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The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments
[Arbeitspapier]
Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Agents in a finite two-sided market make costly investments and are then matched assortatively based on these investments. Besides signaling complementary types, investments also generate benefits for partners. We shed light on quantitative properties of the equilibrium investment behavior. The bila... mehr
Agents in a finite two-sided market make costly investments and are then matched assortatively based on these investments. Besides signaling complementary types, investments also generate benefits for partners. We shed light on quantitative properties of the equilibrium investment behavior. The bilateral external benefits induce an investment multiplier effect. This multiplier effect depends in a complex way on agents' uncertainty about their rank within their own market side and on their uncertainty about the types and investments of potential partners. We study how the multiplier effect depends on market size and how it interacts with other important factors such as the costs of investment and the signaling incentives induced by competition for more desirable partners. We use our results to characterize equilibrium utilities in large markets. For small markets, our results lead to bounds on the hold-up problem.... weniger
Klassifikation
Volkswirtschaftslehre
Freie Schlagwörter
investment; matching; multiplier effect; signaling
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2017
Erscheinungsort
Berlin
Seitenangabe
42 S.
Schriftenreihe
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, SP II 2017-310
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/172335
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz
Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung