Download full text
(external source)
Citation Suggestion
Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/95868
Exports for your reference manager
Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others
[working paper]
Corporate Editor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relati... view more
We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
school choice; strategy; security; information; quantity; impact; market; layout
Classification
Social Psychology
Information Management, Information Processes, Information Economics
Free Keywords
Top-Trading-Zyklen
Document language
English
Publication Year
2014
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
24 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2014-202
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/95868
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications