also included a few other exploratory measures which were not related to the main hypotheses outlined above and therefore, for reasons of space and clarity, are not analysed here.

Results

Scale Reliability

All the scales used in subsequent analyses yielded a reliability index ranging from very satisfactory to very good. The independence scale yielded a standardized alpha of .90, the Scottish identification scale of .84, and the British identification scale of .76.

Relative Ingroup Prototypicality as a function of support for Independence (H1)

In order to test our central hypothesis H1, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with the degree of RIP as criterion and with support for independence, Scottish identification, British identification and the product of the two identification scores (representing their interaction) as predictors (Aiken & West, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 1986). Identification scores and their interaction were included in this analysis in order to control for their potential effect, and in particular to make sure that varying degrees of RIP as a function of support for independence could not be accounted for by potentially varying scores of dual identification amongst participants. Indeed, any effect of support for independence could potentially be attributed to lower levels of superordinate identification (and hence of dual identification) amongst strong supporters of independence. In accordance with Aiken and West (1991)'s recommendation regarding MR involving higher order terms, all predictor variables were also first centered

The overall results showed that support for independence did not predict significantly RIP ($\beta = -.088, p = .482$), thus failing to provide support for our hypothesis. However, inspection of the scatterplot of the data and of the regression residuals revealed the possibility of a curvilinear relationship (in the form of an inverted U-shaped function) between support

for independence and RIP. In order to test this idea, a quadratic component for the support for independence variable was added to the regression equation, following a step-up procedure. This addition led to a significant improvement in the overall regression model, $\Delta R^2 = .11$, $\Delta F(1, 57) = 7.30$, $p = .009$, and revealed that the quadratic component of support for independence was indeed significant ($\beta = -.334$, $p = .009$).

There was no effect of Scottish, British and dual (Scottish * British) identification on RIP (respectively, $\beta = -.061$, $p = .621$; $\beta = -.071$, $p = .554$; $\beta = .087$, $p = .446$)¹. An additional multiple regression analysis with support for independence as criterion and Scottish, British and dual identification as predictors, also showed that superordinate and dual identification were not significantly related to the level support for independence (respectively, $\beta = -.189$, $p = .145$ and $\beta = -.043$, $p = .733$). Only Scottish identification was significantly related to support for independence ($\beta = .321$, $p = .015$). Note that Scottish and British identification were not significantly correlated with each other ($r = -.111$, $p = .461$).

Figure 1 shows the predicted level of RIP as a function of level of support for independence, according to the regression model. As can be seen, the curve is an inverted U with an apex at around 4 on the scale of support for independence. This suggests that, in the range from moderate opposition to strong support for independence, participants may have behaved according to our expectations, with higher pro-independence being associated with lower RIP. The anomaly lies in those who are strongly anti-independence who, against expectations, show low RIP. While they, like strong supporters of independence, may judge Scotland to be less prototypical of Britain, perhaps the two groups do so for very different reasons. This is an issue to which we shall return in discussion.

What was of most interest for us, however, was to know whether RIP did indeed significantly decrease as one went from moderate opposition to strong support for independence. The fact that the quadratic component of the regression was significant overall

did not provided definitive evidence for this given that this significance might in part be due to the presence of the strong opponents. Thus simple slopes were computed to appraise the relationship between support for independence and RIP at different conditional values (or levels) of support for independence (see Aiken and West, 1991). This revealed that the relationship between support for independence and RIP was indeed negative and significant ($\beta = -.698, p = .008$) at high level of support for independence (one SD above the mean), confirming our expectation as to the impact of support for independence on RIP as far as moderates to high supporters of independence were concerned (the simple slope being the tangent of the curve at 1 SD above the mean, it illustrates that the downwards trend of the curve from the apex to the high end of the scale is significant). On the other hand, at low level of support for independence (one SD below the mean), the relationship was also significant but positive ($\beta = .636, p = .034$), showing that from strong opponents to moderates, support for independence increased the level of RIP (i.e. the simple slope illustrates that the upwards trend of the curve from the low end of the scale to the apex is significant)². For participants in the range from moderate opponents to strong supporters of independence, then, H1 is supported.

Relationship between support for independence and RIP as a function of issue salience (H2)

The salience of the issue of independence was manipulated through varying the order of items in the questionnaire. The questionnaires were initially coded according to whether the measures of prototypicality were before the measures of independence (independence non-salient) or afterwards (independence salient), thus creating a new dichotomous salience variable.

