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Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects
[working paper]
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency prope... view more
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
market; design; regulation; acceptance; incentive system; distribution
Classification
Basic Research, General Concepts and History of Economics
Free Keywords
Top-Trading-Zyklen
Document language
English
Publication Year
2014
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
33 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2014-201
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93379
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications