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%T Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members
%A Angelova, Vera
%A Güth, Werner
%A Kocher, Martin G.
%P 14
%V 10
%D 2019
%~ IHS (Wien)
%> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66132-3
%X We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
%C AUT
%C Wien
%G en
%9 Arbeitspapier
%W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org
%~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info