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Standing on our own feet? Opportunities and risks of European self-defence
[Arbeitspapier]
Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit
Abstract Only a Europe that provides for its own defence can be a fully sovereign Europe. As is the case for the US, Europe would have to be capable of protecting its core security interests without depending on its transatlantic partner. Structural incentives as well as recent developments militate in favou... mehr
Only a Europe that provides for its own defence can be a fully sovereign Europe. As is the case for the US, Europe would have to be capable of protecting its core security interests without depending on its transatlantic partner. Structural incentives as well as recent developments militate in favour of establishing such intra-NATO status parity. Structurally, unilateral dependence, even among friends, comes at a price. This timeless incentive is reinforced by recent developments: the demise of the old West, with or without Trump; China's twofold challenge; an emerging Sino-American rivalry; a resurgent Russia; the new world disorder; Macron's offer to his European partners. European self-defence has to meet four key requirements: broader and greater European integration, sufficient military capabilities, effective strategy, and political leadership. Defence autonomy requires an independent nuclear deterrent capability. In the case of the EU, neither primary deterrence, reserved for a single state, nor extended deterrence, such as that provided by the United States, would be adequate. Instead, Europe would have to create a novel type of "integrated deterrence". Underpinned by a solid community of solidarity and trust, this would be based on French nuclear forces, with the French president maintaining exclusive decision-making authority. Germany and France would have to seize the initiative by "taking their bilateral relations to a new level", as stated in the Aachen Treaty of January 22, 2019. They would have to lead by example, bring about the progressive integration of their armed forces and an alignment of their strategic cultures. This would demand a great deal of Germany in terms of defence spending and redefining its "culture of military restraint". To initiate such a process of rethinking and repositioning will require an open-minded debate on the role of the military for a Europe that "takes its fate into its own hands" (Chancellor Angela Merkel). (author's abstract)... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
EU; GSVP; europäische Integration; Verteidigung; Militärpotential; Effizienz; transatlantische Beziehungen; Weltordnung; China; USA; Russland; Frankreich; internationale Beziehungen
Klassifikation
Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Sicherheitspolitik
Europapolitik
Freie Schlagwörter
Souveränität; Streitkräfteplanung; Militärische Stärke, materiell; Militärische Stärke, personell; Selbstverteidigungsrecht von Staaten; Risikoabschätzung; Nukleare Abschreckung; Status und Rolle im internationalen System; Bedrohungsvorstellungen (Sicherheitspolitik); Rivalität von Staaten; Implikation; Epidemie/Pandemie; COVID-19
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2021
Erscheinungsort
Berlin
Seitenangabe
37 S.
Schriftenreihe
SWP Research Paper, 1/2021
DOI
https://doi.org/10.18449/2021RP01
ISSN
1863-1053
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz
Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung