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The aaersion to lying
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract "We experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one-sided asymmetric information. A seller has private information about her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message. Four different treatments are comp... mehr
"We experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one-sided asymmetric information. A seller has private information about her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message. Four different treatments are compared: one without communication, one with free-form communication, and two treatments with pre-specified communication in the form of promises of varying strength. Our results suggest that individuals have an aversion towards lying about private information and that the aversion to lying increases with the size of the lie and the strength of the promise. Freely formulated messages lead to the fewest lies and the most efficient outcomes." [author's abstract]... weniger
Klassifikation
Erhebungstechniken und Analysetechniken der Sozialwissenschaften
angewandte Psychologie
Freie Schlagwörter
Deception; Communication; Lies; Promises; Experiments;
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2009
Seitenangabe
S. 81-92
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70 (2009) 1-2
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.010
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)