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Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.009
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College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decen... mehr
We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.... weniger
Klassifikation
Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und "Schulen", Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Freie Schlagwörter
all-pay auctions; college admissions; contests; experiment; incomplete information; student welfare
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2018
Seitenangabe
S. 886-934
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Theory (2018) 176
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/209667
ISSN
0022-0531
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht kommerz., Keine Bearbeitung 4.0