dc.contributor.author | Fehr, Dietmar | de |
dc.contributor.author | Schmid, Julia | de |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-10-26T15:10:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-10-26T15:10:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | de |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/70267 | |
dc.description.abstract | Contest designers or managers who want to maximize the overall revenue of a contest (relative performance scheme) are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able bidder in favor of greater homogeneity among the remaining bidders, even if the theoretical exclusion principle predicts otherwise. This is because the strongest bidders are willing to give up a substantial part of their expected rent and prefer a strategy that ensures a lower but secure pay-off. | de |
dc.language | en | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Wirtschaft | de |
dc.subject.ddc | Economics | en |
dc.subject.other | C72; C92; D84; all-pay auction; superstars | de |
dc.title | Exclusion in the all-pay auction: An experimental investigation | de |
dc.description.review | unbekannt | de |
dc.description.review | unknown | en |
dc.source.volume | SP II 2017-202 | de |
dc.publisher.country | DEU | |
dc.publisher.city | Berlin | de |
dc.source.series | Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten | |
dc.subject.classoz | Volkswirtschaftstheorie | de |
dc.subject.classoz | National Economy | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Markt | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | market | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Wettbewerb | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | competition | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Experiment | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | experiment | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Heterogenität | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | heterogeneity | en |
dc.subject.thesoz | Auktion | de |
dc.subject.thesoz | auction | en |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung | de |
dc.rights.licence | Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications | en |
ssoar.contributor.institution | WZB | de |
internal.status | formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen | de |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10034440 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10047904 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10043015 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10073824 | |
internal.identifier.thesoz | 10068068 | |
dc.type.stock | monograph | de |
dc.type.document | Arbeitspapier | de |
dc.type.document | working paper | en |
dc.source.pageinfo | 44 | de |
internal.identifier.classoz | 1090301 | |
internal.identifier.document | 3 | |
dc.contributor.corporateeditor | Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH | |
internal.identifier.corporateeditor | 381 | |
internal.identifier.ddc | 330 | |
dc.description.pubstatus | Veröffentlichungsversion | de |
dc.description.pubstatus | Published Version | en |
internal.identifier.licence | 3 | |
internal.identifier.pubstatus | 1 | |
internal.identifier.review | 4 | |
internal.identifier.series | 961 | |
internal.dda.reference | https://www.econstor.eu/oai/request@@oai:econstor.eu:10419/157372 | |
dc.identifier.handle | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157372 | de |
ssoar.urn.registration | false | de |