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Contests at the workplace with and without prize selection: testing theory in a field experiment
[working paper]
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We conduct a field experiment with 302 workers of the microcredit company in Russia to study the effects of the different designs of a contest for monetary prizes at the workplace. We consider a standard all-pay auction design with two and four prizes of different size and compare it to "parallel" c... view more
We conduct a field experiment with 302 workers of the microcredit company in Russia to study the effects of the different designs of a contest for monetary prizes at the workplace. We consider a standard all-pay auction design with two and four prizes of different size and compare it to "parallel" contests with the same prizes, but where participants have to choose the prize prior to the start of the competition and then the winner is selected only among the players who chose the same prize. Despite the theoretical predictions, the parallel contests lead to higher efforts for all players, but mainly by lower-ability players. Division of prizes leads to the predicted effects. In parallel contests, too many players choose the higher prize than equilibrium suggests. Overall, the parallel version of contests appeared to be more profitable for the firm.... view less
Keywords
competition; Russia; information; field research; experiment
Classification
National Economy
Methods and Techniques of Data Collection and Data Analysis, Statistical Methods, Computer Methods
Free Keywords
C78; I21; all-pay auctions; incomplete information
Document language
English
Publication Year
2016
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
35 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2016-211
Handle
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148568
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications