Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects

Anno, Hidekazu; Kurino, Morimitsu

[working paper]

dc.contributor.author	Anno, Hidekazu	de
dc.contributor.author	Kurino, Morimitsu	de
dc.date.accessioned	2016-03-03T08:39:02Z
dc.date.available	2016-03-03T08:39:02Z
dc.date.issued	2014	de
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46335
dc.description.abstract	We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design. (author's abstract)	en
dc.language	en	de
dc.subject.ddc	Wirtschaft	de
dc.subject.ddc	Economics	en
dc.subject.other	Top-Trading-Zyklen	de
dc.title	Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects	de
dc.description.review	begutachtet	de
dc.description.review	reviewed	en
dc.source.volume	SP II 2014-201	de
dc.publisher.country	DEU
dc.publisher.city	Berlin	de
dc.source.series	Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten
dc.subject.classoz	Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und Schulen, Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften	de
dc.subject.classoz	Basic Research, General Concepts and History of Economics	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Markt	de
dc.subject.thesoz	market	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Design	de
dc.subject.thesoz	design	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Regelung	de
dc.subject.thesoz	regulation	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Akzeptanz	de
dc.subject.thesoz	acceptance	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Anreizsystem	de
dc.subject.thesoz	incentive system	en
dc.subject.thesoz	Verteilung	de
dc.subject.thesoz	distribution	en
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung	de
dc.rights.licence	Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications	en
internal.status	formal und inhaltlich fertig erschlossen	de
internal.identifier.thesoz	10034440
internal.identifier.thesoz	10040773
internal.identifier.thesoz	10045428
internal.identifier.thesoz	10035015
internal.identifier.thesoz	10035721
internal.identifier.thesoz	10036643
dc.type.stock	monograph	de
dc.type.document	Arbeitspapier	de
dc.type.document	working paper	en
dc.source.pageinfo	33	de
internal.identifier.classoz	10901
internal.identifier.document	3
dc.contributor.corporateeditor	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
internal.identifier.corporateeditor	381
internal.identifier.ddc	330
dc.description.pubstatus	Veröffentlichungsversion	de
dc.description.pubstatus	Published Version	en
internal.identifier.licence	3
internal.identifier.pubstatus	1
internal.identifier.review	2
internal.identifier.series	961
dc.identifier.handle	https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93379
internal.check.abstractlanguageharmonizer	CERTAIN

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Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und "Schulen", Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Basic Research, General Concepts and History of Economics

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