Our initial intention was to examine the predicted interaction between support for independence and salience of independence on RIP using the whole data set. However, the unexpected curvilinear relationship between support for independence and RIP made this

problematic. Testing an interaction between linear and curvilinear effects is technically possible, but because we had no specific a priori prediction about the role of the order of questions for people who strongly rejected independence, and because they were not the main focus of interest, we decided instead to select only those participants ranging from moderate opposition to strong support for independence. In practice, this meant taking those participants in the top two thirds of scores for support for independence ($n = 40$), with a range from 2.5. to 10 on the 10 point scale.

A multiple regression was then run with RIP as criterion, and with level of support for independence, order, and the product of these two variables (representing their interaction) entered as predictors. As expected, the analysis revealed a significant interaction ($\beta = .568, p = .033$), showing that the effect of support for independence on RIP did vary as a function of the order of the questions. Confirming that the pattern of this interaction was as predicted by H2, the analyses of the simple slopes for each group based on Order showed that support for independence was a significant (negative) predictor of RIP only in the case where support for independence was measured first ($\beta = -.696, p < .001$), with higher support for independence leading to lower RIP. When support for independence was measured second, it failed to bear a significant relationship with RIP ($\beta = -.128, p = .472$).

Relationship between ingroup identification and RIP as a function of support for independence (H3)

As for the test of H2, and for the same reasons, only those participants in the top 2/3 of scores on support for independence were used in our tests of the prediction that higher identification would lead to lower RIP only for those strongly in favour of Scottish independence.

A multiple regression was run, with RIP as criterion, and ingroup identification, level of support for independence (both centered), as well the product of those two variables

(representing the interaction) entered as predictors. This analysis yielded a significant and negative main effect of support for independence ($\beta = -.386, p = .004$) but no significant main effect of ingroup identification ($\beta = -.101, p = .503$). However, these effects were qualified by a significant interaction ($\beta = -.429, p = .006$).

In order to interpret this interaction, simple slopes were calculated, which revealed a pattern of results consistent with our predictions. As expected, at low level of support for independence (1 SD below the mean), ingroup identification led to significantly higher scores of RIP ($\beta = .327, p = .024$). However, at high conditional value of independence (1 SD above the mean), the relationship was significantly negative ($\beta = -.530, p = .050$). These results provide support for H3.

Discussion

Leaving aside those who are strongly opposed to Scottish independence, the results provide clear support for all three of our hypotheses and exclude alternative explanations. First (H1), increased support for independence is associated with decreased RIP. This cannot be explained as resulting from lowered British or dual identification amongst those who are strongly pro-independence. On the one hand, neither of these forms of identification was significantly related to support for independence. On the other hand, there was no effect of British or dual identification on RIP. In that respect, it is also worth noting that alternative mediational models of the relationship between identification, support for independence, and RIP do not hold. Indeed, the lack of significant relationships between British/dual identification and support for independence/RIP rules out the possibility that British and/or dual identification may act as a potential mediator of the relationship between support for independence and RIP or that support for independence is mediating the effect of British and/or dual identification on RIP. As for Scottish identification, although it was related to higher support for independence (this is not because high identifiers always support

independence, but because it is unusual to support independence without identifying as a Scot – see Sindic & Reicher, 2007), it had no direct effect on RIP even with support for independence removed from the regression model ($\beta = -.072, p = .557$), thus violating one of the conditions for mediation (Barron & Kenny, 1986), whether Scottish identification is considered as the mediator or as the mediated variable.

Second (H2), and in further support of our instrumental interpretation of the support for independence – RIP link, this association only occurs when the issue of Scottish independence is salient. A possible alternative explanation of this result is that when groups' prototypicality is not measured at the beginning of the questionnaire, the questions preceding this measure could make ingroup and/or superordinate group identities salient, thus explaining the effect of our order manipulation. In particular, the identification questions would be likely to have such an effect (see McGarty, 1999), and there was an inevitable degree of overlap between the order of the independence and identification measures in relation to the prototypicality measures (logically, in 4 cases out of 6, both independence and identification were measured conjointly either before or after groups' prototypicality), thus creating a partial confound. However, when we examined this directly (i.e. does the support for independence-RIP link depend upon whether identification, rather than support for independence, is measured before or after prototypicality) the interaction was non-significant ($\beta = -.052, p = .816$). This finding does not only allow us to reject the alternative interpretation. It also shows that the significant effect of order was not just a matter of groups' prototypicality being measured later in the questionnaire, but that it was specifically due to the fact that it was preceded by the measure of independence.

Third (H3), the effects of Scottish identification upon prototypicality judgments were moderated by political attitudes. Higher identification led to less RIP for strong supporters of independence and to more RIP for moderate opponents of independence.

All of this only highlights the question of why these various relationships only hold for part of the range of attitudes to independence. Why, as we have already asked, do those who are strongly opposed to the idea of independence, judge Scots as less, not more prototypical of Britain than those who are moderately opposed? One possibility is that these are people who, like strong supporters of independence, recognize that the English are by far the dominant majority in Britain but who, unlike the supporters, see this dominance as both legitimate and inevitable. Alternatives, such as leaving Britain or changing power relations in Britain are simply not viable. The best they can do is to avoid challenging the dominant group and (potentially) invoking their displeasure (cf. Klein & Licata, 2003). Certainly, perceived legitimacy and lack of alternatives are conditions which rule out a collective challenge to the status quo, whatever form that might take (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Clearly, this explanation is speculative. However, whether it is valid or not, the findings for anti-independence participants may lead us to amend the form of our instrumental explanation but they should not lead us to discard it. Indeed if anything, these findings make it more difficult to explain the patterns of variability we have found purely on the basis of variations in motivational and/or cognitive processes. Certainly a motivational explanation of our findings based entirely on identification processes is ruled out. First, the level of dual identification with Scotland and Britain does not differ as a function of support for independence and cannot therefore be driving the difference in RIP. Second, while identification with Scotland alone does impact on RIP, the direction of this impact is moderated by political attitudes. So, identification alone does not account for the way that political attitudes affect subgroups' relative prototypicality, it simply amplifies the different impact of different political stances.

Likewise, a cognitive explanation based on biases in group representations has difficulty in accounting for the effects of order of presentation. This finding is important

because all the other results could be explained in terms of a stable difference in group representations (or in levels of identification) between those who hold different political positions. But what the order effect suggests is that those who are more or less pro-independence only differ in their prototypicality judgments when independence is at issue and hence when such judgments are relevant to the cause.

Nonetheless, we recognize that changing the order of items in our questionnaire constitutes a rather indirect manipulation of issue salience. Hence, in overall terms, the strength of this first study lies mainly in the demonstration that prototypicality judgments vary as a function of political attitudes and in a way that is hard to explain in conventional cognitive or motivational terms. In our next study, then, we examine the effects of a more explicit manipulation of the argumentative context in which prototypicality judgments are made, so as to strengthen the case for an instrumental approach.

Study 2

Study 2 employs the same general procedure as Study 1. Scottish participants were again asked to complete measures of political attitudes to Britain, the extent to which Scotland and England are prototypical of England and their level of identification as Scottish and British.

However the second study differed from the first in one significant way. In order to make independence more or less salient, we directly manipulated the nature of the issue in relation to which judgments were made rather than varying the order of presentation of the measures (thus, in this study, the measures of prototypicality came before the measures of political attitude in all the experimental conditions). There were three conditions: participants were either told that the study was about independence, about the contribution of Scotland to British history or about what Scots and English people are like. However, given that different issues have the potential to invoke different audiences in the mind of participants, a factor

known to alter instrumentally based group judgments (Klein et al., 2007), we also sought to keep the imagined audience constant by stressing to participants in all conditions that their responses would be assessed by English respondents. This had the added advantage of making the communicational (and hence instrumental) aspect of the study more explicit.

The first condition (*independence*) was designed to stress independence and is akin to the condition in study 1 where political attitudes are measured before subgroup prototypicality. We would therefore expect a curvilinear relationship between support for independence and RIP. We predicted that strong opponents of independence would advocate their position by claiming that Britain reflects Englishness. However, of more direct interest, moderate opponents would advocate their position by claiming that Scotland represents Britain (high RIP) while supporters of independence would advocate their position through claiming that Britain reflects Englishness (low RIP or high ROP) (**H1a**).

The second condition (*history*) was designed as a context in which support for independence would lead to increased not decreased RIP. Those who support independence commonly complain that the contribution of Scots to British history has been overlooked. For instance, in October 2004, Richard Lochhead, a Scottish National Party member, tabled a motion to the Scottish Parliament complaining about the comments of a well known historian, David Starkey. He said "The comments made by Dr David Starkey are typical of the anglocentric view held by English historians. To seek to undermine the enormous contributions made by many Scots to history by claiming that Scotland was unimportant historically is grossly inaccurate. These comments simply prove that we need a much greater emphasis on Scottish history in our schools" (retrieved from <http://hnn.us/roundup/archives/14/2004/10/>). In this context, then, we would expect a linear relationship between support for independence and RIP. We predicted that those who support independence would advocate their position by arguing that Scotland is highly representative

of Britain (high RIP); they would do so more than both moderate opponents of independence and those strongly opposed to independence, who, in such a context, have less interest in stressing Scotland's contribution to Britishness (**H1b**).

The third condition (*neutral*) was designed to be neutral. By invoking the rather general topic of 'what Scots and English people are like', and given that prototypicality was measured before political attitudes, this meant that, in this condition, the issue of independence was not made salient, nor was any other issue in which participants would have a political stake in claiming that Scotland was more or less prototypical of Britain. Accordingly, we predicted that there would be no relationship between support for independence and judgments of group prototypicality (**H1c**).

In addition, we expected the effects of ingroup (Scottish) identification upon subgroup prototypicality to be dependent upon the context condition. That is, identification should increase the importance of the ingroup to the individual and hence amplify the extent to which they want to make claims about the group. Specifically, in the independence condition, high Scottish identification will lower RIP for supporters of independence and increase RIP for moderate opponents (**H2a**). In the history condition, high Scottish identification will increase RIP for strong supporters of independence but not (or less so) for moderate and for strong opponents. (**H2b**). In the neutral condition, level of Scottish identification will have no effects on RIP (**H2c**).

Method

Participants

In total 205 participants took part in the study. They were recruited amongst the student body of Dundee College in Dundee, Scotland. Some participants had to be withdrawn from the analyses because they did not see themselves as being of Scottish nationality ($n = 12$) or because of missing values in their answers ($n = 2$). Of the remaining 191 participants,

141 were female. They were between the ages of 16 and 56 years - with 75% of participants being between the ages of 16 and 21 years.

Design

The design was based on the manipulation of one between-subjects factor (experimental condition), with three levels: history ($n = 63$) vs. neutral ($n = 66$) vs. independence ($n = 62$).

Procedure

The experiment was run in 4 sessions, during class time (one session per class, groups of 30 to 57). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions, depending on which type of questionnaire they received.

Questionnaire and manipulation

The questionnaire used in this study was divided into two main sections. The first part of the questionnaire introduced the manipulation. The front page introduced the alleged topic of the research. The title of the questionnaire as well the description of the research purposes differed according to the condition. In the independence condition, the title was '*Should Scotland be independent?*'. The subsequent text stated that there was a controversy about whether Scotland's interests were or were not properly represented within Britain, that some Scots advocated independence because Scotland would always come second to England but that others thought that Scotland would lose out by leaving Britain, and that the research was concerned with their opinion on this issue. In the history condition, the title was '*What is Scotland's contribution to British history?*'. The text stated that there was a controversy about whether or not books and TV series on British history were overly dominated by English history to the detriment of Scottish history, and that the research was concerned with their opinion on this issue as well as on the real contribution of Scotland to British history. Finally, in the neutral condition, the title was '*What Scottish and English people are like?*'. The text

then stated that there was a controversy about the respective characteristics of the Scots and the English and that the research was concerned with their opinion on this issue. In all three conditions, the text stated that responses would be shown to an audience of English people.

After reading these descriptions, and a page of general instructions, participants were then asked to give their opinion on the alleged topic of the research, in an open format. They were also asked to indicate what an English audience would think of the issue. These questions were not aimed at providing data but were designed (a) to reinforce the commonality of the implied audience across conditions, and (b) to increase the salience of the issue manipulation while also leading participants to commit themselves through an open statement of their opinion (Kiesler, 1971)³.

The second part of the questionnaire contained the dependent measures. These were identical to those used in Study 1 apart from the fact that the order of questions was constant: attitude to independence and identification were measured after groups' prototypicality⁴.

Results

Relationship between RIP and support for independence as a Function of Experimental Condition (H1)

In order to test H1, a multiple regression was run with degree of RIP as the criterion. The predictors were support for independence, its quadratic expression, experimental condition, the interactions between experimental condition and both the linear and quadratic effects of support for independence. Scottish identification, British identification and dual identification (Scottish*British) were also entered for the same reasons as in study 1.

Experimental condition was coded as a dummy variable and the regression model was run three times so as to alternate the comparison group (independence, history, and neutral condition), in order to allow the calculation of simple slopes for significant interactions (Aiken & West, 1991).

The results showed a significant interaction between experimental condition and the quadratic effect of support for independence when comparing independence vs. neutral conditions ($\beta = .404, p = .020$). When comparing independence vs. history condition, the interaction was also fully significant ($\beta = .485, p = .005$). Consistent with our predictions, simple slopes analysis showed that the quadratic effect of support for independence was significant in the independence condition ($\beta = -.388, p = .003$), while it was not in the history condition ($\beta = .098, p = .397$) nor in the neutral condition ($\beta = .017, p = .886$).

Mirroring the procedure followed in study 1, further simple slopes analyses were conducted in order to unravel the pattern of the quadratic effects in the independence condition. This revealed that, at high level of independence (1 SD above the mean), the relationship between support for independence and RIP was significantly negative ($\beta = -.891, p = .002$). At low level of independence (1 SD below the mean), however, the relationship was significantly positive ($\beta = .660, p = .019$). This pattern supported our hypothesis H1a as to the relationship between support for independence and RIP in the independence condition.

The results also showed a significant interaction between experimental condition and the linear effect of support for independence when comparing history vs. independence conditions ($\beta = -.426, p = .012$) and also when comparing history vs. neutral conditions (RIP1: $\beta = -.333, p = .035$; RIP2: $\beta = -.373, p = .027$). In line with our prediction, simple slopes showed that, in the history condition, support for independence positively predicted RIP ($\beta = .310, p = .014$), while it did not in the independence condition ($\beta = -.116, p = .364$) nor in the neutral condition ($\beta = -.023, p = .837$). These results therefore supported H1b as to the relationship between support for independence and RIP in the history condition. The absence of both linear and quadratic effects in the neutral condition also supported our hypothesis H1c.

Finally, the analyses revealed no significant effect of Scottish identification, British identification or dual identification on RIP (β 's respectively .008, -.026, .103; all *ns*).

Furthermore, additional regression analyses showed that although Scottish identification was significantly and positively related to support for independence ($\beta = .398, p < .001$) and that British identification was significantly and negatively related to support for independence ($\beta = -.272, p < .001$), dual identification was not a significant predictor of this support ($\beta = -.068, p = .277$)⁵. Note also that Scottish and British identification were not significantly correlated to each other ($r = .024, p = .724$). In sum, the results of those analyses provided clear support for our main hypothesis H1 and rule out alternative explanations. Figure 2 shows the relationship between support for independence and RIP in the three experimental conditions.

Relationship between ingroup identification and RIP as a function of Experimental Condition (H2)

H2 predicts an interaction between ingroup identification and level of support for independence in predicting RIP for both the independence and the history conditions, with opposite patterns in each case, but no such interaction in the neutral condition. In order to test that hypothesis, a multiple regression analysis was performed with RIP as criterion and, as predictors, experimental condition, Scottish identification, support for independence, the 3 two-way interactions between these variables⁶, and, lastly, the 3-way interaction. For the same reasons as in study 1, in the independence condition, we included only the top two thirds of our respondents based on their level of support for independence (i.e. moderate opponents to strong supporters, $n = 43$, in numerical terms scores ranged from 3.67 to 10)⁷.

The analysis yielded the predicted significant three-way interaction on RIP scores between Scottish identification, support for independence, and experimental condition, when comparing independence vs. history conditions ($\beta = 1.043, p < .001$), when comparing

independence vs. neutral conditions ($\beta = .714, p = .001$), and when comparing history vs. neutral conditions ($\beta = -.339, p = .036$).

