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Cabinets and Legislative Cartels in Uruguay: examining the Legislative Consequences of Government Formation
Gabinetes y Cárteles Legislativos en Uruguay: examen de las consecuencias legislativas
de la formación del gobierno
Kabinette und legislative Kartelle in Uruguay: Bestimmung der legislativen Konsequenzen der Government Formation
[journal article]
Abstract Since the return to democracy, Uruguayan presidents have built cabinets of varying
natures (majority and minority coalitions, majority and minority parties). Most studies
on presidential government assume that the partisan composition of a cabinet is a
good predictor of the perf... view more
Since the return to democracy, Uruguayan presidents have built cabinets of varying
natures (majority and minority coalitions, majority and minority parties). Most studies
on presidential government assume that the partisan composition of a cabinet is a
good predictor of the performance of a government’s legislative program. In this paper
I test this hypothesis using Cox and McCubbins’ (1993, 2005) party cartel theory.
The results confirm that six of the eight presidential cabinets’ legislative performances
were consistent with theoretical expectations, while two were deviant cases. This
article also provides a theoretical explanation for these two outliers, highlighting
the importance of legislative parties, the presidential style of government, and preferences
as regards legislative initiative.... view less
Desde el retorno a la democracia, los presidentes uruguayos han formado gabinetes
de diferente naturaleza (coalición mayoritaria, coalición minoritaria, partido mayoritario
y partido minoritario). La mayoría de los estudios del gobierno presidencial asumen
que la composición par... view more
Desde el retorno a la democracia, los presidentes uruguayos han formado gabinetes
de diferente naturaleza (coalición mayoritaria, coalición minoritaria, partido mayoritario
y partido minoritario). La mayoría de los estudios del gobierno presidencial asumen
que la composición partidaria del gabinete es un buen indicador para predecir qué
sucederá con el programa legislativo del gobierno. En este trabajo se controla esta
hipótesis a partir de la teoría del party-cartel de Cox y McCubbins (1993, 2005).
Los resultados del análisis empírico confirman que seis de los ocho gabinetes presentan
un desempeño legislativo ajustado a las expectativas teóricas. El resto del artículo
brinda una explicación teórica sobre lo ocurrido con los casos desviados, destacando
la importancia de los partidos legislativos, del estilo presidencial de gobierno y
de las preferencias de sus iniciativas legislativas.... view less
Keywords
Latin America; Uruguay; legislative; cartel; government; party; party system; political system; senate; voting; agenda setting function; coalition; historical analysis; comparative research; president; legislation; South America; developing country
Classification
Political System, Constitution, Government
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Law
Method
applied research
Document language
English
Publication Year
2013
Page/Pages
p. 67-94
Journal
Journal of Politics in Latin America, 5 (2013) 1
ISSN
1868-4890
Status
Published Version; peer reviewed
Licence
Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works