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Cyber deterrence is overrated: analysis of the deterrent potential of the new cyber doctrine and lessons for Germany's "active cyper defence"
[Stellungnahme]
Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit
Abstract Proponents of active, offensive cyber operations argue that they could have a deterrent effect on potential cyber attackers. The latter would think twice about attacking if a digital counter-attack might be the consequence. The idea that offensive cyber capabilities should have a deterrent effect w... mehr
Proponents of active, offensive cyber operations argue that they could have a deterrent effect on potential cyber attackers. The latter would think twice about attacking if a digital counter-attack might be the consequence. The idea that offensive cyber capabilities should have a deterrent effect was one reason why the new US cyber doctrine was adopted in 2018. The same assumption is implicit in the debate about cyber counterattacks ("hack backs") in Germany. Yet these assessments are based on a superficial understanding of deterrence. Cyber deterrence by the threat of retaliation works differently than that of nuclear deterrence. Problems of attribution, displays of power, controllability and the credibility of digital capabilities increase the risk of deterrence failure. Thus, the German cyber security policy would be well advised to increase its "deterrence by denial", cyber security and the resilience of its systems. (Autorenreferat)... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Verteidigungspolitik; Sicherheitspolitik; USA; virtuelle Realität; Infrastruktur; Maßnahme; Vergleich; Internet
Klassifikation
Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Sicherheitspolitik
Freie Schlagwörter
Kritische Infrastrukturen; Verwundbarkeit von Zielen; Gegenmaßnahme; Abwehr eines Angriffs
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2019
Erscheinungsort
Berlin
Seitenangabe
8 S.
Schriftenreihe
SWP Comment, 34/2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.18449/2019C34
ISSN
1861-1761
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz
Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung