Zitationshinweis
Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):
https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v18i2.972
Export für Ihre Literaturverwaltung
Ferdinand Alquié contra o monismo de Espinosa
Ferdinand Alquié against the Spinoza's monism
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract This paper aims to present Ferdinand Alquié's rejection of Spinoza's monism. Unlike Descartes, who sustains dualism, the monist thesis determines that there can be only one substance constituted by infinite attributes. This thesis is fundamental for the consolidation of the entire philosophical syst... mehr
This paper aims to present Ferdinand Alquié's rejection of Spinoza's monism. Unlike Descartes, who sustains dualism, the monist thesis determines that there can be only one substance constituted by infinite attributes. This thesis is fundamental for the consolidation of the entire philosophical system of Spinoza. Alquié concludes that the monist thesis is incompatible with the argumentative structure of the first book of the Ethics. Alquié's approach is important because it exposes the problem very clearly, which justifies the presentation of his thinking, that can be useful to those who are interested in the studies of Spinoza's philosophy.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Spinoza, B.
Klassifikation
Philosophie, Theologie
Freie Schlagwörter
Alquié, Ferdinand; Monism; Substance; Attribute
Sprache Dokument
Portugiesisch
Publikationsjahr
2018
Seitenangabe
S. 72-85
Zeitschriftentitel
Griot: Revista de Filosofia, 18 (2018) 2
ISSN
2178-1036
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)