Further inspection showed that the two-way interaction between Scottish identification and support for independence was significant in the independence condition ($\beta = -.767, p < .001$) and in the history condition ($\beta = .277, p = .033$), but not in the neutral condition ($\beta = -.053, p = .550$). The calculation of the simple slopes for the two significant interactions revealed a pattern which was in line with our expectations. In the independence condition, at a low level of support for independence (1 SD below the mean), the relationship between identification and RIP was positive and significant ($\beta = .897, p = .001$). However at high values of support for independence (1 SD above the mean) this relationship was negative and significant ($\beta = -.636, p = .005$). In the history condition, this pattern was reversed. At low levels of support of independence (1 SD below the mean) the simple slope was negative, though not significantly so ($\beta = -.047, p = .716$). However, at high levels of support for independence (1 SD above the mean), the simple slope was significantly positive ($\beta = .506, p = .037$). Thus the data supported H2a, H2b and H2c. Figure 3 shows the relationship between ingroup identification and RIP as a function of support for independence in the independence and the history conditions.

Discussion

The results of this study are consistently supportive of all our hypotheses. In every case, the pattern of our findings is precisely as expected. To summarize, we find that strong supporters of independence show less RIP compared to moderate opponents when independence is at issue (**H1a**), more RIP compared to both moderate and strong opponents when the place of the Scots in British history is at issue (**H1b**), and the same RIP as moderate and strong opponents when nothing is explicitly at issue (**H1c**). We also find that the effect of ingroup identification upon the relationship between support for independence and RIP varies

according to the topical issue. Thus, when the issue is independence, higher identification leads to strong supporters of independence expressing less RIP and moderate opponents showing more RIP (**H2a**). When the issue is history, higher identification leads to supporters of independence expressing more RIP but it has no impact on moderate or strong opponents (**H2b**). When the issue is not specified, higher identification does not affect the levels of RIP for either supporters or opponents of identification (**H2c**).

As for study 1, the analyses of this study show that this variability in RIP cannot be explained in terms of variations in dual identification since there is no significant relationship between dual identification and RIP, nor between dual identification and support for independence. Equally, and again as in study 1, the relationship between support for independence, identification and RIP cannot be supplanted by a mediational relationship. On the one hand, the lack of significant relationships between dual identification and support for independence/RIP rules it out both as a potential mediator or as the variable to be mediated. On the other hand, whilst Scottish identification is positively associated with support for independence and, this time, British identification is also (negatively) associated with such support, nonetheless both identification scales fail to show a direct effect on RIP, even with support for independence removed from the model (Scottish identification: $\beta = .039$, *ns*; British identification: $\beta = -.025$, *ns*).

In sum, the findings of study 2 corroborate those of the first study using a more satisfactory manipulation of issue salience. We are able to show how, as a function of different issues being at stake, increasing support for Scottish independence can lead to either increased relative ingroup prototypicality judgements, decreased RIP or else makes no difference to RIP. Given that these results are not straightforwardly explicable in terms of the impact of issue on some cognitive or motivational process such as identification, they

reinforce the case for an instrumental contribution to the explanation of the way in which people rate the prototypicality of their ingroups.

General Discussion

Our two studies support our general contentions that (a) people will not always rate their ingroup as more prototypical of a superordinate group than rival outgroups but may indeed stress the greater prototypicality of the other; (b) that RIP will vary as function of political attitudes and hence the perceived group interest on a given issue; (c) that RIP is further dependent upon which issue is salient in context. In more concrete terms, they show that (a) Scots will not always rate Scotland as more prototypical of Britain than England; (b) that Scottish RIP varies as a function of attitudes to independence and hence whether Scotland is best served by being part of Britain or not – notably strong supporters of independence will stress how Britishness reflects Englishness not Scottishness; (c) that the lowered RIP of pro-independence respondents is dependent upon the salience of the issue of independence.

The one revision to our original hypotheses concerns the precise mapping of different levels of support for independence upon ratings of RIP. Whereas, originally, we expected a simple linear relationship such that the more one supports independence, the more the perceived group interest will be served by stressing the Englishness of Scotland, the data from both studies consistently shows a curvilinear relationship. That is, those who both support and oppose independence strongly rate Scottish RIP as low and those who have moderate views rate it as high. However, this revision concerns our assumptions about how those with different political attitudes judge the group interest (i.e. those who are very anti-independence may, like those who are very pro-, stress the English dominance of Britain, but for very different reasons), it does not concern our psychological model of the relationship between perceived group interest and prototypicality judgements. That is, these data reinforce our

overall instrumental approach (because they make it even harder to apply a straightforward cognitive or motivational account) even as they refine it. They are explicable by arguing that prototypicality judgments should be viewed as arguments which advance the position of the group as seen from the political perspective of the actor.

Three issues remain to be addressed. The first concerns the relationship between our findings and existing research on ingroup projection. The second concerns further steps that are needed to establish our instrumental perspective. The third concerns the wider implications of our findings.

First of all, as we stressed at the outset, our aim is to complement not to contest the existing work on motivational and cognitive bases of ingroup projection. This is consonant with the general perspective of the SIDE approach which argues that the cognitive and instrumental dimensions of group processes operate in tandem and indeed the same factors may impinge on both (Reicher et al, 1995; Klein et al., 2007). Consequently, our strategy in these studies is to demonstrate variation in prototypicality judgments in domains where they cannot be explained in conventional ways rather than to suggest that there are no domains where these conventional explanations are applicable.

This is particularly important when it comes to the issue of dual identification. As we have noted, ingroup projection theorists argue that RIP would only be expected where people identify with both the subgroup and the superordinate group. Hence, one might find variations in levels of RIP between people where they vary in levels of dual identification and more specifically, one would expect that those who have lower dual identification to show lower RIP.

We ruled out that this can provide an alternative explanation of our results by showing that our high and low supporters of independence do not differ in levels of dual identification and that dual identification was not significantly related to RIP. However, this is not to say

that prototypicality judgment are, in general, insensitive to variations in dual identification – only that these variations cannot account for the findings in our particular studies. We readily acknowledge that there are ways in which our studies may violate the conditions under which Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) predict that motivational processes should lead to variations in RIP. Indeed, while participants generally identified highly as Scots ($M = 5.14$ and $M = 5.50$, for study 1 and 2 respectively), they generally did not identify very highly as British ($M = 3.47$ and $M = 3.52$ for study 1 and 2 respectively), and hence few of them showed strong dual identification. This being the case, one would not expect them to show a motivational bias towards making the subgroup prototypical of the superordinate group. Our point, though, is precisely that, having found that RIP varies under conditions where motivational processes are equally inapplicable to all participants, it is clearly necessary to invoke a different set of processes. In other words, lack of dual identification strengthens rather than weakens our argument for broadening our conceptual approach to prototypical judgment.

A similar point can be made about evaluations of the superordinate group. Walczus et al. (2003) have found that such evaluations moderate the relationship between identification and RIP and they argue that we should only expect such a relationship to appear when evaluations of the superordinate group are positive (which may be related to, but is not the same as superordinate identification). While we did not explicitly measure these evaluations, it is plausible that evaluations of Britain are related to support for independence. Certainly qualitative evidence suggests that Scottish nationalists see Britain as a bad thing (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). This, then, provides another basis for arguing that those who support independence lack the motivational basis for showing RIP. First, though, such an argument would have a greater difficulty in explaining why those who are very anti-independence – and hence, by the same logic, very pro-Britain – also show low RIP. Second, and more substantively, this motivational account would suggest that pro-independence respondents

would always lack the basis for demonstrating RIP. Yet we find that there are occasions, such as where history is at issue, where not only do they show RIP but that their level of RIP is higher than that of moderates. Once again, we find variability in ratings of RIP which is inexplicable on a motivational basis and which therefore suggests that other processes are at play.

The second issue is how further support for our instrumental perspective is to be sought after in future research. Our suggestion throughout this paper is that prototypicality judgments are used by participants as an argument to promote what they see to be in the interest of the group. That is to say that they are a) contingent upon the group interest as perceived in context, and b) purposeful communicative acts. Our efforts have concentrated on the former. That is, we have shown how these judgments vary along with the general way people see what is good for Scotland and the specific issue on which they are advocating. However, conventionally, research on the instrumental nature of ingroup and outgroup judgments has tended to focus on the latter by showing the ways in which different audiences affect the ratings that people provide (Klein et al, 2007; Postmes et al., 2000). For such an approach to be viable, it is necessary to be in a position to make clear predictions as to how different audiences will invoke different instrumental considerations – for instance the importance to display less ingroup bias, less ingroup conformity and less outgroup prejudice when communicating to outgroup as opposed to ingroup members. However, in the present case, it is unclear whether communicating to a Scottish or English audience would make any instrumental difference to prototypicality ratings. That is, those who support independence might have equal reason to persuade Scots and the English that Scotland is different to Britain and doesn't belong there. This certainly appears to be the case from our previous studies (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) and is the reason why we chose not to manipulate audience in the present studies. But that is not to rule out such procedures in future studies, either by

choosing a different intergroup context in which differentiated predictions can be made or else by refining the audience manipulation, such as giving varying information about the ingroup and outgroup positions. Thus, while we believe that the present studies provide a clear case for considering the instrumental bases of prototypicality judgments, we equally accept that there is more to be done in demonstrating the various conditions which instrumentality makes a difference.

This takes us to our final issue: what are the more general implications of our studies for understanding group process? The obvious point is that this research is further demonstration that we need to consider instrumental (alongside motivational and cognitive) dimensions of all aspects of group judgment and action. This has been our constant theme and hence we do not need to insist upon it here. There is another point, however. As we argued in the introduction, one key aspect of the instrumental approach is that it forces us to address how people see the group interest, rather than taking the group interest as a given. Hence, rather than suggesting that identification itself directly impacts on what people do, we have argued and shown that identification serves to amplify one's concern with the group interest such that outcomes depend upon the way in which the group interest is construed. To understand behaviour, therefore, we cannot look at identity alone. We must also look at the beliefs, norms and values which members associate with the category. Social identity processes should not substitute for an analysis of such politicized understandings. Rather, they provide a psychological basis for understanding how and when we act as political beings.

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Footnotes

¹A similar pattern was also found before the quadratic effect of independence was added in the model. We should also note here that Waldzus et al. (2003) used a different procedure to test for the effect of dual identification, using as predictor a composite score obtained by multiplying the exponential function of both Scottish and British identification (both variables first standardized) - and without entering Scottish and British identification as possible main effects. The reason they advance for such a procedure is that they do not predict any kind of interaction but a specific pattern whereby both ingroup and superordinate identification need to be high in order to produce an effect, whereas a simple product term could also be significant for other patterns. Although this danger does not apply here given that the interaction was not significant anyway, we nevertheless replicated all analyses reported here and which include dual identification as predictor by using a similar procedure to theirs. No difference with the results reported emerged, in study 1 as well as in study 2.

²Given that the predictor variables were centered, the simple slope for the relationship between support for independence and RIP at average level of support for independence (i.e. on the mean) is equivalent to the linear component in the main analysis. Likewise, in the subsequent interactions analyses, the simple slope for the relationship between RIP and identification at average level of support for independence is equivalent to the main effect (or average effect; see Aiken & West, 1991) of identification in the main regression analysis.

³In relation to our research purposes, the details of the exact underpinning process need not to concern us here.

⁴We also included an alternative measure of group prototypicality, equally adapted from Waldzus et al. (2004), which consisted of a list of 8 pre-defined traits that participants were asked to rate in terms of the extent to which each applied to Scottish, English and British people. All of the following analyses were conducted for both measures of

prototypicality. The results were very similar: in all cases the overall pattern of findings was the same, although in a few cases there were differences in the level of significance. For reasons of space and clarity, and in order to ensure comparability with study 1, only the findings for the measure of prototypicality based on self-generated traits will be reported here. Full results can be obtained from the authors.

⁵It is worth adding that, in study 2, no significant differences in Scottish, British or dual identification were found across experimental conditions.

⁶Although we were only interested in the two-way interaction between support for independence and Scottish identification (as well as in the 3-way interaction), Aiken and West (1991) state that all lower order terms should be included in testing three-way interactions. Accordingly all 2-way interactions were included but we only report the results relevant to our hypotheses.

⁷It could be argued that, rather than using proportions, selecting participants on the basis of a criterion, i.e. participants who scored above 2.5 on the scale of independence, would make a psychologically more meaningful selection to separate strong opponents from moderate opponents (in study 1 both methods of selection coincided, but not in study 2). Accordingly, the analyses reported here were repeated using such a criterion-based selection, yielding highly similar results.

Figure Caption

Figure 1. Level of relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP) as a function of support for independence (study 1).

Figure 2. Level of relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP) as a function of support for independence in the three experimental conditions (study 2).

Figure 3. Level of relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP) as a function of Scottish identification and support for independence in the independence and history conditions (study 2).

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3

