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The Impact of Envy on Relational Employment Contracts
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract We study the effects of envy on relational employment contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reects an agent's individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit horizontal disadvantageous ineq... mehr
We study the effects of envy on relational employment contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reects an agent's individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit horizontal disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial; in the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates, relational contracts may be more profitable. For some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with envious agents.... weniger
Klassifikation
angewandte Psychologie
Freie Schlagwörter
Principal-agent; Relational contract; Inequity aversion; Envy
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2009
Seitenangabe
S. 766-779
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72 (2009) 2
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.016
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)