Download full text
(1.341Mb)
Citation Suggestion
Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-61804-8
Exports for your reference manager
Veto players in post-conflict DDR programs: evidence from Nepal and the DRC
[journal article]
Abstract Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR... view more
Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR.... view less
Keywords
conflict; disarmament; demobilization; game theory; Nepal; Democratic Republic of the Congo
Classification
Peace and Conflict Research, International Conflicts, Security Policy
Free Keywords
Veto-Spieler; Veto-Spieler Theorie
Document language
English
Publication Year
2019
Page/Pages
p. 112-130
Journal
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 13 (2019) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981
ISSN
1750-2985
Status
Published Version; peer reviewed