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Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract "In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences and thus differ in their bargaining behavior. Ind... mehr
"In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences and thus differ in their bargaining behavior. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining." [author's abstract]... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Fairness
Klassifikation
angewandte Psychologie
Freie Schlagwörter
Hold-up; Relationship-specific investments; Reciprocity; Asymmetric information; Signalling;
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2009
Seitenangabe
S. 486-494
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71 (2009) 2
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.007
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)