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@book{ Paul2019,
 title = {Partnership on the high seas: China and Russia's joint naval manoeuvres},
 author = {Paul, Michael},
 year = {2019},
 series = {SWP Comment},
 pages = {8},
 volume = {26/2019},
 address = {Berlin},
 publisher = {Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit},
 issn = {1861-1761},
 doi = {https://doi.org/10.18449/2019C26},
 urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-63093-6},
 abstract = {On the occasion of the 70th founding anniversary of China’s national navy, a big naval parade with more than 30 Chinese ships sailed off the coast of Qingdao. A few days later, on 29 April 2019, the "Joint Sea 2019" Russian-Chinese bilateral naval exercise began. In numbers, China’s navy now has the world’s biggest fleet - also thanks to decades of Russian naval armament. From Beijing's point of view, however, the Chi­nese armed forces have a serious shortcoming: a lack of operational experience. Here, too, Moscow fills some gaps. Since the first joint manoeuvre in 2005, cooperation has increased at many levels. Sino-Russian sea manoeuvres now also serve as a menacing signal of support for China’s claims in the South China Sea or in the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea. Moscow and Beijing use the joint naval exercises to set geopolitical signals. Despite all historic mistrust, Sino-Russian cooperation seems to rest on a relatively stable foundation of partnership. But maritime cooperation and coordinated partnership must not lead to an alliance. (Autorenreferat)},
 keywords = {China; China; Russland; Russia; internationale Beziehungen; international relations; Verteidigungspolitik; defense policy; Sicherheitspolitik; security policy; Indischer Ozean; Indian Ocean; Pazifischer Raum; Pacific Rim; militärisches Manöver; military maneuver; Meer; seas; Marine; navy; Geopolitik; geopolitics; wirtschaftliche Faktoren; economic factors}}