Problems of Strategic Planning of Presidential Campaign

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Before Presidential elections, the problem of ability of Ukrainian electoral technologies specialists to plan and conduct a large-scale (for example, presidential) and complicated election campaign independently and completely was brought up more and more often.

Yulija Mostova, Editor of "Zerkalo Nedeli", stressed this problem in one of her articles in the news-paper. Analyzing the problem of hiring Russian specialists for organizing a presidential campaign in Ukraine, she emphasized: "… We must face the truth and accept that, in Ukraine, one cannot choose among PR agencies, because such agencies, as well as experienced image-makers, are absent. On the Internet, 'The Agency of Political News' rated 20 Russian companies that have been successful in this sphere; such rating is impossible in Ukraine. The absence of bright and out-of-ordinary actions in presidential campaigns of every single candidate proves this" [1].

Indeed, Russia's several dozens of openly working (without revealing details of their activity and their 'know-how' technologies, of course) political PR agencies makes Russian situation much more positive than that in Ukraine.

Firstly, politicians and parties willing to use such services can turn down proposals of political charlatans and, instead, enjoy full-scale electoral services from serious agencies.

Secondly, sociologists, political scientists, and PR workers employed in such organizations aren't 'ashamed' of their profession and aren't afraid of accusations of serving the 'insidious politics', even when they have to use confidential information, which is unavoidable in this sphere. When conducting 'closed' or special image research, they can be perfectly sure that their work's objectivity and compliance with professional codes would be verified.

Finally, this approach allows public to control main parameters of such research and its level of accuracy; it allows public to know what organizations conduct a research and work for a specific candidate; it reveals methods used in research, etc. (all this doesn't appear unnecessary after the Kyiv Mayor election campaign).

Now, let's revert to the situation on the Ukrainian market of PR services and election technologies. Here, we really fall behind the Russians. The only question is *why*? Relying on our experience, we analyzed the practice of organizing election campaigns in Ukraine and found two main (in our opinion) reasons:

a. Our sociologists, politologists, psychologists, unlike Russian ones, are very slow and indecisive in adopting 'political-technological' approaches; at the same time, they accept full responsibility for organizing elections. Statements of leading Ukrainian sociological agencies sound pathetical: "Unfortunately, we cannot give any promises; we can just say that if elections were conducted today and if we had high voter turnout…" Still, as sociologists, we aren't trying to mock at ourselves and our colleagues. On the contrary, all we're saying is that elections should be organized not by *any* sociologists or *any* politologists, but by professional PR teams; by the way, all around the globe, such teams consist of sociologists, politologists, or psychologists. Everywhere, including Russia, these teams really accept responsibility for election results, despite the fact that even the most famous of them, such as the American company "Whitaker and Beckster", are successful in only 70% to 80% of cases.

b. Ukrainian politicians, especially the big ones, suffer from an 'inferiority' complex when engaging PR specialists in their election campaigns. Of course, this doesn't apply to every politician: for example, one of this article's authors used only Ukrainian special-

ists in elections. However, in most cases, our leading politicians request help from Moscow without even trying to find local specialists, without priorly conducting any tender. Here, we won't discuss the actual competence of specialists from invited Russian teams. Neither we will discuss the depth of their knowledge of Ukrainian political reality. Still, we want to mention that Russian politicians possessing sufficient financial resources, seldom invite PR specialists from the US or any other 'non-Soviet' foreign country for conducting their own election campaigns. In other words, does Ukraine have specialists able to organize an effective election campaign?

A thought-out and stipulated answer to this question is 'yes'. Our statement is based on analyzing the organization of the latest Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) election campaigns – most candidates employed Ukrainian teams. One could observe some cases of very effective work. The question is: how many such teams and specialists are there? Because their work in Ukraine can be described as highly specific and semi-undercover, we can hardly hope to give a precise answer to this question. In either case, the time has come to make teams of our Ukrainian specialists visible: they need to appear on the Internet, to conduct special conferences, and to compete on the market of PR services and election technologies.

It is our belief that we already have teams ready to take part in conducting election campaigns, even presidential ones, if they are put to work. Quality of their work will become evident some time later, because only their practical activity can naturally show just how successful they are. Only politics and elections will show the truth.

* * *

We'll reveal some strategic elements of the 1999 Ukrainian presidential campaign that was conducted for one of democratically-oriented presidential candidates by a team of specialists from the Center of Sociological and Political Research and Technologies "Sociopolis"; the team was headed by the authors of this article.

We'll ignore such problems as campaign financing, election headquarters organizations, work of teams, etc. We'll only discuss the 'creative' aspect of designing an election campaign strategy. This aspect includes clarifying and working out the following items:

— choosing a general strategy, an election campaign paradigm, and the main course of the campaign;

— finding a key problem (problems) of the campaign;
— deciding the goals and tasks of the campaign;
— revealing and using 'target' electorate groups in the course of the campaign;
— designing the main slogans of the campaign;
— selecting parties and public organizations which can back up a candidate or those he associates with;
— developing a candidate's positions and finding ways to improve his image and to decrease that of his main opponents;
— clarifying a candidate's propaganda (political advertising) strategies;
— choosing the main courses of counter-propaganda.

Because of the exclusiveness of the developed strategy and the presence of 'know-how' (electoral technologies) in the original document, it is possible to reveal only some of its items in this article. Still, it appears that they can help us understand whether Ukrainian specialists can be effective on the market of PR services.

Choosing a general strategy for an election campaign

Ukrainian and international experience shows that in choosing a general strategy for election campaign (including presidential ones), there is a number of serious problems that should be dealt with before finding a key problem and goals of the campaign [2]. These are:
— 'candidate, program or party';
— 'integration or disintegration';
— 'preference scale' (or party scale).

Let's discuss them from the standpoint of the main course of the campaign (as you remember, our strategy was developed for one of democratically oriented candidates) and of materials we possess, including data of sociological monitoring research.

'Candidate, program or party'. Task of solving this problem is of utmost significance in choosing a strategy for election campaign. To do so, we need to determine who or what enjoys the largest support of electorate and public opinion in the election campaign period: is it a candidate for which the election campaign is conducted, or a program that he presents to voters, or is it a party he belongs to or claims to associate with. Clarifying this issue helps us find the main accent for an election campaign.

In countries with a formed democratic system, this problem can be solved in different ways, depending on a number of circumstances, including the mentality of voters. Thus, in the US, as American sociologists' researches, a voter primarily bases his/her electoral decisions on his/her assessment of a candidate's personality; the political program is on the third place; the party affiliation is on the fifth place. The situation in Germany is completely different: there, public mostly votes for a party.

When it comes to selecting the best democratically oriented candidate in the last Ukrainian presidential elections, there has been many options to choose from (see Table 1).

Table 1

The percentage of supporters of different political parties among the population of Ukraine, % of respondents

Political parties	December, 1998	July, 1999
Agrarian Party of Ukraine	2	1
The All-Ukrainian Community "Gromada"	2	1
The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)	18	18
People's Movement of Ukraine (RUKH) (H.Udovenko)	8	4
RUKH (Yu.Kostenko)		1
People's Democratic Party	5	5
The Greens' Party of Ukraine	6	2
"Reforms and Order" Party	4	1
The Rural Party of Ukraine	2	1
The Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	3	3
The Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine	4	3
Socialist Party of Ukraine	3	3
Other	1	1
None	34	49

Table 1 shows that only P.Symonenko (CPU) could fully rely (which he did) on electorate loyal to his party; other presidential candidates, in-

cluding left candidates, were very limited in this sense (it's noteworthy that political stratification of electorate somewhat clarified before the last parliamentary elections, was slowly fading with time gone by).

As for the *'candidate or program'* dilemma, our studies showed that Ukrainian electorate pays more attention to candidates, although not always. When asked which of the two qualities of a presidential candidate is more important for a potential voter, content of his program or his personal qualities, 49% of respondents chose personal qualities and 41% — the content of his program (10% were hesitant).

For citizens, the concept of ideal candidate is pretty controversial: just like in a famous M.Gogol's novel, people want him to have 'everything' and everything to be the best. In respondent's point of view, a presidential candidate should be a political party leader and/or a high government executive. Primarily, he must be able to make correct and effective decisions (sure, people don't have a specific method of analyzing the effectiveness of decisions, but the effectiveness of the present executive branch is the same as the situation in the country); he must be reasonably young (no older than 50-55); his speech must be well-reasoned and convincing; he must support the acceleration of market reforms and bring the country to an 'iron-firm' order; he must advocate a Russian-Ukrainian unification. It is less desirable for him to belong to present-day government structures. It must be a politician able to oppose conservative forces and old nomenclature; he must have a clear reform ideology.

Results of our studies (see Table 2) show that it's almost impossible to find a candidate with a full set of qualities listed above: some are young, but have neither experience, nor realistic chances to win; others are more experienced and more 'fitting', but they are older and represent 'weak' parties or even declare themselves independent candidates. So, there is not only a problem of choosing the best candidate, but also a problem of developing an optimal version of electoral program. Here, we face a very serious problem. For most part, candidates' programs consist of basis and situative elements. Basis elements reveal a candidate's political, economical, and social intentions (for example, his attitude to market reforms, or to the Russia-Belarus union, etc.). Situative elements (people often pay more attention to those) consist of giving some promises, explaining tactical plans of solving the most urgent problems. As for the second, situative part of a candidate's program, those problems, which, in respondents' opinion, are the most important and urgent, are shown in the Figure 1.

Figure 1. The hierarchy of the main problems of Ukrainian society, which worry population the most; % of respondents; July 1999.

The study didn't reveal anything unexpected. Still, the fact, that the issue of payment of salaries and pensions became the number one problem among all the most complicated present-day social problems, is significant. It was obvious, that candidates who were presently involved in government, in current situation, could not realistically expect a success, unless debts would be paid out before the elections (let's remember Livshits moving markers of debt cancellation across regions before B.Yeltsin's victory) and an item strictly forbidding delays in paying salaries and pensions would be included into the program. High prices of public utilities and acute problems of medical service should be also remembered. However, in designing an election campaign strategy, it is more important to reveal basis, that is, key intentions of different candidates. The problem is that voters aren't likely to trust a candidate who suddenly exhibits something extraordinary that, in his opinion, will cause electorate to support him. For most part, voters already have ex-

pectations about a content of a program of a candidate. We studied exactly what voters think about the content of registered candidates' programs (unfortunately, because of the complexity of including all candidates in our study, we had to limit ourselves to assessing the programs of the current President and four left candidates).

Table 2

**'Elections Rating' — the percentage of respondents
who were to vote for specific presidential candidates
among those who were planning to vote. (The question was:
For which presidential candidate would you vote today?")**

Presidential Candidates	December 1998 N=2198	April 1999 N=2198	July 1999 N=2198
Vitrenko Natalija	11.9	21.5	19.5
Haber Mykola			0.2
Karmazin Yurij			0.2
Kononov Vitalij			0.2
Kostenko Yurij			0.7
Kravchuk Leonid	2.6		
Kuchma Leonid	7.4	14.5	20.5
Lazarenko Pavlo	1.4		
Marchuk Yevhen	3.5	5.7	5.2
Moroz Oleksandr	13.4	9.2	6.7
Olijnyk Volodymyr			0.4
Onopenko Vasyl			0.4
Pustovojtenko Valerij	6.0	4.4	
Rzshavsky Oleksandr			0.2
Symonenko Petro	9.6	10.4	16.2
Tkachenko Oleksandr	1.1	2.9	2.1
Udovenko Hennadij		5.4	3.1
Chornovil Viacheslav	4.9		
Yushchenko Victor	8.7		

Note: Grayed-out cells signify that names of corresponding presidential candidates were not included in a corresponding poll.

The effort to reflect public perception of programs of these candidates for a position of the President of Ukraine is shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Hierarchy of possible actions that, in respondents' opinion, some of presidential candidates will undertake for solving urgent problems, provided they get elected (% of those respondents who were planning to vote; July 1999)

Actions, methods	Vitren- ko	Kuch- ma	Moroz	Symo- nenko	Tka- chenko
Will continue radical economic reforms and take past mistakes into account	16	31	11	9	6
Will ensure the right of private property ownership	5	18	5	3	4
Will allow free land market	3	14	3	1	3
Will support small and mid-size businesses	9	20	8	5	6
Will stop supporting unprofitable organizations	7	12	6	6	4
Will increase the quality of life of population	23	15	13	18	8
Will restore help for low-income persons and increase pensions	22	13	12	17	7
Will decrease taxes	16	11	11	12	6
Will give special consideration for problems of children and youth	18	9	8	11	5
Will support culture, education, and science	12	10	8	9	5
Will stop an increase in criminal activity	14	10	10	15	5
Will actively fight corruption	19	10	11	16	5
Will insist on obeying the law	15	9	9	12	6
Will index people's bank accounts and start paying out the difference	11	6	7	10	4

Will ensure fortifying the country's border and prevention of illegal export of financial resources	10	8	8	9	5
Will resume control of state over the prices	16	6	10	17	8
Will abandon imitating the Western lifestyle	10	2	8	15	8
Will refrain from receiving Western financial support	9	1	5	12	6
Will stop privatization	8	1	5	13	6
Will use severe methods to stop chaos in the country	9	4	4	11	4
Will put a ban on harmful books and movies	6	2	3	7	4
Will strictly control the sources of citizens' income	9	4	5	9	5
Will put a ban on emigration from the country	3	1	2	5	3
Will put a ban on strikes and other forms of civil disobedience	3	4	1	5	3
Will ban opposition parties (or a set of parties)	4	3	2	7	3
No response	52	54	66	56	72

The wording of the question was: "What would a certain politician do in the first place if he is elected the President of Ukraine?" Over a half of respondents in all cases, that is, in cases of assessing different candidates, didn't have clear understanding of what main actions different candidates intend to implement being elected the President of Ukraine. The situation is a little better for three leading candidates (L.Kuchma, N.Vitrenko, P.Symonenko): most (over a half) of respondents were able to name their main intentions; however, when it comes to O.Moroz and, especially, O.Tkachenko, voters exhibited little understanding of what these politicians 'want'. At the same time, respondents seldom named any clear, interesting, and bright characteristics of these candidates' programs. Therefore, it was impossible to reconstruct them according to

the potential voters' knowledge. This must be the reason why they fell behind the other two left candidates in the above rating.

L.KUCHMA PROGRAM'S IMAGE. From the results of the study, it is apparent that the incumbent President will act in the direction of increasing people's quality of life, increasing pensions, and severe struggle with crimes, although in these categories, he is behind N.Vitrenko and P.Symonenko. His most distinctive intentions, however, in respondents' opinion, have to do with continuation of radical market reforms, supporting small and mid-size businesses, ensuring private property ownership. In other words, in the economic sphere, he supports market reforms; in the political sphere, he implements democratic transformations (he won't abandon orienting on Western lifestyle, won't limit freedom of the press, won't ban civil disobedience, etc.).

P.SYMONENKO PROGRAM'S IMAGE. From the above data, it is clear that we mean the left leader. The tendency to attribute Symonenko not only the intentions to increase the quality of life and to increase the struggle with crimes and corruption, but also those to restore the state control over the prices, to abandon imitating the Western lifestyle, etc., shows that. One thing's for sure: voters cannot clearly understand (neither it is explained to them!) what are contemporary communist ideas. Indeed, they deal with banning privatization, refusing to accept Western financial support, implementing drastic measures, etc. Yet, only 10-12% of respondents gave such answers. We didn't observe a solid unity of communist ideas in terms of their future development. Probably, this is the Achilles heel of the communist leader trying to avoid expressing specific communist values that have been 'experienced' already, but voicing the necessity of communist control over the government. Of course, it is not clear how advantageous for communists it is to advertise their values; public may or may not support them. This is a different problem, though; it is to be solved by P.Symonenko's electoral team and image-makers.

N.VITRENKO PROGRAM'S IMAGE. In N.Vitrenko's case, we deal with clear eclecticism. Her speeches give electorate an idea that, on the one hand, Natalija Mykhajlivna emphasizes the need to increase common people's quality of life, to combat corruption, and to increase pensions; on the other — to resume the State control over the prices; and on yet another — to continue radical economic reforms. Moreover, after hearing her public statements, people believe that she will actively support science and culture and will pay special attention to the problems of chil-

dren and youth (let's remember V.Zhirinovsky making such promises in Russia several years ago).

In formulating specific recommendations on designing our candidate's electoral program, we were guided by the above and other data on democratically oriented presidential candidates.

'Integration or disintegration'. This problem which is solved when an election campaign strategy is being developed consists of clearing upon which categories of voters a candidate should primarily rely during his campaign. There are two options:

a) a candidate can equally rely on all groups of potential voters (in terms of their position in the society), or

b) he can only rely on specific groups of voters that are most likely to support him, that is, target voter groups must be selected.

For the US, the question was answered by famous American sociologist G.Lipset; he proved that in stable society having no social conflicts, either party or candidate may have supporters in all strata of society. However, in times of social conflict, or serious socio-economic crisis, a candidate must 'disintegrate' voters and appeal to those social groups whose interests he can represent the best.

The latter situation seems to be similar to the one in contemporary Ukrainian society before the 1999 presidential elections. Plus, public opinion polls results show that main candidates for a position of the President of Ukraine enjoy different levels of public support in different regions of the country (see Table 4). (We will discuss this aspect in the section on distinguishing target groups of voters for different candidates.)

'The scale of preferences'. Especially important for choosing an election campaign's strategic line (that later is to be specified in application to principal problems of the campaign) is determining its *key content aspects that depend on a candidate's orientation on either main electorate groups, or entire electorate.* To do so, usually, the so-called 'preference scales' are created using the results of sociological research (public opinion polls, monitoring). A general content 'profile' of the future election campaign can be designed by locating ideas and problems most interesting for potential voters on such 'preference scales'. Our studies clarifying the 'national idea', in which we analyzed its socio-economic, political, and foreign policy aspects, showed what this content profile is like (see Figure 2).

'Electoral Rating' (readiness to vote for a certain candidate): attitudes of different population groups to selected politicians (% of respondents planning to vote in presidential elections; July 1999)

Respondent groups	Vitrenko	Kuchma	Symonenko	Moroz	Marchuk
Total	19.5	20.5	16.2	6.7	5.2
Men	18.5	21.4	16.0	6.9	6.3
Women	20.4	19.8	16.4	6.6	4.4
18-29 years old	21.0	23.9	6.5	4.7	5.7
30-50 years old	20.5	20.7	13.3	6.8	5.9
50+	17.6	18.5	24.7	7.8	4.3
Kyiv	16.0	32.1	5.7	13.2	6.6
Northern region	19.2	31.5	17.8	11.0	3.4
East Central region	23.6	11.8	12.5	13.2	4.2
West Central region	21.0	12.9	19.4	12.1	4.8
North-Eastern region	24.7	9.7	20.1	3.2	2.6
North-Western region	17.9	38.1	4.8	4.6	4.8
South-Eastern region	26.1	14.4	24.5	3.7	3.2
South-Western region	20.2	15.5	4.8	20.2	17.9
Eastern region	19.9	13.5	30.6	4.6	1.4
Western region	7.0	38.9	0.5	0.5	16.9
South region	22.3	22.3	11.4	4.0	1.7
Crimea	12.2	13.4	22.0	1.2	2.4

The data shown in the figure was found by calculating the average: a position 'negative' relatively to the main course of historical progress had a value of 1 point; 'positive' position means 3 points, and a middle position on the scheme had a value of 2 points.

Country with free market economy	Social-democratic way of development	Returning to the socialist planning economy

1,93
1,89

Democracy regime of Western pattern	Authoritarian regime	State of Soviet type

2,16
2,12

Pro-Western orientation, integration to Europe, EU	Real independent state	Returning to 'Euroasia' space, closer relations with Russia

1,84
1,81

—————— april, 1999

---------- july, 1999

Figure 2. Content profile of the 1999 Ukrainian presidential campaign, concerning different aspects of national idea.

The results of public opinion polls conducted by the Center "Sociopolis" in April and July of 1999 show that in the public consciousness of Ukrainian population (results varied by regions) the 'national idea' is formulated in the following way:

UKRAINE MUST BECOME A STATE THAT:

— CHOOSES A SOCIO-DEMOCRATIC COURSE OF DEVELOPMENT WITH A MARKET ECONOMY AND A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM THAT IS, HOWEVER, MORE SIMILAR TO THE 'IRON HAND REGIME' THAN TO THE WESTERN POLITICAL SYSTEM.

— CHOOSES TO DEVELOP INDEPENDENTLY, BUT WITH A MORE PROMINENT 'EASTERN' ORIENTATION, TO SOME EXTENT.

Of course, this is only an average profile, but it shows the average state of 'national idea' in the country where different regions are often characterized by radically opposite economical, social, and political attitudes. In the Western region, one can observe the following attitudes:

Ukraine must become a state with a free market economy and Western-like democratic system oriented at European integration. In Crimea, public opinion was practically unanimous. Crimean study yielded the following profile of 'national idea': Ukraine must go back to the socialist economy; it must create a political system similar to the Soviet one and must be oriented on integration with Russia. As for other regions, the 'national idea' elsewhere fluctuates in the described limits.

Determining a key problem
of an election campaign

There are national and foreign precedents showing that some candidate can win by simply ventilating his attitude to a single specific problem. This is likely to happen in local elections in such districts where population can concentrate on specific urgent local problems. In presidential elections, such situation is unlikely, although it is known that the last election campaign of B.Yeltsin practically consisted of one problem — the need to prevent Russia from going back to socialism.

Different studies prove that the main problem of the 1999 campaign was bound to stem from the socio-economic situation in Ukraine. Today, the slogans of revival of the Soviet Union will not stir enthusiasm in people; neither will a call for 'bringing the country to an order', unlike it was five years ago. Clearly, in elections, these elements can play trather subordinate role.

Studies conducted by the Center "Sociopolis" enabled us to verify the accuracy of this assumption by creating a model of political-semantic field of Ukrainian society before the 1999 elections (see Figure 3).

On one axis of the coordinate system, there are values of public opinion index of the 'reform vs. anti-reform attitudes' issue; the other axis shows the index of the issue of 'national vs. international attitudes' ('international attitudes' refer to people's willing to see Ukraine having closer ties with Russia and Belarus; 'national attitudes' mean multi-vector politics and independence).

A place every region of Ukraine occupies on this scheme was calculated in the following way: placing regions on the coordinate system was based on respondents' answers to two questions determining socio-national typology: 'national and free market' answers were assigned positive value; international and socialist answers — negative value. To place a region on the coordinate system we added percentage values related to each alternative.

Figure 3. Positions of respondents in different regions of the country — a model of political-semantic field of Ukrainian society before the 1999 presidential elections.

For example: 40% of region A respondents stated that the most promising course of development consists in getting closer to Russia and the Union of Independent Nations (international course) and 20% named independence as the most promising course. We subtract 20% from 40% and assign a negative value to the resulting 'internationalist' position. Therefore, region A is placed at –20 on the vertical axis.

As we see, in most regions, the problem of 'resurrecting' the Soviet Union is not on the first place anymore. There are, however, regions where this is the case. At the same time, in other regions, a clear support for free market and fortifying the national independence can be observed. It is noteworthy that the support of national independence (see the upper left section on the scheme) doesn't ever go hand-in-hand with anti-reform attitudes in any regions.

Thus, it is necessary to understand whether a 'dual' key problem can be used in either election campaign. Can we talk about multi-vector politics and fortifying the national independence in the West, while propagating a union with Russia and Belarus in the East? We believe such actions to be pointless (election campaigns of the past support this statement): choosing this course would have negative consequences and, in the end, would result in failure. Therefore, there should be only one key problem in either election campaign, although additional details may be introduced on different stages of the campaign. Key problem must be 'broad' enough to 'satisfy' the all regions of Ukraine. Because a problem is always formulated as a presence of some controversy that can be solved in a proposed way, the key problem of the presidential campaign can be formulated like this:

IN TODAY'S COMPLICATED SOCIAL SITUATION, TO STRIVE FOR REALIZATION OF 'THE UKRAINIAN MIRACLE IDEA', THAT IS, TO BUILD AN EFFECTIVE ECONOMY AND TO ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR EVERY MEMBER OF SOCIETY, WHILE TAKING UKRAINIAN PEOPLE'S MENTALITY INTO ACCOUNT.

What can the 'Ukrainian miracle' be like? Probably, a person ready to be quite precise answering this question, could be sure enough in success. Formulating this problem and breaking it down in a candidate's electoral program are the main functions of a candidate's headquarters and advisors during the final stages of developing an election campaign strategy.

For our part, we'll comment on 'mentality orientation' of the content of this problem. Naturally, it's very versatile and includes such problems as economy, attitude to government, work, family, etc. Still, as we have already noted, the main part of an election campaign strategy is its socio-economic aspect. Now, we'll express our opinion based on results of numerous studies of how Ukrainians solve the problem of 'wealth and poverty'.

No doubt, in solving this problem, Ukrainians are different not only from Western peoples who profess Protestantism and Catholicism (say, Czechs and Poles), but also from Russians and Belarussians. This mentality goes back to Orthodox faith, was affected by socialism, and has some ethnical specificity. In our opinion, Belarussians tend to propagate poverty or, at least, to accept it. For Russians, this is not a number one problem at all; all Russians want to be the 'great' nation, to make NATO remember about them while bombing Yugoslavia, etc. As for Ukrainians, it seems that we have a following stereotype: "IF WE ARE NOT TO BE

RICH, WE ARE TO LIVE WITH DIGNITY". That is, on the one hand, poverty is not accepted, and on the other — we profess the idea that wealth is 'moral', etc. For an outside observer, it all appears rather unclear and incomprehensible. However, if we remember the principles of Orthodox business ethics based on the ideas of Volodymyr Monomakh, we'll realize that today' Ukrainian mentality very much corresponds to the attitude toward the 'wealth-poverty' problem, formulated in those principles. The most important of them are:

— main economic categories (poverty, wealth, income) are assessed from the standpoint of how righteous are their origins and usage;

— economic activity of any businessman must be socially useful, that is, he must work not only for himself, but also for the society (countryside, city);

— an Orthodox person's virtue is not only a way to save one's soul, but also a criterion of social effectiveness of economy;

— in the sphere of economy, there must be a working principle of non-strict profitability of market exchange, that is, it is unacceptable to make profits in just any way and by using just any methods ('profit above all, but dignity above profit').

Most likely, the combination of socio-democratic principles of social development, accepted by Ukrainian people (these principles support not only market economy, but also firm social policy and social protection of population) and Ukrainian mentality, can show what a *Ukrainian course of development* should be, taking into account the course that Ukrainian electorate has approved to a maximum extent when entering election booths. We'd like to emphasize that the approach we proposed is not the only option; on the other hand, any similar approach must be 'developed' in specific program documents of either candidate.

Apart from the main program of a presidential campaign, others can be introduced, too (although, there shouldn't be too much of them, because they may confuse a common voter). Since in October, 1999 presidential elections, four 'serious' left candidates were to compete against a democratically oriented candidate, the wording of an additional problem of an election campaign, which is now socio-political, rather than socio-economical, was to be as follows:

VOTE OR LOSE!

Certainly, in such a way detailed problem was more appropriate for the second round of elections, in which a democratic candidate has faced one of the left candidates, P.Symonenko. It was reasonable to use

the above slogan to resist the 'Red Threat'. On the one hand, it definitely gave the candidate some advantages, since a considerable (and most importantly, socially active) part of electorate has a negative attitude as to renewing socialism. However, we should remember that, unlike the Russian population, that of Ukraine is more conservative (consequently, it is more oriented on advantages of socialism, if not socialism per se) and pays close attention to the economy. Elements opposing the socialist course should be used only when necessary for preventing an increase in popularity of left candidates.

Goal and tasks of an election campaign

When a key problem is chosen, the next step in designing an election campaign strategy is to state the main goal and the most important tasks. The main goal of any election campaign is securing a victory for a specific candidate. Yet, we must decide how to achieve a victory and what electoral resources are available; what tasks must a candidate and his team perform in this process.

In our opinion, for every democratic candidate, the goal of 1999 election campaign consisted of three issues:

Primarily, a ***high voter turnout ought to be secured.*** In other words, a democratic candidate had to appeal to his target voter groups, that is, he did not make any efforts to secure maximum turnout in those regions where he did not enjoy serious support, but ought to secure an optimal voter turnout in those regions (primarily Western) that really supported him.

The second issue was ***to strive for an electoral situation when a democratic candidate would face the weakest of his potential left opponents in the second round of presidential elections.***

The third issue was ***to ensure that the democratic candidate could get ahead of his opponent by any number of votes in the second round of the elections.***

To achieve these goals, the following specific election campaign tasks were to be performed:

— producing an optimal structure of conducting an election campaign (such optimal structure can be based on certain political parties and civic groups supporting the candidate, as well as effective PR centers that control the effectiveness of the course of elec-

tion campaign and give recommendations on adjustments that should be made);
— conducting an effective nomination and gathering signatures campaign (the candidate's advertising and propagating his image and program is to begin on the signature gathering stage);
— creating a memorable picture of a candidate who is quite optimistic about the future and represents progressive democratic forces opposing a bunch of reactionaries that want Ukraine to go back to the past, but are unable to unite due to their personal ambitions;
— developing an effective system of cooperation with 'parallel' candidates, that is, those who would urge their supporters to vote for our presidential candidate in the second round;
— in the process of organizing an election campaign, developing and analyzing clear and effective systems of propaganda and negative advertising, etc.

Revealing and using target voter groups in the course of election campaign

The most important part in developing an election campaign strategy is searching, revealing, and actively using target voter groups. Such target groups consist of citizens ready to vote for a set of principles and personal qualities that a certain candidate represents. An election campaign should be primarily directed at these groups, because they:
— abare the framework of all candidate's supporters;
— abare the main force in conducting propaganda and negative advertising during an election campaign;
— abaffect undecided voters (by the 'spiral of silence' phenomenon or by open advertising).

Also, it is necessary to reveal potential target groups of other candidates and either 'contain' them in their 'social niches' or use them, convince them, and convert them into one's own supporters. In Ukraine and all around the world, three ways of using target groups are known:
— appealing to one's own supporters;
— appealing to other candidate's supporters;
— appealing to hesitant voters.

We won't analyze possibilities and advantages of these three strategies in details. Let's just say that national experience and our own studies and technologies have shown us that, during 1999 presidential elec-

tion campaign, it was reasonable to concentrate on working with 'one's own' groups, that is, revealed target groups [3].

This is how it's done: first, a candidate's election campaign headquarters analyze the intensity of public support of all candidates in different population groups in different regions of the country (see Table 4). Secondly, they analyze levels of potential activity of different population groups and of electorate in different regions on the upcoming elections (see Table 5). Next, they come up with different types of voters and analyze how likely they are to support specific candidates (see Figure 4). Only after these steps are taken, we can stimulate (or suppress) the electoral activity of various types of voters. Here, we offer a short description of the electorate of two leading (as voters' intentions have shown) democratic candidates; the description is based on our studies.

Table 5

Ukrainian citizens' plans concerning participation in 1999 presidential elections; % of respondents

Respondent Groups	December 1998			April 1999			July 1999		
	Will vote, definitely or probably	May or may not vote	Will not vote definitely or probably	Will vote definitely or probably	May or may not vote	Will not vote definitely or probably	Will vote definitely or probably	May or may not vote	Will not vote definitely or probably
Total	69	12	19	70	9	21	73	7	20
Men	70	12	18	73	9	18	74	6	20
Women	67	13	20	68	9	23	72	8	20
17(18)-29 years old	65	14	21	65	9	26	66	9	25
30-50 years old	68	13	19	72	10	18	72	8	20
50+	71	11	18	71	8	21	78	5	17
Kyiv	66	15	19	68	4	28	81	8	11
Northern region	75	12	13	70	7	23	67	4	29

East Central region	76	15	9	77	7	16	69	7	24
West Central region	67	13	20	77	11	12	78	8	14
North-Eastern region	83	8	9	72	11	17	68	10	22
North-Western region	79	8	13	76	12	12	86	4	10
South-Eastern region	68	9	23	61	11	28	63	10	27
South-Western region	75	18	7	60	14	26	77	12	11
Eastern region	61	11	28	77	5	18	75	6	19
Western region	71	11	18	73	11	16	76	6	18
Southern region	70	18	12	61	15	24	77	3	20
Crimea	50	5	45	68	2	30	65	8	27

Note: The wording of the question was: "Would you vote if presidential elections were conducted next week?"

L.Kuchma's electorate was mostly located in Western regions, in Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, in a number of northern oblasts (say, Chernihiv); and mainly in countryside. We can assume that his electorate consisted of traditionally conservative layer of population advocating Ukrainian independence, those who believed that president shouldn't change the present political course, because any new political course (in their opinion) will deteriorate the situation in the country. Almost a third of the incumbent President's potential electorate (more than that of any other 'serious' candidate) consisted of youth.

Figure 4. Typology and size of electorate groups having different motivations in reaching decision on participation in the elections (% from those respondents who are likely to vote in presidential elections).

The President enjoys little support in the Central and Eastern regions (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) and especially in the North-Eastern one (Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts). Interestingly, that during last few months before elections, there was observed a substantial increase in number of his supporters in the Southern region (Mykolayiv, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts); half a year previously, this wasn't the case. In comparison with other candidates, among the supporters of L.Kuchma, there were many reform advocates: 63% supported reforms and 23% were against them (only Ye.Marchuk had more reform advocates among his supporters — 73% vs. 13%), as well as those believing that Ukraine must be politically oriented on Western democratic values.

Ye.Marchuk, another democratic candidate, enjoyed much less support. His electorate was mostly located in the South-Western region of the country (Ternopil and Khmelnitsky oblasts). He had some supporters in Kyiv, too. Among his supporters, there were many people with post-secondary degrees (37%). In the West, he was considered to be nationalist, in the East — a social democrat; this fact created a possibility of an undesirable 'clash' of these two images. As we've already noted, Ye.Marchuk's supporters were the most reform-oriented (even more than those of the incumbent President). In his electorate, a proportion of voters supporting and opposing democracy was similar to that of L.Kuchma; however, a considerable number of Ye.Marchuk's supporters would like to see an 'iron hand regime' (similar to the regime of Pinochet), although the majority of his electorate had democratic attitudes.

Shortly, these were characteristics of the majority of supporters of two main democratic candidates in 1999 Ukrainian presidential elections. Their electorates were rather similar, what was a matter in the second round of elections, when one of them, as we know, have got there. Our studies also yielded interesting data on differences between O.Moroz, P.Symonenko, and N.Vitrenko supporters, but in this article, we won't offer such analysis, although it is definitely helpful for designing an election campaign strategic plan, for revealing the specificities of opponents of democratic candidates, and for strategic and tactical planning of opposing them in elections.

* * *

As we finish our discussion of some problems of designing a presidential election campaign strategy, we'd like to remind you that, for a number of reasons, in this article, we didn't reveal all elements of the

strategy we prepared; neither we discussed in detail its most important exclusive specifics. Also, this strategy is not identical to specific program documents available to public, because it shows all problems of election campaign organization, including 'closed' ones, like the instructions to election headquarters and description of propaganda and negative advertising strategies.

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